niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
but she testified that she did only two recordings and discussed ethnic Koreans in both. She also suggests that the Government’s questioning was confusing, but the record reflects that the Government clarified its questions. As to her failure to mention the fourth police visit, Cui explained that she paused after listing the -dates of the first three visits to allow the interpreter to translate, but she did not explain why she stopped mid-answer or immediately thereafter mention the fourth visit, or why her application did not list that fourth visit. Because Cui’s explanations conflict with the record, the IJ reasonably found that the inconsistencies called Cui’s credibility into question. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In light of these inconsistencies, the IJ was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so (B) holding that an ij need not credit an explanation for an inconsistency unless the explanation would compel a reasonable fact finder to do so (C) holding that an agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so (D) holding that an agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistencies in the record unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so (E) holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so
Output: (B)
of the documents. In his report, Gage stated only that the witnesses could not recall whether or not Peng raised his fist, but that they saw Peng grab the documents from Mei Hu. Peng has submitted a declaration by C. Peng that neither he nor Mr. Chi ever told anyone anything about what happened. As the district court noted, Peng has not cast doubt on the fact that, prior to Peng’s arrest, Jonathan Hu, acting as interpreter, told Gage that the two witnesses saw Peng grab the documents from Mei Hu. Peng has cast doubt on the identity of the witnesses and the veracity of Jonathan Hu, but Gage could not have known this at the time of the arrest. We are satisfied that Gage made a reasonable investigation under the circumstances before he arrested Peng. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1442-44 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the presence of a factual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (B) holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction (C) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (D) holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances (E) holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible
Output: (A)
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790. “[A] plaintiff must allege both that the conspiracy was motivated by discriminatory animus against an identifiable class and that the discrimination against the identifiable 'class was invidious.” Farber, 440 F.3d at 135. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a conspiracy under § 1985 as he has not alleged “the conspiracy was motivated by discriminatory animus against an identifiable class .... ” Ibid. He instead alleges the conspiracy was motivated by Defendants’ desire to cover up their past misconduct or to prevent further litigation, neither of which is sufficient to state a claim under § 1985(3). See Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261, 266 (D.Conn.2009)(<HOLDING>). As it is possible that Plaintiff may be able 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the court sanctions more harshly for cumulative misconduct than for isolated misconduct (B) holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct (C) holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct (D) holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government (E) holding inmates failure to allege that officers misconduct was motivated by raceor classbased discriminatory animus rather than desire to conceal their own misconduct was insufficient under  19853
Output: (E)
misrepresentation); Church of Scientology Int’l v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 92 CIV. 3024, 1998 WL 575194, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 9, 1998) (denying leave to add a li 2d 873, 438 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963-64 (citing Rosenwasser v. Amusement Enters., 88 Misc. 57, 150 N.Y.S. 561 (1917) for the rule that “fraud or illegality in inducing a tenant to make a lease is not a defense in an action for rent so long as the tenant remains in possession of the leased property” and finding that rule “controlling”). In contrast, the defrauded party who continues performance after discovering the fraud is not barred from seeking damages. See Towers Realty Corp. v. Fox, 278 A.D. 74, 103 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (N.Y.App.Div.1951); accord Bazzano v. L’Oreal, No. 93 Civ. 7121, 1996 WL 254873, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1996) (<HOLDING>). Where the right to have the contract voided 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment (B) holding that the plaintiff may proceed under a claim for breach of contract and unjust enrichment because the defendant admitted the existence of a contract solely for the purposes of summary judgment (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute (E) holding that defrauded party may either choose to void the contract and recover paid consideration on an unjust enrichment theory or affirm the contract and pursue a breach of contract remedy
Output: (E)
