niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
reasoning is further highlighted by the fact that it would apparently hold that MCL 500.3220, despite nothing even approximating such language, envisions that insurers will investigate an insured, but will only do so when the claimant is a third party and not when the claimant is the insured. See Hammoud, 222 Mich App 485. How does any of this policy reasonably derive from the actual statute in controversy? 9 See MCL 8.3a (“All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”). 10 Accord United Sec Ins Co, 133 Mich App at 42 (<HOLDING>). 11 Ohio Farmers Ins Co, 179 Mich App at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used (B) holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent (C) holding that it is presumed that no change in the commonlaw was intended by the legislatures enactment of a statute on the same subject unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention (D) holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent (E) holding that under mcl 5003204 etseq rjescission is insufficiently similar to cancellation to support the conclusion that the legislatures enactment of a statute controlling cancellation of an automobile insurance policy without mentioning rescission demonstrates the legislatures intent to preclude rescission
Output: (E)
proceeding, an appellant must first obtain a COA. Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir.2006). The court that issues a COA must “indicate which specific issue or issues,” if any, warrant a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). Appellate review is then limited to the issues specified in the COA. Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir.1998). Here, however, the dis trict court failed to specify which issues or issues warranted a COA. Because the court failed to specify the issue or issues for which it granted a COA, we may do one of two things: (1) remand to the district court for enumeration of issues; or (2) retain jurisdiction and rule on those issues raised by the prisoner that we deem worthy of a COA. See Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1315 n. 1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to enumerate specific issues for review in a coa does not deprive us of appellate jurisdiction (B) holding the scope of appellate review of denial of a habeas petition limited to the issues on which coa has been granted (C) holding that on appeal from the denial of a  2255 motion appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa (D) holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa (E) holding that appellate review in a habeas ease is limited to the issues specified in the coa
Output: (A)
for playing the tapes were legitimate and the tapes would eliminate the need for T.S. to testify a second time. Defense counsel responded: “Right.” 3 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay when the declarant testifies at trial, is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is “consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” 4 For this reason, we need not address defendant’s argument that the recorded statements were inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 5 Defendant does not claim that defense counsel did not have the power to waive his right to confront witnesses against him. See generally New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Many courts allow defense counsel to waive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel (B) recognizing a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver of constitutional rights by counsel although certain fundamental rights require personal waiver by defendant (C) recognizing conditions of release may curtail certain fundamental rights (D) holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so (E) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary
Output: (B)
In United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 442 Fed.Appx. 136, 137 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), the district court found the defendant had not given truthful testimony at the sentencing hearing and had, therefore, obstructed justice. As a result, he was not entitled to a reduction of his sentence for acceptance of responsibility. We agreed, reasoning that “[b]ecause Hernandez did not accept responsibility under the Guidelines, the condition triggering the Government’s obligation not to oppose Hernandez’ request for an adjustment was not fulfilled; the Government was, therefore, not in breach of the agreement by opposing his request for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment.” Id. (emphasis omitted); cf. United States v. Bell, 417 Fed.Appx. 420, 422 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). A contrary unpublished opinion, United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was denied wrongfully his right to crossexamine on the issue of whether the device was designed as a pipe bomb or as a firecracker and that the jury may have found reasonable doubt if that right was not denied (B) holding that under  111 the defendants knowledge of the official status of the victim is generally irrelevant (C) holding that where the proffered hearsay statement of the victim pertained to a memory of the previous days events and was offered solely for the purpose of proving such events such statement was not admissible under rule 8033 (D) holding the same where the defendant offered exculpatory and irrelevant interpretations of transactions and events deflected responsibility denied or discounted relevant conduct portrayed himself as a victim of unfair government treatment and generally denied or minimized his culpability at the sentencing hearing (E) holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility
Output: (D)
and manufacturing agreement with BDT.” BDT acknowledges that “Lexmark did not sign such a written agreement.’-’ BDT nevertheless claims that Lexmark breached a contract implied-in-fact to compensate BDT for its purported trade secrets with the understanding that BDT would be compensated if its technology were incorporated into Lexmark’s products. BDT contends that it suffered a “loss of profits from the anticipated agreements with Lex-mark.” Plaintiffs’ claim must fail, however. A contract implied-in-fact is not an “anticipated” contract but rather a true contract that “requires an actual agreement or meeting of the minds although not expressed.” Kellum v. Browning’s Adm’r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459, 466 (1929); see also Oliver v. Gardner, 192 Ky. 89, 232 S.W. 418, 420 (1921) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). A contract implied-in-fact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (B) holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith (C) holding that proof must show that both the party rendering the service and the one receiving it expected and understood that compensation would be made (D) holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm (E) holding to warrant reversal the appellant must show both the error of the ruling and resulting prejudice
