niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
entered an order finding probable‘cause that the property was used to facilitate the commission of a felony. Although Flagg’s atto ation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the . conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard. Express findings are required to ensure that the trial judge has consciously determined that the failure was more than a mistake, neglect, or inadvertence, and to assist the reviewing court to the extent the record is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495-96 (Fla.2004) (citing Tubero, 569 So.2d at 1273); cf. Ledo v. Seavie Resources, LLC, 149 So.Sd 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Flagg filed a motion to set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (B) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (C) holding that where the record plainly reflected ledos willful and deliberate disregard of the courts repeated orders to respond to interrogatory requests the trial courts failure to provide written findings of fact in its order striking ledos pleadings did not require reversal (D) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (E) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal
Output: (C)
crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex.2005). A. Applicable Statute of Limitations As a threshold issue, the parties disagree over the length of the statute of limitations for Nelda’s breach of an implied warranty claim. In her last live pleading Nelda asserted a claim for breach of a common law implied warranty to repair her home in a good and workmanlike manner. She also asserted, under her DTPA cause of action, that Olshan breached an implied warranty that its foundation repairs would be done in a good and workmanlike manner. Olshan asserts the limitations period is two years for all of h 09, 412 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Darr Equip. Co. v. Allen, 824 S.W.2d 710, 712 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years (B) holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania (C) holding that because the dtpa is the only way of pursuing an implied warranty claim for repairs to existing tangible goods such a claim must necessarily be brought within the twoyear dtpa limitations period (D) holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty (E) holding that an implied warranty to perform services in a good and workmanlike manner is an action available under the dtpa and is subject to the twoyear limitations provided by the dtpa
Output: (C)
Smith v. Southern Pacific Co., 187 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir.1951) ("The necessity of establishing in the complaints the relationship of the defendants, in this case an employment relationship, is at best a doubtful question of state law which should be tried in the state court and not determined in removal proceedings”). Federal district courts are not entitled to determine uncertain issues of law in order to ascertain whether there has been a fraudulent joinder, as those such issues must be determined in state court. See e.g., Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir.1983) ("if there is even a possibility that a state court would find a cause of action stated ... then the federal court must [remand]”). 11 . See, e.g., Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 254 (11th Cir.1988) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the resident defendant had not been formally served prior to removal the resident defendant had made a voluntary appearance in state court and therefore jurisdiction was not proper under  1441b (B) holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice (C) holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense (D) holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined (E) holding that fraudulent joinder required a finding that either there was no possibility that the plaintiff could prove a cause of action against the resident defendant or that the plaintiff fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts in order to subject that resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court
Output: (E)
such that the name of — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“States may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”). Based on these decisions, he argues that Va.Code 46.2-716 violates the Constitutional prohibition of state laws that discriminate against out of state commerce. The merits of defendant’s negative commerce clause argument are doubtful, given that the Virginia statute, as applied to all vehicles traveling in Virginia, is both reasonable and neither discriminates against interstate commerce, nor results in an unreasonable burden on such commerce. See American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Com’n, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2419, 2423, 162 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In any event, it is unnecessary to reach the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding 18 usc  922o a valid exercise of congressional power under commerce clause (B) holding that michigans imposition of flat 100 annual fee on trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling was valid exercise of states police power which did not violate dormant commerce clause (C) holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant commerce clause (D) holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce (E) recognizing that congress had the power to regulate boxcars that traveled exclusively intrastate because of their inherent mobility and connection to interstate commerce it is no objection to such an exertion of commerce clause power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise in whole or in part out of matters connected with intrastate commerce
Output: (B)
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1283 (7th Cir.1986); In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 198 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996). Here, the central issue is whether the Plaintiffs were “known” or “unknown” claimants at the time of the Bar Order. As noted above, actual notice is necessary only as to known creditors while constructive notice is sufficient for unknown creditors. See New York, 344 U.S. at 296, 73 S.Ct. 299; In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775, 788 (7th Cir.1992). Constructive notice can be satisfied through publication notice since “in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final de .1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding death caused by unknown object provides sufficient notice (B) holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law (C) holding that governments choice to publish notice in the new york times did not violate statutory publication requirements even though publication in the houston chronicle would have been more likely to provide notice to the claimant (D) holding that notice published in the new york times and the wall street journal was sufficient to satisfy due process owed to unknown creditors (E) holding publication in the wall street journal sufficient notice to unknown creditor injured in louisiana
