niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
which offered a coherent theory of innocence based on the very limited exculpatory evidence in the record. A defense counsel need not be the equal of Clarence Darrow to pass constitutional muster, see Wise v. Smith, 735 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1984), and in this case petitioner was plainly afforded constitutionally adequate representation at his trial. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, I recommend that the writ be denied and the petition dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from this date to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court 42, 43 (2d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044, 88 S.Ct. 1643, 20 L.Ed.2d 305 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 1 . By the time of trial, Mr. White and Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court must resolve all claims for relief raised in a habeas petition regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied (B) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (C) holding that the insufficiency of factual data necessary for the resolution of a question presented is a reason for declining to grant declaratory relief (D) holding that insufficiency of indictment is not a basis for habeas relief (E) holding that remand for new trial is remedy for factual insufficiency of evidence
Output: (D)
task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). Section 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) states in part that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.” (emphasis added). On its face, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) generally references “the cost of living” not a local/regional cost-of-living. Id. (emphasis added). See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“[CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). This choice of language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (C) holding that the more general cpiu for all items applied because if congress had meant to permit upward adjustments based on the increased cost of legal services it would have done so with greater specificity and clarity (D) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 (E) holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it
Output: (C)
1144, 1146 (8th Cir.1989), which is to be determined on the circumstances of each case, United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir.1986). In general, however, the' binding Eighth Circuit precedent requires the proponent of the plan to identify a rate of interest that could be earned on a risk-free investment, such as that currently paid on a United States treasury bond of like term, and then to augment that rate by an increment that is sufficient to compensate the secured creditor for the risk it will bear over the term of the reamortization, as a result of the reorganized debtor’s retention of the possession of the collateral. United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d at 1146; In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d at 1339. See also In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In the second step of this process, [t]he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this as the general rule (B) recognizing doud as applying just this methodology (C) recognizing and applying the stream of commerce theory (D) recognizing this rule (E) recognizing this presumption
Output: (B)
court’s description of the panel’s rationale as “one over which reasonable jurists may differ” can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore’s precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel — namely, that the plaintiffs’ novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success
Output: (C)
integrity by acknowledging that children are vital to the continued existence of a tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1988) (finding “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children”); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (finding state exercise of jurisdiction over Indian child cus tody proceedings often fails “to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families”). Fourth, this decision is consistent with the federal policy of encouraging tribal autonomy. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988). Finally, the decision satisfies the parens patriae role of both the state and the tribe in protecting the welfare of the child. See Minn.Stat. § 518A.03, subd. 1 (<HOLDING>); Red Lake Tribal Code § 801.13 (recognizing 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing virginias interest in protecting defendants from claims and in holding down insurance costs (B) holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents (C) recognizing that mineral interest owners bear some obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in protecting their interests (D) recognizing the sherman acts central interest in protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market (E) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child
Output: (E)
as an excessive fine, what is the appropriate remedy! Although the United States Supreme Court in Bajakajian declined to consider the issue, we recognize that like the trial judge in Bajakajian (see note 27, supra), as PERAC points out, a number of courts, after concluding that a statutory forfeiture operated as an excessive fine in the particular circumstances of the case, have proceeded to determine a forfeiture amount that would not be excessive, and have imposed it. See, e.g., United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1251 (2011) (where forfeiture amount is constitutionally excessive, court must impose alternative fine in exact amount over which fine would become excessive); United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the eighth amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions it provides excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted  (B) holding in context of case involving racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations act violations that lower court is required to impose maximum fine amount that would not be excessive under eighth amendment (C) holding a fine excessive because it was greater than defendant could pay in a lifetime (D) holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment (E) holding that forfeitures may violate the eighth amendment excessive fines clause
