niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
file his § 2254 petition, see Lawrence, 421 F.3d at 1226-27; and (2) the co-defendant's affidavit — indicating that neither he nor San Martin knew about a murder plan — is not evidence of actual innocence of the crime or the death penalty, see Sibley, 377 F.3d at 1205. The district court reasoned that regardless of whether Petitioner planned to kill another person, the murdered individual was killed while Petitioner perpetrated a robbery, which still constitutes first-degree felony murder under Florida law. Moreover, the court said, the death penalty remains permissible because Petitioner never challenged several of the aggra ew affidavit in the Statement of Facts is not enough to preserve the issue for appeal. See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., 358 F.3d 840, 847 n. 4 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys reference to having made an argument before the district court in the statement of facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal (B) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (C) holding that this court need not address the merits of an argument raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that an argument not made to the circuit court cannot be raised on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
Output: (A)
ones in the present case, are capable of sustaining “direct physical loss or damage.” The definition of “physical,” as provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, is “[o]f or relating to natural phenomena perceived through the senses (as opposed to the mind); of or relating to matter or the material world; natural; tangible, conCrete.” Oxford English Dictionary, Ohio courts have recognized that “[m]oney deposited in a fund is intangible property,” Walther v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 70 Ohio App.3d 26, 32, 590 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio Ct.App.1990), and that “[i]ntangible personal property, by its very nature, is not capable of being physically possessed.” Denezza v. Denezza, 1996 WL 111812, *2, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 935, at *5 (Ct.App. Mar. 15, 1996) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Falck v. United States, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing limited partnership interest as intangible personal property (B) recognizing that property not subject to physical seizure such as mutual fund shares are intangible property (C) recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property (D) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (E) recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership
Output: (A)
the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence State’s Exhibit 1, consisting of a photograph of the latent print and the defendant’s known print. We must, however, address the defendant’s argument that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to reach a guilty verdict because, if the evidence were insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions would preclude a remand for a new trial. State v. Sweeney, 151 N.H. 666, 672-73 (2005). Ill In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to reach a guilty verdict, we consider all the evidence, including evidence that we have concluded was erroneously admitted. State v. Horak, 159 N.H. 576, 582-83 (2010); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988) (<HOLDING>). To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction (B) holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence (C) holding that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the commonwealth intentionally undertakes to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial (D) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted (E) holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial
Output: (E)
(1982)). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has held that, assuming “the absence of express statutory language precluding the formation of a property right,” a cognizable property interest in a government permit or license requires both a “right to transfer” and a “right to exclude.” Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2005). The government argues that, as a matter of law, a medical license does not meet either of these requirements. The Court agrees. First, it is clear that the holder of a medical license cannot sell or transfer his medical license to another individual or entity; a medical license can only be obtained by-meeting the requirements specified in state law for the holders of such licenses. See Webster, 74 Fed.Cl. at 447 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Filler’s arguments to the contrary are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint (B) holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent (C) holding governments repudiation of license gave patentee right to terminate license (D) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (E) holding that because plaintiff does not have the right to sell assign or otherwise transfer her medical license a medical license does not possess the requisite indicia of transferability
Output: (E)
that the release of the names will provide, we must conclude that the records at issue here are individual records generally subject to the guardians’ authorization requirement contained in the federal P&A statutes. Concluding, however, that the records DRW seeks are individual records does not necessarily preclude the agency from access to at least some of the infor mation. See Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Prog. v. J.S. Tarwater Dev. Ctr., 97 F.3d 492, 497 (11th Cir.1996) (concluding that “it is clear that the [federal P&A statutes] providef] express authority for P&A’s to gain broad access to records, facilities and residents to ensure that the [statutes’] mandates can be effectively pursued”); Miss. Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Cotten, 929 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). DRW repeatedly argues that it is circular to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that facilities have an affirmative duty to implement policies and practices that promote effective pa access (B) holding that negligent misrepresentation is not affirmative defense regarding avoidance of life insurance policies (C) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (D) holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense (E) holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant
Output: (A)
