niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
in order to be regarded as independent.” Sutherland v. Sutherland, 958 A.2d 235, 241 (Del.Ch.2008) (citation and footnote omitted). Accordingly, Tuttle’s friendship with Singer is not a “substantial reason” indicating that he was incapable of making decisions in the best interests of the corporation. II. Without directly resolving the question of Lauren Brisky’s independence, the majority notes that her status as a named defendant and as a member of the Audit Committee “cast some doubt on her ability to independently consider the Shareholders’ claims against the directors!)]” Again, I disagree. Status as a defendant, in and of itself, does not disqualify a person from serving on an SLC. See Kindt v. Lund, No. Civ. A. 17751, 2003 WL 21453879, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2003) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Katell v. Morgan Stanley Group, Inc., Civ. A. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an slc members status as a defendant does not create a lack of independence (B) holding that an illegal immigrants status as a nonresident does not create an exemption allowing him to drive without a valid georgia license (C) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (D) holding mere status as a director does not create liability where the actions complained of were taken by individual managerial employees of a corporate entity (E) holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit
Output: (A)
nonetheless entitled to claim derivative asylum relief based on the possibility that their citizen child would be subjected to FGM. In so assuming, the majority’s remand is illusory. Although the practice of FGM is considered persecution under our law, there is no threat here since a United States citizen child cannot be deported to the country of her parents’ birth, and the parents cannot claim an unrecognized form of derivative relief when they themselves cannot establish entitlement to asylum. By usurping the prerogative of Congress, which alone has the power to create a new basis for cancellation of removal, the majority violates the separation of powers doctrine and creates an unnecessary conflict with the Seventh Circuit. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Like the petitioner in Oforji, Mr. and Mrs. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (B) holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation (C) holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding (D) holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel (E) holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them
Output: (B)
S1753-02 (daily ed. March 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 35 (“[CAFRA] would [also] amend section 2461 of title 28 to give the government the option of pursuing criminal forfeiture as an alternative to current civil forfeiture if civil forfeiture is otherwise authorized.”). Thus, the intent of Congress when passing CAFRA was two-fold — to expand the criminal forfeiture authority to the civil forfeiture context and to require that appropriate due process procedures were implemente no meaningful difference between the propriety of an in personam money judgment arising directly under 21 U.S.C. § 853 ... and the propriety of an in personam money judgment under 21 U.S.C. § 853 by way of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).”); Capoccia, 402 Fed.Appx. at 641 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes that under 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases (B) holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct (C) holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p (D) holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint (E) holding that since the reference in  2461c to the procedures of  853 includes the latter statutes implicit authorization of in personam money judgments we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets
Output: (E)
can serve to relieve a claimant of this requirement. Although the doctrine of substantial compliance has occasionally been applied in the tort claims context, it has been limited carefully to those situations in which the notice, although both timely and in writing, had technical deficiencies that did not deprive the public entity of the effective notice contemplated by the statute. See, e.g., Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J.Super. 204, 214-15, 970 A.2d 399 (App.Div.2009) (concluding that notice that identified plaintiff and her attorney, set forth date and description of incident, listed injuries and demanded damages, but that did not specifically assert legal theory of negligent supervision substantially complied); Henderson v. Herman, 373 N.J.Super. 625, 633, 862 A.2d 1217 (App.Div.2004) (<HOLDING>); Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act (B) holding that notice of claim against police dispatch and emergency transport personnel that failed to include names of specific dispatchers substantially complied (C) holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after (D) holding that records regarding complaints against state police officers which would be exempt from disclosure when unredacted where no longer exempt after the names of state police troopers the names of complainants and all identifying information were redacted (E) recognizing emergency exception
Output: (B)