Output: (B)
with the independent evidence being offered against him. In essence, it is alleged that the convictions rested upon an unlawful cumulation of evidence, and that had there been separate trials, the appellants would not have been convicted. . . . [citations omitted] Weighing this possibility of prejudice ‘against the interests of economy and expedition in judicial administration’, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the denial of a severance . . . [citations omitted].” 406 F.2d at 933, 934, 935. The judgment and sentence appealed from are Affirmed. 1 . Counts 1 through 35 charged violations of the mail fraud statute, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1341. Count 36 charged a conspiracy under Title 18, U.S.C., Section 812, cert. denied 1956, 351 U.S. 966, 76 S.Ct. 1025, 100 L.Ed. 1486 (<HOLDING>) ; Collins v. United States, 9 Cir. 1946, 157 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that delay is waived when the defendant fails to object when a continu ance is granted (B) holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error (C) holding that an accused cannot sustain a speedytrial claim when delay results from his    making dilatory pleadings or motions failing to object when a continuance is granted the government    (D) holding that delay is waived when the defendant makes dilatory pleadings and motions (E) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority
Output: (A)
is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted.” Id. at 1041. We noted, however, that this rule applied only to “unconditional and unqualified” guilty pleas, not to negotiated pleas where the State has agreed to a particular sentence or to the disposition of particular charges, or where the State opposes the plea. Id. at 1041-42 (on motion for rehearing). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) provides: “A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved.” See State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). A trial judge has wide discretion to refuse 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review (B) holding that a defendant in a criminal case might plead no contest conditioned on the right to preserve for appellate review a question of law (C) holding that the defendant failed properly to preserve assignment of error for appellate review because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the defendants contention as presented on appeal (D) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (E) holding that under state procedural law a timely objection is necessary to preserve a batson question for appellate review
Output: (B)
recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district “in which [the case] might have been brought,” according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should “sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed.” PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. “There is no valid reason for reading the words ‘where it might have been brought’ to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of  1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
Output: (C)
to refrain from speaking “applies ... equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid,” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). The compelled speech at issue here raises particularly troubling First Amendment concerns. At bottom, the disclaimer portrays abortion as one among a menu of morally equivalent choices. While that may be the City’s view, it is not the Center’s. The message conveyed is antithetical to the very moral, religious, and ideological reasons the Center exists. Its avowed mission is to “provid[e] alternatives to abortion.” J.A. 360. Its “pro-life Christian beliefs permeate all that the Center does.” J.A. 354. Its staff and volunteers are trained “in encoura 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) (<HOLDING>). But over time, adjunct First Amendment rights 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state may not exercise a prior restraint on publishing a newspaper (B) holding that unlawful restraint could not even be an included offense (C) holding that prior restraint analysis applies to commercial speech but that the general health claim regulation 21 cfr  10114 was sufficiently welldefined to survive prior restraint analysis (D) recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge (E) holding that a regulation was not a prior restraint because it did not authorize suppression of speech in advance of its expression
Output: (A)
Cir.2002); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.1997) vening change in the law has rendered the conduct for which McAdory was convicted non-criminal, he cannot proceed under the approach recognized in Dorsainvil. See id. at 252. Further, McAdory’s inability to satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 does not render the remedy inadequate or ineffective. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the § 2241 petition. Finally, we conclude that the District Court properly denied McAdory’s motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). To the extent that McAdo-ry sought to simply reargue claims previously raised, the District Court properly denied the Rule 59(e) motion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). McAdory also argued that the Supreme Court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (B) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court (C) recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration (D) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (E) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions
Output: (E)
