niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250). Repudiation discharges the other party’s remaining duty to render performance. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 253. To state a claim for anticipatory breach, however, the aggrieved party must treat the repudiation as a total breach, terminate the contract, and file suit. See Haddon Hous. Associates, Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 711 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2013) (citing 13 Williston on Contracts § 39:32 (4th ed.)). The Federal Circuit has recognized at least two scenarios by which a party will be treated as having repudiated a contract. First, repudiation may occur where a party “clearly and expressly” communicates its intention not to perform. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In addition, where an obligee reasonably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a creditor could be liable for the misrepresentations in a letter mailed by a collection agency hired to send the letter (B) holding agencys letter to plaintiff repudiated licensing agreement by stating agency would refuse to make payments and that requests for reconsideration would be denied (C) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts and under contract principles payments survive obligors death absent agreement to contrary shown by provisions of contract or surrounding circumstances (D) holding that letter from attorney fraudulently accusing plaintiff of violating defendants exclusive licensing rights was not actionable under the njcfa because letter did not involve a sale of merchandise (E) holding that statements of franchisor that total investment of capital necessary would be about 85000 that agency would turn around within 12 to 18 months that agencys gross profit once business was established would be approximately 300000 and that franchisor would play substantial role in operation of franchise were not fraudulent under michigan law
Output: (B)
a recent unpublished decision, United States v. Seals, this court held that Johnson was properly applied retroactively to the defendant’s original conviction, which occurred in 1992. The court stated that “[i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be given retroactive effect.” Because a circuit-split existed prior to Johnson and at the time of the defendant’s original conviction and sentencing, the court concluded that Johnson’s construc t. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (distinguishing between rules that are jurisdictional and rules that are merely inflexible claim-processing rules); see also United States v. Leijano-Cruz, 473 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 4 . - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement (B) recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict (C) recognizing authority but declining to issue writ (D) holding that kontrick and eberhart require the conclusion that rule 59e is a claimprocessing rule (E) recognizing that eberhart and kontrick suggest that rule 4b is not jurisdictional but declining to resolve the issue
Output: (E)
Aff. ¶¶ 23, 24. See also PL’s Depo. at 178 (Ex. F to Document No. 39).) To be sure, Plaintiff cites no law stating that sleeping, writing, using a truck driver’s license, or sex are “major life activities,” but Defendants raise no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the court will assume that at least some of these activities are “major life activities” under the ADA and chapter 151B. See Arrieta-Colon v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc., 434 F.3d 75, 88 (1st Cir.2006) (“Under Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, [638-39], 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998), ‘reproduction is a major life activity for the purposes of the ADA’ and ‘reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself.’ ”); Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Farrington v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2003 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that to establish a disability a plaintiff must prove a substantial limit with specific evidence that his particular impairment substantially limits his particular major life activity (B) recognizing sleeping as major life activity (C) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (D) holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada (E) holding that reproduction is not a major life activity
Output: (B)
to saddle the client with the mistakes of its attorney. The Court today properly rejects that rationale.” Id. at 405-06, 113 S.Ct. 1489. There is a small measure of inconsistency between the D.C. Circuit’s use of equitable principles in not holding a purely innocent and misled client liable for the neglect of counsel and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Link and Pioneer. But this court need not address this inconsistency any further. Even under the slightly more relaxed standard that the D.C. Circuit used in two deei-sions, which allow a client to avoid the consequences of his counsel’s malpractice, Moving Plaintiffs still fail to show circumstances that will allow this court to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>), and Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., et 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred when it sanctioned client where the evidence showed that the attorney filed frivolous pleadings on behalf of the client but the client did nothing more than rely on her attorneys advice (B) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case (C) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (D) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
Output: (B)
