niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
noted at 152 N.C. App. 477, 2002 WL 1914015, at *7, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 2144, at *19-20 (Aug. 20, 2002) (unpublished opinion); Hart v. Pharaoh, 1961 OK 45, 359 P.2d 1074, 1079; Berg v. Wilson, 353 S.W.3d 166, 180 (Tex. App. 2011); Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979); Zweber v. Melar Ltd., 2004 WI App 185, ¶ 10, 276 Wis. 2d 156, 687 N.W.2d 818. But see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 405.32 (requiring cancellation of lis pendens notice if the filer failed to prove his claim at trial); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 1608 (granting discretion to cancel lis pendens if the filer is not likely to prevail); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2731 (permitting courts to cancel lis pendens in certain circumstances during litigation); Sloane v. Davis, 433 So. 2d 374, 375 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (<HOLDING>); Inv’rs Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 169, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal (B) holding that notice of administrative forfeiture sent to prisoner did not require actual notice to the property owner only notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action (C) holding that statute permitting cancellation of lis pendens  at any time  allowed cancellation during pendency of appeal emphasis omitted quoting nd cent code  280508 (D) holding that appeal did not prevent cancellation of lis pendens under statute reading in part that lis pendens shall be canceled  w hen judgment is rendered in the action or proceeding against the party who filed the notice of the pendency thereof     quoting la code civ proc ann art 3753 (E) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding
Output: (D)
communication need not itself contain a misrepresentation, Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712-15, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), it must be “incidental to an essential part of the scheme.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954). The district court found, and we agree, that Kaye has not alleged a situation in which anyone was misled or fraudulently induced to engage in activity to their detriment. Although Kaye’s allegations, if true, may amount to questionable conduct on the part of Defendants, “[n]ot all conduct that strikes a court as sharp dealing or unethical conduct is a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ ” as those terms are used in the mail and wire fraud statutes. Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Kaye’s allegation of wire fraud is supported 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a buyer could not rely on a sellers mere expression of opinion (B) holding that sellers failure to disclose known soil conditions was not a scheme to defraud where seller did not affirmatively lie to buyer (C) holding that failure to disclose that the defendant was involved on both the sellers and buyers side of transactions constitutes a concealment of a material fact sufficient to support a charge of fraud (D) holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession (E) holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation
Output: (B)
of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1996). For example, in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975), the defendant produced “Grotrian-Steinweg” pianos and the plaintiff produced the world-renowned “Steinway” pianos. The court explained: The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some connection with “Steinway”, would consider it on that basis. The “Grotrian 3 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use (B) holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue (C) recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement (D) holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense (E) holding that nominative fair use involves questions of fact whose resolution is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss
Output: (A)
reference to representation before the Court that could reasonably be said to have induced the appellant to miss the filing deadline. See Butler v. Derwinski, 960 F.2d 139, 141 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[although often effecting a seemingly harsh result, courts cannot disregard jurisdictional requirements[,] established by Congress[,] out of sympathy for particular litigants”), overruled in part on other grounds by Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1368; see also Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam) (“[procedural requirements established by Congress for gaming access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants”); cf. Gilbert v. Secretary of HHS, 51 F.3d 254, 257 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The appellant further asserts that errors 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing doctrine (B) holding that equitabletolling doctrine cannot apply where attorney misread statute (C) holding that even if the court were to apply the apex doctrine the doctrine would not preclude the deposition of two corporate executives in that case (D) holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply where promise was supported by bargained for consideration (E) holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi
Output: (B)
393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). • GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [¶ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City’s operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [¶27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature “includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality’s implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality
Output: (A)
