niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
to require jury trials); State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002) (rejecting argument that the analysis supporting the decision in McKeiver has been undermined by recent revisions to the juvenile system that make it more akin to adult criminal justice system); State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 581 (Me. 1979) (revisions to juvenile code retained informality, flexibility of dis-positional alternatives, and criteria for selection of proper disposition which distinguish juvenile system from adult system); State v. Chavez, 163 Wash. 2d 262, 180 P.3d 1250 (2008) (rejecting argument that the juvenile charged with serious violent offenses faces process and consequences so akin to adult system that right to jury trial should be required); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that juvenile adjudications may not be used for impeachment purposes because the disposition of a juvenile does not constitute a criminal conviction (B) holding that statute allowing for transfer of juvenile to adult criminal court does not implicate apprendi because the judges transfer determination does not subject the juvenile to enhanced punishment it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system (C) recognizing that the admonition to function in a parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness and holding that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived before being released to a criminal court for prosecution (D) holding that the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury includes the right to a complete and correct charge of the law so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions (E) holding that more recent revisions to the juvenile system have not so transformed it into a criminal prosecution that the right to trial by jury must be afforded
Output: (E)
906 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The report was adopted by the district judge, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that for fourth amendment purposes an arrest warrant supported by probable cause carries with it limited authority to enter a dwelling in which a suspect lives when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within (B) holding that the facts that the vehicle described in the tip was parked outside the home that allen gave inconsistent answers to officers questioning and that in addition the defendant fit the physical description of the suspect were sufficient to support the officers reasonable inference that the defendant was actually the suspect and therefore that there was probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (D) holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect (E) holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause
Output: (C)
defense or a prima facie case. Although the OAH rule references Rule 60(b), that requirement is not stated in the rule itself. It is derived from our case law. Frausto argues that it is not clear that one in her position (i.e., the successful party at the initial stage of her request for unemployment compensation) is required to show an adequate defense even under Rule 60(b). She cites this court’s decision in Lester v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (D.C.2002) where we observed that an adequate defense is irrelevant to a Rule 60(b) motion filed by a plaintiff. We agree that, in the circumstances of the present case as above-described, no additional showing was required for purposes of the motion. 8 . See Rodriguez v. Filene’s Basement, Inc., 905 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Frausto also argues that she has a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo (B) recognizing de novo standard of review (C) holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo (D) holding that the oah properly accorded no deference to the determination of the claims examiner where the administrative review of unemployment compensation claims is conducted de novo (E) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo
Output: (D)
in a single limits policy covering multiple vehicles as to sums required to be provided by statute. Id. at 431, 475 S.E.2d at 775. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held that a policy provision prohibiting stacking of liability coverage is valid because “[liability coverage, ... while statutorily required, is limited to the particular vehicle for which it is purchased.” Ruppe v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 329 S.C. 402, 406, 496 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1998). The Ruppe case is not dispositive in this case, however, because we determined that no Class I insured was involved in the accident. Inasmuch as the appellants were Class II insureds under the garage policy, none were entitled to stack. Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 538, 370 S.E.2d 85 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore the order of the circuit court is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action (B) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (C) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (D) holding that although class i insureds may stack coverage class ii insureds may not (E) holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied
Output: (D)
941, 944 (1937); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 572 (La.Ct.App.1936); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910, 911 (1934); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Bojonell, 88 Ohio St.3d 154, 724 N.E.2d 401, 402 (2000); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Cromwell, 82 Ohio St.3d 255, 695 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1998); Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d at 234; Brown v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 742 S.W.2d 34, 42 (Tex.Ct.App.1987); accord 16 John A. Appleman and Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 8649, at 137 (1981) (“generally the courts have held that if a lay adjuster attempts to handle claims on behalf of plaintiffs, or to effect settlements for them, even though litigation is not required, such amounts to the practice of law”); cf. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Jansen, 816 S.W.2d 813, 814-16 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning of these courts is helpful in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public insurance adjusters were not engaged in the practice of law when they merely documented and presented firstparty claims for property damage to insurance compa nies even though they discussed the competing valuations with the inhouse insurance adjuster the court distinguished these activities from the evaluation and presentation of personal injury claims and from the negotiation of settlements (B) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (C) holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim (D) holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies (E) holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims
Output: (A)
the same objections. (Govt.’s Opp’n [94] 3-4.) While the parties argue objections relating to matters as varied as timeliness, privilege, proper procedure, undue burden, materiality, this Court finds that the jurisdictional issue is dispositive. Defendant’s motion must be denied because it has provided no valid basis on which to compel a federal agency to comply with a subpoena. This Court must have authority to compel discovery. The most likely source are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Government notes, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 cannot provide a basis for granting defendant’s motion to compel because the United States is not a “person” within the meaning of that rule. See U.S. ex. rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 233 F.R.D. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.2005) (Leon, J.) (<HOLDING>); Lerner v. District of Columbia, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant cannot overcome this presumption of service merely by denying that he did not receive the complaint (B) holding that the presumption that rule 45 does not apply to the federal government can only be overcome by affirmative evidence (C) holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness (D) recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome (E) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government
Output: (B)
physical boundaries of his property when harm reaching outside those boundaries is foreseeable.” Id. In Almarante, the plaintiff was struck and injured by a motorcycle while crossing a highway that ran between two school dormitory buildings that she frequented as a student. Id. at 704. The defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that it had no legal duty to provide a reasonably safe passage across property that it did not own. Id. The Almarante court held that plaintiffs complaint stated a valid cause of action because the school created a foreseeable zone of danger for its students by building its dormitory on either side of a busy highway without taking steps to ensure their safe passage. Id. at 705; see also Bailey Drainage Dist. v. Stark, 526 So.2d 678, 682 (Fla.1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Gunlock v. Gill Hotels Co., 622 So.2d 163, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger (B) holding that even if overgrown brush causing a dangerous condition for passing motorists was located on privately owned property so that removal is not an option the defendant still has a duty to warn of the danger (C) recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge (D) holding that engineering firm whose work was dictated by and complied with contractual specifications had no duty to warn of dangerous condition on premises (E) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign
Output: (B)
v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 157 Colo. 188, 196, 402 P.2d 194, 198 (1965)). The absence of an established market for an asset does not, however, preclude application of the fair market value standard. Rather, fair market value is a term that has long been used in the law as applicable to property having no actual current market place. Whitlow v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 82 F.2d 569, 572 (8th Cir.1936) (noting that in such a case, the term means “the sum that would in all probability result from fair negotiations between an owner who is willing to sell and a purchaser who desired to buy,” quoting De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61, 72, 52 S.Ct. 78, 80, 76 L.Ed. 168 (1931)); see also Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 258, 61 S.Ct. 507, 509, 85 L.Ed. 813 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Here, Commerce City presented expert 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue (B) holding that evidence of contamination is relevant and admissible on the issue of market value in an eminent domain valuation trial (C) holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach (D) holding that the market price is understood to mean the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it is produced (E) holding that the absence of a market price is no barrier to valuation for purposes of assessing tax liability
Output: (E)
44-14-161(a) governs actions between a defendant debtor and the SBA. United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Irby, 618 F.2d 352, 355 (5th Cir.1980) (applying Mississippi real property law to determine reasonableness and validity of foreclosure sale by SBA under guaranty agreement). Furthermore, § 44-14-161(a) applies to both primary debtors and guarantors; an action for the balance remaining on a note following a foreclosure sale against a guarantor rather than the primary debtor is still an action for a deficiency judgment under the statute and is barred if no confirmation was obtained. United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir.1980); see also First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Kunes, 230 Ga. 888, 889, 199 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the foreclosure sale in the case sub 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that guarantors and sureties are  debtors within the meaning of the georgia confirmation statute immediately upon the default on the promissory notes (B) holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute (C) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (D) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge (E) holding that workers compensation awards remained property of the estate despite confirmation of the debtors plans where the confirmation orders specifically provided that property of the estate did not vest in the debtor until the completion of the plan
