niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Judge. James Carter appeals a non-final order finding him in contempt of court for failing to pay temporary child support and temporary alimony. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Tina Carter filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against James Carter. After a hearing, James was ordered to pay weekly te the opportunity to include a purge provision in the contempt order. James Carter was sentenced to serve 30 days in the county jail, but the order does not permit him to purge himself anytime after incarceration. See Thurman v. Thurman, 637 So.2d 64, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citing State ex rel. Coody v. Muszynski, 402 So.2d 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (<HOLDING>)). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contempt finding may be averted if the alleged contemnor establishes 1 (B) holding that a civil contemnor must be permitted to be purged by complying with the disobeyed order (C) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review (D) holding that because civil contempt is only to obtain compliance it must be used only where the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the court order and the trial court specifically finds that the contemnor has that ability (E) holding that the district court committed reversible error by imposing criminal sanctions in a civil proceeding which did not afford the contemnor the procedural protections the constitution requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions
Output: (B)
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce
Output: (E)
2d 266, ¶ 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
Output: (E)
it fails because the procedures employed with respect to the photo array were not unduly suggestive. Tyni-cia Teague had seen Muller several times in the past and identified him as the truck’s driver from a six-photo array during an interview with police at a restaurant on May 13, 2012. As Defendants’ expert in the field of cognitive psychology, memory, and eyewitness identification testified at trial, the photo array contained "five additional photographs that were similar in appearance to Mr. Muller. And that’s the proper procedure for conducting an identification.” App. 2272. These procedures were not unduly suggestive, and the District Court did not err in admitting Tynicia Teague’s identification of Muller. See, e.g., United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Muller also argues that he should be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the photo lineup was not unduly suggestive where the defendants photo was the only one that included his name (B) holding that a photo array in which all of the men in the array were of similar age there was no striking difference in the amount of head hair each had and the skin color of the members of the array was not strikingly different was not impermissibly suggestive (C) holding in a very similar underagesex case that a school photo of the victim taken three months after the alleged crime plainly was relevant to the defendants mistakenage defense and did not prejudice the defendant because he was free to challenge the weight of the photo evidence by arguing that it did not show the victim as she had appeared on the night in question (D) holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction (E) holding that section 33021b was overbroad because it prohibited a wide array of constitutionally protected speech and was not drawn narrowly enough to achieve only the legitimate objective of protecting children from sexual abuse
Output: (B)
mechanism by which a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent may file a “postadjudication” petition challenging counsel’s effectiveness. Rule 1(a), Ala. R. Juv. P., explains, in relevant part: “If no procedure is specifically provided in these Rules [of Juvenile Procedure] or by statute, ... the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be applicable to those matters that are considered criminal in nature.” (Emphasis added,) Because no procedural mechanism for “postadjudication” petitions are specifically provided for in either the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure or a statute, W.B.S. attempts to seek relief through the use of Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P. Because juvenile-delinquency proceedings are “quasi-criminal in nature,” see Driskill v. State, 376 So.2d 678, 679 (Ala. 1979) (<HOLDING>), and because Rule 1(a), Ala. R. Juv. P., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings (B) holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law (C) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings (D) holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings and noting the rules incompatibility with the streamlined administrative nature of such proceedings (E) recognizing the quasicriminal nature of delinquency proceedings
Output: (E)
to its policy holders. For example, the company’s purpose can be readily revealed to the policyholder by the addition of a single line or sentence to the declarations page or by defining the term “driver name.” Thus, this court concludes that the arguments of the defendant are unavailing and that although our holding in this case comports with that of the minority of jurisdictions, we are of the opinion that it represents the better public policy. “And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy’s boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured.” Id. at 347, 638 A.2d at 892; see also Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 327, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, therefore, we affirm the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant (B) holding that an ordinary reader in the face of such detail would be warranted in concluding that any significant limitation on collision insurance would have been explicitly noted (C) holding that the patentees argument that any shape would be equivalent to the conical limitation would write such a limitation out of the claim (D) holding that it is most improbable that a significant change to bankruptcy procedure would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history (E) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible
Output: (B)
care ... to reasonably assure itself that its immediate vendee and distributor was so informed as to be able and likely to transmit ... knowledge of [the product’s] dangers.”); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that “[t]he sophisticated intermediary doctrine protects a manufacturer from liability only if the chain of distribution is such that the duty to warn ultimate users should fall on an intermediary in that chain, rather than on the manufacturer”); Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741 (3rd Cir. 1990) (weighing totality of factors is required to determine reasonableness of reliance on a third party as a conduit of necessary product information); Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based (B) holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication (C) holding that there is no necessity to warn a consumer already aware through common knowledge or learning of a specific hazard (D) holding that the staffing agency which forwarded a background check conducted by another entity to the ultimate employer was liable under  1681bb3 because its decision to furnish the report to the ultimate employer was an adverse action (E) holding that a suppliers duty to warn an ultimate consumer can be discharged by a warning given to an intermediary but focus is on whether the intermediarys knowledge was sufficient to protect the ultimate consumer
Output: (E)
Rehabilitation Act, the Second and Eighth Circuits have come to different conclusions. In Faconti v. Potter, the Second Circuit favorably notes the district court’s determination that claims under the CSRS and the Rehabilitation Act cannot functionally co-exist because of their inherent inconsistency. Faconti v. Potter, 242 Fed.Appx. 775, 776 (2d Cir.2007) (precluding a Rehabilitation Act claim after obtaining CSRS benefits because “the requirements for obtaining a [CSRS] disability retirement annuity are wholly inconsistent with the requirements for proving a claim of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act” (quoting Faconti v. Potter, No. 01-cv-1034, slip op. at 17 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2002))); see also Wallace v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 108 F.Supp.2d 716, 719 (S.D.Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). But, in Arneson v. Heckler, the Eight Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (B) holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act (C) holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits (D) holding disability discrimination claim barred (E) recognizing that a claim of disability retirement under the csrs precludes a rehabilitation act claim because plaintiffs applying for disability retirement under the csrs must be unable to work even with an accommodation
Output: (E)
at 321. We explained that “the pertinent inquiry is not whether the actual harm was of a particular kind which was expectable” but, “[r]ather, the question is whether the actual harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been anticipated.” Id. ¶54 Other lower courts have correctly observed that while prior similar acts are among the best evidence available to demonstrate that a business owner is on notice of a risk of harm to invitees, they are not the only relevant evidence. See, e.g., Passovoy, 52 Wn. App. at 172-73 (recognizing a business may be on notice that a shoplifter confronted by store detectives could cause harm to invitees, though no such harm had occurred on the premises in the past); Griffin v. W. RS, Inc., 97 Wn. App. 557, 567-70, 984 P.2d 1070 (1999) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 143 Wn.2d 81, 18 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient to support conviction for possession when none of the defendants had any proprietary interest nor previous association with the premises and there was no evidence of how long the defendants had been on the premises prior to the arrival of the police (B) holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant (C) holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there (D) holding business may be on notice of harm posed by intruder against invitee even when no intruder had been identified and there had been no prior acts on the premises (E) holding evidence insufficient to support conviction when none of the defendants had any proprietary interest nor previous association with the premises and there was no evidence of how long the defendants had been on the premises prior to the arrival of the police
Output: (D)
than December 18, 2000. Because notice was received by December 18, 2000, any jury damages for breach of contract after the expiration of the thirty-day notice period on January 17, 2001 are not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The portion of the jury damages award relating to the period from January 18 until January 31, 2001 should, therefore, be vacated. Finally, Rollins claims that the jury damage awards are unsupported by legally sufficient evidence. State substantive law governs the measure of damages in this breach of contract diversity case. Kona Tech. Corp. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595, 601-02 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). Neither party di 7, 329 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1972, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The burden is on the plaintiff to provide 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract (B) holding that a construction contractor is entitled to recover profits upon breach of a partially performed contract but not the same amount as if the contract were completed because that amount must be reduced by the cost of completion (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) holding that one method of computing damages for a breach of contract is the contract price less the reasonable cost of completion (E) holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach
Output: (D)
vehicle for accomplishing this goal a sedimentation control statute. Rather, the clear intent and purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-57(1) is to control sedimentation pollution in the waters of this State, and particularly in trout streams. Further, the issue of whether N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-57(1) prevented activities “on, over, or under” a trout stream was abandoned by petitioners before the trial court. This ruling by the trial court was not assigned as error to this Court, and is thus not before this Court. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) (“[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal . . . .”); Atlantic Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty & Miller ofN.C., Inc., 175 N.C. App. 339, 346, 623 S.E.2d 334, 340 (2006) (<HOLDING>). The second assumption made by the majority is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the appellant did not present a question before a hearing examiner or district council the question was not properly before this court (B) holding that the putative noteholder lacked standing to foreclose because mers lacked authority to assign the note though it arguably had authority to assign the mortgage (C) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (D) holding that because plaintiff failed to assign error to the dismissal of one its claims that issue was not properly before this court (E) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court
Output: (D)
it necessary to inquire into the reasonableness of two delays: first, the delay between the seizure and the mailing of the notice informing claimants of their right to request a hearing and of the NOAA’s intent to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings; and second, the overall delay between seizure and the actual filing of forfeiture actions by the U.S. Attorney. Whether the time lapse between seizure and filing of forfeiture actions rises to the level of due process violation must be determined by weighing four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of right to a judicial hearing, and prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850), 461 U.S. 555, 565, 103 S.Ct. 2005, 2012, 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Plaintiffs have not made 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that revival by statute of an action which was already timebarred did not violate due process (B) holding that evidence obtained from valid search warrant did not violate constitutional due process provisions (C) holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process (D) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (E) holding that a filing deadline under federal land policy and management act carrying a penalty of an automatic forfeiture of a mining claim did not violate due process
Output: (C)
Brief for Petitioner in No ord’s altered circumstances are immaterial to our resolution of this dispute, and we do not decide any questions that would arise if he were the only defendant. 10 Our analysis of the proper disposition of this case follows from our conclusion that government officials who secure a favorable judgment on immunity grounds may obtain our review of an adverse constitutional holding. See supra, at 708. As just noted, Munsingwear justified vacatur to protect a litigant who had the right to appeal but lost that opportunity due to happenstance. 340 U. S., at 39, 41. We have therefore left lower court decisions intact when mootness did not deprive the appealing party of any review to which he was entitled. See, e. g., U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U. S., at 25 (<HOLDING>); Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 83 (1987) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appealing party had sur rendered his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur by settling the case and thus voluntarily forfeiting his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal (B) holding that the appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal for his discovery violation allegations (C) holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs (D) recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy (E) holding that the illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax or imposition is not of itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the united states in such a case the aggrieved party is left to his remedy at law when that remedy is as complete practicable and efficient as the remedy in equity
Output: (A)
the Bond offering because they underwrote the transaction and sold the Bonds to investors, either directly or through their brokers. Indeed, given the role of underwriters generally, Baird, Jones, and Stern “had a duty to make an to speak, they knew investors might rely on the statements made. The law firms’ duty, however, must also be considered in light of the services they were retained to perform. Because Kutak and Stinson were not hired to opine on the feasibility of the Event Center, they cannot have been held to a duty to investigate or determine whether the financial projections were realistic unless these firms otherwise became involved in the making, preparing, or drafting of those projections. See N.Y. City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 616 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (N.D.Cal.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, to the extent the law firms 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (B) holding that substantial participation requires particular facts relating to each djefendants specific role in the preparation of each of the allegedly misleading statements (C) recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case (D) holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case
Output: (B)