is, we assume, an unusual way to operate as a middleman. Compton’s inclusion of these details regarding Brian Howard’s modus operandi thus suggested some particularized basis of knowledge. And, as discussed below, these details provided investigators with the opportunity to corroborate Compton’s tip. In all, however, Compton’s tip as described in the affidavit was largely devoid of detail, and the affidavit failed to state how Compton came to his knowledge of Defendant’s operation. For those reasons, Compton’s basis of knowledge did little to bolster the credibility of his tip. See Helton, 314 F.3d at 822. C. Corroboration Where the veracity and basis of knowledge of an informant have been thoroughly established, corroboration of the tip may not be necessary. See Allen, 211 F.3d at 976 (<HOLDING>); Williams, 544 F.3d at 690 (“named informants, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible (B) holding corroboration of named informants statements some of which included suspects hearsay enhanced informants reliability (C) recognizing that although not a key detail corroboration of defendants name residence and make of vehicle lent credence to informants tip (D) holding corroboration is not a necessity where confidential informants reliability was well established and his tip was based on direct personal observation of criminal activity (E) holding an informants tip if questionable can be corroborated by the observation of lawful conduct
Output: (D)
Taxes, Governing Magazine (Sept. 11, 2013), (explaining that the Affordable Care Act’s “transitional reinsurance fee will require state and local government employers to pay'$63 per covered individual each year” and noting the steps that McHenry County, Illinois, was taking to pay its $160,000 “transitional reinsurance fee”). And, as a' legal matter, the Court finds that HHS has rendered a “final agency action” through its notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020-21 & n. 12 (noting that notice-and-comment rulemaking published in the Federal Register constitutes final agency action for APA review); Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339, 1361 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In HHS’s (first) final rule governing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it well settled that a final eis or the record of decision issued thereon constitute  final agency action  (B) holding that the final renewable agency action was taken when appropriate administrator signed the final rulemaking document designated in the federal register (C) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (D) holding a rod to be final agency action (E) holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action
Output: (B)
evidence of record, or it is inconsistent with the physician’s own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41; Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir.1991) (concluding that good cause existed not to rely on a treating physician’s findings when, inter alia, his treatment notes contained unexplained inconsistencies). The ALJ may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir.1985). Further, when a treating physician makes merely conclusory statements, the ALJ may afford them such weight as is supported by the clinical or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of the claimant’s impairments. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986); see Vega, 265 F.3d at 1220 (<HOLDING>). When a treating physician’s opinion does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability (B) holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs (C) holding that the alj failed to analyze the effect of cfs on a claimants ability to do work meaningfully when he rejected cfs as a diagnosis for want of a definite test or specific laboratory findings to support the diagnosis (D) holding that the alj properly relied on the assessments of a nonexamining physician and not claimants treating physicians in determining the rfc at step four (E) holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record
Output: (B)
of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." § 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a  547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value  in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc  547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer
Output: (D)
overseeing use of budget appropriations held to be an unconstitutional encroachment on powers of the executive); In re Opinion of the lustices to the Governor, 369 Mass. 990, 341 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1976)('[T]o entrust the executive power of expenditure to legislative officers is to violate [the mandated separation of powers] by authorizing the legislative department to exercise executive power.’); State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board, 185 Neb. 490, 500, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (1970)('[The legislature] cannot through the power of appropriation exercise or invade the constitutional rights and powers of the executive branch of the government. It cannot administer the appropriation once it has been made.’); People v. Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 56, 168 N.E. 817, 827 (1929)(Crane, J., concurring)(<HOLDING>).” Opinion of the Justices No. 87-314, 129 N.H. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding un constitutional a requirement that a legislative committee sit with the governor in decisions regarding spending of money on state buildings see separate opinion of justice crane (B) holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others (C) holding that a federal court does not sit as a superpersonnel department to review the prudence of employment decisions (D) holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a mandamus action against the governor and the department of transportation to compel their performanee in accordance with constitutional and legislative mandates (E) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes
Output: (A)