June 1993 was being denied. Katz asserts that he never received the letter and, therefore, until March 27, 1995, when he received the notice of the denial of coverage, Colonial had led him to believe that his policy covered registered nursing care provided at a general hospital. As the dispute as to whether Katz actually received the letter cannot be resolved at this juncture, I now consider whether, if he did not receive the letter, Colonial should be estopped from denying coverage for the October/November private nursing care. In order to prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Katz must show (1) a material representation, (2) reasonable reliance upon that representation, and (3) damage resulting from that representation. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Katz asserts that Colonial’s failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa
Output: (E)
him, he cannot state a claim for breach on this ground. See Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 79 F.3d at 514 (concluding that damages are an essential element of a breach of contract under Tennessee law). 8 . Wachovia arrives at this calculation by taking the $389.66 per month payment specified in the May DFA plus Hinton’s "regular payment” of $887.72. J.A. at 24 (May DFA at 1). Wachovia determines the "regular payment” to be $887.72 by dividing $7101.77, the total of the eight "regular payments,” by eight. Id. 11 . Wachovia’s conduct, even if deceptive, might not be covered by the TCPA because it is not clear under Tennessee law that such actions related to a forebearance agreement would be seen as affecting commerce. See Pursell v. First Am. Nat’l Bank, 937 S.W.2d 838, 840-42 (Tenn.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim against state for failing to prevent sexual abuse was covered by statute (B) holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities (C) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (D) recognizing that discrepancy regarding political activities went to the heart of petitioners claims where those activities formed the basis of the persecution claim (E) holding that a claim for deception regarding lenders repossession of debtors collateral was not covered by the tcpa but explicitly refraining from exempting banking activities from the tcpa
Output: (E)
judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
Output: (C)
for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). 2 . In his notice of appeal, Poyer stated that he did not receive notice of the denial of relief in a timely manner, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(A), and he sought leave to proceed with his appeal. However, he filed the notice of appeal requesting additional time, at the earliest, on January 12, 2016 — 266 days after the court entered the dismissal order. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(B) (requiring that motion to reopen be "filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier”); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 651 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect (B) holding that tenday time limit to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional and an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (C) holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional (D) holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period (E) holding that district court had no authority to reopen appeal period when motion was filed beyond 180day limit
Output: (E)
Terry is to be established by reference to particular facts necessitating the intrusion. Officer Stewart testified to no such facts once he had the purse. We come to this conclusion not because we disagree with the juvenile court with respect to what the facts are — the facts in this case are not in dispute — but rather because we disagree with the juvenile court as to how the law applies to those facts, and it is our responsibility to make that determination de novo. ¶ 32 Because the warrantless search of the purse was not justified under the circumstances, the marijuana pipe should not have been admitted into evidence, and Officer Stewart’s testimony regarding its discovery should not have been permitted at the hearing. See State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz.App. 6, 12, 406 P.2d 208, 214 (1965) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 33 The finding of delinquency is thus 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings (B) holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings (C) holding that an exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies where the police would have obtained the evidence if no illegality had occurred (D) holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid (E) holding that the exclusionary rule applies to oral evidence adduced from an officers testimony as to what he saw or found pursuant to an illegal search
Output: (E)
conflict-free counsel, February 23, 2006, because the defendant was “unable to stand trial” during that entire period. The defendant counters that, although the time it took the court to dispose of the motions to withdraw and appoint new counsel should be excluded from the 180-day period, the time he was represented by each counsel must be included. We agree with the defendant. The parties agree that the period of time between the filing of the motions to withdraw and the appointment of new counsel should be excluded from the 180-day period. During this time period, the defendant was without counsel and, thus, “no action of consequence to the defendant c[ould have] occur[red] in the . . . case until the motion [wa]s resolved.” State v. Rieger, 695 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 708 N.W.2d 630 (Neb. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing conflict (B) holding that delay resulting from defense counsels withdrawal based upon a conflict of interest was properly excluded from 180day time period (C) holding that when defense counsel withdrew an objection to admission of evidence the defendant waived his right to a review of the courts ruling on appeal (D) holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation (E) holding that delay when defense counsel withdrew because of conflict is excluded from iad time calculation