Output: (A)
issue in the case before us is byzantine in its complexity, but from the morass of dependent clauses one may distill the following: If one is discharged for misconduct, in general, one loses one’s rights to unemployment compensation for six weeks, unless one is discharged (among other things) for theft or larceny in connection with one's work, in which case one is disqualified from receiving any unemployment compensation benefits until one has found a new job and worked for thirty days in covered employment. 205 W.Va. at 202, 517 S.E.2d at 299 (footnote and citation omitted). 3 . See W. Va.Code § 61-6-16 (1923) (Repl.Vol. 2000). 4 . See W. Va.Code § 61-6-18 (1969) (Repl.Vol. 2000). 5 . See W. Va.Code § 61-3-53 (1998) (Repl.Vol. 2000). 6 .See Summers, 205 W.Va. at 202, 517 S.E.2d at 299 (<HOLDING>). However, in the context of proving fraud, for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the movant (B) holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that burden is upon employer to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence that claimant committed act in question (D) holding that a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to an administrative claim (E) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant
Output: (C)
(<HOLDING>). We deny all pending motions, AFFIRMED, ** 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision (B) holding  2254d authorizes federal court to review state courts decision only and not explanation of decision (C) holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar (D) holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case (E) holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it
Output: (D)
690 F.Supp. 317 (D.C.N.J.1988) (direct mail solicitation in New Jersey confers personal jurisdiction). In light of CCC’s uncontested affidavit, therefore, the court was justified in denying further discovery. CBS argues that it could not have made more specific allegations without jurisdictional discovery and that it never had the opportunity to take such discovery. Further, CBS points to cases in this circuit suggesting that a district court abuses its discretion w . 308, 312 (S.D.Ind.1997) (citing cases and holding “it is reasonable for a court ... to expect the plaintiff to show a colorable basis for jurisdiction before subjecting the defendant to intrusive and burdensome discovery”); International Terminal Operating Co., Inc., v. Skibs A/S Hidlefjord, 63 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y.1973) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, CBS had no obligation to make 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 144 requires both a factual affidavit and a separate certificate that the affidavit was made in good faith (B) holding jurisdictional discovery not appropriate when plaintiff merely hopes to find statements in defendants affidavit not accurate but has not made counterallegations in its own affidavit (C) holding that because plaintiff has met defendants affidavit evidence with mere speculation plaintiffs request for  jurisdictional discovery  must be denied (D) holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit (E) holding affidavit insufficient to support probable cause when one cannot learn from the affidavit when the past activities occurred and when the observations were made
Output: (B)
of an applicant’s claim. Id. An applicant’s failure to mention relevant facts before her asylum hearing, such as her omission of those facts from her asylum application, may support an adverse-credibility finding. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287-88. In Forgue, for example, we held that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse-credibility determination because the petitioner failed to mention important facts until his asylum hearing, including the fact that he was doused with acid and had prevented members of an opposing political party from committing election fraud. Id. We have held that even one inconsistency and one omission, with respect to relatively minor details, may justify an adverse-credibility determination. See Xia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). An applicant’s provision of tenable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adversecredibility determination was supported where the applicants testimony included at least one internal inconsistency how old she was when she had the abortion and one omission identifying data on the abortion operations certificate and where the petitioner did not provide corroborating evidence that would have rebutted these inconsistencies and omissions (B) holding woman who alleged she was terminated for having an abortion stated a prima facie case for discrimination (C) holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed (D) holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants (E) holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states
Output: (A)
or (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2). 2 . We decline to address whether a COA that fails to specify the issue or issues for appeal may nevertheless suffice to confer jurisdiction on this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), or whether, in certain circumstances, we may address the merits of a petitioner’s claims despite their having been brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals by a defective COA. Cf. Soto v. United States, 185 F.3d 48, 52-53 (2d Cir.1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under 28 usc  2253c1 certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability (C) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (D) holding that order denying relief under fedrcivp 60b in a habeas setting is the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding subject to the certificate of appealability requirement of 28 usc  2253c1a 2000 (E) holding that a certificate of appealability issued without meeting the substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requirement nonetheless suffices to confer appellate jurisdiction quoting 28 usc  2253c2
Output: (E)
