niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
two theories in support of his contention: a “temporary injury” theory and a “continuing contract” theory. First, Cline argues the gas company’s responses to his requests for free gas— namely its assertions he was required to pay a connection fee or deposit in order to receive the gas—constituted a series of temporary injuries, each of which gave rise to a new and independent cause of action. Kansas courts have recognized a temporary injury theory in nuisance actions, where a plaintiff suffers temporary, occasional, or recurrent physical damage to his real property. See, e.g., Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 270 Kan. 468, 15 P.3d 338, 346 (2000) (allowing independent causes of action for periodic episodes of flooding); Henderson v. Talbott, 175 Kan. 615, 266 P.2d 273, 281 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Cline has cited no case, however, in which a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (B) holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action (C) holding that although money had and received and unjust enrichment were pled as separate causes of action they are really the same cause of action (D) holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries (E) recognizing separate causes of action for injuries to plaintiffs land caused by occasional flooding
Output: (E)
of this state that when ... a business homestead is conveyed to a corporation ... the property is no longer the homestead of the grantors, even though they may continue to occupy it.”); Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1947, writ refd) ("One can not have a homestead interest in property the title to which is in neither spouse nor in the community.”); Williams v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust Co., 104 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1937, writ ref'd) ("After the Williams had conveyed this tract to the Townsite Company, it ceased to be their homestead, and ... the fact that they continued to use the land at the sufferance of the grantees[ ] did not change the situation.”); Hampton v. Gilliland, 23 Tex.Civ.App. 87, 56 S.W. 572, 573-74 (1900, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See, e.g., Franklin v. Woods, 598 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that son who lived on land entirely by virtue of his mothers consent owned no estate to which the homestead right could attach and that the homestead right cannot be based on so precarious a tenure as the sons occupancy at the will of his mother (B) holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title (C) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (D) holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future (E) holding that son had no homestead interest in property even though he resided upon it with his fathers consent because son had neither title nor a present right to possess land nor right to demand partition from father who was his cotenant
Output: (A)
that pursuit of the theory would have opened the door to the fact that Overton was a suspect in many unsolved crimes, which Overton’s counsel attempted to avoid as evidenced by the motion in limine they filed. The claim was facially invalid. Similarly, other paragraphs which assert that counsel improperly failed to impeach Detective Visco with Overton’s statements from the Rachelle Surrett homicide investigation were also properly summarily denied because this would have opened the door to the fact that Overton was a suspect in the unsolved crime involving Surrett. Denial of Claim III, which alleged that the State committed a Brady violation by not providing notes from police profiler brainstorming sessions and documentation of th that this type of claim is without merit. See id. (<HOLDING>). Claim IX, which alleged ineffectiveness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors is without merit when the goal is to be able to conduct fishing expedition interviews with jurors after they return a guilty verdict (B) holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias (C) holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial (D) holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when the jurors saw him being searched where the jurors themselves had been frisked (E) holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal
Output: (A)
that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble’s intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted
Output: (E)
Plaintiff did not meet the notice requirements of the CFRA and the FMLA. Plaintiff did not notify Defendant in advance that Plaintiff would be absent from March 31, 2014 through April 3, 2014. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo., Exhs. Vol. II. Additionally, Plaintiff did not call in sick or ask someone to call Defendant on his behalf on any of those four days of absence, even though Plaintiff made 26 phone calls to individuals or entities other than McCale or Defendant. Alejandro Depo., Vol. II at 338:2-339:1, 339:9-340:8; Alejandro Depo,, Exhs. Vol. II. Thus, unlike in Avila, upon which Plaintiff relies, Plaintiff did not call in sick during his absence from March 31, 2014 through April 3,2014. See Avila, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1258, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, two weeks prior to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party (B) holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state (C) holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income (D) holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice (E) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights
Output: (D)
15 & n. 9. Here, the District offers only speculation and senescent stories. Lastly, the statute was premised on the notion that “good government requires greater transparency” — a “value judgment” that was not “susceptible to empirical evidence.” Id. at 16. Here, the District’s core premise is that tour guides who have not passed a multiple-choice exam will harm the tourism economy. See Appellee’s Br. at 19. But this is exactly the sort of “economic” harm we distinguished in Taylor as being “susceptible to empirical evidence.” See Taylor, 582 F.3d at 16. Indeed, the Supreme Court has demanded evidence for the existence of harms in other contexts, too. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 169, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771, 113 S.Ct. 1792 
