niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
H. Hyman, for appellant. 2. Having found that insufficient evidence supports one of the grounds used to revoke Mann’s probation, we must now determine whether the trial court’s order revoking the balance of Mann’s probation may still stand. Mann asserts that his probation may not be revoked based upon the remaining two counts because they were technical violations justifying a maximum revocation of two years. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c). We disagree. The trial court was authorized to revoke the balance of Mann’s probation based upon his admitted violation of the special condition of restitution imposed in his initial sentence. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (e) (court may revoke balance of sentence for violation of special condition of probation); Walker v. Brown, 281 Ga. 468 (639 SE2d 470) (2007) (<HOLDING>); Hill v. State, 270 Ga. App. 114, 118, n. 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding miranda decision does not apply retroactively (B) holding 2001 amendments to ocga  428341 apply retroactively (C) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively (D) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively (E) holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively
Output: (B)
are reasonably susceptible to two different interpretations, and therefore are ambiguous. See Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Keller Transp., Inc., 382 Mont. 72, 365 P.3d 465, 470 (Mont. 2016). Montana law construes ambiguous provisions “against the insurer and in favor of extending coverage.” Id. We therefore reject United Fire’s argument that the Premises Endorsements limit coverage to incidents that occurred on the St. George premises. Because the Premises Endorsements purport to cover claims “arising out of ... the use of’ the St. George premises, they are sufficiently capacious to include coverage for bodily injury in Montana that flows from or grows out of the use of the St. George premises. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 311 Mont. 155, 54 P.3d 21, 23 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, United Fire had a duty to defend 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity (B) holding that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous and interpreting it as originating from or growing out of or flowing from (C) holding that insurance provisions excluding damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles subject to registration and damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles if the injury or damage occurs away from the insured premises were ambiguous because together they could be read in four different ways (D) holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear (E) holding phrase arising out of the ownership maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as contained in um policy should be given same interpretation as in automobile liability policies
Output: (B)
however, where the decision is wrong on everything else, this theory is little more than a legal fiction. In my view, affirmance of the trial court here leaves an entity that had virtually nothing to do with the injury potentially liable for the whole verdict, and the real perpetrators of the fraud possibly off the hook. This result is unjust, in my view. Waiver The majority find that Kinko’s has waived any argument regarding negligent supervision because essentially they find the cases defendant cites essentially to be not on point (going to hiring and retention) and unpersuasive. Where the party has offered authority, but the court is ultimately unpersuaded by the cases for whatever reason, in my view, waiver is much too harsh a result. See Welch v. Johnson, 147 Ill. 2d 40, 48 (1992) (<HOLDING>). I think waiver is more appropriately applied 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defective waiver colloquy as opposed to a defective waiver may be subject to a harmless error analysis (B) holding that scientific hydrographic judgment and purely scientific considerations do not involve policy considerations and are not protected by the discretionary function exception (C) holding that the decision not to remove materials during canal construction was based not on policy judgments but on technical scientific engineering considerations and thus is not susceptible to policy considerations (D) holding that there were no public policy considerations to prevent a diving school from limiting liability for its own negligence (E) holding that a reviewing court may in furtherance of its responsibility to provide a just result override considerations of waiver
Output: (E)
(Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) (“[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21’s administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction.”); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person “may file a complaint with the commission”); id. § 21.0015 (defining “commission” as “the Texas Workforce ■Commission civil rights division”); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed “not later than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional
Output: (D)
judgment, the District Court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Bourdon contends that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. He argues that his appointed counsel was ineffective and therefore, notwithstanding his representation by that attorney, defendants hindered Bourdon’s access to the state trial court, in violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts, when they denied Bour-don’s request for reference materials. Bourdon, however, has not asserted a cause of action of ineffective assistance of counsel, and, in any event, an ineffectiveness cause of action would be inappropriate in a proceeding brought under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that suits under 42 usc  1983 do not override state immunity (C) holding that 42 usc  1396aa13a is enforceable in a suit under  1983 (D) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983
Output: (E)