the trial judge had seen the videotape of James Eas-ley impheating Woodard, the trial court’s conclusion, without explanation or a hearing, that there was no “deceit or trickery” appears unsupported by the bare record before us. Whether the government indeed threatened Woodard with a murder charge if he did not testify before the grand jury, or diverted him from consulting with his attorney before he did so, or misled him into thinking he was not a target, are open questions of fact that must be tested at a hearing. Whether all or some of those alleged facts, even if true, undercut the voluntariness of his grand jury testimony despite the Miranda waiver, is a question that only a hearing can begin to answer. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (<HOLDING>)”. I’m sure that the government will object to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under 28 usc  2254d the ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry requiring plenary  review (B) recognizing the possibility that 28 usc  1331 supplies jurisdiction for violations of international law but not reaching the ultimate merits of the issue (C) holding that the ninth circuits decision exceeded the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 usc  2254d (D) holding that a claim brought in a pro se brief that the state court did not address was not adjudicated on the merits as required by  2254d (E) recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law
Output: (A)
DCA 1980) (“[The rule providing for sanctions upon discovery violations] is not penal. It is not punitive. It is not aimed at punishing the litigant. The objective is compliance-compliance with the discovery Rules [sic].”); Garden-Aire Vill. Sea Haven, Inc. v. Decker, 433 So.2d 676, 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Further, the harshest sanction should be imposed only when there is evidence that the party deliberately and willfully refused to comply with the court’s order, not when the failure to comply is due to confusion or inability. Garden-Aire, 433 So.2d at 678 (noting that dismissal or default is rarely appropriate when the record does not reflect a willful refusal to comply with the court’s order). See also George A. Morris, M.D., P.A. v. Ergos, 532 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the imposition of sanctions after 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that not only must discovery requests be reasonably tailored to include only matters relevant to case but discovery requests may not be used as fishing expedition or to impose unreasonable discovery expenses on opposing party (B) holding that dismissal for discovery violations was an extreme remedy but warranted under the facts of the case (C) holding that dismissal is not necessarily warranted even when a partys conduct in response to discovery requests is laggard and slothful (D) holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits (E) holding sanctions were appropriate when a partys failure to turn over materials in response to a discovery request prejudiced the opponent
Output: (C)
of the policy. There is no suggestion that Rollins was not provided with the policy or could not, for some reason personal to him, understand it. The third and fourth situations to which the reasonable expectations doctrine applies under Gordinier require “some activity which can be reasonably attributed to the insurer.” 742 P.2d at 284. NSIC did not choose the language of the Outline or circulate the Outline for promotional purposes. Rather, state law mandated the relevant language of the Outline and required that insurers distribute the Outline of Coverage along with any Medigap policy. Ariz. Admin. Code § R20-6-1113(C). Furthermore, state law mandated the level at which NSIC could cover Rollins’ hospitalization costs. Id. § R20-6-1105(C). Cf. Philadelphia Indemnity, 21 P.3d at 404 (<HOLDING>). If Medigap-covered patients are being misled 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a variable annuity issued by an insurance company to be a covered security (B) holding an insurance company liable for an accident clearly outside the protection of the policys actual terms but that could reasonably have been expected to be covered based on a promotional brochure drafted and distributed by the insurer (C) holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer (D) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage (E) holding that a closing protection letter offering to indemnify a mortgage company was not an insurance contract where although issued by an insurance company there was no distribution of the risk
Output: (B)
of Congress.” Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 823 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). That is so because the authority to preempt state law is “an extraordinary power ... that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly.” Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991)). According to the First Circuit ruling on the parallel FAAAA preemption question for air transport, there is a presumption against preemption when Congress legislates in a field that has traditionally been regulated by the states. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d at 336 (internal citations omitted). See also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the 48hour standard as a department of health regulation (B) recognizing this presumption (C) recognizing presumption that state and local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the supremacy clause (D) holding city may enact reasonable regulation to promote health safety and welfare of its people (E) recognizing presumption
Output: (C)
