niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
released funds through New York banks acting as agents for various corporations; and (4) a Lloyds’ employee visited three Tennessee banks in an unsuccessful attempt to generate business for Lloyds. These contacts are not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Lloyds. First, Lloyds’ accounts with Tennessee addresses do not support the court’s ruling. Lloyds points out that these 108 customers represented a mere 0.000675% of Lloyds 16 million account holders, and none of those accounts were opened after 2002. The fact that 108 account holders have Tennessee addresses is merely fortuitousLloyds markets and sells its accounts in the United Kingdom, not in Tennessee. Further, no me Tennessee banks justify the exercise of general jur vs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1045-46 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing contacts amount to nothing more 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ceos trip to the forum state to negotiate a services contract did not constitute the continuous and systematic general business contacts required to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state (B) holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction (C) holding that 155 trips to texas by foreign corporation personnel over a tenyear period did not support general jurisdiction because evidence did not establish a general business presence (D) holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state (E) recognizing general jurisdiction where availment is systematic and continuous
Output: (B)
Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1984); the nonmovant has a “corresponding obligation to offer the court more than steamy rhetoric and bare conclusions.” Lawton v. State Mid. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, “the nonmovant must ‘produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form’ sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle.” Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that “the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence.”); Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (<HOLDING>) Local Rule 56(b), moreover, requires the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court must compare and weigh the opposing evidence and it must set aside the verdict if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence (B) holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance (C) holding substance of claim must have been presented to state court (D) holding that the evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve (E) holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted
Output: (D)
leave to file a civil complaint under a host of federal statutes, alleging employment discrimination by the Department of Transportation and, relatedly, the Federal Aviation Administration. Noting that the proposed complaint asserted claims “again relating to [Arizpe’s] past employment by the Department of Transportation,” the district court concluded that Arizpe failed to show that his claims were not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or another legal doctrine and denied Arizpe’s request for leave. Arizpe appeals that denial. We generally review denials of leave under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Raz, 252 Fed.Appx. 609 (5th Cir.2007) (reviewing a district court’s refusal to grant a “prolific filer” leave to file rine Offshore, Inc., 448 F.3d 825 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a review of the record and Arizpe’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 even though forum selection clause provided that the courts of the commonwealth of massachusetts would be the exclusive forum (B) holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching (C) holding that a federal courts order dismissing a case because a forum selection clause mandated venue in england met the requirements for collateral estoppel (D) holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum (E) holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel
Output: (C)
is quoted in Prince, 1999-NMCA-010, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 547, 972 P.2d 859, Gonzales, 97 N.M. at 610, 642 P.2d at 213, and State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 100, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 788, 653 P.2d 162, 164 (1982). When analyzing whether an officer’s actions create liability for tort or civil rights claims, the officer’s perspective is usually the central focus. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 1999— NMCA-113, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 13, 988 P.2d 883 (stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force is measured “from the perspective of the officer on the scene, with the understanding that officers must often make split-second decisions in difficult situations”); Baum v. Orosco, 106 N.M. 265, 271, 742 P.2d 1, 7 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Here, in contrast, the issue is whether 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the motives of the officer as a critical factor in determining whether a particular instance of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation (B) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (C) holding that the risk posed to third parties by the official use of force is not to be considered in determining whether an official used excessive force as against a particular plaintiff (D) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (E) recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists
Output: (A)
