niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of priorities for economic development” — were the centers of power in many areas of importance. Harry Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, Law and Soc’y (Fall 1975) 57, 97. See generally id. at 86-100 (discussing diffusion of power and rnment’s contentions here ... would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”); id. at 578, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part qf our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (<HOLDING>); id. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“No matter how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite 1985 amendments minimum jurisdictional amount remains 50000 (B) holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively (C) holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act (D) holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect (E) holding unconstitutional taketitle provision of the lowlevel radioactive waste policy amendments act of 1985
Output: (E)
P.3d 516 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ¶18, 8 P.3d 1025). Additionally, the prejudice must be "such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments." Reed, 2000 UT 68, 1 18, 8 P.3d 1025. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that Defendant has satisfied his burden in meeting this two-prong test. ¶ 25 First, the prosecutor called the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration. - During closing arguments, the prosecutor relied on information not admitted into evidence and implied both that Defendant had stolen software licenses and that Myers could not have legally consented to Defendant taking the computer because of that software. See generally State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶¶ 23-24, 999 P.2d 7 (<HOLDING>). Further, the charge against the Defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had not abused discretion in denying rule 59 motion because no persuasive reason has been shown why this evidence could not have been presented during the trial nor does it appear that it would have altered the result (B) holding that it is inappropriate to make a claim to the jury during closing arguments when no evidence hals been presented during trial to support it (C) holding that to obtain the proper context of a challenged statement made during closing arguments the court must recount in its entirety the portion of the closing argument wherein those statements appear (D) holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue (E) holding that this court has discretion to hear arguments presented to it in the first instance provided that it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim
Output: (B)
not a proximate-cause witness. Specifically, counsel stated: {¶ 33} “Your Honor, we are not going into long-term care of how this patient is going to be managed forever. We are going to go into standard of care. We are going to go into standard of care for an emergency physician.” {¶ 34} Ultimately, the trial court made its evidentiary ruling based on MVES’s proffer of Dr. Galan as a standard-of-care witness only. Since standard of care is never viewed in hindsight, the court properly ruled to limit Dr. Galan’s testimony to only that information known to Dr. Jackson when he treated Darlene. See Grabill v. Worthington Industries, Inc., 98 Ohio App.3d 739, 744-745, 649 N.E.2d 874, quoting Hetrick v. Marion-Res. Power Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 347, 358-359, 25 O.O. 467, 48 N.E.2d 103 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 35} MVES insists that even if we find that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a grant of equitable relief requires diligence by the claimant (B) holding that foresight not retrospect is the standard of diligence (C) holding that rule 16bs good cause standard focuses on a partys diligence (D) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (E) recognizing implied obligation to use reasonable diligence
Output: (B)
the firearm, as opposed to any use that might cause danger,” Aplt. Br. at 10, '“[t]he simple possession of an unregistered firearm ... is not covered by [the Section 4B1.2] list.” Id. at 11. He cites to the commentary to this section of the sentencing guidelines, which provides that “the term ‘crime of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 App. Note 2. Dwyer argues since “the commentary is a binding interpretation of the phrase ‘crime of violence,’ ” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 47, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), simple possession of an unregistered firearm is not a crime of violence. In United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1411 (10th Cir.1990), in discussing the unlawful possession of an unre h Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 651 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained following the polices unconstitutional search of the defendants backpack which was not with the defendant at the time of the search and in which the police found a sawedoff shotgun was sufficiently far from the unconstitutional search because the challenged evidence was obtained as a result of the polices decision to pursue the defendant a decision they would have made even absent finding the sawedoff shotgun because the defendant was a person of interest in their underlying investigation (B) holding that possession of a sawedoff shotgun under 26 usc  5861d is a crime of violence and noting that congress found certain firearms  sawedoff shot guns and grenades  to be inherently dangerous and lacking in usefulness other than for violent and criminal purposes (C) holding that for purposes of  4b12 possession of a sawedoff shotgun in violation of  5861d is a crime of violence because by its very nature a sawedoff shotgun always creates a serious risk of physical injury to another (D) holding that possession of sawedoff shotgun is violent felony as defined by armed career criminal act (E) holding that possession of a sawed off shotgun is a crime of violence
Output: (C)
required expert testimony at trial. We agree with other appellate courts that the statute does not violate the open courts provision by requiring an expert report sooner rather than later in the litigation. See, e.g., Gill v. Russo, 39 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). Mocega’s fifth point is overruled. Notice of Hearing Mocega’s final two points assert the trial court was required to grant her the grace period provided under art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). A motion under that section is timely if filed before “any hearing” on a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Urquhart’s motion was “heard” by submission on April 3rd. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mocega’s motion was not filed until April 
