niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
impair the exercise of authority, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the State’s regulations must give way.” Id. at 12,127 S.Ct. 1559. Cadence Bank argues that the NBA preempts Tennessee’s statutory requirement that national banks, as ‘ corporations transacting business in Tennessee, obtain a certificate of authority. The NBA provides, in relevant part: Upon duly making and filing articles of association and an organization certificate a national banking association shall become, as from the date of the execution of its organization certificate, a body corporate, and as such, and in the name designated in the organization certificate, it shall have power— Fourth. To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity, as ful 3, 616 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 390 S.W.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nba preempted a kentucky statute that re quired a national bank as a foreign corporation transacting business in the state to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining suit in a kentucky court as it significantly impaired the banks exercise of authority under the nba (B) holding that the nba preempted application of a texas statute that would infringe on a national banks federally granted right to sue in any court as fully as natural persons by requiring the bank to obtain a certificate of authority before it could maintain a suit in texas (C) holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporations capacity to sue but did not affect the courts subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks (E) holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba
Output: (D)
Equivalents. As a jury has been demanded, only a jury can resolve the conflicting views of the experts in this non-obvious and extremely complicated patent dispute. “Summary judgment is as available in patent cases as in other areas of litigation.” See Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., .948 F.2d 1264, 1265 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citation omitted); see also Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corporation, 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed.Cir.2000); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795 (Fed.Cir.1999). However, I tend to agree with those of my confreres who have held that, in general, summary judgment is appropriate only in cases where the technology at issue is relatively simple and straightforward. See Amhil Enterprises, Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact (C) holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care (D) holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact (E) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate
Output: (C)
may give such retroactive effect to these legal clarifications because “where ... a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency’s current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.” Id. Therefore, unless the new regulation “replaces a prior agency determination,” this Court may find that the amendment merely provides an explanation for what the law always has been. Id. In order to determine if the amendments to Regulation E marked a change in the rules or served as an interpretation of existing law, this Court will first look to the stated intent of the Board in proffering the amendments. See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). If an agency plainly states that it is merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted (B) holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain (C) holding regulatory amendment extending a banks deadline for returning checks could be given retroactive effect (D) holding that where a legislative amendment changed the exemption provisions of a tax statute defining those eligible for certain exemptions and refunds the amendment could only be applied to tax years after its effective date even where the legislature expressly stated the amendment should have retroactive effect and looked to the law in place during the taxable events to determine if the taxpayer was eligible for a refund (E) holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment
Output: (C)
needed to fund the health premium obligations” and that “establishment and modification of such an employee benefit has traditionally been within the scope of legislative discretion.”); Unterschuetz v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill.App.3d 65, 281 Ill.Dec. 367, 803 N.E.2d 988, 994 (2004) (observing that, even within context of actual ordinance declaring policy, “the function of a legislative body is to make laws that declare the policy of a governmental body, which laws are subject to repeal when a subsequent legislature decides to alter that policy” and that City had “simply announced] various policies that the City intends to carry out until such time as the city council wishes to change those policies.”); Chicago Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 56 Ill.2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3, 6 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Foley v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 421 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that longevity pay enhanced the regular periodic salaries paid to firefighters and police officers (B) holding that in reviewing the petition the court is to weigh the policy of public access to records against the longstanding public policy of providing a second chance to criminal defendants who have not been adjudicated guilty (C) holding that police officials did not have property interest in continuation of longstanding policy of providing officers with step and longevity salary increases (D) holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records (E) holding that a townships unilateral termination of a longstanding policy of permitting police officers to take police vehicles home at the end of their shifts was a mandatory subject of bargaining
Output: (C)
basis in which defendants are considered. I question whether that concern for individuality exists under a system which not only admits expert testimony deduced without examining the subject but also, as in this case, accepts the possibility that jurors will allow that evidence, rather than factors more personal to a defendant’s crime and character, to effectively condemn that individual to death. 1 . As the Court of Criminal Appeals admitted, "the State’s case at [Flores’] punishment [hearing], to some extent, rested upon Dr. Griffith's testimony.” Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 83, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (allowing the use of psychological testimony on a defendant’s alleged "future dangerousness”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence (B) recognizing that texas courts have adopted the aamr definition of mental retardation providing that mental retardation must manifest before age of 18 years (C) holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record (D) holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence (E) holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background
