niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
argument that “unusual circumstances” warranted a departure from the rule. We now turn to our reasons for abrogating Coulter. At issue is Coulters holding that [i]n the absence of unusual circumstances, the hours allowed for preparing and litigating the attorney fee case should not exceed 3% of the hours in the main case when the issue is submitted on the papers without a trial and should not exceed 5% of the hours in the main case when a trial is necessary. Coulter, 805 F.2d at 151. Pla the right to revisit this question, see Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1990). This is true even in the unusual situation where binding circuit precedent overlooked earlier Supreme Court authority. Ballinger v. Prelesnik, 709 F.3d 558, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); see also Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule for habeas review in brown v smith 551 f3d 424 6th cir 2008 had been called into doubt by harrington v richter 562 us 86 131 sct 770 178 led2d 624 2011 even though robinson v howes 663 f3d 819 823 n2 6th cir 2011 which was decided after harrington applied brown (B) holding that we are bound to follow almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 even though it has been called into question unless it is explicitly overruled by the supreme court (C) holding that ylsts look through doctrine survives harrington v richter  us  131 sct 770 178 led2d 624 2011 (D) holding that  an award of makewhole relief in the form of surcharge was within the scope of appropriate equitable relief for purposes of  502a3 quoting cigna corp v amara  us  131 sct 1866 1880 179 led2d 843 2011 (E) holding government had not met its burden allowing it to invoke the brown v ohio 432 us 161 97 sct 2221 53 led2d 187 1977 exception
Output: (A)
at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir.1991). 4 . For ease of reference, all citations to page numbers of docketed items are to the page assigned by the court's case management and electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system. 5 . In so doing, this court is following well-settled Ninth Circuit precedent denominating Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment as motions to reconsider. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009)) (enumerating the circumstances under which "[r]econsideration under Rule 59(e) is appropriate[]”); Kona Enterprises Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Judgment was entered in this case on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider (B) holding that a motion to reconsider a section 2255 ruling is available and that it is to be treated asa rule 59e motion if filed within 10 days of entry of the challenged order (C) holding that no provision authorizes a district court to reconsider its order on a  3582 motion (D) recognizing that rule 59e permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order (E) holding that the district court cannot extend the time for filing a rule 59e motion by margin order
Output: (D)
court has already ‘deem[ed] just after considering’ the conduct at issue here.” (quoting Mo.Rev.Stat. § 452.330.1) (alterations in original)). When a court distributes marital property, it does so in accordance with the parties’ “rights and obligations [that] aris[e] from [their] marital status,” — i.e., in accordance with state family law — and not the law of torts or contracts. McLaughlin, 193 F.3d at 414 (emphasis added). Although the distribution of marital property under state law may require that courts consider the spouses’ conduct — conduct that may or may not constitute tortious conduct — that does not affect the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Stated simply, state law does not determine the scope of our jurisdiction. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 314, 126 S.Ct. 1735 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in situations like Wallace, other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that texass probate statute does not affect whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to a case (B) holding that a suit for compensatory and punitive damages against various probate judges for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of property during the probate proceedings was not barred by the probate exception or rookerfeldman abstention doctrine (C) holding that a probate court lacked jurisdiction over a proceeding to declare heirship because a court empowered with probate jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters incident to an estate when a probate proceeding related to such matters is already pending in that court emphasis added quoting bailey v cherokee cty appraisal dist 862 sw2d 581 585 tex 1993 (D) holding that probate exception does not apply where plaintiffs assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty seek in personam jurisdiction over defendants and do not seek to probate or annul a will (E) holding that breach of fiduciary claim falls outside probate exception
Output: (A)
in original). With the possible exception of his claim that he was not permitted to testify, Man-giardi has not satisfied either prong of the Strickland test. Because each of Mangiardi’s claims relating to the proceedings is meritless, appellate counsel was not unreasonable for any failure to raise any of them on direct appeal. See Williams, 166 F.Supp.2d at 305 (finding that where each of the claims raised in the defendant’s § 2255 motion was meritless, appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise them on direct appeal). The same reasoning applies to appellate counsel’s failure to raise Man-giardi’s claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See id., James v. Superintendent of SCI Huntington, No. CIV.A. 97-2864, 2000 WL 5196, at *3 (E.D.Pa. January 4, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as discussed above, claims for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim (B) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (C) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate (E) holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue
Output: (B)
