niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of equitable estoppel is founded on the notion that a litigant should not be permitted to assert a claim or defense that is predicated on his own wrongdoing. The elements that must be established to succeed on an equitable estoppel claim are as follows: (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts, (2) the party to be estopped must intend that his conduct be acted on or must act so that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended, (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the facts and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must rely on the other party’s conduct to his injury. Emeco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 202 Ct.Cl. 1006, 1015, 485 F.2d 652, 657 (1973). The Supreme Court has cast considerabl 2 F.2d 1554, 1561-64 (Fed.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). In any event, “it is well settled that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing estoppel based on bank officers conduct (B) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (C) holding that this court erred in concluding that richmond stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for any monetary claim and remanding for consideration of the facts supporting the estoppel claim (D) recognizing that richmond was limited to estoppel claims involving payment from the public treasury (E) holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims
Output: (D)
file, unless the letter writer has requested that the letter not be made public or when the licensee feels that it should be excluded from the public inspection file because of the nature of fis content, such as a defamatory or obscene letter. 9 . See, eg., Chevalier v. Animal Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 839 F.Supp. 1224, 1234 (N.D.Tex.1993) (plaintiff appeared on television, gave interviews to magazines, and "apparently tried to orchestrate a counter-letter-writing campaign"); Samuels v. Berger, 191 A.D.2d 627, 595 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (plaintiff took out newspaper advertisements, purchased advertising time on local radio, spoke at public hearings, and wrote letter to editor). 10 . See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Bell v. Nat'l Republican Cong. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lawyer who attended coroners inquest and filed action for damages did not engage the publics attention because he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so (B) recognizing that a broad definition of stolen is consistent with the guidelines purposes and finding that the enhancement was properly applied where a defendant found a gun that was lost or mislaid by its owner who never authorized anyone to take the gun never sold it and never gave it away as a gift (C) holding the assignment invalid because the assignee never used the mark and never acquired any of the assignors tangible assets or goodwill (D) holding that plaintiff did not establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment where the complained of conduct was episodic but not so frequent as to become pervasive was never severe was never physically threatening though occasionally discomforting or mildly humiliating and significantly was never according to the record an impediment to the plaintiffs work performance (E) holding that employee did not invoke grievance procedure where he never mentioned the word grievance to the union and where he never asked the union to take any action on his behalf
Output: (A)
that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d. Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a declaratory judgment action was not the proper forum for the principal to make its bad faith argument which instead is properly asserted as a defense to the suretys claim against the principal for indemnification (B) holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agents misrepresentations because the principal was not blameless in the misrepresentations made to the third parties (C) holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties (D) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (E) holding a principal liable for its sales agents misrepresentations
Output: (B)
them, sua sponte, on various grounds, including improper venue, untimeliness, and failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Logan appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural history, and the scope of issues on appeal. We affirm on the opinion of the district court. We note that Logan stated at oral argument that the charges from her allegedly false 1996 arrest were dropped within twenty-four hours, removing any doubt that the corresponding § 1983 claim is time-barred, as the district court had concluded. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir.2004) (“The statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under ...[§] 1983 in New York is three years.”); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 121-23 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We have considered all of Logan’s arguments, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest (B) holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest (C) holding that a false arrest claim accrues at the latest when the criminal prosecution is dismissed (D) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (E) holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative
Output: (C)
is one factor that is "the focus of a district court’s analysis when determining whether to utilize a multiplier"); Longden v. Sunderman, 979 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1992) (post-Dague case noting that Fifth Circuit still uses multipliers, including for risk, to adjust the lodestar amount); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 150 F.R.D. 174, 185 & n. 6 (D.Colo.1993) (rejecting argument that Dague precludes use of risk multiplier in common fund cases); In re Avon Prods., Inc. Sec. Litig. [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,061, at 94, 701, 1992 WL 349768 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1992) (post-Dague decision using percentage method, but stating that risk multiplier of 2 to 3 would be appropriate under lodestar method), with Nensel v. Peoples Heritage Fin. Group, Inc., 815 F.Supp. 26, 30 (D.Me.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec-Litig., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding teague applies to capital cases (B) holding that eaja applies to court proceedings for review of social security cases (C) holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation (D) holding that dagues proscription of the use of risk multipliers applies to common fund cases (E) holding the medical improvement standard applies to closed period cases
