niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
state to respect the laws and actions of-the other states, the Constitution “alter[ed] the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereign-ties, each free to ignore the obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and [made] them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.”' Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935). And while neither Florida nor any other state is required to give full faith and credit to another state’s laws and judgments that conflict with that state’s legitimate public policy, see, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Lincoln Square Props., Inc., 571 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit (B) holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a forum to apply the sovereign immunity doctrine of another state if such an application would violate the forums legitimate public policies (C) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state (D) holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy (E) holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states
Output: (D)
cases where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to impose cumulative punishments in cases where there are actual murder victims. Third, §§ 2113(a) and (e) and §§ 924(c) and (j) were clearly designed for different purposes: the armed robbery statute was designed to punish those who take money from banks by force or violence, whatever the means, and the firearm statute was designed to punish those who use or carry firearms during violent crimes, whatever the underlying crime. We therefore conclude, notwithstanding our assumption of the likely failure of the two statutes to pass the Blockburger test, that Congress fully and clearly intended to permit cumulative punishments for violations of § 2113 and § 924(j). See United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Allen’s proposed reliance on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (B) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (C) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (D) holding that because the ultimate question is legislative intent the blockburger test cannot authorize two punishments where the ljegislature clearly intended only one (E) holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy
Output: (C)
the United States Constitution. 466 U.S. at 684-85, 104 S.Ct. at 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d at 691-92. I would therefore conclude that the Federal Constitution is the asserted ground for reversal. The most one can say for the majority’s position is that the second of the four Iowa cases cited by the defendant — Hepperle— mentions the right to counsel under both Constitutions. 530 N.W.2d at 739. Therefore, if we do some detective work and read all the defendant’s authorities, we can find a reference to the state constitution in one of them. Yet, I do not believe that an appellant can preserve a separate ground for appeal without arguing or mentioning that ground, just because a court decision cited- by the appellant refers to that ground. See Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2005) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, the defendant has not urged that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived this argument (B) holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue (C) holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived (D) holding class of undocumented immigrants waived their argument that denial of drivers licenses violated the iowa constitution because they failed to examine this claim in their brief and failfed to address any specific application of the language of the state constitution to this case (E) holding that a petitioners failure to address the bias denial of a motion to reopen in the argument portion of his opening brief on appeal waived the issue
Output: (D)
mobile. Thus, when a tenant sells his mobile home, the home remains on the rent-controlled space, resulting in a higher price to the buyer than a home on a space not subject to rent control. See Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940, 108 S.Ct. 1120, 99 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). 4 . The Supreme Court has since held that compensation is required for losses incurred while an invalid regulation was in effect. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2387-88, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). The relevant date for an inquiry as to the status of the state law, however, is the time of the taking. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194, 105 S.Ct. at 3120; Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1507 (<HOLDING>). 5 . Contrary to the suggestion in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (B) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (C) holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs (D) holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation (E) holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action
Output: (A)
Mylett’s claims against three police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of due process and § 1985 for conspiracy need not long detain us. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Mylett failed to assert a cognizable class-based animus to support a claim under section 1985 and failed to establish an enforceable property interest as against these defendants. The judgment of the district court is, in all respects, AFFIRMED. 1 . The charges stemmed from Mylett's supposed refusal to pay for belt buckles. 2 . Mylett objected to the form of the submission because it required the jury to determine whether some part of his speech was protected before it could answer the question related to causation. See Wilson v. University of Texas Health Center, 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied sub nom. Hurst v. Wilson, — U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that question whether employee speech is protected and concomitant determination whether it touches a matter of public concern are for the court and to be answered with reference to the form context and content of the claimed speech as revealed by the record as a whole (B) holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern (C) recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech (D) holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation (E) holding a regulation is contentneutral as long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech
Output: (A)
written opinion, memorandum of decision or findings of fact and conclusions thereon relating to the issues raised on appeal." 2 . Moreover, we held that the concrete subcontractor's actions were not the proximate cause of the employee's injuries. Woods, 648 N.E.2d at 1202. Rather, the intervening collapse of the scaffold, which could not have been foreseen by the concrete subcontractor, was the proximate cause of the employee's injuries. Id. 3 . Although the Crawfords mention in the complaint that Dawn was an invitee on the property, this allegation is relevant to a determination of whether Dawn was rightfully on the property. See infra. 4 . Guy's Concrete and Modern analyze the duty issue by using our supreme court's three-part analysis set forth in Webb. See Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995 (<HOLDING>). However, it is unnecessary for us to perform 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that before a duty can be imposed there must be a relationship between the parties and the harm must have been foreseeable (B) holding that in determining whether a duty exists a court should consider the following factors 1 the reasonable foreseeability of injury 2 the reasonable likelihood of injury 3 the magnitude of the burden that guarding against injury places on the defendant and 4 the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant emphasis added (C) holding that in determining whether to impose a duty the following factors must be balanced 1 the relationship between the parties 2 the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured and 3 public policy concerns (D) holding that a high degree of foreseeability is required to impose a duty to hire security guards and that the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely if ever can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowners premises (E) holding no duty and noting that foreseeability bears on the scope of a duty and not whether it exists in the first place
Output: (C)
Amendment rights to show that he had something to hide violates Due Process. See Aplt. Br. at 12. The Doyle Court held that a defendant may not be impeached with evidence of his silence at the time of his arrest and after his receipt of Miranda warnings. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240. To the extent that Mr. Dozal argues that he was penalized for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-inerimi-nation, see Aplt. Br. at 12, we note that he was not in custody at the time he refused to consent to the search. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (distinguishing custodial interrogation from Fourth Amendment detentions, which are “substantially less intrusive”); United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485-86 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, his statements to the officers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found (B) holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence (C) holding that defendant was not in miranda custody during knock and talk interview at his residence (D) holding that search of appellants suitcase found on the floor next to the couch on which he was sleeping was an unconstitutional search of his person and was not authorized by a search of the residence (E) holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop
Output: (B)
with the general contractor to provide materials and labor. Decina, 258 Mich App at 422. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 423. Although the subcontractors did not contract with the homeowners directly, they were nevertheless at least initially entitled to a construction lien under the CLA. See MCL 570.1107(1) (“Each.. . subcontractor . .. who provides an improvement to real property has a construction lien upon the interest of the owner or lessee who contracted for the improvement to real property .. ..”). 27 H A Smith Lumber & Hardware Co v Decina (On Remand), 265 Mich App 380, 382; 695 NW2d 347 (2005), rev’d 480 Mich 987 (2007). 28 Id. 29 Id. at 384-385. 30 Decina, 480 Mich at 988. 31 id. 32 Decina, 258 Mich App at 424, 431. 33 See MCL 570.1107(1) and (6); see also Vugterveen, 454 Mich at 129 (<HOLDING>). 34 Decina, 480 Mich at 988. 36 MCL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that mcl 57011076 provides a real property owner with a defense to a claim of lien if the owner can show that the sum of payments made pursuant to the specific contract plus the claim of lien exceed the price of the contract (B) holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond (C) holding that under nebraskas physicians lien statute a physicians lien could not exceed the amount the health care provider agreed to accept for the services rendered to a patient even if the usual and customary charge for such services is greater than that sum because the statute extends such lien only to the amount due or debt of the patient to the hospital (D) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (E) holding a lien is a claim against property  here a surety bond and breach of contract is a claim against a person thus the lien proceeding did not dispose of the breach of contract action
Output: (A)