 Holding statements: (A) holding term successor does not contemplate acquisition by ordinary purchase from another corporation (B) holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context (C) holding that oral rendition of judgment supported by the courts docket sheet was insufficient express specific written order is required (D) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes (E) holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing
Output: (B)
Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir.2002); Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1386 n. 10 (8th Cir.1992); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 959 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1992). The Tenth Circuit has adopted a different view of the open question, concluding that because the law is not clearly established that a citizen may refuse to answer questions during an investigative stop, the officer could lawfully arrest the person for failure to comply. Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1189-90 (10th Cir.2000). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that arresting a person for refusing to provide his or her name violates the Fourth Amendment, but this position has not been adopted by other federal Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court. See Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881-82 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Risbridger, 275 F.3d at 572 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects against use of force while in arresting officers custody until arraignment or formal charge (B) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (C) holding that a person is presumed to own all property that is titled in her name (D) holding arresting a person for refusing to provide his or her name violates the fourth amendment (E) holding that fourth amendment seizure continues throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers
Output: (D)
to impeach or rebut the defendant’s testimony. § 16-8-107(1), 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.). In its analysis, the majority also discussed section 16-8-106, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1992 Supp.). Section 16-8-106(2) provides: (2) The defendant shall have a privilege against self-incrimination during the course of an examination under this section. The fact of the defendant’s noncooperation with psychiatrists and other personnel conducting the examination may be admissible in the defendant’s trial on the issues of insanity, competency, or impaired mental condition. § 16-8-106(2), 8A C.R.S. (1986). 7 . Similarly, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a specific objection is waived on appeal if not raised at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 103; see, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 499-500 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 363, 112 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection but also by making the wrong specific objection (B) holding party must make timely and specific objection at trial to preserve issue for appellate review (C) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (D) holding that in order to preserve an issue for review a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial (E) holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error
Output: (A)
to act in these circumstances. But the district court’s interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6) is contrary to established law. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment for “any other reason justifying relief____” (Emphasis added.) The courts have universally interpreted “other” to mean other than the reasons specified in subsections 60(b)(l)-60(b)(5), see, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15, 69 S.Ct. 384, 390-91, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949), and it is generally accepted that cases clearly falling under Rule 60(b)(1) cannot be brought within the more generous Rule 60(b)(6) in order to escape the former’s one year time limitation. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Building and Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 460 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); see also Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances (B) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (C) holding that a motion brought under rule 60b6 two years after the district courts judgment was untimely where the reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original judgment (D) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (E) holding the motion was more appropriately analyzed under rule 60b1 because the district court made a mistake when it determined that abdurrahmans claim was not exhausted in state court
Output: (B)
878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (finding local ordinance charging BellSouth a land occupation fee was not impliedly preempted by State legislation); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199, 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (finding a county ordinance recognizing domestic partner relations and allowing for benefits to be paid to domestic partners of county employees was not impliedly preempted by state marriage laws), rev. denied, 789 So.2d 346 (Fla.2001). The protection of the welfare of the local citizenry through the adoption of generally applicable land development regulations has been exclusively within the province of local government. Implied constraints within these particular areas should be even more carefully scrutinized. Cf. HTS Ind., Inc. v. Broward County, 852 So.2d 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Applying the sanctions of the Bert Harris Act 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the question of whether courts should extend chevron deference to an agencys interpretation of an explicit preemption provision remains open (B) holding that general categorical release clauses are narrowly construed (C) recognizing that texas courts narrowly construe the intentional infliction of emotional distress doctrine (D) recognizing that in areas historically legislated by the states the courts must narrowly construe any express preemption clauses so that if an ambiguity exists as to preemption nonpreemption should be found (E) holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3
