niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
constitutional question beyond debate.... [T]he right allegedly violated must be estab lished, not as a broad general proposition, but in a particularized sense so that the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable official. Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093-94, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Otherwise stated, to determine whether a right is clearly established, courts must determine “whether (1) it was defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has confirmed the existence of the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful.” Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 345 (2d Cir.2011); see also Johnson, 239 F.3d at 250 (<HOLDING>). There cannot be much debate that as a general 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established (B) holding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity where it was not objectively reasonable for them to believe that failing to develop ieps which contained the required information did not violate the plaintiffs statutory rights (C) holding that qualified immunity applies if either a the defendants action did not violate clearly established law or b it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the officers action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding that qualified immunity analysis begins with the court asking whether the plaintiffs allegations if true establish a constitutional violation internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (C)
of the CLAM Sale were treated as distributions to Richard and Todd. The effect of these transactions was to transfer money from one Kitchin-controlled entity to pay the debts of another Kitchin-con-trolled entity resulting in harm to the Trust. On this basis, this Court finds that Richard exercised sufficient control over Kitchin LLC to satisfy the first prong of the Ashley test. Having established control, this Court also finds that the totality of the circumstances warrants piercing the corporate veil. Looking to the substance of the CLAM Sale and the CAP Payments, this Court recognizes that both Richard and Todd treated the debts of Chester Auto Parts and Kitchin LLC as indistinguishable. See Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 198 F.3d 107, 127 fn. 5 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Neither Richard nor Chester Auto Parts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation (B) recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked (C) holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud (D) holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law (E) recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person
Output: (E)
the OA says FedEx directs the results, but not the manner and means, of the Plaintiffs’ work. (OA, ¶ 1.15) More specifically, the OA provides that FedEx cannot “prescribe hours of work, whether or when the Contractor is to take breaks, what route the Contractor is to follow, or other details of performance.” (Id.) The contractual designation of the work status of a person is not conclusive for purposes of determining whether he is an employee or an independent contractor, when there is evidence to overcome such designation. Nunn, 151 S.W.3d at 401. See also, Williams, 2009 WL 2592312, at *3-4 (the mere characterization in a con tract of a party as an independent contractor is not controlling, especially when other contractual provisions evidence control); Burgess, 923 S.W.2d at 454 (<HOLDING>). Simply characterizing a party as an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the agreement was not illusory because it was supported by consideration insofar as the employee and employer were equally bound by a promise to arbitrate disputes (B) holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder (C) holding that the fact that the defendant maintained employment records was insufficient to establish that she was a joint employer under the economic reality test (D) holding that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and declining to permit the reality of that status to be obscured by illusory formalities in the employment contract (E) holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract
Output: (D)
Brenner’s ideas, concepts, and innovations are not a part of her protectable trade dress. The copying that is relevant here relates only to the total “look and feel” of the two gyms, and efforts to confuse consumers as to source. But, as discussed, the “look and feel” of the Pure Power and Warrior Fitness facilities are not substantially similar. And, there is no evidence that Defendants intended to mislead customers as to the identity of Warrior Fitness. This is not a case where Defendants profited by selling “knock-off’ copies of Plaintiffs’ products or services, see, e.g., Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 205, 120 S.Ct. at 1339, and the names of the two businesses are not confusingly similar. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 118 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court of appeals correctly stated the public policy exception but erroneously concluded that the exception did not apply (B) holding that the white defendants association with a black defendant was not sufficient to give them standing to join in the black defendants batson challenge (C) recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits (D) holding that the district court reasonably concluded that black bear did not intend to mislead the public that the charbucks coffees were starbucks products (E) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court
Output: (D)
voluntary dismissal by stipulation under Rule 41 (a)(1)[ (A) ](ii) is of right, cannot be conditioned by the court, and does not call for the exercise of any discretion on the part of the court.”). 10 . See also Bechuck v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 814 F.3d 287, 292-93 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Court-ordered sanctions should be neither ‘a consequence’ of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice nor a ‘condition’ placed upon such dismissal.” (quoting Cooter &Gell, 496 U.S. at 396-97, 110 S.Ct. 2447)); Predator Int'l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., 793 F.3d 1177, 1188 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Forum shopping is not an improper purpose [under Rule 11] if a ground for federal jurisdiction arguably exists.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)); Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). 11 . We also held that the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered (B) holding that default judgment could not be rendered after the defendant had served plaintiff with a copy of a motion to dismiss that had not then been filed (C) holding district court had no authority to require plaintiffs to obtain courts permission to dismiss defendant who had not served answer or motion for summary judgment as plaintiffs had absolute right to dismissal without prejudice and thus court could not sanction plaintiffs for filing notice of voluntary dismissal rather than motion (D) holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment (E) holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter
Output: (C)
to the poisonous tree”) (quoting Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1117). To be able to object to the police conducting an illicit protective sweep of the Gonzalez residence, Defendant would have to have some basis to claim that the sweep violated his rights. He does not. We conclude, therefore, that his subsequent detention was lawful. 2. Defendant’s detention occurred after the police had conducted the sweep of Gonzalez’s residence, and only an individual with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence could object to the sweep. After entering the garage, officers acted reasonably in detaining Defendant when they caught him red handed with large quantities of marijuana, cuttings tools, and scales in plain sight. See United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1344 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). We reject any contention that the officers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the standard of probable cause applies to all arrests without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations thus an officer may without violating the fourth amendment arrest an offender if probable cause exists to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence (B) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (C) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (D) holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed (E) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed
Output: (D)
law torts committed by employees of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. However, the waiver only extends to torts committed by government employees “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [tortious] act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The plain meaning of section 1346(b) is that the United States cannot be held liable when there is no comparable cause of. action against a private citizen. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 2674 restates the threshold limitation on the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity: ‘The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same maimer and to the same extent 1990) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. United States, 644 F.2d 846 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under missouri law (B) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law (C) holding that the united states was a statutory loaning employer under illinois law (D) holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer (E) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law
Output: (A)
335, 112 S.Ct. at 1355; see United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam) ("[T]he granting of credit for time served is in the first instance an administrative, not a judicial, function.”). In view of Wilson and our circuit precedent, it is troubling that the dissent advances the position that district courts can override the BOP's determination regarding sentence credits. “In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the district court has no authority to grant a defendant credit for any time served in detention before sentencing, but rather the Attorney General has the sole authority to grant credit for time already served." United States v. Daggao, 28 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1390, 131 L.Ed.2d 242 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 10 . A subsequent BOP program statement, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where mandatory life sentence enhancement was the tail which wags the dog of defendants firearm conviction which raised constitutional due process issues the district court had authority to consider a downward departure under section 5k20 of the guidelines (B) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent (C) holding that the district court could not circumvent attorney generals determination that inhome presentence detention of defendant pursuant to release on bond is not applicable for sentence credit by according a downward departure under ussg  5k20 based on this detention (D) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (E) holding that after granting the governments motion for downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the district court did not err when it determined that the starting point for departing downward was the higher statutorily required minimum sentence and not the lower otherwise applicable guideline range
Output: (C)
to Miranda warnings. Moreover, the government agreed not to submit to the jury any statements that Ahmad Bey made at the interview and Ahmad Bey does not allege that the government broke their agreement. We can quickly dispose of Ahmad Bey’s remaining arguments. She argues that the district court should not have rejected her claim of privilege and allowed the government to call as witnesses the attorneys she hired to file her bankruptcy petitions. But information provided to an attorney in anticipation of a bankruptcy filing is not intended to be held in confidence and therefore is not privileged. United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Ahmad Bey also argues that the government 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant liable for intended loss created by filing false tax return for someone else even though intended victim demonstrated to irs that tax return was bogus (B) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (C) holding that tax returns are privileged under the statutes that prohibited the tax board and employees from disclosing any information and this privilege should not be nullified by allowing third parties to obtain the information by demanding copies of the returns (D) holding that information furnished to preparer of tax return is not privileged (E) holding that intentional failure to file an information return is not a willful filing
