niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
arrest for a misdemeanor is permitted only when one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-207© (2008). 5 . "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 0 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the duration of the stop was unreasonably extended where the officer admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen minute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were unrelated to the traffic violation); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172— 73 (Del.2010) (concluding that the stop, during which the officer asked the defendant for identification and ran a background check, “did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop”); Bucalo v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-CA-000176-MR, 2012 WL 246245, at *5-7 (Ky.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mason, 173 Md.App. 414, 919 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity (B) holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made (C) holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished (D) holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop (E) holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes
Output: (A)
argues that these statements violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Commonwealth argues that this issue is waived because Appellant failed to present it in his motion in limine. We disagree. In general terms, Appellant’s motion in limine states that introduction of Shakuur’s statements would violate his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, the issue is preserved for our review. See Gray, 867 A.2d at 574. Nevertheless, Bruton and Crawford are clearly inapplicable to the present case. As we have concluded that Shakuur’s statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the concerns in Bruton and Crawford regarding conviction on the basis of hearsay confessions are not implicated in this case. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (<HOLDING>); see also Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n. 3, 88 
 Holding statements: (A) holding of crawford applies only to testimonial hearsay (B) holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements (C) recognizing that excited utterance and testimonial hearsay inquiries are separate but related (D) holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay (E) holding that hearsay statement between relatives concerning the circumstances of an infants death was not testimonial
Output: (A)
to the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Penn s to avoid the appearance of impropriety is a worthy standard for professional conduct, a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a prosecution free of such appearances. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (stating that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated when his lawyer has a “possible” or “potential” conflict of interest). Instead, a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office and is not effectively screened from contact with the Commonwealth’s attorneys who are handling the defendant’s case on a related matter. See Thompson, 246 So.2d at 763 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236-37 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding than an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent anyone in a substantially related matter without the consent of the original parties because mediators routinely receive and preserve confidences in much the same manner as an attorney and where the mediator was privy to confidential information the applicable ethical rules impose the same responsibility as the rules relating to any attorneys subsequent representation of a former client (C) holding that defendants right to due process was not violated by the employment of his former counsel in the us attorneys office where the former counsel recused himself and was screened from the prosecution of defendants case (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendants due process rights are violated only if his former lawyer prosecutes him on a matter related to the representation or discloses client confidences to other prosecutors
Output: (E)
rules]. 2 . Maryland Rule 8-501(c) states: The record extract shall contain all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary for the determination of the questions presented by the appeal and any cross-appeal.... The record in this case is contained in seventeen boxes filled with transcripts and hundreds of exhibits. We have held that when the record extract “is absolutely devoid of the evidence, oral or physical,” necessary for us to rule upon an issue, we may dismiss the appeal as "we are not required to ferret out from the record those materials which counsel should have printed in the abstract.” Eldwick Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Pitt, 36 Md.App. 211, 212, 373 A.2d 957 (1977). See also Davis v. Davis, 97 Md.App. 1, 24, 627 A.2d 17 (1993), aff'd, 335 Md. 699, 646 A.2d 365 (1994) (<HOLDING>). In those instances where appellant has made 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (B) recognizing that because the magistrate court is not a court of record any record on appeal would only consist of papers filed in that court (C) holding that this line of cases was not on point and that no error was apparent on the face of the record due to lack of reporters record from defaultjudgment hearing because the judgment reflected that it was based only on the pleadings and affidavits that were in the record (D) holding that party waived issue by not including relevant portions of record in extract and by not clearly directing this court to relevant portions of record (E) holding that there must be sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate the courts consideration of the relevant section 3553a factors
Output: (D)