Output: (D)
the duty to defend. At most, the court did not expressly address whether an insured would have a viable cause of action if it alleged an insurer’s payment of an invalid claim violated the duty to defend. See id. We conclude the provision giving the insurer the right to settle negates existence of a contractual obligation to pay only valid claims, regardless of the different policy provisions cited by the Duddlesten insured and Methodist. Under its plain meaning, the “duty to defend ... any claim ... for benefits payable by this insurance” merely imposed an obligation on Zurich to assume responsibility for handling a claim when benefits are payable under workers’ compensation law. See Burlington Ins. Co. v. Tex. Krishnas, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Methodist does not allege Zurich refused to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is a duty to defend if any of the complaints allegations fall within the risk covered by the policy (B) holding insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured since the underlying suit arises out of a breach of contract which is not an accident or occurrence contemplated or covered by the provisions of a general liability insurance policy (C) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (D) holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage (E) recognizing in context of general liability policy if petition contains allegations which when fairly and reasonably construed state cause of action potentially covered by policy insurer has duty to defend insured in underlying suit
Output: (E)
he provided after December 31, 2005, and more importantly, he gives us no reason to question the District Court’s finding that “he had already become aware that [he] was not going to receive what he believed he was entitled to” prior to that date. App. 10. In fact, Steudtner had already tendered his resignation in October 2005. Steudtner argues that his contract claims were timely by virtue of the “continuing violation” doctrine because Duane Reade continued refusing to promote him and pay him what he supposedly deserved up until his departure in 2006 (and to the present day, for that matter). But the mere fact that the repudiation of a contract has continuing effect does not trigger the continuing violation doctrine. See Selkirk v. State, 249 A.D.2d 818, 671 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the District Court did not err 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct (B) holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine (C) holding that negligence may be predicated on the foreseeable acts of third persons (D) holding that because original interception was not unlawful subsequent use by prosecutor could not be found unlawful (E) holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred
Output: (A)
such equitable relief as may be appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). A. Serious Health Condition Wells Fargo first argues that Vincent did not suffer a “serious health condition” as that term is defined by the FMLA. The parties agree that the Court should examine the regulations implementing the FMLA in order to determine whether Vincent suffered from a serious health condition. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the interim regulations or the final regulations, which became effective on April 6, 1995, should be used by the Court in arriving at its determination. The Court finds that the interim regulations which were in effect in January of 1995, the time of Vincent’s termination, govern this action. See Gay v. Gilman Paper Company, 125 F.3d 1432, 1434 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Having resolved the dispute as to which set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (B) holding that as the court has made clear in several recent decisions a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue (C) holding that the interim regulations governed a dispute in which the serious health condition and subsequent termination occurred prior to april 6 1995 the effective date of the final regulations (D) holding that iiriras effective date is april 1 1997 (E) holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996
Output: (C)
departure rate is 25.7% in all drug cases). According to a report recently released by the General Accounting Office, courts departed on the basis of substantial assistance in 28% of all drug trafficking cases in fiscal years 1999-2001. United States General Accounting Office, Federal Drug Offenses: Departures from Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Fiscal Years 1999-2001 12 (Oct.2003). 2 . The court is not strictly limited to the factors listed in § 5K1.1. However, these factors seem to cover the range of relevant information in the substantial assistance context. 3 . Because the mandatory minimum sentence fell within the guideline range, I simply departed from the offense level specified by the guidelines. Cf. United States v. Hayes, 5 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jones, 233 F.Supp.2d 1067, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that where the statutory mandatory minimum sentence is higher than the upper end of the guideline range the court departs from the statutory level ie the lowest offense level that could support the statutory minimum (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum
Output: (B)
use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
Output: (A)
controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia’s onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts “Where there is no material connection between the district and’the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action.” Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). ‘When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made.” Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
Output: (A)
