niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Saidie May ... at some point in time” before its alleged theft. See Opp. to the BMA’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Opp.”) 28. Fuqua ignores the many other records — such as the board meeting minutes, financial ledger, and especially the police report — that prove the Painting was in BMA’s possession until it was stolen. Fuqua also speculates that Saidie May might never have had actual ownership of the Painting, insinuating that she loaned her husband’s property without his permission. Id. This argument is not consistent with any evidence in the record and therefore comes up short because summary judgment cannot be defeated by speculation alone. Fuqua ultimately fails to offer a scintilla of evidence that the Painting was not stolen from BMA. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>). She has not provided a compelling factual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial (B) holding that the moving party has tjhe burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists (C) holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted (D) holding that an adverse party must state specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact for trial (E) holding that the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial
Output: (D)
into a level two stop," Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at { 13 n. 2, 998 P.2d 274, holding an individual's identification card longer than is necessary to obtain the information needed to run a warrants check will. See, eg., Unit ed States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir.2003) (stating suspect was seized when, inter alia, police officers "took possession of his personal property-here, his driver's license"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 962, 124 S.Ct. 425, 157 LEd2d 304 (2003); United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir.1995) ("[When law enforcement officials retain an individual's driver's lHeense in the course of questioning him, that individual, as a general rule, will not reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter."); State v. Painter, 296 Or. 422, 676 P.2d 309, 311 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 427 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer (B) holding seizure occurred when police officer retained drivers license while making radio warrants check (C) holding that defendant was not free to leave when officer directed defendant to stay while he conducted a warrants check (D) holding that detention ended when police officer returned drivers license and registration and driver voluntarily consented to additional questioning (E) holding encounter became improper detention when officer took passengers license back to police car to run warrant check
Output: (B)
transaction was entered into by Greenheart and the Browns for a commercial purpose. Because the Browns are the prevailing party on appeal, the Browns are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3). V. Conclusion The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The Browns are awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON concur. 1 . The parties concede that the instant water rights case is not governed by Title 42, Chapter 14 addressed by the omitted portion of Idaho Code section 6-401. 2 . Extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of an agreement is also admissible where fraud or mutual mistake has been plead. Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 Idaho 69, 72, 415 P.2d 712, 715 (1966) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake (B) holding the parol evidence rule presumes finality with respect to the written terms of the agreement only and does not prevent consideration of parol evidence concerning the duration of contract (C) holding the parol evidence rule not pertinent to the present issue because a contract may be clear and unambiguous as far as it goes and yet may not express the true agreement of the parties by reason of mutual mistake (D) holding that mutual mistake is ground for reformation when as here the minds of the parties have met contractually but because of a mutual mistake the written contract between the parties is wanting in expression or execution to evince the actual and binding contractual intent of the parties (E) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties
Output: (C)
of petitioner’s exchange with Sprague, he should not have imposed a sentence of incarceration in the absence of counsel, without record proof of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Because Sprague had a right to counsel, there should have been no suggestion that he could suffer a disability for exercising that right. This constitutes legal error and an abuse of discretion. The United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense * * * unless he was represented by counsel * * Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)); see also State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83, 88-89 (R.I.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open (B) holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary (C) holding that trial judges must be satisfied that an accused is making a knowing voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel having been advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation such that there is a record demonstration that an accused elected to proceed without counsel with eyes open (D) holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person who has been advised by competent counsel may not be collaterally attacked (E) holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act
Output: (C)
activity” refers to any predicate act that is relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3). The indictment in this case alleged many predicate acts, but the jury verdicts did not specify which were attributable to any particular defendant. At sentencing, the district court found certain predicate acts attributable to each defendant, based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at trial. 1. Findings of predicate acts Barragan and Franco argue that the district court erred in att g racketeering activity” in RICO guidelines includes “any act, whether or not charged against defendant personally, that qualifies as a RICO predicate act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and is otherwise relevant conduct under § 1B1.3” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Pica, 692 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Massimino, 641 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct in rico sentencing (B) holding that district court may treat acquitted conduct as relevant conduct at sentencing (C) holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct (D) holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant (E) holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence
Output: (B)
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). What matters is that Renb-A-Center’s interest in assuring that its employees focus on their work while on the job is a rational one, and the company’s prohibition on non-emergency, personal phone calls is a reasonable manifestation of this policy. Certainly, Rent-A-Center has a legitimate interest in ensuring that Bradford’s personal phone calls do not disrupt business meetings or interfere with his daily responsibilities. See, e.g., Koons v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 367 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.2004) (affirming district court’s holding that the discharge of an employee for making excessive personal calls was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1011 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Because Renb-A-Center has successfully set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that termination of individuals employment for making personal phone calls was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge (B) recognizing that even a personal grudge can constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision (C) holding that employer met its burden of articulating  a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs termination by offering admissible evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that plaintiff was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records  (D) holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination (E) holding that employees threats of violence against a coworker were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination
Output: (A)
Whitman never expressly told Khan or Motey that he would rather not know the story behind a suspicious tip. But a defendant’s “purposeful contrivance” to avoid knowledge, Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 480, may not manifest in an affirmative act because “the very nature of conscious avoidance makes it unlikely that the record will contain directly incriminating statements.” United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir.2011). For that reason, “[i]t is not uncommon for a finding of conscious avoidance to be supported primarily by circumstantial evidence.” Id. Whitman responded to warning signs about the nature of Khan and Mote/s tips not with skepticism but with advice on how better to play fast and loose. A reasonable jury could thus infer that WL 1943342 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (<HOLDING>). But that question is not at issue in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employer breached fiduciary duty to disclose that it was considering allowing employees to participate in benefit plan (B) holding that a debtor need not have received a benefit from the fraudulent activity in order for  523a2a to prevent a discharge (C) holding that remote tippee need only know that tipper breached a fiduciary duty and not have specific knowledge that tipper received a personal benefit (D) recognizing that on the part of a fiduciary there is a duty to make a full disclosure of any and all material facts within his knowledge and of which he knows or should know that the other person is ignorant (E) holding record supported jury finding that fiduciary relationship existed between bishop diocese and plaintiff and that such duty was breached
Output: (C)
of the insurer; whereas, in other cases, the insured may own less than 100% of the insurer. Id. 5 .This policy lists TRMI and subsidiaries as named insureds. 6 . This policy insures Rosewood and lists Lubri-pac as an additional insured. 7 . The defendants argue that the Mutual Release Agreement applies to any claims for reapportionment of the funds paid toward the Saturn settlement, rather than to claims to the salvage value funds. However, the defendants claim West-chester is not entitled to any salvage value funds because the funds were properly paid to the highest levels of insurers under the defendants’ construction of the layers of insurance coverage. See Vesta Ins. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 986 F.2d 981, 988 (5th Cir.1993) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 80, 126 L.Ed.2d 48 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Accepting as true Westchester's pleadings 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed (B) holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees (C) holding that none of the physicians insurers had a duty to provide coverage since the effects of the negligence first manifested themselves prior to the coverage periods of any of the three policies (D) holding that regardless of insurers good faith denial of coverage plaintiff is entitled to recover interest to put it in position it would have been in if coverage had not been denied (E) holding that money recouped by insurers after paying claims is first applied to the highest layer of coverage
Output: (E)
retaliation for his sexual harassment complaints. In addition, the Plaintiff points out that there are no written memoranda or letters in his file documenting any issues with his attendance, either in the summer of 2008 or during any other time period. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argues that Robert Cacciola, another warehouse employee, was never monitored by Ellis or disciplined by Geier, although he had similar attendance issues. Courts have consistently held that one way to establish a claim of retaliation is to show that the complaining employee is treated differently than other employees who did not engage in a protected activity. See Knight v. City of New York, 303 F.Supp.2d 485, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y.2004); see also DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court finds that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a rational reason for disparate treatment similarlysituated taxpayers should be treated in a similar fashion (B) holding that discrimination can be established through other evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct (C) holding that the individuals with whom a plaintiff seeks to be compared must have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employers treatment of them for it (D) holding that title vii does not provide for a damages claim against supervisors or fellow employees (E) holding that a causal connection may be established indirectly with circumstantial evidence for example by showing that the protected activity was followed by discriminatory treatment or through evidence of disparate treatment of employees who engaged in similar conduct or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus
Output: (B)
