niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
himself as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighs any injury the speech could cause to the employer’s interest in promoting effective and efficient public service. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Kiser’s claim fails because he specifically alleges that he was expressing himself as a public employee, not as a citizen: “Defendants retaliated against and harmed [him] because he exercised his constitutional speech rights when he fulfilled his duties as Executive Administrator by not speaking publicly.” (Compl.t 70(c) (emphasis added).) By alleging that he was expressing himself in his official capacity as Executive Administrator, Kiser has pleaded himself out of court. See Youker v. Schoenenberger, 22 F.3d 163, 166-67 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 143, 103 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation (B) holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern (C) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (D) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (E) holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen
Output: (D)
in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. R.C.P. 1.6 Comment (emphasis supplied). ¶ 22 Cosgrove simply is not entitled to utilize Rule 1.6 in an effort to avoid the trial court’s order. See Chmiel supra (rejecting a challenge based on Rule 1.6 that disclosures made by attorney were improper). Furthermore, Cosgrove would not be subject to disciplinary proceedings where he follows a court order requiring him to turn over information for purposes of discovery. See also R.P.C. Scope (<HOLDING>). ¶ 23 Because none of the reasons proffered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (B) recognizing exceptions to immunity (C) holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute (D) recognizing that attorneys disclosure of confidential information may be judicially compelled in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that opinion work product is entitled to nearly absolute protection with limited exceptions
Output: (D)
of bribing a juror and conspiring to bribe public officials). We are, however, greatly disturbed by this "misappropriation.” 20 . Mr. DiTrapano did not comment on his authority to tell the bank falsehoods regarding his client’s intent to execute the loan documents, his client's intent to be jointly liable on the loan, and his own intent to take the loan documents to the client for the client’s signature. 21 . If Mr. DiTrapano’s law license had not already been annulled and the Court was instead deciding on an appropriate sanction, his failure to take full responsibility for his behavior would constitute an aggravating factor, potentially justifying an increase in the degree of discipline imposed. See syl. pt. 4, Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 213 W.Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Aleshire, 230 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors (B) holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that aggravating factors may justify increasing the degree of discipline imposed (D) holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that danger must justify the degree of interference imposed
Output: (C)
Zillgitt was sentenced principally to 109 months’ imprisonment. In a separate appeal docketed as No. 00-1421, Zillgitt challenges the legality, of his sentence, arguing that the jury’s general verdict, made without findings as to the type and amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy,, required that he be sentenced under 21 U .S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), which provides the penalties for conspiring to distribute an unspecified amount of marijuana. The maximum period of imprisonment for violation of that subsection is 5 years, which is substantially less than the sentence imposed on defendant, nearly 7 years of which he has already served. In his motion for bail pending appeal, Zillgitt argues that, both under our decision in United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 667-72 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), and under the principles recently articulated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant can only be sentenced for misprision of felony based on drug quantities that he knew or should have known or foreseen  were involved in the conspiracy (B) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy (C) holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case (D) holding that when a district court determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant convicted of participating in a drugtrafficking conspiracy the court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug amounts attributable to or foreseeable by that defendant (E) holding that in certain circumstances where a defendant is convicted of a charge alleging a conspiracy to distribute one drug or another he must be sentenced as if the conviction were only for a conspiracy involving the drug that triggers the lowest statutory sentencing range
Output: (E)
to collect those rates. While the result we reach is mandated by the filed rate doctrine, that doctrine is plainly a creature of a different time. The Supreme Court has recognized that “although the filing requirement prevented price discrimination and unfair practices” when AT&T held a monopoly in long-distance telecommunications, strict application of the filed rate doctrine “frustrates those same goals” in today’s era of deregulation and multiple competing carriers. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. 512 U.S. 218, 233, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 2232-33, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994). The FCC itself has tried unsuccessfully to regulate the doctrine out of existence by excusing carriers other than AT&T from the FCA’s filing requirements. See id. at 220-21, 234, 114 S.Ct. at 2226-27, 2233 (<HOLDING>). In practice, as this case illustrates, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the childrens court exceeded its authority in prohibiting the human services department from placing a child with her brother (B) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute (C) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (D) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (E) holding that the fca exceeded its authority in exempting nondominant carriers from filing requirement
