niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
no indication that Mexican law should govern the claims at issue. Thus, under Texas’s most significant relationship test, American law is likely to govern the merits issues, and this factor weighs against dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens. 4. Application of Foreign Law Although American law is likely to govern the merits, it appears that Mexican law will be relevant to collateral issues such as the nature of the property that is the subject of the contract. An American forum would nevertheless be capable of handling the difficulties posed by Mexican fideicomiso law should the court need to do so. Indeed, American forums have competently adjudicated matters involving Mexican fideicomiso property interests on other occasions. See Gale v. Camrite, 559 F.3d 359 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810 (9th Cir.1995) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages (B) holding that a seller did not breach its contract by averring that there would be no tax liability incurred by the sale of a baja california sur condominium owned pursuant to fideicomiso law (C) holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation (D) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (E) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract
Output: (B)
which would have reported violence at New York City detention facilities. Complt. ¶¶ 19-22. He conclusorily alleges that these prior incidents established a policy or custom of violence against prisoners, and that the Supervisory Defendants were aware of and allowed this policy to continue. Complt. ¶¶ 13-26. Given the passage of time and the installation of a new DOC Commissioner and other supervisory staff between the prior violent incidents and the alleged abuse of Plaintiff, as well as the general failure of Plaintiff to plausibly allege that a policy or custom underlay these acts of violence, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the violence which harmed him was part of a larger policy or custom at the DOC. See, e.g., Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted); Carson v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the first amendment retaliation context there is no bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship so courts judge the permissible inferences that can be drawn from temporal proximity in the context of particular cases quoting gormanbakos v cornell coop extension 252 f3d 545 554 2d cir2001 espinal v goord 558 f3d 119 129 2d cir2009 (B) holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation (C) holding that in addition to temporal proximity plaintiff must show further evidence supporting a causal connection (D) holding that a close temporal proximity between a public employees speech and a defendants actions suggested a causal relationship (E) holding that onemonth temporal proximity was sufficient to establish causation and noting that the prima facie burden in this context is not an onerous one
Output: (A)
is cases involving misrepresentations. See, e.g., DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 799 n.9, 985 N.E.2d 1187 (2013). 9 . This approach accords with decisions by the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court in the residential mortgage context. While serving as a Justice of the Superior Court, he rejected the suggestion that "stated income” loans are inherently unfair, as they "are no more prone to foreclosure than full documentation loans if the statements in the application are accurate.” Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 2008 WL 517279, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008) (Gants, J.); see Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 427, at *27-29 (Nov. 28, 2008) (Gants, J.); see also Forbes, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 1122, 2015 WL 2365497, at *2 (<HOLDING>); id. at *1 & n.5 (observing that the plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the foreigndefendant seller was not subject to personal jurisdiction in michigan since the only reason it had contact with the state was because the plaintiff chose to reside there (B) holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of   net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all   fishing sources (C) holding that the judge reasonably concluded that because forbes chose to state and to continually verify his false income information  countrywide was entitled to rely on it in determining the debttoincome ratio and otherwise  (D) holding that the bia is entitled to rely heavily on state department reports (E) holding that it was not error plain or otherwise for a judge to rely on an unsubstantiated summary of a state indictment contained in the psr to determine that the prior offense was a crime of violence even though the defendant had not admitted that the summary of the indictment was correct
Output: (C)
arises between two states’ statutes of limitations, the Restatement provides: An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, even though it would be barred by the statute of limitations of another state. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 142(2). Section 142(2) thus requires Ohio courts to apply Ohio’s statute of limitations to breach of contract actions brought in Ohio, even if the action would be time-barred in another state. See Males v. W.E. Gates & Associates, 29 Ohio Misc.2d 13, 504 N.E.2d 494, 494-95 (Ohio Com.Pl.1985) (applying Ohio’s fifteen-year statute of limitations to a breach of contract action that would have been barred by Virginia’s five-year statute); cf. Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Mackey v. Judy’s Foods, Inc., 867 F.2d 325, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional error was waived even though petitioner repeatedly used the phrase full faith and credit because petitioner did not cite to the federal constitution or to any cases relying on the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution (B) holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy (C) holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit (D) holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit (E) holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states
