niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
transfer is “made” at the time of perfection. See id. All of this raises the question of when a transfer “takes effect” — a question that the statute does not answer. The bankruptcy court assumed, as we have said, that the mortgage transfer took effect on June 30, 2000, when Mr. Lowe signed the mortgage papers and delivered them to the bank. This, we believe, was error. Under Regulation Z, Lowe had an absolute right to cancel the transaction— and to rescind the mortgage — before midnight of July 5, 2000. Accordingly, the bank did not disburse any of the proceeds of the loan until July 6, 2000. For both of these reasons, it seems to us, the mortgage was unenforceable before July 6 and the mortgage transfer took effect on that date. See In re Pitman, 843 F.2d 235, 2Á0-41 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Having determined when the mortgage transfer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage (B) holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa (C) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (D) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (E) holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity
Output: (C)
underlying claim arises. The Diehls argue that this exclusion does not apply for a number of reasons. First, the Diehls claim that the loans made to Hanft were a debt to be repaid, not a profit, and that Hanft did not profit because he was attempting to repay the loans, which were not due in full until a year after his death. The Diehls’ argument is belied by their own allegations in the underlying complaint that Hanft “never intended to repay” the loans. (TAC ¶ 41.) Further, the underlying complaint states that, over seven years, Hanft made only a single payment of $10,000 toward the almost $800,000 owed to the Diehls. (TAC ¶¶ 17-18.) The allegations of the underlying complaint show that Hanft took money for personal use with no i 5, 2005 WL 1220746 at *12 (Ohio Ct.App. May 24, 2005) (<HOLDING>); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (B) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (C) holding that the fact that an investigatory stop took place in a high crime area is pertinent to a terry analysis (D) holding it is a question of fact (E) holding exclusion inapplicable because there remains a question of whether any conversion in fact took place
Output: (E)
been prejudicial, and must have “affected the outcome of the [trial] court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993). III. ANALYSIS A. Denial of Mistrial Turbe argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mi resulted in sufficient prejudice to warrant a mistrial, we evaluate: (1) the scope of the comments within the context of the whole trial; (2) the effect of any curative instructions given; and (3) the weight of the evidence against the defendant. See United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2003). Curative instructions, which the jury is presumed to follow, are generally sufficient to overcome improper statements. See United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 329-31 (3d Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, the prosecutor asked two improper 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions (B) holding that the district courts decision to delay jury instructions and deliberations did not warrant a presumption of prejudice (C) holding that when an objection is overruled failing to request curative instructions or a mistrial does not result in waiver (D) recognizing that use of curative or limiting instructions is within the district courts discretion (E) holding that a thirtyminute delay in providing curative instructions to a jury for improper conduct did not result in prejudice against the defendant
Output: (E)
Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed.Cir.1993), aff'd sub nom Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994), the Court emphasized that the plain meaning of a statute “must be given effect unless a ‘literal application of [it] will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters.’ ” Gardner v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 584, 586-87 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)). Only where a statute’s plain meaning leads to such an absurd result that Congress clearly never could have intended it is this “plain meaning rule” abandoned for a review of the applicable legislative history and statutory construction. Id. at 587-88. See also Thayer v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 204, 210 (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In Mintz v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 277 (1994), the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when interpreting statute court must avoid a conclusion that  is not supported when construing every part or section of the statute and would yield an absurd result (B) recognizing the legal concept that when interpreting a statute it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result (C) recognizing that the cardinal rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature and to avoid construing a statute in a manner that produces an absurd unjust or unreasonable result (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result
Output: (A)
In Claim 23, Andela cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, but does not make any allegations whatsoever other than to incorporate all of his prior allegations. Id. ¶ 186. In his Response (dkt. # 24), Andela does not dispute UM’s characterization that his Claim 23 is for discrimination and retaliation. Andela simply argues that res judicata and collateral estoppel should not apply because the ALJ and state court affirmance should be considered void. Under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). UM is a private university. “Only in rare circumstances can a private party be viewed as a [s]tate actor for section 1983 purposes.” Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, when § 1983 is used as a parallel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (B) holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage (C) holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant (D) holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff (E) holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983
Output: (A)
