niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
to testify was well within the bounds of the court’s discretion. We are likewise unpersuaded by Valiav-icharska’s related argument that the court erroneously curtailed her cross-examination of Sergeant Jewell. Valiavicharska’s counsel was allowed to ask Sergeant Jewell a broad range of questions about the escalating conflict between the police and demonstrators during the protest, and the court did not unfairly constrain the scope of cross-examination. To the extent the magistrate judge limited Valiavicharska’s cross-examination of Sergeant Jewell at all, she did so only to prevent unduly prejudicial, cumulative, and otherwise irrelevant testimony. Imposing these reasonable limitations was not an abuse of discretion. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 332-33 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that trial courts have great latitude and considerable discretion to determine necessary and proper jury instructions (B) holding that trial court retains wide latitude and considerable discretion to limit crossexamination internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing district courts wide latitude in imposing supervised release conditions (D) recognizing that we review a trial courts jury instruc tions for abuse of discretion and that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (B)
(citing CBS, 729 F.2d at 1180) (the court must examine the capacity of pretrial publicity “to inflame and prejudice the entire community"). Both demonstrate that this case is simply not one of the rare instances in which pretrial publicity mandates prior restraints, This civil trademark infringement action involves issues that are far more banal than the subject matters of the criminal trials in which pretrial publicity has presented serious constitutional problems. See, e.g., CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181 (collecting cases that involved armed robbery, kidnapping, bludgeoning, and murder, and concluding prosecution of prominent defendant for conspiracy to import cocaine was not lurid or highly inflammatory); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (<HOLDING>). And, as we have long held, pretrial publicity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury (B) holding that media coverage contributed to due process violation in murder trial that intrigued and captivated the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals (C) holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred (D) holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist (E) holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder
Output: (B)
report Under New York law, “[t]he applicable standard of fairness at sentencing hearings is whether the defendant had an opportunity to refute the aggravating factors which might have negatively influenced the court[.]” People v. Massmann, 13 A.D.3d 808, 785 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (3d Dep’t 2004) (quotation and citations omitted); People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114, 365 N.Y.S.2d 518, 324 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y.1975) (“[NJeither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever held, nor do we now believe, that the full panoply of constitutional rights should be applied to the sentencing process[.]”) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), aff'g People v. Williams, 298 N.Y. 803, 83 N.E.2d 698 (1949)); see also United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). It was thus within the discretion of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim but the state court denies such a hearing entitlement to a federal court hearing is analyzed pursuant to preaedpa law rather than the standards set out in  2254e2 (B) holding that a court is not under a duty to conduct a fullblown evidentiary hearing in each instance where information in a presentence report is challenged at federal sentencing nor does the convicted defendant have an absolute right to demand that kind of hearing (C) holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report (D) holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant (E) holding that the supreme court does not require an evidentiary hearing in every case
Output: (B)
879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned
Output: (B)
V. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and the Aldermen and Mayor’s motion for summary judgment as to Elizabeth’s whis-tleblower claims. We render judgment that the City, Aldermen, and Mayor are immune from suit on Elizabeth’s whistle-blower claims. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. 1 . Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 554.001-.010 (Vernon 1994 & Supp.2001). 2 . City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 n. 1 (Tex.1993); see also City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653-54 (Tex.1994); Putthoff v. Ancrum, 934 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied). 3 . City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex.1995); Putthoff, 934 S.W.2d at 174 n. 2. Compare Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d at 812 (<HOLDING>). 4 . Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that city could not appeal based on sovereign rather than official immunity under section 510145 (B) holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal (C) holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice (D) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity (E) holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official
Output: (A)