because there is an intact disk that can be replaced on the corneal stro-ma. On the other hand, when an excimer laser is used, -tissue is vaporized and no longer exists and, as a result, that tissue cannot be replaced on the corneal stroma to achieve reversibility. 54. Where more than one claim construction is possible, the Court should not choose a construction that is broad enough to encompass prior art. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1984). If the Court were to construe the third element of Claim 1 to cover the reshaping of the cornea with an excimer laser, then the patent would be invalidated by the wealth of prior art LASIK procedures. See also SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>) 55. The Court also finds that the pat-entee’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase prior conviction under this section should be read broadly to include any prior conviction under the kansas uniform controlled substances act ksa 654101 et seq or other analogous municipal or foreign provisions (B) holding that a prior conviction is not a predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines if the statute that provides the basis for the prior conviction sweeps more broadly than the generic crime described in the guidelines (C) holding that the fact that the written description stated a particular feature that offered advantages over the prior art supported the conclusion that the claims cannot be read so broadly as to encompass the distinguished prior art (D) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense (E) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime
Output: (C)
school work. The district court thus correctly held that his due process claim accrued by that date and that the instant lawsuit, filed on January 13, 2009, was untimely. Even taking into account a 145-day tolling period— credited by the district court for the time when Storman’s adverse rating was on remand to the DOE under a state court order — the limitations period on Storman’s due process claim ran out in December 2009, one month before he filed his complaint. In urging otherwise, Storman argues, for the first time on appeal, that his due process claim “sounds in malicious prosecution,” Appellant’s Br. at 17-18, and thus did not accrue until the termination of disciplinary proceedings in his favor. See Palmer v. New York, 57 A.D.3d 364, 364, 870 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (1st Dep’t 2008) (<HOLDING>). In Storman’s view, this occurred on May 11, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same for malicious prosecution (B) holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  (C) holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists (D) holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest (E) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated
Output: (E)
judgment action the Court should consider the following factors: (1) avoiding needless determination of state law issues; (2) discouraging litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and (3) avoiding duplica-tive litigation. Id. In addition, the Court should retain jurisdiction on a declaratory judgment action where it is necessary to avoid piecemeal litigation. Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.1998). The Court has already concluded that § 616D.030 does not preclude Plaintiffs state law claims, therefore, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claim would result in piecemeal litigation. Because a declaratory action is a procedural remedy, the Court grants leav 956 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1998) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  616d030 barred employees actions where employees sued the state industrial insurance system alleging bad faith administration of their workers compensation claims (B) holding that the peculiar risk doctrine has no application to employees of independent contractors whose claims fall within the workers compensation system (C) holding  616d030 barred employees action where employee alleged the insurance carrier acted in bad faith in handling the claim (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim (E) holding  616d030 did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a tortious discharge action for filing a workers compensation claim because the statutory scheme applies only to the administration of the act
Output: (A)
to remand based on the presence of a defendant from the forum state is based on a procedural defect in removal. Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F.Supp. 531, 534-35 (S.D.Tex.1996). III. FRAUDULENT JOINDER A. Standard To establish that a defendant is fraudulently joined to defeat removal jurisdiction, the removing party bears the heavy burden of proving either of the following: (1) there has been outright fraud in the plaintiffs’ recitation of jurisdictional facts; or (2) there is no possibility that the plaintiffs would be able to establish a cause of action in state court against the defendants whose citizenship prevents removal. Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.1995); see also Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person who requests public records is a necessary party and must be joined in any action brought under rcw 4256540 (B) holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in removal petition (C) holding a party cannot be joined to prevent removal where no cause of action can be brought against that party (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal
Output: (C)
to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Davis, 66 Ill.2d at 89-90, 360 N.E.2d at 767, 4 Ill.Dec. at 654, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d (1965). Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants’ conduct rose to such a level. Accordingly, the probable cause existed to support an officer’s actions, the case should not be permitted to go to trial if there is any reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed.” Biddle v. Martin, 992 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir.1993), quoting Cross v. City of Des Moines, 965 F.2d 629, 632 (8th Cir.1992). 10 . See Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv. Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 200 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest (B) holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment (C) holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment (D) holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada (E) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely
Output: (B)