Output: (C)
Co., 168 N.C. 296, 84 S.E. 363 (1915); Plemmons v. Southern Improvement Company, 108 N.C. 614, 13 S.E. 188 (1891). This rule was amended somewhat by the enactment of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(b), (hereinafter N.C.R. Civ. P.), which provides that a summons shall be directed to the defendant rather than to a process officer ordering him to summon the defendant. Still, the strict requirement that the summons command the appearance of the defendant and not that of an individual designated an agent or officer of the defendant has been carried over in the interpretation of the sufficiency of summonses under Rule 4. Carl Rose & Sons Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Thorp Sales Corporation, 30 N.C. App. 526, 227 S.E. 2d 301 (1976); see also, Philpott v. Kerns, 285 N.C. 225, 203 S.E. 2d 778 (1974), (<HOLDING>). In reviewing the summons issued in this case, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (B) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (C) holding that insurance provisions excluding damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles subject to registration and damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles if the injury or damage occurs away from the insured premises were ambiguous because together they could be read in four different ways (D) holding that a summons directed to the commissioner of motor vehicles was defective process as against a nonresident defendant in an action arising out of operation of a motor vehicle in this state (E) recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle
Output: (D)
seek in this litigation, which I have determined to be relevant to this case, fall within its scope. Resolution of this issue depends on principles of federalism, comity and courtesy, as well as an evaluation of the nature of the Order, and practical matters such as where the court should allocate the burden and expense of seeking modification of the Order. There seems to be little doubt that a protective order issued by a court, either state or federal, which on its face survives the underlying litigation, continues to have full force and effect on the parties subject to it even after final resolution of the underlying case, and the issuing court retains jurisdiction and authority to modify or revoke it. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, 858 F.2d 775, 780-82 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   (B) holding that the issuing court necessarily has the power to enforce a protective order it issued at any point it is in effect even after entry of a final judgment and courts enjoy the inherent power to modify any discovery related orders postjudgment (C) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (D) holding that this court has power to direct the entry of summary judgment when it would be just under the circumstances (E) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals
Output: (B)
of § 3.303(b) regarding the use of or need for continuity of symptomatology as to a service-connection claim and what the relationship of that concept is to the need for medical evidence of a nexus between a current medical condition and the veteran’s service. Until those issues are resolved in Savage, the current opinion should be withheld. In Caluza, the Court reiterated that medical evidence of nexus to service was generally required in order to well ground a service-connection claim. Caluza, supra (citing Grottveit, supra). As the Secretary’s motion indicates, the Court’s opinion in Smith will add confusion to the Court’s easelaw on the question of the nature and quality of the evidence needed to well ground a claim. Compare Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 609, 610-11 (1992) (<HOLDING>), and Boeck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 14, 16-17 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr  3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim  that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (C) holding physician statement that veterans death may or may not have been averted if medical personnel had been able to intubate him a procedure complicated by his serviceconnected injuries insufficient to well ground claim for service connection for veterans cause of death (D) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child (E) holding that action for wrongful death may generally not be maintained where death was selfinflicted
Output: (C)
family situation. The federal courts are not well suited to this task. They are not local institutions, they do not have staffs of social workers, and there is too little commonality between family law adjudication and the normal responsibilities of federal judges to give them the experience they would need to be able to resolve domestic disputes with skill and sensitivity. 694 F.2d at 492. 4 . In various unpublished cases, we have continued to limit the domestic-relations exception to “cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree,” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704, 112 S.Ct. 2206, and cases seeking to modify or interpret a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Abdallah, No. 98-1551, 1999 WL 331631, at *1 (6th Cir. May 13, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Chambers v. Michigan, 473 Fed.Appx. 477, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the domesticrelations exception prevented the plaintiff from challenging in federal court the constitutionality of the statecourt judges decision to consider certain assets and property when calculating the plaintiffs husbands income for the purposes of determining alimony payments because the plaintiff ultimately wanted this court to enjoin the state court from using property  to determine the amount of alimony owed (B) holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule (C) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (D) holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred (E) holding that the domesticrelations exception barred federal adjudication of a statelaw fraud action because the plaintiff essentially sought a modification of the process in the divorce decree relating to distribution
