niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
judge erred when he changed his mind as to the admissibility of the shed statement. She contends she was entitled to rely upon the inadmissibility of this evidence and that the district court violated her due process rights in changing its ruling one week before trial without granting her request for a continuance. The State argues that due process does not prevent a trial court from changing a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence and that a decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion was not abused in this case. “The Due Process Clause guarantees every defendant the right to a trial comporting with basic tenets of fundamental fairness.” State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008) (<HOLDING>). However, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness (B) recognizing the purpose of crossexamination is to enlighten the jury as to whether the witness actuallyas a matter of fact knows the general reputation of the defendant and to place the jury in a better position to pass upon the credibility of the witness testimony (C) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (D) holding no due process violation where the state took one position regarding the credibility of a witness during the trial against defendant and changed its position in a subsequent trial of another defendant involved in the underlying crime (E) holding that section 90403 florida statutes did not preclude testimony that a critical state witness knew that the defendant had previously murdered a child when the credibility of the witness was at issue due to his failure initially to fully cooperate with law enforcement officers investigating the crime for which the defendant was on trial
Output: (D)
“support[] a rule requiring trial judges to prescreen eyewitness evidence for reliability any time an identification is made under suggestive circumstances.” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 725. It held that “the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” Id. at 730 (emphasis added). “The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” Id. at 728 (emphasis added); see also State v. Addison, 160 N.H. 792, 801-02 (2010) (<HOLDING>). We read Perry as confirming our conclusion in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the biggers analysis does not apply to either incourt or outofcourt identification in the absence of improper state action (B) holding that in the absence of some express indication from congress title vii does not apply to the military (C) holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action (D) holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state (E) holding in conflict of laws analysis that it was proper to apply the law of the state of washington as to the measure of damages which involved the substantive rights of the parties
Output: (A)
preempts the Lacey Act to that extent. Contrary to appellants’ assertion, nothing in the Lacey Act suggests that the Magnuson Act preempts 18 U.S.C. § Cir.1983) (stating that the rule of lenity has no application to defendant’s preemption claim where “the elements required to prove the respective statutes differ so unambiguously”). IV. Accordingly, we hold that 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), the Magnuson Act’s criminal false statement provision, does not preempt 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the general federal criminal false statement provision. Appellants’ convictions therefore are AFFIRMED. 1 . Stated another way, appellants claim that 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), as applied to the facts of this case, implicitly repealed 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Cf. United States v. Herring, 916 F.2d 1543, 1547 (llth Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The interim rule originally was effective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18 usc  1920 the misdemeanor false statement provision of the federal employees compensation act feca preempted 18 usc  1001 because  41 of feca expressly repealed all inconsistent statutes (B) holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b (C) holding that where defendant lied to a federal magistrate performing an administrative function there was a violation of 18 usc  1001 (D) holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001
Output: (E)
failed to allege any “specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegation” that Plaintiff’s injuries were precipitated through a municipal policy or custom. Hossman v. Blunk, 784 F.2d 793, 797 (7th Cir.1986); see also Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432-33, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). Moreover, the complaint’s conclusory allegations likewise failed to substantiate any claim that Gerald’s death was caused by a failure to adequately train the police officers involved. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir.1985); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (<HOLDING>). As to these four Defendants, then, no federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no deliberate indifference when a failure to take reasonable measures was due to defendants mistake (B) holding that a failure to adequately train will only result in  1983 liability where that failure amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact (C) holding that deliberate indifference is the level of culpability pretrial detainees must establish to maintain a failure to protect claim under the fourteenth amendment (D) holding city may be liable for the failure to train officers regarding appropriate assistance and treatment of intoxicated persons (E) holding that a complaint alleging a single incident of police officer misconduct together with an assertion that the districts failure to train its officers showed deliberate indifference was sufficient to state a claim under monell
Output: (B)
