niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(3) Dr. Hickman’s observation that Seever’s surgeries, residual pain, and physical limitations “have taxed his psychological coping abilities,” ApltApp. at 372. But Dr. Hick man interpreted this information as presenting no more than a slight impairment—meaning that he could still function well—as to understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions, and he declined to identify any other mental capabilities affected by Seever’s depression. We will not fault the ALJ for failing to interpret Seever’s symptoms and test results differently than Dr. Hickman. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir.1996) (observing that an ALJ may not substitute his lay opinion for a medical opinion); Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we convinced that the ALJ should have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may not reweigh evidence (B) recognizing this method (C) recognizing this presumption (D) recognizing this distinction (E) recognizing this rule
Output: (A)
States, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1944). Although “acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded,” id., this does not “mean that if officials act for purely personal reasons, they necessarily fail to act ‘under color of law.’ ” United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir.1991). Rather, “individuals pursuing private aims and not acting by virtue of state authority are not acting under color of law purely because they are state officers.” Tarpley, 945 F.2d at 809 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). For example, a police officer’s purely private acts which are not furthered by his state authority, are not acts under color of state law. See, e.g., Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 411 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada (B) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely (C) holding that a police chief was not acting under color of state law even though he was on duty and at the police station when he assaulted his sisterinlaw over personal arguments about family matters (D) holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes (E) holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation
Output: (C)
in the Readjustment Counseling Service). Ms. Thompson specifically notes that Mr. Luper “did not inform her that [the phone call] was an interview for the vacancy announcement or schedule the interview in advance as was regional practice.” Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 8. “Along with disparate qualifications of the applicants, procedural irregularities in the selection process also may demonstrate that the employer’s justification for a hiring or promotion decision was pretex-tual.” Kilby-Robb v. Duncan, 77 F.Supp.3d 164, 174 (D.D.C.2015) (citing Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1355 (D.C.Cir.2012)). For instance, summary judgment may be inappropriate when contemporaneous documentation supporting the employer’s justification is missing. See, e.g., Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1355-56 (<HOLDING>); Browne v. Donovan, 12 F.Supp.3d 145, 153 
 Holding statements: (A) holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act (B) holding that an ij need not first identify the particular pieces of missing relevant evidence and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant when he or she is not otherwise credible (C) holding that missing documentation of an interviewing panels deliberations coupled with a missing page of interview notes could lead a reasonable jury to doubt the employers interviewbased explanation (D) holding that a jury could accept witnesss explanation as reasonable (E) holding spoliation instruction was warranted in medical malpractice action where two pieces of evidence initially collected by hospital were missing
Output: (C)
has never adopted the Ellerth/Faragher model for vicarious liability of an employer for [ ] harassment by a supervisor,” instead relying on the “known or should have known” standard for assessing liability. Stricker v. Cessford Construction Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 987, 1014 (N.D.Iowa 2001); see McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 499 (Iowa 2001) (using federal case law to flesh out the distinction between quid pro quo harassment and sexually hostile work environment claims under the ICRA); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993) (analyzing propriety of a sexually hostile work environment claim under the ICRA using the same factors as employed by federal courts in analyzing comparable claims under Title VII); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 833-34 (Iowa 1990) (<HOLDING>); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (B) recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims (C) holding that the elements of a hostile environment claim under title vii equally apply under title ix (D) recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context (E) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
Output: (B)
of his convictions were for minor offenses, such as multiple trespasses. But the district court concluded that these offenses showed repeat criminal activity and “a person who has no respect for the law and thinks that he can do whatever he wants to do.” It was within the district court’s “wide discretion” and “substantial latitude” to determine the weight of each factor in sentencing Griffin-Cooke. See United States v. Salazar-Aleman, 741 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir.2013). The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Griffin-Cooke five months above the Guidelines range. This court, finding the variance not substantively unreasonable, need not address Griffin-Cooke’s objections to the upward departure. See, e.g., United States v. Grandon, 714 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an upward variance or departure in the sentence imposed on a career offender based on  3553a factors including criminal history was substantively and procedurally reasonable (B) holding that district courts error was not harmless because the court relied on an improper factor in imposing an upward departure (C) holding district court did not impermissibly engage in triple or quadruplecounting when it relied on prior convictions to determine that the sixteenlevel enhancement applied in calculating the criminal history category in departing upward and in varying upward (D) holding harmless any error in departing upward under ussg  4a13 where district court alternatively imposed reasonable sentence as an upward variance (E) holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure
Output: (D)
a variety of rules of self-restraint have been developed over the years, one of which has surfaced in this case. Generally, courts refuse to decide disputes presented in a lawsuit when the party asserting an issue is not properly situated to seek an adjudication. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct, 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 2005). This doctrine is now called standing, although it began to develop as a doctrinal rule long before a designation of its title. Today, the doctrine not only serves to limit which persons may bring a lawsuit, but it has developed into a larger cultural doctrine, concerned with the “ ‘role of the cour prudential restrictions on judicial action based on policy grounds that help explain a general, compatible approach to standing. See Reitz, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. at 459-61 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we return to our general two-prong test 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing significant differences in text of state and federal equal protection clauses (B) holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state (C) holding federal courts should follow state court decisions that are based on facts essentially indistinguishable from the facts at hand (D) recognizing doctrine (E) recognizing most states essentially follow the federalstanding doctrine but also citing differences in state and federal law
Output: (E)
scheme, an Oklahoma capital sentencing jury's finding of any particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself "convict” a defendant and require the death penalty, and its failure to find any particular aggravating circumstance does not "acquit” a defendant and preclude the death penalty. 20 . The dissent acknowledges that Hogan can prevail only if this Court declines to follow Poland. 21 . The dissent misconstrues our holdings in Crawford v. State, 1992 OK CR 62, 840 P.2d 627, 640-41, Cheney v. State, 1995 OK CR 72, 909 P.2d 74, and Perry v. State, 1995 OK CR 20, 893 P.2d 521, 533-37, and misunderstands the Satta-zahn distinction between a jury’s non-finding of an aggravating circumstance and an acquittal on the merits of murder plus aggravating circumstances th 556 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Hogan’s aggravators were tried to a jury, not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the existence of any fact increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant that fact constitutes an element that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that under the sixth amendment any fact which increases the penalty for a crime  eg by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that sixth amendment requires that a jury not a judge find the existence of any aggravating circumstance and that they be found beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty
Output: (D)
Id. at 1179. In Commonwealth v D'Entremont, 36 Mass App 474, 475; 632 NE2d 1239 (1994), the defendant was arrested for rape and placed in a jail cell after invoking his right to remain silent and to have counsel present. A detective subsequently interviewed the victim and then went to the defendant’s cell. Id. The detective informed the defendant that she had interviewed the victim and that she knew the defendant had advised the police earlier that he did not want to talk, but if he changed his mind, then she would be willing to speak with him. The defendant informed the detective that he wanted to tell his side of the story. Id. The dete 163 (1982) (finding that inquiries about counsel do not constitute interrogation); Foster v Commonwealth, 8 Va App 167, 174; 380 SE2d 12 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing authorities, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation (B) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (C) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (D) holding that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel police may still legitimately inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (E) holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel
Output: (D)
to section 3.03 are (1) the subcontractor industry proviso, and (2) the work preservation theory. Section 8(e)’s con struction industry proviso states that the prohibition against hot cargo agreements does not “apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(e); see, e.g., Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 95 S.Ct. 1830, 44 L.Ed.2d 418 (1975); Gen. Truck Drivers Local No. 957 v. NLRB, 934 F.2d 732, 737-39 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); N.L.R.B. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters Local 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arbitration clause which was included with product mailed to customer and with proviso that customer could return product within 30 days was binding on customer who did not return computer (B) holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction (C) holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption (D) holding delivery work did not fit within construction industry proviso (E) holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you  and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work
Output: (D)
defense in response to the application for attorneys fees. At the time the Secretary raised the defense, the meaning of “final judgment” in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1982) was still undefined. It was unclear at that time whether fee applications had to be filed within 30 days of an appealable judgment by a District Court or within 30 days of the end of the appellate process. See Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants, Inc. v. Pierce, 755 F.2d 177, 179 (D.C.Cir.1985) (noting conflict in circuits); id. at 180 (noting that Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) left issue open). Under these circumstances, we find the Secretary’s position substantially justified. Compare Massachusetts Fair Share v. LEAA, 776 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Grace v. Burger, 763 F.2d 457, 459 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (B) holding governments position unreasonable where government advanced no legal authority for its position and applicable principle of law was long settled (C) recognizing this principle as a settled rule (D) holding that the directors litigating position was not entitled to chevron deference but did warrant skidmore respect on certain issues where the arguments were persuasive and the agencys manual and practice had for some time consistently advanced a reasonable position (E) recognizing that the government agreed not to take a position
