niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
could have accrued was the point at which Minnesota Mutual required Parkhill to make out-of-pocket payments that were inconsistent with Russo’s alleged representations regarding the policy. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 875 F.Supp. 1342, 1352-53 (D.Minn.1995) (stating that statutory claims of consumer fraud and deceptive trade practice accrue at the time of the alleged statutory violation), aff'd, 87 F.3d 231 (1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 179, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997); Anderson v. Anderson, 293 Minn. 209, 197 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn.1972) (concluding that breach of fiduciary duty accrues when claimant becomes aware, or should become aware by reasonable diligence, of facts supporting the claim); Estate of Riedel v. Life Care Ret. Cmtys., 505 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Upon de novo review of the district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (B) recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (E) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract
Output: (B)
the matter as a “disbarment” proceeding in its motion for summary judgment. Further, the October 19, 2001 order granting summary judgment did not determine whether disbarment was the appropriate remedy for Wightman-Cervantes’ violations of the disciplinary rules. That issue was scheduled for a separate hearing, which the judgment of disbarment reflects occurred on January 11, 2002. Wightman-Cervantes has made no claim that he did not have fair notice of the January 11, 2002 hearing. Wightman-Cervantes does not appear to have moved for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing, nor did he prosecute his appeal therefrom. In light of all of those circumstances, we hold that he was not deprived of due process under the applicable federal standard. See Smith, 123 F.Supp.2d at 357 (<HOLDING>). IV We turn next to Wightman-Cervantes’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (B) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard (C) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (D) holding that attorney received due process where circuit court afforded attorney notice and opportunity to be heard before suspending him and later disbarring him (E) holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to boards recommendation demands of due process were satisfied
Output: (D)
the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”). The Court provided a nonexclusive, illustrative list of such “presumptively lawful” exceptions, including but not limited to “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” id. at 2816-17, but did not explain how lower courts were to identify other such “presumptively lawful” exceptions. More recently, the Court restated its belief in the existence of “presumptively lawful” regulations but again declined to provide any guidance to lower courts in our efforts to identify them. McDonald v. Chicago, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3047, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Post-Heller, and now, post-McDonald, lower 
 Holding statements: (A) holding second amendment right is incorporated against the states through fourteenth amendment (B) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the second amendment fully applies to state and local regulation through the fourteenth amendment (D) holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that the second amendment constrains state and local laws through its incorporation under the fourteenth amendment due process clause
Output: (E)
did not behave unreasonably in choosing to stop the vehicle. Therefore, we hold that the police officers had reasonable, articula-ble suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle had been involved in the Minni-Market robbery, and lawfully stopped the vehicle. II. We then turn to the issue of whether the subsequent search of the vehicle was proper. A protective search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the officer possesses a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). See also State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). If, while conducting a legitimate protective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant a rear seat passenger of a car for possession of marijuana based on the discovery of two marijuana seeds in the front of the vehicle (B) holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the juvenile a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by four persons was in possession of marijuana recovered from a crumpled piece of newspaper behind the drivers seat (C) holding that search of area under front passenger seat of a validly stopped vehicle was justified for officer safety (D) holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety (E) holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by three individuals was in constructive possession of marijuana found in white bag directly under the defendants seat
Output: (C)
above, the court finds that MCS’s summary judgment motion with regard to Mason’s hostile work environment claim is due to be granted. 2. Racial Discrimination Claim — Title VII and § 1981 (i) Statement of the Law Mason’s claims are brought pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and consist of disparate treatment claims alleging discriminatory pay seful discrimination. See General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982); Lincoln v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 697 F.2d 928, 935 n. 6 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, a showing of disparate impact through a neutral practice is insufficient to prove a § 1981 violation because proof of discriminatory intent is essential. See id. at 388, 102 S.Ct. 3141. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, only direct or circumstantial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the drafters of  1981 were not concerned with practices that were facially neutral (B) holding that the challenged practices were not consumeroriented under  349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents (C) holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding (D) holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed (E) holding that parents who brought suit challenging certain religiouslyrelated practices in public schools were without standing to challenge religious practices at baccalaureate programs because their children who were enrolled in elementary schools were not adversely affected by the challenged practice
