niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
total amount of forged cheeks deposited by Wade and her codefendants. Wade argued that each codefendant engaged in separate transactions and that United S iew Wade’s ultimate sentence for reasonableness. Id. We reject Wade’s challenge to the district court’s use of the preponderance of the evidence standard. We have previously determined that “the remedial opinion in Booker held that such judicial fact-finding [by the preponderance of the evidence] for sentencing purposes does not violate the Sixth Amendment when made as part of an advisory Guidelines regime.” United States v. Vaughn, 410 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.2005), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1103, — L.Ed.2d -, 2006 WL 37911 (2005). See also United States v. Patient Transfer Service, Inc., 413 F.3d 734, 745 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the supreme courts holding in ferber (B) recognizing that the supreme court maintained the trial courts fact finding authority without setting a new standard in booker (C) holding that when court applies the clearly erroneous standard court may not reverse boards finding of fact if after court reviews the record in its entirety the finding is supported by a plausible basis (D) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (E) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction
Output: (B)
VA C & P examination was, by his own report, from a previous cyst, and is thus distinct from his present skin condition. III. ANALYSIS A. Interpretation of Diagnostic Code 7806 Interpretation of a regulation’s meaning is a question of law that the Court reviews de novo. Lane v. Principi, 339 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2003). “Regulatory interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the words used.” Hudgens v. Gibson, 26 Vet.App. 558, 561 (2014) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994)). The canons of statutory construction apply with similar force to agency regulations and require interpretation of words in their context with an eye to the law as a whole. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract must be read as a whole in order to give a reasonable and harmonious meaning and effect to all of its provisions citation omitted (B) holding that when interpreting a statute or regulation courts must read the provisions of the law as a whole and in context (C) recognizing that a statute should be read as comprehensive whole (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) holding courts must adhere to legislative intent when interpreting a statute
Output: (B)
with comparable experience on cases of comparable difficulty are $250/hour — partner; $175/hour — associate; and $75/hour— paralegal. The court determines that the attorneys’ affidavits are the best evidence of reasonable fees. The affidavits are well-supported and indicate that the reasonable value of Plaintiffs attorneys’ services was significantly more than Plaintiff and his attorneys agreed Plaintiff would pay. Factors such as the complexity of the case and the attorneys’ experience also weigh in favor of awarding fees at a higher rate. Moreover, both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have allowed recovery of attorney fees in excess of an agreed-upon amount in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Cadle Company, II, Inc. v. Chasteen, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant may receive only the portion of his fees under 42 usc  1988 that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim (B) recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 (C) holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 (D) holding that an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a 11 usc   1988 fee (E) holding that a contingentfee agreement should not act as a ceiling on the award of attorney fees under 42 usc  1988
Output: (E)
interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.”). In this case, the Referendum has prevented SDDS from operating Lonetree under the conditions and standards set forth when the legislature passed S.B. 169. However, nothing prevents SDDS from reapplying for another permit and proposing more stringent environmental safeguards. Furthermore, even if SDDS cannot operate Lonetree, the example of the Big Stone waste disposal plant demonstrates that the flow of interstate waste to South Dakota has not been prevented. The Court concludes that the incidental burden which the Referendum imposed on interstate commerce was not “clearly excessive” in comparison to the local benefits. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 473, 101 S.Ct. at 728-29 (<HOLDING>); Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128-29, 98 S.Ct. at 2215 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment was improperly granted in view of the need for careful interpretation of the original and reissue claims in light of the specification the prosecution history and the alleged industry practice (B) holding that in 1998 the law was clearly established that excessive duration of a police dog bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force (C) holding that even if outofstate plastic producers were burdened relatively more heavily than the minnesota pulpwood industry the burden was not clearly excessive in view of the ecological benefits which would accrue (D) holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable (E) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff
Output: (C)
take place in federal court. The Government maintains that a facially valid certification is not subject to review by this Court and must be held sufficient. It further contends that even if the certification can be reviewed by this Court, the certification at issue here was correct. “Whether the government complied with [the juvenile delinquency certification requirements of] 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is an issue of statutory interpretation which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 241 F.3d 684, 686 (9th Cir.2001). A certification filed in the district court by a United States Attorney is presumed to be accurate, absent circumstances calling into question its accuracy or validity. See Pasadena Research Labs., Inc. v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 381-82 (9th Cir.1948) (<HOLDING>). A Section 5032 provides in relevant part: A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding generally the law presumes that every man in his private and official character does his duty until the contrary is proved it will presume that all things are rightly done unless the circumstances of the case overturn this presumption (B) holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence (C) holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 (D) recognizing a presumption of regularity that undergirds the official acts of public officers causing courts to presume that they have properly discharged their official duties (E) holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation
Output: (A)