it has not done so here. Under the express terms of the Statute, Satterfield has no available remedy against Crown Cork. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 149.001-.006. Texas courts have recognized that a cure for retroactivity is to allow statutes to operate prospectively or for the Legislature to provide a grace period when enacting statutes affecting vested rights. See, e.g., Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502 (upholding retroactive application of new immunity defense when the Legislature afforded a reasonable time to file accrued causes of action); Texas Water Rights Comm’n, 464 S.W.2d at 649 (permittee afforded a reasonable time after enactment of statute to preserve their rights, thus providing a “reasonable remedy” after fair opportunity to protect rights); Middleton, 185 S.W. at 560 (<HOLDING>). In Middleton, the Texas Supreme Court upheld 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment (B) recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment (C) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (D) recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment (E) holding that the payments accrued
Output: (B)
held unconstitutional, as long as the unlawfulness [of defendant’s actions] was apparent in light of pre-exist-ing law.” Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.1995). Butler cites no case directly demonstrating that the asserted right was clearly established in 2005. She contends that in 2005 it was clearly established that “a seizure becomes unlawful when it is more intrusive than necessary to accomplish the objectives that justified the seizure in the first place.” Be that as it may, the circumstances of Butler’s arrest do not demonstrate that her detention was unconstitutionally intrusive. To the contrary, it was established that Perez could detain Butler during the search of her car and home. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (<HOLDING>); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agents were allowed to seize and question occupants of business while executing search warrant for illegal aliens (B) holding that it is permissible under the fourth amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence (C) holding that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (D) holding that officers may detain the occupants of a house while executing a search warrant (E) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted
Output: (D)
1989); Tweedle v. State, 153 Tex.Crim. 200, 218 S.W.2d 846 (1949). But Humphreys was not convicted in a Texas court, and we think it sufficient answer to point out the obvious: Texas criminal procedure does not govern federal criminal trials in Iowa. BODA was required, under Tex.R.Disci-plinaey P. 8.02 (1992), to treat the record of conviction as “conclusive evidence” of Hum-phreys’s guilt. Moreover, U.S. Const, art. 4, § 1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, require Texas to extend “full faith and credit” to the judgments of federal trial courts in other states just as Texas must to the decisions of other state courts. Hancock Nat’l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640, 645, 20 S.Ct. 506, 508, 44 L.Ed. 619 (1900); see generally Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). While Texas will not extend full faith and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit (B) holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states (C) holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit (D) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state (E) holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy
Output: (B)
the undisputed facts do not establish that Perez currently lives in the Dominican Republic or is a member of the police force in that country, as Pau-lino asserts. Moreover, the evidence does not show that any public official in the Dominican Republic would consent or acquiesce to the mistreatment of Paulino. The record, therefore, does not compel the conclusion that Paulino is entitled to deferral of removal under the CAT. Finally, to the extent that Paulino takes issue with the BIA’s resolution of factual issues (such as whether Perez lives in the Dominican Republic or is a police officer there), and its weighing of the evidence presented, we agree with respondent that we lack jurisdiction to review those issues. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). III. For the reasons stated, we will deny the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (B) holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence (C) recognizing that arguments such as that an ij or the bia incorrectly weighed evidence failed to consider evidence or improperly weighed equitable factors are not questions of law under  1252a2d (D) holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte (E) holding that review of questions not raised to the bia is barred
Output: (C)
that subsequent extraneous offenses are admissible to show a defendant’s intent as to an earlier offense. See U.S. v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2nd Cir.1998) (upholding admission of subsequent act under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent regarding charged offense and holding, “[t]he fact that the evidence involved a subsequent rather than prior act is of no moment”); U.S. v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.) (construing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and holding that it “draws no distinction b Austin 1990, no pet.) (same). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Russell’s contention that the Vogt Street offense was not admissible simply because it occurred after the Fast Freddy’s offense. Cf. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Although, based on the authorities cited by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court (B) recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion (C) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (D) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) recognizing that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules
Output: (E)
