niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
WTT Project area as defined by the Corps. NEF contends that we need not consider the State’s argument because the State failed to raise this argument in its initial motion to clarify, instead raising it for the first time in its Rule 59(e) motion. “Rule 59(e) motions are ‘aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.’ ” FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1990)). In World University, this Court held that the defendant’s argument, which it raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion, was barred where there was no reason why the defendant could not have presented its argument prior to its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; see also Engler, 146 F.3d at 374 (<HOLDING>). This rule, however, does not cover the facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument (B) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
Output: (D)
by an erroneous view of the law.” United States v. Henry, 53 M.J. 108, 110 (C.A.A.F.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In applying the Reynolds test, the content of the chats survives the first required finding. Forensic evidence offered at trial from the appellant’s computer established that he engaged in these conversations. Further, both his admissions to NCIS and the testimony of his wife at trial also established that he used the same online profile name. PE 14 at 1; Record at 261. Next is the issue of logical relevance. These chats display the appellant’s clear sexual interest in children and desire to trade related images. They are relevant to prove intent and motive for the charged offenses. See United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). However, in balancing the prejudice of these 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim (B) holding chat transcripts between defendant and undercover police officers posing as minors where defendant boasted of past sexual intercourse with 14yearold were relevant to show intent and motive toward charged offenses of attempted enticement of a minor and child pornography (C) holding child could bring action for enticement of parent (D) holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive (E) holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim
Output: (B)
to assess the claimant's functional residual ■ capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The claimant has the burden of proof in steps one through four. The Social Security Administration bears the burden of proof at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir.2007). 5 . The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff could perform “past work” -as a bank teller. (AR at 24). As the Defendant acknowledges, Plaintiffs work as a bank teller did not constitute • past work; rather, he was currently employed as a bank teller. However, as discussed herein, because the court concludes that the ALJ's step four determination regarding Plaintiff's student services job is supported by the substantial evidence, the error is harmless. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 730, 733-34 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The court also notes that this issue was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding proper basis for award of fees (B) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review (C) holding ambiguous finding that one or another defendant was liable did not provide a proper basis for judgment (D) holding that an aljs factuallysubstantiated findings at other steps of the sequentialevaluation process provide a proper basis for upholding a stepthree the decision (E) holding that statute does not provide for the adjudication by the alj of a state law breach of contract action for damages that is independent of the aljs determination of entitlement to benefits under the terms of the applicable agreement
Output: (D)
portion of the same law.” Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (citing cases). In this case, the only interpretation of Section 402 that does not make clause (b) meaningless is that the CRA is applicable to all cases which are filed after, or which are pending at the time of, its enactment, with the exception of Wards Cove. Moreover, courts have held that where “Congress enacts [a] statute to clarify the Supreme Court’s interpretation of previous legislation thereby returning the law to its previous posture,” the act should be given retroactive effect. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 754-55 (5th Cir.1990), reh’g granted, en banc 898 F.2d 1014 (1990). Accord Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 665-66 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amendments to education of the handicapped act should be applied retroactively since they codified congressional purpose  which congress believes the supreme court had misinterpreted (B) holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively (C) holding legislature was required to provide a system of free education to the public including programs for the handicapped (D) holding that only the amendments listed in  lb110c may be applied retroactively using a  3582c2 motion (E) holding that the 1986 amendments may not be applied retroactively to cut off a defense which existed under the old law
Output: (A)
plaintiff); Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 279 Or 443, 445-49, 568 P2d 1382 (1977) (evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient). The second is where the defendant intended to commit an injury-inflicting act with knowledge that it would cause severe distress, and the defendant’s relationship to the plaintiff involves some responsibility aside from the tort itself. Hall v. The May Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or 131, 135-37, 637 P2d 126 (1981) (evidence sufficient to support verdict for employee against employer under theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress). Finally, the third arises where the defendant’s negligent conduct infringed on some legally protected interest of the plaintiff apart from causing the claimed psychic injury. See Nearing, 295 Or at 706 (1983) (<HOLDING>); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or 781, 562 P2d 540 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that oregon law allows recovery of damages for psychic harm when defendants conduct infringes some legal right of plaintiff independent of an ordinary tort claim for negligence (B) holding that expert proof was not required for an asserted claim of ordinary negligence (C) recognizing recovery under common law for tort damages that are proven to be reasonably foreseeable damages of ones tortious acts (D) holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim (E) recognizing tort of negligence by words