Output: (D)
that a declaration of an' express trust of land must be in writing. S.C.Code Ann. § 62-7-101 (1987). However, “sufficient part performance of a parol contract for the conveyance of land will remove the contract from the statute of frauds.” Stackhouse, 271 S.C. at 521, 248 S.E.2d at 488. To compel specific performance of an oral agreement where part performance is alleged to remove the contract from the statute of frauds, a court of equity must find: 1) clear evidence of an oral agreement; 2) the agreement had been partially executed; and 3) the party who requested performance had completed or was willing to complete his part of the oral agreement. Gibson v. Hrys tlemeyer cannot establish part performance of the alleged agreement. See Stackhouse, 271 S.C. at 521, 248 S.E.2d at 483 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the circuit court did not err by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract (B) holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds (C) holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it (D) holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds (E) holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds
Output: (B)
or techniques used in the interviews. He also pointed out that Crappa’s certainty in her testimony waned between the February 15 interview and a March 12 conversation with an investigator, explaining that hypnotically-induced suggestions must be reinforced with some frequency to last. This phenomenon explained Crap-pa’s amnesia at Alcala’s second trial. B. Error “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. The right[ ] ... to call witnesses in one’s own behalf ha[s] long been recognized as essential to due process.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard (B) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (C) holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (D) holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause (E) holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard
Output: (E)
Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co., 115 N.M. 622, 627, 857 P.2d 22, 27 (1993). {53} Other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have unequivocally held that for purposes of personal jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to establish only instrumentality, and instead a plaintiff must also establish that the corporation that is 960 F.2d 1080, 1091-93 (1st Cir.1992) (deciding the question of personal jurisdiction using federal veil piercing standard for ERISA cases and holding that fraudulent intent and injustice are elements of the standard), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Cent. States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 2000); ACE & Co. v. Balfour Beatty PLC, 148 F.Supp.2d 418, 425 (D.Del.2001) (<HOLDING>); Medina v. Four Winds Int’l Corp., 111 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results (B) holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law (C) holding that delaware law requires fraud injustice or inequity to be shown before the alter ego doctrine can be used to find personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation (D) holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation (E) recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked
Output: (C)
Morawski was concerned about these comments, that Morawski consented to the monitoring of the “Open Line,” and that Morawski made the decision to terminate Plaintiff within a year of those comments. Although this evidence is far from conclusive proof that a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse áction, the temporal proximity between the protected conduct, Morawski’s behavior indicating concern about that conduct, and the adverse action, -is sufficient evidence to satisfy the third element of a prima facie retaliation claim. See EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation “is not onerous”); Polk v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 801 F.2d 190, 197 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiff has presented a prima 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment (B) holding that the combination of temporal proximity and negative statements concerning the employees protected activity can create a triable question of fact on the issue of retaliatory motivation even in the presence of legitimate performancerelated reasons for terminating the plaintiff (C) holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases (D) recognizing temporal proximity when agency had knowledge of employees protected activity (E) holding that the plaintiff has established temporal proximity when the plaintiff engaged in protected activity on june 23 1988 and the defendant terminated the plaintiff on august 1 1988
Output: (B)
(D.D.C.1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C.Cir.1988) (explaining that the pleader must allege with particularity the alleged fraud to survive a Rule 9(b) motion). Finally, “[c]onclusory allegations that a defendant’s actions were fraudulent and deceptive are not sufficient to satisfy 9(b).” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 217 F.Supp.2d 59, 73 (D.D.C.2002); see also In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir.2002) (noting that courts are not required to credit a complaint’s bald assertions, legal conclusions or “legal conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations”) Where a pleading does not satisfy the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b), the court should freely grant leave to amend. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court should reserve 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (B) holding that a district court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts (C) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (D) recognizing that courts almost always grant leave to amend to cure deficiencies in pleading fraud (E) recognizing that courts freely grant pro se litigants leave to amend
Output: (D)