requires that the convict must have been sentenced to separate terms of at least one year for each of his two prior felonies. Id. However, Section 99-19-83 provides that any person convicted of a felony that has two previous felony convictions, one of those being a conviction of a violent crime, that person will be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or probation. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev.2000) (emphasis added). ¶ 12. This issue has been examined before. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that “[i]t [is] not necessary for the State to specify in the indictment which section of the habitual criminal statute they were proceeding under.” Ellis v. State, 469 So.2d 1256, 1258 (Miss.1985) (citing Osborne v. State, 404 So.2d 545, 548 (Miss.1981)) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 13. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the two statutes are nearly identical (B) holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical (C) holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing (D) holding that claims under  1983 1985 and 1986 are barred for the further reason that these statutes create rights solely against persons and a state is not considered a person under these statutes (E) holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction
Output: (C)
in lost revenue 150, 154 (D.D.C.2007) (finding defendant’s claim that “the total cost ‘is certain’ to exceed $75,000” insufficient to establish jurisdiction). Here, Monster merely asserts that complying with the injunction would cause it to “suffer a decrease in revenue in an amount greater than $75,000.” See Def.’s Opp’n at 14. It argues that “[t]his conclusion follows logically from the fact that [defendant] sold more than $2,000,000 of Monster Energy products in the District of Columbia” in the three years before the complaint was filed. See id. As an initial matter, and as Zuckman points out, courts have held that it is improper to consider a decrease in future revenue as a cost of complying with an injunction. See, e.g., Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). As a result, Monster’s contention that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the event it is not faeiaby apparent from the underlying complaint that the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied the court may rely on summary judgmenttype evidence to ascertain the amount in controversy (B) holding that a court may deny a request for injunctive relief in a summary judgment proceeding if it is clear the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for an injunction (C) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (D) holding minimum amount in controversy required for district court jurisdiction is 20001 (E) holding that injunctive relief does not meet the amount in controversy when the only reason the injunction is worth more than the jurisdictional minimum is that it would affect defendants future sales
Output: (E)
S.W.3d at 595; Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). However, it is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. The critical determination is “whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event” at the time of the statement. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. Stated differently, a reviewing court must determine whether the statement was made “under such circumstances as would reasonably show that it resulted from impulse rather than reason a -Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also Reyes v. State, 48 S.W.3d 917, 920 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements made while the declarant was in pain crying bleeding and having trouble breathing were properly admissible as excited utterances (B) holding that the statements of a scared to death declarant whispering help me to police officers twenty hours after being assaulted were excited utterances (C) holding statements qualified as excited utterances where declarant was scared and tired and her statements were in response to questions twenty hours after the event (D) holding that the statements of a recently assaulted very upset and crying assault victim were excited utterances (E) holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion
Output: (D)
fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party
Output: (E)
conviction constitutes a violent felony. See United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc). The instructions underlying Wardrick’s 1983 assault conviction support the proposition that the district court did not err in characterizing that conviction as a violent felony. In Maryland, a common-law assault “presents the unusual situation in which an offense may be committed in one of two ways — one of which requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force and one of which does not.” Coleman, 158 F.3d at 202. Because of this ambiguity, we have been “unable to conclude that a Maryland conviction for common-law assault is per se a violent felony within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).” Id. However, the jury instructions in Wardrick’ th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the district court accurately 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in and that escape is not a continuing offense (B) holding felony escape in north carolina to be crime of violence under acca because escape presents risk of injury to others (C) holding that an escape from custody under minnesota law is a crime of violence (D) holding attempt to rescue prisoner and assisting in escape to be crimes of violence because of inherent risk of force (E) holding that in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody we hold that for purposes of  2k21b5 every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being in connection with the escape
Output: (D)