Output: (A)
allegations are correct, then it can be determined from the face of the record that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense and is patently illegal. Crotts is therefore entitled to have his motion decided on its merits. Crotts alleges that, in 1989, he was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, a second-degree felony, and given a guidelines sentence of sixty-six months’ prison followed by eighteen months’ probation. According to Crotts’s motion, his original sentence was not a habitual offender sentence. After being released from prison, Crotts violated his probation and, in 1991, he was sentenced to twenty years’ prison as a habitual felony offender for that violation. If these facts are true, Crotts’s habitual offender sentence is illegal. See King, 681 So.2d at 1140 (<HOLDING>). Although Crotts was sentenced before the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that shull does not apply to habitual offender sentencing and stating that this was not a case where the judge relied upon a reason for departure that was later declared invalid but rather one in which the judge considered his sentence to be one to which the guidelines did not apply (B) holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony (C) holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence (D) holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation (E) holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation
Output: (E)
either argument as a reason for reversal. 26 . There was no hearsay exception that would have permitted admission of Brisbon’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence against Wonson. Brisbon’s statements implicating Wonson could not be introduced against Wonson as an admission because they were not made by or attributable to him, see Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988), nor were they admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest because they did not directly implicate the declarant, Brisbon. See Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 199-200 (D.C. 1979) (en banc) (adopting the principles set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Only "in a certain, limited class of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonself inculpatory statements are not statements against penal interest under fedrevid 804b3 (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements (D) holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
Output: (A)
of action to be known as “civil action”[,]’ the statute authorizing foreclosures by action compelled such suits to be brought in equity”) (some brackets added and some in original); Bank of Hawaii v. Davis Radio Sales and Service, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 469, 480-81, 727 P.2d 419, 427 (1986). A complaint in equity is an appeal to the exercise of the equity court’s sound discretion, Fleming v. Napili Kai, Ltd., 50 Haw. 66, 430 P.2d 316 (1967). Equity jurisprudence is not bound by strict rules of law, but can mold its decree “to do justice,” id.,' and a court of equity, once having assumed jurisdiction, may retain the case to afford complete relief. Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958). Id. at 481, 727 P.2d at 427. See also Forte v. Nolfi, 25 Cal.App.3d 656, 692, 102 Cal.Rptr. 455, 479 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the circuit court had the power 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan (B) holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes (C) holding that while nondebtor purchase money deed of trust can be described as part of the same transaction by which the buyer acquired debtors real property that does not elevate the deed of trust to status of something under a plan confirmed (D) holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given (E) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed
Output: (D)
17200 of the Business and Professions Code will not support an award of punitive damages. Id. (citing Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F.Supp. 1525, 1550-51 (C.D.Cal.1987)). Indeed, it is settled law that punitive damages are not available under section 17200. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148, 131 Cal. Rptr.2d 29, 63 P.3d 937 (2003) (“While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited. A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.... We have stated that under the UCL, ‘[prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’ ”) (internal citations omitted); see also Dozier v. Maispace, No. C-05-1761, 2007 WL 518622, *10 (N.D.Cal.2007) (Trumbull, Mag. J.) (<HOLDING>) (citing Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Santa Cruz 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 (B) holding that neither compensatory nor punitive damages are recoverable under section 17200 (C) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b (D) holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the flsa (E) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda
Output: (B)
the present issue of what effect, if any, the appointment of a trustee would have on the limitation period. Id. 22 F.3d at 40. The several courts considering this issue have reached differing results. A Utah bankruptcy court, in Gillman v. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. (In re D-Mart Servs., Inc.), 138 B.R. 985 (Bankr.D.Utah 1992), has held that the subsequent appointment of a trustee in a case commenced under Chapter 11 generates a new two-year period under § 546(a). The debtor in D-Mart had filed for reorganization on December 29, 1987 and operated thereafter as debtor in possession. The case was converted to Chapter 7 seven months later, on July 12, 1988, and a Chapter 7 trustee wa Lumber Corp.), 145 B.R. at 816 (adopting conclusions of D-Mart); In re Carroll Indus., 153 B.R. at 102 (<HOLDING>). Cf. also In re San Joaquin Roast Beef, 7 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment (B) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (C) holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated (D) holding that for causes of action not time barred as of the date of the trustees appointment the limitation period is tolled for an additional two years from the date of appointment (E) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
Output: (D)
