niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144,129 S.Ct. 695. Furthermore, the officials in this case, unlike those in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), did not take “every step that could reasonably be expected of them.” Id. at 989, 104 S.Ct. 3424. When the officials here rang the doorbells that morning at 2424 Cambreleng Avenue, and discovered that Voustianiouk lived on the second floor instead of the first, they could have obtained a warrant to search Voustianiouk’s second-floor home instead of deciding, without any judicial oversight, that the evidence in their possession provided probable cause to do so. Cf. Velardi, 40 F.3d at 576 (<HOLDING>). There is no question that the officers in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene (B) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity when they conducted an entry and emergency sweep of the third house on a particular road even though the warrant specified the fourth house while noting that the warrant specifically mentioned the name of the houses occupant (C) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house (D) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (E) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises
Output: (C)
leadership enhancement, arguing on appeal that he performed only the functions of a street-level drug dealer, the lowest rung on a drug-conspiracy ladder. Erasto challenges the district court’s application of the section 3B1.4 use of a minor enhancement, arguing on appeal that A.G.’s presence at a drug deal conducted by he and Pedro was not legally sufficient to support that enhancement. Consistent with our circuit precedent in Savillon-Matute and Hargrove, rather than review the merits of each of these challenges, we may proceed directly to an “assumed error harmlessness inquiry.” Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 162. In Savillon-Matute, we held that harmless error review applies to a district court’s procedural sentencing errors made during its Guidelines calculation. 636 F.3d at 123-24 (<HOLDING>). A Guidelines error is considered harmless if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny quoting turner broad sys inc v fed commcn commn 512 us 622 642 114 sct 2445 129 led2d 497 1994 plurality opinion (B) holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review (C) holding that procedural errors at sentencing  are routinely subject to harmlessness review  quoting puckett v united states 556 us 129 141 129 sct 1423 173 led2d 266 2009 (D) holding on the basis of melendezdiaz v massachusetts  us  129 sct 2527 174 led2d 314 2009 that a certificate of norecord is testimonial (E) recognizing that references to and descriptions of the jurys verdict as advisory as a recommendation and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are permissible under romano v oklahoma 512 us 1 114 sct 2004 129 led2d 1 1994
Output: (C)
the ammunition charge from the gun charges. II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Unregistered Firearm Count Under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it is unlawful for any person to “possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” For purposes of this provision, the definition of “firearm” includes a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length or with an overall length less than twenty-six inches. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). In order to obtain a conviction under § 5861(d), the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew the barrel’s length was less than eighteen inches or the overall length was less than twenty-six inches. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (D) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (E) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time
Output: (A)
underlying payment in income, it effectively changed India Music’s treatment of a material item. We agree. From 1998 to 2004, India Music accounted for the accounts payable owed to HRI on an accrual basis, deducting the payments from income each year as they became fixed. But since HRI was a cash-basis taxpayer, it could not include the payments from India Music in its income until it received those payments. See Arnwine v. Comm’r, 696 F.2d 1102, 1111 ( nge in accounting method for the purposes of § 481 because it forced India Music to “com-put[e]” its taxable income for the tax year 2004 “under a method of accounting different from the method under which [India Music’s] taxable income for the preceding taxable year was computed.” 26 U.S.C. § 481; see Graff Chevrolet, 343 F.2d at 572 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that the language of §§ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a change in the method of compensation met the consideration requirement of contract formation (B) holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony (C) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (D) holding that  481 authorizes necessary adjustments to income in the year of change whether the change in method of accounting was initiated by the taxpayer or the commissioner (E) holding that tolling inappropriate where data supplied to fund reflected change in accounting method which was central to dispute
Output: (D)