that the proportionality review in this case would not save the death penalty because reliance upon the allegedly unconstitutional aggravating circumstances was not cured on appeal. 4 . The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Cartwright’s sentence on January 7, 1985. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d at 548. Later that year Oklahoma modified its capital punishment statute to allow for resentencing in the event that a death penalty is set aside on appeal. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, § 701.13(E)(2) (West Supp.1986). The Oklahoma court has held that this provision is not to be applied retroactively. Green v. State, 713 P.2d 1032, 1041 n. 4 (Okla.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 241, 93 L.Ed.2d 165 (1986). But see Brewer v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 365-66 (Okla.Crim.App.), (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 245, 93 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (B) holding that the statute is mandatory (C) holding that a provision in the 1985 amend ments eliminating mandatory proportionality review is to be applied retroactively (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions
Output: (C)
a sanctions motion, as it was clearly injured by the fraud. Because neither Silverstein nor YCST were aggrieved by the sanctions imposed on JTR and Miscovich’s estate, neither may appeal the order granting them. See Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Only a litigant who is aggrieved by the judgment or order may appeal.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We also agree that the district court had more than sufficient basis to invoke the crime-fraud exception. There can be no serious dispute with the court’s finding of a “massive fraud of the court.” The district court was authorized to compel discovery which would reveal existence of the fraud as well as efforts to conceal it. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>); see also In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state and city tax evasion considered relevant conduct under conviction for federal tax evasion (B) holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination (C) holding crimefraud exception applied to testimony of attorney and accountant who prepared his clients tax returns during grand jury investigation for tax evasion (D) holding that agency could not claim confidentiality for tax returns that had been exhibits in tax court and were therefore public records (E) holding the conduct element satisfied where debtor earned income during the tax years at issue but did not make any estimated tax payments had inadequate or no withholdings and latefiled his tax returns
Output: (C)
language, petitioner urges us to entertain jurisdiction on two bases. First he argues that because he challenges the constitutionality of INA § 212(a)(2)(C), resolution of the constitutional claim is a necessary part of the jurisdictional inquiry. Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (when determination of the merits is necessary to determine jurisdiction, “the jurisdictional question and the merits collapse into one”). We have held that “the terms of [IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G) ] preclude direct appellate review of constitutional issues” and that “[a] literal reading of IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G), precluding direct review of constitutional claims, is consistent with one of the central purposes of IIRIRA.” Alfaro-Reyes v. INS, 224 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because the constitutionality of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because 28 usc  2241 habeas corpus relief is available to review constitutional claims congress preclusion of direct appeals in iirira see tion 309c4g does not offend the due process clause of the constitution (B) holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241 (C) recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions (D) holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction (E) holding that jurisdictionstripping provisions of iirira did not preclude aliens convicted of aggravated felonies from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to 28 usc  2241
Output: (A)
Center. v. National League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that Cedars-Sinai’s claims were not preempted because they were “predicated not on the [service benefits] plan” but on a separate contract between the carrier and the medical services provider). Plaintiffs claim that Plaintiff never received compensation for the emergency care of B.G. directly relates to the processing and administration of the enrollee’s covered claims which is governed by the Service Benefits Plan and the Contract between Blue Shield and OPM. Any obligation that Blue Shield could have to pay Plaintiff stems directly from the B.G.’s enrollment in the Service Benefit Plan and directly relates to the payment of B.G.’s benefits under the plan. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Botsford, 314 F.3d at 396 (“Because the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba (B) holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba (C) holding state law claims arising out of unions refusal to readmit union members preempted by  301 (D) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
Output: (A)
County policy. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Brooks amended his claim to allege that the County’s conduct “was part of a general policy of neglect that [the County] has followed when dealing with federal detainees jailed in County facilities.” Again the district court dismissed the claim, this time with prejudice, on the ground that the complaint did not allege a deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity. We need not decide whether the district court erred in declining to permit a further amendment, because the district court’s ruling was correct even if the complaint had been amended as proposed. See United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1999 WL 770907, at *7 n. 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). That is so because the alleged actions of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the record supported the district courts award of damages (B) holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record (C) holding that we may affirm on an alternative basis supported by the record (D) holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by record (E) holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record
