niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
their administrative inspection of the salvage yard, another stolen vehicle was being driven off the premises by the owner’s nephew. See id. There was one, and possibly two, suspicious motorcycle frames very near Johnson’s toolbox. See id. The toolbox was large enough to contain license plates and VIN plates. See id. Thus, the officers had at least a reasonable suspicion that the toolbox might contain something relevant to their administrative search and accordingly did not exceed what is permissible under the administrative-inspection statutes when they searched Johnson’s toolbox. See id. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit stated that the fact that the toolbox was locked did not place it off limits from inspection. See id.; United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317, 92 S.Ct. 1593 (<HOLDING>). The Tenth Circuit did not directly address 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing warrantless search under the authority of an administrative inspection statute were entitled to demand that gun dealer unlock storeroom (B) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (C) holding that officers may detain the occupants of a vehicle while executing a search warrant (D) holding that the discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect (E) holding that officers may detain the occupants of a house while executing a search warrant
Output: (A)
Cir. 1996)). Under this “functional approach” to the application of absolute immunity, the Unit ed States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has directed courts to analyze the “nature of the function performed” by the government official. Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 634 (5th Cir. 2000). “In other words, immunity attaches to particular official functions, not to particular offices.” O’Neal, 113 F.3d at 65. Absolute immunity extends to officials whose responsibilities are functionally comparable to those of judges and prosecutors. See id. at 67. The Fifth Circuit has recognized absolute immunity for officials that are members, attorneys, and directors of professional licensing boards. See, e.g., Di Ruzzo v. Tabaracci, 480 Fed.Appx. 796 (5th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Beck, 204 F.3d 629 (recognizing absolute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that board panels may consider only independent medical evidence to support their findings resulting in va altering its longstanding practice of including members of the board with medical expertise on each panel and relying on their medical opinion in rendering board decisions (B) holding that county airport board and twenty board members in their representative capacities had sovereign immunity in suit for negligence (C) recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing (D) recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board (E) holding the courts ruling precludes an extension of absolute immunity to board members decision to terminate faculty member
Output: (D)
Because these hardship determinations are made in the same manner under practically identical standards and because De La Vega holds that the cancellation-of-removal hardship determination is discretionary, we join the Fourth Circuit in holding that the § 1182(i)(l) hardship determination is discretionary as well. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review this judgment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)®. Finally, we hold that § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), does not affect our conclusion because the instant petition, in challenging the BIA’s discretionary extreme-hardship determination, does not raise any “constitutional claims or questions of law” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Xiao Ji Chen v. DOJ, 434 F.3d 144, 153-54 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we lack 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (B) holding that adverse credibility determinations under the real id act must take into consideration the individual circumstances of the applicant (C) holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations (D) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations (E) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of removal and that sjection 106 of the real id act does not override the jurisdictiondenying provision of 8 usc  1252a2b unless the petitioner raises a constitutional claim   or question  of law within the meaning of 8 usc  1252a2d
Output: (D)
§ 341. 4 .It should be noted that there is another class action pending before same district judge who decided POM Wonderful. See Saedian v. The Coca Cola Co., No. 2:09cv06309-SJO-JPR (C.D.Cal.) (Otero, J.). The plaintiffs there bring claims against what appears to be the same product. The instant case was stayed pending a decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) on whether to transfer or consolidate it with the Saedian case. ECF No. 30. This Court lifted the stay after the JPML denied the Defendants’motion. ECF No. 31. 5 . The preemption clause makes no mention of § 343(a). 6 . It is true that not every violation of the FDCA will support a state-law claim. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001) (<HOLDING>); cf. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518-19 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the fda (B) holding that express warranty claims that could only arise out of fda approval are preempted (C) holding that state claims for fraudulent submissions to the fda were preempted (D) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (E) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property
Output: (D)
by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he “agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel
Output: (B)