(statute of frauds). Carpenter and Carpco further contend the trial court erred in concluding that the contract was partially performed and that promissory estoppel bars the application of the statute of frauds. The trial court found that the alleged contract provided that Phelps and Helms would initially share in a pro rata ownership of 100% of the M.T. Cole “A” lease until net revenues from the wells equaled the principal and interest due the investors, after which Phelps and Helms would share in a pro rata ownership of 50%. On appeal, the parties do not dispute that an agreement assigning such real property interests must contain a description of the property in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex.1982) (<HOLDING>); Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a metes and bounds partition when land contains oil and gas results in a serious loss to a coowner who receives a lot without oil or gas under the surface with the loss due solely to the division of the land (B) holding provision in oil and gas lease authorizing lessor to use gas for agricultural purposes contained no geographical limitations (C) recognizing oil gas and coal are minerals and holding if oil gas and minerals are reserved from the grant of the surface of several tracts of unseated land  they can be taxed as an estate in land (D) holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation (E) holding assignment of oil and gas lease is subject to business and commerce code section 2601
Output: (E)
was a justifiable change of methodology as long as such change in position was reasonably supported by the record. 2. Agency’s Reconsideration of Its Determination After Issuance of Preliminary Results An agency’s reconsideration of its determination after issuance of prelimi nary results does not necessarily mean that the parties affected by the determination have been denied due process of law. A party subject to or affected by the review does not have a due process right to notice and comment on the agency’s change in position if, throughout the agency’s investigation, the party was reasonably on notice that the agency was considering the alternative ultimately used in the final determination. See Tehnoimportexport v. United States, 15 CIT 250, 255, 766 F.Supp. 1169, 1175 (1991) (<HOLDING>); accord Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commerce has no obligation to notify the parties beforehand that commerce had chosen a surrogate country different from that designated in the initial determination (B) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce (C) holding that nothing in the statute prohibits commerce from valuing the fop as it did because commerce does not have to duplicate the exact production experience of an nme manufacturer at the expense of choosing a surrogate that most accurately represents the fmv of the surrogate in the hypothetically created marketeconomy version of the nme (D) holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause
Output: (A)
amounts in the budget process that were insufficient to fund payments due local governments as stated in the Act. This failure to request sufficient funds was a breach of the alleged implied contract, plaintiff believes, citing the General Accounting Office on the issue of statutory formulae: ‘Where allocation of funds is based on a statutory formula, the formula itself establishes the obligation to each recipient and the obligation occurs by operation of law.” GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (“GAO Redbook”) at 7-34. Greenlee also points to eases in which the full appropriation for a government obligation was not available, yet the obligation itself remained. The plaintiff had recourse to the courts for the difference. See, e.g., New York Airways, 369 F.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). The elements of an implied-in-fact contract 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 2005 amendment was a substantive change (B) recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law (C) holding that change in state substantive case law does not constitute the removal of an impediment (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding that congress had the power to amend an obligation but any intent to change substantive law in a subsequent appropriation must be clearly manifest
Output: (E)
as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband’s parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband’s obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house  is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house  the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss
Output: (D)
it appears that the majority opinion ignores the legal principles which must govern its review. The judicial lens through which this Court must examine the City’s exer cise of its police power is governed by well-established law, beginning with the premise that rational basis scrutiny “is the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny,” City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (emphasis added), and municipal zoning ordinances, which are legislative enactments, are presumed to be valid and constitutional. See Orange County v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 823 So.2d 732, 737 (Fla.2002) (specifying that ordinances reflecting legislative action are entitled to a presumption of validity); State v. Hanna, 901 So.2d 201, 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Statutes and ordinances in Florida not only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee (B) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage (C) holding any doubts concerning scope of arbitrable issues resolved in favor of arbitration (D) holding that statutes and ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of constitutionality (E) holding that disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in state law must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party
Output: (D)
