niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
release she signed. Gene and Priscilla argue that Leonida assumed the risk of mistake because she did not ask Priscilla to read and translate the entire contract before she signed it. But according to the testimony of both Leonida and Priscilla, the insurance agent went over the contract and explained it to Priscilla, who then translated for Leonida. Leonida testified that Priscilla told her that the release was for lost wages only. Although Priscilla testified that she told Leonida the release covered pain and suffering as well as lost wages, we do not weigh credibility. Further, Priscilla is a family member whom Leonida trusted to explain the contract, so we cannot say that Leonida was negligent as a matter of law for relying on Priscilla’s explanation. Cf. Mesa, 193 S.E.2d at 927 (<HOLDING>). See also Bjorklund, 35 Wash, at 444 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding signers negligent for failing to have englishspeaking daughter explain writing (B) holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint (C) holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding that mother who neither owned vehicle in question nor had control over her daughter could not be liable as a matter of law for damages caused by daughters negligent driving
Output: (A)
of a class consisting of all African-American plant employees. Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion to deny class certification on the basis of the appellants’ direct evidence. B. Statistical Evidence Nucor provided the appellants with actual promotion-related job posting and applicant data from January 2001 to February 2006. According to the appellants’ own expert, statistical analysis of this data resulted in a standard deviation of - .84, a result indicating no statistically significant disparity in the actual versus expected percentage of African-American employees successfully bidding on jobs. J.A. 5872-73. The appellants, however, objected to use of the 2001 to 2006 time period because it included job posting and bidding 759 n. 17 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Since the appellants could not prevail based 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard (B) recognizing that differences between the expected value and the observed number greater than two or three standard deviations are significant (C) recognizing the cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing that a standard deviation greater than two or three excludes chance as the cause of underrepresentation
Output: (E)
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see also St 06 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (same). Whether RIDA created an adequate substitute for habeas corpus for those aliens to whom a petition for review is available, however, is different from whether RIDA created any adequate substitute for those aliens for whom it is no longer available. Unlike in previous cases where we have upheld RIDA against Suspension Clause challenges, Singh never had the ability to obtain judicial review of the merits of his removal through a petition for review filed within 30 days of his removal order. Cf. Puri, 464 F.3d at 1043; Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By the time RIDA created jurisdiction in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (B) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief (D) holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization (E) holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows
Output: (E)
in Gonzalez v. Chertoff, 454 F.3d 813 (8th Cir.2006), that the reasoning of Alvarez-Portillo is overruled. In Gonzalez, we held an alien who failed to apply for adjustment of status before IIRIRA’s enactment, based on a pre-IIRIRA marriage, was subject to the new expedited removal proceedings under IIRIRA. See Gonzalez, 454 F.3d at 814-15, 816-18 & n. 4. After discussing Fernandez-Vargas at length, we determined "the Supreme Court in Femandez-Vargas found that the elimination of the opportunity to apply for adjustment of status under [IIRIRA] imposed no new burden on a completed act.” Id. at 818. We stated "[w]e find that decision determinative on the issue of retroactivity in the instant case.” Id. We then noted, "To the extent our decision in Alvarez-Portillo, 280 F.3d at 861 (<HOLDING>), suggests a different result, it is overruled 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantive defenses to removal eliminated by 8 usc  1231a5  may not be retroactively denied to aliens who illegally reentered prior to enactment (B) holding that zadvydas applies to inadmissible aliens who have illegally entered the united states (C) holding that sjection 241a5  bars aliens who have illegally reentered the united states after having previously been deported from applying for relief (D) holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment (E) holding that an iirira provision on reinstatement of orders of removal did not apply to aliens who reentered prior to the iiriras effective date
Output: (A)
FELA applicable to Jones Act cases. See Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 120 n. 2 (2d Cir.2010). We rejected this contention in Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2011), and held that the 2008 amendment did not change the law. Thus, under our prior panel precedent rule, we must conclude that § 6 of the FELA does not apply to Jones Act claims. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Fla. League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir.1996)). Finally, Escobal invites us to revisit Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2005) and Lindo, 652 F.3d 1257, arguing that these decisions conflict with Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970) (<HOLDING>). We find no conflict between Bautista or Lindo 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that injured seamans loss of consortium claim under state law was preempted by jones act (C) holding that the jones act did not operate to make negligent crew members liable to their employers for damages paid to other seamen under the jones act because crew members cannot sue each other for negligence (D) holding that a usbased company was an employer under the jones act (E) holding that jones act claimant against the government must comply with the terms of  2675