Output: (E)
agree with the Commonwealth that the PCRA court’s reference to Pa.R.E. 705, which requires that “an expert must testify as to the facts or data on which the opinion or inference is based,” does not support a finding of counsel ineffectiveness. As the medical examiner testified that the basis for her time-of-death estimation was her investigator’s lividity test, she clearly set forth the facts or data on which her opinion was based, and an objection grounded on Pa.R.E. 705 would have been futile. Further, to the extent the PCRA court found counsel ineffective for failing to challenge the time-of-death testimony as speculative because it was based on the investigator’s notes, we find such legal conclusion to be in conflict with our ruling on direct appeal. See Elliott, 700 A.2d at 1252 (<HOLDING>). Thus, there is no arguable merit to a claim 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort (B) holding that it was proper for the medical examiner to estimate the victims time of death based on the results of her investigators lividity test as it was standard procedure for her to rely on tests performed by members of her office (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding victim waived physicianpatient privilege by authorizing her doctor to release her medical records to the department of criminal investigation because the information contained in her medical records was no longer confidential between herself and her physician (E) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties
Output: (B)
at 634, the Supreme Court made a similar observation about the offending portion of the Violence Against Women Act, noting further that “Lopez makes clear” that such a jurisdictional element would have lent support to the constitutionality of the Act. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740. The felon-in-possession statute, on the other hand, has a jurisdictional element that has been considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), and Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), the latter case holding that only a minimal nexus with interstate commerce satisfies the interstate commerce requirement of the felon-in-possession statute (then 18 U.S.C. § 1202). See Lemons, 302 F.3d at 770-71 (<HOLDING>). Wolvin asks us to read the holding of Lopez 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing application of the doctrines may involve a fact question for the jury but not finding such a question in the case before it (B) recognizing that the supreme court maintained the trial courts fact finding authority without setting a new standard in booker (C) recognizing that the supreme court in those cases was principally concerned with congressional intent but finding that the constitutional question was not far from the courts mind (D) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (E) holding that although not essential to the outcomes of two previous cases the court of appeals should have followed the texas supreme courts statements in those cases
Output: (C)
protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.2005). The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995); see also Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.2005) (“Prisoners’ grievances, unless frivolous ..., concerning the conditions in which they are being confined are deemed petitions for redress of grievances and thus are protected by the First Amendment.”); Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Jones’s complaints of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (C) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (D) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (E) recognizing prisoners first amendment right to eom plain to prison officials about discrimination
Output: (E)
conclusion in entering judgment in favor of Debtor, it did not abuse its discretion. See Younie v. Gonya (In re Younie), 211 B.R. 367, 372 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (evidentiary questions decided in the context of summary judgment are reviewed for an abuse of discretion), aff'd, 163 F.3d 609 (9th Cir.1998). 6 . Our decision today is narrow. We leave for another day the issue of whether a transcript of the bankruptcy court docket would also meet the requirements of MCA § 25-9-303. Furthermore, we offer no opinion as to whether Miller could also utilize the provi sions of the Montana Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, MCA §§ 25-9-501 to 25-9-508, as that issue was not raised in the proceedings. See Robinson v. First Wyo. Bank, N.A., 274 Mont. 307, 316-17, 909 P.2d 689, 695 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The editor's comment to paragraph (c) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court (B) holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court (C) holding that a juvenile adjudicated as delinquent in federal court for violation of  2241c had a duty under state law to register as a sexual offender when present in montana (D) holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court (E) holding that the uniform act and mca  259303 are alternative methods for filing a judgment of a montana federal court in montana state court
Output: (E)
father did so here'. No putative father had standing here.' Under section 63:089, “[a]n unmarried biological father does not have standing to seek relief from a judgment terminating parental rights if the mother did not identify him to the adoption entity before the date she signed a consent for adoption 'or if he was not located because the mother failed or refused to provide sufficient information to locate him.” § 63.089, Fla. Stat. (2015); see also id. § 63.022 (providing that unmarried biological father’s interests “acquire[ ] constitutional protection only when he detoon-strates a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities - of parenthood, both during the pregnancy and after the child’s birth”); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming, without deciding, that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (B) holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum (C) holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a (D) recognizing that the mere existence of a biological link does not confer legal rights without the fathers full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood (E) holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction
Output: (D)
Inc., 270 F.R.D. 150, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “An identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria. Where any criterion is subjective, e.g., state of mind, the class is not ascertainable.” Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 97 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (internal quotation omitted). Pearson appears to argue that the class is not sufficiently ascertainable because the Court will have to make a determination about the merits of each claim in deciding whether a particular individual is a class member, that is, whether Pearson exceeded the print run. Of course, the mere fact that class membership overlaps with an element of the plaintiffs legal claim does not mean that the class is not ascertainable. See Friedman-Katz, 270 F.R.D. at 154-55 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>); Noble v. 93 Univ. Place Corp., 224 F.R.D. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a credit card arbitration provision presented in a takeitorleaveitmanner was not unconscionable (B) holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable (C) holding that an arbitration provision in a credit card cardholder agreement was not unconscionable (D) holding that a class of individuals whose receipts contained more than the last five digits of their credit card number or the expiration date of their credit card number was ascertainable even though these criteria were also elements of the plaintiffs legal claim (E) holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the flsa by virtue of the plaintiffs purchase of items at local stores using their employers credit card
Output: (D)
the amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured.” DCL § 271(1). Significantly, however, “[o]nly assets with a present salable value are taken into consideration in determining insolvency. Claims that are inchoate, uncertain, and contested have no present value and cannot be considered' an asset of the [transferor],” First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v. Schlesinger Elec. Contractors, Inc., 871 F.Supp.2d 103, 120 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 621 F.Supp. 198, 220 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (“It is the fair saleable value of assets, not their book value, that determines insolvency.”); Ede v. Ede, 193 A.D.2d 940, 598 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (3d Dep’t 1993) (<HOLDING>). “To be ‘salable’ an asset must have ‘an 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that distributees interest to estate property is subject to divestment until estate is closed (B) holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law (C) holding that interest subject to a life estate is an interest so inchoate uncertain and contingent in nature as to clearly lack a present fair salable value (D) holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit (E) holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest
Output: (C)
abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 2 . Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963, 965-66 (Fla.1983). 3 . See Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 1773, 118 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992); State v. Lumarque, 990 So.2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Hernandez v. State, 913 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), rev. denied, 941 So.2d 368 (Fla.2006); Sutton v. State, 834 So.2d 332, 334-35 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Biggs v. State, 745 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla.1998); see also Chaeld v. State, 599 So.2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute as recognized in Davis 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the legislature intends to punish separate acts even ones in close temporal proximity the blockburger test does not apply because the precondition for employing that test that the two offenses involve the same conduct is absent (B) holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control (C) recognizing that other courts have found the type of test reliable but finding that this particular urinalysis test was unreliable since the lab did not perform a backup test or identify lab test results and state left questions about how probationers diabetes affected the results (D) holding that the faison test does not apply to false imprisonment and observing that the test has no application when the charge alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in  78701lal 3 or 4 (E) holding that a defendant charged with kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim is not entitled to a faison instruction
Output: (D)
commencing an action will be assumed to have waived its right to arbitration when its use of the judicial process is clearly inconsistent with seeking arbitration at a later date.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this law, Judge Weinstein' concluded that choosing to file a claim in court rather than arbitrate constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Id. (citing Digitronics Inventioneering Corp. v. Jameson, 52 A.D.3d 1099, 860 N.Y.S.2d 303 (3d Dep’t 2008)). I agree with Judge Weinstein’s well-reasoned decision that, if New York law applies, the decision to litigate disputes over unpaid claims in state court precludes Defendants from now seeking to compel arbitration with respect to those same claims. But see Grand Med. Supply, 2012 WL 2577577, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, I would reach the same result even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa (B) holding that the framework for determining any disputed issues concerning arbitration must be determined in the context of the faa (C) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
Output: (B)