Output: (E)
in what the fraud consists”). Like the Sykes’ claim for negligent misrepresentation, however, their claims for fraud are not based on any specific allegations of fact. Since these claims do not comply with the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), adding them would be futile. Fifth, the Sykes want to add a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Virginia, a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot succeed if a party does not “plead with specificity that [it] incurred a physical injury which was the natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by the defendant’s] alleged negligence.” Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 523 S.E.2d 826, 834 (2000); see Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214, 220 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Here, neither Lisa nor Seth Sykes have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (B) holding that a party claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot recover for emotional disturbance alone (C) recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (E) holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response
Output: (B)
Under section 22.011(c), a “child” is a person “younger than 17 years of age who is not the spouse of the actor.” Id. 22.011(c)(1). A “spouse” means a person who is legally married to another. Id. 22.011(c)(2). Legal marriage in Texas requires a marriage license or proof of an informal marriage. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 2.001(b), 2.401 (Vernon 2006). A marriage license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 2.001(b). An informal marriage is solely recognized between a man and a woman. Id. § 2.401. Here, because the State clearly showed that J.B. is a male and that appellant is male, the evidence is legally sufficient to prove that appellant was not married to J.B. See Jacques v. State, 579 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>); Henson v. State, 638 S.W.2d 504, 505 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (D) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (E) holding that appellants substantive rights were not prejudiced by omission in indictment that complainant was not the spouse of the defendant because it had been clearly shown that both appellant and complainant were male and that they could not have obtained marriage license nor entered into commonlaw marriage
Output: (E)
soundness of a business decision may be assessed by examining the qualifications of the persons with whom the director consulted, the general topics, not the substance, of the information sought or imparted, and whether the advice was followed. Id. Corporate officers are agents who owe duties to both the corporation and its shareholders. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 419, 421 (W.D.Va.1994) (“A Virginia corporation’s directors and officers owe a duty of loyalty both to the corporation and to the corporation’s shareholders.”) (citation omitted); Upton v. S. Produce Co., 147 Va. 937, 133 S.E. 576, 580 (1926) (stating that officers “owed the duty of frankness and fair dealing as fiduciaries to [stockholders]”); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). An officer has a specific duty to “tell his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under delaware law that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors (B) recognizing that insolvent corporations officers are directors and may have fiduciary duty to existing creditors not to dissipate corporate assets (C) holding that directors of whollyowned insolvent subsidiary owe fiduciary duties not only to subsidiarys creditors but also to subsid iary because duties owed to creditors are derivative of duties owed to subsidiary (D) recognizing privilege for corporate officers directors and shareholders to influence the actions of their corporation (E) holding that directors and officers are fiduciaries
Output: (A)
fair determination of guilt or innocence because the informant could testify regarding information about the house itself. Nevertheless, appellant does not provide supporting argument as to why information about the house itself would be necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence. We observe that in appellant’s motion for disclosure of the confidential informant, appellant argued that the informant can “testify that [appellant] had no ownership or control over the premises .... ” However, this allegation is nothing more than mere conjecture and speculation and, thus, is insufficient to merit an in camera hearing, much less require the trial court to order disclosure of the informant’s identity. See Patterson v. State, 138 S.W.3d 643, 648-49 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that appellant failed to meet his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee (B) holding that a violation of a defendants constitutional right to compulsory process requires at a minimum some plausible showing of how the excluded testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense (C) holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice (D) holding that defendants argument that the informant could have identified other occupants of residence who could have been responsible for the contraband was nothing more than mere conjecture or supposition unsupported by any evidence and thus defendant failed to make a plausible showing of how the informants testimony was important (E) holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop
Output: (D)
for postconviction relief actions. At the time Harrington filed the present action, this provision required that PCR applications “be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of proceden-do is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3. This statute was enacted in 1984, several years after Harrington’s conviction and appeal became final. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1193, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code section 663A.3 (1985)). In Brewer v. Iowa District Court, 395 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1986), we held “that all potential postconviction applicants whose convictions became final prior to July 1, 1984, must file their applications' for postconviction relief on or before June 30, 1987, or be barred from relief” 395 N.W.2d at 844 (<HOLDING>). Thus,- Harrington’s present action is time 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coram nobis was abolished by pcr statute (B) holding that postjudgment application for intervention was timely (C) holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect (D) holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time (E) holding harringtons first pcr application was timely filed