Output: (D)
a plan for managing the potential liability, and submit the information to the agency. See Minn.Stat. § 115A.471. Defendants argue that NSWMA does not have standing to challenge section 115A.471. This court’s jurisdiction is limited by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which limits the judicial power of the federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A threshold question in every case is whether the plaintiff has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The standing doctrine is “an essential and unchanging part of the ease-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 2136-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). To establish standing within the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing is an essential and unchanging part of the easeorcontroversy requirement of article iii (B) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (C) recognizing that standing requirement is indispensable part of case (D) recognizing that the case or controversy requirement for standing is no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any suit where other relief is sought (E) holding that standing existed
Output: (C)
was not altered.”). Rather, we believe that the “burden-shifting” approach advanced in Southmre strikes the appropriate balance by maintaining plaintiffs burden of persuasion, but eliminating the possibility that defendant may prevail on the bare allegation that some unidentifiable change occurred in the product. Cf. Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 501 (10th Cir.1984) (ruling that the mere “conclusory statement” that substantial change had occurred was insufficient to create a jury question). This balance, we note, comports with the underlying philosophy of strict products liability, leaving the ultimate burden of proof with the party in control of the product when the substantial change allegedly would have occurred, see Stewart, 52 Haw. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243 (<HOLDING>), but still advancing the public interest in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (B) recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim (C) recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law (D) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (E) recognizing strict product liability actions
Output: (D)
is adverse to its interests. Lamar cites no authority establishing that either “fact” was material to determining whether City exceeded the scope of its powers by surrendering and contracting away zoning authority that would otherwise have applied to Lamar’s efforts to rebuild or relocate eight of the forty-two signs identified in the Agreement. For reasons we explain, neither factual contention prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of City as a matter of law. We have already explained that the Agreement hindered City’s zoning authority, and that zoning authority is an exercise of police powers. City thus established all that was necessary to demonstrate that the Agreement exceeded the scope of City’s powers in violation of section 432.070. Stewart, 165 S.W.2d at 629 (<HOLDING>). It is true that “[t]he due process clauses of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation (B) holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have (C) holding that if a contract surrenders or contracts away governmental functions then it exceeds the scope of a governmental entitys powers and is void (D) holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability (E) holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary
Output: (C)
reported, to the office of the State’s Attorney.” 2 . The officer who registered S. Williams as a confidential paid informant testified that because the identities of confidential informants were not centrally computerized, S. Williams’s status as a police informant, while known to some, was not known to all police officers in the Eastern District 3 . The Cou 230 (1989) (in regards to newly discovered evidence, favoring a standard that falls between "probable,” which is less demanding than "beyond a reasonable doubt,” and "might” which is less stringent than probable, and establishing that the inquiry is whether there is a "possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected”) (emphasis added); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-427, 578 A.2d 734, 738-739 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Gross v. State, 371 Md. 334, 347, 809 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petitioner demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice by proving a claim under strickland (B) holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test (C) holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland (D) holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis (E) holding regarding sixth amendment prejudice if there is no reasonable possibility that the appellate court would have ruled in his favor there can be no strickland prejudice
Output: (C)
