niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
permanent resettlement, and thus may ... not be able to make the prima facie showing of firm resettlement under § 208.15 in that manner.” 242 F.3d at 486-87 (noting that we faced such a situation in Cheo). In the event that direct evidence is unobtainable, “the IJ or BIA may find it necessary to rely on non-offer-based factors, such as the length of an alien’s stay in a third country, the alien’s intent to remain in the country, and the extent of the social and economic ties developed by the alien, as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a government-issued offer.” Id. at 487. Such factors may serve as a surrogate for direct evidence of a formal offer “if they rise to a sufficient level of clarity and force.” Id. Again, the Seventh Circuit is in accord. Diallo, 381 F.3d at 694 (<HOLDING>). Opting for a “totality of the circumstances” 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest (B) recognizing that such circumstances may exist but holding that the ij erred as he neither considered whether there was an offer at all nor suggested that he was using nonofferbased factors as a surrogate (C) recognizing further that the court need not  and could not  resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law (D) recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal (E) holding that appellant was not harmed where defendant never asserted that he was not a us citizen and no evidence in the record suggested he was not a us citizen
Output: (B)
is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Tex.R. Evid. 803(1). The record does not reflect how long it took to walk from Carolina’s apartment to Carless’ and Carlos’ apartment, but it does reflect the two apartments were in close proximity and suggests the walk from one to the other was at best one minute. Given the close proximity between the two apartments, it is apparent Carolina’s first statement was made immediately after the con dition was perceived. We therefore hold Carolina’s first statement that Gizmo was upstairs in her apartment qualifies as a present sense impression because it was a statement describing a condition — Gizmo being in Carolina’s apartment — made by Carolina immediately after she perceived it. See Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 3047, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission (B) holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either (C) holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition (D) holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial (E) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence
Output: (C)
Here the facts are undisputed. Where the facts upon which liability is claimed or denied under an insurance policy are undisputed and the existence or amount of liability depends solely upon a construction of the policy, the question presented is one of law and this court reviews the finding de novo. See Tonka, 9 F.3d at 52; Auto-Owners, 667 F.2d at 721. Substantial Probability A review of Minnesota and Eighth Circuit decisions recognizes the fundamental premise that an insurance policy protects an insured from fortuitous loss. For example, if a budding contractor suffers a loss because of unknowing mistakes or carelessness, the resulting damage is intended to be covered. If, however, the loss is incurred due to intentional acts, no coverage is intended. See Bartlett, 240 N.W.2d at 313 (<HOLDING>). While an insured has a reasonable expectation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the loss of a contract failed to constitute ascertainable loss under cutpa (B) holding that officers reliance on accountant negated a finding that he acted consciously voluntarily intentionally knowingly or recklessly in his failure to pay tax (C) holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after  it was informed of the occurrence (D) holding that contractor who knowingly violated contract specifications consciously controlled risk of loss precluding an occurrence (E) holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand
Output: (D)
to Mr. Cluff s conversation with Mr. Floyd, would have been cumulative of this prior testimony. See Hernandez-Urista, 9 F.3d at 84 (determining that the denial of a request for a subpoena is supported when witness testimony is merely cumulative); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 462 (10th Cir.1990) (same). As a final point, we note that the timing of Mr. Pursley’s Rule 17(b) request supports the propriety of its denial. Although Mr. Pursley filed his motion on the first day of trial, he never attempted to make a nonconclusory showing of necessity until the government rested. Mr. Pursley provided no justification for failing to act sooner. Granting Mr. Pursley even partial relief at that point had the potential to delay the completion of the trial. See Bloomgren, 814 F.2d at 585 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 579 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lack of timeliness of a rule 17b application supported the district courts decision to deny twentythree of twentysix requested subpoenas (B) holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue (C) holding costs of service of subpoenas recoverable (D) recognizing district court application of the same rule (E) holding that a rule 17b application filed on last day of governments case lacked timeliness and supported district courts limitation on subpoena requests
Output: (A)
for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 “authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if the defendant is deemed a ‘minimal’ participant in the criminal activity! ] [and] a two-level reduction if he is deemed a ‘minor’ participant....” United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783 (6th Cir. 2012). The difference between “minimal” and “minor” is “not just semantic,” United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1991), and the standards are not interchangeable. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (defining a “minor participant” as “a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal”) (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Both Griffith and the Government focus their 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) holding that the district court improperly used the two different standards under ussg  3b12 interchangeably thus blurring the distinction between section 3b12a and b (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel
Output: (D)
