niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
satisfactory. See Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir.2010). The plaintiffs burden is to demonstrate that it was unlawful discrimination that motivated the dismissal, and not simply an employer’s erroneous belief or assessment about poor performance. Id. at 1267. The plaintiff correctly asserts that Hurd did not follow its own employment-termination policies that are set forth in its employee handbook, and she relies upon Barros, 710 A.2d at 686, to support an argument that this too gives rise to a suspicion of mendacity. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because it is undisputed that her employment was designated as “at will” that could be terminated “with or without cause, at any time.” Hurd’s policy of progressive discip 20 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no pretext for not following progressive discipline where policy contemplated immediate termination for certain offenses (B) holding that failure to follow mandatory provision of statute renders the act void whereas failure to follow directory provision does not (C) holding failure to follow progressive discipline does not demonstrate pretext when use of the policy is entirely discretionary (D) holding failure to follow progressive discipline policy does not constitute pretext when employer reserves right to fire atwill employees without notice (E) holding that the statement in the employers progressive discipline policy that in situations where employee behavior warrants immediate termination the stages of this process do not need to be followed granted the employer unbounded discretion to discharge employees without following the guidelines
Output: (C)
with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (emphasis ours). 15 . See also Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-79 (11th Cir.1994) (an employee with numerous sporadic absences was not "otherwise qualified” under the Rehabilitation Act); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) ("[A]n employee must be willing and able to demonstrate, [for the purposes of an ADA claim, the skills necessary to perform the job in question] by coming to work on a regular basis”); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact (B) holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function (C) holding that coming to work regularly is an essential function (D) holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim (E) holding it is not reasonable to require an employer to hire a helper to do overhead work for a miner who cannot perform this essential job function alone
Output: (C)
and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Compl. ¶¶ 134^-48.) Federal courts possess “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy,” but may decline supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The United States Supreme Court has held that it remains within the court’s discretion to retain jurisdiction over state law claims where all federal claims have been resolved. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245, 127 S.Ct. 881, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350-51, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the federal character of a removed case is eliminated the court has discretion to retain jurisdiction to remand or to dismiss (B) recognizing that pleadings filed in federal court while the federal court has jurisdiction become part of the state court record on remand (C) holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case (D) holding an appellate court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits of a case notwithstanding the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal (E) holding that a party waives remand on the basis of a procedural defect by filing a motion to remand more than thirty days after the case is removed
Output: (A)
analysis and did not provide any guidance as to its future implications.... ”); Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 553 (“Sturrup is out of the mainstream of caselaw on equal protection analysis_(citation omitted));. Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 793 (“Federal equal protection ‘rational basis’ analysis does not contain an ‘overbroad’ component. Rather, high school transfer rules, like the rule in question, are valid and enforceable.” (citations omitted)); Jordan, 813 F.Supp. at 1381 (refusing to apply Sturrup overbreadth scrutiny and writing “Indiana’s practice of subjecting equal protection and procedural due process claims to ‘over 75 (N.D.Ill.1978) (finding Illinois version of Transfer Rule did not violate equal protection); Simkins v. S.D. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 434 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.1989) (<HOLDING>); Chabert v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 323 
 Holding statements: (A) holding illinois high school associations version of the transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that the cap does not violate equal protection (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest
Output: (B)
statute is clearly erroneous. First, the FCHR’s conclusion that a personal representative of a decedent’s estate is not a “legal representative” of the deceased for all purposes is consistent with the specific and limited duties and powers of a personal representative as set forth in the Florida Probate Code. See §§ 733.602, 733.608, Fla. Stat. (2014). Second, the FCHR’s interpretation of the statute is in conformity with federal case law interpreting similar language in Title VIL See, e.g., Wright ex rel. Wright v. United States, 914 F.Supp.2d 837 (S.D.Miss.2012) (Title VII claim cannot be brought by personal representative of employee’s estate where the employee did not initiate the complaint for discrimination prior to death); Pueschel v. Veneman, 185 F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (D.Md.2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, Mr. Cimino did not initiate a complaint 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the survivor of a deceased federal employee has no standing to file an eeo complaint on behalf of that former employee but personal representative of deceased employee can be substituted as plaintiff if deceased employee initiated complaint prior to death (B) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (C) holding county employee with unenforceable contract was atwill employee (D) holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship (E) holding that where an employee has never requested the union to file a grievance the employee can hardly argue a breach of the duty of fair representation on the unions part