Cir.1997) (upholding a § 3A1.2(a) sentence enhancement of defendant who was convicted of plotting to blow up an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) building because, although no one was killed and the defendant did not know the names of his intended victims, the defendant did intend to “kill, injure, or maim federal employees in the [building] solely because those person worked for the IRS.”); United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465, 1476 (5th Cir.1997) (reversing a defendant’s enhancement under § 3A1.2(a) because while two of the defendant’s co-conspirators had shot a police officer while fleeing, the defendant’s offense of conviction, accessory after the fact, “was not motivated by the government employee status” of the officer.); United States v. Hooker, 997 F.2d 67, 75-76 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We have previously never considered an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no double counting in applying  3c12 and  3a12b because they were based on separate acts (B) holding that the defendants sentences were properly enhanced under  3a12b because they assaulted an officer employed by the mississippi bureau of narcotics and during the assault made statements including they are the police lets kill them (C) holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern (D) holding defendants were properly joined because they are alleged to have participated in the underlying conspiracy (E) holding that the defendants unconstitutionally obtained statements to the police telling them that narcotics were located in the hood of his truck did not render the narcotics inadmissible because the police were trained to look under the hoods of vehicles when searching for drugs and therefore would have found them even had the defendant not directed them to look under the hood
Output: (B)
may not have been present during the entire time [the witness] observed [defendant] driving, we note that a motorist may be stopped for reckless driving even if the only concern is for the motorist’s own safely.” Id. at 608 (citing Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 562 Pa. 667, 753 A.2d 816 (2000)); see also, Commonwealth v. Cook, 865 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. 2004) (finding that a report of erratic driving followed by a trooper’s independent observations of the defendant’s vehicle crossing the right white fog line three times, to the extent of half the vehicle width, over a distance of one mile, each time rapidly jerking the vehicle back into its lane of traffic, justified the traffic stop); Commonwealth v. Klopp, 863 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. 2004) (<HOLDING>). In summarizing whether a police officer has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car  once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action  and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop (B) holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence (C) holding that an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway does not violate state statutes requirement that vehicles remain entirely in a single lane as nearly as practical (D) holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant stopped in middle lane of traffic to exit his vehicle (E) holding officer had a reasonable basis to stop a motorist for crossing the fog line and that failure to have regard for the width and use of the street by swerving off the side of the road or crossing the marker lines constitutes probable cause for a traffic stop
Output: (A)
specifically instructed jurors that they “may not consider Clinton Van Berry’s statements to the FBI on December 17th in any way against Nadine Van Berry.” (1AA225.) See In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir.2006) (finding that Crawford was not violated where co-defendant’s out-of-court confession was admitted solely against co-defendant); cf Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (finding Confrontation Clause violation in admission of wife’s testimonial statement as evidence against husband in criminal trial). We find, therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation under Crawford. We also find, as did the District Court, that Clinton’s statements did not “powerfully incriminate” Nadine. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 n. 1, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>). In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant (B) holding that limiting instruction was insufficient to avoid confrontation clause violation where codefendants powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statement was admitted in joint trial with petitioner (C) holding that a limiting instruction is required where evidence of a prior conviction is admitted over objection (D) holding that when all references to the defendant in a codefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given (E) holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction
Output: (B)
make a hearing unnecessary. These contentions have no merit. Although we retain jurisdiction to resolve the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal, we first remand this matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We remand because whether Mr. Comer has expressly or impliedly consented to the filing of any pleadings in federal court is a critical question of fact that we believe the district court is in a better position to resolve. Indeed, we have previously recognized the general presumption that an attorney is authorized to act on his client’s behalf. See, e.g., Nevius, 105 F.3d at 459; Lucky, 86 F.3d at 925; Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1994); cf. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, — U.S. —, —, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (<HOLDING>). When parties have challenged this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (B) holding that attorney lacked standing to file notice of appeal on behalf of client who couldnot be located because the client must make the ultimate decision regarding the appeal internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that counsel have the authori ty to file an appeal on their clients behalf even when the client does not expressly give them his consent to do so (D) holding broker and clients agreed to arbitration where newaccount forms signed by clients expressly incorporated separate unsigned client agreement containing arbitration provision even if client agreement was not attached or read by clients because they were presumed to have read newaccount form which placed them on notice of client agreement (E) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal
Output: (C)
voters of the political subdivision or subdivisions whose combined territory composes the territory of a district shall be qualified voters of the district. The nomination and election shall be by separate nonpartisan ballot. The term of each member of the board thus elected shall be six years and until his successor is elected and qualified. (Emphasis added.) No definition of a “qualified voter” is provided in SDCL Chapter 49-36. Thus, we must turn to the definition of “voter” as provided under SDCL Title 12, and the South Dakota Constitution as to what qualifies a person as a “voter” within the meaning of Chapter 49-36. See SDCL 12-1-1. [¶44.] Our state affords great protection to a citizen’s voting franchise. SD Const, art. 6, § 19; Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>). A court must strictly adhere to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal (B) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (C) holding it is not the policy of the state of south dakota to disenfranchise its citizens of their constitutional right to vote (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding that the right to vote is fundamental
Output: (C)
for alleged misconduct in processing claims); Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 51-52 (5th Cir.1975) (sovereign immunity applied to claim of alleged wrongful suspension of payments for fraud); Pine View Gardens, Inc. v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (D.C.Cir.1973) (claim for unpaid benefits barred by sovereign immunity). Fewer circuit courts have decided the issue of whether fiscal intermediaries and carriers are entitled to official immunity for discretionary acts taken within the scope of their authority under the Medicare Act. See, e.g., Bushman v. Seiler, 755 F.2d 653, 655-56 (8th Cir.1985) (official immunity granted to consultant of Medicare carrier for reporting fraud to carrier); Peterson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 508 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Several district courts, however, have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding by implication that employee of both fiscal intermediary and carrier was entitled to official immunity in connection with suspension of payments for fraud (B) holding that attorney who was retained by city to assist in conducting official investigation into firefighters potential wrongdoing was entitled to qualified immunity in firefighters  1983 claim because official investigation of state employee was activity of the type entitled to qualified immunity (C) holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier (D) holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits (E) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity
Output: (A)
the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005); United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir.2006). Flores-Vasquez contends that because the statute of conviction includes “stealthy snatching,” it does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence. The D.C. Circuit has held that the D.C. robbery statute does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). See In re Sealed Case, 548 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C.Cir.2008). However, the Government cites our discussion of a Texas statute (which did not explicitly include “stealthy snatching”) as supporting its argument that the D.C. robbery statute qualifies as generic robbery. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 381 (<HOLDING>). We need not resolve any tension among prior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conviction under a texas robbery statute qualifies as generic robbery be cause its elements substantially correspond to the basic elements of the generic offense in that they both involve theft and immediate danger to a person (B) holding in part that robbery as a class b felony is not necessarily a lesserincluded offense of robbery as a class a felony (C) holding conviction for robbery under alabama statute a crime of violence both because the statute involved physical force and because robbery was one of the enumerated offenses in comment note 1 to ussg  4b12 (D) holding that where the states definition of robbery has on its face the element of use or threatened use of physical force a robbery conviction is properly used as a predicate under acca (E) holding insufficient the plaintiffs generic allegations
Output: (A)
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. 507. OFAC has directed us to a few cases, however, in which the Supreme Court has analyzed whether a warrantless search was reasonable in the totality of the circumstances — without reference to any specific exception. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). We will assume for the purpose of our discussion (but do not decide) that the “ ‘general Fourth Amendment approach,’ ” Samson, 547 U.S. at 848, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587), applies equally to warrantless seizures. But see KindHearts I, 647 F.Supp.2d at 878-79 (<HOLDING>). Under this approach, “we examine the totality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (B) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances (C) recognizing a presumption of reasonableness (D) holding that there is no general reasonableness approach to warrantless seizures (E) holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law