brother for the payment he made to the smuggler. Although Garcia-Baez’s testimony was not entirely clear, “the evidence presented [does not] compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result.” Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1999). Therefore, the IJ’s conclusion that Garcia-Baez knowingly aided and encouraged Armente to illegally enter the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) was supported by substantial evidence. See Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, Garcia-Baez was not eligible for suspension of deportation because he was statutorily barred from establishing good moral character during the requisite period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); see also Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Garcia-Baez challenges the IJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure (B) holding that an alien was statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure on the basis of his failure to meet the good moral character component of 8 usc  1254e 1996 in light of his violation of 8 usc  1182a6e (C) holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation (D) holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation (E) holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed
Output: (B)
conduct ‘shows a fixed intention to abandon, renounce, and refuse to perform the contract.’ ” Hunter, 339 S.W.3d at 802 (quoting SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Sci, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)). But such repudiation “must be absolute and unconditional.” Id. In other words, “[t]he declaration of intent to abandon the obligation must be in positive and unconditional terms.” Narvaez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 757 F.Supp.2d 621, 631 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Preston v. Love, 240 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1951, no writ)). Thus, to show anticipatory repudiation, Texas courts have required that a party overtly communicate its intent not to perform under a valid and enforceable agreement. Compare Hunter, 339 S.W.3d at 803 (<HOLDING>), with Hauglum v. Durst, 769 S.W.2d 646, 649, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mere presentation of a settlement agreement absent direct language or conduct evincing intent not to perform did not constitute a fixed intention to abandon the original contract quoting sava 128 sw3d at 315 (B) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (C) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (D) holding that agreement did not constitute a binding preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith a mortgage contract (E) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt
Output: (A)
needed in the practice of Native American religion. Thus, our reasoning for upholding IDOC’s tobacco ban does not extend to a ban on smoking non-tobacco elements in a religious setting. Relatedly, concerns over the impact of smoke on other inmates and the presence of fire inside the institution could be significantly addressed by simply directing that the ceremonies be conducted outside in the exercise yard. Although IMSI officials expressed concern about the presence of fire and smoke, testimony indicated that the fire marshal was never consulted about the possible alternative of conducting the ceremony outdoors. See e.g., Skenandore v. Endicott, 2006 WL 2587545 (E.D.Wis.) (disallowing smudging in cells, but allowing it outside); Greybuffalo v. Frank, 2003 WL 23211615 (W.D.Wis.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, in regard to concerns about safety 
 Holding statements: (A) holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone (B) holding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest should not be allowed because such searches cannot be justified by officer safety or the preservation of evidence given the privacy implications inherent in cell phone data searches (C) holding that disallowing smudging in ones cell was not a substantial burden where smudging was allowed elsewhere (D) holding the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in his cell so the jailer had the right to inspect anything in his cell (E) holding no eighth amendment violation where prisoner was placed in a strip cell without clothes the water in the cell was turned off and the mattress removed and prisoners bedding clothing legal mail and hygienic supplies were withheld
Output: (C)
change in circumstances); United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 762 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir.1989) (“Once the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, only a substantial change in circumstances will require the district court to inquire whether the defendant wishes to revoke his earlier waiver.”); Panagos v. United States, 324 F.2d 764, 765 (10th Cir.1963) (concluding that there were no facts or circumstances preventing “the initial waiver of the right to counsel, knowingly and intelligently made, from extending to and being fully effective at the time of sentencing” where only a reasonable amount of time intervened between the plea and sentencing); Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834, 840 (8th Cir.1955) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later (B) holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel (C) holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary (D) holding that a defendants statements were voluntary after defendant initially refused to sign waiver but later initiated the contact with police and signed the waiver (E) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary
Output: (A)
holding that a workers’ compensation award will not be set aside based upon a party’s unilateral mistake. For example, in Smith v. First Choice Servs., 158 N.C. App. 244, 249, 580 S.E.2d 743, 748, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 461, 586 S.E.2d 99 (2003), the claimant was an officer of the employer. On appeal, we affirmed the Commission’s decision that, because the workers’ compensation pol icy included coverage for company officers, the carrier was liable for the plaintiffs compensable injury even though the extension of coverage to officers in the relevant policy provisions may have resulted from a unilateral mistake on the part of the carrier. See also Brookover v. Borden, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 754, 398 S.E.2d 604 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 270, 400 S.E.2d 450 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, this rule is consistent with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment (B) holding that a unilateral mistake by an unrepresented claimant would not support a decision to set aside a settlement agreement that the plaintiff had signed (C) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (D) recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict (E) holding that where both parties had all the facts needed to form a correct conclusion as to the law a settlement will not be set aside on theory of mutual mistake