spouse. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). A majority of courts, including this one, have concluded that the burden of proof for section 523(a)(15) is initially with the non-debtor spouse who must first establish that the debt, which arose from a divorce or support agreement, is not in the nature of alimony or support. The burden then shifts to the debtor to prove either an inability to pay or that the benefit to the debtor outweighs the detriment to the non-debtor spouse. See Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1996); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1996); Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112, 115 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995). But see Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1996) (<HOLDING>); Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15 (D) holding that the government bears the burden of proof with respect to the issue of whether termination for default was justified (E) holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause
Output: (C)
to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor” constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n. 2 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1266). If the alleged statement suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory motive, then it is considered circumstantial evidence. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir.2004). At trial, Akouri testified about a conversation he had with Blanchard he premise for the DOT’s employment decision was discriminatory. Although Blanchard denied making the statement, we may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations when reviewing the district court’s order denying a party’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we do not disturb the jury’s finding of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony (B) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses (C) holding that credibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions not those of a judge (D) holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence (E) holding that credibility determinations are for the jury
Output: (C)
alcohol, carrying a gun. (Emphasis added). The prosecutor further argued, without objection, that the appellant would have the opportunity to join prison gangs and participate in their activities, if he chose to: The gentleman from the prison prosecution unit told you also that drugs are a big factor with prison gangs, that they sell drugs to make money in prison gangs. So, this will be another indication that [the appellant] would have the opportunity, if he wants to, if he hadn’t learned his lesson, that he is going to be a future danger. In light of the jury’s previous exposure to these similar arguments, suggesting the potential for the appellant’s participation in gang-related activities in prison, any error is harmless. Cf. Massey v. State, 938 S.W.2d 141, 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Point of error one is overruled. In his third 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection (B) holding that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence is received without objection (C) holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement (D) holding that if defendant objects to admission of evidence but same evidence is subsequently introduced from another source without objection defendant waives earlier objection (E) holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection
Output: (D)
be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 or Fourteenth Amendment claims. 4. The United States Court of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over A Just Compensation Clause Claim Based On Illegal Taxation. a. The Government’s Argument. Although the Government acknowledges that a claim asserted under the Just Compensation Clause to the United States Constitution is money-mandating, the Government argues that the court does not have jurisdiction over this claim, because the appropriate cause of action is a direct challenge to the tax levy. See Gov Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 127, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a disability must be evaluated at the time of the challenged employment action (B) holding that the federal action at issue must be authorized (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) recognizing that every theory of relief must raise federal issue for claim to arise under federal law (E) holding that a federal employee cannot bring a civil action placing only the allegedly insufficient administrative remedy at issuethe employee must also place the finding of discrimination at issue
Output: (B)
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). 3 . During the attack victim’s uncle and cousin, who had arrived on the scene, called 911. 4 ., On March 15, 2016, the State filed a multiple bill of information pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, charging Defendant as a quadruple offender based on a 2009 guilty plea to unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling; a 2002 guilty plea to illegal possession of a stolen automobile worth over $500; and a 1996 guilty plea to i l be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term of not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life,” , (emphasis added). See State v. Shaw, 2006-2467pp. 23-24 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So.2d 1233, 1247 (<HOLDING>). 8 . As Judge Jenkins recognizes in her 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony (B) holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time (C) holding that all sentences for convictions on same date for a single course of criminal conduct are subject to enhancement under the habitual offender law overruling state ex rel porter v butler 573 so2d 1106 la 1991 and state v sherer 411 so2d 1050 la 1982 (D) holding that it is permissible for a trial court to consider the same prior offenses for both enhancement of the instant offense and to establish habitual offender status (E) holding that predicate crimes for which defendant received probation and adjudication could be considered for purposes of habitual offender enhancement
Output: (C)