Output: (A)
the words of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, 'is of the very essence of judicial duty.”\’) (internal citation omitted); Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257, 260-61 (2005) (rejecting Baker v. Carr-based political question argument and concluding that, "[a]s the final guardian and protector of the right to education, it is incumbent upon the court to assure that the system enacted by the Legislature enforces, protects and fulfills the right [to education]”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (1993) (concluding that constitutional right to adequate education is justiciable and that "any citizen” has standing to "enforce the State’s duty” to fulfill this right); Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417, 428-29 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court (B) holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children (C) holding that while legislative findings are due deference that cannot foreclose a courts constitutional analysis (D) holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review (E) holding that while deference should be given to legislative content and performance standards it is still the courts duty to ensure that these standards together with funding measures comport with the constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient education for all new jersey school children
Output: (E)
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir.1985), we held that ACME Scale & Supply met the ERISA definition of fiduciary as an employer-administrator of the plan at issue. Id. at 1184. We found that the employer exercised discretionary authority and control in managing the plan by notifying certain employees when they were eligible for an increase in life insurance coverage not explained in the terms of the plan. Id. at 1184-85. The employer’s failure to notify all employees generally was deemed a breach of the fiduciary duty ERISA imposes. Id. at 1185-86. See also Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir.1993) (finding employer to have fiduciary status solely on the basis of its role as plan administrator under ERISA); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). ERISA makes clear that a fiduciary is one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when employers serve as plan administrators they assume the role of fiduciary under erisa (B) holding that unlike the social security disability program erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to the opinions of treating physicians and noting that there are critical differences between the two programs that nothing in erisa requires employers to establish employee benefit plans and that erisa does not mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan quotations omitted (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) recognizing that benefit plans must designate a fiduciary to serve as the plan administrator (E) recognizing that plan participants should be able to access information about the plan administrators fiduciary duties from the plan administrators counsel
Output: (A)
documents that may be exempt from disclosure under the Sunshine Law. See Chasnoff v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 334 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.App. E.D.2011) (noting trial court reviewed investigative file log of 59 documents in camera to determine disclosure under Sunshine Law); Bill, 935 S.W.2d at 663 (noting trial court granted in camera review of retirement benefit records of government employees; subsequently finding records exempt from disclosure under Sunshine Law); accord State ex rel. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr. v. Keet, 678 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. banc 1984) (in discovery context, trial court has discretion to examine privileged documents in camera to determine whether redaction and production of documents is appropriate); State ex rel. Fusselman v. Belt. 893 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Mo.App. W.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). In light of the Sunshine Law and the Missouri 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (B) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (C) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (D) holding in camera review by trial court to determine whether crime stoppers information contained brady information would meet the balance of defendants constitutional rights against the states interest in fostering law enforcement (E) holding trial court should have reviewed records requested by criminal defendant in camera to determine whether they contained exculpatory evidence while protecting against unnecessary publication of privileged information
Output: (E)
Edwards thereafter made the scope of his consent less clear by placing the bag on the bed before the officer began the pat-down, his passive acquiescence while the officer searched the bag affirmed that the bag was within the scope of his consent. See Grinton, 14 Va.App. at 851, 419 S.E.2d at 863 (“The scope of a search may be further defined during the course of the search by the passive acquiescence of the person whose property is being searched.”); United States v. Rison, 946 F.2d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.1986) (“Failure to object to the continuation of the search ... may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the consent.”); McNair v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 76, 83, 521 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In Grinton, the defendants expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent (B) holding that defendants failure to withdraw consent to search for criminal activity in his home included the top floor because he did not withdraw his consent to search when he observed the officer go upstairs (C) holding that the defendants unlawful arrest in his hotel room rendered his subsequent consent to the search of his room invalid even though he signed a consent form allowing the search after his arrest because the government  completely failed to address whether there was a break in the causal relationship between the unlawful arrest and the subsequent search (D) holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
Output: (B)
