niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
The motions alleged the mother was seeking to intervene in the proceedings, individually and on behalf of the minor child, for the purpose of challenging the agreement and the order terminating parental rights as the termination had deprived the child of support and a father/child relationship. The trial court denied the motions to intervene, indicating the mother’s remedies, if any, “lie in # 09-15176 [the custody case] ... with Kelley Lynn Reed as Petitioner.” In this appeal, the mother challenges the denial of her motions to intervene. There is no question that the parents’ agreement for termination of the father’s parental rights and the subsequent order adopting such agreement are void and subject to challenge. See, e.g., Casbar v. Dicanio, 666 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Fleming v. Brown, 581 So.2d 202 (Fla. 5th DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel (B) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (C) recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights (D) holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father (E) recognizing that termination of parental rights can be accomplished only by resort to chapters 63 adoption and 39 termination of parental rights and any attempt by a parent to contract away the childs right to support is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy
Output: (E)
13 . Exhibit- 14 contains two 2010 K-ls for QPSR Partners, LP. One lists "Joseph and Donna Grasso" and the shareholder's name. The other lists "Joseph Grasso” as the shareholder's name. 14 . A debtor-in-possession’s failure to seek court approval for payments to professionals represents cause for dismissal or conversion. In re 3868-70 White Plains Rd., Inc., 28 B.R. 515 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1983). 15 . Fed. R. Bankr.P.2015(a)(3) requires a chapter 11 debtor in possession to file monthly operating reports. The timely filing of such reports has been characterized a "one of the most fundamental and crucial duties of a debtor-in-possession." In re Savino Oil & Heating Co., Inc., 99 B.R. 518, 526 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1989); see also In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 22 B.R. 668, 670 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982) (<HOLDING>). 16 . The Debtor received a loan repayment on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency reports ofgovernment investigations containing witness interviews were not admissible under public records exception because statements in reports were not based upon personal knowledge of government agent (B) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records (C) holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence (D) recognizing a telephone company operating under a franchise agreement as holding a nondelegable duty to the public (E) recognizing the debtorinpossessions duty to file records and operating reports
Output: (E)
(4th Cir.2001) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 n. 7, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). In denying the motion, the district court rendered detailed factual findings with regard to each appellant, specifically assessing the effect of Gibson’s testimony on the trial, and the additional evidence supporting the verdicts. Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. We disagree. As demonstrated by the district court’s findings, the government presented overwhelming evidence— separate and apart from Gibson’s testimony — establishing: (1) that each of the appellants participated in the conspiracy; (2) their respective roles in the conspiracy; and (3) the vast amounts of crack being distributed by them. Cf. White, 238 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Gibson’s testimony was, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed (B) holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful (C) holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability (D) holding that even if attorney had secured defense witnesses  2255 relief was not warranted where the evidence against defendant at trial was so overwhelming that no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession
Output: (B)
it is possible that those persons the legislature intended to protect from unlawful discrimination under the chapter could themselves be liable for unlawful retaliation. However, an employee who otherwise enjoys the protection of the statute is not, for that reason, shielded from liability for retaliatory conduct prohibited by the statute. Cf. Martin v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 862 F. Supp. 2d 37, 38, 38-40 (D. Mass. 2012) (rejecting co-worker defendant’s argument that retaliation provision in Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination law applied only to “employers and those ‘persons’ who exercise similar degrees of authority” and finding that statutory language allowed for a co-employee to be held liable); Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Associates, 738 N.E.2d 753, 764, 764-67 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that, if the legislature 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plain language of act provides cause of action only against participating hospitals (B) holding that although a statute regarding sentencing for firsttime drug offenders was plain obvious and unambiguous in its terms construing the statute by its plain language would be inconsistent with contrary to and illogical in light of the legislatures intent in enacting the statute (C) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language (D) recognizing that plain language of retaliation provision in massachusetts antidiscrimination statute provides on its face for individual personal liability and upholding jury verdict against employee under statute (E) recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions
Output: (D)