box, .was too small to fit an assault rifle. 2. The package was not immediately recognizable as contraband, preventing seizure under the plain-view doctrine. 3. Deputy Barker could discover whatever lay in the back of the trunk by leaning over the speaker box and searching with his hands. 4. The compartment behind the armrest (where the cocaine was found) was'too small to contain an assault rifle. 5. Deputy Barker did not know whether the car had a trunk-access panel. We reject Mr. Mirabais first argument. Deputy Barker testified based on his mili tary experience and familiarity with assault rifles. In light -of this experience, he testified that a rifle could have fit behind the speaker box. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court had little reason to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that police officers can draw inferences from prior experience (B) holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (C) holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (D) holding that triers of fact may draw only reasonable inferences (E) holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
Output: (A)
with intent to deliver. The District Court excluded Gaston’s conviction for possession of a firearm without a license but admitted all three of Gaston’s drug-related convictions. The District Court limited the government to asking about “the fact of the conviction and the date of the conviction.” In response to this ruling, Gaston requested that the court admit only one of the three drug convictions for impeachment. The District Court denied the request, holding that the convictions were relevant to Ga-ston’s credibility. On direct examination, Gaston preemptively admitted to one of the felony drug crimes. Gaston concedes that he has waived the right to object to the introduction of this crime. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 760, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The parties dispute which of the three drug 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (B) holding that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error (C) holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial (D) holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial (E) holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered
Output: (B)
concluded that this regulation does not require a bus operator under contract to provide insurance coverage for a bus that it does not own and did not register. The court reasoned that under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, only the vehicle’s owner or registrant is responsible for maintaining financial responsibility. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786. This responsibility, the court concluded, belonged to COLT. (Trial Court Opinion at 15). We agree. Moreover, we decline to impose the requirement of maintaining coverage for every vehicle driven by Lebanon Coach on its insurer when the regulation clearly imposes that duty on the common or contract carrier of passengers. See 52 Pa.Code § 32.11; Czarnecki v. Delco Cab, Inc., 276 Pa.Super. 148, 152, 419 A.2d 139, 141 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Although the Lehmans strenuously argue that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (B) holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued (C) recognizing that a material misrepresentation or omission of fact in an insurance application relied on by the insurer in issuing a policy renders the coverage voidable at the insurance companys option (D) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy (E) holding predecessor regulation likewise did not impose coverage requirement on taxicab companys insurer for cab not listed as scheduled vehicle in policy
Output: (E)
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for review be dismissed. The petition for review was not filed within 60 days after issuance of the May 16, 2001 order, nor does alleged agency error in the underlying proceeding constitute “reasonable grounds” for not filing by the 60th day. See 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). Furthermore, petitioner’s series of reconsideration petitions did not toll the running of the judicial review period for the May 16, 2001 order. Whatever the effect of the first petition for reconsideration (which was dismissed as untimely), the second petition (which was dismissed as unauthorized under agency rules) did not toll the running of the review period. Cf. National Bank of Davis v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 725 F.2d 1390, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1984) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Finally, to the extent that petitioner seeks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend  retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions (B) holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order (C) holding that court can affirm administrative order only on grounds on which agency relied and noting that the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained (D) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (E) holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review
Output: (A)
of permanent custody where the obligated parent is clearly able to prove substantial compliance with the award and satisfy the other Aeree factors, no principled basis exists to deny an award of credits for the payments. Such circumstances may be contrasted with and distinguished from those arising in cases where the change in custody is not permanent, the alternative payments are sporadic, inconsistent, and insufficient, the non-, obligated parent does not agree to the permanent change in the form of payment, and the non-conforming payments adversely affect the. children. Cf. Henderlite v. Henderlite, 3 Va.App. 539, 542, 351 S.E.2d 913, 914 (1987) (credit not allowed where mother did not agree to the alternate payments and there was no finding that the c 6 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Extending the Aeree exception to cases where 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that only relevant factors must be considered (B) holding that the trial judge erred in not considering factors other than the number of black venirepersons excluded in ruling on the defendants prima facie case (C) holding that after determining presumptive amount under guidelines court must determine whether parties agreement would better serve childs interest (D) holding that trial court must determine presumptive amount under guidelines before considering other factors (E) holding that federal courts must ensure that they have jurisdiction before considering the merits of a case
