niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
interests that a lawful permanent resident or even an illegal entrant residing more than two weeks may have developed.... Diaz Rodriguez has not shown that he has been lawfully admitted, so the due process rights of a lawfully admitted citizen are not implicated here.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has no constitutional due process rights in relation to her admission beyond that authorized by Congress. The restricted habeas review provisions set forth in Section 1252 adequately protect Petitioner’s rights because she has a meaningful review of the cause for her exclusion and of the Executive’s power to exclude her. The writ therefore has not been suspended and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims. See Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1140-41; Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281 (<HOLDING>); Vaupel, 244 Fed.Appx. at 895 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place (B) holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal (C) holding that strict limitations set forth in section 1252e preclude judicial review of any constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying expedited removal order (D) holding that  1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order (E) holding prior to enactment of section 1326d that a person charged with illegal reentry has a constitutional right to collaterally attack the underlying removal order when a due process violation in a removal proceeding amounts to a complete deprivation of judicial review
Output: (C)
(6th Cir.1999)); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 446 F.3d 808, 815 (8th Cir.2006) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has strongly signaled that an agency’s decision to issue ... an environmental impact statement is a ‘final agency action’ permitting immediate judicial review under NEPA”) (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665); Goodrich v. United States, 434 F.3d 1329, 1335 (Fed.Cir.2006) (collecting “case law from our sister circuits holding that, for purposes of the [APA] a ROD is a ‘final agency action’ ”); Highway J Citizens Group v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938, 958 (7th Cir.2003) (stating that NEPA “documents are intended to be the culmination of an agency’s environmental assessment”); Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 210 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record conducted under the administrative procedure act (B) holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action (C) holding that when the administrative procedure is not empowered to achieve the end sought in the legal action the procedure is unavailable because it cannot accomplish the purpose of the legal action (D) holding that judicial review of final agency action under the administrative procedure act  provides the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of an eis (E) holding that when an agency fails to follow the proper procedure under the illinois administrative procedure act for the adoption of rules the rule is invalid
Output: (D)
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.106; State ex rel. WW., No. 12-13-00045-CV, 2013 WL 3156312, at *6 (Tex. App.-Tyler June 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Because W.W. presented evidence to the trial court of his preference to avoid an increased dose ... based upon its side effects and ineffectiveness, it is presumed that the trial court gave his preferences due consideration.”); In re T.O.R., No. 02-12-00376-CV, 2013 WL 362747, at *5 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("T.O.R. did not present any evidence to dispute So-biesk’s testimony about the medications’ benefits and the ineffectiveness of alternative treatments.”); M.H. v. State ex rel. M.H., No. 01-09-00205-CV, 2009 WL 2050988, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. A.R.F., No. 12-03-00294-CV, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery (B) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (C) holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding when patient did not present any evidence to dispute physicians testimony about benefits of treatment with psychoactive medications and lack of alternative treatments (E) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract
Output: (D)
* * *.”); accord Lynch, supra, 85 N.J. at 71, 424 A.2d 1169 (stating that in some medical-malpractice cases “fault is not implicit in injury”). Although litigants are not noted for an ability dispassionately to appraise both s .Y.S.2d 831 (1968) (applying continuous-representation rule as adaptation of continuous-treatment rule); Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc.2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup.Ct.1968) (same). In the medical-malpractice context we stated that “it would be inequitable for a physician who has given * * * assurances [of progress towards recovery] to claim that a patient, in relying upon them and not suspecting their falsity or inaccuracy, failed to exercise the ‘reasonable diligence and intelligence’ required by the discovery rule.” Lynch, supra, 85 N.J. at 75, 424 A.2d 1169 (<HOLDING>) The reasoning in Lynch is equally applicable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding testimony of a treating physician is not subject to discovery procedures under the iowa rule governing discovery of experts be cause the treating physicians mental impressions and opinions were not acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial (B) holding that treating physicians testimony was properly discounted when it was inconsistent with physicians own treatment reports and the record as a whole and appeared to be based on patients subjective complaints (C) holding that treating physicians continued reassurances that a patients pain was part of the healing process prevented discovery (D) holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability (E) holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations
Output: (C)