they fail to analyze the language of the statute itself, the court finds does not find the cases instructive much less persuasive. The court does, however, find persuasive the Gutierrez court’s reliance on other provisions of the TCPA in support of this reading. Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C) provides that the FCC may exempt calls to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party from the requirements of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). If § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) did not include “calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party,” the exemption would be meaningless. See Gutierrez, 2011 WL 579238 at *6; see also Smith v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11-cv-1958-JLS, 2012 WL 2975712 (S.D.Cal. July 20, 2012) (slip op.) (<HOLDING>). Based on the court’s reading of the statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing (B) recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements (C) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (D) holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention (E) holding that the tcpa does not limit its protection to instances in which the plaintiff is charged within the context of article iii standing
Output: (E)
affirmatively chose an appeal at the administrative level could frustrate Title VII’s goal of encouraging discrimination complaints to be resolved at the administrative level. See id. Courts have recognized the importance of the exhaustion requirement in similar, though not identical, circumstances, such as where plaintiffs had withdrawn or failed to pursue their complaints at the initial administrative step. “Allowing a plaintiff to abandon the administrative remedies he has initiated would tend to frustrate the ability of the agency to deal with complaints. All participants would know that at any moment an impatient complainant could take his claim to court and abort the administrative proceedings.” Gagnon v. Potter, No. 3:05-CV-324RM, 2006 WL 2051730, at *3 (N.D.Ind. July 19, 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Mackay v. USPS, 607 F.Supp. 271, 276 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (B) holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing (C) holding that plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily withdraw her complaint after electing to have her complaint heard before an administrative law judge (D) holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint (E) holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort
Output: (C)
theoretical underpinnings of the Act, we can discern why retroactive application is not only counter-intuitive, but legally improper. Landgraf again provides the analytical framework. Landgraf identified three examples of laws which generally do not have retroactive effect: (1) those which authorize or affect the propriety of prospective relief; (2) those which confer or oust jurisdiction and (3) those which make changes to procedural rules. 511 U.S. at 273-75, 114 S.Ct. at 1501-02. Legislation which operates in futuro by definition generally does not have retroactive implications. The classic example' is injunctive relief which proscribes present and fu ture conduct. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921) (<HOLDING>). However, habeas corpus relief involves 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 11 applied to a letter sent with the intent to influence the court with respect to injunctive relief (B) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (C) holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases (D) holding that tillman applied to cases then pending on direct appeal ie in the pipeline (E) holding that the clayton acts provisions on injunctive relief applied to pending cases
Output: (E)
The Steins contend that those remedies are not good enough to “obligate” Paradigm to construct the condominium in two years, as required by § 1702(a)(2) of the Disclosure Act. They argue that without the remedies of special, consequential, punitive, speculative, and indirect damages, which they expressly waived in the contract, they cannot inflict enough legal pain on Paradigm to force it to carry out its contractual duty to finish within two years. Specific performance or injunctive relief, if vigorously pursued, ordinarily will be enough to force a seller to fulfill its contractual obligations within the time a contract requires. Florida law provides that a party may sue for specific performance and obtain an injunction that “shall specify the time within which the ac 3d DCA 1979) (<HOLDING>). A court order requiring a party to perform as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party does not automatically qualify as a real party in interest merely because it has been named as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action (B) holding that a party may be held in contempt for refusing to comply with a specific performance judgment requiring the party to sell a piece of real estate (C) holding that a party may not contract away the protection that a statute is intended to afford him nor may the other party to the contract exempt itself from its duty to comply with such statute (D) holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute (E) holding that trustee may bring assigned creditor claims where estate is the real party in interest
Output: (B)
The estate of David L. Welsh (“Welsh”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et al. (“MetLife”), which administers an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. We review for abuse of discretion MetLife’s denial of Welsh’s claim for long term disability benefits, see Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 967-69 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), and the district court’s denial of a portion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (B) holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review (C) holding that similar language conferred discretion on the plan administrator (D) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (E) holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator
Output: (E)
