niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
prevail on a bad faith claim against Defendant, Plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits; and (2) that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis.” Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688). To meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, the evidence must be “so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing’ so as to enable the court to make its decision with ‘a clear conviction.’ ” Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 752 (3d Cir.1994) (citing In re Estate of Fickert, 461 Pa. 653, 337 A.2d 592, 594 (1975)); see also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). B. Analysis To determine whether Defendant’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard (B) holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied (C) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (D) holding that bad faith andor prejudice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence (E) holding that release status must be proven by clear and convincing evidence through reliable documentary evidence
Output: (A)
services. Here, for example, if Loveland’s services are not subject to being segregated, Love-land could still hold M.F.’s parents responsible for amounts not paid by the State (■i.e., approximately $12,500) for services that the parents had no ability (especially in hindsight) to decline as part of the “stay put” placement at Loveland. The court can easily envision scenarios where parents and a disabled student would be put in an untenable situation of having to decide whether to continue at a bilateral placement (and still incur significant and potentially prohibitive expenses — such as the $12,500 at issue here — for extra services), or to accept an inappropriate public placement, but at no cost. This would be contrary to the purpose of the IDEA. See, e.g., Clovis, 903 F.2d at 641 (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, however, making this decision 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the supreme court refused to give the stay put provisions a reading that would force parents to  act at their peril in keeping a child in their chosen placement after a successful administrative ruling (B) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (C) recognizing that at common law a parents liability to support his child terminated at the parents death the terms of the support order could not be enforced against his estate unless provisions allowing for such enforcement were included in the order (D) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (E) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children
Output: (A)
article is no longer manufactured or is not available, we will pay the cost of a new article similar to that damaged or destroyed and which is of comparable quality and usefulness.” See policy at replacement cost settlement on personal property endorsement. 2 . The policy states “[w]e will pay no more than the actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or replacement is completed....” See policy at replacement cost settlement on personal property endorsement. 3 . This court notes that Gilderman’s summary of the Ferguson holding is inaccurate when read against the actual language of Ferguson, quoted herein. 4 . See also, Kastendiek v. Millers Mutual Insurance Co., 946 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Brachter v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 961 P.2d 828, 831 (Okla. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The provision does favor defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  672316 and  672719 stand for the principle that parties to a contract may properly limit the remedies for a breachofwarranty to repair and replacement when such limitations are reasonable but noting that the limitation is not valid when the limitation causes the product to fail of its essential purpose (B) holding limitation of liability provision limiting damages to replacement or correction of defective material andor installation in service contract for improvements to plaintiffs residence was valid and enforceable citing restatement of contracts  339 cmt g other citations omitted  (C) holding replacement cost provisions making payment of replacement cost dependant upon actual repair or replacement are unambiguous (D) holding that where log home construction kit contained defects that could not be repaired contractual provision limiting damages to cost of repair failed of its essential purpose and therefore the limitation on liability was not enforceable (E) holding that written warranty may limit a remedy to repair or replacement of parts so long as limitation is clearly expressed
Output: (C)
The court ultimately concluded, however, that the danger Mendoza posed to the community — evidenced by the fact that, despite his relatively young age (twenty-five), Mendoza had a history of using aliases, two convictions for driving while impaired, and a prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon — trumped any leniency that these factors might otherwise support. Thus, the court opined that an upward variance was necessary to protect the public from any further crime Mendoza may commit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). We thus conclude the district court’s well-reasoned explanation amply justified the extent of the variance it imposed. Because there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reasoning in this case, we will defer to it. See Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366-67 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentencing courts decision to impose a sentence six years longer than advisory guidelines range was reasonable because district court employed  3553based reasoning to justify the variance (B) holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (C) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (D) holding that district courts decision to exceed the advisory sentencing range in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines ussg  7b14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding booker error is avoided when district court calculates proper guidelines sentencing range treats guidelines as advisory and imposes reasonable sentence
Output: (A)
