niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 16 . Plaintiffs’ April 3, 2009 Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs never received a Notice of Deficiency for any of the tax years at issue. Compl. at 2. Plaintiffs, however, attached a copy of a Notice of Deficiency for 1997 and 1998 in their Petition to the Tax Court challenging the deficiency determinations for these years. Gov't Mot. Ex. C. Further, Plaintiffs did not dispute their receipt of a Notice of Deficiency at the November 15, 2002 CDP hearing. Gov’t Mot. Exs. E, G, H. Section 2514 of Title 28 of the United States Code requires forfeiture of a tax claim when a party attempts to establish its claim through fraud. 28 U.S.C. § 2514; see also Standard Oil v. United States, 98 Ct.Cl. 201, 246, 47 F.Supp. 120 (1942) (<HOLDING>); see also Kamen Soap Products v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs claim for refund of corporate income taxes was forfeited when plaintiff presented forged corporate minutes to the irs with the knowledge they were forged (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors (C) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (D) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (E) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant
Output: (A)
estigated Mion’s claim, concluded that Aftermarket owed Mion $310 .18 in baek wages under the FMLA and forwarded WH-58 release forms to Aftermarket to be signed by Mion. The parties have submitted evidence of several communications bet its assent to a settlement by sending out the applicable release forms. See id. at 306. Similarly, in Cuevas, the court held that § 216(c) applied to effectuate a waiver where the DOL supplied, and the employee signed, WH-58 release forms. 752 F.Supp. at 1415-16. The court in Heavenridge v. Ace-Tex Corp., No. 92-75610, 1993 WL 603201 (E.D.Mich. Sept.3, 1993) held that where an employee cashes the employer’s check, the DOL’s supplying of WH-58 forms with the check, rather than the employee’s signing the forms, effectuates the waiver. Id. at *2-3 (<HOLDING>). The court relied on the plain language of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the authorization under 29 usc  1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc  1106a (B) holding under flsa 29 usc  216c (C) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc  1108 from 29 usc  1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision (D) holding under flsa (E) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d
Output: (B)
interests. By recognizing the distinction, we encourage the government to open its property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it might not open the property at all. That this distinction turns on governmental intent does not render it unprotec-tive of speech. Rather, it reflects the reality that, with the exception of traditional public fora, the government retains the choice of whether to designate its property as a forum for specified classes of speakers. 523 U.S. at 680, 118 S.Ct. 1633. 12 . Although Berry’s brief mentions the use of the Red Bluff Room for "quilting group meetings” there is no support for this conclusory allegation in the record. See Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 13 . The Supreme Court's approach to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of misconduct or a deficient work performance record precluded the plaintiff from establishing a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff (B) holding that where a state court found that the defendants representation was adequate and did not reach the issue of prejudice the court could examine this element of the strickland claim de novo (C) holding that a court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found (D) holding that while a district court has discretion to consider other materials in the record it has no obligation to do so where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found (E) holding that a district court need not comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment particularly where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found
Output: (C)
denied him due process of law when it dismissed his appeal without again directing him to argue for application of equitable tolling. II. This court reviews the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ interpretation of statutes without deference to the extent presented and necessary for a decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (1994); Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464, 1466-67 (Fed.Cir.1997); Prenzler v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed.Cir.1991). This review includes questions of statutory jurisdiction. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c) (1994); Wick v. Brown, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed.Cir.1994). Furthermore, this court narrowly construes jurisdictional statutes. Wick, 40 F.3d at 370. This court does not review a challenge to a factual determination made by the Secretary or the Board of Veterans’ Appeal 00) (<HOLDING>). But see Friendly Fin. Corp. v. Bovee, 702 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that service was not defeated by an address with an incorrect zip code (B) holding that an incorrect zip code does not render an otherwise proper address improper (C) holding that an inaccurate zip code does not render an address improper for purposes of texas rule of civil procedure 5 (D) holding a missing zip code to be an inconsequential error that does not defeat a notice of deficiency (E) holding that although an address in which the zip code is incorrect may be properly addressed an address in which both the zip code and the street address is incorrect is not properly addressed
Output: (C)
that he would therefore be entitled to tolling. Second, Waldron-Ramsey argues that even if he had known his state petition was untimely, he believed in 1997 and 1998 that an untimely petition would still be considered “properly filed” under AED-PA and would toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. The Supreme Court foreclosed this interpretation in 2005, holding that an untimely state petition does not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807. Waldron-Ramsey points out that we did adopt his reading — that even an untimely state petition can be deemed “properly filed” so as to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations — ■ in 2001, before the issue was finally decided by the Supreme Court in Pace. See Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, Dictado was decided years after 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending (B) holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion (C) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (D) holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations (E) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations was tolled for the entire period during which saffold pursued state habeas relief including the time between filings
