niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
that the social history is not. Accordingly, the social history is not discoverable. The court also concludes that the letter is not protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege because it was disclosed to a third party, and Officer Draper could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the letter. Accordingly, the court concludes that the letter is discoverable. Conversely, Officer Draper has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the PTSD interview. Unlike the letter, the PTSD interview was not disclosed to the Ogden City Police Department. Accordingly, the court concludes that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to the PTSD interview, and therefore, it is not subject to discovery. See e.g., Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154, 162 (D.N.J.2000) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. District of Columbia, No. CIV. A. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the psychotherapistpatient privilege applied to mandatory postshooting evaluation where no confidential information was disclosed by the psychologist to the police chief but only a yes or no as to whether the officer was fit to return to duty (B) holding that the psychotherapistpatient privilege applied where an officer was required to undergo a psychological evaluation after killing a suspect and the psychotherapist merely opined whether the officer was fit to return to duty (C) holding that an exception to the general rule applied when counsel asked the court whether its ruling was the final order of the court and the court responded yes (D) holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council (E) holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern
Output: (A)
further delineates certain requirements concerning the selection and retention of those who will exercise that judicial power. See Utah Const, art. VIII, §§ 8, 9, & 13. Thus, under state law, examination of the constitutionality of section 78-3-31 consists of two inquiries: (1) whether section 78-3-31 violates the Utah Constitution’s exclusive vesting of the state’s judicial power in article VIII courts, and (2) whether section 78-3-31 violates the Utah Constitution’s requirements for those persons exercising that judicial power in courts of record. A Constitutional Powers of Article VIII Courts Core functions or powers of the various branches of government are clearly nondelegable under the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that zoning and rezoning are legislative matters (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others
Output: (C)
Act’s definition of “person,” which could potentially subject governmental entities to liability. Id. at 73-74. “But general statements by the Legislature that ‘no substantive change in the law is intended’ must be considered with the clear, specific language used” in section 38.001. Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999). “[W]hen, as here, specific provisions of a ‘nonsubstantive’ codification and the code as a whole are direct, unambiguous, and cannot be reconciled with prior law, the codification rather than' the prior, repealed statute must be given effect.” Id. at 286. Thus, under the plain language of section 38.001(8), a person may not recover attorney’s fees against a partnership. Cfi Ganz v. Lyons P’ship, L.P., 173 F.R.D. 173, 176 (N.D.Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Without any other authority for the award of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tcprc section 380018 authorizing recovery of attorneys fees against individual or corporation does not provide for award of attorneys fees against limited partnership (B) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (C) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (D) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (E) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees
Output: (A)
“escape” offense for purposes of sentencing. See Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d at 668 (“Even though the word ‘escape’ does not appear in subsection three, the crime is plainly an escape offense within the meaning of [the consecutive sentence statute].”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no basis upon which to distinguish escape and failure-to-appear offenses in the context of a continuing-offense analysis: [A] defendant who fails to appear for sentencing presents a threat to society analogous to that posed by an escaped prisoner. Both are convicted criminals obligated to serve sentences or facing sentencing. In addition, the failure of a defendant to appear for sentencing poses a threat to the integrity and authority of the court. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared (B) holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute (C) holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits (D) holding that failure to appear when released on bond was a continuing offense (E) holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense
Output: (E)
area’ ....” Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). The technology at issue in Kyllo was a thermal imager that produced images showing heat distributions within the defendant’s home and in comparison with his neighbors’ homes. Id. at 29-30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Based on their thermal imaging scan of Kyllo’s residence, officers determined that Kyllo was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house. Id. at 30, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Though the officers obtained additional information about Kyl-lo’s increased electricity usage by subpoenaing his utility company, the Court determined that the officers’ use of the thermal imager constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038; id. . 2010) (non-prece-dential) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, courts agree that individuals do 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed (B) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that where there is no evidence of shared use or common authority an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files kept on a personally owned computer (E) holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying information transmitted for isps and phone providers to provide service
Output: (E)
claim because "she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights”); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1129 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.”) (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)); United States ex rel. Cogifer, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., Civ. A. No. 86-183-NN, 1987 WL 19932, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished). 11 . See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990). 12 . See, e.g., Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 896 (finding equitable estoppel where surety reneged on promise to pay after statute of limitations had run). 13 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 436 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Atlas Erection Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (C) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (D) holding that estoppel applied where surety repeatedly responded to subcontractors threats to sue with answers which assured them that amicable settlement was just around the corner (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety
Output: (D)
16 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Punishment for contempt is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1017, 115 S.Ct. 578, 130 L.Ed.2d 493. We have previously noted that Ind.Code 34-4-7-6, which limited punishment to a fine of $500.00 and/or imprisonment of no more than three months, has been repealed. See Contempt of Steelman, 648 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Matter of Craig, 552 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Now, in the absence of the statute, the power to punish contempt is limited by reasonableness. Id. (citing Green v. U.S., 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 645, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958) (<HOLDING>)). Our supreme court has held that a sentence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury (B) holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly (C) holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion (D) holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence (E) holding that the lack of statutory limitations does not give the trial court unbridled discretion as the trial court has a special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection
Output: (E)
appropriate relief for such a violation is for the habeas court to “vacate the judgment of conviction and enter a new judgment from which an appeal can be taken.” Id. Defendant argues that the Peak line of eases applies to his situation, and that his appellate rights should thus be reinstated. However, the Peak rule does not apply in defendant’s ease, as the appeal at issue is not an appeal from a conviction. A Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to an appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. Borrego v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1997). This follows logically from the fact that there is no guaranteed constitutional right to counsel at the supervised release revocation hearing itself. See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (E) holding that most of the fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not required for supervisedrelease proceedings as a matter of constitutional law including a right to counsel
Output: (E)
to and from Atasca and Bowman by requesting information from that time period in its interrogatory. Further, the dates of insolvency were established by El Paso’s partial motion for summary judgment. Legally, El Paso’s complaint about the time period would shift the burden to Bowman to prove an element of El Paso's claim. Rather, it is El Paso's burden to prove that Atasca did not receive reasonably equivalent value. See In re Pace, 456 B.R. at 270; see also Mladenka, 130 S.W.3d at 405. Perhaps El Paso will disprove Bowman's self-serving testimony with additional financial records, or a fact finder may disbelieve him and find actual fraud. See Phillips v. B.R. Brick and Masonry, Inc., No. 01-09-00311-CV, 2010 WL 3564820, at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 10, 2010) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). But with the summary judgment evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although there was evidence the defendant transferred or caused to be transferred more money to the debtor than the debtor transferred to the defendant there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of actual fraud under section 24005a1 and b because the badges of fraud showed the debtors intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors (B) holding that debtors depositing of funds into spouses separate account did not establish actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors for purposes of denial of discharge under chapter 7 (C) holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud (D) holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice (E) holding that debtor cannot take advantage of  522f after debtor has transferred his exempt property
Output: (A)
evidential basis for the court’s conclusion of liability, although what it was is unknown to us. However, if the finding of liability had no evidential basis, that fact would provide an additional ground for reversal in this case. We find that Newman had no obligation in the proof hearing to demonstrate fault on the part of the settling tortfeasors, with the exception of Rosalie Holmes, upon whose liability that of Dean depends. Dean did not appear in the action, and he thus filed neither a erossclaim for contribution nor any other document that would provide notice to Newman that he was asserting a right to a credit based upon the settlements reached in the matter. Thus his right to an apportionment of damages was waived. See Young v. Latta, 123 N.J. 584, 596-98, 589 A.2d 1020 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Green v. General Motors Corp., 310 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act (B) recognizing a right to contribution (C) recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct (D) holding that the right of a nonsettling defendant to a credit as the result of a settlement with a codefendant can be asserted without a crossclaim for contribution but that fair and timely notice to plaintiff of an assertion of that right must be given (E) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error
Output: (D)
and necessary, are all issues for the damages phase of these claims.” Id. FAS disagrees, citing cases suggesting summary judgment on claims for expenses and overtime is inappropriate when issuer of fact are left unresolved. Opp’n at 25 (citing Morgan v. Wet Seal Inc., 210 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1358, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 70 (2012) (proving liability for failure to reimburse expenses would involve answering: (1) what, if anything, the employee was told regarding reimbursement of expenses; (2) whether each expense was necessary and a direct consequence of the discharge of the employees’ job duties; (3) whether the employee sought reimbursement of that expense; and (4) whether the employee was in fact reimbursed)); Sotelo v. MediaNews Group, 207 Cal.App.4th 639, 654, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 293 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Defendants’ cases are inapposite. In Morgan, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job (B) recognizing that simply having the status of an employee does not make the employer liable to a claim for overtime compensation (C) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (D) holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness (E) holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed
Output: (B)