Output: (D)
findings of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ determined that Avilez retained a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with an additional restriction: she could only stand or walk two hours out of an eight-hour work day. AR 16; see Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that an RFC may deviate from the Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Guideline grids “[w]hen the grids do not completely describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations”). Since the RFC fell between the categories of light and sedentary, the ALJ correctly decided to consult a vocational expert (“VE”) for expert testimony. AR 25; see, e.g., Thomas, 278 F.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>). The ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical can constitute substantial evidence of residual functional capacity (B) holding that vocational experts testimony that there were jobs claimant could perform constituted substantial evidence (C) holding that a vocational expert must be consulted when an rfc falls between two categories (D) holding that claimants pain should have formed a paxt of aljs question to vocational expert (E) holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record
Output: (C)
and Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d at 326 (finding that an inmate’s request for monetary damages on a failure to protect claim was barred by § 1997e(e) because he did not allege any physical injury). “The prohibitive feature of § 1997e(e), requiring physical injury before recovery, does not apply[, however,] in the context of requests for declaratory or injunctive relief sought to end an allegedly unconstitutional condition of confinement.” Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d at 665. (c) Failure to State a Claim To the extent that Plaintiff complains about retaliation, conspiracy, religious freedom, and equal protection, he has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted despite having been given the opportunity to amend his pleadings. See Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d at 98 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that many of the Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice (B) holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice (C) holding that dismissal of a complaint for insufficient jurisdictional allegations should be without prejudice to amend (D) holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter (E) holding that when the allegations do not affirmatively negate a claim dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only when the plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend after special exceptions have been sustained
Output: (A)
years after the occurrence of the violation which is the subject of suit[.]”). Defendants claim that 317 of the underlying state court complaints against class members were filed before May 30, 1999, so those class members' OCSPA claims are time-barred. 17 . Common law fraud claims have a four-year statute of limitations. See O.R.C. § 2305.09(C) ("Any action for [relief on the ground of fraud] shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued[.]”). Defendants claim that 42 of the underlying state court complaints against class members were filed before May 30, 1997, so those class members' common law fraud claims are time-barred, 18 .42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations. See Kuhnle Bros. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted). Defendants claim 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the period of limitations starts to run anew on the date the notice of dismissal is filed in the court (B) holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action  (C) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (D) holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania (E) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action 
Output: (B)
to the parties after Richard's motion for reconsideration. Specifically, he alleges that the trial court changed the figures used to calculate the value of the Caskill home without explaining the change. In its oral findings on the record, the court credited Richard's testimony that it would be nee-essary to make $54,977 in repairs to bring the house up to code, which would increase the house's value to $215,000. The court calculated the value in its spreadsheet by subtracting $54,977 from $215,000. Richard requested reconsideration on the grounds that the outstanding mortgage debt of $24,949 should also have been subtracted, leading to a value for the home of $185,074. The court recalculated the value to account for the mortgage, but changed the amount necessary to make repairs t 015 (<HOLDING>). 29 . Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retirement benefits are marital property because they would be a form of deferred compensation funded by money earned during the parties marriage (B) holding income tax liability incurred during marriage is one of accepted costs of producing marital income and should be treated as marital debt for purposes of determining equitable distribution of marital estate (C) holding that workers compensation disability benefits received by disabled spouse are marital property only to the extent that they compensate for loss of earnings during the marriage (D) holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage (E) holding that health benefits earned during marriage are marital asset of insured spouse
Output: (E)
