niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
were driven by ‘[p]rice in an all-inclusive sense, which starts with the freight rate.’ ” (Doc. S-l at 56). No effort was made to differentiate or promote any aspect of Trailer Bridge’s products or services. Instead, the statement provided a brief explanation of the factors affecting price in the entire Puerto Rican cabotage market. Cf American Simmental Ass’n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.2002) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of ‘advertising idea’ generally encompasses an idea for calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or patronage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Proxima Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 132, 1994 WL 245671 at *1 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>). Regardless of whether the statement lulled 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery (B) holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product (C) holding that the essential wrong of trademark infringement the appropriation of the good will of anothers established mark may be effectively accomplished by advertising matter associating that others distinguishing mark with the product of defendant (D) holding that the shape of a product was not an advertising idea because there was no allegation in the complaint that the design itself was a trademark or was intended to distinguish the product from others that might enter the market citation omitted (E) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury
Output: (D)
offense” render the warrant general. A warrant must be read as a whole, see, e.g., Tracey, 597 F.3d at 154, and a supporting affidavit likewise “is to be read in its entirety and in a common sense, nontechnical manner,” United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir.2011); see also United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.1982) (“When a warrant is accompanied by an affidavit that is incorporated by reference, the affidavit may be used in construing the scope of the warrant.”). Accordingly, “such evidence of a criminal offense” refers not to any criminal offense, but to the criminal offense of unlawful contact with a minor defined throughout the remainder of the warrant and affidavit. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Karrer contends that the warrant failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase together with other fruits instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown did not render a warrant general where context made clear that the reference was to false pretenses crime (B) holding that the inclusion of the phrase together with other fruits instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was clear from the context that the term crime in the warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of one specific real estate lot (C) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (D) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (E) holding prosecutor has discretion to charge defendant under general crime even though more specific crime exists
Output: (A)
FECA limited contributions to $1000 per federal candidate, the Court only considered contributions larger than that amount in evaluating the validity of the government’s interest. See 424 U.S. at 28, 96 S.Ct. at 639 (noting that $1000 cap focused upon “the narrow aspect” of contribution activity linked with actual or potential corruption). Here, the defendants argue that the old contribution limits were not adequate to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. However, the old limits ranged from $200 to $2000, depending upon the race. D.C.Code § 1-1441 (1981). The defendants did not present convincing evidence that contributions under the old caps were large enough to raise a concern about corruption or the appearance of corruption. See also Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d at 643 (<HOLDING>). The defendants did present some general 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contingency fee contract did not cap award of attorneys fees where johnson had so held (B) holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect (C) holding that the combination of the statutory cap and a high threshold for culpability for punitive damages in a title vii case confined a punitive damages award within the cap to a level tolerated by due process (D) holding down the locking cap (E) holding that previous contribution cap levels did not suggest possibility of corruption
Output: (E)
officer was not acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he commanded Green to come speak with him. See generally Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) (727 SE2d 257) (2012) (describing circumstances in which a citizen may walk or even run from a law enforcement officer). By expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging his official duties in their encounter, Green implicitly challenged his own knowledge that the officer’s commands to him were lawful. Indeed, Green’s counsel argued at trial that, because the officer made no lawful commands to Green, the state could not show that Green had the knowledge required by the statute for the offense of misdemeanor obstruction. See Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 216) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 325, 328 (593 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all challenges to his or her death sentence including appeals state postconviction collateral review and federal habeas corpus if he or she has the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies (B) holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right (C) holding that defendants disobedience cannot have been knowing and wilful if officer has not made clear to defendant that he or she was compelled to obey (D) holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority (E) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities
Output: (C)
