niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
requires that the “parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration.” See Section 9. What language is required in an agreement to indicate that a judgment of the court is authorized is not set forth in Section 9. While several courts have held that “an explicit agreement between the parties providing for judicial confirmation of an award is not an absolute prerequisite to [S]ection 9 authority to enter judgment on the award,” see Booth v. Hume Pub. Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir.1990) (where parties agree that arbitration would be binding and final, district court has authority to enter judgment on award); see also Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838, 102 S.Ct. 144, 70 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law (B) holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions (C) holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration (D) recognizing intervention is generally impermissible after entry of final judgment and exception allowing postjudg ment intervention in the interests of justice is limited to permitting intervention by affected persons so that an appeal can be taken (E) holding that an award deemed to final conclusive and binding implicitly agrees that federal court intervention may be sought to compel compliance
Output: (E)
trial that the State’s timeline was very improbable, if not impossible. Serrano has not demonstrated that this investigation and strategy regarding the travel timeline was unreasonable. See generally Atkins v. Dugger, 541 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1989) (“One tactic available to counsel is to present expert testimony. However, it is by no means the only tactic, nor is it required.”). Second, Serrano has failed to demonstrate prejudice. During the post-conviction proceedings, Serrano never introduced any evidence indicating that a more complete investigation into the time-line or hiring an individual to reenact the timeline would have changed Serrano’s defense at trial or would have further called the State’s timeline into question. Cf. Conahan v. State, 118 So.3d 718, 727-28 (Fla. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Serrano has failed to establish a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony (B) holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony (C) holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence (D) holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error (E) holding that the states failure to designate its expert witnesses was not harmless in trial for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation where it was reasonably possible that defendant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy and that defendant would have deposed experts and possibly procured his own expert
Output: (C)
evidence to conclude that the government’s conduct in this case amounted to a material breach, it denied Malone’s appeal. 87-2 BCA 1119,758, at 99,966. In our view, the government materially breached this contract. According to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(e) (1981), “the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform ... comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing” is a significant factor in determining whether that party’s breach is material. The Restatement also states that “[sjubter-fuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith,” as does lack of diligence and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. Id. § 205 comment d; cf. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 550 F.2d 26, 32, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (C) holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party (D) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (E) holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination
Output: (C)
motion at which Pritchett would be represented by counsel or at which the court would determine that Pritchett knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Ex parte Pritchett, 117 So.3d at 362. In the instant case, the circuit court immediately appointed new counsel to represent Trimble after Trimble gave his oral notice of appeal. Despite having newly appointed counsel who could file a motion for a new trial attacking his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, Trimble elected to file a pro se motion for a new trial. Therefore, unlike the defendant in Pritchett, Trimble had the benefit of newly appointed appellate counsel who represented him and who could file a motion for a new trial on his behalf. See King v. State, 613 So.2d 888 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage (B) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver (C) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (D) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (E) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel
Output: (D)
was merely acting as Casey’s nominee by allowing him to park 28th Place in her name without relinquishing the benefits of ownership of the property. The district court agreed with the government and allowed forfeiture on this ground. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “nominee” (in the context of property law) as a “party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1149 (9th ed.2009). Unlike a party with a cognizable property interest, a nominee cannot claim a viable third-party interest sufficient to render a forfeiture invalid. See People v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 75 Ill.2d 479, 27 Ill.Dec. 476, 389 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1979); United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1542 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (B) recognizing that we held in tilley that the forfeiture of proceeds from illegal drug sales pursuant to 21 usc  881a6 does not constitute punishment (C) holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 (D) holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property (E) holding that property held by another as nominal owner for benefit of a drug dealer subject to forfeiture under 21 usc  853
Output: (E)