Output: (D)
and declared that dolphin-safe labeling may not be used for tuna caught with purse-seine nets. Id. [1] In this appeal, the government challenges each of the three legal grounds on which Judge Henderson granted summary judgment for Earth Island. The government’s principal contention is that the' district court erred in not deferring to agency expertise in the methodology of the agency’s studies. We conclude, however, that no deference to agency discretion as to methodology is appropriate when the agency ignores its own statistical methodology. In addition, because most of the data the government relied upon was inconclusive, the district court correctly held that the Final Finding was not rationally connected to the best available scientific evidence. See Brower II, 257 F.3d at 1070 (<HOLDING>). We also agree with the district court that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract (B) holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination (C) holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding (D) holding that the agency cannot use insufficient evidence as a basis for finding no adverse impact (E) recognizing that omissions of details may be an insufficient basis for upholding an adverse credibility finding
Output: (D)
to property” and thereby be eligible for revival under the Revival Act, such a claim must not be an action for either personal injury or breach of a contract. Because the warranty claim asserted by Chase is not an action for personal injuries, the crucial question is whether it is a breach of contract action within the meaning of § 25-b. New York courts have interpreted claims for breach of warranty as breach of contract actions within the meaning of GCL § 25-b. Therefore, New York courts would find that a breach of warranty action is not an action for injury to property and would not be revived by the Toxic Tort Revival Act. In Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), the New York Court of A . 182, 183, 22 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (N.Y.City Ct.Kings Co. 1940) (<HOLDING>); see also Great American Indemnity Co. v. Lapp 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (B) holding that violation of accountants duties mandated by statute did not create a cause of action based on breach of implied contract for employee (C) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (D) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy (E) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract
Output: (C)
perform work for Kiwi. Synergy alleges that Ms. Willis knew these statements were false when she spoke them. Synergy contends that her intent to induce Synergy to rely on these statements can be inferred by the benefit LHC stood to receive. Finally, Synergy offers documentation of advertising run on behalf of Kiwi as evidence of its damages. Assuming for purposes of this motion that Ms. Willis made the alleged statements, Synergy’s fraud claim fails as a matter of law. First, statements by Ms. Willis as to Kiwi’s financial condition constitute an opinion. In Georgia, statements of opinion will not support a claim for fraud. Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 227 Ga.App. 648, 650, 490 S.E.2d 184 (1997); See also Miller v. Clabby, 178 Ga.App. 821, 822, 344 S.E.2d 751 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Synergy also alleges that Ms. Willis stated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding agency may not rely on expert opinion without disclosing hard data supporting opinion to the public (B) holding that sellers failure to disclose known soil conditions was not a scheme to defraud where seller did not affirmatively lie to buyer (C) recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud (D) holding that a buyer could not rely on a sellers mere expression of opinion (E) recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed
Output: (D)
they are not entitled to avoid the judicial lien. DISCUSSION Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor may avoid most judicial liens “to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled ...” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) A debtor is entitled to avoid a judicial lien that impairs a homestead exemption even if the debtors have no equity in the property. Kolich v. Antioch Laurel Veterinary Hosp. Inc., (In re Kolich), 273 B.R. 199, 204 (8th Cir. BAP 2002)(citing F.D.I.C. v. Finn (In re Finn), 211 B.R. 780, 782-84 (1st Cir. BAP 1997) and quoting H.R.Rep. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1994)), aff'd, 328 F.3d 406 (8th Cir.2003). See also Higgins v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Higgins), 201 B.R. 965, 967-968 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Whitehead, 226 B.R. 539, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debt or could only exempt an item of property that exceeded the exemption limit by paying the difference between the value of the property and the exemption limit to the estate (B) holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens (C) holding that a retained equity interest is property even if it has no market value (D) holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit (E) holding that debtor could not avoid a judicial lien where after accounting for unavoidable liens and mortgages he had no equity in the property and therefore no interest on which to avoid the judicial lien
Output: (B)
