niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). It is well settled that the DJA is not a grant of jurisdiction; rather, it is a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.1996); City of Houston v. Buttitta, 274 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). Here, York claims that the justice court’s order awarding the property to the State for the benefit of the Wise County Sheriffs Office is void allas 2003, no pet.); Davis v. Boone, 786 S.W.2d 85, 87 n. 3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ). But see S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). To prevail on a collateral attack, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (B) recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack (C) holding that dormant judgment is voidable and therefore not subject to collateral attack (D) holding in dictum that extrinsic evidence should be permissible to show applicability of automatic stay in collateral attack against judgment (E) recognizing collateral attack on void order
Output: (D)
to incorporate the affidavit,” and that preprinted language like that used here is insufficient. 920 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (D.C.Cir.1990). The government concedes that Maxwell is indistinguishable from this case, and that this panel is without authority to overturn that prior decision. Appellee's Br. at 27 n.7; see United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1038 n. 1 (D.C.Cir. 1999). Thus, although at least one court has taken a path different from that of Maxwell, see United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (2d Cir.1993), we cannot rely on the affidavit to constrain the language of the warrants. 3 . Pindell also contends that the plain view doctrine is inapplicable because the warrant applications did not list the notebooks even though the police knew of their re 38, 1543-44 (<HOLDING>). 6 . See United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was required to justify officers search of stereo found in plain view (B) holding that the criminality of a knotted opaque party balloon found in plain view during a traffic stop was immediately apparent because the officer had probable cause to believe that the balloon contained an illegal substance (C) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred (D) holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime (E) holding that the search of a balloon was justified under the plain view exception where the contraband nature of the balloon  was immediately apparent to the officer who seized it
Output: (B)
defined to mean all state governmental entities, regardless of their nomenclature. “State” means the State of Georgia and any of its offices, agencies, authorities, departments, commissions, boards, divisions, instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities. By its express terms, the act clarifies that the “State” includes state authorities and instrumentalities, but not local governmental entities, for purposes of waiving sovereign immunity. Our earlier cases distinguishing between instrumentalities of the state and state agencies are not dispositive since both instrumentalities and agencies are included in the act’s definit 2d 246) (1947) (<HOLDING>). 5 OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) (1990). 6 Webster’s Third 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims (B) recognizing that constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws is not violated without destruction or impairment of vested right (C) holding that state appropriation to ports authority violated constitutional prohibition against state debt and other constitutional provisions (D) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (E) holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution
Output: (C)
was arrested for committing a felony or committing a nonfelony crime in which a firearm was used or displayed. f 17 A prosecutor may not use the fruits of an illegal search as evidence against a defendant at trial. State v. Marks, 114 Wn.2d 724, 730-31, 790 P.2d 138 (1990); State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 806, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004). And without the evidence obtained in the illegal search, the prosecution could not have proved that Nusbaum possessed or controlled the guns at the time of his arrest. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965) (the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture hearings); cf. Barlindal v. City of Bonney Lake, 84 Wn. App. 135, 141-42, 925 P.2d 1289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Because the officers seized the weapons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible police officers testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking (B) holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them (C) holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade (D) recognizing firearms as common tools of the drug trade (E) holding that evidence in first trial concerning firearms in which defendant was acquitted of drug and rico conspiracies could be used in second trial on firearms offenses because evidence was collateral to elements of offenses in second trial
Output: (B)
review. 2 . The record is inconsistent as to who placed the documents in the sealed envelope. In his March 16 letter to Target’s outside counsel Jeffrey D. Wohl ("Wohl”), Clayton Halunen wrote, "we had [Doe] remove ... any documents which involved any in house or outside counsel. These documents were then immediately placed into an envelope.” Halunen Decl., Ex. E. However, Thome and Doe aver Thome reviewed the documents and placed those she believed may be privileged into the sealed envelope. Thome Decl. ¶ 17; Doe Aff. ¶ 15. 3 . At this time, the Halunen firm had not yet agreed to represent Gifford. 4 . The telephonic advisory opinion Halunen received from the Board is not binding on this Court. See In re Admonition Issued in Panel File No. 99-42, 621 N.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The Complaint and Amended Complaint 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that advisory opinions of the minnesota lawyers professional responsibility board are not binding (B) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding (C) holding that stipulations involving questions of law are not binding on the court (D) holding that nontreating physicians opinions are entitled to little weight when contradictory to treating physicians opinions and will not constitute substantial evidence standing alone (E) holding that statements that employee was doing a good job are more akin to opinions than statements of fact and on this basis are not actionable in fraud and citing a state case as holding that neither opinions nor statement that are general and indefinite are representations of fact giving rise to a misrepresentation claim
