niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Bruce Lee Scott challenges his 18-year aggravated sentence for second degree murder. His claim is that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the trial judge, and not a jury, found statutory aggravating factors and increased his sentence beyond the presumptive one, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The district court denied the petition, holding that Scott had procedurally defaulted on the Apprendi claim under Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). 1. The right Scott seeks to invoke was not clearly established until Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), a decision announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In Blakely, the Court applied Apprendi to a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is retroactive (B) holding retroactive application (C) holding that blakely did not apply to a case that was final but not on direct review when blakely was decided and in which the trial court later allowed a belated appeal (D) holding blakely not retroactive (E) holding that the act is not retroactive
Output: (D)
matter, we note that the State does not raise an issue on appeal regarding the merits of the motion to suppress, but argues that as a procedural matter, the trial court erred in reconsidering the motion five years after it was originally denied, without providing prior notice or an evidentiary hearing. Thus, our analysis is limited to this procedural issue, and we do not address the question of whether Miller had reasonable suspicion to detain Wolfe. This Court has held that because a motion to suppress is “nothing more than a specialized objection,” a trial court is “free to reconsider its own earlier suppression ruling.” Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 183, 137-38 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no pet.); see also State v. Henry, 25 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The State argues that while a trial court may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (B) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding that ruling on motion to suppress is interlocutory and may be reconsidered (D) holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss (E) holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo
Output: (C)
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 20, 103 S.Ct. 927 (emphasis in original). As such, the third factor does not favor abstention. See PaineWebber, 276 F.3d at 207 ("[T]he desire to avoid litigating a single issue in multiple forums is insufficient to overcome the strong federal policy support-mg arbitration.” (citations omitted)). 3 . It is true that Randy signed the arbitration agreement and is also a wrongful-death beneficiary, so it may appear on the surface that he was a party to the arbitration agreement and should be bound by it. But Randy signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of his father, not on behalf of himself. So Randy was not a party to the agreement. See Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc,, 376 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Ky.2012) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Randy does not contest that the signature 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (B) holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother (C) holding that although signing arbitration agreement was condition of employment agreement was not void for unconscionability (D) holding that a person signing an arbitration agreement using power of attorney is not a party to that agreement merely by virtue of having signed it (E) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it
Output: (D)
421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), and is consistent with the holdings in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983), and in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, supra. Blue Chip Stamps held that a section 10(b) plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security, and thus limited standing under the 1934 Act to “plaintiffs ... who have at least dealt in the security to which the prospectus, representation, or omission relates.” Id. 421 U.S. at 747, 95 S.Ct. at 1931. Put and call option trading on an underlying security is directly affected by the prospecti, representations and omissions of the issuer of the underlying security. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506. Cf. Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mass.1987) (<HOLDING>). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that sellers of covered calls are not atypical class representatives (D) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (E) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent
Output: (C)
on Hammons’s retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any of his employees because she has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: (1) that [she] engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relationship between the two events.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1566. We assume, without deciding, that Hammons’s December 17, 2002 letter to the Chancellor was a s link when the plaintiff returned to work for 11 days before leaving again, and no problems occurred during those 11 days); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 951 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Breech v. Ala. Power Co., 962 F.Supp. 1447, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding that more than a year between the protected activity and the discharge is not close enough to support the causal connection requirement (C) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (D) holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action (E) holding that a 7month time period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is too indirect to satisfy the causal connection requirement
Output: (E)
“good cause for delay.” United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F.Supp. at 526; United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F.Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Next, a “sufficient” affidavit must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the facts must be material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts must be such that if true they would convince a reasonable man that a bias exists; and (3) the facts must show the bias is personal, and not judicial, in nature. McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 942 F.Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.Tex.1996) (citation omitted). To be found sufficient as a matter of law, the affidavit must show “ ‘a true personal bias and allege specific facts’ as opposed to mere conclusions and generalizations.” United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F.Supp. at 525; see United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339 (<HOLDING>). This Circuit has observed that “judicial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment (B) recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced (C) holding that course of dealing may render uncertain terms sufficiently definite (D) holding that the facts averred must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a reasonable person that bias exists simple conclusions opinions or rumors are insufficient (E) holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment
Output: (D)
and steel-toed boots may be indispensable to plaintiffs’ principal activities without being integral. The donning and doffing of such generic protective gear is not different in kind from “changing clothes and showering under normal conditions,” which, under Steiner, are not covered by the FLSA. 350 U.S. at 249, 76 S.Ct. 330. Among the activities classified in the regulations as preliminary and post-liminary are “checking in and out and waiting in line to do so, changing clothes, washing up or showering, and waiting in line to receive pay checks.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(g) (emphasis added). The donning and doffing of generic protective gear is not rendered integral by being required by the employer or by government regulation. See Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 147 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer (B) holding that the national highway traffic safety commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking a motor vehicle safety standard without supplying a reasoned analysis (C) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (D) holding that donning and doffing safety glasses a pair of earplugs a hard hat and safety shoes although essential to the job and required by the employer are pre and postliminary activities (E) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others
Output: (D)
its discretion in proceeding to trial in light of the evidence indicating the defendant’s incompetency to proceed is to vacate defendant’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial if and when defendant is properly determined competent to proceed with trial. Compare McRae II, 163 N.C. App. at 361, 594 S.E.2d at 74 (noting the proper remedy in cases where the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing in violation of a defendant’s due process rights is to remand the case to the trial court to (1) determine whether it is possible for a retrospective competency hearing to be held effectively, and (2) if so, to hold such a hearing to determine defendant’s competency at the time of trial), with State v. Reid, 38 N.C. App. 547, 550, 248 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, in the present case, Dr. Corvin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict (B) holding that the appellants failure to provide a transcript of the proceedings was fatal to its claims because without a record of the trial proceedings the appellate court can not sic properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial courts judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory (C) holding that where the trial courts determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial was not supported by the evidence the verdict and judgment must be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings against the defendant (D) holding that disposition order be vacated and the cause remanded for correction thereof (E) holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed
Output: (C)
375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we need not consider whether the District’s failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith’s case) further limits our review “to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice,” Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury’s verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc  1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc  1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
Output: (E)
of the remaining documents, the court holds that they were properly classified under Exemption 5 of FOIA. An agency may meet its FOIA burden by providing the requester with a Vaughn index, adequately describing each withheld document and explaining the exemption’s relevance. Summers, 140 F.3d at 1080; Vaughn, 484 F.2d 820. After conducting a review to assess the accuracy of the defendant’s assertions, the court concludes that, except for those documents noted earlier, the Vaughn index was accurate and nondisclosure is justified. E.Notice to the Government Regarding FOIA and its Burdens The court undertook an onerous in camera review of the defendant’s documents, in large part, because of the defendant’s failure to provide an accurate Vaughn index. Mem. Op. (Nov. 17, 2005) at 10-11 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the court discovered its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citizens united did not undermine the supreme courts precedents regarding the validity of contribution limits under the first amendment (B) holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate (C) holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper (D) holding that the discrepancies in the vaughn index undermine the courts confidence in the accuracy of the governments assertions (E) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
Output: (D)
preempted by FIFRA; if anything, it suggests a contrary conclusion. Plaintiffs claim in this case, though arguably more akin to the Cipollone plaintiffs’ second theory of fraudulent misrepresentation, is subject to a preemption provision under FIFRA which differs in scope from that under consideration in Cipollone. Unlike § 5(b) of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which limits the preemptive force of that Act to state laws “based on smoking and health,” FIFRA § 136v(b) broadly preempts “any requirements” that arise under state law, suggesting that Congress did intend, via FIFRA, to proscribe the regulation of deceptive advertising. Plaintiffs fraud claim is thus preempted. See Graves v. Metrex Research Corp., No. CV91 505710, 1995 WL 416292, at *6 (Conn.Super.Ct.1995) (<HOLDING>); Trinity Mountain Seed Co. v. MSD Agvet, 844 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim (B) holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage (C) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted (D) holding plaintiffs misrepresentation claim preempted where the only alleged misrepresentations shown by plaintiff were those contained in their labeling or safety data sheet (E) holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim
Output: (D)
of this case there is no substantive difference between the old rule and the new rule, which provides that two prior sentences count separately if the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Thus, Huggins cannot be distinguished based merely on a nonpertinent change to the text of the applicable rule. The relevant distinction is that the defendant in Huggins received two separate sentences for his two prior offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses were “consolidated for sentencing.” The prior offenses in Huggins occurred in 1987, six years before North Carolina enacted the consolidated sentence provision. See N.C. Gen. Ann. Laws 1993, c. 538, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1994; see also State v. Branch, 134 N.C.App. 637, 518 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Huggins is inapposite because it does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987 (D) holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity (E) holding that as a matter of law offenses that were committed prior to 1 october 1994 the effective date of the structured sentencing act cannot be consolidated for judgment under the act
