niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
by the government and there was no clear prejudice to Allen. c. Court-Ordered Psychiatric Examination Allen asserts that the district court erred in ordering him to undergo a psychiatric examination by a government-selected psychiatrist without a full protective order and in allowing a prosecutor to violate the terms of the court’s partial protective order. We find no constitutional error and therefore reject both claims. There is no doubt that a district court has the authority to order a defendant who states that he will use evidence from his own psychiatric examination in the penalty phase of a trial to undergo a psychiatric examination by a government-selected psychiatrist before the start of the penalty phase. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 338-40 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829, 120 S.Ct. 83, 145 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing superior court must conduct an  on the record examination to determine defendants voluntariness and knowledge (B) holding that preservation for review requires a fair ruling or decision by the district court in order to provide the lower court with an opportunity to correct any mistake give the opposing party an opportunity to demonstrate why the district court should rule in its favor and create a record which enables this court to make informed decisions (C) holding that the district court did in effect hold a hearing when it gave the defense a chance to supplement a psychiatric report with further evidence (D) holding that a district court possesses the inherent power to order a psychiatric examination based on 18 usc  3593c which requires that the government be given a fair opportunity to rebut any of defendants mitigating evidence and fedrcrimp 12 which allows a courtordered psychiatric examination during similar circumstances in the guilt phase of trials (E) holding that 18 usc  3583d requires that the court determine the number of drug tests to which the defendants must submit
Output: (D)
case commences from the time the discriminatory conduct causes economic injury and ends upon the date of the judgment. In other words, back pay accrues from the date of the commencement of the discriminatory course of conduct causing financial loss until the date damages are “settled.” Palasota, 499 F.3d at 483 (internal citations omitted); see also Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1999) (“A prevailing ADA claimant is presumptively entitled to all back pay which would have accrued from the termination date to the entry of judgment, provided it is made to appear that reasonable diligence was exercised in the effort to secure other suitable employment.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Back pay may be denied “only for reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (C) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (D) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (E) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable
Output: (C)
Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir.1992) (noting that substantive due process claims should be limited to “truly irrational” governmental action). Therefore, we conclude that the officers are entitled to summary judgment on appellees’ due process claim. III. The second incident occurring on September 21, 1996, involves appellants Offi cer Stanley and Sergeant Aldrich. These appellants contend that the district court should have granted them qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment and due process claims. A. Fourth Amendment As stated above, the relevant inquiry in a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest appellees. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 142, 99 S.Ct. at 2693-94; Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1389 (<HOLDING>). Appellees claim that Officer Stanley and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (B) recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest (C) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (D) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
Output: (A)
and held that a failure to do so amounted to ineffectiveness of counsel warranting the grant of a new trial. A review of our case law prior to the Brooks decision, however, indicates that this Court had declined to evaluate ineffec tiveness claims alleging the failure to prepare based solely on the existence or duration of counsel’s pretrial face-to-face consultation with the defendant. See Harvey, 812 A.2d at 1196-97 (rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for consulting with defendant for only one hour prior to trial where defendant failed to allege any issues that counsel should have raised or any beneficial information that his counsel would have discovered had further pretrial consultations been held); Commonwealth v. Mason, 559 Pa. 500, 741 A.2d 708, 715-16 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Porter, 556 Pa. 301, 728 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding counsels strategic decision not to present a voluntary intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel determined the murder was not committed while floyd was under the influence of cocaine (B) holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings (C) holding that the defendant did not show prejudice to support ineffective assistance of counsel because any evidentiary error was harmless (D) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (E) holding that counsels limited pretrial consultation with defendant did not render him ineffective because defendant did not identify issues that should have been raised and the defendants ability to convey pertinent information to counsel was impaired due to his severe intoxication at the time of the offense
Output: (E)
buys, and I didn’t have a source at that point that was willing to do that. So that was not an option for me. Therefore, the way I handled it was what I felt to be the only option at that point. [MUCHNICKI]: Which is the stop—stopping the van? [MYERS]: Yes. 6 . At some point during the traffic stop, Agent Myers recognized Marroquin from an earlier investigation and prosecution for passport fraud and identity theft. (Id. at 164). 7 . The Court exercises its discretion in considering Pacheco’s affidavit, but assigns it less weight than live testimony given that he did not testify at the suppression hearing, thereby denying the Government the ability to cross-examine him. See United States v. Ramos, 591 F.Supp.2d 93, 113 (D. Mass. 2008). 8 . At one point, Marroquin , 1147 (8th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Pacheco also argued that his arrest was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation (B) holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody (C) holding that even if defendant were in custody a miranda violation would not require suppression of his fingerprints because the fifth amendments self incrimination clause offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting quotation omitted (D) holding that miranda violation did not require suppression of immigrants fingerprints (E) holding that the fifth amendment did not require the suppression of the physical fruits of a miranda violation where the statement was voluntary
