niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
delivery of the parcel. Once the beeper alerted, indicating that the package had been opened, Honolulu police officers executed the search warrant, recovered the parcel, and arrested Hernandez. After Hernandez was advised of her Miranda rights, she signed a statement of rights and waiver form. Prior to signing the waiver form, Hernandez wrote, “I think I want to answer questions at this time with out [sic] a lawyer.” She then provided a statement implicating herself and her co-defendants as being involved in a conspiracy to possess crystal methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. After her statement was typed, Hernandez reviewed it, and initialed the beginning and end of each paragraph. On May 31, 2000, Hernandez filed a motion to suppress the c S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 929 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights (B) holding that the sca violates the fourth amendment to the extent that it allows government agents to obtain the contents of emails without a warrant (C) holding that insurance investigators were not agents of the government for fourth amendment purposes because they had an independent reason to investigate the scene (D) holding that even though federal agents obtained mailed packages of videos lawfully they nevertheless violated the fourth amendment when they viewed the videos without a warrant (E) recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights
Output: (D)
overspray); Criterion Leasing Group v. Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So.2d 799 (Fla.App.1991) (insurance agent issued certificate of insurance listing subcontractor as covered by workers' compensation insurance without amending policy to add workers’ compensation coverage); Bucon, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfg. Assoc. Ins. Co., 151 A.D.2d 207, 547 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1989) (pursuant to indemnity agreement between contractor and subcontractor, insurance agent issued certificate of insurance listing contractor as an additional insured on subcontractor’s policy, but failed to notify insurance company to change policy coverage; insurance company argued that inclusion of contractor on certificate of insurance was a "clerical error”). 11 . In some instances, insurance comp 144 (Utah App.1991) (<HOLDING>); J.M. Corbett Co. v. Ins. Co. of North 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance company that does not deliver a policy to a certificate holder is estopped from asserting exclusions contained in the policy but not revealed in the certificate (B) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled (C) holding that exclusions are invalid unless they are communicated to the certificate holder in writing (D) holding that the federal rules of civil procedure apply in diversity eases where they are on point unless they both directly conflict with state law and are invalid under the constitution or the rules enabling act (E) holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage
Output: (C)
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and (3) violation of RICO section 1962(c) through conspiring to violate RICO sections 1962(b) and (e) . Plaintiffs RICO claims against the Business Council are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Business Council is an arm of Community government, and as such is presumptively immune from suit. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that this immunity has been waived. RICO contains no language which suggests Congress “unequivocally” waived Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity, and Plaintiffs have provided no evidence of a Community waiver. Absent a congressional or tribal waiver, the Community, like other sovereigns, is immune from suit for alleged RICO violations. See Snowbird Constr. Co. v. United States, 666 F.Supp. 1437, 1440-41 (D.Idaho 1987) (<HOLDING>); see also McMaster v. State of Minnesota, 819 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity (B) holding tribal sovereign immunity protects officers from suit in official but not individual capacity (C) holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity (D) holding that a senior vice presidents signature to an agreement with an express waiver of sovereign immunity provision did not waive sovereign immunity because that right was reserved exclusively to the tribal council (E) holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity
Output: (A)
an “of counsel” attorney who was not an employee of the firm but who participated on an ad hoc basis in the firm’s caseload. While the attorney was “of counsel” for more than one law firm at the same time, he was active on more than twenty-five cases for the firm over a five-year period, and he held himself out (and was held out by the firm) as acting on behalf of and affiliated in some manner with the firm. In its decision, the District Court stated that “[a] lawyer who is acting ‘of counsel’ for a law firm and held out to the public will be regarded as a ‘member’ within 11 U.S.C. § 504, so as to be free from statutory limitations on fee sharing arrangements.” Lemonedes, 226 B.R. at 132 (citations omitted); see also In re Sheehan Memorial Hosp., 380 B.R. 299, 303 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Bradley, 495 B.R. 747, 767 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fee sharing arrangement between attorneys was enforceable even though one attorney failed to register with the state as required (B) holding the same with respect to an apartment (C) holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable (D) holding that service provider was not a fiduciary with respect to revenue sharing because the total expenses associated with each investment option were fully disclosed (E) holding that when attorneys were acting as members of the firm with respect to the case in question section 504b1 applies to allow  fee sharing with any member whether that membership is regular or sporadic
Output: (E)