470, 472 & n. 1 (Tex.1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 cmt. a (1965)); see also Borg-Wamer Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex.2007). In other words, for an act or event to rise to the level of cause in the legal sense, the act or event must be such that reasonable jurors would identify it as being actually responsible for the ultimate harm. The cause must be more than one of the countless ubiquitous and insignificant causes that in some remote sense may have contributed to a given effect as, for example, simply getting up in the morning. That the term substantial factor is given to this commonsense aspect of legal causation simply makes plain to jurors that more than causation in this indirect, “philosophic sense” is required. See Staggs, 134 S.W.2d at 1030 (<HOLDING>). It does not demand, nor even imply, a higher 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that butfor language repeated something already included in the usual and ordinary meaning of cause and draws juror attention to the importance of an unbroken causal connection (B) holding that failure to demonstrate a causal connection is fatal to a  1983  cause of action (C) holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language (D) holding that the language of the statute clearly requires  proof of a causal connection between the drivers intoxication and the death of another person (E) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect
Output: (A)
And, the Dallas Court of Appeals used the Timberwalk factors in analyzing the foreseeability of targeted crime. See Stewart, 214 S.W.3d at 663 (applying Timberwalk to test foreseeability of targeted shooting of employee). Barton produced some evidence of criminal activity at the Whataburger in the years preceding Dean’s murder: in July 1997, six years before the incident, a customer was shot in the parking lot, and another customer in the drive-through lane was robbed and shot in the thigh; in July 1998, a customer was robbed in the drive-through lane; in June 1999, a customer’s purse was stolen; in July 2000, a customer reported an assault (without injury); in April 2001, a woman sought help in the Whataburger, reportin z, 220 S.W.3d 33, 40 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>), and Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that carjacking and murder were foreseeable in light of 184 reported criminal incidents on premises during previous three years (B) holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that murder at shopping mall was foreseeable because plaintiff produced evidence of ten violent crimes at mall in previous two years (E) holding that sexual assault was not foreseeable because plaintiff produced no evidence of similar criminal acts on or near defendants premises
Output: (D)
did not seek to amend the complaint. Her only response was to file a notice of appeal. On appeal, she continues to argue that the factual allegations contained in her complaint are sufficient. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 9 (“The lower court’s opinion is premised on the mistaken assumption that the Appellant/Plaintiff should have pled the evidence and facts underlying her Complaint.”). Because Frederico has elected to stand on her original complaint rather than amend or refile it, the order dismissing the complaint without prejudice is final. See, e.g., Lucas v. Township of Bethel, 319 F.3d 595, 600 (3d Cir.2003) (dismissal without prejudice was final and appealable because plaintiff chose to stand on the complaint); Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n. 5 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete (B) holding that a plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint by repeatedly asserting the validity of her averments and by failing to seek leave to amend following dismissal (C) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (D) holding that plaintiff elected to stand on complaint by failing to amend within specified time period (E) holding that a plaintiff should be allowed to amend the complaint to add a claim
Output: (D)
for the litigation, resulting from irresistible pressure on Defendants to settle the matter. Under this consideration, we determine whether the defendant has made a sufficient showing “that the damages claimed would force a company of its size to settle without relation to the merits of the class’s claims.” Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 108. FIE has been defending multiple class action suits throughout the country, and stipulated to the MDL. Defendants do not show why they will feel forced to settle this particular state litigation, while they are able to withstand and even voluntarily assume the pressure of the consolidated MDL. {15} In connection with the death-knell factor, we will normally also look for error or a substantial weakness in the certification order. See Blair, 181 F.3d at 835 (<HOLDING>). However, because Defendants have not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the futility in granting review of a class certification decision that is impervious to revision even if the decision effectively terminates the litigation (B) holding that the plaintiff was effectively asking the federal court to review and rule on the propriety of the state court action and that granting the requested relief would effectively declare the state court order invalid (C) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action (D) holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted (E) holding that once a regional office decision is final a claimant may only attempt to overcome the finality of that decision in one of two ways a request for revision of the decision based on clear and unmistakable error or a claim to reopen based upon new and material evidence
Output: (A)
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the trial court’s ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Embry v. State, 70 Ark. App. 122, 15 S.W.3d 367 (2000). The majority relies upon United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998). I, too, find that Beck is instructive. As explained by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: During an investigative stop, officers may check for weapons and may take any additional steps “reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985); see abo United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1430 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872 (1995); United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers belief that he had observed the occupants of a truck participate in a drug transaction supported a valid investigatory detention of the truck and its occupants (B) holding warrant check not unreasonable where detention not extended solely for that purpose (C) holding detention of passenger for warrant check violated fourth amendment absent reasonable suspicion (D) holding that request for license destination and purpose of trip within reasonable scope of detention (E) holding that requests for identification of all occupants explanation of presence in area and warrant check was within reasonable scope of detention
Output: (E)
Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) (“Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.”); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
Output: (D)
