niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of attempted murder: 1) a person, 2) with the specific intent to cause the death of another, 3) does an act amounting to more than mere preparation, 4) but fails to effect the death of the other individual. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01(a); 19.02(b); Jeffley, 938 S.W.2d at 517; Palomo, 925 S.W.2d at 332. The charge given to the jury did not expressly include the words “attempt to cause the death” of Williams. However, the word “attempt” was not required because the entire paragraph is a description of the elements of “attempt.” The language “with the intent to commit the murder of Alberta Williams” was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the charge include the culpable mental state of the attempted felony. See, e.g., Ex parte Bartmess, 739 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.Crim. App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we find no error in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument (B) holding under section 1902a1 specific intent required as an element of section 1501 is the intent to cause the death of an individual (C) holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry (D) holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder (E) holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication
Output: (B)
to IGRA. For the following reasons, plaintiffs other claims against the state defendants are also dismissed. 1. State of Kansas and Kansas State Gaming Agency a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity The State and the KSGA contend the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits for damages in federal court against a state or a state’s agencies. It is well settled that, in the absence of consent, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State of Kansas or one of its agencies from being sued in federal court. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1560 (10th Cir.1992)(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)); Reiger v. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 755 F.Supp. 360, 361 (D.Kan.1990)(<HOLDING>). This principal holds true regardless of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (B) holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts (C) holding the eleventh amendment bars suits in federal court against the state of kansas or one of its agencies (D) holding that the eleventh amendment bars retrospective declaratory relief against state officials (E) holding that the eleventh amendment bars blyshrl and nychrl claims against a state agency in federal court
Output: (C)
defendant failed to take reasonable care or that the harm that occurred was foreseeable. Id. at 708-09. The court adhered to that reasoning in Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or 689, 696 P2d 513 (1985), when it recognized that the plaintiff could proceed on both a common-law negligence theory and on a theory that the defendant had violated a statute prohibiting service of alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated patron. The court explained: “Thus, a plaintiff protected by such a statute need not resort to any concepts of negligence. Negligence is irrelevant. The sole question is whether the defendant engaged in acts prohibited by the statute and whether the violation of the statute resulted in injury.” Id. at 696; see also Davis v. Campbell, 327 Or 584, 592, 965 P2d 1017 (1998) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the commonlaw standard for negligence says nothing about whether the legislature intended that legal standard to apply to a statutory claim under the rlta (B) holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict (C) holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard (D) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (E) holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss
Output: (A)
that “[t]he patient is to be brought directly to a room if one is available” and that “[t]hey are not intended to delay physician evaluation.” The Triage Guidelines were clearly intended to allow a nurse to initiate testing before a physician’s examination; they did not apply when a patient saw a doctor promptly and did not specify specific steps for the doctor to follow when he or she saw a patient. T was undisputably able to see a doctor promptly, he saw Haynes twenty minutes after he arrived in the emergency room. Even if we accept the Guzmans’ argument that the Triage Guidelines were part of Memorial’s screening policy, Memorial could not have violated the Triage Guidelines because they did not apply to T. Cf. Fraticelli-Torres v. Hosp. Hermanos, 300 Fed.Appx. 1, 3 (1st Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The Guzmans did not raise a genuine issue of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala (B) holding that hospital did not violate emtala by failing to follow a thrombolysis protocol because by its very terms the protocol was not expressly applicable to patients in the er (C) holding that emtala applies to any and all patients (D) holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed (E) holding that because the contract between the hospital and the health insurance company had a hold harmless provision which stated the hospital would not bill or hold insurance subscribers liable for any hospital expenses covered by the subscribers insurance contract and all expenses from the patients treatment for the automobile accident were covered in such contract there was no debt upon which the hospital could assert a lien pursuant to the states hospital lien statute
Output: (B)
