niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
CURIAM. Appellant, Roberto Trejo, was indicted for racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. His predicate offenses included attempted first degree murder, shooting into a building, and three armed robberies with a firearm. He was also charged on substantive counts for the same five offenses. Trejo was acquitted on the racketeering, conspiracy, and shooting into a building charges, but convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and the three armed robberies. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, including his fifty-year sentence. The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) does not apply to appellant’s sentence. See Guzman v. State, 110 So.3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). As we did in Guzman, we certify conflict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham (B) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (C) holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper (D) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (E) holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide
Output: (D)
plans that entail ongoing or periodic payment schemes. See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. 2211; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455-56; Simas, 6 F.3d at 853. While it is true, as Nadworny argues, that Shaw’s and Albertson’s obligations under the severance agreement constitute a one-time, lump sum payment of benefits, as in other cases where the courts have determined that ERISA does not preempt a state law, Pl.’s Mem. at 6-7, several of the cases Nadworny cites in support of his argument are distinguishable from his own case. The holdings in O’Connor, Rodowicz, and Belanger for instance, were decided under different facts; in those cases, the employers offered early retirement packages indiscriminately to their employees as a means of encouraging attrition. O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 268-69 (<HOLDING>); Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 166 (upholding district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (B) holding em ployers retirement incentive package that mechanically calculated and offered to a broad class of employees indiscriminately did not implicate erisa (C) holding that serial offer of retirement plans did not implicate erisa (D) holding onetime retirement incentive package was purely automatic and nondiscretionary and thus not under the rubric of erisa (E) holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa
Output: (B)
by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Gokhan Bergal appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for an extension of time to appeal the court’s August 6, 2015, order denying his motions for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012). Bergal did not seek an extension of time until November 13, nearly two months after the expiration of the excusable neglect period. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(b)(1)(A), (4); cf. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court was without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed (B) holding that pro se prisoners 28 usc  2254 application deemed filed for limitation purposes when deposited with prison officials for mailing (C) holding that prisoners legal materials are deemed filed on the date they are deposited with prison officials for mailing (D) holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court (E) holding that a pro se prisoners notice of appeal is considered filed upon delivery to prison authorities for mailing to the court
Output: (D)
Kompan’s trade dress contributes to a likelihood of confusion in the context of two lines of playground furniture which are very similar overall. Kompan has also established that the similarities contribute to a likelihood of confusion. Kompan argues that similarities in trade name — Karavan and Kompan — and in catalog format should also be weighed in assessing similarity. The Karavan catalog format does not by itself closely approximate Kom-pan’s catalog. Any confusion caused by the catalog can be attributed either to the similarities in the products themselves or to the similarities in trade names. The Kompan and Karavan trade names are similar in both configuration and sound. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons., 523 F.2d 1331, 1340 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) PSI argues that these similarities are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trademarks like small children are not only seen but heard (B) holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations (C) holding that the cumulative effect of the prosecutors comments which as seen above are welldocumented errors denied appellant a fair trial (D) holding wife unreasonably exposed neighbors children to danger because she invited the children over in spite of knowing her husband had molested children in the past (E) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children
Output: (A)
people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right. When looking for the source of our rights under the New Jersey Constitution, we need not look beyond our borders. Nevertheless, we do take note that no jurisdiction, not even Massachusetts, has declared that there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the federal or its own constitution. Having decided that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage does not end our inquiry. See WHS Realty Co. v. Town of Morristown, 323 N.J.Super. 553, 562-63, 733 A.2d 1206 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 489, 744 A.2d 1211 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service (B) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (C) holding that rule 4 displaced service provision in the admiralty act (D) holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states (E) recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis
Output: (E)
