niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
would assign. To the contrary, this case, in all important respects, is on all fours with Richardson. For largely the same reasons as stated in that case, we conclude that Duncan failed to establish, under the plain error standard of review, that his sentence was unconstitutionally determined by the executive branch. For these reasons, Duncan’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED. 1 . Eleven law enforcement officials were implicated. 2 . Williams testified that demanding money from drug dealers in exchange for protection was common among his fellow officers. 3 . Rule 24(b) assigns the number of peremptory strikes to which the parties in a criminal case are entitled, in this case, ten for the defense and six for the prosecution. 4 . 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 5 . 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a white defendant can object to the exclusion of minority jurors through the use of peremptory challenges (B) holding racebased use of peremptory strikes against jurors unconstitutional (C) holding that there was no batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent 70 of its peremptory strikes to remove potential african american jurors (D) holding that it was not iac to decline to use peremptory strike on a potential juror whose statements hinted at possible bias against defendant where counsel strategically used peremptory strikes against jurors who might have been more likely to convict (E) holding that where a defendant does not use all of his or her peremptory challenges the defendant may not complain of prejudice for failure to dismiss prospective jurors
Output: (B)
by California Code of Civil Procedure § 356. [Doc. No. 10 at 4-5.] However, this contention is inconsistent with the plain language of section 3439.09(c). “The phrase ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law’ is a ‘term of art’ that ‘expresses a legislative intent to have the specific statute control despite the existence of other law which might otherwise govern.’ ” Roach v. Lee, 369 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1199 (C.D.Cal.2005) (quoting People v. Franklin, 57 Cal.App.4th 68, 73-74, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 742 (1997)). Therefore, 3439.09(c)’s seven-year backstop “is absolute,” and “it cannot be tolled or otherwise extended.” Internet Direct Response, Inc. v. Buckley, 2011 WL 835607, at *6, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28344, at *21 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 7, 2011); see, e.g., Roach, 369 F.Supp.2d at 1199-1200 (<HOLDING>); cf Inco Development Corp. v. Sup. Ch, 131 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was barred by section 343909c (B) holding that the statute of repose for latent construction defects cannot be tolled by california code of civil procedure  356 (C) holding trial court erred by imposing sanctions under section 9 of civil practice and remedies code because claim for sanctions was based solely on section 10 of code and rule 13 of rules of civil procedure (D) holding that section 343909c cannot be tolled by california code of civil procedure  351 (E) recognizing distinction between findings of fact under section 6711 of the family code and findings of fact under rules of civil procedure
Output: (D)
the key elements required to satisfy the discovery rule are injury (we use “damage” interchangeably with “injury”) and fault. Legally-cognizable damages occur when a plaintiff detrimentally relies on the negligent advice of an attorney. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 172. Actual damages are those that are real and substantial as opposed to speculative. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621 (1937). In the legal-malpractice context, actual damages may exist in the form of an adverse judgment. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 373, 460 A.2d 172. However, a client may suffer damages, in the form of attorney’s fees, before a court has announced its decision in the underlying action. See, e.g., Knight, supra, 553 A.2d at 1235 (<HOLDING>); Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (B) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (C) holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages (D) holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice (E) holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice
Output: (E)
v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 F.Supp. 558 (D.Nev.1991) (applying Nevada law); Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 167 Ariz. 93, 804 P.2d 822 (Ariz.Ct.App.1990)). Because the question of whether the efficient proximate cause doctrine should apply in first party property claims is an issue of first impression in Maryland, I must predict how the Maryland Court of Appeals would rule were it to confront this issue. See Delawder v. American Woodmark Corp., 178 Fed.Appx. 197, 202 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006) (because neither the West Virginia legislature nor any West Virginia court had defined the term within the context of the statute, “we must predict how the West Virginia Supreme Court would define this term if it had to confront this issue”); Doe v. Doe, 973 F.2d 237, 240 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). I conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state (B) holding that uncertainty for pullman abstention means that a federal court cannot predict with any confidence how a states highest court would decide an issue of state law (C) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law (D) holding that a federal court sitting in diversity must predict how a state court would decide an issue (E) holding that a federal court must decide an issue regarding the interpretation of a state law according to its anticipation of how the highest state court would hold
Output: (D)
of Rule 404(b). Instead, appellant’s counsel focused on the fact that not redacting the “child molester” statement would require appellant to “open the door” to the DHS investigation so that the jury was properly informed about that allegation. Without a specific objection and a ruling, that issue is not preserved for appeal and we need not address it. Moreover, appellant never made a specific relevancy objection. Rather, appellant urged that the portion of the statement including the comment had “nothing to do with this case” and “no evidentiary purpose.” This court will not presume that these ambiguous statements preserve a specific relevancy objection, lest we presume such statements preserve all “evidentiary” objections. See Vanesch v. State, 343 Ark. 381, 37 S.W.3d 196 (2001) (<HOLDING>). |17V. Officer Testimony For his final point 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection on grounds of relevance does not preserve an objection for lack of authentication (B) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (C) holding that objection by defense counsel that he did not see the relevance of the evidence was not a proper relevancy objection (D) holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection (E) holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully
Output: (C)
brief investigatory stops. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903-05 (1968). “An investigatory stop must be justified by ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.’ ” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)). Whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)). The stop must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as vie 410 S.E.2d 504, 506-08 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 119, 414 S.E.2d 762 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the dispatch specified only that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot (B) holding officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to support traffic stop where officer received dispatch that defendant committed disorderly conduct and record check showed parked truck was registered to defendant (C) holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of an automobile where the officer received a dispatch that a black male in a black bmw with a temporary license tag was selling controlled substances and the officer observed a person in an automobile fitting that description less than one minute later (D) holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop (E) holding that taillight and license plate violations justify investigatory stop of automobile
Output: (C)
inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution.”) 12 . See Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. City of Hartley, 497 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Iowa 1993) (addressing interplay between state constitutional provision on the taking of private property and the state rules of civil procedure and concluding that similarly-worded waiver provision in civil rules applied when appellant failed to file a timely jury demand and did not establish good cause for the failure). 13 . Empire Metal Corp. v. Wohlwender, 445 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Ky.1969) ("The right to a jury trial is waived unless it is demanded within 10 days after service of the last pleading directed to an issue triable by jury. CR 38.02, 38.04.”); see Ohio River Pipeline Corp. v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Perry v. Williamson, 824 S.W.2d 869, 871 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury (B) recognizing that parties had right to trial by jury in trespass action but holding that parties waived that right under cr 3804 by not filing a demand for a jury trial (C) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (D) holding defendant to a preference action has a right to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh amendment of the united states constitution but that right can be waived by filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings (E) holding that a demand for a trial by jury is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty
Output: (B)
that “a prevailing party can be awarded fees before the conclusion of protracted litigation.” NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 689 F.2d 1161, 1165 (3d Cir.1982). “A prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendent lite or at the conclusion of the litigation.” Garland, 489 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486. However, an interim award is available “only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.” Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757-58, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). Several courts of appeals have held that a party cannot be a prevailing party if the interim relief received is not merit-based. See Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park v. Nathan R., 199 F.3d 377, 382 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Christopher P. by Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea (B) holding that the invocation of the stayput provision of the idea does not entitle the party to attorneys fees (C) holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea (D) holding that the legislative history of the idea indicates that this attorneys fees provision should be interpreted in accordance with hensley v eckerhart (E) holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue
Output: (B)
(Tr. 1288:7-15.) The Court explained that the mere presence of Melo at the crime scene with the knowledge that a crime is being committed, or “the mere acquiescence by a defendant in [ ] criminal conduct of others even with guilty knowledge” would not justify aiding and abetting liability. (Tr. 1287:25; 1288:1-4.) The jury charge provided all of the elements of aiding and abetting liability and made clear that the jury could not find Melo guilty of aiding and abetting based only on his knowledge that a firearm would be used, carried, or possessed during the robberies. Nooter’s decision not to object to the Court’s aiding and abetting instruction was reasonable because the charge to the jury was an accurate statement of the law. See Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 100 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). For the same reason, Melo cannot establish 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to request jury instruction about manner in which evidence was obtained was not error and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance because defendant was not entitled to instruction (B) holding that trial courts failure to provide additional instructions as to plaintiffs burden of proof in negligence case was not reversible error there having been no proper and accurate request for such instruction (C) holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver (D) holding that because the jury instructions were not improper the failure of petitioners trial counsel to object or request an additional instruction was not objectively unreasonable (E) holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error
Output: (D)