to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21; see also Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010). At the time of sentencing there was no “sentencing error”. Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, choosing the certainty of a binding plea agreement over the uncertainty of a jury trial. He cannot accept the benefit of that agreement and then repudiate it when a change in circumstances later arises. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21. A retroactive determination that an advisory guideline range may have been ■ miscalculated does not overcome petitioner’s appellate waiver; See Sotirion, 617 F.3d at 38; see also United States v. Calderon-Pacheco, 564 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). In view of the circumstances, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (B) holding a showing of egregious facts required to vault the hurdle erected by the waiver (C) holding that the failure to provide a person with all of the information required by ors 4261001 constitutes an egregious error that justifies plain error review (D) recognizing waiver by acquiescence as a possible defense to an action for past due alimony but finding no waiver under the facts presented (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case
Output: (B)
ability of prosecutors to coerce guilty pleas has increased so dramatically.”); cf. Cynthia Alkon, The U.S., Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 561, 590 (2014) (“Prosecutors, in particular, would resist plea bargaining reform if such changes were thought to undermine their power in the system, which, in part, en ables them to exercise control over their caseloads.”). The rise in plea deals led the Supreme Court in 2012 to confront the issue of whether the right to counsel in criminal cases, extends to the plea bargaining process in a pair of companion eases. See Lafler v. Cooper, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012); Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1399. It found that counsel was required. See Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (<HOLDING>); Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1399 (holding that, as a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (B) holding that the defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel when a codefendants plea bargain including a promise to testify against the defendant was negotiated by the law partner of the defendants counsel (C) holding that if plea bargain has been offered defendant has right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it (D) holding that right to effective assistance of counsel requires that defendant be advised of immigration consequences of plea (E) holding a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process
Output: (C)
the defendant’s breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay the claims do not raise a federal question and, therefore, removal was improper. The plaintiffs contend this is a private contractual dispute between an insured and a health cáre insurer and argue the well-pleaded complaint rule should govern this case. Removal of a state court action based on federal question jurisdiction is proper only if the action asserts a claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. Ordinarily, as plaintiffs contend, a ease “arises under” federal law only when a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391-92, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2428-29, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Under that rule, a ease cannot be removed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the presence or absence of federalquestion jurisdiction is governed by the veil pleaded complaint rule which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only where a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint (B) holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim (C) holding that a claim not pleaded in the petition ie the complaint was not properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage (E) holding that where the statute of frauds is pleaded the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that a sufficient writing exists
Output: (A)
agreements was the product of collusion among all defendants. (Tr. at 33-35; Pl. Mem. at 18-19.) This Court disagrees. Plaintiffs propose two distinct grounds for invalidation of their arbitration agreements: (1) collusion by defendants renders them agreements unenforceable, and (2) defendants’ collusive beh igible economic transaction” in which the parties agreed to a mechanism for resolving disputes. In contrast to the circumstance where Chase and Citibank withheld material information from cardholders, there is no evidence that Bank One Delaware (f.k.a. First USA), Bank of America, MBNA or Household withheld relevant information from their cardholders. Thus, these issuing banks’ arbitration agreements may be enforced. See Rooney v. Columbia Pictures, 538 F.Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ argument that defendants’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (B) holding that an agreement in violation of antitrust laws may be enforceable where the parties underlying conduct is legal (C) holding that plaintiff need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws (D) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (E) holding that a court may enforce a contract when it does not mandate illegal conduct despite an antitrust violation
Output: (B)
trans. denied. Section 35-37-4-6 applies to juvenile proceedings. D.G.B. v. State, 833 N.E.2d 519, 524-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). L.H. first argues that the case can be “easily and appropriately resolved” by holding that the requirements of the child hearsay statute were not met because A.H. did not testify at a “trial” as required by section 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(A) because there was no trial. Brief of Appellant at 6. L.H. contends that the juvenile court’s judgment should be reversed on this basis. However, the ramification of the requirements of the child hearsay statute not being met is that the hearsay should not be admitted at trial. Reversal would not necessarily be required if other evidence is sufficient to support the adjudication. See Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 704 (Ind.2003) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because the issue of whether there 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (B) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting child hearsay because it failed to exhibit sufficient indications of reliability but noting that it is not every error that warrants reversal of a judgment of conviction and examining whether there was sufficient evidence outside of the hearsay to support the conviction (C) holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict (D) holding that a plain error that is fatal to a conviction is sufficient to warrant reversal (E) holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered
Output: (B)
211, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916). Access to the courts is also not a fundamental right unless the denial of that access itself impinges on a recognized fundamental right. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 1172-75, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 76 (1973) (access to courts to seek welfare relief not a fundamental right). Being grounded in the common law, not the constitution, the right to receive compensation for tortious injury is simply not fundamental. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 882, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 407, 506 P.2d 212, 231 (1973). Those few states which have applied strict scrutiny in a similar context are simply outside the mainstream of state constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 973 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas case law, as in most states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right of access to recover damages for bodily injury was fundamental but noting that numerous other states have held otherwise (B) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings (C) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (D) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (E) holding right to be fundamental
Output: (A)
while the parties informally agreed to extend the discovery deadline in order to allow further expert depositions, we do not regard this arrangement as a waiver by plaintiffs of their right to receive documents of such volume and complexity in a sufficiently timely manner to allow an effective response. We recognize, of course, the normal tendency for preparations to intensify as trial approaches and, thus, suggest no general bar to material produced seasonably and in good faith. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir.1993). In this case, however, we believe that, if Ford intended to rely on this evidence at trial, it should have made more diligent efforts at its timely production. Cf. Glover v. Grace Pac. Corp., 86 Hawai'i 154, 164, 948 P.2d 575, 585 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, nevertheless, distinguished 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (B) holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded an expert who failed to arrive at his final opinion before the discovery cutoff date (D) holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates
Output: (C)
for Health and Family Services (the Cabinet). Sefa alleged that the Cabinet kidnapped his niece and nephew in connection with a state-court action for neglect instituted against two of Sefa’s sisters. Sefa claimed that the Cabinet violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, suing under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1988. He also raised claims under several other federal statutes in his complaint. The district court dismissed Sefa’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Sefa appeals, reasserting his claims for monetary and declaratory relief, as well as “seekpng] [an] injunctive order” directing the Cabinet to release his niece and nephew from state custody and to halt all “spiritual attacks” against his family. We re Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Cabinet is not a “person” 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that claims against a state under  1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment (B) holding that the eleventh amendment bars blyshrl and nychrl claims against a state agency in federal court (C) holding that a takings claim was barred under the eleventh amendment where state courts provided a means of redress for such claims (D) holding california school district a state agency for purposes of the eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment
Output: (E)
Wright & Miller § 2751 (“[The declaratory judgment remedy] relieves potential defendants ‘from the Damoclean threat of impending litigation which a harassing adversary might brandish, while initiating suit at his leisure-or never.’ ” (citing Japan Gas Lighter Ass’n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F.Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J.1966)). In these circumstances, it would be inappropriate for the Court to deny plaintiffs the right to proceed, eve 261, 265 (2d Cir.1984) (“Ordinarily, a judgment in an ejectment or quiet title action will not affect the interests of others than the parties or those in privity with them. Such actions do not operate in rem upon the land itself, and therefore principles of collateral estoppel by judgment are not implicated.”); Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 24 F. 154, 158 (C.C.D.Or.1885) (<HOLDING>). That said, the Court sees no reason why the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing actions to quiet title are equitable in nature and a court sitting in equity has jurisdiction to quiet title as a remedy for fraud (B) holding that a plaintiff in possession of property may bring suit to quiet title against any or all tenantsincommon with competing claims (C) holding that a plaintiffs attempt to quiet title failed because the plaintiff could not furnish competent evidence that the description in the deed includes any or all of the real estate which is admitted by the parties to be the subject of controversy (D) holding there is no statute of limitations on action to quiet title by landowner who was in continuous possession of property under claim of ownership (E) holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law
Output: (B)
v. Robinson, 533 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Mo.App.1975). Here, the trial court’s judgment in favor of Mazurkiewicz was based on the weakness of the Kempers’ title, as the trial court stated Plaintiff has the superior title based upon the chain of title as presented in evidence as to that certain one-acre tract described in Defendant’s Exhibit B herein. Appellant’s claim to title starts from a tax deed and traces back the “Babb deed” as the originating deed but provides no confirming evidence of Babb’s title to convey. According to the trial court, Mazur-kiewicz prevailed because of a deficiency in Kempers’ title, their inability to trace “back” from the Babb deed, and not due to the strength of Mazurkiewicz’s own title. Trailwoods Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Scott, 938 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Mo.App.E.D.1997)(<HOLDING>). Mazurkiewicz presented no evidence to defeat 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments (B) holding that a defendant may challenge the validity of prior convictions during a sentencing hearing and that the burden to establish invalidity is on the challenging party (C) holding that the taxpayer has the burden to prove the governments tax assessment is incorrect (D) holding that the party challenging a tax deed has the burden to prove its invalidity (E) holding that with two presumptively valid marriages in existence the ultimate burden rests on the party who advocates the second to prove the invalidity of the first