Output: (C)
Settlement is GRANTED. However, the Court wishes to clarify the Magistrate’s analysis of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate states in his report and recommendation that “in this Circuit a district court has jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements, on motion by counsel especially when the non-moving party refuses to comply with the agreement before the case has been dismissed.” Mag. Report and Recommendation at 5, Le Bon Pain, Inc. v. Guyon and Co., Inc., No. 89-0616 (July 26, 1989). The Magistrate notes the existence of an intracircuit conflict over the issue of whether a district court retains jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements before a case has been dismissed. Compare Cia Anon Venezolana De Navigacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33 (5th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>) with Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court has the inherent power to summarily enforce settlement agreements  in a pending case (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (D) recognizing use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of the courts inherent power to enforce its judgments (E) recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants
Output: (A)
& Video Corp. v. Universal Music & Video Distribution, Corp., 372 B.R. 619 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2007) (Gonzalez, J.) (“RMM Records 3 . In re Best Payphones, Inc., 2003 Bankr.LEX-IS 180, 2003 WL 1089525 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2003) (Bernstein, C.J.) (“Best Payphones "). 4 . Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 223 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2000) (“UNUM Life ”). 5 . Ames Merchandising Corp. v. Unical Enterprises, Inc. (In re Ames Dept. Stores), 2010 Bankr.LEXIS 5115, 2010 WL 6052849 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010) (Gerber, J.) (“Ames-Unical ”). 6 . See UNUM Life, 223 F.3d at 139 ("In a suit to enforce a right under ERISA, the question of whether or not to award prejudgment interest is ordinarily left to the discretion of the district court.”); Ames-Unical, 2010 Bankr.LEXIS 5115, at *3, 2010 WL 6052849, at *2 (<HOLDING>). 7 . Ames Merchandising Corp. v. Cellmark 
 Holding statements: (A) holding likewise in preference action (B) holding mothers preference for placement with nonindian adoptive parents was appropriate factor in finding good cause (C) holding that michigan wrongful death action is a derivative one in which the representative in effect stands in the shoes of the decedent and thus any substantive impediment that would have prevented the decedent from commencing suit will likewise preclude suit by the personal representative (D) holding that where there is no suggestion in the text legislative history or purpose of the flsa that congress intended to confer a nonwaivable right to a class action a plaintiffs inability to bring a class action cannot by itself suffice to defeat the strong congressional preference for an arbitral forum (E) holding that states likewise retain immunity from private suit in their own courts which congress may not abrogate by article i legislation
Output: (A)
“may suspend the sentence in whole or in part, including any mandatory minimum sentence.” I draw two conclusions from the statutory language. First, the legislature selected the term “sentence” in the statute. We have repeatedly held the term “sentence” includes restitution in a criminal case. See, e.g., Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 551 (“Restitution ... is a part of the sentencing process.”); State v. Alspach, 554 N.W.2d 882, 883 (Iowa 1996) (recognizing that “restitution is a phase of sentencing”); see also 4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice Series™, Criminal Law § 33:5, at 905 (2016-2017 ed.) (characterizing restitution as “part of the sentence imposed” under our cases). Others authorities have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences include all consequences of convictions (B) holding that although sentencing for separate convictions arising from unrelated crimes can take place on same day sentences cannot be part of same sentencing proceeding those separate convictions in same proceeding cannot be considered sequential for purposes of habitualization (C) holding that all convictions under wisconsin sexual assault statute were not per se convictions for crimes of violence (D) holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes (E) recognizing that abatement rests on the outdated premise that criminal convictions and sentences serve only to punish the convicted
Output: (A)
their own rules — rules they are bound to comply with under § 78s(g)(l) — by improperly charging PFOF fees. Thus, removal was proper because the plain language of the Exchange Act establishes that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions seeking to interpret and enforce compliance with exchange rules or the Act itself. The district court correctly determined that this case implicates a federal interest sufficiently substantial to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2001) (finding federal subject matter jurisdiction where an exchange failed to perform its statutory duty under federal law); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the remedies are exclusive (B) holding that although plaintiffs theories are posited as state law claims their viability depended on whether the sros rules were violated thereby triggering the exclusive jurisdiction provision of  78aa (C) holding the state law claims were not preempted (D) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (E) holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim
Output: (B)
type of home in which many abused children live, such information does not educate the jury about certain misconceptions the public may hold, nor does it rehabilitate the child once the child’s credibility is at issue as a result of his or her apparent inconsistent conduct. Dr. Gos-lin’s proffered profile testimony was offered simply to prove the commission of a crime, and, as such, it should have been declared inadmissible. Moreover, Dr. Goslin did not testify about any studies comparing homes of children who were known to have been molested with homes of children who had not been molested. If such studies exist, they could conceivably qualify the profile as an accurate predictor of child sexual abuse. Cf. In re Sara M., 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 593, 239 Cal.Rptr. 605, 610-11 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Seering v. Department of Social Servs. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (B) holding wife unreasonably exposed neighbors children to danger because she invited the children over in spite of knowing her husband had molested children in the past (C) holding that proper foundation existed for qualified experts testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome where expert had extensive training and experience with sexually abused children expert testified regarding the characteristics of the syndrome and its recognition by specific agencies and defense counsel rigorously crossexamined witness concerning the basis of her knowledge of the victims conduct (D) holding that kellyfrye precludes the introduction of generalized syndrome testimony during the states caseinchief for the purpose of demonstrating that the particular child had been abused in that the experts knew of no studies comparing the reactions of children known to be molested with those who claim to be molested or those who were not molested (E) holding that a wife who invited and encouraged children to visit her premises even though she knew that husband had molested women and children in the past and might do so again could be held liable in negligence
Output: (D)
course of investigation. The instant case involves an alleged “seizure” that occurred well after the point in time where Place is directly relevant. The plaintiff here is not challenging any action of the defendants until over four months after the plaintiff’s license was removed from a vehicle pursuant to an inventory search, inventoried, and stored. 7 . See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1162-64 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 631, 139 L.Ed.2d 611 (1997) (rejecting concept of "continuing seizure” and holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply after a person has been arrested but has not yet been tried; also collecting cases on "continuing seizure”); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir.1989) (same); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fourth amendment seizure continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding fourth amendment protects against use of force while in arresting officers custody until arraignment or formal charge (D) holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment (E) holding arresting a person for refusing to provide his or her name violates the fourth amendment
Output: (A)
can be characterized as “new” or “future” as opposed to “continued” at-will employment. Jimenez, however, correctly responds that in Missouri, a promise of at-will employment does not qualify as consideration,- regardless of whether it is characterized as “new,” “future,” or “continued” at-will employment. Thus, it does not provide the consideration needed to support the arbitration agreement in this case. Defendants concede that Jimenez was an at-will employee. They also agree that under Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo.App.W.D.2008), a promise of “continued” at-will employment will not constitute consideration for purposes of- enforcing an arbitration agreement. See also Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue, however, that this line of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement (B) holding that a postinjury arbitration agreement was not part of a employment contract when a seamans continued employment was not conditioned upon its execution (C) holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation (D) holding that an alleged oral modification of a written employment agreement was not enforceable because the employees action in remaining on the job did not constitute adequate consideration (E) holding that offer of atwill employment is valid consideration to support an arbitration agreement
Output: (A)