the twelfth action, where the union plaintiffs assert the Labor Management Relations Act claim, the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on only the ERISA claims does not dispose of all the claims between the parties. Accordingly, for purposes of appeal, the plaintiffs in that action sought the district court's certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), which was granted. Because the twelve cases were not consolidated for trial, even though the district court's order granting summary judgment to Unisys on Counts I and II of the second amended consolidated complaint does not dispose of all of the claims in the twelve consolidated actions, it is a final, appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Hall v. Wilkerson, 926 F.2d 311, 314 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 10 . On review of the district court’s award 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dispositive factor in determining whether an order disposing of less than all claims in a consolidated case is appealable is whether the consolidation was for all purposes (B) holding that additional consideration is a factor in determining whether there is an implied contract of employment (C) holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated (D) holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant (E) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable
Output: (A)
the instant Amended Motion.” 3 . In their motion, the Mestres did not address why the earlier orders granting Bank leave to amend were not "procedurally binding.” 4 . In limited circumstances, a party may recover attorney's fees pursuant to a contract even though the contract is later rescinded by the court. See, e.g., Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1989); Bus. Aide Computers, Inc. v. Cent. Fla. Mack Trucks, Inc., 432 So.2d 681, 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (finding a choice of law provision in a contract applicable even though the appellee claimed the contract was fraudulently induced). However, in the instant case, these circumstances do not apply because, based on the trial court’s finding, no contract ever existed. See David v. Richman, 568 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Bank was not the original lender. 6 . The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party is precluded from claiming attorneys fees under a contract which has been found to have never existed (B) holding party should have segregated attorneys fees for fraud claim from attorneys fees for contract claim based largely on the difference between the essential elements of each claim (C) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees (D) holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue (E) holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages
Output: (A)
testimony, which included not just the cooperators but also the undercover agent, the government also played for the jury the taped conversations from the wiretap. In a number of these conversations, Herrera specifically discussed the drug quantities involved. Furthermore, this case does not present a situation such as the one the Supreme Court considered in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), where a conviction was overturned because there was too great a risk of evidentiary spillover, in part because there were thirty-two named participants and eight separate conspiracies. In the present matter there were only six named participants, two conspiracies and two defendants on trial. See United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 433 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Given the strength of this evidence for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conviction should be affirmed despite the existence of two conspiracies where the indictment charged only one because this variance did not prejudice the defendant (B) holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found (C) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (D) holding that the conviction should be upheld because there was no prejudice to the defendant even though the defendant had been charged with one conspiracy and the proof at trial showed two separate conspiracies (E) holding that the jury would have no problem separating the actions of the individual defendants where there were only four defendants and two separate conspiracies
Output: (E)
officers say that Mr. Jones ignored their commands and refused to step back, id. at 17, even though Jones has denied this. Indeed, the officers expressly decline to concede Mr. Jones’ version of the facts, instead “requesting] that this Court review the record and determine the appropriate facts.” Id. at 4 n. 1. In their reply brief, it is true, the officers argue that “even relying on Jones[’] statement of events, probable cause still exists to support his arrest.” Reply Br. at 5. They.drop all references to Mr. Jones’ physical obstruction of the officers and argue that “verbal actions” alone can rise to the level of obstructing police business. Id. at 8-10. But this effort to preserve the officers’ appeal comes too late. Cf. United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 401 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). And significant factual issues would remain 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reply brief is appropriate forum to rebut new material raised in appellees brief (B) holding that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief (C) holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited (D) holding that arguments first raised in appellants reply brief were in answer to those raised in appellees brief and therefore refusing to strike those arguments (E) holding that the appellant cannot raise new issues in a reply brief he can only respond to arguments raised for the first time in appellees brief internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (E)
witness testifying against him was in custody). This right is not subject to the trial court’s discretion; however, the court may preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation. Ramey,. 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68; Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. Thus: “[A] defendant need not show interest or motive in that any promises of leniency have, in fact, been made to the witness by the State or that any expectations of special favor exist in the mind of the witness, before cross-examining a witness as to possible bias. Further, the defense is entitled to inquire into such promises or expectations whether they are based on fact or are simply imaginary.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 67-68, citing Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475-76. See also People v. Tomes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520, 672 N.E.2d 289 (1996) (<HOLDING>). “To this end a defendant has the right to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required (B) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (C) holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive (D) holding it is well established that crossexamination to show that a witness might be vulnerable to pressure whether real or imagined from the state regarding a pending charge is a matter of right (E) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination
Output: (D)
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because Erickson failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v. Member-Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing elements of a.RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). The district court properly dismissed Erickson’s claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RES-PA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of limitations for violations of RES-PA); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (<HOLDING>). However, after the district court dismissed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc  2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction (B) holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond (C) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (D) holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction (E) holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period
Output: (D)
not in ordinary course of business purchases collateral free of an unperfected security interest only if buyer has no actual knowledge of interest). Accordingly, since a secured creditor acquires a personal property right, see id. § 70A-l-201(37)(a), actual knowledge of the assignment’s existence precludes substantial interference with the assignee’s rights. Legal commentators have noted that under the UCC, an assignee’s rights may be adversely affected by contract modifications made by the account debtor and the assignor, but such actions are “unwarranted” if the assignee’s rights are jeopardized by termination of the contract or similar unilateral action. 9 Hawkland, Lord & Lewis, UCC Series § 9-318:01 (Callaghan 1991). See also In re Apex Oil Co., 975 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Given these principles and a plain reading of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (B) holding company acted unreasonably by setting off debt after receiving notice of third partys security interest in same debt (C) holding that reporting of historically accurate debt may violate the fcra when the reporting did not include that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy or that the debt was in dispute (D) holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt (E) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or
Output: (B)
H & J’s individual claims to proceed. Nextel then moved to strike H & J’s individual claims arguing that H & J did not sustain any injuries because H & J’s account with Nex-tel had been disconnected for nonpayment prior to the discontinuation of analog service and that H & J no longer needed the equipment because H & J went out of business. The trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, H & J moved for reinstatement as class representative alleging that the criminal matter that required it to assert its Fifth Amendment privilege had been resolved, and therefore, it was able to give full discovery. The trial court denied the motion. Nextel also renewed a prior motion for summary judgment as to Asphalt arguing that Asphalt had no contract with Nextel. Next .R.D. 442, 444 (S.D.N.Y.1988)(<HOLDING>); Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So.2d 888, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the primary issue to be considered in whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class is a determination of whether any antagonism exists between the interests of the plaintiffs and those of the remainder of the class (B) holding that where adequately supported credibility findings are for the alj to make (C) holding that president of association of minority prisoners would not fairly and adequately protect interests of class even though intelligent enough to represent himself (D) holding that serious credibility problems a factor in determining whether plaintiff can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (E) holding that additional consideration is a factor in determining whether there is an implied contract of employment
Output: (D)
doing home exercises, resting, and experiencing headaches and other symptoms”; (3) the victim suffered an injury similar to a whiplash injury, which would make her more susceptible to reinjury; (4) the victim’s physician was unable to predict when she would be free from symptoms and told her to expect to return to therapy two times per year at a cost of approximately $300; and (5) the victim has endured “much pain, suffering, and fear.” The district court denied Colsch’s motion to reduce restitution and reinstated the remaining $7,665 of the restitution judgment. This appeal followed. ISSUE Did the district court err in ordering restitution that included noneconomic damages? ANALYSIS This issue is appealable as a matter of right. See State v. Whitledge, 500 N.W.2d 488, 489 (Minn.1993) (<HOLDING>). “Deciding whether a particular item of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding when it is not clear that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence if a lower sentencing range would have been available remand is required (D) holding that misdemeanor defendant may appeal sentence if sentencing issue is one that could have been raised by defendant before sentencing guidelines became effective in 1980 (E) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines
Output: (D)
admission of low-template DNA analysis as sufficiently reliable under the Daubert regime generally rely on the close adherence to nationally recognized protocols and standards in determining reliability. See, e.g., United States v, Williams, 979 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1103 (D.Haw.2013) (explaining that "the existence of null alleles is a known phenomenon which 'is taken into account on a case-by-case and profile-by-profile basis and is managed according to validated methodology, standard operating procedures, [Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods] guidelines and the FBI Quality Assurance Standard’ ”) (citation omitted). Ms. Halverson, however, did not consult such standards. See N.T., Oct. 29, 2009, at 91. 19 . See generally State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428-29 (Minn.1989) (<HOLDING>). 20 . The report also stressed the need for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dna test results warranted a new trial of a postconviction petitioner who was convicted of rape and kidnaping (B) recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion (C) holding that because a dna laboratory failed to make information about its methodology and probes publicly available this prevented independent assessment of its methods supporting a determination that specific test results were inadmissible (D) recognizing that other courts have found the type of test reliable but finding that this particular urinalysis test was unreliable since the lab did not perform a backup test or identify lab test results and state left questions about how probationers diabetes affected the results (E) holding that it was not error to allow the government to introduce urinalysis laboratory results from a california laboratory through a probation officer who had not prepared the report and without live testimony from the laboratory technicians because the hearsay was reliable and the proposed testimony was of little value
