niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
The bankruptcy court lacks discretion, however, to alter the scope of the assignment. That being so, the bankruptcy court’s order finally assigned the assets to Baum. See, e.g., Poole, 796 F.2d at 321 (stating that a bankruptcy court’s order is final if “further bankruptcy court proceedings would not affect the scope of the order”). Turning to the second criterion, the assignment transferred the only significant assets from the estates. Therefore, the assignment seriously affected the rights of all creditors, including Duckor, to receive payment for their claims. We conclude that the district court did not err by holding that the order was “final” for the purposes of appellate review. Cf. Law Offices of Nicholas A. Franke v. Tiffany (In re Lewis), 113 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stone (In re Stone), 6 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds (B) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds
Output: (E)
aligns us with a broad coalition of other courts which, subsequent to Seminole Tribe, have rejected similar arguments aimed at barring suits for prospective in-junctive relief commenced by Medicaid beneficiaries against state actors. See, e.g., Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 550-51 & n. 109 (5th Cir.2002) (concluding that the Medicaid Act does not possess an intricate remedial scheme regulating noncompliance by states and permitting Ex parte Young action on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries to secure EPSDT benefits); Mo. Child Care Ass’n v. Cross, 294 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding “that the [Child Welfare Act of 1980, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act] does not reflect any intent to limit Ex parte Young actions”); Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 190 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (C) holding that the medicaid act provision allowing reduction of funds to noncompliant states is not a detailed remedial scheme sufficient to show congresss intent to preempt an action under ex parte young (D) holding that ex parte young permits jurisdiction over officials who have authority to control the assessments of railroad taxes that are in violation of federal law (E) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action
Output: (A)
communication with a juror or the jury from an outside source that presents a likelihood of affecting the verdict”); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir.1984) (observing that “Remmer ... controls the question of how the district court should proceed where ... allegations [of potential jury partiality] are made, i.e., a hearing must be held during which the defendant is entitled to be heard”). Here, after individually interviewing each juror and alternate juror, the district court learned that most had indeed heard the reported “racist redneck” comment. The court thus should have provided Taylor a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias. Because the court denied Taylor’s request for a Remmer hearing, it abused its discretion. See Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (<HOLDING>); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant by not bringing his knowledge of possible juror bias to the attention of the district court prior to verdict waived his right to a new trial (B) recognizing district court application of the same rule (C) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (D) holding that preservation for review requires a fair ruling or decision by the district court in order to provide the lower court with an opportunity to correct any mistake give the opposing party an opportunity to demonstrate why the district court should rule in its favor and create a record which enables this court to make informed decisions (E) holding that although this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same
Output: (E)
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 143 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1999), which expressly defined the term “exaction” to be “the dedication of property to public use.” (Emphasis added.) The City, citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1635, 143 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1999), argues that the Dolan proportionality standard does not apply here because there was no “exaction” as the United States Supreme Court uses that term — “the dedication of property to public use.” We disagree for the following reasons: (1) the language in Del Monte Dunes defining exactions is nonbinding dicta, see Honesty in Environmental Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 96 Wn. App. 522, 534, 979 P.2d 864 (1999) (<HOLDING>); and (2) even if Del Monte Dunes did control, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding authority to control limits duty to control (B) holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public (C) holding that pharmaceutical benefit management companies are generally not erisa fiduciaries because they lack discretionary authority or control in the management of the plan but rather engage in ministerial duties (D) holding that a partner in and accounting firm who brought an action under the age discrimination in employment act adea and the employee retirement income security act erisa was considered an employee because he was subject to the control of a management committee which acted in secrecy and had no bona fide ownership interest fiduciary relationship voting right or management control (E) holding that del monte dunes dicta did not control applicability of nollandolan to growth management act regulations
Output: (E)
but refuse to do anything about it.”); Aff. of Harry Seymour, Nov. 30, 1992 ("It is my observation that throughout the institution that there is a continuous covering over of filth and dirt, rather than a unified regimen of daily house keeping and cleaning. My observation is that policy is to let area go uncleaned and paint over it when it looks bad or when outside people are touring the area.”); Aff. of James Doane, Mar. 26, 1993 (recounting his efforts, over the course of four days, to replace a broken Pak-A-Pottie and stating that he was told there were none available). 10 . I respectfully suggest that, in making that decision, the Superior Court failed to follow the sequential rule in cases alleging constitutional violations. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (<HOLDING>); see also Fabiano, 352 F.3d at 453 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the question of qualified immunity dovetails with the substantial inquiry in a  1983 action in that both depend on the specific contours of the constitutional right at issue (B) holding that the initial inquiry for a court called upon to rule upon the qualified immunity issue is whether the facts alleged show the violation of a constitutional right (C) holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question (D) holding that the threshold inquiry assuming as true the facts alleged by the injured party is whether the officers conduct violated a constitutional right (E) holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right