811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002). 10 . Because the Court concludes that the Franchisees have stated a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith within the bounds established by Razumic and Witmer, the Court need not consider the parties' arguments about whether the duty of good faith might extend beyond termination to other aspects of the franchise relationship. 11 . It is undisputed that the defendants are ''persons” that may be held liable under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (defining "person” as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property”). 12 . Indeed, because the corporate defendants are both "persons” and "enterprises,” it is not clear whether they could be held liable under § 1962(b). See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1190 (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (B) holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes (C) holding that instructions allowing a jury to find an enterprise from evidence of its activity as opposed to its structure properly conveyed the holding in turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an associationinfact enterprise (D) holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise (E) recognizing that it is difficult to understand how a corporation can acquire or maintain an interest in itself through a pattern of racketeering activity and that 1962b may require that the person and enterprise be distinct entities
Output: (E)
Guidelines based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines, if the court feels that the guidelines sentence fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.”)- Furthermore, it is not necessary to identify a court of appeals decision that has directly addressed the guidelines provision at issue as Booker provides that discretion across the board with the statutory sentencing factors serving as the guideposts. A district court’s failure to recognize its discretion to vary in this context constitutes procedural error. Accord Robinson, 741 F.3d at 601 (“[A] sentencing court commits procedural error if it fails to appreciate its discretion to consider evidence of cooperation under § 3553(a).”); United States v. Burns, 526 F.3d 852, 862 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). That is precisely what the district court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant (B) holding that when the defendant admitted that he pleaded guilty for reasons other than to have the judge who took his plea sentence him the defendant could properly be sentenced by a different judge (C) recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge (D) holding that defendant was entitled to have his sentence set by a judge aware of the discretion that kimbrough has announced (E) holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him
Output: (D)
sentence and that of her co-conspirators was unwarranted, and asserts this point of error for two reasons: “(1) to preserve the issue in the event the Supreme Court decides that under facts similar to those in this case the disparity is not warranted; and (2) ... because of the timing of her arrest and her inclusion in the case as a defendant, she was not presented with any opportunity to provide substantial assistance and therefore was not similarly situated to the co-conspirators who testified against her.” Perez was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment, while her co-conspirators (other than Fonceca) were sentenced to significantly lower sentences due to their assistance to the government in prosecuting this case. We rejected an argument similar to Perez’s in Duhon, 440 F.3d at 720 (<HOLDING>). Duhon noted that district courts should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury (B) holding that sentencing disparity produced by substantial assistance departures was intended by congress and is thus not a proper sentencing consideration under section 3553a6 (C) holding that the district courts failure to give consideration to the sentencing disparity that would result was another reason the defendants sentence was unreasonable (D) holding that sentencing enhancements and sentencing departures are not synonymous and that a waiver for upward departures imposed by the court does not permit the challenging of sentence enhancements (E) holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional
Output: (B)
. . . there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision[s].” Murray v. St. Michael’s Coll., 164 Vt. 205, 210, 667 A.2d 294, 299 (1995). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII need show only that “a reasonable employee [in the employee’s situation] would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity. 548 U.S. at 68. ¶ 34. Assuming, without deciding, that this is the standard to apply with respect to retaliation claims brought under 21 V.S.A. § 710(b), we conclude that the limited video surveillance in this case in connectio v., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 35. But in this case, if the release 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony (D) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (E) holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy
Output: (B)
felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal.Penal Code § 211 (West 20Ó3). A police officer may make a warrantless arrest when the “officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed.” Id. § 836(a)(3) (West 2003), ' Under California law, an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest “if the facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” People v. Adams, 175 Cal.App.3d 855, 221 Cal.Rptr. 298, 301 (1985) (citati h Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action (B) holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages (C) holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim (D) holding that possessing property of another for the purpose of security on a debt does not give rise to probable cause to arrest (E) holding that a dispute regarding payment of a restaurant bill does not give rise to probable cause to arrest
Output: (E)