146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not the holdings of lower federal courts. B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court stated that “until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.” 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708. In other words, in order to succeed on a claim based on an alleged conflict, there must be a showing of an actual conflict, namely that a defendant’s attorney is representing conflicting interests. Conflicting interests have been recognized by the Supreme Court in a variety of settings. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164-65, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 270-72, 101 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the conflict (B) recognizing a potential conflict of interest when appointed counsel previously represented the murder victim in a separate case (C) holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest (D) recognizing a potential conflict when defense counsel is currently representing in another matter either the victim of the crime or a prosecution witness (E) recognizing conflict
Output: (B)
which the trial court may consider the individual circumstances of a particular defendant. In making that concession, the state did not identify any particular source of law for its view, but we think that the source of law is (as the trial court held) Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The injunction that “excessive bail shall not be required” necessarily presupposes a factual inquiry into the issue of “excessiveness.” Only a hearing could provide that factual inquiry. We hold that any defendant who wishes to make an “as applied” challenge to the propriety of imposing the specified security release amount of $50,000 or higher under ORS 135.240(5) has a constitutional right to a hearing to address that question. See Delaney v. Shobe, 218 Or 626, 628, 346 P2d 126 (1959) (<HOLDING>). It follows from the foregoing that, as the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the purpose of the credit statute is to provide credit for confinement    where 1 bail has been set for the defendant and 2 the defendant was financially unable to post the bail (B) holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (C) recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial (D) holding under excessive bail provision of article i section 16 of oregon constitution criminal defendant bears burden of establishing at hearing that amount of bail imposed is excessive (E) holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity
Output: (D)
Cir.1991), we will not craft petitioner’s arguments for him where his allegations are conclusory in nature. Id. Finally, we note that the majority of petitioner’s brief to this court concerns not the arguments discussed above but, instead, his struggle reconciling his sexual orientation with his deep Christian beliefs, and his assertion that he would be persecuted if he were returned to China on the basis of those Christian beliefs. But petitioner never raised religion as a ground for asylum in the administrative proceedings and we may not address it for the first time here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring an alien to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him prior to court review of a final removal order); Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The petition for review is DENIED. * After 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia (B) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (C) holding the bia may in its discretion grant a motion to continue or reopen to allow an alien to pursue adjustment of status before the uscis (D) holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte (E) holding that to satisfy  1252d1 an alien must present the same specific legal theory to the bia before he or she may advance it in court
Output: (E)
the court house would be a profound miscarriage of justice. Id. Thus, in accordance with the legislative history, case law, and North Carolina public policy, the Court finds that the North Carolina Legislative did not intend the statute of repose clause in § 1-52(16) to refer to latent diseases. Instead, latent diseases are only governed by the statute of limitations in § 1-52(16), giving plaintiffs three years to file from when they should have reasonably have discovered the existence and cause of their illnesses. Constitutionality of § 1-52(16) To interpret § l-52(16)’s statute of repose as applying to latent diseases would likely render the statute unconstitutional under the North Carolina’s Constitution’s art. I, § 18, known as the “open courts” provision. Th 5, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions (B) holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 (C) holding 12year period of repose and threeyear period of limitations contained in statute operated to eliminate a cause of action before wrong could reasonably be discovered were unconstitutional in consolidated product liability actions (D) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (E) holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983
Output: (C)
coherent and consistent, the inquiry is over.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). In a different context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “dealing with” is a “broad term.” See N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211, 79 S.Ct. 1015, 1020-21, 3 L.Ed.2d 1175 (1959) (concluding that “dealing with” as used in 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) is a “broad term” and is not synonymous to “bargaining with”). The dictionary definition of “dealing with” is “to be concerned.” Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 350 (1984). Given the breadth of the language used by Congress, we conclude that Menendez’s construction of § 410(b)(2) is overly narrow and that the plain meaning of “dealing with” includes 18 U.S.C. § 641. See United States v. Estus, 544 F.2d 934, 935-36 (8th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion that the scope of § 410(b)(2) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statute which made it illegal for a person to knowingly use  any false writing or document did not involve a continuing offense because it contemplated a single act quoting 18 usc  1001 (B) holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 (C) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (D) holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  1001 which criminalizes making false statements to a united states agency is specifically made applicable to the postal service by 39 usc  410b2
Output: (E)