single question strongly implied that Leja had “said nothing” to police upon her arrest in Mississippi. But Leja never answered the question, and the jury was instructed to disregard it. The general rule is that the jury must be presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions. See State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn.2002). This is not a case of repeated questioning aimed at planting an improper inference. See State v. Harris, 521 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 n. 5 (Minn.1994) (questioning whether curative instruction would have prevented prejudice from repeated improper questioning). Rather, the prosecutor’s question was brief, although, as the last question on cross-examination and one followed by a lengthy bench conference, it was not “undramatic.” Cf. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d at 429 (<HOLDING>). But the jury had already heard abundant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that brief undramatic reference to defendants prearrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases (D) holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (B)
See Marshall, 173 F.3d at 1316. The government also produced “substantial circumstantial evidence” far more convincing than that found in the case before us; “the defendants had large sums of cash (including the recorded bills used by [the informant in conducting the drug transaction]) and lived in a trailer filled with items used in crack production.” Id. Although we noted that the government informant’s “testimony, if believed, would be more than sufficient to sustain Marshall’s convictions,” id. at 1318 n. 15, we vacated the defendants’ convictions, reasoning that because the chief witness was “an informant of questionable credibility,” id. at 1316, two evidentiary errors could improperly have swayed the jury. See also United States v. Blakey, 14 F.3d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1425 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence consisting of the testimony of three witnesses who each had motives to lie was not overwhelming and that prosecutorial misconduct therefore was not harmless error (B) holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt (C) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (D) holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt (E) holding that the error of allowing unsequestered witnesses to testify in violation of a motion to separate witnesses was harmless error because the state presented overwhelming evidence supporting defendants conviction
Output: (A)
normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 683 (1998). In this case, defendant is entitled to rely on Faragher and Ellerth because, even though plaintiff was terminated, this termination was not the culmination of any harassment against plaintiff. “The Far-agher/Ellerth defense is available to the employer despite the fact that the employee had been discharged, where the alleged hostile work environment did not culminate in employee’s discharge, but the employee was instead fired for another reason.” Patterson v. CBS, Inc., 2000 WL 666337, * 8 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). As discussed below, plaintiff was terminated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated (B) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (C) holding that erisa preempts the texas dtpa because plaintiff relied on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated (D) holding that cbs could raise the faragherellerth defense because even though the plaintiff was sexually harassed and terminated the evidence showed that plaintiff was terminated for leaving his camera during a live broadcast (E) holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations
Output: (D)
that may be considered in determining punishment are the subject of article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. Art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp.2004). This statute authorizes the admission of evidence in the punishment phase of trial as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing. Id. The circumstances of the offense are relevant to sentencing and may be considered by the trier of fact in determining the punishment to be assessed. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). One circumstance of the offense that may be considered is the degree of injury to the victim so long as the fact finder may rationally attribute moral culpability to the accused for that injury. Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm (B) holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted (C) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (D) recognizing trauma that new trial would likely bring to victim of child sexual assault (E) recognizing the purpose of missouris child victim witness protection law sec 491675 et seq as an attempt to minimize the emotional and psychological trauma to the alleged child victim
Output: (B)
appealing the ALJ’s decision to the Board are exactly the same in LHWCA and DBA cases. Id. at 1113-1115. However, the 1972 amendments also amended the judicial review provisions of the LHWCA to provide direct review of the Board’s decision to the federal court of appeal where the injury occurred, not to the district court. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 921(c); Home Indem. Co., 597 F.2d at 90. Congress has not, however, amended the judicial review provision of the DBA that expressly modified the former judicial review provisions of the LHWCA. Section 3(b) of the DBA still provides, as quoted above, that judicial review of compensation orders lies in the appropriate district court. Section 3(b) controls judicial review of compensation orders in DBA cases. See Home Indem. Co., 597 F.2d at 89 (<HOLDING>); AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide, 930 F.2d at 1115 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision (B) holding that if a provision of the dba specifically modifies a provision of the lhwca the dba provision controls in a dba case (C) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision (D) holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision (E) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them
Output: (B)