Output: (E)
that the use of Rule 60(b) to correct a court’s own mistakes of law was much more efficient than requiring an aggrieved party to appeal. Id. at 531. The panel also cited with approval the recommendation from Moore’s Federal Practice that Rule 60(b)(1) motions not be permitted past the deadline for filing a notice of appeal, thereby preventing Rule 60(b)(1) from becoming a way to assert an otherwise time-barred appeal. Id. (citing Moore’s Fed. Prac. § 60.23(3-4), at 239 (1955)). Although some circuits have resisted an expansive use of Rule 60(b) to correct the court’s mistakes of law, see Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (1st Cir.1971), Judge Friendly’s approach has remained the law of this circuit. See Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir.1977); see also id. (<HOLDING>); see generally 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired (B) holding that rule 60b1 motion may not be brought after time for appeal has run (C) holding that motions for relief from judgment or order brought under federal rule of civil procedure 60b1 provide means for a district court to correct legal errors by the court internal citation omitted (D) holding that district court abused its discretion in denying rule 60b1 motion without conducting equitable analysis (E) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied
Output: (B)
a mechanism for obtaining large attorney’s fee awards in cases with de minimis returns for the client and society in general. Furthermore, the prospect of a fee award can skew attorneys’ incentives when confronted with settlement offers that would more than compensate their clients, but that fall short of the large fees already incurred. These concerns are most prevalent in cases such as this, where recovery of private damages, rather than the vindication of constitutional rights, is the primary purpose. While it is Congress’ duty to re-shape fee-shifting provisions to alleviate these concerns, it is this Court’s duty to determine a reasonable fee in light of the de minimis victory achieved in this case. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (<HOLDING>). I. BACKGROUND After a jury trial before this 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (B) holding that the most critical factor in the analysis of a reasonable fee is the degree of success obtained (C) holding that status as a prevailing party does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to attorneys fees rather the most critical factor in determining a fee awards reasonableness is the degree of success obtained emphasis added (D) holding that the quantity of relief obtained as compared to what the plaintiff sought to achieve are key elements in determining the degree of success (E) holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 
Output: (B)
and compare 8th Cir. Model 5.06G. 22 . This court also held, in Honken’s case, that the 1996 conspiracy charge, to which Honken pleaded guilty, was not the "same” conspiracy as the conspiracy underlying the “conspiracy murder” and "CCE murder” charges against him, which were also pending against Johnson, but even if it was the "same” conspiracy, the "conspiracy murder” and "CCE murder” charges were not the "same” offenses. See United States v. Honken, 381 F.Supp.2d 936, 966-67 (N.D.Iowa 2005) (even assuming that the conspiracy underlying the capital offenses was he "same” as the conspiracy to which Honken had previously pleaded guilty, the capital offenses were not the "same” offenses for prior jeopardy purposes); United States v. Honken, 271 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1115 (N.D.Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>). The court will assume, however, for purposes 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy (C) holding that the prior conspiracy to which honken had pleaded guilty was not the same as the conspiracy underlying the capital offenses (D) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication (E) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges
Output: (C)
The Court will therefore reduce Defendant’s Bill of Costs by the entire $128.68 that Defendant attributed to necessary travel expenses for Ms. Burkhart, Ms. Hunt, and Ms. Smith. D. Westlaw Expenses Plaintiffs also object to Defendant’s inclusion of $164.45 on its Bill of Costs that it attributed to “compensation for Westlaw usage.” (Def.’s Application of Costs at 1.) In reviewing Plaintiffs’ objection, the Court first notes that the cost of legal research services is not listed as an allowable expense in either the Local Rules or 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Furthermore, the Court finds that the cost of legal research is more properly characterized as a component of attorneys’ fees, not as a taxable cost of litigation. United States v. Merritt Meridian Constr. Corp., 95 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees would include expenses for computerized legal research and thus not allowing computerized legal research as a separate taxable cost (B) holding that computeraided research like any other form of legal research is a component of attorneys fees and cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost in addition to the attorneys fee award (C) holding that the costs of computerized research was a component of attorneys fees that cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost (D) holding that based on leftwich the law of this circuit is that computerbased legal research must be factored into the attorneys hourly rate hence the cost of the computer time may not be added to the fee award (E) holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees
Output: (A)
code, Appellants here “do[ ] not seek an advisory opinion that [their] proposed actions would not be criminal.” Total Vending Svc., 153 Ga. App. at 111. Instead, Appellants seek a determination of whether licensed individuals may carry a weapon on the grounds of the Garden in accordance with OCGA § 16-11-127 (c). See Total Vending, 153 Ga. App. at 111. Further, Appellants’ requested relief is not premised on mere speculation that the Garden will enforce its weapons ban; Evans, who holds a membership with the Garden, had already been asked to leave the premises of the Garden and was escorted from the property by law enforcement. Importantly, however, there is no allegation here that criminal conduct has been accomplished. See Osborne v. State, 290 Ga. App. 188 (665 SE2d 1) (2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Appellants’ request for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding dollar amount is not an essential element (B) holding that damage to the property of another is an essential element of the offense of criminal mischief (C) recognizing that an essential element of criminal trespass is a showing that entry onto the premises had previously been expressly forbidden (D) holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case (E) holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim
Output: (C)
to the crime, while at the same time avoiding criminal liability herself. Her last-minute change of heart, after she had both pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of endangering a child and disavowed any responsibility for Jordan’s death for two and a half years, further supports this view. This appears to be a “justice-subverting ploy” that provides the justification for requiring indicia of truthfulness. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301 n.'21, 98 S.Ct. 1038 (discussing a scenario where person A is a defendant, person B tells persons C and D that he committed the crime and then goes into hiding, persons C and D testify at A’s trial, and then person B — who did not commit the crime — returns from hiding and has several witnesses to corroborate his innocence); Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 290 (<HOLDING>); Bracero, 528 A.2d at 941 (noting that “it is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition (B) holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant (C) holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either (D) holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission (E) holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination
Output: (D)
there has been a presumption of openness and public access to judicial proceedings and documents. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 10, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 507, .104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). Addressing the presumption of access to judicial proceedings, in Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court held that there is a qualified right of public access to judicial proceedings, rooted in the First Amendment, if there is “a tradition of accessibility” to the nature of the proceedings involved and if p any, Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 345 (6th Cir.1987)(<HOLDING>). With respect to the common law right of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to intervene to assert the publics first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is proper (B) recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents (C) holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case (D) holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable (E) holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case
Output: (C)
cannot be controlled by mandamus.” Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19, 50 S.Ct. 320, 324-25, 74 L.Ed. 809 (1929). We agree with the district court that Edison’s showing falls far short of this high standard. To begin with, the Attorney General obtained the surcharge and now retains it pursuant to a federal court order. He is thus complying with — not violating — his legal obligations. Resisting this obvious proposition, Edison argues that the Attorney General’s possession of the surcharge is so plainly wrong that it amounts to a violation of a ministerial duty. In our view, however, this argument amounts to a completely inappropriate collateral attack on the Alabama court’s judgment. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Although Edison never formally asked the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper to exercise general jurisdiction when defendants purchases combined with its sales in the forum yielded 129 of its total income (B) holding that mandamus is only available to confine an inferior comt to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so (C) holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury (D) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) recognizing the supreme courts longstanding jurisdiction over writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction
Output: (B)
matter jurisdiction over the claims made by Southwest against Reclamation. Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir.1995). Pursuant to section 1540(g) of the ESA, a citizen may not bring suit prior to sixty days after written notice of an alleged violation has been given to the Secretary, and to the alleged violator. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i). This sixty-day notice requirement is jurisdictional. Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir.1988). A failure to strictly comply with the notice requirement acts as an absolute bar to bringing suit under the ESA. Lone Rock Timber Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 842 F.Supp. 433, 440 (D.Or.1994). See also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26-28, 110 S.Ct. 304, 308-10, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989)(<HOLDING>). “The purpose of the 60-day notice provision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the citizen suit notice requirements cannot be avoided by employing a flexible or pragmatic construction and that plaintiffs suit must be dismissed where plaintiff had not strictly complied with the notice requirements (B) holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute (C) holding that even though the government had not strictly complied with the statutory requirements the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because they failed to challenge that noncompliance in a prompt fashion (D) holding notice provision in rcra and clean water act are virtually identical and citizens notice to violators under either act must strictly comply with statutory notice requirements (E) holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa
Output: (A)