2505. III. DISCUSSION A. No Private Cause of Action Under IGRA As an initial matter, the court dismisses all of plaintiffs claims against all defendants brought pursuant to alleged violations of IGRA. The court, following the majority of courts who have decided the issue, finds that IGRA provides no private right of action against the Tribe, the State, the federal government or any official or agency thereof. See, e.g., Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030, 1049 (11th Cir.1995)(finding plaintiff failed to state a claim against tribe for alleged failure to comply with IGRA’s licensing requirements because no implied cause of action in IGRA); American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1053 (D.Ariz.2001)(citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A))(<HOLDING>); Jimi Dev. Corp. v. Ute Mountain Ute Indian 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no private right of action exists (B) holding that there is no private right of action for any person under  13d (C) holding that the scope of section 541 is broad and includes all kinds of property including causes of action (D) recognizing private right of action (E) holding only three kinds of entities are expressly given causes of action under igraindian tribes states and the united statesand there is no implied private right to enforce igra
Output: (E)
has waived his right to appeal. 3 . The District Court had diversity jurisdiction. over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 . We afforded the parties the opportunity to address the standing issue, and in our correspondence to the parties we cited both Rauscher and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Treesdale, 419 F.3d 216 (3d Cir.2005), as potentially controlling authority. The parties inevitably agreed that Rauscher (and F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.1994) (same), Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991) (same), Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir.1989) (same), and United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir.1978) (same), with Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing (B) holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues (C) holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements (D) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (E) holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing
Output: (D)
2003 WL 21347112, at *2 (8th Cir.2003); but see United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 2003 WL 21399025, at *2 (10th Cir.2003) (applying de novo standard of review to a sentencing appeal pending as of the passage of the PROTECT Act). In assessing the district court’s authority to depart upward, we must determine whether the bases for departure were already taken into account by the offense guideline. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (authorizing a departure only where the “court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described”); United States v. Bell, 303 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The guideline for involuntary manslaughter 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the issue of standing is waived if not asserted at the district court level (B) holding that the sentencing courts conclusion that there was simply no way to avoid the base offense level did not indicate mandatory application of the guidelines (C) holding that a district court should avoid repeating the use of a factor previously accounted for in the offense level (D) holding that law of the case prevented the new jersey district court from redetermining jurisdictional issue previously decided by the district of columbia district court and noting that the principles of comity among courts of the same level of the federal system provide further reason why  an issue already decided by a court of equal authority should not be reexamined (E) holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level
Output: (C)
(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1999); In re Fisher, 151 B.R. 895, 898 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993). Other courts have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 421 B.R. 341, 354-55 (S.D.Tex.2009) (collecting cases); Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 250 (N.D.Ala.2001); In re Tate, 253 B.R. 653, 662 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.2000); In re Williams, 244 B.R. 858, 865-66 (S.D.Ga.2000). There is also disagreement about whether the bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors or is limited to exercising jurisdiction over debtors whose petitions are filed within the same judicial district. Compare, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.Ala. 2000) (permitting nationwide class) with Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). The class at issue in this case was limited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the governments prosecutorial discretion decisions (B) holding court lacks jurisdiction over putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside of judicial district (C) holding that it is not necessary that all putative class members share identical claims (D) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (E) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
Output: (B)
rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction and (2) he did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a). The grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims over a claim for compensation for an unjust conviction and imprisonment is strictly construed. Vincin v. United States, 199 Ct.Cl. 762, 468 F.2d 930, 933 (1972) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Federal Claims does not have the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding dormancy statutes should be strictly construed (B) holding that in presence of any doubt a penal statute is to be strictly construed (C) holding that the unjust conviction statute has always been strictly construed (D) holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   (E) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed
Output: (C)