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (internal citations omitted). A court “read[s] an [indictment] as a whole” and “construefs] the allegations in a practical sense, with all necessary implications.” Barker, 985 F.2d at 1125 (internal citations omitted). II. Section 922(k) is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s Authority Under the Commerce Clause Defendant Colon-Quiles argues that section 922(k) is an invalid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because the activity that it prohibits does not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. Section 922(k) reads, in part, as follows: “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s s 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a determination of whether the defendants actions constituted a taking under the louisiana constitution does not implicate any issues of federal law and thus does not provides a basis for a federal district court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute (C) holding under the circumstances that a criminal proceeding does not qualify as an alternate remedy under the federal fca (D) holding that application of federal arson statute to a private home would federalize a typically state crime and thereby significantly change  the federalstate balance in the prosecution of crimes (E) holding that arson of an owneroccupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property used in commerce and is not subject to federal prosecution under federal arson statute
Output: (E)
law-abiding and upright manner.” The district court excluded the convictions for two reasons, because of the 1975 pardon and under Rule 609(b) because they were more than 10 years old. However, McMur-rey was allowed to testify that Stout told him he had been to prison before. Rule 609(c) and the accompanying commentary draw a distinction between pardons based on actual innocence or a finding of rehabilitation (which make the underlying conviction inadmissible for impeachment) and pardons granted solely to restore civil rights (which have no relevance to character and do not impair the admissibility of the underlying conviction). Fed.R.Evid. 609(c) & accompanying Notes of Committee on the JudiciaRY House RepoRT No. 93-650; see also United States v. Wiggins, 566 F.2d 944, 946 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950, 98 S.Ct. 2859, 56 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mere failure to accord procedural protection called for by state law or regulation does not of itself amount to a denial of due process (B) holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege (C) recognizing that absolute judicial immunity is not grounded in any special esteem for those who perform judicial functions and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself (D) recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor (E) holding that rule 609 shows a desire to accord a controlling consideration to rehabilitation as opposed to executive grace or judicial invalidation
Output: (E)
that were built lawfully but subsequently found to violate the RHA. The Corps suggests a broader reading of the RHA, claiming that section 403 makes it unlawful to place or maintain any obstruction to the navigable capacity of any waters except as authorized by the Corps. While the word “maintain” is not found in section 403 itself, the Corps avers that prior decisions have made clear 516, 26 S.Ct. 518, 519, 50 L.Ed. 845 (1906) (preserving government’s right to require the removal or reconstruction of tunnel under Chicago river that had been constructed with permission of Chicago). Finally, the government may be compensated for removing obstructions to navigation when their owners refuse to remove them. See United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 758 (2nd Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Illinois Terminal R.R. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insured could recover the costs of defending a declaratory judgment action brought by the injured party to compel the insurer to defend but could not recover the costs associated with prosecuting crossclaims against the insurer (B) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (C) holding that government was entitled to recover costs for removal of shoal in navigable channel (D) holding party not entitled to recover attorneys fees without also recoveringdamages for breach of contract in part because attorney fees are in the nature of costs not damages (E) holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal
Output: (C)
45, review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1020 (2013); see Eugster v. City of Spokane, 139 Wn. App. 21, 33, 156 P.3d 912 (2007) (The interpretation and application of a statute are reviewed de novo.). 7 RCW 4.24.525(4)(b) provides: A moving party bringing a special motion to strike a claim under this subsection has the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is based on an action involving public participation and petition. If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the responding party to establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim. If the responding party meets this burden, the court shall deny the motion. 8 Laws of 2010, ch. 118, §l(a). 9 Burt v. Dep’t of Corr, 168 Wn.2d 828, 833, 231 P.3d 191 (2010) (<HOLDING>). 10 561 U.S. 186, 195-96, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a party cannot be joined to prevent removal where no cause of action can be brought against that party (B) holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a person who requests public records is a necessary party and must be joined in any action brought under rcw 4256540 (E) holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception
Output: (D)