was not bound by this ruling when he rendered this decision in 1999 because SSR 00-4p was not effective until December 2000. Perhaps as a result, Money mentions SSR 00-4p on appeal but concedes that we do not need to apply it here. She argues persuasively that this court has endorsed reconciling conflicts between VEs’ testimony and the DOT definitions even in claims not governed by SSR 00-4p. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 126-27 (3d Cir.2002). We do not need to decide this question, though, because the district court’s decision to affirm stands even if such reconciliation was needed. Money apparently did not raise the first issue regarding the error in step four to the district court, and it is therefore waived. See Gass v. V.I. Telephone Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Looking at this issue on the merits, this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding issues not raised before local agency are waived (C) holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (D) holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal (E) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal
Output: (D)
in its condition as imported. In Worthington v. Robbins, the Supreme Court first annunciated the principle that goods are to be classified in their condition as imported. See Worthington, 139 U.S. at 341. The merchandise at issue was white hard enamel, which had various uses. Id. at 340. However, in the condition in which it was imported it could only be used, and in fact was used, to make watch faces. Id. Customs and the Defendant-In-tervenor attempt to distinguish this case and others that build upon it on the ground that the products at issue have a recognized commercial identity regardless of subsequent use. See e.g. Dwight v. Merritt, 140 U.S. 213, 219 (1891) (applying the rule in Worthington to determine the correct classification of the merchandise); Schoverling, 146 U.S. at 82 (<HOLDING>); Citroen, 223 U.S. at 414-15 (noting the well 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a use provision the article had to be classified on its condition as imported (B) holding that the dutiable classification of gunstocks must be made on their condition as imported (C) recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing (D) holding that despite alleged uses articles must be classified in their condition as imported (E) holding that compensation need not be made as condition to exercise of drainage law rights
Output: (B)
after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) (1997). The Third Circuit was the first federal appellate court to consider whether Rule 4(m) grants courts the discretionary authority to extend the time for service, even in the absence of good cause. See Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, GMBH, et al., 46 F.3d 1298 (3d Cir.1995). In Petrucelli, the Third Circuit held “[w]e read the new rule to require a court to extend time if good cause is shown and to allow a court discretion to dismiss or extend time absent a show ) (<HOLDING>); Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the for good cause shown tolling provision encompasses the same circumstances as the rules for excludable time under the speedy trial act (B) holding that the plain language of the rule broadens a courts discretion to extend time for service even if good cause has not been shown (C) holding that if good cause does not exist the court has the discretion to either dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time (D) holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss (E) recognizing that in the 1993 amendments to the rules courts have been accorded the discretion to enlarge the 120day period even in the absence of showing good cause
Output: (B)
was Allsopp standing inside the house, and he later identified Allsopp in court. The process server testified that he told Davis that he had papers to serve on Allsopp and that he then gave those papers to Davis. The process server did not attempt to hand the papers to Allsopp. We recognize that courts have upheld service when a defendant attempts to evade service, and, therefore, “in-hand” delivery is not required. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.2009) (upholding service where process server testified that, after five attempts to serve defendant, pa pers were left on the front step after the defendant spoke to process server through an intercom system but refused to answer and unlock the door); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 457 (9th Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); and Slaieh v. Zeineh, 539 F.Supp.2d 864 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house (B) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (C) holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful (D) holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service (E) holding that service was sufficient where sheriff pitched papers through a hole in defendants screen door after she spoke with him and ducked behind a door to avoid service
Output: (E)
Delgado Guijosa, 144 Wn.2d at 915. Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if it could persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the validity of the plaintiff’s claim. Delgado Guijosa, 144 Wn.2d at 915. Generally, parties have a duty to read the contracts they sign. And a party who has limited knowledge — but treats that limited knowledge as sufficient — bears the risk of any mistake. Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 83 Wn. App. 411, 426, 922 P.2d 115 (1996); Bennett, 108 Wn.2d at 395. Accordingly, although no Washington case has dealt di rectly with this issue, the general rule adopted by other jurisdictions is that a person who signs a contract written in an unfamiliar language must attempt to have the contract explained or bears the risk of mistake: A good, and 927 (1972) (<HOLDING>). A more complicated issue arises, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs with limited proficiency in english could not avoid personal injury release noting plaintiffs could have had englishspeaking daughter translate it (B) holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage (C) holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim (D) holding that free special education services provided by state to plaintiffs child in order to cope with needs caused by personal injuries are collateral source and that defendants could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits (E) holding that a plaintiffs experts differential diagnosis must at least consider other factors that could have been the sole cause of the plaintiffs injury
Output: (A)
