niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
“ ‘may take a variety of forms,’ ” including evidence tending to show “ ‘that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was false.’ ” Id. (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir.2000) (further quotation omitted)). “The plaintiffs evidence can also allow for an inference that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons were either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action....” Id. at 1102-03 (quotation and alteration omitted). A. Ms. Ramsey first argues that the district court failed to recognize that LCMC’s reasons for the termination have shifted over time, which is evidence tending to show pretext. See Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1104 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable jury could find pretext for a termination where the plaintiff stated that her work was satisfactory and there was no indication that the plaintiffs statement was either incredible or fanciful (B) holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination (C) holding that inconsistency in employers reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext (D) holding that posthoc reasons for an adverse employment decision constitute evidence of pretext (E) holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he
Output: (C)
and she reported being stressed about having to take care of the family and feeling like she was “wearing the pants in the home.” Tr. 388, 392, 412, 413. Further, Vang reported to Dr. Hoistad that she engaged in very little social activities because she did not have the time and she was depressed about taking care of her children. Tr. 436. There is nothing in the initial intake report or progress notes by Thersleff that made any mention of the impact of Vang’s depression on her ability to engage in daily activities. “A treating physician’s opinion does not deserve controlling weight when it is nothing more than a conclusory statement.” Hamilton, 518 F.3d at 610 (citing Piepgras v. Chater, 76 F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir.1996)); see also Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, checking a box on a form, without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (B) holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations (C) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (D) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (E) holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence
Output: (A)
an insurance policy from Life Investors. As a result, Mary’s selection of optional insurance did not create a separate, binding insurance contract, but instead arose out of the original Lease. Moreover, Mary did not allege in her complaint that she was an “insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy” as stated in section 15-48-10(b)(4). Instead, Mary’s complaint alleged Harrelson breached its fiduciary duty and breached the parties’ contract by failing to procure the credit life insurance from Life Investors. Because Mary’s asserted causes of action arise out of an automobile lease agreement and not an insurance contract, the circuit court properly held Mary was required to submit her claims against Harrelson to binding arbitration. See Cox, 347 S.C. at 468, 556 S.E.2d at 402 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We conclude the Lease between Mary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 15  4810b4 is a specific exemption limited only to entities within the insurance industry (B) recognizing only specific limited forms of pleadings (C) holding that section 12a2 did not apply to a private placement memorandum which was subject to a section 42 exemption (D) holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers (E) holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
Output: (A)
the compressor station would be about [$]100,-000? A. I think so. Q. And that’s due — and then because of the compressor station- being there with the noise and the odors, do you agree with the figures she gave of [$]25,000 being the best that y’all might could get? A. I imagine that would be close to it. This was the Mashburn’s only reference to market value. We conclude that none of this testim ut even his testimony was insufficient. Although he demonstrated his familiarity with area market values, he- failed to explain the factual basis behind his determination that his property suffered a $400,000 decrease in value. His statement that it was “based on property sales around in the area” provides little more detail than using the words “market value.” Cf. Arkoma, 249 S.W.3d at 389 (<HOLDING>). In both' cases, the owners stated a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (B) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (C) holding that evidence that the petitioner had a political opinion that he expressed it to his persecutors and that they threatened him only after he expressed his opinion compelled the conclusion that the threats were connected to his political opinion and not only to his failure to provide money in response to demands from the persecutors that predated his expression of his political opinion (D) holding that the affidavit of an expert proffered in opposition to summary judgment motion was assertedly in conflict with the experts prior deposition testimony but the court found that the affidavit could generate genuine issues of material fact because the expert explained the basis for his apparently changed opinion (E) holding that experts cursory testimony did not make his opinion conclusory because accompanying exhibit explained the basis for his conclusion
Output: (E)
