niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
otherwise. City of Bellevue v. Kravik, 69 Wn. App. 735, 743, 850 P.2d 559 (1993). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed a single jury to decide this case. CONCLUSION We hold that the “fairly and knowingly made” standard applies only to personal injury releases when the injured party claims unknown injuries, so the trial court should not have used that standard in this case. But, under general contract principles, questions of material fact remain regarding whether the release may be avoided. We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Becker, C.J., and Schindler, J., concur. Reconsideration denied June 23, 2003. 1 In determining whether a release was fairly and knowingly made, courts are 19 (1929) (<HOLDING>). Some jurisdictions have also distinguished 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that release did not bar plaintiffs claim because plaintiff had no ground to suspect that act complained of had taken place when giving release (B) holding question of fact existed regarding fraud where release signed by plaintiff not understanding english language and defendant failed to cause release to be explained in plaintiffs language (C) holding that exculpatory clause in release plaintiff signed as part of a health club membership agreement was not specific enough to release club from negligence liability (D) holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release (E) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release
Output: (B)
by a party under this section which is not accepted and the party recovers a judgment which is greater than or equal to the amount specified in the offer of settlement, the party is entitled to interest at the annual rate of 12% on the amount recovered from the date of the offer of settlement until the amount is paid. Interest under this section is in lieu of interest computed under ss. 814.04 (4) and 815.05 (8). 2 The parties do not attempt to draw a distinction between a reasonable degree of professional certainty on the one hand, and a reasonable degree of professional probability on the other — Casimere v. Herman, 28 Wis. 2d 437, 445-446, 137 N.W.2d 73, 77 (1965), uses the phrases as apparent synonyms. See also Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 166, 465 N.W.2d 812, 821 (1991) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the phrases can be used interchangeably (B) holding that statements taken in violation of massiah can be used for impeachment purposes (C) holding floor can be used as deadly weapon (D) holding that rule 35a can be used to challenge sentences that are not authorized by the judgment of conviction (E) recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case
Output: (A)
authority. In determining whether to retain jurisdiction, courts look to four factors: economy, convenience to the parties, fairness to the parties, and comity. Querner, 7 F.3d at 1202; In re Carraher, 971 F.2d at 328; In re Morris, 960 F.2d at 1534. Thus, when claims had been pending for several years and concerned issues with which bankruptcy courts are familiar, the factors have warranted continuing jurisdiction. See, e.g, In re Carraher, 971 F.2d at 328 (finding postbankruptcy jurisdiction appropriate where comity not implicated because issue concerned res judicata effect of prior bankruptcy decision and claims had been pending for six years); In re Morris, 950 F.2d at 1534 (continuing jurisdiction over contract claim that had been pending six years); In re Smith, 866 F.2d at 580 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, continuing jurisdiction was not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding citys plea to the jurisdiction in rule 202 proceeding properly denied because district court had jurisdiction over portion of claim under investigation even if city and governmental agency had exclusive jurisdiction over another portion of claim (B) holding postbankruptcy jurisdiction proper over fraud claim pending for four years (C) holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment (D) holding over (E) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim
Output: (B)
that no instruction directly explained to the jury that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that O’Connell’s criminal conduct was voluntary. The trial court’s instructions informed the jury (1) that the State was required to prove that O’Connell was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) also instructed that he could be convicted only if he voluntarily engaged in the conduct in violation of the statute defining the offenses. These instructions, considered as a whole, in reference to each other and not in isolation, adequately explained to the jury the State’s burden of proving that O’Connell’s actions were voluntary. Simply put, the instructions as a whole did not misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. See Hurt v. State, 570 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Under these facts and circumstances, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder (B) holding that the jury instructions taken as a whole sufficiently informed the jury of the states burden of proving that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim (C) holding that there was no error where one instruction did not inform the jury that in order to convict defendant of attempted murder the evidence must show that defendant had a specific intent to commit murder but where subsequent instruction did inform jury of this requirement and concluding that the instructions when read as a whole adequately informed the jury of the requirement of specific intent to kill (D) holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction (E) holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill
Output: (C)
in those proceedings. Andiarena, 967 F.2d at 718. However, Goldman must still show cause for failing to raise his claim regarding the 1977 conviction at his 1993 sentencing. See Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 47 (1st Cir.1999) (affirming that “a defendant’s failure to object [to an issue] at sentencing ... constitutes a procedural default, leaving the issue open to collateral attack only if the defendant can show cause and prejudice”); United States v. LaValle, 175 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.1999) (rejecting government’s cause and prejudice challenge to petitioner’s § 2255 motion based on state vacatur of a predicate conviction because the petitioner had challenged the predicate conviction at his 1994 sentencing hearing); United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 892 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Goldman has not made this showing. Goldman 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cause and prejudice standard applied to defendants failure to object to his career offender classification at sentencing (B) holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal (C) holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission (D) holding that defendant must object at trial to preserve as applied challenge for appeal (E) holding that a showing of cause and prejudice fails to overcome a defendants initial failure to object
Output: (A)
932 So.2d at 541-42; Tandem Health Care of St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Whitney, 897 So.2d 531, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Melamed, 425 So.2d at 128. The question then becomes, “What constitutes a ‘substantial issue?’ ” In Chastain—which was cited with.approval in R 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“In this case, at the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, Linden’s attorney failed to specify any issue that required an evidentiary hearing.”); Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consolidated Credit Counseling Servs., Inc., 920 So.2d 1286, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“No evidentiary hearing was required because no factual issues were in dispute and the issue of whether a valid arbitration agreement existed was a matter of law.”); Proper v. Don Connolly Constr. Co., 546 So.2d 758, 759-60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the following facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the  district court did not give the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to be heard where it failed to conduct an in limine hearing and denied oral argument on the evidentiary issues (B) holding that contested factual issues in  2255 cases must be decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing not affidavits (C) holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law (D) holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel (E) holding that a trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing on a  motion to compel or stay arbitration if it can determine the issue as a matter of law after inspecting the relevant documents and affidavits andlistening to argument oh the issues
Output: (E)
negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury and was a factor without which no harm would have been incurred. Excel Corp. v. Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex.2002). “ ‘The word “substantial” is used to denote the fact that the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called “philosophic sense,” which includes every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not have occurred.’ ” Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex.1995) (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.1991)). The test for fore ex.App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Because we hold that only a non-use of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ttca does not waive immunity from suit for claim whose substance is that patients death was caused by hospital staffs failure to restrain patient after having learned that he was suicidal (B) holding that claim based on failure to restrain inmate by handcuffing or shackling was allegation of nonuse of property for which ttca did not waive immunity (C) holding that errors in medical judgment do not provide waiver of immunity under ttca (D) holding that ttca did not waive immunity for claim based on failure properly to evaluate and to restrain patient who was assaulted by fellow patients after exiting unlocked door (E) holding that failure to lock door through which patient escaped and later drowned was nonuse of property for which ttca did not waive immunity
Output: (E)
v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142 (1st Cir.2006). Moreover, the broad scope of the Copyright Act definitions may be of limited assistance as the court applies a “common sense” analysis of whether a particular unfinished work may be covered by VARA. One of the co-sponsors of VARA observed that “we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that will be covered.... The definition is not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act....” H.R.Rep. No. 101-514, at 11. In Lilley v. Stout, 384 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C.2005), the district judge noted that “VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: ‘works of visual art,’ which differs in many respects from the pre-existing categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.” Id. at 86 (<HOLDING>). While this overview leaves much that is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a set of photographs taken to be used as studies for a painting did not qualify for vara protection (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief (D) holding that use of a pretext phone call did not qualify for protection because the technique is generally known to the public (E) holding that purely reputational damage does not qualify for dueprocess protection