public official or employee must breach a ministerial duty imposed by statute or by regulation.” Norton does not cite to any authority or provide any rationale for that statement; moreover, NoHon made that comment solely in the context of the public duty doctrine. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court has declared that, absent allegations that a state official violated “either a statutory or departmentally-mandated duty,” a petition’s pleadings “are insufficient to state a claim which is not barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law.” State ex rel Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo.1986). But a “departmentally-mandated duty” may clearly arise from sources other than statutes or regulations. Such a duty can arise from departmental rules, the orders of a s E.D.2010) (<HOLDING>); Geiger v. Boiversox, 974 S.W.2d 513, 517 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emergency medical technicians and paramedics were not entitled to official immunity for their actions related to the treatment of patients in nonemergency situations (B) holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits (C) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity (D) holding that patients who were denied medical treatment on nonemergency basis had standing to bring antitrust action against medical center (E) holding nurses were not entitled to official immunity where it was alleged that they failed to follow orders for a patients care given to them by a doctor
Output: (A)
Judge. Kathleen Swan, as personal representative of the Estate and Survivors of Alan Swan, Sr., deceased, and Mary Joe Swan, appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on their claim for stacked uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits under an automobile insurance policy. Because the insureds expressly rejected UM coverage on the subject policy and paid no premium for such coverage, we affirm. See Coleman v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 517 So.2d 686, 689-91 (Fla.1988) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 922 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer may  assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not  succeed  to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations (B) holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute (C) holding that the rejection was made a part of the policy because the declarations pages included the statements uninsured motorist covs rejected and uninsured motorists coverages have been rejected (D) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured  shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (E) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid
Output: (E)
these circumstances, requiring Robert to pay Nicole’s attorneys’ fees constituted an abuse of discretion. Gaudette v. Gaudette, 890 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also Derrevere v. Derrevere, 924 So.2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Bridge-The-Gap Alimony Although we have found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of permanent periodic alimony in this case, the trial court clearly expressed frustration during the proceeding with its lack of ability to consider a short-term alimony award to aid Nicole in making her transition to single life. Section 61.08, Florida Statutes, does not preclude such an award, and the other four district courts of appeal in Florida have expressly recognized bridge-the-gap alimony. See, e.g., Shea v. Shea, 572 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So.2d 748, 753 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that family court may under special circumstances require a supporting spouse to secure an alimony obligation with a life insurance policy (B) recognizing that even though a spouse is already employed or employable an award of rehabilitative alimony may also be justified as a bridgethegap measure to aid the recipient in making the transition from a married to a single state (C) holding that an obligation is in the nature of alimony when it is intended to provide support for the spouse rather than an equalization of property rights (D) holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony (E) holding that an award of temporary or rehabilitative alimony may not be made unless the recipient spouse is not selfsupporting and citing hull v hull 83 mdapp 218 220221 574 a2d 20 1990
Output: (B)
have been required to examine the entire public record and would have discovered the foreclosure judgment....”). These recorded instruments would charge any subsequent purchaser with the information contained in them. Fairmont Funding, 301 A.D.2d at 564, 754 N.Y.S.2d 54 (“The intended purchaser must be presumed to have investigated the title, and to have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry suggested by the record would have led.”). The Foreclosure Judgment provides a purchaser with notice that a foreclosure sale was authorized by the court, and at a minimum would require a purchaser to inquire whether a foreclosure sale had occurred. See In re Davidson Rehab Associates, 103 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, here the Referee’s Report of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien (B) holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default (C) holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser (D) holding that a wouldbe bona fide purchaser could not simply ignore the recorded notices of an impending nonjudicial foreclosure sale and fail to make inquiry as to whether the announced sale had occurred (E) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser
Output: (D)
that the substantial relationship test effectuates both the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality. In the seminal case setting forth the substantial relationship test, T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York held that only through the substantial relationship test “can the lawyer’s duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged communications be maintained.” 113 F.Supp. at 268-69. See also Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 215 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117, 116 S.Ct. 922, 133 L.Ed.2d 851 (1996) (“[T]he duty of loyalty also continues with respect to those matters substantially related to that representation.”); Felix v. Balkin, 49 F.Supp.2d 260, 268 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>); Selby v. Revlon Consumer Prod. Corp., 6 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (C) holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one (D) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (E) holding that the substantial relationship test embodies a broader concept than the rule of confidentiality  that of continuing fidelity to a former client  a duty of loyalty