F.3d 490, 510 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that a co-defendant can “free ride” on the objection of another only if trial judge makes it clear that such a practice will be followed). Appellants’ objections to the process are essentially twofold: first, that the jurors were in effect “volunteers,” and second, that the court’s hardship excusáis were invalid because they failed to fit the criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(1). Although the statute does not in terms bar a jury of volunteers, courts have held that such a jury fails to satisfy the Act’s goals of random selection and of exclusion only on objective grounds. See United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 611 (5th Cir.1977). But see Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 449 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). We assume that a truly voluntary jury would 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pennsylvania national guard members could be used for civilian law enforcement because they were not in federal service at the time (B) holding that the challenged practices were not consumeroriented under  349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents (C) holding that prospective jurors randomly asked if they could serve at a particular time were not volunteers (D) holding if plaintiff does not serve report as to particular defendant trial court must dismiss that defendant from suit (E) holding officers did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene because they were not present at the time of the shooting
Output: (C)
he heard from Rae Davis that Sergeant Benson sexually assaulted Ms. Kramer. When he did have knowledge of the sexual harassment, he took immediate action by starting an investigation. Soon thereafter, Sergeant Benson resigned and the source of Ms. Kramer’s harassment was removed. Particularly given the absence of admissible evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could find that Sheriff Van Wagoner had any discriminatory intent, and Sheriff Van Wagoner is entitled to qualified immunity. Alleged Custom, Practice, or Policy Wasatch County may only be liable under § 1983 if it had a custom, practice, or policy that condoned sexual harassment in the workplace. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The custom, practice, or policy must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 under a theory of respondeat superi or but may be liable for policies or customs that violate an employees constitutional rights (B) holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom (C) holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 (D) holding that municipality may not be held liable under  1983 upon theory of respondeat superior (E) holding inter alia that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory
Output: (A)
318 (1987)). However, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). “It is only ‘when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that [the] claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim ... or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.’” Brittingham, 526 F.3d at 278 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp., at 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (<HOLDING>). A careful reading of the complaint in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (B) holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit (C) holding that if the resolution of a statelaw claim depends upon the meaning of a collectivebargaining agreement the application of state law  is preempted and federal laborlaw principles  necessarily uniform throughout the nation  must be  employed to resolve the dispute (D) holding that a statelaw claim is preempted and removable from state court if resolution of the claim depends on an interpretation of the collectivebargaining agreement (E) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law
Output: (C)
factual disputes. See Doc. 57. Further, although the Court has reviewed the entire-record, the Court will discuss only the facts necessary to resolve the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 4 .All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 5 . See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 41 F.Supp.3d 927, 962 (E.D.Cal.2014) (finding California law imposing a 10-day waiting period on purchase of firearms "burdens [and violates] the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 n. 8 (3d Cir.2010) ("Commercial regulations on the sale of firearms do not fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment”); Illinois Ass'n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F.Supp.2d 928, 947 (N.D.Ill.2014) (<HOLDING>); Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chicagos laws which ban gun sales and transfers other than inheritance are declared unconstitutional under the second amendment (B) holding that sales made to contractor who builds roads for the state are not sales to the state and therefore are not exempt (C) holding that because the first sentence of  45106a expressly limited the preemptive effect to inconsistent state regulation it would not infer a negative pregnant from the second sentence of subsection a that laws other than the specific state criminal laws described would be preempted (D) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept (E) holding that a juvenile whose sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment is entitled to be resentenced under chapter 2014220 laws of florida
Output: (A)
that his experts meet the standard of reliability required of expert scientific testimony pursuant to the Alberico factors. See Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 (“We will not search the record for facts, arguments, and rulings in order to support generalized arguments.”). {27} It was Mr. Firstenberg’s burden, in the district court, to show that his experts, including his treating physician, Dr. Elliott, were qualified to present scientific expert testimony as to the cause of his EMS symptoms. See Parkhill, 2010-NMCA-110, ¶ 20 (stating that a treating physician must be qualified pursuant to the Alberico factors in order to present scientific expert testimony as to the external causation of the patient’s symptoms); id. ¶ 54 (Vigil, J., specially concurring) (<HOLDING>). The district court, having reviewed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony (B) recognizing burden (C) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law (D) holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that trial courts are gatekeepers in determining fitness of scientific expert testimony for admissibility at trial
Output: (A)
specific performance of an earnest money agreement. Id. at 1019. In that case, the plaintiffs had failed to make a payment in accordance with the parties' contract and the defendant, consequently, refused to convey the property. Id. at 1020. The plaintiffs sought specific performance of the purchase contract, and the defendant was, therefore, required to defend by showing that the plaintiffs did not perform their contractual obligations. Id. at 1028. Since the defendant did not disaffirm the contract, but chose, instead, to rely on the terms of the contract, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was entitled to recover his attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of the contract. Id. See also Oral Roberts University v. Anderson, 11 F.Supp.2d 13836 (N.D.Okla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Weter v. Archambault, 313 Mont. 284, 61 P.8d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract (B) recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea (C) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees (D) holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute (E) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees
Output: (A)
headings from the approximately 34,000 options in the heading book. With so many related headings to describe a business principally known as a bakery, BAPCO’s arrangement of the listing of a particular bakery under one, two, three, four, or more headings is neither “obvious” nor “practically inevitable” as defined in Feist. See Feist, 499 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1297, 113 L.Ed.2d at 380. Accordingly, the evidence is clear that BAPCO’s arrangement was in no sense mechanical. On the contrary, the 1984 Yellow Pages reflects several layers of BAP-CO choices on grouping 106,398 business listings under approximately 7,000 classified headings, which BAPCO selected from a heading book containing 4,700 primary entries and 34,000 related headings. Accord Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514 (<HOLDING>). Donnelley challenges BAPCO’s evidence of an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement (B) holding that a classified publishers grouping of over 9000 listings into approximately 260 different categories constituted original arrangement entitled to copyright protection (C) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (D) holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently (E) holding over
Output: (B)
is not permitted to assert in a subsequent infringement action that the same structure is equivalent to the structure described in the patentee’s specification for purposes of section 112 paragraph 6. Id. Based on the clear disavowal found in the file wrapper, we concluded that the accused device did not include an equivalent to the claimed function’s corresponding structure. Id. at 1362, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1501; see also Bell Atl. Network, 262 F.3d at 1273-75, 59 USPQ2d at 1874-76 (relying on prosecution history to limit claimed “transceiver” to the three stated modes, because of clearly limiting statements made by the patentee to the examiner to overcome a prior art rejection); Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 260 F.3d 1343, 1349, 59 USPQ2d 1790, 1794 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1576-77, 34 USPQ2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the patentee had disavowed curing done at the higher conventional curing temperatures because of representations to the patent examiner that the prior art curing temperatures were too high and because of the numerous references to a low temperature cure or low temperature vulcanization throughout the file wrapper (B) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art (C) holding that after reading the patent a person of skill in the art would not understand the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding of obviousness affirmed on the basis of the teachings of the prior art references in combination not on the basis of the contemporaneous invention
Output: (A)
an untrue statement of material fact; (6) failed to state a material fact necessary to make other statements not misleading; and (7) made a statement in such a manner as to mislead a reasonably prudent person to a false conclusion of a material fact. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff bases these claims both on Walker’s alleged misrepresentations during the enrollment phase and on Walker’s or another Paychex employee’s alleged fraudulent alteration of Mr. Kersh’s enrollment form. (Id. ¶ 31.) Defendants argue that these claims, like all others in the Complaint, relate to the Salto Plan and are therefore subject to conflict preemption. (MTD at 19.) While some claims brought under the Texas Insurance Code are preempted by ERISA, see, e.g., Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), such preemption is not automatic. Instead, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding negligent misrepresentation claim was not preempted because it neither sought benefits under plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits (B) holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan (C) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that claims for misrepresentation fraud and texas dtpa violations brought pursuant to article 2121 of the texas insurance code were completely preempted by erisa even if the result left the plaintiff with no adequate remedy for fraud
Output: (D)
is significant. Id. Determination of the nature of the motion for summary judgment under analysis is critical. Id. Accordingly, I first address how to review both parties’ motions. Here, Coastal brought its motion for summary judgment on its claim for contractual indemnity on traditional grounds. On the other hand, SWBT asserted that it brought its motion under both traditional and no-evidence grounds. SWBT filed “unified summary judgment exhibits” applicable to another pending motion and to its motion for summary judgment on Coastal’s contractual indemnity claim. I note that the mere existence of evidence attached to a no-evidence summary-judgment motion is not sufficient to allow the court to disregard the no-evidence motion. See Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, SWBT’s no-evidence motion merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment (B) holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion (C) holding that a motion to dismiss based on a forumselection clause should be treated as a rule 12b3 motion to dismiss for improper venue (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that evidence attached to noevidence motion shall not be considered but motion should not be disregarded or treated as traditional motion
Output: (E)
See Ernst, 427 F.3d at 359-60. The State of Tennessee has represented to the court that it is the “real party in interest,” that “[a]ny judgment entered against [DHS] would ultimately be paid by the State of Tennessee,” and that DDS is not legally distinct from DHS. (Docket No. 15 at 1.) The plaintiff has made no argument to the contrary. The second factor supports a finding of immunity because the operation of DHS is controlled by the state. See Ernst, 427 F.3d at 360. DHS was created by the state legislature, see Giorgio, 1996 WL 447656, *1 (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-3-1201), and DHS is identified by the Tennessee Code, the courts of the State of Tennessee, and Tennessee’s executive branch as an executive administrative agency of the state of Tennessee, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-101 (<HOLDING>); Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 464-65 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing dhs as one of the states twentyfour executive administrative agencies (B) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (C) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (D) recognizing that administrative agencies lack to power to consider or determine constitutional issues (E) holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege
Output: (A)
tribal court jurisdiction.” We have been unable to locate, however, any authorities that support the distinction drawn by the district court. It is well recognized that “[f]ederal question jurisdiction ... extends to ... claims that the exercise of tribal authority impermissibly exceeds the federal common-law limits imposed by the Supreme Court.” Cohen 3 F.3d 1412, 1421-22 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that among the “aspects of the dispute” that raised a federal question was the fact that “this case is being directed to the Tribal Court and exhaustion within that system” and further observing that “[t]he existence of tribal court jurisdiction itself presents a federal question within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1331”); cf. Arizona Publ. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Following the lead of our sister circuits, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation (B) holding states in exercising the federal trust power over indian tribes pursuant to a federal statute authorizing them to do so may enact legislation that would be an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of state power (C) holding that federal court has neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction over civil action by nonindian against indian for events occurring on the reservation (D) holding that in context of a challenge to a tribes legislative authority over a nonindian that was allegedly limited by contract a nonindian challenging an exercise of tribal adjudicatory or legislative power states a claim that arises under federal law (E) recognizing that tribes have an interest in a uniform body of federal law in the area of tribal immunity
Output: (D)
(“A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.”); HuntGolliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (7th Cir.1997) (suspension and suspension pending termination); Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir.2000) (denial of a raise); Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir.1999) (denial of a promotion). Markel could be considered to have been constructively discharged, though not in the traditional sense, or suspended pending termination. See Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.2000) (a constructive discharge normally occurs where an employer drives the employee to quit by making working conditions miserable); Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d 7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Murray v. Chicago Transit Authority, 252 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of a request for reimbursement for travel expenses did not constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (C) holding that a transfer to a worksite 180 miles away from plaintiffs home did not necessarily constitute an adverse employment action while noting that such a transfer could under some circumstances constitute an adverse employment action (D) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action (E) holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action
Output: (A)
clauses resulted in actual prejudice. 463 N.E.2d 257, 265-66 (Ind.1984). When an insured fails to provide its insurer with timely notice of an occurrence, we apply a two-part test. First, we inquire whether the insured notified the insurer within a reasonable amount of timé. Second, we determine whether the insurer suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. If notice was not tendered in a reasonable amount of time, there is a rebuttable presumption that the insurer was prejudiced. Id. at 266. Other jurisdictions have held that an insured can rebut this presumption of prejudice regarding late notice by showing that the insurance company would have denied coverage on unrelated grounds even if the notice had been timely. In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Bradley C d 842, 851 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strickler v. Huffine, 421 Pa.Super. 463, 618 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (B) holding that when an insurer denies coverage on grounds unrelated to late notice a strong presumption arises that the insurer has not suffered prejudice from the late notice (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice (E) holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved
Output: (A)
court is without power to extend that authority beyond the scope granted by the statute, and no District of Columbia court has ever found service upon such an unauthorized official to be valid against a foreign corporation. Accordingly, we conclude that service upon the Director was ineffective to bring Am-eritrade within the jurisdiction of the district court. Finally, Gorman urges that it would be unfair if a foreign corporation, lawfully subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia because it does business here, could evade that jurisdiction by keeping its agents out of the District and hence beyond the range of effective service of process. If such a loophole does exist, the legislature can, of course, remove it by amending § 13-384 to provide an alternative method 1) (<HOLDING>); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that making phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum may be sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction (B) holding that purposeful availment may exist when a defendant makes phone calls and sends facsimiles into the forum state and such communications form the bases for the action of an intentional tort (C) holding that the defendant companys action in sending a representative to ohio to negotiate a resolution of a prior dispute did not confer personal jurisdiction (D) holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction (E) holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts
Output: (A)