meaning); cf. Shames v. Coontz, 882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174 (D.Mass.1995) (Lasker, J.) (deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with “apparent considerable success” and “broad ... and pervasive” advertising) (emphasis added). Advertising of a mark can be probative of secondary meaning. See Boston Beer, 9 F.3d at 182. “[W]hile secondary me BS, 1998 WL 428092, at *8 (D.Mass. May 26, 1998) (Alexander, M.J.) (suggesting that evidence of trademark advertising is relevant to determining secondary meaning only insofar as it indicates that the public associates an advertised mark with a particular source) (citing Aro-matique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir.1994)); Stratus Computers, 1987 WL 7748 at *3-4, (<HOLDING>). Here, Lyons does not offer adequate evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to mark 13 of products is certainly not adequate marking (B) holding that mark had not acquired secondary meaning even with advertisements costing 4400000 over five years because it did not lead consumers to associate plaintiffs mark with its products (C) holding that inconsistent advertising of an alleged protected trademark for five years did not establish secondary meaning (D) holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark (E) holding plaintiff failed to establish selfrealization acquired secondary meaning because members of the american hinduyoga community believed the mark was a spiritual state of mind and did not automatically associate a selfrealization product with plaintiff
Output: (B)
conducting a review for harm — even if the error is not preserved. See Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984). Second, we apply fundamental-error review when an important public interest or public policy is at stake. See, e.g., Ramsey, 205 S.W.2d at 983. “Pub . 1350, 25 L.Ed.2d 594, on remand, 457 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.1970). Substantively, public-interest-based fundamental error is rare, implicated only when our most significant state public interests are at stake. The meaning of the “public interest” that is adversely affected must be extremely circumscribed, or the exception would swallow the rule. Thus, it cannot be enough to allege that an error violates a party’s constitutional rights. See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions (B) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue (C) holding that because appellant had waived review of constitutional challenge to sentencing statute by failing to raise it at the first opportunity the trial court correctly proceeded to examine whether the appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to the sentencing statutes (D) holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court (E) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief
Output: (D)
at twelve after a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of III, Scirotto’s sentencing guideline range was fifteen to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. The court rejected Scirotto’s plea for a noncustodial sentence and sentenced him to the guideline minimum term of fifteen months’ imprisonment and a $100 assessment. Scirotto filed a timely notice of appeal with a new attorney. He urges us not to enforce the appellate waiver, contending former counsel was ineffective during the guilty plea for failing to preserve for appeal the issue of sentencing guideline selection. II. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Our review of the validity and applicability 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable (B) holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so (C) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (D) holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a defendants waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
Output: (D)
owner); Tucker v. Hankey, 173 Kan. 593, 250 P.2d 784, 788 (Kan. 1952) (“To constitute adverse possession of land, it is not absolutely necessary that there should be [enclosure, buildings, or cultivation. ...”). With respect to agricultural lands whose primary purpose is cattle grazing, courts have consistently held that the actual, physical, and hostile possession elements of an adverse possession claim may be satisfied simply upon a showing that the individual who claims to have adversely possessed the land has had his cattle graze on the disputed parcel. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Haecker, 243 Neb. 693, 502 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Neb. 1993); Davis v. Parke, 135 Ore. App. 283, 898 P.2d 804, 806 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Overson v. Cowley, 136 Ariz. 60, 664 P.2d 210, 217-18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). As the Wyoming Supreme Court, in summarizing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession (B) holding that a past arrest for possession without more is simply not enough to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is currently in possession (C) holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession (D) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter (E) holding cattle grazing without more sufficient to establish actual possession element
Output: (E)
decision contained numerous citations to both federal precedent and state court decisions which were based on federal due process principles. In the FAR petition, Davis specifically noted the factual underpinnings of his claim: “[T]he prosecutors suppressed the fact that Frame ... refused to be interviewed by the defendants because of threats by Delinsky....” Pet’r’s Mem.Ex. A at 24. Davis focused his argument in the FAR petition, however, on the failure of the trial justice to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding this and other suppression claims. See id. at 25. Davis characterized his claims as “allegations of constitutional violations,” “allegations of constitutional dimensions,” and as a “Due Process” violation contrary to United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 905, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship (C) holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim (D) holding that where affidavits raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a brady claim an evidentiary hearing should be conducted (E) holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing when parties submissions in contempt proceedings raise disputed issue of material fact
Output: (D)