the district judge’s independent review of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. But w ced, the efficient administration of justice is. Third, Hall asserts we should at least exercise plain error review of his issues. Hall refers to the Supreme Court’s directive in Thomas that default may be excused by a court of appeals “in the interests of justice,” 474 U.S. at 155, 106 S.Ct. 466, arguing the exception should be equated with plain error. Hall asserts other circuits have done so, but he does not mention this circuit’s precedent, e.g., United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.1995) (“When a right is waived, it is not renewable, even for plain error.”) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Nor does Hall explain why 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to object timely to a magistrates report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrates decision (B) holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to   636b1  has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc  1292b  2000  (C) holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court (D) holding the failure to file objections to a magistrates report issued pursuant to 28 usc  636b1 waives the right to appeal all issues both factual and legal (E) holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report
Output: (D)
not on the requirement for “candidates [to] show a ‘modicum’ of support prior to their placement on the ballot.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Instead, they specifically challenge as undue and excessive the percentage of support they are required to show under the statute. Id. (“[T]he issue in this case is whether the modicum of support that Section 16.1-11-36 actually requires— more than 15 percent of the eligible pool for some candidates — is constitutional.”). The Supreme Court often focuses on the amount of support a candidate is required to show when determining whether a ballot access restriction is constitutional, specifically considering the percentage of signatures or votes required. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 190, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 774-75, 783, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state may not compel political parties to allow nonmembers to vote in primary elections (B) holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections (C) holding as constitutional a 1 vote requirement in a blanket primary (D) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (E) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal
Output: (C)
of Appeals found that the definition of “take” in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was restricted to the sort of conduct engaged in by hunters and poachers. While acknowledging that some courts have held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act reaches direct, though unintended, bird poison ing from toxic substances, the appellate court ruled that habitat destruction, leading indirectly to bird deaths, does not amount to a “taking” of a migratory bird within the meaning of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id. at 303. Other courts have recognized that lawful commercial activity, such as logging, that is unrelated to hunting or poaching and not directed at birds does not constitute a crime under the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act. See, Curry v. U.S. Forest Sew., 988 F.Supp. 541 (W-D.Pa.1997) (<HOLDING>); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Sew., 927 F.Supp. 1559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the delivery of the deed following a foreclosure sale was a ministerial act that was not prohibited by the automatic stay (B) holding that the forest service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to verify its model with ontheground data (C) holding in suit under the administrative procedure act challenging us forest service approval of forest development plan that injury to aesthetic conservational or recreational interests is sufficient to confer standing (D) holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment (E) holding that migratory bird treaty act was not the proper statutory basis upon which to contest a forest service timber sale and concluding that the loss of migratory birds as a result of logging operations did not constitute a taking or killing prohibited by the migratory bird treaty act
Output: (E)
if a defendant’s will has been overborne, we must assess “the conduct of the law enforcement officials in creating pressure and the suspect’s capacity to resist that pressure”; “[t]he defendant’s personal characteristics as well as his prior experience with the criminal justice system are factors to be considered in determining [the defendant’s] susceptibility to police pressures.” Jackson, 562 So.2d at 1380-81 (citations omitted). The evidence does not indicate that McLeod was threatened with physical intimidation or psychological pressure. The evidence does not show that the interrogation lasted for an extraordinary length of time or that he was deprived of either food or sleep for an unexplained and prolonged time. See, e.g., Pardue v. State, 695 So.2d 199 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Further, the evidence does not show that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a confession obtained by interrogating the defendant for approximately 78 hours was involuntary (B) holding involuntary a confession obtained by prison psychologist because the defendant reasonably understood that his communications would remain confidential (C) holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession (D) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (E) holding that impermissible police procedures rendered confession involuntary
Output: (A)