restrictive covenants in Borowski v Welch, 117 Mich App 712, 716-717; 324 NW2d 144 (1982): When interpreting a restrictive covenant, courts must give effect to the instrument as a whole where the intent of the parties is clearly ascertainable. Where the intent is clear from the whole document, there is no ambiguous restriction to interpret and the rules pertaining to the resolution of doubts in favor of the free use of property are therefore not applicable. In placing the proper construction on restrictions, if there can be said to be any doubt about their exact meaning, the courts must have in mind the subdivider’s intention and purpose. The restrictions must be construed in light of the general plan under which the restrict e City of Enid v Rogers, 874 P2d 818 (Okla App, 1994) (<HOLDING>); Mauldin v Panella, 17 P3d 837 (Colo App, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period (B) holding that a district court may not construe an untimely notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time (C) holding that amendments of the restrictive covenants passed during the initial 20year term would not take effect until the beginning of the automatic 10year extension period (D) holding that the bankruptcy court could not extend a deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 20 day extension period allowed by the bankruptcy rules (E) holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless
Output: (A)
Section 41-22-20(d), Ala.Code 1975, provides that a notice of appeal from a final decision of an administrative agency such as the CONRB of SHPDA must be filed with the pertinent administrative agency within 30 days of the date the petitioner receives notice of, or other service of, the decision rendered by that administrative agency. When the decision of the administrative agency is the denial of a petition or application by operation of law due to the administrative agency’s failure to rule on that petition or application within a specified period, a notice of appeal from such a denial must be filed within 30 days after the petition or application was denied by operation of law. See Noland Health Servs., Inc. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 44 So.3d 1074, 1081-82 (Ala.2010) (<HOLDING>). Section 41-22-11(b) provides that, when a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court (B) holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement (C) holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired (D) holding that the period for seeking judicial review of denial of con application not expressly ruled upon by the conrb begins to run at the time that application has been denied by operation of law (E) holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach
Output: (D)
v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm ’n, 732 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1999) (citing Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1994)). Summary judgment is proper only when the uncontroverted allegations of record and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Potter v. Herman, 762 A.2d 1116, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2000). To dispose of the pending motion for summary judgment in an efficient manner, the court will first address LaS cola’s challenge to improper and untimely service of process. A party who fails to object to service of process in the form of preliminary objections waives that claim. Cinque v. Asare, 585 A.2d 490, 492 (Pa. Super. 1990); Martin v. Gerner, 481 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 1984) (<HOLDING>). LaScola’s current counsel filed an entry of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections (B) holding that when defects in a petition raise a question of the trial courts subject matter jurisdiction over the action the issue may properly be raised for the first time on appeal (C) holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases (D) holding that removing defendant could not establish fraudulent joinder based on waivable defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or defects in service of process available only to joined defendants (E) holding that former husband waived any defects in service of process by appearing at the first contempt proceeding
Output: (A)
intend to preclude a franchise tax upon other, unmentioned corporate entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, a franchise tax is imposed upon all domestic and foreign corporations doing business in Texas. See Tex.Tax.-Gen.Ann. arts. 12.01 to 12.22 (Vernon 1969 & Supp.1978-1979). The granting of the privilege to transact business in this state confers economic benefits, including the opportunity to realize gross income and the right to invoke the protection of local law. The Texas franchise tax is a tax on the value of this privilege. General Dynamics Corp. v. Bullock, 547 S.W.2d 255, 257-58 (Tex.1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Calvert, 526 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r. e.); see Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 334-35, 60 S.Ct. 273, 84 L.Ed. 304 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The formula employed to compute a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (B) recognizing this texas rule (C) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied (D) holding texas franchise tax constitutional (E) holding texas poll tax unconstitutional
Output: (D)
2008, as evidenced by Exhibit B to Plaintiffs’ April 3, 2009 Complaint, i.e., a “Certified Promissory Money Note[,]” that states it is a “U.C.C. negotiable instrument redeemable at full face value when presented to [Plaintiffs’ address].” Pl. Ex. B. Plaintiffs later corrected the Promissory Note and proffered it in Plaintiffs’ July 10, 2009 Addendum. Pl. Add. Ex. A. This Promissory Note, however, is not a payment of the taxes due, because it is not a “means of cash or cash equivalents” as required by Section 6311 of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 6311; see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6311-1. Therefore, since Plaintiffs have not paid the taxes at issue, the court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ tax refund claim. Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). c.The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations (B) holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full (C) holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the court of federal claims (D) holding that interest received by a foreign corporation on a tax refund from the united states was interest on an interestbearing obligation of a resident of the united states within income tax statute (E) holding that full payment of the assessment is also required for tax refund suits brought in the united states court of federal claims