as independent entities that solicited and accepted customer orders but used the services of FCMs for clearing, record keeping and retaining customer funds. See id. at 41. To guarantee the accountability of introducing brokers, the Commission was authorized to require them to meet “minimum financial requirements.” See id. First American Discount Corp. v. CFTC, 222 F.3d 1008, 1012 (D.C.Cir.2000). Thus, the legislative history behind the creation of IBs demonstrates Congressional intent not to render IBs agents of FCMs merely because of their status as IBs. Where, as here, the IB is engaged in non-CEA regulated activity, the court concludes that an IB of an FCM is not rendered an agent of the FCM by its mere IB status. See Cunningham v. Waters Tan & Co., 65 F.3d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf. Tatum v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing (B) holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of the assistance of counsel is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment (C) recognizing that a broad definition of stolen is consistent with the guidelines purposes and finding that the enhancement was properly applied where a defendant found a gun that was lost or mislaid by its owner who never authorized anyone to take the gun never sold it and never gave it away as a gift (D) holding that an fcm by entering into a guarantee agreement with ib as an individual never agreed to guarantee ibs other venture as a commodity pool operator  an activity of which fcm was never made aware (E) holding an attorney does not have a duty to insure or guarantee that the most favorable outcome possible and because no amount of work can guarantee a favorable result attorneys would never know when the work they do is sufficiently more than adequate to be enough to protect not only their clients from error but themselves from liability
Output: (D)
ascertained without an inquiry into the privacy of the jury’s deliberations. But public policy forbids such inquiries. To permit it would encourage tampering with jurymen after their discharge, would furnish to corrupt litigants a means of destroying the effect of a verdict contrary to their interests, and would weaken the public regard for this ancient method of ascertaining the truth of disputed allegations of fact. But few verdicts are reached in which some juryman does not yield in some degree his opinions and convictions to the opinions and convictions of others. And when he does so, even in criminal cases, it is to the interest of the public that he be not permitted thereafter to gainsay his act. Gay, 82 Wash. at 439; see also State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 345, 103 P. 420 (1909) (<HOLDING>). ¶13 Reynoldson argues that courts recently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 606b precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one jurors affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other jurors dishonesty during voir dire (B) holding that discussion among jurors of their agreement to the defendants guilt during trial and before deliberation was not such misconduct as can be shown by the affidavit of a juror (C) holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated (D) holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (E) holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct
Output: (B)
of but one nondiverse party divests the district court of original jurisdiction over the entire action.” In re Olympic Mills Corp., 477 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806)). Generally, jurisdiction is determined at the time the lawsuit is filed. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “if jurisdic tion exists at the time any action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events.” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. KN Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428, 111 S.Ct. 858, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991). There are exceptions, however: the postfiling introduction of a nondiverse party may, in certain circumstances, defeat diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Prestige Title, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a postfiling nondiverse party under rule 19a may destroy subjectmatter jurisdiction if the party is deemed indispensable (B) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (C) recognizing that the burden is on a party making a rule 12b7 motion to establish that missing parties are necessary or indispensable to the action (D) holding father waived claim that alleged de facto custodian should have been named as party in child support proceeding by failing to move to join party or to dismiss for lack of an indispensable party (E) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees
Output: (A)
and loan officers who were allegedly negligent in approving bad loans; it does not involve the same kind of intentional and abhorrent conduct present in Bouterie. Therefore, we will not extend the doctrine beyond the four traditional categories in this case. 18 . See, e.g., Palowsky v. Premier Bancorp, Inc., 597 So.2d 543, 545 (La.Ct.App.1992) (noting that "a shareholder may ... sue to recover losses to a corporation resulting from mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duties [on the part of its directors] secondarily through a shareholder's derivative suit.”). 19 . See Rogers, 42 F.3d at 295 (stating that the third category “is applied in situations involving concealment, fraud, misrepresentation and other ill practices.”); Fontenot v. ABC Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 960, 963 (La.1996) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Because we hold that contra non valentem 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud (B) holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court (C) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (D) recognizing fraud to be a known misrepresentation or a nondisclosure (E) holding in a medical malpractice case that to trigger application of the third category a physicians conduct must rise to the level of concealment misrepresentation fraud or ill practices
Output: (E)