comply with those conditions. See § 32A-2-13(G). In addition, Gerald received oral notification from the children’s court at his plea hearing that detention would result from failure to comply with certain grade court conditions. Gerald’s counsel and mother were present at the plea hearing. Gerald repeatedly told the court that he understood the conditions. {38} Furthermore, when Gerald signed the plea agreement and grade court order, he received the considerable benefit of being released into the community. Gerald now seeks to be relieved of the conditions of release while leaving the rest of the plea agreement intact. Having received the benefit of the plea, Gerald may not now complain that the conditions are invalid. Cf State v. Trujillo, 117 N.M. 769, 772, 877 P.2d 575, 578 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶25 (stating that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that both parties to a plea bargain make various concessions and gain certain advantages during plea negotiations and underscoring that a criminal defendant having availed himself of the advantages of a plea agreement cannot welch on his part of the bargain internal quotation marks and citation omitted (B) holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense (C) recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea (D) recognizing that a single guilty plea may embody a series of interrelated concessions between the parties and allows the defendant to withdraw the entire plea when one part of the agreement fails (E) holding defendant did not prove an enforceable agreement only that there was some discussion of a plea bargain
Output: (A)
1024-25 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (J. Mark) (discussing the split of authority and explaining that Congress codified the result of In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.1985) which encouraged the use of debt repayment plans by ensuring that property acquired post-petition would not be subject to creditors’ claims if Chapter 13 proved unsuccessful). Courts which held that property acquired post-petition must be property of the Chapter 7 estate after conversion did so because they believed such policy was “necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interests of the debtors.” In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir.1991). Lybrook, In re Colder, 973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.1992), and In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), base their results on policy concerns that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (B) holding for  1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (C) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (D) holding that date of conversion determines what exemptions apply (E) holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case
Output: (D)
combination of presence in an area known to be a center of drug-related activity coupled with evasive action on the part of individuals involved in some sort of interaction with Defendant is sufficient to support a conclusion that Officer Pritchard had the “reasonable articulable suspicion” necessary to support an investigative detention. In fact, having seen the two pedestrians approach Defendant’s vehicle and insert their hands into it, an action which the trial court found to have the appearancé of a hand-to-hand drug transaction, Officer Pritchard actually had more of a basis for suspecting that criminal activity was afoot in this instance than Officer Hedges had for suspecting that something was amiss in Butler. State v. Summey, 150 N.C. App. 662, 667, 564 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Clyburn, 120 N.C. App. 377, 380-81, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding truck lessors liability to truck lessee existed without parties express indemnity clause in lease thus exclusion was inapplicable where carolina casualty alleged its insured truck lessor was precluded from coverage because lessors liability was assumed under contract with truck lessee (B) holding that a truck drivers injury from a fall in the shower of a truck stop while off duty was not compensable (C) holding that officers observations of the speed of the truck coupled with the sound of the engine racing and the bouncing of the truck as it passed through the intersection gave officer probable cause to believe that truck was exceeding a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions (D) holding that inconsistent answers by occupants or problems with the occupants licenses or registration of the vehicle provide grounds for broadening the inquiry (E) holding that an officers belief that he had observed the occupants of a truck participate in a drug transaction supported a valid investigatory detention of the truck and its occupants
Output: (E)
the armbands because of its desire to avoid the controversy associated with the Vietnam War. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733. School officials also feared that if the armbands were worn, the friends of a high school student in the district who had been killed in the Vietnam War would “be difficult to control” and that disagreeing students would wear armbands of other colors, causing the potential for conflict. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10, n. 3, 89 S.Ct. 733. In rejecting the concerns of school officials as a basis for prohibiting sp eld the censorship of speech and expression by school officials when such activity has caused material and substantial disruption or collided with the rights of others. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Blackwell, supra, 363 F.2d at 751-54 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ban of confederate flags on school grounds was not an unconstitutional restriction of students first amendment rights where racial tensions existed at the school raciallybased fights had occurred in the months leading up to the case and the confederate flag is inappropriate in the school context because it is so associated with racial prejudice that it is likely to provoke feelings of hatred and ill will in others (B) holding unconstitutional a free transfer provision by which students were allowed to transfer solely on a racial basis from the school to which they had been assigned by virtue of redistricting if they were in a racial minority in their new school (C) holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours
Output: (A)