Output: (E)
phrase “periodical ly review and monitor the agent” is untested. Thus, the unanswered question before us is how much reviewing and monitoring is required by a trustee to satisfy the mandates of R.C. 1339.59(A)(3)? The plain meaning of the operative words are (1) review — “to go over or examine critically or deliberately” and (2) monitor — “to watch, keep track of, or check usually for a special purpose.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.2003) 1067, 801. However, secondary legal authority on this point is scarce and wide ranging: If in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the trustee discovers conditions adversely affecting the security of the investment, it is bound to er (1987), 152 Ariz. 527, 528, 733 P.2d 1110, citing Restatement of the Law 2d, Trusts (1959) 227 (<HOLDING>); Estate of Miller (1964), 230 Cal.App.2d 888, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trustee who lacks investment experience must seek expert advice regarding investing trust assets while exercising his own judgment (B) holding that a trust beneficiarys state law claims concerning investment of trust assets in affiliated mutual funds satisfied the in connection with a purchase or sale of security requirement of slusa (C) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust (D) holding that although a trustee is not required to watch the ticker as a speculator would    the question of the quality of judgment in holding or disposing of trust assets    coupled with evidence of failure to review or monitor the trust estate and refusal to meet with cotrustees presents a jury question on whether or not the trustee breached his duty (E) holding that a trustee properly withheld trust payments owed to a prior trustee who had misappropriated trust funds
Output: (A)
Chicago, 242 F.3d 737 (7th Cir.2001) (finding “a reasonable officer would have thought [the defendant] was trying to flee, thereby justifying the use of a higher degree of force to protect the community and the officers than that needed for someone who committed only a minor traffic violation” where the defendant did not pull over after being followed by police cars playing their sirens); Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., 653 F.3d 478, 486-87 (7th Cir.2011) (“An officer, faced with a suspect fleeing toward his home and ignoring police commands, is not obliged to give that suspect an opportunity to retreat into his home and, perhaps, to fortify himself or to escape before the officer employs reasonable means of incapacitation); cf. United States v. Norris, 640 F.3d 295, 303 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Officer Drumm’s actions were also reasonable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada (B) holding that an officers single use of a taser was reasonable where used to subdue an arrestee who had failed to accede to repeated police commands to stop his retreat into his home (C) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers (D) holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment (E) holding that an unconstitutional seizure occurred when police officers discovered that a suspect illegally sold alcohol from his home and ordered him to open the door involuntarily to be arrested inside his home
Output: (B)
return date, she should have been allowed to plead to the amended complaint. The plaintiff asserts that the amendment responded to and corrected a procedural technicality only — a scrivener’s error. Although the plaintiff followed the court’s order and filed an amendment, it has maintained that, under the circumstances, no amendment was necessarily required. Relying on Merrill v. NRT New England, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 314, 12 A.3d 575, cert. granted on other grounds, 300 Conn. 925, 15 A.3d 629 (2011), the plaintiff further asserts that the defective return date implicated only personal jurisdiction. Our Supreme Court has stated that a defect in process implicates personal jurisdiction. See Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 31-33, 848 A.2d 418 (2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the case without prejudice because the plaintiff failed to properly serve the defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint (B) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (C) holding that noncompliance with general statutes  52102b which requires service of apportionment complaint within 120 days after return date of original complaint implicated personal jurisdiction (D) holding that the statutory requirement that a defendant serve any apportionment complaint within 120 days of the return date of the original complaint is mandatory and implicates a courts personal jurisdiction (E) holding original complaint was admission where it alleged an accident occurred on a different date than the amended complaint
Output: (C)