adjustment under § 3B1.2(b) of the Guidelines. We reject both contentions. A. Walker argues that the district court violated her due process rights by precluding her from conducting “meaningful questioning” into the reliability of Mario Morales’s testimony during her sentencing hearing. This assertion is unsupported by the record, which shows that A. Walker was permitted to make an extensive attack on Morales’s reliability by inquiring about his drug use and about allegedly inconsistent statements he previously made to law enforcement. The district court only interjected to curtail cross-examination when it became apparent that A. Walker’s repetitive questions were not adding anything to the existing record. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 766 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court in its discretion may limit crossexamination in order to preclude repetitive questioning upon determining that a particular subject has been exhausted even during the trial phase when defendants actually have a constitutional right to confront witnesses and more extensive due process rights than they have at sentencing (B) holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination (C) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination (D) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (E) recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination
Output: (A)
matter, even if this count were dismissed, Plaintiffs would simply refile with a new caption, putting the case right back where it started. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(f) (district courts are to construe pleadings so “as to do substantial justice”); Dopp v. HTP, Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 513 (1st Cir.1991) (“Pleadings are liberally to be construed, and for the purposes of determining what relief a claimant has sought, complaints ought not to be read grudgingly or with a hypertechnical eye.”); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 226-27 (1st Cir.1990) (“It is not fatal to a complaint that a legal theory has been mischaracterized or that the precise language invoking jurisdiction has not been used.”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 622 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Janke Constr. Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing authority stating that a plaintiff in a cercla action is allowed to plead alternative theories even if it cannot ultimately seek duplicate recovery (B) holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim (C) holding that the failure to draw the district courts attention to an applicable legal theory waives pursuit of that theory in this court (D) holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error (E) holding that the failure to plead a particular legal theory when the plaintiff pled two related legal theories was not a bar to recovery
Output: (E)
Citizen’s Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Farmer, 395 NE2d 1121, 1123 (Ill. App. 1979) (deficiency action brought by assignee under retail installment contract for sale of motor vehicle following repossession); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Casaulong, 62 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 1027 (Cal. App. 1976) (deficiency action arising from sale of farm equipment); Palmer, 219 A2d at 860-861. Because the predominant purpose of the Contract was the sale of a good, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is governed by OCGA § 11-2-725 (l)’s four-year statute of limitation. It is undisputed that SunTrust’s deficiency claim seeking a deficiency judgment was filed more than four years after the cause of action accrued. See Radha Krishna, Inc. v. Desai, 301 Ga. App. 638, 641 (2) (689 SE2d 78) (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, SunTrust’s claim is barred under 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court (B) holding that the 120day time period begins to run after the agencys initial interview of the applicant (C) holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach (D) holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues (E) holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement
Output: (C)
solid waste collection contract. Wash. Rev.Code § 81.77 only requires that a WUTC Certificate be obtained by the time performance commences. Nevertheless, the Air Force’s Final Justification concluded: ,“[o]fferors on the previous solicitation are expected to show an interest in this procurement, however, they will not be eligible to compete as prime contractors without a certificate for this geographic area issued by the WUTC.” AR at 777. The record in this case does not support that conclusion. The law is clear that a contracting officer must make reasonable efforts to ascertain if it is likely that at least two small businesses capable of performing the work will submit offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 657a(b)(2)(B); see also MCS Management, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed.Cl. 506, 511 (2001) (<HOLDING>) aff’d, 25 Fed.Appx. 957 (Fed.Cir. 2001); see 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although 15 usc  657a and relevant far provisions do not require a particular method to assess small business availability a contracting officer must make reasonable efforts to determine whether offers will be received from at least two responsible small businesses at fair market prices (B) holding that the alleged disclosure must at least be reasonable for the perceived whistleblower doctrine to apply (C) holding misrepresentation must at least be partial cause of plaintiffs injury (D) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (E) holding that appellant was deprived of a fair trial where the jury was instructed in such a way that it was not required to find at least two elements of the offense of capital murder to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (A)
suggested that an honorable discharge could be stigmatizing if prospective employers had some reason to know of the reasons for the honorable discharge. See Beller, 632 F.2d at 807 (rejecting claim that an honorable discharge resulted in stigma because there was “no evidence indicating that the plaintiffs’ service records [we]re likely to impose stigma upon them or make it more difficult for them to seek post-discharge employment”). However, the record does not reflect what will appear on her discharge certificate and, thus, whether any stigma will occur. Accordingly, the pro cedural due process claim is not ripe for adjudication on this record because the injury that Major Witt asserts may or may not occur. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (<HOLDING>). We hesitate to dismiss the claim at this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defamation by a state official alone does not violate a liberty interest of a plaintiff absent the alteration or extinguishment of a right or status previously recognized by state law (B) holding that im proper means may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation or a recognized rule of common law or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession (C) holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted (D) holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim (E) holding that defamation standing alone does not suffice for a stigmaplus claim there must be a right or status previously recognized by state law that was distinctly altered or extinguished