Output: (B)
created doctrine of issue exhaustion. See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that AFRC is arguing that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile (B) holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement (C) recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement (D) recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different (E) holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement
Output: (D)
personal counsel until just before the final mediation in March 2014 and did not settle with Ledcor and Admiral until shortly after that mediation. (See Def. Reply at 3- 4; Stip. Judgment; 2d Martens Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 18; Hudson Letter at 1.) Defendants offer no way for a reasonable fact-finder to trace Comhusker’s non-response in October 2007 and April 2008 through six years of litigation, defense, and mediation and find that non-response to have caused SQI to hire personal counsel and agree to a covenant judgment. Thus, even if Cornhusker violated WAC 284-30-330(2), which the court does not decide, Defendants present insufficient evidence to show that such violation caused injury to SQI’s business or property. See Hangman Ri Ins. Co., 16 F.Supp.3d 1240, 1254-55 & n. 5 (W.D.Wash.2014) (<HOLDING>). The court need not decide the legal issues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insured may maintain a cause of action under ifca for a violation of a washington insurance regulation listed in subsection 5 of ifca (B) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (C) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (D) holding that a violation of washington insurance regulations is not a violation of ifca and collecting cases (E) holding that agents violation of irs regulations did not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of violation
Output: (D)
the dredging project lack merit. Nor does it mean that the Court will never adjudicate the merits of these claims or that, as stated at oral argument, Defendants have blanket immunity to carry out their dredging project without any judicial oversight. Instead, the Court, as section 9613(h) requires, must adjudicate these claims after the EPA’s remedial action at the Hudson River is undertaken. See Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1560. Consequently, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action and their third cause of action to the extent it too raises ability to bring pre-enforcement due process and equal protection claims against the Environmental Protection Agency); Broward Garden Tenants Ass’n v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 157 F.Supp.2d 1329, 1340-41 (S.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>); South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 9613h precluded preenforcement judicial review of plaintiffs constitutional challenge cercla (B) recognizing cercla successor liability (C) holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo (D) holding that section 9613h bars judicial review over constitutional challenges to cercla (E) holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges
Output: (D)
be brought by means of a motion for post-conviction relief. In doing so, the state acknowledges the court departed from the essential requirements of law and requests we reverse the portion of the appealed order which dismissed the mandamus petition. Massey has exhausted his administrative remedies with the DOC. He correctly sought mandamus relief in the circuit court. See Taylor v. State, 780 So.2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(affirming trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief motion filed to challenge DOC’s reduction of his gain time because it had to first be entertained in the DOC; if defendant was not satisfied with the DOC’s ruling, then he could file a petition for writ of mandamus with the appropriate circuit court); see also Bedford v. State, 775 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(<HOLDING>). We, therefore, quash the order and remand for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the doc to comply with a district court order directing the doc to grant a prisoner credit for time spent in presentence confinement (B) holding that a mandamus petition rather than motion for postconviction relief was appropriate remedy to have doc honor amount of jail credit awarded in each of defendants sentences (C) holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief (D) holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief (E) holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act
Output: (B)
as significantly restricted in his ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs.” Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 322 (5th Cir.1997) and Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir.1996)). Garrett has offered no evidence that Autozone regarded him to be so limited. Garrett’s own testimony demonstrates that he was treated in the same manner as he was before he informed Autozone that he had been diagnosed with lupus. See Garrett’s Dep. pp 170-174, 200, 202. Because Garrett did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was regarded as disabled by his employer, Autozone is entitled to summary judgment. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 480 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Southwestern Bell, 136 F.3d at 1052; Sherrod, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer (B) holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled (C) holding that an employer did not regard an employee with an impaired ankle as disabled where it encouraged her to work in a position that required walking (D) holding that employer did not regard plaintiff as disabled where it repeatedly attempted to return him to work (E) holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project