contents of Form 4549). 16 . Perez further argues that Form 4549 requires the explicit approval of the IRS’s District Director in order for it to be effective. He derives this argument from the last line of Form 4549, which states that the taxpayer understands "that this report is subject to acceptance by the District Director.” In this case, the Form 4549 was signed only by the IRS examiner. We reject Perez’s contention that an IRS examiner is not a duly authorized agent of the district director capable of accepting a Form 4549. In re Barry, 48 B.R. at 603 ("A revenue agent is a delegate of the district director authorized to accept waivers. His signature is sufficient 'acceptance' of this [IRS Form 4549] waiver.”). Cf. Holbrook v. United States, 284 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1960) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212-6213. 18 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that it is not necessary for the irs commissioner to personally consent to a taxpayer waiver in order for it to be effective (D) holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account (E) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent
Output: (C)
that Turner exhibited symptoms of ADHD prior to the age of seven, a requirement for diagnosis of this condition, and none of the data reviewed by Dr. Danziger suggested an onset prior to age seven either. Had trial counsel presented Dr. Eisenstein as an expert during the penalty phase, the State would have undermined his opinions in the same manner as occurred during the evidentiary he ) (rejecting Caldwell challenge to the standard jury instructions on the mer jecting challenge to constitutionality of execution methods as meritless); Darling v. State, 45 So.3d 444, 447-48 (Fla.2010) (rejecting challenge to constitutionality of section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2007), which exempts from public records the identity of an executioner); Israel v. State, 985 So.2d 510, 521 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>). Cumulative Error Finally, where the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is not absolute where the defendant has been convicted of or has admitted to committing a crime (B) holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force (C) holding that a claim that the defendant may be insane at the time of execution is premature where no death warrant has been signed and the defendant has not been found to be incompetent (D) recognizing that it has long been the rule that a mechanics lien claim may be waived (E) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced
Output: (C)
production: it must ensure that the evidence upon which the movant relies supports the facts asserted; confirm that the facts entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law; and set forth its reasoning for granting summary judgment. See Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244; see also Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 143 n. 5 (2d Cir.2003) (noting that granting summary judgment without verifying the supporting facts “would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (e)(3). We have examined the record evidence and considered the factual allegations in Alzawahra’s verified amended complaint, insofar as they are in the form of admissible evidence. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Even drawing all permissible inferences in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate where matters of credibility and determining the weight of the evidence exist (B) holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves (C) holding that a verified complaint can be considered as summary judgment evidence only to the extent that it comports with the requirements of rule 56e (D) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (E) holding that a verified complaint is treated as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes and considered in determining whether material issues of fact exist
Output: (E)
prone to settle. See Rose, 2014 WL 4273358, at *12 (“Class Counsel, for the most part, have a great deal of experience litigating TCPA class actions and presumably would ‘know how to pick a winner’ ‘[and]-.because the TCPA has the potential of ruinous financial liability ($500 or $1,500 per violation, and some defendants are accused of millions of violations), defendants will almost always settle if there is any merit at all to the case.”). In light of the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the burden on counsel and risk of nonpayment do not support the benchmark fee award. The Ninth Circuit has also instructed district courts to - consider the lodestar cross-check as one factor in assessing the reasonableness of a fee request. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation (B) holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed (C) holding that both the lodestar and the percentage of the fund methods are permitted (D) recognizing the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award (E) recognizing a presumption of reasonableness
Output: (D)
measure”). Viewed in light of the primary, accepted definition of “somewhat,” the SPDs appropriately described the impact of the offset. Plaintiffs further argue that the 1996 Retirement Plan SPD was misleading because it did not disclose that the Secured Benefit Account would be calculated based on the value of the Account projected to normal retirement age. (Pis.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. at 8-9.) They claim they were misled because the SPD would be offset by the “value of [a participant’s] SBA balance” and did not disclose that the value of the Secured Benefit Account balance included interest through normal retirement age. (Id.) As discussed above, § 1022 does not require a summary plan description to go into this level of detail. See Stahl, 875 F.2d at 1408 (<HOLDING>). In any event, the 1996 SPD contains more than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plan provision stating that the summary plan description and summaries of material modifications  are hereby incorporated by reference and constitute a part of the plan acted to incorporate into the plan a limitations provision found only in the summary plan description (B) holding that a summary plan description need only provide information about the general circumstances in which benefits could be lost (C) holding that even though the summary plan description did not include discretionary language the grant of discretionary authority in the plan controlled (D) holding that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits may be an act of plan administration (E) holding that an spd need only be specific enough to enable ordinary employee to sense when there is a danger that benefits could be lost or diminished