individually, to her late husband’s claims; she cannot be an heir to her own claims”). There is no provision in the agreement stating that Garcia, on behalf of her children, was agreeing to submit the children’s claims to arbitration. Garcia did not sign the agreement on behalf of the children or as representative of the children. Accordingly, the children are not bound by the express terms of the agreement. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 280 F.3d at 1074; see also Fortune v. Killebrew, 86 Tex. 172, 175, 23 S.W. 976, 977 (1893) (“But [the children] did not sign; and, as we have seen, their father having an adverse interest, had no authority to sign [the arbitration agreement] for them as their guardian.”); Snow v. Walker, 42 Tex. 154, 156, 1875 WL 7396, 1874 Tex. LEXIS 288, *4-*5 (1874) (<HOLDING>). Relators argue that Garcia exercised her 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mothers agreement to arbitrate matters concerning an estate in which the mother and her minor children had a common interest did not estop the minors from asserting claim to the estate (B) holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy (C) holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother    because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children (D) holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate (E) holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan
Output: (A)
venerable requirement that a cross-appellant file a notice of cross-appeal. See Smeaton v. Smeaton, 6 as (presumably) a purveyor of ideas: The record shows it was a book purchaser; not a book publisher. Part of the constitutional difficulty with section 212.06(9) is the uncertainty it creates about just which ideas a book must express, in order for its purchase to escape the tax. See generally State v. Ashcraft, 378 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla.1979) (noting that “overbreadth of a law may have a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment freedoms”). Given the pall this uncertainty casts, pursuing tax refunds book by book in individual cases would not afford an adequate remedy for the constitutional harm. See Metro. Dade County v. Dep’t of Commerce, 365 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding declaratory relief available in circuit court against an administrative agency where a partys constitutional rights are endangered (B) holding that the judicial immunity available to federal officers extends to section 1983 actions for declaratory and injunctive relief (C) holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process (D) holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action (E) holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa
Output: (A)
and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093,108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). The officers arrested Newsome near his kitchen table, which was adjacent to his bedroom and not separated by any walls. As one of the officers, Russell Bassett, put it, “If you are standing in the kitchen, you can see ... all the way back to [Newsome’s] bedroom.” R. 18 at 47. The bedroom was thus a “space immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could immediately be launched,” and the officers required neither a warrant nor reasonable suspicion to enter it. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093; see also United States v. Kaler, 11 Fed.Appx. 400, 401-02 (6th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 287-88 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under buie the second room in a tworoom apartment immediately adjoined the first room in which the suspect was arrested (B) holding that buie allowed officers to perform a protective sweep of a bathroom that adjoined the place of arrest (C) holding a protective sweep unconstitutional where officers had no information that any other persons were in the apartment (D) holding that the officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest on outstanding warrants because the officers had information that the defendant was suspected of running a methamphetamine operation on the premises other people were living there and assisting the defendant and at the time the sweep began the defendant had not yet been located (E) holding that protective sweep was justified incident to arrest outside residence where officers had reasonable suspicion that dangerous individuals were in apartment
Output: (B)
Amendment, federal power extend[s] to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment....” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58-60, 116 S.Ct. 1114. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has never held that private parties may sue states without Congress first passing implementing legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, § 5. Indeed, Seminole Tribe continues its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “intrufsion] upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment” by stating that “therefore ... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow[s] Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment.” Id. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (emphasis added); see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99-100, 119-121, 104 S.Ct. 900 (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (<HOLDING>)). Similarly, the Supremacy Clause dictates 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity (B) recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 (C) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (D) holding that suits under 42 usc  1983 do not override state immunity (E) holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity
Output: (D)
that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
Output: (C)
removal was untimely, and thus, this cause should be remanded to state court. The notice of removal must be filed “within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based ...” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West Supp.1991). When, as here, removability can be determined from the face of the original state court petition, the thirty day removal period runs from the date the defendant receives the petition. Harding v. Allied Products Corp., 703 F.Supp. 51, 52-53 (W.D.Tenn.1989) (relying on plain language of § 1446(b), which says “receipt by defendant, through service or otherwise ... ”); Uhles v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 715 F.Supp. 297, 298 (C.D.Cal.1989) (<HOLDING>). See also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirty day period began to run when defendants inhouse counsel received copy of complaint and engaged in settlement negotiations (B) holding that removal under the second paragraph of  1446b did not apply and defendants therefore had removed outside of the thirty day time period triggered at the time of service of the complaint (C) recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired (D) holding that the thirty day time limit was mandatory but not jurisdictional (E) holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff first received notice of an alleged deficiency from the irs not when he received a final determination of tax liability
