niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
The judgment is affirmed. 1 . The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 . Crow analyzed the damp substance removed from the microwave and concluded that it was cocaine base (also known as crack cocaine). The cocaine in the microwave amounted to 45.03 grams of the 52.06 gram total. During the time it was held as evidence, the damp cocaine dried into a single large chunk. 3 . Our conclusion is consistent with our prior observation that "Section 841 and its mandatory minimum sentencing provisions have consistently withstood constitutional scrutiny.” United States v. Regenos, 54 Fed.Appx. 245, 245 (8th Cir.2002) (unpublished per cu-riam) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1517-18 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding life in prison without the possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile convicted of murder (B) holding that a life sentence pursuant to  841 blaiii was not a cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law (D) holding sentence of life imprisonment resulting from a wrongful killing caused by the use of an automobile is not cruel and unusual punishment (E) holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved
Output: (B)
(1973), automatically requires disqualification of the decision maker. In Bunnell, the rec ord indicated that in numerous instances the administrative law judge had demonstrated active hostility toward the claimant in an employment disability benefits proceeding, while at the same time exhibiting favoritism toward the employer and the employer’s counsel. 740 P.2d at 1333-34. We ruled that such an atmosphere of partiality violated fundamental principles of due process. Id. at 1334; see also Local No. 3 v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325, 329-30 (8th Cir.1954) (disqualifying examiner who uniformly rejected evidence offered to support company’s point of view, while accepting evidence supporting union). But see NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 659, 69 S.Ct. 1283, 1285, 93 L.Ed. 1602 (1949) (<HOLDING>). In Berryhill, the United States Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that assessing witness credibility is uniquely the function of the trier of fact (B) holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact (C) holding that direct evidence if believed by the trier of fact will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption (D) holding total rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn the integrity or competence of a trier of fact (E) holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice
Output: (D)
prejudice. Common v. W. Suburban Hosp. Med. Ctr., 301 Ill.App.3d 939, 235 Ill.Dec. 158, 704 N.E.2d 731, 738-39 (1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We quoted Common and echoed its sentiment in Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir.2000), where we held that a district court’s failure to permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint in order to comply with section 2-622 was an abuse of discretion. Second, although the district court believed that plaintiffs’ counsel should have known to submit an affidavit and report in accordance with section 2-622, it made no specific finding that the failure to do so was in bad faith or an attempt to delay litigation. See Cookson v. Price, 393 Ill.App.3d 549, 333 Ill.Dec. 22, 914 N.E.2d 229, 232 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Further, it did not explain whether or in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a (B) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension (C) holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a new affidavit and report complying with section 2622 where there was no indication that the plaintiffs failure to file the report earlier in the litigation was in bad faith (D) holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment (E) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel
Output: (C)
a minor, in violation of section 847.0135, Florida Statutes (2012) (Count 2); using a .two-way communications device to facilitate or further the commission of a felony, in violation of section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2012) (Count 3); and attempting to engage in sexual activity with a child twelve years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, in violation of sections 800.04(4) and 777.04(1), Florida Statutes (2012) (Count 4). On appeal, Rubio argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss all counts based on entrapment and in denying his motion to dismiss Count 4 based on legal impossibility. He also argues for the first time that the prohibition against double jeopardy precluded his adjudication and sentencing on both Counts 2 and 3. 1st DCA 2017) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse Rubio’s conviction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause (B) holding that examination of separate criminal episodes for double jeopardy purposes should encompass entire evidentiary record rather than just charging document and verdict form (C) holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause (D) holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause (E) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count
Output: (B)
Therefore, we will construe Plautz’s ADA claim as a Rehabilitation Act claim. There is no significant difference between the substantive standards of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as they relate to this case. The Rehabilitation Act expressly provides: “The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging nonaffirmative action employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12204 and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 791(g)(1999). See also Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 11 (<HOLDING>). Therefore construing the ADA claim as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act (B) holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment (C) holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable (D) recognizing standards to determine discrimination are the same under the ra and the ada (E) holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act
Output: (A)