at issue, it was revocable at the pleasure of the grantor); Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, 311 (1877) (“[A] user [that] has been by sufferance and permission only ... [is] but a license, revocable at pleasure, and ... confer[s] no right in the way. It simply relieve[s] the [party] from being a trespasser ....” (citation omitted)); Goss v. C.A.N. Wildlife Trust, Inc., 157 Md.App. 447, 457, 852 A.2d 996, 1002 (2004) (stating that “a license is merely a personal privilege to do some particular act ... on [another’s] land without possessing any estate or interest therein, while an easement is an interest in land that grants the right to use that land for a specific purpose” (internal quotations omitted)); State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667, 671 (1945) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, based on the record before us, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (C) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (D) holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public (E) holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner
Output: (E)
further reduced the damages by the per centage settlement credit of $377,383.53. Based on our holding above, the judgment should not be reduced by the pereentage-of-responsibility settlement credit of $377,383.53, but nonetheless must be reduced pursuant to either section 33.012, subsection (b) or subsection (d), by the dollar-for-dollar settlement credit amount of $183,000. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment applying the $377,383.53 percentage settlement credit and render judgment applying the $183,000 dollar-for-dollar settlement credit. See Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(c), 43.3. B. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Joint Enterprise Finding; No Evidence of Community of Pecuniary Interest in the Common Purpose of the Enterprise Between Appellees 13-14 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>); Blount v. Bordens, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 931, 932 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of representations outside the contract was legally sufficient evidence to support a section 1746b12 claim (B) holding slight circumstantial evidence of fraud in combination with failure to perform as promised was legally sufficient to support finding of fraudulent intent (C) holding evidence legally insufficient (D) holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e (E) holding evidence legally sufficient
Output: (E)
is superficially persuasive, the fundamental differences in the statutory scheme and legislative histories of the two acts require us to find federal pre-emption in the case of train speed limits. b. Vegetation Easterwood also claims that excessive vegetation on the side of the track obstructed the views of the train engineers and the decedent, thereby causing the accident. We find this claim to be partially pre-empted. Under 49 C.F.R. § 213.37 (1990), track owners must keep vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the tracks under control. Because the Secretary has chosen to regulate vegetation, Congress explicitly has pre-empted all state regulation in this area. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 434 (1986); See also Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Tex., 833 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). However, while the Secretary has chosen to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (B) holding that 49 usc  44112 applies to owners of aircraft and preempts state law that would hold owners vicariously liable in aircraft accidents (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims (E) holding that 49 cfr  21337 preempts all state regulation of vegetation immediately adjacent to railbed
Output: (E)
statute can be compared.” Rojas, 728 F.3d us state and federal statutes, the formal categorical approach presumptively applies. Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290. However, where a statute lists alternative elements that implicate the same criminal behavior, an IJ may use the modified categorical approach and review a limited set of docu ments, including “the criminal information,” to determine what underlying conduct supported the finding of guilt. Id. at 291-93. Similar to a statute that includes alternative elements, the New York drug schedules delineate the various controlled substa employed the modified categorical approach in consulting the criminal information to determine the precise drug involved in Baboolall’s 1998 conviction. See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Baboolall argues that the record of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint (B) holding a downward departure  may be appropriate for a relatively young defendant with a brief criminal career (C) holding that we may appropriately examine the criminal complaint if departure from the formal categorical approach is appropriate (D) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (E) holding that a formal summons and complaint were unnecessary because the motion before the court is not an independent action
Output: (C)
677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials
Output: (C)
to summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs claim for excessive force. B. Failure to Train and Supervise In her amended complaint, the plaintiff seeks to hold the Sheriffs Office, Sheriff Johnson, and PHS liable on the theory that they failed to adequately train and supervise the deputies and the medical personnel. However, because the plaintiffs claim against these defendants is predicated on their supervisory roles, the plaintiffs claim against them must also be dismissed. It is well established that there can be no liability under § 1983 on the part of a supervisory official or governmental employer in the absence of a constitutional violation on the part of the employees being supervised. Huggins v. Weider, 105 Fed.Appx. 503 (4th Cir.2004); see also Young, 238 F.3d at 579 (<HOLDING>). III. Plaintiff’s Claims Under State Law In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a section 1983 failuretotrain claim cannot be maintained against a governmental employer in a case where there is no underlying constitutional violation by the employee (B) holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell (C) holding that recovery against an individual employee is barred and may be sought against the governmental unit only  when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee id  101106e (D) holding that a claim for municipal liability under  1983 requires inter alia proof of an underlying constitutional violation (E) holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers
Output: (A)
of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (“If the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”). Because plaintiff commenced the instant action more than three years after signing his loan documents, his TILA rescission claim is time-barred. Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412, 118 S.Ct. 1408, 140 L.Ed.2d 566 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a claim under mcl 6002932 includes all actions to decide interests in land even when the claim involves fraud or rescission and holding that the 15year period of limitations applies to such an action rather than the shorter periods applicable to typical claims for fraud and rescission (B) holding that absent a collective bargaining agreement which extends the employment period past the end of a particular voyage a seaman is entitled to unearned wages until the end of the voyage (C) holding that   1635f completely extinguishes the right of rescission at the end of the 3year period (D) holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action (E) holding elements of rescission are 1
Output: (C)
[ ] resisting] or interfering] with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” Ohio Rev.Code § 2921.33. As we have already held that the officers lawfully arrested Harris, the sole question is whether the officers had probable cause to believe that he recklessly resisted or interfered with that arrest. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Harris’s actions — his uncooperative attitude, attempts to “resist[] and try[] to get loose,” unwillingness to accompany the officers to the DEA office and confrontational and threatening statements and gestures — satisfy this requirement, despite the lack of an “actual struggle.” JA 131; see Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., Nos. 93-3231/93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 at*6, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 31576, at *15 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Palshook, 120 F.Supp.2d at 651. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (B) holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest (C) holding that plaintiff had failed to show officers lacked probable cause to arrest and prosecute him for resisting arrest under ohio law when he pulled his arm away from the officer told him to get your paws off me and struggled with the arresting officers (D) holding that officer had probable cause to arrest for violation of ordinance and that officers failure to cite ordinance either orally or in his arrest report was irrelevant (E) holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave
Output: (C)
requirements for filing such a petition. See id. at 148. Although the state had “announced strict rules regarding the granting of second and subsequent ... petitions,” id., the Third Circuit did not consider whether Lovasz’s petition satisfied those rules before concluding that the petition was “properly filed.” In short, the court did not review the merits of the petition. This case is indistinguishable from Lo-vasz. Like Pennsylvania, Washington recognizes exceptions to its bar against successive petitions, see Wash. Rev.Code § 10.72.140, as well as exceptions to its one-year time limit for filing petitions for post-conviction review, see Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100. Dictado invoked one of those exceptions: he claimed his petition was based on newly discovered ev .D.Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); Hughes v. Irvin, 967 F.Supp. 775, 778-79 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court (B) holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed (C) holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed (D) holding that a second or subsequent state petition for postconviction relief filed according to the procedural rules of the state constitutes a properly filed application  without regard to the merits of the petition (E) holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed
Output: (E)
hardship has been rebutted “nothing in § 524(m)(l) expressly prohibits the court from considering other factors (such as the debtor’s best interest, as under § 524(c)(6)(A)).”). Reaffirmation of the debt does not appear to provide any benefit to the Debtor. The Debtor does not reside in the Property, does not maintain any equity in the Property, and Debtor’s counsel was unable to indicate what benefit, if any, the Debtor would derive in exchange for her reaffirmation of the debt. (See Audio Recording of Hearing Held in Courtroom D, January 20, 2012 (10:19-10:21 AM)). While the Debtor’s desire to protect her co-owning daughter’s interest in the Property is understandable, it does not appear to be in the Debtor’s best interest. See In re Hoffman, 358 B.R. 889, 843-44 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2006) (<HOLDING>). Further, just because this Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard (B) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (C) holding that reaffirming an unaffordable debt for the purpose of protecting a coobligor was not in the debtors best interest (D) holding that a debt incurred for a personal family or household purpose is a consumer debt even though it is secured by the debtors real property (E) holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents
Output: (C)
Attorney General filed an application to intervene in the federal case and requested that the case be dismissed on a number of grounds, including the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thereafter, without ruling on the merits of the Attorney General’s application to intervene, the District Court granted judgment to all of the defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds, dismissed the case, and denied the application to intervene as moot. AmerenUE appeals the dismissal of its suit. We review a district court’s dismissal of an action on Eleventh Amendment grounds de novo. Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 829, 115 S.Ct. 100, 130 L.Ed.2d 49 (1994). AmerenUE urges that under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (<HOLDING>), its action against the individual defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not prevent private individuals from bringing suit against state officials for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief for ongoing violations of federal law (B) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities (C) holding that the eleventh amendment protects both states and state officials acting in their official capacity from suits brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983 (D) holding that in a suit against state officials in their official capacities monetary relief unlike prospective injunctive relief is generally barred by the eleventh amendment (E) holding that eleventh amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity
Output: (E)
issue in controversy.” Fidelity, 48 F.3d at 133. Moreover, in vigorously opposing Hildebrand’s claims in this suit, Lewis is undoubtedly “aligned against” Hildebrand and defending “a course of conduct” which Hildebrand attacks. Smith, 354 U.S. at 95, 77 S.Ct. 1112. This, in turn, compels the conclusion that Iron Works is properly aligned as a defendant, as initially pled in the complaint. Accordingly, because Hildebrand and Iron Works are both Virginia citizens, Lewis’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be granted. This conclusion in no way impairs Hildebrand’s right to seek vindication of any of her asserted Virginia corporate rights in the appropriate state forum. An appropriate Order will issue. 1 . See DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true (B) recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss (C) holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true (D) holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom (E) holding that for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss courts take allegations as true unless contradicted by  documentary evidence  from the exhibits attached to the complaint
Output: (B)
had any role in the content provided on Virginia Tile’s website — in fact, Blanke Germany was not even listed on the website, which weakens the argument further. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (explaining that the defendant himself must create the contact with the forum state). Second, Tile Unlimited provided Virginia Tile’s website information from January 15, 2014, the date counsel “last visited” the website. See R. 253 at n.3. Whatever information was on the website in 2014 has no bearing on Blanke Germany’s contacts with Illinois in 2008 when Tile Unlimited allegedly purchased Uni-Mat from Virginia Tile and when the product was installed. See Robinson v. Automa, S.p.A., No. 2:13-cv-02305-GMN-PAL, 2014 WL-, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *32 (D.Nev. Apr. 17, 2014) (<HOLDING>). If that was the totality of Blanke Germany’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a felony of criminal recklessness was not a crime of violence under  16b because it does not require any purposeful conduct and does not necessarily create a risk that force may be used as a means to an end during the commission of the offense (B) holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant (C) holding that the burden is on the party seeking to exercise jurisdiction by clearly alleging facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction (D) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (E) holding that postincident conduct does not establish the purposeful availment necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction
Output: (E)
do not criminalize what Weichert and Merriam did in this case. See ante at 399-400, 677 A.2d at 171-172. Whether this is correct or not is not particularly relevant here. Certainly, the fact that a clear mandate of public policy is not incorporated in legislation making its violation a crime does not render it any less a clear mandate of public policy. Many cases of this nature, indeed most, involve a clear mandate of public policy the violation of which is not criminalized. See, e.g., Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988) (observing that discharge of employee for requesting information relevant to suspected gender-based employment discrimination would be actionable under Pierce)-, Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 670-71, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The Legislature’s decision not to criminalize 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for retaliatory demotion for asserting workers compensation rights (B) recognizing the cause of action (C) recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing cause of action under pierce for retaliate ry firing of employee who filed workers compensation action even though specific statutory remedy was available
