niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
was 12% per annum, or .03288% per day. , To calculate interest, each missed payment is treated as a separate final judgment, with interest equal to .03288% multiplied by the amount of the missed payment multiplied by the number of days from the date due until the date of payment.. The sum- of the missed payments plus interest equals the total amount due. To favor McGlaughlin, this decision deems the adjustment of $178 that the Florida Court made on August 27, 2013, as reflecting a partial payment made by Bennie on August 1, 1986. In accordance with Florida law, the payment that Bennie actually made on November 12, 1986, will be credited first to reduce interest'outstanding as of that date and second to reduce principal. See Vitt v. Rodriguez, 960 So.2d 47, 49 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). , ' Although the interest calculation has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 (B) holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to  current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on  delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support (C) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (D) holding that child support should have been made retroactive (E) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation
Output: (B)
and Mr. Sledge.” Officer Smith then observed a third officer run over to the group, and testified the four individuals “went down to the ground in a pile.” In describing Sledge’s actions, Officer Clarke testified that during the encounter Sledge (1) “was yelling, screaming, upset and irate when he was arrested”; (2) made several threats after he was arrested and handcuffed; (3) “wasn’t very cooperative in that he was moving his arms”; and (4) exhibited “resistive angry behavior.” Carriker testified Sledge attempted to get away from the officers twice, and stated “the first time handcuffs were not used,” but “[t]he second time, they were.” On these facts, probable cause existed to believe Sledge was resisting arrest. See State v. Campbell, 260 Neb. 1021, 620 N.W.2d 750, 757 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, even assuming arguendo the detention 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an arrestee who resists being handcuffed and struggles with officers may be convicted of resisting arrest under nebraska law (B) holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view even though appellant was handcuffed and under the control of the officers was lawful because there were other occupants in the house who were not handcuffed and who would have had access to the weapon (C) holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest (D) holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer (E) holding that an officers noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence
Output: (A)
pleads two counts of unjust enrichment, one on a contract-based theory and the other on a tort fraud theory. He correctly argues that by virtue of his allegation that he worked above the agreed-upon hours set forth in his employment contract, he can state a quasi-contract claim and seek an award for unjust enrichment because the additional hours worked' were not covered by an express contract. See, e.g., Buenaventura v. Champion Drywall, Inc., 803 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1219 (D.Nev.2011) (allowing unjust enrichment claim based on failure to provide adequate compensation); McCullough v. Lennar Corp., No. 09-CV-1808-WQH-NLS, 2009 WL 3805305, at *6 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (same); United States ex. Falco Constr. Corp. v. Summit Gen. Contracting Corp., 760 F.Supp. 1004, 1011 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>). Risinger’s unjust enrichment claim thus seeks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a provision making all payments to subcontractor by  contractor expressly contingent upon payment for the work by contractor from owner is a payifpaid clause under texas law (B) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (C) holding that subcontractor can recover in quasicontract from contractor for work not encompassed in the agreement between the two (D) holding that the owner could maintain a 93a claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor (E) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law
Output: (C)
at 516-23, 127 S.Ct. 1438. The court concludes that West Virginia has failed to do so here. Its claimed injury of “political accountability” is not an “invasion of a legal ly protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For starters, the State’s interest in avoiding greater political accountability relative to the, federal government is not the kind of sovereign state intere app, 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260 (observing that “a State is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests ... [such as] ownfing] land or participating] in a business venture”). It also does not involve resolution of public nuisances, id. at 603, 102 S.Ct. 3260 (<HOLDING>); preservation of its citizens’ economic or 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (B) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (C) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (D) recognizing a states interest in representing the interests of their citizens in enjoining public nuisances (E) recognizing the public interest exception
Output: (D)
in calculating the reduction of state workers’ compensation benefits advances the legislature’s intent to reduce the state’s compensation burden by taking advantage of the workers’ compensation government benefits offset to its fullest extent. Accordingly, we hold that SSDI child’s benefits are to be included when calculating the amount of the reduction in an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4. II. The Fund makes the argument that the WCCA exceeded its authority in examining the Social Security Act. The WCCA’s jurisdiction does not extend to interpreting or applying legislation designed specially for the handling of claims outside the workers’ compensation system. Taft v. Advance United Expressways, 464 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). In that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy (B) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (C) holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law (D) holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims (E) holding that the jurisdiction of the wcca did not extend to interpreting or applying the law related to claims against the minnesota insurance guaranty association