that I should wear my dust mask or respirator after I mixed [and sprayed] the product, [when] I could see little, if any, dust in the air.”). Mr. Headley’s declaration answers this question by stating that, were such information given, he would have worn the dust mask/respirator for the entire day, rather than the usual five hours per day he usually wore it. Dkt. No. 78 at 2, ¶ 3 (Headley Deck). At the very least, genuine factual disputes exist regarding whether Mr. Headley knew, or was ever made properly aware by Ferro, that breathing silica was possible even when the air appeared clear, as well as whether a warning indicating as much would have affected his safety decisions. See, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 117 Wash.2d 747, 755-756, 818 P.2d 1337, 1341 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 3. Summary Judgment Is Improper on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search (B) holding that plaintiffs contention that had they been warned of the dangers of aspirating baby oil the accident would have been avoided satisfied the requirements of rcw  7720301b (C) holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled (D) holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements (E) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible
Output: (B)
simply, whether the officer intends that a detention lead to a prosecution has no bearing on whether an arrest has occurred. Id. at 513-14, 723 A.2d 423 (citations omitted). Terry constituted a limited departure from the requirement of probable cause to support a seizure. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop, without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although roving patrols in which officers stop and question motorists about their resident status may be conducted without probable cause such stops must at least show that the stopping officer is aware of specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that a vehicle contains illegal aliens who may be illegally in the country (B) holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity (C) holding that when a border patrol officers observations lead him or her to reasonably suspect that a vehicle may contain illegal aliens the officer may stop the vehicle question its occupants as to citizenship and immigration status and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances but stating that any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause (D) holding that officers may detain the occupants of a vehicle while executing a search warrant (E) holding that a border patrol agents blocking the stopped vehicle approaching the vehicle with his gun drawn and interrogating the individual about his citizenship and immigration status did not convert the stop into a custodial arrest
Output: (C)
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (3d Cir.1993); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-10 (3d Cir.) (contrasting the standards governing 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1991); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir.1974). As the Third Circuit has instructed, “[a] district court has federal question jurisdiction in any case where a plaintiff with standing makes a non-frivolous allegation that he or she is entitled to relief because the defendant’s conduct violated a federal statute.” Growth Horizons, 983 F.2d at 1281; cf. Stibitz v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 997 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S.Ct. 1187, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct (B) holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim (C) holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit (D) holding that there is no federal question jurisdiction where a claim is so insubstantial as to be completely devoid of merit (E) holding that even where primary claim is a federal question pendent party jurisdiction is not a recognized basis of jurisdiction in the seventh circuit
Output: (D)
rights by initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not “clearly established” that malicious prosecution is a violation of constitutional rights, and. thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that “[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United State 16 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment
Output: (B)
employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation,” Ckandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 357, 115 5. Ct. 2172, 2184, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) (quotations omitted). The Stewart Court held that, although it was idle, with one scow at sea and the other without a working engine, the Super Scoop was a vessel in navigation because it “had not been taken out of service, permanently anch “repairs,” the “necessaries” for which maritime liens are authorized under the Federal Maritime Lien Act specifically include towage. See 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4). Although she could not self-propel, the BETTY LYN II could be towed upon 24 hours notice. Nor does the fact that the BETTY LYN II was drydocked for the repairs divest her of vessel status. See N. Pac. S.S. Co., 249 U.S. at 128, 39 S.Ct. at 224 (<HOLDING>); Jones v. One Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 4 displaced service provision in the admiralty act (B) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (C) holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts (D) holding that admiralty jurisdiction extended to an action for ship repairs performed in drydock because there is no difference in character as to repairs made upon the hull of a vessel dependent upon whether they are made while she is afloat while in dry dock or while hauled up by ways upon land the nature of the service is identical in the several cases and the admiralty jurisdiction extends to all (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
Output: (D)
be ascertained from the creating instrument, the permissible uses of an easement acquired by prescription are necessarily defined by the use of the servient land during the prescriptive period.”). In French, plaintiffs acquired a prescriptive right of user over a roadway for certain discrete purposes based on their past use of the property. We concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to make a different use of the roadway because it would increase the burden on the servient estate and it would extend the right acquired by plaintiffs’ prior use of the property. French, 135 Vt. at 80, 369 A.2d at 1388. Thus, French does not support plaintiffs’ assertion that the reasonable use of the right>of-way at issue here depends on its historical use. Cf. Nelson, 113 Vt. at 172, 32 A.2d at 146 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as previously discussed, we agree 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance (B) holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone (C) recognizing that where a grantee has an easement which he shares with others his duty to repair and maintain it must be apportioned with all other easement holders based upon the extent of the individuals use of the easement (D) holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement (E) recognizing that one cannot have an easement in his own land
