niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of counsel issues. The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted as guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, supra. In following this mandate, the' majority of the circuits hold that the Sixth Amendment requires that assistance of counsel be measured against a standard higher than “sham and mockery” and rise to the level of reasonably competent assistance of counsel. The move toward this more demanding standard has been slowly evolving. Indeed it is our belief that even though courts in this circuit have articulated the “sham and mockery” test, they have been in fact applying the more stringent “reasonably competent” test, and that formal adoption of this standard represents a change in name. See Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942) (<HOLDING>). It seems appropriate, nevertheless, to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel (B) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (C) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (D) holding the sixth amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of a criminal proceeding including during the plea process (E) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel
Output: (E)
it comes to enforcing a person’s right to “occupy” a home, enforcement should be left to the states. The government counters by arguing that, because the definition of “economic activity” is broad, the civil rights legislation at issue is easily considered “commercial activity” under the Commerce Clause. See September 21, 2001 Government Responsive Brief at 5. This legislation, according to. the government, is analogous to the legislation upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964), a case in which the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate discriminatory practices of hotel chains. Moreover, the government points out that even the mere “occupation” of a home arises ou ir.1997)(<HOLDING>). It is these small effects upon commerce that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fire insurance written by two outofstate companies fuel obtained from outofstate and a restaurants use of food brought in from outof state have a substantial effect upon commerce (B) holding that the requisite effect on interstate commerce for a 18 usc  1951 conviction is demonstrated by inter alia evidence that restaurant robbed by defendant had often purchased food products from outofstate vendors and that the money taken by defendant would have been used to buy more food products (C) holding that an arkansas statute discriminated against interstate commerce by banning the importation of most outofstate waste even though a small amount of outofstate waste was allowed into arkansas under the statute (D) holding that interstate commerce nexus is established where defendant stole less than 100 from bar that imported beer from outofstate (E) holding that tavern that  purchased beer from outofstate vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute
Output: (A)
given immunity for his involvement in this crime and others in exchange for his testimony. The trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mills’ claim of newly discovered evidence would not produce an acquittal or life sentence on retrial. Claim, II Since his direct appeal, Mills has repeatedly argued that a person found guilty of felony murder is more likely to receive a death sentence than a person found guilty of premeditated murder because once he has been found guilty of felony murder (in this case, murder committed during the course of a burglary), the aggravating factor that the murder was committed in the course of another dangerous felony becomes automatic. We have repeatedly denied this claim. Mills v. Singletary, 606 So.2d 622 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. Dugger, 559 So.2d 578 (Fla.1990); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (B) holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense (C) holding stringer v black 503 us 222 112 sct 1130 117 led2d 367 1992 was not a change in the law that warranted retroactive application and thus mills claim that the felony murder aggravator was an unconstitutional automatic aggravating circumstance in felony murder cases was procedurally barred (D) holding that it is unconstitutional to base aggravating circumstance in capital prosecution on felony that was used to obtain firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that a conviction of first degree felony murder based on the predicate felony of robbery does not establish the pecuniary gain aggravator set forth in  13703f5 with respect to the murder
Output: (C)
In that case, the lawyer had even identified the client by name, stating that “ ‘[i]n order to help determine my status to assess fees, you should know that I am an attorney representing Three Forks Ranch Corp ...’” Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). The Court held that even this reference was not sufficient because the FOIA request did not also explicitly specify that the FOIA request was being made “on behalf of’ Three Forks Ranch Corporation. See also Burka v. United States Dep’t. Of Health & Human Services, 142 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (D.C.Cir.1998) (finding that undisclosed client could not be real party in interest in FOIA case, and discussing dangers inherent in recognizing an “undisclosed” client as the real plaintiff); MAXXAM Inc. v. FDIC, 1999 WL 33912624 at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Lamb v. I.R.S., 871 F.Supp. 301, 303 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a foia plaintiff seeks sensitive foreignaffairs information the court should give substantial weight to a government affidavit that the information is exempt from foia but nevertheless consider contrary evidence presented by the plaintiff (B) holding that when attorney representing unigard submitted a foia request in his own name unigard lacked standing because its name did not appear on the request itself (C) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents (D) holding that only the person or entity whose name appears in the foia request is the real party in interest and thus has standing to bring subsequent foia enforcement action (E) holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing
Output: (D)