Phillips’s sentence. As an initial matter, we review the procedural reasonableness of Phillips’s sentence for plain error. In United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir.2004), we instructed district courts, after announcing a proposed sentence, to “ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence ... that have not previously been raised.” Id. at 872. If a party failed to raise an objection after being asked this question, we held that plain-error review applies on appeal to any arguments not preserved. Id. Our recent en banc opinion in United States v. Vonner, No. 05-5295, 516 F.3d 382, 2008 WL 320773 (6th Cir. Feb.7, 2008) (en banc), makes clear that the Bostic rule applies to post -Booker procedural reasonableness challenges. See Vonner, 2008 WL 320773 at *3 (<HOLDING>). Here, after the district court announced a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (B) holding that plainerror review applied to appellants procedural reasonableness argument where defendant answered no to district courts bostic question at sentencing and explaining that although this answer did not undermine vonners right to appeal issues he had previously raised it did undermine his right to challenge the adequacy of the courts explanation for the sentence  an issue that became apparent as soon as the court finished announcing its proposed sentence and that counsel nonetheless declined the courts invitation to address (C) holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed (D) holding that under subsection al as then written the defendant had no right to appeal whether his sentence was supported by evidence presented because he entered into a plea agreement as to the sentence (E) holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added
Output: (B)
The $14 million stolen from JPMorgan is a proper measure of restitution for which Dobruna may be jointly and severally liable. See United States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir.2004). But a forfeiture order would defy the purpose and spirit of forfeiture law. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Government’s request is DENIED. SO ORDERED. 1 , Although 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) is a civil forfeiture statute, it has been integrated into criminal proceedings via 28 U.S.C. §'2461(c), which authorizes a court to order forfeiture of property as part of a criminal sentence. 2 . The presence of a criminal conspiracy adds nuance to these forfeiture rules, and it is true that Dobruna’s crime touched on a conspiracy. See United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). However, Do-bruna was convicted only of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual conspirator may be ordered to forfeit all of the proceeds derived from the criminal enterprise he participated in (B) holding municipal police department to be an enterprise within meaning of hobbs act (C) holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud (D) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances (E) holding that in interpreting a contract the actual purpose and intent of the parties must be derived
Output: (A)
apparently finds the extension of time for payment (majority at 88) was prejudicial to the rights of the judgment creditor. But quite to the contrary, an extension of time to repay a loan is generally presumed beneficial to junior lienors, not prejudicial. See, e.g., Crutchfield v. Johnson & Latimer, 243 Ala. 73, 8 So. 2d 412, 414 (1942); Lennar N.E. Partners v. Buice, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1576, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 439 (1996) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. BVS Dev., Inc., 42 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994)); Eurovest Ltd. v. 13290 Biscayne Island Terrace Corp., 559 So. 2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Larson Cement Stone Co. v. Redlim Realty Co., 179 Neb. 134, 137 N.W.2d 241, 245 (1965). But see Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 277 S.C. 162, 284 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Instead of a note amortized over 15 years 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although alabama state law would give a mortgagee who erroneously recorded a release of a mortgage an equitable right to have the mortgage retroactively reinstated reinstatement would have resulted in relating back the perfection of the mortgage to the original recording date in violation of treas reg  3016323hla2 (B) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (C) holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee (D) holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage (E) holding extension of senior mortgage resulted in loss of priority because intervening mortgagee had agreed to be subordinated on the assumption the senior mortgage would be fully satisfied on the initial due date
Output: (E)
ie., the presence of an elaborate mechanism for the resolution of claims] are applicable here with respect to the NCBA’s allegations of violations of the fifth amendment due process clause and of various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Although there may be no established mechanism for the recovery of damages against federal authorities for unconstitutional conduct, the unavailability of complete relief does not mandate the creation of a Bivens remedy when other “meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as were the plaintiffs” are available. In this case, the NCBA has recourse to challenge the legality of the penalty assessment under several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Accord Dahn v. United States, 127 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The conduct which gives rise to this action 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that comprehensive administrative scheme signals that congress did not intend to permit service members to assert a private cause of action in federal court under the mwpa (B) holding that in light of the comprehensive administrative scheme created by congress to resolve taxrelated disputes individual agents of the irs are also not subject to bivens actions (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record (E) holding that irs agents did not violate the fourth amendment by conducting surveillance in violation of regulations requiring prior authorization because neither the constitution nor any act of congress requires that official approval be secured before conversations are overheard or recorded by government agents with the consent of one of the eonversants
Output: (B)
13 case, the starting point for determining the cram-down rate is the treasury rate, not the prime rate. 7 . Bankruptcy Judge Letitia Z. Paul, who is now retired, also issued an opinion that although not expressly holding that Till requires use of the Prime Plus Approach, nevertheless used this approach in determining the cramdown rate in a Chapter 13 case. In re Tirey, 350 B.R. 62, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 8 . In Montemayor, the real estate securing the claim was the debtors' homestead. [Case No. 10-36990, Doc, No. 1, p. 14 of 49], Because this property was the debtors’ principal residence, § 1322(b)(2) prevents modifying the rights of the lien holder—including changing the interest rate. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, § 1322(b)(5) provides an exception 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence (B) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract (C) holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 (D) holding that citys tax hen on debtors principal residence was modifiable despite  1322b2 because not consensual and thus not a security interest (E) holding that modifying an interest rate in a bankruptcy plan constitutes an impermissible modification under  1322b2