Output: (E)
be entitled to the same immunity enjoyed by the SEC when it is performing functions delegated to it under the SEC’s broad oversight authority”). Indeed, the doctrine of absolute immunity for SROs has been characterized as a matter of simple “fairness” in light of their “quasi-governmental powers.” DL Capital, 409 F.3d at 97-98 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is further beyond dispute that at least the sovereign immunity enjoyed in the first instance by government agencies themselves has been recognized as shielding them — absent waiver of the sort found in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) — from enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum in civil suits to which the United States is not a party. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d 592, 597-99 (2d Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>), opinion amended in part on rehearing, 212 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that while the lack of an express statute granting sovereign immunity precludes such immunity as a matter of law the entity in question could still be determined to be acting as an agency of the state under the facts and circumstances of a particular relationship (B) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (C) holding that federal express despite the use of the word federal in its name is not a federal agency and therefore cannot be sued in this court (D) holding that waiver of sovereign immunity under federal tort claims act for intentional acts committed by federal law enforcement was not limited to investigative activities (E) recognizing that enforcement of thirdparty subpoena issued by civil defendant would compel federal agency to act and would therefore be barred by sovereign immunity but for the express waiver set forth in the apa
Output: (E)
were similar in their overall purpose — trafficking in cocaine). After a defendant puts his intent at issue by pleading not guilty, the strength of the government’s case on intent must be “overwhelming” in order to render extrinsic evidence on intent unnecessary. See United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1987) (“Moreover, the government’s proof of intent at trial was not so overwhelming as to render the extrinsic offense evidence merely cumulative.”); United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446, 451-52 (11th Cir.1986). We have found that an intervening period of as much as fifteen years did not render evidence of prior convictions inadmissible. United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.1995); cf. United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>)- A defendant’s incarceration for a substantial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense (B) holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel (C) holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction (D) holding the district court abused its discretion in admitting a 22yearold conviction involving 14 grams of marijuana and recognizing that although we have declined to establish a brightline rule for when a prior conviction is too old to be admissible the conviction at issue was nearly fifty percent older than the oldest conviction we have previously allowed in lampley (E) holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury
Output: (D)
raised, the purported defect in the notice of foreclosure is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Under § 44-14-162.2, a secured creditor must provide the debtor with notice of a foreclosure sale that, in relevant part, “shall be in writing [and] shall include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtorf.]” O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a). Georgia courts have concluded that substantial compliance with this statute’s notice provision is sufficient. See TKW Partners, LLC v. Archer Capital Fund, L.P., 302 Ga.App. 443, 446, 691 S.E.2d 300 (Ga.Ct.App.2010). See also Stowers v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 317 Ga.App. 893, 895, 731 S.E.2d 367 (Ga.Ct.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (B) recognizing that the applicant received notice from the plea form even though such notice was not required (C) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (D) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an award of sanctions entered against attorney because the notice of appeal did not provide that attorney was appealing in his own name (E) holding that notice of foreclosure listing name address and phone number of attorney rather than the lender was sufficient under  44141622 even though the attorney did not have full authority to negotiate amend and modify the loan and the notice listed no entity or individual with such authority
Output: (E)
Parts. I There is no question that the trial judge mistakenly prevented the defense from peremptorily back-striking a juror whom it identified to the trial judge. The law has been quite clear for some time that the trial judge has no discretion to restrict a defendant’s exercise of a peremptory challenge by back-striking. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 795 B(l); State v. Watts, 579 So.2d 931 (La.1991), and State v.Taylor, 93-2201, p. 22 (La.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, 376 (“In other words, peremptory challenges are exercisable at any time before the jury panel is sworn.”) |;>The Louisiana Supreme Court requires us to review the trial judge’s violation of the defendant’s right to peremptorily back-strike a juror under the so-called “harmless error” rule. See Taylor, 93-2201, p. 26, 669 So.2d at 378 (<HOLDING>) Despite my disagreement that this kind of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the failure to proffer rendered the allocution error harmless (B) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (C) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding exclusion was harmless error (E) holding we find that the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to any error that occurred in not allowing back striking and so qualifies as harmless
Output: (E)