Output: (E)
section 302, but to preempt it. The debtors argue that precluding conversion of pending cases defeats the purpose of the 1986 Act, pointing to legislative history indicating that the Act was meant to give relief to farm families in economic crisis. See, e.g., 132 Cong.Rec. H9001 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (remarks of Mr. Synar). However, the purpose of giving farm families relief is not inconsistent with a decision to make the provisions of the new chapter available only in cases filed after the effective date of the Act. Congress could rationally have chosen to avoid disrupting the progress of pending cases, while finding it preferable to change the law governing future cases. Cf. Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors’ Committee, 454 U.S. 354, 102 S.Ct. 695, 70 L.Ed.2d 542 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Congress’ general intent to give farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional (D) holding that the bankruptcy reform act effectively overruled wrenn (E) holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act
Output: (E)
documents to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d at 1123; and Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d at 123. 62 . See Wallace v. Texas Tech University, 80 F.3d at 1047; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075. (5th Cir.1994); King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d at 346; Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges & Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1991); and Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d at 123. The filing of an unverified amended complaint renders a verified original complaint a nullity unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleadings. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d at 346; and Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir.1985). 63 . See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d at 346, (<HOLDING>); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d at 304-05, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that a verified complaint can be considered as summary judgment evidence only to the extent that it comports with the requirements of rule 56e (C) holding that a verified complaint is treated as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes and considered in determining whether material issues of fact exist (D) holding that rule 56e requires that summary judgment affidavits be based upon personal knowledge contain admissible evidence and affirmatively demonstrate the competency of the affiant to testify as to the matters contained therein (E) holding that facts were not disputed because nonmovant failed to contest them with specific sworn evidence as required under rule 56e
Output: (B)
opinion as to whether or not the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants acted or failed to act within the appropriate standards of care as charged in the complaint.” Ind. Code § 34-18-10-22(a) (emphases added). Wren’s Proposed Complaint charged that “[t]he medical treatment provided by Defendants fell below the standard of care within the medical community and proximately caused or proximately contributed to Leslie Wren’s death.” Appellants’ Appendix at 29. Wren timely filed his Submission which contained evidence related to an alleged breach in the standard of care regarding Leslie’s fluid and electrolyte balance, and it can therefore be presumed that the Panel considered such a breach and addressed it in the Panel Opinion. See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332 (<HOLDING>); see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions (B) holding that the medical review panel is authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendants treatment of a patient and that while a medical malpractice plaintiff must as a prerequisite to filing suit present the  proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim (C) holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment (D) holding that conduct by the plaintiff contributing to his illness or medical condition and furnishing the occasion for medical treatment is not a defense to medical malpractice where a doctor negligently treated a man who had attempted to commit suicide (E) holding unconstitutional the wyoming medical review panel act
Output: (B)
house.” This is sufficient to connect West to the conspiracy of which Chapman was a part. See United States v. Misher, 99 F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that an individual’s “presence and association with other members of the conspiracy, when supported by other evidence, may be used to support the finding of a conspiracy”). Therefore, even, if the jury believed that only West knew about the guns, they had ample evidence that West was a co-conspirator of Chapman’s. West’s testimony would not likely have resulted in Chapman’s acquittal. Giv-. en these shortcomings of Chapman’s motion for a new trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Chapman’s motion. See United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). B. Boyer Boyer argues that the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony (C) holding defendant not entitled toa hearing on his motion for a new trial where he failed to prove that his new evidence  was in fact newly discovered and that its recent discovery was in no way attributable to a previous lack of diligence (D) holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted (E) holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant
Output: (C)
. The record indicates that Heard has been confined to at least three different maximum-security facilities, including the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility in Standish, Michigan, the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility in Baraga, Michigan, and the Marquette Branch Prison in Marquette, Michigan. 3 . The R & R also recommended denial of Heard's motion for a preliminary injunction and motion for summary judgment, both of which had been filed before the defendants filed their motion to dismiss. 4 . Heard styled the motion an "affidavit,” but it was unsworn. 5 . With respect to Heard’s RLUIPA claim against defendants in their official capacities, Heard may seek only declaratory or injunctive relief and not monetary relief. See Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 798-801 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). This court has not ruled, however, on whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983 (B) holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims (C) holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 (D) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the recovery of monetary damages under rluipa when state officials are sued in their official capacities (E) holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983
Output: (D)
