niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
an individual has adequately stated a pri-ma facie claim. Cf. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1995) (“An inquiry into the reasonableness of procedures ... belies a claim that liability under [15 U.S.C.] § 1681e(b) must be predicated on the effect of that information once disseminated .... The district court was required to consider whether [the defendant] was liable under § 1681e(b) before it determined that [the plaintiff] had suffered no recoverable damages.”). Several courts have previously recognized the possibility that a claim for actual or compensatory damages under FCRA may include compensation for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury or out-of-pocket expenses. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any (B) holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless (D) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (E) holding that even in the absence of outofpocket expenses or costs incurred the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding actual and punitive damages when appellees testified about how they felt when appellant obtained their credit reports and violated their privacy thereby causing them some emotional distress
Output: (E)
Jones v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 72 B.R. 956 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1987); McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter), 59 B.R. 944 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986). Palmer argues that the BAP erred in distinguishing among the various subsections of section 523 on the issue of the discharge of punitive damages. He notes that courts have found that punitive damages are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4), which bars discharge of debts “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), and under section 523(a)(6), which bars discharge of debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See, e.g., Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable (B) holding that punitive damages are not fines (C) holding punitive damages nondischargeable under  523a6 when such damages are based on the same conduct as the underlying nondischargeable judgment (D) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that both actual and punitive portions of judgment for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity were nondischargeable (E) holding a court may not award punitive damages
Output: (A)
parameters of her administrative complaint.” Def.’s Reply at 6. The plaintiff, however, included a hostile work environment claim in her EEO complaint filed in March 2005. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 8. Accordingly, the defendant has not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985). 3 . Failing to provide notice or requiring a party to expend significantly more time, money or effort than reasonably expected may constitute undue prejudice. See, e.g., Marcoux v. Shell Oil Products Co. LLC, 524 F.3d 33, 43 n. 9 (1st Cir.2008) (determining that “defendants suffer undue prejudice as a result of delay or lack of notice’’); Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 210 n. 5 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted); Dzwonkowski v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that laches is an affirmative defense (B) holding that fair use is an affirmative defense (C) holding that unpleaded affirmative defense was properly considered by the district court where plaintiff had notice of the defense and an opportunity to respond (D) holding that a defendant avoids  causing undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff with notice and the opportunity to challenge an affirmative defense (E) holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice
Output: (D)
waived his attorney-client privilege when his attorney failed to make timely objections to questions that it alleged sought privileged communications. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, many of the questions Airdata asked did not seek confidential communications. Therefore, no objection was necessary to preserve the privilege. Second, Jenney’s current attorney did make timely objections to those questions actually seeking confidential communications. The fact that Jenney’s attorney had to interrupt him to make the objection is not sufficient to establish a waiver. Because the objections were made as soon as the confidential nature of the communication became apparent, Jenney did not waive the privilege. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege (C) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (D) holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts (E) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
Output: (A)
no clear textual invitation for courts to explore the “employer’s awareness,” Dissent at 971, whatever that indeterminate phrase might mean. In short, we fail to see how the dissent’s special new rule of imputation for punitive damages finds any grounding in the statute’s “plain language.” We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland 
 Holding statements: (A) holding improper conduct to be an element of the tort of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship (B) holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy (C) holding that an accounting is an extraordinary remedy (D) holding that under  1981a pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy to be reserved for egregious eases and are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort (E) recognizing recovery under common law for tort damages that are proven to be reasonably foreseeable damages of ones tortious acts
Output: (D)
him from filing his petition on time. To be eligible for equitable tolling, a petitioner must “demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances.” Valverde, 224 F.3d at 134. The district court observed that Rivera still had a couple of weeks to file before his § 2255 motion was due once he received the requested documents. The court acted within its discretion in concluding that this was enough time for Rivera to have filed a timely, even if unpolished, petition. See Belot v. Burge, 490 F.3d 201, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). [2] The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was within the courts reasonable discretion to conclude that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he ought reasonably to have begun his preparation earlier and filed an unpolished  but timely  petition rather than wait to file his more polished petition until the week that the deadline expired  internal quotation marks and alterations omitted (B) holding equitable tolling was not warranted where counsel misadvised client as to the deadline to file a habeas petition (C) holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended (D) holding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed his habeas petition more than two months late (E) holding that the habeas petition did not qualify for equitable tolling because the petitioner discovered that his attorney had lied about filing a petition in early 2008 and yet the petitioner did not file one himself until nearly two years later