that other creditor groups had endorsed the proposed Plan, could easily have prompted an even higher-than-usual degree of inattentiveness or inaction among affected creditors in these cases. Furthermore, many creditors may simply have assumed that a package that related to the Debtors’ bankruptcy case must have related only to their dealings with the Debtors and would not affect their claims against other parties. Charging all inactive creditors with full knowledge of the scope and implications of the proposed third party releases, and implying a “consent” to the third party releases based on the creditors’ inaction, is simply not realistic or fair, and would stretch the meaning of “consent” beyond the breaking point. See In re Washington Mut. Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 355 (Bankr.D.Del.2011) (<HOLDING>). As to creditors and interest holders who were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 24 hours is sufficient time for a plaintiff to review release (B) holding that inaction was not a sufficient manifestation of consent to support a release (C) holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party (D) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (E) holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid
Output: (B)
this Court has yet to decide whether a posse 296-97 (Tex. 1983) (reversing directed verdict where, “even in the absence of evidence showing the storeowner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the presence on the floor of the specific object causing the fall,” the plaintiff had shown that the storeowner failed to protect its customers from a dangerous condition it knew to reoccur); Dumont v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d 846, 848 (Me. 1995) (“A plaintiff does not have to prove that the store owner had actual notice of the specific condition giving rise to the injury if the plaintiff can establish that the store owner was aware of the risk of a recurrence of a hazardous condition of the premises.”); Rallis v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 159 N.H. 95, 977 A.2d 527, 531-32 (2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Moultrey v. Great A & P Tea Co., 281 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could find constructive notice from evidence that the defendants knew of a recurring dangerous condition (B) holding that circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statutory presumptions where the issue was whether the physical exertions of the claimants job aggravated or contributed to his heart condition (C) holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant (D) holding that the district court erred in failing to properly charge the jury on defendants affirmative defenses (E) holding the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant claiming selfdefense had no duty to retreat
Output: (A)
assistance of counsel because Roark failed to file a motion to suppress Hollon’s confession. Hollon asserts that the confession would have been suppressed because, at the time of the confession, Hollon was mentally incompetent and was therefore unable to understand his Miranda warnings. When considering whether an attorney’s failure to file or pursue a motion to suppress constitutes incompetent performance, the Court is required to examine the probability of success of such a motion in order to determine whether counsel’s decision against pressing the motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and sound trial strategy. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct.App. 1993). See also Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 794-95, 702 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (B) holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given (C) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (D) holding that trial counsels decision to submit evidence to the jury that his confession was coerced rather than submitting the evidence to the judge in a motion to suppress was a matter of trial strategy and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance (E) holding that counsels total failure to conduct pretrial discovery constituted ineffective assistance
Output: (C)
of an accused in a second trial when the accused has already been convicted or acquitted of that crime, and it forbids punishing an accused more than once for the same offense in a single prosecution. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 845; Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 369-70 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); see also Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 629. This is a multiple-punishments case. The relevant inquiry in a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy case is always whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 673. However, because two subsections of a single statute are at issue in this case, we must first “ascertain whether [the] alleged conduct violates two distinct statutory provisions within one statute.” Vick, 991 S.W.2d at 832 (<HOLDING>); Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 847-48 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unlawful restraint an included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault so conviction on the former was vacated (B) holding that multiple prosecutions for aggravated sexual assault based on different statutory subsections are permissible because the legislature defined the allowable unit of prosecution as each completed act (C) holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault (D) holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range (E) holding in a multiplepunishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct
Output: (B)
to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.”). Thus in Raftdain II we held that a “waiver by a foreign state [of sovereign immunity], rendering it a party to an action, is broad enough to sustain the court’s jurisdiction through proceedings to aid collection of a money judgment rendered in the case, including discovery pertaining to the judgment debtor’s assets.” 281 F.3d at 53-54; Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 297 (2d Cir.2011); see also FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C.Cir.2011) (upholding contempt sanctions against foreign sovereign for failing to comply with general asset discovery order); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477-78 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Whether a particular sovereign asset is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period (C) holding that an instrumentality of a foreign nation must respond to discovery about its worldwide assets and that it could not use the fsia to conceal its assets from the district court (D) recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia (E) holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case