Output: (E)
the Cabinet, and Yowell and Codell in their official capacities. Ordinarily, a federal appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a state court. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). However, in cases involving removal, the district court is instructed to “take[ ] up the case where the State court left it off.” Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812, 25 L.Ed. 875 (1879). Further, although “[a]ny orders or rulings issued by the state court prior to removal are not conclusive in the federal action after removal ... it is well-settled that they do remain binding on the parties until formall S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state (B) holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants (C) holding suits against state officials for monetary damages impermissible where the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state rather than against the officer in his individual capacity (D) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities (E) holding that suits which seek no recovery from state funds but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the states liability insurance coverage fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the state
Output: (C)
has any significant contact with California. DTK-NJ has employees in New Jersey, and has its principal place of business in New Jersey. DTK-NJ has no employees located outside of New Jersey. (Def. Reply to PI. Mem. In Opp’n to Mot. to Transfer, Decl. of Alice Lin ¶ 3.) Although DTK-NJ receives its products for resale from DTK (located in California), see id. ¶ 4, this is not sufficient to establish the minimum contacts described in International Shoe, see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Under Burger King Corp., the fact that DTK directs its products to DTK-NJ is evidence of DTK establishing contacts with New Jersey as opposed to DTK-NJ establishing sufficient minimum contacts with California. 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (<HOLDING>); see also Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intentional tort knowingly directed at a forum resident satisfies the minimum contacts test (B) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (C) holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state (D) holding that minimum contacts exist if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities (E) holding that sufficient minimum contacts exist when nonresident defendant purposefully directed action toward texas
Output: (D)
he raises it to preserve it for possible review by the Supreme Court. He further argues that the age of his conviction, his subsequent work history and devotion to his family, and his motive for returning to the United States — to be with his family, in particular, his aging and ill parents — made a sentence within the guideline range greater than necessary to meet the goals. As he so concedes, his argument that the presumption of reasonableness should not apply to his sentence because § 2L1.2 lacks empirical support has been rejected by this court. See id. (rejecting the notion that this court should examine the empirical basis behind each guideline before applying the presumption of reasonableness); see also United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Before imposing a sentence within the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a presumption of reasonableness (B) holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that any sentence that is properly calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (E) holding that kimbrough does not require discarding the presumption of reasonableness for sentences based on nonempiricallygrounded guidelines
Output: (E)
a hearing before the Industrial Commissioner on his application for alternate medical care and not for the legal process’s (i.e., the answer’s) intended use; (3) ITT’s use of the legal process for the improper purpose was a proximate cause of Gibson’s damage; and (4) the amount of damage. ITT challenges various aspects of the abuse-of-process claim. For example, it argues that (1) the answer was not filed (or not withdrawn) in order to refuse to pay for psychiatric care, (2) this action was not unreasonable, and (3) Gibson cannot show damage from ITT’s failure to pay the psychiatric bills. Because ITT has not appealed from the judgment in favor of Gibson on this claim, it cannot now challenge the judgment. See Johnson Equip. Corp. v. Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Iowa 1992) (<HOLDING>). We reject ITT’s contention that it was a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it (B) holding that a party need not crossappeal a trial courts rejection of a ground urged in the trial court to preserve error on a claim decided in the partys favor but must still crossappeal to preserve an issue on a claim decided adversely to the party (C) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (D) holding neither party was prevailing party where appeal and crossappeal were dismissed (E) holding that in order to preserve an issue for review a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial
Output: (B)
S.Ct. 554, 2 L.Ed.2d 539 (1958) (“in considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is entitled to consider exhibits and other papers that have been identified by affidavit or otherwise made admissible in evidence”) (emphasis added). Discussion The FMLA was enacted by Congress in 1993, in part to address problems arising from “inadequate job security for employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them from working for temporary periods.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). The act was designed to provide a balance between “entitling] employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons” and “accommo-dat[ing] the legitimate interests of employers.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(l-2); see Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir.2005) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)) (<HOLDING>). The FMLA grants eligible employees the right 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court must balance the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and the demands of its calendar (B) holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase (C) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (D) holding that  825220c is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibition on interference with and restraint of employees rights under the fmla  2615a1  and that the labor departments conclusion that employer use of the taking of fmla leave as a negative factor in employment actions  violates  the act is  a reasonable one (E) holding that one of the primary purposes of the fmla is to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families 
Output: (E)
