niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 15, 556 N.E.2d 439; Children’s Home of Marion Cty. v. Fetter (1914), 90 Ohio St. 110, 127, 106 N.E. 761; Ex parte Januszewski (C.C.Ohio 1911), 196 F. 123, 127. In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 66. {¶ 65} Despite the differing goals of juvenile and adult courts, the establishment of juvenile courts was not a license for the General Assembly to deprive juveniles of their constitutional rights. In fact, juveniles are entitled to a range of rights grounded in constitutional protections. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (applying reasonable-doubt standard to juvenile offenders); Gault, 387 U.S. at 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (<HOLDING>); State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (C) recognizing that juveniles have no right to jury trial and that juvenile proceedings unlike adult prosecutions are rehabilitative in nature (D) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel (E) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles
Output: (B)
GUIDO CALABRESI, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges. SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Heptagon Creations Ltd. (“Heptagon”) appeals from a judgment granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A designer of high-end furniture, Heptagon contends that the District Court erred in dismissing its claim for copyright infringement against Defendants-Appellees Core Marketing Group, LLC, Pleskow & Rael Corporation, and Thomas Rael (“Defendants”) for copying nine of its furniture designs without permission. Because Heptagon does not press any of its other claims on appeal, it has waived those claims. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). We review a district court’s grant of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived (B) holding issues which are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived (C) holding that issues which are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived (D) holding that issues not raised in a partys opening brief are waived (E) holding issues that are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived
Output: (A)
Mathews has named a number of white employees whom he believes were similarly situated and were not terminated. From an examination of the affidavits in the record, it appears that employees named Schmidt, Hoile, Warner, Blanford and “Moonehicken” possibly had attendance problems. See generally Flint, Figueroa, Gamble, Hines and Wedge Affs. However, these affidavits, besides being primarily hearsay and speculation, contain only general statements regarding these individuals’ behavior that do not meet Mathews’ burden of establishing that these Caucasian employees also repeatedly violated Giant policies, that Giant policies required the employees’ termination and that the employees were not terminated. See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Mathews has failed to establish 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment (B) holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible (C) holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence (D) holding that unsworn statements signed under penalty of peijury can be used to oppose a motion for summary judgment (E) holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment
Output: (A)
when he injured a woman by accidentally hitting her with a golf cart. We agree with the district court that St. Paul Travelers, Inc., (St. Paul), the insurer, owed a duty to defend Scher from the time the Red Cross tendered Scher’s defense to St. Paul. See Montrose Chem. Corp. of California v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal.4th 287, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153, 1160 (1993) (explaining that the duty to defend arises if there is potential liability). Indeed, St. Paul concedes this point on appeal. However, the district court erred in interpreting the terms of the St. Paul policy to exclude from the definition of “covered person,” volunteers who were not acting at the express direction of Kraft. See Bank of the West v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264-65, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (1992) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). As a result, St. Paul was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (C) holding that an erisa insurance policy is governed by a uniform body of federal common law which requires policy language to be interpreted in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience (D) holding that policy terms must be read in their ordinary and popular sense (E) holding that we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense and if doubts remain resolve them in the light not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment but as well by all other available aids to construction and looking to supplemental legislation and the scheme and structure of the legislation
Output: (D)
[I]f the manner of termination, including dismissal, reflects negatively on the merits of the case, it will be considered favorable to the defendant.... More specifically, if the dismissal somehow indicates that the defendant is innocent of wrongdoing, it will be considered a favorable termination.... On the other hand, if the reason for dismissal is “not inconsistent” with a defendant’s wrongdoing, it will not be considered a favorable termination.... If the circumstances surrounding dismissal are ambiguous on this point, the determination should be left for trial. Parrish, 172 S.W.3d at 531 (quoting Siliski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 174 Vt. 200, 811 A.2d 148, 151-52 (2002) (citations omitted)). See also Sewell v. Par Cable, Inc., 1988 WL 112915, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. M.S., Oct. 26, 1988) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The order of voluntary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that only malicious prosecution requires a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings and that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process accrue on the date of arrest (C) holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice was a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action where the courts reasons for dismissing the criminal charges were not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused (D) holding that for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action a favorable termination must be one indicating that the accused is innocenta disposition that does not indicate the plaintiffs innocence is not considered a favorable termination  (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment
Output: (D)
disciplinary proceeding were not a matter of public record, but instead were part of his “employment history” which could not be released under New York’s Freedom of Information Law, Public Officers Law, art. 6, (“FOIL”). See Hanig v. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 109-10, 580 N.Y.S.2d 715, 588 N.E.2d 750 (1992) (citing exemption under Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i) for “disclosure of employment, medical or credit histories”). As noted by the district court, however, New York courts have found that the disposition of misconduct charges does not constitute part of an employee’s “employment history” as that phrase is used in New York’s FOIL. See, e.g., LaRocca v. Board of Educ. of Jericho Union Free Sch. Dist., 220 A.D.2d 424, 632 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578-79 (2d Dep’t 1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we agree with the district court that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (B) holding that settlement agreement which disposed of misconduct charges brought under  3020a did not constitute an employment history for foil purposes (C) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (D) holding that additional charges were barred in an employment discrimination case when the additional charges did not reflect the essence of the other charges (E) holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes
Output: (B)
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Tenry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). Moncriefs argument concerning the timeliness of her failure to promote claim is unavailing. To state a timely Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The most recent date upon which Moncrief was denied a promotion was April 2002, and she filed her EEOC charge in May 2004, more than two years later. Therefore, this claim was time-barred, and the district court correctly dismissed it. See Alleyne v. American Airlines, Inc., 548 F.3d 219, 220 (2d Cir.2008)(per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As to Moncriefs wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party must file an eeoc charge within 180 days from the date the unlawful act occurred or lose the ability to recover for it (B) holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 (C) holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii (D) recognizing that under 42 usc  2000e5el a title vii claim is timely where the eeoc charge was filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice (E) holding that statute of limitations barred title vii claim where the plaintiff would have been aware of discrimination more than 300 days before eeoc charge filed
Output: (D)
was told he needed to “go back to the jungle,” and Ku Klux Klan material was shown to an African-American employee on the internet. 446 F.Supp.2d 615, 627 (W.D.Va.2006). In granting summary judgment, the Court held that the acts of harassment plaintiff experienced were insufficiently frequent because he could only identify eight acts that took place over the course of twenty years. Id. Similarly, in Rose, this Court granted summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff could only identify two relatively non-severe racial insults that were nonthreatening, and that did not appear to adversely impact plaintiffs ability to do her job. 2006 WL 173690, at *4. The racial comments at issue in Orenge v. Veneman were similarly infrequent and non-threatening. 218 F.Supp.2d 758, 767 (D.Md.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prima facie case of discrimination is not established merely by the number of peremptory strikes against blacks in cases where the percentage of blacks on the empaneled jury is higher than the percentage of the venire pool (B) holding that white female had standing under title vii to challenge her employees alleged racial discrimination against blacks (C) holding that the statement at your age i dont believe you could pass the test is not direct evidence of age discrimination (D) holding that blacks who were not subjected to racial discrimination had standing under title vii to sue over discrimination against other blacks (E) holding that repeated racial comments such as whites will never trust blacks again blacks are trying to get a free ride and you guys dont pull your weight did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive
Output: (E)
state law causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. IV. DISPOSITION For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23). The Clerk shall remove Document 23 from the Court’s pending motions list. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In Bell Atlantic Corp., the United States Supreme Court rejected the language previously used by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, providing that "[i]n appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (<HOLDING>). 2 . Though there are other pleading 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical (B) holding that the conley no set of facts language has earned its retirement and is best forgotten (C) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (D) holding that dismissal is inappropriate unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations (E) holding that there was no jurisdictional defect when the language of the charging document tracked the statutory language even though the facts proffered at the plea hearing were insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime
Output: (B)
visits or inspections by the board or its agents to verify compliance with the stipulation and order. The statement of charges was irrelevant because it was merely assertions of wrongdoing. None of the matters in the statement of charges was either proved or disproved. And nothing in the stipulation and consent order amounted to an admission of wrongdoing. The stipulation and c 6, 767 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming exclusion of SEC consent decree in prior enforcement proceedings under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in which “consent decree involved no finding of culpability and no judgment of wrongdoing and contained a recitation that it did not constitute evidence of wrongdoing in the enforcement proceeding”); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F.Supp. 1547, 1565, 1566 (N.D.Ill.1985) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Pinter v. Dahl, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if the sec succeeded in showing defendants violated the exchange act or sec rules the sec is not entitled to a permanent injunction or an officerdirector bar (B) holding that all evidence of sec investigation sec opinion and defendants acquiescence in sec opinion was inadmissible as irrelevant and immaterial (C) holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable (D) holding that the sec may subpoena records in a securities investigation even if the persons involved are also subject to regulation by the department of agriculture under the commodity exchange act (E) holding that section 21g operates as impenetrable wall to intervention by victim of fraudulent scheme in sec enforcement action