In Donaldson v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that the civil rules apply to an IRS summons proceeding, but they do not apply inflexibly. 400 U.S. 517, 528, 91 S.Ct. 534, 541, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971). Rather, “a district court, by local rule or by order, may limit the application of the rules in a summons proceeding ... so long as the rights of the party summoned are protected and an adversary hearing, if requested, is made available.” Id. at 528-29, 91 S.Ct. at 541. The Court in Donaldson approved limiting the application of Rule 24(a)(2), governing intervention as of right, in a tax summons case. Id. Subsequent cases have approved other limitations of the civil rules in IRS summons-enforcement cases. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 954 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (C) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (D) holding district court had discretion to modify the threeday notice requirement for default judgment by giving notice in a show cause order (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice
Output: (D)
the proceedings. There is nothing in the factual stipulation which identifies witnesses that have died, specific exculpatory evidence that has been destroyed, or specific matters that cannot be developed due to faded memories. We have generally required a factual showing of concrete prejudice before a defense of laches may be invoked. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d 672, 680 (Iowa 2001). On the equitable estoppel issue, Wintroub’s argument has similar factual shortcomings. Even assuming that equitable estoppel applies in attorney grievance proceedings, nothing in the record of this ease supports the claim that Wintroub has relied upon any action of the Iowa authorities to his detriment. See The Florida Bar v. McCain, 361 So.2d 700, 706 (Fla.1978) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Iowa complaints were filed, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of equitable estoppel (B) holding equitable estoppel in disciplinary proceeding requires inducement to change position (C) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (D) holding that equitable estoppel requires proof of fraud misrepresentation or affirmative deception (E) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa
Output: (B)
law) analysis on a pre-2005 (old law) case.” Appellants argue the Commission erred in that “[n]o mention was made in the award of the differing standards that were created by that major law change” and the “findings made by the Commission should show whether the basis of its decision was an issue of fact or a question of law” “in the light most favorable to [Employee].” Having reviewed the Commission’s lengthy award, we must disagree with Appellants. In our review we first note that Appellants urge error in the fact that the Commission did not mention “the differing standards that were created by th[e] major [2005] law change.” However, Appellants cite this Court to no authority for such a requirement. See Richmond v. Springfield Rehab & Healthcare, 138 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Mo.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, in our review of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an argument that fails to cite to supporting authority in support of claim presents nothing for review (B) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority (C) holding that an appellant waived a claim where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his appellate brief (D) holding waiver results if an appellant fails to properly develop an issue or cite to legal authority to support his contention in his appellate brief (E) holding that an appellate brief is deficient per the missouri rules of court where it fails to cite authority for an argument or fails to specify why such a citation is unavailable
Output: (E)
test developed by Justice O’Connor, which dispenses with the “entanglement” prong of the Lemon test and collapses its “purpose” and “effect” prongs into a single inquiry: would a reasonable, informed observer, i.e., one familiar with the history and context of private individuals’ access to the public money or property at issue, perceive the challenged government action as endorsing religion? See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, - U.S. -, -, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2468-69, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (upholding school voucher program where 96% of participating students attended - religiously affiliated schools because parents’ genuine and independent choices determined where children went to school); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 117-19, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding proper remedy when a christian student newspaper was denied student activities funds was to make funds available to the religious paper not to deny funds to nonreligious student groups (B) holding that a university creates a public forum when it makes its facilities generally available to registered student groups (C) holding that establishment clause did not require public school to bar evangelical christian student group from using facilities accessed by various other groups (D) holding high school which allowed student secular noncurricular activities to meet on school property was required to provide equal access to a christian student group (E) holding that the establishment clause does not bar local school district from providing a publiclyemployed interpreter for a deaf student in a parochial school
Output: (C)