Output: (B)
Ill We AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. 1 . The plaintiff-appellants also purport to challenge the district court's denial of limited jurisdictional discovery. However, the argument in their opening brief contains no discussion of the discovery ruling apart from a few statements suggesting dissatisfaction with it. See Aplt. Br. at 8 (“The Trial Court erred in dismissing the case ... without permitting any discovery as to the true nature and identity of SCTC.”); id. at 16 (suggesting that the case could be remanded to the district court for further factual development). Plaintiffs have therefore waived this issue through their failure to adequately address it in their opening brief. Cf. United States v. Beckstead, 500 F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief (B) holding issue waived when discussion of it in the opening brief was limited to two section headings a single sentence in the briefs summary and two phrases in arguments otherwise challenging a separate issue (C) holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived (D) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (E) holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief
Output: (B)
Education. In Peoria and Parsons, the plaintiffs made the eligibility for federal aid argument and added the argument that state action existed because the accreditation agency was incorporated, and thus a creature of state law. The arguments asserted in those cases were easily disposed of under traditional state action doctrine. Collateral consequences of eligibility for federal aid is not enough for state action under Blum v. Yaretsky, U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982); a company is not a state actor merely because it is itself regulated, see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-55, 95 S.Ct. at 454-55; and a corporate charter cannot create “state action” because such a rule would transform nearly every business entity into a state actor, cf. Burton, 365 U.S. at 726, 81 S.Ct. at 862 (<HOLDING>). In this case, by contrast, McKeesport can 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need to avoid a rule that creates universal application of state actor status (B) holding that amtrak was a state actor (C) recognizing district court application of the same rule (D) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (E) holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule
Output: (A)
their questionnaires, the District Court instructed them that [i]t is a common practice followed in many cases in the Federal court to keep the names and the identities of the jurors in confidence. This is [in] no way unusual. It is a procedure being followed in this case to protect your privacy even from the Court. United States v. Edmond, Crim. No. 89-0162, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 1989) (Preliminary Statement To Be Read To Jury Venire) (“Preliminary Instruction”), reprinted in J.A. I 259. By instructing jurors that the use of an anonymous jury was routine, the District Court avoided the possibility that jurors would view the procedure as an extraordinary precaution signaling a threat from the defendants and, inferentially, the defendants’ guilt. See Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1133 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the District Court immediately 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case (B) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (C) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (D) holding that lay opinion testimony is not admissible when the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion (E) holding that identical instruction was sufficient to ensure that the jury would not draw improper conclusions from the preservation of their anonymity
Output: (E)
arm’s-length transaction or from making as prompt or searching investigation as might otherwise be expected. In some situations there is no legal duty to use means available for discovering the fraud.... We are not prepared to say, however, that one in a relationship of trust and confidence is always justified as a matter of law in neglecting every precaution until something occurs to arouse his suspicions. Courseview, 312 S.W.2d at 205; Duthu v. Pena, 228 F.3d 409, 2000 WL 1056126, at *7-9 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (collecting cases). This case presents precisely the sort of intentional concealment of ill-gotten profits (in the face of a duty to disclose such profits) that allows a plaintiff to benefit from equitable estoppel. See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>);. Gibson v. Burkhart, 650 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself (B) holding that because a physician lias a duty to disclose a negligent act or fact that an injury has occurred and physician failed to do so cause of action was deferred until victim learned of the right of action (C) recognizing negligent procurement to be a negligence cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing the cause of action
Output: (B)
under section 2254(d)(1), “a state court need not even be aware of [its] precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result contradicts them.’ ” Id. (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam)). The state PCR court’s rejection of Wilson’s claim in this case was based on its conclusion that, “the trial judge properly found that [the QCRB report] contained neither exculpatory nor mitigating evidence that was undisclosed in a different form.” J.A. 590. We believe this demonstrates that the court was conducting the proper inquiry, under Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), and that therefore its decision was not “contrary to ... clearly established Federal law.” See id. at 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (<HOLDING>). We next consider whether the state court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (D) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment
Output: (E)
Right to Know Act); Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 562 Pa. 570, 757 A.2d 333 (1998) (appointing a special master to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether a taxing statute violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution); Pa. State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 324, 681 A.2d 699 (1996) (appointing a special master to prepare recommendations to the Supreme Court regarding the implementation of the unified judicial system); Commonwealth v. Banks, 612 Pa. 56, 29 A.3d 1129 (2011) (appointing a trial court judge as a special master to make findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to a challenge to the competency of a defendant to be executed). See also In re City of Pittsburgh, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 618, 600 A.2d 630, 632 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The grand jury presentment found 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cjourts historically possess the inherent authority to appoint masters to assist them in performing their various functions (B) holding that the samaritan act does not immunize doctors from suit when they are performing their normal job functions (C) recognizing the qualified immunity from liability extended to a police officer in performing discretionary functions achieves this balance (D) holding that qualified immunity extends to government officials performing discretionary functions (E) holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasiprosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings
Output: (A)
in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney’s fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART’s unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are “receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART’s claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P’ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
Output: (B)
was pending on, AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). “Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court’s decision] is plenary.” Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings tó be correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but we “exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law.” Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (E) holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to  2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination
Output: (E)
property where the entire cost exceeds $10,000. A school board cannot avoid this bidding requirement by contracting for materials or services “piecemeal” for the purpose of obtaining prices under $10,000. 24 P.S. § 7-751(f). Bennett argues that the Board clearly violated these sections of the Code because the dugouts were constructed “piecemeal” at a cost in excess of $10,000. Bennett also argues that limiting his remedy to the appeal process of Section 2451 penalizes taxpayers for the mistakes of auditors. We understand Bennett’s concerns over the actions of the school officials in this case, but we cannot ignore the holdings of our courts that auditors’ reports must be challenged exclusively as provided by statute. Skelton v. Lower Merion Township, 318 Pa. 356, 178 A. 387 (1935) (<HOLDING>); Festa v. Derry Township, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding age discrimination claim barred (B) holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal (C) holding that a tax collectors assumpsit claim was barred for having failed to submit his claim to the township auditors (D) holding disability discrimination claim barred (E) recognizing that an a3 claim for equitable relief could survive despite a claim for benefits under a1b but dismissing plaintiffs a3 claim because it was simply one for benefits based solely on claims that fiduciary failed to interpret plan properly failed to adequately investigate the claim failed to properly administer the claim and failed to administer the plan for the benefit of the beneficiaries
Output: (C)
Where an association asserts claims solely on behalf of its members, standing “depends in substantial measure on the nature of relief sought.” Id. at 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, quoted in Discovery House, 319 F.3d at 280. In such cases of pure associational standing, an association is limited to relief that, “if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.” Id. However, in addition to bringing suit on behalf of its members, an entity may also be granted “standing in its oum right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.” Id. at 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (emphasis added); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (<HOLDING>). As we understand it, the Seventh Circuit’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonprofit organization had standing to bring an action in its own right where  congress intended standing under the fair housing act to extend to the full limits of art iii quoting gladstone realtors v vill of bellwood 441 us 91 103 n 9 99 sct 1601 60 led2d 66 1979 (B) holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did (C) holding that courts should look to the standing principles  developed under section 4 of the clayton act for guidance in interpreting section 303s standing requirements id at 406 for a recent discussion of standing under the clayton act see associated general contractors v california state council of carpenters us 103 sct 897 74 led2d 723 1983 (D) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (E) holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury
Output: (A)