to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). ¶ 20 In this case, appellants were not given the time, place, or date of the final adoption hearing. Because they were not given notice of, and thus did not appear at, the final adoption hearing, appellants were also not afforded an opportunity to be heard. While the court may consolidate adoption petitions and determine that “one petition is the primary matter to be decided,” In re Adoption of A.B., 991 P.2d 70, 1999 UT App 315 at ¶ 14, notice must nevertheless be given t appellate review that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is largely discretionary with that court”). Cf. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ¶ 8, 984 P.2d 987 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION ¶ 22 We remand the issue of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review (B) holding that a state court criminal judgment is final for purposes of collateral attack in federal court at the conclusion of review in the united states supreme court or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires (C) holding in a similar case that certiorari was the proper vehicle for review (D) holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available (E) holding that for purposes of certiorari review court of appeals must identify the basis for refusing to treat an issue
Output: (E)
should "cease this activity asap!!!” 6 . As one basis for its motion to dismiss, the Board asserted that it, its members, its staff, and the administrative prosecutor had absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit under Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245 (4th Cir.1999). Because the court regarded the record as inadequate to evaluate the applicability of any immunities at that early stage of the proceedings, it rejected the immunity argument without prejudice to the Board’s right to reassert it on summary judgment. At present, the Maryland appellate cases do not unequivocally resolve the question of whether the Board had the right to an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order rejecting a claim of quasi-judicial immunity. See State v. Keller-Bee, 224 Md.App. 1, 3-5, 119 A.3d 80 (2015) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the Board did not appeal. 7 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by defendants who were not public officials (B) holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss (C) holding that immediate right to appeal lies from denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity (E) holding that court clerk had right to take immediate appeal of ruling denying motion to dismiss based on absolute judicial immunity
Output: (E)
medical opinions need not “be expressed in terms of certainty in order to serve as the basis for a well[-]grounded claim”), and Molloy v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 513, 516 (1996) (distinguishing Tirpak and stating in dictum that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as “could” suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim, with Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1996) (ignoring Tirpak and holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as “possible” suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim), and Watai v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 441, 443 (1996) (ignoring Tirpak and holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as “very well might have been” suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim); cf. Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 398, 403, 406 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 398, 406 (1995) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a defendant attempts to explain his actions and reveals his parolee status on direct examination the specific reason for his parole could not have been enlightening to the jury and therefore was not relevant (B) holding that there was a sufficiently direct relationship between restricting the defendants selfemployment as a roofer and his bank fraud conviction when the defendant used his roofing business to facilitate the fraud and after his initial sentence he failed to provide information about his business activities to his probation officer (C) holding appellants flatfeet claim to be well grounded based on his statements regarding continuity of symptomatology inservice notation indicating worsening of his pes planus and confirmed existence of current condition on va examination his statements as to continuity of symptomatology provide a direct link between the appellants active service and the current state of his condition (D) holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt (E) holding plaintiff had sufficiently stated such a claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs with regard to his hepatitis c condition his pancreatic condition and the gout in his hand
Output: (C)
their quest had generally confirmed their suspicion. Thereafter it was incumbent upon them to make a decision as to their course of action with “reasonable dispatch.” Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., supra, 496 F.2d at 1268; Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, supra, 488 F.2d at 917; Baumel v. Rosen, supra, 412 F.2d at 574. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs were guilty of unreasonable delay during the period from May 20, 1969 to August 27, 1969. Considering the number of plaintiffs involved and the time necessary for counsel to research legal authorities and draft and prepare the original complaint, this Court concludes that there was no unreasonable delay. Cf. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 343 F.Supp. 245, 255-56 (D.Md.1972) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973) (in jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (B) holding inter alia that 130 days was reasonable period for researching and drafting of complaint (C) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (D) holding that delays of 115 days and 101 days were both substantial (E) holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business
Output: (B)
poly-drug substance abuse. Burstein, a psychiatrist, testified that Mickey was delusional at the time of the crime, plagued by a borderline personality disorder exacerbated by his use of multiple types of drugs. These experts provided substantial testimony before the penalty phase jury. Mickey, however, points to three deficiencies. First, he argues that counsel should have better coordinated the experts’ testimony. The experts, for example, differed as to whether Mickey needed to be intoxicated for a diagnosis of toxic psychosis. But surely counsel cannot be faulted for the fact that their experts gave inconsistent sworn testimony. We do not expect counsel to manipulate experts to get their stories straight, Mod. R. Prof. Cond surrebutt nsolicited, access to fact witnesses. Id. (<HOLDING>). Finally, Mickey claims that counsel should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was (B) holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime (C) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (D) holding counsel must bring relevant facts to attention of experts (E) holding that only relevant factors must be considered
Output: (B)