and sentences from the third remand. The district court denied that petition, and we affirmed. See Smith v. Coleman, 453 Fed.Appx. 625 (6th Cir.2011). 2 . Respondent’s argument that this petition should be reviewed under AEDPA's deferential standard because even though it was filed prior to a state court judgment, it was not considered until after a judgment had been rendered, is unavailing. What determines our standard of review is the nature of the claims raised and "the time [the petitioner] filed his petition,” Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.2004) (alteration omitted), not the "present status of the case pending against him,” Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.1987); see also Jacobs v. McCaughtry, 251 F.3d 596, 597 (7th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). But see Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention (B) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy (D) holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge (E) holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause
Output: (D)
and reinvest the proceeds. “Courts may not permit the positing of transactions which are unlikely and plainly contrary to the economic interest of a hypothetical buyer.” Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 198 F.3d 515, 529 (5th Cir.1999), citing Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 57. The Tax Court’s internally inconsistent assumptions, that a hypothetical purchaser of Johnco stock would engage in long-range timber production even though the Timber Property’s annual rate of return is substantially lower than the investor’s required return, fatally flawed its decision to discount s, proximity, and time, the more probative it is of value. Id. Courts have observed, however, that agreed valuations near in time to a decedent’s death are not conclusive. United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); First Nat’l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law (B) holding that irs claim for taxes and claim of debtor against irs for violation of automatic stay did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence (C) holding that the irss full participation in the bankruptcy proceeding in relation to an income tax debt did not bar it from collecting a gift tax debt that had also been listed in the debtors schedules where the irs did not file a proof of claim and the debtor did not force the irs into the proceeding on the gift tax debt (D) holding that irs was bound by plan and bankruptcy codes method of determining amount of nondischargeable claim where irs had filed proof of claim for nondischargeable tax debt (E) holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation
Output: (A)
v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Alaska 1999) (construing a statute to give rise to an equitable lien because it established "an interest in and a right to seek reimbursement from" a particular source). 13 . Cf. AS 09.35.160 (giving a judgment creditor and the process server who levies on property under a writ of execution full control over the timing of a sale in satisfaction of the judgment). 14 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 89(a). 15 . AS 13.16.505. 16 . AS 13.06.050(39). This definition comports with the definition set out in Uniform Probate Code section 1-201(33), which states: " 'Property' includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that 'may be the subject of ownership." 17 . Cf. Goldstein v. Prien, 143 Cal.App.2d 123, 299 P.2d 344, 346 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Since AS 13.16.505 prohibits liens from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (B) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (C) recognizing under analogous section of california code that the right to recover property conveyed by a decedent in fraud of creditors is an asset of his insolvent estate and that the executor or administrator is a trustee thereof for the benefit of creditors (D) holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors (E) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors
Output: (C)
against another,” United States v. Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C.Cir.2006) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), the government has conceded that Officer Alton lacked probable cause to arrest for PPW. The government nonetheless argues the arrest was valid because there was probable cause to believe Vinton committed the offense of “carrying a dangerous weapon” (CDW), D.C.Code § 22-4504(a), which “does not require proof of intent to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose,” Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881. Because the Fourth Amendment inquiry is objective, an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588; see also Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881 (<HOLDING>). The CDW statute prohibits “carry[ing] within 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (B) holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute (C) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (D) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (E) holding arrest was valid because there was probable cause of cdw even though officer incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of ppw
Output: (E)
were not the true reasons. This Court has held that the nonmoving party, opposing a motion for summary judgment, “carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.” Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I.1996). Therefore, even when we view the evi dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no issues of material fact existed, and the motion justice properly granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. For these reasons, we affirm the summary judgment for the hospital. 1 . We are of the opinion that, under the non-emergent ci l.App.3d 651, 62 Ill.Dec. 54, 435 N.E.2d 852, 857-58 (1982) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for trial court not to grant a continuance when appellant moved in open court to disqualify judge or in the alternative for a continuance to file a proper motion (B) holding states failure to oppose a continuance of preliminary hearing at the request of the defense is not bad faith and presentation of case to grand jury during continuance was proper (C) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance requested by telephone when the party requesting same was served with notice of the proceeding less than one hour before the hearing (D) holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day (E) holding that a telephone request to the court for a continuance the day before the trial was to start was a nullity
Output: (E)