Output: (A)
could not rely upon such hearsay statements absent some minimal indicia of reliability. See United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005). The argument fails because the requisite minimal indicia of reliability were provided by the specificity of the statements, the fact that those statements were sworn under penalty of perjury, and, more generally, by the evidence of Kinney’s extensive embezzlement throughout the accounts of the Border Lodge Credit Union. See United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that, where “sufficient indicia of reliability” are required to corroborate information presented at sentencing, affidavits “[may] themselves” be sufficient' to resolve disputes); United States v. Schwamborn, 542 Fed.Appx. 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Although Kinney argues that, insofar as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant failed to object to the procedure utilized by the court in determining the amount of restitution at sentencing his challenge on appeal was unpreserved for appellate review (B) holding that trial court did not err (C) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution (D) holding that under ibanez district court did not plainly err in relying on sworn affidavits alone for determining amount of claimants restitution (E) holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver
Output: (D)
omitted). Accordingly we concluded that because misdemeanor battery could be violated through the “least touching,” the statute did not require the use of violent force and thus was not a crime of violence under the federal generic statute. Id. Ortegar-Mendez, however, is readily distinguishable because a conviction under § 273.5(a) requires more than a simple battery. Unlike § 242, which criminalizes the use of “force or violence,” § 273.5(a) contains no differentiating provision. California Penal Code § 273.5(a) requires that the defendant “willfully inflict ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” (emphasis added). The commonsense reading of this language is that § 273.5(a) requires the use of violence. See United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Unlike simple battery, which requires 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege (B) holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that a defendant could not reasonably  dispute that inflicting corporal injury on his spouse involved the use of violence (E) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse
Output: (D)
New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296-97, 73 S.Ct. 299, 97 L.Ed. 333 (1953), the Court extended this constitutional guarantee to governmental entities. We assessed the constitutional adequacy of the official notice provided in bankruptcy proceedings in Matter of Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.1983). There, a creditor argued that its claim in bankruptcy should not be discharged because it had received inadequate notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy plan. Id. at 112 the Board had doubts about the tax estimate, it could have either requested an extension of time in which to file a claim, or filed an estimated claim in any amount, and then sought an amendment of that claim prior to the distribution. See, e.g., Lompa v. Price (In re Price), 871 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Yet the Board does not explain why it did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time (B) holding 57 days notice before deadline to file a complaint under  523 was sufficient notice when creditor had actual notice of filing (C) holding that the operative fact is whether or not the creditor has notice of the debtors bankruptcy proceeding in time to file a timely proof of claim (D) holding that the plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file appeal qualified as a notice of appeal because it met the requirements of rule 4 of the federal rules of appellate procedure (E) holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted
Output: (A)
to follow established procedures for accepting such a plea. After reviewing the state court record, including the transcripts of White’s plea hearing and the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea, the district court concluded that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ resolution of White’s coerced plea and ineffective assistance claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As to White’s claim that the state trial court failed to comply with state procedures regarding the acceptance of a guilty plea, the district court concluded that the claim was not cognizable in a § 2254 petition because it involved a simple alleged error of state law. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court concluded 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas relief is not available to correct errors of state law (B) holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief (C) holding that gardenvariety errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas relief (D) holding that claim of cumulative error does not entitle state prisoner to habeas corpus relief unless 1 claim of cumulative error refers to errors rather than mere unfavorable rulings or events 2 habeas review is not procedurally barred and 3 the errors more likely than not caused a suspect verdict (E) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law
Output: (E)
are still the “law-abiding, responsible citizens” entitled to full Second Amendment rights, because the construction regulations do not come close to implicating the core of their rights, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. See id. (“the [City] must show at least that the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest”). The City satisfies intermediate scrutiny if its “legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the rec ord.” See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 211, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997). Substantial evidence is found not only in the form of hard data. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The City fares better in justifying its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category (B) holding that unconstitutional government action can only be challenged by a person directly affected it cannot be challenged by one invoicing the rights of third parties (C) holding that common knowledge and common sense of one skilled in the art must be considered in determining obviousness (D) holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence (E) holding that challenged ordinances can be justified based on history consensus and simple common sense
Output: (E)