when it is relevant to an issue in question other than.the character of the defendant, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the prior act, and the potential unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” United States v. Marin-Cifuentes, 866 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.1989). A decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) “will not be disturbed unless ... the evidence in question clearly had no bearing upon any of the issues involved.” United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir.1985). Rule 404(b) evidence has been admitted to prove intent and lack of mistake in Sherman Act and mail fraud trials. See, e.g., United States v. Misle Bus & Equip. Co., 967 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence properly admitted as nonhearsay during trial in a title vii action to show nondiscriminatory intent (B) holding in similar bus bid rigging trial that evidence of another conspiracy was properly admitted to show defendants knowledge and  general intent (C) holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute (D) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy (E) holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged
Output: (B)
into these facts at all. Neither could defense counsel have relied on the fact that Dr. Emery did not find a need for neurological examinations because, as discussed above, they failed to give him the information necessary to form an opinion in this regard. In sum, defense counsel’s failure to insist on neuropsychological testing did not stem from an informed decision made after reasonable investigation, as required by the Constitution, but was the product of neglect. See Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir.1998) (finding ineffective assistance where defense counsel “failed to conduct even the minimal investigation that would have enabled him to come to an informed decision” regarding his client’s mental health defenses); cf. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Pizzuto not only has shown that his counsel’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsel opened the door to the states rebuttal remarks when defense counsel raised the issue in his closing argument (B) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (C) holding that the decision whether to seek a mistrial is a tactical decision entrusted to defense counsel binding the defendant even when the defendant expressed a contrary wish to his lawyer (D) holding that defense counsel gathered sufficient evidence to make a reasonable tactical decision not to conduct further investigations into his clients mental health when psychiatric experts interviewed the defendant for more than twenty hours and informed defense counsel that they could not find any basis for a mental defense (E) holding that defense counsels decision not to call defendant to the stand despite defendants repeatedly expressed desire to testify on his own behalf was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel not to subject defendant to all of the risk attendant on crossexamination
Output: (D)
of. law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). B. Hostile-work-environment claims In order to establish a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of harassment that “unreasonably interferís] with [his or] her work performance and creat[es] an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir.2008). We have little doubt that, but for the administrative-exhaustion requirement, the plaintiffs in this case presented sufficient evidence of hostile, racist behavior in their work environment to survive a motion for summary judgment on this claim. See Baltimore v. City of Franklin, No. 3:06-0578, 2007 WL 2123906 at *14-15 (M.D.Tenn. July 20, 2007) (<HOLDING>). The issue presented here, however, is whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation (B) holding in a companion case to the one before us that evidence submitted by the black firefighter with the city of franklin was enough to present a hostileworkenvironment claim to a jury where the firefighter had alleged sufficient facts in his eeoc charge to exhaust his administrative remedies (C) holding that the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claim involving a procedural error correctable by the bia (D) holding that if the alleged retaliatory action occurs before the initial eeoc charge is filed a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim by including factual information in the charge that discloses the factual basis for the retaliation claim (E) holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim
Output: (B)
party’s claim, cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the public interest aspect of such a claim is less significant than an EEOC suit seeking large-scale injunc-tive relief to attack discrimination more generally. Recognizing these competing policies, we agree with the balance struck by the Second Circuit, which held that although the EEOC “may seek injunctive relief in the federal forum for employees even when those employees have entered into binding arbitration agreements,” it may not pursue relief in court — in that case, monetary relief — specific to individuals who have waived their right to a judicial forum by signing an arbitration agreement. Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 302-03; but see Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 459-67 (<HOLDING>). When the EEOC seeks “make-whole” relief for a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred the eeoc from seeking individualized benefits under the adea on behalf of individuals whose own suits were unsuccessful because the eeoc was in privity with those individuals (B) holding that neither a letter from the eeoc nor an attached charge of age discrimination qualified as a claim under a claimsmade policy because the documents failed to request money or other relief and only served to put the plaintiff on notice that a demand for relief may subsequently follow (C) holding that the pjlaintiff was not seeking the enforcement of a final eeoc order because he specifically requested more relief than the eeoc awarded (D) holding that an arbitration agreement between a charging party and an employer precludes the eeoc from seeking purely monetary relief in federal court on behalf of the charging party but not from seeking broad injunctive relief (E) holding that neither the faa nor principles of preclusion or waiver could operate to bar the eeoc from seeking monetary relief on behalf of aggrieved individuals
Output: (E)
