niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
manager-trainees. 25 . When Foradori's counsel asked Feigenb-aum “if we don’t understand all of their training [i.e. Captain D's training policies as evidenced in Captain D's manuals] as was suggested [by defense counsel], whose fault is that[?],” the district court sustained Captain D’s objection, stating that such opinion was outside of Feigenbaum’s area of expertise. Also, the district court sustained objections to plaintiff counsel's mischaracterization of King's testimony and to leading questions. 26 . In a motion in limine, Captain D's raised a Daubert objection to Feigenbaum's qualifications; however, Captain D’s waived it by failing to timely object to his qualification and testimony at trial. See C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 701 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Waggener, 837 F.2d 220, 222 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to object does not preclude raising the issue on appeal where erroneous evidence is offered in violation of an order in limine (B) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (C) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal (D) holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue (E) holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial
Output: (C)
it may be satisfied by “a closed period of repeated conduct,” or “past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” Id. Whereas predicate acts that extend over a few weeks or months and threaten no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement, “[a] party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” Id. In this case, the indictment identifies fourteen predicate acts that occurred between 2000 and October of 2008, several of which allegedly spanned a multi-year period. Consequently, closed-end continuity is sufficiently charged in the indictment. See Lovin, supra, 2007 WL 167454, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4914, at *8 (<HOLDING>); see also Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 890 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b (B) holding that the indictment was sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement since it alleged that the defendants conduct occurred over a period of eight years (C) holding that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate retaliation for activities that occurred two years prior to the termination (D) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (E) recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier
Output: (B)
involved enablement: [1] to require the patentee to describe his invention so that others may construct and use it after the expiration of the patent and [2] to inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not. Id. at 57, 59 S.Ct. 8. The Court then concluded that even if the original specification enabled the use of a flexible web, the claim could derive no benefit from it because “that was not the invention which [the patentee] described by his references to an extremely rigid web.” Id. at 58-59, 59 S.Ct. 8 (emphasis added); see also MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 98-102, 59 S.Ct. 427, 83 L.Ed. 506 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Although the Court did not expressly state 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims that were internally contradictory were invalid as indefinite (B) holding that contractual conditions printed on cruise ticket were valid even though they were in small type (C) holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite (D) holding invalid claims amended to include structures not within the invention described in the application even though the variations were small (E) holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations
Output: (D)
v. State, 175 Ga. App. 234, 238-39 (4) (333 SE2d 103) (1985) (reversing conviction when there was no evidence that firearm found near defendant was on defendant’s person during commission of the crime). 32 Carswell, 251 Ga. App. at 735 (1) (b) (emphasi at jury could “consider the evidence concerning the small size and crowded conditions within the residence and infer that it was inevitable” that defendant passed even momentarily within arm’s reach of a firearm hidden under a couch that was positioned behind a coffee table containing cocaine). 36 Copeland v. State, 228 Ga. App. 734, 736 (1) (492 SE2d 723) (1997), declined to follow on other grounds, Weems v. State, 269 Ga. 577, 579 (2) & n.2 (501 SE2d 806) (1998). Cf. Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1) (704 SE2d 470) (2010) (<HOLDING>). 37 See Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 166, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial (B) holding inter alia that a jury may consider a defendants appearance at trial in conjunction with the evidence submitted at trial in order to resolve conflicts in the testimony presented (C) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (D) holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial (E) holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of a trial by jury requiresthe jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial
Output: (B)
Int'l, Inc. v. Sage Apartments, L.L.C., 167 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (party filed notice of non-suit while stay imposed by appellate court was pending); In re Martinez, 77 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding) (same); In re Consol. Freightways, 75 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (party filed motion to enforce agreement during pendency of stay automatically imposed by insurance code due to other party’s insurer being declared “impaired”); Paine v. Sealey, 956 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (party served requests for admissions while automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect); Burrhus v. M & S Mach. & Supply Co., Inc., 897 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Harrell v. NationsBank of Tex., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate deadlines are stayed during pendency of automatic stay imposed by insurance code (B) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (C) holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay (D) holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay (E) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay
Output: (A)