to crimes with even greater precision than criminal legislation. See Baja-kajian, 524 U.S. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of the sentencing guidelines “is to select punishments with precise proportion”). Therefore, although we retain a duty under the Eighth Amendment independently to examine fines for excessiveness, a defendant would need to present a very compelling argument to persuade us to substitute our judgment for that of the United States Sentencing Commission. Thus, in a forfeiture action, if the value of the property forfeited is within or near the permissible range of fines under the sentencing guidelines, the forfeiture almost certainly is not excessive. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St, 74 F.3d 1165, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at-, 118 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 150000 was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 20000 (B) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 65000 was not excessive where the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 40000 (C) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines (D) holding that forfeiture of 357144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 250000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 5000 (E) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal
Output: (B)
obligations potentially impact a recognized privilege, an in camera review is generally the preferred method for resolving the competing compulsions. R.C.M. 703(f)(4)(C) states that where the holder of evidence requests relief from compliance with a subpoena or order of production, the military judge may direct that evidence be submitted for an in camera review to determine whether such relief should be granted. In camera proceedings are specifically provided for in other situations involving privileged material. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have approved of in camera review as a mechanism to resolve attorneys’ claims of privilege in criminal discovery matters. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Romano, 46 M.J. at 275 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the joint defense privilege preserved the attorneyclient privilege against waiver in the context of a group with common interests seeking common representation (B) holding that defendants privilege login combination with the in camera review requested by plaintiffsis adequate to determine whether the elements of the privilege have been established (C) recognizing privilege (D) holding that a complete prohibition against an opponents use of in camera review to establish the applicability of the crimefraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege is inconsistent with the policies underlying the privilege (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege
Output: (D)
processors: The analogy is not terribly useful here, particularly given that the 2004 regulations suggest a more traditional meaning of “production.” The new regulations state that the “directly related” test is met by employees who “assist[ ] with the running or servicing of the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2006). [Material Damage Appraisers] are obviously neither working on a manufacturing line nor “producing” anything in the literal sense. They are service providers, and the service they provide is the administration of insurance claims. Id. at 872-73 (emphasis added); cf. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds the production/administrative 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that crossdefault provisions in insurance policies were unenforceable because they would impermissibly restrict the debtors ability to assume some of the policies and reject others (B) holding that subcontractors primary and excess insurance policies must pay first and before contractors own insurance (C) recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing (D) holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies (E) recognizing that the employers principal production activity was the creation of insurance policies
Output: (E)
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In movant’s case, § 2255(1) and (3) provide the possible starting date for the one-year limitations period. The Third Circuit’s mandate affirming movant’s conviction and sentence was issued on January 19, 1996, and he did not petition for certiorari. As a result, movant’s conviction became final on April 24,1996, and he had until April 24, 1997 to file a timely § 2255 motion. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir.1999); Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 662-63 (3d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Movant, however, did not file the instant § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment (B) holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action (C) holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aed pas oneyear limitations period (E) holding that former federal rule of civil procedure 6a and e applies to federal habeas petitions
Output: (D)
38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the “need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial”). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee’s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as “the formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]” and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense (B) holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest (C) holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation (D) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown (E) holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant
Output: (C)
The Washington Supreme Court upheld its similar statute against a special legislation challenge in Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P. 2d 108 (1972). The court found persuasive the fact that “the scope of the Washington provision is not limited as to vocation. The subject statute bars actions against any person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property.” Id. at 532, 503 P. 2d at 111 (emphasis original) ; see also Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N. J. 190, 293 A. 2d 662 (1972). We cannot conclude that the 1965 Act is a special law coming within the constitutional proscription. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; contra, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N. E. 2d 588 (1967) (<HOLDING>). II Similarly, we find no violation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute authorizing creation of community councils in certain counties was unconstitutional special law (B) holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law (C) holding  122604a companion legislation to  122603 unconstitutional (D) holding the illinois statute unconstitutional as violating a special legislation proscription (E) holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana
Output: (D)
any decision that would ‘reflec[t] negatively upon [a] state court’s ability to do so.’”) (quoting Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977)). Quite to the contrary, this court finds that state procedure does provide adequate remedies. See Streeter v. City of Worcester, 336 Mass. 469, 146 N.E.2d 514, 517 (1957) (“The Land Court had jurisdiction over the 'cause of action, to wit, whether the city was entitled to a decree of foreclosure by force of its tax title.... If, as the plaintiff now contends, the court came to the wrong conclusion in the foreclosure proceeding, [the plaintiff] had the right to bring the case [to the Supreme Judicial Court] by an appeal or by exceptions.”); see also Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F.2d 606, 609 (1st Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, having raised the claim in the Land 
 Holding statements: (A) holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license (B) holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner (C) recognizing certificates of assessment as adequate evidence of tax liability (D) holding that in some rcases there is an adequate remedy at law for an attack on an illegal or unconstitutional tax through the tax appeal board (E) holding that massachusetts provides an adequate remedy for challenging a real estate tax assessment
Output: (E)
must be punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year or involve dishonesty or false statement; and that the trial judge must determine, in his discretion, that the danger of unfair prejudice by use of the evidence of conviction does not substantially outweigh its probative value. The defendant urges that Montgomery permits the use of felonies or infamous crimes for impeachment purposes, but was not intended to al low the admission of misdemeanor convictions. This contention is- supported by cases in other districts in this State which appear to assume without discussion that even under Montgomery only felonies or infamous crimes are admissible. See People v. Partee (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 166, 308 N.E.2d 18, and People v. Cassman (1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 301, 293 N.E.2d 710 (<HOLDING>), and People v. Cox (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 1033, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded (B) holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime (C) holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage (D) holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony (E) holding without discussion of montgomery that a defendant can only be impeached by evidence of a conviction of a prior felony or infamous crime
Output: (E)
ADA.” Id. And, third, it must inquire whether the plaintiffs impairment “substantially limited” the major life activity identified in step two. Id. Ms. Kelly states that she suffers from “fibromyalia, chronic back and leg pain, a condition affecting her quality of life and mobility ... [she] requires an aid at times to walk and suffers pain [ r mental impairment was corrected by some measures did not have an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity and thus had not stated a claim that they were disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Id. Merely having an impairment that affects a major life activity does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. See e.g., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Boyce v. New York City Mission Soc., 963 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs claim that she was disabled because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ada (B) holding that the plaintiffs were not substantially limited in any major life activity because plaintiffs severe myopia was correctable with appropriate lenses (C) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (D) holding that reproduction is not a major life activity (E) holding employees inability to do repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels was not sufficient proof that she was substantially limited in major life activity of performing manual tasks
Output: (E)
instant case, the loss of the administrative file gives rise to the possibility that the penalty assessment in question lacks foundation. As described in Janis and its progeny, however, an assessment is not “naked” simply because the administrative file supporting its entry is lost — what is critical, given the de novo nature of the proceedings before this court, is that admissible evidence exists to support the assessment. See Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir.1999); Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.1982). If such evidence exists, and is admitted by the court, it is irrelevant whether it is the same evidence that the Service relied upon in originally making its assessment. See Coleman v. United States, 704 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, consistent with the “no-look” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency decisions enjoy a presumption of correctness (B) holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness (C) holding that because there was no factual dispute between the parties the presumption of correctness is not relevant (D) holding that although the presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate classification decision  the presumption carries no force as to questions of law (E) holding that assessment was naked but noting that secondhand records or any demonstrably reasonable methodology of estimation may be used to establish presumption of correctness
Output: (E)