in St, 1965, c. 764, § 1), prisoners convicted of certain listed crimes are not eligible for parole until they have served at least two-thirds of their minimum sentence (but not less than two years). Other prisoners need only serve one-third of their minimum sentence (but not less than one year). The history of § 133, set forth in the Third Report of the Special Commission on Firearms, Paroles and Related Matters (1965 Senate Doc. No. 1151), indicates that the draftsmen intended to distinguish between “crimes of violence against the person and other crimes committed against society, and that the laws governing the release of those convicted and sentenced for crimes against the person must be more strict.” See also Bel v. Chernoff, 390 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Mass. 1975) (three-judge court) (<HOLDING>); Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 148 (1967) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same with respect to an apartment (B) holding that g l c 127  133 established two classifications of criminal activity  violent and nonviolent  with respect to parole eligibility (C) holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation (D) holding congress may impose civil and criminal sanctions with respect to the same act or omission (E) holding that a public housing authority may terminate benefits conferred by section 8 of the united states housing act of 1937 42 usc  1437f for the violent criminal activity of a family member without having to prove that the violent criminal activity threatens the health safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents
Output: (B)
court found that appellant was not in custody at any time during the questioning. We agree. When the circumstances show, as here, that a person is acting upon the invitation, urging, or request of police officers without any threat or coercion by the officers, that person is acting voluntarily and is not in custody. See, e.g., Nickerson v. State, 312 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd); Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd); see also Delacerda, 425 S.W.3d at 386-88 (noting that the appellant voluntarily went with officers into police station to homicide division office for questioning and merely being questioned at stationhouse, by itself, does not constitute custody); cf. In re D.F.C., 312 S.W.3d at 714 (<HOLDING>). Our record reflects that appellant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (B) holding that fifth amendment custody is a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest (C) holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody (D) holding that since petitioner made specific request for counsel before interview policeinitiated interview was impermissible (E) holding that there was a restraint of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest when juvenile went to stationhouse for interview but magistrate read defendant his mircmda warnings defendants grandmother was excluded from interview despite her request and defendant was alone in locked interrogation room with armed officer
Output: (E)
Corp., 767 F.Supp. 167, 170 (N.D.Ill.1991), the court considered the amended complaint filed even though the plaintiff never requested leave because the complaint “merely alleged additional theories of liability based on the same set of facts,” which the court would have allowed the plaintiff to re-file. But it was more procedurally expedient to consider the complaint filed than to strike the amended complaint and then grant leave to file another complaint that raised the exact same issues. And more important, the parties would be in the same position regardless of which procedure the court used. Similarly, in Straub v. Desa Industries, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 6, 9 (M.D.Pa.1980), an amended complaint alleging a new cause of action was deemed filed without a request 4, 987-88 (5th Cir.1989)(<HOLDING>). Thus, this exception does not apply and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the loss of a statute of limitations defense prejudices a defendant (B) holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury (C) holding that the loss of a statute of limitations defense constitutes clear legal prejudice (D) holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense (E) holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause
Output: (C)
nothing more than a sexual harassment case. Record at 323. No doubt, these comments, coupled with the lack of any credible evidence indicating that the appellant’s conduct was not sexual harassment and the overwhelming evidence of sexual harassment, made the members’ decision regarding the sexual harassment offenses a relatively easy venture. In all probability, the challenging issue debated during deliberations was whether the terminal element of an Article 134 offense was proved. The comments also lessened the chances that the members were either confused or misled by the military judge’s instructions (i.e., lessened the chances of the instructions infecting the trial with prejudicial error). Fifth, State v. Sanderson, 33 Or.App. 173, 575 P.2d 1025 (1978), quoted in the lead opinion (<HOLDING>) is inapposite. That decision involved a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unconstitutional a sexual harassment statute prohibiting conduct that alarmed or seriously annoyed the victim (B) holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii (C) holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment (D) holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort (E) holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed
Output: (A)
Alleyne error, Ellis, 868 F.3d at 1170-71, Ellis made clear that a defendant need not ”object[] during,trial to the jury instructions or the general-verdict form to preserve an Al-leyne objection." Id. at 1171. Instead, the burden is on the government to make sure the jury is properly instructed. Id. (“If the government wanted a heightened sentence under [§ 841(b)(1)(A) ], it was obliged to ensure the jury received proper jury instructions and a special-verdict form with spaces enabling the jury to find [the defendant’s] individually attributable powder and crack-cocaine amounts.”). Nevertheless, a defendant must object at some point before she is sentenced to preserve Alleyne error. Id. To be clear, however, use of the term "Alleyne" is not a necessary predicate to preservation. Id, (<HOLDING>). At oral argument, the parties argued 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense (C) holding a defendant can preserve the type of error at issue here by invoking the applicable decision here alleyne or by claiming that the issue of drug quantity should go to the jury that an element of the offense was not proved that the judge cannot determine quantity or that quantity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not by a preponderance of the evidence quotations and alteration omitted (D) holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c (E) holding that apprendi dictates that in order to authorize the imposition of a sentence exceeding the maximum allowable without a jury finding of a specific threshold drug quantity the specific threshold quantity must be treated as an element of an aggregated drug trafficking offense ie charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt internal footnote omitted