Output: (A)
skill, etc.) is to be applied liberally, general business experience unrelated to antitrust economics does not render a witness qualified to offer an opinion on complicated antitrust issues such as defining relevant markets. (B) Reliability of the Opinion The second prerequisite to admissibility is the reliability test embodied in Rule 702 and recently developed through Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). In applying this rule, the Court acts as a gatekeeper to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (<HOLDING>). Even if a witness is qualified to offer an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding historical cellsite analysis testimony about how cell phones and towers connect clearly based on scientific technical or specialized knowledge within the scope of rule 702 quoting fed r evid 701c (B) holding that daubert sought only to clarify the standard for evaluating scientific knowledge under rule 702 (C) recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony (D) holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  (E) holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge
Output: (E)
position and whether the party would receive “an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. The doctrine is designed to prevent “intentional self-contradiction” and is improperly applied “when the former position was the result of inadvertence or mistake.” Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prod., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the court does no disservice to the important purposes underlying holding parties to judicial admissions by acknowledging that a response to an injunctive action is an evolving position, and the facts and legal positions should be taken in view of the emerging facts as they become known to the litigating parties. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is also necessary to note that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that courts should not use doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent evolution of arguments but should permit preliminary constructions made without full development of the record or issues to remain open to revision (D) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (E) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent
Output: (C)
in this regard, and it is certainly understandable that an employee, relying solely on the Zero-Tolerance Policy, might believe that she had preserved her rights so long as she notified her supervisor or manager about the harassment. However, the Zero-Tolerance Policy was not the sole information available to Johnson. On the page of the Workbook immediately preceding the Policy, there is a chart detailing the time limits for the various steps to be taken in filing an EEO complaint. Moreover, as the magistrate judge pointed out, there is no basis in law to suggest that an employee’s complaints to her supervisors satisfy the requirement that the aggrieved employee seek EEO counseling prior to filing a formal complaint or suing in court. Slip op. at 6-7. Cf. Leorna, 105 F.3d at 551 & n. 3 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also argues on appeal, as she did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no statutory requirement that a taxpayer exhaust administrative remedies before filing a complaint in the tax court (B) holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court (C) holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing (D) holding that filing of a verified complaint was similar to a policeman filing an arrest warrant and did not initiate judicial process (E) holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court
Output: (C)
supposedly memorialized in the report and other phases of the investigation. When the state court ordered a hearing to determine the report’s authenticity, Pratt promptly withdrew his motion to vacate. Although not pertinent to our ultimate conclusion, we accept the District Court’s factual finding that the police report was forged, that Pratt knew it to be forged, and that Pratt endeavored to mislead the courts. The District Court concluded that, despite the fraudulent nature of Pratt’s state court motion, it still tolled AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Tr. at 9.) Whether a state court motion based on a fraudulent document is “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) is a question of law that we review de novo. See Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1606, 152 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the threshold question of whether to adopt a doctrine is reviewed de novo (B) holding that whether the period during which a petitioner may pursue certiorari on state collateral motions tolls aedpas statute of limitations is a question of law to be reviewed de novo (C) holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo (D) holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo (E) holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo
Output: (B)
for the employee.” Id. at 1011. “However, employers can effectively disclaim any implied contractual obligation arising from such provisions.” Id. “‘The legal effect of such a disclaimer is, in the first instance, a question for the court to decide.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269 (D.C.1993)). A mere statement that the employee handbook is not a contract does not necessarily settle the matter. See Strass, 744 A.2d at 1012-14. Rather, for provisions relating to employee termination to be “unenforceable at law,” our cases have held that the employee handbook “must contain language clearly reserving the employer’s right to terminate at will.” Sisco v. GSA Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52, 55 (D.C.1997); See, e.g., Smith, 620 A.2d at 269 (<HOLDING>); see also Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowm, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties (B) holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will (C) holding that an employment contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at will (D) holding that a contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at will (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law
Output: (B)
