niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
“involves challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at Graham is limited to juveniles. See United States v. Banks, 679 F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir.2012); Jones, 476 Fed.Appx. at 652; Moore, 643 F.3d at 457. Walker’s attempts to differentiate his case are unpersuasive. That Walker’s sentence may prove to be an “effective[ ] life sentence” does not create an Eighth Amendment violation. “[T]he Supreme Court has never held that a sentence to a specific term of years, even if it might turn out to be more than the reasonable life expectancy of the defendant, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 537 (6th Cir.2004); see also Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Walker’s categorical challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eighth amendment forbids life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense (B) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (C) holding that multiple sentences for offenses under 18 usc  924c are appropriate when multiple separate acts of firearm use have occurred even if they are related to the same underlying offense (D) holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses violates the eighth amendment (E) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences
Output: (B)
removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
Output: (B)
264; Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 674 N.E.2d 1164; Civ.R. 56(E). {¶ 9} Under R.C. 3375.06, a board of library trustees “shall have the control and management of the county free public library, and in the exercise of such control and management shall be governed by sections 3375.33 to 3375.41, inclusive, of the Revised Code.” R.C. 3375.33 provides that “[t]he boards of library trustees * * * are bodies politic and corporate, and as such are capable of suing and being sued, contracting, acquiring, holding, possessing, and disposing of real and personal property, and of exercising such other powers and privileges as are conferred upon them by law.” See, generally, Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Ratchford (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 256, 259-260, 18 O.O.3d 450, 416 N.E.2d 614 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 10} Former R.C. 3375.40(H) provided that a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the general assembly can delegate discretionary functions to administrative bodies and officers and holding that a statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes an intelligible principle to which the administrative body or officer must conform and if it establishes a procedure for effective review (B) holding that the secretary may only delegate the powers and duties of the office to a natural person not to an administration or entity other than a natural person (C) holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality (D) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (E) holding that a district court may review successive or abusive claims but only if petitioner establishes cause and prejudice
Output: (A)
4. When a litigant challenges the legality of a zoning law on the theories that the law violates equal protection or is arbitrary and capricious, for “a facial challenge, the remedy is the striking down of the regulation. In the case of an as applied challenge, the remedy is an injunction preventing the unconstitutional application of the regulation to the plaintiffs property and/or damages.... ” Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). This is so because, in a facial challenge, “the claimed constitutional violation inheres in the terms of the statute, not its application ... [t]he remedy is necessarily directed at the statute itself and must be injunctive and declaratory.” Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir.2011) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). Thus, “a victory by the plaintiff in [facial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge (B) holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea (C) holding that damages are not available for a facial challenge to a gun control law (D) holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract (E) holding that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance under the first amendment because the provision had not yet harmed the plaintiff
Output: (C)
person of the principal. 3 . Timmons argues that UBS'S Master Account Agreement should not have been included in the Record on Appeal because UBS failed to present it to the circuit court. We disagree. While the Master Account Agreement was not included with UBS'S pleadings, it was incorporated into the UBS contract by direct reference, and the UBS contract was included in UBS’S Motion to Compel Arbitration. In any event, the circuit court's order sets forth the pertinent language of the arbitration clause in the J.C. Bradford contract and includes a finding that Timmons signed a similar contract with UBS. Timmons did not appeal this finding, and as such, it is the law of the case. See Charleston Lumber Co., Inc. v. Miller Hous. Corp., 338 S.C. 171, 175, 525 S.E.2d 869, 871-72 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4 . S.C.Code Ann. §§ 43-35-5 to -595 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (B) holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (C) holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case (D) holding a trial judges unappealed procedural rulings become the law of the case (E) holding that an unappealed ruling is the law of the case
Output: (E)
in part. As the Majority explains, the “implied bias [doctrine] remains available, in appropriate circumstances, to disqualify jurors whose connection with the litigation makes it highly unlikely that they can remain impartial adjudicators.” (Slip Op. at 13 (citing United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991)).) In dicta in Calabrese, we cited with approval Justice O’Connor’s observation in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S. Ct. 940, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982), that a “juror [who] is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency” is one example of an “extreme situation^ that would justify a finding of implied bias.” Calabrese, 942 F.2d at 226 (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 (O’Connor, J., concurring)); accord United States v. Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858, 861-64 (7th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). It is true, as the Majority says, that Juror 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to strike potentially biased juror was not iac where decision was based on trial strategy (B) holding that where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror a defendant must show that the juror was actually biased against him (C) holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added (E) holding without citing to justice oconnors concurrence in smith that a juror who was a 15year secretarial employee in the civil division of the prosecuting agency was impliedly biased