of the account of the method of service, and thus, in the absence of contrary facts, we presume that Pacific was properly served with the complaint. See Nyctl 1997-1 Trust v. Nillas, 288 A.D.2d 279, 732 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (2001). A defendant’s sworn denial of receipt of service, however, rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server’s affidavit and necessitates an evidentiary hearing. See Skyline Agency, Inc. v. Ambrose Coppotelli, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 135, 502 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483-84 (1986). But no hearing is required where the defendant fails to swear to “specific facts to rebut the statements in the process server’s affidavits.” Simonds v. Grobman, 277 A.D.2d 369, 716 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (2000) (citations omitted); see also Nyctl 1997-1 Trust, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (<HOLDING>); Walkes v. Benoit, 257 A.D.2d 508, 684 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that service was proper where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with the defendants wife at the defendants maryland house in which the defendant had lived before moving ahead of his family to arizona where he had purchased a house intending never to return to maryland and to move his family to arizona noting that the service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of service at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode where the service succeeded in actually apprising him of the lawsuit (B) holding defendants failure to substantiate claim that she was not present at place of service fails to rebut presumption of proper service established by process servers affidavit (C) holding that actual notice of lawsuit is no substitute for substantial compliance with frcp 4d1 requiring service on person of defendant on suitable resident at defendants dwelling or on defendants agent a  judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is void and may be set aside at any time pursuant to fedrcivp 60b4 personal jurisdiction is established either by proper service of process or by the defendants waiver of any defect in the service of process (D) holding public service corporation obligated to furnish service to each patron at same price charged to other patrons for substantially similar service (E) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service
Output: (B)
what flows into a sewer treatment plant and what flows out of that plant and pollutes the waters of the state.... Controlling what goes into a sewer system is a practical method of controlling the final effluent. The efficiency, sufficiency, adequacy and capacity of a specified sewer treatment plant are obviously controlled and patently affected by what goes in to such plants. In such manner only, it would seem, can the legislative declaration ... assure that no contaminants are discharged into the waters without being given the degree of treatment or control necessary to prevent pollution. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 8 Ill.App.3d 1018, 290 N.E.2d 892, 894-95 (1972). Accord Armstrong Chemcon, Inc. v. The Pollution Control Board, 18 Ill.App.3d 753, 310 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1974) (<HOLDING>) The public policy of our state is similar. See 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the position of the ose that the rio grandes surface waters are fully appropriated and that new surface water appropriations are not allowed (B) recognizing the need for reasonable preservation of the natural environment and allowing minimum stream flow and natural lake surface level and volume appropriations on behalf of the people of the state of colorado for that purpose (C) recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning (D) holding that waters in utah are of two classes private and public and title to public waters is in the public all are equal owners that is have coequal rights therein (E) holding that sewers were within the statutory definition of waters as being all accumulations of water surface and underground natural and artificial public and private or parts thereof which are wholly or particularly within flow through or border upon the state
Output: (E)
corrective action. 3/3/17 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120-30. For these reasons, the court has determined that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims alleged in the March 3, 2017 Amended Complaint. B. Standing. “Standing is [also] a threshold jurisdictional issue.” Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “The party, invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the[ ] elements [of standing].” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To establish standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), a complaint must allege sufficient facts to show that the plaintiff: (1) is an interested party; and (2) was prejudiced by alleged errors in the procurement process. See Myers, 275 F.3d at 1370 (<HOLDING>); see also Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear (B) holding that standing under  1491b1 is limited to interested parties (C) holding that a district courts review of a  6330d appeal is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery (D) holding that the lack of shareholder standing under texas law does not implicate constitutional standing (E) holding that standing existed
Output: (B)
court, Ghosh’s submissions suggest that he was, understandably, confused by the dual processing of his case by both agencies, and believed that he would have to wait for the SDHR’s administrative process to conclude prior to filing his suit. Were Ghosh represented by counsel, such reasoning perhaps would not be tenable. However, as a pro se plaintiff attempting to navigate a confusing administrative structure, made more confusing by SDHR’s duplicative investigation begun just two weeks after Ghosh was sent the EEOC’s final determination in the case, Ghosh is not unjustified in reaching the conclusion that he was obligated to wait to file suit until the close of the administrative proceedings. Cf. Shumway v. Hendricks, No. 93-CV-485, 1994 WL 672656, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1994) (<HOLDING>). The case file indicates that Ghosh has been 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing same principle (B) recognizing the established principle that the alj is not required to take the claimants assertions of pain at face value (C) recognizing principle (D) holding premature a suit filed before final administrative determination of claimants administrative claim (E) recognizing the principle that an administrative agency error should not work to a claimants detriment