Output: (D)
Tax Court under subparagraph (A), until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Rules similar to the rules of sec. 7485 shall apply with respect to the collection of such assessment. (ii) Authority to enjoin collection actions. — Notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 7421(a), the beginning of such levy or proceeding during the time the prohibition under clause (i) is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the Tax Court. The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction under this subparagraph to enjoin any action or proceeding unless a timely petition has been filed under subparagraph (A) and then only in respect of the amount of the assessment to which the election under subsection (b) or (c) relates. 7 See Trent v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-285 (<HOLDING>). 8 Respondent has adopted the following 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the commissioner was not barred by sec 6330e1b from offsetting the taxpayers overpayments for later years against an earlier tax liability for which the taxpayer had claimed relief under sec 6015 (B) holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity (C) holding that a fpaa is the functional equivalent of a notice of deficiency because it serves to afford affected taxpayers that the commissioner has made a final administrative determination of their liability for particular tax years (D) holding the rule against taxpayer standing applies both to federal taxpayers and state taxpayers challenging state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as state taxpayers (E) holding this court generally lacks jurisdiction over the sec 6651a2 addition to tax for failure to pay tax
Output: (A)
full amount of $45,000 was recoverable. Even if that amount were found to be the value of the property on either the date of loss or sentencing, the value of the portion of the property recovered by Workman must be determined and deducted from that amount. More importantly, we disagree with the thrust of the government’s argument, namely, that any sums Workman expended to recover the property are recoverable as long as the total is less than the value of the property when Paul first acquired it. That is not in keeping with the plain language of the statute. We hold that an award of restitution under the VWPA cannot include consequential damages such as attorney’s and investigators’ fees expended to recover the property. See United States v. Arvanitis, 902 F.2d 489, 497 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 1255, 1261 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution for consequential damages such as legal fees expended to investigate a fraudulent insurance claim are unavailable under the vwpa (B) holding that restitution under the vwpa was more akin to compensation for actual loss than a criminal penalty that may not bear interest (C) holding that consequential damages are not to be considered (D) holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
Output: (A)
successfully challenges his sentence on appeal and the cause is remanded for resentencing, the resentencing is a ‘de novo’ proceeding, at which either side may present evidence anew regarding the appropriate sentence.”). The principle of de novo sentencing often benefits the defendant. See, e.g., Galindez, 955 So.2d at 525 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“In fact, because resentencing is de novo, the State was required to produce evidence on sentencing issues even if the State established the fact at the original sentencing.”); Tubwell v. State, 922 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“As this resentencing proceeding was de novo, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses.” (citations omitted)); Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding the state must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing (B) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (C) holding that on resentencing following reversal the state was required to introduce evidence to prove the defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence and could not only rely upon evidence introduced at a prior sentencing hearing (D) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (E) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing
Output: (A)
(S.D.Tex.2009). In Fisher, the plaintiffs deposed Keith Richard, a former employee of defendant Halliburton. Id. at *1. Richard’s attorney instructed Richard not to answer questions concerning documents Richard reviewed in preparation for his deposition. Id. The Court declined to extend work product privilege to “the identity of the documents [the deponent] reviewed in preparation for his deposition,” on the grounds that “imbuefing] ever compilation of documents reviewed by a witness before testifying — at trial or at deposition — with work product privilege protection would all but write Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence out of existence.” Id. at *1-2; see also In re Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)) (<HOLDING>). Since the advent of the controversy involving 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fedrcivp 26b3 does not require absolute protection for opinion work product and noting that these materials may be discovered and admitted when mental impressions are at issue in the case and the need for the materials is compelling (B) holding that although plaintiffs claims were masked in various legal theories they were premised on a single claim of product liability and therefore fell under north carolinas product liability statute (C) holding that materials prepared by an investigative audit committee were not work product because they were not the mental impressions conclusions opinions or legal theories of an attorney (D) holding opinion work product may be discovered when mental impressions are at issue and need for material is compelling (E) holding that cover letters from counsel to an expert that do not contain mental impressions opinions or conclusions of counsel are discoverable but written notes that contained the lawyers mental impressions were protected