are matters within the province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa.Super. 420, 471 A.2d 1228, 1229-30 (1984). This same standard is used when evaluating an adjudication of delinquency. See In the Interest of A.D., 771 A.2d 45 (Pa.Super.2001). A minor is guilty of driving under the influence if he operates a motor vehicle while maintaining a blood alcohol content of .02% or greater. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4)(ii). ¶ 5 Here, the record reflects that Appellant drove past a posted stop sign without stopping. Thereafter, he failed two field sobriety tests and registered a blood alcohol level of .022%. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to adjudicate Appellant delinquent for driving under the influence. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 834 A.2d 1160, 1167 (Pa.Super.2003) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 6 Next, Appellant challenges the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests was admissible as evidence of intoxication (B) holding evidence sufficient when appellant exhibited signs of possible intoxication failed field sobriety tests and had blood alcohol level in excess of legal limit (C) holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give a voluntary intoxication charge because even though there was testimony that the appellant had consumed some alcohol prior to the killing there was no evidence that the appellant had been overwhelmed or overpowered by alcohol (D) holding that an erisa fiduciary did not act unreasonably when it denied benefits to an insured beneficiary after the insured died from driving with a blood alcohol level 50 higher than the legal limit (E) holding such intoxication to be voluntary
Output: (B)
through his enjoyment of the proceeds. Adopting this approach would go too far, potentially extending the offense of bank fraud indefinitely. No doubt,- the vast majority of bank fraud schemes entail not only obtaining but also retaining the ill-gotten gains. But when the proceeds of a criminal venture are spent may not be viewed as part of a plan to defraud. See Anderson, 188 F.3d at 891. To rule otherwise and hold that failure to repay a fraudulently obtained bank loan constitutes conduct for the offense of bank fraud would extend the life of the offense so indefinitely as to render the ex post facto prohibition ineffective. The Supreme Court has cautioned against such a result in other contexts. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) (<HOLDING>). Kilkenny’s M & T bank fraud scheme was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding a conspiracy to conceal should not be inferred from acts of concealment because every conspiracy will inevitably be followed by actions taken to cover the conspirators traces and the opposite result would extend the life of a conspiracy indefinitely (C) holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy (D) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges (E) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators
Output: (B)
stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in “temporary, intermediate storage,” however, these courts have limited that subsection’s coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no longer fall within the Act’s coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate’s server after delivery are stored “by an electronic communication service” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service
Output: (E)
numerous corporate and tax issues related thereto and to the SMI and the LLC; services in connection with Herbert Hribar employment arrangements, services in connection with various Registration Rights Agreements; services in connection with Lidestri settlement; miscellaneous general corporate services and advice” These billing statements demonstrate that the scope of Proskauer’s representation was more akin to outside general counsel during that two-year period than mere counsel on two or three isolated transactions. Although disqualification could rest on Proskauer’s work on the two acquisitions alone, the general nature of Pros-kauer’s work for Interliant over this two-year period reveals that Proskauer’s disqualification is well-founded where the complaint al (E.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>). In any event, there was no delay in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics (B) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence (C) holding that a threeyear delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not warrant barring such claim where the party seeking disqualification did not demonstrate any prejudice as a result (D) holding that a twoyear delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of unfair prejudice (E) holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay
Output: (A)
many years. See, Leske Dep., at 7-8. In addition, she had maintained a garden at the Defendants’ farm, and had stayed over night there on occasion, during the Summer of 1996. Id. at 17-19. Leske testified that the Wilkin County Sheriff’s Deputies had been to the Defendants’ farm a number of times, during the Summer, looking for the Defendants, and that she had recorded those visits. Id. at 17-18, 24-25, 31-34. Leske also testified that, on August 28, 1996, she was staying overnight at the Defendants’ residence. Id. at 46. Both Mr. and Mrs. House have testified that they were aware of Leske’s presence at their home that night, and t daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home (B) holding that defendant could challenge search of luggage belonging to overnight guests staying in his house (C) holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying (D) holding daughter who was watching parents home and staying overnight met the residing requirement (E) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in gambling records stored under his parents bed although he did not reside regularly at his parents home he kept clothing there and had occasionally remained overnight
Output: (D)
Whether to allow the use of transcripts to aid in the presentation of tape-recorded evidence is within the district court’s sound discretion. United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir.1984). Here, the transcript was properly authenticated, and the district court appropriately instructed the jury that the transcript was not evidence, that the list of speakers in the transcript was not proof as to the identity of the speakers, and that any inconsistencies between the transcript and the recording should be resolved in favor of the recording. As such, we find no abuse of discretion. Id. (noting that cautionary instructions “cured any prejudice that might have resulted from discrepancies between tape and transcript”); United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 69 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Next, we have recently held that prior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy (B) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence (C) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in its admitting extraneous evidence to rebut a defensive theory