basis in eminent domain); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 257, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (1977) ("It is settled that recovery of reasonable compensation under § 1498 is premised on a theory of an eminent domain taking under the Fifth Amendment.") (citing Calhoun v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 41, 51, 453 F.2d 1385 (1972)) (stating the government “ipso facto takes by eminent domain a compulsory compensatory license in the patent”); Pitcairn v. United States, 212 Ct.Cl. 168, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (1976) ("The use or manufacture by or for the Government of a device or machine embodying any invention by a United States patent, is a taking of property by the Government under its power of eminent domain.”); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 117 Ct.Cl. 799, 93 F.Supp. 633, 635 (1950) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See e.g., Leesona Corp., 599 F.2d at 964 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that  1498 is in effect an eminent domain statute (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding that the statute is mandatory (E) holding the precursor statute to  1498 to be nonjurisdictional as to private defendants merely establishing an affirmative defense
Output: (A)
has not demonstrated a clearly established constitutional right. In Goldschmidt, the defendant prosecutor sent to the plaintiff attorney a letter, advising the attorney that his newspaper advertisement appeared to violate the Illinois statute prohibiting advertising for dissolution of marriage. The attorney continued advertising despite the letter, and the Illinois legislature subsequently repealed the statute. Nevertheless, the attorney sued the prosecutor, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. The Goldschmidt court held that the mere threat of deprivation of First Amendment rights does not constitute adequate injury for § 1983 purposes; rather, plaintiffs must allege an actual deprivation. Id. at 585. See also Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). As in Goldschmidt and Reichenberger, in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners of bar with nude dancers did not state a  1983 claim based on first amendment rights where they failed to allege interruption of business or expressive activities despite monetary losses (B) recognizing that the first amendment protects the expressive activities associated with the voterregistration process (C) holding that a plaintiff failed to state a claim for a breach of a joint venture agreement where it failed to allege  responsibility for losses (D) holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 (E) holding that raising chickens is not an expressive act for the purposes of the first amendment
Output: (A)
takes place that it poses the potential for additional members for the country club. There was even some conversation, although I can’t officially state it, that apparently one of the developers had talked about linking with Mission Valley. Tr. 175. Messrs. Durrance and Dellos did not describe what such access would have entailed in the before condition. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim for lost access damages was JMC’s severance by the rails corridor from “native wooded lands, well maintained single family homes, and [a] golf course” on Mission Valley. PX 21B (BB-PLTF-13050); Pis.’ Post-Trial Br. 38. The mere adjacency of JMC to Mission Valley does not equate to potential access or the right to severance damages. See United States v. Mattox, 375 F.2d 461, 463 (4th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have not established a manifest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that if subsequent to the taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of  itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable probability of an imminent change (C) holding that lack of a separate judgment does not preclude the taking of an appeal from a district courts final decision because the parties may waive the separate judgment requirement where one has accidentally not been entered (D) holding that premises owner had duty to use degree of care in performing activities that owner of ordinary prudence would use under same or similar circumstances (E) recognizing that mere proximity or possibility of an integrated use of two separate tracts use will not confer upon the owner a right to severance damages without reasonable probability that the separate tracts could have been combined for such integrated use before the taking
Output: (E)
Inc., 299 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1321 (S.D.Fla.2004). First, the PSLRA altered Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement by mandating the following: [T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)(B). Thus, the PSLRA requires greater specificity than Rule 9(b). Druskin, 299 F.Supp.2d at 1321. Second, the PSLRA raised the standard for pleading scienter by making it clear that a plaintiff can no longer plead scienter generally. In order to properly allege scienter, the plaintiff m 2 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing defense in securities case (B) recognizing doctrine (C) holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange (D) holding the doctrine applied in a case of mistake (E) recognizing the incorporation by reference doctrine in a securities case
Output: (E)
unemployment rate in Poland. The Government contends that we lack jurisdiction to review this claim because Dziwak’s arguments “address only the question of what is likely to happen” if he returns to Poland. Resp’t’s. Br. at 20. We agree. The IJ found Dziwak credible, but determined that “the conjecture stated by [Dziwak] and a series of suppositions strung together as to what may occur if [he] is returned to Poland is not sufficient to meet ... the more stringent more likely than not standard.” J.A. at 16. Thus, the IJ concluded that Dziwak failed to establish that what he feared was more likely than not to happen, which is the factual part of the mixed question of whether there is a likelihood of a threat to life or freedom. Cf. Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Although Dziwak’s brief conflates the two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions (B) holding that in likelihood of torture inquiries what is likely to happen is the factual aspect and whether that amounts to torture is the legal aspect (C) recognizing that what is a reasonable area is a factual matter to be determined in each noncompete case (D) holding that communication was initiated by the question well what is going to happen to me now (E) recognizing that the primary source for determining whether a contract is clear is the text of the document itself when an instrument is unambiguous it construction and legal effect will be based upon what is found within its four corners