Output: (A)
of the defendant, however, will shift the burden to the State to prove that the exercised challenges were not racially motivated. To sustain this burden, the State ... must satisfy the court that its peremptory challenges were made on grounds of specific, individual juror bias, or on grounds reasonably related to the particular case or trial ... and not solely on the ground of the juror's race. Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1013 (quotation and citation omitted). 11 . See, e.g., MacKintrush v. State, 978 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Ark.1998) (describing step three of Batson as requiring "that the trial court weigh and assess what has been presented to it to decide whether in light of all the circumstances, the proponent’s explanation is or is not pretextual”); State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 821 (La.1989) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted). 12 . This is unlike the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action (B) holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiff attempted to prove pretext simply by showing that the defendant knew of her complaints and took an adverse employment action shortly thereafter and did not offer reasons as to why the legitimate reasons proffered for her discharge were pretextual (C) holding that a reasonable jury could find pretext for a termination where the plaintiff stated that her work was satisfactory and there was no indication that the plaintiffs statement was either incredible or fanciful (D) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (E) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible
Output: (D)
at trial, defense counsel explained to the court that the witness was to describe the “fight or flight” response to the jury. According to defense counsel, the psychologist was prepared to testify that in some highly stressful situations, an individual’s perception of danger may impel them to “fight,” when they perceive that they are being prevented from “flight.” Additionally, the psychologist was prepared to testify that given Filomeno’s situation, his perceptions of danger were both logical and reasonable. Sustaining the State’s objection to the proffered testimony, the trial court concluded that the psychologist’s testimony attempted to put forth the defense of diminished mental capacity, a defense not recognized in Florida. See Chestnut v. State, 538 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). The admissibility of evidence is within the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract (B) holding that evidence of an impaired mental condition that does not rise to floridas definition of insanity is not admissible (C) holding that evidence of impaired mental functioning is inherently mitigating and that a defendant is not required to demonstrate a nexus between his mental capacity and the crime committed (D) holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action (E) holding that rule 35 does not permit sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition by asserting his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim and that mere relevance to the case is insufficient
Output: (B)
Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004). 4 . Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.2006). 5 . Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 328-29 (Tex.2006); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980). 6 . Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 271.152 (Vernon 2005). 7 . Id. at § 271.153(a). 8 . Id. at § 271.153(b)(1), (b)(3). 9 . Id. at § 271.151(2). 10 . Id. at§ 271.151(3)(C). 11 . See Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 328-29 (noting that sovereign immunity is waived only by clear and unambiguous language). 12 . See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.001(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.2007). 13 . Id. § 49.066(a). 14 . Bexar Metro. Water Dist. v. Educ. and Econ. Dev. Joint Venture, 220 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. filed); see also Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 342 (<HOLDING>)- 15 . Matheus v. Sasser, 164 S.W.3d 453, 459 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity (B) holding that the trustee alone has the capacity to sue and be sued  (C) holding that sue and be sued provisions of agencies should be liberally construed and that  authorization of suits against federal entities engaged in commercial activities may waive sovereign immunity from awards of interest as an incident of suit  (D) holding that the words sue and be sued when used in a statute do not by themselves waive immunity (E) holding that plaintiffs do not lose their right to sue for damages sustained within statute of limitations period by failing to sue on earlier incidents in timely manner
Output: (D)
45 U.S.C. § 56, and 46 U.S.C. § 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be “commenced” or “brought” within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly “commenced” although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s second argument for distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
Output: (D)