Output: (E)
the legislature’s authority to determine the sanctions to be imposed for contempt and a circuit court’s inherent constitutional power to determine the species of contempt it chooses to use to enforce its orders and vindicate its authority. We conclude, therefore, that the legislature’s authority to restrict the sanctions which courts may impose after a finding of contempt does not give it the concomitant authority to completely eliminate the power itself. See State ex rel. Franks v. Clark, 46 So.2d 488. We note that Florida is not alone in espousing this fundamental doctrine. Other states with constitutionally created courts also recognize this concept. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Or. 477, 495, 407 P.2d 250, 256 (Or.1965) (and cases and authorities cited) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 1460, 16 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of supreme court independent of statutory authority to punish for contempt of court (B) holding that it is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court (C) holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   (D) recognizing inherent power in the courts to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being impaired or destroyed (E) holding that the power of a constitutionally established court to punish for contempt may be regulated within reasonable bounds by the legislature but not to the extent that the courts power is substantially impaired or destroyed
Output: (E)
both SORNA was enacted, and the Interim Order was promulgated. As a result, this case is distinguishable from those cases in which Courts have found that the Ex Post Facto Clause was violated, which are limited to circumstances in which the offender failed to register after the passage of SORNA, but prior to the date of the Interim Order. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette, supra at 533 (finding that SORNA was ex post facto as to the defendant whose failure to register as a sex offender predated both the passage of SORNA, and the promulgation of the Interim Order); United States v. Aldrich, 2008 WL 427483 at *5 (D.Neb., February 14, 2008); United States v. Kent, 2008 WL 360624 at *10 (S.DAla., February 8, 2008); United States v. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462 at *5 (E.D.Mo., July 26, 2007)(<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we find that SORNA is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the attorney generals decision as to timeliness of an asylum request pursuant to 8 usc  1158a3 the attorney generals decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances such that the time limit should be waived is not reviewable by any court (B) holding that sorna is only unconstitutional when applied to those previouslyconvicted persons who traveled before the attorney generals rule (C) holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term (D) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (E) holding that sorna was made retroactive by the attorney generals february 28 2007 interim rule
Output: (B)
has the right to confront those who testify against him or her and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 998, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). When a juror communicates objective extrinsic facts regarding the defendant or the alleged crimes to other jurors, the juror becomes an unsworn witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir.1975); United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971). That the unsworn testimony comes from a juror rather than a court official does not diminish the scope of a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. See Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Jeffries III correctly determined that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a jurors communication about the defendants reputation for violence deprived the defendant of his rights to confrontation crossexamination and assistance of counsel embodied in the sixth amendment (B) holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel (C) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel (D) holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest (E) holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel
Output: (A)
71 (1984). Un der this elaboration, states have been shielded when engaged in activities such as purchasing, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-10, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976), selling commodities produced in a state-owned facility, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2271, 65 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980), and contracting for the construction of public buildings, White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06, 214-15, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983). Withal, this shield has relatively modest dimensions; for example, it does not extend to hybrid proprietary/regulatory activities that have downstream effects in a market in which the state is not a participant. See, e.g., S.-Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. at 84-85, 104 S.Ct. 2237 (<HOLDING>). It is uncertain whether the market 
 Holding statements: (A) holding invalid alaskas practice of selling stateowned timber with a contractual condition requiring purchasers partially to process the timber before shipping it out of state (B) holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state (C) holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice (D) holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole (E) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state
Output: (A)