transcript has the same character as the act of denying a debtor the opportunity to register for class or to graduate, as it deprives a student of a service that would be available to her were she not a debtor ...” Id. at 534. Numerous courts have examined the issue whether an educational institution violates the automatic stay when it withholds a debtor’s transcript due to an outstanding tuition balance or student loan debt. “The majority view is that the withholding of a debtor’s transcript because of an outstanding tuition balance or unpaid student loans violates the automatic stay.” In re Moore, 407 B.R. 855, 860 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2009) (citing In re Mu’min, 374 B.R. 149, 155 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007)); Parker, 334 B.R. at 534-36; see also In re Carson, 150 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS Based on the foregoing, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order (B) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (C) holding that university violated the automatic stay by withholding chapter 7 debtors transcripts because the debts were not yet determined nondischargeable (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that a college withholding delivery of transcripts due to an outstanding prepetition debt is an act to collect in violation of the automatic stay
Output: (E)
speaking, there are two distinct purposes of a standby counsel. One is to “stand by” and be ready to proceed if the defendant should choose to cease self-representation, or if there is any other reason why self-representation cannot continue. The second purpose of a standby counsel is to help a self-representing defendant if, and to the extent, assistance is requested. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Faret-ta expressly recognized both these applications, see 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, even though it left the precise scope of standby counsel’s role not fully charted. In the wake of Faretta, however, federal courts have adopted both these rules in delineating standby counsel’s role. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 96-97, 102 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 252 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (B) holding that district court could consistent with faretta require that standby counsel screen pro se defendants motions to facilitate the orderly functioning of the proceedings after the unassisted defendant deluged the district court with nearly 100 long and frivolous motions (C) holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that a court commits no error in refusing to rule on pro se motions raised by a represented party
Output: (B)
up to $2,000, which would have set aside, in a literal sense, a discrete “amount . . . necessarily consumed for the support of’ the taxpayer and his or her family. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 572. This description, made in reference to an income tax exemption, is not applicable to the question of whether an income tax assessed on gross rather than net income is unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate. Certainly nothing in that opinion suggested that such an exemption was necessary in order to render that tax constitutional. Where we have found that a tax was unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate, the constitutional deficiency has been of a much different character than the one the petitioners allege here. See Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 470-71 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783-84 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (B) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (E) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge
Output: (B)
if the defendant did not intend to return the vehicle, then a loss calculation based on the market value of the vehicle is warranted. The sentencing court may properly infer such intent if the defendant is indifferent or reckless with respect to the owner’s recovery of the vehicle. “[I]t has long been the case that ‘if one takes another’s property intending to use it recklessly and then abandon it, the obstacles to its safe return are such that the taker possesses the required intent to steal.’ ” United States v. Cruz-Santiago, 12 F.Sd 1, 2 (1st Cir.1993) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1853, 128 L.Ed.2d 477 (1994) (deciding robbery case and quoting LaFave & Scott, supra, § 8.5, at 360-61); see also State v. Piscattano, 32 Conn.Supp. 649, 352 A.2d 783, 785 (Ct.App.Sess.1976) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 570 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that the factfinder may conclude that recovery is not likely when the car is left on street with keys in the car (C) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (D) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car (E) holding car lessee specifically contracted with car lessor for liability for any and all loss or damage to rental car thus barring recovery from insurer under exclusion for liability assumed by contract
Output: (B)
Martucci, Missouri Practice Series, Employment Law and Practice section 5:20 (2013-2014 ed.2013) (noting that whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive “generally is a factual issue for the jury, and the finding of sufficient severity depends on the nature and degree of the conduct”). “ ‘Once -there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.’ ” Cooper, 204 S.W.3d at 245 (quoting Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir.1998) (emphasis added)). Summary judgment will rarely be appropriate, therefore, in discriminatory harassment cases that turn on whether an employer’s conduct is objectively severe or pervasive. Cf. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818 (<HOLDING>). Rather, once subjectively offensive conduct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if the resolution of material issues depends upon credibility determinations (B) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (C) holding that because discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant and summary judgment is appropriate in such cases only in  those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion  quoting johnson 931 f2d at 1244 (D) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (E) holding that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in employment discrimination cases where determination of discriminatory animus requires the resolution of factual disputes that turn on reasonable inferences