v. ITT Consumer Financial Corporation, 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.2000) (common law ground for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA includes when an award is arbitrary or capricious); Ainsworth v. Skumick, 960 F.2d 939, 940-41 (11th Cir.l992)(arbitration award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious when court cannot infer any ground for the awards from the facts); U.S. Postal Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778-79 (11th Cir.1988) (award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious if it exhibits a wholesale departure from the law). Hall Street precludes the use of any common-law grounds as an independent basis for vacatur of an arbitration award. See Royce Homes, L.P. v. Bates, 315 S.W.3d 77, 90 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); LeFoumha v. Legend Classic Homes, Ltd., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hall street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in section 10 of the faa (B) holding that common law grounds such as manifest disregard of law and gross mistake were not valid grounds for vacatur of arbitration award as hall street forecloses any common law grounds for vacatur (C) holding that the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards may not be supplemented by contract (D) holding that arbitrary and capricious ground for vacatur recognized along with the four grounds for vacatur specified in chapter 1 of the faa could not be used to vacate award under the convention (E) holding that a transcript is necessary if the asserted grounds for vacatur of arbitration award are grounded in the conduct of the proceeding
Output: (B)
here that the sentencing judge complied with the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(C). Appellant made an allocution before the judge began announcing the sentence. The issue before us, however, is how to consider appellant’s second statement to the court. On the facts before us, in which the sentencing judge indicated, prior to the imposition of sentence, that appellant would be given an opportunity to respond, we hold that it was a continuation of the allocution. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not accord a defendant the right to a second allocution. In fact, the rules do not even require a sentencing court to remind a defendant of the right to allocute so long as the court clearly notifies the defendant once. See United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 506-07 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). However, the fact that there is no right to a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon (B) holding right to allocution not denied when judge addressed defendant by name and asked him if he had anything to say but did not renew that invitation after defense counsel finished speaking (C) holding that the trial court violated the defendants allocution rights when the court in the defendants absence did not afford  defense counsel an opportunity to present information in mitigation of punishment (D) holding that the trial court violated the defendants allocution rights when the court sentenced him without allowing him to offer mitigating remarks (E) holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation
Output: (B)
to procure blanket coverage. Anderson discusses the difference between blanket and specific coverage, noting that First State quoted 15 Couch on Insurance 2d 54:83 for the proposition that a schedule of property values in an insurance policy renders the policy coverage specific and not blanket: A distinction must be made between a policy which speaks in terms of a lump-sum obligation or value of the property and one which separately schedules different items of property. In the latter case, each separately treated item of property is in effect covered by a separate contract of insurance and the amount recoverable with respect to a loss affecting such property is determined independently of other items of property. 617 N.E.2d at 935. Upon application of 868, 870-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Mackoul v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 402 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wrongful death claim related back to a personal injury claim in an automobile accident case where the wrongful death claim  arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the original complaint and the defendant was advised of the essential facts necessary to prepare his defense even with the added claim (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (C) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (D) holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death (E) holding survivors entitled only to per person coverage since wrongful death claim was only one claim
Output: (E)
The latter case is L-1283. There Judge Brown’s order of dismissal referred to the prior opinion of Judge Stanley, saying that no new legal or factual grounds were presented, and also expressed his view against the retro-activity of O’Callahan. Our record initially covered only the latter case, but we have since caused a supplementary record of the pertinent portions of the first proceeding to he incorporated in view of the appeal in both cases. Opportunity was afforded for additional memoranda addressing the supplemental record, but the parties did not find this necessary. The record now covers all the proceedings in both cases except a hearing transcript in the former case. Chief Judge Stanley’s opinion indicates that there were no disputed f 22, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (<HOLDING>) ; Smith v. Crouse, Warden, 378 U.S. 584, 84 
 Holding statements: (A) holding retroactive application (B) holding retroactive the rule that persons with conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment cannot be excluded from juries (C) holding that the act is retroactive (D) holding no retroactive application (E) holding that the act is not retroactive
Output: (B)
90-day window. The court is not persuaded that this proposed alternative approach constitutes^ an adequate remedy for Plaintiffs. First, § 1501 simply authorizes Customs, in its discretion, to revisit a liquidation within 90 days of the notice. It does not confer any rights on Plaintiffs and therefore does not constitute a “remedy” for Plaintiffs that would preclude injunctive relief. See Canadian Lumber, 30 CIT at _, 441 F.Supp.2d at 1266 (“a cognizable alternative remedy must rest on more than the whim or discretion of a defendant”). Second, monitoring the liquidation of entries subject to an anti-dumping duty order is a serious challenge even for importers who have access to complete information regarding an entry. See, e.g., Juice Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Defendant-Intervenors were themselves 
 Holding statements: (A) holding weintraub rational inapplicable to liquidations because corporation ceases to exist after liquidation order (B) holding defendant cannot establish prejudice merely by alleging court held probation revocation hearing after defendants period of probation expired (C) holding hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by reforming indefinite suspension to temporary suspension of 92 days in excess of 15day statutory period for temporary suspensions (D) holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired (E) holding customs violation of statutory suspension of liquidation not actionable by importer who discovered improper liquidations after protest period had expired
