niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
before the indictment was returned, but which did not end until 1984 — a time within the five-year period of limitations. Under the Probation Act, the only limits on restitution are that repayment must relate (i) to the particular offense of which the defendant was convicted and (ii) to the actual losses suffered by the victim. See United States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.) (“As a condition of probation a district court undoubtedly has the authority to require that a defendant make restitution to injured parties for the actual loss or damage caused by the offense for which he stands convicted....”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819, 99 S.Ct. 81, 58 L.Ed.2d 110 (1978); see also United States v. Stuver, 845 F.2d 73, 76 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error (B) holding that the sixth amendment does not require factfinding by a jury for purposes of calculating the amount of restitution (C) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial (D) holding that precise amount of loss for restitution purposes must be legally determined in the underlying criminal proceeding (E) holding that a district court cannot order restitution in amounts that will result in the payment to the victim of an amount greater than the victims loss
Output: (D)
presence in a room in which marijuana had been smoked, and his awareness that marijuana had been smoked, cannot permit a rational trier of fact to infer that Taylor exercised a restraining or directing influence over marijuana that was concealed in personal carrying bags of another occupant of the room. Id. at 463, 697 A.2d 462. We do not consider Taylor controlling in the instant case. As recognized by the Taylor Court, “convictions for possession cannot stand when the evidence does not establish, nor provides any reasonable inferences to establish, that the accused exercised dominion or control over the contraband.” Id. at 461, 697 A.2d 462. In Taylor, the evidence was insufficient because the drugs were located in a closed bag and “his mere proximity to the contraband fo 711 (1969) (<HOLDING>). In this case, unlike Taylor and the cases it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient for conviction of possession of marijuana amphetamines and barbiturates when those drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other people on the premises (B) holding when drugs are found on premises exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession (C) holding evidence insufficient to establish defendant had physical or constructive possession of heroin when no drugs were found on his person and the only drugs discovered on the premises which he shared with the codefendant were secreted out of plain view (D) holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant (E) holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises
Output: (E)
to the effective date of the Act, it could have done so.... Since it did not, and since there is nothing ambiguous in the statute’s language concerning its reach or applicability, there is no need to conduct the Landgraf retroactivity analysis. Id. at 61-62 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. One “Piper” Aztec “F” De Luxe Model 250 23 Aircraft Bearing Serial No. 27-7651057, 321 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir.2003) (“[The] CAFRA applies to ‘any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after [August 23, 2000].’ The plain language is clear: the commencement of a forfeiture proceeding can mean only the point when the government first files a complaint for forfeiture in rem under 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2).... No other interpretation is sensible.”); $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1185-86 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Real 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (B) holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof was not applicable to a civil forfeiture action in which the complaint had been filed on november 9 1999 congress manifested a clear intent to apply the cafras heightened burden of proof only to judicial forfeiture proceedings in which the governments complaint was filed on or after august 23 2000because congressional intent is clear we need not resort to judicial default rules to determine the retroactive scope of the legislation (C) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that the cafras heightened burden of proof standard was applicable to a civil forfeiture action that was pending at the time of cfras enactment (E) holding that section 523a2c shifts the burden of production and not the burden of proof on the issue of intent only
Output: (B)
and “if the plan administrator ] believe[s] that more information is needed to make a reasoned decision, they must ask for it.” See Booton v. Lockheed Medical Benefit Plan, 110 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir.1997); see also Saffon v. Wells Fargo Company Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir.2008) (reversing judgment in favor of insurer; noting insurer had failed to explain to claimant “in a manner calculated to be understood by the claimant” what “[claimant] must do to perfect her claim”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, however, Broadspire, on three separate occasions, informed plaintiff as to the information it needed. These communications were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice as t 0, at *8-9, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32515, at *25-28 (D.Ariz.2005) (<HOLDING>). With respect to her WC claim, plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari (B) holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims (C) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (D) holding plan fiduciary need not consider ssa findings further holding no inference of conflict to be drawn from failure to consider such findings (E) holding that where plaintiffs alleged that the plan suffered significant losses and requested that fiduciaries make good to the plan the losses to the plan they need not seek to recover for all plan participants allegedly injured by the fiduciary breach
Output: (D)
the Department must make in order to obtain the order it seeks in this action, as well as certain other issues that are likely to arise on remand. We conclude the Department's petition adequately sets forth the necessary elements it must prove in order to involuntarily treat Saenz: (1) that he has refused to consume food and fluids sufficient to maintain his health for an extended period; (2) that, as a result, he has been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition, dehydration or other deleterious condition; and (3) that, pursuant to reliable medical opinion, Saenz is in imminent danger of suffering serious harm or death unless he is given medical treatment, including, if necessary, forced hydration and/or forced feeding. Cf. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 29. We next consider the Department's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (B) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate (C) holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative (D) holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (E) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate  with antipsychotic drugs against his will under certain circumstances while not limiting treatment to those circumstances
Output: (D)