Output: (A)
putting air into his tire at a gas station. The motorist pulled into the gas station and parked his truck in a manner that blocked the insured’s vehicle. The motorist then began yelling and threatening the insured, attempting to pick a fight. The motorist moved his truck so that it was no longer blocking the insured’s vehicle, and parked it parallel to the insured’s vehicle. The motorist then pointed a gun at the insured. An exchange of gunfire ensued culminating in the motorist shooting the insured while the insured was attempting to escape in his vehicle. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 944-45. ¶51 In holding that the insured’s injuries did not arise out of the use of the motorist’s truck, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the “natural consequences” test to U . 1995), 878 F.Supp. 862, 864-65 (<HOLDING>). ¶53 In advocating their respective tests, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that injuries must be connected to the use of the car as a car ie as a means of transportation rather than a situs for the commission of criminal acts (B) holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car (C) holding that there was probable cause for arrest where officers knew defendants had recently been with suspected drug dealer officers saw defendants car being maneuvered so as to indicate that surveillance had been detected and when officers approached car defendant attempted to place package under car and then pulled the package back inside the car and closed and locked the car door (D) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (E) holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force
Output: (A)
Clause. ¶ 13. Respondent’s main interest in this case is his right to run for elected office. In general, the federal courts have declined to hold that the right to run for elective office is “fundamental,” a position that was applied in the seminal Clements decision. There, a plurality of the high court held that “[f]ar from recognizing candidacy as a fundamental right, we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny.” 457 U.S. at 963 405, 420 (W. Va. 2000) (concluding that constitutional provision forcing judges to vacate office before running for nonjudicial office was supported by “State’s compelling and permissible interest”); Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 78, 666 N.W.2d 816 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16. Respondent’s constitutional arguments 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that states legitimate interests in enacting constitutional provision prohibiting judges from holding other public office far outweigh the burdens put upon the petitioners right to be a candidate for office (D) holding that a school superintendent does not have a constitutional right to actually hold his position and execute the duties of the office (E) holding constitutional provision selfexecuting if it grants right that can be put into operation without further legislative action
Output: (C)
risk that the actor will intentionally use force in the furtherance of the offense.’ ” 493 F.3d at 307 (quoting Tran, 414 F.3d at 471). Likewise, Popal's discussion emphasizes that the focus of the § 16(b) analysis should be on whether the crime at issue "involves ‘a substantial risk that the actor will intentionally use ... force.’ ” 416 F.3d at 255 (citing Tran, 414 F.3d at 472). 16 . Citing to various cases from our sister circuits, Aguilar argues that reckless crimes cannot be crimes of violence under § 16(b). Those cases are inapposite because they either do not involve § 16(b), or a similarly worded statute, or they do not create the same inherent substantial risk that force will be used, as § 3124.1 does. See Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense (B) holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict (C) holding that a felony of criminal recklessness was not a crime of violence under  16b because it does not require any purposeful conduct and does not necessarily create a risk that force may be used as a means to an end during the commission of the offense (D) holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense (E) holding that unlawful imprisonment of a minor or incompetent adult is not a crime of violence under  16b because the crime can be accomplished with the victims acquiescence
Output: (C)
to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) “Duty” of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
Output: (A)
opportunity to be heard on the issue ofrepayment of unemployment benefits. {32} The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a due pr e Court of Appeals of Minnesota that distinguish Schulte where the Court ultimately held that there was no constitutional violation when the employee did participate in the hearing. See Comm ’r of Nat. Res. v. Nicollet Cty.Pub. Water/Wetlands Hearings Unit, 633 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming an appellate denial of the appellant’s due process claim based on constitutionally valid notice of the hearing because the appellant knew the potential consequences of a reversal of the initial decision and participated in the appeal with counsel); see also Aubin v. Family Dollar, Inc., No. A14-0483, 2014 WL 6724937, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2014) (<HOLDING>); Koch v. Sheldahl, No. A03-1562, 2004 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (D) holding that online system of appeals did not violate due process rights because it was not affirmatively misleading and it adequately explained the potential consequences of failing to file a timely appeal citations omitted (E) holding that on summary judgment a court may not disregard evidence merely because it serves the interests of the party introducing it citations omitted
Output: (D)