agreed not to introduce the testimony of DeFoy, a jailhouse informant who claimed that Pursell admitted to the killing. Today, Pursell claims that Krahe’s testimony violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that his defense counsel was ineffective when he abandoned the motion for a mistrial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the merits of the ineffectiveness claim, and I will apply AEDPA’s deferential standard of review to that claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In all other respects, my review is de novo. There is little question that Krahe’s statement about Pursell’s prior record violated the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, any statements made by Pursell after he invoked his rights to counsel and silence were inadmissible under Miranda. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-75, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once miranda warnings have been given if the individual indicates in any manner  that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion subtle or otherwise (B) holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel (C) holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning (D) holding that a statement given after miranda warnings have been administered may be inadmissable when police have elicited a previous unwarned statement during a custodial interrogation (E) holding state did not impermissibly comment on defendants right to remain silent when it crossexamined him on the inconsistency of his testimony with the prior statement he made to the arresting officer after being given the miranda warnings
Output: (A)
legal hunting. Id. Since the unambiguous text of 50 C.F.R. § 20.23 states that "tak[ing] migratory game birds” is an element of the offense (as opposed to taking species of migratory game birds not open to legal hunting), this Court rejects appellant’s legislative intent argument. To the extent appellant's third ground may relate to a lack of intent to commit the offense charged, such an argument would also be unavailing. The Fifth Circuit has noted that most misdemeanor offenses under the MBTA do not require a mens rea element as they are strict liability offenses. United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 614-15 (5th Cir.2002) (distinguishing "baiting” crimes which do require a minimal level of scienter); United States v. Stephans, 142 Fed.Appx. 821 (5th Cir.2005) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if appellant's offense were 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (B) holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute (C) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (D) recognizing strict product liability actions (E) holding that duress is unavailable to defendants charged with the strict liability offense of child abuse
Output: (A)
evidence working against him, Defendant cannot establish a reasonable probability that the district court’s explanatory error caused him prejudice. See Cook, 550 F.3d at 1298-99. B. Defendant also challenges the district court’s factual finding that the $8,450.00 found on his person on June 30, 2007 represented the fruits of the drug trade. We review a district court’s factual finding at sentencing for clear error, reversing only if that finding is “wholly without factual support in the record.” United States v. Ivory, 532 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir.2008). The record in this case, as described above, clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Defendant obtained the $8,450.00 in question through drug trafficking. See United States v. Brown, 556 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). For many of the same reasons we rejected 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard (C) holding that the preponderance standard is generally appropriate in guidelines sentencing (D) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (E) holding that in order to satisfy due process findings made at sentencing need only be based upon a preponderance of the evidence
Output: (D)
or tortured if returned to Guatemala due to his desertion from the army. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Although Ramos-Orella-na argues that the agency improperly discredited his evidence of country conditions and placed excessive reliance on the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Guatemala (“Country Reports”), the task of resolving conflicts in the record evidence lies “largely within the discretion of the agency.” Jian Hui Shao v. Mulcasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir.2008). In evaluating Ramos-Orellana’s evidence of country conditions, the agency reasonably noted that the more recent Country Reports do not indicate that former army deserters are targeted for persecution or death. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 164 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lastly, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a report from the state department is usually the best available source of information on country conditions (B) holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible (C) holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala (D) holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions the bia compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below (E) holding state department country report on fairness of liberian judicial system admissible
Output: (A)
of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for” rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words ‘because of' mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’ Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of age is that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr  1263ale3i the language  directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc  4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc  4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc  4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc  4061a 4218a
Output: (A)
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Contract suits filed in state courts alleging a violation of a collective bargaining agreement have long since fallen under the scope of § 301. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957) (interpreting § 301 as a congressional mandate to the federal courts to create a body of federal common law to handle labor contract disputes); Local 17k, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, “[a] state rule that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any suit filed in state court alleging violations of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under  301 and be resolved by federal law (B) holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur (C) holding state immune from suit brought in state court (D) holding that if the state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement the claim is independent for  301 preemption purposes (E) holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law