see also Gov’t Brief at 30. There is no reason to believe that national defense or national security will be adversely affected, since Waste Management — Washington will continue to provide solid waste collection and disposal services at Fairchild AFB until a new solicitation is issued and contract is awarded. See TR 5. 2. Bid And Proposal Expenses And Attorney’s Fees And Costs Blue Dot also has requested payment for bid and proposal expenses, including costs and attorney’s fees associated with this protest. See Pl. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6 at 8. The Tucker Act states that the court may award monetary relief in post-award bid protests for “bid preparation and proposal costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1920; E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 447 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Blue Dot may file an appropriate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly (B) holding that tucker act jurisdiction is founded on an implied contract to have the involved bids fairly  considered (C) holding that a denial of a bid protest without holding a hearing did not deprive a disappointed bidder of any property rights because there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a government contract unless the contract actually is awarded (D) holding that tucker act jurisdiction is founded on an implied contract to have the involved bids fairly and honestly considered (E) holding that unsuccessful bidder is awarded its bid preparation costs because the government violated its implied contract to have the involved bids fairly and honestly considered 
Output: (E)
complaint on federal preemption grounds, the district court concluded that to the extentthatMr. Firstenberg’s claims related to Ms. Monribot’s use of her cell phone, the claims were preempted by federal law. In so holding, the district court relied on Murray v. Motorola, Inc., in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that lawsuits based on the premise that radio frequency (RF) emissions from cell phones are harmful to human health are preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption because “[s]uch claims conflict with the [Federal Communications Commission (FCC)] determination that wireless phones that do comply with the FCC’s RF standards are safe for use by the general public].]” 982 A.2d 764, 768-69, 777-78 (D.C. 2009) (alteration omitted); see id. at 772 (<HOLDING>). {32} Mr. Firstenberg argues that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding with respect to a general motion for directed verdict that it raised the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence on venue an essential part of the governments case internal quotation marks and citation omitted (B) recognizing that conflict preemption precludes laws that under the circumstances of a particular case stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress omission alteration internal quotation marks and citation omitted (C) recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted (D) holding in a related context that the legal determination that convictions arose out of separate criminal episodes is based on a factual finding specifically the finding that the acts giving rise to the convictions were not part of continuous and uninterrupted conduct that    is so joined in time place and circumstances that such conduct is directed to the accomplishment of a criminal objective internal quotation marks omitted omission in original (E) holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original
Output: (B)
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). See also, United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2313-14, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) (discussing the expansive reach of § 541). Notwithstanding this broadly inclusive definition, the debtor may seek to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate by means of 11 U.S.C. § 522 or some other valid nonbankruptcy law exemption. See Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977, 980 (4th Cir.1984). Although property that ultimately becomes exempt will not be available for distribution to creditors, it is nonetheless property of the bankruptcy estate at the outset of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Consequently, these debtors’ pre-petition causes of action for personal injuries are property of their estates. See, e.g., Tignor, 729 F.2d at 981 (<HOLDING>); Sierra Switchboard Co., v. Westinghouse 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (B) holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate (C) holding that whether an action would have a conceivable effect on the bankrupt estate is determined at the time a lawsuit is filed (D) holding that the debtors claims for injuries to the person whether unliquidated as when the petition was filed or settled as occurred during the proceeding are thus property of the bankrupt estate as of the commencement of the ease (E) holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate
Output: (D)
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 104 S.Ct. 77, 78 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). Moreover, in Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1476-1478 (D.C.Cir.1995), the D.C. Circuit held that prior to imposing the sanction of dismissal or default for fraud upon the court, the fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. (citing Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir.1989); Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040, 97 S.Ct. 738, 50 L.Ed.2d 751 (1977)). Courts are split as to whether perjury or false statements, standing alone, provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority. See Kadri v. Johnson, No. 03-2562 MW, 2005 WL 3454330, *2-*3 (W.D.Tenn. Dec.16, 2005) (<HOLDING>) (citing Quality Tech. Co. v. Stone & Webster 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that perjured testimony standing alone does not constitute fraud upon the court (B) holding witnesss testimony identifying appellant is sufficient standing alone to support conviction (C) holding that probation does not constitute a sentence (D) holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution (E) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment
Output: (A)