Output: (B)
us, moreover, the agency publication is alleged not only to be defamatory but also to be a knowing misrepresentation. Despite its obvious relevance, we nonetheless have reason to question the continued validity of the Hearst Radio decision, particularly in a case such as this one in which there is a specific statutory authorization for dissemination of information. The Hearst Radio doctrine has not been reconsidered carefully since 1948. During the thirty-five years since the issuance of the decision in Hearst Radio, the Supreme Court and lower courts have developed a more expansive interpretation of the term “agency action” than the one suggested by Hearst Radio. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 238 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 488, 492 n. 7, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (<HOLDING>) (quoting broad language of APA legislative 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action (B) holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action (C) holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized (D) holding issuance of administrative complaint to initiate proceedings not final agency action (E) holding that apa  702s waiver of sovereign immunity applies regardless of whether the challenged agency action constitutes final agency action 
Output: (B)
application of our law. The analogy of D.C.Code offenses to federal offenses is also used to justify the continued trial of D.C.Code offenders in the federal courts in the District, notwithstanding the conferral of all local criminal jurisdiction on the Superior Court. Under D.C.Code § 11-502(3) (1982), a D.C.Code violator also charged with a federal offense may be tried in a joint indictment in federal court. Even if the federal charge is ultimately dismissed, the federal court tries these offenders using federal standards. See United States v. Brown, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 314-15, 483 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (1973) (applying federal bail rules to defendant charged with D.C.Code offenses tried in federal court); United States v. Belt, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 8, 14, 514 F.2d 837, 844, 850 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The result may be a difference in outcome in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal evidentiary standard for impeachment by prior conviction should apply to dccode offenders tried in federal court (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (D) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (E) holding that plaintiffs noncompliance with dccode  12309 cannot bar federal claims
Output: (A)
American Airlines, Inc., 996 F.2d 1315, 1319 (1st Cir.1993) (finding doctrine not to apply because of “no breach of a special transport promise” and “no deviation from the kind of thing one might expect to find when a carrier has lost, damaged, or delayed cargo”) (internal quotation omitted); United States Gold Corp. v. Federal Express Corp., 719 F.Supp. 1217, 1225 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (citing cases upholding validity of limitation of liability with respect to express carriers). None of the cases cited by Nippon are to the contrary. See, e.g., Coughlin v. TWA, 847 F.2d 1432, 1433-34 (9th Cir.1988) (breach of special contract provision to carry valuables in cabin) (per curiam); Nissan Fire & Marines Ins. Co. v. North American Van Lines, Inc., No. C-96-03621-VRQ, 1997 WL 81179 (N.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>); Information Control Corp. v. United Airlines 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented (B) recognizing doctrine (C) recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion (D) recognizing validity of doctrine but finding that the number of drivers is not such a safety measure (E) recognizing the validity of the singlelarceny doctrine in new mexico
Output: (D)
Chief Judge: The appellant, Craig G. Falk, appeals from a July 8, 1996, Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA or Board) decision denying his claim service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As the appellant has limited his appeal to the denial of that claim, the Court deems the appellant to have abandoned his right to appeal with respect to the denial of entitlement to benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151. Bucklinger v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 435, 436 (1993); see also Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32, 34-35 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Upon consideration of the pleadings of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal (B) holding that issues not presented in an appellants initial brief to the court need not be considered under this courts rules (C) holding that claims not raised in an appellants initial brief to our court are waived (D) holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned (E) holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief
Output: (B)
court jurisdiction and its silence on the matter of federal jurisdiction”); Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir.1998) (accepting the holding oí International Science, supra, that the federal statute "intended to authorize private causes of action only in state court”); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to confer exclusive state court jurisdiction over private rights of action” under the Act); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289, modified 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to assign the private right of action [under the Act] to state courts exclusively”); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 6 . An earlier Texas intermediate appellate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act (B) holding there is no federal private right of action for borrowers under the nfia (C) holding veilpiercing claim does not state cause of action under erisa and cannot independently support federal subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding subject matter jurisdiction divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice (E) holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions
Output: (A)