denied. PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . Torres does not contest the IJ's finding that he committed an aggravated felony and is therefore ineligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); he merely argues that his aggravated felony conviction did not constitute a particularly serious crime, a sufficient finding to disqualify him from withholding of removal relief. 2 . The government argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) also bars our jurisdiction of Torres’s CAT claim. We disagree because in denying relief under the CAT, the BIA considered the merits and did not rely on Torres's prior conviction. Brezilien v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403, 410 (9th Cir.2009) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that to survive dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that as to factual issues when an ij does not rely on an aliens conviction in denying cat relief and instead denies relief on the merits none of the jurisdictionstripping provisions  apply to divest this court of jurisdiction ellipsis in original internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that an aliens ability to secure reopening depends on a demonstration of prima facie eligibility for relief which means she must show a realistic chance that she will be able to obtain such relief internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that the attorney generals discretionary power to suspend deportation did not apply to aliens within the country on parole because parole by statute was not to be regarded as an admission of the alien citation and internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original
Output: (B)
Costs The Court has also expressed concerns about imposing asymmetric liability costs on privately operated facilities as compared to government-operated facilities. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72, 122 S.Ct. 515. We are equally concerned about issuing a decision that will yield disparate rights and remedies among inmates in private and public prisons. Unfortunately, under the current Bivens regime, asymmetries may remain irrespective of whether we recognize or deny a Bivens cause of action here. Unlike officers employed by public prisons, the GEO employees may not be entitled to qualified immunity, and as a result, prisoners asserting claims against them may be able to recover more often than their counterparts in governmentally run prisons. Compare Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (<HOLDING>), with Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501, 98 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (B) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that employees of privately operated state prisons are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity
Output: (D)
in the most nefarious negotiating tactics possible, force a lockout to put pressure on the employees, and then attempt to clean up-fhe mess with good-faith, post-lockout bargaining. Horsehead cannot retroactively “cure” its prior negotiating tactics with post-lockout bargaining, and evidence regarding these activities has no relevance to pre-lockout activities. B. Lockout Because the majority determined that Horsehead did not bargain in bad faith, it found that the lockout was lawful. I contend that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Horsehead engaged in bad-faith bargaining, and I believe the lockout was an outgrowth of this activity. Lockouts are. not per se unlawful. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965) (<HOLDING>). A lockout can, however, be unlawful if it is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union (B) holding a lockout unlawful when utilized to enable the employer to implement its own bargaining position without  genuine impasse (C) holding that employer violates neither  8a1 nor  8a3 when after a bargaining impasse has been reached he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position (D) holding that an employee is guilty of misconduct connected with his work when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer (E) holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union
Output: (C)
felony offense, the government had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm aided the felonious conduct (internal quotation marks omitted)). This circuit has not yet interpreted U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) to determine at what point a defendant would know or have reason to believe that the transferee intended to use the transferred firearms unlawfully. But cases interpreting the pri- or version of § 2K2.1(b)(5), which required that the defendant have reason to believe that the firearms “would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense,” support the district court’s application of the current version of § 2K2.1(b)(5) in the present case. See United States v. Cummings, No. 93-2037, 1994 WL 91825, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 1994) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Cutler, 36 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court eired in applying the firearm enhancement where the government presented no evidence that the defendant possessed the gun or knew that the gun was located in the bottom of his codefendants backpack (B) holding that evidence of the defendants connection to the guns suggests possession of the drugs found next to the guns (C) holding a consent voluntary when a defendant who had been warned of his rights and knew police were investigating murders turned his gun over to a policeman who suggested that he could sell the gun for the defendant (D) holding that the application of  2k21b5 was appropriate where the volume of cummings gun sales was significant handguns constituted the largest proportion of the weapons sold cummings knew his customers were criminals and his customers knew the guns were stolen (E) holding that the defendant knew of his accomplices gun and benefitted from its presence for protection
Output: (D)