1213 (Fla.1990) (“ ‘[0]nce damages are liquidated, prejudgment interest is considered an element of those damages as a matter of law, and the plaintiff is to be made whole from the date of the loss.’ ’’)(quoting Kissimmee Util. Auth. v. Better Plastics, Inc., 526 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla.1988)). The trial court should not view Section XXI of the lease as operating to limit the Department’s liability to an amount equal to six months’ rent. The Department did not assert Section XXI as a defense and, thus, its applicability was never argued below. While Section XXI of the lease may have been applicable under the facts of this case, it was not for the trial court to invoke a defense the Department failed to raise. See Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Blocker, 728 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Also, we direct the trial court to carefully 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is error to grant relief that was not requested noticed nor litigated by any party (B) holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that where the final judgment provided relief that was not requested  its entry constituted reversible error (E) holding that it is not
Output: (A)
relevant factor. In the I & D Memo, Commerce dismissed consideration of the appraisals because they were not “timely”, as they were completed just one week before the asset purchase agreement was signed and as part of a regulatory package to obtain state approval of the transaction. I & D Memo at 134-35. Though the timing of the appraisals could be a factor for Commerce to consider in weighing the probity of the appraisals and the impact of the appraisals on the negotiated price, Commerce may not unreasonably disregard important, relevant evidence of FMV, such as the outside valuations, solely because it is unclear what the role was of the particular valuations. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing these five factors (B) recognizing that an agency may not ignore relevant factors or considerations (C) holding that such factors may constitute a substantial burden (D) holding that only relevant factors must be considered (E) recognizing same factors
Output: (B)
and that he relied on the informant’s statements that he purchased the drug from Banks. The informant did not appear at the May 2013 hearing, and neither the officer nor counsel for the Government knew of his whereabouts. The revocation hearing resumed in June 2013. Based on the officer’s hearing testimony, the district court revoked Banks’ supervised release and sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and nineteen months of supervised release. On appeal, Banks argues that the district court improperly relied on evidence admitted in violation of Fed. R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) (providing that a releasee “is entitled to ... question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear”) and Dos-well, 670 F.3d at 530-31 (<HOLDING>) in revoking his supervised release. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule requires a district court to balance the releasees interest in confronting an adverse witness against any proffered good cause for denying confrontation prior to admitting hearsay evidence in a revocation hearing and emphasizing that reliability is a critical factor in the balancing test (B) holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing (C) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (D) holding that it was reversible error for a district court to fail to applying a balancing test before admitting oral hearsay testimony recounting a third partys allegations of sexual assault by the probationer (E) recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause  because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis
Output: (A)
deported after being convicted for “a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i). In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “drug trafficking offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines, this court again utilizes the categorical approach. See, e.g., Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d at 691. Section 11379 does not qualify as a drug trafficking offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i) under the categorical approach. United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir.2004). Under the modified categorical approach, however, a Section 11379 conviction for the sale of amphetamine does qualify as a drug trafficking offense. See United States v. Corona-Rivera, 503 Fed.Appx. 500, 502 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2040, 185 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants conviction for the sale of marijuana in violation of california health  safety code  11360a was a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of ussg  2l12 (B) holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment (C) holding that the position of  alltime health officer for a county was not an office within the meaning of section 1467 of the code of 1907 (D) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (E) holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983
Output: (A)
their own courts,’ even when the controversy is governed by substantive federal law.... [H]owever, where state courts entertain a federally created cause of action, the ‘federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice.’ ” Rosenthal, 926 P.2d at 1069. See also Collins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 752 So.2d 825, 828-30 (La.2000) (stating that “provisions of § 16 of the FAA governing the timing of appeals are procedural in nature and ... states are free to follow their own procedural rules regarding appeals, unless those rules undermine the goals and principles of the FAA,” but holding that under Louisiana law no right to an immediate appeal of an order compelling arbitration existed); Atlantic Painting & Contracting Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Ky.1984) (<HOLDING>); Weston Sec. Corp. v. Aykanian, 46 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments (B) holding that under the faa  10a arbitration panels refusal to continue hearings to allow witness to testify the only witness with evidence of fraud not found from other sources was fundamental unfairness and misconduct sufficient to vacate the award (C) holding in the analogous context of a motion to vacate an arbitration award under 9 usc  12 that pjlaintiffs were required to serve notice through the united states marshal and that because the notice requirement expressly addresses the manner of serving notice of motion to vacate   the federal rules of procedure  relating to service are inapplicable (D) holding that the three month limitation of faa  12 on a motion to vacate an award did not apply to a state court motion to vacate because the procedural aspects of the faa are confined to federal cases (E) holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law