to three counts of aggravated sexual battery, see Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-67.3 (LexisNexis Supp.2006); (2) in February 1985, Mills pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, see id.; and (3) in August 1990, Mills pleaded guilty to yet another count of aggravated sexual battery, see id. Based on these convictions, the district court at sentencing determined that Mills was subject to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(b)(l) (West Supp.2006), which requires a statutory minimum sentence of 15 years when the defendant “has a prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of 180 months imprisonment. II. Mills 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>). According to Mills, because the federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca (C) holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense
Output: (E)
persuaded. Only the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of the § 1981 claims enabled that court to re solve issues common to both claims, issues that otherwise would have been resolved by a jury. But for that erroneous ruling, this case would be indistinguishable from Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen. It would be anomalous to hold that a district court may not deprive a litigant of his right to a jury trial by resolving an equitable claim before a jury hears a legal claim raising common issues, but that a court may accomplish the same result by erroneously dismissing the legal claim. Such a holding would be particularly unfair here because Lytle was required to join his legal and equitable claims to avoid the bar of res judicata. See Harnett v. Billman, 800 F. 2d 1308, 1315 (CA4 1986) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion is consistent with this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication (B) holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial (C) holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action (D) holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit (E) holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit
Output: (D)
solely the result of former provocation.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(2). “ ‘Adequate cause’ means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind .App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating that defendant’s conduct led complainant to fire a gun at him and therefore complainant’s conduct did not constitute adequate cause). A defendant must prove that the homicide occurred while the passion still existed and before there was reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool. See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569. Anticipation of an event and preparation of a response indicates a defendant had time to deliberate over an action and did not act under the immediate influence of sudden passion. Id. at 570 (<HOLDING>). B. Legal Sufficiency In his first issue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant who had maintained his fathers gun collection at his home deserved a reduction under ussg  2k21b2 (B) holding evidence that defendant went to retrieve his gun before discovering that his tires were slashed demonstrated anticipation and preparation even before he was provoked and was not sufficient to require sudden passion instruction (C) holding evidence that defendant went home sat at his desk for some time and then retrieved his gun in preparation for fight showed deliberation and not sudden passion (D) holding a consent voluntary when a defendant who had been warned of his rights and knew police were investigating murders turned his gun over to a policeman who suggested that he could sell the gun for the defendant (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept
Output: (C)
that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice (the methoxy of naphthalene).” Webster’s Int’l 608. Thus, while some of the general purpose dictionaries provide support for Defendant’s suggested definition for derivative, others define the term as proposed by Plaintiffs. Technical dictionaries can also assist claim construction by showing how those skilled in the art define “derivatives.” Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[A]s this court has repeatedly counseled, the best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, again, the cited sources provide 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term (D) holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning (E) holding that courts may consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises to deter mine the ordinary meaning of a technical term to persons skilled in the art
Output: (E)
all investigative techniques used with respect to every individual that might be part of the drug trafficking organization under investigation); Edwards VI, 994 F.Supp.2d at 3-6, 2013 WL 5587256, at *2-3. The Court fully addressed Defendant’s arguments that his name should have been included under subsection (b) and/or (c) in prior opinions and the Court sees no reason to revisit those rulings. Accordingly, under either theory of the scope of subsection (e), as Defendant Edwards’ was not “specified in the applications ],” a clear prerequisite of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(e) disclosure, the Government had no obligation under subsection (e) to provide “a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications” of Defendant Edwards. See Edwards V, 943 F.Supp.2d at *128 (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants other arguments (B) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant (C) holding that since the government satisfied the disclosure requirements of subsection c without referencing defendant edwards name the court need not address the defendants arguments regarding subsection e (D) holding that in the absence of public disclosure the court need not address whether relator was original source of the information (E) holding where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants remaining arguments
Output: (C)