Inc., 213 W.Va. 667, 584 S.E.2d 523 (2003) (per curiam). Syl. Pt. 3, Shafer v. Kings Tire Service, Inc., 215 W.Va. 169, 597 S.E.2d 302 (2004). Cognizant of these standards, we turn to the substantive issues presented. III. DISCUSSION A Fair Value Determination Out the outset, we may quickly dispose of appellees’ argument that the instant appeal of the circuit court’s fair value determination of the PRF stock is untimely. Ap-pellees argue that the circuit court’s April 6, 2006, order setting the value of the shares of PRF stock “approximates a final order in its nature and effect” and, thus, was required to be appealed with four months of its entry pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rides of Appellant Procedure. See, Syl. Pt. 2, Durm v. Heck’s, Inc., 184 W.Va. 562, 401 S.E.2d 908 (1991) (<HOLDING>). However, simply because an order may be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that the absence of language in an order indicating that there is not just reason for delay pursuant to rule 54b of the west virginia rules of civil procedure does not bar appeal of the order so long as this court can determine that the circuit courts ruling approximates a final order in its nature and effect (E) holding that an order which purports to become final upon the happening of an event specified in the order is not a final order and the happening of the event does not operate to render the order final
Output: (D)
the petitioner custody would be in the child’s best interests; and (3) there were sufficient facts pleaded that the welfare of the child required custody be vested in a third party pursuant to the statute. Id. at 140. Guardians allege Grandparents cannot initiate an independent action outside of a pending custody matter because the probate division already determined custody and this case arises outside of a dissolution proceeding. This Court recognizes that, since T.Q.L. was decided, appellate courts have interpreted its holding to permit a nonbiological parent or third-party to initiate an independent proceeding for third-party custody outside the parameters of a pending custody proceeding. See, e.g., D.S.K. ex rel J.J.K. v. D.L.T., 428 S.W.3d 655, 659-60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (<HOLDING>); McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 445 (Mo. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that res judicata did not bar relitigation of paternity but only because the plaintiff had not been a party to or in privity with a party to the uncontested divorce judgment (B) holding that although the statute of limitations ran on the parents action the child could bring action after majority was reached (C) holding that female children excluded from membership in the boys club could bring claims against the organization (D) holding that husband who was excluded from paternity of children and could not intervene in a paternity action to obtain custody would be able to bring an independent action per tql (E) holding that judgment which ordered simultaneous paternity testing of both the defendant and his brother was interlocutory in that it did not determine the merits of the paternity case and thus was not governed by la cc p art 1951 such that a second judge could amend the judgment
Output: (D)
proceeding is a core proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code and as such is equitable in nature. See id. at 1505. The court reasoned that “[a] bankruptcy discharge and questions concerning the dischargeability of certain debts, involve issues with an equitable history and for which there was no entitlement to a jury trial in the courts of England prior to the merger of law and equity.” Id. (quoting In re Hooper, 112 B.R. 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. BAP 1990)). Thus, given the equitable nature of the dischargeability proceeding, the court held that debtor was not afforded the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. See id. The reasoning underlying the Hallahan decision has been accepted by a legion of other federal courts. See, e.g., In re White, 222 B.R. 831, 834-35 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1998) (<HOLDING>); In re Tanner, Nos. 97B00073, 97A00517, 1997 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dischargeability proceedings are inherently equitable in nature and as such parties are not entitled to jury trials (B) holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials (C) holding that under the hallahan progeny of cases parties are not afforded the right to jury trials in dischargeability proceedings (D) holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials (E) holding that the bankruptcy court has constitutional and implied statutory authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings
Output: (C)
of the issue in question. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219, 225 (2000). However, there is some disagreement as to the prohibition’s precise legal operation. Id. A few courts conceptualize the general prohibition as a question of justiciability. See, e.g., Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir.1997) (stating "true belief is not readily justiciable”); Nayak v. MC 33 (4th Cir.1997) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under First Amendment); Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F.Supp.2d 732, 736 (dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Establishment Clause); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185-88 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (B) holding first amendment precluded subjectmatter jurisdiction over title vii suit challenging church hiring procedures (C) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction (D) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case (E) holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims
Output: (B)
also depend upon voluntary reporting by physicians and other health care professionals. See Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients, 59 Fed.Reg. at 3945. Yet courts have allowed discovery of such reports. See, e.g., In Re Eli Lilly & Co., 142 F.R.D. at 461 (allowing discovery of adverse reaction reports in redacted form); Harris v. Upjohn Co., 115 F.R.D. 191, 1921-93 (S.D.Ill. 1987) (allowing discovery of adverse reaction reports and drug experience reports in redacted form); Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28-30 (E.D.Mich.1981) (denying protective order of New Drug Application file, information related to post-marketing adverse events, pre-marketing studies, and animal tests); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>). Defendants have presented no case law that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a plaintiff can establish that she was in the vicinity in which asbestos dust from defendants products was inhaled a jury can reasonably infer that plaintiff was injured by defendants products (B) recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim (C) holding that a products liability plaintiff was entitled to discovery of redacted adverse reaction reports (D) recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law (E) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability
Output: (C)
24 . It appears Plaintiffs themselves recognized this at some point. In their original Motion for Entry of Judgment, Plaintiffs sought as damages the entire principal amount of the underlying-judgment of $5,830,000. In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs modified their request to seek the remaining principal of the underlying excess verdict of $5,730,000 ($5,830,000 - $100,000). 25 . Interest = Principal x Rate x Time in years: $5,830,000 x 6.25% x (493 days/365 days). 26 . Had Nationwide wanted to reduce the amount of interest accruing on the judgment, it could have paid its $100,000 policy limits immediately after the judgment was entered and before any substantial amount of interest had accrued. See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 311 Ga.App. 495, 497, 716 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Threatt v. Forsyth Cnty., 250 Ga. App. 838, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states (B) holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof  which is the subject of litigation (C) holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with ocga  91167 by depositing with the court all or any part of such sum  to be held by the clerk of the court subject to withdrawal in whole or in part at any time thereafter upon order of the court upon posting of sufficient security (D) holding that jurisdiction of the subject matter  in either a civil or criminal action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even after a plea of guilty and for the first time in the appellate court (E) holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute
Output: (C)
a specific date and when the contingency fees in question are still unresolved. However, neither case speaks to the dissolution of a partnership, which, under the UPA, is not bound to a specific date in the determination of value. The UPA specifically contemplates a winding up period during which the contingency fees can be resolved and become susceptible to valuation. Instantly, the contingency fees were resolved by the time of trial and thus could be valued. Therefore, Lamparski and Beasley do not apply to the current situation, and the trial court in Solo should not have relied upon those cases. Turning next to the authorities relied upon by the trial court in granting the new trial in the instant case, we examine In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, 227 p.2d 208, 820 P.2d 1248, 1251 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 361 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing (B) holding that law firm was liable for restitution of contingency fee but not of other noncontingent fees following vacatur of judgment (C) holding contingency fee cases commenced prior to dissolution are assets of the firm (D) holding that contingency fee contracts are voidable where attorneys fail to comply with disciplinary rules (E) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee
Output: (C)
215. As the modified categorical approach is “merely a ‘tool for implementing the categorical approach,’ ” we concluded that it too did not apply. Id. at 216 (quoting Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2284, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013)). Contrary to Baboolall’s assertions, Rojas did not discard the modified categorical approach in drug possession and distribution cases. Rather, we held that neither the categorical nor the modified categorical approach was in play because there was no comparable federal statute and the record was silent as to the precise drug involved. Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215-16. In this case, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir.2013) adhered to on reh’g, 723 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). As the IJ recognized, because there are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (B) holding that a conviction under  22039 for attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony (C) holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession (D) holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
Output: (B)
to obtain the benefit of the bond, for which it paid a significant premium, only through legal action. Accordingly, Olympic Steamship applies here. Colorado Structures, 125 Wn. App. at 928 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We agree. ¶27 Lastly, in McGreevy, where this court awarded reasonable attorney fees in addition to the limits of the insurance policy, we reasoned, “when an insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage, it has placed its interests above the insured. Our decision in Olympic Steamship remedies this inequity by requiring that the insured be made whole.” McGreevy, 128 Wn.2d at 39-40. Likewise, West placed “its interests” above that of Structures. Id. Structures should be awarded attorney fees under Olympic Steamship, so as to be made “whole.” Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 280 (<HOLDING>)- Without the application of Olympic Steamship 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the contract was not authorized by law (B) recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract (C) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (D) holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied (E) holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity
Output: (E)
602 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.N.J.1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Po esentation against the Government. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Further, the FTCA requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication in a federal court, all claims to first be brought before the appropriate agency-here, the USPS’s Tort Claims Examiner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). It is undisputed that Mr. Foster did not bring his claims to the USPS before initiating this suit. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. II Mr. Foster also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration and its denial of sanctions against USPS. We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit
Output: (E)