founded upon conclusory, vague or general allegations, but must instead, allege facts that show the existence of the asserted constitutional rights violation recited in the complaint and what each defendant did to violate the asserted right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Further, “a supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.1999)(internal quotation marks omitted). Moniz’s general allegations of Cox’s failure to supervise and investigate are insufficient to state a claim under these standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). In sum, we agree with the district court that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supervisory liability under  1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon a mere failure to act internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that a rule 26b application based on ineffective assistance cannot function to save the underlying substantive claim from procedural default internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted (D) holding that state officials cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
Output: (A)
historical CSI without a showing of probable cause renders the statute constitutionally suspect); see also Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“There is something creepy and un-American about such clandestine and underhanded [continuous surveillance]---- Some day, soon, we may wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.”). As a result of such decisions, I believe that magistrate judges presented with ex parte requests for authority to deploy various forms of warrantless location-tracking must carefully reexamine the constitutionality of such investigative techniques, and that it is no longer enough to dismiss the need for such analysis by relying on cases such as Knotts or, as discussed below, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons discussed below, I now 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed (B) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (C) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (D) holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider (E) holding that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bulletin board subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person
Output: (D)
as amended on denial of reh’g (July 28, 2006). In addition, no other statutory preclusion provision under § 6972(b)(2)(A)-(C) applies to this RCRA citizen suit. Defendant does not contest this. In fact, even when EPA consent orders pursuant to CERCLA are in place, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have found that such consent orders do not preclude citizen suits under RCRA, where the consent order did not remediate all of the harm. Organic Chems. Site PRP Grp. v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 6 F.Supp.2d 660, 665 (W.D.Mich.1998) (denying motion to dismiss RCRA citizen suit for cleanup of soil contamination where plaintiff alleged EPA had taken action only with respect to groundwater contamination); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 968 F.Supp. 423, 430-31 (E.D.Wis.1997) (<HOLDING>). In sum, this court does not lack jurisdiction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroads rights under 1862 act were for surface easement only (B) holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site (C) holding that the failure to raise a futile issue does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding rcra claim regarding groundwater contamination not futile where epa consent order only expressly covered surface contamination and might not extend to groundwater (E) holding that amendment is futile if the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted
Output: (D)
Konor Enters., Inc. v. Eagle Publ’ns, Inc., 878 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir.1989). Once the copyright owner has established the amount of the infringer’s gross revenues, the burden shifts to the infringer to prove either that part or all of those revenues are “deductible expenses” (i.e., are not profits), or that they are “attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.” Id Although § 504(b) places the burden on the infringer to demonstrate that certain portions of its revenues were due to factors other than the infringement, the in-fringer need not prove these amounts with mathematical precision. See Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir.1985); cf. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 408, 60 S.Ct. 681, 84 L.Ed. 825 (1940) (<HOLDING>). 3. Despite the existence of § 504(b)’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding past profits coupled with other facts and circumstances may establish lost profits (B) holding that there need only be reasonable approximation of recoverable profits (C) holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation (D) holding sentences need only be below the statutory maximum (E) holding lost pension benefits recoverable as front pay
Output: (B)
those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant’s prior conviction’s probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote
Output: (B)
was notified of the first claims by O’Rourke. By that time, four of the underlying suits had been settled and many other suits were filed with the understanding that they would be settled in the near future. However, many of the suits against O’Rourke were not filed until after or shortly before Aetna filed its declaratory judgment action. Aetna cannot be found to have breached its duty to defend those cases in which Aetna sought declaratory judgment in a timely manner. Consequently, we find it necessary to remand to the trial court to determine in which cases Aetna breached its duty to defend. For those cases in which Aetna breached its duty to defend, Aetna . cannot raise defenses to coverage. See Central Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kammerling, 212 Ill. App. 3d 744, 571 N.E.2d 806 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Aetna is required to indemnify 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved (B) holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage (C) holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation (D) holding that insurer that waited five months after being informed of occurrence and two months after being informed of suit against insured to deliver reservation of rights letter waived its noncoverage defense (E) holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended
Output: (C)
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “In deciding a Rule 60(b) motion, a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigant’s claims on the merits against the policy in favor of finality.” Kotlicky v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, Rule 60(b) motions are left to the sound discretion of the district judge. See Nat’l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). “To prevail on a motion for relief pursuant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted (C) holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice (D) holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion (E) holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion
Output: (B)