Output: (E)
appeal docketed, No. 03-2415 (1st Cir. Oct. 17, 2003). 17 . See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 & 319, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (noting that a "diverse student body ... is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education” but striking down a two-track medical school admissions system that used "explicit racial classification[s]”) (opinion of Powell, J.); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003) (striking down as not narrowly tailored an undergraduate admissions system that automatically awarded twenty points in admissions scoring to members of under-represented ethnic and racial minority .groups); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 & 328, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Walsh has a Master’s Degree in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that universities can  consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant and that a diverse student body is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify such use of race (B) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant (E) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck
Output: (A)
111 .When it reversed the First Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the plaintiffs SWDA claim for a new trial on the question of “arranger” status, the Texas Supreme Court in R.R. Street II declined to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the plaintiff proved the remaining elements of the defendant's liability as a matter of law. See 166 S.W.3d at 253, 255. The Texas Supreme Court gave no indication that it would reverse the Court of Appeals's findings on the remaining elements of SWDA liability. As a result, those undisturbed findings remain the Texas courts’ only pronouncement on these remaining elements and thus the best indicator of what the Texas Supreme Court would decide. See Transcon. Gas v. Transport. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Those findings — to the extent they are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a federal court must decide an issue regarding the interpretation of a state law according to its anticipation of how the highest state court would hold (B) holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts (C) holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide (D) holding that a federal court in absence of a state supreme court pronouncement on a subject of state substantive law must determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide (E) holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state
Output: (D)
the trustee’s stead.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court made clear that it was rejecting only an “independent right to use § 506(c).” Id. Accordingly, although Hartford Underwriters provides guidance for our analysis, it does not control the question of whether the Bankruptcy Code allows courts to grant derivative standing to creditors to bring avoidance actions when the trustee refuses to do so. We first note that since Hartford Underwriters every court of appeals to address derivative standing to pursue avoidance claims has affirmed the practice’s validity. Two courts have expressly considered the impact of Hartford Underwriters and have upheld the practice. See PW Enters., Inc. v. N.D. Racing Comm’n (In re Racing Servs., Inc.), 540 F.3d 892, 898 & n. 7 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy courts can authorize creditors committees in chapter 11 proceedings to sue derivatively to avoid fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the estate notwithstanding hartford underwriters (B) holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions (C) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (D) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (E) holding that derivative standing is available to a creditor to pursue avoidance actions when it shows that a chapter 7 trustee or debtorinpossession in the case of chapter 11 is unable or unwilling to do so notwithstanding hartford underwriters
Output: (E)
undertakings in such a context could embroil the court in the merits of the underlying custody issues and would tend to dilute the force of the Article 13(b) exception. Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25 (quoting the Brown Letter). Nevertheless, even where a district court has found grave risk arising from physical or psychological abuse, several Courts of Appeals have required district courts to consider undertakings prior to denying a petition. See, e.g., Simcox, 511 F.3d at 610-11 (remanding for assessment of whether undertakings could be fashioned to allow for return); Blondin, 189 F.3d at 249-50 (after affirming finding of grave risk, remanding for consideration whether arrangements could be made with a third party custodian to allow for repatriation). But see Baran, 526 F.3d at 1351-52 (<HOLDING>). Although this case involves domestic abuse 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (B) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (C) holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case (D) holding that upon a finding of grave risk the district court did not have to consider undertakings (E) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
Output: (D)
2010) (quoting Atomic Tattoos, LLC v. Morgan, 45 So.3d 63, 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). However, “the protection of former customers generally does not qualify as a legitimate business interest where no identifiable agreement exists with such customers establishing that they would return with future work.” Carter, 9 So.3d at 1265 (citing Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812 (Fla.1994)). Additionally, protection of an employer from ordinary competition is not a legitimate business interest, and a covenant designed solely for that purpose will not be enforced. PartyLite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1224 (M.D.Fla.2012) (interpreting section 542.335(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes); Colucci v. Kar Kare Auto. Grp., Inc., 918 So.2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The party seeking enforcement of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds (B) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (C) recognizing an agreement whose sole purpose is to prevent competition per se is void as a matter of public policy (D) holding physicians covenants not to compete are unenforceable and void as a matter of public policy (E) holding that where agreement prohibits recovery of attorneys fees in civil rights case the relevant portions of the arbitration policy are therefore void as against public policy
Output: (C)