who inspected the property for termites and provided a termite bond and report. This appeal, however, involves only the validity of the preliminary injunction against the Blaylocks' foreclosure. 3 . The sales contract provided: "9. NECESSITY OF INSPECTION: Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that Alabama law imposes a duty on Purchaser to thoroughly inspect a property, for defects or otherwise, in accordance with the terms of this contract and prior to the sale....” 4 . The narrow "health or safety" exception to the general no-duty-to-disclose rule is also inapplicable to this case because the Carys, failed to make a sufficient showing that the water damage to the house (i.e., wood rot and fungus growth) posed a direct threat to their health or safety. Cf. Fennell, 529 So.2d at 1004 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the other two narrow exceptions to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 (B) holding that even though the contract limited the buyers remedies to specific performance or a refund of earnest money they were entitled to damages in the amount of the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property where the seller thwarted the buyers right to specific performance by selling the property to another at a higher price (C) holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it (D) holding that the evidence was sufficient to preclude inference where he tried to enter the house drunk and was staying at the neighboring house (E) holding that a duty to disclose a health hazard arose where the buyers of a house made a sufficient showing that a defect in the furnace serving the house would have if not remedied caused the release of carbon monoxide resulting in the buyers possible injury or death
Output: (E)
decided that § 80A.01(b), as a derivative of § 17(a)(2), “does not require scienter, but supports a negligence based theory of recovery.” Sprangers, 394 N.W.2d at 503. Although the Minnesota cases on § 80A.01 subsequent to Sprangers may appear at first glance to be in conflict because the subparts of the statute are not always referenced, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited to Sprangers with approval when ruling on a securities case involving an unsuitability claim. Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn.1994) (citing Sprangers’s holding that a “seller of stock may be liable for misrepresentation [under § 80A.01(b) ] irrespective of scienter”). That court also referenced § 80A.01(a) in Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn.1988) (<HOLDING>). Sprangers is the state’s most thorough 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this subpart does require scienter (B) holding that 20 of individual defendants holdings raised an inference of scienter (C) holding that this rule does not require the creation of an inventory of documents to be produced (D) holding that this court does not necessarily require the claim to be specifically raised in an eeoc charge provided that it satisfies this scopeofinvestigation test (E) holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter
Output: (A)
injury is not covered by the policy, and Allstate is under neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Drumheller in the state court action brought by Katzenmoyer against Drumheller. When Drumheller struck the sewer manhole on the trail, he was clearly not operating the ATV on the residence premises. Thus, the only issue is whether the trail on which Drumheller was operating the ATV was used “in connection with the residence premises.” Drumheller did not use the trail in connection with his premises. Even though the trail begins less than 800 yards from his driveway and he used the trail almost everyday for recreational purposes, Drum-heller did not use the trail “in connection with” his premises. See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Coppa, 494 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Hudnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a neighbors adjoining hayfield was not used in connection with the residence premises and therefore coverage for bodily injury arising out of an accident involving an atv was excluded under insurance policy (B) holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person (C) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (D) holding that an unpaved public street a short distance from the policyholders home was not part of the insured premises because it was not used in connection with the residence premises (E) holding that homeowners policy excluded coverage because atv accident on private roadway in homeowners association occurred away from the insured premises
Output: (A)
that when “‘an agency’s failure to state its reasoning or to adopt an intelligible deci-sional standard is ... glaring ... we can declare with confidence that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious’ ” (quoting Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). At the very least, the agency must have reviewed relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation establishing a “ ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,’” Ark Initiative, 816 F.3d at 127 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 724 F.3d at 249 (same); see also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1584, 1602, 188 L.Ed.2d 775 (2014) (<HOLDING>). “[C]onclusory statements will not do; an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency retained discretion to alter its course under a regulation provided it gave a reasonable explanation for doing so (B) holding that the plan administrator abused its discretion when it ignored contrary evidence without explanation (C) holding that even though the government retained discretion as to how to mark or fence dropoffs it did not retain discretion whether to do so (D) holding that a 103day delay in payment did not amount to bad faith because the carrier gave a reasonable explanation for the delay in payment it was continuing its investigation (E) holding that when an agency has not reached an issue the proper course is to remand to the agency to address it in the first instance
Output: (A)
See In re Allawas, No. 07-06058-hb, slip op. (Bankr.D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2008) (denying confirmation, despite the use of exempt social security income, for lack of good faith where debtor proposed to retain an expensive motorcycle as a second vehicle). Moreover, the Plan provides for inconsistent treatment of similarly situated creditors in that it would allow an apparently undersecured mortgage creditor to receive a full cure of its undersecured claim while other unsecured creditors receive a de minimis payment. Though Debtor may have acquired the home during more prosperous times, it is apparent that the expense associated with the home led to Debtor’s current need to seek relief in this Court to cure a debt that he can no longer afford. See In re Rice, 72 B.R. 311, 313 (D.Del.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Leone, 292 B.R. 243, 245 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a debtor should not be able to retain a home the spoils of an imprudent purchase to the detriment of unsecured creditors (B) holding that because creditors claim was unsecured after application of section 506a and because section 1325a5 does not apply to unsecured claims creditors lien could properly be avoided (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) holding that the purpose of the bankruptcy codes avoidance provisions is to prevent a debtor from making transfers that diminish the bankruptcy estate to the detriment of creditors (E) holding that postconfirmation attempt to equitably subordinate claim of one general unsecured creditor in a class of general unsecured creditors was a violation of  1123a4