a factor listed in this subpart, departure from the applicable guideline range is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. Indeed, we have recognized the possibility of departure beyond the adjustments made available by U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1 (aggravating role) and 3B1.2 (mitigating role), based upon a defendant’s extraordinary role with respect to the offense of conviction. See United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 461 (2d Cir.1991) (acknowledging possibility of role “so extraordinarily minute that [defendants] deserved a departure beyond the four-level maximum reduction available for ‘minimal’ participation”); United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 585-86 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where there are other persons who are criminally responsible for the offense who have not been apprehended or have not been charged due to cooperation a sole defendant may be eligible for an upward or downward adjustment for role in the offense (B) holding that within these parameters apprendi permits an upward adjustment for a defendants role in a drugtrafficking conspiracy (C) recognizing potential upward adjustment beyond that provided by guidelines for aggravating role in the offense (D) holding that role in the offense is a factual determination albeit complex a district courts decision not to apply an adjustment based on such a determination is reversed only for clear error (E) holding that a defendant convicted of a soleparticipant offense may nonetheless be entitled to a mitigating role adjustment
Output: (C)
he is sentenced. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), (2). Mr. Hernandez has nine criminal history points, see PSI ¶ 35, and pled guilty to violations of two firearm possession offenses, and therefore the relief afforded by section 3553(f) is not available to him. B. Criminal History Mr. Hernandez argues that the court should depart from the applicable sentencing range because his criminal history category overstates the seriousness of his past criminal conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (policy statement) (authorizing departure when a defendant’s criminal history category “significantly over-represents the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal history category or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes”); see also United States v. Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440, 446-47 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Mr. Hernandez contends that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may depart downward from the applicable guideline range under section 4a13 (B) holding that district court must provide reasonable notice of intent to upwardly depart from guideline range (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range (E) holding that consideration by a sentencing court of acquitted conduct was appropriate in establishing the applicable guideline range or in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range
Output: (A)
7 or 8 of the NLRA: At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board.... ^ ^ ^ ^ In the absence of the Board’s clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-46, 79 S.Ct. 773 (emphasis added). See also Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Both Wasden and amicus suggest that even if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration agreement between a charging party and an employer precludes the eeoc from seeking purely monetary relief in federal court on behalf of the charging party but not from seeking broad injunctive relief (B) holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity (C) holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction (D) holding that garmon preemption is inapplicable in eases involving the americans with disabilities act (E) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer
Output: (B)
robbery and brandishing a firearm during the armed robbery of a hair salon on May 11, 2010. To prove those offenses, the Government presented, inter alia, the following evidence: (1) Levatte and Harris testified Thomas participated ejudicial when the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime, other than his statements, was a single fingerprint that could have been left at any time, and neither the eyewitness nor the four codefendants testified). In light of the overwhelming direct and circumstantial evidence of her guilt, Thomas’s improperly admitted statement did not have a prejudicial effect on the other evidence presented at trial. 2. Effect on defense counsel Thomas’s statements from the holding cell also did not affect defense counsel in any discernible way. Defense 1999) (<HOLDING>); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 660-61 
 Holding statements: (A) holding one day was enough time for the coercive effect of an edwards violation to dissipate particularly when in the interim the accused appeared before a magistrate judge received fresh miranda warnings and received appointed counsel citing gomez 927 f2d at 153839 (B) holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection (C) holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance (D) holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense (E) holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process
Output: (A)
by more than Feldman was owed would result in reducing some victims’ restitution below what the court had determined to be their loss. This would be an abuse of discretion. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (“the court shall order ... that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense” and “[t]he order of restitution shall require that such defendant ... pay an amount equal to ... the value of the property on the date of the ... loss (emphases added)); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (“In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., United States v. Guy, 335 Fed.Appx. 898, 900 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The Amended Judgment entered by the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court erred in failing to inform the defendant that it could impose restitution but that the error did not affect the defendants substantial rights because the court informed the defendant that it could impose a maximum fine of an amount higher than the restitution amount imposed (B) holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction (C) holding that ordering a defendant to pay an amount of restitution less than the calculated amount of loss was error even where the victim was negligent citing united states v jones 289 f3d 1260 1265 11th cir2002 (D) holding that a district court cannot order restitution in amounts that will result in the payment to the victim of an amount greater than the victims loss (E) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount
Output: (C)
