niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
First, we address the trial court’s inclusion of a motorcycle in its equitable distribution scheme. The husband claimed the motorcycle had been stolen, but counsel for the appellee (“the wife”) argued it should be included in the equitable distribution scheme and assigned its value at the time of filing, which counsel asserted was about $7,999. During the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the parties did not present any evidence regarding the value of the motorcycle. The trial court, apparently rejecting the testimony that the motorcycle had been stolen, included it in equitable distribution and assigned it a value of $7,999. The trial court did not err in rejecting the husband’s claim that the motorcycle was stolen. See Maurer v. State, 668 So.2d 1077, 1079 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the court erred in assigning a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a judge sitting as a factfinder may reject a witnesss uncontradicted testimony (B) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility (C) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (D) holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay (E) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony
Output: (A)
violations that the Guidelines classify as Grade C, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.”) § 7B 1.4(a), p.s., have not received prison terms following supervised release revocations. Mr. Manning's comparatively short sentence was imposed on March 31, 2008. Mr. Manning had been detained on the supervised release revocation charge for more than two months before sentencing. At this juncture, although the clock has not run on the ten months, if Mr. Manning was given the statutorily prescribed credit for that time, see, e.g., Weekes v. Fleming, 301 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)), in all likelihood he has completed his sentence. Indeed, publicly available Bureau of Prison records indicate that Mr. Manning completed his prison 883-84 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). And, even if there were some very slight room 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release (B) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (C) holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions
Output: (E)
opportunity to view the defendant); Lewisohn v. State, 433 A.2d 351, 355 (Me.1981) (concluding, in hab .2d 517, 522-23 (App.1982) (concluding, in a personal injury action arising from a fall at a roller skating rink, that the trial court properly admitted testimony of two lay witnesses, who 'were experienced skaters present on the night of the accident, regarding safety procedures used by the defendant on the night of the accident); Lee v. State, 661 P.2d 1345, 1354-55 (Okla.Crim.App.1983) (concluding that an investigating police officer could testify that spots on a carpet were blood, and that a chemist, testifying on other matters, could offer a lay opinion that the type of glass found at a murder location was safety glass); Williamson v. O’Neill, 696 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). 11 . For example, in United States v. Myers, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 3877160 clearly limits the amount of coverage which may be stacked from policies on vehicles not involved in the accident to an amount no greater than the coverage of the vehicle involved in that accident (B) holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident (C) holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person (D) holding that probable cause was clearly present justifying the taking of a blood sample without the defendants consent when it was established that the defendant was involved in an automobile accident and the police noticed liquor on his breath at the scene of the accident and at the hospital (E) holding that the driver of a tractortrailer rig a codefendant in a personal injury lawsuit arising froman autotruck accident was uniquely qualified as the experienced driver of the rig involved in the accident to offer a lay opinion as to the reason the trailer separated from the tractor since his opinion would be rationally based on his firsthand perceptions of the accident and would help determine causation
Output: (E)
as in his judgment, properly exercised, the case must have appeared to require; in other words that he neglected the proper treatment from inattention and carelessness.” Morrill v. Tilney, 128 N.H. 773, 779-80 (1986); see RSA 508:13 (1997). Due care, howeve 9) (noting “error in judgment” language is basically ambiguous and subjective); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn. 1983) (noting “bona fide error in Judgment” instruction confusing because it implies only an error in judgment made in bad faith actionable); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting “honest error in judgment” instruction as inappropriately imposing subjective language when defining standard of care); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Parodi v. Washoe Medical Ctr., 892 P.2d 588, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (B) holding mere error of judgment instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent (C) holding that even though the governments conduct may have been negligent or even grossly negligent it did not rise to the level of flagrant misconduct (D) recognizing that a party that objects to a jury instruction before the jury retires may challenge the instruction on appeal (E) holding that any error in trial courts comparative negligence instruction was harmless where the jury found that both defendants were not negligent
Output: (B)
decision); id. at 451-52 (rejecting the argument that removal violated the Equal Protection Clause because of a difference in the timing and location of proceedings); id. at 452 (finding an argument based on international law waived). Rather, he contends that “summary decision on this case would result in overlooking legal arguments” that were not presented in Salazar-Regino. The relief Petitioner seeks would require us to act contrary to prior precedent. However, one panel of this court cannot overrule a prior panel decision. See id. at 448 (court obliged to follow the panel decision in Hernandez-Avalos); Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 282 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) (“[I]n this Circuit, one panel cannot overrule another”); Williams v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because we are obliged to follow 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ajbsent en banc reconsideration we are bound by prior decisions of this circuit (B) recognizing that a later en banc court may overrule an earlier en banc opinion (C) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc (D) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (E) holding that circuit court decisions bind circuit unless and until overturned by the court en banc or by higher authority
