niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
“is one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ”. The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Additionally, a determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate or reasonable entails a balancing of interests. Id. 620 A.2d at 1118 (Citations omitted). Here, Mr. Cass obviously meant to keep the contents of his locker private from the public. Mr. Cass’ locker was locked, and this fact would indicate that he meant to keep the contents private. Simply because he did not own the locker does not preclude him from having an actual expectation of privacy. See, Bnmdidge supra (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 433 Pa.Super. 157, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest (B) holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented (C) holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home (D) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will (E) holding that a visitor to a hotel room for purposes of distributing drugs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room
Output: (B)
the common level ratio. The Board may hold a hearing to consider the objections, but it may also decide the objections have merit and adjust its calculations. If not satisfied with the outcome of the hearing, the taxpayer may “appeal de novo such ratio determination to the Commonwealth Court.” Id. It has long been established that “[wjhere a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive.” Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63, 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). This Court has explained that “where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby.” Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Where the statutory remedy is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (B) holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a class action in equity (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (E) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action
Output: (B)
various policymaking county officials who “combined to create an official County policy of illegal retaliation against plaintiffs based on racial motivations.” See Plaintiffs’ Opposing Memorandum, pg. 21. In plaintiffs view, evidence of this retaliatory policy is established primarily by initially awarding the GPP contract to another vendor (although plaintiffs were ultimately awarded the contract), ordering minuscule amounts of the product, and a derogatory statement made by Rodriguez, an individual who is not even a party to this case. These incidents, however, fail to constitute a custom or policy of retaliation “so permanent and well settled ... with the force of law.” See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, supra. See e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, plaintiffs fail to present any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two separate incidents of rape were perpetrated against the same victim where an appreciable period of time elapsed between the incidents and intervening events occurred during the interim (B) holding that a dozen racial incidents over a two and one half year period were too few to constitute a custom with the force of law (C) holding that five alleged incidents in four years were too few too separate in time and too mild  to create an abusive working environment (D) holding that two incidents of alleged excessive force are insufficient to show policy or custom (E) holding that only two overtly racial comments and one arguably racial remark over the course of the plaintiffs eight years of employment did not constitute pervasive conduct
Output: (B)
to sustain a conviction on each offense.” Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 262, 353 A.2d 240, 244 (1976). For d stribute and possession are the same offense, we must next determine if retrial for the same offense is barred by double jeopardy. The double jeopardy prohibition against retrial for the same offense attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973); Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 444, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975). Thus, after jeopardy attaches, retrial is barred if a mistrial is declared without the defendant’s consent unless there is a showing of “manifest necessity” to declare the mistrial. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (<HOLDING>). Although there is no clear test to determine 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict (B) holding that once the defendant is before the court the court will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding his presence there (C) holding that adverse credibility determinations under the real id act must take into consideration the individual circumstances of the applicant (D) holding that the trial court was not authorized to dismiss misdemeanor charges without the states consent on the basis that the state had refused to consent to fishers waiver of a jury trial (E) holding that a trial court may discharge a jury without the defendants consent whenever taking all the circumstances into consideration there is a manifest necessity for the act
Output: (E)
if they are to be successful in this appeal. It is important to note initially that the “Corrected Release” executed by the appellants is of no consequence to this appeal. By failing to assert the validity of the “corrected” releases in their point relied on or their argument, the appellants have abandoned any claim that the “Corrected Release” has legal force or effect in its own right which can be asserted against the respondent. See Black v. Cowan Const. Co., 738 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo.App.1987) (in applying Rule 84.04(d) which mandates that the point relied on contain the action or ruling of the court sought to be reviewed, the Court stated that violations of Rule 84.04(d) can cause abandonment of an argument on appeal); see also Cox v. Crider, 721 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Mo.App.1986), (<HOLDING>). Further, the original release executed by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority (B) holding that the governments failure to argue harmless error results in a waiver of the argument (C) holding that the failure to identify or argue an issue in an opening brief constitutes waiver of that argument on appeal (D) holding that if an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority his action is state action (E) holding that a failure to argue a point of error on appeal or produce supportive authority or state that there is no supporting authority acts as abandonment