¶51 L&A’s reasoning is deeply flawed and should be soundly rejected by this court. First, L&A erred in reasoning that “default” must mean a material breach justifying termination rather than the failure to fulfill a contractual obligation. The subcontract itself defines “default,” and the meaning of “default” must also be read in light of the purpose of the bond, which is to guarantee the “prompt and faithful” performance of the subcontract. Obviously, a subcontract has not been promptly and faithfully performed when the principal has breached its contractual obligations, whether the breach is serious enough to justify termination or not. “[I]t is axiomatic that the very purpose of a performance bond is ‘to assure completion of the contract.’ ” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 F.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a  113f contribution action (B) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (C) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety (D) holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under  107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred (E) holding that a surety must pay all the costs of completion not simply those incurred after a declaration of default
Output: (E)
whether a private right of action may be implied. In recent years the Supreme Court has substantially modified the four-part analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), for determining whether an implied right of action has been created by any federal statute. The critical factor in the present analysis is whether there is an indication of any legislative intent to create a private remedy. See Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 13, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2622-23, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981). See also Local Division 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. MARTA, 667 F.2d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). In this case this court can find no 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (B) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law (C) holding that absent a clear congressional statement courts should not infer that congress intended to alter equity practices (D) recognizing the supreme courts articulation of the new test and stating that the sole question now is whether there is clear evidence that congress intended to provide such a remedy (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
Output: (D)
Catchers did not receive a fixed rate of remuneration, but rather the Joint Venture determined compensation on a job-by-job basis depending upon the number ure did not exercise control over the manner in which the Catchers divided the work to be accomplished or performed the task of catching the chickens and loading them into cages and/or onto trucks. The Joint Venture was interested in the end result only — the catching and loading of live chickens. Finally, and of great significance, it appears from the record that the Catchers were free to decline or accept any chicken catching job that was made available by the Joint Venture without repercussions. See Danielle Viktor, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., Bureau of Employer Tax Operations, 586 Pa. 196, 229, 892 A.2d 781, 801 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we note that there is no evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the transfer of all rights interests and control in property assigned was an effective assignment occurring at the time the assignment was perfected not later when proceeds paid (B) holding that because drivers provided services to company on jobbyjob basis and each assignment was taken or rejected strictly at drivers prerogative drivers were independent contractors gjiven the fluidity of these arrangements (C) holding that even if the individual who signed the mortgage assignment lacked the authority to do so the assignment would still be binding on mers because he purported to be authorized (D) holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9 (E) holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments
Output: (B)
property of the bankruptcy estate vests in the reorganized debtor, a new entity, and administration of the estate ceases.” U.S. v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932, 934 (D.Kan.1984). The duty to pay federal income taxes is tied to the duty to make an income tax return. See Holywell Corporation v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 52, 112 S.Ct. 1021, 1024, 117 L.Ed.2d 196 (1992) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6151(a), which provides, in part, “[W]hen a return of tax is required ... the person required to make such return shall ... pay such tax-”). Among the persons required to make returns of income are estates, trusts, and estates of individuals under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a)(3),(a)(4), and (a)(9); see also In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 501 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). The “[r]eturns of an estate, trust, or an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 (B) holding that the phrase return of income used in 26 usc  6012 is synonymous with the phrase return of tax used in 26 usc  6151 (C) holding that the phrase or ganic diseases of the nervous system contained in 38 usc  11013 was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase (D) holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase (E) holding that punitive damages are not awarded on account of personal injuries or sickness pursuant to 26 usc  104a2 and therefore constitute gross income
Output: (B)
disclosure was sufficient or, if it was not, whether the bankruptcy court’s abandonment can be undone in this separate litigation. Judicial estoppel is also sometimes argued when a party pursues a claim that it did not disclose in bankruptcy, see, e.g., Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2012), but that equitable doctrine does not raise a jurisdictional question. So the Causeys failure to timely raise estoppel again means we cannot address it. 4 . Karry . suggested a real-party-in-interest problem ahead of trial but decided not to pursue it then. 5 . Garry also argues that the district court-erroneously relied on the "outward appearances” doctrine in finding he could be served at the Albuquerque . address. See NLRB v. Clark, 468 F.2d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). But this misconstrues the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that former employees state law claim of fraud brought against his former employer was preempted by labor management relations act (B) holding that when a defendant has in fact changed his residence but to all appearances is still occupying a former dwelling substituted service at the former dwelling is proper (C) holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation (D) holding that actual notice of lawsuit is no substitute for substantial compliance with frcp 4d1 requiring service on person of defendant on suitable resident at defendants dwelling or on defendants agent a  judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is void and may be set aside at any time pursuant to fedrcivp 60b4 personal jurisdiction is established either by proper service of process or by the defendants waiver of any defect in the service of process (E) holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where defendant believed house to be that of his girlfriend and nothing in the dwelling had been disturbed