must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338, 123 S.Ct. at 1040 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604). Accord Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. at 282, 124 S.Ct. at 2569. In a case in which the petitioner wishes to challenge on appeal this Court’s dismissal of a claim for a reason not of constitutional dimension, such as procedural default, limitations, or lack of exhaustion, the petitioner must show jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether this Court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604 (<HOLDING>). In death penalty cases, any doubt as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct (B) holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it (C) holding when a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim a coa may issue only when the petitioner shows that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether 1 the claim is a valid assertion of the denial of a constitutional right and 2 the district courts procedural ruling was correct (D) holding that if the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason would find debatable two issues 1 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling and 2 that the applicant has established a valid constitutional violation emphasis in original (E) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would conclude it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct
Output: (C)
officials’ need for maintaining order and discipline in school is such that school officials do not need either probable cause or a search warrant to search students and their belongings. Instead, T.L.O. provides that “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” Id. at 341,105 S.Ct. 733. In evaluating whether a search is reasonable under the circumstances, T.L.O. requires that courts apply a two-prong test: (1) whether the school authority’s search was justified at its inception and (2) whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference. Id.; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2639, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) (<HOLDING>). At issue in the present case is the first 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion (B) holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest (C) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that when reasonable suspicion exists a school search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search (E) holding that the challenged item was within the scope of the search because it reasonably fell within the expressed object of the search even though it turned out to be the defendants personal property
Output: (D)
464, 27 P.3d 456; State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 42, 908 P.2d 731, 735 (1995); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-18, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (“[t]he defendant may not have constitutionally sufficient notice to support a lesser included offense instruction requested by the prosecutor if the elements of that lesser offense are not part of the indictment.”). Committing an aggravated battery against Thomas does not presume that an assault would therefore be committed against Thompson. {12} Here, alleging the existence of a new victim of a separate criminal act altered a material element of the crime with which Child was originally charged and about which he was entitled to notice. See State v. Mankiller, 104 N.M. 461, 466, 722 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). This is basically unfair. {13} Furthermore, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later (C) recognizing that the government need only prove that crime occurred reasonably near the date stated in the indictment (D) holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment (E) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
Output: (B)
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ " (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 30 . Id. at 339-40, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (citations omitted). That arbitration agreements are instruments of a fraudulent scheme is not an arbitration-specific defense. Any contract employed as an instrument of a fraudulent scheme would similarly be invalid. In any event, the cases cited by the Court evidence its concern for state laws targeting arbitration clauses. E.g., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 31 . — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law governs whether an arbitration clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the faa (B) holding that all arbitration provisions dealing with transactions involving interstate commerce are subject to the faa (C) holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court (D) recognizing a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration in the faa (E) holding that montanas firstpage notice requirement which governs not any contract but specifically and solely contracts subject to arbitration conflicts with the faa and is therefore displaced by the federal measure
Output: (E)
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occürred... , It is undisputed that the 300-day limitations period applied here, and that the filing date of Kassaye’s charge for EEOC purposes was January 18, 1991. It is also undisputed that Kassaye received actual notice of the tenure denial, at the latest, by January 20, 1990 Thus, Kassaye’s EEOC charge was timely only if “the alleged unlawful employment practice” occurred within 300 days before January 18, 1991. Kassaye concedes that if, as the district court held, the gravamen of his complaint was the tenure denial, his charge was filed too late because it was not filed until 363 days after January 20, 1990. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Kassaye’s administratively-filed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included (B) holding that the statute of limitations for an employment discrimination lawsuit by a college professor who did not receive tenure began when the college made the tenure decision and communicated that decision to the plaintiff (C) holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run (D) holding that when prisoner diligently seeks information about the status of his case the limitations period may be equitably tolled until he receives notice of its denial (E) holding that the limitations period for a discrimination charge based on tenure denial begins when aggrieved person receives notice of denial not on the last day of employment
Output: (E)