Output: (C)
of an additional committee in such a situation. These courts rely upon the inherent power of judicial review over acts of the U.S. Trustee as well as relying upon the equitable powers granted to the courts under 11 U.S.C. see. 105. See, e.g., In re Value Merchants, Inc., 202 B.R. 280, 287-88 (E.D.Wis.1996); In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 200 B.R. 933, 939-40 (M.D.Fla.1996); In re Barney’s, Inc., 197 B.R. 431, 439 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996); In re Plabell Rubber Products, 140 B.R. 179, 180 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992); In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 89 B.R. 1014, 1020-21 (Bankr.D.N.H.1988). “[I]f there is an objection to the act of the United States Trustee, there must be an ability to resort to the court; absent very specific and direct language, one should not concl 39 (9th Cir. BAP 1992)(<HOLDING>); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 118 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee (B) holding that the burden to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction resides with plaintiff (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that the power to appoint and delete members of the committee now resides exclusively with the us trustee (E) recognizing power of appointment does not rest exclusively in any one branch
Output: (D)
it may not be a room that is “used for detentions other than detentions under this section.” Tex. Fam.Code. Ann. § 52.025(a); Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 653-54 (taking juvenile arrested for murder to homicide division of police department violated Family Code requirements for handling child taken into custody). If, after taking a juvenile into custody, authorities do not take him to either a juvenile processing office or a statutorily designated alternative for questioning, but rather obtain a statement from the juvenile in an area used to interview adult suspects, that statement is inadmissible. Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654-56; In re U.G., 128 S.W.3d at 799; see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 52.02(a); Salas v. State, 756 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Roquemore, 60 S.W.3d at 868; Marsh, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statement inadmissible when instead of following section 5202 officers took juvenile first to police station where they obtained signed written statement from him before taking him to appropriate juvenile detention center (B) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (C) holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there (D) holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial (E) holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning
Output: (A)
— Protecting People, Not Places Because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it “provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), and there is no dispute that Hardin was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection while in Ms. Reynolds’s apartment. But, because “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted,” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133— 34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), Hardin may not assert Ms. Reynolds’s rights, he may assert only his.own. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (<HOLDING>). And, because Hardin was the subject of an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding search invalid under the fourth amendment when a physicallypresent occupant expressly objected to a search  notwithstanding the consent of a fellow occupant (B) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (C) holding that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling was reasonable as to one occupant who gave consent but not to another who did not (D) holding defendants girlfriend had authority to consent to search as a joint occupant (E) holding defendant gave a valid and knowing consent to a search of his dwelling and automobile when he agreed to the terms of probation
Output: (C)
of the composite tape is demonstrated by a July 11, 1994 letter written by Attorney Collins, who represented the City at the Civil Service Commission hearing, to Attorney Li-chten, Cignetti's counsel at the hearing. In that letter, Attorney Collins states that the tape was "made as part of the investigation.” The defendants’ have, moved to strike the letter. The motion is denied as moot. Although the letter itself has little or no evidentiary value, the defendants, as discussed above, have not established that they were engaging in prosecutorial functions when they prepared the tape. 8 . Several other Courts of Appeals have adopted similar exceptions to the broad immunity recognized in Briscoe v. LaHue. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 11 (<HOLDING>); see also Palma v. Atlantic County, 53 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disputed issues of fact as to whether officer who allegedly gave false testimony before a grand jury could be considered a complaining witness prevented summary judgment (B) recognizing that absolute immunity is immunity from charges of either constitutional or statutory violations (C) holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony (D) holding that absolute immunity does not extend to a complaining witness who initiated a baseless prosecution by giving false testimony at either a grand jury proceeding or preliminary hearing (E) holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity
Output: (D)
need only allege-not prove-reasonably specific, non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 715 n. 6 (emphasis in original). “A hearing is not required on patently frivolous claims or those which are based upon unsupported generalizations. Nor is a hearing required where the petitioner’s allegations are affirmatively contradicted in the record.” Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir.1989) (citation omitted) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to inform appellant of statutory parole consequences before entering a guilty plea because record did not conclusively show that appellant was entitled to no relief); see also Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that evidentiary hearing is not required when  2255 petitioner offers nothing more than conclusoiy allegations (B) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (C) holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on  2255 petitioners mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit (D) holding that conclusory allegations in an affidavit have no probative value and a nonmoving party cannot rely on the eonclusory allegations to avoid summary judgment (E) holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes
Output: (C)
which the bank was located. Such a result could never have been contemplated by Congress.” Id. 67-68. See also Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558, 43 S.Ct. 200, 67 L.Ed. 396 (1923) (“Here, while the suit is one in equity, the statute and decisions relied upon have nothing to do with the general principles of equity or with federal equity jurisdiction, but simply establish a measure of damages applicable alike to actions at law and suits in equity. The case presented by the bills is primarily one involving title to land and seeking an injunction against continuing trespasses. The conversion of the oil, for which damages are sought, is incidental and dependent. The entire cause of action is therefore local”); Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545, 550, 39 S.Ct. 372, 63 L.Ed. 764 (1919) (<HOLDING>); Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue (B) holding that the venue provisions of the bankruptcy act were superseded by the local action doctrine (C) holding that former federal venue statute applied to transitory actions only and did not displace local action rule (D) recognizing that special venue statutes are supplemented by the 28 usc  1391 venue provisions applicable to all civil cases (E) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added
Output: (B)
of injury which would be attributed to a reasonable person under the circumstances of the case.” Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 802, 811, 407 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1991). “This approach ... has been characterized as ‘requiring subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury . . . . ” Id. at 810, 407 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 323 Pa.Super. 363, 470 A.2d 634, 637 (1983)). Knowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver “where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.” People v. Carter, 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 52 Cal.Rptr. 207, 208 (1966) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred (B) holding that where impact slightly dam aged bumper or fender of both cars and bumper had to be pulled away from wheel of one so it could be moved collision was not of sufficient magnitude to compel the conclusion that injuries had probably occurred (C) holding that after two years of litigation the employer had waived any right it had to compel arbitration (D) holding that impact in the district resulting from the defendants conduct that occurred outside the district must be deliberate not incidental (E) holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested
Output: (B)
an effort by the legislature to “set the metes and bounds of recovery rights in tort suits based on the sale or furnishing of intoxicants.” Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Iowa 1987) (emphasis added). In its current form, the statute is phrased in language particularly indicative of tort theory in that liability is based on service to a person when “the licensee ... knew or should have known the person was intoxicated” or “would become intoxicated.” See 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 54 at 402 (1971) (“Fundamentally, the duty of a person to use care and his liability for negligence depend on the tendency of his acts under the circumstances as they are known or should be known to him.”). Historically, dram shop statutes were created to fill a void left empty at commo (<HOLDING>); see also Rinden, Judicial Prohibition? 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants affirmative acts of driving minor to robbery helping minor enter the building and serving as a lookout for the minor warranted sentencing enhancement (B) holding a common law cause of action exists against a nonlicensee who furnishes alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12347 where the minor subsequently causes the plaintiffs injuries (C) holding that reasonable attorneys fees for the benefit of a minor in defending the minor against a criminal charge were necessaries (D) holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor (E) holding in a case in which negligence was based on the illegal sale of alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12343 now section 12347 that proximate cause was an issue to be resolved by the finder of fact
Output: (B)