on the large number of contradictions about fairly insignificant facts in the testimony to bolster his allegation of error. But this Court is not in the business of retrying cases; the ultimate fact-finder in a criminal trial must remain the jury. The jury heard all of the evidence, and witnessed the demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the give and take of the trial process. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless great injustice may result from an absolute misreading of the evidence, a situation which has not arisen here, particularly given the fact that Morris’s own statement inculpated him in the assaults. ¶ 12. It is settled that the jury may freely believe and disbelieve testimony to reach a verdict. See Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 512 So.2d 666, 670 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurors are the sole arbiters of witness credibility (B) holding that jurors may consider inconsistencies and deficiencies in testimony when assessing witness credibility (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
Output: (A)
Supreme Court carefully analyzed Schmerber and other opinions. The court concluded that its decision was in accord with the view of a majority of the courts that had considered the issue. The court also considered the burden on law enforcement of obtaining a warrant: Further, requiring law enforcement to consider other factors places an unreasonable burden on law enforcement. For instance, though the officer may be familiar with the area in which the accident occurred, the officer has no control over how long it would take to travel to a judge or the judge's availability. The officer 335 (1992) (relying mainly on the Oregon Constitution in declining to hold that blood-alcohol dissipation creates a per se exigency); Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006) (<HOLDING>). 11 . 90 P.3d 156. 12 . Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw (B) holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense (C) holding that exigent circumstances were created by dissipation of bloodalcohol content in time needed to obtain a warrant (D) holding that in drunkdriving investigations the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant (E) recognizing exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement
Output: (B)
record evidence that the government offered the witness full immunity .for self-dis*closed criminal conduct, as well as the assistance of counsel. Indeed, . the victim’s professed fear of retaliation by Harris was reasonable given that (1) part of the alleged assault—the punch in the face— could itself be viewed as retaliation for the victim’s complaint about the preceding smack to her buttocks, (2) the victim lived in the same neighborhood as Harris, and (3) none of their mutual neighbors had come to her assistance after the assault. This was sufficient to allow the district court to conclude that there was “a possibility” of reprisal if the victim were to testify against Harris. United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2002); accord United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s finding that reliability 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that history of domestic violence provides good cause for declarants absence (B) holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause (C) recognizing the cause of action (D) holding that a good work history may be deemed probative of credibility (E) recognizing cause of action
Output: (A)
downtown at the polygraph.” Defense counsel continued the examination until Judge Morrissey called for a sidebar. Considering any error to have been harmless, Judge Morrissey denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Judge Morrissey then admonished Pienta not to again make mention of any polygraph. The jury was not instructed because defense counsel indicated that he wanted the subject to be minimized. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, generally, a rule established as controlling in a particular case will continue to be the law of the case, as long as the facts remain the same. (14 Ill. L. & Prac. Law of the Case §74, at 233 (1968); see PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 291, 312; Bradley v. Howard Hembrough Volkswagen, Inc. (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 121, 124 (<HOLDING>); see also Christianson v. Colt Industries 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court is bound by views of law in its previous opinion in a case unless the facts presented require a different interpretation (B) holding that appellate court is not bound by the agencys interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue (C) holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision (D) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (E) holding that claim preclusion did not apply even though the legal theory at issue in that case was addressed in a previous case because the case at issue was based on a different set of operative facts
Output: (A)
concurrence is not required.” Id. at 366; see Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 517 F.Supp. 390, 402 (S.D.W.Va.1981), aff'd, 674 F.2d 279, 283 (4th Cir.1982) (explaining that “courts ... [have] uniformly held that defendant need not have given personal consent to the motion terminating trial”); Jeffers v. United States, 461 F.Supp. 300, 305 (N.D.Ind.1978); State v. Engleman, 634 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Mo.1982); Poretta v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 763, 569 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1991) (“Following the [Supreme] Court’s ruling in Dinitz, there can be no doubt that the Federal Constitution does not condition the permissibility of retrial on the defendant’s personal, explicit assent to a mistrial motion brought by his attorney.”); People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80-82 (1986) (<HOLDING>); People v. Moore, 140 Cal.App.3d 508, 189 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial when defendant was not consulted or present (B) holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial after defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in the midst of trial (C) holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds (D) holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial (E) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted
Output: (A)