Output: (D)
in any way suggest that it is a payment in lieu of taxes. Instead, the dividend-based payment is calculated based on a percentage of the City’s equity or investment in the properties of the electric division. This sum is not in the nature of an ad valorem tax and is separate and distinct from tax equivalent payments calculated based on the value of the utility’s property. See Town of Middleton v. City of Bolivar, No. W2011-01592-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2865960, at *18-24 (Tenn.Ct. App. July 13, 2012) (examining the distinction between PILOT payments and other types of fees). Accordingly, the City is not entitled to subtract the dividend based payment required by subsection 693(6) from the total tax equivalent payment made by MLGW prior to calculating Shelby County’s share. See id. at *23 (<HOLDING>). In summary, we agree with the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant to pay all back taxes (B) holding that the gas laws mandate that pilots be in lieu of all state city and local taxes or charges did not bear on the utilitys authority to pay franchise fees that were not in the nature of property taxes and that the utility was required to pay both franchise fees and pilots (C) holding that  charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees  (D) holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction (E) holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes
Output: (B)
to claim the radio. Higazy was released in his cotton prison scrubs and given three dollars for subway fare. "Higazy spent 31 days [in the New York MCC], all but a few hours in solitary confinement.” Christine Haughney, “A Sept. 11 Casualty: 'Radio Man’ Jailed for A Month, Then Freed; Egyptian Student Perplexed by Mistaken Arrest,” 3/11/02 Wash. Post, at A3, available at 2002 WL 15844201. 30 . It should be emphasized that, even if the government had the statutory authority to detain Awadallah, the question would remain as to whether the government nonetheless violated Awadallah’s Fourth Amendment rights. Even when the government acts with probable cause and a warrant, government actions must be reasonable. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-66, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The prolonged detention of a previously 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the surgical removal of a bullet was on the facts of the case unreasonable despite judicial review and authorization and probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (D) holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question (E) holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute
Output: (A)
to explain in this appeal any evidence of the defendants’ malicious interference with his relationship with others. The evidence he offers, that he has had difficulty obtaining employment and privileges following his dismissal from the Hospital and that his dismissal could potentially serve as a basis for a revocation elsewhere, is not probative at all of the defendants’ unllful intent to interfere in those other business relationships. That evidence merely reflects the incidental consequences of his termination from, the Hospital. Dr. Wong simply fails to offer any proof of the first element of this claim, that the defendants influenced others to the same course that they took for the purpose of damaging his business. See Fuselier, Ott & McKee v. Moeller, 507 So.2d 63, 69 (Miss.1987) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that the adverse summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding error for chancellor to find that the appellants had tortiously interfered with the appellees business relationships where record failed to disclose a single client who was influenced by the appellants to terminate the appellees services due to the appellants intervention (B) holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial given the appellees testimony that we dont have no ticket for that accident notwithstanding the fact that the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the comment (C) holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact relating to issues raised at an evidentiary hearing on the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not raise the issue in the circuit court (D) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (E) holding that appellants privacy interests under the us and texas constitutions were not invaded when officer walked up appellants driveway to allow drug dog to sniff appellants garage door
Output: (A)
for Sarvis is that even if there is a windfall vote, his complaint would still fail to raise the “reasonable inference” that Virginia’s ballot ordering law creates constitutionally significant burdens. The fact remains that, “windfall” or not, the Virginia ballot ordering law still does not “restrict access to the ballot or deny any voters the right to vote for candidates of their choice.” Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 638 (Alaska 1998). The law instead “merely allocates the benefit of positional bias, which places a lesser burden on the right to vote.” Id. And contrary to Sarvis’s cursory equal protection argument, Appellant’s Opening Br. 12-13, it makes this allocation in a neutral, nondiscriminatory manner. Compare Graves v. McElderry, 946 F.Supp. 1569, 1582 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (<HOLDING>), with Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petition nominating candidate under social democratic party violated party name protection act (B) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (C) holding that an oklahoma law placing democratic party candidates in the highest ballot positions violated the equal protection clause (D) holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause (E) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause
Output: (C)
reasonableness standard in Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 842 A.2d 773 (2004), within the context of lawful possession of premises. In Laney, the mortgagor of a home that had been foreclosed upon challenged several warrantless searches of the house where he had personal property. Id. at 527-28, 842 A.2d at 777. The searches occurred after title in the home had passed to the Department of Veteran Affairs (“V.A.”) — - the original guarantor of the mortgage. Id. Laney claimed that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house under the Fourth Amendment despite the fact that title had passed to the V.A. because the V.A.’s ownership rights in the house were inferior to his “possessory and private rights” in the house. Id. at 534, 842 A.2d at 780. This Court determined 6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying (B) holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics (C) holding that a squatter had no standing to challenge search of vacant home he frequented for the sole purpose of engaging in drugrelated business transactions  (D) holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying (E) holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure
Output: (C)
treat transactions of this kind as the sale or use of tangible personal property or as something else. Faced with a virtually identical interpretative regulation (although substantially different tax provisions), California has resolved the matter by reference to the single consideration of physical usefulness. See Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, 25 Cal.4th 197, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 407, 19 P.3d 1148, 1158 (2001) ("Together, these decisions establish that any transfer of tangible property physically useful in the manufacturing process is subject to sales tax even though the true object of the transfer is an intangible property right like a copyright.") (emphasis in original); see also Simplicity v. State Bd. of Equalization, 27 Cal.3d 900, 167 Cal.Rptr. 366, 615 P.2d 555, 562 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Boulder urges that its tax provisions be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed (B) holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract (C) holding that contractual conditions printed on cruise ticket were valid even though they were in small type (D) holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced (E) holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process
Output: (E)
functioning of the judicial system. Id. at 707, 94 S.Ct. at 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d at 1063; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 447, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2782, 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 893-94 (1977). Although we have recognized that the principle of separation of powers is implicit in the Alaska Constitution, Brad-ner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 n. 7 (Alaska 1976), we have never addressed an executive privilege claim. However, other state courts have held that a governor, in the discharge of official duties, is entitled to an executive privilege analogous to the President’s. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d at 921-24; Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (1978); cf. State, ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330, 334 (1981) (<HOLDING>). We agree with this view and conclude that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under separation of powers the legislative department makes the laws the executive department carries the laws into effect and the judicial department interprets and declares the laws (B) holding that the qui tam provisions do not usurp the executive litigating function because the statute gives the executive branch substantial control over the litigation (C) recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor (D) recognizing dhs as one of the states twentyfour executive administrative agencies (E) holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege
Output: (E)
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” [14] Id. The question of what amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct depends in part on prevailing cultural norms and values, and “[i]n the appropriate case, the question can be decided as a matter of law.” Id. This is the case here. [15] McCollough argues that Bryant’s conduct in failing to thoroughly investigate the incident, leading others to believe that he had fully investigated the incident when he had not, and in directing that McCollough’s statement be altered so that i Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. Because we conclude as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title to land vests in decedents heirs not in his administrator (B) holding decedents remains are not property and the coroner and the coroners employees have no mandatory statutory duty or common law duty to treat human remains as if they were operating a mortuary or crematory (C) holding that evidence that decedents second wife secretly decided to disinter decedents remains rather than maintain a grave with a headstone pursuant to an agreement with family members sufficiently established that wifes actions were deliberate and extreme and outrageous for purposes of establishing an iied claim (D) holding that executor owed no legal duty under negligence theory to decedents sons who claimed bank accounts upon her death under a right of survivorship but were not beneficiaries of any of decedents property under her will (E) holding that decedents daughter was necessary party to maryland wrongful death action
Output: (C)
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tor-tious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."). 14 . Although we have cited § 302B several times in dicta, this court has never invoked that section as a source of liability. See Bryson v. Banner Health Sys., 89 P.3d 800, 805 n. 11 (Alaska 2004) (quoting almost identical language in Prosser and Keeton on Torts for the proposition that a special relationship may yield a duty to protect another from a third party); Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 n. 67 (Alaska 2001) (citing § 302B for the proposition that "a reasonably foreseeable occurrence cannot be an intervening/superseding cause if the actor has a duty to prevent that occurrence"); Wil 011) (<HOLDING>); Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior conviction for abusive sexual contact under 18 usc  2244a3 was a per se crime of violence within the meaning of the application notes and declining to consider application of the residual clause (B) holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house (C) holding that violence was not the foreseeable result of opening the door to an abusive and upset exhusband while a new boyfriend was over (D) holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent (E) holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful
Output: (C)