Output: (E)
and the prosecutor, the Court finds, one, there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea[.]” We conclude that the summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor and Defendant’s stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant’s guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements that the victim “is 80 years of age” and “is crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk” and that Defendant “told his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out[,]” “grabbed the victim[,]” and “slung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch” provided a sufficient factual basis to support Defendant’s guilty plea. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(a) & (e); see also State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 166, 583 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude this argument has no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea (B) holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient (C) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (D) holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari (E) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea
Output: (C)
in Shipping Corp. of India — when structuring their transactions, the Supreme Court has held that a reliance interest is insufficient to overcome the presumption of retroactivity set forth in Harper. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753-54, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995). Accordingly, the presumption of retroactivity set forth in Harper applies in this case. 8 . It is well-established that a party can waive its right to challenge the district court’s personal jurisdiction over it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1) ("A party waives a[] defense [of lack of personal jurisdiction] by ... failing to either: (i) make it by motion ... or (ii) include it in a responsive pleading .... ”); see also Datskow v. Teledyne, Inc., Cont’l Prods. Div., 899 F.2d 1298, 1303 (2d Cir.1990) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of interest was proper where there had been a long delay in the enforcement action (B) holding that a delay in challenging personal jurisdiction may result in waiver (C) holding that participating in the litigation on the merits does not result in a waiver of personal jurisdiction when the participation comes at the direction of the district judge after having raised the defense in a timely fashion (D) holding waiver did not preclude rule 32d motion challenging validity of waiver due to ineffective assistance of counsel (E) holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived
Output: (B)
albeit dicta, supports by negative implication allowing claimants to proceed in state court so long as the vessel owner’s right to limitation of liability is adequately protected through appropriate stipulations. Extending the “single claimant” exception to instances like the present has also been endorsed by a number of our sister circuits. Specifically, the Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits have all allowed multiple claimants to proceed in state court where the claimants have stipulated to certain conditions, namely concerning the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district court to decide the limitation of the vessel owner’s liability and the claimants’ waiver of any res judicata assertion. See Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v. Bonnette (Odeco I), 4 F.3d 401, 404-05 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single claimants stipulations and prioritization of her multiple claims created a single claim situation (B) holding that district court did not abuse discretion by denying review of factual determination that claimants stores were not tourism businesses within the meaning of the settlement agreement (C) holding that claimants have an enforceable right to compliance with specific remand instructions when such are issued by the board or court (D) holding that claimants stipulations which fully protected the shipowners right to seek limited liability and claimants agreement to abide by an admiralty court determination of the right to limit were adequate to lift an injunction of state court proceedings (E) holding that the plaintiff waived her right to object to procedural defects in the removal proceedings by filing requests for discovery entering into stipulations and seeking to amend her complaint
Output: (D)
agency is defined by the APA. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he APA defines ‘agency’ as ‘each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency’,” but explicitly does not include the Congress) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(1)). The fact that § 6012 incorporates by reference the CPI, which is compiled and published by an agency of the DOL, does not cause the APA to be invoked. In this context, the CPI is simply an ascertainable numerical standard, and there is no requirement that such a standard incorporated into a statute be itself an enforceable rule of law. Cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, a statute providing the basis 
 Holding statements: (A) holding portions of the online solicitation of a minor statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment (B) holding that the incorporation of community standards by itself did not make the child online protection act unconstitutionally overbroad (C) holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad (D) holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad (E) holding the improper photography or visual recording statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment
Output: (B)