Output: (E)
28, 33-34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955). A person injured by an intoxicated person has no common-law claim against a liquor vendor for illegally selling alcohol to the intoxicated person. Id. Causes of action created by statute in derogation of common law are generally strictly construed. Id. at 43-44, 70 N.W.2d at 897. The CDA also provides that a person who is sued for causing the injury of another while intoxicated may bring an action against a liquor vendor for contribution and indemnification if the person serves written notice to the vendor within 120 days from the date of the injury. Minn.Stat. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2000) (barring an action for contribution and indemnity if notice is not provided within 120 days of the injury); Oslund v. Johnson, 578 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn.1998) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the CDA contains a statute of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (B) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that failure to follow mandatory provision of statute renders the act void whereas failure to follow directory provision does not (E) holding that a tortfeasor seeking contribution and indemnification is required to follow the 120day notice provision in the cda and not the 60day notice provision
Output: (E)
role of an advocate in prosecuting Srivastava. Likewise, the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes Srivastava’s claims against the judge who presided over her criminal case. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (judicial immunity shields judges from civil actions for their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1990) (mere allegations of conspiracy insufficient to overcome judicial immunity). Additionally, Srivastava cannot sue employees of the Marion County Public Defender’s Office under § 1983 because they are not acting under “color of state law,” a requisite element of any § 1983 claim. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>). As for Srivastava’s claim against the officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff (B) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (C) holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant (D) holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action
Output: (C)
intent of exercising dominion and control over the person. See DeShaney 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (explaining the State’s affirmative duty to protect arises from the limitation it imposes on the freedom to act); see also id. at 206, 109 S.Ct. 998 (Brennan J., dissenting) (“[T]o the Court, the only fact that seems to count as an ‘affirmative act of restraining an individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf is direct physical control.”). The complaint’s allegations do not satisfy this demanding standard. Apart from the fact that the complaint does not allege the special relationship upon which the custody inquiry depends, Defendants did not restrain decedent’s liberty or freedom to act through a show of force or authority. See Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 641 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendants did not force decedent against his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a doctors report that merely repeats a patients assertions about her level of pain and ability to sleep stand and walk is not objective medical evidence (B) holding that period of limitations on a patients negligence cause of action began to run when the patient knew or had reason to know about the foreign object left in her body (C) holding that doctors do not have to accept patients (D) holding a doctors assurances that his patient had nothing to worry about and was fine did not constitute a restraint of liberty regardless of the patients reliance on those assurances to forego medical assistance (E) holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors
Output: (D)
a portion of the original district court decision. Id. at 640. But our holding only affirmed the small portion of the decision that found that an exception in the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA. The relief sought by Federation was far broader than that which we upheld. It sought not the elimination of merely this exception, but rather the elimination of the entire ordinance. In fact, our holding that the generic advertising exception was preempted actually did not provide Federation any relief at all; rather, it further limited Federation’s ability to advertise. Therefore, the fact that we affirmed this portion of the original district court decision certainly does not make Federation a prevailing party. See generally Cady v. City of Chicago, 43 F.3d 326, 329 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Federation also tries to characterize itself 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even under the catalyst theory a plaintiff is not a prevailing party unless he obtains the relief sought or at least relief that is directly beneficial to him (B) holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action (C) holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought (D) holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process (E) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees
Output: (A)
the BIA’s decision. 1 . United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); see also implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. 2 . In this regard, the IJ's finding is supported by Yusif's statement to the airport immigration official that he fled Iraq because he "use[d] to have a big place that sold alcohol in big quantities. Then the government took over.” When asked if this were the reason he left Iraq, he responded that ‘‘[tjhe main reason is because after [they took over the store], they would give us a hard time.” See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 162 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 . A quick note about our jurisdiction is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the fact that petitioners had been the victims of criminal activity in russia is not a basis for asylum unless their harassers knew of and pursued them because of race religion nationality membership in a particular group or political opinion (B) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (C) holding that forced recruitment does not amount to persecution without a showing that it was on account of petitioners political opinion (D) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable (E) holding that a petitioners unwillingness to return must be based upon persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race religion nationality membership in a particular social group or political opinion  