‘due process of law.’ ” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quotation omitted) (setting forth the test for determining whether a • procedure meets the minimum requirements of due process). In the context of traffic ticket enforcement and adjudication, procedures substantially similar to Philadelphia’s—which provides ample notice and multiple opportunities for both administrative agency and state court review of disputed parking violations—satisfy the requirements of due process. See Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Gardner v. City of Columbus, 841 F.2d 1272, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we consider issues not raised at administrative level waived (B) holding petitioner may not introduce on appeal issues that were not presented to or considered at the administrative level (C) holding that chicagos system whichprovided only one level of administrative hearing before appeal to the state courts was sufficient (D) holding that where plaintiff fails to raise issue of timeliness of departments hearing at administrative level the issue is waived on appeal (E) holding chicagos system for adjudicating parking violations satisfied due process
Output: (C)
For instance, for some procedural purposes, habeas proceedings are considered “civil.” See, e.g., Browder v. Director, Illinois-Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269, 98 S.Ct. 556, 563, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (“It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.”); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60, 2 S.Ct. 871, 872-73, 27 L.Ed. 826 (1883) (habeas corpus review is a civil proceeding because its purpose is to enforce civil rights). Yet for other purposes, they are not. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1087-88, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) (“Essentially, the proceeding is unique. Habeas corpus practice in the federal courts has conformed with civil practice only in a general sense.”); Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 971 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The same inconsistency exists in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habeas corpus is not a civil action for purposes of the equal access to justice act provision for award of attorney fees to prevailing party (B) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (C) holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (D) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus (E) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees
Output: (A)
however, that the ballot summary is defective for three reasons: (A) it fails to inform voters that deauthorization of slot machines would require another constitutional amendment; (B) it fails to inform voters of the proposed amendment’s effect on the extant constitutional provisions concerning lotteries; and (C) it fails to inform voters that the amendment authorizes the Legislature to license and regulate slot machines. We address these in turn. A. Is the Ballot Summary Defective Because It Fails to Inform Voters that Deauthorization of Slot Machines Would Require Another Constitutional Amendment? The opponents first argue that the summary fails to inform voters that de-au-thorization of slot machines would require another constitutional amendment. See Askew, 421 So.2d at 156 (<HOLDING>). Last year we rejected this same argument as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto (B) holding that an affidavit denying what is established by ones own evidence  does not preclude summary judgment (C) holding the ballot summary defective and commenting that the problem therefore lies not with what the summary says but rather with what it does not say (D) holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art (E) holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say
Output: (C)
in nature and may be waived if not timely raised. Section 1445(c) applies to prohibit the removal of a civil action arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of a state. It does not prohibit federal district court’s from exercising supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367. The state worker compensation statutes themselves may affect the court’s jurisdiction by requiring claims to be filed with an administrative agency. However, such is not the case for claims of retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under Michigan’s WDCA. As noted above, the expeditious and inexpensive procedures found in Michigan’s WDCA are not utilized when an employee alleges retaliatory discharge. Such a claim is treated like any other tort and can be filed in state court. See Delke, 460 N.W.2d at 327-28 (<HOLDING>); see also Lamoria, 584 N.W.2d at 600; Chiles 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (B) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (C) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (D) holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws (E) holding that the bureau of workers disability compensation did not have jurisdiction to hear retaliation claims and explaining that the michigan legislatures intent was not to create an administrative remedy for retaliatory discharge
Output: (E)
argument that the predicate acts of racketeering were unrelated, and emphasizing that “the named Defendants were all deputies of the Robeson County Sheriffs Office” and that the “connection between the criminal conduct of the Defendants [was] their abuse of power to further criminal activity”). The court also concludes that the allegations in the first indictment are sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement. As previously noted, to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, “it must also be shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or that they otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (emphasis in original). The continuity requirement is “both a closed- and open-ended co d 688, 690 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the nature of the alleged 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indictment was sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement since it alleged that the defendants conduct occurred over a period of eight years (B) holding that the defendants predicate acts of racketeering that occurred over a tenyear period met the requirements of continuity notwithstanding the closedended nature of the acts (C) holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period (D) holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred (E) holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment
Output: (B)
among other things, the nature of the charge, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible penalty. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(c)(1). However, in determining that a defendant understands the consequences of his plea, the judge is not required to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea, but only of the direct consequences of it. See, e.g., State v. Fox, 659 So.2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The determination of whether a consequence of a plea is direct or collateral “ ‘turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.’ ” Zambuto v. State, 413 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>)). We agree with the state that the effects of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation does not constitute a sentence (B) holding that enhancement of sentence after violation of probation was collateral rather than direct consequence of plea (C) holding that the sanction of deportation is a collateral not direct consequence of a guilty plea (D) holding that probation is not a sentence (E) holding that an enhancement in a future sentence based on the present conviction is a collateral consequence and need not be advised of by the district court in its plea colloquy
Output: (B)
Judge. In this direct appeal, Scottie Lee White challenges his judgment and sentence for second-degree murder. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm without prejudice to White’s right to file a motion for postcon-viction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Corzo v. State, 806 So.2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court will consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only in rare instances where counsels ineffectiveness is clearly apparent from the record prejudice to the defendant is obvious and no tactical explanation for the conduct can be conceived (B) holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced (C) holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be decided on direct appeal where the district court has developed a record on the ineffectiveness issue (D) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record
Output: (A)
a plaintiff must show that he suffered a violation of a constitutional right and that the violation was committed under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corporation, 918 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir.1990). Traditionally, a defendant must have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law for its conduct to constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Accordingly, a private entity’s conduct may become so entwined with governmental policies, or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755-57 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has articulated two tests 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a private plaintiff may not being an action under the family educational rights and privacy act of 1974 because that statute does not create personal rights to enforce under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 (D) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (E) holding that to the extent that private hospital acted in furtherance of a child welfare statute and not medical considerations it may be held liable under 42 usc  1983
Output: (E)
was the owner of the Property on this record. Our caselaw holds that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to forfeiture cases as long as a rule does not conflict with a specific provision of the Forfeiture Act. With respect to whether summary judgment applies to forfeiture proceedings, summary judgment is appropriate in a forfeiture case where a hearing would serve absolutely no purpose, such as where the material facts are not in dispute. Summary judgment was appropriate because Palaz-zari was the legal owner of the Property on the Deed. Judge LEADBETTER joins in this dissent. 1 . These cases applied the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pr o what constitutes proper service by certified mail. See Commonwealth v. One 1991 Cadillac Seville Vin 1G6CD53B9M4342561, 853 A.2d 1093 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (<HOLDING>). CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY Judge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper procedure to prove prior convictions is to offer a certified copy of the conviction (B) recognizing presumption of effective service by regular mail (C) holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail (D) holding rules of civil procedure are appropriate in determining what constitutes proper service by certified mail (E) holding that if service done by certified mail action commenced upon receipt of summons and complaint
Output: (D)
of the rules of procedure, the court must, in effect, fit the punishment to the crime. “Although the trial court’s discretion to choose an appropriate sanction is broad, when a court imposes a ‘drastic’ sanction such as dismissal or default we will closely scrutinize the court’s decision.” Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281, 288. [¶ 17] In determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon a party for failure to comply with the rules, the court should take into account the purpose of the specific rule at issue, the party’s conduct throughout the proceedings, the party’s bonafides in its failure to comply, prejudice to other parties, and the need for the orderly administration of justice. See, e.g., Estate of Dineen, 1998 ME 268, ¶ 11, 721 A.2d 185, 188 (<HOLDING>); Ricci v. Delehanty, 1998 ME 281, ¶ 15, 719 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sanctions were appropriate due to prejudice imposed on other party from failure to disclose subject matter of expert testimony (B) holding sanctions were appropriate when excessive responsive pleadings were filed for purposes of delay (C) holding sanctions were appropriate where party filed motions merely for purposes of delay (D) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (E) holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined
Output: (C)