Leak should not have been admitted, because, they say, 1) its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and 2) it was inadmissible under the general exclusionary rule. However, Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County did not object before the trial court based on these grounds. Because Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County failed to state these grounds for their objection, the alleged error was not preserved for appeal. Rule 103, Ala. R. Evid. The trial record shows that Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County based their objection to the testimony on a relevancy argument. They do not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was relevant. Therefore, they have not presented any basis for appellate review on this issue. See Landreth v. State, 600 So.2d 440 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (C) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (D) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (E) holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal
Output: (D)
presumption as he would before the Office of Unemployment Compensation. Raphael v. Okyiri, 740 A.2d 935, 945-46 (D.C.1999); see Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 675 (D.C.1984) (“Not every act for which an employee may be dismissed from work will provide a basis for disqualification from unemployment compensation benefits because of misconduct.”). Moreover, in terms of incentives, while an employer faces merely a potential increase in its contribution to the unemployment compensation fund before the Office of Unemployment Compensation, see Morris, supra, 975 A.2d at 182 n. 5, an employer faces a potential reinstatement and back pay order before the OEA should the employee prevail. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 & n. 25 (D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). These differences weigh heavily against 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the court has construed broadly the grant of jurisdiction in section 201 (B) recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power (C) recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions (D) recognizing the oeas power to grant relief very broadly including the power to order reinstatement and back pay (E) holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements
Output: (D)
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the “unified judicial system,” is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) (“All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state rather than local agencies.”). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state
Output: (E)
action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems arising from such improper comments....”) (citations omitted). Considering Alcantara’s significant credibility problems, the evidence presented at trial of his illegal presences in the United States, and. the curative instruction given by the trial judge, Alcantara failed to demonstrate that “in the context of the entire trial, it is more probable than not that [the prosecutor’s comment] materially affected the verdict....” Dorsey, 677 F.3d at 954 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated another way, any error in vouching for the witnesses was harmless. See id. at 955. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the requested curative instruction. See Skinner, 667 F.2d at 1310 (<HOLDING>). Our decision in United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts use of limiting instructions and other measures defused any risk of prejudice (B) holding that the district courts curative instructions cured the governments truly improper and unfortunate comments (C) holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions (D) recognizing that use of curative or limiting instructions is within the district courts discretion (E) holding that this court is required to assume that the jury followed the limiting instructions given by the district court
Output: (D)
to find that the arbitrator did not willfully flout known, governing law in reading School of Rock I to hold that California law does not apply to the restrictive covenant. Local 863, 773 F.2d at 533. Here, the arbitrator plainly did not willfully flout known, governing law, because, as the District Court observed, section 16600 is not part of the CFIL. Alternatively, Smith argues that the restrictive covenant is invalid under Pennsylvania law. The District Court concluded that the non-compete provision is valid under Pennsylvania law. School of Rock II, 2009 WL 426175, at *3 (citing Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 465 Pa. 500, 351 A.2d 207 (1976)). Piercing Pagoda upheld a restrictive covenant in the context of a franchisee/franchisor relationship. Piercing Pagoda, 351 A.2d at 211 (<HOLDING>). As previously noted, the District Court need 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable (B) holding that a restrictive covenant will be upheld where a franchisor has a protectable interest in the sale of his franchise (C) holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created (D) holding that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are enforceable to protect the basic product which the franchisor has to sell namely the franchise itself   (E) holding that franchisor not only has valid interest in protecting good will it has developed but it also has an interest in being able to place a new franchisee at or near the same location where its goodwill has been created
Output: (B)
whose last names begin with the letter "S” than to make the decision fully retroactive. The majority obviously would not countenance the latter course, but its failure to identify any truly relevant distinction between cases on direct appeal and cases raising collateral challenges makes the rule it announces equally indefensible. Shea v. Louisiana, supra, 470 U.S. [51] at 64 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. [1065] at 1072, n. 1 [84 L.Ed.2d 38] (White, J., dissenting). Griffith, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 719 n. 2 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The logic of Justice White is applicable here, for the majority "fail[s] to identify any truly relevant distinction between [this case] and cases raising collateral challenges...." Id.; cf. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review (B) holding booker is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review (C) holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review (D) holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review (E) holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review