Lottery should be included in the Deferred Payment Component — the exact opposite position it now takes. (Def.’s SDF ¶ 161.) While the filing of an amended complaint typically renders the original complaint “dead letter,” Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir.2008), under “certain circumstances,” the statements made in the superseded complaint “may be party admissions, usable as such, despite the subsequent amendment of the complaint.” InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144-45 (1st Cir.2003). These “certain circumstances” typically involve situations similar to those here, where a party’s theory of the case changes in its amendment, as opposed to situations where its theory is merely amplified through amendment. Wiseman v. Reposa, 463 F.2d 226, 227 (1st Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Raulie v. United States, 400 F.2d 487, 526 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations (B) holding original complaint was admission where it alleged an accident occurred on a different date than the amended complaint (C) holding that while the excerpt from the original complaint was competent as evidence as a pleading it was superseded by the amended complaint (D) holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint (E) holding that amended complaint related back where the facts alleged in the original complaint clearly put defendants on notice as to the conduct  at issue in this action
Output: (B)
days after the beginning of discovery. Noting that it could nevertheless grant Vig’s motion if he showed good cause, the district court refused to do so, because he had not alleged any previously unavailable facts and had not been diligent in pursuing the newly asserted causes of action. The district court correctly ruled that Vig had not shown good cause. He pointed to no new evidence to support his proposed second amended complaint, and there.is no reason that he could not have alleged, in an earlier pleading, the new claim it attempted to raise. Vig’s untimeliness and failure to show good cause amount to a “substantial reason” to deny him leave to amend, meaning the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Shipner v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 406-07 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Vig’s second contention is that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although district courts have discretion to deny leave to amend they may only do so for a substantial reason (B) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (C) recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint (D) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (E) holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so
Output: (A)
findings, unless they “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” (reasonable decision). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added). In that regard, those findings are “presumed to be correct”; as noted, in district court, Gutierrez had “the burden of rfebutting [that] presumption ... by clear and convincing evidence”. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The first four claims for which a COA is requested are: (1) whether the state-habeas and district courts erred in construing Gutierrez’ due-process claim (regarding the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce information about a juror’s prior offense) as one arising under Brady v. Maryland, 873 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>); (2) whether Gutierrez was denied a fair and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith (B) holding prosecutions suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process (C) holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt (D) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material (E) holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment
Output: (B)
would allow him to enjoy an exemption provided by § 522(b).”). However, there is now agreement that the 1994 amendment to § 522(f), by adding the formula set forth in § 522(f)(2)(A), eliminated the need for a debtor to demonstrate the existence of equity in their property in order to avoid the fixing of a judicial lien. In re Higgins, 201 B.R. 965, 967 (9th Cir. BAP 1996). In particular, by adding the phrase, “to the extent that the sum ... exceeds the value that the debt- or’s interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens,” to the formula set forth in § 522(f)(2)(A), it is clear that Congress intended to eliminate the need for a debtor to have equity in property in order to avoid a judicial lien. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 259 B.R. 104, 110 (Bankr.D.S.C.2001) (<HOLDING>). Bolstering this position is the amendment’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a retained equity interest is property even if it has no market value (B) holding  he who seeks equity must do equity  (C) holding that an action for specific performance lies in equity (D) holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens (E) holding that the formula in section 522f2a creates equity for purposes of lien avoidance even if debtors otherwise have no equity in the property
Output: (E)
proposition that the licensing of the Blanks’ trademark was an executory contract or that trademark law is “applicable federal law” for purposes of section 365(c)(1). However, they dispute whether applicable trademark law would bar assignment to a third party without consent of the assignor. Whether under the federal common law of trademarks a licensor would have the power to reject “performance by an entity other than the debtor” appears to be an issue of first impression in this circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have come to the conclusion that two other forms of intellectual property, copyrights and patents, are personal and assignable only with the consent of the li-censor and therefore unassumable under section 365(c)(1). See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (<HOLDING>); In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that applicable federal patent law made patents personal and unassignable without consent of the licensor (B) holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims (C) holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement (D) holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked (E) holding that the rationale of the consent decree cases was fully applicable where a stipulated dismissal and settlement resolved pending patent litigation and there were other licensees and alleged infringers who had an incentive to challenge the patents validity
Output: (A)