Output: (C)
with our ability to review the sentence imposed by the district court for substantive reasonableness because, on review, we must compare the sentence imposed with the correctly calculated Guidelines sentencing range. He contends the relevant Guidelines sentencing range is the post-departure Guidelines sentencing range. But it is the pre-departure Guidelines sentencing range that the district court must correctly calculate and that we must use when we review a sentence for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.2006) (“[W]e elect to review the district court’s application of the advisory sentencing guidelines only insofar as they do not involve departures.”); see also United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1114 n. 11 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We used the pre-departure sentence for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that a fee application based on claims that were interrelated nonfrivolous and raised in good faith may still be excessive where the applicant achieved only partial or limited success (C) holding forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon and it is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith (D) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (E) holding mohamed is still good law
Output: (E)
the Supreme Court upheld the application of certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. See generally 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122. These provisions established an allotment of a certain number of acres for the Filburn’s wheat crop that year; however, Filburn grew more wheat than he was supposed to, intending to use the excess for his own consumption on the farm. Id. at 115-17, 63 S.Ct. 82. The Court held that "Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices." Id. at 128-29, 63 S.Ct. 82. 8 . United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217-19 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1285 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 2252a5b constitutional as applied to defendants intrastate possession of child pornography after the supreme court remanded the eleventh circuits prior holding for reconsideration in light of raich (B) holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment (C) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (D) holding that even a remand by the supreme court for reconsideration in light of an intervening court opinion does not require the court to consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography
Output: (A)
730 A.2d at 150. We also have said that “[t]o be permanently disfigured” for the cognate crime of malicious disfigurement “means that the person is appreciably less attractive or that a part of his [or her] body is to some appreciable degree less useful or functional than it was before the injury.” Perkins, 446 A.2d at 26. Plainly, it is difficult to be precise about the degree of seriousness required, but we think it fair to conclude that only more severe and extensive bruising than J.G. sustained should be treated as disfigurements for purposes of the crime of aggravated assault; to do otherwise likely would be to trivialize the statute and to disregard the “high threshold of injury” it erects. Jenkins, 877 A.2d at 1069; cf. Stroman v. United States, 878 A.2d 1241, 1246 (D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming, though, that J.G.’s bruises 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm (B) holding in a prosecution for attempted possession of a prohibited weapon that a cut on the forehead requiring fifteen stitches though more than a mere bruise was not shown to be a protracted and obvious disfigurement (C) holding that something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct (D) holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion (E) holding that persecution is an extreme concept requiring more than mere harassment
Output: (B)
of such an interest without due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). That opportunity sometimes may occur after the deprivation of liberty or property. See id. at 342-43, 96 S.Ct: 893 (approving a system in which the Social Security Administration may terminate disability payments without a prior hearing, so long as it provides the recipient with a post-termination opportunity to contest the decision); see also City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 718, 123 S.Ct. 1895, 155 L.Ed.2d 946 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682, 97 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a hearing is not required within 48 hours of when a city imposes a parking fine (B) holding that 72 hours actual notice before a hearing is required it is not sufficient to make court calendars available to all the sureties in the county (C) holding that a hearing is not required before a junior high school imposes corporal punishment on a student (D) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (E) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract
Output: (A)
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 1st day of April, 2011. 1 . When parties fail to file timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the Federal Magistrates Act does not require a district court to review the report before accepting it. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 ) (<HOLDING>); Oldrati v. Apfel, 33 F.Supp.2d 397, 399 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the appellate standard of review in fourth amendment search and seizure cases is limited to determining whether any evidence supports the trial courts finding and the appellate court may only reverse where there is clear error (B) holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record (C) holding that the role of the courts is limited to ascertaining whether there exists one of the specific grounds for the vacation of an award as provided in  10 of the arbitration act and that the court should not review the arbitration proceeding for errors of law or fact (D) holding without a transcript of proceedings below review on appeal is limited to errors of law that are apparent on face of record (E) holding that the courts review is limited to ascertaining whether there is clear error on the face of the record
Output: (E)