Output: (B)
Merely pleading guilty does not entitle a defendant to an acceptance of responsibility reduction. United States v. Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546, 554 (7th Cir.2008). The Guideline’s Application Notes state that in deciding if a defendant is entitled to a reduction, factors the court may consider include whether the defendant “truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully ad-mitt[ed] ... any additional relevant conduct”; voluntarily terminated or withdrew from criminal conduct; voluntarily paid restitution before an adjudication of guilt; and voluntarily assisted authorities in recovering the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense(s). U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 1(a)-(c), (e); see also United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 306 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility was a penalty which could not be imposed for defendants assertion of fifth amendment privilege (B) holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility despite his plea of guilty where he attempted to suborn perjury (C) holding that defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he failed to fully account for the proceeds of his crime and attempted to delay a longscheduled hearing based on an incredible claim of innocence (D) holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility (E) holding defendant failed to meet burden for acceptance of responsibility reduction where he objected in the psi but only made arguments at sentencing without offering evidence
Output: (C)
pregnant woman consists of a person other than the woman injuring a pregnant woman in the commission of a felony causing her to suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth as a result of that injury” (§ 30-3-7(A)), defining “miscarriage” as “the interruption of the normal development of the fetus, other than by a live birth” (§ 30-3-7(B)(1)), and defining “stillbirth” as “the death of a fetus prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother” (§ 30-3-7(B)(2))); see also NMSA 1978, § 66-8-101.1 (1985) (injury to pregnant woman by vehicle). These provisions 'indicate that when the Legislature intends to include fetuses within the protection of a criminal statute, it does so specifically. {9} This Court may not expand the meaning of “human being” to include an unborn vi 0, 713 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Reinesto v. Superior Court of Ariz., 182 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mother could not be prosecuted under child abuse statute for prenatal use of heroin (B) holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse (C) holding a mother not criminally liable for child endangerment for ingesting heroin while pregnant (D) holding that mother may not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment for prenatal substance abuse (E) holding a mother may not be held criminally liable under a reckless endangerment statute for the effect that prenatal ingestion of a controlled substance may have on her child pre or postbirth
Output: (D)
Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Tex.1999). Nothing on the face of the acceleration clause suggests that the parties intended to restrict the meaning of “encumbrance.” Nor is there any evidence in the summary judgment record reflecting such an intent. We must, therefore, give the word “encumbrance” its plain grammatical meaning, and that plain grammatical meaning includes easements. Third, an easement is subordinate to a prior deed of trust. “When the owner of real estate executes a valid deed of trust, and then conveys an interest in the mortgaged property to a third party, the rights of the mortgagor’s vendee are subject to the rights held by the beneficiary of the deed of trust.” Motel Enters., Inc. v. Nobani, 784 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Cousins v. Sperry, 139 S.W.2d 665, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that buyer who purchased property at foreclosure sale took title free from easement granted after deed of trust (B) holding that the terms of the trust deed foreclosure statutes must be strictly complied with (C) holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone (D) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (E) holding foreclosure of prior deed of trust extinguished subsequent easement
Output: (E)
building did not “constitute the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the clause”), with Kim, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (determining that the insured’s “discharge of a hazardous material into the soil [met] the definition of traditional environmental pollution” (emphasis added)). Other cases dealing with the absolute pollution exclusion would seem to support this distinction. See Economy Preferred Insurance Co. v. Grandadam, 275 Ill. App. 3d 866, 870-71, 656 N.E.2d 787 (1995) (finding, as the first Illinois court to construe an absolute pollution exclusion, that the exclusion barred coverage when the minor son of the insured spilled mercury in the home of a neighbor); Housing Authority Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority, 378 F.3d 596, 606 (7th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1044 (finding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection (B) holding that the absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage for injuries resulting from hazardous materials that were introduced released and allowed to remain in the environment in altgeld gardens by the surrounding industrial plants abandoned factories toxic waste dumps landfills and a metropolitan sanitary district plant citation and by pcbs and pahs that cha introduced released and allowed to remain in the environment of altgeld gardens (C) holding that courts must examine the facts surrounding the publication the context in which the statements were made and the nature of the language used (D) recognizing the increased breadth of the definition of property damage introduced in the more recent form of policy (E) holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession
Output: (B)