of appeals, and this jurisdiction is exclusive as to actions brought to adjudicate or execute removal orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), (9), (g). Although habeas jurisdiction remains available to deportees who raise questions of law and who have no other available judicial forum, see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), the statute here provides an adequate judicial forum, permitting the noncriminal deportee to file a petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals. Because judicial review was available to Lopez, the district court was not authorized to hear this,§ 2241 habeas petition. See Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.2001); Bini v. Aljets, No. 01-3234, 36 Fed.Appx. 868, 2002 WL 535083, at *1 (8th Cir.2002) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Lopez filed the wrong action in the wrong 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the purported state law claim for violation of the automatic stay and that any such claim could be brought only in bankruptcy court only (B) holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court (C) holding district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a removal order because such challenges must be raised in a petition for review (D) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review (E) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of a petition challenging a removal order or to stay a removal order where the petitioner was not specifically challenging his physical detention
Output: (C)
dock. As discussed above, the Declaration does not unambiguously create a dock easement on Parcel A and it is not an undisputed fact that the Davids took Parcel A subject to the Declaration or the dock easement. And it follows that if the Davids took Parcel A unrestricted by the Declaration, the property is also not sub" ject to the amendments that were later unilaterally executed by Ippolite, who no longer owned Parcel A. See Endruschat v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 377 So.2d 738, 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (“[AJuthority throughout the country, with which we agree, would indicate that a developer cannot seek to encumber property with restrictions [a]f-tfer he has sold it.”). Furthermore, the terms of the Declaration provide that the Declaration “may be mo 1144, 1145-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded for proceedings 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured (B) holding that when a contract is ambiguous and the parties suggest different interpretations summary judgment is inappropriate because an issue of fact exists (C) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper (D) holding that a contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations (E) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence
Output: (B)
of a defendant’s residence when the arrest is made just outside the suspect[’]s residence. ¶91 The footnote in Hopkins states, in pertinent part: Buie specifically addressed an arrest inside a person’s home, but other courts have expanded its rationale to areas just outside a residence. See United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Hopkins, 113 Wn. App. at 959 n.3. ¶92 The court erred in concluding the police had the authority to conduct a protective sweep of the house incident to arrest for two reasons. First, a warrantless search of “spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest” without probable cause or reasonable suspicion does not apply when the police arrest an individual outside his home. See United States v. White, 748 F.3d 507, 511-12 (3d Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that buie permitted a search of an open storage unit when the suspect was arrested immediately outside (B) holding the buie prong 1 exception is not available where the arrest took place just outside the home  (C) holding the search of defendants home took place within the time designated in the warrant and later examination of computer disks seized did not make the search unconstitutional (D) holding that arrest took place inside home even though officers did not physically enter residence to place suspect in custody (E) holding that the doorway of the home is a public place for purposes of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment
Output: (B)
judgment to select suitable goods, so as to support liability under the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 2.315 (Vernon 1994). In addition, the implied warranty of merchantability does not apply in Texas to used goods which are purchased, as in this case, with knowledge that they are used. See Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1983, no writ); Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner, 619 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1981, no writ); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 5 pp.3d 464, 710 N.E.2d 770, 771-73 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Toets § 388 
 Holding statements: (A) holding supplier of compactor had no duty to warn worker or his employer of the availability andor need for a rops for the compactor because this was an open and obvious danger (B) holding that seller of frontend loader had no duty to warn injured worker concerning the dangers of operating the loader without a rops because the dangers were obvious under an objective standard (C) holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger (D) holding under section 388 of the restatement seoond of torts defendants had no duty to warn injured tractor driver that tractor lacked a rops because this was an open and obvious danger (E) holding that a grocery store employer had no duty to warn an employee that placing his hand in the doorjamb of a customers car is an obvious danger
Output: (A)