Put another way, Shriner contends that the use of telephonic warrants makes any exigency disappear because the police will be able to obtain a blood sample well before the evidence is entirely gone. But the officer facing the need for a telephonic warrant cannot be expected to know how much delay will be caused by following the procedures necessary to obtain a warrant. And during the time taken to obtain a telephonic warrant, it is undisputed that the defendant's body is rapidly metabolizing and dissipating the alcohol in the defendant's blood. We do not believe that the possibility of obtaining a telephonic warrant is sufficient to overcome the single-factor exigent cireumstances of the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the defendant's blood in this case.[ ] We agr 7 (Colo.1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 16minute delay between the defendants arrest and the reading of the implied consent notice did not require suppression of the chemical test results when the arresting officer was dealing with a second intoxicated driver and investigating the accident scene (B) holding that probable cause was clearly present justifying the taking of a blood sample without the defendants consent when it was established that the defendant was involved in an automobile accident and the police noticed liquor on his breath at the scene of the accident and at the hospital (C) holding that exigency exists when time has elapsed while the driver is transported to the hospital and the investigating officer is detained at the accident scene (D) holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident (E) holding that a 20 to 30 minute delay was warranted when the arresting officer was investigating the accident scene and dealing with the hazard created by the wrecked vehicle
Output: (C)
this ease is to certify a class to determine the issue of whether Beverly systematically and chronically understaffed the Batesville nursing facility and then to decertify the class, if necessary, to determine individual restitution and damage claims as well as any defenses in separate proceedings.” Thomas, 370 Ark. at 320, 259 S.W.3d at 451 — 52. The same is true here. Determining the central questions whether understaffing creates contractual or statutory liability and whether chronic understaffing occurred are more efficiently handled in a single proceeding. Otherwise, there exists the possibility of a multiplicity of suits across the state with the potential that circuit courts may reach inconsistent results. See Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We also do not agree that efficiency is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that whether or not claimant would have returned to work at all was a question of fact (B) holding it is a question of fact (C) holding that actual apportionment of damages is a question of fact (D) holding that the repeated litigation of the liability question and the possibility of inconsistent results outweighed the fact that each claimant would have different evidence regarding damages (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
Output: (D)
approximately eight years later was an unforeseeable intervening act. Id. 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d at 1253. Defendant also stressed that the potential for indeterminate liability for a single wrongful act argued against recognition of a preconception tort cause of action. Id. 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. Rejecting defendant’s contentions, the Illinois Supreme Court, 4-3, remanded the case for trial observing that “it is not necessary that the legal duty be owed to one in existence at the time of the wrongful act.” Id. 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d at 1256. A number of cases from other jurisdictions subsequently have recognized malpractice causes of action based on preconception torts. See, e.g., Empire Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo.1988) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind.1992) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined (B) recognizing infants preconception tort claim based on allegations that medical centers misidentification of mothers rh negative blood as rh positive led to doctors failure to administer rhogam following earlier pregnancy causing mothers rh isoimmunization to inflict severe damage to child of subsequent pregnancy (C) recognizing preconception tort cause of action for child born with rubella syndrome based on allegations that physicians who treated mother during earlier pregnancy failed to test or immunize mother for rubella (D) holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy (E) recognizing cause of action for preconception tort based on allegation that obstetricians mismanagement of mothers prior pregnancy including failure to diagnose and test mothers rh isoimmunization was proximate cause of severe injuries to child of subsequent pregnancy
Output: (E)
limit, or condition the promise not to sue as to Atlantech, which was the only party before the district court charged with infringement. Future disputes relating to Atlantech’s successors in interest and others in privity with Atlantech are just that-future disputes. They must be left to future cases and are not ripe for consideration in this case. See Amana, 172 F.3d at 855-56; Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1060; Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 637-38 (Fed.Cir.1991). Once Inline made its unconditional promise not to sue Atlantech, the case or controversy at the center of the lawsuit became nonjusticiable, and any apprehension on Atlantech’s part that it would face further claims of infringement of Inline’s asserted patents was eliminated. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1059 (<HOLDING>). The filing by Inline of its motion to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs unconditional agreement not to sue defendant for infringement based upon any product then manufactured by defendant rendered noninfringement and invalidity counterclaims nonjusticiable (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (C) holding that plaintiffs infringement claim against defendants laterdeveloped product would be barred by laches and estoppel found applicable to earlier product if subsequent product is equivalent to earlier one under doctrine of equivalents (D) holding a covenant not to sue mooted a counterclaim of trademark invalidity notwithstanding the lack of an admission or finding of liability (E) holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage
Output: (A)