Output: (C)
address could have been the same. Not only do the photo S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system — thus makng it possible to identify him or her later). Second, the information that Officer Chih learned when he entered apartment 301 did little to corroborate the conclusory tip “from the neighborhood.” That Mr. Jackson was inside the apartment, consistent with the tip, does not demonstrate that the “tip [was] reliable in its assertion of illegality” but merely that it was reliable in “its tendency to identify a determinate person.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Lewises’ inaccurate statements 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location (B) holding that automobile exception applied to search of defendants tractor trailer where confidential informant who was detained at border with a trailer full of marijuana told agents that he was driving to meet the defendant to exchange trailers and defendant subsequently arrived at the location described at the time described in a tractor with an empty trailer that matched informants description (C) holding tip to be sufficiently reliable where the officer confirmed an informants description of the suspects appearance and location though the officer did not personally witness any criminal behavior (D) holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description (E) holding that stop of appellant was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion where anonymous 911 caller said that she had seen suspect pull gun out of his pocket 911 caller described suspect and suspects location responding officer located appellant near stated location appellant matched description and no one else in vicinity matched description
Output: (A)
inquiry — • whether New Provo Canyon’s treatment of one individual constituted state action — differs substantially from that in Milonas, irrespective of whether, for purposes of a class action suit, Old Provo Canyon’s treatment of its patients generally constituted state action. Thus, the question here does not present the necessary “like facts” to trigger the stare decisis doctrine. D. Collateral Estoppel For the very same reason, Taylor’s collateral estoppel argument fails. Collateral esto Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed below). 13 . Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes, 1 F.3d 415, 415-417 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (B) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (C) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact
Output: (E)
Officer Calise called Timmann at 3:33 PM, he did not “confront” Timmann with the evidence the officers obtained through their illegal search of Timmann’s bedroom. During the call, Officer Calise did not tell Timmann .that the officers had entered Timmann’s apartment and found firearms and ammunition. Rather, Officer Calise only spoke to Tim-mann about the bullet hole in Carr’s wall, information the officers learned about lawfully. Thus, because Officer Calise did not use the evidence obtained via the officers’ unlawful search to induce Timmann’s statement that a friend had lent him a rifle which he accidentally discharged, the statement was not made “as a direct result” of the unlawful search and thus not a fruit of that search. But cf. Ruiz v. Craven, 425 F.2d 235, 236 (9th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if police conduct  unconstitutional searches that acquire information used to obtain a search warrant then evidence seized during the later search conducted pursuant to warrant would be inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree (B) holding that evidence that would not have been obtained but for an unlawful search must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree (C) holding evidence found pursuant to warrant based on probable cause provided by prior illegal entry was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree (D) holding incriminating statements defendant made when police officers questioned him regarding heroin the officers found during an unlawful search of defendants house were fruit of the poisonous tree (E) holding incriminating statements defendant made after a detective questioned defendant about serial numbers the detective had obtained during an unlawful search of a stolen car were fruit of the poisonous tree
Output: (D)
for abuse of discretion, while its application of legal precepts in determining that any delay was excusable is reviewed under a plenary standard). 17 . The Melendez court issued an order granting the petition on October 15, 2002, giving the Election Division Director three weeks to make any necessary changes. 18 . See supra note 8, at 239, 919 A.2d at 1280. 19 . This Court has long recognized the importance of the elective franchise. See Maryland Green Party v. State Board of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 150, 832 A.2d 214, 228 (2003) (stating that Article 7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights "has been held to be even more protective of rights of political participation than the provisions of the federal Constitution”); Munsell v. Hennegan, 182 Md. 15, 22, 31 A.2d 640, 644 (1943) (<HOLDING>); Kemp v. Owens, 76 Md. 235, 241, 24 A. 606, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the potential harm caused to uocava voters far outweighed the burden placed upon the state because of the states legally mandated obligation to provide uocava voters the ability to vote (B) recognizing the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters regardless of their political persuasion to cast their votes effectively (C) holding that electors should have the fullest opportunity to vote for candidates of any political party and any restrictions that are destructive of freedom of choice by voters will not be upheld (D) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (E) holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections
Output: (C)