Output: (B)
1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 Fed.Appx. 615 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050, 128 S.Ct. 675, 169 L.Ed.2d 529 (2007); Agee v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 284, 290 (2006); Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 732, 739, aff'd, 204 Fed.Appx. 885 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 2006), Plaintiffs’ claims sounding in tort, such as misrepresentation and conspiracy, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent that plaintiffs are alleging acts of criminal conduct, such as criminal conspiracy, identity theft, criminal fraud, and racketeering, this court also lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed.Cir.1994): see also Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed.Cl. 306, 312 (2012) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); Mendes v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts (B) holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over tax claims for declaratory or equitable relief (C) holding federal district courts do not have jurisdiction  over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state courts action was unconstitutional review of those decisions may be had only in this united states supreme court (D) holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal (E) holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court
Output: (A)
for the greater crime. See State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 164, 630 P2d 796 (1981) (applying vertical proportionality to conclude that the portion of a sentence that required the defendant to serve a minimum of 25 years before being eligible for parole was invalid under Article I, section 16, because it required a lesser minimum sentence for aggravated intentional homicide than “unaggravated” intentional homicide); State v. Dobash, 210 Or App 145, 148, 149 P3d 1235 (2006) (determining that the defendant’s sentence was not unconstitutional because the maximum sentence allowed by law for first-degree theft was at least five years’ probation, which was greater than the four years’ probation that the defendant received for second-degree theft); State v. Koch, 169 Or App 223, 7 P3d 769 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, defendant maintains that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a 24month sentence for forgery unconstitutional because it exceeded the maximum sentence that the defendant could have received for a more serious forgery conviction (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment (D) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines (E) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable
Output: (A)
court about Buividas’s availability for trial, Sunkett’s objection might reasonably be taken as objection to a violation of N.J. RPC 3.3(a)(1). The Rules of Professional Conduct can supply a clear mandate of public policy under CEPA. See Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett, & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 442, 672 A.2d 1132, 1144 (1996)(citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). While there is no direct evidence that Sunkett in fact believed that an ethical violation was taking place at the time he objected, a reasonable jury could infer as much from his long career as a practicing attorney, and his presumed familiarity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Cf. Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J.Super. 342, 356, 702 A.2d 523, 530 (App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, given the remaining factors I discussed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (C) holding that court could properly infer that veteran officer believed there was a violation of the law based on his long experience with law enforcement (D) holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law (E) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had
Output: (C)
JT & T parties also appeal the district court’s order reversing the bankruptcy court’s denial of Hyundai’s motion to lift the automatic stay. II. ANALYSIS A. Appellate Standing Hyundai contends that the JT & T parties lack appellate standing to appeal either the district court’s order granting Hyundai’s request for derivative standing or its order granting Hyundai’s motion to lift the automatic stay. Specifically, Hyundai argues that the JT & T parties lack standing under the prudential doctrine of “appellate standing” that applies only in the bankruptcy context. Under that doctrine, which is “more limited than Article III standing or the prudential requirements associated therewith,” standing to appeal a bankruptcy order is limited to “person[s] Co.), 146 F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Squire v. Scher (In re Squire), 282 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (B) holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal (C) holding that shareholders of debtor corporation lacked appellate standing to appeal bankruptcy courts order awarding insurance proceeds to trustee (D) holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed (E) holding that creditor lacked appellate standing to appeal order of bankruptcy court absent permission of bankruptcy court
Output: (E)
two for support). The fallacy of this position is that it confuses and commingles two conflicting strands of case law which follow opposing judicial routes. As noted above, in every case cited by the majority in footnote two, the fruits of a search were deemed admissible only after the search was found to be constitutional, i.e., distinctions as to admissibility of the fruits of a particular search against the consenting occupant and the nonconsenting occupant were never drawn. There is no authority for the majority’s proposition that the fruits of an unconstitutional search should be admitted into evidence. Indeed such a proposition violates one of the founding principles of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Most commentators also agree failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed (C) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed (D) holding that regardless of the applicable framework defendants statement must be suppressed (E) holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search