II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed ...” (Emphasis added.) In Montana, it is firmly established that venue, although not an element of the crime, is a “jurisdictional fact” that must be established at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Price, 2002 MT 229, ¶ 11, 311 Mont. 439, ¶ 11, 57 P.3d 42, ¶ 11; State v. Johnson (1993), 257 Mont. 157, 161, 848 P.2d 496, 498. However, this Court has recognized that direct evidence that an offense was committed in a particular county is not required to prove venue. State v. Keeland (1909), 39 Mont. 506, 513, 104 P. 513, 516 (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 257 Mont. at 161, 848 P.2d at 498 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition (B) holding testimony that defendant delivered cocaine maybe 20 or 30 times was sufficient to support conviction (C) holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction (D) holding that circumstantial evidence maybe sufficient to prove venue (E) holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination
Output: (D)
may arise with respect to any forensic evidence. The potential for contamination may present an open field for eross-examination or may be addressed through testimony of defense experts at trial, as is true of other forensic evidence. State v. Cunningham, 197 Or.App. 264, 105 P.3d 929, 932 (2005) (quoting State v. Lyons, 324 Or. 256, 924 P.2d 802, 813 (1996)). There may, however, be instances when forensic evidence, including DNA evidence, is so unreliable that it should be excluded. Connell, 2012 WL 222926, at *9 (stating "[the evidence may be found so tainted that it is totally unreliable and, therefore, must be excluded[,}" but despite discrepancy in dates of obtaining DNA swab sample, it would have been admitted at trial); Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221, 233 (App.1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774, 895 P.2d 1238, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of pending charges and that where the defendant was given a full opportunity outside the presence of the jury to develop a foundation for bias but failed to do so the trial judge did not abuse its discretion (B) holding that the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude dna evidence if errors in the laboratory procedures render it so unreliable that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact but that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (D) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes (E) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence
Output: (B)
2 (emphasis added). In its Clarification, the FCC freed itself of this deadline, continuing to state that the order would last until the Fourth FNPRM but giving no time period in which that would occur. Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, at ¶ ¶ 1, 35. We hold that this extension newly aggrieved CompTel and thus made its petition timely. See Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating that where a party was “aggrieved” by a later interpretation of a rule that it could not have reasonably anticipated, the time limit starts to run at the later event). Cases have held that extension of a temporary order may entitle the parties to seek judicial review of the order. See Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Interstate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged (B) holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership (C) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (D) holding that an alien who procured permanent resident status byconcealing his ineligibility had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence (E) holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right
Output: (A)
322 U.S. 665, 671, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 1243, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944). Mixed questions of law and fact are even more troubling for standard of review purposes. A mixed question is present when the facts are admitted or established and the law is undisputed; the sole issue is whether the law applied to the facts satisfies the statutory standard. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1790, n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). Where the mixed question involves primarily a factual inquiry, the clearly erroneous standard is appropriate. If, however, the mixed question primarily involves the consideration of legal principles, then a de novo review by the appellate court is appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199-1205 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Most appellate courts that have reviewed a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review (B) holding that the mixed question of exigent circumstance is reviewable de novo as a question of law (C) holding that the question whether a party has agreed to submit an issue to arbitration is a question of law requiring de novo review (D) holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo (E) holding that whether the defendants confession was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review
Output: (B)
reopen as untimely. See id. The BIA properly noted that it previously issued the final removal order in February 2004, and Chen did not file her motion to reopen until March 2007, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent Chen argues that the family planning policy will now apply to her in a manner in which it did not apply before she gave birth to two children in the United States, and that such a difference amounts to a change in country conditions, her argument is without merit. Merely reframing her change in personal circumstances as a change in country conditions in China does not bring Chen’s motion within the exceptions to the time limitation on motions to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129,130-31 (2d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Even if Chen’s motion to reopen were subject 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a change in personal circumstances is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances for the purpose of 8 cfr  10032c3h (B) holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala (C) holding that 8 cfr  10032c3ii applies to changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation and not changed personal circumstances in the united states (D) holding that a change in personal circumstances namely the birth of a child in the united states does not fit under the changed circumstances exception provided by 8 cfr  10032c3ii (E) holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions the bia compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below
Output: (C)