Output: (E)
order granting Appellee Elliott’s motion for pretrial diversion and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on Kenton Circuit Court Indictment No. 99-CR-641. All concur. 1 . KRS 533.250 — .262. 2 . KRS 533.250(1). 3 . Class D Felony Pretrial Diversion Rules for the Kenton Circuit Court (hereinafter "Kenton Circuit Court Pretrial Diversion Program”), § III(C). 4 . KRS 533.250. 5 . KRS 533.252. 6 . KRS 533.254. 7 . Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 17 S.W.3d 121, 123 (2000). 8 . KRS 533.258(1). See also KRS 533.258(2) ("The defendant shall not be required to list this disposition on any application for employment, licensure, or otherwise unless required to do so by federal law.”); KRS 533.258(3) ("Pretrial diversion records shall not be introduced as evidence 998) (<HOLDING>). 20 .See Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal for his discovery violation allegations (B) holding that an appeal is properly dismissed as moot when an appellate court lacks power to provide an effective remedy for the appellant should it find in his favor (C) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (D) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (E) holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal
Output: (A)
18 to dictate that sentencing courts should not include the weight of the liquid solvent in liquid LSD when determining a defendant’s base offense level. Amendment 484 demonstrates the Commission’s intention that not all materials that are combined or “mixed” with controlled substances should be included in the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes. The liquid solvent thus may not be included in the definition in Amendment 484 of “mixture or substance” given that, although wholesale traffickers use the solvent to apply the drug to ingestible carrier media, consumers do not “use” the solvent because it evaporates from the carrier media before the media are ingested. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 457, 111 S.Ct. at 1923. But cf. United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128, 131 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we thus remand 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under plain error standard that basing sentence on lsd and water in which it was dissolved did not violate due process (B) holding that omission was not plain error (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (E) holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard
Output: (A)
self-evident. 2. Injury Based on the Administrative Record, Affidavits, or Other Evidence Because their injuries are not self-evident, Petitioners bear the burden to “present specific facts supporting standing through citations to the administrative record or ‘affidavits or other evidence’ attached to [their] opening brief.” Sierra Club 2015, 793 F.3d at 662 (quoting Sierra Club 2002, 292 F.3d at 900). As a general matter, an injury in fact is not difficult to prove in the fundraising context. “If ... a political party can marshal its forces more effectively by winning its lawsuit, that ought to be enough for Article III.” Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Taxation with Representation of Washington v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability (B) recognizing that the assessment of victim injury points depends on whether the victims injury was a direct result of the defendants crimes (C) holding that allegations of future injury must be particular and concrete (D) recognizing a drain on the organizations resources as a concrete and demonstrable injury (E) holding that the financial losses that texas would bear due to having to grant drivers licenses constituted a concrete and immediate injury for standing purposes
Output: (D)
address an argument despite its abandonment on appeal, we ordinarily will not do so ‘unless manifest injustice otherwise would result.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 27 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir.1994))). Here, no “manifest injustice” results from the denial of Turma-laj’s petition, as the relevant regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As the plain language of the regulation provides, failure to comply with the requirement is a ground for denial of the motion. See Zhen Nan Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir.2006); see also Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Because no manifest injustice results, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions (D) holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it
Output: (D)
and services bearing counterfeit marks) ... section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property) ... (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 ... 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The Amended Complaint alleges two or more related instances of mail fraud, wire fraud, trafficking in counterfeit goods, money laundering, interstate transportation of converted goods, tax fraud and bankruptcy fraud. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 249-256. Before determining if the Amended Complaint implicates Ravinder Chawla, the Court will first review the pleading standard applicable to each predicate act. Pleading Standards for Predicate Acts Where, as here, Plaintiffs rely, inter alia, on a series of fraud-based predicate acts (mail, wire, and bankrupt (N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). Having determined what the Amended Complaint 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard (B) holding that transmission of photographs by means of the internet  constitutes transportation in interstate commerce (C) holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for transporting stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce under either 18 usc  2314 which prohibits interstate transportation of stolen goods or 18 usc  2312 which specifically prohibits interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles and airplanes (D) holding that the government need not prove that interstate transport was foreseeable in order to obtain a conviction under 18 usc  2314 which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen goods (E) holding that crime of interstate transportation of anothers property subject to notice pleading standard