Therefore, General Cigar may not rely on the interviews to show conduct supporting its acquiescence and estoppel claims. ■ Finally, silence may constitute cause for equitable estoppel if a duty to speak exists. Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assoc., 274 F.3d 706, 725-26 (2d Cir.2001). A duty to speak may arise if the party’s silence will mislead the infringer into believing that an infringement claim will not be asserted. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Eva Armadora, S.A., 37 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1994) (“Silence in the face of an explicit contrary assumption by an innocent party may constitute a concealment of facts or a false representation for estoppel purposes.”); Forest Laboratories Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 96 Civ. 159-A, 1999 WL 33299123, at * 22 (W.D.N.Y. June 23, 1999) (<HOLDING>). Cubatabaco’s silence lasted from January 1994 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a city was equitably estopped from denying the accuracy of blueprints and specifications given to a party who had been contracted to build a sewer for the city (B) holding party was estopped by silence (C) holding that licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of a trademark (D) holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party (E) holding that a party was not judicially estopped from departing from a claim construction theory unsuccessfully advocated before the trial court
Output: (B)
Rodrigues hit him in the head with a hand-held radio. Defendant Rodrigues ordered Barile to tell the doctors at the hospital that he injured himself in a “fall.” Subsequently, Barile made a complaint to the Internal Affairs Division and an investigator was assigned to verify Barile’s claim. On June 11, 1997, a private attorney informed Barile that the law firm had filed a Notice of Intent to sue the City of Hartford. On April 13, 2004, the cessive force against him on December 21, 1996. Thus, Barile had until December 21, 1999, to file his complaint. When considering a ease filed by a prisoner, the courts consider a complaint to have been filed as of the date the inmate gives the complaint to prison officials to be mailed to the court. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court (D) holding that the date of filing is the time at which a pro se prisoner entrusts the document to prison officials for delivery (E) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court
Output: (E)
of private homes from governmental invasions without probable cause was the bedrock principle of the common law that there exists an “ ‘overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.’ ” Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, 224 (1984) quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1387, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 660 (1980). A citizen’s privacy interests are not limited to his or her home, however. Rather, those interests extend to his or her person. As the Supreme Court observed in Katz v. United States, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home . 3469, 3480-3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1220 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (B) holding that search of the passenger compartment of an automobile limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons (C) holding that an investigatory stop must be supported by specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion (D) holding that to justify detention of a criminal suspect the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion (E) holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous
Output: (B)
2001) (describing the denial of a jury trial as a structural defect requiring automatic reversal). Similarly, every Florida district court of appeal has issued a decision reversing a conviction obtained without a valid waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g., Montero v. State, 780 So.2d 917, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the record failed to show that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding that a conviction must be reversed where the record contained no written waiver and did not reflect an inquiry by the trial court that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial); Gamble v. State, 696 So.2d 420, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Sansom v. State, 642 So.2d 631, 631 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected (B) holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy (C) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (D) holding that failure to inform the defendant of the constitutionally mandated right to a sixperson jury when one juror became ill after the jury had been sworn but before trial had begun and the defendants attorney waived his rights without consulting defendant mandates a new trial (E) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence
Output: (B)
or a well-founded fear of future persecution. As the BIA determined, Thang is not eligible, as a matter of law, for asylum based on his wife’s forced abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc); see also Gui Yin Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 723 (2d Cir.2007). As Thang did not assert any other incidents of past persecution, he was not entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Thang failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution because he and his wife wanted more children. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 158-68 (2d Cir.2008); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the BIA reasonably found that whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable (B) holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal (C) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (D) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (E) holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412
Output: (A)