of the complaint because it is unclear whether he was acting within the course and scope of his employment. There is a factual dispute whether the chase began on or off of reservation property, as well as a legal question concerning Epstein’s authority to engage in a chase in order to investigate an expired license tag. See e.g. City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So.2d 1222, 1226 (Fla.1992)(<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity (B) holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added (C) holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity (D) holding that rfras waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to monetary damages the acts reference to appropriate relief was susceptible to more than one interpretation and thus was not an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that sovereign immunity shields only those acts which are discretionary in nature and not operational
Output: (E)
and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order — though included in the record on appeal — is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied.”); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity
Output: (E)
as the trial court determined, Appellant’s trial did not commence until the parties were present and voir dire occurred on February 8, 2016, which was three days after the mechanical run date. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 cmt. (“A trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions that had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony, or to some other such first step in the trial.”) (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Brock, 619 Pa. 278, 61 A.3d 1015, 1020-21 (2013) (“It is not intended that preliminary calendar calls should constitute commencement of a trial.”) (quotation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 373 A.2d 1355 (1977) (<HOLDING>). This does not end our inquiry, however, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated (B) holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial (C) holding that even where the case has been called for trial the trial is not deemed to have commenced for speedy trial purposes until the jury is empaneled voir dire has occurred or some other substantial step of trial begins (D) holding a selfrepresentation request untimely where made after voir dire had begun but before the jury had been empaneled (E) holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial
Output: (C)
factor here contributing to a reasonable suspicion of drug-related illegal activity. The record indicates that at the time of the traffic stop, VanEl ouden was already known to the deputies as someone suspected of involvement in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Deputy Eichinger testified that, based on his training and experience in drug crime investigation, he was familiar with ether as an ingredient used to manufacture methamphetamine. At the time Deputy Eichinger smelled ether, he also saw a covered object between Wilson’s feet that was large enough to contain implements used to manufacture methamphetamine. This combination of factors, we believe, formed an adequate basis for Deputy Eichinger’s reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although pcp has no odor because streetlevel pcp is mixed with other substances that have a distinct odor an officers recognition of that odor was sufficient to establish probable cause (B) holding the odor of patchouli oil the officers knowledge that the oil was often used to mask the odor of illegal drugs and the officers learning from the dea that the driver was suspected of involvement in drug smuggling gave rise to reasonable suspicion (C) holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion (D) holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle (E) holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper
Output: (B)
Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 1389, 118 L.Ed.2d 39, 46 (1992); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136, 141-42 (1979)). 24 . See In re Huffman, 204 B.R. 562, (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1997) ("Missouri law determines a creditor's right to a deficiency following the repossession of personal property secured by a properly perfected security interest.”). 25 . In re Fleming, 339 B.R. at 724. 26 . Id. ("Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly permits modification of the [c]ar [creditor's] rights subject to the limitations set forth in Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code.”) 27 . See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 400.9-623 (providing that a debtor may redeem collateral up until the time the property is sold). 28 . See In re Knaus, 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir.1989) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (B) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (C) holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order (D) holding secured creditors refusal to turn over property of debtors estate to debtor upon demand constituted an exercise of control over such property in violation of automatic stay (E) holding refusal to turn over property seized prepetition constituted violation of stay once notice of the stay had been given
Output: (A)
cruel or unusual punishment because, under Iraqi law, he could be subjected to the death penalty despite the fact that his alleged crimes did not result in any fatalities. Am. Pet. ¶¶ 43-45. The respondents assert that this line of argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Munaf. Respts’ Mot. at 15-16. In Munaf, the Supreme Court held that “[t]hose who commit crimes within a sovereign’s territory may be transferred to that sovereign’s government for prosecution.” 128 S.Ct. at 2224-25 (reasoning that the “same principles of comity and respect for sovereigns that preclude judicial scrutiny of foreign convictions necessarily render invalid attempts to shield citizens from foreign, prosecution”); see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 125, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901) (<HOLDING>). As the Munaf Court explained, [t]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that habeas corpus was not available to prevent the petitioners extradition to cuba despite the fact that he would not be afforded the full panoply of rights afforded to him by the us constitution in a cuban criminal proceeding (B) holding that the rights afforded prisoners set a floor for those that must be afforded sexually violent predators subject to civil detention (C) holding that the decision as to the weight to be afforded to documentary evidence  lies largely within the discretion of the ij (D) holding that the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioners conviction what occurred in the petitioners collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding (E) holding that an order denying compensation under the federal criminal justice act for services performed before a state clemency board by counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner was final and appealable despite the fact that the order was separate from the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding
Output: (A)