she had responded, the disciplinary hearing which was held might have proven to be unnecessary. Spooner, No. SC04-1375, Florida Bar No. 2004-00,357 The referee made numerous findings concerning the Spooner case, all of which led to the conclusion that Broome’s representation of Spooner was adequate. The only ethical violation the referee found in this case, a failure to respond to the Bar’s letter of inquiry in violation of rule 4-8.4(g)(1), was not supported by a factual finding by the referee that Broome failed to respond to a letter of inquiry from the Bar. However, Broome admitted the allegation in her answer to the Bar’s formal complaint against her. Nor is she taking issue with the referee’s finding of the violation. See also Fla. Bar v. Lancaster, 448 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Fla.1984) (<HOLDING>). Mailloux, No. SC04-1375, Florida Bar No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants were precluded from challenging the validity of jury verdict forms for failure to have complained at trial (B) holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal (C) holding that a defendants failure to object or join in a codefendants objection to an issue bars the defendant from raising the issue on appeal (D) holding bars failure to present evidence on an issue to which the parties had stipulated precluded the attorney from challenging the accuracy of the finding (E) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court
Output: (D)
the ISBE would terminate on August 1, 2011, and the consent decree for CPS on September 1, 2012. With the consent decrees terminated, the only remaining action is for the Monitor to file the final report detailing her findings of the agencies’ compliance with the decrees. Then, just a few months before the consent decree for CPS was set to terminate, CPS filed a motion with the district court to decertify the original “Corey H.” class and vacate the consent decree it had agreed to in 1998 and also in 2010. The district court denied the motion and CPS appealed to this court. On appeal, CPS contends that the district court erred by denying its motion on the ground that our decision in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.2012), mandates that we d th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Even if this case were not moot, we would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (B) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (D) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (E) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated
Output: (E)
Jan. 5, 2011); Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., Inc., 686 F.Supp.2d 942, 945-46 (E.D.Mo.2010); Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1052 (C.D.Ill.2009). But see West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Comcast Corp., 705 F.Supp.2d 441, 449-50 (E.D.Penn.2010) (concluding that Caldwell's framework is consistent with CAFA’s goals). 5 . I have previously expressed that I generally eschew the use of legislative history to determine a statute's intent. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 675 F.3d 802, 829 n. 4 (5th Cir.2012) reh'g en banc granted, 688 F.3d 801 (5th Cir.2012). 6 . I note some commentary consistent with this concern. See Dwight R. Carswell, Comment, CAFA and Parens Patriae Actions, 78 U. Chi. L.Rev. 345, 370 (2011) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The majority opinion also suggests that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury (B) holding that prospective injunctive relief is appropriate in a federal civil rights action only if a reasonable likelihood exists the plaintiff will again be subjected to the unconstitutional actions (C) recognizing that civil rights lawsuits are private only in form (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) recognizing that lawsuits that seek only injunctive relief or money that will go to the state treasury rather than to state citizens are not mass actions as defined by cafa thus it does not make sense to argue that these are the only lawsuits that will fall within the mass action exception
Output: (E)
5th DCA 2002)(recognizing that the determination of whether an offer of judgment was served in good faith turns entirely on whether the offeror Mortgage’s notice of voluntary dismissal with out prejudice, Ormond Beach lost its right to request recovery of such fees. To hold otherwise would preclude the filing of a voluntary dismissal in all cases in which a defendant had filed an offer of judgment. AFFIRMED. COBB and PLEUS, JJ., concur. 1 . The bankruptcy court disallowed all of Citation’s claims against Ormond Beach. See In Re: Ormond Beach Assocs., Ltd. Partnership, 204 B.R. 336 (Bankr.D.Conn.1996). That decision was affirmed on appeal. See In Re: Ormond Beach Assocs., Ltd. Partnership, 184 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.1999). 2 . See MX Investments, Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640 
 Holding statements: (A) holding attorney fees not allowable as costs (B) holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment (C) holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice (D) holding proper basis for award of fees (E) recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs
Output: (C)