Output: (E)
of their prolonged detention. The Supreme Court outlined the history of the writ prior to the adoption of the Constitution as a means to protect the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745, 128 S.Ct. 2229. The Court described how the writ historically has served as a bulwark against tyranny by providing a judicial forum to protect against the practice of arbitrary imprisonments. See id. at 744, 128 S.Ct. 2229. Here, Petitioner is challenging the legality of her expedited removal from the United States, not her detention. Her detention is merely the constitutionally permissible part of that process. See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the separation-of-powers 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process (B) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (C) holding that being placed in removal proceedings rather than deportation proceedings does not violate a petitioners due process rights (D) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (E) holding that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true
Output: (A)
until a final decision were issued in this case on PNM’s Emergency Fuel Clause.... We supported giving PNM an interim fuel clause solely as a way to give PNM some interim relief until we and the rest of the [PRC] had the opportunity to determine, based on the record in this case, whether a more permanent fuel clause or some other relief should be given to PNM. {42} It is well established that adverse rulings do not constitute a valid basis for disqualification based on personal bias or prejudgment of a disputed factual issue. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion.”); State v. Hernandez, 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326 (1993) (<HOLDING>); United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 96 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that personal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling (B) holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an officials single decision or act (C) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (D) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (E) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances
Output: (A)
reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim). Since Purchasers are estopped from relying on a representation outside of the agreement, they cannot sustain any of the causes of action that require justifiable reliance. Therefore, the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and FBPA claims fail, even construing the pleadings most favorably to Purchasers. Nevertheless, Purchasers argue that the determination of justifiable reliance is a jury question. While justifiable reliance may be a jury question in a fraud case where no contract exists or where the contract has become void, it is a question of law in a case where the contract language prevails and the contract’s merger clause precludes reliance on oral representations. Compare City Dodge, 232 Ga. at 770 (<HOLDING>) with First Data POS, 273 Ga. at 796 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law (B) holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance (C) holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable (D) holding that the only fraud that could vitiate the contract is fraud that would invalidate the merger clause itself ie fraud relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause quoting 3 corbin contracts  578 (E) holding that justifiable reliance is a jury question where the contract containing the merger clause was found invalid due to an antecedent fraud
Output: (E)
we hold that Defendant’s employee handbook does not constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity. Participation in New Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation Program {17} Plaintiff urges the Court to hold that Defendant’s voluntary participation in New Mexico’s workers’ compensation program serves as a waiver of immunity. Plaintiff makes this argument without citing to any authority or providing any substantive argument in support of her contention. {18} A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670. Thus, we conclude that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot be created by implication through activities such as participation in the state’s workers’ compensation program. See Webb v. Paragon Casino, 872 So.2d 641, 646 (La.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Inconsistent Waivers in Other Business 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity (B) holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him (C) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (D) holding that offreservation casino owned and operated by tribe was arm of the tribe and therefore was entitled to sovereign immunity (E) holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity
Output: (C)
Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that com-pensable working time is involved. Id. at 692, 66 S.Ct. at 1195. More recently, in Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1984), the Ninth Circuit explained that three factors should be examined to assess whether otherwise compensable time should be considered de minimis, and therefore not compensable: (1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether “the claimants performed the work on a regular basis.” Id. at 1062-63. See also Hill, 751 F.2d at 815 (<HOLDING>). Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis  (B) holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation (C) holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis (D) holding that interruption of postal worker during lunch was de minimis requiring no compensation under the flsa (E) holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard
Output: (D)
Surgeons, P.C., 266 Ga. App. 696, 699-700 (1) (598 SE2d 12) (2004); see also OCGA § 13-2-2 (5) (“If the construction is doubtful, that which goes most strongly against the party executing the instrument or undertaking the obligation is generally to he preferred!.]”); Hertz Equip. Rental Corp. v. Evans, 260 Ga. 532, 533 (397 SE2d 692) (1990) (citing to OCGA § 13-2-2 (5) for the proposition that “if a contract is capable of being construed two ways, it will be construed against the preparer and in favor of the non-preparer”). 17 See OCGA § 10-6-53 (“The form in which the agent acts is immaterial; if the principal’s name is disclosed and the agent professes to act for him, it will be held to he the act of the principal.”); Dover v. Burns, 186 Ga. 19, 21-22, 29 (3) (196 SE 785) (1938) (<HOLDING>); Tiller v. Spradley, 39 Ga. 35, 35-38 (1869) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error (B) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (C) holding that an attorneys bills are high evidence as to the maximum value of the attorneys services (D) holding that attorneys fees were nondischargeable as maintenance even though award was in favor of attorneys not spouse because it was rendered in light of the financial resources of the parties (E) holding that attorneys brothersinlaw were not rendered personally liable in settlement of attorneys accounts when the agreement described the brothersinlaw as agents of the attorney
Output: (E)
by one party and the house by another. ”)(citing Cullers, 1 S.W. at 315). 11 . See Gann v. Montgomery, 210 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.Civ.App.Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.)("[T]o be exempt as part of the homestead, [mobile homes] must be part of the exempt realty.”). See also Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Ditt ll.1997); In re Herd, 176 B.R. 312, 313-14 (Bankr.D.Conn.1994); In re McMahon, 60 B.R. 632, 634 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1986). 14 . In re Scudder, 97 B.R. 617, 618-19 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.1989)(allowing a houseboat to be claimed under Alabama's homestead exemption statute,' which provides for exemptions of "mobile home[s] or similar dwelling[s].”) 15 . In re McMahon, 60 B.R. at 634. 16 . In re Mead, 255 B.R. 80, 84-85 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2000). 17 . In re Laube, 152 B.R. 260, 262-63 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1993)(<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 18 . In re Kiedaisch, Bk. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding as matter of law that mobile home with wheels removed placed on blocks and hooked to lights and water is trailer within scope of covenant proscribing trailers used as temporary or permanent residences (B) holding operable semi truck cab used by professional driver as homestead despite statutes description of dwelling as a building condominium mobile home house trailer or cooperative (C) holding that the condominium association was not a thirdparty beneficiary of contracts between the owner and contractor of the condominium building and between the general contractor and the subcontractors (D) holding that where appellants owned and resided upon contiguous 60acre rural farm and used 18 acres as a mobile home park 18acre tract was part of the rural homestead (E) holding that an assembler of a mobile home is deemed to be a manufacturer of a finished product that is the mobile home for purposes of determining the applicability of the affirmative causalrelation defense under the aemld
Output: (B)
of his criminal history and likelihood of reoffending. Currie notes that most of his prior convictions were remote and that he has demonstrated both a decrease in criminal behavior since 1990 and a decrease in violent conduct since 2006. However, the vast majority of Currie’s adult life has been spent in prison, undermining his argument that his reduction in criminal convictions during this period is indicative of reduced criminality. Notably, Currie’s dozens of institutional would impose the same sentence as a variance sentence, even if it erred in its Guidelines calculations or application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a). And although Currie identified nonfrivolous mitigating factors in support of a lower sentence, see, e.g., United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 532-33 (4th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>), we cannot conclude, in view of the totality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding as a matter of law that a child of the tender age of 3 years and 8 months could not have realized the risk or danger of an artificial body of water (B) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive (C) recognizing reduced culpability in youthful offenders and inverse correlation between inmates age and risk of recidivism (D) holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference (E) holding age discrimination claim barred
Output: (C)