Output: (E)
of a child. It may be true that a child’s interests are generally served by accurate, as opposed to inaccurate or stipulated, paternity determinations. However, it is possible that in some circumstances a child’s interests will be even better served by no paternity determination at all. The best interests of the child standard does not entitle a court to presume that paternity determination is automatically in the child’s best interest. Therefore, absent a showing that such determination is in fact within the child’s best interests, this standard cannot be invoked on behalf of someone other than the child.” Id. at 261. (citations omitted). Other courts have followed the sound reasoning in McDaniels and Ross. See, In re Paternity of “Adam, ” 273 Mont. 351, 903 P.2d 207, 211 (1995) (<HOLDING>); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (B) holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity (C) holding court properly applied best interest of child standard when determining whether placement goal should be changed (D) holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child (E) holding that the best interest of the child standard should be used in deciding whether to grant a paternity petition
Output: (A)
stigma of having his name associated with a criminal investigation,” and (2) a “distinct privacy interest in the contents of the investigative files.” Id at 1091-93. Despite the fact that it was widely known that Mr. DeLay had been the subject of an investigation, the Circuit nonetheless concluded that he still retained a privacy interest in further disclosure of the files entirely. Id. In this case, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs assertion that Mrs. Clinton no longer has an interest in “avoiding the stigma” of having her name associated with the criminal investigation at issue, because it is widely known that this investigation was conducted. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. However, similar to the individuals in American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Justice, 750 F.3d at 933 (<HOLDING>), Mrs. Clinton has a significant privacy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because plaintiffs would be able to file their case in colombia  plaintiffs concerns as to their safety are more appropriately considered in the private interest factors analysis (B) holding that disclosure of information contained in undercover officers personnel files violated the officers privacy interest in preserving their lives and personal security (C) holding social workers efforts would have been futile in part because father never had a relationship with children initially denied paternity as to both and had previously shown no interest in being a parent (D) holding that the defendants had significant privacy interest in being able to proceed forward with their lives by being able to control information concerning criminal charges never filed against them (E) holding that although the defendant was able to impeach the prosecution in certain respects the suppressed information was material under brady because there was a significant difference between the suppressed material and the information to which the defense had access
Output: (D)
App. at 193 (2). 24 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 25 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord La Quinta Inns, Inc. v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 816 (1) (658 SE2d 637) (2008); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 26 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 27 See, e.g., Peterson v. Reeves, 315 Ga. App. 370, 375-78 (3) (727 SE2d 171) (2012) (physical precedent only); Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga. App. 472, 475 (1) (552 SE2d 865) (2001); Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc., 188 Ga. App. 106, 116 (3) (b) (372 SE2d 265) (1988); Misfeldt v. Hosp. Auth. of City of Marietta, 101 Ga. App. 579, 583-84 (115 SE2d 244) (1960). 28 See Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (<HOLDING>); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 194 (2) (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor the district court relied principally if indeed not entirely on the contract language and that doing so was error because inter alia employment contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what the terms may not be used to waive protections granted to an individual under title vii or any other act of congress (B) holding that an inmates suicide was an unforeseeable intervening act for which a detention officer was not liable when inter alia there was no evidence that the inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he took his own life but was instead calm and controlled and appeared to have known what he was doing (C) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (D) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (E) holding that a suicide victim did not kill himself during a rage or frenzy or in response to an uncontrollable impulse when although his physical or psychological pain was obvious and he specifically attributed it to the alleged tortfeasors negligence he recorded a videotape just before he committed suicide in which he appeared to have control of himself and to have known exactly what he was doing
Output: (B)
contends that the application of the primary-jurisdiction doctrine to Plaintiffs’ RICO claims would require the dismissal of those claims, such a contention is incorrect. (Cassens Br. at 20-21.) The principal issue underlying the application of that doctrine is simply whether a federal court should postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to an administrative agency; it does not divest the Court of its subject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 10 L.Ed.2d 915(1963). 2 . At least one federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction has applied the primary-jurisdiction doctrine in favor of a state administrative agency. See Northwinds Abatement, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 69 F.3d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is unclear, however, whether that federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act (B) holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act (C) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (D) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim (E) holding that under the doctrine the district court should have stayed the diversityjurisdiction case pending the state workers compensation commissions final decision on whether the defendant properly paid certain workers compensation claims
Output: (E)