Output: (E)
A.2d at 835 (“[I]t is elementary that mere presence is not, of itself, sufficient to establish that that person was either a principal or an accessory to the crime.”). Knowledge is an essential ingredient of the crime of possession of marijuana. Writing for the Court, Judge Eldridge discussed the knowledge requirement of § 287 in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 649, 547 A.2d 1041, 1046 (1988): [A]n individual ordinarily would not be deemed to exercise ‘dominion or control’ over an object about which he is unaware. Knowledge of the presence of an object is normally a prerequisite to exercising dominion and control. The evidence in this case does not establish that Taylor had knowledge of the presence of the marijuana concealed in Myers’s, carrying bags. As clearly ind 711, 714 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Haley v. State, 7 Md.App. 18, 33, 253 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient for conviction of possession of marijuana amphetamines and barbiturates when those drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other people on the premises (B) holding that the fortress theory applied where a firearm and marijuana were found on a night stand and cocaine was found in the same room as defendant had easy access to the firearm (C) holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises (D) holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant (E) holding evidence insufficient to establish defendant had physical or constructive possession of heroin when no drugs were found on his person and the only drugs discovered on the premises which he shared with the codefendant were secreted out of plain view
Output: (A)
made after a plenary hearing____ The Act contains rape-shield and confidentiality provisions, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1d to -1g, and in paragraph h, authorizes damages “in the amount of $10,000, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, or actual damages, whichever is greater.” Compensatory damages including but not limited to pain and suffering, medical expense, emotional trauma, diminished childhood and enjoyment of life, costs of counseling, and lost wages, as well as punitive damages, are recognized as recoverable. Ibid. The Act applies to the present matter by its terms, which provide that it “shall not apply to any action which is commenced before the effective date.” Historical and Statutory Note on N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 (1992). See also J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J.Super. 418, 429, 722 A.2d 558 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 158 N.J. 685, 731 A.2d 45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act applies prospectively to complaints filed after its effective date (B) holding that the aedpa applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of april 24 1996 (C) holding that section 591610 applies to actions commenced before its effective date (D) holding that in general aedpas provisions apply to cases filed after its effective date (E) holding aedpa applicable to petition filed on or after aedpas effective date
Output: (A)
one district required an incumbent Democratic representative to run against an incumbent Republican representative. These pairings of incumbent congressman permitted the creation of an open congressional district in the southeastern part of the Commonwealth. In contrast to its treatment of Democratic incumbents, no Republican congressmen are forced to run against each other. Moreover, Act 1 splits eighty-four local governments, including twenty-five counties, fifty-nine cities, boroughs or townships, as well as forty-one wards. It also splits six voting precincts. II. Analysis A. Population Deviation The United States Constitution requires that each congressional district in a state contain equal population. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has been exceedingly clear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized (B) recognizing that a stay is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal (C) holding as much (D) holding that the law in effect at the time a contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein (E) holding that art i  2 of the constitution requires that as nearly as is practicable one mans vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as anothers
Output: (E)
they would have been inevitably discovered. Id. at 255-56. We noted that we have the authority to order such a remand pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.05, subd. 2, and 29.04, subd. 11. Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 256. Giving Krause a full evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel remedies the district court’s violation of his due process rights. If, after the evidentiary hearing, the district court finds that Krause’s right to counsel was violated, the district court should then vacate the convictions and order a new trial. On the o 2, 53 (1999) (concluding “that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel”); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with that case law, we conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys (B) holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct (C) holding that a habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief from a state courts determination that he had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney and threatening to put a contract on his attorneys life (D) holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel (E) holding that trial court need not appoint an interpreter where counsel indicated that he could communicate with defendant and that defendant could understand questions and answers
Output: (A)