Output: (B)
958 S.W.2d 679, 692-93 (Tenn.1997). 5 . The jury convicted Antonio Saulsberry of premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit a robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction for premeditated murder because it was not supported by sufficient evidence. Claude Sharkey entered into a plea bargain agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to felony murder. Kevin Wilson also entered into a plea bargain agreement. Clashaun Sharkey was tried separately, but the record does not reveal the verdict in that trial. 6 . Because we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, we cannot find the error harmless. See Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis (B) holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis (C) holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis (E) holding that the omission of an element is not a structural error subject to automatic reversal but rather  where objected to  is subject to harmless error analysis
Output: (D)
entry of private home when warrantless arrest commenced outside and suspect fled into private home in effort to avoid arrest); Allen v. Wrightson, 800 F.Supp. 1235, 1238 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that law enforcement officers properly forced entry of plaintiffs home to arrest on New York warrant for violation of probation); Edwards v. United States, 364 A.2d 1209 (D.C.App. 1976), reh’g en banc, 379 A.2d 976 (D.C.App.1977) (finding that police were not required to “shrug [their] shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape,” when a suspect attempting to evade a valid investigatory stop fled into a private home) (citations omitted); People v. Land, 198 A.D.2d 438, 604 N. Y.S.2d 146 (App.Div.1993), leave to appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 926, 610 N.Y.S.2d 178, 632 N.E.2d 488 (1994) (<HOLDING>). V The Appellate Division’s holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police properlyfollowed defendant into home after initiating arrest on front stoop (B) holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information (C) holding based on steelman and johnson that evidence of the smell of marijuana emanating from a home a car with an open door and the keys in the ignition in front of the home and pry marks on the homes front door was not sufficient to justify a warrantless entry (D) holding that in die absence of exigent circumstances the mere existence of probable cause does not justify a nonconsensual entry by police into a home without an arrest or search warrant (E) holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest
Output: (A)
Even construing the indemnity provision strictly in favor of TPS, see U.S.B. Acquisition Co. v. Stamm, 660 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995), we find no support whatsoever for TPS’s reading of “attorneys’ fees” as applying only to judgments obtained against SBA by third parties. Nor do we find any basis under Florida law for setting aside an express attorneys’ fee provision in a duly executed, arms-length commercial contract. The cases on which TPS relies are inapposite, as they address only attorneys’ fees incurred in establishing the right to common-law indemnity, not contractual indemnity. See, e.g., Bravo Elec. Co., Inc. v. Carter Elec. Co., 532 So.2d 698, 701 n. 3 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1988) (Cowat, J., dissenting); cf. Kuhns v. Koob, 408 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Avis Renh-A-Car 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers (C) holding that indemnitee may recover attorneys fees incurred in defending indemnity agreement (D) holding theft act entitles defendant to recover reasonable and necessary attorneys fees in successfully defending theft act claim even if defendant does not recover any actual damages (E) holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith
Output: (C)
S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Sparks v. Peacock, plaintiff husband filed an action in superior court seeking contributions for payments on promissory notes executed by both he and his wife. Unlike the Garrison litigants, however, the parties in Sparks had not brought an action for equitable distribution in district court. Based on the wife’s motion, the superior court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, this Court acknowledged the jurisdictional nature of section 7A-244, stating that if the parties had indeed brought an equitable distribution action and such action was pending pursuant to section 7A-244, the superior court would not have jurisdiction over the propriety of payments on the promissory note. Id. at 641, 500 S.E.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>); see also Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C. App. 643, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that defendant correctly stated that the district court has jurisdiction over equitable distribution actions and citing section 7a244 (B) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (C) holding that personal jurisdiction over partner did not follow from jurisdiction over partnership citing sher (D) holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract (E) recognizing the difference between jurisdiction over an action and jurisdiction over an issue and holding that although section 2074207 vests the family court with exclusive jurisdiction over actions to determine paternity under section 621302a1 the probate court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of paternity when the issue is essential to the probate courts determination of heirs
Output: (A)