appeal”). Because of that conclusion, we do not reach the issue whether the Right-to-Know Law requires the responsible official to provide summaries or statistical analyses of government documents. Similarly, because we remand this case to the trial court to conduct the comm 89). Accordingly, the general rule is that public agencies are not required to produce new information even if the documents available under the Right-to-Know Law and the common law are unresponsive to a citizen’s inquiry. Nevertheless, we note that rigid adherence to that general rule might not necessarily be appropriate in all cases, and observe that the Appellate Division has ruled to that effect in Board of Education v. New Jersey Department of the Treasury, 279 N.J.Super. 489, 500, 502, 653 A.2d 589 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), leave to appeal granted, 142 N.J. 440, 663 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claimsinformation data for specific municipality or state agency constituted public records under righttoknow law and common law even though such data was not grouped by municipality or agency but rather was compiled into two groups  state and local (B) holding that the state police is a state agency (C) holding that various data tapes were owned or obtained by the agency even though they were neither created by agency employees nor  currently located on agency property because the firm that created the tapes acted on behalf of the agency in creating the tapes (D) holding that the university of maryland law school was a state agency (E) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor
Output: (A)
remand, the Board violated due process by depriving him a full and fair opportunity to seek cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction to review this constitutional claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006). It is well established in this circuit that an alien cannot predicate a due process claim on alleged infirmities in the adjudication of an application for discretionary relief. Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir.2006) (“No property or liberty interest can exist when the relief sought is discretionary”), overruled on other grounds by Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008). The relief of cancellation of removal is entirely discretionary. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a); Sorda v. Holder, 643 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir.2011); see Obioha, 431 F.3d at 409 (<HOLDING>). We accordingly reject Cruzaldovinos’ due 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien raising a due process challenge to removal proceedings must show error and substantial prejudice (B) holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen (C) recognizing that petitioners due process claim stemming from denial of motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal was flawed in part because an alien does not have a legal entitlement to discretionary relief (D) holding that an order denying a petitioners motion to reopen proceedings so that he could apply for adjustment of status was not a judgment regarding the granting of relief and was thus reviewable (E) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
Output: (C)
of the evidence, on defendant. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25[3]. In People v. Diaz, 177 A.D.2d 500, 576 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1991), leave to appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 1048, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 596 N.E.2d 413 (1992), defendant appealed his conviction for felony murder, arguing that the judge’s failure to charge the jury on the affirmative defense denied him a fair trial. The court sustained the ruling, noting that the defendant continued to participate in the robbery after his accomplice displayed the gun and while the fatal assault continued. Thus, the record does not contain a sufficient basis to establish- every element of the affirmative defense, and the trial court’s refusal to charge was proper. [Id. at 146 (citation omitted).] Cf. People v. Heyward, 111 A.D.2d 420, 488 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Like the defendant in Diaz, this defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object (B) holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act (C) holding that the government did not waive an affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer because it raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient time by listing the defense in the joint pretrial order (D) holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state (E) holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice
Output: (B)
that, because it was granting the motion for a downward departure, it was not required to sentence Johnson to 240 months. The court then sentenced Johnson to eighty-four months’ imprisonment. II A The first issue in the case is whether the district court chose the correct starting point for departing downward. Although the court initially determined that it would depart downward from the original Guideline range (135 to 168 months), the court subsequently corrected itself and stated on at least two occasions that its starting point for the departure was 240 months. The court’s approach— starting to depart downward from the statutory minimum sentence of 240 months— was consistent with the decisional law of our circuit. See United States v. Pillow, 191 F.3d 403, 406-07 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court did not err 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may depart downward from the applicable guideline range under section 4a13 (B) holding that restitution is not a proper ground for departing downward from the guidelines range (C) holding that after granting the governments motion for downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the district court did not err when it determined that the starting point for departing downward was the higher statutorily required minimum sentence and not the lower otherwise applicable guideline range (D) holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure (E) holding that a motion under  5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under  3553e
Output: (C)