Output: (A)
“[t]he ultimate question ... is whether [the contractor] adequately disclosed to the Government the ‘accurate, complete, and current’ ... costs .... [and] whether the Government relied on the overstated costs to its detriment.” 576 F.2d at 914 (emphasis added). In other words, a contract price has been increased by defective cost or pricing data when the government relied on the defective data to its detriment in agreeing to the contract price. That reliance on defective data is a necessary element of a TINA claim was reinforced by this court’s decision in Universal Restoration, Inc. v. United States, in which we found that the government could not recover on its TINA claim, even though the contract price was calculated using defective data. 798 F.2d 1400, 1402, 1406 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In that case, we held that the presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a decision below is correct it will not be disturbed on appeal even though the lower court relied upon wrong reasons (B) holding that government could not recover under tina even though billings were calculated on the basis of the 115 markup for overhead and the court aceepted as correct that universals overhead rate was in fact lower than 115 (C) holding that the addition of a enough cereal to dog food to place it in a tariff provision with a lower rate of duty was within the importers right to fashion merchandise to obtain a lower rate of duty (D) holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point (E) holding on appeal the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower court has erred in the respect complained of
Output: (B)
bar, Carlock and Reid were engaged in a “minor confrontation” about ten to twenty feet away from him. (J.A. 54-55.) 7 Given the context in which the police report was used to cross-examine Decatur, we assume thatit was used under the past recollection recorded exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(5). The police report was not admitted into evidence. We do note, however, that the prosecution did not object to the use of the police report and the trial court judge did not explicitly rule on the use of the police report during cross-examination. 8 “[Credibility] determinations are the sole province of the jury.” Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Henry, 232 Fed. Appx. 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2007); see also U.S. v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 598 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The Third Circuit has held that the testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable (B) holding that the credibility determinations of hearing officers are afforded special deference (C) holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence (D) holding that credibility determinations are for the jury (E) holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence
Output: (D)
added); see Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir.1996) (finding that a labor union could be liable under Title VII). In the Court’s view, the Plaintiffs allegations as to her alleged employment relationship with the Union are conclusory and fail to satisfy the liberal pleading standards in Title VII cases. See e.g. Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713-14 (2d Cir.1994) (dismissing the claims based on the plaintiffs conclusory assertions of ra cial and gender discrimination against a university); Timmons v. City of Hartford, 288 F.Supp.2d 712, 717-18 (D.Conn.2003) (dismissing the complaint based in part on the fact that no factual allegations were provided in support of the discrimination claim); Richards v. Frank, No. CV-89-3087, 1991 WL 35502, at *1-*2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1991) (<HOLDING>). The only nonconclu-sory allegations of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs allegations of abuse did not amount to the allegations of torture required by  1605a7 to survive a motion to dismiss (B) recognizing inferential factual allegations to defeat a motion to dismiss (C) holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim (D) holding it appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss a discrimination claim where claim is not supported by factual allegations (E) holding that factual disputes are inappropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss
Output: (D)
employee,” Ms. Hays had “a reasonable expectation of continued employment based upon district policy” and could only be terminated “for cause.” Thus, Ms. Hays had a substantive due process right to continued employment. See Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 528. But Ms. Hays has failed to show that the District’s conduct violated her right to continued employment in a manner that “is truly conscience shocking.” See id. (quoting Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574). Ms. Hays argues that the District terminated her employment “on the basis of comments made by co-workers whose names [Superintendent Timothy] could not recall, making vague charges which he never shared with Hays.” Further, Ms. Hays asserts that Superintendent Timothy’s decision was based on achieving an 8 out of 9 on Mr. Frost’s Post-Con 529 (<HOLDING>). Here, the District states that it terminated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a career teachers substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance (B) holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim (C) recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim (D) holding that a law school professors substantive due process rights were not violated despite his allegations that the university failed to warn him that his conduct was prohibited (E) recognizing a plaintiffs  1988 claim predicated on an alleged violation of his substantive due process rights
Output: (D)