NLRB v. Princeton Memorial Hosp., 939 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1991) (quotations omitted) (ellipses in original). In determining whether the employing entity is administered by individuals responsible to public officials for purposes of the political subdivision exemption, courts and the Board generally consider whether a majority of the employer’s governing body — the governing board and executive officers — is appointed by or subject to removal by public officials. See, e.g., Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 125-26; Truman Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570, 573 (8th Cir.1981); Economic Sec. Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 562, 1990 WL 272722, at *2 & n. 10; Woodbury County Community Action Agency Employer, 299 N.L.R.B. 554, 1990 WL 267415, at *2; see also Princeton Memorial Hosp., 939 F.2d at 179 (<HOLDING>). Courts and the Board also consider whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that procedural unconscionability existed where a nursing home residents daughter met with the homes administrator for about five minutes during which time she was presented with a thirtyseven page document that included an arbitration clause and instructed that her fathers continued stay in the home was conditioned upon her signing the papers which the administrator flipped through and presented the signature pages (B) holding nursing home was political subdivision both because homes directors were responsible to elected officials and because the daytoday administration of center was directly tied to city (C) holding that where plaintiffs were entitled to recover both treble damages and punitive damages under the illinois nursing home care reform act both issues could be submitted to the jury and the plaintiff could choose which award to be reflected in the judgment (D) holding that although the state regulated and subsidized the nursing homes private parties not state officials made the administrative decisions therefore the decisions could not be treated as state action (E) holding that home purchased with spouses separate funds prior to marriage was transmuted into marital property because mortgage payments made from joint account home was used as marital residence and both parties devoted resources and energy into home
Output: (B)
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir.2009). Our review of the reasonableness of Defendant’s sentence is conducted under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir.2008). The district court sentenced Defendant to 121 months’ imprisonment — the low end of the suggested Guidelines range. Because the district court selected a with in-Guidelines sentence, its ruling is due a presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal. See United States v. Algarate-Valeneia, 550 F.3d 1238, 1245 n. 6 (10th Cir.2008). Our review of the record has failed to uncover any evidence that brings this presumption of reasonableness into question. See United States v. Donohoe, 458 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This order and judgment is not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge (B) holding that trial justice has wide discretion to determine relevancy of evidence (C) recognizing that the trial judge must be given a wide range of discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared (D) recognizing that wide discretion in imposition of sentence reposes in the trial judge (E) holding that trial court has wide discretion in determining sufficiency of foundation for opinion testimony
Output: (D)
use of property that forms the basis of the underlying forfeiture action, the Court agrees with Harborside that when a CSA violation is alleged, only the Government qualifies as a proper movant for purposes of Rule G(7)(a). As indicated above, the starting point for this analysis is § 882 of the CSA, which authorizes district courts to enjoin violations of the CSA consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Rule G cannot be read in isolation; rather, the CSA provides the parameters for any requested relief as long as it is consistent with the Federal Rules, As Harborside points out, courts have consistently held that there is n o Rule G(7)(a) to stop alleged violations of the CSA would thus give them power not intended under the CSA. See Jones, 745 F.Supp.2d at 892 (<HOLDING>). Concourse and Ms. Chretien’s only response is 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment (B) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law (C) holding that it may be decided as a matter of law (D) recognizing that when  congress has decided not to provide a particular federal remedy we are not free to supplement that decision in a way that makes it meaningless (E) recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules
Output: (D)
conduct of the employer’s business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Although the amendment was enacted after Brown’s termination, an EEOC guideline containing substantively equivalent language was promulgated in 1967. Thus, the guideline has been accepted as a reasonable construction of the pre-1972 statute. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). 2 . There is no question that General Motors did attempt to initially accommodate Brown by attempting to get the union to waive the provisions of the Shift Preference Agreement to allow Brown to be assigned back to the first shift out of the line with his seniority. The Union refused to waive thé agreement. Cf. Huston v. Local No. 93, International Union, UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>). The result of the refusal of the union to so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original (B) holding no violation of title vii by the union in refusing to alter its seniority lists to accommodate a sabbatarian (C) holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine (D) holding that an agreedupon seniority system did not give way to an employers duty to reasonably accommodate religious observance under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
Output: (B)
explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted). Finally, if the proponent provides a sufficient explanation for the peremptory challenges, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2416; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. ¶ 16 Since deciding Batson, the Supreme Court has continually increased the scope of the Batson test. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (B) holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges (C) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (D) holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause (E) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race