provision is a condition precedent to the customer’s right to file an action against the bank to recover losses caused by the unauthorized signature or alteration”). 7 . An item (e.g., check) that contains less than the required number of signatures amounts to an “unauthorized signature.” See Va.Code 8.3A-403, Official Comment 4. 8 . See March 18, 2011 Hr’g Tr. 18:8-11. 9 . See March 18, 2011 Hr’gTr. 23:10-24:6. 10 . The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Collins is consistent with its earlier deci sion in Radin v. Crestar Bank, 249 Va. 440, 457 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1995), holding that an attorney who opened a fiduciary account in which he deposited his client's funds was a "customer.” 11 . Cf. Thrash v. Georgia State Bank of Rome, 189 Ga.App. 21, 375 S.E.2d 112, 113 (Ga.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). 12 . It is worth noting that at least some 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks (B) holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations (C) recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check (D) holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs (E) holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities
Output: (A)
risk; and (3) explained the consequences of not installing a ROPS when it sold the tractor. However, this report did not address whether the average user of a tractor would recognize the risk of harm from operating one without a ROPS or whether Bren-Tex had reason to know that someone was likely to operate the tractor without understanding that risk or otherwise lacking the competence to operate the tractor safely without one. Moreover, when Bren-Tex objected to the admission of this exhibit as hearsay and lacking testimony to authenticate it, it was expressly offered and admitted into evidence merely as evidence “of the case that was being built against Bren-Tex,” and not for the truth of the matters asserted. 13 . See Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Iowa 1985) (<HOLDING>); Ky. Utils. Co. v. Auto Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 388 of the restatement does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers even though the supplier is aware of those means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not (B) holding party seeking disqualification waives attorneyclient privilege as to the court so the court may assess the contents of allegedly confidential information and the party may present the information either in a hearing out of the presence of the party against whom confidentiality is to be protected or in camera inspection (C) recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act (D) holding that when the united states is a named party participates in the general action and is or may be interested in the outcome of an appeal even though it is not a party to the appeal it is a party for purposes of frap 4a (E) holding under section 388 of the restatement seoond of torts defendants had no duty to warn injured tractor driver that tractor lacked a rops because this was an open and obvious danger
Output: (A)
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure intended to deceive.”). Also, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act functions in conjunction with Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to “prohibit fraud in the offer, purchase, and sale of securities.” SEC v. Global Telecom Servs., L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 111 (D.Conn.2004) (citations omitted). Similarly, Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act “prohibits a broker or dealer from using any manipulative or deceptive device ... to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any security.” SEC v. George, 426 F.3d 786, 792 (6th Cir.2005). To prove any, or all, of these violations, the SEC must establish that the defendant made material false statements or omissions , with scienter , in connection with the securities exchange. See Ganino, 228 F.3d at 161(<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Global Telecom., 325 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a section 10b violation the sec must prove that the defendant in connection with the purchase or sale of securities made a materially false statement or omitted a material fact with scienter and that the plaintiffs reliance on the defendants action caused injury to the plaintiff (B) holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities (C) holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement (D) holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities (E) holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities
Output: (A)
arbitration clauses require arbitration only if the dispute is related to thé class of claims- identified in the clause. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp., 302 A.D.2d at 126, 752 N.Y.S.2d 611. “Where the arbitration clause is narrow, a collateral matter will generally be ruled beyond its purview.” Id. (quoting Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir.2001)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of whether an arbitration clause is broad or narrow, arbitration is strongly favored under New York law and any doubts about whether an issue is arbitrable should be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A., 252 F.3d at 223 ., 220 A.D.2d 752, 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y.App.Div.1995) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>).. Vocada argues that the parties’ narrow 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope (B) holding that the parties choice to require arbitration for disputes which arise under a contract when the standard language was arising out of or relating to demonstrated that the parties intended the agreement to be narrow (C) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (D) holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   (E) holding that an arbitration clause was narrow when it called for arbitration only of disputes relating to certain payments made under the lease
Output: (E)