Output: (D)
among these requirements, “they remain distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Id. The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden at trial to establish these elements of admissibility. Id. However, a party moving in limine under Daubert to preclude testimony by his opponent’s expert must first make a threshold showing sufficient to indicate that his adversary will be unable to meet his burden at trial with regard to the testimony. See Gottstein v. Flying J, Inc., 2001 WL 36102297, at *1 (N.D.Ala. Aug. 22, 2001); see also Andrew I. Gavil, Defining Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-Daubert/kumho Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust, 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 831, 849 & n.76 (2000); cf. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). As to the first element, the Eleventh Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it (B) holding that the moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence if the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial (C) holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response (D) recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial (E) holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial
Output: (D)
See, Trial Court Memorandum Order and Non-Jury Verdict, 6/26/01, at 6-7. The court found that because of its “true motivation,” Sun did not inspect Conomos’s work in good faith. See, id. The record reflects that following Conomos’s cessation of work, Sun granted the incomplete segments of the job to the next highest bidder, MP Industries. Id. at 4. It shows that MP had similar difficulties in satisfying Sun’s foreman, and a mediator stepped in and determined that MP’s work was acceptable. Id. ¶20 When an obligation necessary to Conomos’s enjoyment of the contract is not expressly provided but implied as a necessary implication of the contract, Sun’s good faith performance is necessary to satisfy the implied obligation. Sun’s lack of good faith performance, A.2d 247, 256 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Amoco Oil Co. v. Burns, 268 Pa.Super. 390, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer has a duty to act with the utmost good faith towards its insured (B) holding that parties to contract have an implied obligation to put forth a good faith effort to fulfill the conditions of the contract (C) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously (D) holding that if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop harassment knew of and failed to act against it the plaintiff has no further obligation to bring it to the employers attention (E) holding that an employers obligation to an employee to act in good faith extends only to the performance of those contractual duties it has chosen to assume
Output: (E)
need not exhaust the procedures set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 where resort to the administrative process would be either futile or inadequate.” Id. at 1303; see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. 592; Kerr Ctr. Parents Ass’n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1990). Here, the Porters exhausted California’s due process procedure regarding their initial complaint, receiving a SEHO order in their favor. Neither they nor the MBUSD appealed that order to a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the order was final and binding under the IDEA and state law. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(l)(A); Cal. Educ.Code § 56505(g), (i). There is no dispute that the IDEA required the implementation of the final decision of the SEHO. See Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts (B) holding that ideas procedural requirements can only be fairly construed to contemplate that once a final favorable administrative decision has been gained by a plaintiff the state will carry out that decision although it may have opposed the position of the plaintiff in the administrative proceedings (C) holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact (D) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (E) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
Output: (B)
202, to determine whether New York or North Carolina law applies. See Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1977); Gorlin v. Bond Richman & Co., 706 F.Supp. 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y.1989). CPLR 202 requires the Court to apply the shorter of the two applicable statutes of limitation, because Barnett is not a New York resident. The North Carolina period of limitations for contract actions is three years, which is shorter than New York’s six year period. See N.C.Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1). The accrual of a claim under ERISA is determined by federal law. Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1138 (7th Cir.1992); Smith v. Rochester Tel. Bus. Marketing Corp., 786 F.Supp. 293, 306 (W.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir.1994); see also Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 382 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). A claim for benefits under ERISA accrues when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (B) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case (C) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (D) holding for  1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (E) holding that state law determines when an interest is perfected when interpreting the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy act
Output: (D)