surviving spouse, or so long as the survivor elects to use or occupy the same as a homestead”), now codified at Tex. Estates Code Ann. §§ 102.003, 102.005 (West 2014). 12 . See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (3) (allowing debtor to exempt property under applicable state law); Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 41.001 (providing homestead exemption under Texas law that is unlimited in amount). 13 . Pub.L. No. 109-8, § 322, 119 Stat. 23, 96-97 (2005). 14 . Wallace v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 513 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir.2008). 15 . The Judicial Conference of the United States adjusted the dollar amount from $125,000 to $136,875 in 2007, from $136,875 to $146,450 in 2010, and from $146,450 to $155,675 in 2013. Id. at 217 n. 2 (citing 72 Fed.Reg. 7082-01 (Feb. 14, 2007)); 78 Fed. Reg. 12089-01 (Feb. 21, 773 (1942) (<HOLDING>). 28 . See Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area (B) holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel (C) holding that it is well settled that while one tenant in common may acquire homestead rights in the common property the rights so acquired are not superior to the rights and remedies of the other joint owners he can acquire no such rights as will prejudice or in anywise interfere with the rights of the other tenants in common (D) recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common (E) holding that where an individual is deprived of liberty or property interests in violation of article of the state declaration of rights he may enforce those rights by a common law action for damages
Output: (C)
704(a); see also United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir.2008). But this rule “does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions.” Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note. The evidence must be otherwise admissible as lay testimony under Rule 701, United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir.1980), or expert testimony under Rule 702, United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir.1979). Most importantly for our purposes, the testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact under either rule. Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note; see also Fed.R.Evid. 701(b), 702. We have held repeatedly that lay testimony offering a legal conclusion is inadmissible because it is not helpful to the jury, as required by Rule 701(b). See, e.g., Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 514 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Espino, 32 F.3d 253, 257 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff (B) holding that the question of whether the defendant knew his actions were legal demanded a conclusion as to the legality of the defendants conduct which is unhelpful to the jury under rule 701 (C) holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant
Output: (B)
(business pursuits did not include spare time racing interest of insured, who was gainfully employed as a mechanic). See also Burdge v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 194 N.J.Super. 320, 323-24, 476 A.2d 880, 883 (1984) (court draws distinction between business pursuits and constitutionally protected political activity, concluding that campaign activities of an office seeker, even if an incumbent, do not constitute business pursuits). See also 7A John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 4501.10 (Berdal ed.) (“The business activity need not be the sole occupation, and part-time business activities are excluded----”). (iv) Investment Activity (minimal or “hobby” to major; active or passive investor). E.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 789 F.Supp. 1212 (D.P.R.1992) (<HOLDING>); Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unlike the activities at issue in lopez and morrison the activities regulated by the controlled substances act are quintessentially economic (B) holding that minimum contacts exist if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities (C) holding that minimum contacts exist if the defendant has purposely directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities (D) holding that investment activities at issue were easily distinguishable from spare time pur  suitssuch as hobbies or leisure activities (E) holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities
Output: (D)
under a claims-made policy, but rather was only a request for information and explanation); United Capital Ins. Co. v. New York Marine and General Ins. Co., No. 91-4862, 1992 WL 38343, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.19, 1992) (concluding that a letter sent to plaintiff constituted a claim because the letter “specifies the nature of the injuries, alleges negligence on the part of the insured and makes a demand for monies in the form of reimbursement”); Insurance Corp. of America v. Dillon, Hardamon & Cohen, 725 F.Supp. 1461, 1469 (N.D.Ind.1988) (“The word claim requires a demand for money or property or some specific relief, accompanied by an allegation of negligence, malpractice, or some kind of wrongdoing.”); Bensalem Township v. Western World Ins. Co., 609 F.Supp. 1343, 1348-49 (E.D.Pa.1985) (<HOLDING>); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Constr. Co., 136 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 (B) holding that failure of eeoc to transmit charge to phrc within limitations period was subject to equitable tolling where plaintiff requested crossfiling in the cover letter attached to the eeoc charge on the first page of the charge itself and on an official form used by the eeoc for requests for dualfiling (C) holding that neither a letter from the eeoc nor an attached charge of age discrimination qualified as a claim under a claimsmade policy because the documents failed to request money or other relief and only served to put the plaintiff on notice that a demand for relief may subsequently follow (D) holding that plaintiffs filing with the eeoc constituted a formal charge because the plaintiff attached a statement to the filed intake questionnaire that included a request for the agency to act (E) holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief
Output: (C)