Output: (A)
technician positions are “irreducibly military in nature.” Id. Unpersuaded by the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the civilian nature of her duties, the court went as far as noting that “the National Guard as a whole is irreducibly military.” Id. at 440. The Sixth Circuit has adhered to this “bright line” rule and has continued to consistently hold that, because dual-status National Guard positions are “irreducibly military in nature,” discrimination claims brought by such technicians are non-justi-ciable. See e.g., Weaver v. Tennessee National Guard, 30 Fed.Appx. 554 (6th Cir.2002) (Title VII claim barred); Brown v. Roche, 206 Fed.Appx. 430, 432 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of plaintiffs ADEA claim); see also Bowers v. Wynne, 615 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In Bowers, the district court determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (B) holding title vii and rehabilitation claims brought by a dualstatus air reserve technician barred (C) recognizing ageplusgender discrimination claim when complaint brought claims under adea and title vii (D) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred (E) holding that air force mechanic was barred by feres from bringing claims under title vii and accordingly the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims under rule 12b1
Output: (B)
designation of "Defendants” refers to James P. Brines and Joyce L. Brines, husband and wife, and William L. Gehrs Jr., and Betty Jo Gehrs, husband and wife. 2 . Details of the real estate transaction and descriptions of the contract documents may be found in Brines I and are only repeated here when required to understand the issues presented. 3 . Defendants sought joinder of Meekers as "parties plaintiff.” The trial court merely sustained the joinder motion without designating Meekers' status. Even so, the trial court and the parties themselves have consistently referred to Meekers as "defendants.” Because of the peculiar circumstances, however, the more appropriate designation of Meekers is "counterclaim defendants.” 4 . See e.g. Davis v. Allen, 740 S.W.2d 699, 700[3] (Mo.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Farrell v. DeClue, 382 S.W.2d 462, 466[1] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest (B) holding a judgment aggrieves a party if it directly affects some pecuniary or property interest that the party possesses (C) holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution (D) holding that a party does not automatically qualify as a real party in interest merely because it has been named as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action (E) holding that even assuming government was a party in interest in the delaware case and that the party in interest status was sufficient to make the delaware plan binding upon it the government did not receive adequate notice that confirmation might affect its pecuniary interest
Output: (B)
a heated, possibly violent argument, the only apartment from which there were any recent signs of activity. Because the argument stopped suddenly after Moore left the third-floor apartment, it was reasonable for the officers to suspect„that he was a participant in that argument. Upon seeing the officers, Moore clenched his hand in a manner indicating that he was attempting to hide something from the officers. Moore therefore was reasonably linked not only with indicia of drug activity, but of a violent confrontation. The hour was late and the neighborhood dangerous. Together, these circumstances supported the officers’ decision to search Moore’s hand for weapons within the lawful scope of the Terry stop. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 26 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers observation of exchange of small object and money in a known drug trafficking area constituted reasonable suspicion (B) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop an occupant of a parked car based on his presence late at night in an area known for drug activity his leaning over the car console with a faint light and his attempt to hide something upon seeing a police officer (C) holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop (D) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers (E) holding defendants unprovoked flight from area of heavy narcotic trafficking after noticing uniformed officers provided reasonable suspicion to detain and stating headlong flight wherever it occurs  is the consummate act of evasion it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such
Output: (D)
to challenge the trial court’s order. We reject this argument. The district court had jurisdiction to review the order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(C), which grants appellate jurisdiction over criminal court orders “entered after final judgment or finding of guilt.” See also art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const, (granting district courts authority to review interlocutory or ders to the extent provided by rules of the Supreme Court). The designation of an offender as a sexual predator is based on the offender’s conviction for one of the crimes specified in the Act. § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The order designating a defendant a sexual predator is thus entered after final judgment or a finding of guilt. See Thomas v. State, 716 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Downs v. State, 700 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 6e motion filed after criminal proceedings terminated was independent proceeding and that order entered was final and appealable under  1291 because it conclusively resolved disclosure issue which was only issue raised (B) holding that an order awarding attorney fees is not appealable and instead the proper appeal lies from the judgment or amended judgment entered on the order (C) holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity (D) holding that an order designating a defendant a sexual predator was entered after defendant was convicted and sentenced and is therefore appealable as an order entered after a finding of guilt pursuant to rule 9140b1c (E) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions
Output: (D)
of judgment); Fed.R.CivJP. 62(a) (requiring prevailing parties to wait until ten days after the date on which a judgment is entered before they may execute on a judgment); Fed.R.App.P. 4 (requiring that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the date on which a judgment is entered). The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 58 bolster this conclusion. Those notes state that the rule is designed to eliminate uncertainties about precisely when a court rendered a judgment. Such uncertainties had arisen in contexts analogous to the one in the instant case, where courts wrote opinions or memoranda “con 2d 940, 942 (5th Cir.1987) (discussing the Advisory Committee’s concern with eliminating uncertainties); Duffer v. American Home Assurance Co., 512 F.2d 793, 799 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). See generally 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law (B) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment (E) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment
Output: (B)
to the jury that an enterprise “must have a structure for making decisions.” It then instructed the jury that”[t]he structure must provide a mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the entity on an ongoing continuous basis, rather than an ad hoc basis.” (emphasis added). The district court did not further define the term “ad hoc.” “In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberation.” Shryock, 342 F.3d at 986 (citation omitted). Appellants do not claim that the instruction as a whole is misleading or inadequate, a wise course since the language of the instruction is virtually identical to that set forth by this court in Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Appellants are therefore left to argue that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an enterprise under rico need not have a businesslike structure and can have a rather informal organization (B) holding that to constitute an enterprise under rico the enterprises structure must provide some mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an ongoing rather than an ad hoc basis (C) holding that in order to plead adequate rico complaint plaintiff must allege that defendant had some part in the direction of the alleged enterprises affairs (D) holding that defendant who was associated with the enterprise and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when he repeatedly violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws was not liable under  1962c because he had no part in directing the enterprises affairs (E) holding that cases claiming that government action requires just compensation must be determined on an ad hoc  basis
Output: (B)
British jurists have suggested that the Bill of Rights of 1689, a document relevant to the interpretation of our own Constitution, may forbid, as cruel and unusual, significantly lesser delays. Riley v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 719, 734-735 (P. C. 1982) (Lord Scarman, joined by Lord Brightman, dissenting). See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 966-967 (1991) (Scaua, J., concurring in judgment) (on the relevance of the 1689 Bill of Rights to the interpretation of our own Constitution). Finally, a reasoned answer to the “delay” question could help to ease the practical anomaly created when foreign courts refuse to extradite capital defendants to America for fear of undue delay in execution. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H. R. Rep. 439 (1989) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, and for the additional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant (B) holding that the extradition of a capital defendant to america would be a violation of article 3 of the european convention on human rights primarily because of the risk of delay before execution (C) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (D) holding that a stay of a capital prisoners execution is substantive (E) holding that execution of a defendant who commits a capital crime while under the age of eighteen is prohibited by the eighth amendment
Output: (B)
failed to complete the assignment and warranty of title to H & L on the same certificate. See Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-32(a) (Supp. 1988). Winn is still listed on the certificate as the registered owner, and under Georgia law, the certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-25(c) (1985). Although our reading of the Georgia statutes yields the conclusion that ownership of the Buick did not pass to the dealership or to H & L since the certificate of title was not properly assigned, it appears that Georgia courts interpreting the same statutes would reach a different conclusion. See, e.g., American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Mote v. Mote, 134 Ga. App. 668, 215 S.E.2d 487 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Winn’s evidence regarding the sale of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (B) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (C) holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes (D) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (E) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received
Output: (B)
except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (emphasis added); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 642, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (recognizing that “ ‘[w]here the [remand] order is based on one of the grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand’ ”) (citing Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977)); Milton I. Shadur, Traps for the Unwary in Removal and Remand, 33 no. 3 Litigation 43 (2007); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 2418, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007) (<HOLDING>). B. Defendant’s Burden on Removal The burden 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subjectmatter jurisdiction appellate review is barred by  1447d (B) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case (C) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction (D) holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute (E) holding review of remand order based on forum selection clause not barred by  1447d