as a claimant in this action and submitted to this Court’s in rem jurisdiction. It is not unreasonable to subject her to this Court’s in personam jurisdiction to resolve the same issues. In United States v. All Right, Title and Interest in the Contents of the Following Accounts at Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, No. 95 CIV. 10929 HB THK, 1996 WL 695671 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.5, 1996), the court considered the reasonableness of allowing cross-claims, based on in personam jurisdiction, to be asserted along with civil forfeiture claims. The court concluded that it would be “unfair to subject a claimant in an in rem proceeding to in personam liability without satisfying [the] fundamental prerequisites” of personal jurisdiction. I o. 3034504504 & 14407143, 971 F.2d 974, 980 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The court does conclude, however, that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claimant submits to personal jurisdiction by appearing in an in rem civil forfeiture action (B) holding that a  881 forfeiture proceeding is a civil in rem action that is independent of any factually related criminal actions (C) holding the claimant does not consent to personal jurisdiction by appearing in in rem action (D) holding that where prior state court had in rem jurisdiction district court could maintain in personam jurisdiction and simply deny requests for conflicting in rem relief because district court is fully capable of preventing inappropriate conversion of the suit to a proceeding truly in rem (E) holding that a party cannot waive in rem jurisdiction under florida law and a court proceeding pursuant to in rem jurisdiction must actually possess in rem jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the matter
Output: (A)
718. Under Texas law, a person may engage in the practice of engineering, architecture, or landscape architecture if he is licensed in those professions. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 3271a, § 1.2 (Vernon Supp.1999) (engineering); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art.249a, § 1 (Vernon Supp.1999) (architecture); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 249c, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp.1999) (landscape architecture). The State complains Henry was allowed to testified as to matters requiring expertise in surveying, engineering, architecture, and landscape architecture even though he is not licensed in any of those professions. Therefore, because Henry is not licensed, he was not qualified to testify as an expert. See Prellwitz v. Cromwell, Truemper, Levy, Parker & Woodsmale, 802 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); but see Southland Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (B) holding that a witness who will be giving opinion evidence about a propertys fair market value must be disclosed and designated as an expert pursuant to discovery and other applicable rules (C) recognizing that a licensed chiropractor is a health care provider competent to testify as a medical expert (D) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts (E) holding that witness giving expert opinion regarding stan dard of care for particular licensed profession must hold license for same profession
Output: (E)
with Appellant that the trial court erred by denying his motion to correct sentencing error with regard to the mandatory minimum firearm enhancement on Count 5, sexual battery with a firearm, and, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions to strike the firearm enhancement on that count. See Arnett v. State, 128 So.3d 87, 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (reversing and remanding the appellant’s sentence with directions to strike his mandatory minimum firearm enhancement sentence because a defendant’s sentence may not be enhanced pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, unless the defendant is charged with actually possessing a firearm, and noting that the jury’s finding of actual possession did not cure the charging defect); Green v. State, 18 So.3d 656, 656-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). We otherwise affirm Appellant’s convictions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in part that the information did not charge actual possession where it alleged that the defendant carried displayed used threatened or attempted to use any weapon or firearm (B) holding that a factual finding of use or threatened use of a firearm by the sentencing court violates a defendants right to a trial by jury under the oregon constitution (C) holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault (D) holding evidence insufficient to support conviction of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon (E) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used
Output: (A)
jurisdiction issue. Standard of Review Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that generally issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex.2005); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992); In re Barnes, 127 S.W.3d 843, 846 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding). With respect to factual matters, we must not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. However, such deference does not apply to the determination of what the law is or applying it to the facts of a particular case. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when it'errs in determining what the law is or in app El Paso 2003, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Application When a party seeks to modify a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in jurisdictional disputes arising from child custody proceedings relator need not demonstrate inadequacy of appellate remedy (B) holding in appellate proceedings decision of trial court has presumption of correctness and burden is on appellant to demonstrate error (C) holding that the a bankruptcy court can enjoin proceedings in other courts when it is satisfied that such proceedings would defeat or impair its jurisdiction over the case before it and the court does not need to demonstrate an inadequate remedy at law or irreparable harm (D) holding that when evidence did not prove dependency of child as alleged in complaint but revealed pure custody dispute juvenile court was without jurisdiction to determine custody of child (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional
Output: (A)