As noted, the parties now agree that he only needed six credits. Further, Appellant ignores the additional evidence presented by Attorney Alva, including his status as a CLE presenter on capital case litigation, for which he received double CLE credits, and his significant history as one of the most experienced capital trial defense attorneys in the Commonwealth. Based upon this testimony, the trial court, as the sole arbiter of the credibility of Attorney Alva’s testimony, concluded that Attorney Alva possessed the six hours of capital case CLE credit he needed at the time of his entry of appearance in September, 2002, and given the facts of record, we see nothing upon which to disturb that factual finding. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 516 A.2d 689, 694-95 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Concerning whether the trial court violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the finders of fact are free to believe all some or none of the evidence presented to it and are further the sole resolvers of issues of credibility decisions made by finders of fact in these regards will not be disturbed on appeal (B) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony (C) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (D) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (E) holding mere conflict in testimony does not render evidence insufficient to support verdict because it is with province of fact finder to determine weight to be given to testimony and to believe all part or none of evidence
Output: (A)
Rule 5.2(C) of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which required him to attach to his brief a certified copy of the district court order being appealed. Because of this failure, the OCCA declined to accept jurisdiction over the merits of his appeal. See Duvall v. State, 869 P.2d 332, 333 (OMa.Crim.App.1994) (“The rule is clear and applicable. An Appellant must affirmatively attach with his brief a copy of the order of the district court. The district court order is the equivalent of the judgment and sentence, which is required to confirm jurisdiction on this Court.”) (citations omitted). The district court concluded that the OCCA’s application of this procedural bar was an adequate and independent state ground. See Johnson v. Champion, 288 F.3d 1215, 1227 n. 3 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner did not attempt to excuse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state rule barring review of postconviction petitioners claims where petitioner failed to provide supporting documentation is adequate procedural ground on which to bar federal habeas review (B) holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal (C) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (D) holding occas declination of jurisdiction over appeal from denial of postconviction relief based on petitioners failure to comply with occa rule 52 was adequate and independent state ground (E) holding that   15a1419a3 is an independent and adequate state ground for a state courts finding of procedural default
Output: (D)
exception to disclosure falls within one of the statutory exceptions to disclosure and how that exception creates a compelling reason to withhold the information.”); see id. at 351-52 (Cayce, C.J., dissenting) (stating that, by presenting evidence that releasing information could compromise criminal investigation, governmental actor demonstrated compelling reason to withhold information). 39 . Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-630 (1994); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-150 (1977) ("This presumpti ident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977). The AG has also consistently opined that the Act does not compel disclosure of information where "release of that information would impair some constitutional right." Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-430 (1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-185 (1978) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lists of persons who visited with inmates are exempt from disclosure because information is confidential by constitutional law (B) holding that the names of thirdparty inmates within memoranda were categorically exempt from disclosure absent compelling evidence of illegal activity by the bop (C) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (D) holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia (E) holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential
Output: (A)
Double Jeopardy Clause 'only proscribes resentencing where the defendant has developed a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence." Id. 18 (quoting Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir.1997)); see also, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137-39, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); Warnick v. Booher, 425 F.3d 842, 847 (10th Cir.2005). 137 While this court has not yet considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the correction of a clerical error that amends a eriminal sentence, other jurisdictions have done so and have held that the correction does not violate principles of double jeopardy when there is no legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence. See Gallinat v. State, 941 So.2d 1237, 1238-42 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006)(<HOLDING>); People v. Minaya, 54 N.Y.2d 360, 445 N.Y.S.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the expectation of finality and tranquility is an interest protected by the prohibition on double jeopardy (B) holding that correction of trial courts miscalculation giving credit to defendant for time not actually served did not violate double jeopardy because defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality (C) holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy (D) holding that correction of sentence to conform with plea agreement did not violate double jeopardy because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality (E) holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation
Output: (B)
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist. 15 U.S.C. § 77o. 6 .Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides: Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir.1992) (applying Eighth Circuit’s test) with Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 & n. 6 (11th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 950, 136 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted (B) holding authority to control limits duty to control (C) holding that to establish a prima facie case of control person liability a plaintiff must establish that the alleged control person actually participated in ie exercised control over the operations of the primary violator in general internal quotations omitted (D) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (E) recognizing power of district courts to control movement of cases from filing to final disposition
Output: (A)
F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino’s testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This “gate-keeping” obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation  applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions
Output: (A)