when a mortgage loan is discharged, satisfied; or recorded. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs contend that the Disputed Fees charged for attorney document preparation, satisfaction, recording and faxing fall squarely in the examples provided by the statute and regulation. The law regarding whether the provisions of RESPA apply beyond the inception of a mortgage is not settled in the Second Circuit. Under facts similar to this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint that alleged a RESPA violation for fees that were assessed at the time repayment of the loan was complete. Bloom v. Martin, 77 F.3d 318, 320 (9th Cir.1996); see also Greenwald v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 446 F.Supp. 620, 625 (D.Mass.1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). This bright-line rule, limiting the scope of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa (B) holding that interest payments on escrow accounts are not a settlement practice under re spa because they can continue long after the closing of the mortgage transaction and which can continue to occur during the entire life of the mortgage (C) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (D) holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity (E) holding that the owner of an equitable interest in property in the form of a land contract can grant a mortgage on that interest under ohio law
Output: (B)
789 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2015). In Doctor, the Fourth Circuit held that South Carolina strong arm robbery categorically falls under the ACCA’s force clause and thus still constitutes a violent felony even after Johnson. 842 F.3d at 312. Courts’ interpretations of the ACCA’s violent-felony definition “apply with equal force” to § 4B1.2(1)’s crime-of-violence definition. United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 231 n.* (4th Cir. 2010). South Carolina strong arm robbery is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery. State v. Scipio, 283 S.C. 124, 322 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1984). As that lesser-included offense is categorically a crime of violence under the force clause, “it necessarily follows” that armed robbery is, too. Cf. United States v. Chisolm, 579 Fed.Appx. 187, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). So is South Carolina attempted armed robbery. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  215 is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  2l12 (B) holding that previous domestic violence finding did not have res judicata effect in proceeding to modify visitation because domestic violence and visitation modification proceedings are different causes of action (C) holding that battery under wyoming law did not necessarily qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (D) holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence (E) holding south carolina crime of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature was categorically a crime of violence under ussg  4b121 because its lesserincluded offense criminal domestic violence fell entirely within  4b12ls force clause
Output: (E)
claims based on a theory of disparate impact. Id. at 240, 125 S.Ct. 1536. That decision also cautions that “the scope of disparate-impact liability under [the] ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.” Id. The Court reasoned that “age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to engage in certain types of employment.” Id. Moreover, the Court referred to amendments to Title VII contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, which expanded the availability of disparate-impact liability in the Title VII context, and effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of Title VII as set forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Because those amendments did not change the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack (B) holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea (C) holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions (D) holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea (E) holding that disparate impact analysis is inapplicable to suit challenging hiring practice that based employee compensation on market rates rather than comparable worth despite demonstrable disparate result and concluding that that analysis is confined to cases that challenge specific clearly delineated employment practice at a single point in the job selection process
Output: (A)
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) ("[Plarties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2."); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ("There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President."). 36 . See, e.g., Perry v. Judd, 840 F.Supp.2d 945, 953-55 (E.D.Va.2012) (barring First and Fourteenth Amendment claims on laches grounds). 37 . See Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F.2d 1336, 1354 (2d Cir.1991) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause (B) holding no violation of federal establishment clause (C) holding that the endorsing requirement does not violate the establishment clause (D) holding in the alternative that plaintiffs establishment clause claims were barred by laches (E) holding that rluipa violates establishment clause
Output: (D)
599 (1976) (stating that School Board would be entitled to release from decree upon district court making factual finding of compliance); Florida Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, 246 F.3d at 1299 (“[I]f the defendants take the position that the consent, decree in this case is no longer justified, they should make an appropriate motion to the .district court on remand to have the decree either modified or terminated.”); United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1505-07 (11th Cir.1993) (explaining that decision to terminate class action employment discrimination decree should address both compliance intended to remedy consequences of past discrimination and whether objective of eliminating illegal discrimination has been met); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 961 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Vazquez v. Carver, 18 F.Supp.2d 503, 507 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to make repeated objections is not ineffective when such objections would not have been sustained (B) holding that district court could not dissolve decree without considering objections to dissolution (C) holding that when defendants only timely filed objections to expert report were that two statements were speculative defendant waived all other objections (D) holding that a party waived its objections on appeal to an affidavit presented in support of a motion for summary judgment by failing to raise its objections to the trial court (E) holding that because generic objections do not afford a sentencing court sufficient notice such objections are inadequate to preserve specific claims of sentencing error