from the right to control land, even where the person held to such a duty does not own the land in question.” Davis v. Westwood Group, 420 Mass. 739, 744-745 (1995), citing Underhill v. Shactman, 337 Mass. 730, 733 (1958). That general principle does not apply here for two reasons. First, the record contains no evidence concerning the existence of any legal right of control possessed by the defen 2 ed.) (‘“State highways shall be maintained and kept in good repair and condition by the department [of highways] at the expense of the commonwealth”). Our conclusion also comports with the Commonwealth’s ‘“elaborate and comprehensive statutory system” establishing municipal liability for injuries resulting from defects in public ways. Huff v. Holyoke, 386 Mass. 582, 585 (1982). See ibid. (<HOLDING>); G. L. c. 84, §§ 1, 15. See also DiNitto v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent explicit statutory authority a municipality cannot be held liable for punitive damages (B) holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing (C) holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages (D) holding that by framing her complaint in terms of commonlaw nuisance plaintiff could not avoid statutory limit on recovery of damages against municipality (E) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages
Output: (D)
date of the EAJA as originally enaeted. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir.1990). Plaintiffs, however, have not provided a calculation for such an adjustment, likely because their position was that they should recover $200 per hour for the two primary attorneys involved in this case, or in the alternative, that the $125 per hour cap should apply. The Court will provide Plaintiffs an opportunity to submit a proposed calculation for a cost of living adjustment in this case and give the Defendants an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ calculation. In devising their proposed calculation, Plaintiffs should take into account the rate of inflation for each relevant year and establish the compounding effect of fees since 1981. The number of h 19, 325 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). When the hourly rate allowed is as low as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based on leftwich the law of this circuit is that computerbased legal research must be factored into the attorneys hourly rate hence the cost of the computer time may not be added to the fee award (B) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances (C) holding that attorneys fees would include expenses for computerized legal research and thus not allowing computerized legal research as a separate taxable cost (D) holding that computeraided research like any other form of legal research is a component of attorneys fees and cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost in addition to the attorneys fee award (E) holding that the costs of computerized research was a component of attorneys fees that cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost
Output: (A)
comparison of the two marks, but rather must determine whether the allegedly infringing mark is confusing to the public when singly presented. Id. Similar ities of the marks are given more weight than differences. Id. In this case, the marks are similar inasmuch as they both utilize some variation of the words “Big Dog.” Holdings relies heavily on this similarity between the marks and asks the court to focus on the fact that this is the dominant portion of the marks. The court finds Holdings’ heavy reliance on this consideration to be misplaced for two reasons. First, it is well settled that while the dominant portion of a mark is given greater weight, the court must still consider each mark as a whole. First Sav. Bank v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 645, 653 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing similarities between illinois and federal law on relation back (B) recognizing auditory similarities between two marks at summary judgment where the plaintiff had linguistic expert evidence that the marks were pronounced similarly (C) holding that despite some differences between the charged offense and the collateral crime similarities between the two were striking enough to establish a unique crime pattern (D) holding the district court erred by relying too heavily on the appearance and pronunciation of the marks where the differences between the entire marks and their attending logos outweighed the similarities (E) holding expert testimony on probative similarities between works is unnecessary where the works are not highly technical and the jury is capable of recognizing and understanding the similarities between the works without the help of an expert
Output: (D)
2. Although the substance of the inquiry remains the same, the Supreme Court has counseled that the question whether a defendant can show a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights “is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). With that said, we do not quarrel with the district court’s analysis on this point. Several distinguished jurists continue to use the “standing” terminology as useful shorthand. See, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir.2004) (Selya, J.) (acknowledging after Rakas that the term “standing” “is imprecise,” but adopting the usage “[f]or simplicity’s sake”). But, regardless of terminolo 1 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). As we observe below, the conclusion that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (B) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there (C) holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home (D) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business (E) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence
Output: (B)
the Insureds paid their own defense counsel millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees prior to August 29, 2001, two years before the date on which the Insureds filed this suit. Despite the Insureds’ requests for reimbursement, Lexington reimbursed the Insureds less than $330,000 of their defense costs, and did not make any reimbursement payments until 1999. Because Lexington denied coverage and the Insureds allegedly incurred millions of dollars in damages, sufficient facts existed for the Insureds to seek a judicial remedy based on their claims for negligence and negligent-misrepresentation and their claims for violations of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code. See Abe’s Colony Club, Inc. v. C & W Underwriters, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 86, 90-91 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Insureds’ second sub-issue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cases in which only issue was liability above the policy limits were not on point in case in which insured sought damages for expenses it incurred in defending thirdparty claims and that such damages constitute legal injury resulting in accrual of claim and starting of limitations (B) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases (C) holding an order of default was not final where it resolved only the question of liability and the case was continued for proof on the issue of damages (D) holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers (E) holding that although some breach of contract damages were calculable specific damages for which grogan sought injunctive relief were intangibles incapable of being measured by damages