again .... MARTIN: Right. WOLCOTT: You have had some bad breaks. Where do we need to go find her? MARTIN: I have no idea. I mean I don’t know. (Emphasis supplied.) Similar to the Walker interview, the interview here did not occur in an unduly oppressive environment. The interview lasted approximately three-and-a-half hours. It included a bathroom break and inquiries regarding Martin’s welfare. The detectives’ comments regarding the death penalty, and the realities of trial, were not made to incite fear in Martin, but were part of a larger conversation regarding possible penalties Martin could face in the absence of further explanation from him with regard to what happened the last time he and Jacey were together. See United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1475 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The detectives’ statements are best 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a government officer who informs the defendant of realistically expected penalties for cooperation andor noncooperation does not offer an illegal inducement (B) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (C) holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes (D) holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added (E) holding that a simple offer of a ride by a friend or neighbor does not constitute a lure as that term is usually defined as the offer is not accompanied by an inducement such as a promise of pleasure an enticement or prospect of financial gain
Output: (A)
intent] at the time it rejected” the plaintiff). Sonic contends that no one replaced Israel, and because Youngblood was the first employee hired into the F & I Department, his age precludes the court from finding Israel has met his prima facie case. Ironically, using Youngblood as Israel’s replacement would allow this court to hold that Israel has met his prima-facie case. Youngblood, who was in his mid-40s, was transferred to the F & I Department after Israel was terminated. Israel was 58 at this time, and although Youngblood was in the age group protected by the ADEA, this does not preclude a finding that his replacement of Israel satisfies the fourth element of the prima-facie case. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prove a primafacie case the employee is not necessarily required to show that the replacement was younger than 40 (B) holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case (C) holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger (D) holding that younger abstention is jurisdictional (E) holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination
Output: (A)
interest arbitration to bind the employer to a new agreement when the employer had lawfully repudiated its 8(f) relationship with the union. Relying on Collier Electric, the Board held that so long as the interest arbitration clause was “arguably binding” on the employer, the union did not commit an unfair labor practice by invoking interest arbitration, even though the agreement had expired and the employer had withdrawn from its 8(f) relationship with the union. Baylor Heating, 301 N.L.R.B. at 260-61. In other words, if the union can make a reasonable argument that the contract language allows it to submit “unresolved bargaining issues to interest arbitration,” the union “will be free to invoke its contract rights, includi mpa Sheet Metal Co., 786 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement (B) holding that notwithstanding the expiration of the original labor contract the employer was bound by a renewal contract issued by the arbitration panel according to the interest arbitration clause (C) holding that interest arbitration clauses survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and rejecting the argument that contractual interest arbitration obligations are canceled by the absence of a statutory duty to bargain (D) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (E) holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract
Output: (B)
before his heart attack and had been “asymptomatic” up until the day after his training. Dr. Sander viewed Bill’s physical activity during fire training as significantly higher than his usual physical activity during work. He testified there was a continuity of symptoms from the time that Bill left the fire training school until he had his heart attack and that he did not see any significance in the period of time from when he left the training to when he had his heart attack. Essentially, New Hampshire Insurance is asking us to presume that its expert’s theory is reliable in order to determine that Peggy Allison’s expert’s theory is unreliable. Conflicting theories between experts, however, do not automatically render one unreliable. See Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 695 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). The trial court could rely on Dr. Sander’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the conflict (B) holding conflict between experts theories is matter to be resolved by jury (C) recognizing conflict between circuits (D) recognizing possible conflict between the cases (E) recognizing conflict
Output: (B)
law controls both the award of and the reasonableness of fees awarded where state law supplies the rule of decision.”) Because Pikco’s entitlement to fees is based on a contract governed by Missis-sippi law, the Court will apply Mississippi law to determine whether the requested fees are reasonable. In most cases in Mis-sissippi, whether state or federal law ap-plies is a distinction without a difference because the lodestar method and John-son factors applied by federal courts are “almost identical” to those applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court and codified in Rule 1.5 of the Mississippi Rules of Profes-sional Conduct. See Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259, 272 (Miss. 1999); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Harried, No. 5:06cv160, 2011 WL 283925, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 25, 2011) (<HOLDING>). The Mississippi Code provides that In any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (B) holding that though mississippi law governs the amount of the fee award here because the factors considered under state and federal law are nearly identical both state and federal cases are instructive (C) recognizing that the aba guidelines and federal law are instructive (D) holding that federal law governs the definition of property which embraces both fee and lien interests (E) holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law
Output: (B)