Output: (A)
States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 846 (3d Cir.2010). Section 924(c) prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (providing that “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall” be subject to an additional sentence depending on the specific facts of the underlying crime). Bag’s testimony and the video surveillance footage were clearly sufficient to show that Hill’s companion carried and made use of a firearm during and in relation to the MetroPCS robbery when he entered the store, brandished the weapon at Bag, and demanded that Bag open the register. United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 626, 528 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the jury could have permissibly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that carries a firearm includes one who knowingly possesses and conveys a firearm in a vehicle (B) holding that fact that robbers issued explicit threats while brandishing and pointing their firearms menacingly was not sufficient to constitute otherwise use of the firearm (C) holding that  use certainly includes brandishing  a firearm quotation marks omitted (D) holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding defendants minimum sentence could not be increased for brandishing a firearm where based on jury instructions jury convicted defendant of the lesser offense of carrying rather than brandishing the firearm
Output: (C)
for relief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. However, Rosa generally challenges the dismissal of his case for failure to state a claim, and his second amended complaint was the operative complaint before the district court when it dismissed his case. See Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1202. Thus, construing Rosa’s brief liberally, we conclude that he has sufficiently challenged the dismissal of his second amended complaint. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Further, the appellees suggest that Rosa is barred from challenging the magistrate’s order that instructed him to file an amended complaint. However, because the magistrate’s order was not the final judgment in the case, it appears that we may review Rosa’s arguments regarding the order. See Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 930-31 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, although Rosa complied with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the final judgment was entered without jurisdiction while a nonfinal appeal was still pending (B) holding that when reviewing a final judgment we generally also have jurisdiction to review all prior nonfinal orders and rulings which produced the judgment (C) recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration (D) holding that a notice of appeal that specifies the final judgment brings up for review all of the previous rulings and orders that led up to that final judgment (E) recognizing that nonfinal orders may be revised at any time before a final judgment is entered
Output: (B)
irrelevant, a respondent’s awareness that his conduct will violate an ethical proscription is not itself material.”). Simply because an attorney’s conduct is intentional or dishonest does not by itself establish a dishonest or selfish motive. See In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, ¶ 42, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (respondent violated his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal, but selfish motive was not an aggravating factor). ¶ 43 In the past, we have held that dishonest or selfish motive is an aggravating factor when an attorney received some financial gain or made misrepresentations to cover his or her negligence. These previous holdings of dishonest or selfish motive involved private attorneys, not public sector lawyers. See, e.g., Arrick, 180 Ariz. at 143, 882 P.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 69, 876 P.2d at 565 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (D) holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case
Output: (C)
401 F.3d at 1228 n. 2 (“[W]hen an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.”). To avoid removal under the Convention Against Torture, “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant ... to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). As under the INA, this burden of proof for the applicant is higher than the burden imposed on an applicant for asylum. Therefore, an applicant like Prado, who cannot show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution, also cannot show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1303; Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1292; Forgue v. United States Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n. 4 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each (B) holding that if an applicant fails to meet the standard for asylum he a fortiori fails to meet the requirements for withholding of removal and relief under the cat (C) recognizing that withholding of removal and cat claims necessarily fail if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same (D) recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate (E) holding that where a petitioner fails to establish a claim for asylum on the merits his claims for withholding of removal under the ina and cat also necessarily fail
Output: (E)
their brief to this court: “[W]hether probation officers should be involved with police so that they are regarded as law enforcement by the community, and therefore negatively impacting the position of probation officer, is a significant public concern. Without respectful input by those in the field, the provision of governmental services could become ... inefficient, and even counterproductive.” In addition, the officers note that the memorandum called their employer’s attention to the fact that by law probation officers serve in the position of “intake officers” and should not be associated with activities of law enforcement because it affects their neutrality. We conclude that there is much merit to the officers’ arguments, cf. Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and that the officers have satisfied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (B) holding that if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop harassment knew of and failed to act against it the plaintiff has no further obligation to bring it to the employers attention (C) holding that attempts to disclose government employee misconduct has been held to further governmental efficiency meeting the governmental employers responsibility to provide effective services (D) holding that employers knowledge of employees injury followed by the employers failure to provide the necessary medical services sufficient to impose liability upon the employer for medical services selected by the employee (E) holding that a single decision by a final policymaker within the area of his responsibility can impose liability on the responsible governmental entity