Output: (A)
with the use of the automobile as an ambulance and thus allowed coverage. We agree with Hisaw that, under the broad interpretation required by our supreme court, there was a causal connection between Struthers’s use of the van and Hisaw’s injuries. But for Struthers’s use and operation of the van in such a manner as to drive it off the road, Hisaw would not have responded to the accident, undertaken his official duties, and ultimately received his injuries. Further, the fact that his injuries were inflicted by the underinsured vehicle itself takes this case out of the realm of those decisions in which the vehicle was the mere situs of an injury that could just as easily have occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., Carter v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ark. App. 16, 660 S.W.2d 952 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service (B) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (C) holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle (D) holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue (E) holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service
Output: (C)
challenge to the amount of refund awarded by DOE to a third-party claimant even though they failed to intervene while DOE was deciding the third-party claimant’s award”). Persistent, the defendant analogizes the instant APA claim with that denied in Brooks v. Snow, 313 F.Supp.2d 654 (S.D.Tex.2004). There, the plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court that Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.722-1 (listing the grounds authorizing the IRS to settle a tax case) was inconsistent with congressional intent, because the regulation omitted delays caused by the IRS in determining tax liability. Id. at 658-59. The court dismissed their complaint, explaining that they had not “allege[d] they ever submitted any offers-in-compromise and, therefore, they have not upp. 239, 255 (Ct.Cl. 1947) (<HOLDING>). Second, and most crucially, this plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim (B) holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run (C) holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted (D) holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that a subsequent refund request on reassessed taxes was unnecessary as the government already had notice of the plaintiffs claim
Output: (E)
to the agency’s employees or activities. Both statutes qualify as Exemption 3 statutes. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985); Krikorian v. Dep’t of State, 984 F.2d at 465; Fitzgibbon v. CIA 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C.Cir.1990); Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat’l Security Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 827-29 (D.C.Cir.1979); Pfeiffer v. CIA 721 F.Supp. 337, 341-42 (D.D.C.1989). Third, the DOC also properly invokes § 12(c) of the Export Administration Act (“EAA”), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(c)(1), prohibiting public disclosure of information obtained with respect to license applications unless the Secretary determines that the disclo sure is in the national interest. See Wisc. Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 281 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, the DOC properly invokes the Ethics 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute (B) holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute (C) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (E) holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3
Output: (C)
filed in 2003 because the court had previously modified his probated sentence and fine in 2002. Prior to Act 1569 of 1999, a trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once it was put into execution. Gates v. State, 353 Ark. 333, 107 S.W.3d 868 (2003). A sentence is put into execution when the trial court issues a judgment of conviction or a commitment order. Id. A guilty plea, coupled with a fine and probation or a suspended imposition of a sentence, constitutes a conviction. Id. This conviction deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to amend or modify the executed sentence. Id. See also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301 (Repl. 1997). Once a sentence is put into execution, an attempted modification of the original order is erroneous. Gates, supra (<HOLDING>). In Harmon v. State, 317 Ark. 47, 876 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may not change the term of sentence by subsequent amendment after the sentence becomes final (B) holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the sentence originally imposed by imposing an additional term of fifteen years suspended sentence (C) holding the court had no jurisdiction to modify a validly imposed sentence on prisoners own motion (D) holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended (E) holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence
Output: (B)
may, however, consider the contents of documents specifically referred to and incorporated into the complaint. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994). A. Defendant OPM’s Motion to Dismiss 1. Claim for Recovery of Benefits under FEHBA Plaintiffs first cause of action is for recovery of benefits under 5 U.S.C. § 8900, et seq., the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”). OPM contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim under FEHBA, and thus Plaintiffs first cause of action should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). OPM argues that because Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies under FEHBA, the United States has not yet consented to the suit and jurisdiction is therefore lacking. ( Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). OPM in its agency regulations under FEHBA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding agency claim requirements under the federal torts claim act must be exhausted before district court has jurisdiction (B) holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court (C) holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court (D) holding on direct review from the bia that bjecause minasyans claim to citizenship is not patently frivolous we have jurisdiction to review it irrespective of whether he has exhausted his claim before the agency (E) holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency
Output: (A)