Output: (E)
right to stop answering questions at any point after questioning has begun.” United States v. Ellis, 125 Fed.Appx. 691, 699 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Gaines, 105 Fed.Appx. 682, 694 (6th Cir.2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds Gaines v. United States, 543 U.S. 1114, 125 S.Ct. 1090, 160 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2005) (finding that a defendant’s oral Miranda waiver and voluntary statements to police were admissible, even if the defendant was not advised of his right to terminate questioning) (citing United States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.1972)); United States v. Ricks, 989 F.2d 501 (6th Cir.1993) (rejecting the argument that a Miranda warning must “include the right to stop answering questions at any time”); United States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). As to Detective Alexander’s alleged haste, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant must assert right of confrontation and right to be present at time of alleged violation and cannot claim those rights for first time on appeal (B) holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time (C) holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning (D) holding that any time is insufficient to warn accused of right to counsel during questioning (E) holding that right to effective assistance of counsel requires that defendant be advised of immigration consequences of plea
Output: (B)
included offense instructions requested by a party constitutes error, as does the trial court’s failure to give an appropriate included offense instruction that has not been requested. Such error, however, is harmless when the jury convicts the defendant of the charged offense or of an included offense greater than the included offense erroneously omitted from the instructions. The error is harmless because jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, and, under the standard jury instructions, the jury, “in reaching a unanimous verdict as to the charged offense [or as to the greater included offense, would] not have reached, much less considered,” [Holbron ], 80 Hawai'i [at] 47, 904 P.2d [at 932,] the absent lesser offense on which it should have been instructed. [Id.] (<HOLDING>). To the extent that [State v.]Kupau [, 76 
 Holding statements: (A) holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause (B) holding that the trial courts erroneous instruction on the nonexistent included offense of attempted reckless manslaughter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the jury reached a unanimous guilty verdict as to the charged offense of attempted murder in the second degree (C) holding that defendants conviction    must be vacated where defendant argued that trial court committed plain error in instructing jury on nonexistent crime of attempted second degree murder (D) holding that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue based on the first districts decision in montgomery that the standard attempted manslaughterbyact instruction was fundamentally erroneous where betts was charged with attempted firstdegree premeditated murder and convicted of the necessary lesserincluded offense of attempted seconddegree murder (E) holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was if error harmless
Output: (B)
¶28 The majority’s refusal to apply the civil rules to a civil “special proceeding” where the civil rules conflict with ANY statute is certainly a novel application of CR 81. We have never held the civil rules inapplicable under CR 81 because of a conflict with an unrelated statute of general applicability. Instead, we have held the rules inapplicable only where the civil rules conflict with the procedures specifically outlined in the statute governing the special proceeding. f 29 This means “[t]he matters before us turn on whether [the civil rule] is inconsistent with provisions for special proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW.” In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476, 489, 55 P.3d 597 (2002); see also In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (comparin 1204 (1999) (<HOLDING>). ¶32 Even where the accused’s protections stem 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (B) holding because the svp is civil the accused has no constitutional right to counsel (C) holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection (D) holding because the svp statute is civil the accused has no right to confront witnesses (E) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel
Output: (B)
for Heart Disease and a Thyroid Disability a Separate Claim for Disability Benefits for Those Conditions? Our ability to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal hinges on whether Mr. Robinson is advancing a new claim or merely a new argument in support of his claim. If Mr. Robinson is advancing a new claim, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because there is no final Board decision on that claim. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a); see also Breeden v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 475, 478 (2004). If, on the other hand, Mr. Robinson is advancing a new argument in support of his claim, then we possess jurisdiction over this appeal and can consider the new argument or remand the matter for the Board to consider it in the first instance. See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In Roebuck v. Nicholson, we held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court has discretion to hear or to remand legal arguments raised for the first time on appeal (B) holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal (C) holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered (D) holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear a cue claim raised for the first time on appeal (E) holding that this court has discretion to hear arguments presented to it in the first instance provided that it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim
Output: (E)