as are other similar terms such as “bar,” “lounge,” “pub,” “saloon,” or “tavern.” All serve alcohol alone or both food and alcohol. B Although AHM devotes less attention to its trade dress argument, it nevertheless maintains that Raleigh Ale House violated AHM’s rights in its trade dress, both as to the exterior and interior appearance of its facilities. At oral argument, however, when AHM was confronted with the observation that the exterior appearances of its .various facilities differed significantly in shape, size, style, color, and materials, AHM appeared to abandon its claim with respect to the exterior and to press only its claim that it had a proprietary interest in the appearance of the interior of its facilities, including its service. See Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 370 (<HOLDING>); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the prohibition on official torture is clear and unambiguous it can serve as a basis for suit under the ats (B) holding that the defendants failure to timely serve a notice of appeal and docketing statement did not prejudice the plaintiff and therefore would not serve as a basis to dismiss the appeal (C) holding that crab house is a generic term referring to a class of restaurants that serve crabs (D) holding that a choice of law provision in a lease did not serve as a basis for jurisdiction (E) recognizing that a restaurants design and decor may serve as the basis for a tradedress suit
Output: (E)
initiative process.” Doe, 130 S.Ct. at 2819 (citations and quotations omitted). Finally, disclosure requirements may permit accurate record-keeping. “[Djisclo-sure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of ... contribution limitations.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68, 96 S.Ct. 612. Such records further enhance the public’s future associational rights by offering voters information about which policies those seeking their vote have previously endorsed. Both the Supreme Court and our court have rejected facial challenges to contribution disclosure requirements in several cases, holding that these substantial interests outweigh the modest burdens that the challenged disclosures impose on First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S.Ct. at 2820 (<HOLDING>); Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 805-11; Human Life of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in conflict of laws analysis that it was proper to apply the law of the state of washington as to the measure of damages which involved the substantive rights of the parties (B) holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process (C) holding that states interest in preserving integrity of sport of horse racing justifies lack of predeprivation hearing (D) holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state (E) holding that a state law authorizing private parties to obtain copies of referendum petitions is substantially related to the important interest of preserving the integrity of the electoral process
Output: (E)
supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent” in addition to any vicarious liability that may be imposed via the agent’s actions. We hold that plaintiffs under the ICRA may proceed against the employer on either a direct negligence or vicarious liability theory for supervisor harassment in a hostile-work-environment case. The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, with the burden of proof on the employer, applies only to claims of vicarious liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. at 2292; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (B) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (C) holding because the court applied the negligence standard the faragher defense is inapplicable (D) holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud (E) holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue
Output: (C)
guilty. [¶ 8] Rule 11(a)(1) establishes that a defendant must be treated as having pled not guilty if the court has refused to accept a guilty or nolo contendere plea. If the court does not affirmatively accept the plea and decides instead to reserve its decision, such action constitutes a refusal, at least temporarily, to accept the plea. See 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 11.2 at IV-27 (1992) (“If the court decides to accept the plea, it does so affirmatively on the record.”). By operation of Rule 11(a)(1), therefore, Willis’s decision to retract his nolo contendere pleas, communicated to the court prior to its acceptance of the pleas, required the court to enter pleas of not guilty on Willis’s behalf. Accord North Dakota v. Welch, 356 N.W.2d 147, 149 (N.D.1984) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 9] We hasten to add that if the court had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state (B) holding jeopardy attaches when the guilty plea is accepted (C) holding criminal defendant does not have constitutional right to have guilty plea accepted by court (D) holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted by the court based on ndr crim p 32d3 which states that a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court  alteration in original (E) holding that a criminal defendant must provide a fair and just reason to support withdrawal of his guilty plea even when that plea has not yet been accepted by the district court
Output: (D)
to facilitate William’s pick ups and returns of the children. The record reflects that Lacey, out of distrust, often would record her interactions with William. William admitted that he routinely avoids interaction with Lacey unless necessary. After reviewing the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the circumstances of the children or a conservator have materially and substantially changed since rendition of the divorce decree and that it is in the children’s best interests to modify the decree to give Lacey the exclusive right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of the children. See Swaab v. Swaab, 282 S.W.3d 519, 534 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Baltzer, 240 S.W.3d at 477 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting mother the exclusive right to consent to all psychiatric and psychological treatment of the child (C) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time (D) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child
Output: (B)
sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the verdict awarding Hinton $10,000 in back pay. REVERSED and REMANDED for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. THOMPSON and TORPY, JJ„ concur. 1 . Interestingly, the federal circuit courts are not in agreement on the issue of whether a claim under Title VII's participation clause must be filed in “good faith". Some courts have held that charges made under both the opposition clause and the participation clause include a reasonable, good faith requirement. See Mattson. Other federal courts have held that a plaintiff merely has to file a charge with the EEOC, regardless of whether it was filed in good faith or not, to be protected under the participation clause. See Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has refused to decide 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff must make concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm denying motion to quash subpoena to undercover identity of doe defendants where inter alia plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show it could establish prima facie claim (B) holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two (C) holding to establish a claim of retaliation under title viis participation clause plaintiff must make a prima facie case by showing that defendants discharged him because he filed a claim with the eeoc (D) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (E) holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct
Output: (C)
district courts and state courts have found judges to be judicially immune from criminal charges relating to the performance of judicial duties. See Chaplin, 54 F.Supp. at 934-35 (sustaining a judge’s plea at bar that he should be immune from indictment and prosecution for depriving a citizen of civil rights “under the color of any law” in judicial proceedings in his court); In re Petition of Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355, 1360 (1979) (finding “that the petitioners are quasi-judicial and/or quasi-proseeutorial officers ... [and] in the absence of allegations of bad faith or corruption, the petitioners, in granting the extensions and variance, are insulated from criminal prosecution for the consequences of their actions”); Commonwealth v. Tartar, 239 S.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Ky.App.1951) (<HOLDING>); In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 502 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983 (B) holding that the circuit court properly sustained a demurrer to the indictment of a judge for misfeasance in office because judges acting in their official capacities should be protected from harassment by either civil suits or criminal prosecutions (C) holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983 (D) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages
Output: (B)
Raye Ellen Stiles appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging, among other claims, housing discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record. Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 733-34 (9th Cir.2012). We affirm. Summary judgment on Stiles’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and public humiliation was proper because she already litigated these claims in Arizona state court, and, thus, res judicata precludes her from bringing such claims in federal court. See Sunkist Growers v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment on Stiles’ federal claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities (B) holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim (C) holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child (D) holding that under arizona law a litigant may not bring a claim identical to one she has previously litigated (E) holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea
Output: (D)
the child can, if necessary, be protected”)- Instead, to determine if a child’s statements were taken in preparation for a legal proceeding, we look to the “totality of the circumstances to determine whether the interviews were primarily to investigate the allegations or primarily to prepare a legal action against the accused.” Id. The “factual circumstances as interpreted by the trial court must govern,” and we will not disturb the court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Blackburn, 162 Vt. 21, 24, 643 A.2d 224, 226 (1993). ¶ 23. The interview here was plainly investigatory. Z.S. had not disclosed any abuse before he was interviewed for the first time, nor did the investigators possess any knowledge that he had been abused. See Fisher, 167 Vt. at 42, 702 A.2d at 45 (<HOLDING>); Blackburn, 162 Vt. at 25, 643 A.2d at 226 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors (B) holding that when no appeal was taken from an initial application for postconviction relief the claims were fully and finally determined in that previous proceeding (C) holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds (D) holding that statements gathered during a childs initial interview with dcf and police which was held within a week of the initial disclosure to dcf were not taken in preparation for a legal proceeding (E) holding because an initial order contemplated the subsequent entry of a judgment the initial order was not considered a final adjudication
Output: (D)
attorneys’ fees can accrue after the filing of a suit, while punitive damages do not — is meaningful. Once post-filing of suit tender of compensatory damages is accomplished, attorneys’ fees can accrue continuously until the matter is fully resolved, thus presenting a cognizable harm sufficient to prevent a case from having been rendered moot by post-suit tender of compensatory damages, unlike punitive damages. See, e.g., Bates, 271 Ill.Dec. 402, 785 N.E.2d at 62 (“Defendant failed to tender the attorney fees recoverable under section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act, and thus, failed to tender the ‘full amount’ owed to plaintiff.”). Punitive damages, thus, should not be available as a matter of law as a result of the pre-tria 3d 1075, 248 Ill.Dec. 721, 734 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (2000) (<HOLDING>); DeCoteau v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Company, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted (C) holding that the dismissal of a class action suit after the representative plaintiffs claims became moot was proper noting that  because the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the district court the decision that the claims of the purported representative were moot dictated the dismissal of the uncertified class action as well quoting bd of school commrs v jacobs 420 us 128 130 95 sct 848 850 43 led2d 74 78 1975 per curiam (D) holding that because no class was certified at the time tender rendered moot haymans claims dismissal of the entire suit was warranted (E) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed
Output: (D)
Co. v. Gomez, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 663, 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1528, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013)). Claims for damages are largely able to avoid mootness challenges. 13C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3553.3 (3d ed. 2017). Damages claims “are retrospective in nature— they compensate for past harm. By definition, then, such claims cannot be moot.” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 622 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a damages claim is not rendered moot because a related injunc-tive-relief claim becomes moot. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 370 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable (B) holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy (C) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (D) holding that a claim for back pay survived even after the ongoing harm an injunction sought to remedy was removed (E) holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion
Output: (D)
is prohibited by the rule of lenity. Under this tool of interpretation, courts must interpret an ambiguous law in favor of a criminal defendant. People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1267 (Colo.1983), abrogated on other grounds by Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Colo.1984). But the rule of lenity is a rule of last resort that we apply only if ambiguity remains after we have exhausted all other tools of interpretation. See People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1195-98 (Colo.2003) (attempting to ascertain the meaning of a provision of the Colorado Hazardous Waste Management Act by turning to legislative history and harmonizing the provision with relevant federal laws before applying the rule of lenity); see also United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1113 (10th Cir.2015) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Here, our application of Colorado rules of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the rule of lenity applies only after courts exhaust all other evidence of congressional meaning (B) holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines (C) holding the rule of lenity inapplicable where the defendants interpretation failed to give meaning to each statutory provision (D) recognizing that the rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions but also to the penalties they impose (E) holding that the rule of lenity applies only if the provision being construed is still ambiguous after the application of normal rules of construction
Output: (A)
)4 mile away. Fifth, also at this time, a vehicle registered to Nelson pulled in and parked next to Miller’s car. Sixth, the note at the boat ramp informed Kaplan that he was being watched. Seventh, Miller and Nelson both left the lake at the same time Kaplan left. Eighth, Nelson arrived at the same McDonald’s immediately after Kaplan arrived. Ninth, a passenger from Nelson’s car approached Kaplan’s vehicle and peered into Kaplan’s vehicle from a distance of 10 feet away. Tenth, Nelson drove home from the McDonald’s using what would normally be described as counter-surveillance techniques. Finally, Miller changed his story as to why he was at the lake that day at that time. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-90, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that the conspiratorial agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence including the acts and conduct of the coconspirators and the inferences that may be drawn from their acts (C) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (D) recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence (E) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award
Output: (B)
Emmert Industrial Corp. v. Douglass, 130 Or App 267, 269, 881 P2d 827, rev den 320 Or 325 (1994) (court’s first inquiry is whether order appealed from is appealable, even if neither party raises question). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we have jurisdiction under section 16(a)(1)(A) of the FAA, which provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from * * * an order * * * refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title.” When federal claims are brought in state courts, “state courts are bound to follow federal substantive law but are free to follow their own practices as to matters which are strictly procedural.” Geris v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 277 Or 381, 383, 561 P2d 174 (1977); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 US 131, 138, 108 S Ct 2302, 101 L Ed 2d 123 (1988) (<HOLDING>). State courts, however, may not follow state 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rules governing criminal cases apply to  3582c2 proceedings (B) recognizing that states may establish procedural rules governing litigation in their own courts (C) holding that the rules governing interpretation of a lease are the same as those governing interpretation of a contract (D) holding that states likewise retain immunity from private suit in their own courts which congress may not abrogate by article i legislation (E) recognizing strong preference that children live in their own homes with their own families
Output: (B)
or were not in existence at the moment of the “effective date” of the Mutual Release Agreement, i.e., when the cause of action for negligence accrued, is needed so the circuit court could properly determine whether the claim for damages was precluded by the language of the Mutual Release Agreement. “[A] cause further proceedings on all issues. We fully expect that other motions for summary judgment will likely be filed in the future, after further development of the facts of this case. At that time, the circuit court may be required to resolve as a matter of law whether the mutual release is a general release or if it is ambiguous as to the extent of its scope. We leave those questions to another day. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Cape Coral Plumbing, Inc., 920 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla. 3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed (B) holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute (C) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed (D) holding that summary judgment was precluded because contract clause limiting liability was unclear (E) holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment
Output: (D)