U.S., $147,900.00, 450 Fed.Appx. 261, 264 (4th Cir.2011) (finding a link between the defendant property and drugs when the claimant had a history of being involved with illegal drugs, the currency seized was allegedly related to drug activities, the cash seized was a large sum, and the claimant had no reported income or work history); United States v. $58,422.00 in U.S. Currency, 154 Fed.Appx. 20, 21-22 (9th Cir.2005) (finding a substantial link when the defendant property (cash and jewelry) was in close proximity to drugs, the claimant’s income was less than his monthly bills, and the claimant had no other source of income with which to have acquired the defendant property); United States v. $21,408.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 4:10-cv-138, 2010 WL 4687876, at *4 (S.D.Ga. Nov. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. $36,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding invalid and of no effect provisions in a judgment purporting to retain jurisdiction in the trial court for six months over the issues of the amount of child support and maintenance  for the reason the respondent was currently unemployed  (B) holding that a complaint met the pleading requirements when it alleged that 36110 was found packaged an unusual manner the money was hidden in a traptype compartment in a van and there was a positive drug dog alert (C) holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant (D) holding that the rule g pleading standard was met when the cash amount seized was large 185000 the claimant had been unemployed for six months the cash was packaged in an unusual fashion the claimant attempted to avoid a search and gave a false statement to police and a drug dog alerted positively (E) holding no probable cause where naddispositive claimant gave false and evasive answers purchased ticket with cash the day of flight and had no luggage or identification
Output: (D)
this and the other accompanying provisions as providing the lender with two options: “[1] the option to accelerate the entire debt, in which event interest would accrue on both the First and Second Parts, or [2] simply accept the missed payments, albeit late, at a higher [default] interest rate to compensate for the time value of money.” Id. at 197. Here, the provision we are interpreting simply is not analogous to the contract provision at issue in PCH Associates. The notes at issue in this case require that the default interest provision be triggered after acceleration and only provide the lend er with one option. Therefore, PCH Associates is inapposite. B. Option to Accelerate 1. Affirmative Action Required Beal argues that even if it was req 2d 455, 71 P.2d 330, 332 (1937) (<HOLDING>); What Is Essential to Exercise of Option to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the holder of the note must act in a manner that effectively provides notice that the holder has exercised his option (B) holding that the mortgage conveys such interests that the mortgagee is the holder of the paramount title (C) holding that even if the doctrine applies to option contracts no conversion would take place until the option were exercised by the party having the right of election (D) holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder (E) holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose
Output: (A)
(stating, that "th[e] [plaintiff's hostile work environment] claim [wa]s wholly unsupported by the summary judgment evidence regardless of the time frame considered, as the district court correctly held” (internal citation omitted)); Sabzevari v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 264 Fed. Appx. 392, 394 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) ("We need not decide [the exhaustion] issue. Even if we assume that Sabzevari has exhausted his administrative remedies, summary judgment on the failure-to-promote claim is proper because Reliable has articulated a legitimate, nondis F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir.2007) (recognizing that a supervisor’s reference to inner-city children as "ghetto children" was "perhaps racially inappropriate”). 35 . Id. at 348. Compare Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 619-22 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment where evidence demonstrated years of inflammatory racial epithets including nigger and little black monkey (B) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive (C) holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that there was a racially hostile work environment when plaintiff was subjected to several statements involving racial epithets and a nude black doll was hung from a noose in his locker (D) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (E) holding that a plaintiff stated a claim of hostile work environment where the court accepted as true the allegation that a monkey doll was hung by its neck in a nooselike fashion in a public work area of an office
Output: (A)
brought the motion to the attention or actual notice of the trial court. Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Merely filing a motion is not enough to show presentment. Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 21. Presentment may be proven in many ways, including by showing the judge’s signature or notation on the proposed order or court’s docket sheet or a ruling on the motion. Thomas v. State, 286 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd) (citing Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 22, 24 and Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 79). However, a counsel’s sta Thomas is not evidence that the trial court was on actual notice that appellant sought a hearing on the Second Motion. See Bearnth, 361 S.W.3d at 145; see also Burrus v. State, 266 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Presentment must occur within ten days of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment (B) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (C) holding a certification of service and presentment was insufficient to establish the trial court received actual notice of the defendants motion for new trial (D) holding a certificate of presentation appearing on the last page of appellants motion for new trial did not establish presentment (E) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment
Output: (A)
that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)(“Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a ‘fair cross section’ of the community.”); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
Output: (B)
