niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
DCA 1999) (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). Furthermore, the Straney case relied upon by the dissent is distinguishable. That case involved an order that changed a custody order’s time-sharing arrangement to give one of the parties more time with the child, not a change in custody. As noted in Boykin, the test for proving entitlement to custody modification has two prongs: 1) whether there is a substantial and material change of circumstances; and 2) whether the child’s welfare will be promoted by a change in custody. The party seeking custody modification must overcome the “extraordinary burden of proving both elements.” 843 So.2d at 320. It is therefore incumbent on the trial court to apply this extraordinary burden test. See Hastings, 875 So.2d at 779 (<HOLDING>). The court here failed to do so. Our review of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation (B) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion (C) holding trial court abused discretion by assessing sanctions without supporting evidence (D) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (E) holding trial court abused its discretion by modifying custody without applying extraordinary burden test
Output: (E)
Reversed. Judge HUNTER, JR. concurs in result with separate opinion. Judge STEELMAN dissents. 1 . The pseudonym T.A.S. is used to protect the identity of the juvenile. 2 . The record does not indicate whether the male students’ underwear was subject to the search or, if so, how the inspection thereof was conducted. In fact, Ms. Robinson’s testimony suggests that only the girls were subject to this more extensive search. 3 . The same standard applies here despite the presence of a law enforcement officer because, as found by the trial court, the search was conducted by school administrators and staff, and the school resource officer’s role was limited to observation, as he did not participate in the actual search. See In re Murray, 136 N.C. App. 648, 650, 525 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment (B) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (C) holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials (D) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours (E) holding search was conducted by school official where school resource officer did not search the bag himself or conduct any investigation on his own and therefore applying the tlo reasonableness standard
Output: (E)
to suspect that the agency would refuse to adhere to clearly applicable precedent. See Philipp Bros., Inc. v. United States, 10 CIT 76, 80, 630 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (1986). 12 Accordingly, this Court finds Timken’s arguments regarding the application of adverse facts available to Premier are without merit. Premier fully participated in the review, and has no control over it’s suppliers cooperation. Section 1677e(b) of Title 19 states that when Commerce finds “that an interested party failed to cooperate .. . [the agency] may use an” adverse inference. Premier’s suppliers are not interested parties. Therefore, the Court will not apply adverse facts to Premier as a result of its suppliers’ deficiencies. See generally Kompass Food Trading Int'l v. United States, 24 CIT 678, 682-83 (2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tax courts miller opinion will no longer be followed (B) holding that once a respondent refuses to supply information commerce no longer focuses on the true margin but rather on determining an adverse margin that will induce future cooperation (C) holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant (D) holding that aggravation was warranted where respondent admitted and the referee found that the respondent had lied in correspondence to the pcc (E) holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening
Output: (B)
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established “before the defendant acted or failed to act.” Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988)). This requires the plaintiff to offer either a closely analogous case or evidence that the defendants’ conduct is so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts. See Rice, at 1173-74; McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). To determine the applicability of qualified 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis (B) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (C) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied (D) holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force (E) holding a gun to the head of a child and threatening to pull the trigger is plainly excessive force so closely analogous case is not needed to put police officer on notice
Output: (E)
making mistakes. Thus, any prejudice against the Defendant was at best minimal and could have been turned to the Defendant’s advantage by his counsel. Even if any prejudice did result, it most certainly did not permeate the entire trial and impact the result as it appears only once in the transcript and never was mentioned later during the trial. See United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519, 520 (5th Cir.1983) (“Prosecutorial misconduct, fortunately occurring only occasionally, mars any trial in which it occurs and gives grounds for appeal. But a conviction should not be set aside if the prosecutor’s conduct, however, wrongful, did not in fact contribute to the guilty verdict and was, therefore, legally harmless.”); see also United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563-66 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This ground for a new trial, therefore, is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify (B) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error (C) holding that prosecutors allegedly improper closing arguments regarding burden of proof defendants failure to testify and other allegations did not case serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury verdict or the fairness of the trial (D) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (E) holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge
Output: (C)
part: "If no objections have been timely filed, the court shall forthwith enter judgment on the referee’s report.” 2 . An amended order was entered on December 22, 2009, to correct a typographical error. 3 . Prejudgment interest awarded to a successful defendant on a counterclaim accrues from the date the counterclaim, not the plaintiff's complaint, is filed. Uncle Henry’s, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 150, 154 (D.Me.2005) (interpreting 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5) (2009)). 4 . We recognized an exception to this general rule with respect to post-judgment interest on certain child support arrearage claims, which were deemed to be a "unique area of the law.” Walsh v. Cusack, 2008 ME 74, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d 414, 417. 5 . See also Walsh, 2008 ME 74, ¶¶ 10-11, 946 A.2d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Tarbuck v. Jaeckel, 2000 ME 105, ¶ 25 n. 5, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts (B) holding that walsh was entitled to postjudgment interest on child support arrearage but vacating and remanding the arrearage judgment because the judgment did not state the interest rate or specify that the interest was fully or partially waived as required by section 1602c (C) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (D) holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case (E) holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment
Output: (B)
of the separation of powers doctrine. Several courts and commentators have recognized, however, that this language is meaningless unless read within the context of the court’s discussion of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1219-20 (“[the Boerne court’s] discussion of the separation of powers doctrine was entirely within the framework of its section 5 analysis — not an independent rationale”); Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958-59 (“Although the court did mention separation of powers concerns in [Boeme], this language must be read in the context of the entire opinion and the question being considered”); Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 1903, 1914 (2001) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court concludes that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still (B) holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution (C) recognizing that in boeme justice kennedy forcefully asserted the judicial prerogative to interpret the constitution in language that might be understood to implicate rfras applications to federal as well as state law but also that other language in the opinion indicates that the court situated its judicial supremacy concerns squarely in the context of the fourteenth amendment and state sovereignty (D) holding that to hold the same constitution that specifically recognizes felon disenfranchisement under  2 of the fourteenth amendment but also prohibits disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the constitution in an inconsistent manner (E) holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state
Output: (C)
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (B) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct  (C) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (D) holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (E) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause
Output: (E)
from the class if the member so requests”). 36. Plaintiffs observe that after receiving-class notice in the ordinary case, a would-be class member cannot refuse to opt out and later object to class certification. Plaintiffs argue that through declining to opt out, the class member has in essence consented to the propriety of class certification. Courts have held, for example, that a decision not to opt out of a class should foreclose attacks on whether the class has adequate representation. See, e.g., Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 354, 357-58 (2d Cir.1979) (observing that right to opt-out of the proposed settlement protects class members’ interests from alleged inadequate representation); see also Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1220, 114 S.Ct. 2707, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conflicts of constitutional magnitude can arise from cases of successive representation (B) holding that the failure to optout precluded challenge to adequate representation based upon purported conflicts of interest between subclasses (C) holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case (D) holding that pslra barred rico claims based on pension fund scheme involving failure to disclose conflicts of interest and commission arrangements (E) holding where challenge was waived that appellate review is precluded
Output: (B)
of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name — Emory Ansley — is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (B) holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation (C) holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain (D) holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart (E) holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation
Output: (D)
address the precise language of the agreement. See id. at 1018. That case cannot stand for the proposition that any contractual rate of interest applies postjudgment, because that would conflict with the merger rule and would have made it unnecessary for the court in Hymel to emphasize that the contractual rate of interest applied both before and after judgment. 23 .See also Steven H. Reisberg & Kristin M. Pauley, An Arbitrator’s Authority to Award Interest on an Award Until "Date of Payment”: Problems and Limitations, 2013 Int’l Arb. L.Rev. 25, 29-30 ("To successfully ‘contract out’ of the statutory post-judgment interest rates, it is therefore critical that the language used specifically refer to the post-judgment period.”). 24 . Cf. also Carte Blanche, 888 F.2d at 264, 268-70 (<HOLDING>) 25 . See also Hosier v. Citigroup Global 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award  until final payment of the award  was insufficient to displace federal rate (B) holding that rule 60a is the proper vehicle for correcting a judgment in order to provide for an award of prejudgment interest where among other things governing law would make the interest award automatic or the district court clearly intended to make the interest award in its prior order (C) holding that arbitral award of 10 interest to the date or dates of payment merged into the judgment (D) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (E) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
Output: (C)
that the trial court could properly conclude that “there was no showing of uniform conduct likely to mislead the entire jury is not required for non-representative class members, the issues of reliance and injury do not foreclose Plaintiff Brown’s UCL class action. See, e.g., Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 275 F.R.D. 573, 578 (C.D.Cal.2011) (“The ... the alleged omissions and affirmative misrepresentations were consistently made and are therefore common to all members of the putative class.”); Wiener v. Dannon Co., 255 F.R.D. 658, 669 (C.D.Cal.2009) (“For a class action, an inference of reliance arises as to the entire class only if the material misrepresentations were made to all class members.”); Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 238 F.R.D. 482, 492 (C.D.Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiff Brown may prove with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court could reasonably assume that no rational class member would have purchased the product had he known of the alleged misrepresentation (B) holding that a person cannot reasonably rely on a misrepresentation when the contents of a written instrument contradict the alleged misrepresentation (C) holding inference appropriate where no rational class member would have acted if there had been adequate disclosure (D) holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action (E) holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation
Output: (A)
to commit the crime in the manner specified. Voluntary abandonment of purpose after an act constituting an attempt is not a defense. The definition in the 1928 and 1949 Manuals was as follows: An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that particular crime, and forming part of a series of acts which will apparently, if not interrupted by circumstances independent of the doer’s will, result in its actual commission. Para. 152c, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1928; para. 183c, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1949. The Articles for the Government of the Navy also did not have any general statutory prohibition of attempts; but apparently they often were punishable as lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., section 91, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937 (<HOLDING>) According to naval law: If an attempt is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal (B) recognizing attempted fraud as a lesserincluded offense of fraud in violation of article 14 for the government of the navy (C) holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred (D) holding that the issue of fraud was precluded because the previous jury necessarily considered fraud as the basis for chapter 93a liability (E) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud
Output: (B)
unique facts and circumstances of each case” to determine whether an individual voluntarily consented to a search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The district court’s sifting of the unique facts and circumstances in this case changed from its first order to its second order. When the district court reviewed the evidence through the lens of an unlawful seizure, it was then-and only then-the court found Loos’s and Escobar’s consents were constitutionally deficient. The district court properly considered the legal effect of the officer’s lie about the drug dog alerting when pondering whether Loos and Escobar voluntarily consented to the searches of their luggage. The Supreme Court has “stated that even when of 86, 1191 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Realizing there is “a vast difference between 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion (B) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding consent where two agents testified that the defendant orally consented but the defendant denied having orally consented and would not sign a written consent form (C) holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act (D) holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert (E) holding that defendant voluntarily consented where defendants only basis for coercion was that the officers said that if he did not consent they would get a warrant which would take a while
Output: (D)
§ 6323(a), leave which is never afforded to nonmilitary personnel. Furthermore, the cases Defendants cite in support of their contention address situations in which employers had unilateral policies affording additional benefits or rights to absent military personnel. While courts have consistently held that employers do not commit a USERRA violation in revoking these extra benefits, these cases do not address USERRA rights provided by statute. See Crews v. City of Mt. Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.2009) (rescission of a flexible work scheduling program did not constitute a USERRA violation); Gross v. PPG Indus., Inc., 636 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir.2011) (rescission of differential pay policy did not violate US-ERRA); Welshans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 F.3d 1100, 1104 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). There is simply no plausible argument that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that revocation of benefits provided by the employee and labor relations manual did not implicate userra (B) holding an employee manual did not create contract restricting the employmentatwill relationship (C) holding enforceable employee manual that was distributed to all employees (D) holding that there was no employment contract where personnel manual provided that after three months an employee became a permanent employee where there was no additional expression as to duration (E) holding employee manual binding based in part on its widespread distribution
Output: (A)
for a valid charging lien set forth by the supreme court in Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983). “In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.” Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla.1986) (citing Sinclair, Louis, 428 So.2d at 1385). Notice is timely where the charging hen is filed prior to entry of the final judgment. See Gaebe, Murphy, Mullen & Antonelli v. Bradt, 704 So.2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Conversely, an attorney’s charging hen is untimely and may not be established in proceedings after final judgment has been entered. See Milio v. Leinoff & Silvers, P.A., 668 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, Mr. Johnson did not give notice of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment (B) holding in part as a general rule a trial courts judgment becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a party files a timely notice of appeal or specified posttrial motion (C) holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment (D) holding attorney may not wait more than thirty days from the entry of final judgment give notice of nonrepresentation and then seek to enforce a hen not noticed before the entry of the final judgment (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
Output: (D)
S.W.2d 759, 767 (Tex.Ciim.App.1973) (stating that seizure conducted within parameters of a valid search warrant did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights where officers acted in accordance with procedural guidelines). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third and fourth issues. In his fifth and sixth issues, appellant contends that the method of seizure violated the constitutional provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws found in article I, section 10, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution. Ex post facto prohibitions apply to civil statutes only when the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. See Rodriguez, 93 S.W.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>). Forfeitures under chapter 59 of the code of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent (B) holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent (C) holding that the legislatures manifest intent will be rejected only where the party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statute is actually criminally punitive in operation (D) recognizing language of statute as clearest indicator of legislative intent (E) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute
Output: (C)
purports to be — an authorization to settle the case for $500,000. In sum, the Court rejects Plaintiff's attempt to rely on this prior settlement discourse as a means to establish a viable amendment. 3 . Plaintiff could have amended her administrative claim at this time because the INS had not yet denied her claim. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). However, Plaintiff elected not to file an amendment. 4 . Plaintiff contends that Defendant has the burden of showing that Plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable when Plaintiff filed her administrative claim. (PL’s Reply at 2-3.) Plaintiff is wrong. It is well settled that a plaintiff has the burden of proving “newly discovered evidence" under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). See Milano v. United States, 92 F.Supp.2d 769, 774 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Lowry, 958 F.Supp. at 719 (“The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that newly discovered evidence must be that which existed at the time of trial but for an excusable reason was not discoverable until later (B) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (C) holding that a plaintiff has the burden of proof to show newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency (D) holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed (E) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence
Output: (C)
or determination of an officer, board, commission, authority or tribunal. Such petition shall be filed within 30 days after the date of the decision or determination complained of and shall recite such decision or determination and set forth the errors alleged to have been committed therein. The petition shall be signed by the petitioner or his attorney, and shall be accompanied by the certificate of the attorney that he has examined the process or proceeding and the decision or determination therein sought to be reviewed, that the same is in his opinion erroneous and that the petition is not filed for delay. Super. Ct. R. 15(a). (emphasis added). To fall under the terms of Rule 15(a) whereby the thirty-day requirement would ept. of Property and Procurement, 41 V.I. 72 (Terr.Ct. 1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Hodge, 16 V.I. 548, 555 (Terr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase party aggrieved should be given a practical rather than hypertechnical meaning (B) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language (C) holding that federal court decisions construing and applying the federal arbitration act may be regarded as persuasive authority in construing and applying corresponding provisions of our local arbitration act (D) holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed (E) holding that party is aggrieved from date of notice but construing rule 15a
Output: (E)
that appellee directly advertised to Pennsylvania residents. See appellants’ EXHIBIT D, E. These references serve as nothing more than indicators for visitors in ascertaining the location of the campground in relation to known areas. ¶ 17 Appellee’s newsletters are advertised in two national publications. There is no evidence in the record that these are directly targeted at Pennsylvania residents. See appellants’ EXHIBIT M, at 12. Additionally, appellee handed out brochures at the campgrounds located in New Jersey. Id. at 15. In order for a party to obtain a brochure without stepping into New Jersey, the party needs to initiate contact with appellee by written inquiry. Id. These forms of communication preclude a finding of systematic and continuous contact. See Efford, supra at 375 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 Moreover, the owner of Four Seasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding interactive website did not create general jurisdiction (B) holding that the defendant maintained a passive website and was therefore not subject to general jurisdiction (C) holding that a passive website that merely makes information available is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction (D) holding that a nonresident defendant who knowingly sent false information about billing commissions into massachusetts via us mail in order to deceive the plaintiff into accepting a lower percentage than was due him was subject to specific jurisdiction (E) holding that absence of evidence that appellee internet company directed advertising towards pennsylvanians via its website and the initiation by appellant to receive information via mail precluded a finding of general jurisdiction
Output: (E)
Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417, 425 (Colo.App.1994); Employers Insurance of Wausau v. RREEF USA Fund-II (Colorado), Inc., 805 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Colo.Ct.App.1991). Here, Plaintiffs confessed the state claims against Cox for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and estoppel against Cox. They did not confess the remainder of causes of action against him, including the state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Because Cox was required to expend efforts beyond the filing of the motion to dismiss, an award of fees under § 13-17-201 is warranted. Moreover, Plaintiffs are liable for Cox’s attorney fees, notwithstanding that certain claims may remain against other Defendants. See Smith v. Town of Snowmass Village, 919 P.2d 868, 873 (Colo.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). I conclude, pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed (B) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (C) holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant (D) holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment (E) holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages
Output: (C)
to principles and interpretations of federal Title VII cases when construing the MHRA. See e.g., Continental Can Co. v. State by Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.1980) (Title VII cases and principles are instructive and have been applied to the MHRA) (citing Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn.1978)). “Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Several federal courts of appeal, federal district courts, and at least one state court have held that an employee has a cause of action against his or her employer when a non-employee sexually harasses the employee. See e.g., Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Trent v. Valley Electric Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action (B) holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers (C) holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations (D) holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor (E) holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action