See id. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.3 (explaining that the enhancement should apply because “the defendant assumes a position of trust, relative to the victim, that provides the defendant with the same opportunity to commit a difficult-to-detect crime”). This understanding is confirmed by the cases cited with approval in the application note, each of which involved a direct relationship of trust between the defendant and the victim. See Gill, 99 F.3d at 489 (applying enhancement to defendant posing as licensed psychologist, explaining that “in real life terms, [the defendant] occupied a position of trust relative to his counseling patients, and that [the defendant] took advantage of the patients’ reliance on his claimed status as a psychologist to further his fraud scheme”); Queen, 4 F.3d at 929 (<HOLDING>). Application Note 3 is therefore consistent 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the imposter investment advisorbroker in that case assumed a position of trust with his victims (B) holding that abuse of trust enhancement applied where defendant had discretion to engage in commodities transactions on victims behalf without victims supervision (C) holding that jury may consider victims mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victims knowledge and consent (D) holding that employer controlled the victims will at least in part by using his position as the victims employer (E) holding that assistant principal used position of authority to gain the trust of the victims to obtain the opportunity to touch the victims and to cause them to submit to his unlawful touching
Output: (A)
be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for an application of the ‘plain view5 doctrine.”). Disputes over its meaning arise primarily in cases in which the police have had to conduct additional examinations in order to determine the import of an object. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. at 2307-08; United States v. Garces, 133 F.3d 70, 75-76 (D.C.Cir.1998). It is clear that the requirement is satisfied, however, where the officers had “probable cause” to believe that an item was incriminating “without the benefit of information from any unlawful search or seizure.” Garces, 133 F.3d at 75. And because the touchstone is probable cause, see United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1133 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), a “seizing officer need not ‘know’ or have an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where other evidence established probable cause to believe that the defendant possessed controlled substances investigating officers had probable cause to search the defendants purse for similar evidence (B) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (C) holding that the officers examination revealed that there was probable cause to believe that the property was stolen (D) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry (E) holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime
Output: (E)
b. C.A.’s Claim is not Moot The defendants argue that C.A.’s claim is moot because they have submitted the requisite payment authorization to enroll C.A. at Cabin John Middle School. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1. The plaintiffs, in their reply, point out that DCPS has not submitted any documentary evidence, other than a declaration, to prove that it submitted the required paperwork. Pis.’ Reply at 4. The plaintiffs further allege that while the defendants may have submitted the payment authorization for C.A.’s enrollment at Cabin John, the defendants recently “rescinded funding authorization for [C.A.]’s Grafton School placement.” Id. at 5. A failure to fund a student’s placement constitutes a unilateral change in the placement, Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 881 F.Supp. 63, 66 (D.D.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). DCPS’ failure to fund C.A.’s placement, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians (B) holding that failure to make payments in whole or in part or cutting off funds for special education programs amounts to a unilateral change in students placements which is prohibited by the idea (C) holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation (D) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child (E) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody
Output: (B)
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); and the presence of foreign parties on both sides of the litigation destroys diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff must be of diverse citizenship to all defendants. See, e.g., Franceskin v. Credit Suisse, 214 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir.2000). We also agree with the district court’s determination that there was no federal question jurisdiction even though AICO’s statement of claim raises Federal securities law questions. It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration may not be based on the content of the underlying claim. See Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263 (2d Cir.1996), amended opinion 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 35571, at *15-16 (<HOLDING>) AICO also argues that the district court had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court has no independent authority to compel arbitration of a class claim (B) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive (C) holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that the text of faa  4 should not be interpreted to mean that a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action to compel or stay arbitration merely because the underlying claim raises a federal question
Output: (E)
award a reasonable sum of future medical expenses. Thus, the trial court’s ruling granting a partial directed verdict on future medical expenses, even if procedurally 1 sor substantively erroneous, is not a valid basis for remanding this matter for a new trial. Jury instruction as to past medical expenses award The third and final legal error the majority cites is the tidal court’s failure to instruct the jury on the law regarding past medical expenses incurred in good faith. The majority, however, fails to cite any authority, nor could I find any, requiring a jury be instructed on the law regarding recovery of past medical expenses incurred in good faith. This law is simply a jurisprudential principle. See Watson v. Hicks, 15-0046-48, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/27/15), 172 So.3d 655, 675 (<HOLDING>). Regardless, Plaintiffs did not raise this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under title vii the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiffs treatment not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace (B) holding that medical treatment is included in the traditional definition of necessaries (C) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (D) holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  (E) holding ec is not responsible for medical treatment required independently by the subsequent noncompensable injury when the removal of a hindrance to recovery from the compensable injury is merely an incidental effect of such treatment
Output: (D)
