niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Vt. 351, 353-54, 779 A.2d 42, 45 (2001) (declining to reach question of whether there was an actual change in circumstances when child support order previously agreed to by the parties was more than a ten-percent deviation from the guidelines). ¶ 7. The family court suggested that our current interpretation of § 660(b) creates a potential for abuse: noncustodial parents could agree to pay child support which exceeds the guidelines one day only to return to court the next with a motion to modify based on the percent age difference between the stipulated amount and the guideline calculation. Courts in some other jurisdictions have interpreted rules similar to § 660(b) in a manner that attempts to avoid this potential evil. See, e.g., Flannery v. Flannery, 950 P.2d 126, 132 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>). In arriving at our interpretation, we found 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rule presuming a change of circumstances when the amount of child support ordered deviates more than fifteen percent from what would be owed under a current application of the guidelines does not apply if obligor agreed to the deviation (B) holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding (C) holding trial court may consider social security disability dependency benefits received by the child and may deviate from the application of the child support guidelines if application of the guidelines is unjust or inappropriate (D) holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid (E) recognizing impact of child support guidelines
Output: (A)
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dill, 108 A.3d 882, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (en banc) (“On appeal, we will not consider assignments of error that were not brought to the tribunal’s attention at a time at which the error could have been corrected or the alleged prejudice could have been mitigated.”), petition for allowance of appeal filed, No. 69 EAL 2015 (Pa. Feb. 11, 2015). The proposition is also well settled that a party may not raise for the first time an argument not previously made to a lower court by inserting the issue into a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). “A party cannot rectify the failure to preserve an issue by proffering it in response to a Rule 1925(b) order.” Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 839 A.2d 437, 444 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (<HOLDING>), aff’d per curiam, 584 Pa. 129, 870 A.2d 318 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived (B) holding under parap 302a issue not raised until after summary judgment was granted and then only in a statement of matters complained of on appeal was waived for purposes of appeal (C) holding that issue not raised in a statement filed pursuant to parap 1925b is waived for purposes of appeal (D) holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal (E) holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal
Output: (B)
At 667. Wearly in fact supports the data owners here. Although the Third Circuit there found a pre-enforcement proceeding premature, it noted: In acting on [a] petition [by an agency for an order enforcing a subpoena] the district court’s role is not that of a mere rubber stamp, but of an independent reviewing authority called upon to insure the integrity of the proceeding. “The system of judicial enforcement is designed to provide a meaningful day in court for one resisting an administrative subpoena.” In the discharge of that duty, the court has the power to condition enforcement upon observance of safeguards to the respondent’s valid interests. Id. at 665 (citation omitted; footnote omitted). Cf. FTC v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 62,830 at 78,792-93 (D.Colo.1979) (<HOLDING>). The FTC has itself provided the “10 day 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ojrdinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the apa the regulation is invalid however when equity demands the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures citation omitted (B) holding that schreiber was not controlling in an ftc subpoena enforcement action because in schreiber the fcc acted pursuant to a validly promulgated regulation while the ftc had not adopted such a rule regarding the confidentiality of subpoenaed material (C) holding that the claim must be based upon the implementation or execution of a policy statement ordinance regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that bodys officers (D) holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena (E) holding that procedures that are implicit and incidental to procedures otherwise explicitly provided for in a properly adopted rule or regulation do not require further codification by a further adopted rule or regulation and to hold otherwise belies statutory intent   and that such an argument based on the lack of a rule or regulation to cover every step of the testing procedures  is not only speculative and theoretical but also hypertechnical
Output: (B)
future dangerousness is placed at issue during the penalty phase of a capital trial, and state law prohibits the defendant from being released on parole, “due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.” Id. at 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187. A majority of the High Court reiterated this principle in Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178 (2001), stating that when a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and state law precludes the defendant from being paroled, the jury must be advised of the defendant’s parole ineligibility through a jury instruction or closing arguments of counsel. Id. at 39, 121 S.Ct. 1263. See also Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In the ease at bar, the prosecutor placed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court erred in relying on authority other than that of the supreme court of the united states in its analysis under  2254d (B) recognizing that the supreme court has indicated that affirmative misconduct is a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the united states (C) recognizing that where a state prisoner declines to pursue certiorari in the united states supreme court that petitioners conviction is not final  until  after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the supreme court has passed (D) recognizing that the united states supreme court reiterated the simmons holding in shafer (E) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states