2004. Because Prudential arbitrarily denied Mr. Smith’s benefits as of that date, the Plan Administrator did not examine evidence regarding Mr. Smith’s disability after July 2, 2004, nor is there sufficient evidence in the record for the Court to do so. Because the administrative record is insufficient to determine the end date of Mr. Smith’s short-term disability (assuming it did end), the Court will remand the case to the Plan Administrator for further evaluation consistent with this opinion. See Smothers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc. Employee Health & Welfare Plan, 298 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir.2002) (remanding case to plan administrator for first consideration of facts newly made relevant by the Court’s opinion); Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 277 F.3d 635, 648 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator (B) holding that remand is the proper course for handling a case where the factual record is incomplete (C) holding that it is appropriate to remand to the plan administrator when the administrative record is incomplete (D) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan (E) holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary
Output: (C)
an adoption or belief in the statements and opinions contained within them. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 148 n.12, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011) (reasoning that defendant was not subject to liability for securities fraud by providing link to fraudulent prospectus on its website since “[m]erely hosting a document on a [web site] does not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the document as its own statement or exercises.control over its content”), The fact, that a party links to or posts on its website material from another source, or otherwise hosts or references third-party documents on its website does not by itself constitute .a clear demonstration of intent to adopt. See Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1149 (D. Colo. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Aikens v. Cty. of Ventura, No. B221992, 2011 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of public disclosure the court need not address whether relator was original source of the information (B) holding that due process was violated where a death sentence was imposed based on information in a presentence report and the defendant was not given an opportunity to deny or explain the information (C) holding proponent of a motion for continuance should state what specific discovery is material and show why it is material (D) holding that experts may rely on inadmissible material in forming the basis of opinions but inadmissible material may not be admitted for truth of the matter asserted (E) holding that material from websites was inadmissible because proponent failed to explain whether the source sponsors endorses collects or simply provides the information on the websites
Output: (E)
aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.” [United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563,] 1570 [(11th Cir.1991)] (internal quotation marks omitted). “To act ‘knowingly,’ therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 952-53. We have explained that “[i]gnorance is deliberate if the defendant was presented with facts that put him or her on notice that criminal activity was particularly likely, yet the defendant intentionally failed to investigate those facts.” United States v. Chavez-Alvarez, 594 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In his safety-valve proffer statement, Honea 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support (B) holding evidence was sufficient to support finding that even if defendant had no actual knowledge that he was acting in furtherance of methamphetamine distribution ring his ignorance was based on his decision not to ask any questions about the suspicious circumstances of his employment (C) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live (D) holding that the scope of crossexamination did not extend to any bad acts committed by the defendant during his life where defendant presented evidence of adverse circumstances that he experienced in his early childhood rather than evidence of his general good character (E) holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction
Output: (B)
under Section 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution. The majority’s greatest foible, however, is in its treatment of the primary issue before this Court, whether the enactment of Senate Bill 1, by which the Legislature removed the PSC Commissioners, constituted an encroachment by the Legislature on the gubernatorial powers enumerated in Sections 1, 9 and 15, Article II of the Maryland Constitution, and a violation of Section 8 of the Declaration of Rights’ separation of powers. Aristotle’s principles, explored by John Locke, and later pragmatically structured by Baron de Montesquieu, are generally credited as the mainstay of the separation of powers doctrine. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L.Rev.2073, 2093 n. 59 (2005) (<HOLDING>)-, Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim premised on the organizing arming and disciplining of members of the national guard involved issue committed expressly to the political branches of government (B) recognizing that the american governments three distinct branches originate from a fusion of concepts found in aristotles the politics john lockes the second treatise of government and montesquieus the spirit of laws (C) recognizing products liability concepts as part of general maritime law (D) recognizing that when other branches of government are remiss in their constitutional duties the judiciary must act (E) recognizing that standing doctrine is fundamentally rooted in respect for the separation of powers of the independent branches of government