could have allowed one to two more spectators to sit with Mrs. Bucci, Mrs. Keefe, and Mrs. Jordan. It is, however, of no constitutional moment that the court did not do so. 9 . Indeed, Mrs. Keefe — whose testimony showed her to be a devoted mother who carefully followed every moment of the trial, talked to her son every day during his incarceration, and even led the effort to collect affidavits for Bucci’s habeas petition — was likely the most important member of the public to be present from Bucci’s perspective. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2 at 30, 33. 10 . Other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have also held that prohibiting public ingress and egress during a jury charge does not constitute "closure” under the Sixth Amendment. E.g., Herring v. Meachum, 11 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 433 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence (B) holding that counsel was deficient when he failed to object to error in jury charge referring to aggravated assault when the charge was assault on a public servant (C) holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge (D) holding that trial was never closed when court locked doors during jury charge because all members of the public who wanted to observe the charge were permitted to do so if there was enough space and they arrived in time (E) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error
Output: (D)
in ongoing litigation.”). Conditioning Gutten-berg’s dismissal on an attorney’s-fees-and-costs award is therefore inappropriate at this juncture. Emery disagrees. He implies that Gut-tenberg’s filings — and Emery’s responses to them — were unnecessary, because they “resulted in the Court’s rejection of three of the four claims originally asserted by Plaintiffs.” Def.’s Resp. at 7. But winning and losing has never been the stick by which courts have measured whether to impose fees-and-costs conditions. See SBM Wageneder Gesellschaft, 113 F.R.D. at 663 (“To condition a voluntary dismissal on an award of fees, the case law requires that defendant’s efforts must have been unnecessary, not that the plaintiff must prevail.”); Combo v. Viacom, Inc., 2007 WL 39410, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Put differently, the mere fact that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith (B) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (C) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (D) holding that whether plaintiffs arguments were frivolous was irrelevant to the question of whether to award attorneys fees and costs upon his motion to voluntarily dismiss the suit (E) recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs
Output: (D)
See also United States v. Morgan, 384 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2004) (questioning whether plain error was even available, or whether the issue was waived entirely, when a Blakely issue was neither raised below nor initially in this court). Plain error is an extremely deferential standard; errors will be corrected only if “(1) ... an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [his] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001)). In applying the plain error standard after Blakely, we have held that no plain error occurs where the facts underlying the enhancement _ were undisputed. Savarese, 385 F.3d at 22 (<HOLDING>). We have also noted, and now emphasize, that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing court may warn a defendant of the possibility of a sentence enhancement (B) holding that omission was not plain error (C) holding that a defendant who fails to object to an error at a plea colloquy hearing must satisfy the plain error rule (D) holding that a defendant who did not dispute the factual basis underlying the sentence enhancement forecloses a finding of plain error (E) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
Output: (D)
was never good history and is no longer good law.”). 8 . Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94, 99 S.Ct. 399, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). 9 . Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a) (emphasis added). 10 . Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989); see also Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir.1993) (citing id.). 11 . Norris, 512 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 2239. 12 . Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir.1999). 13 . Norris, 512 U.S. at 264 n. 10, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (quoting Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311-12, 109 S.Ct. 2477). 14 . Id. at 264, 114 S.Ct. 2239. 15 . Id. at 264 n. 10, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R 171 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that the present controversy concerns the plaintiffs rights under state and federal statutes which exist independently of the collective bargaining agreement and do not require interpretation of that agreement (C) holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim was not completely preempted and noting that state court on remand would have to apply federal law to remaining issues requiring interpretation of collective bargaining agreement (E) holding that an arbitrators interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
Output: (B)
due process rights.” Id. Doc. 31 at 4. The district court adopted the recommendation and denied the petition. Id. Doc. 35 at 3. II. Discussion On review of the denial of a petition for habeas corpus, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. See Patterson v. Knowles, 162 F.3d 574, 575 (10th Cir.1998). Mr. Mayberry argues that he has a liberty interest in his earned good-time credits even though the DOC now asserts they were not validly earned. We agree with Mr. Mayberry. Oklahoma “has created a liberty interest in earned credits and an inmate is entitled to due process protection prior to the loss of those credits.” Waldon v. Evans, 861 P.2d 311, 313 (Okla.Ct.Crim.App.1993); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Under Oklahoma law, once good-time credits 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a parents right to rear his or her children without state interference as a constitutionallyprotected fundamental liberty interest (B) holding that when state provides right to good time and specifies method of forfeiture inmate has constitutionallyprotected liberty interest entitling him to procedures designed to ensure that the statecreated right is not arbitrarily abrogated (C) holding that state statutes which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular substantive result do not give rise to a statecreated liberty interest (D) holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure (E) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right
Output: (B)