regulation of which plaintiff himself is the object, “there is ordinarily little question that the [defendant’s] action or inaction has caused the injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555, 112 S.Ct. at 2130. A second factor in deciding whether there is an imminent threat of harm to the plaintiff is the plaintiffs level of certainty that he will engage in conduct that will subject him to injury. See id at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. When the plaintiff has been able to state with some certainty an intent to engage in allegedly expected conduct at a relatively specific time in the future, courts have found a sufficiently imminent threat of harm to meet the first element in the Lujan test. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (B) holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim (C) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (D) holding that plaintiffs statement that it bid on every guardrail project in colorado combined with affidavits showing that there had been fourteen guardrail contracts up for bid between 1983 and 1990 created a sufficient certainty that plaintiff would bid on contracts in the future to support standing (E) holding that a business owners testimony was insufficient to establish lost profits where he was not able to specify which contracts they lost how many they lost how much profit they would have had from the contracts or who would have awarded them contracts and explaining that the plaintiffs could have supported their lost profits with testimony that they had lost out on specific contracts but failed to do so
Output: (D)
1276 (4th Cir.1986)). If Meritage was neither aware nor on notice that the plaintiffs were working overtime, then no violation of the FLSA’s overtime provision has occurred. Id. Meritage does not claim to have paid any plaintiff for her unreported overtime. Therefore, if each plaintiff proves that Meritage knew she was working overtime hours, and establishes the amount and extent of her unpaid overtime by just and reasonable inference, she has satisfied her burden. i. Angela Carman Th s presented sufficient evidence to establish the amount and extent of her unpaid overtime hours. Her sworn testimony and accompanying evidence sufficiently detail when and how many additional hours she worked each month. See Prince v. MND Hospitality, Inc., 2009 WL 2170042, at *6 (S.D.Tex. July 20, 2009) (<HOLDING>); cf. Harvill, 433 F.3d at 441 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was sufficiently reliable because there was corroboration (B) holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds (C) holding that description was sufficiently detailed (D) holding that witness had an independent basis to support incourt identification where the description made prior to any pretrial identification was substantially an accurate description of the defendant (E) holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference
Output: (C)
dismissal when “it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief’). Conwill timely appealed the judgment dismissing his PCR motion. Discussion ¶ 14. The involved background facts and procedural history, once sorted, lead to a straightforward conclusion: Conwill is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal. I. Time Allowed for Giving a Notice of Appeal ¶ 15. To prove the right to an out-of-time appeal, Conwil e of appeal was filed within the thirty days following the sentencing order. ¶ 16. In his PCR motion, Conwill does not challenge the waiver he pronounced to the court in May 2008, at his burglary sentencing hearing. See Davis v. State, 36 So.3d 456, 460 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). Instead, he asserts that, because he later 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel (B) holding that an accused may voluntarily waive his or her right of appeal so long as the waiver is informed and voluntary quoting 24 cjs criminal law  2349 2006 (C) holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary (D) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary (E) holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily
Output: (B)
a more comfortable applicator for a sensitive area like the axilla was not based on anything disclosed in either of the Gueret references. Dr. Singh’s testimony failed to establish any reason a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the two references to arrive at the claimed double-wall structure. Neither the Gueret ’986 reference nor the Gueret ’187 patent suggests, much less teaches, the claimed wall disclosed in the asserted claims of the ’861 patent. The nonobviousness of the inventions of the ’861 patent is further reinforced by the fact that the disclosures of both the Guer-et ’986 publication and the Gueret ’187 patent were considered by the PTO during examination of the ’861 patent. See Sciele Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed.Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we hold that Amneal has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing burden (B) recognizing that there is a high burden of proof created by the necessary deference to the pto (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it (E) holding that the statute at issue created a new cause of action because the burden of proof needed under the statute was less rigorous than the common law burden
Output: (B)
contest the factual allegations of the administrative complaint, the Department was still required to prove those facts with competent, substantial evidence before it could take action against his license. In making this argument, Nicks cites to Scott v. Dep't of Professional Regulation, 603 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). We reject Nicks’ argument. When a party waives the right to challenge the factual allegations of an administrative complaint, either by requesting an informal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, or by failing to respond to the complaint at all, the facts of the complaint are deemed to be admitted. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.111(2) & (4); § 120.569(2)(c); Autoworld of America Corp. v. Dep’t of Highway Safety, 754 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Hime v. Fla. Real Estate Comm’n, 61 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper standard to apply  is to assume that the facts have occurred as reported and then determine  whether those facts constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law (B) holding the supreme court was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the courts finding of facts conclusions of law and ruling until the court entered the decree that was contemplated by the finding of facts conclusions of law and ruling (C) holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged (D) holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case (E) recognizing that when the facts alleged in the administrative complaint are not disputed this leaves only conclusions of law to be drawn as to whether the admitted facts constitute a violation of the statutes as charged and penalties to be imposed