below and develop a factual record in support of his argument. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 50, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant did both, and we therefore turn to an analysis of Defendant’s state constitutional argument. {23} Under our State Constitution, Officer Thatcher could ask questions about narcotics and weapons only if he had developed independent, reasonable suspicion giving rise to such questions. See Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 24, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. The only basis for suspicion of criminal activity that the State articulated in the district court involved Defendant’s demeanor when Officer Thatcher approached the vehicle and requested the driver’s documentation. Officer Thatcher testified that Defen 2, 131 P.3d 1286 (<HOLDING>). {24} To summarize, Defendant was detained at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suspicion must be individualized (B) holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion (C) holding that a nervous and possibly furtive demeanor was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain (D) holding nervous behavior and inconsistent story justified reasonable suspicion and subsequent search (E) holding that nervous behavior and failure to make eye contact did not give rise to reasonable individualized suspicion
Output: (E)
2006). Subsequently, on February 4, 2004, Mr. Tarrant filed his complaint with this court requesting damages for actions taken by EPA during its removal activities undertaken pursuant to CERCLA. The government responded by moving for a more definite statement under RCFC 12(e), which motion the court granted. Order of Nov. 22, 2004. An amended complaint was filed on November 29, 2005, and the government thereafter filed a motion to dismiss. A hearing was held on May 11, 2006, and the matter is now ready for disposition. ANALYSIS A. Jurisdiction Jurisdiction must be established before a court addresses the merits of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); see Hambsch v. United States, 857 F.2d 763, 764 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Tarrant, as the plaintiff, bears the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a federal court is obliged to dismiss a case whenever it appears the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (B) recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking (C) holding that a federal court is obliged to determine its own jurisdiction for each case (D) holding court was obliged to apply its own law despite problems created by lack of uniformity in application of immigration laws (E) holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case
Output: (C)
Elan snowmobile 700 700 Morgan promissory note (4/14/98) 10,000 10,000 Power tools 7,000 7,000 Violin and home furnishings 3,000 3,000 IRA account no. 1 5,200 5,200 IRA account no. 2 3,400 3,400 Reimburse Katie’s Galaxy fund (5,700) (5,700) Home equity loan (29,810) (29,810) Condominium fees (3,660) (3,660) Personal loan (5.500) (5.500) VISA credit card debt (Í, 500) (4.500) Loan from Andre Drouin (1.500) (1.500) TOTAL MARITAL NET WORTH 53,078 [¶ 37] A court must take into account “[t]he value of the property set apart to each spouse” as part of its disposition of the property. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(1)(B) (1998). Here, the overall distribution of the assets is unbalanced, which in some circumstances amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Beattie v. Beattie, 650 A.2d 950, 952 (Me.1994) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The court’s judgment does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce (B) holding that while certain elements of the divorce judgment may be supportable independently the evidence did not support the cumulative effect of the judgment (C) holding that because judgment of youngs guilt was not rendered independently of trial courts ruling on motion to suppress evidence of offense and judgment would not be supported without that evidence error not waived by plea of guilty (D) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (E) holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment
Output: (B)
entitled to a “continuing violation” instruction — that is, that the jury could conclude that, as long as one act fell within the limitations period (i.e., after July 9, 1999), other related acts that took place outside the limitations period were actionable as part of a continuing violation. See Pl.’s Mem. 7-9; Pl.’s Reply at 8-10. In response, defendant argues that the Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), foreclosed application of the “continuing violation” doctrine in c 1343 (D.Kan.2006) (reasoning that, under Morgan, “rejection of an employee’s proposed accommodation is a discrete act” that begins the ADA limitations period); Lipka v. Potter, No. 03CV381A, 2006 WL 839421, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context (B) holding that claim for reasonable accommodation under the ada was timebarred the continuing violation doctrine applies only to cases of alleged hostile work environment or other claims which involve a series of acts necessary to comprise the alleged discriminatory act (C) recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 (D) holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive (E) recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims
Output: (B)
may consist of motorcycles rather than ski trails, but the principles are no less applicable.” Post, ¶ 25. This assertion ignores the fact that our decision in Dalury depended in large part on “[t]he major public policy implications . . . underlying the law of premises liability.” 164 Vt. at 334, 670 A.2d at 799. Dalury emphasized the duty of care a business owner has “to make sure that its premises are in safe and suitable condition for its customers.” Id. (quotation omitted). The dissent’s attempt to equate motorcycles to ski hills fails because the strong public policy of premises liability in Dalury has no parallel in the area of motorcycle test riding. Another critical distinction is that there is no claim here that the product offered by defendant 492, 493 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (<HOLDING>). In addition, unlike the ski area in Dalury 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the public interest exception (B) holding that mountaineering does not implicate the public interest (C) holding that a school principals suspension with pay did not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process
Output: (B)