for a sentence reduction because he was sentenced as a career offender. Gibson now appeals the ruling. We are bound by this court’s decision in United States v. Moore “unless and until it is overruled by this [C]ourt en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir.2003). Where a retroactively applicable guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but does not alter the sentencing range upon which his sentence was based, the District Court is not authorized to grant a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330. This includes the situation in which a retroactive amendment to § 2Dl.l(c) would result in a lower base offense level, but the defendant was sentenced as a career offender. See id. at 1326-30 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we held in Moore that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (B) holding a reduction in defendants sentence as a career offender was not authorized under  3582c2 because amendment 706 did not lower his applicable guideline range under the careeroffender guidelines (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range
Output: (E)
the highest rating available, ‘Fully Successful.’ ” Def.’s Mot. at 22 & Ex. 17. Moving to the third prong of the prima facie case, the reassignment of work responsibilities can rise to the level of an adverse employment action when it results in “significantly different responsibilities.” Brown, 199 F.3d at 456 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)); see also Carpenter v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 949 F.Supp. 26, 28 n. 3 (D.D.C.1996). Courts are hesitant to intervene in business affairs so as to avoid judicial micromanagement, especially when a diminution in pay, benefits, or work hours does not accompany the reassignment. Mungin, 116 F.3d at 1556-57; accord Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Traditionally, “short of finding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same  rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified (B) holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits (C) holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge (D) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action (E) holding in first amendment retaliation case that unwarranted reprimands a negative work evaluation threat of job loss through dissolution of the plaintiffs division threat of suspension without pay removal of job duties and exclusion from meetings did not constitute adverse employment action either singly or when considered in the aggregate
Output: (B)
candidate whose name appears on the sign could be prosecuted for the state employee’s misdeed, even though the candidate did not know the volunteer personally; did not solicit the help; and, had no idea that the person joining him to spread his campaign message was even a state employee. If applied in this fashion, we agree with Mr. Siplin that this statute would be unconstitutional on both over-breadth and substantive due process grounds. However, criminal statutes are generally read to include a mens rea element, even when not expressly included in the statute. E.g., State v. Giorgetti 868 So.2d 512, 515-516 (Fla.2004); see also, State v. Oxx, 417 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Deehl v. Knox, 414 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); but see, Suit v. State, 906 So.2d 1013, 1022 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). As explained in Giorgetti there are two 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire  act and that it is axiomatic that we construe the statute as a whole entity  in order to arrive at a construction which avoids illogical results (B) holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations (C) recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written (D) recognizing this rule but concluded that the statute in that case was incapable of a narrower construction because there is no logical way to read a specific intent element into the statute as it is currently written (E) recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court
Output: (D)
floor with suspect cocaine and marijuana. The baggies were approximately one inch by one inch. The parties stipulated that the substances were marijuana and cocaine. Police testified that the manner of packaging indicated the drugs were set up for distribution. At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had failed to prove the defendant had committed any crime as the police never observed anything illegal in the defendant’s possession. The trial court denied the motion. We find that the evidence presented by the State failed to establish a prima facie case of guilt, see Hodge v. State, 970 So.2d 923, 926-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and thus reverse the judgments of conviction. See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). Morejon v. State, 633 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing ruling on motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo on appeal (B) holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo (C) holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo (D) holding that a circuit courts entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo (E) holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo
Output: (A)
Williams I), we conclude that these claims were properly dismissed. Williams provided no evidence that Hal-ford was directly responsible for supervis ing the Council’s compliance with its contract. In fact, the IDOC official who signed the 1997 Council-IDOC contract attested that he — not Halford — oversaw the IDOC’s religion-related policies and practices. Williams also failed to establish that Halford knew of the alleged contract breaches or Tawil’s alleged improper activities (admitting on appeal that he believes she was unaware of either), or the other alleged violations of his rights. Thus, his claims against Halford rested on respondeat superior, which is not a proper basis for section 1983 liability. Cf. Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Serv., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As to the claims against Tawil and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury (B) holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation (C) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (D) holding that where there was no evidence that program director was personally or directly involved in alleged violation of constitutional rights or that as supervisor she knew about allegedly unlawful conduct and facilitated approved or deliberately ignored it summary judgment was properly granted in her favor in  1983 action (E) holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others
Output: (D)