in Griffin in one or the other of the following respects: It either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically impossible. [Id. at 68, 120 S.Ct at 1124, 146 L.Ed.2d at 55 (footnoteq omitted).] Ultimately, the Court concluded that a prosecutor may accuse a defendant of tailoring based on trial presence because such com- merits are “appropriate” and “sometimes essential [ ] to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth.” Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. at 1127, 146 L.Ed.2d at 59. Our appellate case law has, for decades, conformed to the Portuondo approach and permitted the kind of accusations allowed in that case. See State v. Buscham, 360 N.J.Super. 346, 366, 823 A.2d 71 (App.Div.2003) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Robinson, 157 N.J.Super. 118, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors reference to defendant being only witness in courtroom during testimony as tailoring opportunity not plain error (B) holding that a trial judges decision to close the courtroom during the testimony of a witness without making the requisite casespecific findings of fact was reversible error (C) holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error (D) holding that prosecutors reference to code of silence among witnesses to shooting not plain error where argument finds support in record (E) holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error
Output: (A)
doubt” submitted to the jury that convicted him may have been unconstitutional. Moreover, as discussed infra, because trial counsel manifestly intended, at the end of the trial, to defend Mercer based solely on an insanity defense, counsel was reasonably unconcerned about the reasonable doubt instruction as it had no relevance to such defense upon which Mercer as the defendant earned the burden. Indeed, as discussed, Discussion, infra, at 240-43, because trial counsel tactically chose to rely on a concession that Mercer had committed the crimes charged in order to sustain the insanity defense for Mercer, such indifference to the reasonable doubt charge as given by Judge Han-nigan was completely understandable. Because as of the date of Mercer’s trial, t 46, 150 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, insofar as Cage is, for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (B) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (C) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (D) holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel (E) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate
Output: (E)
finding on the basis of supposition: the court inferred a worst-case scenario involving sex with a “child” that would have resulted in the endangerment of Francisco’s own children. The trier of fact may draw inferences, but only reasonable and logical ones. Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.1997) (observing that “[t]his Court has held that the trier of fact may. draw inferences, but only reasonable and logical ones,” and noting that the evidence relied on may not just be “ ‘meager circumstantial evidence’ which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another” (quoting Blount v. Bordens, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex.1995))); see also Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.1969) (<HOLDING>). We agree that an offense occurring before a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference (B) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (C) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (D) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (E) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference
Output: (B)
and substantive due process claims against the defendants because, on this record, these claims present genuine issues of triable fact. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The plaintiffs may recover their costs from Deputy Mar he alone had the power to transfer ownership. 4 . This statutory provision has been amended and its new provisions became effective on July 1, 2007. 2007 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 191-2007 (H.E.A.1425). The amendments to the statute do not bear on the issues in this case. 5 . The record does not demonstrate whether Mr. Belcher had to use any tools to remove the radio from the van, nor does the record clarify with any certainty how the radio was affixed to the van. However, at his deposi- . ti 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The law enforcement immunity provision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (B) holding police officers were entitled to immunity where the officers decided not to arrest an intoxicated driver who subsequently died of hypothermia in his vehicle (C) holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity (D) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search (E) holding that police officers who instructed an intoxicated and unlicensed teenager who was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his intoxicated relative to drive the vehicle home rather than go through the effort of preparing arrest paperwork for the two intoxicated subjects were immune from liability for damages resulting from deaths of two innocent motorists and injuries to another cause by the drunk driving relative
Output: (B)
to release medical records to law enforcement for investigative purposes does not preclude the use of the records in a criminal prosecution resulting from the investigation. The purpose for which medical information is released is not necessarily a limitation on the use of the information, especially when the purpose and the use are closely related. The important focus is on the concept of confidentiality. When Demaray consented to the hospital’s release of his medical records to Deputy Miller, he destroyed the confidentiality between him and his doctor by allowing the information to be communicated to a third party. See 1 McCormick on Evidence § 103, at 413 (stating patient’s disclosure of the information waives the privilege); State v. Randle, 484 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Iowa Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Even though Dema-ray retained the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records because of statutory exception to physicianpatient privilege in homicide trials (B) holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records (E) holding victim waived physicianpatient privilege by authorizing her doctor to release her medical records to the department of criminal investigation because the information contained in her medical records was no longer confidential between herself and her physician