its discretion in denying the mistrial. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. We overrule Appellant’s fifth issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11 (Vernon 2011) & 22.021 (Vernon 2016). 2 . For the purpose of this appeal, we refer to the children using the pseudonyms Alice, Belle, and Cici, rather than using their initials, and their mother as Mother. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 57.02(h) (Vernon Supp. 2016). 3 . Belle also testified that on another date, Appellant attempted to kiss- her on the mouth, but she pulled away from him. She did not mention this during her forensic interview. 4 . Parties do not contest the testimonial nature of the forensic examinations. See Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge (B) holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing (C) holding that in reviewing confrontation clause challenge appellate courts must first determine whether the confrontation clause is implicated (D) holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue (E) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
Output: (C)
sued in their individual capacities. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1989). That is to say, the liability of counties and other local governments under § 1983 depends solely on whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights have been violated as a result of a “policy” or “custom” attributable to the county or local government. Nevertheless, the district court reached the correct result in awarding summary judgment to Clermont County, as we shall explain below. Therefore we shall affirm its judgment, although on other grounds. See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Clermont County could only be held liable if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (B) recognizing that this court may affirm on any ground supported by the record even if it differs from the reasoning of the district court (C) recognizing that this court may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record quotation omitted (D) holding we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even those not relied upon by the district court (E) recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record
Output: (A)
showing he was denied a constitutional right. Because Weaver’s application for a COA raises several claims, it is impossible to glean from the present record which issue(s) the district court thought worthy of appeal. Cf. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250-51 (determining that while court of appeals could not decide issue not specified in COA, it could “construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record”). Therefore we must remand the record for the district court to specify the issue or issues for appeal. See Muniz v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1076 (6th Cir.1997); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1584 (11th Cir.1996); but cf. Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). It is so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand for specification of issues unnecessary where clear from briefing appellant had not made substantial showing he was denied any constitutional right (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant (D) holding that application of section 9711h as amended did not deprive appellant of any constitutional right (E) holding that where appellant acknowledged timely receiving notice by regular mail appellant appeared and fully participated at the trial and appellant made no claim that he was harmed in any way appellee had fulfilled the primary purposes of texrcivp 21a
Output: (A)
determine whether the statute or regulation infringing on that interest is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. See id. The Circuit Courts that have addressed the constitutionality of § 236(c) have differed on the question of whether the right asserted by Hall is fundamental. See, e.g., Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir.2002) (right of alien to be free from mandatory detention is not a fundamental one); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir.2002) (“We are reluctant to uphold civil detention impinging on fundamental liberty interests, based on a government policy the need for which the implementing agency has itself questioned.”), cert. granted, 536 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 2696, 153 L.Ed.2d 833 (2002). ; Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, No. 01-1616, 2003 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a fundamental right to marry (B) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (C) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental (D) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (E) holding right to be fundamental
Output: (E)
Circuit’s decision is based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005), regarding the availability of § 1983 to redress violations of federal statutory rights. The Third Circuit’s 2007 ruling in A.W. abrogated its holding in W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir.1995), that violations of a plaintiffs rights under IDEA and § 504 were actionable under § 1983. A.W., 486 F.3d at 795. As there is no genuine issue of material fact, and because the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this court must grant summary judgment for the District on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Id. See also Ronald E. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., No. 05-2535, 2007 WL 4225584, at *6 (E.D.Pa., Nov.29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). B. IDEA Claims 1. Statute of Limitations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (B) holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea (C) holding that parents did not have standing to sue under  1983 to enforce the predicate rights secured by idea and section 504 (D) holding that employers have standing to sue (E) holding that bjecause idea provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of its own requirements  parties may not sue under section 1983 for an idea violation
Output: (C)