Output: (B)
defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner’s counsel advised him that he would “in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years’ imprisonment.” (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel’s advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for  212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence
Output: (E)
be difficult except by improper means). Yet, “[sjecrecy is a relative term. The information may be known to several persons and yet still be secret if third parties would be willing to pay for a breach of trust in order to ascertain it.” Taco Cabana Int’l, 932 F.2d at 1125 (quoting A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp., 268 F.Supp. 289, 299 (S.D.N.Y.1967)). Courts have held that, even where a plaintiff voluntarily discloses the trade secret without the benefit of a confidentiality agreement, the requisite secrecy is retained if the “disclosure occurs in a context that would not ordinarily occasion public exposure, and in a manner that does not carelessly exceed the imperatives of a beneficial transaction.” Taco Cabana Int’l, 932 F.2d at 1124; see also Phillips, 20 F.3d at 631-32 (<HOLDING>); Metallurgical Industries Inc. v. Fourtek, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation (B) holding that the burden of establishing the true existence of a trade secret and its value to the owner remains on the claimant who must submit evidence relating to the six factors that texas law considers for trade secret status (C) holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana (D) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty to keep it confidential (E) holding that the inevitable disclosure theory can be applied under north carolina law where 1 injunction is limited to protecting specifically defined trade secrets and 2 the trade secret is clearly identified and of significant value
Output: (A)
are reversed with instructions that he be re-sentenced under a correctly calculated score sheet. Cooper also asserts the same argument for his 41.712-month sentence on the delivery of cocaine charge. The question, however, is whether this error is harmless because Cooper was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. While the 41.712-month sentence happened to be equal to the minimum guidelines sentence under the incorrectly calculated score sheet, the guidelines scoresheet is legally irrelevant because Cooper was habitualized. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002)(“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code].”); Tannihill v. State, 848 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); LaFleur v. State, 812 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>); Kenon v. State, 780 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (D) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range
Output: (B)
of 1990, as amended (ADAAA).” We agree with the Dyer court’s line of reasoning: “As disability discrimination claims encompass both kinds of cases, it is reasonable to conclude that [Vasquez’s] charge alleging disability discrimination can be expected to encompass the various statutory means by which [Vasquez] might establish such a claim, including the assertion that she was regarded as having an impairment.” Dyer, 532 F.Supp.2d at 935-36. The vast majority of district courts addressing this or substantially similar issues have reached the same conclusion, holding that the scope of an EEOC charge alleging disability discrimination extends to “regarded as” claims in addition to actual disability claims. See, e.g., Pellack v. Thorek Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 9 F.Supp.2d 984, 989 (N.D.Ill.1998)(<HOLDING>); see also Anderson v. Foster Group, 521 
 Holding statements: (A) holding disability discrimination claim barred (B) holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim (C) holding that regarded as claim is reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability alleged in eeoc charge (D) holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc (E) holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge
Output: (C)
the necessity for government to be able to take private property for governmental purposes, see The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), that power could be exercised only by making the private property owner whole. Thus the distinction plaintiffs attempt to draw is unavailing. Analytically, whether common law-based tort and contract law is subject to statutes of limitations, with or without sovereign immunity in the case of suits against the government, is unrelated to the question of whether constitutionally based takings claims may be made subject to such statutes. Which leads to the question of the applicable law. This court hears a goodly number of takings cases. In some the plaintiff property owner prevails. See, e.g., Ciéne-ga Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unenforced tobacco regulations did not constitute a taking of vending machine owners contracts (B) holding that island owners had rights to the thread of the channel (C) holding housing statutes create no rights in tenants for purposes of section 1983 (D) holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs (E) holding that statutory abrogation of lowincome housing owners contract rights was a taking
Output: (E)
and his fellow Thunderguards members to leave the hall and provide them with identification, a reasonable person would not have felt free to simply ignore the police presence.”); State’s May 12, 2011 Answering Supplemental Memorandum, at 1 ("Outside [the banquet hall], the encounter became less-than-consensual”). 19 . See Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 612 (Del.1988). 20 . Scheets, 188 F.3d at 836-37. 21 . Id. 22 .Title 24, chapter 13 does not impose criminal sanctions for the unauthorized delivery of private security services. Rather, the Delaware Board of Examiners of Private Investigators and Private Security Agencies has the power to impose a civil penalty up to $200 per day, for each violation. 24 Del. C. § 1311. See also Rickards v. State, 2011 WL 153643, at *1 (Del.2011) (<HOLDING>). Rickards is arguably distinguishable because 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation (B) holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot (C) recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot (D) holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring (E) holding that if an officer possesses an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense has been committed the officer may request identifying information from the driver