Output: (E)
ted unwanted fondling and rubbing of plaintiffs breasts and buttocks and unwanted kissing on the cheek over a seven-month period, despite her protests on every occasion, was sufficiently severe or pervasive). In these cases, the pervasiveness of the alleged conduct was sufficient to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiffs employment. By contrast, Paul’s sexual harassment claim relies exclusively on a single confrontation with Barattini, which, according to her brief, lasted a total of approximately a minute and a half. We therefore agree with the district court’s finding that Barattini’s alleged conduct was clearly not pervasive, and are left with the task of assessing its severity. This circuit’s case law reveals that isolated incidents may form the , 328 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Derouen v. Carquest Auto Parts, Inc., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act (B) holding that three sexually suggestive comments over a three month period were not frequent enough nor severe enough to be unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs work environment (C) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (D) holding that conduct of supervisor who grabbed plaintiff on the buttocks and made suggestive comments while she was conversing with another employee was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term or condition of plaintiffs employment (E) holding that sexually suggestive comments slapping plaintiff on the behind with a newspaper grabbing or brushing up against plaintiffs breasts and behind and attempting to kiss plaintiff did not qualify as severe
Output: (E)
to warrant such a delay. See id. Moreover, despite his argument to the contrary, Staler did not demonstrate that his criminal trial was invalid due to a fundamental error. See Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. Stuler was indicted and convicted for violating 26 U.S.C. § 7208. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir.2007) (noting the elements of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 include that the defendant: (1) was required to file the tax returns; (2) failed to file them; and (3) acted willfully). Stuler’s invocation of a host of unrelated statutes and regulations does not alter the fact that “importing” is not an element of a § 7203 charge. He has therefore failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a funda-' mental error. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). Because Stuler showed neither that any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any proceeding which is challenged by the writ is presumed to be correct and the burden rests on its assailant to show otherwise (B) recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged
Output: (A)
charges under the Act is a piecemeal and inefficient method of addressing these issues. This is, however, the system the Legislature has put in place for challenging insurance rates. 28 . An obvious exception to the requirement of first seeking a hearing before the Commissioner to establish an excessive charge would be those instances where an insurer charged a rate that was above the amount on file with or authorized by the Commissioner. It is arguable that the cause of action established through West Virginia Code §§ 46A-3-109 and 46A-5-101 was intended to cover instances of wrongful or unconscionable charges rather than inviting any ongoing inquiry into the reasonableness of insurance charges. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Friedman's, Inc., 213 W.Va. 394, 399, 582 S.E.2d 841, 846 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 29 . In the event that we are misinterpreting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a deceptive practice consists of a material representation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances (B) holding california ucl fal and clra claims depend on the common question of whether the labels at issue are unlawful unfair deceptive or misleading to reasonable consumers (C) recognizing purpose of ccpa as protection of consumers from unfair illegal or deceptive acts (D) holding that recovery under the north carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices act  is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants deceptive statement or misrepresentation  (E) holding that actual reliance is not required to establish injury under nc gen stat  5863151 2001 which governs the unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance
Output: (C)
where she took initiative to summon police because defendant was storing drugs in a closet used by both of them); State v. Frame, 45 Or.App. 723, 609 P.2d 830 (1980) (noting that a consenting occupant can act in his own interest where he or she summons the police to seize stolen property kept in the premises because the consenting party could later be charged with possession of such items); People v. Irel 2000) (explaining that mother's ownership of the house in which appellant lived was prima facie evidence of authority to let police officers search the house and the fact that appellant was an adult living in a bedroom within that house did not necessarily negate the mother’s authority to consent to search room); Turner v. State, 931 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996) (<HOLDING>); Sailings v. State, 789 S.W.2d 408 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom (B) holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom (C) holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom (D) holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom (E) holding that twentyyearold appellants mother had authority to consent to a search of sons bedroom where appellant had agreed to pay 10 per week as rent he had not instructed mother to stay out of his room and mother infrequently entered appellants room to pick up after him