light on the kind of relationship that the landlord is “suffering.” If the prior relationship was a tenancy of some kind, then it may be inferred that a tenancy by sufferance continues thereafter. The absence of a prior relationship, however, may make it more difficult to draw such an inference. This deficiency, however, does not compel the conclusion that plaintiffs will be unable to establish conduct sufficient to create a tenancy by sufferance if the allegations in the complaint are proved at trial. The initial trespassory nature of plaintiffs’ entry would not preclude it from being transformed into a tenancy by sufferance or some higher form of tenancy with the acquiescence of the owner. See Tunick v. Federal Food Stores, Inc., 117 Misc. 329, 331, 191 N.Y.S. 174 (2d Dep’t 1921) (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, the conclusion that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that current version of rsa chapter 540 applies to tenancies at sufferance (B) holding that a landlords acceptance of rent turned a trespasser to a tenant at sufferance (C) holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property (D) holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave (E) holding that increase in rent combined with friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under fair housing act
Output: (B)
Koonin, argued that the indictment was filed one day too late. Id. The government countered that when “computing the time within which a prosecution may be commenced, the first day counted is the day following that on which the offense was committed.” Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit agreed with the government’s argument, noting that”[t]he long-established general rule is that a statute of limitations begins to run on the day following the day on which the event giving rise to the cause of action occurred.” Id. at 901 (citing Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437, 439, 51 S.Ct. 185, 75 L.Ed. 448 (1931)). This principle, the Court noted, had been applied in criminal as well as civil cases. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 923, 926 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). As Davis illustrated, this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment (B) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (C) recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy (D) holding that for an indictment returned on september 5 1974 to be timely the government had to prove that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy on or after september 5 1969 (E) holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
Output: (D)
as well as recent country reports and his own affidavit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that conditions in China have materially changed. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China. Id. at 275 (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”); Jian Huan Guan, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we find that the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it
Output: (A)
by these individuals is one that necessarily requires public disclosure of identity. Even assuming that an official proponent has a First Amendment anonymity interest, the potential burden is negligible. In a different context, the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism that an informational interest can sustain regimes that compel disclosure of the identity of an advocate at the point of contact with voters, or signatories in the initiative context. In Buckley v. Am he identity not of an advocate, but of an individual who serves as an official proponent and representative of the signers in the lawmaking process — a role akin to a candidate for office and recognized explicitly as distinct from that of an advocate under California law. See Perry, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 265 P.3d at 1017-18 (<HOLDING>). The government’s interest in alerting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages (B) holding that where the customary measure of damages for a vendors failure or refusal to convey land was inapplicable the measure of damages must be flexible enough to vary with the necessities of the situation (C) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (D) holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion (E) holding that the official proponents of an initiative measure are recognized as having a distinct role  involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from other supporters of the measure
Output: (E)
RFDI’s behalf) and Schmidt (subcontractor to Stokes for installation of the racking system). Interlake also introduced no expert testimony of its own; it did not introduce the testimony of the previously precluded experts, Kath leen Murphy R.N., or Gary Barach. Instead, Interlake elected to rely on: its cross-examination of Rice and a reading from the transcript of Rice’s deposition taken before the first trial. N.T., 02/23/10 at 7-25. In addition, Interlake read to the jury selections from: the transcript of the prior trial testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Ketchman, plaintiff’s design expert {id. at 27-125); the deposition of Brian Tumulty, formerly RFDI’s chief financial officer {id. at 128-131); the prior trial testimony of Charles Daniel Willis, a former em 598, 493 A.2d 669, 672-74 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Berkeihiser v. DeBartolomeo, 413 Pa. 158, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that superior court erred in granting judgment nov and remanding for a new trial generally (B) holding that superior courts erred in granting judgment nov on a wrongful death claim and remanding for new trial on that claim and on damages (C) holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages (D) holding that the superior courts erred to the extent that it allowed a new trial on a lung cancer claim and affirming the grant of a new trial limited to noncancer injury claims (E) holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only
Output: (C)
Def.’s Mot., Ex. E, Gaskins’ Decl. ¶ 5. Although plaintiff said that he “heard the rumor about [the cubicle] being unsafe[,]” he contends that the cubicle was not in disrepair and was removed solely in retaliation for his EEO complaint. Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 113, 115. However, plaintiff did not testify that he was unable to complete his work assignments; rather, he testified that the result of the cubicle being dismantled was that he “had no place to put none of [his] stuff[,]” which included “records and stuff[,]” although he testified that the cubicle was replaced with a desk, albeit a small one. Id. at 114-15. These facts do not support a finding of an adverse action sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Brodetski, 141 F.Supp.2d at 45 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). III. Conclusion For the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the administrative transfer of a teacher which denied him the opportunity to teach his preferred subject could constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that plaintiff s allegations that defendants denied him his right to choose a new workstation on two occasions do not constitute adverse employment actions even if they made plaintiff feel slighted or wrong (C) recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn (D) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (E) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually
Output: (B)
Tatta received between Dr. Wright’s initial denial of Tatta’s April 2002 request to be retreated with Pegylated Interferon in combination with Ribavirin and his subsequent approval of Tatta’s request in December 2003 was inadequate. Further, Dr. Wright has repeatedly stated that he initially refused to re-treat Tatta with Pegylated-Interferon with Ribavirin because, even though recommended by Drs. Fish and Rogers, the treatment had yet to gain FDA approval. See Wright Decl. at ¶¶ 18, 35-39. It was neither unreasonable nor indifferent for Dr. Wright to refuse a treatment not approved by the FDA. Thus, Tatta has failed to demonstrate that Dr. Wright was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). As to Tatta’s allegation that Eastern’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court violated bradleys right to counsel of choice because none of the conditions identified in wheat as overriding the right to counsel of choice were present (B) holding that evidence that patient who had a history of not taking medication and who murdered husband during a period when she was off of her medication and delusional tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to patient or others (C) holding that inmates have a property interest in their money (D) holding that inmates do not have the right to the medication of their choice (E) recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance
Output: (D)
case as well. The district court permissively abstained under § 1334(c)(1) and equitably remanded pursuant to § 1452(b). The district court did not address the related Chapter 15 bankruptcies. Courts may permissively abstain from certain bankruptcy cases “[ejxcept with respect to a case under chapter 15.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (emphasis added). Defendants base their challenge to the district court’s order on the argument that § 1452 does not apply in this case, rather than on the court’s reasons for remand. We conclude that Defendants’ challenge to the remand order thus falls within an exception to nonreviewability. See Schexnayder, 394 F.3d at 283 (the Fifth Circuit will review a case if based on a ground for remand not contemplated by remand statute); Wilson Indus., 886 F.2d at 95 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we' have jurisdiction to review 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion (C) holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute (D) holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court (E) holding that in reviewing a district courts decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo the decision can be affirmed on any ground that finds support in the record including an alternate ground
Output: (C)
because it did not state the necessary facts to support a charge of criminal contempt, it is clear from the record of the hearing that the order to show cause was based on Tsokos’s purchase of the properties. Because the circuit court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, it is not necessary to address this deficiency. It is well-established that “[o]ne may not be held in contempt of court for violation of an order or a provision of a judgment which is not clear and definite so as to make the party aware of its command and direction.” And, “implied or inherent provisions of a final judgment cannot serve as a basis for an order of contempt.” Cooley v. Moody, 884 So.2d 143, 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citations omitted). See also Keitel v. Keitel, 716 So.2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, as Tsokos argues in the petition, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (B) holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment (C) holding that even an order that establishes entitlement to a judgment is not final unless it  actually enters or renders a judgment  or includes specific language of finality necessary for a judgment  to be considered final for purposes of an appeal (D) holding that even though the former husbands visitation rights were implicitly obstructed by the former wifes relocation to new york the final judgment did not contain an express provision prohibiting relocation and implied or inherent provisions of a final judgment cannot serve as the basis for an order of contempt (E) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment
Output: (D)
parties, Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209 (1998), and the burden of showing a change in circumstances is always upon the party seeking the change in the amount of alimony. (Emphasis added.) Weeks v. Wilson, 95 Ark. App. 88, 234 S,W.3d 333 (2006) (citing Hass v. Hass, 80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003)). The majority opinion specifically states that, “There is no evidence in the record to suggest that appellee needed alimony then or that she needs alimony now.” (Emphasis added.) Apparently, the majority is attempting to go behind the order to determine whether or not the trial court erred in its first award of alimony. There is no authority for that proposition, and the premise is untenable. See Taylor, supra (citing Lively v. Lively, 222 Ark. 501, 261 S.W.2d 409 (1953) (<HOLDING>)). This last distinct flaw, the shifting of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards may not be supplemented by contract (B) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (C) holding that prison term following revocation of probation is a modification and part of the actual sentence imposed for the original offense (D) holding that the liberality of the original allowance cannot afford grounds for modification (E) holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure
Output: (D)
