niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Com’n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1397 (4th Cir.1994) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211-12, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). 2 . With respect to Defendant's argument that determining whether Plaintiff held a “good faith, reasonable belief” that the uniform violated the DCHRA when she made her complaint would require interpretation of the CBA, see Def.'s Mot. at 8, the Court is not persuaded. To satisfy the first prong of a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must "demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief” that the challenged action is unlawful under Title V II, and thus the DCHRA. See Welzel v. Bernstein, 436 F.Supp.2d 110, 118 (D.D.C.2006), accord Sullivan v. Catholic Univ. of Amer., 387 F.Supp.2d 11, 13 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). However, this determination would not involve 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap (B) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (C) holding that in addressing employment claims under the dchra courts look to title vii jurisprudence (D) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (E) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii
Output: (C)
reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already “irretrievably occurred.” Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become “academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... ” Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a “ ‘subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate’ to make a substantive determination on the merits.” Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot (B) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (C) holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred
Output: (E)
court's decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The trial court was particularly troubled by the Estate's "form over substance" insistence that McKinney's designated evidence be excluded from consideration, (Summary Judgment Tr. 7) because the Estate sought to preclude the trial court from considering documents the Estate's attorney had drafted and filed with the trial court in prior litigation against McKinney. Moreover, the Estate was not prejudiced by the trial court's decision: McKinney's supplemental affidavit presented no new substantive evidence, the Estate had already addressed the previously designated evidence in its brief, and the Estate failed to renew its motion to strike upon McKinney's submission of the supplemental affidavit, See Logan, 728 N.E.2d at 860 (<HOLDING>). The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery (B) holding no prejudice occurred when supplemental affidavits of a substantive nature were submitted after the time for a nonmovants response had elapsed and the parties had ample opportunity for prior discovery (C) holding that when the trial court proceeded to consider affidavits submitted with motion to reconsider summary judgment the affidavits were properly before the appellate court for purposes of reviewing the propriety of the trial courts grant of summary judgment (D) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that adequate time for discovery had passed because movant successfully resisted nonmovants attempts to obtain discovery (E) holding movant may not raise new grounds for summary judgment in reply to nonmovants response
Output: (B)
immunity and sent the plaintiff to pursue her claim in tribal court. See 436 U.S. at 58-59, 98 S.Ct. 1670; see also Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1461 (10th Cir.1989) (noting the Santa Clara Pueblo distinction between a substantive constraint and an abrogation of sovereign immunity). Absent explicit and unequivocal language to the contrary, the imposition of substantive constraints upon a tribe’s sovereignty cannot be interpreted as an abrogation of its sovereign immunity. We must determine for ourselves whether anything in the Thirteenth Amendment or the 1866 Treaty worked an abrogation of the Cherokee Nation’s sovereign immunity. Again, we will only acknowledge such an abrogation if the text is express and unequivocal. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (<HOLDING>); Fla. Paraplegic, Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribes membership requirements violated icra and noting that a tribes right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community (B) holding the icra not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because nothing on the face of title i of the icra purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief (C) holding the copyright act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity where nothing on the statutes face could be so construed (D) holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act (E) holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity
Output: (B)
at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Wise relies on Marttila v. City of Lynchburg, 33 Va.App. 592, 535 S.E.2d 693 (2000), in support of his assertion. In Marttila, the appellant challenged his conviction under Code § 18.2-16, Virginia’s breach of peace statute, which criminalizes “fighting words.” 33 Va.App. at 598, 535 S.E.2d at 698. We recognized that when confronted with an individual’s use of “fighting words,” police officers were required to exercise “greater restraint in their responses than the average citizen.” Id. at 600, 535 S.E.2d at 697. Code § 18.2-460(C) aims, however, to protect the integrity of the legal process, not any individual personally. Whether a speaker’s words would provoke a law enfo , 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1104, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3, 69 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a georgia statute that criminalized using opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace unconstitutional because first amendment protections forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not within narrowly limited classes of speech  (B) holding that under chaplinsky any statute punishing or regulating the use of abusive language must be limited to fighting words (C) holding unconstitutional a statute barring the use of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace (D) holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language (E) holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty
Output: (C)