and the State offered no other evidence that linked his house to a cocaine transaction. Id. No other witnesses testi fied that Farr entered Young’s house or that a cocaine transaction took place there. Id. at 452. As for the tape recording, the court concluded that without Farr’s testimony to identify Young’s voice, there was nothing to connect him to the voices on the tape, and the tape showed nothing more than the “commission of an offense.” Id. (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proo. Ann. art. 38.141). Noting that no other evidence in the record tended to connect Young to the offense, the court held the evidence to be legally insufficient to support the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 864 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1993, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). When we eliminate Baccus’s testimony, we are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no seizure occurred where the defendant initially stopped in compliance with a police officers order but then drove off quickly before the police officer could reach the suspects car (B) holding that testimony by police officer to effect that informant told him that defendant and his accomplice had come to informants home and discussed purchase of five kilograms of cocaine was not hearsay because statement was made by informant who was authorized by defendant to communicate such information to police officer under rule 801e2c (C) holding corroborating evidence sufficient that officer drove informant to defendants house saw defendant admit informant and saw informant come out with drugs and defendants voice was identified on audio tape of transaction (D) holding enhancement applicable where the record supported conclusion that drugs were stored and cut in the same location as the guns even though a search of the location yielded no drugs (E) holding evidence that police officer drove informant to location and waited outside while transaction occurred insufficient to corroborate informants identification of defendant as person from whom he purchased drugs
Output: (E)
669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism
Output: (E)
“assault could have been prevented if there was a Corrections officer properly overseeing the tier.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) But, although Plaintiff avers that the corrections staff were generally aware of Wallace’s disciplinary violations, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest that Doe 1 had any subjective awareness that his absence posed a substantial risk of serious harm. So his claim against Doe 1 alleges only negligence, not deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (defining deliberate indifference as requiring a subjective awareness, rather than the objective test of reasonableness under the negligence standard). And mere negligence does not support an Eighth Amendment claim. Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620; Johnson v. Smith, 354 Fed.Appx. 516, 516 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mere knowledge of a defect is not sufficient to amount to an eighth amendment claim defendant must also draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm exists (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that the mere fact that rocco and kaplan were associated is not sufficient to support an inference by the jury that one imparted knowledge to the other (D) holding that a prison official may be held liable under the eighth amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it (E) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation
Output: (A)
“rightful tax revenue” or to avoid paying state taxes, both of which would reduce the flow of tax revenue. Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 760-62 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004). Although the TIA applies only to suits seeking injunctive relief, suits for damages that seek to reduce state tax revenue are barred “by the free-standing principle of comity.” Wright v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). Mr. Johnson does not seek to tie up the County’s tax revenue or to avoid paying taxes. The taxes originally, but erroneously, assessed on the property were paid at the tax sale. The ultimate relief Mr. Johnson seeks — a tax deed— would not deprive the County of tax revenue. Cf. Levy, 510 F.3d at 762 (<HOLDING>); Wright, 256 F.3d at 637 (holding that the TIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (B) holding that suit by taxpayers alleging that they fell outside statutorily defined class subject to occupation tax so that states attempt to collect such tax from them was illegal was not suit against state (C) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (D) holding tia inapplicable to suit challenging the constitutionality of state tax credits where the relief sought would increase not decrease states revenue (E) holding that the tia barred suit alleging loss of and delay in receiving tax refunds because relief sought would operate to reduce the flow of tax revenue to the state
Output: (E)
may vary from, or are in addition to, those found in this Agreement. If your principal place of business is located in one of those states, this Agreement is amended to the fullest extent necessary to provide you those rights. Id. at 77. This provision resulted from DMI’s request to modify the initial draft of the agreement, which had provided North Carolina law would govern. DMI wanted the benefit of the South Dakota Dealer Protection Act (SDDPA), which it understood to permit termination of the agreement only if DMI justly provoked LeeBoy through misconduct. See S.D. Codified Laws § 87-5-3 (prohibiting a manufacturer or distributor from canceling a dealer’s franchise “unfairly ... and without just provocation”); Groseth Int’l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 168 (S.D.1987) (<HOLDING>). After entering the agreement, DMI took its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding wholesale dealer had antitrust standing in suit against manufacturer where dealer refused to comply with minimum resale price levels set by manufacturer and was terminated as a dealer (B) holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government (C) holding that an automobile dealers liability insurer was not liable for any damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the dealer and sustained in an accident involving an automobile purchased from the dealer or to defend the dealer in the negligence action where the injury occurred outside of the policy period and occurrence was defined in the policy as an accident including injurious exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or property damages   (D) holding just provocation under  3753 requires some sort of misconduct or shortcoming on the part of the dealer (E) holding that a finding of misconduct under section 44303626 requires intentional repeated instances of misconduct or violations of explicit policies after the employee has received warnings
Output: (D)