further hold that the district court did not commit any procedural error or abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (assuming sentencing decision is procedurally sound, appellate court considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant’s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1309, — L.Ed.2d - (2010); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Having reviewed the record independently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court committed no significant procedural error despite departing downward from the guideline range for multiple reasons without explaining the weight it was attributing to each reason (B) recognizing that a party has not preserved a claim of procedural error if the party did not raise it in a manner sufficient to alert the district court to the specific error (C) holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error (D) holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
Output: (C)
idea. 6 . As a preliminary matter, we note that counsel for Lower Merion has submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), in which he contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) renders the ADEA inapplicable to Lower Merion. This contention is meritless. In Kimel, the Supreme Court held "only that, in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals.” Lower Merion, however, is not a state or an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 870-71 (3d Cir.1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991)(<HOLDING>)(citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (B) holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth (C) holding that school boards in alabama counties were not arms or alter egos of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment (E) holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity
Output: (B)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part). See also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAG, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). I would ask whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead impose restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits? What this Court has called “strict scrutiny” — with its strong presumption against constitutionality — is normally out of place where, as here, important competing constitutional interests are implicated. See ante, at 518 (<HOLDING>); ante, at 533 (“important interests to be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possible conflict between the cases (B) recognizing conflict between circuits (C) recognizing conflict (D) recognizing the conflict (E) recognizing conflict between interests of the highest order
Output: (E)
that the onset of ADEM symptoms is usually rapid, but argues that an onset of four weeks after the vaccination is nevertheless “within the generally acceptable onset.” Id. at 9-10. Additionally, petitioner disputes respondent’s argument that the severity of petitioner’s symptoms was inconsistent with symptoms typically caused by ADEM. Id. at 10-12. Finally, petitioner argues that even if petitioner’s protracted course of injury was atypical, it was still within the acceptable range for ADEM. Id. at 12-18. As explained in the preceding section, petitioner has the burden of establishing, by the preponderance of the evidence, that she actually suffers from the specific injury she alleges was caused by the vaccination. Hibbard, 698 F.3d at 1365; see also Broekelschen, 618 F.3d at 1349 (<HOLDING>); Lombardi, 656 F.3d at 1553 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner must establish that she suffers from a vaccinerelated injury not merely a symptom or manifestation of an unknown injury (B) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (C) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (D) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (E) holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain
Output: (A)
aff'd, 683 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S.Ct. 1438, 137 L.Ed.2d 545 (1997), quoting Ex parte Wilson, 571 So.2d 1251, 1261 (Ala.1990). In Brooks v. State, 695 So.2d 176 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), aff'd, 695 So.2d 184 (Ala.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 893, 118 S.Ct. 233, 139 L.Ed.2d 164 (1997), this Court stated: “[A] prosecutor has the right to indicate to the jury those parts of the evidence or testimony presented by the State that the defense has failed to contradict; that process is not an infringement of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Duncan v. Stynchcombe, 704 F.2d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir.1983); Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1993); Griffin v. State, 393 So.2d 523, 528 (Ala.Cr.App.1981).” 695 So.2d at 180 (<HOLDING>). “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s statement that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence (B) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence (C) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (D) holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense (E) holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence
Output: (C)
is narrowly crafted to get to the heart of the motion for summary judgment without allowing a lot of potentially unnecessary discovery. Montoya has said he did not show Wilks or Armijo his computer screen, or tell them Todd’s crimes; if Wilks says othexwise, there will likely be a genuine issue of fact requiring .the Court to deny the motions and allow the parties to proceed to trial. It seems fundamentally unfair to dismiss Todd’s case when a deposition of Wilks may make his case. Further, this deposition will not burden any government employees or entities. Accordingly, the Court finds that this limited discovery falls within the exceptions to disallowing discovery once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised. See Garrett v. C.A. Stratmen [Stratman], M.D., 254 F.3d at 953 (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe this one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine (B) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (C) recognizing that a discovery order in the context of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the defendants immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question when the district court is unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are neither avoidable or overly broad (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