trustee which would be property of the estate. See generally In re Si Yeon Park, Ltd., 198 B.R. 956 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1996). Such a turnover requirement may undermine the Barton Doctrine to some degree. Neither statutory provision, however, is germane to this proceeding. As mentioned above, the former statute is inapplicable because it is limited to receivers that operate businesses. The trustee concedes that Mr. Freeman was appointed solely as a liquidating receiver. The latter statute is inapplicable because its directives are addressed to “custodians” — a term defined by section 101(11) to include receivers — whose duties involve controlling property of the debtor for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. See Matter of Miami General Hosp., Inc., 1111 B.R. 363, 366 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); see generally Matter of Cash Currency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement (B) holding that a receiver of insurance policies did not have standing because it failed to prove it was the assignee of the policyholders claims (C) holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation (D) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors (E) holding that a receiver appointed for the parent corporation of the debtor was not a custodian of the debtorsubsidiary because the receiver was not appointed to take control of the debt ors assets for the benefit of the debtors creditors
Output: (E)
anything but voluntary. The evidence is therefore legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s implicit rejection of Gokey’s involuntary act or conduct defense. Enhancement Allegations In his final two points of error, Gokey asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding of true to the enhancement allegations because there is a material variance between the allegations and the proof. The State agrees the enhancement allegations recite a conviction in Chesterfield County, Virginia and the proof establishes a conviction in the Circuit Court in the City of Colonial Heights, Virginia. We must therefore decide whether variance between what was alleged and what was proved is material. See Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). Prior convictions alleged for enhancement are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material (B) holding evidence legally insufficient (C) holding variance in style of case pled for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice (D) holding that multiple conspiracies instruction is required where there is possibility of prejudicial variance between indictment and trial proof and noting that such an instruction is designed precisely to cure the problem of kotteakos spillover  and would not cure other prejudicial variance problems (E) recognizing that evidence may be legally insufficient where there is variance between indictment allegations and proof
Output: (A)
“improper definition of reasonable doubt.” (Claim I.C.4, paragraph 51, of Boyd’s petition.) 23. Boyd alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object, during the penalty phase of the trial, to the prosecutor’s “expressions of his personal opinion of [Boyd’s] sentence.” (Claim I.D.2, paragraph 62, of Boyd’s petition.) 24. Boyd alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object, during the penalty phase of the trial, to the prosecutor’s comments “deni-grat[ing] ... the jury’s role in the sentencing process.” (Claim I.D.2, paragraphs 63-64, of Boyd’s petition.) Claims presented in a Rule 32 petition but not pursued on appeal are deemed to be abandoned. See Brownlee v. State, 666 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)(<HOLDING>). See also, e.g., Charest v. State, 854 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived (B) holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived (C) holding that we will not review issues not listed and argued in brief (D) holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief (E) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived
Output: (C)
his equal protection rights by irrationally excluding some nonviolent felonies from the class of exempted crimes listed in § 921(a)(20)(A). See Baer v. Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d 1117, 1125 (7th Cir.1983) (“People are not allowed to challenge statutes or ordinances because of the consequences of applying them to other peo-ple_”). Even without the standing problems, Jester’s second claim flies in the face of precedent. This Court has once before rejected a similar challenge that the exemptions to § 922(g)(1) violated the Fifth Amendment by “too narrowly defining the class of application”. United States v. Weatherford, 471 F.2d 47, 51 n. 6 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 2144, 36 L.Ed.2d 695 (1973); see also United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Also in this context, the Second Circuit has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this rule (B) recognizing continuing validity of the butner decision (C) holding that shepard did not affect the continuing validity of almendareztorres (D) recognizing the continuing validity of negligence as a separate basis for employer liability in action in which employee alleged supervisor harassment (E) recognizing the continuing validity of weatherford on this point
Output: (E)
and after the transfer between the sons. The transfer-of-shares agreement cannot be considered a contract by Joe Sr. to transfer four shares of stock to Joe Jr. because it does not meet the basic requirements for a contract: it states no action or forbearance by Joe Sr. in return for an action or forbearance by Joe Jr. Compare § 7-8-319, Ala. Code 1975, the former “Statute of Frauds” for securities transactions, that, at the time relevant here, required, in a contract for the sale of securities, a writing “signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought ... sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.” (Emphasis added.) See DeVito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 189, 755 A.2d 1147, 1160 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Although Joe Sr.’s signature on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties under the uniform commercial code where there was allocation of commercial risks in a socially or economically unreasonable manner (B) recognizing the purpose of a uniform statewide building code (C) holding that a memorandum referring to the allocation of stock ownership did not satisfy  8319 of the uniform commercial code (D) holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement (E) holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because it did not meet the definition of seller as defined by mississippis product liability statute or under the uniform commercial code