Output: (A)
the parent who receives child support.” That ruling is erroneous. Support agreements that are voluntarily made by the parties are subject to the same rules of construction applicable to contracts generally. See Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va.App. 11, 15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985). The parties’ agreement expressly provides that “[t]he husband’s obligation to pay child support for each child shall continue until such time as each child reaches the age of twenty-three ... or twenty-two ... years and graduates from college.” The evidence proved that the middle child had not reached age twenty-three but did not prove her college status. Nothing in the agreement conditions the husband’s support obligation upon the place of the child’s residence. Cf. Tiffany, 1 Va.App. at 17, 332 S.E.2d at 800 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the issues of amount, due date, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the father had to pay college costs because the agreement provided him no explicit veto over college selection (B) holding over (C) holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement (D) holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required (E) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement
Output: (A)
pending in that court, and her instigation of a separate action in Russell Circuit Court runs afoul of § 6-5-440. The former husband has met the requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, including demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief he seeks; therefore, we grant his petition. The Russell Circuit Court is directed to enter an order dismissing the former wife’s contempt petition. PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. PITTMAN, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur. THOMPSON, P.J., concurs in the result, without writing. 1 . In her answer to the former husband’s petition for the writ of mandamus, the former wife does not refute the factual assertions in the former husband’s petition, so we accept those assertions as true. See Ex parte Turner, 840 So.2d 132, 134-35 (Ala.2002) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted (B) holding that appellate courts can review the denial of a rule 60b motion by appeal even if the appellant mistakenly files a petition for a writ of mandamus (C) recognizing in the context of a petition for a writ of mandamus that although the district court retained jurisdiction over the case following the governments mandamus petition the district court justifiably could defer trial until resolution of the appellate proceedings had the government prevailed on the merits of the mandamus petition  the trial strategies of the government as well as the defense would surely have been altered (D) holding that when a respondent fails to challenge factual allegations contained in a petition for the writ of mandamus the appellate court accepts as true the factual statements in the petition (E) recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review
Output: (D)
these claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions apply to him. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule (B) recognizing a defendant may seek postconviction relief pursuant to rule 32 ariz rcrim p on ground that trial counsel had been ineffective by inducing defendant to enter guilty plea (C) holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief (D) holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act (E) recognizing untimeliness under ariz rcrim p 324a as a basis for dismissal of an arizona petition for postconviction relief distinct from preclusion under rule 322a
Output: (E)
11 . Ultimately, Dr. Donner did not testify at trial, in light of Appellant’s decision to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence. 12 . Moreover, Appellant made it clear to counsel that his ultimate desire was to secure an outright acquittal on the theory that the victim’s death was not the result of his actions at all, but was caused by some undetermined, coincidental fatal brain abnormality. Obviously, the prospect of securing an outright acquittal was a difficult task for counsel given the facts adduced at trial. 13 . We note that Appellant does not allege counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to previously raise the allegation of a Brady violation. Accordingly, we could dispose of this issue on the basis of waiver. See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 79 A.3d 595, 609 (2013) (<HOLDING>). However, the Commonwealth has not argued 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea (B) holding claim of alleged brady violation waived on collateral appeal for failure to raise it at trial or on direct appeal (C) holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone (D) holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived (E) holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court
Output: (B)
involved in the incident, which was for his own lustful gratification. Moreover, while “the definition of sexual penetration announced in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97 encompasses any penetration, the Court holds the parameters of the definition of sexual penetration are logically confined to activities which are the product of sexual behavior or libidinal gratification.” Frei v. State, 934 So.2d 318, 325(¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2006)(quoting Roberson v. State, 501 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 11. This Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have interpreted Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97 (Rev.2006) to include common sense applications where the accused attempts to engage in semantics regarding the literal reading of the statute. See Frei, 934 So.2d at 325(¶ 18) (<HOLDING>); see also Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law (B) holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense (C) holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional (D) holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses (E) holding that mississippi code annotated section 97395 was not overbroad despite the fact that innocent penetrations can occur during the course of parental activities or clinical duties and the meaning of sexual penetration is legitimately confined to those activities which are done for sexual gratification