Output: (E)
criminal activity, strictly liable to a person injured by such handgun during the course of a crime? 3) Does the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S, serial number 0152662, fall within the category referred to in question 2? Kelley, 304 Md. at 131, 497 A.2d 1143. 7 . The Court also discussed the effective date of the "modification of Maryland common law tort principles” it had fashioned. Id. at 161-62, 497 A.2d 1143. 8 . The majority of these cases have discussed the Court’s ability or willingness to modify the common law. See Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 283 n. 7, 653 A.2d 436 (1995); State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 292-94, 604 A.2d 489 (1992); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469-70, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); Murphy v. Edmonds t, Inc., 17 Md.App. 646, 659, 303 A.2d 432 (1973) (<HOLDING>) 10 . We alternatively based our decision on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court (B) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals (C) holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available (D) holding the fact remains however that such standard appears to be the law of this state as enunciated in the decisions of the court of appeals discussed previously unless those decisions are either explained away or overruled by the court of appeals itself this court must follow what a majority of its members discern to be the precept to be drawn from them ie proof of fraud in a civil action either in law or in equity must be clear and convincing only the court of appeals could disabuse of that notion (E) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision
Output: (D)
Defendant asserts that the application of this standard to the case at hand indicates that the district judge should have recused himself, primarily in light of the critical importance of credibility determinations throughout the proceedings. {19} As a practical matter, we acknowledge that the expression of personal opinion about the credibility of a complaining witness and the guilt of a defendant gives rise to question whether the judge could put such opinions out of his or her mind in order to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial on remand. However, authorities establish a presumption that judges will be able to set aside previously-expressed opinions and preside in a fair and impartial manner on remand. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that the judge on remand had presided over the defendants first trial and had expressed the opinion that the victims testimony was highly credible did not support recusal for bias (B) holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court (C) holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal (D) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
Output: (A)
at 334 (citing 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4434, 4441-42); see also Putnam, 833 F.2d at 904-05 (dismissal for failure to serve within time period may operate as dismissal with prejudice when action will be time-barred); Townsel v. County of Contra Costa, 820 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir.1987) (stating that Congress “balanced the possible loss of a litigant’s federal cause of action against the need to encourage diligent prosecution of lawsuits.”); Lovelace v. Acme Markets, Inc., 820 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455, 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987) (determining that even though dismissal could spell end of plaintiffs cause of action, inadvertence and lack of diligence could not be excused in light of legislative intent for strict interpretation of Rule 4(j)); Wei 763 F.2d at 372 (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Plaintiffs Original 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) recognizing that action will be timebarred under title vii if dismissed under rule 4j (C) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (D) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
Output: (B)
the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). The “do-it-yóurself” manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause
Output: (A)
to analyze ozone emissions resulting from the proposed action, rather than from a concern with the adequacy of an actual ozone analysis.”). This contention is belied by the record. In its final EIS, BLM identified the 8-hour background concentration for ozone in the region adjacent to the WAII tracts for the period from 2005 through 2007. See J.A. 1033. According to the data relied upon by BLM, the background concentration for that time period was 136 |xg/m3, below the NAAQS of 157 p,g/m3 that applied prior to May 2008 and below the 147 p,g/m3 standard that applied after May 2008. See J.A. 50, 1033. BLM therefore noted that the area is considered to be in “attainment” status for ozone, see J.A. 1388, something that is conceded by WildEarth Plaintiffs, see WildEarth Pis.’ [89] Mem. at 9 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, BLM analyzed the effects of NOx 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that nox is an ozone precursor (B) recognizing that campbell county is in attainment with the current ozone naaqs (C) holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county (D) recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  (E) holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest
Output: (B)
no margin for error — all flawed assumptions, see discussion infra part one, section IV), 15% of African Americans share those markers. 24 In fact, Cellmark did not stand by the technique with any sort of validation study and Dr. Word, the State's own expert, testified pretrial that the technique is only "sometimes possible" even when there are only two contributors to the mixture and is impossible when there are more than two contributors. She neglected to mention in what circumstances such analysis is possible. See discussion supra at 161-163, 699 A.2d at 617. 25 Additionally, this error might have prevented the penalty-phase jury's formation of "residual doubt" and thus influenced the death sentence meted out. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 172, 690 A.2d 1 (1997) {Marshall III) (<HOLDING>); State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 580, 662 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing concept of joint employer when separate entities share or eodetermine conditions of employment (B) recognizing in union democracy context potential adverse impact of requiring candidates to qualify long before election (C) recognizing impact of child support guidelines (D) recognizing concept of residual doubt and its potential impact on penaltyphase delibera tions (E) recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact
Output: (D)
Plaintiff and none of whom were terminated. (PI. Facts ¶¶ 108-109; PI. Ex. A, Enclosure # 2). But a reasonable factfinder could not conclude based on these facts alone that Fisher acted with invidious purpose. There is no showing that the younger store managers had received the same degree of negative reviews as had Plaintiff — i.e., that they were “similarly situated” — nor that Januus had been qualified for his job. There are no facts whatsoever about the abilities or performance of these store managers; Plaintiffs table merely provides the ages of the other store managers under Fisher’s control and whether or not they were terminated. This sort of raw data does not support a finding invidious intent. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 542-43 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs description of the discriminatory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (B) holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations (C) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (D) holding raw numerical comparisons between the number of male and female partners when not accompanied by any analysis of either the qualified applicant pool or the flow of qualified candidates over a relevant period of time was not relevant to a showing of pretext (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
Output: (D)
2011, the day after the 2011 amendments went into effect. See Act of June 17, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 690, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1651, 1651-1653, 1655 (current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a) (West Supp 2012)). In this opinion, we cite to Article 55.01(a) as it existed prior to September 1, 2011. 5 . Article 55.01(a)(2)(A) provides that the indictment was dismissed or quashed because of mistake, false information, or other similar reasoning indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or because it was void. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A). 6 . While DPS is the sole appealing agency, the relief granted is not limited to that agency. See Ex Parte Elliot, 815 S.W.2d 251, 251 (Tex.1991) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession (B) holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession (C) holding that the reversal of a trial courts expunction order must encompass all persons and agencies in possession of relevant criminal records (D) holding reversal warranted where a permissive inference instruction on possession of a controlled substance contributed to the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in defendants trial (E) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession
Output: (C)
vis-á-vis a jointly tried co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. A statement is powerfully incriminating only when it is inculpatory on its face. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The confession in Bruton fit that description because it identified both the declarant and his codefendant by name as the perpetrators of the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Statements that are incriminating only when linked to other evidence in the case do not trigger application of Bruton’s preclusionary rule. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. This criterion is easier to state than to apply; for example, it does not allow a prosecutor merely to delete a codefen-dant’s name. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Zuñiga and Vega challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment (B) holding that simply replacing a codefendants name with a symbol or a blackedout space is insufficient to wrest an inculpatory statement from brutons precedential orbit (C) holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature (D) holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement (E) holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation
Output: (B)
Id. at 404. To support a § 841(b)(1)(B) statutory enhancement, the government must file an information notifying the defendant of the enhancement and the prior convictions upon which it is based. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The defendant may respond that the conviction was obtained in violation of the U.S. Constitution, and bears the burden of proving the conviction’s constitutional infirmity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 851(c)(2). However, he may not “challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under this section which occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction.” Id. § 851(e). We have upheld the validity of § 851(e)’s limitations period. See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The specific subsection of the Florida drug 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights (B) holding that although court should inform jury about defendants prior sentences the court should instruct the jury that it should not consider prior sentences in its decision to impose a life or death sentence because they are not statutory aggravating or mitigating factors (C) holding that imposition of lengthy sentences did not show prejudice where sentences were warranted by facts shown in the evidence (D) holding that  851es limitations period was constitutional because it was reasonably tailored to impose enhanced sentences on recidivists (E) holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences
Output: (D)
v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 407-08, 100 S.E.2d 4 (1957)). Likewise in this case, the presence of signs barring unauthorized admittance is sufficient to establish that the access road is not “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Va.Code § 46.2-100. 395 F.3d at 521 (emphasis as in the Fourth Circuit opinion). The court also rejected a government argument that taxis, buses, delivery trucks, and people in search of directions such as defendant Smith also used the road, and that such use brought it within the definition of “highway.” The court said: Because the general public is not permitted on the access road, it is not “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Va.Code § 46.2-100. See also Flinchum, 24 Va.App. at 737, 485 S.E.2d 630 (<HOLDING>). Id. D. The Virginia Cases There are at least 
 Holding statements: (A) holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public (B) holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway (C) holding that case law had made clear that masturbating in car on public road was sufficiently open (D) holding the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances (E) holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system
Output: (B)