Output: (C)
See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000). “The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim.” Id. While mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden, the reviewing court must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. Id. “We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.” Id. Although the police were authorized to search Pugh incident to arrest, it may not have been proper for the officers to extend that search to the trunk of the vehicle, in which case a motion to suppress could have been successful. See Betz v. State, 793 So.2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA) (<HOLDING>), review granted, 791 So.2d 1101 (Fla.2001); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (B) holding that defendants suspect activity in the trunk and passenger compartment of his car immediately after he engaged in an apparent drug sale established probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs and drug money (C) holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not (D) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (E) holding that search of golf bag was not legal as search incident to arrest because it was not in passenger compartment of vehicle or otherwise within arrestees immediate control
Output: (C)
but clear, as a matter of law, that the “military exception” applies only to the person who served in the armed forces — not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called “military exception” of 8 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives
Output: (E)
party may only inquire as to the existence of convictions and their number (or, if the matter be denied, may show the convictions by documentary evidence) the party presenting the testimony of the witness may delve into the nature or circumstances of the convictions for the purpose of rehabilitating the witness by attempting to diminish the effect of the disclosures. Id. at 522; see also McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla.1957)(“If the witness so desires he may of his own volition state the nature of the crime and offer any relevant testimony that would eliminate any adverse implications; for example, the fact that he had in the meantime been fully pardoned or that the crime was a minor one and occurred many years before.”); Williams v. State, 730 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(<HOLDING>). In the present case, during the defendant’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of montgomery that a defendant can only be impeached by evidence of a conviction of a prior felony or infamous crime (B) holding that witness could not be impeached with prior statement because his silence did not constitute testimony  (C) holding that on direct examination of defendant he is entitled to explain the nature and circumstances of his prior conviction in order to rehabilitate himself prior to being impeached by the state during crossexamination (D) holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded (E) holding that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error
Output: (C)
raised before the district court. Under Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), a suppression issue must be raised before trial, and the failure to raise the issue in a timely pretrial motion results in “waiver” of the matter under Rule 12(f). Frazier, Sr. concedes he was late in raising the issue but contends we may still review the alleged Franks violation for plain error under Rule 52(b). His argument raises the interesting question of whether a court of appeals is barred altogether from reviewing an issue that has been “waived” under Rule 12(f). Compare United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 955 (D.C.Cir.1999) (concluding that plain error review under Rule 52(b) of a “waived” issue would render Rule 12(f) meaningless), and United States v. Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d 127, 129-30 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (B) holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal (C) holding that rules 12b3 and 12f along with circuit precedent barred defendant who failed to raise a suppression issue before the district court from raising the issue for the first time on appeal (D) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (E) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal
Output: (C)
Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 270 N.J.Super. 311, 637 A.2d 191, 193, aff'd, 138 N.J. 185, 649 A.2d 1243 (1994), we find no merit in Ford’s contention that the district court erred by relying on legislative history to expand the NJFPA beyond the scope of its plain statutory language. See br. at 16. The legislative history, however, clearly does support a statutory interpretation that prohibits spurious transactions which ultimately fail to result in reimbursement at the dealer’s retail rate. The New Jersey courts have held that the NJFPA is a remedial statute intended to equalize the disparity of bargaining power in franchisor-franchisee relations. See Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 146 N.J. 176, 680 A.2d 618, 626 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 127 N.J. 269, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (B) holding that the duty of good faith and commercial reasonableness is used to define the franchisors power to terminate the franchise only when it is not explicitly described in the parties written agreements (C) recognizing njfpas basic legislative objectives of protecting franchisees from the superior bargaining power of franchisors (D) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (E) recognizing employers interest in protecting confidentiality of data bearing on employees basic competence
Output: (C)