Output: (C)
to the Title AHI claim); and 4) citation to deposition testimony wherein Plaintiff admits her inability to produce evidence that Hooper knew about the allegations of sexual harassment. Neither this record evidence nor Defendants’ arguments below or on appeal adequately address Plaintiffs allegations against each specific Defendant. With regard to Cacioppo, Defendants did not directly address Plaintiffs claim that after she rejected the “unwelcome[d] sexual advances, Cacioppo repeatedly denigrated her work performance, harassed and beleaguered her, and such actions ultimately le[d] to and [were] the proximate cause of Palmer being discharged from her employment of 13 years.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 2; see also Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously (B) holding that an employers decision to terminate the plaintiff based on information supplied by a supervisor satisfies the causation requirement (C) holding that although physicians letter requesting an accommodation for disabled employee came after employers decision to terminate employer should have reconsidered the decision to terminate his employment (D) holding that plaintiff satisfies causation by showing that in absence of defendants negligence she would have obtained abortion (E) holding that an employers decision to terminate and individuals employment based on race is a violation of title vii regardless of whether that person is white or black
Output: (B)
the purchaser assume that responsibility. ECRA further provides that the DEP or transferees can void the sale if the trans-feror fails to comply with any provision of the Act, and that penalties of up to $25,000 per day may be imposed on those who fail to comply. The Act also provides that obligations imposed by the Act are intended to “constitute continuing regulatory obligations imposed by the state” and are not to be considered as liens or claims dis-chargeable in bankruptcy. In re Borne Chemical Co., 54 B.R. at 128. Obviously, the interests could not be satisfied with a money judgment. See Torwico Elecs., Inc., v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (In re Torwico Elecs., Inc.), 8 F.3d 146, 150-51 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1576, 128 L.Ed.2d 219 (1994) (<HOLDING>). In the case at issue, DMAS can be compelled 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtors exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under bankruptcy code (B) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (C) holding debtors obligation to clean up hazardous waste on property was not claim under bankruptcy code state didnt have right to payment but instead had right to force debtor to comply with existing environmental laws (D) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (E) holding that the bankruptcy code should not be understood to force bankruptcy courts to use statelaw procedures and statelaw actors to determine what portion of a debtors real property is an exempt homestead
Output: (C)
of educational institutions. On the other hand, it does not provide a standard for courts to follow and ensures that every nontraditional school will litigate its exemption status. Other states have adopted an even less restrictive definition of schools. In most of those jurisdictions, however, the inquiry focuses on whether the institution serves “an educational purpose.” See, e.g., McKee v. Evans, 490 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Alaska 1971) (granting exemption to-Apprentice and Manpower Training Trust’s nonprofit educational school because “educational purposes” were defined to “include[] systematic instruction in any and all branches of learning from which a substantial public benefit is derived”); see also J.A.T.T. Title Holding Corp. v. Roberts, 258 Ga. 519, 371 S.E.2d 861, 862 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Feather, 149 Tex. 402, 234 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislation cannot prohibit school children from learning languages other than english (B) holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union (C) holding that extracurricular activities like a high school dance are within the charitable purpose of conducting a school for learning even where the organization charged admission (D) holding trade school operated by union trust was seminary of learning (E) recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union
Output: (D)
declaration of the state’s intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found. Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 54, 64 S.Ct. at 877 This final caveat guides this Court today. The State of Georgia has explicitly consented to actions seeking recovery of taxes “erroneously and illegally assessed and collected ... under the laws of this state.” O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35(a)-(d). Awards are drawn directly from the state tre f’s claims against the State for damages or prospective relief. B. Abrogation Plaintiff argues that Congress actually abrogated state sovereign immunity for constitutional claims by passing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this argument is clearly incorrect. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145-46, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suits under 42 usc  1983 do not override state immunity (B) holding that the tia does not abrogate states immunity under the eleventh amendment (C) holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity (D) recognizing the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from suing a state (E) holding that congress did not intend to disturb the states eleventh amendment protection in passing  1983
Output: (C)