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-713. 4 . This decision, therefore, does not address or rule upon the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception to violations of 11 U.S.C. § 525, 11 U.S.C. § 362, or 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); or violations of federal law or regulations not grounded in the Bankruptcy Code, e.g., 34 CFR 682.402(f)(2)(i) ("If the lender [of a loan governed by these regulations] is notified that a borrower has filed a petition for relief in bankruptcy, the lender must immediately suspend any collection efforts outside the bankruptcy proceeding against the borrower."). See, e.g., In re Carson, 150 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993) (discussing whether failure to release transcript violates automatic stay); Buford v. Higher Education Assistance Foundation, 85 B.R. 579, 582 (D.Kan.1988) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Heath, 3 B.R. 351 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtor must pay the government interest at the rate the debtor would pay a commercial lender for a loan of equivalent amount and duration considering the risk of default and any security (B) holding that an answer that asserts a counterclaim against a plaintiff who then becomes a bankruptcy debtor is an action or proceeding against the debtor within the meaning of  362a1 notwithstanding the fact that the debtor initiated the lawsuit (C) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked the power under  105a to grant the partial discharge of student loan debt when the debtor did not show undue hardship as required by statute (D) holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full (E) recognizing that a debtor may be able to obtain an injunction against a lender for attempting to collect a student loan after the filing of bankruptcy in violation of 34 cfr 682
Output: (E)
by the State Police are accurate and need not be corrected. Citing Feigley v. Department of Corrections, 731 A.2d 220 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), Dunbar contends that he has a due process right to an appeal hearing and that under Section 9151(b) of CHRIA, 18 Pa. C.S. § 9151(b), he has the right to have a proper party present at the hearing to defend its interests. Dunbar claims that he was denied due process because DOC, as the agency authorized to enforce and to interpret sentencing orders, was not a party to the proceedings. He asserts that the State Police is not the proper party to defend against the challenge because it is responsible, inter alia, for collecting fingerprint cards and maintaining criminal arrest histories. See Wagaman v. Attorney General, 872 A.2d 244 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) (<HOLDING>). The State Police points out that pursuant to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action (B) holding that a proper party must have responsibility to administer or to enforce the law (C) recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms (D) holding that congress may not direct a state to enact or enforce a particular law or type of law (E) recognizing that prevailing party has remedies available at common law to enforce arbitrators award
Output: (B)
merits of a plaintiffs cause of action ... also implicate the class certification decision,” Jackson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth, 260 F.R.D. 168, 184 (E.D.Pa.2009), such an inquiry is merely preliminary. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317. A plaintiff need not establish by a preponderance of the evidence the merits of its claims at the class certification stage, and any inquiry into the merits that is not necessary to a Rule 23 decision is precluded. Jackson, 260 F.R.D. at 184 (citing Newton, 259 F.3d at 166-67, and Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317-18). However, the movant must do more than “assur[e] ... the court that it intends or plans to meet the requirements” of Rule 23. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318; see also Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As with other matters relating to Rule 23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right (B) holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity (C) holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (D) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right (E) holding that there must be full and clear articulation of the litigations contours at the time of class certification
Output: (E)
FBI qualifies as an extraordinary effort at restitution, and a downward departure beyond acceptance of responsibility is warranted. The district court understood its power to depart but declined to grant defendant’s motion. We lack the power to review the district court’s decision because the court understood it had the power to depart. See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 245 F.3d 667 (8th Cir.2001) and United States v. Jones, 145 F.3d 959, 965 (8th Cir.1998). Accordingly, the sentence of the district court is affirmed. 1 . The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Court Judge lor the Western District of Missouri, Western Division. 2 . See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2F1.1, cmt. n. 11 (1998). See also United States v. Saffeels, 39 F.3d 833, 837-38 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Moskal, 211 F.3d 1070, 1074 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history (C) holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category (D) holding that a district court may depart upward based upon a significant number of fraudulent schemes conducted by the defendant (E) holding that a court may depart upward based upon a third partys injury in an assault case
Output: (C)
Commission, in making its determination on permanent total disability, considered a statement from Dr. Tollison which was to have been excluded from the record. The court thus remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to review the record without considering the excluded material and to determine whether its findings and conclusions should be altered in any way. The circuit court remanded the issue of the 30% disability assessed by the Veterans Administration for Foggie’s combat-related post- traumatic stress disorder, finding the Commission made “absolutely no ruling and no findings of any kind” on the issue, and instructed the Commission to review the record and applicable law and make specific findings concerning General Electric’s entitlement to the claim 1, 622 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Our courts have recognized that, in some 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the commissions order reversing an award and remanding the case to the single commissioner to take further testimony was not final and not appealable to the circuit court until the commissions final determination regarding the single commissioners award the court construed the language in a provision of the code that states appeals from the commission to the circuit court shall be under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions  and stated an appeal to the circuit court will not lie from an interlocutory order of the commission unless it affects the merits citation omitted (B) holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court (C) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (D) holding an appeal from a circuit court order remanding a workers compensation case for the purpose of making specific findings of fact is interlocutory and not reviewable by the court of appeals (E) holding interlocutory order of the circuit court remanding the workers compensation matter for taking additional medical evidence did not involve the merits of the action and therefore was not reviewable by the court for lack of finality