child abuse coincides with the appropriate measures that child protective services employees acting pursuant to § 424 are supposed to undertake. Section 424 provides, in relevant part, that if “the child protective service ... determines that the best interest of the child require[s] family court or criminal court action, [it could] initiate the appropriate family court proceeding or make a referral to the appropriate district attorney, or both.” Under the SSL, conclusive proof of child abuse is not a requisite threshold to trigger reporting under § 424. See Isabelle V. v. City of New York, 150 A.D.2d 312, 541 N.Y.S.2d 809, 809 (App.Div.1st Dep’t 1989); see also Kempster v. Child Protective Services of the County of Suffolk, 130 A.D.2d 623, 515 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (App.Div.2d Dep’t 1987)(<HOLDING>). In Isabelle, hospital employees, pursuant to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that compliance with fda requirements though admissible to demonstrate lack of negligence is not conclusive on this issue just as violation of fda requirements is evidence but not conclusive evidence of negligence (B) holding that reporting requirements that are afforded immunity under  419 are not predicated on actual or conclusive evidence of abuse or maltreatment (C) holding that the substantive provisions and reporting requirements of an unclaimed property law are valid as applied to national banks (D) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding that trial courts resolution of disputed facts are conclusive on appeal when supported by substantial evidence
Output: (B)
The allegations of retaliation found in the FAC are not “like or reasonably related” to the allegations contained in the charge. Nor are the new claims of retaliation consistent with Plaintiffs original theory of the case — sex discrimination and hostile work environment. Plaintiffs EEOC charge does not include an allegation of retaliation or facts that would support the claim of retaliation she now makes. Her charge to the EEOC was narrow in scope, focusing exclusively on sex discrimination. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust her retaliation claim at the administrative level and will dismiss her retaliation claims under Title VII and ACRA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Epps v. Phoenix Elementary Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 996308 (D.Ariz. April 14, 2009) (<HOLDING>). B. Negligent Misrepresentation (Third Claim 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation (B) holding that a title vii retaliation claim was not properly before the court because although the plaintiff had not been fired when he filed his complaint the plaintiff never amended his complaint to include a claim of retaliation based on his termination (C) holding that if the alleged retaliatory action occurs before the initial eeoc charge is filed a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim by including factual information in the charge that discloses the factual basis for the retaliation claim (D) holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim (E) holding court did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs retaliation claim where plaintiff did not check the retaliation box or describe anything that indicates such a claim in the eeoc complaint
Output: (A)
[The landlord] is not subject to liability to invitees of the lessee who come upon the premises for a business purpose other than that for which they are open to the public, as in the case of a truck driver delivering provisions to a restaurant. The lessor is not liable to licensees of the , lessee who come for another purpose, as in the case of the friend of the restaurant keeper who comes to pay a social call. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 comment e (1965). ¶20 Courts in other jurisdictions have cited this comment in declining to impose liability on owner-landlords for injuries suffered on their leased premises by ■tradesmen who came onto the premises at the behest of the tenant for work-related activities. See Rollo v. Kansas City, 857 F.Supp. 1441, 1443-45 (D.Kan.1994) (<HOLDING>); Horstman v. Glatt, 436 S.W.2d 639, 641, 643 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a landlords duty for injuries sustained on leased premises where the landlord is aware that the premises are leased with intent to admit the public (B) holding that abandonment requires that tenant vacate the leased premises (C) holding that signs placed on the inside of a leased space were not alone sufficient to provide notice of control of any part of the premises by anyone other than the debtor (D) holding under kansas law that a plumber who was injured while inspecting the leased premises in order to prepare an estimate for plumbing work had not entered the premises for the purpose for which they were leased and thus could not rely on the public use exception (E) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees
Output: (D)
Furthermore, we are confident that the City does not contemplate returning to its prior zoning ordinance, given our strict disapproval of this type of governmental “flip-flopping.” See Jews for Jesus v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 162 F.3d 627, 630 (11th Cir.1998). In such an instance, the courthouse door would remain open for reinstatement of such a law suit. Id. We are convinced that since the City harbors no intentions of returning to the prior zoning ordinance this case does not fall within an exception that would require us to retain jurisdiction. REVERSED and REMANDED, with instructions to DISMISS for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 . In addition to this case, National also filed a second suit against the Ci 02 S.Ct. 867, 869, 70 L.Ed.2d 855 (1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 128-29, 97 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference (B) holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation (C) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (D) holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended (E) holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations
Output: (D)