of Mishawaka I, Church Park Apartments, Willow Creek Apartments, and Riverside Village Apartments—had twenty-year prepayment eligibility dates that occurred during the period that LIHPRHA was in effect. Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ claims accrued on each property’s twenty-year prepayment eligibility date. Plaintiffs, relying principally on Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed.Cir.1994), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) explained that “property owners cannot sue for a temporary taking until the regulatory process that began it has ended,” contend that their claims accrued in 1996 when the HOPE Act ended the regulatory process that began the temporary taking. Cf. Greenbrier v. United States, 75 Fed.Cl. 637, 642 (2007) (<HOLDING>). The court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing some dispute over the accrual date for temporary taking claims based on elihpalihprha mortgage payment restrictions (B) holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest  owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal (C) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due (D) holding erisas accrual date for limitations period controlled despite contrary language in policy (E) holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action
Output: (A)
discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity, Plaintiffs’ claim fails. 11 . The Court notes again that the challenged ordinances have presumably been enforced since November 2007 and that Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that the City has engaged in any discriminatory enforcement against Hispanic operators or workers. Similarly, Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that predecessor ordinances to those challenged here — in effect since 2000 — have ever been disparately enforced against Hispanics. 12 . Nov. Transcript [Doc. # 44], at 108. 13 . Plaintiffs' Response [Doc. # 47], ¶ 8. 14 . It must be noted that should the City choose to eliminate MFUs from the City altogether, it is entitled to do so. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 15 . Plaintiffs have offered virtually no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city (B) holding that a city could conclude that mobile vendors have a deleterious effect on the economy of the city and could accordingly substantially curtail their operation if not totally ban them (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) recognizing the holding in webb and stating operation of the plant for the city by a separate agency does not relieve the city from liability (E) holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight
Output: (B)
to § 1983 does not expressly authorize suits for declaratory relief against judges. Instead, it implicitly recognizes that declaratory relief is available in some circumstances, and then limits the avail ability of injunctive relief to circumstances in which declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate. The language is not an express authorization of declaratory relief, but simply a recognition of its availability or unavailability, depending on the circumstances, which the statute does not delineate. A review of the legislative history confirms this reading of the amendment. The Senate Report accompanying the amendment suggests that the amendment’s purpose was to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-43, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (<HOLDING>), not to alter the landscape of declaratory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees awards are available under  1988 for frivolous actions (B) recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs (C) holding that judicial immunity was not a bar to awards of attorneys fees and costs or to demands for injunctive relief (D) holding plaintiff had no right to recover attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because declarations requested no greater or different relief than claim for injunctive relief for constitutional violation (E) holding that the judicial immunity available to federal officers extends to section 1983 actions for declaratory and injunctive relief
Output: (C)
of the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act is reasonable and permissible. Congress’s objective in the Clean Water Act is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” through the elimination of pollutant discharge into those waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Through the Act, Congress designed a comprehensive regulatory scheme that recognized and preserved a primary role for the states in eliminating pollution from our waterways. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). The power of states under the Act is underlined by their ability to force the development of technology by setting stringent water quality standards that the EPA can enforce against upstream polluters. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(k), 1341, 1342, 1370; Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 106, 112 S.Ct. at 1056-57 (<HOLDING>). In the Clean Water Act, Congress provided the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (B) holding that the epas requirement that npdes dischargers must comply with downstream states water quality standards was a reasonable exercise of the agencys statutory discretion pursuant to  13411342 (C) holding that the epas explanation in five different documents of its interpretation of a specific statutory provision satisfied the apas basisandpurpose requirement (D) holding that with respect to judicialenforcement provision in clean water act limiting courts to enforcementj of existing standards and orders the authority to enforce an existing requirement is more than the authority to declare that the requirement exists and repeat that it must be followed (E) holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law
Output: (B)
seeking treatment elsewhere. Id. at 567, 167 S.E.2d at 567. In this case, Dr. Epstein indicated Clark was not a suitable candidate for treatment and referred him for pain management. That treatment was unsuccessful, however. Because Clark related the continuing symptoms to the treating physicians and was unable to obtain relief, he was justified in seeking treatment elsewhere. Although the more appropriate procedure would have been for Clark to seek an order from the full commission before engaging Dr. Greenberg for treatment and surgery, we find that under Ford the full commission was not outside its discretion in ordering the County to pay for the surgery and continuing treatment, once it determined the treatment was medically necessary. See Gattis, 353 S.C. at 111, 576 S.E.2d at 197 (<HOLDING>). We find no merit to the County’s argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed (B) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage (C) holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed (D) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee (E) holding that statutes and ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of constitutionality