in a foreign nation where only quasi-sovereign interests are at stake.” DeCoster, 229 F.3d at 336. Notwithstanding this Circuit’s precedent, the provincial plaintiffs argue that they may bring their claims in a parens patriae capacity because they are provinces, not foreign nations. This distinction is of little consequence, however. The federalism concerns implicated by the relationship between the U.S. States and the U.S. federal government do not exist between foreign provinces and the U.S. federal government. The provinces, as political subdivisions of Ecuador, do not claim and have not shown that they have conceded any of their sovereignty to the U.S. government. See, e.g., State of Sao Paulo of the Federative Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., 919 A.2d 1116, 1122 (Del. 2007) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “the theoretical underpinning of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law (B) holding that injured consumers for whom the state sought restitution were not real parties in the states parens patriae suit (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states (D) holding that the republic of panama and state of sao paulo brazil did not have parens patriae standing to bring suit on behalf of their citizens in part because they had retained the full array of sovereign rights that the american states and puerto rico had ceded to the united states government (E) holding united states government is immune from rico suit
Output: (D)
need not be witnessed. See Dove v. Dove, 285 Ga. 647 (680 SE2d 839) (2009). However, such contracts were long deemed invalid as contrary to our State’s public policy favoring marriage, and while they are now enforceable under some circumstances, they must meet other requirements. See id. at 650-651; Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641 (2 al agreements settling property rights of the parties at death are made in contemplation of marriage”). On the other hand, contracts that provide for alimony payments in the event of divorce, or that direct how property should be distributed if the parties divorce, are considered to be made in contemplation of divorce rather than marriage alone and thus are not subject to OCGA § 19-3-63’s attestation requirement. See Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 311-312 (<HOLDING>); Dove, 285 Ga. at 37 (“This Court has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement that defined the parties respective rights in the property of the other and waived each spouses right in the others property either before or after death was a marriage contract (B) holding that an agreement which both addressed alimony and divided the parties property in the event of divorce was not a marriage contract subject to ocga  19363 (C) holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract (D) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (E) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties
Output: (B)
A: “Not as much as it was in the classroom.”)), or that certain aspects of the flapper lifestyle were “not appropriate” for class discussion (id. at 207 (Q: “He talked too much about flappers. Is that what you’re saying?” A: “The comments about drinking and sex were not appropriate. I feel like it could have been addressed in a more appropriate manner.”)). Third, not giving due regard to the nature of pedagogical decisionmaking puts teachers in a bind, with the possibility that they will embroil themselves and their institutions in litigation initiated by students seeking to eliminate course materials and methods on one side, and students claiming the right to learn from them on the other. See also Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir.1981) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). Again, one need look no further than this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression (B) holding that the defendant school officials did not create the students danger or increase their risk of harm where female students were physically verbally and sexually molested by male students in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom (C) holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students (D) holding that a students right to bodily integrity under the fourteenth amendment encompasses a students right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers (E) recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed
Output: (E)
does not require that the testimony be given controlling weight.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir.1992) (per curiam)). The opinion and credibility of claimant’s treating physician is entitled to great weight but may be disregarded if there is persuasive contradictory evidence. Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir.1984). Controlling weight may be given only in appropriate circumstances to medical opinions, i.e., opinions on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of an individual’s impairments), from treating sources, when the opinion is 1) well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and 2) not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). See Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (<HOLDING>). To decide whether the impairment is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight given a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (B) holding that opinions of treating doctors are not conclusive in determining disability status and must be supported by medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic data (C) holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (D) recognizing treating physicians opinion that he would expect the applicant to miss more than two or more days of work per month as an opinion regarding the nature and severity of a medical condition that is entitled to controlling weight if wellsupported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence (E) holding that a treating physicians medical opinion must be given controlling weight only when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record
Output: (E)
abstraction, therefore, never produces reversible error in the court’s charge because it has no effect on the jury’s ability fairly and accurately to implement the commands of the application paragraph or paragraphs.” Ramirez, 967 S.W.2d at 922 (citing Plata, 926 S.W.2d at 302). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that if a jury charge improperly “ ‘singles out a specific type of evidence and tells the jury that it may infer an element of the crime’ from that evidence,” then there is error. Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 651 (citing Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800-01 (Tex.Crirm.App.2003)). However, our sister courts have found that even when there is error due to improper definitions, the error is frequently harmless. See Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); Baggett v. State, 367 S.W.3d 525 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts may not find a per se sixth amendment violation where the defendant was unable to present relevant evidence (B) holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error (C) holding the erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes per se reversible error (D) holding that the statutory definition of responsibly connected provided a per se rule (E) holding that the trial courts inclusion of per se definition of intoxication did not expand the allegations against the defendant and was not error