but concluding that Rule 6-9 is not applicable in this case does not necessarily impede that purpose. First, Rule 2(a)(2) allows an immediate appeal from an order denying intervention. Second, such an appeal does not prohibit the circuit court from maintaining jurisdiction and conducting hearings, as Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-343(c) (Repl.2008) specifically provides that the circuit court retains jurisdiction to conduct further hearings, pending an appeal from any case involving a juvenile out-of-home placement. See also Harwell-Williams v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 368 Ark. 183, 243 S.W.3d 898 (2006). Moreover, not every order resulting from a dependency-neglect case is automatically appealable under Rule 6-9. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Denmon, 2009 Ark. 485, 346 S.W.3d 283 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, as this appeal is governed by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a permanency planning order was not immediately appealable under rule 69 absent a rule 54b certification (B) holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all claims or parties not immediately appealable absent rule 54b certification (D) holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification (E) holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification
Output: (A)
to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court. (Docket No. 14.) On April 2, 2013, defendant Perímetro submitted a motion requesting the Court to reconsider. (Docket No. 17.) II. LEGAL STANDARD “A motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Rosario Rivera v. PS Group of P.R., Inc., 186 F.Supp.2d 63, 65 (D.P.R.2002). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (“Rule 59(e)”) , “the moving party ‘must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence’” in order to prevail. Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir.2012) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992)); see also Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n. 2 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). It is 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law (B) recognizing that a court will ordinarily apply new legislation to pending cases unless manifest injustice would result (C) recognizing examples of exceptional circumstances where the public interest requires that the issues be heard or manifest injustice would result from the failure to consider such issues (D) holding that the complained of statements may be improper personalizations but plain error does not embrace all errors and defendant has not demonstrated manifest injustice (E) holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result
Output: (A)
the defendant complains in his post-trial motion that the composition of the venire deprived him of a fair trial. During his argument on his post-trial motion, the defense counsel again claimed that there were only four minority members on the 44-person venire. The judge stated that five members of the venire had appeared to him to be minority members and denied the post-trial motion. We agree with the State that the defendant has waived review of this issue by failing to challenge the venire by a written motion supported by affidavit. See 725 ILCS 5/114 — 3 (West 1992); People v. Johnson (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 301, 507 N.E.2d 179 (finding waiver when the defendants did not support their written motions with affidavits); People v. Flowers (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 939, 478 N.E.2d 524 (<HOLDING>); People v. Perry (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 422, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two general objections were insufficient to properly preserve the issue (B) holding that an oral challenge to the venire is insufficient (C) holding that the defendants oral motion challenging the venire was insufficient to preserve the issue for review (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review
Output: (C)
That case dealt with whether the deletion of certain details before disclosure was proper under the PDA’s “unreasonable invasion of personal privacy” exception, former ROW 42.17.260(1) (1975); it too does not alter our analysis here. 14 The Washington PDA closely parallels FOIA, and when construing similar provisions, judicial interpretations of that act are helpful in construing the PDA. Hearst Corp., 90 Wn.2d at 128. See also Dawson, 120 Wn.2d at 791. The Newspapers argue that, because the provisions of FOIA and the PDA do not differ as to the proposition that disclosure to some is the equivalent of disclosure to all, FOIA cases are helpful. But in fact, neither the PDA nor FOIA contains such a provision. 15 See, e.g. Naturalization Serv., 721 F. Supp. 552, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Cooper v. Internal Revenue Serv., 450 F. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency could not claim national security disclosure exemption where documents already released to the press (B) holding that documents concerning how to respond to ongoing inquiries from the press and congress about the entry of a government witness and mexican national into the united states fell under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist (D) holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption (E) holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c
Output: (A)
two challenging the summary judgment in favor of Savannah on its release affirmative defense. Because we have concluded the trial court properly granted Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on Savannah’s release defense, which is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the remainder of sub-issues two and three. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. VI. Conclusion We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not continuing the submission date of Savannah’s summary judgment motions, and therefore, we overrule D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s first sub-issue. We also hold the trial court did t, to preserve error, trial court must have expressly or implicitly ruled on request, objection, or motion), and Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 114-15 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 5 . D.R. Horton and DRHI also complain on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for trial court not to grant a continuance when appellant moved in open court to disqualify judge or in the alternative for a continuance to file a proper motion (B) holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel (C) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (D) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (E) holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing
Output: (E)
unconstitutionally forecloses meaningful access to our state courts by not providing for de novo review by a district court following an adverse arbitration award. The right of access to the courts is one aspect of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and also is protected by the provisions protecting due process of law, as set out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in Article II, Section 18, of the New Mexico Constitution. Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 696, 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (1988); Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 426, 659 P.2d 311, 312 (1983); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing fundamental fairness requires criminal defendants be granted a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense (B) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (C) holding that the constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense  (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case
Output: (E)
of all evidence, we cannot say that we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the judgment.”); Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 356 Pa.Super. 42, 47, 514 A.2d 133, 137 (1986) (same conclusion); Commonwealth v. Petrino, 332 Pa.Super. 13, 29, 480 A.2d 1160, 1168 (1984) (same conclusion); but see Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 415, 543 A.2d 1068, 1072 (1988) (introduction of statements made by lay witnesses regarding the voluntariness of a confession found to be harmless error); Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 355, 365 A.2d 1237, 1244 (1976) (curative instruction given following improper admission of statement regarding right to silence held sufficient not to require mistrial); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 246 Pa.Super. 132, 138, 369 A.2d 846, 849 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, no such case holds that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis when the defendants guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt (B) recognizing that harmless error analysis is appropriate even if presumptively coerced confession is improperly introduced (C) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  (E) holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature
Output: (B)
an immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual determinations, Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 816 (9th Cir.2001), and review de novo due process claims, Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.2000). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Echeverria-Ruiz’s application for withholding of removal because she failed to establish that the guerrillas targeted her because of her political opinion or any other statutorily protected ground. See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the record does not compel a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners who apply for withholding of removal must establish that a statutorily protected ground was a reason for their persecution (B) holding that dangers arising from police work do not support a claim of persecution on account of a protected ground (C) holding that random criminal acts bore no nexus to a protected ground (D) holding that harassment by the farc for refusing to cooperate with their demands for money did not establish a nexus to a statutorily protected ground (E) holding that persecution by militants for purpose of recruitment does not establish a nexus to a protected ground
Output: (E)
with the Native American employment preference. D. Alaskan Native Corporation Liability Under The Americans With Disabilities Act 1. The Americans With Disabilities Act Under Title I of the ADA, all “covered entities” are prohibited from discriminating against an individual on the basis of a disability, ... in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “covered entity” is defined as “an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2); see also Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Like Title VII, Congress has exempted certain 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that whether a consumer survey should be admitted depends among other things on whether the questions are leading or suggestive  (B) holding that whether an employer is within adas coverage depends a great deal  on circumstances (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred (E) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage
Output: (B)
10-cr-3029, 2014 WL 1018081, *22 (W.D.Mo. Mar. 14, 2014) ("The Court ... joins with other district courts in concluding that the submissions fall short of the mark in establishing that the FDPA is unconstitutional.”); United States v. Sablan, Case No. 08-cr-259, 2014 WL 172543, *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014) ("This Court agrees with the other courts that have addressed and rejected the position taken by Defendant ... on whether the FDPA is incomprehensible.”). See also United States v. Williams, Case No. 08-cr-00070, 2013 WL 1335599, *17-*18 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) United States v. Jacques, 2011 WL 1675417, *11-*13 (D. Vt. May 4, 2011); United States v. Taylor, 635 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1247 (D.N.M. 2009); United States v. Green, Case No. 06-cr-19, 2008 WL 4000901, *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mikos, Case No. 02-cr-137, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that complaint seeking to enjoin highway construction project pending completion of environmental impact statement for larger project no longer presented any live controversy after highway project was completed and thus was moot and provided no basis for federal court jurisdiction (B) holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage (C) holding that the movant has the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion (D) holding empirical studies including the capital jury project provide no basis for undermining the constitutionality of the fdpa a statute that has withstood innumerable attacks since its passage in 1994 (E) holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings
Output: (D)