Output: (D)
James Rankin Mortensen appeals his conviction and sentence imposed following his guilty plea to importation of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. Mortensen contends that 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 are unconstitutional pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2848, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Our holdings in United States v. Mendoza-Paz, 286 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.) (§ 960), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 573, 154 L.Ed.2d 459 (2002) and United States v. Varela-Rivera, 279 F.3d 1174, 1175 n. 1 (9th Cir.2002) (§ 952) foreclose this argument. See also United States v. Hernandez, 322 F.3d 592 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Mortensen further contends that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 (B) holding that harris v united states 536 us 545 122 sct 2406 153 led2d 524 2002 does not overrule mendozapaz (C) holding that ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 which applied apprendi to arizonas capital sentencing scheme was not a watershed rule and did not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review (D) holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review (E) holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998
Output: (B)
filed an Anders brief that did not mention the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) sentencing issue, Defendant did not have the assistance of counsel in raising this claim or obtaining access to the information needed to challenge this particular aspect of his sentencing. This claim was therefore rejected on direct appeal because the evidence refuting the PSR’s erroneous information was not brought to t of sentencing error does- not rise to the level of “a miscarriage of justice” and thus is not cognizable under § 2255. See United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir.1998) (“[N]umerous cases have held that sentencing errors typically do not give rise to a miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse procedural default.”); cf. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Talk, 158 F.3d at 1070 (assuming without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that error in classifying defendant as a violent offender caused a miscarriage of justice (C) holding that courts of appeal should only correct a forfeited error at the trial level in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result (D) holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding some evidence standard applicable to cdoc decision classifying inmate who had not been convicted of a sexual offense as a sex offender
Output: (B)
testified that he examined bullets and casings found at both S & A Food Store and Fast Freddy’s. He concluded that the .9 millimeter used in the S & A offense was also fired during the Fast Freddy’s offense. Therefore, the State’s evidence showed a strong correlation between the S & A offense and the Fast Freddy’s offense, providing both intent and identity evidence in the Fast Freddy’s offense and eliminating the need for the Vogt Street offense. c. No Need for Vogt Street Offense The evidence outlined above shows that the State’s evidence of Russell’s intent in the Fast Freddy’s offense was strong; therefore, the need for the extraneous Vogt Street offense was minimal at best. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390; Graff v. State, 65 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet ref'd) (<HOLDING>). The State’s evidence showing Russell’s intent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine laboratory discovered in a bedroom she shared with a renter (B) holding that methamphetamine retained for personal use by the defendant who had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute the substance and never argued any of the methamphetamine was lawfully obtained was properly considered contraband with which he was directly involved and therefore relevant conduct (C) holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine (D) holding the state did not need this evidence of possession of 147 boxes of cold pills used to manufacture methamphetamine because the state had other convincing evidence to establish the defendants intent to deliver methamphetamine (E) holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant
Output: (D)
to seek applicants from persons with complainant's qualifications. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.; see also Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir.2001) (addressing a racial discrimination claim). 16 . McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. 17 . McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that "[a]n employer, even a public employer ... is free to choose among qualified candidates so long as that choice is not based on unlawful criteria”) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). 18 . See Deines v. Tex. Dep't Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 282 (5th Cir.1999). Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 19 . 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578. 20 . Price, 283 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established (B) holding that expert was qualified to testify regarding sexuallyabused children based on witness education professional license and experience (C) holding that better education work experience and longer tenure with the company do not establish that an applicant is clearly better qualified (D) holding plaintiff with nineteen years experience as hospital assistant and bachelors and masters degrees to be significantly better qualified for pharmacy technician position than applicant with no college education and two months relevant experience (E) holding that the applicant failed to satisfy the statute because the applicant did not have an ownership right or access right to the reservoir site
Output: (C)