Output: (A)
and fired North Bay’s employees, and that Elmar Lee Pettit made the decision that North Bay would be non-union. Nor does appellants’ evidence contradict appellees’ proffer that Elmar Lee Pettit transferred Nor-Cal accounts to North Bay. Elmar Lee Pettit does declare that “I told [customers] I could not help them, that they should call North Bay Plumbing.” (C.R. 229.) But these general denials of involvement in North Bay’s affairs conflict with his sworn statements on North Bay’s business license that he would “supervis[e] and control” North Bay’s plumbers. Such internal inconsistencies in a party’s own testimony fail to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether North Bay was the alter ego of Nor-Cal. See Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). 2 Intent Even though the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff cannot create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment through an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony (B) holding that mere speculation does not satisfy the nonmoving partys burden of establishing a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that the necessity of choosing between the appellants two conflicting versions of a material fact does not defeat summary judgment (D) holding that conflicting expert evidence regarding function establishes material issue of fact (E) holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact
Output: (C)
corporation had the option to acquire all of the remaining stock in Randall’s company. If Randall was not employed by the company at that time, he would not make any more profit on his fair value stock options because he would no longer be a company stockholder. In addition, even if his employment continued after divorce, Randall would not make any more profit on the stock options if the sale did not occur or if his company’s stock did not become publicly traded after 2004. To date, no Texas court has considered how to determine the community property value of stock options at divorce. The cases have only addressed whether stock options are community property. See Kline, 17 S.W.3d at 446; Bodin, 955 S.W.2d at 381; Demler, 836 S.W.2d at 699; see also Charriere, 7 S.W.3d at 220 n. 6 (<HOLDING>). The factors presented here cause us to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate (B) holding that like pension benefits stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage (C) holding that stock options that could be purchased but not sold without company consent during marriage were community property even though value of options was dependent upon employee spouses postdivorce employment (D) holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property (E) holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock
Output: (C)
Our research has revealed a number of cases in which Illinois courts have considered whether the terms of section 4(h) of the Act support the implication of a statutory right of action for retaliatory conduct apart from actual discharge of the employee. See Bryce v. Johnson & Johnson (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 913 (plaintiff who was reassigned to a position at half his salary failed to state cause of action for violation of section 4(h) because he was not discharged); Bragado v. Cherry Electrical Products Corp. (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 136 (plaintiffs claim for wrongful termination of temporary total disability benefits was a matter for the Industrial Commission and not the basis for an action pursuant to section 4(h)); Cook v. Optimum/ Ideal Managers Inc. (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 180 (<HOLDING>); Miranda v. Jewel Cos. (1989), 192 Ill. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because of statutory remedial scheme court would not imply a cause of action arising directly under the state constitution (B) holding that court would not imply a statutory cause of action for employers interference in employees assertion of claim for compensation (C) holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action
Output: (B)
this interpretation, insisting that its construction requires the court to pick a penalty between $25,000 and $50,000. Gov’t Reply Br. 6 n. 1; see Oral Arg. Recording 54:03-54:19. We have difficulty seeing how the government’s construction yields that result, at least without considerable verbal gymnastics. Finally, whatever the persuasiveness of the government’s “disgorgement” rationale for penalizing the payee in the full amount of the payment, it does not apply to the penalty imposed on the payor. The payor has no “ill-gotten gains” to disgorge; to the contrary, it is already out the amount it paid. Yet 86, 1992 WL 46682, at * 1 (9th Cir. Mar.12, 1992) (noting “that good faith [i]s not a defense to a general intent crime”); United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n. 9, 105 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief (B) holding that because the government need not show that a defendant specifically intended to disobey the law in order to prove a violation of 8 usc  1326  which makes it a felony for a previously deported alien to reenter the united states without the express permission of the attorney general  the defendants good faith or mistaken belief  that she could reenter lawfully is not a defense (C) holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states (D) holding that alien on student visa could not lawfully possess intent to be domiciled in the united states (E) recognizing that the plain language of  1326a establishes that a previously deported alien who illegally enters and remains in the united states can violate the statute at three different points in time namely when the alien 1 enters 2 attempts to enter or 3 is at any time found in the united states
Output: (B)