Output: (E)
Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers and a Proposal for Reform, 31 B.C. L.Rev. 1173 (1990). Some jurisdictions follow the line of reasoning established in Michael H. and hold statutes which deny a putative father standing constitutional under the state or federal constitutions. See, e.g., Dawn D. v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal.4th 932, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 952 P.2d 1139, 1146 (1998) (finding alleged biological father seeking to establish relationship with child born to married mother did not have constitutionally protected liberty interest in forming relationship with child under California Constitution); Hauser v. Reilly, 212 Mich.App. 184, 536 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1995) (agreeing with Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael H.; in the absence of a pa .1998) (<HOLDING>); A v. X,Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1224-27 (Wyo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute denying putative father standing to bring legitimation action under statute in effect at the time did not violate due process or equal protection of state or federal constitutions (B) holding statute that conferred putative father no standing to challenge paternity of a child born in wedlock did not deny due process or equal protection (C) holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection
Output: (A)
1985). 34 Bourne v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964). 35 See City of Vancouver v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 107 Wn. App. 694, 706, 33 P.3d 74 (2001). These factors are (1) the history of the employer’s attitude towards its employees; (2) the type of information sought; (3) the company rank of the questioner; (4) the place and manner of the conversation; (5) the truthfulness of the employee’s responses; (6) whether the employer had a valid purpose for obtaining the information; (7) if so, whether the employer communicated it to the employee; and (8) whether the employer assured the employee that no reprisals would be forthcoming should he or she support the union. 36 See Clallam County v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 43 Wn. App. 589, 599, 719 P.2d 140 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 37 No. 5579-B, 1998 WL 812651 (Wash. Pub. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (B) holding that a prisoners right to hie grievances is constitutionally protected under the first and fourteenth amendments (C) holding that to pursue a grievance is a right protected under chapter 4156 rcw (D) recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected (E) holding that while there is not a constitutionally protected right of intrastate travel under equal protection there is a constitutionally protected right to intrastate travel arising from the due process clause
Output: (C)
case en banc, considered only the merits of the two attorney’s fees issues because Tucker waived his complaint on the modification requests. 405 S.W.3d at 711-14. The court of appeals held that the Family Code gives trial courts authority to order a parent to pay attorney’s fees for legal services benefit-ting the children — whether provided by the amicus attorney or the other parent— as additional child support in non-enforcement modification suits. Id. at 712. While acknowledging that other Texas courts of appeals have held that the Family Code does not expressly grant trial courts authority to assess attorney’s fees as additional child support when parties seek only modification of an order under Title 5 of the Family Code, the court reas ex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). II. Analysis In this issue of first 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and costs may not be awarded as child support when they are incurred in a suit to modify the parentchild relationship that does not involve the enforcement of a child support obligation (B) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (C) holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification (D) holding that attorneys fees incurred in a nonenforcement modification suit can be awarded as additional child support under the family code (E) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support
Output: (A)
of the second hearing, the child’s guardian ad litem asked the court to clarify whether that proceeding was an action under the dependency statute. The trial court responded by saying, “I looked back through the file. There is nothing that does indicate that this is a dependency case.” In its June 7, 2001, judgment, the trial court did not make a finding that the child was dependent, and the language of that judgment indicates that the trial court determined that this action was not governed by § 12-15-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. After carefully reviewing the evidence in the record on appeal, we agree with the trial court that this case is a custody dispute and that it did not fall within the scope of the dependency statute. See S.T.S. v. C.T., 746 So.2d 1017, 1020 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). The mother correctly contends that because 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the facts of that case the action primarily involved a custody dispute and therefore that the trial court erred in determining the case by applying the dependency statute (B) holding that for all intents and purposes the instant case is the same action that was brought previously we therefore find the application of the doctrine of the law of the case to be appropriate (C) holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute (D) holding that reinstatement in an age discrimination case lies within the discretion of the trial court after careful consideration of the particular facts of the case (E) holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue
Output: (A)
discovery. NYC admits that it did not provide its Initial Disclosures before the discovery deadline, however, NYC argues that: (1) it was awaiting information for use in its Initial Disclosures and alerted Empire to this fact; (2) the late disclosure was not in bad faith; and (3) regardless, the late disclosure contained information already provided in discovery, so no prejudice to Empire resulted. NYC denies that it did not produce a witness or that it did not provide additional documentation. Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to impose various sanctions when a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2); see also Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd. v. Saudi Chattering S.A., 112 F.R.D. 185, 189 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>). It is clear that sanctions may be imposed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing power of bankruptcy court under  105 of the code and bankruptcy rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay (B) recognizing power of bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on parties and counsel who willfully abuse the judicial process but not finding sanctions appropriate against debtor and his attorney for their repeated bankruptcy filings (C) recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal (D) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that under rule 37b  sanctions are appropriatefor defendants proven dishonesty and repeated violations of three court orders