Output: (C)
or erected by the government rather than a private organization. The discriminating characteristic that allowed the Christmas tree display and prohibited the menorah was solely that the former was a secular symbol and the latter a religious one. The distinction was made on the basis of what was said, not who was speaking. 11 . The Court explained: It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. Other principles follow from this precept. In the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another. Discrimination against speech bec L.Ed.2d 640 (1990). 16 . Cf. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In Allegheny, the Court evaluated the effect 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that display of unattended menorah in city hall park quite close to seat of government violated establishment clause because its combination alongside a secular holiday display did not cause a viewer to see the exhibit as a whole or as a unitary symbol (B) holding inter alia that the display of a creche at a country courthouse violated the establishment clause but noting that there is an obvious distinction between a creche display and references to god in the motto and the pledge (C) holding that the display of a creche as a part of a public christmas display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a national holiday (D) holding that county violated establishment clause by giving roman catholic group preferential access to display standalone creche depicting birth of jesus on main staircase of its seat of government because reasonable observer would believe countys action was meant to support and promote christianity (E) holding that the display of a privately sponsored creche on the staircase of the courthouse violated the establishment clause because the display actually favored sectarian religious expression
Output: (E)
in the context of alleged violations of § 2517(5) relating to the state interceptions, see Section XII. 6. at 66-67, infra. 7 . In the state criminal proceeding, State of Florida v. Robert Gainer Jernigan, Jay Travis Jernigan, John Dennis Cason, Rudolph Lutz, Case No. 80-5687-CF, Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, the Defendants’ Motion to Suppress the communications intercepted by the state wiretap were denied. See Order of October 30, 1981, Exhibit “F” to Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence (docket entry No. 700). 8 . The foregoing conclusion disposes of the contention that the contents of page 21C vitiate the showing of necessity under § 2518(3)(c). Although unrelated to the issues created by mi 701-03 (<HOLDING>). This Court adopts the view espoused in Marion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements (B) holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied (C) holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied (D) holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims (E) holding that the requirements of article iii are consistent with the establishment by congress of nonarticle iii courts to enforce federal criminal laws in clause 17 federal enclaves
Output: (C)
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement — the evidence here, and the logical inferences therefrom, demonstrate that the police would have obtained Heath’s currency during a valid search conducted pursuant to a well-established exception to the warrant requirement, namely, a search incident to a lawful arrest. See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir.1993) (“[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could ... have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest.... Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events (emphases added); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper (B) holding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant a rear seat passenger of a car for possession of marijuana based on the discovery of two marijuana seeds in the front of the vehicle (C) holding that the facts that the vehicle described in the tip was parked outside the home that allen gave inconsistent answers to officers questioning and that in addition the defendant fit the physical description of the suspect were sufficient to support the officers reasonable inference that the defendant was actually the suspect and therefore that there was probable cause to arrest him (D) recognizing without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant that the discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest the defendant and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched the defendant and discovered the marijuana in his pocket (E) holding that officers had objective probable cause to search the pocket of a jacket found on the seat of the defendants truck where the discovery of marijuana in two different locations in the truck combined with the defendants possession of marijuana reasonably led officers to believe that other caches would be found elsewhere in the vehicle
Output: (D)
29, 1997). Accordingly, all claims against the Waterbury Police Department are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l). F. Defendants Slavin and the City of Waterbury Defendant Slavin is a Waterbury police officer against whom two claims are asserted. First, Nicholson alleges that defendant Slavin used excessive force and conducted an illegal search of his personal effects when he arrested Nicholson in February 1999. The court has construed the brief reference to the City of Waterbury as relating to this claim. Second, he alleges that defendant Slavin made a false report charging him with robbery and provided that false information to the prosecutor. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nicholson alleges that defendant Slavin used 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims (B) holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions (D) holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc  1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations (E) holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983