commission of ... unlawful distributing or dispensing of controlled dangerous substances.... Second degree felony murder occurs when a person engages in the commission of any felony other than the unlawful acts set out in section 701.7(B) which results in death. 21 O.S.1991, § 701.8(2). Because unlawful distribution of a controlled dangerous substance is an enumerated felony for first degree felony murder, it cannot serve as the basis for a second degree felony murder charge. Id. Therefore, the State cannot charge McCann or anyone else with second degree felony murder if the underlying felony is unlawful distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. This does not mean that the State cannot charge McCann with second degree depraved mind murder. See Palmer v. State, 871 P.2d at 433 (<HOLDING>). The State’s choices are to charge McCann with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that simple possession is not a lesserincluded offense of distribution of a controlled substance (B) holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder (C) holding that instructions on depraved mind murder were correctly refused when the defendant shot the victim a second time in the chest at close range (D) holding distribution of a controlled dangerous substance which results in death can constitute second degree depraved mind murder (E) holding that states pretrial amendment of the original indictment charging defendant with willful and deliberate first degree murder to add an alternative murder theory of depraved mind murder did not add a different offense and therefore did not prejudice the defendant
Output: (D)
closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement is within the ‘wide range’ of permissible professional legal conduct.” Under Necoechea, Udovic and Bennett’s decision not to object to Wondries’s comments, possibly to avoid highlighting them, was a reasonable strategic decision. Under Strickland’s second prong, even if Udovic and Bennett should have objected, there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of Cunningham’s trial would have been different had Wondries’s statement been stricken from the record. The comments were a single paragraph of a twenty-page argument and the trial judge explained to the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. See Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we have explained that “prosecutors 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper (B) holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence (C) holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made (D) holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court (E) holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it
Output: (B)
provide: If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity!,] ... a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense .... U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (1995). To be considered for a downward departure under this section, the defendant must have committed a nonviolent offense. Valdez argues that, because the shotgun used in the attempted robbery was not loaded and his accomplice was carrying the weapon, his commission of the robbery should be considered nonviolent. We reject this argument and hold that Valdez was not entitled to a downward departure for diminished capacity. See United States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). III. Johnson raises two arguments apart from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (B) holding that defendants commission of the offense of bank robbery precludes any diminished capacity reduction under  5k213 (C) holding judge in bank robbery prosecution did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse juror whose wife was bank employee or juror whose daughter had been victim of bank robbery (D) holding that defendants act of threatening bank customers who otherwise simply watched defendants rob the bank constituted aggravated menacing rather than robbery (E) holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes
Output: (B)
Cir.1996). And, despite Shorter’s contention to the contrary, the fact that the weapons were not in plain view does not preclude a finding of constructive possession. The apartment was not so large, and the weapons were not so well hidden, as to prohibit a reasonable fact finder from concluding that Shorter was aware of their presence. Cf. Kitchen, 57 F.3d at 519-21 (affirming conviction for constructive possession of firearm found in dresser drawer when evidence indicated that defendant had access to bedroom where dresser was located). This is particularly so in view of the fact that ammunition for one of the firearms was found in plain view in the apartment, and a holster was found in the closet of the bedroom where Shorter’s personal papers were located. Cf. Surratt, 172 F.3d at 564 (<HOLDING>). IV. Finally, Shorter argues that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a second state court conviction for simple possession of narcotics is an aggravated felony as defined in 8 usc  1101a43 (B) holding that a spouses joint occupancy of a home where drug paraphernalia was found was insufficient to establish the spouses constructive possession (C) recognizing that firearms are regularly found on narcotics traffickers (D) holding in part that defendant charged with unlawful possession of heroin marihuana and narcotics implements was eligible for a conditional discharge (E) holding that evidence supported finding of constructive possession of concealed narcotics in part because narcotics paraphernalia was found in residence
Output: (E)
federal firearms disabilities which might be vindicated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1337, which establish original district court jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions and congressional commerce regulations, respectively. Rather, the statute states that a person “may make application to the Secretary” and “the Secretary may grant such relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Second, the standard for granting relief is worded so broadly as to connote administrative agency decisionmaking. Section 925(c) states that relief may be granted if “the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the application will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary 97) (<HOLDING>); Burtch v. United States Dep’t of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress clearly intended to suspend  925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus (B) holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925c (C) holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief (D) holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review (E) holding that the only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a denial of relief under  925c
Output: (E)