in an attempt to establish diversity jurisdiction in connection wit WL 3535, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 11, 1991) ("The district courts have inherent authority to enforce professional rules of conduct.... The rules of professional responsibility are applicable in arbitration proceedings. Courts in Pennsylvania and New York have applied such rules in compulsory court-annexed arbitration hearings and in private contractual commercial arbitration hearings.”) (citing Gwertzman v. Gwertzman, Pfeffer, Tokar & Lefkowitz, No. 87 Civ. 6824, 1988 WL 138149 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1988) (disqualifying counsel from representing a party in arbitration based on New York Code of Professional Responsibility)). Cf. Bidermann Indus. Licensing v. Avmar N.V., 173 A.D.2d 401, 570 N.Y.S.2d 33, 33 (1st Dep't 1991) (<HOLDING>). 43 . See, e.g., Hempstead Video, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration in accordance with aaa rules is a binding arbitration (B) holding that completed arbitration pending appeal mooted district courts order directing arbitration (C) recognizing that an action at common law can be maintained on an arbitration award rendered under the parties submission that does not comply with the arbitration statute (D) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (E) holding that state courts can disqualify counsel in an arbitration
Output: (E)
paid out an allegedly undervalued lump sum to his bank account in the Northern District of Illinois "arguably supports that the 'breach took place’ in the Southern District of Illinois....” Appellant's Br. at 15 n. 5. We shall not consider this undeveloped argument. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) ("We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived....”). 2 . This court has addressed the meaning of § 1132(e)(2)’s service of process provision ("and process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may be found”). See Bd. of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers' Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1035-37 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Elite Erectors did not determine, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that erisas venue provision can provide broad access to the federal courts and clarifying that nationwide service of process is available only if the suit is an action under this subchapter   emphasis in original quoting 29 usc  1132e2 (B) holding such service satisfies due process (C) holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states (D) recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act (E) holding that  1132e2 allows for nationwide service of process and thus jurisdiction and that the nationwide service of process provision comports with the constitution
Output: (E)
majority of the seized items on the basis that Music City’s inventory was contraband and thus could not be returned, regardless of whether or not the government properly obtained and executed its search warrant. However, the court did order the return of cigarette holders as well as a plastic tube called a “head rush,” thought to be a component that could be used in making a “bong,” which the government acknowledged were improperly seized. II. A. There is no criminal indictment or proceeding pending against Music City. Thus, Music City’s Rule 41(e) motion for the return of its property was really in the nature of a civil proceeding invoking the court’s equitable powers, rather than a criminal proceeding. See White Fabricating Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 404, 407-08, (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Delta Engineering v. United States, 41 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion (B) holding that rule 41e motion for return of seized property is treated as a civil equitable proceeding when criminal proceedings against moving party are not yet pending (C) holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e (D) holding that a district court has jurisdiction to consider  a rule 41e motion  filed after criminal proceedings had been completed (E) holding that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a rule 41e motion for the return of property before a criminal prosecution has begun believing such a motion to be in effect a civil action
Output: (E)
brought against him in a state court “for any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The second, by contrast, authorizes “any employee of the [federal] Government” to remove any “civil action or proceeding for money damages” brought against him in a state court for injury to person or property resulting ficom his negligent or wrongful conduct, upon a finding, either administrative or judicial, that he was “acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2); see id. § 2679(b)(1). As Wiley points out, he was entitled to have this action remain in federal court if removal jurisdiction existed under either of these two alternative provisions. See Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 131-32 n. 3 (<HOLDING>); Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d 301, 306 n. 9 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (B) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (C) holding that the federal officer removal statute is not narrow or limited  (D) holding that removal proceedings are in the nature of process and defects in the removal procedures are waivable (E) recognizing that  1442a1 provides federal officer named as defendant in a state tort action with a right of removal separate and apart from that provided by the removal provision in the westfall act
Output: (E)
that only if a plaintiff demonstrates that an employer delegates in order to facilitate discrimination, rather than for legitimate management reasons, should a policy of decentralized decisionmaking provide a sufficient nexus for class certification). Reap does not allege that CNA intended to use its delegation policy to discriminate against women or older women in its work force, that CNA encouraged local managers to discriminate against women or older women, or that CNA condoned such discrimination. In fact, any such discrimination would violate CNA’s written policy of non-discrimination. (See Samuel Aff. ¶ 10 & Ex. 1 Procedure 1500.) Instead, Reap submits self-created statistical evidence purporting to show that CNA’s policy of delegating employment decisions to local supervisors h (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we conclude that Reap has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under wilkerson it was error for district court to deny class action certification motion of named plaintiffs whose claims were resolved after filing motion for class certification but before district court decided motion (B) holding that an inmates eighth amendment legal claims were straightforward and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel (C) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case (D) holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class action when claims were so individualized that certification was improper