 Holding statements: (A) holding special master did not err in rejecting a theory of causation where there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the proposed mechanism was at work in the petitioners case (B) holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process (C) holding that in the postaward context a disappointed bidder lacked standing to bring a protest action when its submission was nonresponsive to the solicitation (D) holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence (E) holding an ordinance regulating doortodoor solicitation unconstitutional in part because there was no evidence of a special crime problem related to doortodoor solicitation in the record
Output: (E)
was public safety. McCullen v. Coakley, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2531, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014) (noting violation of statute depended not “on- what they say,” but “simply on where they say it”). The Fifth Circuit has likewise found regulations content-neutral, even where the regulation governed a specific topic of speech. See Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir.2014), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1403, 191 L.Ed.2d 361 (2015) (upholding regula tion requiring license for a person to charge for tours to City’s points of interest and historic sites, “for the purpose of explaining, describing or generally relating the facts of importance thereto,” finding regulation “has no effect whatsoever on the content of what tour guides say”); Asgeirsson, 696 F.3d at 461 (<HOLDING>). The ITAR, on its face, clearly regulates 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 610 rsmo which requires public governmental bodies to open their meetings to the public when conducting the peoples business does not violate the home rule law because it does not regulate powers duties or compensation (B) holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government (C) recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way (D) holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy (E) holding while florida courts have recognized that notice of public meetings is mandatory the preparation of an agenda that reflects every issue that may come up at a properly noticed meeting is not and notice need not be given of every potential deviation from a previously announced agenda the public has the right to attend open meetings but no authority to interfere with the decisionmaking process
Output: (B)
*3 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 16, 2005) (same). This court finds that transfers of Title VII actions are thus governed by the well-settled public and private factors relevant to section 1404(a) analysis. See Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843. However, plaintiffs are correct that the special venue provision must influence the contours of section 1404(a) analysis. The factors expressly identified as a basis for venue under Title VII — the location of the discriminatory act or decision, the location of relevant employment records, and the location where a plaintiff would have worked but for the unlawful employment practice — should therefore be key factors in analyzing the “interests of justice” prong of section 1404(a) analysis. See In re Horseshoe Entertainment, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, a plaintiffs choice of forum is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii (B) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (C) holding that location of relevant employment records should be given significance because it was expressly stated in the title vii venue provision (D) holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii (E) recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap
Output: (C)
courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439, 77 S.Ct. 408, 412, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401, 91 S.Ct. 668, 672, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (deploring “traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1715, 1722, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (“The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars”); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620-2621, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Neville, 459 U.S. at 558-59, 102 S.Ct. at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the public interest exception (B) holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court (D) recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety (E) holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest
Output: (D)
of Fact No. 16]. Because Swayne held that the proceeds of an insurance policy take the place of the property loss, the settlement proceeds paid by TWIA therefore take the place of the property loss associated with the Debtor’s homestead. Moreover, because a court may not limit the value of such proceeds under the homestead exemption, the Debt- or may exempt the entire settlement amount of $73,000.00. Nor does the fact that the State Court Lawsuit pleaded several causes of action change this conclusion. Texas case law discusses apportionment of settlement proceeds, holding that debtors do not have the initial burden of breaking down these awards into exempt proceeds and nonexempt proceeds for other state law claims. See, e.g., In re Harrington, 306 B.R. 172, 183 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>)- In In re Harrington, the Chapter 7 trustee 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the trustee objector cannot escape the burden of proof assigned to an objecting party under rule 4003c because the exemption claim relates to a settlement agreement which fails to allocate damages into specif ic categories of recovery (D) holding that the burden of proof is initially placed upon the objector with respect to any objections he files and  this burden does not shift to the debtor merely upon a showing that the debtor has failed to allocate the personal injury settlement into its various component parts (E) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt
Output: (C)
(2004). 4 . Ind.Code § 35-49-3-3(a)(3) was amended effective July 1, 2006, to read: “sells, rents, or displays for sale or rent to any person matter that is harmful to minors within five hundred (500) feet of the nearest property line of a school or church.” 5 . The dissent also argues that Zitlaw did not engage in a “performance,” which is defined as "any play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition or presentation, whether pictured, animated, or live, performed before an audience of one (1) or more persons.” Ind.Code § 35-49-1-7. However, Zitlaw did not make this argument in his Appellant’s Brief. Consequently, this basis for reversing the trial court's denial of Zitlaw's motion to dismiss has been waived. See, e.g., Chupp v. State, 830 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Waiver notwithstanding, a finding that Zitlaw 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (B) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief (C) holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief (D) holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief (E) holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief
Output: (C)
Judge.” See Daniels v. Yancey, 175 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (“[0]ne party may not use another party’s objection to preserve an error where the record does not reflect a timely expression of an intent to adopt the objection.”). In construing the nature of SOS Alliance’s objection, we consider only the objection actually made to the trial court. See Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630, 639-40 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“To have preserved error, a party’s argument on appeal must comport with its argument in the trial court.”). Moreover, SOS Alliance waived its statutory objection to the assignment of Judge Bender by not asserting the claimed error on any basis by a point on appeal. See Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist., 632 S.W.2d at 148-49 (<HOLDING>). On its direct appeal of the 2004 judgment, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure (B) holding that statutory grounds for recusal can be waived both by failing to object and by failing to assert error on appeal (C) holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court (D) holding that government waived right to challenge alleged error of district court in failing to impose statutory minimum sentence under  841b1b by failing to object to sentence announced by district court (E) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal
Output: (B)
satisfy the requirements of Due Process. See, Rule 7(c)(1), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (stating that an Indictment “shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged”). Id. The Government disagrees with the Defendant’s contention that the Indictment is unconstitutionally vague, and argues that the Defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements of Section 2250(a)(2)(A), since he is a sex offender by reason of a conviction under Federal law, as defined by SORNA, see, Complaint, Docket No. 1, Affidavit of Moran, at ¶ 7, and that that allegation, alone, provides the Defendant with adequate notice of the crime with which he is being charged. See, United States v. Templeton, 2007 WL 445481 at *3 (W.D.Okla., February 7, 2007)(<HOLDING>). In the alternative, the Government argues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment was sufficient where it failed to specify which subsection of sorna defendants conviction allegedly meets (B) holding that an indictment under  922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient (C) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (D) holding that evidence of an eighteenyearold conviction was admissible to show intent because that conviction involved exactly the same crime as was charged in the indictment (E) holding that an indictment which cites the pertinent statute and uses its language will be sufficient to support a conviction
Output: (A)
Forrester contends that the question of whether ecstasy meets the definition of a Schedule I substance is a factual determination that must be left to the jury. In both Apprendi and Buckland, the judges made improper findings of conduct (sale of a particular drug and engaging in hate speech, respectively) by a preponderance of the evidence. The respective courts held that those findings should have been made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Buckland, 289 F.3d at 563; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, both cases explicitly confirm Congress’s ability to “ramp up the punishment for controlled substance offenders based on the type and amount of illegal substance involved in the crime.” Buck-land, 289 F.3d at 568; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, under Buckland and Apprendi, the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an attorneys right to conduct the clients case with a certain degree of privacy (B) holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states (C) recognizing congresss ability to choose the degree of culpability  associate with particular factually distinct conduct (D) recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another (E) recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations
Output: (C)
As mentioned above, he would first fill the jury box, then excuse jurors for cause, and replace them with jurors next in line. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 26-27. This method results in spectator benches being emptied sequentially from front to back. Thus had spectators been allowed back into the courtroom, they could have been seated in empty benches in front of the remaining venirepersons, rather than “among” the venire. Spectators might, therefore, have filled those benches, bench by bench, sitting no closer to the venire than the bench occupied by Mrs. Bucci, Mrs. Keefe, and Mrs. Jordan. Still, admitting spectators bench by bench as benches became vacant would greatly have increased the risk of inappropriate interaction between the venire and the spectators. Moreover A.2d 968 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Davidson v. State, 591 So.2d 901, 902-903 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was unreasonable for officers to break down doors that they already knew were open (B) holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him (C) holding that no closure occurred where judge locked doors to ensure jury would not be distracted (D) holding that it would not be unreasonable to find condition in hotel lunchroom unsafe because invitee would be distracted (E) holding that no closure occurred when judge did not allow anyone to enter or leave courtroom during jury instructions