Output: (C)
to restore a sense of fairness to lost-chance cases. A purely prospective application of Scafidi would clearly frustrate that purpose. VI Also at issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. See Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). Defendant does not contest the proposition that in cases governed by Scafidi an ultimate outcome charge is generally appropriate. Instead, he asserts that any error in not giving the charge was harmless. We disagree. The primary justification for giving a jury an ultimate outcome charge is that it informs the jury about the impact of its decision. In Roman, supra, we stated “that a jury in a comparative negligence situation should be given an ultimate out . 518, 485 A.2d 338 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In Scafidi, we acknowledged that the jury’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages (B) holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted (C) holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded (D) holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court (E) holding that ultimate outcome charge which would inform jury that any damages awarded to plaintiff in personal injury action would be molded to reflect only that percentage of liability which jury attributes to nonsettling defendant was warranted
Output: (E)
IS TEMPORALLY REMOTE FROM ALLEGED WHISTLEBLOWING Plaintiffs claim has a serious temporal problem: he alleges that he was not reappointed in late 2007 for events that took place in late 2003 and early 2004. Our courts have taken pains to stress that the length of time between an alleged whistleblowing and an adverse employment action is not dispositive of retaliation— when those two events are close in time (i.e., days, weeks, or a few months apart). If whistleblowing and retaliation that occur close in time are not sufficient to find causation under the WPA, whistleblowing and retaliation that occur far apart in time are certainly not sufficient to support causation — and, in fact, weigh against finding causation. See Fuhr v Hazel Park Sch Dist, 710 F3d 668, 675-676 (CA 6, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is an enormous temporal gap 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of a title vii retaliation claim that a twoyear gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the claimed retaliatory act proves fatal to plaintiffs assertion that there is a causal connection (B) holding that failure to demonstrate a causal connection is fatal to a  1983  cause of action (C) holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint (D) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (E) holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two
Output: (A)
law. Courts were unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action against purveyors of intoxicating beverages because, as a matter of law, consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was considered the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 384; Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982). Thus, dram shop statutes were enacted to enable tort plaintiffs to bridge the proximate cause gap between the sale of an intoxicating beverage and the subsequent injury or damage caused by the intoxicated patron. In exchange for this new claim, the legislature mandated that liquor purveyors were strictly liable and carefully prescribed the means by which liability may be ascertained. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227. The statute limits recovery for injuri 984) (<HOLDING>); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance (B) holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest (C) holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees (D) holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident (E) holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer
Output: (A)
effects never can be proven with certainty, the issue becomes whether the instruction had “a substantial propensity for prying individual jurors from beliefs they honestly have.” Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1182. Here, the judge preceded his “invitation to dialogue” with his observation that the jury had been deliberating for a longer period of time than it had taken to hear the evidence. The jurors could have taken the remark as a rebuke for engaging in excessively drawn out deliberations. In addition, the judge had entered the jury room on two separate occasions without counsel or a court reporter present, and those visits formed the basis for the judge’s belief regarding the jury’s confusion. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 462, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (<HOLDING>). We add to this the fact that the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding new trial required after judges ex parte communication with jury in response to jury question during deliberations because there was no way of reaching a conclusion about what transpired other than by adopting the judges recollection (B) holding that a defendant did not waive his right to be present at an ex parte encounter between the judge and juror because he was not present at the time of the communication and therefore had no opportunity to object when the error was committed (C) holding that judges ex parte communication telling a jury it needed to reach a verdict was reversible error without any discussion of harmlessness (D) recognizing the hazards of ex parte communication with a deliberating jury (E) recognizing that cases holding that proof of venue is jurisdictional are inconsistent with ex parte seymour and have therefore been overruled
Output: (D)