Output: (E)
fiduciary duty or breach of contract, which, without more, cannot be converted into a fraud claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. Pross is analogous to this case. Plaintiffs have not alleged facts suggesting that Mr. Pickett’s conduct involved any “element of deception.” Notably, plaintiffs have not alleged that Mr. Pickett had anything to gain financially, that he was churning plaintiffs’ accounts, or that he intended to benefit by contravening the terms of the brokerage contracts. Cf. Mihura v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir.1980) (recognizing that churning an account to increase commissions violates the Securities Act). Plaintiffs have not alleged ■ that Mr. Pickett promised to repurchase account assets, but then failed to do so. Cf. Kayne, 703 F.Supp. at 1336 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have not alleged that Mr. Pickett 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law (B) holding that a securities fraud claim was properly pled where a broker falsely assured his client that he would cancel unauthorized trades (C) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error
Output: (B)
Board should be required to bargain with the Union on the disputed items. Washington Teachers’ Union, supra, 556 A.2d at 210. Even if, on our own, we would reach a different conclusion from the PERB’s, we must defer to the PERB’s interpretation unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. In other words, if the Union is unable to demonstrate that the PERB’s decision is rationally indefensible, we are obliged to sustain it. The PERB held non-negotiable the Union’s proposal that the work year for attendance counsellors shall not exceed the length of the normal work year for teachers and attendance officers, and that the attendance counsellor’s work day shall be from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Its conclusions, in our view, were not shown to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Washington Teachers’ Union, supra (<HOLDING>); D.C.Code § 1-613.1(a)(2) (“[t]he basic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that opening day and duty days were not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (C) holding that implementation and termination of safety incentive programs were mandatory subjects of collective negotiations (D) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (E) holding that the terms and conditions placed on applicants are not subjects of mandatory bargaining
Output: (B)
violations of § 922. This new subsection “(u)” was intended to protect the holders of federal licenses who import, manufacture or deal in firearms from theft of their inventories. In fact, many of these licenses are issued in accordance with other subsections of § 922. Furthermore, in May 1995, the Sentencing Commission filed proposed Amendment 522 with Congress. In this amendment, the Commission itself determined that the proper guideline for handling § 922(u) violations would be U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. When dealing with a new statutory crime, we believe the courts should defer to the authority of the Sentencing Commission to define, by amending the guidelines, which particular guideline will be applicable to the new crime. See United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826-26 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Where, as in this case, evidence of the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that congress instructed the sentencing commission that the sentencing ranges could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima (B) holding that congress has power to subject the states to wage and hour regulation (C) recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim  (D) holding that congress necessarily contemplated that the commission would review the work of the courts and revise the guidelines (E) recognizing that congress has the power to completely divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and that congress granted broad authority to the sentencing commission guided by specific goals and principles
Output: (E)
III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution), the Deputy Sheriffs, as police officers, fall within the scope of Act 111. For these reasons, I would reverse the PLRB’s decision and remand with direction that the PLRB grant the Association’s petition for certification. Judge McGINLEY joins in this dissenting opinion. 1 . The Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1 to .10, is commonly referred to as Act 111. 2 . 53 Pa.C.S. § 2162. 3 . 18 Pa.C.S. § 103. 4 . I agree with the majority’s rejection of the County’s constitutional argument based on Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Maj. Op. at 12 n.ll.) 5 . See Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 31; see also Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding act 111 valid under pennsylvania constitution (B) holding that an amended complaint alleging injuries to the driver caused by an auto accident which were allegedly the result of defendants negligence and that pennsylvania survival act was the basis for the cause of action stated a valid survival claim under pennsylvania law (C) holding that when majority of class lived in new jersey maryland pennsylvania and virginia the eastern district of pennsylvania was a desirable forum (D) holding pennsylvania replevin statute unconstitutional (E) holding pennsylvania state ethics act unconstitutional as applied to former judges
Output: (A)
conspired to t rt erred by allowing the Government to present evidence of his prior convictions. The district court admitted evidence of the prior convictions for the sale of cocaine, the sale and delivery of a controlled substance, and numerous counts of possession of cocaine because they were probative of an intent to commit the offenses charged in the indictment. Brown argues that his prior convictions were too remote to be probative of intent. Accordingly, he argues that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). We review a district court's decision to admit idered highly probative of intent to commit current drug trafficking offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The drug conspiracy at issue here began in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding that a prior conviction for using a communications device to facilitate the distribution of cocaine was admissible under rule 404b to prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that a prior conviction for transporting cocaine was probative of the intent required for participation in a separate plan to transport cocaine (D) holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack (E) holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609
Output: (C)