had obtained sufficient financing. As such, we find that the financing contingency was not illusory. IV ¶ 34. Under the terms of the contract, GEA was required, among other things, to use its best efforts 1) to ensure GEA did not dispose of its assets to a third party; and 2) to obtain the assignments of GEA's limited partners. Metropolitan alleges that GEA breached its fiduciary duty, duty of good faith, and contractual obligations. Metropolitan also asserts that GEA intentionally interfered with the contractual relationship and intentionally, or at least negligently, made material misrepresentations to Metropolitan. A ¶ 35. Parties to a contract have a duty of good faith to each other. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis. 2d 26, 44, 330 N.W.2d 201 (1983) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); Ekstrom v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 218, 222, 172 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (B) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (C) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (D) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (E) holding that parties to contract have an implied obligation to put forth a good faith effort to fulfill the conditions of the contract
Output: (B)
in Wheeler occurred on May 31, 2007. Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i at 386-87, 219 P.3d 1170-74. Hence, for charging purposes, the law that governed was the OVUII statute as it existed in 2007. It is therefore inaccurate to say that the OVUII law post-Wheeler was any different than that existing pre-Wheeler, because the requirements set forth in Wheeler were themselves applied to a charge that dated back to 2007. Accordingly, the Walker quote is a misstatement ("essential elements that the State must include in an OVUII charge differ from those required in 2007”). 31 .This court has previously applied Wheeler retroactively in cases in which an OVUII charge lacked the public-road element without discussion of whether Wheeler announced a new rule. See Garcia, 125 Hawai'i at 443, 263 P.3d at 724 (<HOLDING>). These post-Wheeler decisions include the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive (B) holding that apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses  argument that ring announced a substantive rule (C) holding that simmons announced a new rule and retrospective application of the rule was barred by teague (D) holding that retroactivity is assumed unless a new rule is announced (E) holding that rule announced in mcconnell applies retroactively
Output: (D)
and cables had been erected across the road does not necessarily indicate that the road had been abandoned when, as in this case, the evidence indicates that the road had continued to be used by those who desired to do so. See Powell v. Hopkins, 288 Ala. 466, 472, 262 So.2d 289, 294 (1972) (“[Placing a gap or gate across a way to control livestock would not cause a road to lose its character as a public way when it was evident that by placing such obstacle there was no interruption of the way by those traveling it.”). Even if the gates and cables had succeeded in blocking public use of the road, we cannot conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence indicating that those gates and cables had been in existence for 20 years. See Smith v. Smith, 482 So.2d 1172, 1175 (Ala.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Darnalls point out that the county had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding impediment to traveling the road at issue must have existed for 20 years to support claim of abandonment (B) holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public (C) holding that a subsequent abandonment of a public rightofway over such a road has no effect on a private easement owned by an abutting landowner (D) holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system (E) holding that the abandonment provision of section 228190 is inapplicable when property is conveyed voluntarily to a county to be used as a public road
Output: (A)
financially secure couples from unnecessarily obtaining Medicaid assistance. Morris, 685 F.3d at 929 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 100-105, pt. 2, at 65 (1987), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857); see also Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Seros., 696 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir.2012). Congress directed that a couple’s combined resources are counted in determining Medicaid eligibility for an institutionalized spouse, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A), but the income of the community spouse is not included, id. § 1396r-5(b)(l). See Morris, 685 F.3d at 930. Further, “a couple may convert joint resources—which may affect Medicaid eligibility — into income for the community spouse—which does not impact eligibility — by purchasing certain types of [income generating investments].” Id. at 928; see also Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (<HOLDING>); James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a spouse was bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party because of her knowledge and acquiescence to the conveyance (B) recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that the employer did not have a plan under erisa where no administrative scheme was required to pay the annuity benefit (E) holding nontransferable annuity for community spouse was not countable resource
Output: (E)
that it was implausible that an Orthodox priest would have retaliated against Farcas if she converted his niece was not supported by any corroborating evidence in the record. Thus, none of the IJ’s findings of implausibility provides a legitimate or cogent basis upon which to make an adverse credibility finding. The IJ also erred by giving diminished weight to affidavits introduced into the record by Farcas at her asylum hearing, as the reasons stated by the IJ for doing so are without merit. Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir.2003) (“Mere failure to authenticate documents, at least in the absence of evidence undermining their reliability, does not constitute sufficient foundation for an adverse credibility determination”); Zhou v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>). Lastly, we hold that the IJ erroneously 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is error for an ij to rely upon the petitioners inability to obtain live testimony from persons living abroad to support an adverse credibility determination (B) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true (C) holding that after the real id act the ij must still provide specific examples of a petitioners demean or that would support this basis for an adverse credibility determination (D) holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding (E) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination
Output: (A)
see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature’s intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