in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” “The threshold question ... in all cases where the Federal Government asserts its tax lien, is whether and to what extent the taxpayer had property or rights to property to which the tax lien could attach.” Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 4 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]l-though state law creates legal interests and rights in property, federal law determines whether and to what extent thos ndard of “choateness” before the federal tax hen arises can prime a federal tax lien. See United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 384 U.S. 323, 328, 86 S.Ct. 1561, 16 L.Ed.2d 593 (1966) (<HOLDING>). A state-created lien is choate only when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award (B) holding that a federal tax lien was entitled to priority over a mortgagees inchoate claim for attorneys fees (C) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (D) holding party should have segregated attorneys fees for fraud claim from attorneys fees for contract claim based largely on the difference between the essential elements of each claim (E) holding that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees for time spent litigating the fees issue on appeal under title viis attorneys fee provision
Output: (B)
criminal activity on the suspect’s part.” United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.2000). Investigators had observed Wilson meet a heavy-set black male immediately before and after selling crack to the undercover detective on July 17, and after Wilson’s arrest on July 24 he received unsolicited calls demanding to know where he was and why he was delayed. In the officers’ presence Wilson agreed to meet the caller at the restaurant, and it was Black — who fit the description of the man driving the Lumina on July 17 — who showed up at the restaurant. In light of Wilson’s identification of Black as his supplier and the investigators’ own observations corroborating Wilson’s statement, probable cause was established. See United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 894 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law (B) holding testimony of officer and narcotics investigator who both witnessed drug transaction coupled with audio recording of transaction constituted sufficient corroboration (C) holding that probable cause existed when trained narcotics officers observed what they believed to be a drug transaction (D) holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law (E) holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry
Output: (C)
See United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). I doubt whether the evidence at issue in this case is exculpatory, particularly because there was no evidence — and the Commonwealth did not allege — that Brine’s murder was coupled with or motivated by sexual assault. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (no due process violation where prosecution failed to hand over evidence of other suspect). I also doubt whether the government suppressed anything, particularly because the substance of the evidence at issue was openly reported in the newspapers on a number of different occasions. See, e.g., Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 702 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, I ultimately deny Pursell’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disputed factual issue existed as to whether claimant knew or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known prior to running of statute of limitations existence of compensable claim (B) holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence (C) holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim (D) holding that government did not suppress evidence when defendant knew about the existence of the evidence and could obtain it through the exercise of reasonable diligence (E) holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant
Output: (D)
a criminal trial is sometimes treated as evidence tending to prove that the defendant committed th .Super. 293, 299-300, 391 A.2d 923 (App.Div.1978) (same) and Hyland v. Kehayas, 157 N.J.Super. 258, 263-265, 384 A.2d 902 (App.Div. 1978) (same). 2 Furthermore, the Appellate Division's opinion reversing the criminal conviction of Guastella’s co-defendant, Wasyluk, raised a serious question about the merits of the judgment against Guastella. Consequently, even if Guastella had survived long enough for a judgment of conviction to have been entered on the verdict against him, once Wasyluk’s judgment had been reversed, the trial court should not have accepted Guastella’s conviction as nce Co., 215 N.J.Super. 278, 282, 521 A.2d 912 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 152, 526 A.2d 211 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kahlaid, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (B) holding that arson committed by a dominant fiftypercent stockholder was attributable to the corporation (C) holding that in an arson case there must be other proof that the offense was committed to corroborate a confession by the defendant (D) holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation (E) holding that arson committed by stockholder who was the principal managing agent precluded recovery by the corporation
Output: (E)
included in the filing sent to the CNJ from the court. CNJ Publisher Ray Sullivan said Monday he is not aware of any such letter from the Brewers arriving at the newspaper’s office. According to the filing, the Brewers used the money on vehicles, homes, an airplane and the purchase of the S & S Supermarket in.Clovis. Additionally, according to the filing, Sherri Brewer was paid $7,000 per month for retirement with no evidence presented that she ever worked at the store. Attempts to contact lawyers for the Brewers on Monday were unsuccessful. 1 . The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a written order, entered after a notice of appeal, which memorializes or explains a prior ruling is made “in aid of the appeal.” Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175, 1178 (5th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Several other appellate courts have likewise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control (B) holding that a lower court should not take any action once appeal is filed which would interfere with the appeal process or with the appellate courts jurisdiction (C) holding district courts written opinion explaining a judgment filed four months after notice of appeal and two days prior to oral argument was of great aid in the appeal allowing the appellate court to examine the case with a thorough understanding of the lower courts posture (D) holding that intermediate appellate courts have jurisdiction to address merits of appeal when amended notice of appeal is filed before briefs are filed (E) holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment
Output: (C)
the substantive motor carrier safety standards for which B&T was cited. Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02(A) contains no substantive motor carrier safety standards. Finally, this is not a case in which the federal government has authorized Ohio to directly enforce federal regulations, and Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-5-02 serves merely to provide notice of Ohio’s intent to enforce the federal regulations. In the case of the FMCSRs, the federal government expressly chose to encourage the states to adopt motor carrier rules of their own that are “identical to, or have the same effect as, the FMCSRs,” rather than to authorize the states to directly enforce the FMCSRs. Section 350.105, Title 49, C.F.R.; Section 31142, Title 49, U.S.Code. See Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Assn. (C.A.4, 2001), 248 F.3d 275 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, when the PUCO cited B&T for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law (B) holding that congress did not authorize the states to enforce federal law where it gave states regulatory control through enforcement of their own laws (C) holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law (D) holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards (E) holding that upon approval by congress a compact between states becomes federal law that binds the states
Output: (B)
the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline
Output: (D)
the effect that the code-fendant’s confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence is ineffective and cannot overcome the prejudicial effect of the incriminating statement on the jury. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. As such, the trial court’s curative instruction in the instant case was insufficient to cure the erroneous admission of Hertz’s statement to Hathcock. Nonetheless, this Court has also recognized that a Bruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction but, rather, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1155 (Fla.1996) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, (1969)); see also Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 644-45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (C) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (D) holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative
Output: (D)
States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 876 (10th Cir.1991) (dismissing the defendant’s variance argument “by simply stating that the evidence underlying his conviction for either conspiracy was strong enough that any prejudice arising from the variance was harmless”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir.2006). In addition to the in-cou conspiracy, any potential spillover effect concerning the drug quantities did not prejudice Herrera in any way. In sum, despite the fact that the government actually proved two separate conspir acies and not the single conspiracy-charged, there is no risk that the jury convicted Herrera for a conspiracy or for transactions in which he did not participate. See United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d 771, 775 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this variance did not prejudice 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff could not prevail on productsliability action where there was no proof he used defendants product (B) holding that there could be no risk of spillover evidence where there was significant proof that both defendants participated in all the transactions (C) holding that evidence did not establish commercial bribery because there was no proof of inducement (D) holding there was no error in refusing to charge accessory after the fact because there is no exclusionary situation which eliminates one defendant or the other from having participated in the murder as a principal (E) holding that there is no basis in law to submit the issue of plaintiffs negligence to the jury when there was no evidence that plaintiff incited the dog or voluntarily or unreasonably exposed herself to a known risk
Output: (B)
for determining what constitutes a comment on post-arrest silence is fairly liberal. “If the comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent, it violates the defendant’s right to silence.” Id. at 769; see also State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). Thus, “Evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being deemed a comment on the right of silence should be excluded.” Giorgetti v. State, 821 So.2d 417, 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 317 (Fla.1990) (“[Cjourts must prohibit all evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the right of silence.”); Dixon v. State, 627 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Here, Detective Kent’s response that Green 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that com ments that are fairly susceptible to being interpreted as comments on the defendants silence are generally reversible error (B) holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence (C) holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis (D) holding that comment on defendants silence was not reversible error because inter alia it did not have the effect of being probative on guilt or innocence (E) holding under plain error review that prosecutions repeated references to defendants silence in a one day trial were not harmless despite defendants responsive comments on silence
Output: (A)