Output: (B)
right" to the uncollected taxes because the Legislature may "cut off . . . liability at any stage" prior to collection. Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan, supra at 292. A more recent court decision found that the State's "accrued right to collect inheritance taxes”, In re Estate of Hitchman, 100 Wn.2d 464, 466, 670 P.2d 655 (1983), was an "existing right" to be protected from retroactive application of a major tax law revision by a savings clause. Hitchman, at 469. Because of the "savings clause", however, the court did not have to address the dissent's invocation of Snow's Mobile Homes, recognizing the Legislature's power to extinguish a tax obligation. See Hitchman, at 472 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting); see also Henry v. McKay, 164 Wash. 526, 535, 3 P.2d 145, 77 A.L.R. 1025 (1931) (<HOLDING>). Given our consistent treatment of amendatory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (B) holding that the state police is a state agency (C) holding that the state through its legislature may retroactively release the delinquent propertyowner from tax liabilities due to the state    (D) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge (E) holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax
Output: (C)
of insurance. That clause specifically states that the defendant is obligated to notify plaintiff of a “cancellation” of the policy. Cancellation is very different than expiration of the policy. Under the Virginia statutes, defendant is only obligated to mail an insured an offer to renew unless defendant has decided not to renew the policy. Defendant extended to insured an offer to renew. Insured did not accept and, therefore, a new contract of insurance was not formed. There is no language in the loss payable clause that requires defendant to notify plaintiff of insured’s failure to renew the policy. The ten-day notice provision governs only cancellation, which is the termination of coverage during the policy period. See Yancey v. Colonial Ins. Co. of California, 51 Va. Cir. 31 (1999) (<HOLDING>). That provision does not apply in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (B) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (C) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (D) holding that no constitutional violation may occur if a procedurally proper nameclearing hearing is provided (E) holding that cancellation may only occur while coverage is still in effect
Output: (E)
case when Ferrell’s father pur chased the Buick and had it titled in Scarborough’s name. Thus, Scarborough’s failure to complete the assignment of title by entering the name of the transferee on the certificate of title does not, per se, defeat the transfer of her ownership of the Buick. Accordingly, we must look to the specific circumstances in this case to determine if, and to whom, Scarborough’s ownership of the Buick was transferred. In order to effect a transfer of the ownership of a motor vehicle, two things are required: (1) the owner must actually deliver the endorsed certificate of title to the transferee, and (2) the owner must deliver possession of the vehicle to the transferee. See Nationwide Insurance Company v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 528-29, 106 S.E.2d 588, 589-90 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Although Scarborough testified that the Buick 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (B) holding that delivery of citation is proper when delivered to a party capable of receiving it (C) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received (D) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (E) holding that normal presumption of ownership in favor of holder of motor vehicle certificate of title may be rebutted despite language of minnstat  168a10 subd 5 providing that the transfer of a motor vehicle is not effective until titling requirements are complied with
Output: (C)
evidence in determining whether the Maoists’ actions rose to the level of persecution. The IJ erred in relying on the absence of permanent physical harm to find that Petitioner was not persecuted by the Maoists. Nothing in the pertinent statutes or relevant precedents suggests that an applicant must be permanently maimed in order to demonstrate past persecution. The record shows that the beating Petitioner suffered resulted in injuries serious enough to require medical care, with the hospital documents indicating that Petitioner was rendered semi-unconscious in the attack. Regardless of whether Petitioner was permanently injured in this attack, it does not seem to be a minor incident that can be brushed off as insig nificant. Cf. Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Petitioner presented both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that harassment or discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution under the ina unless it is accompanied by physical punishment infliction of harm or significant deprivation of liberty (B) holding that physical assaults did not rise to the level of persecution where they did not requirfe medical attention (C) holding that alien was teased bothered and harassed based on her religious beliefs but that it did not rise to the level of persecution and that fear of future persecution was too speculative (D) holding any improper delegation did not rise to level of plain error (E) holding that charging fees for medical services did not violate the eighth amendment where prisoner did not allege denial of medical care
Output: (B)