litigation; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney because of acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case is undesirable; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 7 . Wachovia cites to District of Connecticut cases including Piurkowski v. Goggin, No. 3:01cv302(SRU), 2004 WL 1534200, at *3 n. 5, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12656, at *10 n. 5 (D.Conn. July 6, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Accel Int’l Corp. v. Renwick, No. 3:03cv983 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine (B) recognizing that between 250 and 300 an hour is a reasonable rate for an attorney with a great deal of expertise his or her field (C) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (D) holding that under texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an attorney and his or her client (E) recognizing that 90 per hour is a reasonable rate for a paralegal
Output: (B)
of the Miami-Dade owners. Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari quashing the Miami-Dade Circuit Court’s order on the basis that the order departed from the essential requirements of the law, causing irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal. See Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We grant the writ. The mandate in Pompano Beach was issued on January 21, 2003, before the Broward Circuit Court transferred the case to the Miami-Dade Circuit Court. Upon the issuance of the mandate from the Fourth District, the Broward Circuit Court’s role became purely ministerial, and its function was limited to obeying the Fourth District’s decree. See Torres v. Jones, 652 So.2d 893, 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (citations omitted)(<HOLDING>). Pursuant to Pompano Beach, the Broward 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding (B) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (C) holding that a trial courts role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes purely ministerial and its function is limited to obeying the appellate courts order or decree (D) holding that a lower court is bound by the decree of the appellate court and can only enter a judgment or decree in strict compliance with the appellate courts mandate (E) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact
Output: (C)
1992 to reserve its rights, Liberty waived its notice provision defense to liability under the policy. Liberty knew of the Johnson Lawsuit by April, 1987 and the DEQ order by May, 1987. There is undisputed evidence that soon thereafter, a Liberty representative contacted Joslyn’s attorney, William J. Rotenberry, to request information about the Site. In a letter, dated February 2, 1988, Mr. Rotenberry enclosed a copy of the Environmental Investigation performed at the Site “as well as other documents which indicate activity through the current date.” Liberty’s communication with Joslyn’s attorney after it had notice of both the occurrence and suit gave rise to an obligation to issue a reservation of rights letter within a reasonable amount of time. See Peavey, 971 F.2d at 1175 (<HOLDING>); V/O Exportkhleb v. M/V ANPA 773 F.Supp. 832, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (B) holding that the liability creating event constitutes an occurrence (C) holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after  it was informed of the occurrence (D) holding that insurer that waited five months after being informed of occurrence and two months after being informed of suit against insured to deliver reservation of rights letter waived its noncoverage defense (E) holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy
Output: (C)
probative value. The two-pronged test must also be met in order to introduce flight evidence. Austin v. State, 784 So.2d 186, 194 (Miss.2001) (citing Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388, 390 (Miss.1997)). This means that Mississippi, unlike some jurisdictions, does not distinguish between the admissibility of flight evidence and the propriety of instructing the jury on the law of flight. Cf. U.S. v. Martinez, 681 F.2d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir.1982) (“Trial courts usually focus not upon the admissibility of flight evidence but upon the propriety of including a jury instruction highlighting already admitted flight evidence.”); but see United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1077 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied sub nom. Cochran v. U.S., 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 28. Here, both prongs were met. ¶ 29. The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (C) holding that because the jury was given a proper flight instruction the federal district court did not err in allowing testimony from a teenage girl babysitting defendants child in defendants apartment in which the girl told the jury that after defendant was informed of drug raid defendant failed to return to his apartment the court of appeals found the flight evidence was admissible even though the drug raid was conducted by state officials on a different charge (D) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where the gun cash and a drug ledger were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different apartment in the same building (E) holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found
Output: (C)
of the federal Equal Protection Clause. With respect, we do not think that the Indiana court correctly applied federal law.” (citations omitted)); Berschback v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Dist., 154 Mich.App. 102, 397 N.W.2d 234, 240 (1986) (“The deeision[ ] in ... Sturrup appear[s] to be [an] anomalfy] in this area of the law. [T]he focus on the ‘overbroad’ and ‘overinclusive’ nature of the rules ... to find a denial of equal protection departs significantly from traditional equal protection analysis.”), appeal denied, 427 Mich. 851, 398 N.W.2d 1 (1986). In addition, a number of courts have expressly held that various versions of high school association transfer rules do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g., Griffin High Sch., 822 F.2d 671 (<HOLDING>); In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding transfer eligibility rule did not deny the student equal protection of the laws or procedural or substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented (E) holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection
Output: (A)