by way of a personal restraint petition, obtained an order vacating his conviction after a remand to the superior court from the Supreme Court to determine if the conflict of interest on the part of Denend resulted in Richardson's being denied effective assistance of counsel. See In re Richardson, 100 Wn.2d 669, 675 P.2d 209 (1983). 2 Alternatively, he argued that the statute of limitations was tolled, pursuant to RCW 4.16.190, during his incarceration from March 30 through May 30, 1978, and, following an unsuccessful appeal, from February 7,1980, through October 30, 1981. The trial court resolved this issue adversely to Richardson. Richardson has not assigned error to this ruling and, thus, we do not address this issue. See State v. Hubbard, 103 Wn.2d 570, 574, 693 P.2d 718 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 Pursuant to RCW 4.16.170, an action is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case (B) holding that it is error for court of appeals to reverse trial courts ruling that had not been objected to at the trial court level (C) holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals (D) holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error (E) holding that appellant waives right to complain of ruling to which no error was assigned
Output: (C)
not violate Glenn’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993 (“Permission to search [may be] obtained from a third party who possesses] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”). However, I must part company with the majority with respect to whether the grandfather’s consent to the search of Ms home also vested the officers with the authority to open and search Glenn’s backpack. See Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1522 (noting, for example, that, “when it comes to searching through bureau drawers, there will be instances in wMch even a person clearly belonging on the premises as an occupant may lack any perceived authority to consent”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725, 104 S.Ct. Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom (B) holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom (C) holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom (D) holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom (E) holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom shared by herself and the man she lived with including the closet
Output: (E)
received evidence on the Hearing Date. To the extent the trial court held an oral hearing on that date, the record reflects that the trial court did not receive any evidence that was the basis of its ruling at that hearing. Under the unambiguous language of the trial court’s Expunction Order, the trial court did not base its ruling on evidence that it received from the parties. See Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441-42 (Tex.2003); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex.2000). Because no evidence was presented at any oral hearing on the expunction petition, the line of cases upon which the Department relies does not apply. See U.S. Auto Ins. Serv. Inc. v. Les Marks Chevrolet, No. 14-02-00644, 2003 WL 22021670, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>) (mem. op.). On this record, the lack of a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the appellate court may reverse an error of law on the face of the judgment when the record contains no transcript of the final hearing (B) holding that error in taking judicial notice of a prior ease was harmless where the entire record of the prior case although not introduced into evidence was made part of the record on appeal and no prejudice was shown (C) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (D) holding that this line of cases was not on point and that no error was apparent on the face of the record due to lack of reporters record from defaultjudgment hearing because the judgment reflected that it was based only on the pleadings and affidavits that were in the record (E) holding trial court erred in granting more relief than husband requested in petition and that such error is apparent on the face of the record
Output: (D)
its content. Id. It is well-established that Rule 1002 does not apply in situations where the mere existence of an independent factual condition is sought to be proved, even if the condition is contained in or effectuated through a writing. See Fed.R.Evid. 1002 advisory committee’s note (“[A]n event may be proved by nondocumentary evidence, even though a written record of “it was made.... For example, payment may be proved without producing the written receipt which was given. Earnings may be proved without producing books of account in which they are entered.”); Dalton v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 1216, 1223 (5th Cir.1993) (concluding the rule did not apply to proof of a debt through an affidavit rather than bank documentation); see also United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 483 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Ms. Smith testified that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing (D) holding trial court should have required segregation because tort claims entailed proof of facts unnecessary for proof of the contract claim (E) holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer
Output: (C)
Brady claims fail where the claimant fails specifically to identify the “potential undisclosed Brady materials” or “to set forth any specific facts indicating that such evidence was withheld. Conclusory or speculative allegations that the Government failed to disclose evidence are insufficient to support a Brady violation.” Verdel v. Cunningham, No. 07-CV-0837, 2008 WL 2755833, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008); see also Visich v. Walsh, No. 10-CV-4160, 2013 WL 3388953, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (‘Without more, [petitioner's unsupported assertion that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory or impeaching information at the time of trial ... is insufficient to warrant habeas relief.”); Castillo v. United States, No. 07-CV-2976, 2010 WL 3912788, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Skinner v. Duncan, No. 01-CV-6656, 2003 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unobjectedto conclusory testimony insufficient to support judgment (B) holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b (C) holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient (D) holding that a partys single conclusory sentence in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim (E) holding that where petitioner did not point to any specific evidence that was withheld his broad conclusory claims  were insufficient to support his claim of a constitutional violation
Output: (E)