Output: (A)
contract defining the relation between Norstan and Rolm. The contract clearly anticipates an agent-principal relationship whereby “Norstan is an independent contractor” who performs as “an agent of Rolm for the purpose of marketing products.” Under the agreement, Rolm compensated Norstan for selling Rolm used equipment via Norstan’s telemarketing capabilities. Although Rolm restricted Nor-stan to offering only certain equipment, terms, and conditions to particular entities, it did so as the principal and accordingly without offen efute Rolm’s evidence that Rolm Resale is a Rolm-owned subsidiary, thereby making it incapable of acting in concert with Rolm for purposes of antitrust law. Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if Rolm’s parts are protected by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parent and subsidiary acting together is unilateral activity and not concerted action for purposes of claim brought under  1 of the sherman act (B) holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act (C) holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under the sherman act for a defendants enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the pto where the plaintiff alleges deliberate fraud and the other elements of a monopolization claim under section 2 of the sherman act (D) holding a concerted boycott to be a per se violation of  1 of the sherman act (E) holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act
Output: (A)
exception, which provides that “[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen” if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). After review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in part. I Ms. Lian acknowledges that binding circuit precedent prohibits us from reaching her challenge to the BIA’s refusal to reopen her proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, Ms. Lian urges us to overrule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (B) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia (C) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte (D) holding that a decision of the bia whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 cfr  10032a is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond the courts review  ie the court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias decision not to reopen (E) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia
Output: (C)
officer, through negligence, suffers a prisoner in his custody upon conviction of any criminal charge to escape, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The trial court dismissed the charges on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional. We affirm. In State v. Winters, 346 So.2d 991 (Fla.1977), our supreme court held a statute criminalizing the negligent treatment of children unconstitutional because it made purely negligent conduct a crime without a showing of willfulness or even culpable negligence. Eighteen years later this court held that amendments to the same statute did not cure the defect which was the basis of the supreme court’s decision in Winters. State v. Mincey, 658 So.2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), (<HOLDING>). When the appellant challenged the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 89313 as amended by section 893101 florida statutes 2002 is constitutional (B) holding that section 7750214b2 florida statutes 1993 prohibited conviction for fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services and grand theft based on the same facts (C) holding florida sexual predators act section 77521 florida statutes 2000 to be unconstitutional as violating procedural due process (D) holding section 82705 florida statutes 1993 unconstitutional and certifying the question as one of great public importance (E) holding defendant had requisite contacts under section 481932 florida statutes where it solicited consulting and other services from a florida corporation in which a substantial amount of the services sought by defendant were performed in florida
Output: (D)
have also concluded that “Rooker-Feldman does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not parties to earlier state court litigation____” Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir.1992). When a plaintiff seeks to litigate a claim in a federal court, the existence of a state court judgment in another ease bars the federal proceeding under Rooker-Feldman only when entertaining the federal court claim would be the equivalent of an appellate review of that order. For that reason, Rooker-Feldman applies only when in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render that judgment ineffectual. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 886 n. 11 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rookerfeldman inapplicable where the district court could and did find that the plaintiffs constitutional claims had merit without also finding that the state court erred (B) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (C) holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine (D) holding that district court could impose attorney fees where plaintiffs lawsuit patently had no legal merit (E) holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff
Output: (A)
employee, for any reason. When the employee chooses to resign, no special rule applies. It is only when the employer actually terminates the’employee in violation of some established public policy that the narrow exception is applied. Moreover, given that the exception is indeed a narrow one which the courts of Virginia have sparingly applied and that the notion of constructive discharge as a basis for the exception has not been recognized in Virginia, it is the opinion of the Court that the exception should not now be expanded. Id. at 460-61. This Court recently held that as a matter of law, “a claim for constructive discharge does not yet exist under Virginia law.” Dixon, No. 95-901, at 9. But see Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F.Supp. 335, 340-41 (E.D.Va.1995) (Brinkema, J.) (<HOLDING>). In Dixon, after the plaintiff left her 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (C) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) recognizing exception to atwill employment doctrine where employee is terminated by employer for refusing to violate municipal regulation