Output: (D)
required then&emdash;and all we require now&emdash;is that the employer show that it established a § 207(k) work period and that the § 207(k) work period was regularly recurring. Id. (citations omitted). Specific reference to § 207(k) is not necessary to satisfy this standard. Consistent with our sister circuits, we decline to require more of employers to qualify for the § 207(k) exemption. See Rosano v. Twp. of Teaneck, 754 F.3d 177, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2014); Calvao v. Town of Framingham, 599 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2010); Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 810 (6th Cir. 2001); Freeman v. City of Mobile, 146 F.3d 1292, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998); Spradling, 95 F.3d at 1505; Barefield, 81 F.3d at 710; see also Milner v. Hazelwood, 165 F.3d 1222, 1223 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The City has satisfied the criteria for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no liberty interest was implicated where the public reason for employees dismissal was that their services did not meet the expectations of the public employer (B) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (C) holding that defendant need not establish that he was not engaged in unlawful activity under section 776012 (D) holding that employer need not establish the exemption through public declaration (E) holding that insurance company administering employerprovided disability plan was not place of public accommodation under ada because employees received their benefits through employment not through a public accommodation
Output: (D)
the collateral it held as security for the bonds. Together with the $82,-001.19 recovered from this same collateral and tendered by the Trustee towards the surety’s claim based on the Wigley settlement, Eastern Indemnity received back $217,558.19 of the $315,557 it had disbursed, leaving a balance of $97,998.81 paid out on behalf of Boggs but not reimbursed. 4 . The precise amount of the fund is the original $90,000, less administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate, plus interest earned on the balance. 5 . Similarly, Trinity Bank contests the bankruptcy court’s finding that Stiegler had apparent authority to subordinate the bank's priority but fails to address Insurance Co. of North America v. Fredonia State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). 6 . See also id. §§ 1-18 (discussing in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding apparent authority can never be derived from the acts of the agent alone but is to be determined by indicia of authority given by the principal (B) holding that authority with which the  1983 defendant is clothed may be actual or apparent (C) holding that a bank may be estopped from denying the apparent authority of one who serves as its executive vice president (D) holding that the fact that a corporate president added the word president after his name on a guaranty agreement could not defeat the agreements purpose of making the president a guarantor of the corporations promissory note the addition of the word president did not create a corporation guaranty of its own obligation (E) holding that defendants position as bank vice president which allowed him knowledge of the banking system and the operations of the bank as well as the ability to oversee commercial and real estate loans and to act as a compliance officer qualified as a position of trust
Output: (C)
the LASH barges to a fleeting area in the Calcutta docks, moving them for loading and unloading purposes, and towing them back to Calcutta to be reloaded on the mother ship, according to schedule. The Memorandum Agreement specifies plainly that it is Eastern’s responsibility to ensure safe towing and handling of the barges in tow. Construction of a maritime contract is governed by maritime law. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir.1986). The court in Moore v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 912 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1990) reviewed the unique characteristics of a time charter agreement: Under the traditional time-charter agreement, the time charterer directs the vessel’s commercial activities. It may designate the cargo to ine Office, Inc., 462 F.Supp. 485, 490 (E.D.La.1978) (<HOLDING>). The time charterer’s duties are different 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that the time to disposition is more important than time to trial (C) holding time charterer liable for injury to passenger during navigation in rough seas when time charterer decided to encounter the weather (D) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (E) holding that an encounter was consensual where the defendant was comfortable during the encounter chose not to leave and acquiesced to the officers request to answer questions
Output: (C)
employees were terminated provided that public hospitals “shall have full power and authority to promulgate and adopt suitable staff and hospital rules and regulations, to employ such personnel as may be necessary to properly maintain and operate such hospital, and to establish employee salaries and other employment benefits as may be advisable to attrac ns this case because of the well established rule of statutory construction in Mississippi that, when a cause of action is created solely by statute and that statute is amended by the legislature, the courts are to treat the statute as if it had always existed as amended and must apply the statute as it exists at trial, regardless of whether the amendment was , 421 F.Supp. 393, 397-98 (N.D.Miss.1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). We do not decide that issue in this case, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mississippi statute providing that employees could be terminated only for cause establishes a property interest under the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that mississippi statute and city ordinance providing employer the right to discharge employees found inefficient or for other good cause creates a property interest (C) holding that an atwill employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reason for a discharge was the employees exercise of a right conferred by a wellestablished legislative enactment (D) holding the pro se plaintiff has no breach of contract or wrongful discharge claim against defendant employer where the employer wrongfully characterized her discharge as for cause but remanding to trial court to consider whether the pro se plaintiff suffered some other compensable injury if the employer as alleged intentionally mischaracterized the plaintiffs discharge in order to reduce its unemployment contributions (E) holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist
Output: (B)
specifically, how to define “adjoining area” under the Act. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.1980) (en bane), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 3031, 69 L.Ed.2d 406 (1981). The Winchester majority adopted a broad definition of “adjoining area” that was in keeping with the plain meaning of the words, as well as “the spirit of the congressional purposes.” Id. at 514. The decades since Winchester was decided have re Appx. 793 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming LHWCA situs status for job shop specializing in the repair and construction of marine parts where shop was one-hundred feet from river and located in area customarily used for maritime activity); Mobil Mining & Minerals v. Nixson, 209 F.3d 719 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Sisson v. Davis & Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that floating casino was not a covered situs (B) holding that a fixed oil production platform was not a covered situs (C) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (D) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (E) holding injury at premises adjacent to the houston ship channel occurred on a covered situs
Output: (E)
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing “broad range of permissible decisions available to the district court”). Kalume’s 14-month sentence was at the high end of her 8-14 month Sentencing Guidelines range. “[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). This case presents no exception. The district court was entitled to rely on Kalume’s lack of remorse, a factor informing her Guidelines range, to explain its decision as to where to sentence within that range. See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); accord United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act (B) recognizing lack of remorse as factor that can inform sentence (C) recognizing generally if the ultimate sentence is reasonable and the sentencing judge did not commit procedural error in imposing that sentence we will not second guess the weight or lack thereof that the judge accorded to a given factor or to a specific argument made pursuant to that factor internal quotation marks and alteration omitted (D) recognizing temporal proximity as important factor (E) holding that evidence that defendant robbed the victim after killing him showed a lack of remorse
Output: (B)
(emphasis added) (citing Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., 202 Misc. 900, 118 N.Y.S.2d 162 (S.Ct.1952)); (“Where defendant inserted a picture of a motion picture actress using a certain camera, with an inscription beneath it giving her name, in a manual for the use of such camera, she was permitted a recovery.”) (emphasis added) (citing Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App.Div.1963)). To the extent that Palmer involved the unauthorized use of professional golfers’ names and playing records in the defendant’s board games, the court acknowledges that Palmer has certain factual similarities to the matter under consideration, but with the critical exception that the defendant in Palmer used golfers’ pictures; ther s’ Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) ; Toney v. L’Oreal USA 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a firearm constituted use under  924c1a (B) holding that the right of publicity is descendible (C) holding that the defendants use of players likenesses in parody trading cards violated the right of publicity (D) holding that the defendants use of a models likeness in connection with the packaging and promotion of its hair care product violated the right of publicity (E) holding that a change of venue was not warranted due to publicity surrounding an unrelated murder with common features because the defendant failed to establish any specific prejudice against him as a result of the publicity
Output: (C)
in the passage quoted above, we explicitly noted that “the government is not required to furnish the defendant with a list of witnesses in a non-capital case....” Id. at 1392 n. 4. Accordingly, we conclude that under Hicks and Rule 16, the district court exceeded its authority to the extent that it ordered the government to disclose a pretrial list of its non-expert witnesses. 2. Preclusion of Undisclosed Witnesses from the Government’s Case-in-Chief A district court has the power to exclude the government’s evidence as a sanction, but only for a “violation of any constitutional provision, federal statute, specific discovery order, or any other recognized right.” United States v. Schwartz, 857 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1046 (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2)(C). Here, the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude because the record showed considerable confusion on the part of the juror (B) holding that federal rule of evidence 408 authorizes the district court to exclude settlement letters (C) holding that the separationofpowers principle imposes significant limits on the district courts use of its supervisory powers to exclude governments evidence (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order
Output: (C)
for acceptance of responsibility, giving him an offense level of 17. This offense level, combined with his criminal history category of IV, yielded a sentencing range of 37 to 46 months. On May 27, 1994, the petitioner was sentenced to 44 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $50 special assessment. II. DISCUSSION The petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. Section 2255 provides four avenues for relief where: (1) the sentence was in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; and (4) the sentence was otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lopez-Torres v. United States, 876 F.2d 4, 5 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing primary assumption of risk as a viable doctrine (B) holding that such a theory is viable under title vii (C) recognizing a challenge to jurisdiction as a viable claim (D) recognizing sentencing manipulation as a viable defense (E) holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim
Output: (C)