Output: (E)
of the evidence presented, make a finding on the record as to whether domestic abuse occurred and then, if necessary, it must apply the remaining provisions of the Custody and Domestic or Family Abuse Act. REVERSED AND REMANDED. THOMPSON, J., concurs. YATES, J., concurs in the result. ROBERTSON, P.J., and MONROE, J., concur in the result only. 1 . For example, without a finding stated in the record, an appellate court cannot be certain whether the trial court has found that the alleged abuse did not occur, or has found that the abuse did occur but that the perpetrator of the abuse had rebutted the presumption against the child’s being placed in the sole or joint custody of the perpetrator. See Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-131; see also Jackson v. Jackson, 709 So.2d 46, 48 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mclendon standard applied where an agreement between the parties granted the parties joint legal custody of the child with physical custody to the mother and the agreement had been adopted by the trial court (B) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the best interest of the children require the continuation of primary physical custody with defendant and secondary custody with plaintiff and the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for this court to determine whether the guidelines were followed (C) holding that the trial court must apply the provisions of the statute and specifically determine whether the perpetrator of domestic abuse had rebutted the presumption against an award of joint custody (D) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting alternative perpetrator evidence where the record demonstrated the supposed alternative perpetrator was near the victim no more than ten minutes before the crime (E) holding that provisions concerning joint custody and healthcare of the parties child were consistent with the signed notes
Output: (C)
fraud alleged must be of an extreme nature, that goes to one of the essentials of marriage.”); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N.W. 252, 254 (1940) (noting fraud must be “of a nature wholly subversive of the true essence of the marriage relationship” to support annulment of marriage). Several courts have held that the nondisclosure of a prior marriage and divorce does not qualify as an extreme enough fraud to annul a marriage. See Attor, 894 A.2d at 88 (citing Gerard v. Distefano, 84 N.J.Super. 396, 202 A.2d 220 (1964) (“The nondisclosure of a prior marriage and divorce is not such a fraud, for it in no way impedes the carrying out of the marital obligations and does not go to the fundamentals of the relationship.”)); Hess v. Pettigrew, 261 Mich. 618, 247 N.W. 90, 92 (1933) (<HOLDING>). However, at least one jurisdiction has held 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) holding concealment of prior marriage is generally not fraud justifying annulment (D) holding that denial of leave to amend is error in the absence of justifying reasons (E) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage
Output: (C)
where the-plaintiff seeks to subject private parties to § 1983 liability by bestowing on them the title of state actors. The instant case does not involve a situation where the State has “ ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’ ” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131 (quoting NBC ¶. Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit in Harvey, confronting facts similar to the case at bar and the issue of whether involuntary commitment by private parties may be considered state action, found an insufficient nexus between the defendants, a private hospital and private physicians, and the State. See id.; see also Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258 (<HOLDING>). The court observed that “[b]oth the Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test (B) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors (C) holding that foster parents are not state actors (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action
Output: (B)
Although a 1986 D.C. law required the May- or to promulgate rules for providers of residential facilities for District juveniles, see D.C.Code § 7-2103; see generally id. §§ 7-2101 to 7-2108 (codifying the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986), the Mayor failed to develop any such rules for independent living programs prior to the events leading to this case. Absent such rules, no minimum standards were required of District providers generally, and the city’s Youth Services Administration (YSA) had, in the words of its Administrator Gail Turner, “no specific standards” for selecting providers. Tr. 3/17/03 at 32. Viewed in the light most favorable to Tron’s grandmother, Minnie Smith, see, e.g., Ekedahl v. COREStaff, Inc., 183 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C.Cir.1999) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), the record reveals the following events: In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jurys verdict (B) holding that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (C) holding that in reviewing whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jurys verdict (D) holding that we view evidence in light most favorable to defendants requested submission (E) holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government
Output: (B)