Output: (B)
2052. B. Prejudice The prejudice prong requires Mr. Mooneyham to demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. A “‘reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.’ ” Heard v. Addison, 728 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir.2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)). Mr. Mooneyham asserted in the district court that he would have rejected the plea offer “but for counsel’s error.” R. vol. 1, at 267. This assertion is inadequate under the circumstances. See Heard, 728 F.3d at 1184 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different (B) holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial (C) holding that a  mere allegation that the petitioner would have insisted on trial but for his counsels errors  is ultimately insufficient to justify relief (D) holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial (E) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different
Output: (C)
to meet his burden of bringing up a proper record and, therefore, dismiss his appeal. Appeal dismissed. Glaze, J., would remand with directions to dismiss. 1 As of April 6,2006, L.B. had been living outside of the home for twelve months. 2 After reviewing the record before us, it appears that the circuit court assumed it was operating under the old rules at the hearing on June 15,2006; however, the final order was filed on July 13,2006, and the record on appeal was lodged September 25,2006. Therefore, the new court rules regarding dependency-neglect cases, which were adopted on July 1,2006, apply to the instant appeal. See In Re: Adoption of Rules 6-9 & 6-10 of the Supreme Court & Court of Appeals (Rulesfor Appeals in Dependency-Neglect Cases), 366 Ark. App’x 628 (2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, our conclusion would be the same 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial (B) holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal (C) holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional (D) holding that tjhese rules are effective july 12006 at which time appeals shall be commenced by filing the notice ofappeal and designation of record form 1 as set out in rule 69 (E) holding that in order for a defendant to remove a case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction there must be complete diversity of citizenship both at the time that the case is commenced and at the time that the notice of removal is filed
Output: (D)
those proceedings, which start the five year period for dormancy. For example, in Cyr, the Kansas Supreme Court found that even though the purpose of a contempt proceeding serves the same remedial purpose as an execution, garnishment, income withholding proceeding, and proceeding in aid of execution-namely to aid in collecting a favorable money judgment-contempt proceedings are not enumerated in § 60-2403, and therefore, do not operate to keep the judgment alive. 815 P.2d at 100. See also DeKalb Swine Breeders, Inc. v. Woolwine Supply Co., 248 Kan. 673, 809 P.2d 1223 (1991) (strictly construing the statutory language of § 60-2403 and holding that pending garnishment proceedings do not toll time period for dormancy purposes); First Nat’l Bank v. Harper, 161 Kan. 536, 169 P.2d 844 (1946) (<HOLDING>); St. Joseph Dev. Corp. v. Sequenzia, 25 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed (C) holding dormancy statutes should be strictly construed (D) holding that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subjected to their operation (E) holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused
Output: (C)
from California. A Michigan federal magistrate judge ordered his return to California. The following day, a criminal complaint based on the September 1995 heroin sales was filed against Jackson. Jackson was never served, did not appear, and the government subsequently dismissed the complaint without prejudice on November 20,1996. On January 6, 1998, Jackson was indicted for distribution of herom in the September 1995 transactions. Jackson eventually was returned to Michigan in November 1998, appeared before a magistrate judge on November 24, 1998, and was arraigned on December 1,1998. Trial was originally scheduled for March 25, 1999. On March 22, 1999, Jackson’s counsel, Stephen Rabaut, moved to dismiss the mdictment based on United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The district court dismissed the indictment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eastern michigans federal grand jury system violated equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (D) holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection
Output: (A)
to the section 924(c) jury instruction, we review it for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir.1996). Although the pre-Bailey instruction was given to the jury (because Bailey had no rovide a defendant, upon their motion, any statement or report made by a government witness that relates to the subject matter of the direct testimony of that witness. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The government need not provide the statement, however, until after the witness testifies on direct examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). 6 . The district court’s ruling was essentially a discovery matter, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fbi informants file contained no brady material not already provided to the defendant in a summary (B) holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation (C) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (D) holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name (E) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
Output: (A)