is supported by the weight of authority from other states. Com. v. Dent, 992 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. 2010), is the most recent and definitive case on the issue. In Dent, the Pennsylvania court was confronted with this question in the specific context of Texas Hold’Em. The court applied the predominate-factor test. 992 A.2d at 192-93. After reviewing the existing case law on whether poker was a game of chance or skill, the court found that “while the outcome of poker may be dependent on skill to some degree, it is predominately a game of chance. . . . [While] skill can determine die outcome in a poker game, players are still subject to defeat at the turn of the cards.” 992 A.2d at 196. See also Plato’s Cave Corp. v. State Liquor Authority, 115 App. Div. 2d 426, 496 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In Joker Club, L.L.C. v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deference to the guidelines depends on the thoroughness of the commissions analysis and the validity of its reasoning (B) holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden (C) holding that the outcome depends materially on the draw of the cards (D) holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred (E) holding that a predominance finding depends on a courts choice of law analysis
Output: (C)
Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The prosecutor’s statement did not improperly shift the burden of proof onto the defense; rather, the prosecutor was commenting on the state of the evidence. More specifically, the prosecutor was commenting on the weakness of the defense theory of the case that another assailant had been present at the crime. Neither are improper. See, e.g. United States v. Cabrera, 201 F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 26-34, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, even if the prosecutor had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence (B) holding that a prosecutor may comment on the absence of evidence so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecutors version of events (C) holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence (D) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (E) holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense
Output: (B)
The juvenile probation officers and evaluating psychologist all admitted that lying to police officers and probation would not support a finding that appellant is amenable to probation and programming. Appellant argues that this factor should weigh in favor of EJJ because he was never offered formal programming and that the district court erred in considering informal programming in his home and school. However, we have consistently held that, in the consideration of this factor, the district court may evaluate the juvenile’s willingness to cooperate with informal programming by considering his behavior in school, home, and juvenile detention and his affiliations with gangs. See In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn.App.2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (B) holding that the court without violating due process of the law may conduct a hearing to determine whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction even if the juvenile fails to appear if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juveniles behalf (C) holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals (D) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (E) holding that the juveniles failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming
Output: (E)
property are merely a proposal that may never come to fruition, the Kolbs cannot recover for a present taking. The City bases its argument on case law stating, “future plans which might result in a future taking are merely ‘future prospects’ and, as such, cannot constitute a taking.” Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564 S.W.2d 816, 821 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). Further, “the announcement of a projected public improvement together with preparation of plans and maps showing the property in question within the limits of the project, without any interference with the landowner’s use, does not constitute a present taking.” Id. at 822. Here, however, the City has directly infringed upon the owner’s current use of the property. See Westgate, 843 S.W.2d at 453 (<HOLDING>). We find, therefore, that the Kolbs have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court was allowed to consider for the purpose of determining just compensation in a condemnation action expert testimony regarding whether the owner of the condemned property would have received permits to develop wetlands existing on the property (B) holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action (C) holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property (D) holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property (E) recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property
Output: (E)
it did, the court, in essence, added that exception to paragraph eight and thus provided Prime with a better bargain than Prime had negotiated for itself. Illinois recognizes a strong presumption against provisions that easily could have been included in a contract but were not. Miner v. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 405, 417, 794 N.E.2d 902, 914 (2003). Further, “the rights of parties to a contract are limited by the terms expressed in the contract and courts may not rewrite language or add provisions to make the agreement more equitable.” Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois, 341 Ill. App. 3d 14, 26, 792 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2003) (McBride, PJ., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part); Shields Pork Plus, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 312, 767 N.E.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Frederick v. Professional Truck Driver 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (B) holding that evidence of custom and usage is admissible to add to a contract that is silent on a particular matter (C) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (D) recognizing that courts will not add terms to a contract about which the contract is silent (E) holding a deviation from the terms of a contract constitutes an impairment of contract
Output: (D)