Output: (C)
or her and the therapist has a resultant incentive to diagnose and treat carefully and competently. Furthermore, the risks to the parent of a misdiagnosis of parental alienation do not rise to the level of criminal repercussions or even termination of parental rights, such as those associated with an accusation of sexual abuse. A false allegation against a parent of child sexual abuse can cause substantial injury. See, e.g., Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288 (Colo.App.1988); Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166, 1170 (2000) (noting that being "falsely accused of sexual abuse is undoubtedly a substantial harm, a harm which is readily foreseeable"); Heather J. Rhoades, Zamstein v. Marvasti: Is A Duty Owed To Alleged Child Sexual Abusers?, 30 Conn. L.Rev. 1411, 1412 (1998) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Thomas M. Horner & Melvin J. Guyer, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fouching for the purposes of abuse language in section 1834014 means touching for the purposes of sexual abuse not abuse in general (B) holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim (C) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (D) recognizing that the climate surrounding child sexual abuse is such that allegations alone are quickly raised to the status of evidence signifying abuse (E) holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse
Output: (D)
employees, one exception applies to so-called “mixed cases,” which arise when "an employee complains of a, personnel action serious enough to appeal .to the [Merit Systems Protection Board] and alleges that the action was based on discrimination.” See Kloeckner v. Solis, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 596, 601; 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (201-2) . (citing 29 C.F.R, § 1614 302 (2012)). While Plaintiff has raised allegations of discrimination, the personnel action in question — Plaintiff's removal from his position as HOCALJ— was not serious enough to entitle him to appeal the decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Therefore, this case is not a “mixed case.” 16 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). 17 . See Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11 n. 15 (<HOLDING>). 18 . Whether exhaustion is required before a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the csra did not explicitly limit federal court jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional personnel actions by federal agencies (B) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a tax lien (C) holding that igras specific grant of federal jurisdiction for certain actions indicates congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to those instances (D) holding that plaintiffs were not released from the exclusive remedial framework of the csra when their claims arose from their federal employment even though the csra provided plaintiffs with no remedy (E) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court
Output: (A)
on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object. It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-for-hire plot. Obtaining those telephone rec ords through a § 2703 court order did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Mainland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home (B) holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice (C) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (D) holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendants home did not require the government to seek a search warrant (E) holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home
Output: (D)
any evidence that Qualex’s action had any reason to perceive plaintiff as being disabled, any claim that the withdrawal of the offer of employment was motivated by such a perception is purely speculative. As such, plaintiffs claim that defendant Qualex violated the ADA by withdrawing its offer of employment fails as a matter of law. See Hoffman at 1 (“Unsupported speculation does not satisfy a party’s burden to produce some evidence in resisting a summary judgment motion.”). B. The Drug-free Workplace policy. Plaintiffs second claim is that the “Drug-free Workplace” policy maintained by defendant Qualex is a blanket exclusionary policy, leaving no allowance for the legal use of controlled substances. See Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 424, 430 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues that defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers drug policy violated the ada to the extent that it prohibits the use of all legally prescribed controlled substances without a determination that such prohibition is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity (B) holding highest and best use is to be considered to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value (C) holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction (D) holding that the ada exceeds the  5 power  at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for irrational discrimination (E) recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public
Output: (A)