evidence and reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir.2006). Under this pre-REAL ID Act standard of review, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) or BIA “must identify specific, cogent reasons for an adverse credibility finding” and the reasons must “strike at the heart of the claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination in Yao’s case. There were significant discrepancies in the evidence regarding the length of Yao’s detention, where he was detained at night, and the chain of events that occurred when he arrived at the police station. These discrepancies go to the heart of Yao’s claim. See Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Yao’s declaration states that he was detained 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation (B) holding that discrepancies regarding the events leading up to petitioners departure and the number of times he was arrested went to the heart of his claim (C) holding that a driver was an independent contractor where he had unfettered discretion to determine the days and times he worked with no minimum or maximum number of hours or days imposed by the defendant (D) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (E) holding that earlier events set the stage for what followed and that factual disputes regarding those events were material
Output: (B)
of Tucson, Inc. v. Marks, 17 Adz.App. 308, 310, 497 P.2d 534, 536 (1972). ¶38 We agree with the trial court that the Richardsons’ claim for declaratory relief regarding future liability to third parties for any failure to maintain the easement is non-justiciable. “ ‘A declaratory relief statute only justifies a declaration of rights upon an existing state of facts, not one upon a state of facts which may or may not arise in the future. Nor will future rights be determined in anticipation of an event that may never happen.’” Moore v. Bolin, 70 Ariz. 354, 357, 220 P.2d 850, 852 (1950) (quoting Annotation, Declaration of Rights or Declaratory Judgments, 87 A.L.R. 1205 (1933)); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 198 Ariz. 208, 214-15, ¶ 15, 8 P.3d 396, 402-03 (App.2000) (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, 201 Ariz. 242, 247, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court will not render judgment on situation that may never occur (B) holding that the court will not interpret the law in such a way as to render a jurisdictional statute a nullity (C) holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a statute must not be given the one of two reasonable interpretations which will render it unconstitutional (E) holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment
Output: (A)
that “[e]ven if the release plate had not been designed at the time the contract was entered, the sonobuoys conformed to the description of the goods contained in the contract .... ” Def.’s Supp. Br. at 8. Defendant says the description of the sonobuoys in the contract was merely 335 sonobuoys with dual depth capability; the release plate was not significant to the overall sonobuoy design described in the ECP, and was only a passing reference. Def.’s Reply at 4; Def.’s Supp. Br. at 8. Sparton contests these points and argues that the patented inventions were never part of the offer for sale because the ’0465 Contract does not encompass each limitation of the claimed inventions or render them obvious. See e.g., Tec Air Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In so arguing, Plaintiff points specifically 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art (B) holding a determination that an invention was onsale within the meaning of the statute requires that a sale be operable the complete invention claimed be embodied in or obvious from the device offered for sale and the sale or offer be primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes (C) holding that even credited testimony by an interested party absent corroborating documents is not sufficient to support a finding that a patent was anticipated by prior knowledge or use of the claimed invention (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b
Output: (A)
of petitioner’s TDCJ medical and mental health records, is wholly credible. Therefore, petitioner’s Ford/Panetti claim lacks any arguable merit. Petitioner is entitled to neither federal habeas corpus relief from this Court nor a continuation of his stay of execution. IV. Certificate of Appealability A. The Necessity for Obtaining a CoA The AEDPA converted the “certificate of probable cause” previously required as a prerequisite to an appeal from the denial of a petition for federal habeas corpus relief into a “Certificate of Appealability” (“CoA”). See Hill v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 78, 80 (5th Cir.l997)(recognizing the “substantial showing” requirement for a CoA under the AEDPA is merely a change in nomenclature from the CPC standard); Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 45 (5th Cir.l997)(<HOLDING>). The CoA requirement supersedes the previous 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict (B) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (C) holding the standard for obtaining a coa is the same as for a cpc (D) holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss (E) holding that the standard for supplementing an ea is the same as for an eis
Output: (C)
1179 n. 7 (8th Cir.1990) (“While [the McBroom factors cited in Baer] may have been relevant and sufficient in Baer to require the state to permit party designation, the same factors might not be relevant in a different context.... We too [having just cited this Court’s subsequent decision in Rainbow Coalition ] reject these factors as the exclusive or even necessarily the most reliable, indicators of the state registration procedure's constitutionality.”), with Atherton v. Ward, 22 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1267-68 (W.D.Okla.1998) (noting that it was "bound by ... Baer" and concluding that there was "no difference in a constitutional sense between Oldahoma law and the Colorado law at issue in Baer"). See also Green Party of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 422 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Our decision in Rainbow Coalition of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers (B) holding that the governor did not have to obtain the consent of the senate for the appointment of a candidate when the first candidate had been rejected by the senate the senate was not in session at the time that the second candidate was appointed and because the legislature which created and therefore controlled the office did not require by statute that the governor seek the senates approval in those circumstances (C) recognizing that baer did not state a universal brightline rule for drawing the line with frivolous party registration but like baer holding that the ability to meet the requirements for placing a candidate on the statewide ballot is enough of an indication of support to overcome the states interest in preventing voter confusion (D) holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling (E) holding that an oklahoma law placing democratic party candidates in the highest ballot positions violated the equal protection clause