Output: (B)
under the public-policy exception involved employees terminated for refusing to engage in unlawful or unethical conduct. In contrast to the employees in Lorenz and Mariani, Weissman here alleges that she was terminated for exercising a job-related right, not for refusing to engage in unlawful or unethical conduct. Specifically, Weissman alleges that she was discharged because she complained to the division that Crawford was attempting to eliminate her morning and evening rest breaks and because she continued to exercise those breaks. Although an employee terminated for exercising a job-related right may state a cognizable claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Lathrop v. Entenmann’s, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Colo.App.1989) (<HOLDING>), we conclude that such circumstances do not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits (B) recognizing wrongful discharge claim where employer allegedly discharged employee for exercising right to receive workers compensation benefits (C) holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act (D) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (E) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim
Output: (B)
claims before the Commission, the claims are properly before us because they were actually addressed by the Commission. We disagree. The mere fact that the Commission discusses an issue does not mean that it was provided a meaningful “opportunity to pass” on the issue. It is only through the adversarial process (or analogous circumstances) that the Commission is afforded such an opportunity within the meaning of § 405. We, of course, recognize that § 405 does not require that the party seeking judicial review of an issue be the party that provided the Commission with the opportunity to pass on the discussion of an issue in an ALJ opinion adopted by the Board was “insufficient to satisfy the requirements” of § 10(e) of the NLRA); Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1215 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In any event, Bartholdi’s challenge to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record (B) holding that the court of appeals erred in granting habeas corpus when it only addressed one of the state courts alternative grounds for rejecting a brady claim noting that the ground it addressed was introduced by the state court with the word moreover confirming that it was an alternative basis for its decision (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action (D) holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal (E) holding that district courts discussion of an alternative ground for its decision did not undermine its ruling that appellants claim was untimely raised
Output: (E)
fairly and reasonably compensate Grace C. Chantos for her damages, if any, that resulted from such breach of contract? Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The amount Grace C. Chantos would have received for the sale of her 502 shares of the business corporation if H. Frank Faucette and J. Lawrence Scha-dler had not breached the Sale and Purchase Agreement. At the charge conference, Faucette’s and Schadler’s only objection to this question was that the answers should have been separate for each of them. They did not complain that the instruction’s measure of damages was improper or otherwise object to the instruction. Therefore, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the language in the charge. Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>); Kroger Co. v. Brown, 267 S.W.3d 320, 323 
 Holding statements: (A) holding when no objection is made to jury issue sufficiency of the evidence is measured against charge given by court rather than some other unidentified law (B) holding that sufficiency of the evidence is measured against a hypothetically correct jury charge (C) holding that sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is not measured by the jury charge actually given but rather measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct charge (D) holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence (E) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence
Output: (A)
of Texas has done the opposite. For the need factor, courts are concerned with “the seriousness of the crime or accident to which the officer responds” before the high-speed pursuit begins. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. For the risk factor, “an officer in a police pursuit must assess both the risk that the suspect will injure a third party and the risk that the officer himself will injure a third party.” Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 583 (emphasis in original). I also note that the majority criticizes Martinez for being speculative about whether the fleeing driver would have returned to normal driving practices if Deputy Johnson has discontinued pursuit. Of course it was the County’s burden to establish as a matter of law that the need outweighed the risk. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653 (<HOLDING>). Given the County’s and the majority’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial (B) holding that a defendant bears the burden of establishing affirmative defenses under the wprkers compensation statute (C) holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity (D) holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense
Output: (C)
interest in the property at that time, a dower/curtesy interest, as an inchoate right, is merely an expectancy of an interest or a future interest contingent upon him surviving Sharron.... Hence, since the property was in Sharron’s name only and she was alive at the time of the foreclosure, First Union had a mortgage on the full interest in the property. Id. See also Whisman v. Whisman, 2009 WL 2971552 (Ky.App. Sept. 18, 2009) (unpublished) (“Our courts have long recognized that a spouse’s right of action for a dower or curtesy interest does not accrue until the death of the other spouse with the surviving spouse ‘not entitled to any interest until the happening of that event[.]’ ”); Tucker v. Grace Enterprises of Kentucky, LLC, 2004 WL 2566518 (Ky.App. Nov. 12, 2004) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). United Bank concludes that pursuant to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner (B) holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license (C) holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute (D) holding a judgment lien does not attach to a husbands curtesy interest in real estate (E) holding the real estate sale proceeds