that Major Anderson submitted to the Board, he apparently believed that he could waive any return to active duty and still be compensated. A.R. 66 (“I do not wish to be placed back on active duty, but instead compensated for the full monetary equivalence of that promotion.”). Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves. See Turnage v. Dep’t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption (B) holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily (C) holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations (D) holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right (E) recognizing initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made is on party seeking to enforce provision
Output: (C)
showed excellent decompression and an excellent position of plates and screws. Dr. Eichert noted that although Claimant reported continued neck pain to Dr. Crow, the treatment notes from the operating surgeon do not reflect significant complaint by Claimant during her follow-up treatment after surgery. The medical records of Claimant’s treating doctors do not contain clinical evidence of a disabling condition during the relevant time period or any restrictions imposed by the doctors. Indeed, the record shows that on August 22, 2005, Dr. Crow released Claimant to work but in the following appointment, on August 30, 2005, Dr. Crow found Claimant’s condition to be permanent without any testing in support of his determination. See Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In any case, whether there is work which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (B) holding alj properly relied on treating physicians wellsupported opinion especially when the contradictory evidence is plaintiffs own medical opinions about her condition (C) holding that an alj may discount a treating physicians opinion where the physician has offered inconsistent opinions (D) holding that the alj erred by failing to mention the contrary opinion of a treating physician (E) holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations
Output: (C)
in this case. Defendant’s quantitative takings are relatively small— SCQuARE for Dummies contains much less material than the copyrighted SCQuARE Manual, and SCQuARE and the Continuous Promise is even less inclusive. (PL’s Mot. [67] at Exs. 1,13, and 16.) Both works are designed to be presented in approximately half an hour, as opposed to the 24 to 26 hour training required to present the material in the SCQuARE Manual. (DSMF [48] at ¶¶ 12, 27, 29.) On the other hand, SCQuARE for Dummies, and to a lesser extent SCQuARE and the Continuous Promise, incorporate, and were intended to convey, the very essence of the SCQuARE Manual. (Id.; PL’s Mot. [67] at Exs. 13 and 16.) Thus, defendant’s qualitative takings are arguably significant. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (<HOLDING>), and Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material (B) holding that the two elements of a copyright infringement claim are 1 the plaintiff owns a valid copyright right and 2 the defendants copied constituent elements of the work that are original (C) holding that defendant who had copied plaintiffs perfume formula had a right to market it under defendants name because it identified to public plaintiffs product as competition (D) holding that where the plagiarized material comprised 35 of the work and the commercial value of the whole was likely attributable in some part to the remaining 65 percent 50 percent of the profits were allocated to the infringing material (E) holding that the third factor disfavored fair use because the defendant copied a qualitatively substantial portion of the original work even though the defendants copied only approximately 300 words out of the 200000 words in the plaintiffs work
Output: (A)
of the facts or by mistake”; or it could mean that the court’s earlier comments regarding deliberate misrepresentations did not apply to unintentional falsehoods and that the latter “would not avoid [a] policy.” Whether or not Willis controls, we conclude that only wilful misrepresentations, made with knowledge of their falsity, can be the basis for voiding a policy under ORS 743.612. The statute provides that a policy will be void if the insured wilfully conceals or misrepresents material facts. The statute also provides for avoidance in the event of “fraud” and “false swearing.” As pointed out in Transamerica v. Bloomfield, supra, however, ORS 743.612 does not incorporate all the elements of common law fraud. Cf. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. v. McBride, 295 Or 398, 667 P2d 494 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The objective of ORS 743.612 is to discourage 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted (B) holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard (D) holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard (E) holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612
Output: (E)
in deceptive practices, Wilkey and his attorney were not deceived into thinking that the report was not favorable to him and therefore could not have relied on that assumption. Wilkey continues to assert that he was put “on unequal footing” in front of the hearing board. Appellant Br. at 25. However, a claim of fraud is concerned only with reliance on deception and provides no relief to those who see past the misrepresentations with which they are confronted. See Bryans v. English Nanny & Governess Sch., Inc., 117 Ohio App.3d 303, 690 N.E.2d 582, 590 (1996) (finding that there was no fraud when the plaintiff, by her own admission, “knew what [she] was getting [herself] into” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Andersons, Inc. v. Consol, Inc., 348 F.3d 496, 506 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in the absence of evidence of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance (B) holding it was error to submit a fraud claim to the jury partly because there was no principle of law establishing an obligation of disclosure (C) holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence (D) holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law (E) holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law
Output: (A)
claim was clearly insufficient to state a claim for breach of § 9.4. The supposed “clarification” in his brief in opposition to judgment on the pleadings, which in fact presented an entirely new legal theory, did not cure the defective complaint. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202-03 (3d Cir.2007). Jang’s proffer that he “would be prepared to amend” his complaint, App. at 559, does not change the analysis, because it cannot be construed as a motion for leave to amend. See Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.2006). The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the § 9.4 claim, nor in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2. Denial of Jang’s Motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (B) holding that in noncivil rights cases district courts have no obligation to offer leave to amend before dismissing a complaint unless the plaintiff properly requests it (C) recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint (D) recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice  (E) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court
Output: (B)