Output: (E)
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). “The fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable ‘political question’ is that its adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of government.” SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990)). Therefore, the courts will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial. SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). This Court, specifically, has declined to opine on issues where the constitution delegates authority to the Legislature. See SCPIF (<HOLDING>); cf. Stone v. Leatherman, 343 S.C. 484, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question (B) holding in answer to the single question of whether power has been lawfully vested that municipal court clerks may issue warrants (C) holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction (D) holding the question of whether the jmsc properly determined residence of judicial candidate or gave proper weight to concerns regarding residency presented a nonjusticiable political question the court should decline to answer because the power to determine if a person is qualified to hold judicial office is vested with the legislature by the state constitution (E) holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine
Output: (D)
changes in our culture, did not alter our essential federal constitutional structure. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (“The actual scope of the Federal Government’s authority with respect to the States has changed over the years ... but the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that authority has not.”). In Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L.Ed. 227 (1868), decided the same year the Fourteenth Amendment wa ct of the law [is] to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty .... It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends.... ”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>); id. at 72, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (“[W]e reconfirm 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that congress has specifically abrogated the eleventh amendment defense when legislating pursuant to  5 of the fourteenth amendment and its article i  8 plenary power over commerce but refusing to extend authority to abrogate to legislation enacted pursuant to the indian commerce clause the indian gaming regulatory act (B) recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii (C) holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy (D) holding that the eleventh amendment bars con gress from using its power under the indian commerce clause of article i to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts under article iii (E) holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts
Output: (D)
2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (”[F]ar more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase ... is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also Carter v. United States, 530 191, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) ("As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a 'willful' act is one undertaken with a 'bad purpose.' In other words, in order to establish a 'willful' violation of a statute, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137, 142 n. 10, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to establish that a defendant willfully violated the antislructuring law the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful and stating that specific intent to commit the crimes  might be negated by eg proof that defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the challenged conduct or statement must be directed at the familial relationship with knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect that relationship internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that in a prosecution for willfully violating federal law against structuring financial transactions to evade bank reporting requirements the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law (E) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law
Output: (A)
complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford’s claim is premised on the officers’ alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard’s instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort
Output: (A)
the entire principal.” See Note, id. (emphasis added). These definitions establish that a final, balloon payment is distinct and separate from the preceding “periodic payments.” Accordingly, it is only the periodic payments — and not the balloon payment— that are subject to the “equal monthly amounts” directive of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I). In reaching a contrary conclusion, courts seem to make one of two errors. First, some courts overlook the “if’ in § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I), assuming that all secured claims must be paid by periodic payments; however, this interpretation renders the “if’ superfluous, and goes against legislative history and the more careful analysis rendered by other courts. See, e.g., United States v. McClure (In re McClure), No. (M.D.Ga. Sept. 30, 2011), ECF 10 (<HOLDING>). Second, many courts, such as Hamilton and its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts (B) holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments (C) holding that where the policy includes indemnification coverage to the corporation proceeds are not property of the estate where there is no proof of payments by corporation of payments (D) holding social security disability payments and military disability payments are separate property after dissolution of marriage (E) recognizing that payments to secured creditors are only required in equal monthly amounts if property to be distributed  is in the form of periodic payments