E. g., In Re Matter of Grand Jury Applicants, C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 619 F.2d 1022, at 1024 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1979); In Re Faltico, 561 F.2d 109, 110 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977); Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942, 98 S.Ct. 1521, 55 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 756-57 (1st Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 98, 34 L.Ed.2d 165 (1972). See United States v. Ryan, supra (<HOLDING>). But see In Re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing general rule (B) recognizing perlman rule (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing this rule (E) holding that nonparty witnesses may not appeal discovery orders but noting in dictum that perlman rule is most common exception to the general rule that pretrial disclosure orders are not appealable
Output: (B)
Sullivan told the bankruptcy court that pending the resolution of the involuntary bankruptcy case, Focus intended to make ordinary business expenditures and would preserve and protect the company’s assets. As noted supra in Section I-D, that day, Sullivan authorized the disbursement of $700,000 of Focus’ funds in a severance package to himself, Rubin, Rubin’s adult children, and others. A rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Sullivan’s statement to the court was knowingly false. A rational juror could also have convicted Rubin for aiding and abetting the statement. Rubin participated in several meetings with Sullivan and Mousseau where they prepared declarations in response to Sears’ motion to appoint an interim trustee. Cf. McCormick, 72 F.3d at 1410-11 (<HOLDING>). In a January 28, 2002 declaration, Sullivan 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement (B) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (C) holding evidence of false statement was insufficient where an appellant signed a bankruptcy petition without reading it (D) holding that evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant remained unlawfully on school property because as a minor appellant could not leave school without parental consent (E) holding that because appellant was not under arrest or detained at time he gave officer a false name the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for failure to identify
Output: (C)
may move for a dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to relief, without waiving the right to offer evidence if the motion is not granted. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the party seeking affirmative relief or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence.... Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b) (emphasis added). See Swait v. Swait, 958 So.2d 552, 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (applying Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420 in a modification of alimony action). We have repeatedly held that a trial court may not involuntarily dismiss an action before the plaintiff has rested its case. See Wachovia Mortg., FSB v. Montes, 156 So.3d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>); Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So.2d 482, 483 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court (B) holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multicount complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action (C) holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence (D) holding that the trial court reversibly erred in involuntarily dismissing the case before the plaintiff finished presenting its caseinchief (E) holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim
Output: (D)
rely on a license for a defense. See Model Penal Code § 3.01(1) (“[JJustification is an affirmative defense.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 977 (10th ed.2014) (defining “justification” as “[a] showing, in court, of a sufficient reason why a defendant acted in a way that, in the absence of the reason, would constitute the offense with which the defendant is charged”). To say that a defendant must prove licensure in those instances when he relies on a license for his defense implies that there may be other instances in which licensure is not viewed as a defense, and in those instances the defendant may not need to prove it. Otherwise, there would have been no need for the legislature to include the limiting language. See Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalberb, 454 Mass. 407, 910 N.E.2d 330, 336 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the text of section 7, standing alone, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that under massachusetts law statutes are construed to avoid surplusage (B) recognizing that statutes should be construed to avoid conflict and to form a harmonious whole (C) holding dormancy statutes should be strictly construed (D) holding that wire and mail fraud statutes are construed identically (E) holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused
Output: (A)
was legally insufficient to prove lost profits). They also argue there was undisputed evidence that she retained the shares, sold assets of the company, and kept the proceeds for herself. When examining a legal-sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge very reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.2005). We credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. at 827. The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. When examining a factual-sufficie , Inc., 744 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied) (<HOLDING>), Here, the jury was instructed that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the customary measure of damages for a vendors failure or refusal to convey land was inapplicable the measure of damages must be flexible enough to vary with the necessities of the situation (B) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed (C) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (D) holding in conflict of laws analysis that it was proper to apply the law of the state of washington as to the measure of damages which involved the substantive rights of the parties (E) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages
Output: (C)