laws and regulations by including prohibited terms in their admission agreements. Plaintiff contends that Defendants, in an effort to seek additional profits, have adopted an admissions policy that discourages admission of Medicaid patients and that Medicaid patients, particularly those without families, are transferred to other homes to make beds available for Medicare or private pay patients. .Supp. 1481, 1498 (D.Minn.1996) (adopting report and recommendation concluding statement that lens maker used the “most advanced equipment available” was puffery). General assertions of quality are also puffery because “quality” is a vague, subjective concept. Am. Italian Pasta Co., 371 F.3d at 393; see also Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 254 Ill.App.3d 435, 193 Ill.Dec. 870, 627 N.E.2d 29 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care (B) holding that statements that hospital would provide high quality care to patients were expressions of opinion or puffing (C) holding that statements at issue were protected expressions of opinion because they lacked specificity and precision and the factual implications concerning such statements were unclear (D) holding that care of the grounds was part of the business of the hospital (E) holding that claim against hospital regarding patients fall caused by defective footboard on hospital bed constituted health care liability claim
Output: (B)
on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography
Output: (B)
way to reconcile the results of the prongs). Given these variations in the methods by which courts determine when corporations shall be liable for the acts of their affiliates, we decline to interpret the Department of Labor’s statement that it does not intend to create “new” law for WARN Act liability as a direction to courts to employ multiple tests within a single case. Rather, we conclude that the most prudent course is to employ the factors listed in the Department of Labor regulations themselves. This approach not only has the virtue of simplicity (if anything in this area of law can be described as “simple”), but also allows for the creation of a uniform standard of liability for the enforcement of a federal statute. Cf. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Finally, and most importantly, the DOL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that resolution of tribal law disputes are not within federal court jurisdiction (B) holding that when state educational benefits exceed minimum federal standards the state standards are enforceable through the idea (C) holding that 15 usc  11142dv requires the federal court to approach the issues raised in an action brought under that provision de novo rather than to apply the deferential review appropriate to actions governed by the federal arbitration act (D) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court (E) holding that federal veilpiercing standards are appropriate in medicare disputes due to the need for a uniform federal approach
Output: (E)
V. Motion for Bifurcation of Guilt and Penalty Phases Appellant’s next two claims will be discussed simultaneously as they both involve his 1995 murder conviction in Maryland. The Commonwealth gave Appellant pretrial notice that during the penalty phase of trial, it would rely on his prior murder conviction as evidence of the aggravating circumstance that “[t]he defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(ll). Appellant argues that the trial court erred during pretrial voir dire by precluding him from asking potential jurors whether they would be influenced adversely or would otherwise be unable to follow the court’s instructions after learning that he , 37 (2012) (<HOLDING>). It is well established that the scope of voir 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution (B) holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution (C) holding that it is wellsettled that the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury (D) holding that the death penalty does not violate the prohibition against cruel punishments set forth in article 1 section 13 of the pennsylvania constitution (E) holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution
Output: (E)
Majority Opinion in Ford, former Justice Newman authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Saylor joined, in which she specifically expressed her agreement “that appellate counsel acted ineffectively by neglecting to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and present evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant’s history of abuse and mental illness.” Ford, 809 A.2d at 336 (Newman, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring). 5 . Although Teague's retroactivity analysis did not gamer five votes, a majority of the High Court soon thereafter reaffirmed the Teague plurality's rule and its two exceptions in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 6 . Compare with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (B) holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (C) holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty (D) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (E) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants
Output: (C)
or federal laws that is inflicted pursuant to official policy.” Palmer v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir.1987); see also Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”). In order to establish liability in these instances, the plaintiff must identify “ ‘(1) a policy (2) of the governmental entity’s policymaker (3) that caused (4) the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional right.’” Palmer, 810 F.2d at 516 (quoting Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Texas, 767 F.2d 161, 169 (5th Cir.1985)); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (<HOLDING>). “Policy” has been defined as a “course of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts normally give great deference to a legislative bodys determination whether or not a legitimate government purpose is served by an ordinance (B) holding that ojrdinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the apa the regulation is invalid however when equity demands the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures citation omitted (C) holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added (D) holding that procedures that are implicit and incidental to procedures otherwise explicitly provided for in a properly adopted rule or regulation do not require further codification by a further adopted rule or regulation and to hold otherwise belies statutory intent   and that such an argument based on the lack of a rule or regulation to cover every step of the testing procedures  is not only speculative and theoretical but also hypertechnical (E) holding that the claim must be based upon the implementation or execution of a policy statement ordinance regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that bodys officers
Output: (E)