878 F.2d at 874; Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553-54 (5th Cir.1988); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-93 (5th Cir.1986); and Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1480-82 (5th Cir.1985). 115 . See Gaines v. Davis, 928 F.2d at 707; Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d at 874 n. 5; Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d at 1559-60; and Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-09 (5th Cir.1987). 116 . See Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Department, 958 F.2d at 621; and Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d at 793. 117 . Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Department, 958 F.2d at 620; Nieto v. San Perlita ISD, 894 F.2d 174, 177-78 (5th Cir.1990); and Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d at 791. See also Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994); and James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir.1990), (<HOLDING>). 118 . Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d at 509; 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss (B) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (C) holding that questions regarding qualified immunity are resolved on the face of the pleadings and with limited resort to pretrial discovery (D) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted
Output: (C)
cap in determining the amount of benefits another person was able to receive. Id. at 615. Although in Parisi, the child was suffering from the technical entitlement, the case stands for the proposition that a technical entitlement of zero should be counted as zero when computing family máximums. Considering that the purpose of the family maximum is to set a maximum that can be given from one wage earner’s account, Parisi complies with this purpose. IV. BY CITING PARISI, HAS PLAINTIFF RAISED A NEW ISSUE THAT IS NOT PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW? “[I]f petitioner wishes to preserve an issue for appeal, he must first raise it in the proper administrative forum_” Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1980); See Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir.1962) (<HOLDING>). Yet, in Tejeda-Mata the court held this “in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that failure to observe the required process deprives the court of jurisdiction (B) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for review because the aliens did not appeal the ijs denial of their motion to reopen to the board resulting in failure to exhaust their administrative remedies (C) holding that partys failure to file a timely internal administrative appeal as required by regulations of the department of agriculture constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and precluded judicial action (D) recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal (E) holding that failure to take available appeal to board of immigration appeals constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies and deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review
Output: (E)
For awhile, K.M.B. and Kristin also lived with Kristin’s mother, Jan Stroud. Not only did Kristin’s homes suffer from these conditions, but friends also testified that Stroud’s home suffered from similar problems. Kristin left K.M.B. in these conditions for part of a summer. While testifying, Kristin even admitted to leaving K.M.B. in incapable child care. By allowing K.M.B. to live in such unsanitary conditions in her own home and another’s home, Kristin endangered KM.B.’s physical well-being. The record shows substantially more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s finding that Kristin knowingly placed or knowingly allowed K.M.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well-being. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re J.R., 991 S.W.2d 318, 321 
 Holding statements: (A) holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother    because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children (B) holding that a mother endangered her children by allowing them to live in extraordinarily unsanitary conditions which included roach infestation garbage and feces (C) holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree (D) holding a mother on appeal must successfully challenge a trial courts finding that there was no substantial and continuing change of circumstances of the children or mother before she can succeed on her claim that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to modify custody (E) holding that a mother and her two children failed to establish a  1983 claim where there was no evidence that threats made to the mother were directly aimed at the relationship between parent and child
Output: (B)
description provided were ample, particularly given the fact that the executing officers had previously monitored the mobile home to be searched, assuring that the warrant would not be executed upon the wrong home. Id. at 495. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, relying on its holding in Durk, and emphasizing once again that where a description of the house to be searched is given, specific reference is made to the house’s occupant, and the warrant is executed by an officer already familiar with the location, due to prior surveillance, inaccuracies in the description of the street address will not render a warrant unconstitutional. Id. at 497. Durk and Pelayo-Landero control in this case. See also United States v. Lemmons, 527 F.2d 662, 665-66 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 60, 50 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers (B) holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on warrant (C) holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant (D) holding that there was no constitutional violation where a warrant was issued for a shop at 9300 woodward but where once inside the executing officers also searched 9304 woodward which was connected by an internal archway and used as an extra space by the shopkeeper (E) holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place
Output: (D)
of relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). 32 . See also Avakian v. Chulengarian, 328 Ill.App.3d 147, 262 Ill.Dec. 663, 766 N.E.2d 283, 294 (2002); Tucker v. St. James Hosp., 279 Ill.App.3d 696, 216 Ill.Dec. 332, 665 N.E.2d 392, 396 (1996). 33 . This conclusion also is consistent with the few of our sister circuits that have addressed this precise issue. See, e.g., Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 261-65 (3d Cir.2011) (finding no conflict between Rule 8 or Rule 11 and a Pennsylvania statute requiring a “certificate of merit” to be filed in professional malpractice claims); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158-61 (3d Cir.2000) (finding no conflict between Rule 8 or Rule 9 and a similar New Jersey law); cf. Littlepaige v. United States, 528 F. App'x 289, 292-93 (4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). 34 . R.40 at 2 (citation omitted). 35 . R.49 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice (B) holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case (C) holding expert testimony is generally required to establish proximate cause in medical malpractice cases (D) holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional (E) holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court
Output: (E)
“When the legislature enacts provisions of a uniform or model act without significant alteration, it may be generally presumed to have adopted the expressed intention of the drafters of that uniform or model act.” Heirs of Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 71 S.W.3d 705, 346 (2001) (“We hold, as have the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, that the offense of wilfully selling unregistered securities requires proof only that the defendant intended to do the act prohibited by the statute.”); Greenhill v. State, 199 Ga.App. 218, 404 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1991) (“The trial court’s instruction that willful means knowingly and intentionally [selling unregistered securities when the defendant himself was unregistered] was not in error.”); State v. Kershner, 15 Kan.App.2d 17, 801 P.2d 68, 70 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Allen, 441 S.W.2d 424, 427 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (B) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (C) holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (D) holding that willfully violating the prohibition on engaging in business as a brokerdealer or agent without registering with the state means the defendant acted intentionally in the sense that he was aware of what he was doing (E) holding that the evidence at trial showed hart was aware that what he was doing was wrong
Output: (D)
use of religious symbolism depends upon its context. These general principles are sound, and have been adopted by the Court in subsequent cases____Accordingly, our present task is to determine whether the display[s at issue in this case], in their respective "particular physical settings,” has the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 596-597, 109 S.Ct. 3086. 7 .Reconciling the majority's holding in Allegheny with the outcome in Lynch, however, is more complicated than Justice Blackmun's neatly drawn summary might imply. Compare A.C.L.U. v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1448 (3rd Cir.1997) (enjoining Jersey City from displaying a creche and a menorah in front of its city hall) with Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 55 (2nd Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The Town argues that a second municipal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause (B) holding that display of solitary semipermanent menorah in city hall park closely associated with seat of city government violates the establishment clause (C) holding that a city owned creche and christmas tree erected in a public park adjacent to another park with a christmas tree lights and a privately owned menorah did not offend the establishment clause (D) holding there was no establishment clause violation in displaying a privately funded menorah during chanukah in the public plaza on which city hall and county building are located (E) holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park
Output: (C)
that she had anything to do with the drugs other than move them down from the apartment to her car. While de la Cruz-Paulino admitted to helping carry “it” from the apartment to the car, responding to Salazar’s question, “Did you get it down?” with “Of course we did,” there is no evidence that de la Cruz-Paulino saw the packages inside the garbage bags until the time of her arrest. We see no basis for concluding that Díaz-Pérez cut de la Cruz-Paulino in on the drug transaction after soliciting her package-carrying services. Díaz-Pérez had a menial job that de la Cruz-Paulino was willing to do for $40; there was no need for Díaz-Pérez to cut de la Cruz-Paulino into the deal to obtain her package-carrying services. Cf. United, States v. Francomano, 554 F.2d 488, 487 (1st Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The jury could not, without engaging in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no hearing was required where there were written reports supporting defendants competency (B) holding that required drug testing of student who had been suspended for fighting was unconstitutional because there was no reasonable suspicion of drug use and no special needs requiring a suspicionless search distinguishing todd and vemonia on their facts (C) holding there were no grounds for challenging in a termination proceeding the alleged failure to comply with the ada in the provision of services because services are not required by the termination statute (D) holding in the context of a promissory estoppel claim that reasonable businessmen could not have relied on a statement that they had a deal when so many terms of the transaction were up in the air (E) holding that there was no basis for a reasonable inference that the defendants were cut in on the drug deal when the record indicated that they were willing to perform the required crewmember services with no special inducement