Plaintiffs maintain that Sehultheis intentionally directed tortious actions towards an Oklahoma resident. Plaintiffs additionally assert that Sehultheis hired an Oklahoma attorney to represent him from 1997 until 2001, which establishes additional contact with Oklahoma. Plaintiffs maintain that Sehultheis has sufficient contacts with Oklahoma to satisfy the first prong of the minimum contact analysis for specific personal jurisdiction. Defendant maintains that Sehultheis did not call Clark but acknowledge that for the purpose of determining personal jurisdiction the Court may consider the Plaintiffs representation that the call was made. However, Defendants maintain that the telephone call is insufficient. See also Far West Capital Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Misco-United Supply Inc. v. Richards of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding one phone call by itself insufficient to find minimum contacts (B) holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts (C) holding that a contract governing a onetime sale and purchase of a product negotiated by fax and phone is insufficient to establish minimum contacts where delivery actually occurred in another state (D) holding defendants phone calls and ten to twenty faxes and letters insufficient contacts for minimum contacts (E) holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant
Output: (D)
to show that “defendants’ convictions did not violate the Due Process or Ex Post Facto Clauses”); cf. United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (10th Cir.2003) (ruling that a criminal defendant’s actual notice of a regulation was sufficient to satisfy a statutory requirement that the regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice satisfied the fair notice purpose of the posting requirement and explaining that this ruling is consistent with “related cases holding that a party can be held criminally liable under an unpublished regulation where the party had actual knowledge of its terms”). Thus, the Department’s Guidance Document provided the defendants with fair notice that this definition of waste would be enforced against them. See, e.g., Elias, 269 F.3d at 1014-15 (<HOLDING>). For all of these reasons, we hold the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff is required to identify specific acts of individual defendants  for his claim to survive (B) holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca (C) holding that an environmental group established constitutional standing where its members lived near a landfill into which an epa regulation allegedly would permit certain hazardous wastes to be deposited (D) holding that industry groups and various agencies conclusions that certain cyanidecontaining wastes were hazardous provided fair notice to support criminal conviction under rcra despite the defendants claim that the regulation required a specific standardsbased test (E) holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation
Output: (D)
visits to Morales’s home, and Morales’s responses were always the same; Morales consistently stated that A. Walker had visited his house with D. Cantrell on five to six occasions, and that D. Cantrell would purchase a minimum of one pound of methamphetamine on each visit. Because the district court did not unreasonably restrict A. Walker’s ability to test Morales’s reliability through cross-examination, the question is whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that Morales’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the due process concern that a defendant not “be sentenced on the basis of materially incorrect information.” See United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (9th Cir.1993), amended by 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir.1993). Notwithst 9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Petty, 982 F.2d at 1369 (same). A. Walker’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unverified tip from a known informant was sufficiently reliable to justify a terry stop and frisk (B) holding that description was sufficiently detailed (C) holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed (D) holding that evidence was sufficiently reliable because there was corroboration (E) holding qualified immunity doctrine does not protect hearing officer where there was no reliable evidence whatsoever of the inmates guilt
Output: (D)
residence. Upon arrival, the police recovered shell casings from a .40 caliber weapon. Robles told the police that he was not home when the shots were fired, and he denied-owning a .40 caliber weapon. Despite Robles’ denials, Detective Cabrera recovered a .40 caliber pistol that was registered to Robles. The police did not follow up with Robles or the witnesses. Once again, Robles was not charged. In August 2010, Johnson amended his pending PCRA petition to allege that the Commonwealth violated Brady by withholding the above-described police reports. The PCRA court dismissed Johnson’s amended petition as untimely. On appeal, however, this Court reversed and remanded for a merits review of Johnson’s Brady claim. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 619 Pa. 386, 64 A.3d 621 (2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). After remand, the PCRA court granted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding that coleman could use certain information to bring a new and separate suit even though that information was discovered subsequent to a violation of the courts protective order (C) holding that attorney abandonment constitutes an extraordinarycircumstance that allows a federal court to disregard the state procedural bar to hearing a habeas petition (D) holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief (E) holding that the information discovered during the federal habeas proceedings constitutes newly discovered facts for pur poses of the b1ii exception to the pcras jurisdictional time bar