without restrictions. This testimony from Doctor Wolfe, which was the only expert medical testimony offered, does not support Mrozg's assertion that Harrison's failure to cooperate with prescribed treatment, exaggeration of symptoms, and failure to complete physical therapy aggravated or increased his injuries. To the contrary, Doctor Wolfe testified that ninety percent of people with Harrison's soft tissue injuries "get well within three (8) months, ninety (90) days" and that Harrison recovered in approximately seven weeks. Tr. at 185. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the evidence did not support the giving of the mitigation of damages instruction. See, e.g., Kristoff v. (Glasson, 778 N.E.2d 465, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (B) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (C) holding that evidence that plaintiff did not regularly perform her prescribed exercises was insufficient to support a mitigation of damages claim in the absence of physician testimony that she failed to mitigate her damages (D) holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action (E) holding in a landlordtenant dispute that even though defendant proved failure to mitigate damages because it did not also prove how much the plaintiffs damages increased by failure to mitigate the trial court did not err in refusing to reduce plaintiffs damages
Output: (C)
cannot conclude based on the information in the record that the CIA’s search fulfilled these requirements as to item 6. The Koch Declaration explains that the CIA’s Public Information Programs Division “manages the processing of FOIA requests, including any assessment of fees associated with FOIA requests,” so the administrative files of that division are “most reasonably likely to contain documents or information pertaining to the assessment of fees associated with Hall’s requests.” Koch Deck ¶ 32. But the Declaration does not state that other divisions, such as those that performed searches, are unlikely to have any records related to Hall’s requests or the Agency’s fee assessments. Such a statement is necessary to determine that a search was reasonable. See Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68 (<HOLDING>). Therefore the Court denies summary judgment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonably detailed affidavits or declarations must set  forth the search terms and the type of search performed and avert  that all files likely to contain responsive materials if such records exist were searched (B) holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents (C) holding that the sanction the agency imposed was not rationally arrived at on this record and was wholly disproportionate to the error petitioner committed where inter alia the agency did not explain why it had not taken the same position  in similar circumstances in the past (D) holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist (E) holding that summary judg ment was not appropriate where the agency limited its search to one record system without making clear that the single system was the only possible place that responsive records are likely to be located and stating that at the very least the agency was required to explain in its affidavit that no other record system was likely to produce responsive documents
Output: (E)
for Timely Disposition” adopted by the Oregon Judicial Conference, “‘90% of all misdemeanors, infractions and other nonfelony cases should be adjudicated *** within 90 days from the date of arraignment, 98% within 180 days and 100% within one year, except for exceptional cases in which continuing review should occur.’” Brunoe, 204 Or App at 756 (quoting State v. Emery, 318 Or 460, 471 n 17, 869 P2d 859 (1994)). Simply put, we have not found an appellate decision in which the court upheld the denial of a motion to dismiss under ORS 135.747 in a misdemeanor case where, as here, the cumulative period of delay attributable to the state exceeded 15 months and where a significant part of the delay was determined to be unreasonable. See State v. Dobson, 240 Or App 315, 245 P3d 704 (2010) (<HOLDING>); Ton, 237 Or App at 453 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal of indictment was abuse of discretion when delay attributable to the government was twelve months (B) holding only two months of four year and eight month delay attributable to commonwealth where defendant fled and concealed his whereabouts for four years and six months (C) holding that petitioners unexplained hence unjustified delay of at least six months was not reasonable for purposes of california law (D) holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect (E) holding that a 15month delay of which four months were unexplained was reasonable in a felony prosecution
Output: (D)
interest of safety and security at the institution. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying Hyde’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chief Judge LANSING and Judge PERRY concur. 1 . Roles was addressed in the context of FERPA. However, as we discuss below, there is no distinction between FERPA’s compelling govern mental interest standard and that embodied in RLUIPA. 2 .Some states along with the Federal Bureau of Prisons allow sweat lodges and other Native American religious practices at maximum security prisons. See Pounders v. Kempker, 79 Fed. Appx. 941, 943 n. 2 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that Missouri eventually built a sweat lodge at its maximum security Potosi Correctional Center); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Morrison v. Cook, 1999 WL 717218, *4 (D.Or. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification (B) holding that africanamerican plaintiffs claims that defendants should have known that placing him in a jail with a large population of white inmates put him at risk of being attacked were without merit because the plaintiff had not alleged any specific facts which would show that he was in danger of being assaulted by the other inmates (C) holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing that general population inmates at oregon maximum security prison were allowed to participate in weekly sweat lodge ceremonies
Output: (E)
593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court’s factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes  46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
Output: (C)