Output: (E)
and voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant to Rule 11. Nesbitt was properly advised as to his rights, the offense charged, and the maximum sentence for the offense. The court also determined that there was an independent factual basis for the plea and that the plea was not coerced or influenced by any promises. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); United States v. De-Fusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir.1991). We find that the district court properly computed Nesbitt’s offense level and criminal history category and correctly determined the applicable guideline range of one hundred twenty to one hundred thirty-five months. Nesbitt’s sentence was within this range. See United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1151 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As required by Anders, we have reviewed the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guideline range is usually reasonable (B) holding that imposition of a sentence within the properly calculated range is not reviewable (C) holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (D) holding that a sentence within the properly calculated guideline range is presumptively reasonable (E) holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable
Output: (B)
Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 61 (“in this type of case the occurrence takes place when the injuries first manifest themselves”); see also Consulting Engineers, 710 A.2d 82 (applying the first manifestation rule as articulated in D'Auria); Keystone Automated Equipment Co., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 369 Pa.Super. 472, 535 A.2d 648 (1988) (same); Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156 (same); Fletcher v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 27 A.3d 299 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (same). The cases Appellants rely on where the first manifestation of injury coincides with the identification of the cause of injury are distinguishable, as the correlation in these cases between manifestation of injury and identification of its cause is merely incidental. See D'Auria, 352 Pa.Super. 231, 507 A.2d 857 (<HOLDING>); Consulting Engineers, 710 A.2d 82 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cause of action accrued no later than date plaintiffs physician advised her to switch from vinyl to latex gloves even though physician did not then discuss latex allergy with her (B) holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physicians failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that the effects of injury caused by a doctors failure to diagnose manifested no later than the date renal failure was discovered by an alternative physician (D) holding that the patientphysician privilege does not prevent testimony by a physician as to the fact that he was consulted by a patient on a certain date (E) recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician
Output: (C)
class’s claims, its interests are not antagonistic to the class, and its chosen counsel are qualified and competent. The Court also notes that the members of the aptly-named Pension Fund Group are public institutional investors, which comports with the PSLRA’s expressed preference for such lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA’s legislative history explains as follows: “[t]he pension funds accounting for $4.5 trillion or nearly half of the institutional assets, in many cases the beneficiaries of pension funds — small investors — have the greatest stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730-34; see also In re Vicuron Pharm. Sec. Litig., NO. CIV. A.04-2627, 225 F.R.D. 508, 511, 2004 WL 2983940, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.7, 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public (B) holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination (C) holding that one candidates status as a pension fund tipped the scales in favor of its appointment as lead plaintiff (D) holding that an employees protected interest in a pension vested before he or she became eligible to collect the pension (E) holding that the employers insidious pattern of seeking to tip the scales in its favor during employment disputes justified a decision to declare the entire agreement unenforceable
Output: (C)
that no single act is the sole subject of the allegation. Smith v. Kmart Corp., No. CS 95-248, 1996 WL 780490, * 7 (E.D.Wash. Dec. 18, 1996). Rather, it is the continuation of the hostile working environment and the resulting constructive discharge that constitute violations of the ADA See id. A hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2693, 129 L.Ed.2d 824 (1994); Meritor Sav. Bank. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-05, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); see Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F.Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F.Supp. 1092 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive (B) recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context (C) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (D) recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims (E) holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute
Output: (B)
and then pass along all overhead costs to consumers, is too tenuous a connection to constitute a “resale” of the computer services themselves. Second, NHC’s business serves the “everyday needs” of the community. The Court recognizes some of NHC’s business is directed at providing specialized training to IT professionals on complex computer systems. Much of NHC’s business, however, is aimed at teaching consumers how to use basic computer programs in their daily professional and personal pursuits. Moreover, regardless of the level of complexity of the training, in today’s world, any type of computer training serves the everyday needs of the community. See Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 801 (9th Cir.2001) (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Carl W. Battle, Smart Maneuvers: 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (B) holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer (C) holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation (D) recognizing that no one can realis tically expect to be successful in our world of megainformation without being able to use a computer (E) holding that a roommate with shared access to anothers computer has common authority over the computer and can grant consent to search