but she voluntarily and knowingly allowed R.A. to remain in the circumstances without making any earnest effort to remove him from them. 3. Conclusion Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we hold a fact-finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Jordan knowingly placed and knowingly allowed R.A. to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered his physical and emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). The evidence is thus legally sufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under section 161.001(1)(D) of the Family Code. See id.; In re J.T., No. 13-08-00652-CV, 2009 WL 2077184, at *13 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re H.C., 942 S.W.2d 661, 665 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fundamental error occurred in the prosecution of a mother for aggravated manslaughter of her child when the prosecutor commented on the fact that the mother had contemplated having an abortion during the course of her pregnancy with the child (B) holding mothers due process rights were not violated when her appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and hearing was held without mother because the record showed mother did not inform counsel of her whereabouts after moving thereby frustrating counsels efforts to contact her and because mother was properly served with notice of the termination hearing (C) holding mothers drug use during pregnancy and after child was removed from her care in face of random drug testing that placed her relationship with child at risk was legally and factually sufficient evidence that she engaged in course of conduct which endangered her child (D) holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement (E) holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was legally sufficient to support termination
Output: (E)
policy of encouraging people to take reasonable care for their own safety precludes imposing a duty on the possessor of land to make ordinary steps ‘foolproof.’” Bertrand, 537 N.W.2d at 189. D. Cudney also raises a new argument on appeal. She claims that the Tort Reform Act of 1995 abolished the open and obvious danger doctrine. We need not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. GenCorp, Inc. v. American Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 817 (6th Cir.1999). In any event, we note that the Michigan courts have continued to apply the doctrine, see, e.g., Millikin, supra, and we assume that the Michigan Legislature was aware of the doctrine when it promulgated the Tort Reform Act. See Dick v. Dick, 210 Mich.App. 576, 534 N.W.2d 185, 190 (per curiam) (Mich.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). III. For all the foregoing reasons, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts will not read language into a statute where it would result in an enlargement of the statute by the court so that what was omitted  may be included within its scope (B) recognizing common law privileges (C) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest (D) recognizing obligation to read the language of the statute in light of previously established common law (E) holding that determination of interests conveyed in nineteenthcentury transfers requires a close examination of the conveying instruments read in light of the common law and statutes of vermont then in effect
Output: (D)
whenever parties who lost in state court ... seek[ ] review and rejection of that judgment in federal court”) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). The first element of Younger abstention is satisfied. C. Important State Interest Implicated As to the second element, implicated state interests are defined broadly to in-elude “the importance of the generic proceedings to the State.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Federal courts have long recognized the important state interest involved in “maintaining and assuring the professional conduct” of lawyers, doctors, and other professionals through enforcement of proper standards through state licensing schemes. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 434, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 778 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing states interest in exercising extensive control of licensing of attorneys to ensure professional conduct (B) holding that the us attorneys office is the alter ego of the united states exercising its sovereign power of prosecution (C) recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys (D) recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child (E) recognizing professional rules are not intended to run to personal benefit of attorneys adversaries
Output: (A)
Co. v. District Council of Painters No. 16, 803 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir.1986), and of note 5 of John S. Griffith Construction v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 785 F.2d 706, 712 (9th Cir.1986), they are not to the contrary. Jon and Mesa Verde note a narrow exception to the rule we describe in the text. They permit a district court to decide in the first instance whether an employer has effectively repudiated a section 8(f) prehire agreement. The employer's right to repudiate is created by, and set forth specifically in, a federal statute rather than, as here, in the collective bargaining agreement itself or in a body of common or other law applicable generally to contract matters. See Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 269, 103 S.Ct. 1753, 1758, 75 L.Ed.2d 830 (1983) (<HOLDING>) (quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) recognizing employers right to repudiate as means of promotfing congress intention  that prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily (D) holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel (E) holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act
Output: (C)
will not suffice.” 12 Moore et al., § 60.24[2], The analysis of Virginia Lee’s threshold showing of a meritorious claim or defense poses a somewhat unusual question. Whereas the more common application of Rule 60(b) requires the court to analyze the merit of a movant’s claim or defense where there has been a default, as in Augusta es specifically contracted that the settlement document would be “governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and, to the extent not preempted, the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” (Agmt. at 4.) Such a choice of law clause is presumptively valid, so long as it is not unreasonable. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir.1996); see also Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240, 242 (1919) (<HOLDING>). A binding settlement in Virginia is judged by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law (B) holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent (C) holding that settlement agreements like consent judgments are not given preclusive effect unless the parties manifest their intent to give them such effect (D) holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld (E) holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect
Output: (E)