Output: (E)
resource. Power that is not exercised is not management or control even though in a legal sense the resource may belong in part or appertain to that party. While the Government is correct in their argument that there is not a double recovery until the total value of the damaged or injured resource has been recovered, a given trustee cannot recover more than what its stewardship is determined to be. To allow otherwise would create the undesirable situation of a race to the courthouse between co-trustees with the first in time being the first in right. Moreover, once a state, federal or other public trustee recovers such damages, res judicata would prevent a second trustee from recovering the same public losses. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, settlement would be discouraged by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii (B) holding that the plaintiffs earlier claims of infringement by possession and its later claims of infringement by use of its source code arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and therefore the later claims were barred by res judicata (C) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred (D) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (E) holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata
Output: (E)
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). 7 . See also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir.2001) (discussing the AEDPA standard of review), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 915, 122 S.Ct. 2381, 153 L.Ed.2d 199 (2002). 8 . See also Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 309-310 (2d Cir.2001). 9 . Moxley’s claim is based on clearly established federal law, i.e., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 10 . See also Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2002). 11 . The prosecutor's reason for striking Patterson was the "prospective juror’s lack of significant employment experiences." R & R at 18; Tr. at 306-309. Such a basis is not inappropriate. See United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Moxley failed to offer any evidence that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts erroneous refusal to strike juror for cause impaired defendants statutory right to his allotted number of peremptory challenges (B) holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors (C) holding that trial judges determination  that the prosecutors use of peremptory challenges to strike all four africanamerican venirepersons for lack of education and business experience was not pretextual  was not clearly erroneous (D) holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant (E) holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons
Output: (C)
exon-erations, twenty-one percent of wrongful convictions were based on confessions that were made by or attributed to the defendant); see generally Richard Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, J. of Crim.L. & Criminology, Winter 1998 (reporting statistics on the unreliability of confessions). 7 . The majority in Henera did not set forth the standard that a person must reach for a truly persuasive showing of actual innocence. However, in Schlup, the Supreme Court resulted in the exoneration of David Vasquez, who had pled guilty to the crime and had been sentenced to 35 years in prison. See 1996 Report at 73. 9 . See Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Watkins v. Miller, 2000 WL 680418, *1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to file fourth amended complaint (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying the habeas petitioners motion to conduct dna testing which was unavailable at trial (C) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (D) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion (E) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen
Output: (B)
definition of legal insanity and is subject to the same procedural requirements” (collecting cases)). The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged this history in Carpenter: The [Michigan] Court of Appeals^] decision in Mangiapane was then followed by a series of decisions continuing to address diminished capacity defense as a form of the statutory insanity defense. See, e.g., People v. Denton, 138 Mich.App. 568, 360 N.W.2d 245 (1984); People v. Anderson, 166 Mich.App. 455, 421 N.W.2d 200 (1988). Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d at 282; see also People v. Lipps, 167 Mich.App. 99, 421 N.W.2d 586, 589-90 (1988) (“Conditions which are recognized as defenses to [a specific intent] crime include intoxication, insanity and diminished capacity”); People v. Paris, 166 Mich.App. 276, 420 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1988) (<HOLDING>); People v. Kvam, 160 Mich.App. 189, 408 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutor does not have general discovery rights because michigan law requires a defendant to disclose only a defense of insanity or diminished capacity citing mcl  76820a (B) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (C) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense (D) holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes (E) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity
Output: (A)