and murdered Special Agent Watson. (Doc. 15.) Defendant—similar to the defendant in Mohammad-Omar—had ample reason to anticipate being into a court for allegedly committing a criminal offense. The extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia specifically permits the extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States for prosecution for kidnapping and murder. See Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, U.S.-Colom., Sept. 14, 1979, S. Treaty Doa No. 97-8 (1981). Both the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have construed treaties as providing notice that “certain generally condemned acts are subject to prosecution by any party to the treaty.” United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 944 (D.C.Cir.2013) (citing United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2008)) (<HOLDING>). The Court similarly construes this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states (B) holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties (C) holding that prosecution of defendant in the united states for hostage taking based on acts committed outside the united states did not violate due process (D) holding that despite plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy they did not suggest that any of the acts committed by individual defendants occurred in the united states (E) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states
Output: (C)
that the “deliberate withholding of exculpatory information” is included within the “legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion”); Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (quoting and affirming opinion of the district court to confirm the principle that, because “ ‘[t]he task of evaluating the credibility of the alleged exculpatory information, and of determining its bearing on the trial and the prosecutor’s decision whether to confess error and agree to have the verdict set aside, no doubt requires the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,’ ” a prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity for the failure to turn over exculpatory evidence that was discovered shortly after the defendant was sentenced); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (B) holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence (C) holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the  1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence (D) holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune for withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of a court order because the order was issued in response to a defense motion for any exculpatory evi dence and thus required the prosecutors to make judgments (E) holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence
Output: (C)
criminal statutes. In addition, the disclosures do not subject the defendant to a real danger of self-incrimination since the source of the funds is not disclosed----Thus, the defendant has failed to show that the Bank Secrecy Act violated any individual right [that] ... Grosso seek to protect.”). Likewise, the provision at issue here, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420, applies to hundreds of thousands of foreign bank accounts. “There is nothing inherently illegal about having or being a beneficiary of an offshore foreign banking account.” In re Grand Jury Investigation M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074. Because the record-keeping requirements of 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420 do not target inherently illegal activity, the provision is essentially regulatory in nature. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 435 (<HOLDING>); In re Special February 2011-1 Grand Jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding civil factual sufficiency preservation requirements do not apply in criminal context (B) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (C) holding that sornas registration requirements and criminal enforcement provision are proper under the commerce clause (D) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature (E) holding that because the bsas recordkeeping requirements serve purposes unrelated to criminal law enforcement and because the provisions do not exclusively target people engaged in criminal activity we conclude that the requirements are essentially regulatory satisfying the required records exceptions first prong
Output: (E)
that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of “permanent” versus “temporary” damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a  complex subject  that depends upon the evidence in the particular case  (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
Output: (A)
case. We conclude, based upon Rambert and Nobles, that the evidence here supported three separate charges against defendant McDaniel. Consequently, the trial court did not err in entering three judgments against defendant McDaniel for discharging a weapon into occupied property. Defendant McDaniel also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to move, based on double jeopardy grounds, to arrest judgment on two counts of discharging a weapon into occupied property. Since we have concluded that defendant McDaniel could properly be convicted of and sentenced for all three counts, he cannot show that his attorney failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Brewton, 173 N.C. App. 323, 333, 618 S.E.2d 850, 858 (2005) (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, conclude defendants received a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (C) holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected (E) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate
Output: (D)