a conclusion that the defendant had been convicted in state court of an “escape” crime that generically qualifies as a violent felony under § 924(e).... [E]ven the facts outside the scope of Shepard, if they could have been considered, would have narrowed Mills’[s] conviction only to either a failure to report or a walkaway escape from a non-secure facility.... [T]he Government concedes that a simple walkaway escape from a nonsecure community residence does not constitute the sort of purposeful, aggressive and violent behavior that is required ... to constitute a “violent felony” for the purposes of § 924(e). Id. at 2-3. We need not address whether a “walkaway escape” is, as the government says, not a violent felony for these purposes under Chambers. Cf. Jackson, 301 F.3d at 63 (<HOLDING>). For the purpose of deciding this appeal, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prior to chambers that a walkaway escape is categorically a violent felony (B) holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca (C) holding that walkaway from community treatment center conviction was a crime of violence consistent with chambers (D) holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony (E) holding walkaway escape under north dakota statute a crime of violence
Output: (A)
discuss, U S West’s own policies offer various kinds of disability leave, both paid and unpaid. “Under the ADA, prohibited discrimination includes failure to make ‘reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.’” Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). An allowance of time for medical care or treatment may constitute a reasonable accommodation. Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1996). However, an indefinite unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation where the plaintiff fails to present evidence of the expected duration of her impairment. Id.; see also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Hudson court noted that “[e]xamples of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation (B) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada (C) holding that reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to wait indefinitely for the plaintiffs medical conditions to be corrected (D) holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation (E) holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation
Output: (C)
quotation marks omitted). “Rule 12(b)(6) should be employed only when the complaint does not present a legal claim.” Smith v. Cash Store Management, Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint contains a single cause of action. It alleges that the UUW and AUUW statutes violate Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right to carry firearms, concealed or otherwise, outside their homes. See Am. Compl. at 10. Because this Court has determined that individuals do not have a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home, this Court finds that the UUW and the AUUW statutes — which only regulate firearm possession outside of the home— do not infringe on Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding second amendment right is incorporated against the states through fourteenth amendment (B) holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (D) holding that the second amendment fully applies to state and local regulation through the fourteenth amendment (E) holding only that the second amendment affords individuals a right to bear arms in the home and explaining that the second amendment elevates above all other interests the right of  citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home
Output: (E)
we to extend the statute to prenatal conduct that affects a fetus in a manner apparent after birth— conduct that would be defined solely in terms of its impact on the victim—the boundaries of proscribed conduct that would subject a pregnant woman to prosecution under W.Va. Code § 61-8D-4a would become impermissi-bly broad and ill-defined. “Many types of prenatal conduct can harm a fetus, causing physical or mental abnormalities in a newborn. For example, medical researchers have stated that smoking during pregnancy may cause, among other problems, low birth weight, which is a major factor in infant mortality.” Reinesto v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 182 Ariz. 190, 193, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ct.App.1995). The court in Reinesto found that numerous prenatal activities could harm a fe 50 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Reyes v. Superior Ct. of San Bernardino 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that possession of listed chemical with intent to manufacture controlled substance is controlled substance offense (B) holding a pregnant woman who uses cocaine is not criminally liable for delivery of a controlled substance despite the possibility the drug may transfer to her infant postpartum via the umbilical cord (C) holding that quantity of the controlled substance does not have to be measurable to support a conviction for possession of such controlled substance particularly when the immeasurable amount of the substance is found on an implement used to consume the substance (D) holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine (E) holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance
Output: (B)
We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings in the sentencing phase, but they must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. U.S. v. Fox, 189 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.1999). We affirm. Nakamura contends the district court erred in determining by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy distributed in excess of 5 grams of actual methamphetamine when only 3.3 grams were recovered and tested for purity. It is undisputed that Nakamura delivered 12.5 grams of unrecovered methamphetamine. Absent evidence to the contrary, it was not clear error for the district court to determine the purity of the unre-covered methamphetamine by extrapolating from the purity of the 3.3 grams actually recovered. See U.S. v. Lopes-Montes, 165 F.3d 730, 731-32 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nakamura’s contention that he had no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant and is agreed to by defendants acknowledged counsel the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the stipulation and agreed to it through his or her attorney (B) holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage (C) holding that absent evidence to the contrary the district court was entitled to assume that the remaining 36 kilograms lopes montes agreed to deliver was a mixture with a similar purity level as the 32 kilogram mixture actually recovered (D) holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing (E) holding that there was no evidence that parties actually agreed to modify stock purchase agreement and thus contract was effective as originally written
Output: (C)