642, 569 P2d 596 (1977), the Supreme Court construed ORS 307.140 and held that, to qualify for an exemption under that statute, “the primary use of the property must advance charitable purposes or goals of the religious organization.” Charitable purposes include the advancement of religion and any other “generally recognized charitable function.” Id.; see also House of Good Shepherd v. Dept. of Rev., 300 Or 340, 345-47, 710 P2d 778 (1985) (discussing how the advancement of religion is a charitable purpose). In conducting the proper analysis, however, courts must bear in mind that “decisions interpreting ORS 307.130 are of value in discerning the contours of ORS 307.140.” German Apost. Christ. Church, 279 Or at 641; see also Archdiocese v. Dept. of Rev., 266 Or 419, 513 P2d 1137 (1973) (<HOLDING>). For organizations seeking tax exemption for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limitations placed upon the religious activities of two prison groups found to be religious organizations were reasonable under the circumstances (B) holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise (C) holding exempt under ors 307130 which relates to other charitable institutions a building that was used as an office for a religious official and religious court and a printing press for a religious publication (D) recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion (E) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise
Output: (C)
contract.” Because of this ambiguity, Hardee’s briefed both issues in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. In their response, Plaintiffs did not clarify which theory of recovery they were pursuing. In fact, Plaintiffs completely failed to respond to Hardee’s arguments and otherwise did not provide any support for an implied-in-law theory of recovery. Even on appeal, Plaintiffs do not clearly state that they are seeking recovery on an im~ plied-in-law basis. Because Plaintiffs failed to brief the issue before the district court, and because the district court did not rule on the issue in its opinion, we find that Plaintiffs abandoned their implied-in- law contractual claim. Preferred Rx, Inc. v. American Prescription Plan, Inc., 46 F.3d 535, 549 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). II. Misrepresentation Claims Plaintiffs argue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal (B) holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal (C) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (D) holding that subject to limited exceptions this court will not consider issues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal (E) holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal
Output: (D)
was a matter for the arbitrator to decide). We find the present case functionally indistinguishable from (and controlled by) those cases in which the parties agree that an underlying dispute is arbitrable, but disagree about the effect of laches, waiver, exhaustion of prearbitration steps, limitations periods, or other “procedural” issues. See supra note 4. Bell and its Union agree that disputes over the reorganization of administrative groups may be resolved through arbitration; they simply disagree on the procedures to be followed. The Union has asked that both of these issues — the reorganization dispute and the procedure to be followed — be submitted to an arbitrator, and we hold that this is the proper course for the parties. See John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 558, 84 S.Ct. 909 (<HOLDING>). The District Court’s judgment will be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that the court must send the parties to arbitration in cases in which arbitrability of the subject matter is unquestioned but a dispute arises over the procedures to be followed (D) holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract (E) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive
Output: (C)
may recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of subsection (a) of this section involved in the action in a sum of not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just, and for each violation of paragraph (4) of this subsection involved in the action an aggrieved party may recover statutory damages in a sum not less than $10,000, or more than $100,000, as the court considers just. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605(e)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(i) (West 1991) (emphasis added). While these penalty provisions consistently refer to damages assessed by a court, the use of that term is not necessarily dispositive on the issue of the right to a jury trial. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192, 94 S.Ct. 1005; cf. Sibley v. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 832-33 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of section 605 is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction to review fines under the criminal sentencing reform act of 1982 because sentence is a broad term which encompasses a fine probation a term of imprisonment or any other form of punishment imposed by the court (B) holding that favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and articulating the materiality standard (C) holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury (D) holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts (E) holding that when the relevant criminal statute encompasses both violent and nonviolent felonies a sentencing court may go beyond the statutory language
Output: (C)
(quoting, inter alia, Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.1983), which recites a veritable litany of invective to describe strip searches). 57 . In this jurisdiction, see, e.g., Jefferson v. United States, 906 A.2d 885, 887 (D.C.2006); Washington v. United States, 594 A.2d 1050, 1051 (D.C.1991); United States v. Rodney, 294 U.S.App. D.C. 9, 10, 956 F.2d 295, 296 (1992). 58 . See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ("The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.”). 59 . See, e.g., Swain, 117 F.3d at 7; Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2008); State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 861 A.2d 62, 76 (2004); People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 856 N.Y.S.2d 540, 886 N.E.2d 162, 166 (2008). But see Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1449 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 708 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search (B) holding probable cause to be required for strip and visual body cavity searches (C) holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant (D) holding a visual strip and visual cavity search unreasonable when done beside a police car (E) holding that prison officials may conduct visual body cavity searches in a reasonable manner
Output: (C)