proof of the four factors alleged to permit intervention in lieu of establishing venue. Since, under that interpretation, we are not permitted to make our own independent evaluation of the propriety of intervention or joinder from the record, our review becomes a review of the trial court’s abuse of discretion — and then only for abuse of discretion with respect to its ruling on the four factors that permit intervention or joinder of plaintiffs unable to establish proper venue — contrary to the express mandate of section 15.003(c)(1). Not only is Collier’s interpretation of section 15.003(c) contrary to the plain language of that section, it is contrary to the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of it. See Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Collier would have us give absolute deference 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals (B) holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case (C) holding that plain language of subsection 15003c requires court of appeals to make its own determination of the propriety of joinder under subsection 15003a with no deference to the trial courts ruling  emphasis added appellate court is not constrained solely to review the pleadings and affidavits but should consider the entire record including any evidence presented at the hearing (D) holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports (E) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial
Output: (C)
DCA 1995). With regard to Jain and Murphy’s appeal of the final judgment, we find that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings excluding certain evidence and, to the extent that any evidence was erroneously excluded, such error was harmless. See Special v. West Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So.3d 1251 (Fla. 2014) (applying harmless error standard in a civil appeal, requiring the beneficiary of the error to establish that there is no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the verdict). We also hold that the trial court properly denied Jain and Murphy’s motion for directed verdict and properly granted Cohen’s motion for directed verdict on Jain and Murphy’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims. See Sanders v. ERP Operating Ltd. P’ship, 157 So.3d 273, 277 (Fla. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Tylinski v. Klein Auto., Inc., 90 So.3d 870, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court viewing the evidence and all inferences of fact in light most favorable to nonmoving party can affirm a directed verdict only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party (B) recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party (C) holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor (D) holding that an appellate court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and grants the state all reasonable inferences (E) holding that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all doubts are resolved against the moving party
Output: (A)
S.E.2d at 666)). While we acknowledge that many of the factors offered by the State seem innocent when viewed in isolation, there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop given the totality of the surrounding circumstances. In evaluating whether reasonable suspicion existed for Deputy Owens to prolong the traffic stop, the trial court first noted the large sum of money found in Moore’s pocket, finding it was unusual and therefore suspicious for an unemployed person to carry such a large amount of cash. We agree with the trial court that, under the circumstances of this case, the presence of a large amount of cash can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the trial court focused on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (B) holding that even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop is unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion (C) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (D) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (E) holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion
Output: (D)
in Germantown and Eastern Montgomery County, which the County determined is causing the need to expand the highway system. In Gaithersburg East, the fact that programmed highways are expected to relieve the traffic congestion and there is no need to build unprogrammed highways provides a rational basis to treat the new development in this area differently than the new development in the existing impact districts, where unprogrammed highwa e sub judice is Chapter 808, which gives Montgomery County broad taxing authority, authority that was lacking in those other jurisdictions. See also Home Builders v. Board of Palm Beach County Comm’rs, 446 So.2d 140 (Fla.App. 4th Dist.1983), cert. denied, 451 So.2d 848 (Fla.1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 376, 83 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We likewise hold that the impact tax imposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (B) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (C) holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court (D) holding that the impact fee there imposed did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment using the rational basis test we discuss here (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection
Output: (D)
Dade County, 343 So.2d 953, 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 2 . Florida’s charter counties numbered 19 as of 2005: Alachua, Brevard, Broward, Charlotte, Clay, Columbia, Duval, Hillsborough, Lee, Leon, Miami-Dade, Orange, Osceola, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota, Seminole, and Volusia. Florida Association of Counties— Charters are formal written documents that confer powers, duties, or privileges on the county and must be approved, along with any amendments, by the voters of the county. Id. 3 . The parties do not dispute that the language at issue in section 171.044(4) applies only to voluntary annexation. See Village of Wellington v. Palm Beach County, 941 So.2d 595, 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), review denied, 954 So.2d 29 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In enacting part II, the legislature 
 Holding statements: (A) holding such intoxication to be voluntary (B) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense (C) holding that the subject of section 1710444 is voluntary annexation (D) holding that title vii is subject to the transfer provisions of section 1404a (E) holding appeal improper since the dismissal was voluntary
Output: (C)
his jury waiver. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. WHITE, J. joins with note: I join the opinion of the Court. However, I also agree with the reasoning in J. MEYERS’ concurring opinion. 1 . The Court of Appeals originally overruled appellant’s points of error on the ground that they were not preserved for review. Marquez v. State, No. 03-93-458-CR (Tex.App.—Austin Feb. 2, 1994) (unpublished opinion). On petition for discretionary review, this Court held that the points were properly preserved and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Marquez v. State, No. 266-94 (Tex.Crim.App. May 18, 1994) (unpublished opinion). 2 . The Sixth Circuit seems to reach a similar conclusion with regard to federal constitutional law. Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, although the case has apparently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences (B) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (C) holding with or without a local rule so requiring failure to file motion to withdraw the reference when jury demanded was a waiver of right to jury trial (D) holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury (E) holding that a trial courts refusal to withdraw a jury waiver ordinarily does not implicate the federal constitutional right to a jury trial