Output: (D)
or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Rule 11(h) provides that “[a] variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(h). We have held that conditional pleas must comply with Rule 11(a)(2), in that pretrial issues must be preserved in writing and the government must consent expressly to the entry of a conditional plea. See Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155 (noting that a “conditional plea must be in writing and must be consented to by the court and by the government”); United States v. Betancourth, 554 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). In Pierre, we specifically noted, “[assuming 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a counsels oral statements at a plea hearing  that the plea being entered was conditional  did not satisfy the rule 11 writing requirement (B) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (C) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (D) holding right to speedy trial is nonjurisdictional and therefore waived by voluntary and unconditional guilty plea (E) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea
Output: (C)
Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir.1998)). Here, it is undisputed that the INS first physically located Trejo-Arroyo and determined his presence in the United States was illegal in August 2003, when he applied for a work permit. Thus, pursuant to Clarke, we must decide whether the INS should have discovered Trejo-Arroyo’s illegal presence earlier, “with the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities.” 312 F.3d at 1346-47 (citations omitted). In United States v. Mercedes, 287 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir.2002), a ease similar to this one, the Second Circuit held that it was not unreasonable for a listing of false names and different dates and places of birth to delay the INS’s determination that the defendant had previously been deported. See also Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d at 511 (<HOLDING>); Bencomo-Castillo, 176 F.3d at 1303 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes (B) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live (C) holding alien was found when he admitted previous deportation and true identity to ins agent not when he used alias during jailhouse interview with ins agent agents investigated his identity with appropriate methodical diligence and could not have known his identity prior to his admissions (D) holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it (E) holding that ins officials did not exercise sufficient diligence in ascertaining the defendants illegal status when although the defendant provided a false name ins had his fingerprints
Output: (C)
could have been the culpable party” and that “the court’s rulings left the defense with no way to suggest an answer to [the] question” of “who else the cocaine could have come from.” III. Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result of the arrest team’s entry into the apartment. He argued, and contends again on appeal, that as the officers did not have a search warrant for the premises and as he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment as a frequent guest, the entry of the arrest team violated the Fourth Amendment. Citing Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178 (D.C.1999), the trial court found that Brown had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment as an invited guest of Powell, the owner of the premises. See id. at 182 (<HOLDING>). The court ruled, however, that although the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment (B) holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public (C) holding that because social guests of the host generally have a legitimate expectation of privacy  appellant met his burden of showing that he had a protectible interest in the house the police entered in order to seize him (D) holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it (E) recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house
Output: (C)
for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.” Id. We have long recognized “the importance of deference” to law enforcement officials when speech threatens to undermine the functions of organizations charged with maintaining public safety. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1989); Cherry v. Picked, 188 Fed.Appx. 465, 469-70 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n the context of police departments, we have emphasized that the court should show ‘deference to the city’s judgment on the matter of discouraging public dissension within its safety forces.’ ” (citation omitted)); cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Thus, although it is not “the rule of this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity (B) holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records (C) holding that policies regulating the uniforms and conduct of police officers are entitled to great deference and should not be set aside unless individual officers can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation based as it is on the countys method of organizing its police force and the promotion of safety of persons and property (D) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (E) holding pleading was sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss based on allegations that two police officers were under the control and supervision of the county when they maliciously and intentionally allowed and encouraged the police dog to attack and bite cox in clear and substantial excess of the force needed to restrain and detain him and that the two officers subsequently beat and further injured cox without justification
Output: (C)
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995). However, courts may not refuse to enforce arbitration agreements under state laws which apply only to such agreements, Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. at 687 (citing Allied-B eld that in instances where a valid individual employee-employer arbitration agreement exists, the FAA requires that employees arbitrate federal and state law discrimination claims. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 (FAA preempts state 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (B) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (C) holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
Output: (D)