Output: (E)
qualified immunity from those claims, but arrive at that conclusion by a different route. Determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop can be a tricky proposition, particularly when one of the factors motivating the stop was, as in this case, the race of the suspects. Race is of little value in distinguishing one suspect from others, particularly where everyone in the pool of possible suspects is of the same race. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (observing that where most people who transverse a checkpoint are His panic, the fact that a particular person transversing it is Hispanic is of little value in establishing reasonable suspicion); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But race is a trait that, when combined with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop (B) holding that a tip to look out for a black person without more does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop anyone (C) holding that an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding that a mere anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  does not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person
Output: (B)
57 . Id. 58 . See Affidavit of Lisa A. Alter ("Alter Aff.”), Ex. A to the Declaration of Donald S. Zakarin in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike "Expert” Affidavit of Lisa Alter ("Zakarin Deck”), ¶1. 59 . See id. ¶¶ 7-28. 60 . See id. ¶ 22. 61 . Id. ¶ 23. 62 . Id. 63 . See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Its Motion to Exclude the Affidavit and Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Purported U.S. Copyright Law "Expert” Lisa A. Alter at 1. 64 . See id. 65 . See Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363 (2d Cir.1992) ("This circuit is in accord with other circuits in requiring exclusion of expert testimony that expresses a legal conclusion. ...”). 66 . See Motown Prods., Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 668 F.Supp. 285, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1987), rev’d on other grounds, 849 F.2d 781 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 67 . See Alter Aff., passim. 68 . Fiataruolo, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion (B) holding inadmissible an affidavit by copyright law expert opining that a term was suggestive rather than descriptive because his opinion was a conclusion of law (C) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (D) holding an affidavit statement referring to the notice required for a binding contract was inadmissible as a legal conclusion (E) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge
Output: (B)
determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur. 1 O’Connor later produced a valid concealed weapons permit. 2 Simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver. State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418, 542 P.2d 122 (1975); see State v. Sims, 119 Wn.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992) ("Where one merely possesses a controlled substance without the statutory element of intent, one is guilty of simple possession under RCW 69.50.401(d), absent unwitting possession.”); State v. Robbins, 68 Wn. App. 873, 877, 846 P.2d 585 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 It is not clear when he purchased the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession (C) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger (D) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession (E) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute
Output: (D)
issuing state was illegible. Significantly, the statute does not restrict its operation solely to Virginia license plates, but requires that “every license plate” be “clearly legible.” Va.Code 46.2-716. Thus, the condition of the license plate provided DeCoster with an objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop, and the fact that the traffic stop was a pretext for further investigation is irrelevant and does nothing to impair the stop’s constitutionality. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Similarly unpersuasive is defendant’s second argument, that Va.Code 46.2-716 violates the negative commerce clause, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a traffic stop. In support, defendant cites Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) (<HOLDING>), and the more recent case of Granholm v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a new mexico statute that criminalized dissemination of materials that are harmful to minors violated the commerce clause because the nature of the internet made it impossible for the statute to reach purely intrastate conduct and the benefits to be achieved were limited (B) holding that a new jersey statute prohibiting the importation of waste materials into the state violated the negative commerce clause (C) recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey (D) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause (E) holding that an arkansas statute discriminated against interstate commerce by banning the importation of most outofstate waste even though a small amount of outofstate waste was allowed into arkansas under the statute
Output: (B)
within the Act’s exception for petitions “based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day” that allows a party to file a petition for review “within sixty days after such grounds arise.” Id. North Carolina contends that our January 4, 2013, decision in NRDC v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428, 435-37 (D.C.Cir.2013), constituted after-arising grounds under section 7607(b). But North Carolina brought its petition more than ten months after we issued NRDC — well outside of the sixty-day window for petitions that the after-arising grounds exception provides. Even assuming, without deciding, that NRDC constituted after-arising grounds, North Carolina’s petition is thus still untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); see also Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 588 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The State explains that it did not bring its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits (B) holding that a fiduciary corporation was a purchaser within the meaning of  12a2 and was entitled to bring suit on its own behalf or on behalf of its clients (C) holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision (D) holding that a petitioner invoking the afterarising grounds exception must bring its petition within sixty days of when its afterarising claim ripens (E) holding that the sentencing disposition which commits the juvenile to a residential program for sixty days followed by sixty days of community control exceeds the maximum sentence permitted by statute for a seconddegree misdemeanor