however, if she had used the term "expense" in the conversation. Also, Mr. Freeman further testified that later in 2002, when the Freemans chose to begin work on the road, Sorchych indicated he would not contribute to maintenance because he preferred that the road be in a more "rustic” condition. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the Freemans’ testimony, as ostensibly found by the court and supported by the record, was that Sorchych had not agreed to contribute monetarily to maintenance or repair of the road, but that he initially offered to assist in maintaining the road, and he rescinded that offer in 2002, before the Freemans had substantially relied on any alleged agreement. Moreover, consistent with the court's e v. Ford, 155 N.J.Super. 571, 383 A.2d 133, 134-35 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Ingling v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 10 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that repair and maintenance costs for common roads and other common areas were the responsibility of the residential users and not the homeowners association that held title to the roads (B) holding that the duty to maintain an easement was upon those entitled to its use rather than upon the servient estate (C) holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties (D) recognizing that where a grantee has an easement which he shares with others his duty to repair and maintain it must be apportioned with all other easement holders based upon the extent of the individuals use of the easement (E) holding that individual property owners holding an express easement to use roads in a privately developed residential area rather than the voluntary nonprofit association organized to raise funds to maintain the roads were obligated to contribute to the repair and maintenance of those roads
Output: (E)
class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated; however, such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if an individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured claims.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1). There is a split among bankruptcy courts concerning whether a plan that gives priority to a cosigned consumer debt should still be struck down if it is found to “discriminate unfairly” against any other class. Compare,. e.g., Nelson v. Easley (In re Easley), 72 B.R. 948, 955-56 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1987) (finding that even a cosigned consumer debt is subject to the unfair discrimination test), with In re Dornon, 103 B.R. 61, 64 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). The argument for applying the unfair 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing general rule (B) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (C) holding that a cosigned consumer debt is an exception to the general unfair discrimination rule (D) recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation (E) recognizing lujanarmendariz as the exception to the general rule
Output: (C)
our precedents still foreclose a defendant from successfully excluding “evidence that has been ‘come at by exploitation’ of a violation of somebody else’s rights.” Jarvi 537 F.3d at 1259. Defendant concedes on appeal that he lacks “standing” to challenge the officer’s initial entry, which means that he had no expectation of privacy in Gonzalez’s residence. Defendant’s brief demonstrates he understands the equivalence of these two concepts. Even if Defendant had not made this concession, we would affirm the district court’s conclusion that Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in Gonzalez’s residence. The district court’s conclusion falls squarely within a host of controlling authority. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1176 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence (B) holding that residence in the cnmi before 2009 was not residence in the united states for naturalization purposes (C) holding residence means legal residence for will probate (D) holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found (E) holding a person who is present at anothers home with permission simply for the purpose of consummating a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there
Output: (A)
filed that statement on November 14, 2005. That claim is not at issue in the Reconsideration Motion. STANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to Rules 59(e) and/or 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and under Local Rule 60.1(c). Rule 59(e) provides that any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Rule 60(b)(1) provides that the court may relieve a party from an order for reason of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that Rule 60(b) may be used to reconsider legal issues and to reconsider the court’s own mistake or inadvertence. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the law in this circuit is that errors of law are cognizable under rule 60b (B) holding claim is not cognizable (C) holding that it is an abuse of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual determination (D) holding claim is cognizable (E) holding that certificate is required to appeal denial of rule 60b motion challenging denial of habeas application and stating that eight circuit courts including eighth circuit are in accord on this issue
Output: (A)
Discipl. LEXIS 78, *9 (attorney disbursed all settlement proceeds to client less amount he retained for himself, after having been placed on notice that prior attorney claimed an in terest in any settlement funds in violation of Colo, RPC 1.15(b)). III. ANALYSIS OF SANCTION In both the Dunn and McCarthy matters, Rishel engaged in knowing conversion by obtaining funds from third parties for a stated purpose, failing to utilize the funds for that purpose, retaining the funds for an extended period of time after the third parties had withdrawn authorization, and failing to refund the amounts paid to the third parties despite their demand that he do so. The presumptive sanction for knowing conversion of the property of another is disbarment. People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(<HOLDING>); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that a lawyers knowing misappropriation of funds whether belonging to a client or third party warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation (C) holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors (D) holding that permanent disbarment was appropriate for failure to remit 2000 in settlement funds to client and failing to answer the charges (E) recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person