Output: (B)
17 . Both Fireman’s Fund and Lodi agree that the even if the district court did not err in abstaining, it erred in dismissing the Fireman’s Fund’s remaining federal and state constitutional claims; the district court instead should have stayed the action and retained jurisdiction over the remaining federal claims pending resolution of the relevant state law issues in state court. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 614 F.2d at 213. 18 . We also note that although HSAA is not identical to CERCLA, it mirrors CERCLA in many respects. It therefore seems inconsistent to consider the Insurers' federal preemption claims, while at the same time abstaining from the related state law preemption claims. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (<HOLDING>). But see Fields v. Rockdale County, 785 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them (B) holding that pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution (C) recognizing exception under state constitution (D) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (E) recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole
Output: (B)
center’s investigation and disciplinary decisions involved the type of legislative or executive policy decisions that we believe must be protected by discretionary immunity. The center’s decisions did not simply require the application of professional judgment to a given set of facts, but were necessarily entwined in a layer of policy-making that exceeded the mere application of rules to facts. Appellants argue that respondents are not immune from liability for the center’s failure to convey certain information to the Department of Human Services to assist in the department’s investigation of appellants’ allegations against Gary Grimm because this failure to convey information was a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, act. See S.L.D. v. Kranz, 498 N.W.2d 47, 55 (Minn.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the circumstances here, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse (B) holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse (C) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (D) holding that county was not immune from liability for continued sexual abuse of child resulting from social workers failure to convey information to supervisor about report of child abuse stating that failure to communicate did not involve planning decisions or the balancing of policy objectives (E) holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child
Output: (D)
than liability for contributory infringement of a copyright. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984); Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 (noting that "trademark infringement liability is more narrowly circumscribed than copyright infringement”). Under copyright law, generalized knowledge that copyright infringement may take place in an Internet venue is insufficient to impose contributory liability. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir.2001) ("The mere existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and Napster’s demonstrated failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient to impose contributory liability.”); Hendrickson, 165 F.Supp.2d at 1088-90 (<HOLDING>). 38 . Of course, a NOCI was not a notice of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generalized notice of copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the purpose of contributory liability (B) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (C) holding that mere authorization and approval of copyright infringements taking place outside the united states is not a copyright violation and does not create jurisdiction over those extraterritorial acts (D) holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply (E) holding manufacturers generalized knowledge of concerns insufficient to meet ucc notice requirement
Output: (A)
an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code  51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision
Output: (B)
v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975 (11th Cir.2001). Accordingly, the question to ask is whether prison officials have been given fair warning that their actions or omissions are unconstitutional. Id. It has been clearly established in this Circuit for a long time that an inmate may not be held in prison beyond the end of his sentence. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied 396 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 210, 24 L.Ed.2d 177 (1969)(upholding liability under § 1983 against a jailer for continuing a prisoner’s incarceration for nine months); Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1993) (denying qualified immunity defense and finding there was a clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment to not be falsely imprisoned); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). These case clearly establish an inmate’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding thirty day detention beyond the expiration of a sentence constitutes a deprivation of due process (B) holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection (C) holding thirtyeight day preappearance detention violated due process (D) holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process (E) holding that deprivation of property must conform to due process principles
Output: (A)
rather than the probate division of the common pleas court, R.C. 2311.04, rather than 2101.31, would have governed the proceedings at trial and would have mandated that the factual issues be tried to a jury. We are not persuaded, however, that R.C. 2311.04 would have conferred upon appellants a right to a jury trial on the factual issues presented in the complaint and in their counterclaims. As we noted above, R.C. 2721.10 and 2311.04 mandate a jury trial of factual issues arising in a declaratory judgment action instituted in the general division of the common pleas court if the action is construed to be “for the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property.” The right to a jury trial thereby (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 113, 114, 12 OBR 420, 421, 467 N.E.2d 564, 566 (<HOLDING>). In its complaint, FNB sought declaratory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a cross claim or counterclaim for affirmative relief must be filed before the statute of limitations expires because a claim is not stripped of its character as an independent action by acquiring the label counterclaim (B) holding that the due process clause confers a right to direct a childs education (C) holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted (D) holding that rc 231104 confers a right to a jury trial on a legal counterclaim that if true would extinguish the original equitable claim but confers no right on a legal counterclaim that is incidental or ancillary to the original claim (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a
Output: (D)