that Wolfe was represented by counsel. However, instead of contacting Wolfe’s attorney regarding the lawsuit, Stevens filed an affidavit of diligent search and inquiry and proceeded to serve Wolfe by publication. At the hearing on Wolfe’s motion to set aside the final judgment, Stevens’ attorney admitted he had the address and phone number of Wolfe’s attorney and that he could have notified him of the lawsuit but he “made the decision, knowing all the circumstances regarding the accusations that were going back and forth, that I would rather go the statutory route.” Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Stevens exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Wolfe. Accordingly, service by publication was improper. See Levenson v. McCarty, 877 So.2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Torelli v. Travelers Indem. Co., 495 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant was estopped from asserting improper service where the defendants conduct caused the allegedly improper service (B) holding that where the plaintiff made no attempt to contact the defendant by telephone or through his known attorneys service by publication was improper (C) holding that the plaintiff did not complete service when she made no attempt to serve the defendant within the time required by the arkansas procedural rules (D) holding that discretionary review was improper in part because the party made no attempt to demonstrate why his case qualifies as one of these rare cases (E) holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice
Output: (B)
added); see also Embassy of Fed. Rep. of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 901 F.Supp.2d 92, 97 (D.D.C.2012) (noting that even though individual could appear pro se in his personal capacity, he cannot do so as the trustee on behalf of a company). The law treats corporations—even small ones—as distinct from the natural persons that create or work for them. A corporation is “viewed as a distinct entity, even when it is wholly owned by a single individual.” Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 757 (D.C.Cir.1975) (footnote omitted). In various contexts, the law takes seriously the formal line between a corporation and a natural person, even when the corporation is, in effect, a one-person firm. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161-65, 121 S.Ct. 2087, 150 L.Ed.2d 198 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Individuals experience burdens as well as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity (B) holding that closely held corporation and its sole shareholder are distinct for purposes of federal racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations act (C) holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder (D) holding shareholder of dissolved corporation could after windup period expired foreclose on mortgage once held by corporation (E) holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets
Output: (B)
14 F.3d at 1500. We conclude that it does not. Courts have recognized that the act of reopening a closed bankruptcy case does not afford the parties any substantive relief. Woods, 173 F.3d at 777 (quoting DeVore v. Marshack (In re DeVore), 223 B.R. 193, 198 (9th Cir. BAP 1998), for the proposition that “[t]he reopening of a case is ‘merely a ministerial or mechanical act [that] ... has no independent legal significance and determines nothing with respect to the merits of the case.’ ”); see Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that order reopening closed case “ ‘lacks independent legal significance and determines nothing with respect to the merits of the case’ ”) (quoting Menk v. LaPaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 913 (9th Cir. BAP 1999)); Paine, 250 B.R. at 107 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, “ ‘[t]he effect of [11 U.S.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that department does not have independent authority to impose device in absence of court order (B) recognizing that an order reopening a closed case was simply a mechanical device that did not afford or deny the debtors any affirmative relief (C) holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order (D) recognizing laches as an affirmative defense (E) recognizing that a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford
Output: (B)
1176 (D.S.D. 2012); Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 993 (N.Y. 1995). It appears that being incorporated under State law rather than tribal law “militate[s] against sovereign immunity”. J.L. Ward Assocs., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 15 See Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs., Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2012) (“a separate legal entity organized under the laws of another sovereign, Oklahoma, cannot share in the Nation’s [i.e., the tribe’s] immunity from suit”). 16 See Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he College serves as an arm of the tribe and not as a mere business and is thus entitled to tribal sovereign immunity”); Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inn which was a subentity of the tribe rather than a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal immunity (B) holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court (C) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws (D) holding that the tribes housing authority was exempt from the adea a general statute because the tribal entity was not just a business but also functioned as an arm of tribal government by providing housing to tribe members (E) holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe
Output: (E)
jurisdiction’ method, [a variant of the present division method of deferred distribution] the trial court reserves jurisdiction to distribute the pension until benefits have matured. Once matured, the trial court will determine the proper share to which each party is entitled and divide the benefits accordingly. McDermott v. McDermott, supra, 150 Vt. 259-60 (such a method allows a court ‘to base its distribution upon actual figures [as to what benefits are being paid] rather than assumptions as to retirement age and other variables’); 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, supra, § 23.02 [4], pp. 23-21 through 23-25; 3 Family Law and Practice, supra, § 37.11 [2] [b], pp. 37-163 through 37-164; see also Whitfield v. Whitfield, 222 N.J. Super. 36, 48, 535 A.2d 986 (1987) (<HOLDING>).” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Krafick 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing but disapproving reserved jurisdiction approach to pension valuation and distribu tion (B) recognizing that some states it should be noted have adopted a hybrid approach (C) holding that the clause at issue granted jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction (D) holding order in dependency proceeding was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and support issues (E) holding order was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and child support issues
Output: (A)