Output: (C)
[¶ 39.] Veith did not object to Dr. O’Brien calling Dr. Gilbert as a treating physician to testify to the treatment that he provided Veith. However, Veith did object when Dr. Gilbert testified to a matter about which he had no record in his patient notes — bile reflux, or the lack thereof. Because there was no mention of bile reflux in Dr. Gilbert’s patient notes, Veith argues that Dr. Gilbert’s testimony on this subject constituted expert testimony by a previously undisclosed expert and as such the trial court abused its discretion by its admittance. [¶ 40.] Previously undisclosed expert testimony to a matter about which the expert has no knowledge, but is instead based on his own perceptions has been held to be inadmissible. State v. Andrews, 2001 SD 31, ¶¶ 18-19, 623 N.W.2d 78, 83 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 41.] In Kuper v. Lincoln-Union Elec. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge (B) holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance (C) holding that agent who interpreted the conversations based on personal knowledge as opposed to his general involvement in the investigation gave permissible lay witness testimony (D) holding that the trial court had properly granted prices motion for new trial because while the state properly introduced identification testimony from a police officer who was not a witness to the offense it improperly elicited testimony that the witness was in fact a police officer who knew the defendant from working in his neighborhood (E) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted
Output: (A)
foreclosure complaint in its own name on behalf of owner and holder of note and servi-cer that merely verifies’ complaint filed in name of owner and holder of note); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Huber, 137 So.3d 562, 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (finding error with trial court’s* determination that appellant’s servicing agent lacked standing to bring foreclosure action on appellant’s behalf when record “clearly reflected]” that appellant filed foreclosure complaint on its own behalf and that servicing agent merely verified complaint); see also US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Marion, 122 So.3d 398, 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (reversing dismissal on basis that servi-cer’s employee verified bank’s foreclosure complaint); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Prevratil, 120 So.3d 573, 576 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, noteholder-plaintiffs routinely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to follow florida rule of juvenile procedure 8150 the juvenile rule equivalent of florida rule of criminal procedure 3830 (B) holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure (C) holding that florida rule of civil procedure 1110 does not require that verification be based on personal knowledge (D) holding that rule 45b does not require personal service (E) holding that trial court has no jurisdiction after litigation is concluded except in very limited circumstances on a motion for relief from judgment under florida rule of civil procedure 1540
Output: (C)
themselves provided appellant notice that “[b]e-cause of the nature of the offenses for which [he] was convicted, the trial court was authorized to cumulate the sentences whether or not the offenses arose out of the same criminal episode.” See Millslagle, 150 S.W.3d at 785; see also Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.08; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(b). As to appellant’s Apprendi-Blakely-Ring complaint, “[t]he federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected the contention that Apprendi is violated when a trial court orders the cumulation of sentences which individually lie within the statutory range of punishment but for which the cumulative total exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum for any single offense.” Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants two eightyear consecutive sentences for rape because they were each within the tenyear statutory range for a single offense did not violate apprendi (B) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred (C) holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range (D) holding that employees deferred adjudication for indecency with child could make sexual assault of customer foreseeable when sales were made in customers homes (E) holding that indecency with a child by contact is lesserincluded offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child because even though the latter offense did not include intent as an express element lascivious intent was implicitly included
Output: (C)