398, 399 (1902) (noting that “[t]he gist of [the] offense [of burglary] is the breaking and entering any building with intent to commit a crime therein”). The State contrasts the phrase “without con holding that the crime of possession of a knife on school grounds requires that the defendant know that he possesses the knife). But the State contends these cases are not relevant to our analysis here because, unlike the criminal offenses at issue in Ndilcum and C.R.M., burglary of any degree requires proof of mens rea and is therefore not a strict liability crime. For their part, respondents argue that our precedent establishes that the statute is ambiguous. See Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818-19; In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 805; State v. Florine, 808 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Respondents also contend that construing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance (B) holding that knowledge that a substance is a controlled substance is an element of  952 (C) holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance (D) holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance (E) holding that quantity of the controlled substance does not have to be measurable to support a conviction for possession of such controlled substance particularly when the immeasurable amount of the substance is found on an implement used to consume the substance
Output: (C)
those interpretations have the “power to persuade.” Id. The Court goes on to note an exception to this rule; when the language of a regulation is ambiguous, we defer to otherwise non-binding interpretations to allow the agency to interpret its own regulations. See id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997)). Although plaintiffs cite a number of other cases holding that we must defer to agency policy statements unless they are “demonstrably irrational,” those cases either deal with rules made through formal procedures see Lifanda v. Elmhurst Dodge, Inc., 237 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir.2001) (discussing a final rule which amended a regulation); special cases, see, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>), or precedent superceded by Christensen. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that guidelines and commentary have force of law that may not be disregarded by sentencing judge (B) holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule (C) holding that amendments to the sentencing guidelines commentary should be treated as legislative rulemaking due to a unique grant of power from congress (D) holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding (E) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative
Output: (C)
In support of his argument, Jewell cites In re 2002 Lake County Tax Sale of Real Property with Delinquent Taxes or Special Assessments Tax I.D. #: 16-27-0122-0026, 818 N.E.2d 505, 509 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), which interpreted that section to mean a “trial court does not have the discretion to extend the period of redemption beyond the one-year limitation.” Id. However, “[e]quity has power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory rules to prevent injustice.” Swami, 841 N.E.2d at 1178. The trial court determined Powell was prejudicially misled by the incomplete information given to him by the Grant County Treasurer’s Office, and that determination supports piercing the statutory rules to prevent injustice. See Tajuddin v. Sandhu Petroleum Corp. No. 3, 921 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a corporation excused from a tax penalty when the sole people in charge of filing and paying taxes were embezzling funds from the corporation thus disabling the corporations ability to pay (B) holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction (C) holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable (D) holding trial court properly denied a petition for a tax deed when the property owners thought they were paying property taxes on an improved parcel of land but actually were paying taxes on a different unimproved parcel because of an assessment irregularity (E) holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him
Output: (D)
490, 493 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied). Although the nonmov-ant is not required to “needlessly duplicate evidence already found in the court’s file,” he is required to make sure the evidence is properly before the trial court for its consideration in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Saenz, 999 S.W.2d at 494. “[A] nonmovant does not meet this requirement by the mere existence in the court’s file of a response to an earlier summary judgment motion.” Id. Because the affidavit dated July 28, 2004 was neither attached to or referenced in the response to the no-evidence summary judgment, it was not before the trial court when it granted the motion and this Court will not consider it. See also Trejo v. Laredo Nat. Bank, 185 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.)(<HOLDING>). The only documents specifically referenced in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing (B) holding that defendant cannot raise the statute of limitations defense in a noevidence summary judgment motion which otherwise shifts the evidentiary burden (C) recognizing the court must grant a noevidence motion if the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact (D) holding photographs attached to a response to second noevidence summary judgment motion were not before court when it ruled on first noevidence motion (E) holding that evidence attached to noevidence motion shall not be considered but motion should not be disregarded or treated as traditional motion
Output: (D)
“does not constitute a [constructively] fraudulent conveyance” under New York law); DCL § 272 (stating that the repayment of an antecedent debt may constitute fair consideration). But there is a significant exception to that rule: the repayment of an antecedent debt is never made for fair consideration where the transferee is a “corporate insider,” Frank, 48 F.3d at 635, including “an officer, director, or major shareholder of the trans-feror,” In re Sharp Int’l Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). That exception applies only to payments that satisfy preexisting obligations. Thus, a debtor may receive fair consideration if it makes a payment to a corporate insider in exchange for new value contemporaneously provided. See Frank, 48 F.3d at 635 (<HOLDING>); see also Cilco Cement Corp. v. White, 55 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a preexisting or antecedent debt may constitute sufficient consideration to support a mortgage (B) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (C) holding that the exception for repayment of an insiders antecedent debt did not apply to a debtors conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer regardless of whether she was a corporate insider because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds not a preexisting debt (D) holding that the repayment of an antecedent debt constitutes fair consideration (E) holding that a debt incurred for a personal family or household purpose is a consumer debt even though it is secured by the debtors real property