Output: (D)
warnings about the dangers of working with those materials; failed to provide El-sey with appropriate safety equipment, such as a breathing apparatus, to prevent the inhalation of carcinogens; and failed to take other appropriate safety precautions. These allegations are directed to an employer’s duty to use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace, not a duty arising from the special knowledge, education, and training of a licensed professional engineer. See Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794; see also Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993) (“The standard of conduct required of the employer is ordinary care based on general negligence principles.”); Kroger Co. v. Milanes, 474 S.W.3d 321, 335 (Tex.A 2013 WL 6795390, at *5 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); with UOP, L.L.C. v. Kozak, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that elevator rider who asserted premisesliability claims against professional engineering firm that provided management services to premises owner was not required to provide certificate of merit because claims as alleged did not clearly arise out of the provision of professional engineering services (B) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (C) holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment (D) holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights (E) holding that homebuyers claims against professional engineering firm acting as thirdparty inspector did not did not implicate the practice of engineering
Output: (E)
sentencing. Either way, the profits were properly a part of the bankruptcy estate which were concealed from the Bankruptcy Court each time Brennan filed a monthly report to the Bankruptcy Court from August 1995 until June of 1997, when the total amount concealed from the bankruptcy trustee stood at $22 million. Because the concealment for which Brennan was formally indicted was still ongoing in 1997, and the original concealment ) requires that “where a defendant alleges any factual inaccuracy in the presentence report, the Court must make: (1) a finding as to the allegation, or (2) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing”); see also United States v. Parrott, 148 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). While both Bond and David Donnelly, Val-met’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that former fedrcrimp 32c prohibits a court faced with a disputed fact in the sentencing report from adopting it without making a factual finding of its own (B) holding that sentencing court satisfies rule 32c where it adequately states and explains the disputed issue in the case (C) holding that by adopting the presentence report the district court made the requisite finding under the guidelines (D) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (E) holding that by blindly adopting the magistrate judges findings apparently without ever having received a report and recommendation the district court violated  636b1
Output: (A)
“must make findings adequate to support the closure,” Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210; accord Gibbons, 555 F.3d at 116; Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc). In other words, if a court intends to exclude the public from a criminal proceeding, it must first analyze the Waller factors and make specific findings with regard to those factors. If a trial court fails to adhere to this procedure, any intentional closure is unjustified and will, in all but the rarest of cases, require reversal. E.g., Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 725. Here, despite not making any Waller findings, the district court intentionally excluded the public from the courtroom for the entirety of voir dire. On these facts alone, the closure was unjustified. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, even if we accept Delaney’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (B) holding the trial court must make findings adequate to support a closure (C) holding that trial court must make findings of fact on all material factual issues that involve ultimate issues in divorce and must make findings that characterize and value each asset or liability on which disputed evidence was presented (D) holding that carter mandates that where the trial court failed to make the requisite casespecific findings of fact closure of the courtroom violated the defendants right to a public trial (E) holding that the fourth waller factor was satisfied despite the lack of specific findings of fact where the information gleaned from the record was  sufficient to support the partial temporary closure of petitioners trial
Output: (B)
of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm. The district court properly granted defendants judgment as a matter of law because the police officers could have reasonably believed that their conduct in detaining Annan-Yartey was lawful where they had probable cause to believe that Annan-Yartey broke the law. See Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1026 (9th Cir.1996). Similarly, the district court did not err in finding that Annan-Yartey’s detention for almost one hour was reasonable given the fact that the police had to issue two citations to Annan-Yartey, Annan-Yartey’s own actions delayed the investigation, and the police had to verify the bicycle’s serial number with a dispatcher. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Annan-Yartey’s remaining contentions lack 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that determination of whether a detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop must take into consideration whether the police diligently pursued their investigation during the time it was necessary to detain defendant (B) recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest (C) holding that an officers diligent pursuit of an investigation during the detention is a factor in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop (D) holding investigative detention occurred when officer after initial inquiry exited vehicle and approached defendant because officer chose to escalate the encounter to afford greater investigation which of course is consistent with the purpose of an investigative detention (E) holding that police may briefly detain individuals for further investigation during a traffic stop as long as they can establish the reasonableness of the detention
Output: (A)