Output: (E)
Fam.Code Ann. § 107.013. 58 . See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); 519 U.S. at 128, 117 S.Ct. at 570. This statutory right may not be taken away without due process of law. Cf. Steny v. State, 959 S.W.2d 249, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (recognizing that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have jury assess punishment, but does, however, have a statutory right to have the jury assess punishment and that this valuable statutory right may not be taken away without due process of law). 59 . See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 1400. 60 . Compare Rylander v. State, 75 S.W.3d 119, 125 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. granted) with Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 4 an Antonio 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Turner v. Lutz, 654 S.W.2d 57, 59-60 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts failure to appoint parent an attorney ad litem in termination proceeding was reversible error (B) holding that a statute that provided that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem left the court with discretion to make an appointment (C) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (D) holding denial of a petition to vacate a termination order was reversible error (E) holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5
Output: (A)
2-401); McCarthy v. Imported Cars of Md., Inc. (In re Johnson), 230 B.R. 466, 468 (Bankr.D.D.C.1999) (“The passage of title cannot ... be delayed until after shipment or delivery of the goods to the buyer. After shipment or delivery, any retention of title by the seller results only in the reservation of a security interest.”); Associated Indus. v. Keystone Gen., Inc., 135 B.R. 275, 279 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1991) (“While the Uniform Commercial Code does permit the parties some power by allowing the parties to agree as to when title will transfer, the Code and the case-law place a limitation on this power. In short, if the seller attempts to retain title after delivery or until paid in full, all the seller gets is a security interest.”); In re Phillips, 77 B.R. 648, 650 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1987) (<HOLDING>); Seitz v. Stecklein, 111 Idaho 364, 723 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the retention of title pursuant to a repurchase agreement limits the seller to the reservation of a security interest under ucc  2401 (B) holding that after delivery under a sale agreement even if the parties intended that title would not pass until the other documents were completed and signed   retention of title would only have given the creditor a security interest (C) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received (D) holding that even if an agreement that title would pass once financing was obtained the most a creditor could claim was a security interest once the good was delivered (E) holding that the junior mortgagee had no right title or interest in the real estate after the sale was confirmed in the purchaser who became title owner
Output: (B)
466, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985)). 3 . United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir.2009). 4 . United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir.2005). 5 . See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 6 . United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1203-04 (10th Cir.2004) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). 7 . Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657. 8 . See United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir.2008) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). 9 . See United States v. Gentry, 406 Fed.Appx. 274, 279 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See United States v. Herrera, 782 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a defendant is not entitled to a franks hearing without making a substantial preliminary showing that defect in the affidavit is material (B) holding that speculation as to whether and when the police had actually field tested a bag reported to contain heroin falls far short of the substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless omission required by the franks test (C) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (D) holding that the defendant would have been entitled to a franks hearing had he shown that officers withheld negative information casting into doubt the dogs reliability (E) holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect
Output: (A)
its own reasons, we review both decisions.” Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2000). Petitioners’ primary contention is that the IJ deprived them of due process by prejudging the case and preventing them from fully developing the record. Petitioners, however, did not raise a due process argument before the BIA. Because the due process claims made here are in the nature of procedural errors that the BIA could have remedied, they are subject to the exhaustion requirement. Because these claims were not exhausted before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review them. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004). On this record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, see Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and that petitioners did not suffer past 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial evidence supports an adverse credibility finding if it is supported by specific cogent reasons (B) holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence (C) holding an ijs credibility findings are entitled to deference if supported by specific cogent reasons (D) holding that explicit credibility finding must be more than passing remark of disbelief and must be supported by specific cogent reasons (E) holding that an ijs credibility determinations enjoy highly deferential review when supported by specific cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the findings
Output: (A)