Output: (E)
for relief under § 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through § 2241. A prisoner may proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 would be “inadequate of ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that § 2255’s “safety valve” applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is “innocent” of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under  841 and 846 was not cognizable under  2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via  2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under  2241
Output: (D)
must be compelling proof that the refusal to deal was motivated by anticompetitive purposes, or will produce an anticompetitive effect. See, e.q., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed. 2d 338 (1978) (“[Something more than an agreement between [a manufacturer and a distributor] must be shown. The agreement becomes violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act only if it is anticompetitive in purpose and effect — in sum, it must be tested by the rule of reason.”) (emphasis in original); Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1728, 100 L.Ed.2d 192 (1988); cf. Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless whether a combination 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid (B) holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier and noting that precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors (C) holding that otherwise lawful nonprice mechanism agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor may be rendered per se unlaw ful if imposed as part of an illegal scheme to fix prices (D) holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal (E) holding such agreements to be per se illegal
Output: (C)
type of contract contemplated by the statute and, further, whether his disability benefits were paid as a result of this contract. The context within which the legislature enacted the statute is instructive in ascertaining the statute’s intended scope and in determining whether the exception clause covers Keelan’s employment contract. The General Assembly enacted section 13 — 21— 111.6 as part of a sweeping array of tort reform legislation designed to limit the amounts that plaintiffs can recover in civil actions. For example, in the same year that it enacted the collateral source statute, the legislature amended an existing statute to limit exemplary damage recoveries. Ch. 106, sec. 1, § 13-21-102, 1986 Colo.Sess. Laws 675, 675-76. See Lira v. Davis, 832 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Colo.1992) (<HOLDING>). It also limited the liability of persons who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court may not award punitive damages (B) recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation (C) recognizing that as part of the sweeping tortreform legislation of 1986 the legislatures purpose in amending section 1321102 was to limit excessive punitive damages awards (D) recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive (E) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable
Output: (C)
of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor’s custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” and that “anything said can and will be used against [him] in court.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial
Output: (C)
protected activity for purposes of the first element of a prima facie case and the second element is not disputed. “To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that ‘the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct’ and ‘that the protected activity and the adverse employment action were not wholly unrelated.’ ” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). “[A]t a mini mum, [a plaintiff] must show that the adverse act followed the protected conduct.” Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.1999). In other words, the plaintiff must show a temporal link between a protected activity and an adverse employment action. See Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1281-82 (finding no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient (B) holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action (C) holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action (D) holding that no causal link existed between protected activity in february 1994 and adverse employment actions in late 1994 and early 1995 (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection
Output: (D)
the in-state banking activities of these French and Japanese banks and Plaintiffs’ claims arising from a terrorist attack that occurred in Israel with the support of the Iranian government. It certainly cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “directly arise” out of the banking activities of these local branches. See GCIU, 565 F.3d at 1024. Thus, under traditional legal principles, specific jurisdiction is lacking. Although the Seventh Circuit • has not addressed this issue, two Circuits have reformulated the minimum-contacts inquiry in cases involving third-party discovery, focusing more narrowly “on the connection between the nonparty’s contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue.” Gucci, 768 F.3d at 137; see also S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)., It is unclear whether this test is proper, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction (B) holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit (C) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (D) holding that courts exercise of specific jurisdiction was proper where subpoena enforcement action arose out of nonpartys contacts with the forum (E) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
Output: (D)