recognized that her statements could later be used prosecutorially. {57} Next, the State argues that the statement cannot be testimonial because the trial court made a preliminary finding that it was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. See Rule 11-803(D) NMRA. The State contends that this ruling necessarily indicates that “[the victim’s] motive for making the statement, and ... Tucker’s motive for eliciting it, was not to perpetuate her testimony for use in a future trial.” {58} We disagree. Even if a statement falls within the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment, it may still be testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 2005-Ohio-1137, ¶ 13, 20 912 (2005) (<HOLDING>). {59} In this case, the facts suggest that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a victims statements to emergency room doctor not testimonial where the purpose of the examination was for medical diagnosis and treatment (B) holding that statements made by a child who was brought to an emergency room by her mother were admissible when the child knew a doctor would conduct a medical exam the physician explained he was a doctor and he asked questions about medical history and performed a physical examination of the child (C) holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurseexaminer for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victims past experience with medical facilities or medical providers (D) holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial (E) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors
Output: (A)
at 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843. Moreover, we also recognized that the pattern-or-practice method of proof had, in the past, been viewed as “no more than an application of the McDonnell Douglas “burden-shifting framework” to claims brought either by the government on behalf of a group of employees or by class plaintiffs. 685 F.3d at 147-148. Parisi recognizes that non-government plaintiffs can use the pattern-or-practice method only in class actions and argues that she is therefore entitled to pursue a class action in court. This logic is flawed. The availability of the class action Rule 23 mechanism presupposes the existence of a claim; Rule 23 cannot create a non-waivable, substantive right to bring such a claim. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2561, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that krs  3373852 prevents class certification under rule 23 in federal court because of the rules enabling act (B) holding that rule 5 prohibits a trial court from enlarging the period for taking action under the rules relating to new trials (C) holding that pleading rules are substantive (D) holding that the rules enabling act precludes rule from abridging enlarging or modifying any substantive right (E) holding that rules allowing multiple claims to be litigated together  including rule 23  are categorically valid under the rules enabling act
Output: (D)
that he intends to perform. If the objection to discharge-ability is based upon an unperformed promise, the proponent must show that the debtor did not intend to perform or had no reasonable basis to believe that she could perform when she made the promise.” Aldus Green Co. v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 227 B.R. 45, 50-51 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1998) (citations omitted). See also In re D’Atria, 128 B.R. 71, 76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991) (“In order for the aggrieved party to the contract to prevail on a claim for fraud in such case, there must also be proof that the other party had no intention of honoring the obligation imposed under the contract when it was signed”); Little Family Farms Corp. v. Mortensen (In re Morten-sen), 2009 WL 721709, 2009 Bankr.LEXIS 765 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa March 17, 2009) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff must establish that his damages 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (B) holding that a surety after becoming aware of a single claim for labor and materials by a subcontractor acted reasonably by directing the owner to withhold further payments from the contractor even though contractor had not been declared in default by the owner (C) holding a premises owner is a general contractor for purposes of the statutory employer provision (D) holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made (E) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors
Output: (D)
the inquiry mandated by Genesco. I. The first question we must address is whether the language in Paragraph 4N calling for the appointment of an independent tax counsel does indeed constitute an enforceable arbitration clause. We believe that the language clearly manifests an intention by the parties to submit certain disputes to a specified third party for binding resolution. It is, in our estimation, irrelevant that the contract language in question does not employ the word “arbitration” as such. Rather, what is important is that the parties clearly intended to submit some disputes to their “ ‘chosen instrument for the definitive settlement of [certain] grievances under ' the Agreement_’” International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 549 F.Supp. 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>) (quoting General Drivers, Warehousemen & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties (B) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (C) holding that binding review by a designated third party is arbitration even if not denominated as such in the contract (D) holding that an arbitration in accordance with aaa rules is a binding arbitration (E) holding that the terms arbitration or arbitrate need not be used as long as binding review by a third party is clearly the intention of the parties
Output: (C)
but before its effective date. Bishop argues that defendants therefore had notice that their conduct was unlawful discrimination at the time that it occurred, and may be held liable for it in a suit brought after the effective date of the ADA. In sum, this argument states that the date of enactment governs when conduct became unlawful, while the effective date only governs when an injured party may bring suit to enforce the provisions of the ADA. A careful reading of Landgraf and Rivers, however, counsels against accepting Bishop’s arguments. First, while these opinions did in fact address cases pending at the time of enactment of the ADA, they both speak in terms of the law effective at the time the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred. See Landgraf — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1508 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Rivers, — U.S. at-, 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that aedpa would not apply to a habeas petition that was pending at the time of its enactment (B) recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment (C) holding that aedpa amendments to  2254 apply only to such cases as were filed after the statutes enactment (D) holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment (E) holding that section 1981a does not apply to cases arising before its enactment