v. Crapps, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 916 (2005). First, Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 280 (2005), held that “a drag certificate is akin to a business record and the confrontation clause is not implicated by this type of evidence.” We ruled that a docket sheet, like a drug certificate, is a business record and thus does not trigger the confrontation clause. Commonwealth v. Crapps, supra. Second, we determined that a docket sheet was not testimonial “because authors of prior conviction records are not witnesses against criminal defendants.” Id. at 916 n.3, citing People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060-1061 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (docket sheets are business records that are explicitly exempt from the Crawford standard). See Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. 577, 591-592 (2006) (<HOLDING>). In June, 2009, the United States Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that g l c 278  11 a allowing record of conviction to serve as prima facie evidence of prior conviction did not violate confrontation clause (B) holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation (C) holding appellate court erred in reversing conviction on confrontation clause grounds because appellant did not clearly articulate to trial court that confrontation clause demanded admission of evidence in question (D) holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause (E) holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue
Output: (A)
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or [3] to be too dangerous.” This is known as the “necessity requirement,” and it obligates the government in its application for a wiretap to demonstrate that it has considered other methods of investigation and to explain why those methods have proven inadequate for one or more of the three listed reasons. United States v. Mandell, 833 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2016). “Despite its name, the necessity requirement “was not intended to ensure that wiretaps are used only as a last resort in an investigation, but rather that they are not to be routinely employed as the initial step in a criminal investigation.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the government’s burden in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evil we are trying to avoid in these cases is the routine use of wiretaps as an initial step in the investigation (B) holding outofcourt statements relating to reasons for investigation are not admissible where the reasons for the investigation are not at issue (C) recognizing that miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of routine traffic offenses (D) holding that a trustee is not required to avoid the initial transfer from the initial transferee before seeking to avoid it and recover from subsequent transferees and noting that this conclusion is consistent with case law that has disallowed automatic recovery from a subsequent transferee following the avoidance of an initial transfer through a stipulated judgment or default when the transferee had not been a party to the underlying avoidance proceeding (E) holding that the commissioners failure to consider one impairment at step two could not constitute reversible error where the commission found at step two that the plaintiffs other conditions were severe and therefore proceeded to step three in the evaluation process
Output: (A)
last constitutional challenge alleges that the HCAA violates the right to due process of the laws. The argument appears to be that, because the HCAA imposes limits on potential damage awards, it inflicts a deprivation of property without a hearing. The constitutional guarantee of due process is applicable to rights, not remedies. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332, 54 S.Ct. 140, 142, 78 L.Ed. 342 (1933) (“[Although a vested cause of action is property and is protected from arbitrary interference, [appellants have] no property, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy; all that [they are] guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the preservation of [their] substantial rights to redress by some effective procedure.”) (citations omitted); DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 792 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the limitations on damage awards 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct (B) holding there is no right to a specific dollar remedy (C) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (D) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law (E) holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right
Output: (B)
irom May 5, 2003 through May 10, 2005.” Kensmoe argues on appeal that the time period to renew the judgment by affidavit under N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 was not tolled and the “Georgia rulings should not be used in the decision of a North Dakota judgment.” In her reply brief, Kensmoe also distinguishes F/S Manufacturing’s reliance on In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. 912 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2002). Kensmoe’s argument necessarily includes whether the district court erred in deciding the time period in N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 was tolled by her prior bankruptcy proceedings, and we reject F/S Manufacturing’s claim about waiver. [¶ 14] We approach with caution the complexity of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code and its interplay with state law. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass’n v. Burk, 427 N.W.2d 108 (N.D.1988) (<HOLDING>), disagreed with by In re Hoffinger Indus., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  108c2 applied to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal in state court until at least 30 days after notice of the stays termination or expiration (B) holding  108b2 extended unexpired period for filing appeal but holding appeal was untimely (C) holding 11 usc  108b2 applied to extend unexpired 60day period to file notice of appeal to 60 days after order for relief but that appeal was untimely (D) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (E) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
Output: (C)
retrieve E.P.C. Reynolds also testified that Father showed no remorse about leaving E.P.C. alone and appeared to worry more about possibly losing his job. Father’s act of leaving ten- month-old E.P.C. alone in the apartment endangered E.P.C.’s physical well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E); see also In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that “a child is endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards”). Moreover, the trial court heard additional conflicting evidence that Mother and Father had been seen in public without E.P.C. as many as eight other times. See In re H.R., 87 S.W.3d 691, 698-99 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In addition to leaving E.P.C. unsupervised, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e (B) holding evidence legally sufficient (C) holding evidence legally insufficient (D) holding the evidence sufficient to establish the defendants knowing possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt when among other things the defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that he had acquired the shotgun for his protection and that officers testimony went uncontradicted at trial (E) holding evidence legally sufficient and noting among other things that the appellant left the child in the care of a nineyearold cousin while she went out drinking
