niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of the injury inflicted. See Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir.1986) (citations omitted); Raby v. Baptist Medical Center, 21 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1349 (M.D.Ala.1998); Griffin v. City of Clanton, 932 F.Supp. 1359, 1368 (M.D.Ala.1996). Use of force must be judged on a case-by-case basis “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. Moreover, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir.)). Because the excessive force standard establishes no bright line, qualified immunity applies unless every reasonable officer in the Defendant’s position would conclude t Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the court finds that it was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied (B) holding that officer did not use excessive force in requiring passenger to lie on ground while he directed shotgun toward her and her companions (C) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (D) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
Output: (B)
she consented in the belief that Defendant was a professional whose explanations were in her best interest. She also believed that a buttock massage was a normal component of a full-body massage. A rational jury could reasonably infer that it was not until Defendant touched Jessica’s vagina without warning that she realized that Defendant was perhaps not behaving in a professional manner, but that until that point Jessica believed Defendant to be a professional health care provider who was in a position of authority over her and used this position to exercise undue influence over her, as evidenced by his ability to convince her that breast and buttock massages are normal components of a full-body massage. See State v. Trevino, 113 N.M. 804, 807, 833 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Ct.App. 1991) (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part by State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reliance must be proven by some evidence (B) holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary (C) holding that best interest of child need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that circumstances evidencing a defendants authority over a minor victim inferentially support a finding of coercion (E) holding that use of a position of authority to coerce sexual contact may be proven inferentially
Output: (E)
applying Old § 1-201(37) developed percentage tests to determine whether the option price contained in a purported lease is nominal (“Percentage Tests”). Percentage Tests compare: (1) the option price contained in the agreement with the original purchase price of the “leased” goods; (2) the option price with the total stream of rental payments made under the contract; and (3) the original cost of the “leased” goods with the total payment stream. See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Pappas, 946 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th Cir.1991) (stating that an option price that represents 12% of total rental payments, while not dispositive, indicates a secured sale rather than true lease); Fruehauf Corp. v. Int’l Plastics, Inc. (In re Int’l Plastics, Inc.), 18 B.R. 583, 587 (Bankr.D.Kan.1982) (<HOLDING>); Equilease Corp. v. AAA Mach. Co. (In re AAA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease the lessee was required to exercise the option on or before the last day of the lease (B) holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach (C) holding that option amount that is 53 of cash sale price on the date agreement was executed reflected a true lease (D) holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement the lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease (E) holding that the question of whether a bankruptcy trustee or a putative lessor was entitled to the proceeds of an equipment sale depended on whether a true lease was involved when the lease is intended as a security interest article 9 applies however a bona fide lease is not affected by article 9
Output: (C)
172, 30 N.E.2d 369 (1940) (applying the “general concept” that the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor turns on “the right of control over the [worker] in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done”); see also Restatement (SeCOnd) of Agency § 220(1) cmt. d (1958) (stating that “control or right to control the physical conduct of the person giving service is important and in many situations is determinative” of whether that person is an employee or independent contractor); Warren A. Seavy, Agenoy § 84, at 142 (1964) (observing that “the right to control the physical movements of the employee is [typically] the most important single element”); cf. Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2 Cal.3d 943, 88 Cal.Rptr. 175, 471 P.2d 975, 980, 982 (1970) (<HOLDING>). B. The District Court’s determination as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control (B) holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted (C) holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control (D) holding that defendant was not an agent because alleged principal did not control means by which the defendants accomplished their duties (E) holding that the right to control is measured by considering 1 the independent nature of the workers business 2 the workers obligation to furnish necessary tools supplies and materials to perform the job 3 the workers right to control the progress of the work except as to the final results 4 the time for which the worker is employed and 5 the method of payment whether by unit of time or by the job
Output: (C)
and TILA Subclass members are also Payday Loan Subclass members. See Brief at 3-4. The only reason that the TILA and EFTA Subclasses are so much smaller than the other subclasses is because the TILA and the EFTA both have one-year statutes of limitations, which restrict the number of proposed class members who have valid claims under these statutes. See Brief at 3-4. Although it is said that there is “no set formula,” Rex v. Owens, 585 F.2d at 436, or “strict numerical test” for determining when a class is sufficiently numerous for joinder to be impracticable, Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d at 884 n. 1, the reality is that a per se numerosity threshold seems to exist somewhere south of 150 proposed class members, see Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d at 624 (<HOLDING>); Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that substantial numbers usually satisfy the numerosity requirement (B) holding that a potential class of 256 members did not satisfy numerosity (C) recognizing that in determining numerosity the proper focus is not on numbers alone but on whether joinder of all members is practicable in view of the numerosity of the class and all other relevant factors (D) holding that 100 to 150 members  is within the range that generally satisfies the numerosity requirement (E) holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed
Output: (D)
§ 2707(a) (2006) provides that a party “aggrieved” by a violation of the Act may pursue a civil remedy against “the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2006) states, “[t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.” The United States District Court for the District of Columbia analyzed the same issue presently before this Court and held that even if the State does not comply with the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, “the statute does not provide for a suppression remedy.” United States v. Ferguson, 508 F.Supp. 2d. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2007); see also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>), superseded on other grounds, Konop v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the stored communications act does not provide an exclusion remedy it allows for civil damages  and criminal punishment    but nothing more (B) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (C) holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action (D) holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence (E) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
Output: (A)
presented by the facts of this case, the majority opinion correctly reserves judgment as to that matter for another day. Although I join this Court’s majority opinion’s holding that a trial court generally has continuing authority to rescind its order granting a new trial, I observe that a trial court must always proceed cautiously when either granting or denying a motion for new trial because there are limitations to the grounds upon which a trial court may properly grant a new trial. Recently, in State v. Thomas, this Court reaffirmed the principle that “[tjhere must be some legal basis underpinning the grant of a new trial,” and a trial court may not grant a new trial for a “non-legal or a legally invalid reason.” See State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 104, 105, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); see also Tex.R.App. P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict (B) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver (C) holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court (D) holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless (E) holding that motion for a new trial whether for guilt or punishment requires a valid legal claim a court cannot grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that he is entitled to one under the law
Output: (E)
F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.2003). In this case, the defendants claim that the Rosado case constitutes precisely such a pending state proceeding. The district court, however, refused to apply Younger on the ground that there was not a strict identity of plaintiffs in the state and federal court actions; whereas the plaintiffs in state court are The New York Times and The Hartford Courant, in federal court they are The Courant and The Connecticut Law Tribune. Hartford Courant Co., 290 F.Supp.2d at 272-73. The question of the extent to which the plaintiffs in a federal action must be identical to the plaintiffs or defendants in the state court case upon which abstention is based is more complicated and less settled, however, than the district court acknowledged. Compare Spargo, 351 F.3d at 85 (<HOLDING>), with Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that younger abstention is jurisdictional (B) holding that while younger abstention is only justified if the pending state proceeding has the authority to adjudicate a litigants federal claims when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related statecourt proceedings a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary (C) holding that younger abstention was appropriate while the case works its way through the state appellate process (D) holding that to avoid younger abstention plaintiffs must demonstrate that state law bars the effective consideration of their federal claims (E) holding that because the federal plaintiffs claims were essentially derivative of the state defendants younger abstention applied
Output: (E)
(adopting view among states that if two escape clauses within insurance policy operate to negate coverage, those escape clauses are null and void). 8 . Harris v. Magee, 573 So.2d at 653; see o.2d 670, 673 (Miss.1976) ("An insurance company cannot by the provisions in one uninsured motorist endorsement limit its liability and endorsement in a separate policy and defeat the mandatory provisions of the statute."); Talbot, 291 So.2d at 703 (declaring invalid clause which reduced uninsured motorist coverage by amounts paid under medical coverage provisions of policy); Lowery, 285 So.2d at 771-77 (declaring invalid restriction in policy that required "insured" to own the automobile described in the policy until uninsured motorist coverage applied); Harthcock, 248 So.2d at 459-60, 461-62 (<HOLDING>); see also Youngblood, 515 F.2d at 1256-58 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conditioning uninsured motorist coverage on insureds agreement to not settle with other tortfeasors contravenes the um act also declaring void other insurance provision of policy which operated to relieve insurer of payment if insured secured statutory minimum from other source (B) holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted (C) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured  shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (D) holding that policy exclusion for uninsured motorist claims involving permissive users violated mississippi public policy as expressed in the um act (E) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid
Output: (A)