Output: (E)
2009 SD 99, ¶33, 775 N.W.2d 221, 235 (2009) (“The community caretaker exception has been recognized only in the context of automobiles by the United States Supreme Court.” (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973))); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (describing Cady as recognizing “a community caretaking function of law enforcement as a reasonable exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement” and acknowledging “the existence of the community caretaking function in Texas”); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363-65 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding a “seizure” as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the community caretaking doctrine); State v. Ford, 2010 VT 39, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 17, 998 A.2d 684, 689 (2010) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 297, 734 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing emergency exception (B) recognizing exception (C) recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue (D) recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement (E) holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception
Output: (D)
to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(h)(3); see Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.2004). Here, the district court found that Moniz “simply is attempting to re-argue [] issues which were already ruled upon by the Court when it dismissed his Complaint,” and thus denied the motion to reconsider. R. 14 (Dist. Ct. Order at 3) (Page ID # 129). This court has stated that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider where the motion “merely raise[s] arguments that were already ruled upon.” Graham, 358 F.3d at 385; see also Lommen v. McIntyre, 125 Fed.Appx. 655, 659 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There was no abuse of discretion in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the motion presented nothing new and merely rephrased allegations in the complaint (E) holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion
Output: (D)
an erroneous legal standard. Instead, Hiedeman argues that “[t]he rationale for [abortion] statutes— the woman’s health and safety — applies with no less force where the woman rather than another person performs the abortion.” Thus, he argues that the U.S. District Court erred in determining that McCormack was likely to succeed on the merits. We disagree. a. History of Abortion Statutes. Historically, laws regulating abortion have sought to further the state’s interest in protecting the health and welfare of pregnant women, who alone bear the burden and risks of pregnancies. With this interest in mind, abortion statutes were first enacted to protect pregnant females from third parties providing dangerous abortions. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800, 806 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (B) recognizing that the purpose of abortion laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the states interest in protecting the womans health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus (C) recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof (D) holding that laws with the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion are invalid (E) holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents
Output: (B)
519 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana [6th Dist.] 1975, writ dism’d). NCNB’s wrongful setoff in this case amounted to an act manifesting the bank’s clear repudiation of Perry Brothers’ rights to the company’s deposited money in the bank; this setoff action constitutes an act of conversion in this case. Perry Brothers has established by the preponderance of the evidence that NCNB converted approximately $1.3 million of Perry Brothers’ property between November 27-29, 1990, when the bank exercised unauthorized dominion and control over “readily identifiable” Perry Brothers funds being transferred through the “ACH” wire transfer, cash collection system. See generally e.g., Houston Nat’l Bank v. Biber, 613 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). 2. As a tort, conversion allows damage awards 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a claim for money damages is an adequate remedy at law and so it does not provide a sufficient basis for injunctive relief notwithstanding the possibility that a money judgment will be uncollectible (B) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (C) holding that action for lien seeks money damages because its goal is to seize or attach money in the hands of the government as compensation   (D) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (E) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money
Output: (E)
1402, 1405, (11th Cir.1996), that it was not clearly established under Branti that the dismissal of clerical employees of a county tax collector’s office for political reasons violated their First Amendment rights. Beauregard controls the qualified immunity analysis in this ease. Moreover, it is not entirely without significance that the district court, with full briefing and two years after Nikolits’s actions, concluded that those actions did not violate the law. Finally, we note that plaintiffs’ argument that the law was clearly established by Elrod and Branti is further undermined by the split of the circuits concerning what those two decisions mean. See supra our discussion at 2510; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533-36, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2819-20, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (<HOLDING>). While we have endeavored in this opinion to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity (B) holding that attorney who was retained by city to assist in conducting official investigation into firefighters potential wrongdoing was entitled to qualified immunity in firefighters  1983 claim because official investigation of state employee was activity of the type entitled to qualified immunity (C) holding that official defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and noting that legal uncertainty about the meaning of a supreme court decision was reflected in the decisions of the lower federal courts (D) recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
Output: (C)
Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word “claimant” in subsection four. Under the plurality’s view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word “claimant” in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of “prevailing party.” This is because, in order for the word “claimant” in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
Output: (A)