21, 1989 — the effective filing date of the '516 patent. The parties disputed the effective filing date of the '516 patent, and in a detailed and well-crafted special verdict form, the jury was asked to choose between the two possible dates: April 21, 1989, and November 13, 1991. The jury chose 1989 and neither party appealed that determination. Presumably because of uncertainty over the priority date, much of Ariad’s evidence was actually directed to the later date. Because written description is determined as of the filing date— April 21, 1989, in this case — evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art knew in 1990 or 1991 cannot provide substantial evidence to the jury that the asserted claims were supported by adequate written description. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (<HOLDING>). In accordance with Rochester, the '516 patent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (B) holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities (C) holding that a written description analysis occurs as of the filing date sought (D) holding that the creditors claim on the petition date for purposes of a  547b5 analysis was the unpaid balance of the store loans as of the filing date plus the total amount of the alleged preferential payments (E) holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference
Output: (C)
argue, inmate observance of Ramadan, with its requirements for month long daytime fasting, multiple daily prayers and special diets, is wholly incompatible with the SDC boot camp regimen. There is likewise no doubt that the effective implementation of the program for all participants is a valid penological concern and objective. It follows, in summary, that defendants did not violate Blagman’s First Amendment rights by implementing a twenty week boot camp program designed to aid in the rehabilitation of eligible inmates, even though the program had the incidental effect of precluding Blagman from engaging in religious rituals or practices that are inconsistent with the program’s regimen. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892, 110 S.Ct. 1595,108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (<HOLDING>). C. Intimidation Claim Blagman’s third claim 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that facially neutral statute may contravene the fourteenth amendment if enacted with discriminatory purpose (B) holding that a law did not violate the first amendment because it did not burden the exchange of ideas and noting most laws restricting a states initiative process would not implicate the first amendment (C) holding that facially neutral laws or acts of general applicability do not violate the first amendment merely because of their incidental effects (D) holding that statute which prohibited polygamy did not violate first amendment (E) holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws
Output: (C)
yet to collect the judgment as Billie and Bert assert they have no assets. Several years after the first final judgment was entered, Bermudez filed a motion to add the Tribe as a judgment debtor in the matter because the Tribe had funded and guided Billie and Bert’s defense in the lawsuit. The Tribe objected on several grounds, including sovereign immunity. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Bermu- dez’s motion. On July 9, 2013, the trial court accordingly entered a second final judgment in favor of Bermudez and solely against the Tribe for the full amount of the original final judgment, plus interest, for a total judgment of just over $4.1 million. That final judgment did not reference the earlier final judgment against Billie and Ber Cal.1898) (<HOLDING>). For a discussion of when issue preclusion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent (B) holding that copyright infringement defendant failed to prove the affirmative defense of unclean hands which was based on the patent holders marking of its product with an expired patent because there was no evidence that the patent holder had acted with the requisite intent to deceive (C) holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement (D) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (E) holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent
Output: (A)
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 261, 92 S.Ct. 885, some of these factors are "not relevant” in suits for injunctive relief, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 484, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986). But suits for injunctive relief, no less than suits for damages, require a plaintiff to demonstrate an "injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Moreover, an antitrust plaintiff — whether seeking relief in law or equity — must demonstrate "antitrust injury,” the more subtle details of which are not relevant here. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 484; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws (B) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit (C) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (D) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (E) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing
Output: (A)
court’s prison sentence.” Crace, 207 F.3d at 836. The facts of the present case support the conclusion that the district court considered and rejected the § 3583(d) option. Johnson’s counsel made the § 3583(d) argument at the hearing shortly before the district court revoked Johnson’s supervised release. Thus, it would be difficult to conclude that the district court was not aware of the option. The district court’s conclusion that an intensive drug-treatment program in prison was “[t]he only solution ... to help” Johnson with his crack addiction, Hr’g Tr. at 15, suggests that the district court concluded that the in-patient program urged by defense counsel would not address Johnson’s addiction problem adequately. See also United States v. McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Washington, 147 F.3d 490, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate court may infer that district court considered sentencing guidelines policy statements despite district courts failure to make explicit reference to them (B) holding that the district court should not have considered a  2255 petition based on an alleged misapplication of the sentencing guidelines (C) holding that failure to permit intervention was harmless where the appellate court considered the defendants claim  as if the district court had al lowed them to intervene (D) holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines (E) holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines
Output: (A)