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court finds that it may hold Goldman Antonetti vicariously liable for the sanctionable conduct of its lawyers pursuant to § 1927. In addition to the reasons articulated in Brignoli, the individual attorneys were undoubtedly aided in their representation of the Esso Defendants by other attorneys employed by the Goldman Antonetti firm who despite their absence from the courtroom must nevertheless fulfill their ethical obligations to the bench and the bar. Where the record discloses sanctionable conduct as extensive as that presented in this matter, the court finds that the law firm must ultimately shoulder its share of responsibility; thus, sanctions should issue under § 1927. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corporation, et al., 144 F.R.D. 662, 669 (D.N.J. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Further, the sanctionable conduct here 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined (B) holding attorneys fees not recoverable under pre1980 version of section 1927 but remanding because they might be justified under the courts inherent power (C) recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions to the lawyers firm or employer (D) recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions (E) recognizing that sanctions under  1927 may be imposed against a law firm
Output: (E)
y. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2008). iy. discussion Before we can examine the merits of this appeal, we first must grapple with these antecedent questions: (1) what is the appropriate standard of review; (2) what record evidence should the district court properly have taken into account in rendering its decision; arid (3) who had the burden of proof. We address each in turn. A.The District Court Utilized the Correct Standard The parties do not dispute that the Plan and Policy confer discretion on John Hancock in adjudicating claims. Further, the Policy issued by John Hancock provides that the claimant for benefits must submit “Proof of Claim satisfactory to Us.” See Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Carr’s argument on appeal, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator (B) holding that similar language conferred discretion on the plan administrator (C) holding that because the spd at issue stated that it is made part of the group policy its terms were sufficient to find that the plan conferred discretion on the plan administrator (D) holding that language determined on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to the committee sufficiently granted plan administrator discretion (E) holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review
Output: (B)
interpretation of the law.’” Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d at 178 (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405). We do not read this provision from Ex parte Cranman and Ex parte Butts, nor do we read any of the progeny of those cases, as holding that an innocent misrepresentation by a state agent falls outside the protection that for so long has been provided by our law to state officials and employees while acting within reason and in good faith in the discharge of their responsibilities to the public. If something more were not required in order for conduct to fall within the exception relied upon by Lewis, that exception would “swallow” the whole of the general rule of immunity itself. Any misrepresentation is beyond the authority of a state agent. Indeed, any misstep by 6-07 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bayles v. Marriott, 816 So.2d 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution (B) holding the same for malicious prosecution (C) holding that a necessary element for malicious prosecution under virginia law is lack of probable cause (D) recognizing tennessee law requires the absence of probable cause to maintain a malicious prosecution claim (E) holding that a state agent was entitled to immunity notwithstanding the fact that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for malicious prosecution because malice for purposes of malicious prosecution can be based upon a lack of probable cause but such malice in law is not enough to satisfy the ex parte cranman exception for acts committed willfully maliciously fraudulently in bad faith beyond his or her authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law
Output: (E)
motions to compel. On March 1, 2012, the District Court (Judge Lono J. Lee) denied Ledbetter’s motions to compel and set trial for April 30, 2012. On April 27, 2012, Ledbetter filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial time limits set forth in HRPP Rule 48. Led-better claimed that 221 countable days had elapsed under HRPP Rule 48, which exceeded the six months permitted under the rule. On April 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Lono J. Lee) held a hearing on Ledbetter’s motion to dismiss. The State stated that it was not ready to proceed to trial because two police officers were sick, and it represented that the HRPP Rule 48 time period did not run until May 12, 2012. The parties argued about the appropriate HRPP Rule 48 computation. After heari h Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Hawai'i Supreme Court accepted Hern’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dismissal without prejudice is a final order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiffs case (B) holding that the dismissal of a criminal charge without prejudice under the federal speedy trial act was not a final decision that could be appealed (C) holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter (D) holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  (E) holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment
Output: (B)
with these statutory time limits in the filing of such administrative appeals is a jurisdictional requirement in such proceedings before the BAA. See Colorado Rocky Mountain School, Inc. v. Shriver, 689 P.2d 651 (Colo.App.1984). However, apart from the timely filing requirement, there are no other statutory jurisdictional requirements for the taking of such administrative appeals by taxpayers before the BAA. See §§ 39-2-125(l)(c) & 39-8-108(1); see also B.C., Ltd. v. Krinhop, 815 P.2d 1016 (Colo.App.1991) (noting that § 39-8-108(1) is silent as to the joinder of indispensable parties and holding that failure to join BOE as indispensable party within statutory time period was not a jurisdictional defect); BOP Industries, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 694 P.2d 337 (Colo.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). The requirement that the underlying BOE 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that completion and filing of baa petition forms by nonattorney officers of corporate taxpayers was not a jurisdictional defect (B) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (C) holding jurisdictional defect voids judgment when defect exposes such personal jurisdictional deficiencies as to violate due process (D) holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect (E) holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect
Output: (A)
and directly connected to the offense, under the facts of the case taken as a whole. For example, if the defendant engaged in several acts of mailing threatening letters to the same victim over a period of years (including acts that occurred prior to the offense), then for purposes of determining whether subseetion[ ](b)(l) ... [applies], the court shall consider only those prior acts of threatening the victim that have a substantial and direct connection to the offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A6.1(b)(l), cmt. n. 2. The pivotal inquiry when determining the appropriateness of a § 2A6.1(b)(l) enhancement is whether the defendant intended to carry out the threat, and the likelihood that he would actually do so. United States v. Gary, 18 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, essential to the determination 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 1 usc  1 does not apply except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (B) holding that any acts that evidence an intent to carry out the threats may form the basis for a  2a61bl enhancement (C) holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation (D) holding that unrebutted evidence can and should form the basis for summary judgment (E) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial
Output: (B)
that whether an investigation is criminal or not has no impact on whether a false statement made to a government official may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The district court sustained the government’s relevance objection as to Jimenez’s testimony that Agent Hays allegedly offered that she could return to Mexico without arrest. Jimenez contends that this testimony was relevant to show her state of mind. The government argues that this testimony was properly excluded as irrelevant. However, this evidence does appear to be admissible to impeach Agent Hays’s testimony that he made no such offer. Testimony that would tend to impeach the government’s main witness, if believed by the jury, is relevant and admissible. See United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). This error was not of constitutional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (B) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative (C) holding that the district court exceeded its discretion in excluding testimony proffered to discredit the key government witness (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony (E) holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony
Output: (C)
PPMs and had to sign off on them prior to their finalization. (Id., ¶¶ 50-51, 302-303). These allegations place Ellison in a position roughly equivalent to that of John Mayeron in Zazzali v. Swenson. Since scienter for RICO claims need only be averred generally, Ellison’s apparent absence from the weekly “cash meetings” discussed in Zazzali v. Swenson is not fatal to the Trustee’s claims. Since substantive RICO violations have been adequately pled, the claim for RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) survives as well. For these reasons, the Court recommends that the federal RICO claims (Counts 1, 2 F.Supp.2d 827, 855-56 (N.D.Iowa 2009) (same); Ling v. Deutsche Bank, 2005 WL 1244689 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2005) (same); cf., Howard v. America Online, 208 F.3d 741, 749 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the TIC investments are properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule (B) holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana (C) holding that the securities fraud exception in section 1964c is conductbased (D) holding that reliance is not a required element of securities fraud in a state enforcement action in idaho (E) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud
Output: (C)
of Rule 13.1(a) in 2002. See Tex.R.App. P. 13.1(a). However, the 2002 amendment followed substantial discussion of whether the duty should be mandatory or only upon request. See Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, 5398-5425 (Jan. 25, 2002). The Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure initially recommended that the rule be modified to make the duty operative only upon request. Id. 5398-99. However, the Supreme Court of Texas responded that it was “not inclined to change the Rule substantively.” Id. In the discussion that followed, it was pointed out that most trial court proceedings are not recorded, id. at 5403-04; section 52.046 of the Texas Government Code made the court reporter’s duty operative on Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); but see Nabelek, — S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing collateral attack on void order (B) holding annexation ordinance void (C) holding that the word void is not sufficient (D) holding rule 131a void (E) holding void judgment must be vacated
Output: (D)
the date a petition for modification is filed). The arrearage provision must be corrected and recalculated to include amounts only from August 22,1994. INTEREST The trial court specifically declined to impose interest on the $18,000 the husband was to pay the wife as equitable distribution of the WGL agreement and rejected the wife’s request for interest on the child support arrearage. On appeal, the wife contends interest should have been awarded on the support arrearage and on the $18,000 equitable distribution. We agree that interest should have been awarded on the child support arrear-age. See Nelson-Higdon v. Higdon, 680 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (failure to award prejudgment interest on accrued support arrearage is error); Romans v. Romans, 611 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we remand for imposition of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alimony obligation was discharged by social security payments received by the wife (B) holding that it is proper to award prejudgment interest at the legal rate from the date the monies were due under the contract (C) holding that because divorce proceedings are civil actions resulting in an order for judgment postjudgment interest was due under the statute on withheld alimony payments (D) holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home (E) holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due
Output: (E)