Output: (D)
retaliate against him for filing a lawsuit. In the instant civil action, Plaintiff alleged in his original complaint that “Nurse Janet” mentally and emotionally abused him, denied him medical treatment, and retaliated against him for filing a lawsuit; but in his answers to the questionnaire, Plaintiff stated that Nurse Janet no longer “bothered” him. Clearly, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Dieken, Burns, Seevers, Franklin, and “Nurse Janet” in the instant civil action are duplicative of claims raised in his earlier Civil Action Nos. 1:03-CV-075-C and 1:03-CV-123-C, and should be dismissed with prejudice as malicious. Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1990); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1988). See Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). (b) Frivolous Claims The “mere threatening 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (B) holding that when a lanham act claim is dismissable upon motion state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice (C) holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim (D) holding that a claim dismissed as malicious under the ifp statute should be with prejudice (E) holding that action could not form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim where criminal information was dismissed as insufficient to support the charges without prejudice and the prosecutors did not amend or refile
Output: (D)
3604(c). B. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads a Section 3604(d) Violation Based on Defendant’s Statements Regarding Housing Availability Under Section 3604(d), it is illegal to represent to someone that housing is unavailable, when in fact it is available, because that person has a disability. (See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d).) The section is intended to afford a legal right to all persons to have access to truthful housing information. See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir.1990) (“The statute creates a right to be free from ... misrepresentations”) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-374, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982)); see also Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 296-97 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526) (<HOLDING>). In Havens, the Supreme Court held that an 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race (B) holding inter alia that real estate brokers who treat customers differently from one another because of their race violate the fair housing act (C) holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing (D) holding that the department of agricultures rural housing services alleged failure to implement the fair housing act was not discrete agency action for purposes of  7061 (E) holding that the brooke amendment to the housing act provided a cause of action under  1983
Output: (A)
is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ also reasonably relied on the absence of evidence of country conditions to corroborate Haidar’s individualized claim of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Diallo, 232 F.3d at 288 (stating that corroboration “typically includes both evidence of general country conditions and evidence that substantiates the applicant’s particular claims”). With respect to the country conditions evidence Haidar did submit, the IJ did not err in finding that such evidence did little to corroborate her specific claims of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution because the articles merely detailed general conditions of unrest in the Ivory Coast. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the IJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (B) holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal (C) holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution (D) holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution (E) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable
Output: (D)
the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury
Output: (D)
on his alleged disability. Upon a thorough review of the record, and after consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm. I. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir.2008). A court “shall dismiss” a case filed in forma pau-peris if the court determines that the action is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We review a frivolity dismissal for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.2001). A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact. Id.; Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Pro se pleadings will be liberally construed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted (B) holding that reversal is required when a significant step in a case is taken in an accuseds absence if it appears that he has lost an advantage or has been prejudiced (C) holding that the taxpayer filed a frivolous return because it had no basis in law or fact (D) holding that a case is frivolous for  1915d now  1915e2bi when it appears the plaintiff has little or no chance of success (E) holding that union has discretion not to file a grievance that it believes has no chance of success due to mootness
Output: (D)