may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances. Regardless of whether Booker’s right was obvious or “manifestly apparent” from broader principles in the decisional law, we find that it was clearly established based on a robust “consensus of persuasive authority.” The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all recognized in published decisions that inmates possess a right, grounded in the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, to be free from retaliation in response to filing a prison grievance. T r. 2006) (“First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for a redress of grievances are violated when a prisoner is punished for filing a grievance.... ”); Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 584-85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Even more, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (B) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (C) holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances (D) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (E) recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances
Output: (B)
the requisite actual intent demanded by § 548(a)(1). Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962, 80 5.Ct. 878, 4 L.Ed.2d 877 (1960); Cf. In re White, 221 F.Supp. 64 (N.D.Cal.1963). With respect to the alternate basis for claiming a fraudulent transfer, when Amelia transferred her one-half interest in the property to William on April 18, 1979, she received no consideration. Amelia had a claim upon William at any time to require him to transfer title back to her without payment to him. Thus, it cannot be said that when William transferred a one-half interest in the property to Amelia on July 3, 1980, he received less than a reasonable equivalent value for the interest transferred. Luper v. Ruhl, 148 F.Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.Ohio 1956) (<HOLDING>); Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., supra. The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because no real property interest was transferred to the agent by virtue of her redeeming the property the statute of frauds was inapplicable (B) holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony (C) holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted (D) holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property (E) holding that where a bankrupt wife transferred a certain lot to her husband the husband being already the equitable owner of the transferred property it cannot be said that the lot was transferred to him without consideration
Output: (E)
to the correction. Because we hold that this issue was properly preserved, we need not remand this case to the trial court for clarification of the record. See Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 n. 4 (Colo.1983) (stating: "Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary to consider the appropriateness of a remand for clarification"). 10 . Arguments not raised before the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. In re Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718, 721 n. 5 (Colo.1992). 11 . We find Allen's arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. Although we agree that consent clauses in insurance contracts are to be liberally construed to provide coverage. See Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288 65, 382, 541 N.W.2d 753, 758-59 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Palomar Ins. Corp. v. Guthrie, 583 So.2d 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing claim requires showing of breach of contract (B) holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing (C) holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty (D) holding when an insurers alleged breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its insured involves facts and circumstances within the common knowledge or ordinary experience of an average juror an insured need not introduce expert testimony to establish a bad faith claim (E) holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act
Output: (D)
that [Chris] commit the 'crime of Aggravated Assault; or b. Was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to result in [Chris] committing the crime of Aggravated Assault. (Emphases in original.) 124 During deliberation, the jury sent a note to the court seekmg clarification of two topics: Define => Aggravated Assault? Question: If leaving Kelly in the canyon does that = "Aggravated Assault"? The district court, without consulting Defendant's counsel or the State, responded in writing that "the elements for the crime of aggravated assault are given in the instructions, The other question, must be decided without my help. It is for the jury to decide." 125 The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specify how a district court is to react to notes from the jury, The court may " 1897) (<HOLDING>). This is especially true when the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction (B) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (C) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (D) holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel (E) holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one
Output: (B)
was again increased in 2000, and the resulting reductions to his Navy pension further reduced Susan’s benefits. Finally, in 2003, Ronald’s disability benefit was increased to 100 percent and Susan’s benefits were “significantly reduced” although not altogether eliminated. On April 23, 2003, Susan filed this action seeking to enforce the terms of the PSA that both parties agreed to in 1986. In a bench decision on December 5, 2003, the Family Court hearing justice found that Ronald impermissibly had modified the PSA when he “unilaterally applied for disability benefits” and that he had breached the contract between the parties. The court entered judgment on July 21, 2004, ordering that Susan receive a sum equal to 35 percent of the gross pension the husband would have received, had ) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that military retirement benefits are to be considered deferred pay for past services (B) holding pension conferred cola was an accrued benefit and not ancillary because it was intended to provide retirement income commenced only at retirement and was a benefit generally transferrable to succeeding employers (C) holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service (D) holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits (E) holding that  disposable retirement pay  from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes
Output: (E)
check and “failing to reverse or disclose this transfer.” During cross-examination of a government witness, Senffner asked whether the funds had been returned to the SEC by late August. The witness responded that the funds were returned “[w]hatever day that Mr. Senffner had been ordered by the Court to submit was the day that the money came back.” On redirect the government briefly asked questions related to this topic. In response, the witness stated that Senffner had been held in contempt of court and ordered to return the funds by that date. Ordinarily, an inquiry into the date of an incident’s occurrence would not warrant further inquiry by the government into the reason for that incident’s occurrence — the proverbial “door” is not that wide open. Cf. Thomas, 155 F.3d at 836 (<HOLDING>). But that is not what occurred here. Senffner 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that misleading testimony regarding the purpose of a proceeding did not warrant inquiry into the result of the proceeding (B) holding that a witness who testifies in one proceeding may not be compelled to give further testimony in a different proceeding (C) holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding
Output: (A)
of civil proceedings, as well as for violations of the Donnelly Act, the New York antitrust statute. These claims, however, fail for many of the same reasons as they do when fashioned as federal antitrust claims. First, as the parties agree, the Don-nelly Act is modelled on and governed by the same standards as the federal antitrust laws. State of New York v. Mobil Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 460, 463, 381 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428, 344 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1976). Plaintiffs have suggested no reason why or how the policies underlying the Donnelly Act would be ill-served by the application of Noerr immunity to these claims. Accordingly, Noerr must apply in much the same manner to immunize claims based on non-sham litigation. Suburban Restoration Co., Inc. v. Acmat Corp., 700 F.2d 98, 101-02 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Defendants also argue that other state 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unfair trade practices and consumer protection law applicable to residential leases (B) recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant (C) holding that a cause of action exists under the connecticut unfair trade practices act for violations of the cuipa (D) holding that plaintiffs statelaw claim was completely preempted under federal statute even though relief soughtan injunctionwas not available under the federal statute (E) holding connecticut statelaw unfair trade practices claim to be subject to noerr immunity because connecticut statute was coextensive with federal statute subject to noerr
Output: (E)
doing something that can be characterized as resistance—even when that resistance includes physically preventing an officer’s manipulations of his body.”). In addition, the black-and-white bus surveillance video fails to clearly show what occurred as the officers forcefully “escorted” Hulett off the bus, and leaves the viewer wondering whether, and to what extent, additional force may have been applied during those moments that might have contributed to plaintiffs broken hip. And even following plaintiffs removal from the bus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Sergeant Galvin acted in an objectively reasonable manner by dragging plaintiff some distance across the pavement, since plaintiff did not appear to be offering any further resistance at that point. Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98 (<HOLDING>); Meyes v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 733 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance (B) holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force (C) holding that no objectively reasonable police officer could believe that after vinyard was under arrest handcuffed behind her back secured in the back seat of a patrol car with a protective screen between the officer and the arrestee an officer could stop the car grab such arrestee by her hair and arm bruise her and apply pepper spray to try to stop the intoxicated arrestee from screaming and returning the officers exchange of obscenities and insults during a short fourmile jail ride (D) holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force (E) holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights
Output: (A)
such entities from exercising their right of eminent domain. We disagree. The statute unambiguously prohibits any curtailment or limitation of an FmHA-indebted water association’s services resulting from municipal annexation or inclusion. This language indicates a congressional mandate that local governments not encroach upon the services provided by such associations, be that encroachment in the form of competing franchises, new or additional permit requirements, or similar means. To read a loophole into this absolute prohibition, as Madison would have us do, and allow a city to do via condemnation what it is forbidden by other means, would render nugatory the clear purpose of § 1926(b). See Moore Bayou Water Association, Inc. v. Town of Jonestown, 628 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D.Miss.1986) (<HOLDING>). Madison contends that this construction of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted (D) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (E) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled
Output: (D)
February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code § 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code § 19.2-305.1(D) states that “[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof.” The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code § 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court’s October 26, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
Output: (B)
a “public official,” places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer “was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control”); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an “official” because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
Output: (D)
("[The use of the word 'shall in a statute usually is deemed to involve a mandatory connotation."); City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105, 1117-18 (Colo.App.1994) (finding that two provisions conflict when harmonization would effectively nullify one of them). Thus, to resolve this conflict, we consider the statute's legislative history to determine legislative intent. See Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo.1993) (looking to legislative history to determine legislative intent); People v. Carrillo, 2018 COA 3, 1 23, 297 P.3d 1028 (turning to "other statutory aids" when the plain text of statutes conflicts). b. Manifest Intent 120 The General Assembly's intent is "manifest" only when such intent is "clear and unmistakable." See Falls, 58 P.3d at 1142 (<HOLDING>). 121 In 2001, the General Assembly passed the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a general statute should not be interpreted as repealing a specific statute albsent clear and unmistakable legislative intent to the contrary (B) recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern (C) holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained (D) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls (E) holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively
Output: (A)