Output: (E)
July 15, 2013). 101 . We also note that the testimony indicates that Gerald’s physical abuse of Ploof and the most egregious sexual abuse occurred in Ploof’s late teens and early adulthood, not in his early childhood. 102 . Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 937 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Francis v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 696, 703 (11th Cir.1990)) (reasoning that the physical abuse a habeas petitioner suffered as a child was less weighty when the defendant was thirty-five years old at the time of the murder). In Callahan (which discussed Williams and Wiggins), there was evidence that the petitioner’s father frequently beat and raped his mother and physically abused the petitioner. Id. at 920; see also Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1217 (11th Cir.2008) (citing Callahan, 427 F.3d at 937) (<HOLDING>). 103 . See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present (B) holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child (C) holding that a habeas petitioner must show that counsels errors  actually prejudiced him (D) holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim (E) holding that a petitioner had not been prejudiced by his counsels failure to present child abuse evidence and noting that several decades had elapsed between the murder and the abuse
Output: (E)
for a loss covered by the policy. The Court dismissed plaintiffs negligence claim, and declined to consider the claim as one for “professional negligence”, applying the economic loss doctrine. Applying these holdings to the case at bar, it is clear that Plaintiff cannot maintain its negligence claim against [the broker]. Numerous courts have held that negligence claims for economic loss do not survive the economic loss doctrine. See Chemtrol [Adhesives, Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mwt. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St.3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624, 629-30 (Ohio 1989) ] (explaining that “a plaintiff who has suffered only economic loss due to another’s negligence has not been injured in a manner which is legally cognizable or compensable”); All Erection & Crane Rental Corp., 1:01-cv-1282, at 7 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 9, 2004) (<HOLDING>). Meskill, 2006 WL 903207 *4-5, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the key question in deciding whether the economic loss doctrine applies to a negligence claim is whether the negligence was extrinsic to the subject matter of the contract (B) holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties (C) holding cause of action for negligence against manufacturer of defective buses was barred by the economic loss rule notwithstanding absence of privity (D) holding economic loss doctrine bars negligence claim based on service contract (E) holding that the economic loss doctrine barred a negligence claim without regard to whether the parties were in privity of contract
Output: (E)
be corroborated, the declarant’s age and the circumstances under which the statement was made. Donaldson, 58 M.J. at 488. A military judge’s factual findings on the existence of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are reviewed for clear error. Id. “A declarant’s young age is a positive factor supporting admissibility and assuring trustworthiness as it lessens the degree of skepticism with which ,we might view his or her motives.” United States v. Dingle, 27 M.J. 704, 708 (A.F.C.M.R.1988). Here, the military judge determined that AM was not available and the hearsay statements were necessary. The military judge considered AM’s prior testimony in court, made personal observations and considered expert testimony. Cf. United States v. Czachorowski, 66 M.J. 432, 436 (C.A.A.F.2008) (<HOLDING>). The trial judge specifically found that AM 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised (B) recognizing that a party could not rely on the hearsay exceptions under rule 804 on summary judgment without showing unavailability of the witness (C) holding a trial judge may not rely only on counsels proffer regarding unavailability to admit hearsay under the residual exception (D) recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception (E) holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule
Output: (C)
that a colorable claim of innocence opens both gateways, it is still insufficient to override the longstanding rule that a freely and voluntarily entered guilty plea bars a collateral attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in summarily denying Woods’ untimely and successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Woods was not entitled to appointed counsel. As a final note, Woods argues in his brief that the district court needed to appoint him counsel. However, the district court is only required to provide counsel when the motion raises the sort of a substantial question of law or fact that requires a preliminaiy hearing. See Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 271); Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170-71, 14 P.3d 424 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Given that the motion, files, and records 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion (B) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (C) holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves (D) holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice (E) holding that the district court may summarily dismiss the motion or determine that a potentially substantial issue or issues of fact are raised in the motion   and hold a preliminary hearing after appointment of counsel
Output: (E)