the terms so used to be effective, wherefore an interpretation of a statute which gives a word, phrase or clause thereof no function to perform, or makes it, in effect, a mere repetition of another word, phrase or clause thereof must be rejected as being unsound, if it be possible so to construe the statute as a whole, as to make all of its parts operative and effective. 4 . This Court recognized that a tort action for wrongful death could be brought on behalf of a viable unborn child in Syllabus Point 1 of Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971). 5 . Contrary to the majority of states, South Carolina and Alabama have held an unborn child is a child, person, or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution. See Ankrom v. State, 152 So.3d 373 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (<HOLDING>); Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute (B) holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child (C) holding that an unborn child is not a dependent for purposes of the neglect statute (D) holding a mothers ingestion of a controlled substance while pregnant does not constitute child abuse as an unborn child is not a person for purposes of criminal prosecution (E) holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child
Output: (B)
or to correct a deficiency — and appeals the deficiency — is no different than the remedy the Secretary ordinarily would impose in the first instance.” Id. Finally, while the Secretary conceded that a home’s deficiencies are posted on the Internet, she also noted that a home can post a reply. Id. In sum, the Court concluded that the statutes that ere- ate the special review channel adequately protect the rights of the nursing homes. Here, of course, the County has sued DHS, not the Secretary of DHHS. But this makes no difference. DHS is standing in the shoes of DHHS. DHS is acting on behalf of, and pursuant to its contract with, the federal agency. See Nursing Inn of Menlo Park v. California Dept. of Health Services, No. C 02-1675, 2003 WL 1872961, *4 (N.D.Cal. April 7, 2003) (<HOLDING>). If nursing homes may not bring actions for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state judges were not necessary parties to action challenging constitutionality of state laws relating to detention of juveniles (B) holding that state agency that performs surveys of nursing homes under contract with dhhs not a proper party to action challenging constitutionality of dhhs regulations (C) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (D) holding that material prejudice was not present under the facts however an agency of the state was not a party to the action (E) holding that agency is bound by its regulations
Output: (B)
plain error. Because the record contains other cognizable errors that in and of themselves require a new trial, see text infra, we are content to allow our comments on the “property interest” ruling to stand as a guide to the district court on retrial. See Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145, 147-48 (1st Cir.1979) (employing a similar strategy)- This brings us to the two evi-dentiary bevues (both of which were properly preserved). In employment discrimination cases, the factors that motivate a decision are central to the decisionmaker’s liability in his personal capacity. See Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2000) (stating that a political discrimination claim “has no meaning absent the allegation of impermissible motivation”); see also Gómez I, 218 F.Supp.2d at 77 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 7 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the most important factor in the preservation hierarchy is whether the relevant issue was raised in the trial court and the least important factor is whether the appellant alerted the trial court to the specific argument raised on appeal (B) recognizing that there is an important privacy interest in corporate financial documents the court agrees that the information can be protected therefore the court  required that the information be disclosed pursuant to a confidentiality order only to be used in connection with this litigation (C) recognizing that admission is important to the evaluation of witness credibility (D) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (E) recognizing that the information possessed by the defendant is an important variable in that equation
Output: (E)
not review issues raised only by amicus curiae. Russian River Watershed Prot. Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998). Even had they made the argument, the district court nonetheless was correct to conclude that the rights plaintiffs assert are no different than the rights contained within the general scope of the Copyright Act. The complaint asserts statutory and common law publicity-right claims, and a claim for a violation of the UCL. Plaintiffs, however, do not identify any use of their likenesses independent of the display, reproduction, and distribution of the copyrighted material in which they are depicted. We have held that under those circumstances, none of plaintiffs’ claims is qualitatively different from a copyright claim. See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144 (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 1143-44 (“squarely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim (B) holding that the mere presence of an additional element commercial use in section 3344 is not enough to qualitatively distinguish a right of publicity claim from a claim in copyright (C) holding that the right of publicity is descendible (D) holding that when a plaintiffs name and identity are used without intent to obtain a commercial advantage but where they are used for some other purpose the use is incidental and does not violate the right of publicity (E) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim
Output: (B)
(citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254). The court then compares the elements of the crime of conviction with those of the generic offense. Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281. During oral argument, the question was raised as to whether W. Va. Code § 61 — 3— 11(a) is divisible because it states alternative locational elements. See W. Va. Code § 61 — 3— 11(a) (criminalizing entry into a "dwelling house, or an outhouse” (emphasis added)). Neither party briefed this issue, and the district court did not address it below. Moreover, there are no Shepard documents in the record pertinent to Defendant’s West Virginia burglary convictions. We therefore need not and do not reach the question of divisibility to resolve this appeal. See United States v. McLeod, 808 F.3d 972, 977 (4th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we express any view as to whether W. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime (B) holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary (C) holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary (D) holding modified categorical approach unavailable where the statute of conviction was missing an element of the generic definition (E) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary
Output: (C)
because the court had not entered the deadly weapon finding in the judgment, under the specific facts the probationary sentence was not void. However, Hooks involved a bench trial, and therefore the judge was the trier of fact. Moreover, Hooks relied on Ex parte Lucke, 742 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet), in reaching its conclusion that article 42.12, section 3g(a)(2) did not bar probation for the appellant because the trial court had not entered an affirmative finding in the judgment. Lucke also involved a case of a plea before the court, and held that “the trial court, as trier of fact, simply declined to enter the additional affirmative finding in the judgment.” Lucke at 820; see also Johnson v. State, 233 S.W.3d 420, (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Hooks court cited Poe with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court failed to make a finding of fact but rather made a finding of the ultimate question of law  that the defendants plea was not knowingly and intelligently made (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial (D) recognizing that the supreme court has indicated that affirmative misconduct is a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the united states (E) holding that the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude dna evidence if errors in the laboratory procedures render it so unreliable that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact but that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence
Output: (B)
It is specially agreed that the liability of each of the Guarantors for the payment of each note ... shall be joint and several; and that suit may be brought against the Guarantors jointly and severally and against any one or more of them, less than all, without impairing the rights of the Lender .... against the other of the Guarantors, (emphasis added). In other words, Burch-field expressly agreed that Prosperity’s bringing suit against “less than all” of the guarantors (i.e., only Woodall) would not impair Prosperity’s right against the other guarantors (i.e., Burchfield). Allowing Burchfield to avoid liability by invoking res judicata would thus contradict the terms of the agreement. See Gilbert v. Fireside Enter., Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (B) recognizing this as the general rule (C) recognizing general rule (D) recognizing general rule that a party may waive the defense of res judicata (E) recognizing that defendant may waive miranda rights
Output: (D)
by approaching the Buick and detaining him. See Doc. # 18 at 1. Since the Defendant did not make a similar argument in his post-hearing memorandum, it has been waived. However, if the Defendant had made such an argument, the Court would have rejected same. The Fourth Amendment limits the ability of government agents to conduct searches and seizures. Since the officers did not search or seize the Defendant by approaching the Buick in which he was passed out, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment by doing so. Based upon reasoning set forth below, the Court concludes that the detention of the Defendant was a lawful arrest supported by probable cause. Therefore, that detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The Defendant also contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment (B) holding that a warrantless arrest on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment even if state law required the police to have prior authorization (C) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed (D) holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
Output: (C)
I would affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment. See Lynch v. Am. Family Mut Ins. Co., 626 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn.2001) (stating that an insurer’s liability is generally determined by the insurance contract, as long as the relevant insurance policy neither (1) omits coverage that is required by law nor (2) violates applicable statutes). I agree with the majority’s decision that the plain language of the policy prevents Pepper from recovering UIM benefits. But I cannot conclude that the policy exclusion violates Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2010), the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Minnesota caselaw allows for insurance companies to impose limitations on receipt of UIM benefits. See, e.g., Myers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn.1983) (<HOLDING>). As explained by the majority, we have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurance policys exclusion of vehicles owned by furnished for or made available for the regular use of the named insured from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle is valid (B) holding that the insurance applicable to the tortfeasors vehicle must be compared to the underinsured vehicle policy limits to determine whether a vehicle is underinsured (C) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (D) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (E) holding that under the plain and obvious meaning of the uim statute a prerequisite to the term underinsured motor vehicle is the existence of  bodily injury liability insurance coverage which is less than the liability for damages imposed by law  and where no such coverage existed tortfeasor was not underinsured under the statute but rather uninsured concluding that terms underinsured and uninsured are mutually exclusive as applied to the same motor vehicle and the combination of these two coverages by the insured was contrary to legislative intent
Output: (A)
“rel ear-cut method for determining whether a state law which merely has some unintended effects on ERISA-gov-erned plans will be preempted. However, in implicit recognition of the fact that the Supreme Court’s guidance often can only obscure the issue, the Eighth Circuit has held that a variety of tests can provide assistance when determining the effect of a state law on an ERISA plan. Johnston v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 241 F.3d 623, 630 (8th Cir.2001). One such test was set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Prudential Insurance Co. 1072, 1073 (8th Cir.2000) (“ERISA remedies preempt ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); accord McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa (B) holding that declaratory judgments fall outside the scope of the court of claims jurisdiction (C) holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (D) holding that general medical malpractice claims do fall with waiver provision of ttca (E) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan
Output: (A)
individually or collectively, a prima facie derivative citizenship claim. See United States v. Guerrier, 428 F.3d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir.2005) (affirming district court’s exclusion of certain evidence that supported some, but not all, of the requirements for derivative citizenship). Williams argues, however, that his purpose in introducing these documents was not to raise an affirmative claim of derivative citizenship, but rather to undermine the government’s case on the theory that Schoenroek failed to definitively rule out the possibility that Williams may have derived citizenship, notwithstanding that Schoenroek was (or should have been) on notice that Williams had challenged his alienage in his prior deportation proceeding. Cf. United States v. Thompson, 37 F.3d 450, 454 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming arguendo that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence (B) holding that the district court erred by not permitting defense counsel to argue to the jury that the governments case was weakened by a lack of evidence allegedly caused by its failure to investigate (C) holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state (D) holding that the district court erred when it relied on the governments representation that the property sought by the defendant had been destroyed because the government did not submit any evidence of the propertys destruction (E) holding that under the extraordinary circumstances found by the district court it was not an abuse of discretion to order that defendants be permitted to take depositions of the witnesses in the presence of their attorney and the governments counsel
Output: (B)
of others that in some respects conflict with some of Thomas’s public statements that were contained in his authorized biography. Moreover, the article does not challenge the principal claims made by Thomas, but rather permits the reader to draw his own conclusions regarding some of the relatively minor details. See Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152 n. 9 (9th Cir.1995) (citing with approval Chapin v. Knightr-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1094 (4th Cir.1993), which held that a publication offering alternative versions of facts does not give rise to a defamatory implication); see also Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1094 (“[I]nquiry itself, however embarrassing or unpleasant to its subject, is not accusation.”); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ’n., 953 F.2d 724, 731 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Further, as the district court correctly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no defamatory implication existed because the authors readers implicitly were invited to draw their own conclusions from the mixed information provided (B) holding no defamation existed (C) holding that identical instruction was sufficient to ensure that the jury would not draw improper conclusions from the preservation of their anonymity (D) holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets (E) holding no liability existed under the circumstances
Output: (A)
date of the Act, N.J. Property Liab. Guar. Ass’n v. Brown, 174 N.J.Super. 629, 633-634, 417 A.2d 117 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 462, 427 A.2d 561 (1980), is instructive. There, a bail bondsman in his office accidentally shot a friend who had paid him a social visit with a gun possessed for business reasons. We held that the exception to the insured’s homeowners’ policy exclusion for non-business pursuits provided coverage because “[sjhowing a gun to a friend in such circumstances would not be an activity ordinarily incident” to the duties of a bail bondsman. Id. at 634, 417 A.2d 117. Cases decided after the effective date of the Act have also given effect to exception to exclusion clauses. See Burdge v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 194 N.J.Super. 320, 476 A.2d 880 (App.Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). Because an exception to an exclusion clause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the underlying action arose out of insureds exercise of his personal and political rights and not out of business pursuits and thus the policy exclusion for claims arising out of business pursuits did not apply because the exception to the exclusion for nonbusiness pursuits was applicable (B) holding that nature of alleged bias must be personal and not arising out of litigation (C) holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity (D) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (E) holding that employees claims against firm were not subject to mandatory arbitration because they did not arise out of business activities of either employee or firm but instead arose out of divorce agreement
Output: (A)
see infra ¶ 35, we should not force such changes on the legislature by judicial mandate. 15 . The dissent posits that equitable adoption may represent the wishes of some decedents and may not prolong all estate proceedings. See infra ¶¶ 47-48. But this hedging is significant; it ultimately supports the conclusion that equitable adoption adds uncertainty and complexity to the intestacy scheme. Justice DURHAM, dissenting: 4[ 34 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is "impossible" to follow both the doctrine of equitable adoption and Utah's version of the Uniform Probate Code (Probate Code o n the basis of policy, they are responsible for determining the constitutionality of challenged statutes. See, e.g., Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶¶ 64, 83, 54 P.3d 1069 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, courts can call the attention 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws (B) holding that an amendment to the colorado constitution that repealed all local and statewide laws prohibiting sexualorientation discrimination violated the federal equal protection clause (C) holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution (D) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (E) holding that the multicounty signature requirement for initiatives violated the uniform operation of laws clause and the federal equal protection clause