being under the influence of a drug necessarily poses a threat of concealing (and thereby using or trafficking) additional drugs in jail during the limited time between booking and bail, or booking and placement in the general population. If not, it was unreasonable to assume that Way harbored drugs in some cavity or other. “Reasonable suspicion may be based on such factors as the nature of the offense, the arrestee’s appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record.” Giles, 746 F.2d at 617. Way was under the control of the arresting officer from the time she was taken into custody at work until booking. The officer perceived no indication that she was carrying drugs or contraband. Compare, e.g., People v. Wade, 208 Cal.App.3d 304, 306-07, 256 Cal.Rptr. 189, 190-91 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Hanson conducted a pat down search before 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search (B) holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant (C) holding that private physician who conducted cavity search of drug suspect pursuant to facially valid search warrant was entitled to qualified immunity in suspects  1983 action where he did not act on his own initiative or out of selfinterest he was uniquely qualified to perform search procedure and where court found that extending qualified immunity to physicians under the circumstances of this case would benefitf society by effectuating acceptable means to execute body cavity searches pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause and benefit the party being searched by providing a safe means of conducting the search in a medically approved manner (D) holding probable cause to be required for strip and visual body cavity searches (E) holding that a body cavity search was justified by the arresting officers observation of the suspect apparently trying to put something beneath his waistband
Output: (E)
72, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033) (“So long as the defect in removal procedure does not involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, there is no reason why either State or Federal courts or the parties, should be subject to the burdens of shuffling a case between two courts that each have subject matter jurisdiction.”). Admittedly, the procedural manner by which this case came to federal court is unorthodox. It is here because the Arndts did not seek to remand the case until four months after it was removed, and only then after the issue was interposed by Magistrate Judge Humphreys. There is no legal principle, however, prohibiting a claimant from accepting an opposing party’s choice of forum. See, e.g., In re Continental Cas. Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, if subject matter 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a party opposing a claim may choose the forum in the absence of objection (B) recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties (C) holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection (D) holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm (E) holding that the question is not whether the party opposing abstention can demonstrate that the federal forum is a better or more convenient forum but whether the inconvenience of the federal forum is so great that this factor points towards abstention
Output: (A)
reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that “even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline.” Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of “prohibited activities” and absence of definition for “market power” as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution
Output: (B)
to him, Martinez has not adduced competent evidence that Hubbard intentionally discriminated against him because of his race. Though Martinez claims that Hubbard lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Acura, as I -noted .above* there is no genuine dispute that Hubbard discovered that, the Acura’s license plates were stolen before pulling the vehicle over. Thus, it is undisputed that Hubbard had a non-discriminatory reason to initiate the stop. Courts have held that a plaintiffs equal protection claim may stand even if his arrest was valid and supported by probable cause when the plaintiff sufficiently alleged and provided evidence of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or another protected, class. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. Harris 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the equal protection clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of race or assumptions drawn from their race (B) holding that the equal protection clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race (C) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (D) holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender (E) holding that plaintiff stated viable equal  protection clause claim where officer humiliated and harassed the plaintiff on basis of race prior to and during a lawful arrest
Output: (E)
for the jury was whether Dr. Cooper consented, and not whether a battery had been committed. Id. at 4-6. The trial court again overruled Appellants’ objection. Following deliberations, the jury answered the aforementioned inquiry in the negative, finding that no battery had been committed. The jury further found in favor of Appellees on all remaining claims. On appeal, Appellants raised various issues. Relevant here is their challenge to the jury instruction on lack of consent. The trial court explained in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that there is no separate tort of lack of consent, and that an action based on the absence of a patient’s consent constitutes a battery. Trial Court Opinion, dated 10/15/09, at 8-9 (citing Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 568 Pa. 574, 798 A.2d 742 (2002) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, the trial court found that its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery (B) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two (C) holding that an operation without the patients consent sounds in battery (D) holding that in pennsylvania lack of informed consent claims utilize a battery standard that is a physician commits battery where the patient does not consent to the procedure on his person thus constituting a harmful or offensive contact (E) holding that a patient who endures an operation without his consent may base his action on a tortious battery
Output: (C)