11 Agreement lacks a description or itemized list of the “ballroom furniture” or the “equipment, telephone systems, and security system.” Appellants also argue that the phrase “take over control” as it pertains to the common areas and collecting assessments and expenditures is undefined and overbroad. The essential or material terms of a contract, whether oral or written, must be definite, certain, and clear and, if they are not, the contract is unenforceable. T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.1992); Southern v. Goetting, 353 S.W.3d 295, 299-301 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2011, pet. denied); Meru v. Huerta, 136 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.); see, e.g., Loeffler v. Lytle ISD, 211 S.W.3d 331, 346 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). The issue of whether a Rule 11 settlement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable (B) holding that a contract to sell real property was unenforceable because it did not contain a sufficient description of land subject to contract (C) holding contract for sale of water which did not specify price was unenforceable because price of water was essence of contract (D) holding unenforceable a contract for real estate commissions formed by an unlicensed corporation (E) holding unenforceable a real estate contract that provided for the payment of brokerage fees to an unlicensed corporation
Output: (B)
matter to the BIA for a ruling on its merits. I also note that the majority concedes that the BIA may require that the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel address the Lozada factors. Nonetheless, as the majority contravenes controlling precedent by expanding our jurisdiction to cover an issue not raised before the BIA and not factually supported, I respectfully dissent. 1 . Moreover, Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, (9th Cir.2000), which was cited in Ray, suggests that despite the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, an alien may file a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his or her immigration proceedings. Id. at 1044; see also Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). But see Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a habeas corpus petitioner who did not raise an ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas petition satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test when counsel on the first state habeas petition was also trial counsel whose performance was allegedly inadequate (B) holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (C) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding that under oregon law a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in the initial habeas proceeding (E) holding that a district court had jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in an immigration proceeding when the petitioner is threatened with immediate deportation
Output: (E)
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” Syvertson v. State, 2005 ND 128, ¶ 6, 699 N.W.2d 855 (quoting City of Grand Forks v. Ramstad, 2003 ND 41, ¶ 9, 658 N.W.2d 731). To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove: “ ‘(1) the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; and (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.’ ” Syvert-son, at ¶ 6 (quoting State v. Goulet, 1999 ND 80, ¶ 15, 593 N.W.2d tute, 194 F.3d 547, 556 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “[s]uch evidence is material ‘if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence (B) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible where defense counsel implied in his opening statement that witness should not be believed because of the favorable consideration he received from the government in his plea bargaining agreement (C) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (D) holding witnesss prior inconsistent statement about whether he was an eyewitness was evidence favorable to the defendant establishing brady violations first requirement (E) holding that a witnesss prior inconsistent statement to an officer could be used to impeach her
Output: (D)
464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983). This line of cases also answers the possible contention that Title VII awards, because authorized by statute, are somehow different than back pay awards. The constitutional question does not change because Congress has created the right. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 1008. Although it has not confronted the Seventh Amendment question directly, this Circuit has endorsed the proposition that in a Title VII action “back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy.” Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C.Cir.1974) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d at 1125). See also Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 3009, 120 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award of damages specifically allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge in violation of first amendment rights under  1983 was nontaxable under  104a2 (B) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion (C) holding that punitive damages are excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 (D) holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages (E) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court
Output: (D)
a standard of review, the government did not know what its burden would be. Like the district court, it proceeded on the assumption that the highest standard of scrutiny applied and then relied almost entirely on conclusory reasoning by analogy from Heller’s reference to the “presumptive” constitutionality of felon-dispossession laws. That was a mistake, for the reasons we have explained. In any event, our discussion here of the appropriate standard of review should provide guidance for the proceedings on remand. Before closing, we offer a few additional observations to help those proceedings along. Intermediate scrutiny tolerates laws that are somewhat overinclusive. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327-28 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). How much is too much is hard to say; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appropriate standard of review regarding campaign finance disclosure laws is intermediate not strict scrutiny (B) holding that the commonlaw distinction between governmental and proprietary acts known as the proprietarygovernmental dichotomyapplies in the contractclaims context just as it does in the tort claims context (C) recognizing that intermediate scrutiny in the commercialspeech context allows some latitude between the regulation and the governmental objective (D) holding that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies (E) recognizing a hearing officers latitude in making credibility calls