Output: (E)
Sykes v. Tx. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 492-93 (5th Cir.1987) (noting an “absolute bar” against reviewing district court’s decision to remand under § 1452, whether the reasons are equitable or based on a lack of bankruptcy jurisdiction). However, there are limited circumstances under which we may review a remand order. See In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir.1991) (“[Wjhere an exception to non-reviewability exists, an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the remand order.... ” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has held that provisions barring review do not apply if the district court exceeds its statutorily-defined' authority to remand. See, e.g., Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case (B) holding that district court had supplemental jurisdiction over claims challenging administrative decision once case was properly removed based on original jurisdiction arising from constitutional claims (C) holding that the district judge who remanded a properly removed case where there was diversity jurisdiction exceeded statutory authority when he remanded that case based on efficiency (D) holding that rule 32 petition should have been granted where defendant was convicted in circuit court on indictment entered while case was on appeal from transfer order because circuit court lacked jurisdiction where we remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings (E) holding review appropriate where district court had remanded case for procedural defects after 30day time limit in  1447c had expired
Output: (C)
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 157(a); see, e.g., In re: Order of Reference to Bankruptcy Judges, General Order 2012-6 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2012). Section 157 provides that bankruptcy judges may issue final orders or judgments where the matter is determined to be core, which includes “matters concerning the administration of the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); see also Bass v. Denney (In re Bass), 171 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1999). A bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over a “related to” matter when the “outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Arnold v. Garlock, 278 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). This Court has jurisdiction over these 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that certainty or even likelihood of such an effect is not a requirement (B) holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing (C) holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement (D) holding that an effect on commerce is sufficient even though the effect is not immediate or direct or significant but instead is postponed indirect and slight (E) holding to the same effect
Output: (A)
(stating that probable cause to arrest exists when officer has “reasonable ground for belief of guilt that was particularized with respect to the person to be ... seized”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court properly denied the motion to suppress, and we affirm the court’s judgment. We deny Holland’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED. * The Government argues that, in determining whether a seizure occurred, we should apply the "force or submission” standard set forth in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The Govern ment contends that, because 
 Holding statements: (A) holding iowa common law touching assault met use of physical force required for enhancement under 18 usc  922g9 be cause any physical contact by necessity requires physical force to complete (B) holding that  2241a1 requires actual use of force meaning use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome restrain or injure a person (C) holding that an arrest requires either physical force  or where that is absent submission to the assertion of authority (D) holding that an arrest may involve either 1 taking the alleged violator into exlended physical custody or 2 issuing the individual a citation and noting that when we use the word arrest in this opinion we refer to physical arrest (E) holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness
Output: (C)
Neither has he cited any evidence to show his night loader position was “secure” against other loaders with more seniority. A party resisting summary judgment must cite the court to relevant evidence in the record raising an issue of material fact. Peterson, 477 N.W.2d at 234. Smith has failed to comply with that requirement. The evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Smith, shows Land O’Lakes eliminated three loader positions in the order of least seniority of the person holding the position, and he was among the three least senior loaders. We conclude Smith failed to present evidence of sufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational fact finder to find fraud by clear and convincing evidence. We therefore con 0-21, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Smith's claims are obviously based, in part, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that former employees state law claim of fraud brought against his former employer was preempted by labor management relations act (B) holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (C) holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement (D) holding state law claim substantially dependent upon interpretation of collective bargaining agreement must be dismissed for failure to use grievance procedure or as preempted by  301 of labor management relations act (E) holding that an employees state law claim against employer for breach of settlement agreement arrived at by virtue of grievance process established by the collective bargaining agreement was preempted by labor management relations act
Output: (D)