to be exactly the same as that of the RJPod. In any event, more significant than whether the work is commercial in nature is whether the Defendant’s use was “trans-formative:” “The central purpose of this investigation is to see ... whether the new work merely supercedes the objects of the original creation, ... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (internal citations, brackets, and citations omitted). The Court considers whether the Defendant’s use of the Floor Plan merely superceded the object of the originals or instead added a further purpose of different character. Id.; cf. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Defendant submits that the RP-Floor Plan, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same types of evidence used to prove a title vii claim also may be used to prove a  1983 claim (B) holding that newspaper articles were inadmissible hearsay when used to prove that the defendant made the statements attributed to him in the article (C) holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction (D) holding that when a photograph that was intended to be used in a modeling portfolio was used instead in a news article the work was transformed into news (E) holding that a hostile work environment was sufficient to constitute constructive discharge because the harassment was expressed by the plaintiffs supervisor and the offending language was not only used in the plaintiffs presence but was directed at him
Output: (D)
assert that, in many of the class members’ cases, there was no “consumer transaction” because the debts arose from phy sician-patient transactions, and as such, Defendants are exempt from the OCSPA. Plaintiffs argue that the physician-patient exemption does not apply to Defendants. The OCPA’s physician exemption in the definition of “consumer transaction” is narrowly construed, and Ohio courts have rejected its application to non-physicians. See Summa Health Sys. v. Viningre, 140 Ohio App.3d 780, 749 N.E.2d 344, 356 (2000) (“While transactions with physicians are exempted from the CSPA, a transaction between a service provider such as a hospital and the consumer is not clearly exempted.”); Elder v. Fischer, 129 Ohio App.3d 209, 717 N.E.2d 730, 734-35 (Ohio Ct.App. 1st Dist.1998) (<HOLDING>); Thorton v. Meredia Suburban Hosp., 1991 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that antitrust claims arising out of an international commercial transaction were arbitrable despite the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause (B) holding that physicians were specifically excluded from the ocspa but hospitals were not so they must abide by the ocspa (C) holding that this court can consider claims not specifically excluded by a coa (D) holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback (E) holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court  we must assume that they were considered
Output: (B)
that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases.” See also Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.1994) (commenting that “we do not rule out the possibility that both men and women ... have viable claims against [a male supervisor] for sexual harassment”), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 733, 130 L.Ed.2d 636 (1995); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir.1993) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (arguing that “harassment is harassment regardless of whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); cf. Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus far, only the Fifth Circuit has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single incident in which a coworker squeezed an employees buttocks was not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment (B) holding that homosexual advances by male coworker were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable (C) holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person (D) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (E) recognizing that conduct amounts to actionable sexual harassment only when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment  alteration in original citation omitted
Output: (B)
the jury to hear Grindle’s version of the events without his being subjected to cross-examination by the State. In this context, the court’s exclusion of a single statement from the recorded interview was in no way prejudicial to his defense and did not violate his right to due process. See M.R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(C); see also Drewry, 2008 ME 76, ¶¶ 27-28, 946 A.2d 981. [¶ 13] We are also unpersuaded by Grin-dle’s contention that the statement was admissible pursuant to Rule 412(b). Grin-dle sought to introduce his own hearsay opinion of the victim’s sexual predisposition whereas the rule permits, in limited circumstances, evidence only of specific instances of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior. See M.R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(A)-(B); cf. State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932, 937-38 (Me. 1980) (<HOLDING>). The court did not abuse its discretion in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that opinion testimony was inadmissible to prove a persons character or character trait when maine rule of evidence 405 permitted only evidence of reputation or specific instances of conduct (B) holding that evidence of other crimes though generally inadmissible to show character is admissible to show for instance proof of motive or plan (C) recognizing that under the proper application of rule 608b extrinsic evidence of specific instances of bad conduct is made inadmissible when offered to prove a witnesss character for untruthfulness (D) holding counsel was not ineffective for making tactical decision to present character evidence in favor of the defendant which opened the door to states presentation of evidence of defendants bad character especially when limiting instruction mitigated any potential prejudice (E) holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense
Output: (A)
Vachon was the true owner should have been known to him and/or his counsel, and certainly was a matter of public record. See Thurlough v. Dresser, 98 Me. 161, 163-64, 56 A. 654 (1903) (“The mere record of a valid mortgage gives constructive notice to all. All are presumed to know its contents, for any one interested can obtain knowledge by examining the record.”). 8 . We are not persuaded by Oceanic’s assertion, on appeal, that the sale notice was not sent by registered mail. Oceanic failed to deny — and therefore admitted — this fact in its opposition to Sloan's Cove's motion for summary judgment. See M.R.' Civ. P. 56(h)(4). 9 . Courts in other jurisdictions have decided differently. See, e.g., Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat’l Bank of La Grange, 797 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Pemstein v. Stimpson, 36 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale (B) holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable (C) holding that buyer who purchased property at foreclosure sale took title free from easement granted after deed of trust (D) holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final (E) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property
Output: (B)
The Court is not at liberty to follow the law of other Circuits if it contradicts -the law of this Circuit. Plaintiffs’ other argument relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1984) which stated that Summit Office Park applies only when a Plaintiff without standing adds a new party and a new cause of action. Delta Coal Program, 743 F.2d at-857, n.6. (“Here, by contrast, the operative facts and the cause of action are not changed, but only the formally named plaintiff.”). Delta Coal Program, however, does not apply to the present case. First, the district court there permitted the substitution of new plaintiffs, and it was within the court’s discretion to do so. Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852, 856 (11th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs did not ask 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (B) holding that when district court has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over sapcr matter judge of another district court in same county may rule in matter so long as record is clear that judge is acting on behalf of court with continuing and exclusive jurisdiction (C) holding that the district court has broad authority to take jurisdiction over a matter even when that matter is not brought by a real party in interest (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive
Output: (C)
Robert Louis Tolbert appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the state trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it admitted evidence of a note containing communications he claims were privileged. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we review the district court’s denial of Tolbert’s petition de novo. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm. To the extent that Tolbert contends that the state court unreasonably concluded that Tolbert waived his state attorney-client privilege, this claim provides no basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the state court reasonably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that gardenvariety errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas relief (B) holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief (C) holding that federal habeas relief is not available to correct errors of state law (D) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (E) holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief
Output: (E)
the record to reach a determination of whether Horton was properly found guilty of theft of property or failure to appear, because Rule 37.1 does not afford a convicted defendant a means to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. Chatmon, 2016 Ark. 126, 488 S.W.3d 501. Next, Horton contended in his petition that the trial court should have considered his claims “individually and collectively.” Even if he had not stated the allegations in entirely conclusory terms, it is well settled that a court is not required to recognize cumulative error in assessing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Noel, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123; see also Pedraza v. State, 2016 Ark. 85, 485 S.W.3d 686 (per curiam); State v. Hardin, 347 Ark. 62, 60 S.W.3d 397 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Horton argues in his brief that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding error was structural because of the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error (B) holding cumulative error not reversible if it is more probably harmless than not (C) holding that to demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel petition must establish that the alleged error was prejudicial in fact (D) holding that errors not rising to level of plain error are to be considered in assessing cumulative error (E) holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
Output: (E)