Output: (E)
of whether evidence of a conviction for a third degree sexual offense is admissible for impeachment under Rule 5-609, the intermediate appellate court opined that the conviction was not relevant to credibility and thus inadmissible for impeachment purposes: As shown by an examination of section 3-307 of the Criminal Law Article, there are numerous ways that the State can convict a person under that section. The offense can be committed by various assaultive acts (see Section 3-307(a)(1)), but the offense can also be committed by nonassaultive means. See § § 3-307(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5). “[A]cts of violence generally have little, if any, bearing on honesty and veracity.” Prout, 311 Md. at 364, 535 A.2d 445. See also Fulp [v. State], 130 Md.App. [157] at 167[, 745 A.2d 438 (2000)] (<HOLDING>) Likewise, the non-assaultive ways that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty (B) holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime (C) holding that the crime of assault with intent to murder was neither an infamous crime nor a crime relevant to the witnesss credibility 130 mdapp at 167 745 a2d 438 (D) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (E) holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage
Output: (C)
Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932)); Missouri (Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo.1950)); New York (Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 NE.2d 531 (1981)); North Carolina (Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 S.E.2d 131 (1939)); Ohio (Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925)); Texas (Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.App.1987)); Utah (Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995)). 3 See Colorado Baseball Spectator Safety Act of 1993, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-120 (1993); Baseball Facility Liability Act, III. Comp. Stat. 38/1-49 (1992). 4 See, e.g., City of Milton v. Broxson, 514 So.2d 1116, 1118 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Bellezzo v. Arizona, 174 Ariz. 548, 851 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts (B) holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding that liability must be determined by the common law standards  governing the duty of landowners to invitees (E) holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court
Output: (D)
power to prohibit discrimination that is itself unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and to regulate otherwise constitutional conduct through legislation that exhibits “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and means adopted to that end.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 121 S.Ct. 955 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997)). A number of courts have reconsidered, in light of these recent Supreme Court decisions, whether Congress validly abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment im munity in enacting Title VII. These courts have concluded that Title VII, including the retaliation provision, does indeed abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Kansas, 220 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1220-1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii (B) holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding title vii abrogates the eleventh amendment because it is based in fourteenth amendment which limits state authority in other ways as well
Output: (D)
“[A]n action can ‘affect’ the exercise of powers by an agency without being aimed directly at [the agency].” Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.1998). In Hindes, the Third Circuit held that the protections afforded to receivers in § 1821(j) extend to third parties. In rejecting the argument that § 1821(j) does not apply to a non-FDIC third party, the court stated, “the statute, by its terms, can preclude relief even against a third party, including the FDIC in its corporate capacity, where the result is such that the relief ‘restraints] or affect[s] the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)). Cf. Telematics Int’l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 707 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the reasoning in Hindes and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest (B) holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien (C) holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset (D) holding that  1821j applied to bar a claim seeking to attach a lien to a certificate of deposit in which the fdic had a security interest because the attachment would ultimately have an effect upon the fdics exercise of its powers as receiver (E) holding that while section 1825b2 does not extinguish an earlier lien or excuse the payment of a tax by the fdic it does deny the ability to use a lien on fdic property as a vehicle for collection of delinquent tax
Output: (D)
and armed robbery would authorize a jury to find that Simpkins was willing to commit murder for pecuniary gain. OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (4). Although the evidence probably will authorize a jury to find these two aggravating factors in the vast majority of armed robbery-murder cases, and although these aggravating factors arise from the same conduct in this case, the aggravating circumstances reveal different characteristics of the defendant and his crimes, and each aggravating circumstance genuinely serves to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. 9 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 877 (103 SC 2733, 77 LE2d 235) (1983); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 244 (108 SC 546, 98 LE2d 568) (1988). 10 See generally Henderson v. Dugger, 925 F2d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 221, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in florida (B) holding that in florida there is no impermissible doublecounting of aggravating circumstances when the same facts   reveal different characteristics of the crime (C) holding that the determination whether relevant facts are extraordinary aggravating circumstances  is a conclusion of law that remains within the discretion of the trial court if it is based on blakelycompliant or blakelyexempt facts (D) holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida (E) holding that the public disclosure must reveal both the true state of facts and that the defendant represented the facts to be something other than what they were
Output: (B)