541 (1992). Put another way, the State may regulate expression on non-content grounds through “reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.” The Supreme Court cases teach that the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with them message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Under this test, the State’s action in moving all newsracks to a concrete pad appears content-neutral. It did not differentiate based on the content of the speech. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-429, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Like the ban on posted signs which the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (B) holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional (C) holding ban violated the sherman act (D) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (E) holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech
Output: (A)
that is not compensable under the IDEA. Defs.’ Opp’n at 15. They therefore contend that the total 7.93 hours billed for administrative work should be disallowed from the plaintiffs fee petition, reducing the overall attorney’s fees total by $1,204.94. Id. at 16. The plaintiff counters that these tasks were necessary, de minimis clerical functions that cannot be separated from clearly billable work. PL’s Mot. at 9-10. Pure clerical tasks are not reimbursable in an award of attorney’s fees. See Role Models, 353 F.3d at 973 (“purely clerical or secretarial tasks are not reimbursable at either attorney or paralegal rates”) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989)); Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 254 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, certain de minimis clerical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mill and gin could be considered part of an exempt homestead if they were part of the exempt realty (B) holding that purely clerical tasks are not reimbursable because they ought to be considered part of normal administrative overhead (C) recognizing that the possibility that pennsylvania district attorneys could be considered state actors to the extent that they are enforcing state law and performing other purely prosecutorial duties (D) recognizing that docket entries form no part of the record that may be considered on appeal because they are inherently unreliable (E) holding that consequential damages are not to be considered
Output: (B)
supply coverage were not existed. Mgmt. Specialists, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 32, 37 (Colo.App.2004). 3. Common Law Duty to Mitigate In addition to the contractual language, RK argues that it had a common law duty to mitigate because “[i]t is well-settled law in Colorado that an injured party may not recover damages for injuries which could reasonably have been avoided.” (RK Mot. at 10 (citing Fair v. Red Lion Inn, 943 P.2d 431, 437 (Colo.1997)).) RK asserts that the corollary to this rule is that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for expenditures made in attempting to mitigate damages. (Id. (citing Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 946 (Colo.1985)).) In Colorado, the common law duty to mitigate damages arises from a breach. See Fair, 943 P.2d at 437 (<HOLDING>); Tull, 709 P.2d at 946 (holding that plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (B) holding that employee had duty to mitigate damages following breach of employment contract by accepting offer of reinstatement (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages (E) holding that no reporters record was required in suit to recover damages for breach of employment contract because the claim for damages was liquidated and proved by the employment contract attached to the petition
Output: (B)
that suits based on state common law are included for purposes of preemption analysis). Delta also argues that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint presents essentially the same preemption issues as the breach-of-contract claim the Court already dismissed. Def.’s Br. at 1, 7. According to Delta, since the ADA preempted Plaintiffs’ state-law contract claim because it required examination of EU 261, Plaintiffs EU 261 claim should be similarly preempted because the same underlying law is involved. Id. at 1. In support of its .argument, Delta cites several cases where, courts have held that a breach-of-contract claim was preempted when the resolution of the claim would have required interpreting foreign law. Id. at 6 (citing Onoh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 613 F.3d 596, 600-01 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Sanchez v. Aerovias De Mexico, S.A. De C.V., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding segregation was necessary because breachofcontract claim required proof of different elements than other claims (B) holding breachofcontract claim preempted because the plaintiff tried to enlarge the federal rights that were incorporated into the contract (C) holding breachofcontract claim was preempted (D) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted (E) holding breachofcontract claim preempted because contract did not explicitly incorporate a federallaw provision
Output: (C)
is to convey to the juiy the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence so the jury can apply the proper legal principles to the facts and arrive at a proper conclusion based on the law and the evidence.” People v. Peebles, 125 Ill. App. 3d 213, 217, 465 N.E.2d 539 (1984). If an IPI instruction does not state the law, the proffered instruction given on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument. If an appropriate IPI instruction does exist it must be used; however, the decision to give or refuse a non-IPI instruction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(a); People v. Thomas, 175 Ill. App. 3d 521, 528, 529 N.E.2d 1071 (1988); see also People v. Sims, 265 Ill. App. 3d 352, 362, 638 N.E.2d 223 (1994) (<HOLDING>). An abuse of discretion occurs in refusing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (B) holding that illinois courts give preference to applicable ipi instruction unless that particular instruction does not accurately state the law in that case the instructions may be modified or supplemented when the facts of a particular case make them inadequate (C) holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel (D) holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error (E) holding that a judgment on appeal constitutes the law of the case as to particular issues decided and is applicable throughout subsequent stages of the case
Output: (B)