Output: (C)
The appellant’s first point relied on is also deficient in that it does not comply with Rule 84.04(d)(5) inasmuch as the authority cited by the appellant in support of the claim raised relates only to our standard of review and the manner in which we are to interpret a statute. Rule 84.04(d)(5) provides: In support of each “Point Relied On,” and immediately following the statement of the Point, the appellant or relator shall cite all authorities upon which the argument rests. If more than three authorities are cited, the three authorities on which the appellant, relator, or petitioner principally relies shall be cited first. The appellant does not, as required by the rule, provide any authority for his claimed interpretation of the implicated statutes. See Coleman, 969 S.W.2d at 274 (<HOLDING>). If no such citations exist because this is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (B) holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review (C) holding that an appellate court may not review errors that have not been assigned by a party or a point of error (D) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (E) holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority
Output: (E)
have a common interest or duty. Chambers v. Am. Trans. Air, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Application of the privilege is a question of law. Id. If the privilege'applies, it can be disregarded upon a showing by the plaintiff of “abuse,” which is demonstrated in one of three ways: (1) the communicator was primarily motivated by ill will; (2) the communication was published excessively; or (3) the communication was made without belief or grounds for belief'in its truth. Schrader v. Eli Lilly and Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 262 (Ind.1994). [41] The Defendants argue that they have an interest in communicating with parents, the local media, and other community members about the conduct of its coaches. See Gatto v. St. Richard Sch., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 914, 925-26 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the Defendants maintain that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a subset of the common interest privilege as parents and schools have a corresponding interest in the free flow of information about administrators and faculty members (B) recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection (C) recognizing privilege (D) holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard (E) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children
Output: (A)
method (under § 3663) in favor of an incorrect method (under § 1593), the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that the district court’s error was “plain,” because the statutes are clear and because the government openly admitted that its proposed methodology derived from the wrong restitution statute. See United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th Cir.2009) (“An error is plain when it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ under the law.”). Finally, we hold that the error affected Defendants’ substantial rights and affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The government did not present evidence — and the district court did not make findings — of the victims’ actual losses, as required by § 3663. See Bussell, 504 F.3d at 964 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 81 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction (D) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum
Output: (D)
in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. The Declaratory Judgment Statute is applicable only where there is a present actual controversy, and all interested persons are made parties, and only where justiciable issues are presented. It does not undertake to decide the legal effect of laws upon a state of facts which is future, contingent or uncertain. A declaratory judgment will not be granted unless the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff is present, not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events; the prejudice to his position must be actual and genuine and not merely possible, speculative, contingent, or remote. Id. (quoting Anderson on Declaratory Judgments (2d. ed. 1951)); see also Cummings v. City of Fayetteville, 294 Ark. 151, 741 S.W.2d 638 (1987) (<HOLDING>). In the case brought to us for decision, I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case (B) holding that although a state may be free to develop its own laws of search and seizure to meet law enforcement needs such laws may not authorize police conduct which trenches upon fourth amendment rights regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that there was no justiciable controversy and that while many laws may be easily subject to challenge we may only review such matters in a proper law suit (E) holding that the summoned party may in an enforcement proceeding challenge the  7609f2 determination that there is a reasonable basis for believing there may be a violation of a revenue law
Output: (D)
with Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex.1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (arguing that officers’ decision to pursue at high speed was “an exercise of discretion”) and Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (noting, without discussion, that county constable was protected by immunity when he stopped a vehicle whose taillights were not operating) and Edgar v. Plummer, 845 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) (“The enforcement of traffic regulations by peace officers involves the exercise of their discretion.”). In other contexts, our courts have held that police officers are exercising discretion while performing their duties. See, e.g., Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect (B) holding testimony of officer explaining how officer came to suspect appellant was not objectionable as hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show why the officer got an arrest warrant for and arrested appellant (C) holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act (D) holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest (E) holding that there was no arrest when suspect was moved from his own truck to a police car
Output: (A)
express an intention different from its clear meaning.”). No Exclusion from SPMS in Business Regulation § 11-207 The administrative law judge based his opposite conclusion on several factors. First, he compared BR §§ 11-206 and 11-207. He concluded that the “staff’ authorized by § 11-206, who were expressly included in the SPMS, were to be contrasted with the “additional employees,” who were not so included. We must reject this reasoning. SPP § 6-302 does not require that executive branch state employees be specifically included in the SPMS. The presumption is that they are so included. Rather, it requires that employees not to be included in the SPMS be explicitly excluded from the system. Cf. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 72 Md.App. 578, 586-87, 531 A.2d 1298 (1987) (<HOLDING>), rev’d, on other grounds, 314 Md. 46, 548 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (B) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment (C) holding that under the old state employment merit system all employees of the state are deemed classified unless they have been specifically exempted form that category (D) holding that the statute plainly exempted  all employees who were covered by the flsa before january 1 2007 (E) holding that antecedent debts will not be deemed within a dragnet clause unless they are specifically identified in the instrument
Output: (C)
487 U.S. 1, 11-14, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (considering a facial challenge to the New York Human Rights Law, which forbade discrimination based on race and other factors). And in Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of a Los Angeles sign ordinance. Noting that the challenging party had not argued that the ordinance could never be validly applied, the Court characterized the attack on the ordinance as “a challenge to the ordinance as applied to [appellees’] activities” and limited its analysis to whether the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied. 466 U.S. at 802, 104 S.Ct. 2118. This court has also found laws unconstitutional as applied, but not facially. See, e.g., State v. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>); McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff (B) holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied (C) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (D) holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause
Output: (B)
the arrearage, inability to pay must be relevant to reinstatement. Even though § 798(c) does not explicitly designate the inability to pay as a grounds for license reinstatement, we will “not presume that the legislature intended absurd or irrational consequences.” In re Judy Ann’s Inc., 143 Vt. 228, 232, 464 A.2d 752, 755 (1983). ¶ 11. Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative scheme for the enforcement of support. Although the payment of child support is a serious obligation, the state enforces payment orders against noneompliants through various civil rather than criminal sanctions. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 603 (authorizing civil contempt orders), 785 (withholding wages), 791 (issuing liens), 793 (affecting credit reports), 795 (revoking licenses or governmental contracts), 796 (<HOLDING>). To avoid qualifying as punishment, a civil 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may not enter an injunction freezing assets in action for damages where there is no equitable interest in frozen assets (B) holding assets in escrow (C) holding that a limited partner does not have an interest right or title in the assets of the partnership (D) holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement (E) holding that insurance premiums deducted from employees paychecks and commingled with corporate assets were plan assets in accordance with department of labor regulations see 29 cfr  25103102a and therefore that president of employer corporation acted as a fiduciary when he failed to separate those assets for payment to the funds and instead used them to pay company creditors
Output: (B)
that the plain terms of the plan indicate that a “lack of work” may arise from corporate reorganization or something analogous, as perhaps is the case for those ANSI employees who were not offered employment with Cargill. However, there is no lack of work as to these plaintiffs under any common sense understanding of the phrase. B. Economic Reduction in the Workforce The plain meaning of “economic reduction in the workforce” in this particular context does not encompass a transfer of position to a successor corporation where the employees faced no threat of unemployment. The phrase “reduction in workforce” is most commonly understood to cover situations in which a poor economic outlook for an employer forces layoffs. See Lesman v. Ransburg Corp., 719 F.Supp. 619, 621 (W.D.Mich.1989) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 911 F.2d 732 (6th Cir.1990); Allen v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that severance pay received postseparation was not marital property as the condition to receive the pay was related to the sale of the corporation not to husbands work during his marriage (B) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (C) holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay (D) holding calculating severance benefits based upon age years of service and pay required no discretion (E) holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract
Output: (C)