Output: (C)
F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.2004). The Fourth Circuit even characterized it “as a very close question” but concluded that a prima facie case had been made “because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude” there was causation. See id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has held that establishing a prima facie case is, quite unremarkably, a “less onerous burden” than is conclusively establishing a causal connection. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir.1989); see also Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1229 (4th Cir.1998) (“Although Karpel presents little or no direct evidence of a causal connection between her protected activity and Inova’s adverse action, little is required.”); McNaim v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). But see, e.g., Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that where evidence showed plaintiffs supervisor considered transferring plaintiff the day before she was served with plaintiffs lawsuit there was no causal connection showing that the transfer was retaliatory (C) holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct (D) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (E) holding that the plaintiff made a prima facie case even though there was no evidence of causal connection other than the fact that the plaintiff was fired after bringing a lawsuit
Output: (E)
battery is to make “physical contact” without causing injury, and that physical contact does not have to be violent in nature. See, e.g., Illinois v. Peck, 260 Ill.App.3d 812, 198 Ill.Dec. 760, 633 N.E.2d 222, 223 (1994) (explaining that 720 ILCS 5/12-3 defines battery as making offensive contact with a victim “by any means,” which encompasses spitting at a peace officer). Moreover, a simple battery involving nonviolent physical contact can become “aggravated” by the addition of facts that have nothing to do with physical force. A battery can be aggravated because it causes “great bodily harm,” 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), or because, as here, the victim is a “peace officer,” 720 ILCS 5/12— 4(b)(6) (2003); see Illinois v. Hale, 77 Ill.2d 114, 32 Ill.Dec. 548, 395 N.E.2d 929, 931-32 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Illinois v. McBrien, 144 Ill.App.3d 489, 98 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery (B) holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm (C) holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth (D) holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter (E) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two
Output: (B)
courts. In Continental Ins. v. Page Engineering Co., 783 P.2d 641 (Wyo.1989), the Wyoming Court discussed the economic loss rule. The opinion provides in part: The recognized majority rule is that a claim for pure economic loss (the damage is only to the defective product) does not lie on a theory of negligence or strict liability. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986); Aloe Coal Company v. Clark Equipment Company, 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.1987), cert, denied 484 U.S. 853, 108 S.Ct. 156, 98 L.Ed.2d 111 (1987); Eart Engineering Company v. FMC Corporation, 593 F.Supp. 1471 (D.R.I.1984); Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). See also Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo.1985) (<HOLDING>). This rule is founded on solid policy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing majority rule and collecting cases (B) recognizing rule (C) recognizing the tide of the majority of case law (D) recognizing the majority rule (E) recognizing distinction made by majority
Output: (D)
Inc., 412 F.3d at 385. SPI contends that ELIT is a coined term without any English meaning and that the ELIT Marks are thus fanciful and entitled to maximum protection under the Lanham Act. But a coined term is not a “fanciful” one merely because it cannot be found in Webster’s Third. To the contrary, “[a] slight misspelling of a word will not generally turn a descriptive word into a nondescriptive mark.” 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition '§ 11:31 (4th ed.). “If the misspelling is so phonetically identical to the original descriptive term that buyers will recognize it as descriptive, then the misspelled mark is still ’descriptive.’ ” Id.; see also Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 455, 31 S.Ct. 456, 55 L.Ed. 536 (1911) (<HOLDING>). Thus, “C-Thru” has been held descriptive in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (B) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (C) holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law (D) holding that a trademark in ruberoid  a misspelling of rubberoid  was descriptive and did not become  arbitrary by being misspelled (E) holding that irreparable injury exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark pending trial
Output: (D)
affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the Riffle’s bankruptcy petition, was a “final” decision of the district court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) that conferred jurisdiction on this Court. Regardless of the finality of that decision, jurisdiction was proper by the time this Court heard the appeal. When Community Bank filed its notice of appeal of the district court’s judgment on September 9, 2008, the bankruptcy court had already confirmed the Riffles’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, issuing its order on June 20, 2008. Such a confirmation order is a final order that may be appealed. See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.1982) (suggesting in dicta that such an order is final); cf. In re Layo, 460 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Am. Preferred Prescription, Inc., 255 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (B) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (C) holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (D) holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal (E) holding that chapter 13 order is a final judgment on the merits for preclu sion analysis purposes