exclusively reserved to old equity, excluding any participation by the creditors. Debtor counters that the new stock will be sold to the old shareholders “on account of” their contribution of “new value,” i.e., cash, and not “on account of” their old equity interest. Acknowledging that status as an old equity holder is a necessary condition to be eligible under the plan to buy the new stock, debtor contends that the absolute priority rule is not violated because old equity status is not sufficient to entitle the holder to shares of the new stock. Debtor’s analysis fails to recognize that the exclusive right to control the reorganized debtor is itself “property” under (B)(ii). See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207-08, 108 S.Ct. 963, 969, 99 L.Ed.2d 169, 180 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a spouse has given separate property to the marital community section 2640 preserves to the contributing spouse the equity value of his or her separate property contribution unless that retained interest is waived (B) holding that there was no evidence of market value where owners testimony affirmatively showed that it was based on personal value (C) holding that a retained equity interest is property even if it has no market value (D) holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens (E) holding that the formula in section 522f2a creates equity for purposes of lien avoidance even if debtors otherwise have no equity in the property
Output: (C)
venture as contrasted with a governmental function.’ ” Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 422, 755 P.2d 781 (1988) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1097 (5th ed. 1979)), adhered to on recons., 113 Wn.2d 148, 776 P.2d 963 (1989). 5 Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 645. 6 Id. at 646 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 695, 743 P.2d 793 (1987)). 7 Id. 8 RCW 57.08.081(1). 9 These factors include the difference in cost to various customers, the location of customers within and without the district, the achievement of water conservation goals and discouragement of wasteful practices, and “any other matters which present a reasonable difference as a ground for distinction.” RCW 57-.08.081(2). 10 See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 685, 399 P.2d 330 (1965) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater (B) recognizing that watershed isolation or acquisition serves to prevent and control water contamination (C) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (D) recognizing that water retained within a watershed is susceptible to multiple use because all water uses are not consumptive uses (E) holding authority to control limits duty to control
Output: (B)
Mexicans to vote, hold office, and sit upon juries, but it does not protect a defendant’s right to an impartial jury. See N.M. Const, art. VII, § 3. That provision does not correspond to the impartial jury provision of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or to the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const, amends. VI, XIV. Defendant did not argue before the district court that the rights of New Mexico jurors were being violated, and the district court did not make a ruling on that issue. Defendant did not cite N.M. Const, art. II, § 14, the provision that protects the right to an impartial jury. Therefore, he did not preserve any argument under the state constitution. See State v. Janzen, 2007-NMCA-134, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 638, 168 P.3d 768 (<HOLDING>). {12} Similarly, while Defendant also cites 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly (B) holding that although this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same (C) holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports (D) holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure (E) holding that preservation for review requires a fair ruling or decision by the district court in order to provide the lower court with an opportunity to correct any mistake give the opposing party an opportunity to demonstrate why the district court should rule in its favor and create a record which enables this court to make informed decisions
Output: (E)
to landslide, even though earth movement was the most immediate cause). We therefore conclude that this is a case of multiple causation. B. We must now determine whether the deterioration or the fungicide manufacturers’ failure to warn is the “proximate efficient cause” of the damage to Berry’s irrigation pipes. In Sabella, the California Supreme Court defined “proximate efficient cause” both as “the one that sets others in motion” and as “the predominating or moving efficient cause.” Sabella, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 695, 377 P.2d at 895; see Garvey, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 296, 770 P.2d at 708 (“Sabella defined ‘efficient proximate cause’ alternatively as the ‘one that sets others in motion’ and as ‘the predominating or moving efficient cause.’”) (citations omitted); Howell, 267 Cal.Rptr. at 716 (<HOLDING>); Brian Chuchua’s Jeep, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d at 445 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (B) recognizing existence of two tests (C) recognizing first two exceptions (D) recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact (E) recognizing the existence of the special relationship
Output: (B)
claimant was injured while exiting an elevator in a parking garage which was not owned or maintained by her employer. However, the claimant’s employer instructed her to park in certain designated spaces which it leased in the garage. Because the employer leased the parking spaces from the garage operator and presumably could pressure the garage operator to keep the facility in a safe condition, Pierson held that there was “sufficient indicia of em ployer control to support the ... conclusion that the [employer] should be responsible for the effects of an injury to an employee which occurred in the garage.” 987 S.W.2d at 318. Since the claimant was utilizing a reasonable means to walk from her parking space to her employer when she fell, she zona, 142 Ariz. 501, 690 P.2d 802 (App.1984)(<HOLDING>); Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (B) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (C) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (D) holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot (E) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties
Output: (D)
risked losing their last chance to defend themselves. Taking into consideration all of these factors, particularly the split-second nature of the decision, we conclude as a matter of law that Appellants had probable cause to believe that Waterman’s oncoming vehicle posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm at least to Officers Batton and Heisey. While reasonable officers would have recognized the possibility that Waterman intended only to accelerate by them rather than at them, they also — in the instant they had to decide — could have interpreted the acceleration in the face of their show of force as the initiation of a second attempt by Waterman to avoid capture by using his vehicle as a weapon against law enforcement personnel. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (<HOLDING>). Thus, although Appellants could have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm (B) holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others (C) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (D) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (E) recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown
Output: (D)