situation he confronted.’ ” Id. at 367 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). Particularly, the contours of De Boise’s right to be free from excessive force must be so sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would know that the multiple tasings under the circumstances were a violation of that right. See Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir.2013). Although we have determined that non-violent, non-fleeing subjects have a clearly established right to be free from the use of tasers, see Brown, 574 F.3d at 499-500, we have yet to determine whether a violent subject, acting aggressively toward officers, has a clearly established right to be free from multiple tasings. See Clark v. Ware, 873 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1123 (E.D.Mo.2012) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in 2008, case law related to the use 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court could not determine as a matter of law that the repeated use of a taser on a subject that was physically resisting the police violated a clearly established right as of november 2009 (B) holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established (C) holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established (D) holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts (E) holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine
Output: (A)
would be unable to present his case fully and fairly if unrepresented, the IJ could not let Lin’s hearing proceed without counsel. The IJ could have capitulated and again postponed the hearing. The cost of this course was obvious: leaving Lin in detention for an even longer time while giving him and his relatives another opportunity to obtain competent counsel or himself to seek pro bono counsel for Lin. Doing so would impose a cost not only upon Lin, but upon the INS, which bore the costs of Lin’s care and upkeep. Instead, the IJ chose to proceed with the long-delayed hearing by insisting that an obviously unprepared counsel, who by her own assertion had not expected to argue this case, represent Lin. He erred in doing so. See Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862-63 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding his previous pledge that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where alien was in custody spoke only spanish had limited education and was unfamiliar with this country and its legal procedures in light of his failure to obtain counsel despite his efforts the immigration judge sua sponte if necessary should have continued the hearing so as to provide the petitioner a reasonable time to locate counsel and permit counsel to prepare for the hearing (B) holding that trial courts failure to consider appointing counsel for petitioner in evidentiary hearing was improper where record revealed petitioners lack of education and sophistication petitioner had limited participation in hearing and record indicates that there was abundant doubt raised concerning gordons need for the assistance of counsel (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioners request for counsel in evidentiary hearing where petitioner had requested counsel and had indicated in his motion that all documents had been prepared by prison law clerk he had only ninthgrade education he had no training in the law and he lacked the skills necessary to participate in hearing (D) holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel (E) holding that it was not error for a trial court to have failed to provide sua sponte a competent interpreter where counsel did not request one prior to trial and defendant spoke and understood english well enough to conversantly discuss the crime with a police officer and had no trouble answering questions at the sentencing hearing
Output: (A)
informed of the charges against him. Even accepting Schell’s version of events as true, and considering that his claim is predicated not on a willful use of excessive force, but on negligence in effecting an arrest, we conclude that Guth was operating in the course and scope of his employment when effecting the arrest of Schell. To the extent Schell was injured by negligent conduct of Guth during the process of that arrest, Guth is entitled to sovereign immunity unless Schell’s negligence claim falls within one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity for negligence claims set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b). We cannot fathom any of the exceptions applying in this situation. See Clark v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 691 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 686, 704 A.2d 640 (1997) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We have carefully examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest (B) holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government (C) holding sovereign immunity barred negligence claim relating to use of force by septa police officers (D) holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official (E) holding inverse condemnation action not barred by sovereign immunity
Output: (C)
assumed the illegible stamp was the certification. We are not persuaded by Mr. Grynberg's argument that because the certification was illegible on the e-filed copy, L & R Venture's copy of the judgment did not comply with the Act. The flegibility created by the electronic filing process did not transform L & R Venture's properly authenticated judgment into an unauthenticated one. And, contrary to Mr. Grynberg's assertion, L & R Venture's counsel's presentation of the original copy at the hearing was not to correct an improper filing, but rather to prove that the original filing was properly authenticated. See C.R.C.P. 44(c) ("This Rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by law."); cf. Griggs, 754 P.2d at 784-85 (<HOLDING>). It may be, however, as Mr. Grynberg contends, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance (B) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (C) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment
Output: (A)