Output: (E)
indicate that the defendant should nevertheless have foreseen that injury could result. Here, the testimony of the store manager and the frozen food manager has generated a fact question in regard to whether Miners could have foreseen Amber’s injury, and, thus, whether Miners was negligent. Miners was aware that young children would be among those likely to retrieve food items from the freezer. The store manager testified that one’s hands could stick to the wall of the freezer if no protective coating of frost had formed. Reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Miners should have foreseen that a child could receive frostbite burns if there was no frost covering the freezer walls. Cf. City of Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Community Sch. Dist., 617 N.W.2d 11, 16-17 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Further, reasonable minds could differ as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it is a question of fact (B) holding that a question about present employment in field of law enforcement did not trigger disclosure of past employment in field of law enforcement (C) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (D) holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question (E) holding that question of whether golf cart with key in ignition posed foreseeable danger to children in context of school field trip was question for jury
Output: (E)
whole. It is the dissent that is trying to "grab bag” one provision, namely section 1, and interpret it separate and apart from the rest of the article. Moreover, because the language of article VIII is plain, it is improper to explore its legislative history, as the dissent would have us do. "The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.” State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983); see also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 428, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the constitutional right to appeal must be given a practical construction (B) holding that if constitutional provision is clear then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to (C) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them (D) holding that if precise issue is not clear in statute reviewing court must not simply impose its own construction but must determine whether agencys construction is permissible (E) holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious
Output: (B)
remained] undistributed.” Id. “The only legitimate purpose of a deadline in this context is to prevent applications from continuing to trickle in after the Secretary is ready to distribute the fund. Since the deadline set by the Secretary bore absolutely no relationship to a realistic date of distribution, it was arbitrary.” Id. at 903 n. 4 (emphasis added). Subsequent events proved the wisdom of the Eighth Circuit decision, with 5,147 more lineal descendants being found eligible to share as a result of the Eighth Circuit decision, with there having initially been 1,969 eligible lineal descendants. Based upon the above, the Court does not find that the Defendants have met their burden of proving that the Secretary’s actions were substantially justified. See Role Models, 353 F.3d at 968 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Court does not find that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) recognizing that the government  must demonstrate the reasonableness not only of its litigation position but also of the agencys actions   (D) recognizing that the government agreed not to take a position (E) holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable
Output: (C)
with intent to murder”; therefore, the two convictions did not violate double jeopardy. Id. In addition to comparing the statutory elements of an offense both in the abstract under Blockburger and as applied to the facts of the particular case under Duchac, courts consider other factors relevant to ascertaining legislative intent. These factors include the following: (1) whether there were multiple victims involved; (2) whether several discrete acts were involved; and (3) whether the evil at which each offense is directed is the same or different. As we noted in Goins, “generally, if a criminal episode involves several victims who have personally been victimized, the evidence could sustain multiple convictions.” Goins, 705 S.W.2d at 651 (citing State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980)(<HOLDING>)). In Goins, however, we held that the multiple 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (B) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (C) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that killing more than one person in a single automobile accident justified multiple homicide convictions (E) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm
Output: (D)
Remmer presumption following third-party communication with a juror, jurors encountered third parties who expressed their view of a party's culpability or appropriate sentence. E.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 676-84 (4th Cir.2002) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing in a § 2254(d)(1) case where the petitioner proffered evidence that a juror’s “strongly pro-death penalty” husband had repeatedly attempted to influence his wife to convict the petitioner and sentence him to death); United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 140-44 (4th Cir. 1996) (reversing and remanding for a new trial based on the Remmer presumption based on juror-third party contact the Court characterized as the juror's correct perception that the third party was attempting to bribe him); Stockton, 852 F.2d at 745-46 (<HOLDING>); Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court is not required to poll the jurors regarding possible acquittal on death penalty (B) holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a third partys statement to jurors that he hoped they fried the sonofabitch bore on the exact issue  whether to impose the death penalty  that the jurors were deliberating at that time (E) holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias
Output: (D)