has been obtained in a manner that would undermine the policies of deterrence and integrity of the courts. We are admonished by the Supreme Court in Terry that we, as the judiciary, are responsible to “guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.” We sustain Appellant’s two points. Conclusion We hold that the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motions to suppress his statements and the marijuana. Therefore, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for the offense of possession of marijuana as well as the conviction for failure to identify and remand those causes to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 65 . See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial (B) holding whether passenger was lawfully detained as witness to traffic violation when officer asked his name so that his false identification violated failuretoidentify statute not necessary to decide since other articulable facts justified continued detention (C) holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements (D) holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand (E) holding that where the opportunity for positive identification is good and not weakened by prior failure to identify and the witness is positive in his identification even after crossexamination identification need not be received with caution
Output: (C)
not review the ICC’s refusal to reopen proceedings unless the motion to reopen was based on new evidence of changed circumstances. Id. Because Appellants’ motion to reopen was based on the ground of material error, the District Court found that it was not reviewable. Id. at 279, 107 S.Ct. 2360. Appellants argued that, under this Court’s holding in Friends of the Atgleiv-Susquehanna Trail, Inc., v. S.T.B., when the STB reopened the 1990 NITU for the limited purpose of substituting NWPTA as trail sponsor, it made the reopening order reviewable “for all purposes.” 252 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir.2001) (concluding that when the STB explicitly reopens a case, even for a limited purpose, it makes every aspect of the reopening order subject to review); see also BLE, 482 U.S. at 278, 107 S.Ct. 2360 (<HOLDING>). The District Court rejected this argument, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order (B) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (C) holding that when the agency reopens a proceeding for any reason and after reconsideration issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties that order  even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order  is reviewable on its merits (D) holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits (E) holding a general prediction set forth in order does not constitute final agency action
Output: (C)
breach of trust, he is chargeable with (a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust; or (b) any profit made by him through the breach of trust; or (c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there had been no breach of trust.” (emphasis added)). In compensating Beneficiaries, the district court put them in the place they would have been if the Bank had never engaged in its self-dealing. Because the disgorgement damages of $540,000 were less than the $849,000 in compensatory damages awarded by this Court to make B eneficiaries whole, any additional recovery for disgorgement would amount to a double recovery and improperly impose a penalty on the Bank. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (<HOLDING>). {46} Plaintiffs are entitled to be fully 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted (B) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted (C) holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that the remedy of disgorgement is meant not to inflict punishment but to prevent an unjust enrichment by allowing injured complainants to claim that which  is theirs and nothing beyond this internal quotation marks and citations omitted (E) holding that disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak but they  do not prevent anyone from speaking citation and internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (D)
deadlines — and then apply that concept using conventional computer technology and the Internet, they fail to meet section 101’s subject matter eligibility requirements. “While running a particular process on a computer undeniably improves efficiency and accuracy, cloaking an otherwise abstract idea in the guise of a computer-implemented claim is insufficient to bring it within section 101.” My Space, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1267 (Fed. Cir.2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir.2012) (concluding that claims directed to a computerized method of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy fell outside section 101); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed.Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not know the residence for which they obtained a warrant actually contained multiple units (B) holding that section 1823e applies only to assets and does not apply to claims regarding letters of credit because letters of credit are liabilities rather than assets (C) holding that a credit issuing bank did not breach a credit agreement when it unilaterally modified the terms (D) holding that claims drawn to a method of applying for credit did not satisfy section 101 notwithstanding the fact that they contained a limitation requiring the invention to be computer aided (E) recognizing statutory credit
Output: (D)
notice. Although in R.G. the record contained an order that notice be sent, we nonetheless find it controlling here. Appellant next argues that R.G. was wrongly decided because it did not require the State affirmatively to show he received notice. Appellant cites no authority holding section 54.11 places this burden on the State. Rather, he analogizes to Family Code section 53.06, which provides, “The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to ... the child named in the petition.... ” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 53.06 (Vernon 1996). He also relies on the case law interpreting section 53.06, which requires the State affirmatively to show the juvenile received service of summons for jurisdiction to vest in the juvenile court. See In the Matter of D.W.M., 562 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Grayless v. State, 567 S.W.2d 216, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (B) holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims (C) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (D) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (E) holding 1 record must affirmatively show summons with which juvenile was served for jurisdiction to vest in juvenile court and 2 no jurisdiction existed despite juveniles attendance because no affirmative showing of service was made
Output: (E)