the collective or class-wide nature of the charge.”). “The policy behind the single filing rule is that ‘[i]t would be wasteful, if not vain, for numerous employees, all with the same grievance, to have to process many identical complaints with the EEOC.’ ” Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir.1968)). “As long as the EEOC and the company are aware of the nature and scope of the allegations, the purposes behind the filing requirement are satisfied and no injustice or contravention of congressional intent occurs by allowing piggybacking.” Id. at 1223. Our threshold task is to determine the time frame that gave rise to Thiessen’s claims of discrimination. See Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 532 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Thiessen is relying on the continuing 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal (B) holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court (C) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court (D) holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   (E) holding that for purposes of singlefiling rule the first issue is the effective scope of the eeoc charge actually filed
Output: (E)
It was undisputed, ho nkruptcy petition on March 7, 2001. The petition scheduled the Board as a priority creditor in the estimated amount of $10,000. The bankruptcy court then sent the Board official notice of the petition. The notice indicated that the meeting of creditors would be held on April 19, 2001, and that the claims bar date for governmental claims was September 3, 2001. The parties do not dispute that this notice complied with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the Board does not contend that it did not receive this official notice. Therefore, like the creditor in Gregory, the Board received constitutionally adequate notice of its right to payment — in the form of the official notice mandated by the Bankruptcy Code — and it ignored the Joyes’ bankruptcy 88) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as the Joyes correctly point out, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time (B) holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors (C) holding that because creditor did not file a proof of claim on a prepetition contract matter the peculiar powers of the bankruptcy court had not been invoked (D) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons (E) holding that the operative fact is whether or not the creditor has notice of the debtors bankruptcy proceeding in time to file a timely proof of claim
Output: (E)
“reasonable collection and legal costs” to DLL in the event of a breach by Dr. Rozentsvit. DLL claimed it had incurred $6,898.00 in counsel fees in pursuing its breach of contract and collection action against Dr. Rozent-svit. DLL also attached an affidavit from counsel and the appropriate billing records to support its claim. In conclusion, DLL requested the court to assess costs in the amount of $6,898.00 to Dr. Rozentsvit. ¶23 In substance, DLL’s “petition to assess collection and legal costs” was intended to perform the same function as a motion pursuant to Rule 227.1. Had DLL simply labeled its petition as a “motion for post-trial relief,” Dr. Rozentsvit could not dispute its validity. See Gemini Equipment Co. v. Pennsy Supply Inc., 407 Pa.Super. 404, 595 A.2d 1211, 1214 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, DLL timely filed its petition on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding reasonable an agency determination that a request for an investigative file did not include the employment file (B) holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition (C) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence (D) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion (E) holding defendant did not waive issues by failing to file posttrial motions where defendant did file petition for reconsideration which was intended to function as posttrial motion
Output: (E)
may assert the statute of limitations defense by filing a motion to dismiss under Article 27.08(2)”). 27 . Indeed, in his brief, appellant candidly states that "this entire appeal could have been avoided if the State had simply amended the existing information to comply with appellant’s complaints. There was nothing that prevented the State from filing a motion to amend the information, even while the case was on appeal.” Indeed, had appellant brought his appellate level complaints about the purported defects in the tolling provision to the attention of the State by means of a motion to dismiss or quash the information filed in the trial court, this appeal could (and presumably would) have been avoided. 28 . See Burton v. State, 805 S.W.2d 564, 571 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>). 29 . See Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to allege facts tolling the statute of limitations did not make indictment fundamentally defective or deprive trial court of jurisdiction defendants failure to object to this defect before trial waived error on appeal (B) holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal (C) holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object (D) holding that a failure to object to the error in the indictment at trial waives a right to challenge the indictment at a latter stage in the proceedings (E) holding that failure to object to trial court about violations of federal and state due process waived appellate review of those claims
Output: (A)
discretion to revisit Judge Johnson’s order, but this is not to say that district courts should take lightly reconsideration of the orders of their colleagues. As the D.C. Circuit has stated, “[i]nconsis-tency is the antithesis of the rule of law. For judges, the most basic principle of jurisprudence is that we must act alike in all ease of like nature.” LaShaum v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that the law of the case doctrine helps implement this principle). Thus, although Judge Johnson’s order is not “subject to” the law of the case doctrine, Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1020, nothing prevents the court from applying the rationales of that doctrine to guide a Rule 54(b) decision. Virgin Atlantic Airways v. National Mediation Board, 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); c†. Lan-gevine, 106 F.3d at 1023-24 (quoting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if rule 54b allows parties to request district courts to revisit earlier rulings the moving party must do so within the strictures of the law of the case doctrine (B) holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so (C) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case (D) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth resulted from a mistaken view of the law by earlier courts (E) recognizing that an appellant seeking to establish that the district court abused its discretion must do so by a discussion of facts arguments and rulings that appear in the record
Output: (A)