was available” between the death on July 9 and the release of the records on October 14 because she did not look. Finally, in her affidavit filed May 17, 2005, Mac-Pherson stated that she failed to inform Dougherty because she assumed he would not be interested in it, as she was told that it had been a natural death. ¶38 None of these explanations meet MCSO’s burden of establishing that records furnished ninety-seven days (sixty-seven working days) after a request was made were furnished promptly. First, after an agency learns that it erroneously responded to a records request, the agency may not justify its failure to provide records by claiming that it no longer has any responsibility to provide them. Cf. Rogers v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 419-20 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Second, an agency may not justify its failure 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises (B) holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception (C) holding for the purposes of the california public records act that a city disclosed all documents in a reasonably timely manner when records that had not been in the citys possession or could not be found were promptly disclosed when they were found or became available (D) recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies (E) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records
Output: (C)
the presence or absence of a dose-response relationship. Defendant memorandum (doc. 585), at 1, 20. Dr. Kramer is an epidemiologist, having received a Ph.D. in the same from the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in 1979. Expert Report of Kramer, submitted as plaintiff ex. 016185, at 6. “Epidemiology, a field that concerns itself with finding the causal nexus between external factors and disease, is generally considered to be the best evidence of causation in toxic tort actions.” Rider v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir.2002). In Rider, the Eleventh Circuit added that “[t]his Court has long held that epidemiology is not required to prove causation in a toxic tort case.” Id., at 1199; citing Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Although she performed no independent studies 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a causeeffect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or epidemiological studies (B) holding that agreements established agency relationship (C) holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established (D) holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts (E) holding coleman injunction is not clearly established law
Output: (A)
that an impartial jury cannot be obtained in such county.”); OCGA § 17-2-2 (a). 15 Jones, 272 Ga. at 901 (2); accord Muldrow v. St hat State failed to prove venue when only evidence presented was that murder victim’s neighbor that defendant abandoned majority of his ineffective assistance claims by making only conclusory arguments and failing to support such argument with citations to authority). 31 Tyner, 313 Ga. App. at 564 (6) (a) (punctuation omitted); see Perdue v. State, 298 Ga. 841, 845 (3) (785 SE2d 291) (2016) (noting that it is well established that the decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy and tactics). 32 Tyner, 313 Ga. App. at 564 (6) (a) (punctuation omitted). 33 See Mattox v. State, 305 Ga. App. 600, 606 (3) (699 SE2d 887) (2010) (<HOLDING>). 34 Davenport v. State, 308 Ga. App. 140, 154 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to impeach a witness by showing bias was ineffective assistance (B) holding witnesss business address even though witnesss middle name omitted enough information because party could locate witness (C) holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand (D) holding that trial counsels inability to locate witness did not constitute ineffective assistance when defendant only knew witnesss first name and the apartment complex where he believed the witness lived (E) holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness
Output: (D)
other forex trader for themselves during this period resulted in net losses; (2) assured pool participants that no more than two percent of their funds would be at risk yet Defendants consistently used more than two percent of pool participants’ funds to trade forex; and (3) promised that pool participants could redeem their initial investments upon 30 days’ no element is established when an individual’s “conduct involves intentional omissions or misrepresentations that present a risk of misleading customers, either known to the defendant or sufficiently manifest that the defendant must have been aware of the risk.” King, 2007 WL 1321762, at *2 (citing R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d at 1328) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wasnick v. Refco, Inc., 911 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Lawrence v. CFTC, 759 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that scienter is established when an individuals acts are performed with knowledge of their nature and character (B) holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore (C) holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted (D) holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law (E) holding that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly
Output: (A)
show the hostile treatment was based on their protected status.”). Indeed, Plaintiff herself believed that much of the hostility she faced was because she had cooperated with the investigation of the onion incident and created a patient-care report for the medication that was used on Roberts, which report contradicted a supervisor’s explanation. Hostile treatment based on Plaintiffs cooperation in the investigation does not provide evidence that these incidents were motivated by Plaintiffs sex. Further, even if Plaintiff had presented evidence that this allegedly negative treatment was motivated by her sex, the treatment was not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to support a hostile work environment claim. Compare Adams v. Austal, U.S.A, L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>) and Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (B) holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it (C) holding that plaintiff did not establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment where the complained of conduct was episodic but not so frequent as to become pervasive was never severe was never physically threatening though occasionally discomforting or mildly humiliating and significantly was never according to the record an impediment to the plaintiffs work performance (D) holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person (E) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where an africanamerican plaintiff saw his coworkers wear the confederate flag on a regular basis saw racist graffiti in the mens restroom that he used on a daily basis heard people say the slur nigger but only a few times  and heard about a noose being left in the breakroom though he did not see it himself
Output: (E)