Output: (C)
S.D.Ohio 2008) (“[T]o defeat the trustee’s status, a creditor must possess a perfected security interest on the date the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under § 544(a)(2), the trustee has the rights and powers of an unsatisfied execution creditor, a hypothetical “creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution against the debt- or that is returned unsatisfied at such time....” 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2). A creditor obtaining such an execution could not use it to avoid or otherwise obtain priority over prior perfected mortgages. See Fundex Capital Corp. v. Balaber-Strauss (In re Tampa Chain Co.), 53 B.R. 772, 777-78 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the holder of a mortgage that is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one who acquires legal title with notice of a prior equitable interest in the property is not a bona fide purchaser (B) holding that unsatisfied execution creditor had rights in property superior to all but prior secured creditors and bona fide purchasers for value (C) holding that the rights of a bona fide purchaser outweighed those of an under secured second mortgage holder (D) recognizing that if a creditors claim is subject to a bona fide dispute that creditor lacks standing to file an involuntary petition (E) holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property
Output: (B)
20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling. 79 . Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 07/12/05 Dep. at 28). 80 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling; Vine St. Exhibit 40 at 001947. 81 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling; Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 07/12/05 Dep. at 38-39, 58). 82 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling; Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 07/12/05 Dep. at 62, 67). 83 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling. 84 . Id.; Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 7/12/05 Dep. at 64-65, 67-78). 85 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of 589, 596 n. 12, 598 (S.D.Tex.1996) (indicating but not directly holding that the arranger need not have owned or possessed the substance); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 1432, 1451 (E.D.Cal.1995) {"Iron Mountain I") (<HOLDING>). 100 . New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant (B) holding without discussion that a cercla arranger must own or possess the hazardous substance at issue (C) holding authority to control limits duty to control (D) holding that defendant was potentially liable as an arranger when it discharged hazardous substances into a river (E) holding that an arranger must have owned or possessed or had the authority to control or duty to dispose of  the hazardous materials at issue
Output: (E)
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim against Popp Popp argues he should have been granted qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim because there was no Fourth Amendment violation. We agree, because Popp did not make the decision to charge Kinkus, and there is no proof in the record that Kinkus presented false information to the prosecutor. This Court has held that a police officer cannot be liable for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to bring charges, as long as the information he submitted to the prosecutor is truthful. See Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant could not be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that defendants conspired with influenced or even participated in the prosecutors decision to bring charges against him (B) holding that a police officer cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to prosecute the plaintiff (C) holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions (D) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (E) holding the same for malicious prosecution
Output: (B)
of no more than ten pages and limited to the private search issue, by November 3, and the government is ordered to submit a supplemental sur-reply, also of no more than ten pages and limited to the private search issue, by November 10. A suppression hearing is scheduled for November 13 at 10 AM. SO ORDERED. 1 . The exact meaning of "Internet Service Provider” is unclear. Wikipedia defines the term broadly — to encompass not only entities that provide "internet service,” thereby allowing consumers to get online (such as Comcast and Tim 014 WL 2918271, at *2 (N.D.Cal. June 26, 2014). 67 . See United States v. Caraballo, 963 F.Supp.2d 341, 361 (D.Vt.2013). But see In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Infonnation, 809 F.Supp.2d 113 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>). 68 . With respect to one of the electronic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cumulative cellsite  location records require a warrant because of the significant governmental intrusion into information which is objectively recognized as highly private  that is the governments surveillance of ones movements over a considerable time period (B) holding inmates have some fourth amendment protection where no institutional need is served by the search (C) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records (D) holding that fourth amendment protection extends to cellsite location records (E) recognizing an implied fourth amendment action for damages
Output: (D)
... shall exist within the United States,” U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const, amend. XIII, § 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase “all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the “badges and incidents of slavery” language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (<HOLDING>). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 usc  1982 a provision of the civil rights act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants was a valid exercise of congress thirteenth amendment authority (B) holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation (C) holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims (D) holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights
Output: (A)