Output: (A)
need for medication and his condition. The booking officer ... failed to use the property in such a way to avoid [appellant] being injured. The improper use of the property proximately caused the injuries to [appellant]. The gist of appellant’s negligence claim is that the booking officer’s placement of the stool was equivalent to “use” of the booking room and that the officer negligently or improperly “used” the room because he failed to “use” it in such a manner as to avoid injury to appellant. When, as in this case, a motion for summary judgment is directed solely at the facts alleged in the pleadings, we will accept as true every allegation in appellant’s pleadings against which the motion is directed. See, e.g., Adamo v. State Farm, Lloyds Co., 853 S.W 2d 528, 529 (Tex.1975) (<HOLDING>). If appellant’s pleadings, when liberally 
 Holding statements: (A) holding courts have held that hospitals have a duty to protect its patients from the tortious or criminal actions of third parties due to the special relationship between the hospital and the patient (B) holding that the hospitals failure to provide patient with a hospital bed with side rails brought the case under  1010212 (C) holding that upon admission to a hospital the hospitals lien attached to the proceeds of all insurance claims accruing to the patient or his legal representative as a result of the patients hospitalization (D) holding that hospitals failure to provide epileptic and mentally retarded patient with a life preserver to be used as part of his swimming attire brought the case under  1010212 (E) holding that universitys failure to provide football player with proper protective gear to be used as part of his football uniform brought the case under  1010212
Output: (B)
to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.’” State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 96, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 484, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981)). When a defendant invokes the right to counsel, police must cease all interrogation until an attorney is provided, unless the defendant “initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. To “initiate [] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,” a defendant must ask a question that “represent[s] a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1045, 103 S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983) (<HOLDING>). However, certain questions do not reinitiate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not a violation of caldwell for the prosecutor to note a number of things have to happen before a death sentence is sought (B) holding that communication was initiated by the question well what is going to happen to me now (C) holding that defendants statement to analysts those countries all continue to do well for us was puffing in part because he omitted any mention of why how under what standard or compared to what those markets were doing well emphasis added (D) recognizing that what is now  893804 is the codification of holytz (E) holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art
Output: (B)
dyed or otherwise marked as a control on numbers permitted on a lease in accordance with the annual operating plan. 9 . Op. at 143. 10 . See, e.g., Kachemak Bay Watch, 935 P.2d 816; Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 921 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1996); Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1990); State v. Northern Bus Co., 693 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1984); Kenai Peninsula Fisherman's Coop. Ass’n v. State, 628 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1981); State v. Tanana Valley Sportsmen's Ass’n, 583 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1978). 11 . See Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 396-97 (concluding that agency policy limiting fishery before escapement goals were met was regulation because it modified commercial fishery limits); Kenai Peninsula Fisherman's Coop., 628 P.2d at 905-06, 905 n. 20 (<HOLDING>); Tanana Valley Sportsmen’s Ass’n, 583 P.2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when an agency promulgates a regulation that is intended to preempt state law the regulation should not be disturbed unless there is evidence that it is contrary to congressional intent (B) holding that agency classification was regulation subject to apa because it intended to regulate future conduct affecting fishery rights by establishing salmon use priority (C) holding that ojrdinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the apa the regulation is invalid however when equity demands the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures citation omitted (D) holding that a judgment establishing a partys exclusive light to use a trade name was not subject to collateral attack (E) holding that verbal requirement of need not contained in hunting regulation was addition of substance and thus regulation under apa
Output: (B)
7 Cal.4th at 1247, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022. Single, trivial or isolated incidents cannot generally support constructive discharge. Id. at 1247, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022. Adverse conditions must be “extraordinary and egregious,” “unusually aggravated,” or part of a “continuous pattern,” such that any reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign rather than continue the employment relationship. Id. 1246-48, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022; accord Mullins, 15 Cal.4th at 737, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 936 P.2d 1246. The conditions must be unreasonably harsh compared to those experienced by coworkers. Id. at 1247; accord King v. AC & R Advertising, 65 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir.1995). The length of time an employee remains on the job is one relevant facto 876 P.2d 1022 (<HOLDING>); King, 65 F.3d at 768 (insufficient as matter 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution (B) holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct (C) holding a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove thatajuror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct (D) holding the alleged misconduct taken together did not constitute a pattern of harassment or aggravating conditions (E) holding that defendant did not preserve his challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct where he did not timely object