may not offer proof of a prior statement that is testimonial in nature unless (1) the accused has had, will have, or has forfeited the opportunity to “be confronted with” the witness who made the statement, and (2) the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross examination.”). The constitutional requirement that a witness be “unavailable” before his prior testimony is admissible stands on separate footing that is independent of and in addition to the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (<HOLDING>), cited with approval in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of a witness prior identification statement where the witness could not remember the basis for the identification did not violate the confrontation clause or fedrevid 802 (B) holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the confrontation clause because the state did not prove that the witness was unavailable (C) holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness (D) holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (E) holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause
Output: (B)
door unlocked and no guard posted. Throughout the interview he was given several bathroom breaks and was offered food and drink. Defendant was cooperative and allowed investigators to examine his shoes. Although detectives encouraged defendant to tell the truth, they did not raise their voices and they neither threatened defendant nor wheedled statements from him with promises. Defendant was never misled, deceived, or confronted with false evidence. Once defendant implicated himself by acknowledging his direct participation in the killing, the interview ended and defendant was given his Miranda rights. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that defendant was not formally arrested or otherwise subjected 1997); State v. Lane, 334 N.C. 148, 154, 431 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Phipps, 331 N.C. 427, 443-45, 418 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview (B) holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave (C) holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation (D) holding that a defendant who voluntarily rode to the station with officers in a police car waited in a lobby with unlocked external doors and was told more than once he was not under arrest was not in custody (E) holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody
Output: (E)
along with three other Duke physicians wrote a published article concluding that at the time of the x-rays, Carnell more likely suffered from a blood clot rather than pneumonia. Additionally, there was other evidence presented that Camell’s lung difficulties were not related to pneumonia, but instead due to a blood clot. Given the convincing evidence presented at trial supporting the defendants’ negligence, we find that the jury argument had a harmless effect, if any on the jury’s verdict. Although these statements may have been improper to the extent that the trial court should have given a cautionary instruction, we are unable to conclude that they were of such gross impropriety to entitle the defendants to a new trial. See State v. Vines, 105 N.C. App. 147, 412 S.E.2d 156 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we reject defendants’ first assignment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu (B) holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony (D) holding that the prosecutors repeated comments that the defendant could have denied knowledge of the drugs or rebutted the trafficking charge by testifying were so prejudicial as to constitute plain error (E) holding that the prosecutors argument attacking the integrity of defense counsel was of such gross impropriety as to justify ex mero mo tu correction however in light of the strong and convincing case against the defendant we could not hold that the prosecutrixs improper comments were sufficiently prejudicial as to require a new trial
Output: (E)
F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir.1975). Anderson’s condition at the time of the statement was described as excited, nervous and scared, and he appeared as if “he did not know what to do.” Moreover, his statement directly related to an exciting event, the shooting. Thus, based on the evidence and circumstances known at the time of its ruling, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the exciting event witnessed by Anderson was the shooting itself. Accordingly, to the extent the trial court based its ruling on the fact that Anderson personally perceived the shooting, we find no abuse of discretion. We further note that the startling occurrence that triggers the excited utterance need not necessarily be the crime itself. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court could have found startling event or condition was declarants sustaining an injury or the pain she later experienced (B) holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence (C) holding that a lower court properly admitted a fouryear olds hearsay statement although she made it 1215 hours after the startling event (D) holding that statement must be product of a startling event (E) holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective
Output: (A)
nature is heir.’” Elliott v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 31 So.3d 304, 307 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)). Where a failure to act is the result of clerical or secretarial error, excusable neglect is established under rule 1.540(b). See Ocwen Loan Servicing, 185 So.3d at 630 (finding that counsel’s absence from case management conference constituted excusable neglect where firm’s clerk misplaced order setting conference); SunTrust Mortg., 153 So.3d at 954 (“[T]he attorney’s unintentional absence in the instant case due to inadvertent calendaring is the type of mistake excused by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), as well as judicial precedent.”); J.J.K. Int’l, Inc. v. Shivbaran, 985 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Woodward, 602 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsels failure to appear at hearing was excusable neglect where secretary accidentally identified the hearing as cancelled (B) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (C) holding that appearance at the scheduled hearing demonstrates actual notice of the hearing (D) holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits (E) holding that a traffic ticket that required a plaintiff to appear at hearing and answer to charges was not a seizure
Output: (A)