that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is prejudiced. See Masaka, 4 So.3d at 1286; Wells, 967 So.2d at 419. In the instant case, there was no evidence offered that Appellant worked in conjunction with anyone else to commit the crimes. Such a theory was never argued before the jury, and the instruction on principals was neither requested by the State nor read in the original reading of the jury instructions. The instruction was only given after the jury presented the court with a question regarding its inability to determine whether Appellant was the actual shooter. Where there was no evidence offered that Appellant acted with anyone in committing the shootings, the trial court erred in reading the principals instruction. See Lovette v. State, 654 So.2d 604, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, the error was not harmless in that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error (B) holding that trial court committed reversible error in not instructing jury to determine credibility of incriminating statements attributed to defendant by state trooper (C) holding that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a principals theory because there was no evidence that the appellant acted in concert with anyone in committing the charged offenses (D) holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed firstdegree murder (E) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial
Output: (C)
of the [Marion County] small claims court shall be taken to the superior court of the county and tried de novo." Retaining the identical language, the Legislature re-codified the statute in 2004 as Indiana Code section 33-34-3-15(a). 2 . Atlantic Coast sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, which the Court of Appeals accepted. The Court of Appeals addressed this claim in the instant appeal. 3 . Atlantic Coast does not challenge the Court of Appeals' determination regarding the discovery order, and the Cooks do not challenge the determination that they waived appellate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta Airlines on the Cooks' negligence claim. 4 . Compare, for example, Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), and O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of aviation safety generally and thus preempts the entire field from state regulation
Output: (E)
at 10 (citing Sanders v. City of Union Springs, 207 Fed.Appx. 960, 966 (11th Cir.2006); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.1986)). Plaintiffs have not, however, demonstrated that the law was “clearly established” that a law enforcement officer can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to prevent another officer’s unlawful search. “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficie e a duty to intervene in unlawful searches when they are in a position to do so, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers and Alma Officers violated clearly established law by failing to intervene in these particular circumstance. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The facts alleged in this case are distinct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (D) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (E) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force
Output: (C)
of due diligence prior to trial. Thus, as the evidence submitted clearly does not constitute newly discovered evidence, the trial court did not err in denying Mann’s motion for postconviction relief without granting him an evidentiary hearing. REPRESENTATION BY THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE IN NON-DEATH PENALTY POSTCONVICTION COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS While the trial court accepted and ruled on the postconviction motion filed by the Public Defender’s Office, it concluded that the Public Defender’s Office did not, in fact, represent Mann because it had not been appointed to do so. We agree. A criminal defendant’s right to counsel is constitutionally mandated regarding representation at trial and on direct appeal. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)(<HOLDING>); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (B) holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (D) holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary (E) holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial
Output: (E)
Impact Statements and forest plans were at least partially privileged. The Court reached this decision only after the forest service had already released redacted copies of the drafts and after the withheld Information had been reviewed in camera. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 861 F.2d at 1115-6. In summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s approach to the deliberative process privilege, however, the Ninth Circuit quoted the D.C. Circuit’s broad statement that the deliberative process privilege “cover[s] all ‘recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions and other subjective doc will not reveal the mental processes of the agency, however, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the argument that whatever is not the “final agency position” must be deliberative. See Carter, 307 F.3d at 1092 (<HOLDING>) (citing Petroleum Info. Corp., 976 F.2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release (B) holding that where a foia plaintiff seeks sensitive foreignaffairs information the court should give substantial weight to a government affidavit that the information is exempt from foia but nevertheless consider contrary evidence presented by the plaintiff (C) holding that foia compelled the department of commerce to release census data that adjusted for systemic undercounts and stating any concerns with public confusion caused by release of erroneous information could be allayed by warning foia requesters that the information is unofficial and disclaiming responsibility for any errors or gaps (D) holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing (E) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents
Output: (C)
be corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist of blunders in execution whereas the latter consists of instances where the court changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original determination, or because on second thought it has decided to exercise its discretion in a manner different from the way it was exercised in the original determination. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a proper Rule 60(a) order involves the purely ministerial act of correcting a clerical mistake; it does not alter the substantive rights of the parties or resolve any of the disputes in the case. Such an order should not be considered final. See Elliott v. Four Seasons Props. (In re Frontier Props., Inc.), 979 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) resolves and seriously affects substantive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts sale order is a final order for res judicata purposes (B) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (C) holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (E) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal
Output: (B)