hostile work environment claims from the general Ricks rule because such claims “ ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day,’ and instead usually involve a pattern of acts that aren’t ‘actionable on [their] own’ but give rise to a legal violation only when assessed in their totality.” Almond, 665 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061). Here, the Court does not construe Plaintiffs pleadings to allege a hostile work environment claim. Even construing Plaintiffs pleadings liberally, his generic assertions that Defendant Beilis treated him in a hostile manner toward the end of his employment and sent him hostile emails fall far short of asserting a claim for age-based hostile work environment. See Phillips v. Moore, 164 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1254 (D.Kan.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite Plaintiffs averment that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments (B) holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims (C) holding that certain conduct was irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of it (D) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (E) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
Output: (B)
Id, at 353, 332 S.E.2d at 808. The Court in Atkinson refused to expand the “bom alive” rule to cover criminal offenses, holding, “Neither our murder statute, W.Va. Code, 61-2-1, nor its attendant common law principles authorize prosecution of an individual for the killing of a viable unborn child.” Id., Syllabus Point 2. Since Atkinson was decided, the Legislature passed the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, which provides that a “fetus” can be the victim of certain violent ding a mother was not criminally liable for knowingly causing injury to a child under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury after the mother’s pre-birth ingestion of heroin caused her child to suffer heroin withdrawal symptoms postpartum); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Encoe, 110 Nev. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a woman possessed immunity from criminal prosecution for causing injury or death to her fetus (B) holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child (C) holding for purposes of establishing the offense of reckless manslaughter against a pregnant woman a fetus is not a person (D) holding a mothers ingestion of a controlled substance while pregnant does not constitute child abuse as an unborn child is not a person for purposes of criminal prosecution (E) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute
Output: (E)
distribute cocaine, LSD, and mushrooms could not later assert that he only knew about cocaine). We decline to follow the reasoning of Tolson and Eaves, being persuaded that the better reasoning limits the effect of a guilty plea to an admission of the facts essential to the validity of the conviction. The appropriate course is not, as the government argues, for the defendant to “delete this [overt] act from the guilty plea,” but rather, for the government at the plea colloquy to seek an explicit admission of any unlawful conduct which it seeks to attribute to the defendant. Having failed to do so, the government must follow the normal procedure of proving relevant conduct at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf. United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Because the government did not prove, and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inference of intent to distribute was not warranted from the possession of one ounce of cocaine (B) holding that a plea to an indictment charging a 28member conspiracy involving possession with intent to distribute or distribution of 30 kilograms of cocaine did not relieve the government of proving at sentencing the amount attributable to the defendant (C) holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (D) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (E) holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute
Output: (B)
the same as two years ago." Mark D. Killian, Lawyers’ Income is Flat as Firms Brace for Lean Times, Fla. B. News, Feb. 1, 2009, at 8. 4 . Although Mr. Hagopian styled his filing as an ‘'objection,” it was — in effect — a motion to withdraw from Mr. Green’s case. For this reason, we will refer to Mr. Hagopian’s ‘‘objection” as a motion to withdraw in the balance of this opinion. 5 . The JAC has filed a separate petition for certiorari from another order challenging various aspects of the payment arrangements for Mr. Hagopian ordered by the circuit court. This petition is pending in this court under case number 2D09-98. 6 . We note that the State did not oppose Mr. Hagopian's motion to withdraw in the circuit court. Cf. State v. Public Defender, 12 So.3d 798, 800-01 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). 7 . We commend Kevin T. Beck and Todd A. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (B) holding that there is a presumptive common law right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions  but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents (C) holding that the state had standing to oppose motions to withdraw filed by the public defender (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that it was inappropriate to allow petitioner to withdraw while motions were pending before the court and ready to be argued
Output: (C)
are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life’s basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities. While section 3 does not refer to “fundamental rights” per se, nevertheless, we have held a right may be “fundamental” under Montana’s constitution if the right is either found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right “without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.” Butte Community Union v. Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (<HOLDING>). The inalienable right to pursue life’s basic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that montanas constitution does not create a right to welfare (B) holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan (C) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (D) holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information (E) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution
Output: (A)
for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions.” Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected
Output: (B)