of an ex parte injunction were the threatened loss of inventory/goods and the improper dissipation of Playcom’s assets. Such injuries fail to qualify as irreparable harm since they are capable of being quantified for the purpose of imposing an award of money damages. Haitian’s filings indicate that the instant controversy is basically a financial dispute between Haitian and his daughter concerning the dissolution of their Playcom business. Haitian’s pleadings do not set forth any allegation of an imminent harm such as a breach of an enforceable restrictive covenant or a misappropriation of trade secrets or customer lists. Therefore, the trial court’s ex parte injunction order must be stricken. See Jefferies & Co., Inc., v. Int’l Assets Holding Corp., 830 So.2d 256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>). The temporary injunction order is STRICKEN. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred in granting ex parte temporary injunction prohibiting marketing activities of defendant company because there had been no showing that plaintiff company would likely suffer irreparable harm or lacked an adequate remedy at law (B) holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction (D) holding that temporaryinjunction orders simple recitation of conclusory statement that plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy does not satisfy rule 683s requirement that a temporary injunction order specify reasons why plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law (E) holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief
Output: (A)
her, the trial court could either strike the witness’s direct testimony or declare a mistrial. Best v. Tavenner, 189 Or 46, 54, 218 P2d 471 (1950). More recently, the court has recognized that, although not required to do so, a trial cotut may strike a criminal defendant’s testimony who refuses to submit to cross-examination. Mende, 304 Or at 21. The court has not had occasion until now to identify the principles that should guide a court’s discretion when a party refuses to answer only some cross-examination questions. We turn to that question. A criminal defendant has both a statutory and a constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense. See ORS 136.643 (statutory right); State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 483 n 10, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US 833 (2001) (<HOLDING>). As the court has recognized, however, a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights (D) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (E) holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area
Output: (D)
that ease were being introduced to show wrongdoing on occasions other than those which were the subjects of the government’s indictment. (The government’s indictment in that case was based on invalid prescriptions issued to undercover officers.) Here, however, there-is no violation of Rule 404(b) because the evidence was not introduced to show that Leal had done something illegal in the past and thus must have been guilty of the current offense. Rather, Leal was indicted partly on the basis of the evidence in those medical records. Moreover, it was Leal, not Dr. Sripinyo, who was on trial, making Jones inapposite. This case is more like United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1087 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. United States, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 397, 116 L.Ed.2d 347 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The medical records in-this case could have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged (B) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (C) holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law (D) holding that by including a knowledge element in two sections of a statute the legislature demonstrated that it knew how to express its intent to require a knowledge element rendering the absence of the element in another statute supportive of the inference that the legislature did not intend for there to be a knowledge element (E) holding admission of prior conviction under rule 404b appropriate where it was necessary to prove knowledge and a limiting instruction was given
Output: (A)
the payment of “prevailing rates” and “regular charges,” Payne could not maintain a cause of action alleging unreasonable, unconscionable and excessive charges. See id. at 1241. The trial court dismissed the complaint; however, on appeal, the First District reversed holding that Payne had alleged the necessary elements to state a cause of action, that he did not need to anticipate Humana’s affirmative defenses, and that Humana’s arguments were more properly raised in an answer rather than in a motion to dismiss. See id. The court held that since the contract between Humana and Payne did not expressly set the governing prices within its four corners, Humana was bound by a reasonableness requirement. See id. (citing F.L. Stitt & Co. v. Powell, 94 Fla. 550, 556, 114 So. 375, 378 (1927)(<HOLDING>); McGill v. Cockrell; 88 Fla. 54, 58, 101 So. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee (B) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied (C) holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition (D) holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed (E) holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 
Output: (B)
instruction was “a powerful indictment of [Smith’s] case and arguments.” She claims that there was no way to cure the effect of this instruction. We disagree. The trial court could have made any error harmless by clarifying its instruction to allow the jury to consider the evidence that Smith claims should not have been excluded. Smith therefore had to object to preserve error on this ground, and she did not do so. Accordingly, we overrule her second issue. Having overruled both of Smith’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. WALKER, J. filed a dissenting opinion. 1 . See Tex.R. Civ. P. 286; Goode v. Ramey, 48 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1932, writ ref'd). 2 . See Pate v. Texline Feed Mills, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 238, 245 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by not objecting the appellants had waived any error in the trial courts correction of typographical errors in the charge (B) holding that the plain error review provided for in ocga  17858 is waived where the defendant requested the charge in question and made no objection to the charge at trial (C) holding appellant waived issue on appeal by not objecting to or protesting the motion to strike before trial court (D) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (E) holding that we ordinarily review jury instruction challenges for correction of errors at law
Output: (A)