Commission argues that the decision in In re Farmers Frozen Food Co., 221 F.Supp. 385 (N.D.Cal.1963), is factually similar to the matter at bar, and should be followed to find that its assessment is a “tax.” In Farmers Frozen Food, decided under the Bankruptcy Act (“Act”), the court confronted the issue of whether an assessment levied pursuant to a marketing order under the California Marketing Act of 1937 was a “tax” so as to be afforded priority status. As with assessment funds collected by the Commission, monies collected under the marketing order were to be used for promotional and research activities benefiting another California commodity industry. In Farmers Frozen Food, the court determined that the marketing order assessment constituted a “tax” aft 2-03 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, interpretation of the public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable (B) holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code (C) holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes (D) holding that taxes are not private property that can be physically taken by the government (E) holding that background check assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code
Output: (E)
The defendants, contend that, assuming their conduct was unlawful and negligent as charged in the complaint, it was nevertheless not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. But a tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] See also, J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 352, 714 A.2d 924 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 465-66, 545 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them (B) holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims (C) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse
Output: (A)
therefore properly denied Chen’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief insofar as they were based on his sexual orientation. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Chen’s application for CAT relief based on his claim of a likelihood of torture for having departed China illegally. Notwithstanding generalized evidence indicating that torture occurs in Chinese prisons, an applicant cannot demonstrate that he is more likely than not to be tortured “based solely on the fact that []he is part of the large class of persons who have left China illegally.” Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005); see also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Chen provided no basis for the agency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pain and suffering does not survive the death of the injured (B) holding that beyond evidence of inhumane prison conditions a cat claimant must provide some evidence that the authorities act with the specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering on those detained (C) recognizing as an element of pain and suffering (D) holding that detention in squalid overcrowded cells without adequate food water sanitation exercise or medical treatment in haitian prisons does not constitute torture under cat because there is no evidence that haitian authorities have the specific intent to inflict pain or suffering (E) recognizing as separate from pain and suffering
Output: (B)
after being placed on the ground, so there was no reason for Officer Frost to place his knee on her back. Pl.’s Opp. at 13. In light of Officer Frost’s prior experience with plaintiffs attempts to escape custody, it was reasonable for him to believe that he needed to use some other part of his body to hold her down while using both of his hands to handcuff her. In that context, pushing his knee over her left arm and onto her back was not an excessive use of force. It is true that at the time Officer Frost placed his knee on plaintiffs back, she was already being restrained by two other officers. But that does not make Officer Frost’s actions unreasonable because plaintiff had managed to escape the grip of multiple officers earlier during the encounter. See Scott, 101 F.3d at 759-60 (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals has upheld the use of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers knocking the plaintiff to the ground rolling him over and pinning him with their knees on his neck back and legs so he could be handcuffed did not constitute excessive force and noting that the plaintiffs offer to return to custody after his escape attempt did not eliminate the need for force (B) holding that purposely tripping the plaintiff while he was being escorted in handcuffs  causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face could be excessive force (C) holding that where an officer grabbed plaintiffs arm twisted it around plaintiffs back jerking it up high to the shoulder and then handcuffing the plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees screaming did not constitute excessive force (D) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (E) holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable
Output: (A)
an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court. 1 . Petitioner Hallock did not seek review from the Kansas appellate courts, proceeding instead directly to the United States District Court. Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his available state court remedies and, therefore, his appeal must be dismissed. AEDPA amended the exhaustion provisions of § 2254. While § 2254(b)(1) retains the pre-AEDPA requirement that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the petitioner has exhausted available state court remedies, § 2254(b)(2) specifically provides that a claim may be denied on the merits notwithstanding a failure to exhaust. See Goodwin v. Oklahoma, 923 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Kansas Supreme Court already decided the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion (B) recognizing the futility exception to the tribal exhaustion rule (C) recognizing doctrine (D) recognizing exception to the exhaustion doctrine where the states highest court has explicitly and recently addressed the precise issue advanced by the petitioner (E) holding that presentation of an untimely petition to the states highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement
Output: (D)