that an IQ of 71 was within the range of § 12.05(C)). Obviously, the Court is not bound by any of these decisions. The Court, however, finds the reasoning in Bendt, and its reliance on Cockerham v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990), to be most persuasive. In Bendt, the district court noted that “[incorporating a 5 point measurement error into a claimant’s I.Q. test results would effectively expand the requisite I.Q. under listing 12.05(C) from test scores of 60 to 70 to test scores of 60 to 75.” Bendt, 940 F.Supp. at 1431. The court concluded that this would alter the range of I.Q.’s which satisfy the Listing of Impairments for Mental Retardation and Autism in contradiction of the federal regulations interpreting the Act, and the court cited Cockerham, 895 F.2d at 495-96 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same inference on the same record as that here was supported by substantial evidence (B) holding that an aljs finding that a claimants iq score of 71 was not within the range of 6069 was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole (C) holding that court reviews aljs decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole including the new evidence submitted after the determination was made (D) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (E) holding that a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole if it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the boards conclusion
Output: (B)
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890))). The Eleventh Amendment protects un-consenting states from suits in federal court brought by citizens of other states, see U.S. Const. Amend. XI, and consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity additionally protects unconsenting states from suits brought by its own citizens in its own state courts, see Hans, 134 U.S. at 18-19, 10 S.Ct. 504; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity, as an a priori concept, extends beyond the explicit language of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Hans, 134 U.S. at 15, 10 S.Ct. 504 (<HOLDING>). Even so, sovereign immunity is not absolute. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (B) holding an exception to eleventh amendment immunity inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law (C) holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state (D) holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens (E) holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts
Output: (A)
against enforcement of the summonses and to quash them are that (1) this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs because they do not reside in a “United States judicial district” or in the District of Columbia, Petition, p. 5; and (2) the revenue agents involved in the investigation “were unable to produce both statutes and implementing regulations ... that authorize him/them to do anything he has done in this case.... ” Id. at p. 7. The plaintiffs give as their address 123 El Diente Drive, Durango, Colorado. Petition, “Notice of Lodgement,” p. 2. The state of Colorado composes a single federal judicial district, created by 28 U.S.C. § 85. The plaintiffs’ argument that they do not reside in a United States judicial district is frivolous. See Lonsdale, 919 F.2d at 1448 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, sections 7604(a) and 7609(h)(1), 26 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (B) holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions (C) holding as frivolous the argument that individuals free born white preamble sovereign natural individual common law de jure citizens of a state etc are not persons subject to taxation under the internal revenue code (D) holding that a contract whereby a foreign state grants a private party a license to exploit the states natural resources is not a commercial activity under the fsia since natural resources to the extent they are affected with the public interest are goods in which only the sovereign may deal (E) holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state
Output: (C)
shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 1988). On June 25, 1938, the date of § 16(b)’s enactment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been proposed and were pending before Congress, but had not yet become effective. One problem bedeviling the common law of class actions in this country in 1938 was the binding effect of the class action decree on absent class members. Chafee, supra, at 224-25. In the United States the application of res judicata to absent parties in class suits raised constitutional issues of due process. Compare Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921) (<HOLDING>) and Restatement of Judgments § 86 (1942) (all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state immune from suit brought in state court (B) holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law (C) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (D) holding all members of beneficial society bound by state decree in class action including citizens of the state in which federal action seeking to enforce state decree was brought who were not parties to the state suit (E) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23
Output: (D)
are “so implausible as not to be the product of rational decisionmaking.” Unlike PGBA, this Court cannot conclude that the Government’s assertion that a delay in this procurement could lead to a void in coverage of items being procured is “completely without foundation.” Id. At 662. Given that the product being acquired is critical to protect the nation’s aircrew against chemical, biological and nuclear threats, and that the Air Force has determined it to be an urgent requirement with no slack time available in the procurement schedule, the Court deems it prudent to deny injunctive relief. Where a solicitation addresses issues of national defense, as it does here, the importance of this factor is inflated. See CSE Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 230 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Computer Sciences Corp. v. United States, 51 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injunctive relief proper if proved at trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that a court may deny a request for injunctive relief in a summary judgment proceeding if it is clear the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for an injunction (C) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (D) holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief (E) holding that national security concerns and the balance of the equities tipped the scales decisively against injunctive relief in a case where a contract for firing range renovations if delayed would raise national defense concerns
Output: (E)