Output: (E)
similarly not designed to apply to “a situation where the employee works an irregular number of hours according to a predetermined schedule.” Id. The section 207(k) exemption applies where the employer has adopted a qualifying “work period.” See Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir.1996). The petitioners’ reliance upon language regarding employee consent and the preferability of reducing the agreement to writing in a section 207(f) employment situation is wholly unfounded. In fact, precedent addressing the section 207(k) scenario, as exists in the present ease, specifically holds that a municipality is not “required to obtain the consent of its [employees] before instituting a § 207(k) program.” Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1153 n. 10; see also Barefield, 81 F.3d at 710 (<HOLDING>); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees approval is not required under section 207k system (B) holding that state law claims involving fdca section 510k medical devices which are subjected to a relatively cursory approval process were not preempted because the fda had taken the position that its regulations only preempted claims involving section 360ec devises which go through a rigorous premarket approval process (C) holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden (D) holding that probation department employees are not county employees (E) holding that employees could be required under mandatory securities registration form to arbitrate claims brought under adea
Output: (A)
This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages
Output: (C)
necessarily characterize it as an “accrued benefit” under the 2002 Regulation. Under this interpretation of the 2002 Regulation, Defendants’ rescission of the 1999 Benefits Increase for pre-February 1, 1999 retirees would clearly violate the anti-cutback rule. We reject Thornton’s interpretation of the 2002 Regulation because of the false dichotomy he draws between “ancillary” and “accrued” benefits. The Seventh Circuit recognized that a particular benefit, even if non-ancillary, would not be “accrued” for a retired participant if the benefit was “not included in the plan during the term of the participants’ employment.” See Williams, 497 F.3d at 713-14. Williams clarified the Seventh Circuit’s earlier position in Hickey v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 980 F.2d 465, 468-69 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), upon which Thornton relied for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding pension conferred cola was an accrued benefit and not ancillary because it was intended to provide retirement income commenced only at retirement and was a benefit generally transferrable to succeeding employers (B) holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa (C) holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age (D) holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement (E) holding that  disposable retirement pay  from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes
Output: (A)
the prescribed five working days after the registrant's birthday is not a defense. Barker, 34 Cal.4th at 350, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507 ("forgetting the mandatory registration requirement of section 290 is simply not a legitimate defense to the charge of willfully failing to register”). As a result, it is possible that Gonzalez violated § 290(a)(1)(D) through ordinary negligence by forgetting to register during the mandated five working day period. Because the record suggests that Gonzalez made a good faith effort to comply with the registration law, we find that little or no moral culpability attaches to his violation of § 290(a)(1)(D). 11 . Gonzalez’s sentence is also a high multiple of the plea offers he received. See Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 969 n. 9 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282, 100 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plea offers are relevant to determining whether a three strikes sentence is grossly disproportionate to the triggering offense (B) holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable (C) holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue (D) holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable (E) holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense
Output: (A)
in particular the potential complexity of the unbundled service that the client may have to handle on her own, the higher the burden on the lawyer to demonstrate that the client understood what she agreed to. For example, where adversary proceedings are unbundled, the lawyer must present sufficient evidence for the court to infer that the client understood the nature of an adversary proceeding, the likelihood of one arising in the client’s case, the client’s pro se responsibilities if one were to be filed, and the potential risks to the client’s interests depending on the probable outcomes. For matters as complex as bankruptcy, a signed retainer agreement that merely states that certain proceedings are excluded from the flat fee is unlikely to suffice. Cf. In re Cuddy, 322 B.R. at 15 (<HOLDING>). There must be a demonstrated link between the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of an adversary proceeding in the same court sis debtors petition but different bankruptcy case violated the automatic stay (B) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons (C) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (D) holding that a retainer agreements general payorwewill quit language was not specific enough to comply with a local rule that required bankruptcy attorneys to represent debtors in adversary proceedings unless the debtors expressly agreed otherwise (E) holding that a debtors  522d1 exemption was invalid when the debtor exempted proceeds from the prepetition sale of the debtors marital home which were paid to a judgment creditor with an attachment on the debtors interest in the home
Output: (D)