Output: (D)
the extent of Diana’s community interest is governed by the fraction formula established in Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.1977), whereas the value of her interest is governed by the Berry formula. Under the Taggart formula, the extent of the nonmember spouse’s community interest in retirement benefits is calculated by dividing the number of months married under the plan by the total number of months employed at retirement. Thus, when applied to his service record, Eddie’s purported hybrid Taggart-Berry formula yields the following: Eddie’s argument is unavailing for two' reasons. First, and more importantly, the Berry court, though expressly declining to overrule Taggart, significantly altered the Taggart formula. See Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 446 n. 3 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Uzzel, 953 S.W.2d 384, 390 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that offerors may revise any aspect of their proposals they see fit including portions that were not the subject of the amendment and discussions (B) recognizing that berry altered the apportionment and valuation portions of the taggart formula (C) holding that it was error for the court to enter a modified agreement which materially altered the agreement reached by the parties (D) recognizing that fdutpa cases apply a benefit of the bargain damages formula (E) recognizing that joint and several liability of  107 seems unfair but the solution is found in apportionment and contribution
Output: (B)
parent’s assertion of a legal right to the child.” Id. Because the circuit court’s decision in this case was based upon a misapplication of the burden-of proof, which stemmed from the court’s incorrect finding that a temporary transfer of custody did not occur in this case, we must reverse the decision in this ease and remand for further proceedings. We also find that the circuit court erred in determining that incidents of domestic violence between the Respondent father and the child’s deceased mother were not relevant to its determination of the Respondent father’s parental fitness. We have corn sistently found that evidence of domestic violence is relevant to the determination of whether a parent is fit. See Syl. Pt. 1, Henry v. Johnson, 192 W.Va. 82, 86, 450 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 177 W.Va. 710, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that children are often physically assaulted or witness violence against one of their parents and may suffer deep and lasting emotional harm from victimization and from exposure to family violence consequently a family law judge should take domestic violence into account when making an award of temporary eustodyt based upon a recognition that it is clear that where domestic violence is present it should be considered when determining parental fitness (B) holding as relevant in a murder case a history of domestic violence involving defendant and his victim (C) holding south carolina crime of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature was categorically a crime of violence under ussg  4b121 because its lesserincluded offense criminal domestic violence fell entirely within  4b12ls force clause (D) holding that previous domestic violence finding did not have res judicata effect in proceeding to modify visitation because domestic violence and visitation modification proceedings are different causes of action (E) holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence
Output: (A)
§ 1337(a). Section 1337 provides jurisdiction for fair representation suits because the duty of fair representation derives from the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and the NLRA is an “Act of Congress regulating commerce.” Breininger, 493 U.S. at 83, 110 S.Ct. at 434 (citations omitted). In this context, the “fair representation claim is a separate cause of action from any possible suit against the employer.” See id. at 84, 110 S.Ct. at 435. In Breininger, for example, the employee alleged that the union represented him unfairly by refusing to refer him to potential employers. The union’s breach did not implicate a collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 71-72, 110 S.Ct. at 427-29. See also Storey v. Local 327, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 759 F.2d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, § 301 and § 1337 provide different 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that a union may breach its duty of fair representation by rejecting an employees interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement if the unions interpretation is itself arbitrary or unreasonable (C) holding that  1337 provides the jurisdictional basis for fair representation suits where no collective bargaining agreement exists (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union
Output: (C)
more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it is proper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter and to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947). A. Credit Against Commitment for Time Spent in Predisposition Detention On the first issue, section 5 — 815(f) of the Act requires that an habitual juvenile offender be committed to the DOC until age 21. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 815(f) (West 2000). Commitment as an habitual juvenile offender is considered a determinate commitment and good-conduct credit for habitual juvenile offenders is determined according to the procedures applicable to adult p , and In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d 640 (2d Dist. 2002) (<HOLDING>). The appellate court in this case relied on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals (B) holding that juveniles sentenced to indeterminate terms are not entitled to predisposition credit (C) holding that when a defendant is sentenced to a term that does not exceed the statutory maximum allowed for an indeterminate amount of the drug involved the jurys determination of drug quantity is practically irrelevant (D) holding that a credit issuing bank did not breach a credit agreement when it unilaterally modified the terms (E) holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials
Output: (B)