Reeves, 410 F.3d 1031, 1033-34 (8th Cir.2005). Smith’s Blakely challenge falls within the scope of his appeal waiver. Relying on Blakely, Smith argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it included drug quantities not admitted by him or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in setting his sentence. Smith argues that his base offense level should have been 32 based on the admitted drug quantities rather than 34 based on additional drug quantities as found by the district court. This Blakely challenge is quintessential^ a constitutional challenge to the Guidelines and is expressly precluded by Smith’s agreement not to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the Guidelines. See United States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 730, 2005 WL 1558486 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Nor does Smith’s appeal fall within the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants failure to object to the denial of his right peremptorily to challenge alternates constitutes a waiver of any right to appeal the issue (B) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines (C) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence unless its was an upward departure barred appeal of sentence within guidelines range
Output: (B)
our circuit has noted that we have “no opinion on whether the habitual residence of a child who lacks cognizance of his or her surroundings should be determined by considering the subjective intentions of his or her parents.” Robert, 507 F.3d at 992 n.4. By “subjective intentions,” we mean the parents’ last “settled mutual intent” for where their child would live. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2010); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995). The district court noted the reliance by courts on the shared parental intent standard in cases concerning especially young children. See, e.g., Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 746 (7th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Holder, 392 F.3d at 1016-17). 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that claim meaning will sometimes be readily apparent even to lay judges and that claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words (B) recognizing  parental intent acts as a surrogate in cases involving very young children for whom the concept of acclimatization has little meaning (C) holding the prospective adoptive father of surrogate children did not comply with the interstate compact on the placement of children (D) holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release (E) holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights
Output: (B)
Depo. at 249-50. Even if I were permitted to consider this statement, it still would not establish that the scoring list was a pretext for discrimination. Since Longoria’s claims fail on the merits, injunctive relief is not appropriate. Accordingly, I must grant summary judgment on the official capacity claims. C. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION Since I have dismissed all claims under which Longoria can claim federal jurisdiction, I shall exercise my discretion to dismiss the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). These claims will be dismissed without prejudice to Longoria’s right to pursue them in the courts of New Jersey. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Kadetsky v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that only exceptional circumstances on the level of the invocation of a significant federal policy or severe prejudice or unfairness to the parties should be considered as a basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction when state law predominates (B) holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims (C) holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances (D) holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim (E) holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court
Output: (A)
failed to ' pay Tomlin at the time-and-a-half rate for the hours he worked in excess of forty per week. In the event of such a failure, we instruct the ALC to determine the rate of compensation to which Tomlin was entitled, the number of overtime hours that were underpaid, and the amount the Department owes Tomlin for his labor. II. Remaining Issues With regard to Tomlin’s remaining issues, we affirm based upon the following authorities: 1. As to the circuit court’s remand to the ALC for determination of the prevailing wage: Condor, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, City of N. Charleston, 328 S.C. 173, 178, 493 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1997) (preventing an appellant from arguing on appeal an issue conceded in the trial court); Bowman v. Bowman, 357 S.C. 146, 160, 591 S.E.2d 654, 661 (Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 2. As to whether Tomlin was an employee of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even when the issue is constitutional in nature an argument is not preserved on appeal unless the appellant raised and made the argument at trial and obtained a ruling on it nor will a particular theory be addressed on appeal if it was not presented below (B) holding a party cannot seek and receive a particular result at trial and then challenge it on appeal (C) holding that defendant must object at trial to preserve as applied challenge for appeal (D) holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court (E) holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal
Output: (B)
on the conditions stated in the publicly-filed limited partnership certificate. We affirm the appellants’ liability under § 106(l)(b). The certificates of limited partnership for TSG, TMG, and TSG 80 all state that, if necessary to satisfy the partnership’s recourse obligations, each limited partner has agreed, upon demand, to make an additional capital contribution of up to three times the limited partner’s original investment. These certificates were recorded publicly in New York County. Accordingly, the capital of the Limited Partnerships upon which creditors properly could rely included the limited partners’ stated ob ligation to make additional capital contributions. See Arno Management Corp. v. 115 East 69th Assocs., 173 A.D.2d 258, 260, 569 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dept.1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 106(l)(b) explicitly provides a means 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability (C) recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership (D) recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state (E) holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties
Output: (E)