Output: (D)
prejudice ... would strip [the defendants] of an absolute defense. [Mrs. Smith] cannot prove her medical malpractice claims without expert medical proof.” But Mrs. Smith contends that Dr. Markowitz’s exclusion did not dictate a result for the defendants because at the time she “still had the option of filing a motion for late disclosure of an expert.” Mrs. Smith reasons that the possibility she might file (and the district court might grant) a motion to extend the expert-disclosure deadline rendered the above defense less than absolute. Notwithstanding Mrs. Smith’s hypothetical avenue for relief, the substantive law applied to the facts of her case at the time of denial dictated a result for the defendants. See Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987-88 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). As matters stood, Mrs. Smith lacked an expert 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff could withdraw admissions despite pending motion by defendants for summary judgment (B) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (C) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (D) recognizing familiarity with governing law as reason to grant motion to transfer (E) holding that statuteoflimitations defense was absolute despite possibility that court might grant plaintiffs pending motion to transfer
Output: (E)
bankruptcy trustee from selling or administering the homestead, even for the benefit of joint creditors. The legal effect of the non-debtor spouse’s right to assert the Florida constitutional exemption meant that the debtor spouse was still “receiving the benefits” of the Florida constitutional exemption, even though he had not claimed that exemption in his bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor was ruled ineligible for the wildcard exemption. The court noted that a different outcome would have obtained if the non-debtor spouse had affirmatively waived the right to claim the homestead protection. No such waiver existed, however, either in Hernandez or in this case. Other courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re Watford, 427 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 790 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other (B) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (C) holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the  522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption (D) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (E) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead
Output: (C)
In its February 14, 2005, ruling on this issue, based on review of the responses to the juror questionnaires and consideration of the parties’ arguments, the court concluded that Johnson had not yet been able to meet the high threshold of proof required to show that this was one of the rare and extreme cases in which the court could presume inherent prejudice based on pretrial publicity at the first tier of the analysis of a motion for a change of venue pursuant to Rule 21(a). See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 707-08 (8th Cir.2003) (stating this two-tiered analysis for appellate review), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 486, 160 L.Ed.2d 355 (2004). In that ruling, the court concluded, further, tha 1662124, *1 (Mass.Ct.App. Dec. 28, 2001) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court finds that Johnson waived 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (B) holding that the issue of change of venue was waived where the defendants motion for a change of venue was denied without prejudice to its renewal during jury selection but the motion was not renewed during empanelment of the jury (C) holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived (D) holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified (E) holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal
Output: (B)
the automatic stay exists to give debtors the time necessary to develop a successful reorganization plan. See Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 922 F.2d 984, 989 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 50,116 L.Ed.2d 28 (1991); Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir.1984). Once the bankruptcy proceeding is dismissed, neither the goal of a successful reorganization nor the debtor’s right to the automatic stay continues to exist. Accordingly, it no longer serves any purpose to determine whether the bankruptcy court properly lifted the automatic stay; the appeal has become moot. See Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Income Property Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); cf. Omoto v. Ruggera (In re Omoto), 85 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order lifting the automatic stay became moot when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed (B) holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court (C) holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal (D) holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case (E) holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order approving a foreclosure sale became moot upon dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case
Output: (A)
CURIAM. In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution, we affirm without comment as to all issues except the requirement that the former husband maintain life insurance to secure his support obligations. The trial court orally pronounced this requirement, but it was not included in the written judgment as the law requires. See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 151 So.3d 27, 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we reverse and remand for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls (B) holding that written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement (C) holding that a trial courts changing of the written sentence to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence is ministerial (D) holding that the failure of a written sentence to conform to the courts oral pronouncement cannot be raised in a rule 3800a motion (E) holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement
Output: (E)