966 So.2d 319, 326 (Fla.2007) (quoting § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005)). See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b) (effective Oct. 1, 2004). 10 . Arnold testified that he was experienced in trying capital cases but because he won the guilt phase portions of all the capital cases he tried, except one, he had only handled one prior penalty phase proceeding. 11 . Dr. McClain also administered the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms test, the Trailmaking test, The State Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 test, the Controlled Oral Word Association test, the Rey Complex Figure test, the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning test, and the Rey 15 Item test. She interviewed Hurst's mother and father, as well as his sister. 12 . Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to be heard on an initial 3850 motion in a capital case for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion (B) holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial (C) holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard including the defendant in person and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance to allow defendant to present mitigating evidence in the form of letters and affidavits from family members when they were not requested until the day before the hearing
Output: (D)
fall within the scope of ERISA, but then be excluded from ERISA coverage because it is a governmental plan.”). Likewise, in Lovelace, this Court held that a health insurance plan established by the Wilmington City Public School System qualified as an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA but nevertheless fell within ERISA’s governmental plan exclusion. Lovelace, 775 F.Supp. at 229-30 (“ERISA regulates employee benefit plans, such as the plan at issue — [bu cv-519, 2013 WL 4832066, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 10, 2013) (“Since [plaintiff] is an employee of the State of Ohio and her insurance plan was established and maintained by the State of Ohio, ERISA is not applicable.”); Robert v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brown Cnty., Kan., No. 08-2150-EFM, 2011 WL 836729, at *9 (D.Kan. Mar. 3, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Kirkpatrick v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that healthcare plan established by the state of vermont for eligible employees qualified for governmental plan exclusion (B) holding that disability plan established by state university for benefit of employees qualified for governmental plan exclusion (C) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan (D) holding that county governments healthcare plan qualified for governmental plan exclusion (E) holding that employee benefit plan sponsored by two participating employers  cook county and the cook county forest preserve district  qualified for governmental plan exclusion
Output: (D)
modify or revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (1993). Although Congress has amended various provisions of § 3583, including § 3583(e), since 1993, those changes do not have a substantive impact on our discussion here, and the district court’s authority to terminate, modify or revoke a term of supervised release under § 3583(e) remains essentially the same under the current statute. In addition to their authority over the term of supervised release, district courts continue to have the authority to modify, reduce or enlarge the conditions of supervised release at any time prior to the expiration or termination of a defendant’s term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); United States v. Navarro-Espinosa, 30 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Allen, 2 F.3d 538, 539-40 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that modification of original sentence occurred outside the sevenday window and the district court lacked jurisdiction to act pursuant to rule 35c (B) holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release (C) holding that  3583e2 allows a district court to modify the conditions of supervised release without extending the term of that release (D) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (E) holding that even if the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct a defendants sentence under fedrcrimp 35c  3583e2 authorized the court to modify the conditions of a defendants supervised release
Output: (E)
once again, the ALJ failed to explain how the agency physicians’ opinions were consistent with the medical evidence or Ulloa’s activities. Indeed, it is unclear how the ALJ came to the conclusion that Ulloa’s activities, which include occasional cooking and cleaning, going to church, walking five minutes to a nearby store and doing exercises prescribed to alleviate pain, are consistent with the ability to lift twenty pounds or sit, stand or walk for up to six hours in an eight-hour day. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because he failed to sufficiently articulate his assessment of the evidence to enable us to trace the path of his reasoning. Consequently, remand is warranted. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). C. The ALJ Failed to Explain the Weight Given 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj gave inadequate reasons for rejecting wifes lay opinion testimony (B) holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects (C) holding the alj is not required to address every piece of evidence but he must articulate some legitimate reason for his decision (D) recognizing that an alj must minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence of disability (E) recognizing that an alj has a duty to ensure that an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues raised 
Output: (D)