does not contain evidence of other exigent circumstances compelling the officers to use a greater than usual amount of force against him. Kyles was tased five times in a short time span, causing him to lose control of his muscles, spasm involuntarily, and beg for the tasing to stop. Id. ¶ 6-8. While Kyles was not pregnant, the plaintiffs pregnancy in Brooks does not appear to be a dispositive factor in the court’s analysis. Moreover, according to Kyles’s testimony, unlike the plaintiff in Brooks, he was not in any way resisting when the allegedly excessive .force was used against him. Kyles Depo. ¶ 4. Finally, if Kyles’s version of events is proven at trial, a juror could reasonably conclude that the deployment of Xena violated clearly established law. See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093 (<HOLDING>); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis (B) holding in case where po lice dog bit plaintiff for approximately fifteen seconds in officers presence that excessive duration of the bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force (C) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (D) holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right (E) holding that in 1998 the law was clearly established that excessive duration of a police dog bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force
Output: (E)
the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. Addressing the identical federal rule, the Supreme Court has stated that “[o]n its face, Rule 23.1 speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representatives pleadings.” Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 1711. The rule itself does not create a demand requirement. Id. “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance, not procedure.’ ” Id. at 96-97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (quoting Daily Income Fund, supra, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 831 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted)); see also Bazata, supra, 400 A.2d at 316 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the demand requirement or its futility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim (C) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (D) holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served (E) holding the connection is an element
Output: (B)
be effected in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section. 5 . For clarity, the first “final denial” refers to the April 28; 1995 letter. The second “final denial" refers to the USPS inaction on BOND’S June 28, 1995 request for reconsideration. It should be noted the USPS has never denied BOND’S request for reconsideration. The USPS did not send a second "final denial” by certified mail. Six months passed since the request for reconsideration, and BOND, at the veiy least, has six months from that date to file an action against USPS. At the earliest, BOND’S claim against the USPS would run afoul of the statute of limitations on either June 28 or July 3, 1996. But see. Conn v. U.S., 867 F.2d 916 (6th Cir.1981); Taumby v. United States, 919 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186 (3rd 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) holding that a time limit for filing a complaint as a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings is not jurisdictional (C) recognizing that there is no time limit for filing ftca action when administrative claim is deemed denied due to agencys inaction (D) holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional (E) holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner
Output: (C)
2012 WL 4344571, *3 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 21, 2012) (Moore, J.); see also Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 645 N.Y.S.2d 433, 668 N.E.2d at 406 (equating “arising out of’ and “based on” for purposes of insurance policy interpretation). Thus, the conversion claims, and any liability incurred as a result, plainly arose out of the TCPA-violating fax advertisements in this case. See Policy at 44. As such, the conversion claims are excluded from coverage by the TCPA Exclusion, and Plaintiff therefore owes no duty to indemnify Med Waste for them. Furthermore, the Policy states that “[w]here there is no coverage under this policy, there is no duty to defend.” Id. at 25; see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Dania Dist. Centre, 763 F.Supp.2d 1359, 1366 (S.D.Fla.2011) aff'd, 513 Fed.Appx. 890 (11th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Having found that both the TCPA claims and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duty to defend ends when it is apparent there is no potential for coverage (B) holding that there is a duty to defend if any of the complaints allegations fall within the risk covered by the policy (C) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (D) holding that where claims are cast wholly within policy exclusion there is no duty to defend (E) holding exclusion did not absolve insurer of duty to defend because no factual or legal basis currently exists for applying the exclusion
Output: (D)
not explicitly mentioning the prior art problem of having to store complete copies of the web site’s content on multiple servers, claim 6 contains provisions that refer to the solution to this problem: the preamble language indicating that the nodes (servers) contain different resources, and the steps relating to the delayed resource-binding aspect of the invention. The claim does not, however, make any reference to the bottleneck problem or to the bypass solution of that problem. Therefore, without explicit claim language relating to the bottleneck problem, we see no reason why the invention as recited in claim 6 must include the bypass feature described in the written description as a solution to that problem. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 298 F.3d 1817 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Alteon also relies on the “Detailed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the computer readable code claimed in claim 6 the product claim was a part or component of that invention (B) holding that claimed invention did not need to solve both problems in the prior art when claim included language addressing only one problem (C) recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention (D) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (E) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art
Output: (B)