Hepler asserts that “a review of the evidence ... will show nothing other than the fact that [Hepler] did his job. There is no testimony or evidence, even from the Plaintiffs expert [Hillman], that [Hepler] knew either where the money came from in this matter or the items behind the numbers. There was no testimony or evidence that [Hepler] had access to records or other data that would suggest or indicate that any email or dissemination of information occurred with malice or a reckless disregard for the truth.” Hepler Memorandum, D.E. No. 546, 2-3. The Defendants argue that the corporate Defendants are all of affiliates or subsidiaries of Kore and therefore cannot conspire with one another. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984) (<HOLDING>). See also Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parent corporation and whollyowned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring with each other (B) holding that parent corporation was not estopped from challenging mark which licensor had licensed to wholly owned subsidiary which was independent of parent and had separate employees records accounts offices and only one shared officer (C) recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary (D) recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations (E) holding that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring with one another
Output: (E)
liability as “the paucity of the record ma[de] it impossible ... to determine the merits of [the victims’] argument.” Id. at 323, 548 S.E.2d at 858 he time lapse since Mr. Bibby had molested their daughter, the passage of time alone should not negate the possibility that Respondent knew or should have known of Mr. Bibby’s sexually deviant proclivities. Respondent knew minor Appellants were coming over to their house to play and minor Appellants’ presence in their home was a result of her own invitation. Further, Respondent admitted she was aware of Mr. Bibby’s prior propensities for pedophilia, as she acknowledged Mr. Bibby sexually abused their daughter in the past. Even after Mr. Bibby was removed from their home and placed in counseling, Respondent clearly appreciated the possi 8) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted (B) holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate (C) holding that a wife could be held liable for the negligent failure to prevent or warn the victims about her husbands sexually abusive behavior when the wife had actual knowledge or special reason to know that the husband was likely to abuse a particular person or persons (D) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (E) recognizing that husband and wife count as separate victims where each sustains part of the actual loss
Output: (C)
Child Hearsay Statute actually contemplates testimony from both the child and those witnessing the child’s later reaction, even if the hearsay may be ‘bolstering.’ ” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ledford v. State, 313 Ga. App. 389, 391-392 (2) (721 SE2d 585) (2011) (“Any ‘bolstering’ can be explored by defendant in cross-examination.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Weathersby v. State, 262 Ga. 126, 128 (4) (a) (414 SE2d 200) (1992). Here, Laster does not assert that the statutory requirements were not met, and we have previously held that, under OCGA § 24-3-16 (2012), the order of witnesses is irrelevant to the question of the admissibility of child hearsay evidence. See OCGA § 24-3-16 (2012); Hilliard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 473, 477 (4) (a) (680 SE2d 541) (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (B) holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify (C) holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness
Output: (B)
law principles that govern the formation of contracts. Sitarik v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. Partnerships (JFK), 7 So.3d 576, 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). “Where two or more documents are executed by the same parties, at or near the same time, in the course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read and construed together.” Collins v. Citrus Nat’l Bank, 641 So.2d 458, 459 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); see also KRC Enters., Inc. v. Soder-quist, 553 So.2d 760, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). But if the parties execute “two separate contracts and only one contract contains an arbitration clause, the parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate disputes arising from the contract that does not call for arbitration.” Lee v. All Fla. Constr. Co., 662 So.2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). “Arbitration provisions from one contract 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause (B) holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract (C) holding that an arbitration clause encompassing all disputes under a contract covers any dispute between the parties that has a significant relationship to the contract (D) holding that consideration for a contract as a whole covers the arbitration clause (E) holding that a homeowner could not arbitrate a dispute over a home repair contract which did not have an arbitration clause on the grounds that another contract for a home addition with the same contractor contained an arbitration clause
Output: (E)
may not use its powers to reward its friends or punish its enemies; thus, where a zoning authority is guilty of misconduct or bad faith in its dealings with the applicant for a use permit in accordance with the then existing zoning regulation or arbitrarily and unreasonably adopts a new regulation in order to frustrate the applicant’s plans for development rather than to promote the general welfare, the new regulation may not be applied retroactively. 451 N.W.2d at 706-07. Because there was a genuine issue as to whether Lincoln acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or in bad faith by delaying the application, the court concluded that Lincoln was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 451 N.W.2d at 707. See Marmah, Inc. v. Town of Greenwich, 176 Conn. 116, 405 A.2d 63, 67 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision (B) holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard including the defendant in person and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing (C) holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action (D) holding that pleadings could not be amended where no evidence offered during trial was outside the issues in the original complaint (E) holding it inequitable to allow amended zoning regulations to act as a bar where the trial court could reasonably conclude that the change was enacted primarily to prevent plaintiff from building the project