Output: (B)
the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another.” Id. § 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert’s conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert’s use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car
Output: (C)
the weight of the evidence, especially in view of the videotape, that no reasonable jury can find in plaintiffs favor. (Tr. 33.) I denied the motion. The second time was after the defense rested. THE COURT: I know that there will be a , motion to- dismiss at the end of the entire ease? MR. LEONG: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: You’ll get a decision on the motion and we’ll go directly through____ (Tr. 72-73.) I did not rule on the motion at the close of all evidence, and the matter was not addressed again. Defendants’ failure to file a new motion after the jury returned a favorable verdict and when a judgment has not been entered to date, does not preclude the Court from granting the motion at this stage. See Nichols Constr. Corp. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 808 F.2d 340, 356 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Defendants shall file with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision (B) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (C) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (D) holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (E) holding that under law of the case appellate decision that material factual issues precluded summary judgment on plaintiffs claims did not preclude district court from later granting defendants motion for a directed verdict because by then the parties had presented all of their evidence
Output: (A)
doctrine does not preclude Hawkins from asserting that his judgment debt is dischargeable. The New Jersey state court proceeding dealt exclusively with the issue of whether plaintiff-creditor suffered injuries due to defen dant-debtor’s actions. The issue of whether Hawkins’ actions during the altercation constituted willful and malicious acts as defined by Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code was “ ‘unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action.’ ” Id. Hawkins voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection months subsequent to the entry of the default judgment against him. Thus, the state court neither had reason to deal with the dischargeability of the debt at issue, nor did it have jurisdiction to do so. See Brown, 442 U.S. at 127, 99 S.Ct. 2205 (<HOLDING>). Given these findings, the Court must deny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (C) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (D) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (E) holding that pursuant to federal statute and the courts inherent equitable powers a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue a separate money judgment after determining the amount and dischargeability of a claim
Output: (A)
maximum, or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful, i.e., the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or pub-He reputation of judicial proceedings. Id, at 1327. Af noted’ Martmez waived his rigbt to appeal any component of his conviction in the plea agreement Further> at the plea colloquy, the district court asked Martinez if he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal bofch his sentence and any comPonent of his conviction or sentence’ and defendant said that he did derstand this’ Tr' of Plea Hr’g’ at 12‘ The appeal waiver did not provide any exception to the broad aPPeal waiver permitting him to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss' Thus> this claim is ^thin the scope of the appeal waive1' See United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Further, Martmez has not met his burden of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendan s appeid he denial of his motion to dismiss was ithin scope of his appeal waiver because the plea cements waiver provision did not reserve this issue as an exceptionto the waiver (B) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary (C) holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so (D) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (E) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
Output: (A)
238 (2) (367 SE2d 786) (1988). 41 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2) (b) (691 SE2d 633) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 42 Id. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 43 Fla. Int’l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 115 (3) (503 SE2d 371) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 44 Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 45 See Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 778(2) (462 SE2d 623) (1995) (affirming trial court’s directed verdict in favor of insured on coverage claim but, nonetheless, also affirming court’s directed verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s bad-faith claim in light of the fact that insured’s coverage, despite ultimately succeeding, was based on a doubtful question of law); Griffin, 302 Ga.App. at 731 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because insurers nonpayment was based on contention that insured did not have a covered loss under the policy because the value of the property was the same regardless of whether it was serviced by an easement nonpayment was reasonable and not subject to a badfaith claim (B) holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy (C) holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment (D) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
Output: (A)