to question whether Barroso and Altura were in a position to make informed decisions about their representation. See Overseas Shipholding, 547 F.Supp.2d at 87-88. Both men were foreign nationals who were sufficiently indigent to quality for , court-appointed counsel. Further, both were out at sea when they signed the agreements and were disadvantaged in their ability to shop around for other representation. Although both were competent to retain counsel (as we describe below), the information discrepancy between Hawthorn and his clients suggests that Barroso and Altura were not in a position to make an informed decision about the appropriate level of compensation or to “shop around for other representation.” Id. at 87; see Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a successor attorney fails to inform the client of the clients duty to pay the predecessor attorney the successor assumes the obligation to pay the first lawyers fee out of his or her contingent fee (B) holding without mentioning cotnam that settlement portion paid to attorneys pursuant to contingent fee was income to client (C) holding that contingent fee agreements were subject to heightened scrutiny because of the vulnerabilities of seamen (D) holding that public policy considerations require that the burden be placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of courtawarded attorneys fees in the contingent fee agreement (E) holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee
Output: (C)
One, plaintiffs claim that the CEP violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously “discriminat[ing]” against minor-party candidates. See J.A. 66 (ComplJ 53). Plaintiffs’ challenge is focused on the CEP’s “qualification criteria,” which are the criteria by which candidates qualify to receive CEP funding, as well as the CEP’s “distribution formulae,” which are the formulae that establish the amount of money that the CEP provides to participating candidates. See id. According to plaintiffs, the CEP’s qualifying criteria and distribution formulae violate the Constitution because they impermissibly burden the “political opportunity” of minor-party candidates. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95-96, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The District Court granted judgment for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cap does not violate equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the admission of his juvenile conviction did not violate equal protection (D) holding that a public financing system may violate equal protection if it unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the political opportunity of any party or candidate (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection
Output: (D)
knowledge of the rule or order, supports our adoption of the majority rule. “[Wjhere the legislature includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is presumed that the legislature acted purposefully in including or excluding that particular subject.” State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn.2000)). By stating that the level of punishment for violations of the rules and regulations promulgated under the 1980 Securities Act is subject to a heightened knowledge requirement, the legislature sent a clear signal that such a requirement does not exist for violations of the Act itself. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Our adoption of the majority rule is also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no violation of the travel act (B) holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law (C) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (D) holding knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and action taken thereafter was sufficient to find a willful violation of the stay (E) holding that the last sentence of 15 usc  78ffa which matches the second independent clause of section 409a of the 1956 uniform securities act makes it clear that the statute contemplates a willful violation by one who has no knowledge of the violated rule or regulation footnote omitted
Output: (E)
that he did not pull his arm away or do anything that would lead Sergeant Palmer to conclude that he was not complying with the arrest. (Doc. 38-2, p. 84). More importantly, once Mr. Scott was on the ground and Sergeant Palmer was on top of him with one arm cuffed behind Mr. Scott, there was no reason for Sergeant Palmer to continue to hit Mr. Scott in the back and press his head into the ground. An arrestee’s right to be free from this level of force during an arrest is clearly established; no reasonable officer with the information available to Sergeant Palmer could have believed that the amount of force that Sergeant Palmer used to arrest Mr. Scott was constitutionally permissible. Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993); see Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1334 (<HOLDING>). Although the non-resisting plaintiffs in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right to be free from the use of excessive force has been well established since 1976 (B) holding that arrest warrant can support entry into suspects residence when there is reason to believe the suspect is within (C) holding that a reasonable officer would have known that repeatedly punching kicking and stomping a subdued individual violated the clearly established constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force during arrest (D) holding that punching a nonresisting criminal suspect for no apparent reason other than malice was a violation of the suspects clearly established right to be free from excessive force during an arrest (E) holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right
Output: (D)
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958))); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (noting a trend "expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations ... [i]n part ... attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years,” including a "great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines”). 4 . See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 572 (noting that a defendant’s mail-order sales to forum residents may satisfy the "continuous and systematic” standard (citing Sollinger v. Nasco Int'l, Inc., 655 F.Supp. 1385 (D.Vt.1987))); Michigan Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ceos trip to the forum state to negotiate a services contract did not constitute the continuous and systematic general business contacts required to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state (B) recognizing general jurisdiction where availment is systematic and continuous (C) holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state (D) holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction (E) holding that inter alia appellees mail order solicitations of michigan businesses and the fact that they made at least one sale in michigan each and every month for two years indicate that appellees have conducted a continuous and systematic part of their general business in michigan  thereby warranting general personal jurisdiction
Output: (E)