Output: (B)
police encountered the defendant in front of a location known for drug trafficking. Id. Arnold appeared startled when he saw the police and hurried into a nightclub. Id. Police followed him into the club and saw Arnold attempting to hide a matchbox behind a machine. Id. The police testified Arnold had a prior arrest for cocaine and that matchboxes are commonly used to carry drugs. Id. While noting Arnold’s location, his actions upon seeing the police, and police knowledge of Arnold’s association with drugs, the court highlighted his concealment of the matchbox in concluding there was probable cause: Most importantly, the officer’s suspicions [about drugs in the matchbox] were confirmed when he saw appellant trying to hide or dispose of the matchbox behind the game machine. U 1982) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion In the present case, the facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants entry into the foyer of a fraternity house was an entry into a dwelling (B) holding that in every warrantless entry into private residence state has burden to demonstrate that exigencies of situation made entry imperative (C) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry (D) holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry (E) holding that as part of showing that a warrantless entry was imperative the government must demonstrate that a warrant could not have been obtained in time even by telephone under the procedure authorized by fedrcrimp 41c2
Output: (B)
and conclusions contained in the OIPs was in manifest disregard of the law and therefore requires that the award be vacated. It is incorrect. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence where: 1) that evidence is of a specific character, namely “of furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount ... [or] of conduct or statements made in compromise ^negotiations;” and 2) if that evidence is offered “to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.” See Fed. R.Evid. 408; see also Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 170 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). First, the discussion and conclusions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (B) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (C) holding that if governmental entity agrees to settle lawsuit from which it is not immune it cannot claim immunity from suit for breach of settlement agreement (D) holding that rule 408 exclusion does not apply to evidence of a settlement agreement if it is offered for another purpose ie for a purpose other than to prove or disprove the validity of the claims that the agreement was meant to settle (E) holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement
Output: (D)
applicability of the Edwards rule to apply to interrogative conduct by a non-law enforcement commander; see United States v. Brabant, 29 M.J. 259, 263 (C.M.A.1989) (concluding that Sergeant Brabant’s commanding officer’s order that Sgt Brabant attend a meeting following his invocation of counsel created the "functional equivalent of a ‘reinitiation of interrogation’”); see also United States v. Mitchell, 51 M.J. 234, 237 (C.A.A.F.1999) (extending applicability of Edwards to question, "Was it worth it” by Petty Officer Mitchell’s leading chief petty officer who was there as part of official command brig visit). The CMA has also created an overseas exception to the Edwards rule. United States v. Vidal, 23 M.J. 319 (C.M.A.1987); see United States v. Coleman, 26 M.J. 451, 453 (C.M.A.1988) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Upon remand, the U.S. Army Court of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel (B) holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview (C) holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance (D) holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel (E) holding that a request for counsel made to foreign authorities is insufficient to trigger edwards rule even if army cid agents were aware of specialist colemans prior request for counsel made to german police
Output: (E)
Appeals’ explanation of the issue in T.C. v. Mac.M., 96 So.3d 115, 117 (Ala.Civ.App.2011), also is helpful: “This court has explained the circumstances under which a juvenile court’s order or judgment is sufficiently final to support an appeal: “ ‘Although a juvenile court’s orders in a dependency case are, in one sense, never “final” because the court retains jurisdiction to modify its orders upon a showing of changed circumstances, see C.L. v. D.H., 916 So.2d 622 (Ala.Civ.App.2005); Committee Comments, Rule 4, Ala. R.App. P., this court has always treated formal dependency adjudications as final and appealable judgments despite the fact that they are scheduled for further review by the juvenile court.’ “D.P. v. Limestone Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 28 So.3d 759, 762 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (<HOLDING>).” Fully in keeping with the “well established” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order denying a motion for reconsideration constituted a final order because at the time the order was entered all nonsuited claims had been adjudicated and were no longer a bar to finality (B) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that order awarding maternal grandmother primary physical custody of a child in a dependency case was a final appealable order as opposed to a pendente lite order (E) holding that an order finding with regard to the father that reasonable efforts at reunification were no longer required of the department of human resources was a permanency order that was sufficiently final to support an appeal that order also expressly left in place previous awards of legal custody incident to dependency findings
Output: (E)
limitations was equitably tolled fails because he did not raise this argument before the district court. See Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Grace’s remaining contentions lack merit. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction resides with plaintiff (B) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule (C) recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented (D) holding that plaintiff bears the burden to timely allege facts supporting equitable tolling (E) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction
Output: (D)