police tactics that may burden the public — for all suspects (even the guilty ones) may protect themselves fully by declining to answer. Nor do the questions forcibly invade any privacy interest or extract information without the suspects’ consent. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829, 123 S.Ct. 126, 154 L.Ed.2d 43 (2002). In this case, after Burton gave Officer Davidson a valid driver’s license, he was asked only a handful of questions, including whether he would consent to a search of the automobile. The record pro vides no reason to suspect either that these questions were unusually intrusive or that asking them made this traffic stop any more coercive than a typical traffic stop. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39, 117 S.Ct. 417 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant gave a valid and knowing consent to a search of his dwelling and automobile when he agreed to the terms of probation (B) holding that a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop typically includes asking for a license and registration asking the driver to sit in the patrol car and asking about destination and purpose of travel (C) holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave (D) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment (E) holding that asking a detained motorist whether he would consent to a search of his automobile for contraband even after he had produced a valid drivers license did not necessarily make the traffic stop unreasonable in scope or duration
Output: (E)
if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms. 4 Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) recognizing the cause of action
Output: (C)
indicate that “all types of sarcoido-sis necessarily have a quick and rapid onset of severe symptomatology.” Id. at *3. Mr. Mathis argued that the report contained inadequate analysis, but the Veterans Court explained that “there is no reasons or bases requirement imposed on [an] examiner.” Id. at *2 (quoting Acevedo v. Shinseki 25 Vet.App. 286, 293 (2012)). Similarly, while Mr. Mathis complained that the examiner cited no medical authorities, the Veterans Court explained that an examiner is presumed to know about medical authorities under the .presumption of competence: The presumption that VA medical examiners are competent “includes a presumption that physicians remain up-to-date on medical knowledge and current medical studies.” Monzingo v. Shinseki 26 Vet.App. 97, 106-07 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Id. at *3. Mr. Mathis also objected to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere fact that an examiner did not cite any studies is not evidence that he is unaware of such studies and is not a basis for finding an examination report inadequate (B) holding that an examiner is not estopped from rejecting a divisional application because of an earlier requirement for division (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that dui is not such an offense (E) holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury
Output: (A)
of proof, then the opposing party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d at 1492 (same). Furthermore, Gaston cannot overcome Perkins’s stated legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment. Therefore, that portion of Perkins’s motion for summary judgment is granted. D. Discharge In Violation Of Public Policy Claim Gaston also asserts a state-law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Gaston’s complaint alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for pursuing his rights under Iowa workers’ compensation laws. Iowa courts recognize a cause of action for common-law retaliatory discharge. See, e.g., Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 686 (Iowa 1990) (<HOLDING>); Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 351, 353 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that illinois cause of action for retaliation does not arise under its workers compensation laws (B) holding that missouris cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws (C) recognizing discharge in retaliation for pursuing rights under iowa workers compensation laws violates public policy and gives rise to commonlaw cause  of action (D) holding that texas cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws (E) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws
Output: (C)
of trial." (Eskin Cert. ¶ 5.) However, the certification from Mr. Ferrante is dated some two weeks after the April 26 letter was sent, and is expressly predicated on the withdrawal of plaintiffs' damages claims. The records of this Court indicate that the motion to which Mr. Eskin refers was in fact made on May 11, 2000. 3 . In cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.” Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir.1999). However, plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages from the County of Westchester. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 (B) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities in actions brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that in employment discrimination cases falling under 42 usc  1983 municipalities are not subject to punitive damages for the actions of government officials (D) holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 in part because a municipality  can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials damages awarded for punitive purposes therefore are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself
Output: (B)
No. 73 at page 30; see also CompL, Attach, of Photograph, ECF No. 1 at 19; Photographs, ECF No. 68-13 at 11-14. Properly viewing the facts in the light depicted by the photographs, see PL’s Resp. SMF, ECF No. 73 ¶ 30 (“The [pjhoto of the item speaks for itself.”); cf. Armbruster v. Frost, 962 F.Supp.2d 105, 110 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that where a court has the benefit of video evidence, it should view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape when deciding summary judgment motions), it is undisputed that there was a monkey-like, ape-like, or Bigfoot-like action figure tightly wrapped — as if mummified — by a thin white cord or rope from the action figure’s ankles to its chest, with additional strands wrapped around the action figure’s neck and arm D.C. 2013) (Sullivan, J.) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 154 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff stated a claim of hostile work environment where the court accepted as true the allegation that a monkey doll was hung by its neck in a nooselike fashion in a public work area of an office (B) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive (C) holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that there was a racially hostile work environment when plaintiff was subjected to several statements involving racial epithets and a nude black doll was hung from a noose in his locker (D) recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context (E) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983
Output: (A)