Output: (E)
plaintiff has not adequately alleged a conspiracy, nor has plaintiff put forth evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that a conspiracy existed. In fact, plaintiff has failed to identify the purported members of the conspiracy. Plaintiff cannot simply make a conclusory allegation that a conspiracy existed; rather, plaintiff must provide facts showing agreement and concerted action. Sooner Prods. Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1983). In this case, plaintiffs allegation of a conspiracy, without more, is insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts tending to show agreement or concerted action. The court finds that plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim fails as a maicer of law. Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1303 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). D. Municipal Liability Plaintiff also alleges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim (B) holding that conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based citations omitted (C) holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient (D) holding conclusory assertions of intent to cause insufficient without supporting facts (E) holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim
Output: (A)
This holding, however, not only fails to dispose of Reyes’s first complaint, it fails to consider Rule 13.1(a)’s history in addressing his second complaint. However, since Reyes’s second issue can (and should) be disposed of without doing violence to the mandatory nature of the court reporter’s duty, I concur in the court’s judgment. When the trial court renders a judgment for the recovery of real property, the amount of “security must be at least ... the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(2)(A). Therefore, to determine the proper amount t did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Reyes’s motion to set superse-deas, a reporter’s record of the hearing was not required. Cf. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex.2005) (<HOLDING>). The majority holds, however, that Reyes 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding (B) holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object (C) holding in the pretrial context that a reporters record is required only if evidence is introduced in open court for nonevidentiary hearings it is superfluous (D) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is  justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (E) holding that it is not
Output: (C)
even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court’s 1993 decision — which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy — was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We believe that the District Court’s 1993 order was no more final under § 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under  1292a1 (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc  1292a1 (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
Output: (D)
boundaries of a search in the same manner as the specifications in a warrant. If the government does not conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search, the search is impermissible. In justifying a consensual search, the government bears the burden of establishing that the search was conducted within the purview of the consent received. When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). See also State v. Nabarro, 55 Haw. 583, 583-87, 525 P.2d 573, 574-75 (1974) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation mark omitted). Hence, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises (C) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted
Output: (B)
Perkins’ testimony were not prejudicial in these circumstances. D. Downward Departures Kornegay claims that the district court erroneously denied him a downward departure on either of two bases. Both departure arguments relate to the 14-month state drug conviction sentence which Kornegay served after the drug deal at issue in this case but before he was indicted. The first ground for departure was premised on the government’s delay in prosecuting Kornegay in order to protect Chaney from being detected as an informant. Kornegay argued that this delay foreclosed the possibility of his federal sentence running concurrently with his state sentence and that a departure should be granted so that he would not be prejudiced. See United States v. Saldana, 109 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The district court declined to grant the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the defendant was paroled rather than released unconditionally his state sentence was discharged for purposes of deciding whether the federal judge could impose a concurrent sentence (B) holding that prosecutorial delay that was extreme or sinister could support a departure if the defendant was required to serve a state sentence which could have been concurrent with the federal sentence had the federal prosecution proceeded sooner (C) holding that a federal sentence commences when the attorney general receives the convicted defendant into custody for service of that sentence (D) holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence (E) holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims
Output: (B)
See In re Russell C., 120 N.H. at 268; cf. State v. Bernaby, 139 N.H. 420, 423 (1995) (concluding that trial court did not deny defendant his right to a speedy trial where delay was due, in part, to defendant’s waiver of right and request for continuances because a “defendant cannot take advantage of a delay he has caused”). In this case, the juvenile moved to dismiss at the original adjudicatory hearing because none of the State’s witnesses was present and, therefore, the State could not go forward with the hearing. The State acknowledged that it could'not go forward with the hearing and did not object to dismissal of the petition. The State did not request a continuance or that it be given a fourteen day extension under RSA 169-B:14, II. Cf. In re Juvenile 2007-150, 156 N.H. at 802 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the only relief the State requested 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (B) holding that trial court did not err in denying juveniles motion to dismiss for failing to complete adjudicatory hearing within statutory time limit where adjudicatory hearing began within thirty days of arraignment but prosecutor requested a continuance when one of his subpoenaed witnesses did not appear (C) holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing (D) holding that trial court did not err (E) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion
Output: (B)