of the Zohar Funds and Patriarch, IMG Brands and DCF continued to sell Products beyond the December 31, 2008 termination date of the License Agreement. (Countercl. ¶ 196.) Although such conduct would normally constitute trademark infringement, the License Agreement provided that, following termination of the agreement, IMG Brands could continue to sell Products for an additional 135 days. See Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., Inc., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (“[T]he continued use by the defendants of a licensed trademark after the Franchise Agreement had been terminated constitutes ... trademark infringement as well as a breach of contract.”); see also Romacorp, Inc. v. TR Acquisition Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5394, 1993 WL 497969 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993) (<HOLDING>). Lastly, to the extent Houbigant alleges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (B) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation (C) holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act
Output: (B)
concerned statements made during settlement negotiations, not the settlement itself. Vardon, like Steele, helps Pfizer, but not entirely. In that case, the plaintiff issued an interrogatory that sought “information relating to settlement negotiations.” Id. at 651. In denying the plaintiffs motion to compel an answer to this interrogatory, the court noted that “[t]he policy favoring freely-negotiated settlements is one of the strongest in the federal courts, and is enshrined in Fed. R. Evid. 4-08’s [ (“Rule 408”) ] exclusionary rule.” 156 F.R.D. at 652 (emphasis added). Like the Steele court’s discussion of the “settlement privilege,” the Vardon court was addressing statements made in the c ivilege as to communications, it did not wholly cordon off all things settlement. Id. at 981-83 (<HOLDING>). Nor could it. As the Court explains below, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of settlement may be considered under rule 408 when reviewing a motion for sanctions (B) recognizing exceptions in rule 408 as applying to settlement agreements and the occurrence of settlement talks (C) holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations (D) recognizing the confidentiality ordinarily afforded to settlement agreements (E) holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced
Output: (B)
and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-1 to-34 (1993, as amended through 2005), in using the wrong statutory standard. Grandmother asks that, based on this error, the case be remanded for a new hearing on the issues of placement and visitation. {11} Grandmother’s argument that the district court erred because it used an arbitrary and capricious standard in evaluating the placement of Child by CYFD fails. In reviewing whether CYFD properly placed Child, the district court stated that CYFD’s determination that Grandmother was not an appropriate adoptive placement for Child was not “arbitrary or capricious.” The district court did not err in using this standard because it was reviewing a discretionary act by CYFD. See In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 771, 764 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). CYFD has the discretion to place children 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments (B) holding that the trial court exceeded its power in ordering the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities to provide daycare services when those services were being eliminated because of staff reductions because ordering the department to implement specific facilities and programs is beyond the judicial function and exceeds the power of the courts (C) holding that the childrens court exceeded its authority in prohibiting the human services department from placing a child with her brother (D) holding that the department of human services policy manual set forth ministerial duties to act to care for and protect children in its custody (E) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute
Output: (C)
provides that statutory ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment). 62 Gordon, 334 Ga. App. at 634-35; see McNair, 293 Ga. at 284 (stating that the rule of lenity does not apply when the statutory provisions are unambiguous). 63 Mack v. State, 323 Ga. App. 821, 823 (748 SE2d 299) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see Worley v. State, 265 Ga.251, 252 (1) (454 SE2d 461) (1995) (“[T] he armed robbery statute clearly specifies that a person convicted of armed robbery can be sentenced to prison for life ”); Lester v. State, 309 Ga. App. 1, 5 (2) (710 SE2d 161) (2011) (concluding that life imprisonment was the longest authorized punishment for a conviction of armed robbery). 64 Mack, 323 Ga. App. at 823; see also Worley, 265 Ga. at 253 (2) (<HOLDING>). 65 See OCGA § 16-8-41 (b). 66 466 U. S. 668, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act (B) holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness (C) holding that the armed robbery statute can be reconciled with ocga  17101 and its sentencing provision is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness (D) holding that va code  182603 is not void for vagueness (E) holding that escape driver with no prior knowledge that robbery would be armed is aider and abettor of aimed bank robbery if he knowingly and willfully joins in the escape phase of an armed bank robbery knowing that an accomplice has a gun
Output: (C)