The court said: The term "Indian reservation" is not defined by statute. However, the Supreme Court in United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 2549, 57 L.Ed.2d 489 (1978), suggested that land "declared by Congress to be held in trust by the Federal Government for the benefit of the . . . Indians ... [is a] 'reservation,' at least for the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction [under 18 U.S.C. § 1153]." Similarly, the Supreme Court in United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449, 34 S.Ct. 396, 399, 58 L.Ed. 676 (1914), stated the principal test as whether the land "had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government." Accord Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. State of Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 667-68 (10th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>). United States v. Sohappy, supra at 822. The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress which regulated the introduction of alcoholic beverages in indian country could validly delegate to indian tribes its authority to regulate that subject matter because indian tribes themselves possessed independent authority over the subject matter (B) holding that lands held in trust by the united states for the tribes are indian country within the meaning of  1151a (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding indian tribes subject to gamblingrelated taxes from which states are exempt (E) recognizing lands taken into trust by the bia under  5 of the ira are indian country and as a general rule indian country falls under the primary civil criminal and regulatory jurisdiction of the federal government and the resident tribe rather than the states
Output: (B)
his claims based on injury to his eye and knees. But Mr. Sanders does not state any basis for his challenge to those decisions. Finally, Mr. Sanders claims that he has been deprived of due process and discriminated against based on his race. As already stated, we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional arguments. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). But Mr. Sanders does not provide any facts to substantiate his arguments. Nor do we see any basis for his arguments in the record. In the absence of any evidentiary support, Mr. Sanders’s passing remarks amount to no more than a constitutional label for his otherwise factual disagreement "with the decisions of the Veterans Court and the Board. That does not suffice to create jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (B) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (C) holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal (D) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim (E) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court
Output: (E)
traffic stop "significantly curtails the 'freedom of action’ of the driver and the passengers” alike); United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397-98 (5th Cir.2001). 11 . Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. 12 . Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. 13 . Id. at 492, 493-94. 14 . United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 15 . Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. . Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 48 . Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859 n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 1397 n. 6, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969)). 49 . 443 U.S. 47, 52-53, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); see also Hull v. State, 613 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). 50 .Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arrest immediately out side of defendants house violated fourth amendment (B) holding detention of passenger for warrant check violated fourth amendment absent reasonable suspicion (C) holding that arrest in backyard violated fourth amendment (D) holding defendants nervousness in part presented officer with reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity (E) holding arrest of individual for refusal to identify violated fourth amendment absent particularized and objective suspicion of criminal activity on his part
Output: (E)
a clear duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy [is] available.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon federal courts.” Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Res., Inc., 542 F.3d 859, 861-62 (11th Cir.2008). It is “an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2143, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he Act permits a party to apply to a federal court for a dec violated by the USCIS’s failure to record the approval of his application “in and about 2005-2006” also does not create jurisdiction in the district court. See Estrada v. Holder, 604 F.3d 402, 407-08 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Declaratory Judgment Act does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the apa and the due process clause over an aliens procedural challenge to the recission of his permanent resident status because the issue was reviewable in his pending removal proceedings (B) holding the district court did not have jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment of status where removal proceedings are pending (C) holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens (D) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal (E) holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings
Output: (A)
and client. Tallitsch v. Child Support Services, Inc., supra. Although the reasonableness of attorney fees is a question of fact for the trial court, we conclude that it is error to reduce an attorney's hourly rate based solely on the attorney's status as a salaried lawyer paid by a nonprofit entity such as the Town. Salaried and public interest attorneys should be awarded attorney fees based on the prevailing market rate rather than a "cost-plus" approach focusing on the attorney's salary. See California Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 246 Cal.Rptr. 285 (1987). See also Oten v. Colorado Board of Social Services, 738 P.2d 37 (Colo.App.1987.)(awarding attorney fees based on market rate to legal services attorneys); In re Marriage of Swink, 807 P.2d 1245 (Colo.App.1991)(<HOLDING>). The fact that the attorneys may not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1410119 cr81999 authorizes market rate fees to pro bono attorneys who render services in dissolution of marriage actions (B) holding that upon dissolution of partnership of attorneys fees collected for work on cases prior to dissolution should be divided among former partners but fees for work done after dissolution went to individual partner who performed the work (C) holding that 42 usc  1988 authorizes the grant of attorneys fees for services on appeal though statute does not specifically so provide (D) holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate (E) holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees
Output: (A)