prosecutorial statements indicated racial motivation (Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723); whether the level of black representation on the venire as compared to the jury indicated racial discrimination (Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d at 413); or whether the crimes with which defendant was charged were interracial (Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 66). While the trial judge’s experience with local prosecutors and knowledge of local conditions are relevant factors in a prima facie case analysis, this court has never intimated that such considerations are dispositive of this issue. We find that the trial judge erred in failing to con sider all of the relevant factors in determining whether a prima facie case had been established. See People v. Holman (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 128, 173 (<HOLDING>). We thus conclude that the trial judge’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (C) holding district court did not abuse discretion in ruling moving party failed to make prima facie case to modify custody (D) holding that the trial judge erred in not considering factors other than the number of black venirepersons excluded in ruling on the defendants prima facie case (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
Output: (D)
the inference of express malice,” the privilege has been abused and “protection withdrawn” (id.). Nearly a century later in Park Knoll Assoc. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182 (1983), this Court held that relevant statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are afforded absolute protection so that those discharging a public function may speak freely to zealously represent their clients without fear of reprisal or financial hazard (see id. at 209, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182). The privilege attaches to such statements irrespective of an attorney’s motive for making them (see Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 331, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667, 239 N.E.2d 540 [1968]). Texas law is similar. See, e.g., James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982)(<HOLDING>). In addition, TBG fails to state a claim to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a choice of law provision in a lease did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction (B) holding that the defendants failure to timely serve a notice of appeal and docketing statement did not prejudice the plaintiff and therefore would not serve as a basis to dismiss the appeal (C) holding that if the dismissal was merely a formal means of securing a negotiated settlement it cannot serve as the basis for a malicious prosecution action (D) holding that protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of city ordinances at issue (E) holding that communications during a judicial proceeding cannot serve as the basis for a civil action for libel or slander
Output: (E)
Appeals similarly elected to address this issue on the merits. See Smith, 2014 WL 3954062, at *18-19. In light of these rather unique circumstances, we conclude that the counsel table issue was properiy preserved for appeal. To rule in favor of the State’s argument that this issue was “never contained in any valid motion for new trial, and [that] it [was] not enough that the defendant raised it orally in the motion for new trial hearing because the' defendant never reduced it to writing,” would elevate form over substance. See' Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tenn.2010) (rejecting argument that no guilty plea is valid unless the defendant is specifically asked “How do you plead?” because argument values form over substance)’; State v. Livingston, 197 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 281 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that to rule that the defendant did not have sufficient notice of the states intent to seek enhanced sentencing would be to impose a hypertechnical procedural requirement that elevates form over substance (C) holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing (D) holding an allegation that defendant caused death by cutting victims throat with sharp object was sufficient to give notice of states intent to seek deadly weapon finding (E) holding that absent legislative intent to impose derivative liability enhanced sentences based on the use of a weapon during a crime may not be imposed on defendants who were not personally armed
Output: (B)
appeal. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review de novo the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir.2011). “We review de novo questions of law, including constitutional rulings, resolved on summary judgment.” Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 131 S.Ct. 1844, 179 L.Ed.2d 772 (2011). We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir.2010). The judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), govern challenges to OFAC’s designation decisions. See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA 540 U.S. 461, 496-97 & n. 18, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d 967 (2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 833 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when considering an agency action as to which the statute does not specify the standard of review the courts of appeals must proceed pursuant to the apas general standard of review for agency actions in 5 usc  7062a (B) holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review (C) holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard (D) holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict (E) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion
Output: (A)
the Court considered the facts surrounding his attempted burglary conviction. In United States v. Telesco, 962 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.1992) the Second Circuit held that “[w]hen prior convictions are for crimes designated as ‘crimes of violence’ by the Sentencing Commission, the sentencing court is not permitted to examine the actual conduct underlying the convictions. The Sentencing Commission has thus determined that certain crimes — regardless of the precise conduct — are inherently violent.” Id. at 166. As stated above, it has already been decided that attempted burglary is a “violent felony.” See Andrello, 9 F.3d at 249. Thus, for purposes of determining career offender status under the Guidelines, there is no such thing as a non-violent attempted burglary. See Telesco, 962 F.2d at 166 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hathaway, 949 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary (B) holding that burglary is violent felony (C) holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary (D) holding there is no such thing as a nonviolent burglary (E) holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary
Output: (D)
the exception for abstract ideas “is more of a problem, a problem inherent in the search for a definition of an ‘abstract idea’ that is not itself abstract”). Some guiding principles, however, have emerged from Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. The courts have determined that mathematical formulas and algorithms, as well as fundamental economic principles, are abstract ideas. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356 (finding the concept of intermediated settlement, or “exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk,” to be an abstract idea); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611—12, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010) (finding the concept of risk hedging to be an abstract idea); Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, 93 S.Ct. 253 (<HOLDING>); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review (B) holding that a mathematical algorithm must produce a useful concrete and tangible result to be patentable (C) holding that statements made in a letter to the editor regarding a psychologists behavior modification techniques were not pure opinion because the letter might reasonably be understood to imply the assertion of undisclosed facts (D) holding an algorithm for converting binarycoded decimal numerals to pure binary numerals to be patentineligible (E) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review
Output: (D)
publication, regardless of the circumstances, and even though the broad ban on publication may not be necessary to effectuate the state’s interests, the statute fails the strict tests for overbreadth set out in The Florida Star and Daily Mail and, therefore, is patently violative of the First Amendment. STATE’S RESPONSE TO OVERBREADTH PROBLEM Notwithstanding the above, the state contends this court can transform the “problems” noted herein, and by The Florida Star Court, into affirmative defenses, so that the statute’s constitutionality can be salvaged. The state directs us to a number of instances where Florida courts have, without legislative sanction, created affirmative defenses to avoid a variety of constitutional problems. E.g., Herrera v. State, 594 So.2d 275, 277 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Glosson, 462 So.2d 1082 (Fla.1985) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense (B) holding that if the undisputed testimony of the prosecutions witnesses establishes or corroborates an entrapment defense entrapment is established as a matter of law (C) recognizing laches as an affirmative defense (D) holding the defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction when sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment (E) recognizing entrapment as a judicially created affirmative defense designed to protect a defendant from being found guilty of a crime where the government instigated the conduct
Output: (E)
environment, a university may, as debt collection tactic, refuse to provide a transcript upon request, is not necessarily grounds for relief from the automatic stay as a matter of law. Rather, under the Hernandez approach, the determination whether relief from stay in favor of the university is appropriate is, like other contested matters under § 362(d), a fact-driven decision left largely to the discretion of the bankruptcy court. See generally In re Porter, 371 B.R. 739, 744-45 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (citing In re Wilson, 116 F.3d 87, 89 (3d Cir.1997); Matter of Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.1982); In re Shariyf, 68 B.R. 604 (E.D.Pa.1986)). 29 . In chapter 13 cases, query whether this factor implicates 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3). Compare In re Mason, 300 B.R. 379 (Bankr.D.Kan.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Bentley, 266 B.R. 229 (1st Cir. BAP 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that priority claims can be paid concurrently with other creditors over the life of a chapter 13 plan (B) holding that the fresh start was a legitimate interest to discriminate in a plan whereby the debtor proposed to pay the student loan in full while paying 15 of the other unsecured claims (C) holding that because creditors claim was unsecured after application of section 506a and because section 1325a5 does not apply to unsecured claims creditors lien could properly be avoided (D) holding that a 56month chapter 13 plan that proposed to pay 17 of the anticipated dividend to student loan creditors while making no distribution to other unsecured creditors unfairly discriminates and could not be confirmed (E) holding that plan proposing and payment of nondischargeable student loan in full outside plan according to its terms for 54 months and 79 payment to unsecured creditors over 36 months did not discriminate unfairly among unsecured class
Output: (D)
all the pending criminal charges against him. A presentence report was again ordered and the sentencing of Fleming was continued to November 2, 1992. The State sought and was granted a continuance of this proceeding until November 25, 1992. The presentence report was filed on November 18, 1992, and on November 25, 1992, after a hearing, sentences were imposed on Fleming for each of the charged offenses and judgments of conviction were entered accordingly. To prevail at trial on his present claim for legal malpractice, Fleming would have the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Gardners’ negligent representation of him proximately caused his present incarceration for which he claims resultant damages. See, e.g., Burton v. Merrill, 612 A.2d 862, 865 (Me.1992) (<HOLDING>). Here, Fleming makes no claim that there was 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that slight evidence of fraud is sufficient to establish its existence particularly involving family transactions (B) holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective (C) holding that attorneys fees can be awarded only from time duty to defend arose (D) holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff (E) holding that evidence must be sufficient to establish elements of professional negligence particularly causation and damages arising from attorneys claimed failure to properly defend plaintiff
Output: (E)