Output: (A)
district court normally should entertain an action requesting declaratory judgment when the declaratory relief sought would (1) “serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue,” and (2) would “terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir.1998). District courts have great latitude in determining whether to grant or deny declaratory relief. Id. Here, a controversy exists between only two parties, the litigants named in the declaratory judgment action. No third-party insurer or otherwise interested party is involved in this case, any related action, nor is another party waiting to be named elsewhere. Cf. id. at 420-21 (<HOLDING>). Neither party here needs to exhaust 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages (B) holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face (C) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment (D) holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court (E) holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court
Output: (E)
and it deposition testimony given by Charlie Thomas in two prior lawsuits, Marshak v. Arista Records, Civ. Index No. 96-3032(JBW)(S.D.N.Y.), and Marshak v. Green, Civ. Index No. 79-3458(EW)(S.D.N.Y.). Portions of these depositions were read into the record during Marshak’s cross-examination in this case. See Trans, at 347-51, 388-94. In the Arista deposition, Thomas testified that he had joined The Drifters during the late 1950s at the request of George Treadwell. See id. at 347. Thomas also testified that Treadwell was the manager of the group and that Treadwell made all final decisions relating to performances, costumes, appearance bookings, musical content, travel arrangements, and personnel changes. See id. at 347-51, 389; see also Rick v. Buchansky, 609 F.Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.1985)(<HOLDING>). Thomas further stated that he considered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consistent with our rejection of the group pleading doctrine we do not construe allegations contained in the complaint against the defendants as a group as properly imputable to any particular individual defendant unless the connection between the individual defendant and the allegedly fraudulent statement is specifically pleaded (B) holding that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case need show only that he is a member of a protected group and whites are a protected group under title vii (C) holding that in the absence of written contracts the manager of a singing group may own the rights to the name if he or she remains continuously involved with the group and is in a position to control the quality of its services (D) holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute (E) holding that plaintiffs statistics did not shed any light on the legally relevant issue because they did not indicate the group of applicants who were interviewed or even the group of applicants found qualified or the group of all applicants
Output: (C)
to pay the purchase price. 3.Pursuant to the Securities Purchase Agreement, dated September 2, 2004, Mer-vyn's Holdings purchased 100% of the interests in Holdings I and Holdings II for $429,746,414,84. At the closing, Mervyn’s Holdings used these funds to pay the purchase price. (Am.Compl.$ 58). 5 . Brandt v. Trivest II, Inc. (In re Plassein Int’l Corp.), 352 B.R. 36, (Bankr.D.Del.2006) ("Accordingly, the Court joins with those decisions that have (either implicitly or explicitly) evaluated fraudulent transfer complaints using Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice pleading standard”) Id. at 40-41. See. e.g., Giuliano v. U.S. Nursing Corp. (In re Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc.), 339 B.R. 570, 574-75 (Bankr.D.Del.2006) (applying "liberal notice pleading standard”); AstroPower, 335 B.R. at 333 (<HOLDING>); Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors v. DVI 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer complaint need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him (C) holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her (D) holding that the information must set forth each element of the crime that it charges as well as fairly inform a defendant of the charge against which he must defend (E) holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted
Output: (B)
135 S.Ct. 1318, 1324, 191 L.Ed.2d 253 (2015) clarified liability for statements of opinion under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. It maintained that "a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an 'untrue statement of material fact,' regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong.” Id. at 1327. But, if a statement "omits material facts about the issuer's inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself,” than the omission creates liability. Id. at 1329. Although addressing claims under section 11 of the Securities Act, Omnicare's analysis may also bear on claims dealing with opinions brought under section 10(b). See City of Omaha, 679 F.3d at 67-68 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable (B) holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement (C) holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable (D) holding that the same reasoning regarding opinions that is used under sections 11 and 12 of the securities act of 1933 applies to claims under sections 10b and 20a of the 1934 act as these claims all share a material misstatement or omission element (E) holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable
Output: (D)
In context; this evidence is hardly sufficient to support the Board’s finding that Horsehead refused to bargain in good faith. In addition to the nine meetings up to this point, the evidence shows continued serious bargaining, substantial personal involvement by the company’s president, development of a creative new offer to address the union’s desire for more money within the economic constraints facing the company, and an offer to extend the expired contract to facilitate further bargaining. Just as the Board has no authority to pass judgment on the content of bargaining proposals (at least if the proposals are not unusually harsh and unreasonable), the Board- is not empowered to flyspeck a party’s choice of bargaining tactics. See Insurance Agents’, 361 U.S. at 488, 80 S.Ct. 419 (<HOLDING>). To borrow a formulation employed in Pease, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting (B) holding that counsels strategic decisions should be afforded wide latitude (C) holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty (D) holding that whether impasse exists rests upon factintensive inquiry into the bargaining history the good faith of the negotiating parties the length of negotiations the importance of the issues about which there is disagreement and the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations (E) holding that subject to the duty to bargain in good faith parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations
Output: (E)
that any section 2255 motion filed by Green after July 29, 1995 would have been time-barred was erroneous. D. The Government’s Waiver of its Statute of Limitations Defense On appeal, the government concedes that it and the district court erred in determining when Green’s conviction became final and that this Court should remand to allow Green the opportunity to move under section 2255. The government suggests, however, that we allow Green only thirty days within which to file and that we restrict his arguments to “those previously raised, by appellant in his pleadings filed below.” Green counters that the statutory time period should be equitably tolled from the date of his initial motion to extend time, June 10, 1997, leaving him 133 days to move. See, e. g., Smith, 208 F.3d at 17 (<HOLDING>). We do not reach Green’s arguments regarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a petitioner may not circumvent the requirements of the aedpa by filing a section 2241 petition (B) holding that aedpas time limitation may be equitably tolled where extraordinary circumstances prevent petitioner from filing a timely petition and where petitioner acts with reasonable diligence (C) holding that  2401b of the ftca can be equitably tolled (D) holding that this court  recognizes equitable tolling  on motions to reopen  during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception fraud or error as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence (E) holding by implication that where a limitations period for suits against the government is mandated by congress such a statute is a limitation that affects the courts jurisdiction and cannot be equitably tolled
Output: (B)
objection made by his counsel at a later point during Dr. Barron’s testimony, in which he repeated the previously asserted objection to exhibits 1 and 2 and then added an objection on the basis of hearsay. What is fatal to respondent’s argument, however, is the fact that, at the earlier point in time when counsel for DCYF had moved for the admission of exhibits 1 and 2, the only objection articulated by respondent’s counsel was that Dr. Barron was “here to testify.” That objection was certainly not sufficiently focused to direct the trial justice’s attention to the hearsay evidence rule, see Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d at 30; and the context did not make it apparent that such was the “specific ground” of objection. See Rule 103(a)(1); cf. State v. Baptista, 894 A.2d 911, 914 n. 2 (R.I.2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, since exhibits 1 and 2 had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial (B) holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered (C) holding that the defendants motion in limine which sought to exclude the evidence to which the defendant later made a general objection at trial adequately provided the context for determining the specific ground of objection (D) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (E) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection
Output: (C)
this amount represented only twenty percent of Burnison’s holdings. Id. ¶ 12. Marksman alleges, however, that the sale was highly unusual, in that Burnison had not sold any of her Chantal stock in the previous three years. Id. Twenty percent of a corporate insider’s shares, especially where the dollar amounts involved are high, may constitute a “suspicious amount” sufficient to support a scienter allegation. See Alfus, 764 F.Supp. at 605; In re Gupta Corp., 900 F.Supp. at 1231-32; McCarthy v. C-COR Electronics, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 970, 978-79 (E.D.Pa.1995); In re Apple Computer, 886 F.2d at 1117. In this case, Burnison’s volume of traded stocks, in excess of $6,300,000, and the percentage of her holdings sold support an allegation of motive. See In re Gupta Corp., 900 F.Supp. at 1231-32 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the alleged “motive” is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that total proceeds from insider sales of 106 million raised inference of scienter (B) holding that sales of corporate stock by six individual defendants for a total of approximately 4200000 were sufficient to support inference of scienter against them under prepslra pleading standard (C) holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter (D) holding that stock sales by one defendant of approximately 8000 shares for profit of 173000 raised strong inference of fraudulent intent (E) holding that 20 of individual defendants holdings raised an inference of scienter
Output: (B)
of the RIF, Dr. Mereish, a pharmacologist, was not conducting research at the USAMRIID but rather was on detail to the Biological Arms Control Treaty Organization. Dr. Assaad, a physiologist, was working on developing a vaccine for ricin utilizing a particular kind of antigen. His research, however, was superseded soon after he was discharged in favor of new ricin research based on a recombinant molecular construct, which is an entirely different source than the antigen upon which Dr. Assaad was focusing. Finally, Dr. Cros-land, a physiologist, was investigating bo-tulinum toxins at the time he was laid off. He was attempting to develop a cell line that would respond to botulinum toxins, in order to facilitate further research of these agents. After he was lai 1176, 1183 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). If we failed to allow proffered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false (B) recognizing as a legitimate reason for conducting layoffs a firms need to retain employees with the contemporary skills necessary to assimilate new technologies (C) holding that a firms decision to implement a reductioninforce to meet its budgetary goals during a business downturn was a legitimate reason for terminating an employee (D) holding that even an incorrect belief that an employees performance is inadequate can be a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action (E) holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination
Output: (B)
not be disturbed. Turning to the element of the intent to deliver, the jury was provided evidence, again circumstantial, with respect to Salda-na’s connection with previously convicted drug dealers. Those individuals happened to be his brothers. There also was submitted admissible evidence that the quantity and purity of the cocaine in question was such that it would not be likely a possessor would have acquired it for personal use. Circumstantial evidence, which is “proof of facts and circumstances from which the main fact to be proved reasonably follows according to common experience of mankind,” is sufficient to establish the elements of a crime. Murray v. State, 671 P.2d 320, 328 (Wyo.1983); Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo.1978). Cf. Jozen v. State, 746 P.2d 1279 (Wyo.1987) (<HOLDING>). As was true with respect to the element of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent (B) holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that a method step was carried out by the direct infringer even in the absence of direct evidence for direct infringer (C) holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination (D) holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence (E) holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution
Output: (E)
adverse credibility determination premised on inconsistencies between Rashid’s testimony and his asylum application. The BIA’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence because the major discrepancy between Rashid’s testimony and his asylum application concerning the alleged acts of persecution went to the heart of Rashid’s asylum claim. Most significantly, Rashid’s application asserts that he was subjected to persecution due to his purported efforts to convert poor Muslims to the Christian and Hindu religions. However, at his asylum hearing Rashid testified that as a member of the Awami League, he assisted poor Christian and Hindu children with their subsistence needs, which led to his persecution. See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); see also Singh v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single inconsistency concerning the nature of the applicants mistreatment  afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding (B) holding that material alterations in the applicants account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding (C) holding that a material inconsistency in an aspect of the applicants story that served as an example of the very persecution from which he sought asylum affords substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding internal quotations omitted (D) holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding (E) holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding
Output: (B)
(i.e., delinquency proceeding), in which the juvenile is entitled to certain rights such as counsel and a jury. See M.C.L.A. § 712A.17(1) & (2), .17c(1), .17d; In re Carey, 241 Mich.App. 222, 615 N.W.2d 742, 745 (2000) (“Although juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial in nature, they are closely analogous to the adversary criminal process.”). In lieu of a criminal “conviction,” the court renders an order of disposition, see M.C.L.A. § 712A.18(1), from which the court has authority to impose sentence, including incarceration, see M.C.L.A. § 712A.18(1)(a)-(1), .18g, .18h. Here, Morris was sentenced to a period of probation. Therefore, we hold that Heck v. Humphrey is applicable to the present case. See also Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). After carefully reviewing the record, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for an initial civil commitment the state has the burden of proof (B) holding that claims for civil rights violation and false imprisonment arising out of civil commitment are not appropriate for tribunal review (C) holding that the possibility that a sex offender could face civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence because civil commitment does not flow automatically from the plea (D) holding heck applicable to claims that implicate the validity of civil commitment proceedings (E) holding that heck is applicable to  1983 suits premised on alleged violations of prison disciplinary procedures
Output: (D)
that Eller has been involved in Eller and Sons Trees’ procurement of the H-2B work visas pursuant to which the Plaintiff class is employed. Eller also was involved in hiring and promoting Eller and Sons Trees’ visa-processing agents abroad, through whom Eller and Sons Trees’ H-2B forestry workers are processed. This evidence, too, supports holding Eller personally liable under the FLSA and the AWPA. See Reich, 998 F.2d at 329 (manager participating in hiring found to be employer); Donovan, 747 F.2d at 972 (noting that the corporate officer personally selected the managers at every hotel); Shultz, 413 F.2d at 1300 (observing that president exercised hiring and firing authority over supervisory personnel); Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 324 F.Supp. 342, 347 (N.D.Miss.1970) (<HOLDING>). Defendants admit that Eller was involved in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that countersurveillance driving is a fact indicative of illegal activity (B) holding board had jurisdiction when employer had final authority over the essential terms and conditions of employment including wages benefits hiring firing promotion discipline and grievances although employer was subject to various governmentimposed restrictions (C) holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext (D) holding that firing authority is indicative of employer status (E) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such
Output: (D)
of discretion and, finally, that the death penalty is predominately imposed upon the poor. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Crews must demonstrate that: 1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 2) counsel’s performance was unreasonable; and 3) counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987). As the United States Supreme Court held in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty per se. Id. at 188, 96 S.Ct. at 2932; see also Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 77, 454 A.2d 937, 969 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that defendant spent years on death row awaiting execution does not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment (B) holding that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death (C) holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for the crime of rape (D) holding that the death penalty does not violate the prohibition against cruel punishments set forth in article 1 section 13 of the pennsylvania constitution (E) holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution
Output: (D)
reach Plaintiffs and did reach Plaintiffs explaining that additional life insurance was available at $4.95 per $15,000 in coverage.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Walker did not exercise reasonable care or competence when he made these statements and that Plaintiff and Mr. Kersh “reasonably relied on these representations to their detriment....” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that if she and Mr. Kersh had been informed that they could not purchase $750,000 in life insurance from UHC, “they would have purchased the same through another company.” (Id.) For the reasons given in the preceding section, this state-law claim, which is brought against non-ERISA entities and does not seek benefits under an ERISA plan, is not subject to conflict preemption. See Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385 (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insureds declaratory judgment class action claims seeking to retain tort settlements following their insurers claims for reimbursement were claims to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan and to clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan under erisa (B) holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan (C) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (D) holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (E) holding that third partys suit against plan administrator for misrepresentation was not related to erisa plan because the finder of fact need only determine 1 the amount and terms of reimbursement that plaintiff could reasonably have expected given what could fairly be inferred from defendants statements and 2 whether defendants subsequent disposition of the reimbursement claims was consistent with that expectation
Output: (E)
that it reasonably believed Goldman had the right to cancel the contract. Again, in limine rulings are not binding on the district court. Id. 4. The district court did not give erroneous jury instructions. Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Civil), 4th Edition 21 and 23 mirror Arizona law. See Fairway was not prejudiced by the late filing. Sueños was not required to show excusable neglect. 7. The district court abused its discretion in determining that Sueños was the prevailing party in. its action against Goldman. The district court held that the parties’ settlement discussions were inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408(a), and that the court therefore could not consider them. The district court erred. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in deciding whether the jurys award is inadequate the test is whether reasonable people could not conclude that the  award was reasonable compensation (B) recognizing the opportunity for mischief in settlement negotiations where the insurer has declined involvement  which may be checked by judicial review of whether the settlement amount stipulated to is reasonable (C) holding a court may eonsider settlement negotiations for the purpose of deciding a reasonable attorney fee award (D) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (E) holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations
Output: (C)
F.3d at 1071. 24 . Consistent with the framework outlined above, two clearly delineated categories of "initial transferee" cases have emerged. 5 Collier on Bankmptcy § 550.02[4][a] (15th ed.2007). In one line of cases, the recipient of funds is not deemed to be an initial transferee because it simply acts as an uninterested agent between the transferor and another entity — these are the "mere conduit” cases. See, e.g., In re Finley, 130 F.3d at 59; In re Chase & Sanborn Coip., 848 F.2d at 1200; Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893. In the other, the recipient is deemed to be an initial transferee because it obtains a complete ability to do what it wishes with the funds — these are the dominion and control cases. See, e.g., Taunt v. Hurtado (In re Jon Rey Hurtado), 342 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 25 . It could be posited that the third party 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trustee is not required to avoid the initial transfer from the initial transferee before seeking to avoid it and recover from subsequent transferees and noting that this conclusion is consistent with case law that has disallowed automatic recovery from a subsequent transferee following the avoidance of an initial transfer through a stipulated judgment or default when the transferee had not been a party to the underlying avoidance proceeding (B) holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers  were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers (C) holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee (D) holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds (E) holding that because the recipient of funds had a contractual obligation to immediately transfer them he was not an initial transferee under  550 even though the funds were eventually used to purchase stock in his name
Output: (D)
by Oklahoma law. She definitively stated she preferred to live with Father, wanted to live closer to extended family, and had been considering this decision for almost two years. 122 Although Buffalo is factually distinguishable, we agree with the appellate court's position that "[i]t is the explanation, the supporting reasons and all the factors that led to the preference that allow the court to examine the child's preference in terms of the requirements outlined in Gibbons." Id. at ¶ 18, 211 P.3d at 927. Here, we have considered FIL's explanation, supporting reasons, and factors that led to her preference in order to determine ii the G4ib-bons requirements have been met. After doing so, we conclude FIL's preference is y"); Eimen v. Eimen, 2006 OK CIV APP 23, ¶ 14, 131 P.3d 148, 152 (<HOLDING>). 2 . Although the Legislature amended section 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child (B) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (C) holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances (D) holding fact that the parties failed to communicate and had continuing hostility does not constitute a material change in custody to warrant modification of custody (E) holding that an employer seeking modification must show a change in claimants physical condition
Output: (C)