Output: (A)
diagnoses were indicated and that Plaintiff’s medical records “continue[d] to support from a psych standpoint” only. (AR 254.) However, the record is inadequate to support MetLife’s rejection of a comorbid diagnosis in favor of finding Plaintiff was disabled solely due to her bipolar disorder that was in partial remission at the time she was diagnosed as having dementia. The Court finds Dr. Stallings’ opinions, based on an eight-year treating relationship with Plaintiff and his consideration of Dr. Whitehurst and Dr. Carstens’s reports, the MRI results, and repeated neuropsychological testing results to be far more reliable than the opinions of Met-Life’s three IPC’s whose opinions were each based on a single file review. See Oliver v. Coca Cola Co., 497 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 450 F.3d 253, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious (B) holding that defendants denial of employees claim for failure to provide objective evidence was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on a mischaracterization of the evidence employee submitted (C) holding it is not arbitrary and capricious to request additional evidence of continuing disability (D) holding that court may set aside lsc decisions that are arbitrary and capricious or are not based on substantial evidence (E) holding that the citys decision was arbitrary and capricious when it was contrary to the evidence and based solely on speculation arising from prior unrelated acts
Output: (B)
Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the entire $5,830,000 underlying judgment in this bad faith action. Plaintiffs here are only entitled to $5,730,000—the principal amount of the judgment that exceeds the $100,000 policy limits subsequently paid by Nationwide. The parties disagreed over whether, under Georgia law (as opposed to Nationwide’s policy language discussed above at page 41-45), Nationwide’s partial payment of its $100,000 policy limits should be credited to the principal amount of the underlying judgment for purposes of calculating post-judgment interest. Under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-17, “[w]hen a payment is made upon any debt, it shall be applied first to the discharge of any interest due at the time.” Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga.App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159, 163 (2003) (<HOLDING>). On February 23, 2011, the date Nationwide 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits (B) holding that for the purpose of applying ocga  7417 judgments are debts and parties to litigation can be judgment debtors or creditors and that ocga  7417 controls how payments for less than the full amount of a judgment should be allocated between principal and interest (C) recognizing that a final judgment may exist even where no judgment has been entered in accordance with ocga  91158 b (D) holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest  owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal (E) holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case
Output: (B)
effect of an admission by a defendant against a codefendant. {10} Although Rule 1-036 does not address whether a defendant’s deemed admissions can be used against a codefendant, this Court has held that such admissions may not be used against a codefendant. See Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 236, 668 P.2d 1104, 1113 (Ct.App.1983) (stating that Rule 1-036 admissions apply to and bind the party making the admissions, not codefendants). Moreover, other courts that have addressed this issue have likewise concluded that the admissions of a defendant cannot be used against a codefendant. See, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir.1997) (“Deemed admissions by a party opponent cannot be used against a co-party.”); United States v. Wheeler, 161 F.Supp. 193, 198 (W.D.Ark.1958) (<HOLDING>); Darnall v. Petersen, 8 Neb.App. 185, 592 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner (B) holding that failure to file timely responses to a request for admissions renders them admitted (C) holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice (D) holding that facts deemed admitted as to one defendant because of his failure to respond to the plaintiffs request for admissions are not binding on a codefendant (E) holding that requests for admissions seeking purely legal conclusions are inappropriate and the failure to respond to such a request may not be the basis for a summaiy judgment
Output: (D)
to allow plaintiff to add a claim for breach of contract, which had a fifteen-year statute of limitations. The action was brought outside the one-year but within the fifteen-year statute. On appeal, the appellate court reviewed the Puerto Rican statutes pertaining to conversion and breach of contract, decided that the district court did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to add the contract claim, and concluded that plaintiffs action still would have been time-barred because “given the applicability of COGSA [to the foreign bill of lading at issue], [plaintiff] cannot circumvent COGSA’s operation by couching its complaint in terms of conversion or breach of contract.” Barretto Peat, 896 F.2d at 661 (citing Miller Export Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 534 F.Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>)). In an Eleventh Circuit ease, Generali v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to maintain sufficient internal controls to avoid fraud is  indicative of scienter (B) holding that cogsa controls shippers claim against carrier even though the purported fraud or negligence is alleged to have occurred prior to loading or subsequent to discharge (C) holding that the right to discharge factor supported contractor status even though the company was only required to provide thirty days notice to discharge a motor carrier (D) holding that  65551 another part of the medical liability act applied to the plaintiffs claim of fraud against a defendant physician because the alleged fraud occurred during preoperative doctorpatient consultations (E) holding that a plaintiff has a duty to plead the date of discovery of fraud where the alleged fraud apparently occurred at a remote time