Output: (D)
Court’s finding that Porter was not an independent trustee was not due to confusion regarding the proper role of trustees and agents in a corporate trust, as Sparkman contends. Rather, the Tax Court found that “she had no meaningful role” whatsoever. That Porter testified otherwise does not, in itself, establish that the Tax Court committed clear error. The Tax Court, describing Porter’s testimony as “vague, contrived, and non-credible,” plainly did not believe her, and “the Tax Court, like any other court, ‘may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.’ ” Conti v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Lerch v. Comm’r, 877 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Demkowicz v. Comm’r, 551 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Comm’r, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it (C) holding that a court is not bound to accept testimony at face value even when it is uncontroverted if it is improbable unreasonable or questionable internal citation omitted (D) holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls (E) holding the tax court not bound to accept taxpayers uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable unreasonable or questionable
Output: (E)
with “complete and final discretionary authority to interpret the plans and maintain control over the operation and administration of the plans.” Accordingly, the Chevron Plan, via the Services Agreement and the SPD, delegates authority to Aetna regarding benefit eligibility for the Medical Plan. Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. “[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1999); see also Chandler v. Hartford Life, No. 05-50688, 2006 WL 1209363, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (C) holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (D) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (E) holding that  rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility  factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion 
Output: (E)
tam complaints, Relator Mayes and Relators Lutz and Webster have filed amended complaints. 2 . In briefing related to the multiple pending motions to dismiss, some Defendants argue that the 2010 amendment that made it clear that a claim resulting from an AKS violation was a false claim operated only in a prospective nature, (See, e.g,, Dkt. No. 146-1 at 17). However, this Court finds that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the 2010 amendment adding 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(g) was merely a clarification of the law; claims tainted by AKS violations constitute false claims for the purposes of the FCA regardless of whether the violation occurred before or after the 2010 amendment. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 312 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment (B) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure 15c2 giving court discretion to permit amendment of complaint applies to  2255 petitions insofar as a district court may in its discretion permit an amendment to a petition to provide factual clarification or amplification after the expiration of the oneyear period of limitations as long as the petition itself was timely filed and the petitioner does not seek to add an entirely new claim or new theory of relief (E) holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification
Output: (E)
termination is inappropriate. 3. Waiver and Estoppel Even if the Agreements have not been terminated, factual questions exist as to whether SBVS is estopped from asserting any right it may have had under the Agreements to replace the defective twin cable. Four elements are necessary to establish estoppel: “1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; 2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; 3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and 4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.” United States v. King Features Entm’t, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir.1988); see also Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, 6 Cal.4th 307, 319, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 597, 862 P.2d 158 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have presented evidence creating 
 Holding statements: (A) holding question of citys exercise of due care in enforcement of ordinance was question of fact and inappropriate for summary judgment (B) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (C) holding agreed judgment presents question of waiver or estoppel rather than question of jurisdiction (D) holding it is a question of fact (E) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question
Output: (B)
So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Direct review proceedings include seeking discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court. Cardali, 794 So.2d at 721. The Florida Supreme Court does not, however, have subject matter jurisdiction over a district court opinion that fails to expressly address a question of law, such as opinions issued without opinion or citation. Beaty v. State, 701 So.2d 856 (Fla.1997) (finding that, where a defendant’s plenary appeal had been per curiam affirmed without written opinion or citation, the two-year period for purposes of filing a motion for postconviction relief began to run from the issuance of the district court’s mandate, rather than from the Supreme Court’s denial of discretionary review); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286, 288 n. 3 (Fla.1988) (<HOLDING>). In the case before us, this Court’s per 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one (B) holding that a district court decision rendered without opinion or citation constitutes a decision from the highest state court empowered to hear the cause (C) holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide (D) holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts (E) holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state
Output: (B)