the verification letters clearly stated that Sterling intended to rely upon the verifications in order to provide financing to NSE. In addition, Small's designated affidavit stated that Sterling relies on the verification letters before purchasing invoices to reduce or eliminate its assumed risk of nonpayment by an account debtor. Having found both a promise and detrimental reliance, we find that promissory estoppel applies in this case and that Ham-mert's is estopped to deny payment on Invoice 3 and place payment restrictions on the payment for Invoice 2. Although we have found no similar Indiana cases, our result is consistent with similar case law from other jurisdictions. See Quantum Corporate Funding Ltd. v. L.P.G. Associates, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 320, 323, 667 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Dimmitt & Owens Financial. Inc. v. Realtek 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that account debtors assurance to factor gives rise to an estoppel predicated upon the factors reliance on that assurance in purchasing the assignment from the vendor (B) holding that the existence of a written contract gives rise to the presumption that the parties have reduced their prior agreements to writing (C) holding that the unique nature of psychotherapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of care to the patient (D) holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action (E) recognizing that the nature of the therapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty  to refrain from  causing emotional or mental harm to the patient
Output: (A)
CURIAM. Having considered the appellant’s response to this Court’s show cause order, dated June 30, 2008, we dismiss this appeal. The trial court’s order does not appear to be final as it treated the appel lant’s motion as a rule 3.850 motion and dismissed it without prejudice to file a proper rule 3.850 motion. Therefore, the trial court’s order is a nonappealable, non-final order. See Lee v. State, 939 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 884 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final (B) holding dismissal without prejudice to refile a facially sufficient motion is a nonappealable nonfinal order (C) holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order (D) holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  (E) holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order
Output: (B)
Doe, 120 F.3d at 1283; see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. 488 (“To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders ... sanctions ‘criminal’ for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation .... ”). Aggregate assessment Only two of the Mendozar-Martinez factors arguably indicate a punitive effect: the tie to criminal conduct and the excessiveness of the sanction relative to nonpunitive purposes. Neither one by itself is sufficient to overcome the legislature’s nonpunitive intent. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 488 (rejecting the Supreme Court’s apparent prior elevation of the excessiveness factor to dispositive status); One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365-66, 104 S.Ct. 1099 (<HOLDING>); Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50, 100 S.Ct. 2636 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause (B) holding that a hearing on a motion to amend to allege punitive damages is not necessary (C) recognizing the financial position of the defendant as a factor in assessing a punitive damages award (D) holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent (E) holding that a punitive indication from the tietocriminalconduct factor does not alone establish the necessary clearest proof
Output: (E)
handling, this issue is a matter of first impression for both the Texas Supreme Court and this court. Resolution of this issue, howev resolve all of the issues in an appeal based on briefing waiver. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.3 ("A court of appeals must not affirm or reverse a judgment or dismiss an appeal for formal defects or irregularities in appellate procedure without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or irregularities.”); Inpetco, Inc. v. Texas American Bank/Houston, N.A., 729 S.W.2d 300, 300 (Tex.1987) (per curiam) (stating that, under predecessor to Rule 44.3, a court of appeals cannot overrule all issues and affirm trial court’s judgment based only on briefing waiver); Elder v. Bro, 809 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, it is appropriate to reach 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues (B) recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law (C) holding that decision on waiver of affirmative defense normally is within district courts discretion (D) holding that a notice of appeal based on a dissent in the appellate division preserves for review only those issues on which the dissent was filed and certification must be sought separately as to all other issues (E) holding that appellate courts may overrule some of appellants issues based on briefing waiver but must not overrule all of them based on briefing waiver
Output: (E)
In his letter dated August 16, 1997 to the EEOC challenging the dismissal of his five complaints, plaintiff wrote, “my complaints/appeals to the EEOC,” (referring to the letters of complaint submitted in late 1996 and early 1997), “are ALREADY FORMAL COMPLAINTS.” (Compl. at Ex. 7) (emphasis in original). Much the same situation arose in Love v. Pullman Co., when the petitioner sent the EEOC a letter of complaint, alleging that his employer had violated Title VII. 404 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. 616. The district court dismissed petitioner’s claim, because he had not formally filed a second grievance when the agency notified him of his right to do so. Id. at 523-24, 92 S.Ct. 616. The court of appeals affirmed. Love v. Pullman Co., 430 F.2d 49 (10th Cir.1969). The Supreme Court 992) (<HOLDING>), but see Hayes v. Shalala, 902 F.Supp. 259, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three to five months is a short enough time lapse between eeo activity and reprisal to establish a causal connection (B) holding that a three month interval between protected activity and adverse act is too long standing alone to establish an inference of retaliation (C) holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation (D) holding that a lengthy delay of approximately a year between plaintiffs reports and her termination does not support an inference she was fired because of the protected activity (E) holding that almost a year between plaintiffs eeo activity and the adverse employment decision is too great a length of time to support an inference of reprisal
Output: (E)