not to erode an employer’s inherent right to operate its business as it chooses. Rothrock, supra; Shick, supra; Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980) (recognizing a public policy against unnecessarily stigmatizing former offenders, finding that a public employer could not deny a former offender employment on the basis of a prior conviction for which the offender had been pardoned, unless the conviction was reasonably related to fitness to perform the job sought); Highhouse, 443 Pa.Super. 120, 660 A.2d 1374 (concluding that an employee was wrongfully discharged for filing an unemployment compensation claim); Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 445 Pa.Super. 378, 665 A.2d 833 (1995) (same); Kroen v. Bedway Sec. Agency, 430 Pa.Super. 83, 633 A.2d 628 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employee stated claim by alleging he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit criminal act for which he would be held personally liable (B) holding that evidence that a polygraph test was offered to or refused by a defendant was not admissible (C) holding that the plaintiffs complaint stated an enforceable claim for wrongful discharge where the employee was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for refusing to testify falsely in a medical malpractice case (D) holding that an employee was wrongfully discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph test (E) holding admissibility of polygraph evidence should be resolved under fedrevid 403 balancing test but reliability of polygraph test may be included to determine how probative particular polygraph test is
Output: (D)
a situation. Treaty language uses the term “inviolability” and the Convention contains no exceptions relevant to this case. Because the United States agrees to an accepted interpretation of the Vienna Convention, and because no evidence appears of a contrary interpretation advanced by any of the United Nation members, all of whom are parties to the Convention, see G.A. Res. 41/78, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 260, U.N. Doc. A/41.53 (1986) (General Assembly resolution emphasizing inviolability of missions as prerequisite to carrying on diplomatic functions and stressing States’ duties to protect mission premises as required by international law), federal courts must defer to the language of Article 22. Cf. Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, 474 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1352, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs breach of contract claims fell outside the scope of the montreal convention because the plain language of article 19 of the montreal convention indicates that it governs claims for delay not nonperformance (B) holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel (C) holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention (D) recognizing us obligations under article 22 of the vienna convention (E) holding that article 3 of the united nations convention on the rights of the child has attained the status of customary international law and is therefore incorporated in federal law
Output: (D)
U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). 16 . 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). 17 . Id. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375. 18 . Id. 19 . Id. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375. 20 . United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir.2007). 21 . See id. 22 . United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir.1995). 23 . Id. 24 . See id. 25 . United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)). 26 . United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir.2005). 27 . United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 284 n. 91 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Puckett v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)). 28 . Id. 29 . See De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d at 159 (<HOLDING>). 30 . See 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2). 31 . United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the incriminating nature of a gun was apparent when officers were responding to charges that the defendants were holding aliens against their will (B) holding that trial court did not err (C) holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted (D) holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime (E) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal
Output: (A)
previously served the warrant, that department must have known that it was outdated.” 325 Md. at 219, 600 A.2d at 117. The policy basis for our decision is simple: imputing the knowledge of any evidence held by one prosecutor to another prosecutor within the same office will, potentially, avoid problems of intentional shielding of information and the existence of artificially created circumstances in which prosecutors can “plausibly deny” having had access to any exculpatory evidence. As noted in Swanson, regarding a prosecutor’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence during a trial as opposed to diligently investigating and disclosing such evidence to defense counsel prior to trial, “If a prosecutor’s response, T told you as soon as I knew,’ is accepted to permit police withholding of 03) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has articulated, instead, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors are held to even higher standards of conduct than other attorneys due to their unique role as both advocate and minister of justice (B) recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard (C) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors (D) holding that a district attorneys duty to preserve exculpatory evidence would arise from his role as an officer of the court charged to do justice an act or an omission concerning such a duty cannot be construed as only administrative or investigative it too is necessarily related to the prosecutors preparation to prosecute (E) holding that when prosecutors who after conviction of criminal defendant acting solely as investigators acquired and withheld exculpatory evidence after their role in the prosecution had ended are not entitled to any more immunity than the defendant police officers
Output: (A)
I. Jurisdiction The Court of Federal Claims has “jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to ... a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement,” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012). A party is an “interested party” with standing to bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) if the party “is an ’ actual or prospective bidder whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract.” Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2013). A bidder has a direct economic interest if it suffered a competitive injury or prejudice. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In a post-award bid protest, the protestor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (B) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim (C) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (D) holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense (E) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim
Output: (A)