Output: (E)
the jury that the children were too knowledgeable about sex for their age and that the Defendant was the one who expose them to this. Defendant wanted to show motive as to why the children would lie, based on the fact the older child was caught engaged in sexual acts with other boys and had a history of lying whenever she was in trouble. The defense theory was that the older child had influence her little sister and was able to get her to lie for her whenever, she was in trouble. Had Defendant been allowed to cross-exami t guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const, amend. VI. The right to confrontation includes the right to conduct reasonable cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Cross-examination is the “principal means by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination (B) holding that if crossexamination aims to reveal the motive bias or prejudice of a witness it ought to be allowed (C) holding that defendants right to crossexamine a witness for bias or motivation to lie is not grounds for reversal where the jury had enough information despite the limits placed on otherwise permitted crossexamination to assess the defense theory of bias or improper motive (D) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (E) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required
Output: (B)
Texas Fund has a legitimate interest in the case and it is in a much better position to protect that interest than any of the other parties. Texas Fund is entitled to intervene in the action to protect its legitimate interests. I foresee no harm or prejudice to any of the other parties by virtue of this intervention. Texas Fund’s intervention in the lawsuit would have little effect on how the case is actually prosecuted before a jury and affects no substantial interest of any of the other parties. Other courts, faced with identical or very similar circumstances, have held that an insurance carrier may intervene as of right in an action brought by the injured party against a third-party tortfeasor. See Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Curtis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 754 F.2d 781, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy (B) recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims (C) holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule (D) recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer (E) holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier
Output: (E)
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that Ms. Toomer offers, no evidence of Ms. Stiger’s threat other than her own self-serving assertions and that such unsupported, self-serving assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (when scrutinizing motions for summary judgment courts “examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but do not accept bare conclusory allegations, as fact”) (internal citations omitted); Ward v. District of Columbia, 950 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[S]elf-serving assertions are not sufficient to create an issue of material fact.”); Musgrove v. Gov’t of the District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 158, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Even if unsupported, self-serving assertions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment (B) holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment (C) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient (E) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment
Output: (E)
Lexapro his pain increased, which caused his blood pressure to rise, and when he resumed taking Lexapro those physical symptoms subsided. Because the Division did not present evidence disputing his testimony, he contends, substantial evidence supported the OAH ruling. [¶ 12] The Division asserts the district court properly held substantial evidence did not support the OAH ruling that Lexapro was prescribed to reduce Mr. Herrera’s pain, numbness and high blood pressure. The Division contends the evidence showed Lexapro was prescribed to treat Mr. Herrera’s agitation, stress, anxiety and depression, that is, mental injuries. Citing § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J), the Division asserts mental injuries are compensable only when the ty and Comp. Div., 2001 WY 45, ¶ 12, 23 P.3d 1138,1141 (Wyo.2001) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence (B) holding clear and convincing evidence established that the claimants attempted suicide was the result of a mental injury suffered subsequent to a compensable injury (C) holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence (D) holding the claimant established by clear and convincing evidence that her depression was caused by her compensable physical injury (E) holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony
Output: (D)
but plaintiffs have imposed correspondingly greater fees and costs upon defendants. That fact may constitute grounds for reducing plaintiffs’ fee request, but it does not permit the court to deny the fee request altogether. As the Court of Appeals has stated, “[t]o the extent that Chambless’ actions were ‘vexatious[ ] and wasteful[ ],’ he is obviously pe-nalized by not recovering any attorney’s fees for those efforts. This does not affect his right to a reasonable attorney’s fee for his successful claim.” Chambless, 815 F.2d at 872. Nor is plaintiffs’ supplemental application so untimely as to be denied on the ground that it “unfairly surprise[d] or prejudice^] the affected party.” White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Defendants do not claim to have been caught 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fee application under 42 usc  1988 is not governed by the 10day limit imposed on motions to amend judgment under rule 59e frciv p (B) recognizing that rule 59e permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order (C) holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment (D) recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 (E) holding that the same standards apply for setting reasonable attorneys fees under the clean air acts fee shifting provision as under 42 usc  1988
Output: (A)