a user of file-sharing software has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his publicly shared files because it is not an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize. See United States v. Samples, No. 3-08-CR-12, 2011 WL 4907315, at *5 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 15, 2011) (“Counsel had no basis for challenging the use of forensic software to download files from a peer-to-peer network because a user of file-sharing software has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his public files.”); see also United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir.2010) (“Borowy’s subjective intention not to share his files did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of such widespread public access”); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 842-45 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrine 518 F.3d 1196, 1205 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellant failed to show any expectation of privacy in files stored on the computer system in his office was one that society accepts as objectively reasonable (B) holding that an agents use of filesharing program to access child pornography files on the defendants computer did not constitute an illegal warrantless search because the defendant had made those files accessible to others and thus lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in files (C) holding stults had no reasonable expectation of privacy in files that the fbi retrieved from his personal computer where stults admittedly installed and used limewire to make his files accessible to others for file sharing one who gives his house keys to all of his friends who request them should not be surprised should some of them open the door without knocking (D) holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer (E) holding that where there is no evidence of shared use or common authority an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files kept on a personally owned computer
Output: (C)
would not exist but for a labor dispute at said establishment---- [Emphasis added.] We also note that other courts in our sister states have interpreted the term premises or related terms as meaning a single unit of employment. se at hand, it is clear that there was a stoppage of work at the distribution and warehouse centers and each of petitioner’s manufacturing plants where sympathy strikes took place. The Board, in its opinion, found that (1) petitioner could not operate its warehouse and distribution centers; (2) “[t]he ice cream plant, beverage plant and dairy remained closed down during the strike”; and (3) the bakery remained closed during three weeks of the strike. Under section 8-1004, there was a “substantia ldredge v. Archie, 93 Nev. 537, 541, 569 P.2d 940, 943 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Basso v. News Syndicate Co., 90 N.J.Super. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that truck drivers who picked up items from a foundry and returned there at the end of the day were last employed there (B) recognizing that presence of sectarian chapel in airport impaired use of airport by passengers (C) recognizing legislature reallocated the regulatory authority from the cities over the property on which dfw airport is located to the airport board (D) holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location (E) holding that pilots based out of a las vegas airport were last employed at that location
Output: (E)
contained no other occupants. Following Calloway’s detention, Calloway volunteered that he had marijuana in the house, and his mother authorized a search of the house — during which the officers found the marijuana (with Calloway’s assistance), and also located a firearm in Calloway’s bedroom (on a top shelf, in a closet, between shirts). The officers testified that the residence was located in a high crime area. In denying Calloway’s motion to suppress, the trial judge seems to have found that the officers’ initial action of ordering all occupants out of the house and cuffing Calloway was justified based upon Callo-way’s “flight” (back into the house) upon seeing the officers “in a high crime area.” See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (<HOLDING>). There are at least two problems with applying 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding that a defendants unprovoked flight upon noticing the police in a highcrime area was suggestive of wrongdoing and therefore provided reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory detention (D) holding that in a high crime area unprovoked headlong flight from police can form the basis for reasonable suspicion under terry (E) holding defendants unprovoked flight from area of heavy narcotic trafficking after noticing uniformed officers provided reasonable suspicion to detain and stating headlong flight wherever it occurs  is the consummate act of evasion it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such
Output: (C)
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is not a substitute for a motion for summary judgment, and in ruling on such a motion, the trial court is confined to a consideration of the allegations found within the four.corners of the complaint.”). We begin our analysis1 by noting that the Personal Representatives are duly appointed legal representatives of the Estate, with the capacity to bring an action on the Estate’s behalf and charged with the obligation to take possession of Norman’s property for purposes of administration. See §§ 733.602; 733.607(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); Tennyson v. ASCAP, 477 F. App’x 608 (11th Cir.2012); Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 706 (Fla.1955); Brake v. Murphy, 687 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); cf. Disque v. Unger, 955 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). To that end, the Personal Representatives 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where all substantive claims are properly dismissed there is no basis for injunctive relief (B) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that where no colorable claim can be construed from a complaint it should be dismissed (D) recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice  (E) holding that trial court properly dismissed estates complaint for declaratory relief where outcome would be of no financial benefit to estate
Output: (E)