Output: (C)
United States”). 11 . It is a general principle of admiralty law that an owner of a vessel has a right to decline salvage assistance and that "a salvor who acts without the express or implied consent of the owner is a 'gratuitous intermed-dler' who is not entitled to any salvage award.” 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 16-1 at 360-61 (3d ed.2001). Interestingly, however, there is dicta in several cases limiting this principle to instances where only the owner’s property interests are at stake. See, e.g., Smit Americas, Inc. v. M/T MANTINIA, 259 F.Supp.2d 118, 134 (D.P.R.2003) (suggesting that an owner's right of refusal is limited in situations involving imminent danger of large losses of the property of third persons); Ramsey v. Pohatcong, 77 F. 996 (S.D.N.Y.1896) (<HOLDING>); see also Martin J. Norris, The Law of Seaman, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (B) holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests (C) holding that tugboat was bound to respect the masters decision to refuse salvage assistance where case involved only ordinary property interests and did not involve imminent danger to life nor the danger of large losses of the property of third persons (D) holding that under missouri law the term property damage defined as physical injury to tangible property does not cover losses due to the insureds negligent performance of contract work where the defective work does not cause accidental injury to surrounding property (E) holding that only courts in the county where property was situated had jurisdiction to hear an action concerning the property
Output: (C)
of procedure are concerned a party has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place.” Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 596-97, 21 S.Ct. 730, 733, 45 L.Ed. 1015 (1901) (citation omitted). Applying these ex post facto principles to this case, we hold that Pilcher has not demonstrated that the statute affected his substantive rights, and we further hold that it is not an ex post facto law as applied in this case. In so holding, we note that courts of other jurisdictions, when confronted with similar ex post facto arguments regarding rape shield statutes, have reached the same result. See Turley v. State, 356 So.2d 1238, 1243-44 (Ala.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); People v. Dorff, 77 Ill.App.3d 882, 885-86, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (B) holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute (C) holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute (D) holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation (E) holding similar statutory amendment violated ex post facto clause when applied to inmate who committed his crime before enactment of amendment
Output: (C)
the Society over in Russia when the company began to sell its SMIRNOV vodka there. A pending litigation in a foreign country between essentially the same parties, even one that concerned a slightly different topic, has been found to create a objectively reasonably apprehension of suit. See Ethicon, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 369 F.Supp. 934, 936-37 (D.N.J.1973). Therefore, even though it appears as if the defendants have never directly threatened the plaintiffs with legal action in the United States, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim that they reasonably feared a lawsuit if they attempted to enter the U.S. market. Cf. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because the court finds that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device (B) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment (D) holding that letter stating that the defendant was fully prepared to take all necessary legal action in order to protect defendants work was sufficient to show an actual threat of litigation and created a case or controversy for the purposes of the declaratory judgment act (E) recognizing that it is not essential for there to be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the declaratory judgment act
Output: (E)
citizens of Alabama for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction analysis. This narrow and specialized statute provides in pertinent part: In any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen. Andalusia and Hughes, who are insureds but not parties defendant, contend that a realignment of Lane will make the case into a direct action by Lane against the insurers, and because it is one in which the insureds are not joined as parties defendant, diversity would be destroyed by § 1332(a)(1). This contentio d.2d 73 (1974). But where the s 13 F.Supp. 367, 371 (D.Conn.1970) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 456 F.2d 282 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (B) holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict (C) holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso (D) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (E) holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second
Output: (C)
1070 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1430-31 (10th Cir.1988). 3 . The Quaintances argue that sincerity wasn't at issue in Meyers and Thiry and urge us to consider those cases’ statements about the applicable standard of review to be dicta. Sincerity, they say, is best viewed as a “constitutional fact” meriting "independent” or de novo review. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505-11 & n. 27, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Though RFRA offers statutory, not constitutional, protection of religious freedom, the Quaintances note that we have extended the constitutional fact doctrine to certain findings in RFRA cases and subjected them to plenary appellate review. See United States v. Friday, 525 F t. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Sincerity, meanwhile, lacks the legal flavor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (B) holding state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (D) holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession (E) holding assessments of credibility and demeanor are not crucial to deciding voluntariness of confession relevant inquiry is whether the techniques for extracting the statements  are compati ble with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means
Output: (E)