Output: (B)
at least as best it can be understood, see Versata, 793 F.3d at 1323, 1326-27. 5 . It appears on only two other occasions and is nowhere defined. See 35 U.S.C. § 291 (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 262; see also 35 U.S.C. § 156 ("patent which claims”). 6 . "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” 7 . See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). LOURIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reviewing a claim construction decided under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness (B) holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation (E) recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo
Output: (A)
federal statute provides a requirement of thirty days after the expiration of an order or denial that the issuing judge report to the administrative office of the United States Court in significant detail. In these cases, we face the constitutional interest of the sanctity and privacy of home. Consequently, close judicial scrutiny should be exercised. United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.1975). Cf. People v. Yanez, 178 A.D.2d 357, 577 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1991). Inevitably, the federal statutory requirements represent the minimum constitutional criteria for electronic surveillance and does not preclude Wyoming from enacting more stringent standards. See People v. Otto, 2 Cal.4th 1088, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 831 P.2d 1178, cert, denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 414, 121 L.Ed.2d 338 (1992) (<HOLDING>). D. No Issue of Retroactivity As it happens, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a murder case improper wire tapping of telephone calls between the victims wife and her lover recorded by the victim before his death required reversal for suppression (B) holding that despite limiting instruction letter written by murder victim shortly before his death was improperly admitted (C) holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident (D) holding that the defendant plainly consented to the recording and monitoring of his telephone calls at both facilities because he used the telephone after receiving notice that his calls would be recorded andor monitored (E) holding as relevant in a murder case a history of domestic violence involving defendant and his victim
Output: (A)
a hearing on a motion for attorney’s fees as sanctions is not the type of proceeding against the state contemplated by the statute; (2) the Legislature did not intend a parent in a dependency proceeding to be a “party” under the statute because the parent did not initiate the suit— DCF initiated by filing a petition; and (3) providing notice to DFS at the outset of the action is not possible where sanctiona-ble conduct has yet to occur. Because we hold that the plain language of the statute supports N.S.’s position, we do not address the entirety of her arguments. Courts in our state have held that section 284.30 requires notice to DFS as a condition precedent when the claim for fees is made pursuant to other statutes. Hale v. Dep’t of Rev., 973 So.2d 518, 521-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); Dep’t of HRS v. Cordes, 644 So.2d 609, 610 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 12309 is a condition precedent to the accrual of rights against a municipality (B) recognizing that the notice required by section 28430 is a condition precedent to the recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to section 12057lb in hospitals suit against the state (C) holding that the notice requirement is a condition precedent for attorneys fees from section 12069 proceedings in action by plaintiff against state (D) holding that section 28430s notice requirement is a condition precedent for fees in action by taxpayer against dor pursuant to section 213015 (E) holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims
Output: (D)
Plaintiff (“Chevron”) to respond to the merits of the Government’s February 13, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration. On May 19, 2008, Chevron filed an Opposition (“Pl. Recon. Opp’n”). On June 2, 2008, the Government filed a Response (“Gov’t Recon. Resp.”). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. United States Court of Federal Claims Rule (“RCFC”) 59(a)(1) provides that “reconsideration may be granted ... for any of the reasons established by the rules of common law or equity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States.” RCFC 59(a)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that a decision to grant a motion for reconsideration is within the trial court’s discretion. See Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The party requesting reconsideration, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight accorded to evidence lies largely within the agencys discretion (B) holding that the weight afforded to the evidence lies largely within the agencys discretion (C) holding that the decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the trial court (D) holding that the decision as to the weight to be afforded to documentary evidence  lies largely within the discretion of the ij (E) holding that the weight accorded to evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency
Output: (C)
The Court’s Resolution. Plaintiff is correct that 13 C.F.R. § 125.1(g) does not allow a contractor to include indirect costs, such as the REDACTED fee included in STOPSO’s proposal. AR Tab 13 at 2494 (REDACTED fee line). For that reason, the FBI contracting officer recalculated STOPSO’s “Proposal Cost/Price Fee: Total Price Summary” to exclude the REDACTED fee. AR Tab 46a, at 3476. In doing so, the contracting officer confirmed that STOPSO’s proposal was compliant and still well below Plaintiffs proposed price. Although the contracting officer could have brought this issue to the attention of STOP-SO for correction, under these circumstances, the court does riot consider the contracting officer’s decision to make the correction a material error. See Axiom Res. Mgmt., 564 F.3d at 1381 (<HOLDING>). To establish a lack of a rational basis, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise (B) holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence (C) holding that an award for punitive damages must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence (D) holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review (E) holding that an error by the procuring agency must be clear and prejudicial to overturn an award decision
Output: (E)
waived those rights. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. Defendant argues that the trial court made numerous errors in its order. Generally, an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s order on a motion'to suppress is limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence and, in turn, whether the findings support the trial court’s ultimate conclusions of law. E.g., State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). However, here, as noted above, the State argues that defendant failed to preserve the issue because he did not object at trial. Defendant coun ters that no objection was necessary, distinguishing our recent opinion in State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 554, 648 S.E.2d 819, 821 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s contention is that the judge who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review (B) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal (C) holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue    for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial
Output: (E)
evades or attempts to evade any [beer] tax”); § 6111(d)(1)(A) (defining certain tax shelters in terms that include "a significant purpose ... of which is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax ...."); § 6501(c)(2) ("In case of a willful attempt in any manner to defeat or evade tax imposed by this title the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.”); § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (defining a tax shelter as, inter alia, an organization "a significant purpose of [which] is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax”); § 7270 (providing for enhanced fines when any person "fails to comply” with the tax requirements of insurance policies issued by foreign insurers "with intent to evade the tax”); § 7341(a) (<HOLDING>); .§ 7422(e) (providing, in the context of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made (B) holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien (C) holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale (D) holding unenforceable certain financing arrangements under a contract for the sale of property upon which the seller is liable for taxes if the sale was consummated with intent to avoid such tax or in fraud of the internal revenue laws (E) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument
Output: (D)
within the meaning of Teague and its progeny when, on March 21, 1988, Townes’s conviction became final by virtue of the Supreme Court’s first denial of certiorari, and if so, whether it falls within a recognized exception. We answer the first question in the affirmative, for we conclude that the rule Townes seeks “was not dictated by precedent existing” in 1988. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070. In support of his contrary contention that the relief he seeks would not require application of a new rule, Townes relies chiefly upon the several cases which a majority of the Simmons Court invoked in support of its holding that the conduct there at issue violated Simmons’s rights to due process. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-87, 105 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a criminal defendant has a due process right to present evidence and that exclusion of evidence for a defense discovery violation should be imposed only if no other remedy suffices (B) holding sentencing courts exclusion of mitigating evidence proffered by defendant violative of due process (C) holding that defendant has due process right to introduce evidence on minimum parole eligibility in sentencing phase (D) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material (E) holding no abuse of discretion in trial courts exclusion of evidence where evidence was cumulative
Output: (B)
436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In this case, Hill has alleged that Britt (1) sexually abused her in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) spoke "with her about her pending case outside the presence of an attorney in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and (3) unlawfully searched her and her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 194-227, 274. Accordingly, Hill has alleged sufficient facts that Britt violated her constitutional rights to state a claim for relief plausible on its face. Cf., e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-31, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and its various exceptions); United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 482 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (B) holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment (C) holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation (D) holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel (E) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation
Output: (D)
3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974).”). 4 . In EEOC, which involved a claim by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against a university that the school had denied tenure for invalidly discriminatory reasons, the court stated its holding as one which recognized the privilege "in the context of challenges to college or university tenure decisions.” 715 F.2d at 337. The present proceeding does not challenge the University of Miami’s decision to deny tenure but rather seeks damages against named individuals for defaming him in the course of that process. 5 . EEOC recognizes that the privilege it established gives way to a showing of a " 'particularized need’ for relevant information,” 715 F.2d at 338; see Gray v. Board of Higher Education, City of New York, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see generally, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege (B) recognizing academic privilege but holding plaintiffs need for information outweighed colleges interest in confidentiality (C) recognizing privilege (D) recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality (E) holding accuseds right to fair trial outweighed newsmans interest in protecting sources and privilege must yield
Output: (B)
the adoption. In accordance with Oregon law, CSD did not offer the Mullinses a hearing on its decision to oppose the adoption. See Oreg.Admin.Rule 412-30-036(2). Nor did CSD give the Mullinses a f inses’ adoption petition on July 13, 1994. See Klamath County Juvenile Court June 20, 1994, Letter Opinion at 2 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction). The Mullinses had no statutory right of appeal. See In re Adoption of Greybull, 565 P.2d at 774-75. Although the Mullinses could not have appealed the juvenile court’s dismissal of their adoption petition, they could have challenged CSD’s withholding of consent under Oregon’s Administrative Procedures Act. See Oreg.Rev.Stat. § 183.484; see also Adams v. Oregon State Children’s Services Div., 131 Or.App. 396, 886 P.2d 19, 22-25 (1994) (in banc) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied by 321 Or. 137, 894 P.2d 468 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that prospective adoptive parents may challenge to csds refusal to consent under the act (D) holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective
Output: (C)
reporter's record, statements contained within other documents have been deemed sufficient “as long as the statement is made in time for the other parties to designate any additional relevant portions of the record and to prepare their appellate briefs.” Mason, 154 S.W.3d at 819; see Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex.2002) (per curiam) (statement of points filed two months after request for reporter’s record sufficient to comply with Rule 34.6(c)(1), absent showing of prejudice by opposing party); Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 377 (Tex.2001) (notice of statement of points given to opposing party in separate document on the same day as request for reporter’s record sufficient); Melton v. Toomey, 350 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, however, Jill contends 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statement of points in notice of appeal sufficient (B) holding failure to timely file statement of points does not forfeit issues on appeal (C) holding failure to file statement of points is no bar to appeal (D) holding an argument to be waived for inadequate briefing and failure to raise the issue in the statement of points on appeal (E) holding failure to raise issue in statement of points does not forfeit it on appeal
Output: (A)
his name and fingerprints. After obtaining this information, Holland was advised of his Miranda rights, and upon invoking his rights, the interview ceased. Several hours later, when the police determined that Holland had given them a false name (his fingerprints did not match the name Holland gave to the police), a detective went to Holland’s cell and asked Holland for his real name, which Holland provided. Holland moved to suppress this statement. The Florida Supreme Court, relying on this Court’s opinion in Avila v. State, 545 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (concluding that a question aimed at discovering the real name of a defendant is not an interrogation within the scope of Miranda ) and the Fifth District’s opinion in State v. McAdams, 559 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>), concluded that because the detective’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a social security number is not private (B) holding that a defendants use of a persons name and social security number without permission constituted the use of a means of identification without lawful authority (C) holding that basic identification data such as name age current address and social security number is not generally subject to miranda (D) holding that although the social security number in the information and the social security numbers in the previous convictions did not match the rest of the identifying information  the first and last name and date of birth  did match and was sufficient to establish the defendants identity particularly in light of the fact that the defendant did not claim he was not the individual named in the previous convictions (E) holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding
Output: (C)