different. Parsons testified that the last time he was on Hancock’s land “was late ’96, early ’97.” When asked if there was a push off ramp on the two pits Parsons testified, “I think there was. I can’t recollect, but manure could have gone into the pit.[A]gain, having a hard time recollecting this. I was thinking that both [pits] were able to be — would have been able to be used.” Mr. Parsons was never specifically asked, nor did he specifically testify as to the Bolivar Ready Mix lawsuit in his deposition testimony. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether perjury occurred and whether an improper verdict resulted therefrom. Hoodoo of Poplar Bluff v. Bosoluke, 9 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Mo.App.1999). See also Clark v. McKeone, 234 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.1950) (<HOLDING>). It is only in cases where the evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling motion for new trial on perjury grounds (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible (D) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
Output: (B)
on the proper valuation date of property when the debtor attempts to strip off a wholly unsecured lien. Dean, 319 B.R. at 477. This Court is more persuaded by the cases that use the petition date as the appropriate date to value both the collateral and, necessarily, the first lienholder’s claim, for the purpose of determining whether any value over the first claim exists in the collateral to support the second lien. The Court’s independent review of relevant caselaw reveals that the majority of courts considering this issue have also settled on the petition date as the proper date for valuation in this and other contexts. See, e.g., Marsh v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev. (In re Marsh), 929 F.Supp.2d 852, 855 (N.D.Ill.2013); In re Gilpin, 479 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011) (<HOLDING>); In re Levitt & Sons, LLC, 384 B.R. 630, 644 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the correct date to use when determining the controlling statute is date upon which the claim arose (B) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (C) holding the petition date is the appropriate date to value the collateral when the debtors intend to remain in the home (D) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due (E) holding petition date is proper date to value assets for a hypothetical liquidation under 11 usc  547b
Output: (C)
pleas; (3) the analysis under long-standing principles of the right to effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the absence of any mention of retroactivity, the conclusion that the opinion does not announce a new rule of criminal procedure seems self-evident to this court. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1478 (stating “[i]n this postconviction proceeding ... ”); 1485-86 (discussing “nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea” and “collateral challenge to a conviction”). Nonetheless, we recognize that some courts that have addressed whether Padilla applies retroactively have concluded that it does announce a new rule of criminal procedure. See Marroquin v. United States, No. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985, at *2 & nn. 3-4 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Because Padilla’s holding effectively 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses  argument that ring announced a substantive rule (B) holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule (C) holding simply that padilla was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review without further analysis (D) holding that simmons announced a new rule and retrospective application of the rule was barred by teague (E) holding that padilla does not announce a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and listing in footnotes three eases finding that padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure and seven cases finding that padilla is simply the application of an old rule
Output: (E)
which would indicate there was no causal connection. Plaintiff has provided letters from The Sun’s attorney, however, indicating the company was aware of the charges filed with the EEOC as early as September 8, 1998. {See Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 1.) The filing of charges with the EEOC constitutes protected activity. See Karpel, 134 F.3d at 1229. The date on which the suit based on those charges was filed is irrelevant in establishing a causal connection between the filing of charges and an alleged retaliatory action. Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be made in his favor, and an inference that may be drawn from the temporal proximity of the demotion with the filing of charges is that a causal connection exists. See McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Williams, 871 F.2d at 457. The Sun has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (B) holding that eight months between charges and dismissal created inference of causal connection (C) holding that a lapse of two months as is the case here is sufficient to show a causal connection and the district court erred in holding otherwise (D) holding that  1109a requires causal connection between breach and loss (E) holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process
Output: (B)
the Lighting Ridge sale will not have an adverse effect on any of the species at issue. However, the Lighting Ridge EA does not suffice to show compliance with the Forest Act because it does not assess pileated woodpecker habitat by means of a valid forest-wide standard. 7 . We do not suggest that the Forest Service must adopt the R4 definition of old growth. It must, however, put in place and observe with respect to each site specific action a valid forest-wide standard for ensuring viable populations of old growth dependent species. 8 . We are aware that other courts have held that § 219.19 does not allow use of habitat as a proxy for population. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11th Cir.1999). See also Utah Environmental Congress v. Zieroth, 190 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1272 (D.Utah 2002) (<HOLDING>); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 180 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing district courts authority to exclude opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert should it conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered (B) holding that  21919 unambiguously requires collection of population data (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that because the statute requires commerce to use to the extent possible data from countries that are significant producers of comparable merchandise commerce may not employ a methodology that requires using data from countries which almost certainly have no domestic production  at least not any meaningful production capable of having influence or effect
Output: (B)