therefore “is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. Similarly, in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938), the Court struck down as facially invalid a local ordinance that required a license to distribute any literature and gave the chief of police the power to deny a license. 303 U.S. at 451-52, 58 S.Ct. 666. The Court held that the ordinance “strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship.” Id. at 451, 58 S.Ct. 666. In New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, however, the Supreme Court declined to find a law facially unconstitutional because plaintiffs could not establish that the law was unconstitutional in all of its applicati 848, 855 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). Those who support this view conclude that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding blood testing for alcohol content a search (B) holding that blood alcohol content almost 30 over the limit together with testimony of intoxication at the time of driving was sufficient to convict contrasting a case in which the blood alcohol content was just barely over the limit which was insufficient to convict (C) holding a minnesota statute that required police to advise drivers that they were not permitted to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to or refuse blood alcohol content testing and one that imposed criminal penalties on individuals who refused to submit to blood alcohol testing within five years of a prior drivers license revocation unconstitutional as applied (D) holding search of blood alcohol tests not permitted under section 1547 where suspect under arrest and police did not request testing (E) holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content
Output: (C)
test for determining whether a hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction as “[a]n abuse of authority occurs when a decision is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law”). In his brief, Salvaggio provides a survey of cases in which courts have held that a hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction under the City of Pasadena test. In City of Pasadena, the Supreme Court held the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by summarily reversing the police officer’s suspension without accepting and hearing any evidence. Id. at 20-21 (noting the Act requires the hearing examiner to base his decision on evidence submitted during a hearing). In Kelley, the Supreme Court held the hearing examiner e 86 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In City of Athens v. MacAvoy, the court held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension (B) holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period (C) holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable (D) holding hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by reforming indefinite suspension to temporary suspension of 92 days in excess of 15day statutory period for temporary suspensions (E) holding that police chiefs suspension letter omitting statutorily required information about process for appeal of suspension did not deprive hearing examiner of jurisdiction over suspended officers appeal and require reinstatement of officer
Output: (D)
the beneficial consumptive use made of the McCanne Ditch water for irrigation of the 300 acres of land. Id. at 56. Decrees for irrigation rights that erroneously determined tributary water sources to be “nontributary” or “independent of other priorities,” despite their tributary characteristics, are protected by res judicata as long as the water right is operated in conformity with the decree. See Closed Basin Landowners Ass’n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734 P.2d 627, 637 (Colo. 1987)(“A trial court has jurisdiction to render an erroneous decision, which may be reviewed on appeal. Consequently, a judgment entered within the jurisdiction of the court, even though wrong, is not subject to collateral attack.”); State Eng’r v. Smith Cattle, Inc., 780 P.2d 546, 549 (Colo.l989)(<HOLDING>). However, a change of water right application 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred successive lawsuits by siblings asserting the same claims because the doctrine of res judicata bars both parties and their privies from relitigating an issue already decided (B) holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred relitigation of an allegedly erroneous court determination that certain waters were not tributary to the arkansas river (C) holding that res judicata prevents relitigation of a claim that was previously the subject of a valid and final decision of this court (D) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant (E) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings
Output: (B)
privilege, “we can only determine the applicability of the privilege based upon what the [documents] reveal on their face.” Starting with the first category of documents, HRMC has pointed to no evidence in the record that Shirley Trantham, who sent the 17 December 2007 e-mail, or Janet Ledford, who received it, were members of a medical review committee. The author and recipients of the 18 December 2007 memorandum are not even identified. Neither of these documents explicitly states that it was generated by members of a medical review committee or for a medical review committee’s consideration. There is absolutely no evidence in the record from which this Court can infer that either document is privileged under § 131E-95(b). See Brown, 183 N.C. App. at 535, 645 S.E.2d at 122 (<HOLDING>). The third document, the 19 December 2007 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant failed to establish that board of directors meeting minutes were protected by attorneyclient privilege because documents listed individuals as being present at meeting but did not identify their positions and therefore defendant could not demonstrate that privilege had not been waived (B) holding that a defendant waived his attorneyclient privilege with regards to a seized letter because he waited six months after the seizure to assert his privilege (C) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege (D) holding that corporate president who called and participated in shareholders meeting to elect directors was estopped from questioning the legality of the meeting and election of directors who later removed him (E) recognizing privilege
Output: (A)