Output: (E)
quasi-judicial functions which are applicable to land use including comprehensive planning, zoning, and controlling storm-water drainage and flood waters. Therefore, we hold that the proposed initiative is constitutionally deficient because it violates the single-subject requirement. Id. (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). Unlike the proposed amendment in People’s Property Rights, which applied broadly to any type of land use and thus involved multiple levels and branches of government, the proposed amendment in this 'case calls for only one discrete change in the established scheme of comprehensive land-use plans — the local government legislative process of enactment and amendment. Cf. Coastal Dev. of N. Fla., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 788 So.2d 204, 208-09 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the proposed amendment would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative (B) holding that provision in comprehensive plan requiring developer to demonstrate that proposed use is consistent with the comprehensive plans general intent and purpose was unreasonably vague subjective and did not furnish ground for denial of specialuse permit (C) recognizing prior decision holding that adoption of and amendments to local comprehensive plans are legislative acts and holding that smallscale development amendments to local comprehensive plans are also legislative acts (D) holding local regulation of hazardous waste disposal facilities preempted by comprehensive and detailed state regulatory scheme (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans
Output: (C)
as a predictor of actual movements because it was predicated on data depicting actual bighorn sheep movements. Given the model’s Payette data-based origin, the Forest Service could reasonably assume that its predictions were sufficiently reliable to satisfy NEPA. Ultimately, the Forest Service used top-rate model designers; relied on peer-reviewed methodologies applied by other bighorn researchers addressing similar issues; and incorporated on-the-ground data of bighorn sheep movements within the Payette. Given the foregoing, and in light of the deference owed to the agency when undertaking technical analysis within its purview, the Forest Service’s reliance on the risk of contact model was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Cf. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 990-94 (<HOLDING>). 2. Disease model Wool Growers asserts two 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the forest service supervisor had authority to issue orders pursuant to 36 cfr  26150 (B) holding under basic principles of property law that easement rights are subject to regulation by the forest service as the owner of the servient estate (C) holding in suit under the administrative procedure act challenging us forest service approval of forest development plan that injury to aesthetic conservational or recreational interests is sufficient to confer standing (D) holding that the forest service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to verify its model with ontheground data (E) holding the ihsaa did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting student limited eligibility
Output: (D)
408 F.3d at 684. Ab though United States v. Booker made the Guidelines effectively advisory, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Magallanez reaffirmed that “district courts are. still required to consider Guideline ranges, which are determined through application of the preponderance standard,. just as they were before.” 408 F.3d at 685 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit, while “recognizing ‘strong arguments that relevant conduct causing a dramatic increase in sentence ought to be subject to a higher standard of proof,’” has “long held that sentencing facts in the ‘ordinary ease’ need only be; proven by a preponderance.” United States v. Olsen, 519 F.3d 1096, 1105 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 15 , 705-06 (10th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). As the Court has noted: The Court explained 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that in order to satisfy due process findings made at sentencing need only be based upon a preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that after alleyne v united states it is wellestablished that sentencing factors need not be charged in an indictment and need only be proved to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment
Output: (D)
or beneficiaries." AS 23.30.012(b). 38 . Dameron v. Neumann Bros., 339 N.W.2d 160, 161 (Iowa 1983) (after employee was awarded weekly PTD benefits, he applied to have them commuted to lump-sum award; commutation was permitted as being in employee's best interest); Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 628, 632 (App.1976) (reversing Iump-sum commutation of PPI award where insufficient evidence supported exceptional circumstances to justify commutation); Bailey v. Colonial Freight Sys., Inc., 836 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tenn.1992) (trial court must consider whether commutation of award is in employee's best interests as well as employee's ability to manage his money). 39 . 8 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Workers Compensation Law § 132.07[1] ( 8-59 (Alaska 1993) (<HOLDING>). 44 . Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1067 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as 2330012 prohibits setting aside workers compensation c  r based on mistake (B) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim (C) holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act (D) holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference (E) recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting
Output: (A)
direct violation of trial court orders); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-r26, 96 S.Ct. 984 (recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials). Furthermore, Cignetti’s attempt to defeat the defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity by fashioning his claim in terms of a conspiracy is not effective. See Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1148 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 659 n. 2 (2d Cir.1995)) (“[W]hen the underlying activity at issue is covered by absolute immunity, the ‘plaintiff derives no benefit from alleging a conspiracy.’ ”); Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as discussed more extensively 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence (B) holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims alleging conspiracy to present false testimony but witnesses including police officerwitnesses are not absolutely immune from such claims (C) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under  1983 (D) recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability (E) holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony
Output: (B)
the contract is of a type usually put in writing, whether it needs a formal writing for its full expression, whether it has few or many details, whether the amount involved is large or small, whether it is a common or unusual contract, whether a standard form of contract is widely used in similar transactions, and whether either party takes any action in preparation for performance during the negotiations.” Horsfield Const., Inc. v. Dubuque County, Iowa, 653 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Restatement (Seoond) op CONTRACTS § 27 cmt. c). b. Analysis of letter of intent The court first notes that the language of the letter of intent clearly contemplates a subsequent, final contract. Paragraph 9 of the letter of intent reads as follows: 9. Form of lting Group, Inc., 494 N.W.2d at 444-45 (<HOLDING>); Air Host Cedar Rapids, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no enforceable contract where letter specified it was a letter of interest only and is subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement  (B) holding that issuing a letter of counseling and a letter of reprimand was not a materially adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim because the letter contained no abusive language andinstead contained jobrelated constructive criticism which can prompt an employee to improve her performance (C) holding that a loi that is subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement was nothing more than an invitation to attempt to reach an agreement of sale and not an enforceable contract based on offer and acceptance (D) holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset (E) holding that an addendum letter was a new contract because it modified a prior lease agreement
Output: (A)
assign to elected government: "Initiative refers to the process by which the electorate petitions for and votes on a proposed law. Referendum is the process by which legislation passed by the governing body is submitted to the electorate for approval or disapproval.” Smallwood, 327 Md. at 232, n. 6, 608 A.2d at 1228, n. 6, and authorities there cited. The power to initiate local legislation is repugnant to Art. XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution, which vests a charter county’s "full” lawmaking power in the county council. Under the Maryland Constitution, however, county voters do have a right to reserve to themselves the power to petition for a referendum on legislation previously enacted by a county council. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In Smallwood, we reiterated the distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county (B) holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county (C) recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  (D) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (E) holding that art xia conferred on the citizens of anne arundel county the right to reserve to themselves by express charter provision the power to refer legislation enacted by their county council
Output: (E)
of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 2011 WL 577108, at *5 (C.D.Ill.2011). This is a difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet. See Powers, 2011 WL 577108, at *5, citing Creative Trade Group, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Alliance, Inc., 2009 WL 3713345, at *6 (N.D.Ill.2009). Plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion to demonstrate he is entitled to judgment on his claims as a matter of law. Powers, 2011 WL 577108, at *5. It has been recognized that “[sjummary judg ment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion ... is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999); see also Frobose v. Am. Sav. Loan Ass’n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 615 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient (B) recognizing that questions of intent and credibility make it difficult to grant summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof (C) holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion (D) holding that movant is entitled to summary judgment when party with burden of proof fails to establish genuine fact issue (E) holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial
Output: (B)