Output: (B)
other court’s construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
Output: (E)
claims makes them amenable to class action litigation, the geographical location of the class members is Texas, and the likelihood that class members would be unable to prosecute individual lawsuits because most do not know of the existence of the causes of action accruing to them as a result of LSRC’s unlicensed-public-adjuster status—all weigh in favor of class certification. The Keys satisfied rule 42(a)’s numerosity requirement. See, e.g., Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 557 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (“Because the estimate of potential class members ranges as high as 14,000, the Court has no difficulty concluding that a class certified in this cause would satisfy the numerosity requirement”); Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1038 (6th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. J. Legis. Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) recognizing that in determining numerosity the proper focus is not on numbers alone but on whether joinder of all members is practicable in view of the numerosity of the class and all other relevant factors (C) holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class (D) recognizing that in determining numerosity courts must consider the geographical dispersion of the class the ease with which class members may be identified the nature of the action and the size of each plaintiffs claim (E) holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity
Output: (D)
Guide to a New Arrival, 55 Ala. Law. 84, 88 (1994). Today, “most courts [ ] recognize the distinction between causing [a birth defect] and causing the parents to lose the option to terminate the pregnancy, [and] the latter causation standard is widely accepted in jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth actions.” Gold, supra, at 1013 (citing Robak, supra, 658 F.2d at 477; Keel, supra, 624 So.2d at 1027). The appropriate proximate cause question, therefore, is not whether the doctor’s negligence caused the fetal defect; the congenital harm suffered by the child is expressly not compensable. Rather, the determination to be made is whether the doctors’ inadequate disclosure deprived the parents of their deeply personal right to decide for themselves whether to 2d 232, 237 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Smith, supra, 513 A.2d at 347 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding woman who alleged she was terminated for having an abortion stated a prima facie case for discrimination (B) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that plaintiff satisfies causation by showing that in absence of defendants negligence she would have obtained abortion (D) holding that plaintiff must establish that had she learned of impairment during her pregnancy she would have terminated pregnancy (E) holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired
Output: (C)
judgment motion by mail does not implicate Rule 6(e), because Martin’s deadline depended on the date that Akzo filed its summary judgment motion with the court. To the extent that Martin views his error as excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), he is mistaken. Martin’s ignorance of local rules or misconstruction of their applicability does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir.1993) (“Gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of the law are insufficient bases for 60(b)(1) relief.”). In addition, Martin’s misinterpretation of the Rule 6(e) does not constitute the type of excusable neglect required to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(1). Midwest Employers Casualty Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Because Martin’s misinterpretation of Local 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the misinterpretation of rule 6e did not rise to the level of excusable neglect where the plaintiffappellee believed he had three additional days to file a motion for a new trial because the courts judgment was served by mail (B) holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect (C) holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review (D) holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment (E) holding that jurisdiction in the district court was terminated by the trial courts order to close the case and that dss was required to file a new petition alleging neglect
Output: (A)
property and that he has “clean hands” with respect to that property. Id. The First Circuit has held that “a Rule 41(g) motion is properly denied if the defendant is not entitled to lawful possession of the seized property, the property is contraband or subject to forfeiture, or the government’s need for the property as evidence continues.” United States v. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 87 (1st Cir.2007) (quotation omitted). If the government wishes to retain the property, it must have and state a legitimate reason for doing so. United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.2001). The government is not obligated to return property that it no longer possesses, but it must provide some evidentiary support for its claim that it no longer has possession of the property. See id. (<HOLDING>). In this case, Garcon’s opening brief does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation (B) holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury not to draw any adverse inferences from the governments failure to call a witness because the witness did not have a relationship with the government such that one would expect him to give testimony in favor of the government (C) holding that even if the district court had erred by not allowing the plaintiff leave to file a reply brief any error was harmless because it did not prejudice the plaintiffs rights (D) holding that the district court erred when it relied on the governments representation that the property sought by the defendant had been destroyed because the government did not submit any evidence of the propertys destruction (E) holding that the district court erred when it relied on neuschafer for the proposition that dismissal of mixed habeas petitions is not the rule in the ninth circuit 