matter by asserting that his claims in Miller II “arose and have been continuing to arise out of the same occurrences or transactions and series of occurrences or transactions adversely affecting and interfering with his rights in Nueces County, Texas, during the time period from September 24, 1993 [when Windsor filed the Windsor suit] through the present.” Thus, Miller’s claims in Miller II have the same factual basis as the claims raised in the Windsor suit. Such claims were accordingly required to be asserted as compulsory counterclaims. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 97(a); Getty Oil Co., 845 S.W.2d at 800. Miller is barred by res judicata from relitigating this same subject matter in Miller II. See, e.g., Soto v. Phillips, 836 S.W.2d 266, 268 n. 1 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The trial court correctly granted Windsor a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party may pursue what would be a compulsory counterclaim in a separate lawsuit but that party runs the risk of losing in the initial lawsuit and being bound by that result (B) holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits (C) recognizing that where first suit is filed in response to notice of a planned lawsuit by the plaintiffs adversary that lawsuit may be dismissed (D) holding res judicata barred plaintiffs derivative suit because of a final judgment in a prior derivative lawsuit (E) holding first lawsuit and allegations in second lawsuit part of same transaction for res judicata purposes even though different theory of recovery and harm alleged in second lawsuit
Output: (E)
10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3-5 (D.Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (collecting cases); see also Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 Fed.Appx. 158, 158 (11th Cir.2011) (similar). 93 . See, e.g., Wright v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, No. CV 11-00095-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4101513, at *2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (citing Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D.Ill.2011)). 94 . Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 95 . Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1069 (N.D.Cal.2011) (citations omitted). 96 . Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.2011). 97 . Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). 98 . Id. 99 . Id. at 1039. 100 . Id. 101 . Id. (citation omitted). 102 . Dkt. 30 at 5-6; Dkt. 47 at 17-27. 103 . See In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 397-405 (D.Idaho 2009) (<HOLDING>); Saxon Mortg. Servs. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes (B) holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid (C) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred (D) holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee
Output: (A)
this authority explicitly by statute in 11 U.S.C. § 362. Nor is there any danger of the bankruptcy court having prejudiced Appellant’s rights under Puerto Rico common law. As the bankruptcy court itself stated, the Appellant remains free to present her arguments under Puerto Rico law at the appropriate time, during the foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s commonwealth courts. (See Hearing Tr., Docket No. 1-7 at 11.) Therefore, any attempts to link this case to the holding in Stem are mistaken. We reject Appellant’s attempt to challenge this routine and plainly constitutional exercise of the bankruptcy court’s authority. This case, thus, fits squarely with several other cases that have been resolved in the wake of Stem. See In Re DiVittorio, 670 F.3d 273, 282 n. 4 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); In Re Garcia, 471 B.R. 324, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stem did not change a bankruptcy courts authority to decide questions impacting whether to grant relief from automatic stay (B) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (C) holding that the bankruptcy court relinquishes jurisdiction over estate property when it grants relief from the automatic stay (D) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy (E) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal
Output: (A)
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 687, 126 L.Ed.2d 655 (1994). 2 . The statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 . For purposes of the motion, the Court will treat the plaintiff as having a constitutionally protected property interest in his position. See Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 401 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Most courts in the district, in fact, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mississippi statute providing that employees could be terminated only for cause establishes a property interest under the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that a public employee who may only be terminated for cause has a property interest in his position that is protected by the 14th amendment (C) holding that any constitutionally protected property interest an employee has as a result of his employment contract is satisfied by payment of the full compensation due under the contract (D) holding driving licenses to be property protected by the 14th amendment (E) holding that contract of employment providing that professor could be terminated only for cause constituted property right protected by fourteenth amendment
Output: (B)
explicitly features the allegedly infringing rugs. Id. at ¶ 10. It also apparently provides extensive assistance to a consumer in viewing available rugs for sale, obtaining information about their fiber content and sizes, and receiving recommendations. Id. at ¶ 8. Other internet retailers that carry Dynamic rugs state that Dynamic will ship directly to the consumer. Id. at ¶ 11-14. Dynamic also advertises in Home Furnishing News magazine, which is circulated in Maine. Ex. to Decl. of Angela Adams (Docket Item 17, Attachment 2). I conclude that Dynamic is marketing the allegedly infringing designs in Maine and that if the infringing rugs arrive in Maine, their arrival is not merely the random or fortuitous actions of a third party. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-417, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>). Dynamic’s marketing of infringing rugs has a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts (B) holding that personal jurisdiction over defendant car manufacturer was inappropriate when defendants only contacts with the forum resulted from plaintiffs unilateral activity of driving defendants product into another state (C) holding that unilateral activity of a third party is not an appropriate consideration in determining what contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction purposes (D) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (E) holding that personal jurisdiction over defendant trustee was inappropriate when defendants only contacts with the forum resulted from plaintiffsettlors unilateral activity of moving to florida
Output: (C)