Furthermore, “[wjhere, as here, the BIA’s order indicates that it may have engaged in de novo review of the IJ’s decision but does not provide any legal analysis, we review the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusions.” Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.2008) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the IJ recognized and applied the Frentescu factors. Torres’s reliance on In re Y-L- is also without merit. In re Y-L- applies to controlled substances offenses, not child pornography offenses; the Y-L- factors therefore do not apply here. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Torres’s claim that the IJ or the BIA misapplied or mis-weighed the Frentescu factors. See Pechenkov, 705 F.3d at 447-48 (<HOLDING>). The weighing of these factors is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 27 is not appropriate where the petitioner seeks discovery of unknown information that the petitioner hopes will assist it in the future when the petitioner applies for judicial relief (B) holding that because the petitioner failed in the petition to set forth facts known to petitioner or state that petitioner has no knowledge of facts regarding the name and address of any judicially appointed guardian or person or agency awarded custody of the child by a court and failed to attach the existing custody order to the petition it was facially defective and did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court (C) holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case (D) holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present (E) holding that where petitioner claimed only that the ij incorrectly assessed the  facts the petitioner had not raised a constitutional or legal question in relation to the particularly serious crime determination and instead had simply asked for a reweighing of the factors involved in that discretionary determination
Output: (E)
2 . Both the district court and Respondents claim that the Fifth Circuit has recognized only an executive privilege, not a law enforcement privilege. Consequently, they argue, Petitioner’s claim to a law enforcement privilege is not supported by this Circuit’s law. However, they provide no basis for why the privilege should be labeled "executive” instead of “law enforcement" or how that label impacts the substance of the privilege. Like other circuits using the law enforcement moniker, the purpose of the privilege in the Fifth Circuit is to protect from release documents relating to an ongoing criminal investigation. The term “law enforcement privilege” ap pears to have evolved over time out of the same concept. Compare Black v. Sheraton, 564 F.2d 531, 545-46 (D.C.Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>) with Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the law enforcement investigatoiy privilege (B) holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege (C) recognizing in the context of discussing executive privilege that law enforcement documents disclosing investigative techniques or sources should be minimized (D) recognizing privilege (E) recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor
Output: (C)
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex.2003) (no-evidence summary judgment); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985) (traditional summary judgment). 19 . See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 869 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied). 20 . First Nat’l Bank of Kerrville v. O’Dell, 856 S.W.2d 410, 415 (Tex.1993) (quoting Oury v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 13 S.W. 1030, 1031 (1890)). 21 . Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 20 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex.2000) (quoting Argonaut, 869 S.W.2d at 542). 22 . Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 337. 23 . Oury, 13 S.W. at 1031. 24 . Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co. v. Long, 5 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1928, writ ref’d). 25 . Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 337. 26 . See Keck, 20 S.W.3d at 702 (<HOLDING>); Galbraith, 5 S.W.2d at 167 (defining an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that place of performance of a life insurance contract was the state where premiums were made payable even if the contract was made in another state (B) holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable (C) holding that admission contained in an answer was binding despite the fact that it was made on information and belief (D) recognizing an insurers right to rescind an insurance contract where the insured has made fraudulent or material misrepresentation in insurance application (E) holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary
Output: (E)
Cir.1985). In Pelleport, the Ninth Circuit explicitly noted that “[h]ad the district court based its remand order on [a lack of jurisdiction], section 1447(d) would no doubt apply, because, even if clearly erroneous, a district court’s decision that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case is not renewable.” 741 F.2d at 276 (9th Cir.1984). Nevertheless, in two eases which would not have come within the scope of the Pelle-port/Clorox doctrine because they implicated subject matter jurisdiction, see In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832, 843 (3d Cir.1991) and Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir.1993), we did not rely on Pelleport/Clorox even though we had invoked that doctrine elsewhere. See Foster v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., 933 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We discuss those cases and this court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum (B) holding review of remand order based on forum selection clause not barred by  1447d (C) holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum (D) holding that remand order based on forum selection clause is reviewable on appeal (E) holding remand based on forum selection clause not within  1447c
Output: (B)
(suggesting, without citing supporting legal authority, that there is a "distinction between a religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and a religious commandment which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul” in the context of prisoners' free exercise claims). 33 . In 1990, a divided panel of our Court suggested in dictum — in a case that did not involve a Free Exercise Clause claim, and without citing Widmar — that public schools have "a compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality” in their classrooms, and that this interest, even if not required by the Establishment Clause, might outweigh public employees' free exercise right to wear religious garb. United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882, 889 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The opinions cited in support of this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability (D) holding that title vii does not require public schools to allow teachers to wear religious garb as this would impose an undue hardship on the schools under 42 usc  2000ej (E) holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii
Output: (D)
Due- nezes moved for rehearing, asserting that the Court’s latest interpretation of the statute directly conflicts with Bomeman. A comparative submission, which the Court now requires in this case, presupposes that the provider's conduct is in issue. In this respect, the Court’s current holding certainly undermines, if not overrules, Bomeman. 5 . On the failure-to-submit issue, Chief Justice Cayce concurred in the result only, as he felt that the sixty-percent responsibility the jury placed on the plaintiff barred her recovery as a matter of law, rendering harmless any error in failing to submit the employer's negligence. Bedford, 166 S.W.3d at 456 (Cayce, C.J., concurring). 6 . See B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Cent. Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex.1980) (<HOLDING>). 7 . F.F.P. also contends the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that the common law principle of vicarious liability applied to the tcpa because absent a clear expression of congressional intent to apply another standard the court must presume that congress intended to apply the traditional standards of vicarious liability with which it is presumed to be familiar (C) holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity (D) holding that vicarious coconspirator liability need not be charged in the indictment (E) recognizing common law right to indemnity when a partys liability is vicarious
Output: (E)
amounts of $19,905.51 for mortgage interest, property taxes, and maintenance expenses and $19,955.62 for lost rent? V. Did the district court err by determining that RTB is entitled to prejudgment interest under Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (2014), beginning on September 20, 2010? VI. Did the district court err by ordering Minnwest to pay $12,000 in administrative costs to correct the property line? ANALYSIS I. RTB argues that the district court erred by refusing to adopt the advisory jury’s finding that RTB is entitled to $100,563.75 in conveyance damages separate and distinct from the diminution-in-value damages award of $638,434. We review a district court’s decision to award or not award damages for an abuse of discretion. Gabler v. Fedoruk, 756 N.W.2d 725, 734 (Minn.App.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Wenigar v. Johnson, 712 N.W.2d 190, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was necessary for this court to reach methodofvaluation arguments because the district court abused its discretion by incorrectly awarding damages (B) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (C) recognizing that an appellant seeking to establish that the district court abused its discretion must do so by a discussion of facts arguments and rulings that appear in the record (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to file fourth amended complaint
Output: (A)
types of proper and timely postdecision motions extend the time to appeal the order or judgment that is the subject of the motion. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 2. Motions for amended findings and a new trial are included in the list of tolling motions. Id,, subd. 2(b), (d). Unless Minn. Stat. § 508.29 provides otherwise, appellants’ proper and timely motions for amended findings or a new trial extended the time to appeal the April 19, 2017 order granting respondent’s petition. No language in Minn. Stat. § 508.29 precludes the operation of Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd.' 2. On the contrary, Minn. Stat. § 508.29 specifies that the appeal shall be as in other civil cases. Cf. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Main St. Fridley Props., LLC, 755 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Appellants’ proper and timely motions for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that faa  16a3 did not preempt a state statute prohibiting appeal of an order to compel arbitration and reasoning that there is no reason to suppose that the timing of the exercise of the right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration is other than a procedural matter which does not alter the substantive rights of either party (B) holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal (C) holding that minn r civ app p 10401 subd 2 does not apply to an appeal of an order approving the public use or public purpose necessity and authority for the taking under minn stat  117075 subd 1c 2006 because the statute specifies that the order becomes final unless the appeal is taken within the 60day appeal period and the statute does not indicate that the matter is to proceed as in other civil actions (D) holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal (E) holding that if an express appeal waiver does not preclude a challenge to the sentence as unlawful then the covenant not to appeal becomes meaningless
Output: (C)
the policy against depriving a plaintiff of its chosen forum. Both federal and Texas courts have prevented defendants from seeking declaratory relief when defendants’ sole purpose is to bereave the plaintiff of its selected forum and substitute a forum more favorable to them. See Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding district court’s dismissal of declaratory judgment action “aimed solely at wresting choice of forum from ‘natural’ plaintiff); kirkbride v. Continental Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734-735 (affirming district court’s refusal of jurisdiction when party was attempting to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to deprive a plaintiff of his selected forum or encourage a race to judgment); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.1985) (<HOLDING>); Space Master Int’l., Inc. v. Portar-Kamp Mfg. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to establish jurisdiction in action for declaratory judgment controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to defendant (B) holding that the trial court should have declined jurisdiction in declaratory action to avoid depriving real plaintiff of traditional right to choose time and place of suit (C) holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action (D) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue (E) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment
Output: (B)