procedure.’ ”). The briefs develop the limited role which should be accorded to anecdotal reports in legitimate scientific methodology, on account of the possibility of false associations. See generally David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 217-19 (3rd ed.2011); cf. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.Supp. 1387, 1411 (D.Or.1996) (“[C]ase reports and case studies are universally regarded as an insufficient basis for a conclusion regarding causation because case reports lack controls.”). As to Dr. Maddox’s reliance on animal studies, Appellants point out the need to demonstrate reasonable similarity in effect. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143-45, 118 S.Ct. 512, 518, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With regard to regulatory standards and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that animal studies can be a proper foundation for an experts opinion but that those opinions must be sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purport to rely (B) holding that a reliable differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion even when no epidemiological studies peerreviewed published studies animal studies or laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion (C) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative (D) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an opinion relying in part on extrapolation from highdose animal studies to lowdose human disease scenarios where there was no attempt to explain how the animal subjects and humans have similar physiological makeup and rate of chemical absorption (E) holding that an rld manufacturer was unlikely to succeed on its challenge to the fdas reliance on animal studies to establish the bioequivalency of a proposed generic because courts are bound to show deference to the agencys factfinding in this area of its technical expertise
Output: (D)
that Boyd would replenish his drug supply by traveling to New Orleans, sometimes daily or every two or three days as necessary. But that is all that is known about Boyd’s source. Although French accompanied Boyd “on a few occasions,” she provided no other information about the identity or location of Boyd’s source, or sources, of drugs. It is not known, for example, whether Boyd obtained his drugs from the same place in New Orleans or from the same person or persons. It is not known whether Boyd used a different source or sources on the occasions that French did not accompany him. Nor is it known whether Boyd obtained his drugs in bulk or in small quantities. French testified that she did not know how much Boyd purchased when he went to New Orleans. Cf. Delgado, 672 F.3d at 332-34 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Holloway, 377 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give instruction that mere buyerseller relationship in single transaction does not alone support a conspiracy conviction where there was evidence of advanced planning among the alleged conspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs obviously not intended for personal use (B) holding that an indictment that referred to wholesale quantities of cocaine and cocaine base was sufficiently broad to include the specific quantities of drugs actually found by the jury (C) holding that the sale of drugs in small quantities is inadequate without additional evidence to support a finding of conspiracy to distribute drugs to others because the seller could reasonably believe that such purchases are intended for the buyers personal use (D) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy (E) holding that evidence supported conspiracy with an unnamed drug supplier where inter alia defendant purchased wholesale quantities of drugs from the supplier
Output: (E)
also Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 150 n. 18 (2d Cir.2003) (“Custom ary international law rules proscribing crimes against humanity, including genocide, and war crimes, have been enforceable against individuals since World War II”). d. Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda recognize claims for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Id. at ¶ 62. Numerous federal courts have recognized that customary international law prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Id. at ¶ 66. Due to their enforcement in the international criminal tribunals, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. See Liu Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d at 1325 (<HOLDING>); Jama, 343 F.Supp.2d at 361 (“The law of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim of cruel inhuman and degrading treatment based on alleged sexual abuse (B) holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim (C) holding that the proscribed treatment must be based on a persons sex and not their sexual affiliations (D) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (E) holding that communication of a venereal disease would constitute cruel and inhuman treatment
Output: (A)
we are persuaded the General Assembly expected judges would weigh all evidence relevant to punishment when it established a range of potential sentences for defendant’s offense class and prior record level. IV. DISPOSITION Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. The trial court did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial when it found a statutory aggravating factor but sentenced defendant within the presumptive range. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. REVERSED. Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 . The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (<HOLDING>). More explicit than the Sixth Amendment, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts (B) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (C) recognizing that the integrity of the family unit has found protection in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding the sixth amendment right to effective assistance extends to a criminal defendants first appeal as of right (E) holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
Output: (A)
the plaintiffs had, in a timely manner, performed what was required of them to initiate proceedings. Once they had initiated the proceedings by tendering their complaints, the time bar was no longer applicable; whatever needed to follow in completing the process of “filing” the pleadings at the clerk’s office was no longer subject to the time bar. In the present case, Spotville initiated his proceedings properly by tendering to prison officials for mailing his habeas petition and application for IFP status, pursuant to the pre-AEDPA statutes, approximately nine months before the AEDPA went into effect. The decision regarding his IFP status, and any necessary subsequent action (the payment of the fee), did not change the set of rules pursuant to which Spotville tendered his petitio 82) (<HOLDING>). Our holding in Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (B) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (C) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (E) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief
Output: (D)