matter, Moton requested that the trial court poll the jury, and the court agreed to do so. The first four jurors questioned all indicated that they freely and voluntarily agreed with the guilty verdict. The court ing that evidence showed that trial court’s refusal to afford defendant first offender treatment was based on deliberate consideration of the case and sentencing options and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion); Graydon, 313 Ga. App. at 581 (same). 15 Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 651 (3) (763 SE2d 453) (2014). 16 Graham v. State, 107 Ga. App. 332, 333 (1) (130 SE2d 166) (1963); see generally Boatwright v. State, 91 Ga. 13, 13 (16 SE 101) (1892). 17 Geiger, 295 Ga. at 651 (3) (punctuation omitted). 18 See Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 664-65 (4) (513 SE2d 498) (1999) (<HOLDING>). 19 Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
Output: (A)
distinction between a survival statute and a statute of limitations as follows: [A] statute of limitations affects the time that a stale claim may be brought while a survival statute gives life for a limited time to a right or claim that would have been destroyed entirely but for the statute. These survival statutes arbitrarily extend the life of the corporation to allow remedies connected with the corporation’s existence to be asserted. M.S. v. Dinkytown Day Care Center, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 587, 589 (S.D.1992) (quoting Davis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur. Co., 727 F.Supp. 549 (D.S.D.1989)). Thus, courts have uniformly held that corporate survival statutes begin to run at the date of dissolution and have dismissed claims initiated outside of the prescribed period. See e.g., Id. at 588 (<HOLDING>); Canadian Ace Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that minority tolling statute did not apply to extend time provided under corporate survival statute (B) holding that tolling statute applicable to those disabled by minority or mental illness continues to operate regardless of guardians appointment (C) holding that rule 60b was not applicable to extend the time to file an action to revoke a discharge under grounds of mistake and not addressing equitable tolling (D) holding that because purpose of tolling statute is to remedy problem of locating a nonresident defendant before expiration of statute of limitations tolling statute does not apply to adverse possession action because of statutory scheme allowing for service by publication on parties outside state in such actions (E) recognizing that the dead mans statute is a survival from an earlier and much broader incompetency statute and characterizing its survival as deplorable
Output: (A)
peculiar positions as state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). We, as well as other appellate courts, have held that the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for establishing a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208; see also Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir.1993); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir.1990). We are aware of no court of appeals which has recognized the constitutional validity of the state-created danger theory in the context of an immigration case. But see Builes v. Nye, 239 F.Supp.2d 518 (M.D.Pa.2003) (<HOLDING>). We decline to do so here, and hold that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture (B) holding that despite petitioners inability to establish habeas relief under cat because evidence did not support finding that colombian government would acquiesce to torture by drug cartel  petitioner was entitled to relief under statecreated danger exception (C) holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief (D) holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture (E) holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment
Output: (B)
setting forth only the BAP’s judgment. Accordingly, by operation of our rules of appellate procedure, the Tau-moepeaus had 180 days within which to file their notice of appeal and their notice, received by the BAP clerk on October 2, 2006, fell well within this period. To be sure, the separate document rule is a technical one. But, as its name implies, it generally requires that judgment be entered in a separate document, one that is “not made part of the opinion and order” of the court. Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir.2008). A combined document denominated an “Order and Judgment,” containing factual background, legal reasoning, as well as a judgment, generally will not satisfy the rule’s prescription. See, e.g., Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Allison v. Bank One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (B) holding that a district courts combined order and judgment did not satisfy the rule on account of being fifteen pages long and containing detailed legal analysis along with citations in addition to providing for entry of judgment (C) holding that a district courts summary judgment order did not meet rule 58s requirements because it was fifteen pages long and it contained detailed legal analysis and reasoning (D) holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner (E) holding that the rule 12b6 ruling was not a final judgment and did not bind the district court at summary judgment
Output: (C)
at 4. This finding of bad faith is amply supported by the record: Sauers admitted that he could not present facts to challenge the Commissioner’s determination of tax deficiency, he refused to engage in a stipulation of facts, and his legal arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 54 S.Ct. 8, 78 L.Ed. 212 (1933) (establishing that burden of proof in Tax Court is on the taxpayer); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 227, 17 L.Ed.2d 142 (1966) (relying on Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 49 S.Ct. 411, 73 L.Ed. 789 (1929) for the conclusion that the statute establishing the Tax Court does not unconstitutionally violate separation of powers); Larsen at 941-942 (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1059, 1062 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances (B) holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal (C) holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists (D) holding the following claims to be frivolous  6673 infringes upon first amendment right to petition tax court cannot have jurisdiction because it is not an article iii court (E) holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims
Output: (D)