prior weapons conviction to support an enhanced sentence for a subsequent weapons conviction, double jeopardy principles precluded the State from introducing evidence on remand to support imposition of the same enhanced sentence). 3 . In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial of the penalty phase of a capital case, when the penalty phase was tried before a jury, in a process identical to a trial on criminal liability, The Court reasoned that in that circumstance, the jury’s decision not to impose the death penalty bears the hallmarks of an acquittal. The Mange Court maintained that exception. 4 . Scott asserts that Almendarez-Torres and Monge. are no longer good law be 3 (2008) (<HOLDING>), implicitly overruling State v. Hennings, 100 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy (B) holding based on monge that floridas double jeopardy clause does not preclude granting the state a second opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant meets the criteria for habitualization (C) holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes (D) holding that resentencing hearing in capital case is not barred by double jeopardy when appeals court rejects sole aggravating factor found by sentencer failure of sentencer to find other alleged aggravating factors is not an acquittal of these factors for double jeopardy purposes (E) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted
Output: (C)
Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 83-84, 662 A.2d 367 (1995), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the disclosure of an offender’s home address, when coupled with the other information included in the notification statute, implicates a privacy interest. The court, however, determined that an offender can only claim a limited expectation of privacy in the information. 142 N.J. at 88. Noting that the degree and scope of disclosure was “carefully calibrated” to the need for public disclosure, the court upheld the statute based on a prevailing state interest in protecting the public from the substantial danger of recidivism by sex offenders. 142 N.J. at 89-90. Some states have refused to find a privacy interest on behalf of the offender. Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska App. July 23, 1999) (<HOLDING>); People v. Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d 319, 334, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where some radio scripts from aradio show had entered the public domain and others were protected by copyright plaintiff was entitled to use the public domain material without a license (B) recognizing a right to privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal matters (C) holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records (D) recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters (E) holding that the right of privacy does not attach to matters already within the public domain
Output: (E)
as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so “would impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written”). {11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (C) recognizing a reliance on federal jurisprudence for the interpretation of louisianas arbitration statutes (D) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (E) recognizing that the csa is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar
Output: (E)
from the “striking” similarities between the works. Id. This rule only applies, however, where “as a matter of logic, the only explanation [for the similarities] between the two works must be ‘copying rather than ... coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source.’ ” 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.02[B] (2009) (citations omitted). Conversely, under the “inverse ratio rule” recognized by the Ninth Circuit, courts “require a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity when a high degree of access is shown.” Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485. To benefit from this rule, Plaintiff must offer proof of access which is greater than or “more compelling than that which is offered in the usual copyright case.” Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1176 (C.D.Cal.2001) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Conversely, where 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted (B) holding that repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works even without direct economic benefit is sufficient for a court to find commercial use (C) holding that younger abstention was appropriate while the case works its way through the state appellate process (D) holding that the inverse ratio rule did not apply because the general unavailability of plaintiffs works es pecially those that were unpublished other than by way of their alleged 1994 and 1995 submissions to defendants makes access to plaintiffs copyrighted works somewhat less than might be available in a large number of cases (E) holding that the plaintiffs allowance of customers to create derivative works for noncommercial purposes did not impliedly license commercial competition
Output: (D)
what ever [sic] terms you apply to guess work or subconscious feelings give rise to some thoughtful, some articulable, reasonable reflection on an evaluation of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. Memorandum of Law, Statement of Facts, attached to Petition (Docket # 1) (quoting T.723). Turning first to the trial court’s alleged direction that a juror should be able to “articulate” his or her “reasonable doubt,” this statement is a variation on New York’s pattern jury instructions, which define reasonable doubt in part as “a doubt for which some reason can be given.” Vargas, 86 F.3d at 1277 (quoting 1 Criminal Jury Instructions (New York) § 3.07, at 92 (1983) and citing People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 300, 303, 449 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170, 171, 434 N.E.2d 237, 238-39, 239-40 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 847, 103 S.Ct. 104, 74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution (B) holding that charge defining reasonable doubt as a doubt for which you can conscientiously express a reason was neither confusing nor inaccurate (C) holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act (D) holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error (E) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases
Output: (B)