Output: (D)
than the Confrontation Clause, we review for plain error. See United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our consideration of the district court’s decision begins and ends with the first element of plain error review because we conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of Rios’s cross-examination. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (explaining that the first element of plain error review requires that “there must be an error or defect”). A defendant’s right to cross-examination is not unlimited. United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.2011). The Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied in this regard so Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, establishing a Confrontation Clause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (B) holding that the district court satisfied the confrontation clause by permitting the defendant to present facts concerning the adverse witnesss plea agreement and incentives to cooperate (C) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea
Output: (B)
business, property, or contract tort claims could be withdrawn from the bankruptcy system, contrary to the intent of Congress. Id. at 161. After distinguishing the plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims from other workplace claims that might constitute a financial, business, or property torts, the Ice Cream Liquidation court concluded that such claims fell within Section 157(b)(5). Id. at 162-63. After considering the three approaches as to what constitutes a “personal injury tort claim,” this Court concludes that the middle ground is the correct approach. Using this approach, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ defamation claims constitute personal injury tort claims within the meaning of Section 157(b)(5). See Control Center, L.L.C. v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 279, 286 (M.D.Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hansen, 164 B.R. at 486 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim (B) holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim (C) holding that an embezzlement claim is not a personal injury tort claim (D) holding that a libel claim is a personal injury tort claim (E) holding that a claim for violation of the fair debt collection practices act is not a personal injury tort claim
Output: (A)
must determine “(1) whether the defendant occupied a position of trust; and (2) whether the defendant abused that position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” United States v. West, 56 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C.Cir.1995). 1. Position of Trust. Application note 1 accompanying § 3B1.3, as amended in 1993, indicates that the defining characteristic of a “position of trust” is “professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference).” To illustrate, the commentary provides that a bank teller who steals from the till is not subject to the enhancement because his or her position does not entail professional or managerial discretion. See id.; see also West, 56 F.3d at 221 (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, because a bank executive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust (B) holding that the position of special trust is not dependent on the closeness of the defendants relationship with the child (C) holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute (D) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust (E) holding that courier is not in position of trust
Output: (E)
bank robber’s statement even though the defendant has not stated that he intends to Idll the teller absent cooperation. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (4th Cir.1995)(eoneluding that a threat to shoot a firearm at a person during a robbery, created by an combination of threats or gestures that would put ordinary victim in reasonable fear of his life is express threat of death); United States v. France, 57 F.3d 865, 866-68 (9th Cir.1995)(adopting view of other circuits that statements and other conduct may constitute express threat of death in absence of robber’s explicit threat to Mil victim); United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting restrictive reading of guideline); United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 276-77 (7th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1008 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded (B) holding that the statement i have a gun would cause a reasonable teller to fear being shot and that the phrase i am willing to use it would make a fear of death even more likely (C) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept (D) holding without detailed exposition that i have a gun and am not afraid to use it warranted enhancement (E) holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death
Output: (D)
to June 1, 2013.” (Id). This means that, on average, Plaintiff alleges a loss of roughly $1,912 per month. Assuming that the loss continued to accrue at that rate, at the time of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the loss would have only equated to a total damages claim of about $40,200. In order to have met the $75,000 threshold, based on the allegation of continuing damages alone, Plaintiff would have had to accrue an additional $57,791, or roughly $4,816 per month, in damages between June 1, 2013 and May 20, 2014. Defendant was given no reason to know or believe that Plaintiff would, after the one year period had run, claim an almost threefold increase in damages or that his damages were allegedly accruing at more than double the rate initially claimed. See Barnett, 973 F.Supp. at 1367 (<HOLDING>). Second, Plaintiff contends that there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint (B) holding that equitable exception to one year limit applied where defendant had no reason to believe that plaintiff would increase the scope of claims after the filing of the original complaint (C) holding that the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims (D) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (E) holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action
Output: (B)