M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The intended effect of the statutory language is at best uncertain because the reference to “any such grounds applied in [Suter ], but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions” is open to interpretation. However, “the fairest reading of Section 1320a-2 [and 1320a-10] is that Congress was concerned ... that a court should not eviscerate an otherwise enforceable right merely because it appears in a statute mandating that participating states include a particular provision in their state plans.” Messier v. Southbury Training School, 916 F.Supp. 133, 144-45 (D.Conn.1996); see also Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (11th Cir.1997). But see LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F.3d 556, 568-70 (D.C.Cir.1995), vacated by 87 F.3d 1389 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In light of sections 1320a-2 and 1320a-10, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because buter did not use an approach different from past cases  1320a2  1320a10 are without any effect (B) recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended (C) holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union (D) holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach (E) holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c
Output: (A)
unpublished decisions, “[njoticeably absent from the list of factors Pruitt instructs district courts to consider are the merits and substance of the pro se plaintiffs claim.” Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Correctional Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014); Kennedy v. Huibregtse, No. 13-C-4, 2014 WL 4924662, at *15 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). On appeal from an adverse judgment in a case where the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recruit; the Court of Appeals will consider whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation” in assessing whether the district court’s abuse of its discretion was prejudicial. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659 (italics original r. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that plaintiffs claim must have arguable merit meaning that plaintiffs allegations clearly state a nonfrivolous prima facie case of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and that the already established evidence indicates more than an extremely slim chance of success on the merits
Output: (E)
the defendant beyond that normally present in first-degree murder. Defendant demonstrated unusual depravity of mind as he told the victim he was going to “f — k him up,” pointed the gun in his face as the victim was backing away, waited a “silent moment,” and then shot him four times over such trivial matters as a missing shirt and perceived disrespect. After shooting the victim, defendant scoffed at him by saying, “you thought I was playing” while kicking the victim about the face and upper body. This decision by defendant to taunt and continue assaulting the victim as he lay helplessly bleeding to death on the ground at defendant’s feet further evinces defendant’s lack of remorse and unusual depravity of mind. See State v. Robinson, 342 N.C. 74, 86-87, 463 S.E.2d 218, 225-26 (1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that defendant robbed the victim after killing him showed a lack of remorse (B) holding that a photograph of the hands of the murder victim tied behind her back was properly admitted because it showed the considerable pain inflicted upon the victim by the defendant (C) recognizing lack of remorse as factor that can inform sentence (D) holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank (E) holding any error in admitting allegedly irrelevant testimony that the defendant loved music was harmless in capital murder prosecution where the defendant admitted killing the victim and evidence supported the conviction
Output: (A)
Instead, on May 31, 2012, he moved for an extension of time to file his NOA, claiming good cause and excusable neglect under Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The problem for Spring, however, is that a Rule 4(a)(5) motion based on good cause or excusable neglect must be filed within thirty days of the expiration of the time to file an NOA. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i). Because the period for filing an NOA expired on April 27, the motion for extension was due May 29 (excluding May 27 and 28, a Sunday and a federal holiday, respectively). See Fed. R.App. P. 26(a)(l)(A)-(C). The May 31 motion was untimely, and the district court’s order granting the motion did not confer jurisdiction on this court. See, e.g., In re MDL 262, 799 F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Spring’s motion for a COA, filed on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient (B) holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error (C) holding that compliance with rule 4a5 is essential to appellate jurisdiction (D) holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed (E) holding that strict compliance is not required
Output: (C)
factors to the State’s requested accommodation. The use of two-way video conferencing can satisfy a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation in certain limited circumstances like those present here. ¶ 20 Applying Craig, we conclude that the strong preference for face-to-face confrontation must give way in the special circumstances of this ease to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. The State’s requested accommodation is necessary to further two important public policies: protecting the rights of a vulnerable alleged sexual assault victim who has been ruled to be outside Arizona’s subpoena power and preserving society’s interest in prosecuting accused sexual offenders. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct (B) recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy (C) holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 (D) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (E) holding that a public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality
Output: (B)
that’s the rule under the Guidelines and I believe that’s the rule in the Eleventh Circuit. I believe those are not factors that the court should take into — that that’s a factor that the court should take into consideration in attempting to depart. Frankly, I think if the court tried to depart, it would be reversible error. Id. at 29. Ordinarily, we will not review a district court’s denial of a request for downward departure. United States v. Hadaway, 998 F.2d 917, 919 (11th Cir.1993). However, a district court’s refusal to depart is reviewable on appeal if the court’s decision was based on the belief that it lacked the authority to consider a departure. United States v. Williams, 948 F.2d 706, 708 (11th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The district court’s determination that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (B) holding that district court must provide reasonable notice of intent to upwardly depart from guideline range (C) holding that a defendants assertion that the district court did not believe it had the statutory authority to depart from sentencing guideline range  presents a cognizable claim on appeal (D) holding that a court may depart downward from the applicable guideline range under section 4a13 (E) holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range