Output: (B)
from representing plaintiffs “in either this or similar actions.” Id. at 1196. Likewise here, Yanny would be prohibited from representing the interests of any party against his former client, the Church of Scientology organization. However, I see no basis for precluding Berry or the Musick, Peeler firm from representing F.A.C.T.Net based on the fact that they formerly represented Yanny in defending him against charges made by the Church of Scientology. Moreover, in suing Yanny as it did, Plaintiffs waived any privilege with respect to any information relevant to the issues raised by their claims and released Yanny from his obligation of secrecy with respect to that information. See Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal.App.2d 212, 228, 64 Cal-Rptr. 915 (Cal.App.1967) (<HOLDING>) That principle of California professional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (C) holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights (D) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (E) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense
Output: (C)
conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. “If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there.” In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end
Output: (E)
See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978);, 5 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure § 25.3(c) (West 1999). A finding of insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). 3 . An exception to this bar is when the conviction is overturned on appeal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 4 . The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both individuals and corporations. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). 5 . Compare Brown, 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (<HOLDING>) with Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds (B) holding that the prosecution cannot divide a single crime into multiple units to avoid double jeopardy (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver (E) holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction
Output: (B)
Cote’s bias, Hayat alleges, first, that Cote made “several inappropriate racial and religious comments during deliberations.” Hayat presented evidence from Jurors L. and B., as well as from Juror H. via an affidavit by Ha-yat’s private investigator, that Cote made a “racial” comment during deliberations. B. declared that “[d]uring the deliberation process, ... Cote[ ] made the statement they all looked the same when wearing a costume or when put in a costume. I believe Mr. Cote made this statement in connection with a discussion of witness Naseem Khan’s claim that he had seen Ayman al-Zawahiri in Lodi.” Similarly, L. stated that “[djuring deliberations Mr. Cote made racial slurs. As an example, on one occasion ... he said in front of the entire group that they a 236-39 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Where, however, “a juror has been asked 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that rule 606b contains no exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations and expressing skepticism about whether constitutional concerns can ever override the rule (C) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors (D) recognizing rule (E) holding that the arkansas counterpart to cre 606b applies whether a verdict is reached or a mistrial declared and under the extraneous information exception allows jurors to testify about statements made during deliberations
Output: (B)
grant mandamus relief and direct the 108th District Court to -withdraw its order denying Crawford’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss the Johnsons’ claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Our writ will issue only if the court fails to act in accordance with this opinion. 1 . 453 S.W.3d 450. The court of appeals concluded that Crawford is not entitled to mandamus relief because (1) "one could interpret” Crawford's five-month delay in filing its petition for writ of mandamus, shortly before trial, as an "effort to further hinder the timely adjudication of the Johnsons’ claims”; (2) even if the court could review the denial of Crawford's plea to the jurisdiction by mandamus, Crawford has not sh 2012 WL 5450826, at *1 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Nov. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>); Carpenter v. Sw. Med. Examination Servs., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims (B) holding that because plaintiffs claims did not challenge the handling administration or payment of his flood claim or compliance with the act or the regulations the state law claims for breach of contract and tort are not preempted by the nfia (C) holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute (D) holding that claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the texas department of insurance because they concern the claims handling process (E) holding that the dwc has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for misrepresentation of an insurance policy when the misrepresentation occurs within the claimsettlement process also holding that the plaintiffs claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis tress arose out of the carriers investigation handling and settling of a workers compensation claim
Output: (D)