and third, that § 1983 claims are best characterized as tort claims for personal injury and that the state statute of limitations for personal injuries should be applied to all § 1983 claims. Id. at 276-280, 105 S.Ct. 1938. The Supreme Court extended this reasoning in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-662, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987), holding that state»statutes of limitations for personal injury actions should also be applied to claims under § 1981. Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Goodman, most Courts of Appeal, with the exception of the Fourth Circuit, have applied the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions to claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See, e.g., Everett v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409-10 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada (B) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act (C) holding that one way for the plaintiff to establish discrimination under title ii of the ada and the rehabilitation act would be to show that the defendant could have reasonably accommodated his disability but refused to do so (D) holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable (E) holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government
Output: (A)
evidence may be allowed when, as here, it bears on the motive and state of mind in relation to an avoidance of apprehension during immediate flight from a crime and is found to be ‘needed as background material’ or to ‘complete the narrative of the episode’ ”). See also Yapor v. Mazzuca, No. 04 Civ. 7966, 2005 WL 894918, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.19, 2005)(“the fact of Yapor’s wife’s arrest on a drug charge completed the narrative and the trial court was within its discretion under New York law to admit it.”) (citations omitted). Evidence of a defendant’s conduct that demonstrates a “guilty mind including evidence of coercion and harassment of a witness” is also admissible. Charles, 516 F.Supp.2d at 217 (citing People v. Plummer, 36 N.Y.2d 161, 365 N.Y.S.2d 842, 325 N.E.2d 161 (1975) (<HOLDING>)). 3. Contrary to, or an Unreasonable 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even evidence of a defendants and a witnesss prior bad acts was admissible to show inter alia the defendants familiarity with the witness (B) holding that an expert witnesss testimony that the behavior of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse is consistent with behavior observed in sexually abused children is admissible under the ohio rules of evidence (C) holding that evidence of defendants threatening behavior toward a witness was admissible (D) holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify (E) holding that the defendants previous threatening behavior toward the victim was highly probative of his motive
Output: (C)
greeted and the way repair orders were written. He stated the implementation of Net Profit would not have necessitated Watt having to stay and work until 9:00 at night. He denied threatening to fire Watt if he did not implement the new system. William Dial, Piedmont Honda’s Chief Financial Officer, testified that his office looked directly into Watt’s office. He stated he usually left the office between 7:00 and 8:00 at night and rarely saw Watt still in his office when he left. He claimed the implementation of Net Profit would not have necessitated Watt’s having to stay late at night. He denied that it created problems or made customers unhappy. Although, as in Jordan, the record contarás conflicting evidence, this court may not weigh the evidence. 381 S.C. at 487, 674 S.E.2d at 169 (<HOLDING>). There is substantial evidence in the record 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the appellate panel and it is not the task of an appellate court to weigh the evidence as found by the appellate panel (B) holding that on appeal an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight the courts duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding (C) holding that one panel of this court is not bound by dicta in a previously published panel opinion (D) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony (E) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review
Output: (A)
301 (1932). The trial court did not err in sustaining St. Al-ban’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment is affirmed. AHRENS, P.J. and KAROHL, J., concur. 1 . William Rosenburg died on May 28, 1996. Jewell Rosenburg has filed an affidavit attesting that no letters of administration was applied for or granted for the one year period after William Rosenburg’s death. 2 . On August 19, 1997, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, and on August 25, 1997 plaintiffs filed an amendment to the motion for summary judgment and Patricia Riebold’s affidavit. The circuit court entered its judgment sustaining St. Alban’s motion on August 25, 1997 and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as moot. 3 . See, e.g., Estate of Crawshaw, 249 Kan. 388, 819 P.2d 613, 618 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church, 284 N.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust (B) holding that if testamentary trust fails proceeds are distributed to the residuary legatee (C) holding that if the trust becomes operative thereafter fails and cy pres is inapplicable the devolution of the trust goes to the heirs at law and not to residuary legatees (D) holding that heirs at law of testatrix were not necessary parties to action where trust fails cy pres is inapplicable and the will contained a residuary clause and finding no basis to distinguish between the situation where the trust does or does not become operative (E) holding that where the will did not provide the life tenant with the power to sell and it was not necessary to sell the property for the payment of estate expenses the life tenant was not entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the property instead the proceeds became a part of the residuary estate
Output: (B)