Output: (C)
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” In his brief to this Court, Deardorff acknowledges that the duct-tape comparison was an area beyond the understanding of an average juror. There is no dispute that Carter examined the tape from the crime scene and the roll of tape from the warehouse facility. Deardorff appears to argue that the State did not establish Carter’s qualification to render an expert opinion about the duct tape comparison. However, the Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 702, Ala. R. Evid., provide: “[U]nder Rule 702 'qualification’ should continue to be defined broadly, so that one may gain an expertise through practical experience as well as through formal training or education. See, e.g., International Telecommunications Sys. v. State, 359 So.2d 364 (Ala.1978) (<HOLDING>).” Carter’s testimony established that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge and jury may rely upon common knowledge and experience without proof (B) recognizing that experience and practical knowledge as fully as formal education qualify one to make technical judgments (C) recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge (D) holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion (E) recognizing that the constitutional right to appeal must be given a practical construction
Output: (B)
which the declarant intends to assert is different from the matter to be proved, but the matter asserted, if true, is circumstantial evidence of the matter to be proved”); United States v McGlory, 968 F2d 309, 332 (CA 3, 1992), cert den 507 US 962; 113 S Ct 1388; 122 L Ed 2d 763 (1993) (“statements containing express assertions not offered for their truth may contain implied assertions that qualify as hearsay because the truth of the implied assertions is at issue and relevant to guilt”); United States v Palma-Ruedas, 121 F3d 841, 857 (CA 3, 1997) (statements offered to support an implied assertion are inadmissible hearsay); Park v Huff, 493 F2d 923, 928 (CA 5, 1974), withdrawn on other grounds 506 F2d 849 (CA 5, 1975) (en banc), cert den 423 US 824; 96 S Ct 38; 46 L Ed 2d 40 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Lyle v Koehler, 720 F2d 426 (CA 6, 1983) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the verbal act doctrine applied to the testators outofcourt statement acknowledging his signature on the will because the existence of that statement was material to determining the validity of the witnesss signature (B) holding that the outofcourt statement by the victims mother which was admitted when the mother refused to testify at trial was inadmissible under residual hearsay exception in mil revid 804b5 because a much of her statement was double or triple hearsay that was most unreliable and b the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement were not supported by any particularized guarantees of trustworthiness (C) holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made (D) holding that when the possibility is real that an outofcourt statement which implies the existence of the ultimate fact in issue was made with assertive intent it is essential that the statement be treated as hearsay if a direct declaration of that fact would be so treated (E) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party
Output: (D)
Cir.1994), a case involving the violent ‘war’ between factions of the Colombo Family criminal enterprise, the Second Circuit rejected the appellan (2d Cir.1991) (rejecting a sufficiency challenge that argued “violent in-fighting somehow proves that the [enterprise] was never a cohesive, ongoing association” because “evidence clearly established that, regardless of internal disputes and membership changes, the [group’s] power structure endured and its members functioned as a unit” during the relevant period); United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir.2002) (noting, in the course of a discussion on evidence admissibility, that two factions existed within the same overall enterprise despite a conflict between them); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in another Mexican Mafia case, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did (B) holding thatthe evidence also shows that the appellants killed in response to a members showing of disloyalty to the organization  and to eliminate a faction of the enterprises membership which threatened one defendants leadership (C) holding that evidence that defense witnesses were members of the same organization of tax protesters as defendant was properly admitted to show bias (D) holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact (E) holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury
Output: (B)
rather than that a particular provision conflicts “with a mandatory provision of applicable law.” The applicability of Rule 18 in these circumstances thus presents a close question. Even though it is unclear under state law whether we should construe the language of Rule 18 in the present case to permit arbitration, Supreme Court precedent dictates that we resolve any doubts as to arbitrability “in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927. Similarly, we have held recently that, when the arbitration agreement at issue includes a sever-ability provision, courts should not lightly conclude that a particular provision of an arbitration agreement taints the entire agreement. Accord Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 890-91 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we agree with the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that costsplitting provision in pep boys arbitration agreement is severable from the rest of the agreement (C) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (D) holding that when agreement includes severability provision intent of the parties and policy in favor of arbitration dictate that rest of agreement should be held enforceable (E) holding that an arbitration agreement that was invalid due to unconscionability was not enforceable
Output: (D)