Output: (E)
7, and 10), plaintiffs response thereto, and the reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the accompa nying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court; 4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry #9) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED; 5. The petition of defendant Nora 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even absent Dr. Klavan’s concession on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amtrak was a state actor (B) holding that a privately owned nursing home that received ninety percent of its funding from the state and was subject to significant state regulation was nevertheless not a state actor (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 (E) holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state
Output: (B)
investigation. Disclosure of this information, Durney declares, “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety” of such persons, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F), and “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” see id. § 552(b)(7)(C), since release of such information would expose them to the risk of physical harm, harassment, and identity theft. Durney Decl. ¶ the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government on its Exemption 7(A) claim and this court issued its order in August’s first appeal. In light of the substantiation of the important third-party interests at stake, it seems quite likely that the Government’s failure to invoke Exemptions 7(C ted States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903-04 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Schanen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in refusing to grant the secret services fedrcivp 60b motion to rehear arguments about the applicability of foia exemptions 7c and 7d in light of the secret services belatedly proffered proof of a promise of confidentiality noting that the case was not the ordinary one since it involves not only the interests of the secret service but that of a third party whose identity and information are expressly protected by foia (B) holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation (C) holding that it was impossible for the court to say that the information met the definition of a trade secret because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the information derived economic value from an element of secrecy that is known only to plaintiff and its employees (D) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents (E) holding that the burden of establishing the true existence of a trade secret and its value to the owner remains on the claimant who must submit evidence relating to the six factors that texas law considers for trade secret status
Output: (A)
prosthesis for the plaintiffs’ daughter, Brittany. On May 10, 1996, the defendant filed a , timely Notice of Removal to this Court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), two alternative theories. On June 5, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court. II. DISCUSSION The plaintiffs’ argument in support of remand is that this case must contain a federal question in order for this Court to have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The plaintiffs a se the defendant raises a federal defense to a state law claim, including the federal defense of preemption. Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir.1996); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908) (<HOLDING>). The right of removal under § 1441 and § 1331 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law (B) holding that a federal defense to a state cause of action does not support federalquestion jurisdiction (C) holding that federal issues interposed as a defense generally do not create a cause of action arising under federal law (D) holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent (E) holding that a federal cause of action for damages arises upon a federal agents unconstitutional conduct
Output: (C)
vivos gifts to family members prior to these beneficiaries’ contact with Estha. Specifically, contestants point out that immediately after Estha’s transmittal of tax information to Cook, who is also a lawyer, Estha gave large cash gifts to Cook’s family up until the execution of the will. Although Ruth is not named as a party in the suit, contestants point to Ruth’s presence and gifts of a bible and wheelchair to Estha from Ruth and Cook shortly before the execution of the will and codicil as evidence of some influence. As to Schreiner, contestants allege that the visits from the college development officer beginning in 1994 constituted an undue influence over Estha who was 98 years old at the tune, lonely, isolated, and plagued with physical infirmities. See Green, 840 S.W.2d at 122 (<HOLDING>); but see Garza, 390 S.W.2d at 47 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite testators death caused by the beneficiary shooting the testator a little more than a month after the third wills execution no evidence of undue influence existed at the time of the wills execution (B) holding that evidence of a plaintiff being under the influence of marijuana and prescription drugs was highly probative of the plaintiffs ability to react perceive and reason at the time of an accident (C) recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution including age any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence (D) holding that equally consistent circumstances of influence cannot be considered as evidence of undue influence (E) holding that rule 35 does not permit sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition by asserting his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim and that mere relevance to the case is insufficient
Output: (C)