v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir.2010) (emphasizing the parsimonious nature of an effective EA) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)). The DOE has more than met its burden here. Accordingly, we find that the DOE’s discussion of the 2005 anthrax shipping incident in the DREA and the FREA satisfies NEPA. b. The “Restricted” Experiments We do not reach the issue of whether the DOE’s decision not to include information about “restricted” experiments in the FREA was arbitrary or capricious because the district court properly found that this argument was waived. Here, Tri-Valley CAREs did not address the district court’s ruling that the argument was deemed waived in its opening appellate bricf. Thus, the issue is not properly before us. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Claims not made in an opening brief in a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments not raised by a party in its open ing brief are deemed waived (B) holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived (C) holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived (D) holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived (E) holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived
Output: (A)
against the other defendants. See Am.Compl. ¶ 23. 2 . The individual defendants also maintain that plaintiffs have engaged in impermissible group pleading. The court agrees. In view, however, of the continuing split among the district courts concerning whether the group pleading doctrine survived enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, compare, e.g., In re CIENA Corp Sec. Litig., 99 F.Supp.2d 650, 663 n. 11 (D.Md.2000) (stating in dicta that application of group pleading doctrine to non-speaking defendants "would seem to be inconsistent with the strict pleading requirements of the PSLRA” (citing Coates I, 26 F.Supp.2d at 916)) with, e.g., In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F.Supp.2d 424, 442 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>), the absence of a controlling Fifth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in the pslra has altered that doctrine (B) holding pslra abolished grouppleading doctrine (C) holding that defendant has the burden of proving that a product has been altered unless the product has been lost whereupon plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion if the defense of substantial change is raised (D) holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law (E) recognizing doctrine
Output: (A)
Law §§ 70.00, 70.70. Therefore, even after Simmons, Foreman’s conviction may qualify as a predicate offense. We note, however, that the information in the PSR is very limited about the conviction. Nonetheless, we conclude, that even if the conviction no longer qualifies under § 851, there is no indication in the record that the district court’s sentencing decision was affected by the enhanced statutory minimum sentence of 120 months. The lowest end of the Guidelines range exceeded the statutory minimum and the court expressed its desire to sentence Foreman in the mid-range, and subsequently did so. Therefore, any procedural sentencing error would be harmless. See United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 454, 181 L.Ed.2d 297 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, on the record before the Court, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds (B) holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines (C) recognizing our authority to affirm sentence despite procedural error where record clearly reveals that court would have reached same result and sentence is substantively reasonable (D) holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding procedural error is harmless where the court would have reached the same result had the guidelines issue been decided the other way and the sentence imposed would be reasonable even if contested issue decided in defendants favor
Output: (E)
or requirements term like the parties' previous contracts. More significantly, the fax was silent as to any quantity terms (output, requirements, or otherwise) for the years 1999 and 2000. As a result, the district court declined Simmons's invitation to consider parol evidence of the parties' course of dealing to supply the missing quantity term. So must we. [W]here the writing relied upon to form the contract of sale is totally silent as to quantity, parol evidence cannot be used to supply the missing quantity term.” Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 794 (4th Cir.1989) (quotation omitted) (applying UCC § 2-201); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 908 F.Supp. 1084, 1091 (D.Conn.1995); cf. Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 728 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). II. The Promissory Estoppel Claim Simmons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury on quantity was harmless in part because the testimony regarding quantity was extensive detailed and uncontroverted (B) holding that a quantity term was present because the writing referred to the entire project (C) holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c (D) holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense (E) holding that a contract without a minimum quantity term is unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality
Output: (B)
to calculate and consider the applicable guideline range as well as the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). Id. If the sentence imposed is within the properly calculated guideline range, it is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2309, 164 L.Ed.2d 828 (2006). Thomas’ sentence was both within the guideline range of 262-327 months and within the statutory maximum of life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000). Because the district court appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory, and properly calculated and considered the guideline range and the relevant § 3553(a) factors, we find the sentence reasonable. See United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 632 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm Thomas’ sentence. We 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court does not have to state on the record that it considered every  3553a factor (B) holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (C) holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of  3553a (D) holding that to establish reasonableness of a sentence a district court need not explicitly discuss every  3553a factor on the record (E) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors
Output: (D)