Output: (B)
1 Stat. 80). However, legislation “passed by the First Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument ... is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.” Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297, 8 S.Ct. 1370, 32 L.Ed. 239 (1888), overruled in part on other grounds by Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935). The long history of qui tam actions strongly supports a finding of their constitutionality. Second, it is not necessary for § 292(b) to meet the demanding standard applied by the Supreme Court in Morrison to withstand an Article II challenge, given that the intrusion of § 292(b) into Executive Branch power is minor in comparison. See Riley, 252 F.3d at 755 (<HOLDING>). A qui tam relator under § 292(b) pursues a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the morrison control test  is simply not dispositive of a challenge to the fca as it involves an entirely different lawsuit and requires entirely different control mechanisms (B) holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union (C) recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself (D) holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted (E) holding authority to control limits duty to control
Output: (A)
a de minimis injury. Nevertheless, our opinions from that period clearly illustrate that whether a plaintiff has satisfied the Norman standard depends on the particular facts of his case. Ussery maintains that the officers caused “severe lacerations,” “extensive bruising,” “increased bi-lateral hearing loss,” “loss of vision in his right eye,” “chronic swelling and loss of feeling,” “recurring migraines,” and “physical and emotional pain and suffering” — all of which resulted in “lasting] physical and emotional damage.” Many of these injuries could have an enduring impact on health and wellbeing. These are the sort of injuries that may affect mobility, sensory capabilities, emotional stability, and other daily functions for an extended period of time. An 58 n. 3 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard (B) holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation (C) holding that a contusion cut to his lips bruises lesions to his wrist and a strained neck and back exceed the de minimis threshold (D) holding that  acute contusions of the wrist and psychological injury from being handcuffed were de minimis and insufficient to find excessive force (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible
Output: (C)
so they could obtain counsel, and the fact that they had engaged three different lawyers in the past weighed in favor of an additional continuance. As noted, petitioners had requested and received numerous continuances. They were warned that the hearing set for May 17, 20 1391-92 (BIA 2000) (stating BIA lacks jurisdiction over the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) exercise of prosecutorial discretion). Ac cordingly, the BIA correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to direct the DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion. To the extent petitioners request this court to direct the BIA to close the case administratively, doing so would be meaningless since the BIA’s order dismissing the appeal is a final order. See Batubara v. Holder, 733 F.3d 1040, 1042 (10th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). “The administrative closing of a ease does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted (B) holding that the bia adopts the ijs entire decision when it cites burbano and expresses no disagreement with the ijs decision (C) holding that the bias streamlining procedure does not compromise appellate review because the ijs decision becomes the final agency action subject to direct review by the court of appeals (D) holding the bias decision upholding the ijs finding of removability  was the final order (E) holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization
Output: (D)
S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”); United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (“[physical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is directed....”). Indeed, the only situation in which the Supreme Court has approved a special needs search of an individual’s home occurred in Griffin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709, where the defendant was a probationer. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (<HOLDING>). That situation is not applicable here. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrant was needed to perform an administrative search upon private property (B) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (C) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (D) holding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law where they relied upon consent of property owner to perform search (E) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises
Output: (A)
than 100 kilograms of marijuana, it must indict him appropriately and then prove the elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the government may indict a defendant under the provision with the lowest statutory maximum sentence and then, as in this ease, rely on relevant conduct findings to achieve what it otherwise might not if held to a higher burden of proof, namely a sentence under a separate offense’s enhanced penalty provision. Of course, it is clearly permissible “for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2358; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the government may still rely upon a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted (B) holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct (C) holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant
Output: (C)