a mere policy change. It was the creation of a new insurance policy with a new named insured. Before McDonald became the named insured, he had never been given the opportunity to accept or reject UIM coverage. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (1993) (en banc) (concluding that, although an insurer by statute must offer uninsured coverage when it initially issues a policy, it need not make another offer when an insured adds, deletes, or replaces vehicles, the court noting that “once an insured has been made aware that the coverage is available, an insurer is not obligated ... to inquire continuously whether the insured really meant to refuse”) (quoting White v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 68 Or.App. 11, 680 P.2d 700 (1984)); El-Habr v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 626 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), with Withrow v. Pickard, 905 P.2d 800 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination (B) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (C) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (D) holding it is settled that in construing an endorsement to an insurance policy the endorsement and the policy must be read together and the words of the policy remain in full force and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement (E) holding an endorsement to an existing insurance policy which added a new vehicle did not create a new contract of insurance but was merged with and became a part of the original policy
Output: (E)
claims); see also Stewart, 104 N.M. at 748, 726 P.2d at 1378 (“An insurance policy is a contract and is generally governed by the law of contracts, and the rights and duties of the parties are to be determined by its terms.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, we held that 8.75% was the proper interest to be assessed on the contract damages. {40} Like the trial court in Teague-Strebeck, the trial court in our case awarded damages based on the insurance contract— $100,000 in UM coverage. See 1999-NMCA-109, ¶¶63-64, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (observing that the plaintiff “was awarded the benefit of its bargain, the extent of insurance coverage promised by [the defendant’s agent]”); cf. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, ¶1, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that 8.75% is the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (B) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (C) holding that sixyear statute of limitations in  65314 is applicable to violations of  7202 (D) recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act (E) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy
Output: (E)
whether the defendant officers tainted the grand jury’s deliberations. V. Under established circuit law, Buehler had the burden of affirmatively showing that the grand jury’s deliberations were tainted, and failed to do so. The judgment' is AFFIRMED. 1 . Snider claims that he acted to stop the passenger from texting and talking on her cell phone, which officers are trained to prevent because dangerous individuals could be summoned to the location of the traffic stop. 2 . Having dismissed all of Buehler’s federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. See 2 r. 1993) (rejecting the argument that a grand jury indictment insulated police officers from false arrest claims); cf. McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). But see Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 
 Holding statements: (A) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that the dismissal of an indictment did not negate the presumption of probable cause (D) holding that because there was probable cause for arresting plaintiff plaintiffs claims whether under section 1983 or new york state law that were predicated on false arrest or false imprisonment compelled dismissal (E) holding under new york law that a grand jury indictment does not create a presumption of probable cause for false arrest claims
Output: (E)
the trial court’s order granting Schultheis’ land use appeal and remanding the matter to the Board. Specifically, the Board argues that it correctly denied Schultheis’ Preliminary Plan application, pointing out that the application did not comport with the SLD Ordinance, that the application was incomplete and that critical data was not submitted timely. Further, the Board contends that these deficiencies were not minor technicalities but, rather, were substantive defects. The Board also argues that it acted in good faith in denying Schultheis’ Preliminary Plan because the Township provided Schultheis with notice of the defects five months prior to the filing of his Preliminary Plan, and seven months prior to the Board’s rejection of the Preliminary Plan; yet, .2d 814 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (<HOLDING>); Housing Authority of City of York v. Ismond, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable (B) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (C) holding that portion of interlocutory order requiring a new hearing rather than basing decision on the proceedings before the hearing officer was appealable but that the employees due process claims regarding reinstatement and back pay could be addressed on appeal from a final order (D) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (E) holding that this court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order which remanded the case so that a new hearing examiner could be appointed and a new hearing conducted where the appellant raised the issue of commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions during the original hearing
Output: (C)
he was charged with violating only §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, not with violating § 841(b). This argument is patently meritless. Subsection 841(b) does not state a substantive offense, but simply establishes the penalties to be imposed upon conviction for a substantive offense. Thus, once the cotut properly exercised its jurisdiction to convict Pinkley of offenses under §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, it properly sentenced him according to statute. Pinkley’s reliance upon the recent decision in United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.2001), that § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) is unconstitutional is unavailing. This court has rejected the same facial constitutional challenge to § 841(b) presented in Buck-land. United States v. Talley, 15 Fed. Appx. 215, 218 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to satisfy due process findings made at sentencing need only be based upon a preponderance of the evidence (B) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (C) holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings (D) holding that it is the commissioners findings of fact to the extent they modify or replace the administrative law judges findings that are relevant on appeal (E) holding that  841b is facially constitutional because congress did not specify that only judges may make the findings required by  841b or that those findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence  
Output: (E)