follow” from a conviction in that deportation “can be instituted only upon the order of the Attorney General” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Pursuant to HRS § 846E-3(a), the attorney general and county police departments, both agencies not controlled by the judiciary, are required to administer the registration of convicted persons and the release of information to other law enforcement and government agencies and to the public. In this regard, sex offender registration requirements are “collateral” consequences of Defendant’s conviction, and, thus, the court had no duty to warn Defendant, prior to pleading guilty, about the collateral consequences of conviction flowing from sex offender registration requirements. Cf. Nguyen, 81 Hawai'i at 287, 916 P.2d at 697 (<HOLDING>); State v. Bollig, 232 Wis.2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deportation is collateral consequence and deportations admonishments are not constitutionally required (B) holding that the sanction of deportation is a collateral not direct consequence of a guilty plea (C) holding that an enhancement in a future sentence based on the present conviction is a collateral consequence and need not be advised of by the district court in its plea colloquy (D) holding that a sentencing court may warn a defendant of the possibility of a sentence enhancement (E) holding that the court had no duty to warn defendants about the possibility of deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction
Output: (E)
became final. Consequently, 558 days (198 added to 360) passed between the time Mr. Bisner’s state convictions became final and the time he filed his federal habeas petition. Because this passage of time well exceeds the applicable one-year statute of limitations, the district court was correct in concluding that Mr. Bisner’s petition was untimely. In addition to arguing that his petition was timely filed, Mr. Bisner also argues for equitable tolling based on the fact that he lacked a law library, legal training, and knowledge of the limitations period, and had only limited assistance from prison contract attorneys. We have limited equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period to “rare and exceptional” circumstances. Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (2000). In ir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding delays caused by prison inmate law clerk and law library closures do not justify equitable tolling (B) holding that allegations of a total denial of all access to the prison law library for 25 days following a prison riot stated a constitutional violation (C) holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling (D) holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling (E) holding that attorney miscalculation of aedpa time period did not justify equitable tolling
Output: (A)
ordinance] authorizes the Authority to shed its immunity ‘by contract,’ and these words would be utter surplusage, if the enactment of the ordinance itself served to perfect the waiver.”). Therefore, we conclude that the charter does not contain an express waiver of tribal-sovereign immunity. In addition to the tribal charter, an agreement can validly waive tribal-sovereign immunity. Here, the parties agree that the board of directors did not pass a resolution waiving sove 282, 1288 (11th Cir.2001) (rejecting argument that tribal representative had actual or apparent authority to waive immunity because “[s]uch a finding would be directly contrary to the explicit provisions of the Tribal Constitution”); World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt, LLC, 117 F.Supp.2d 271, 276 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>); Danka Funding Co. v. Sky City Casino, 329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity (B) holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council (C) holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity (D) holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity (E) holding that a senior vice presidents signature to an agreement with an express waiver of sovereign immunity provision did not waive sovereign immunity because that right was reserved exclusively to the tribal council
Output: (E)
from making any payments to Medicare providers unless and until they have furnished such information as the Secretary may require, Columbia’s receipt of Medicare payments for each year after 1994 was the result of its false certifications of compliance because otherwise it would not have been permitted to participate or receive payments for each subsequent year and the government would not have paid to Columbia the money that is the basis of this suit. Equifax, 557 F.2d at 461 (identifying as a false claim a material misrepresentation knowingly made in order to qualify for a government contract, privilege, or service). Courts have found FCA violations based on comparable misrepresentations. United States v. Oakwood Downriver Medical Center, 687 F.Supp. 302, 303-04 (E.D.Mich.1988) (<HOLDING>); Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1266 (false certification 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit (B) holding relator stated fca claim where defendants submitted annual cost reports that included a certification of compliance (C) holding that an fca claim arose out of defendants failure to disclose in its form 2552 cost reports the existence of prohibited transactions with related health care organizations (D) holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided (E) holding that the disclosure of billing invoices and cost reports were neither allegations of fraud nor fraudulent transactions
Output: (C)
sources of its hearsay, this member of the Court sees no reason to deprive them of these opportunities for the sheer sake of expediency. Finally, the Court is far from convinced that it should defer questions of admissibility until all of the government’s evidence has been considered on the theory that “the reliability of a particular piece of evidence will generally depend on how it fits within the evidence as a whole.” Gov’t’s Mem. at 3. This suggested approach is a direct inversion of what takes place in any other kind of adjudicative process, where factual findings are made on the basis of admissible evidence, not the other way around. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, attempting to determine the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the movant (C) holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty (D) holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard (E) holding that with respect to the preponderance of the evidence standard before any such burden can be satisfied in the first instance the factfinder must evaluate the raw evidence finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of certainty
Output: (E)
separate from damages, and he did not object to proceeding to trial in his yellow prison jumpsuit and leg shackles after he mistakenly sent his civilian clothes to the county jail instead of to the federal courthouse. Thus Dodd cannot argue those issues now. See Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 699-700 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining that pro se litigants are subject to same waiver rules as counseled parties). As to the questions properly before us, we turn first to Dodd’s argument that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Croymans and Kelsheimer. Dodd objected generally to Croymans’s testimony but failed to object at all to Kelsheimer’s, so we confine our review to Croymans’s testimony. See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The decision to admit testimony must stand 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial (B) holding that a claimed violation of the right to a public trial must be preserved for review by a timely objection at trial (C) holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial (D) holding that lack of objection at trial precludes appellate review of allegedly misused evidence (E) holding party must make timely and specific objection at trial to preserve issue for appellate review
Output: (D)
the plaintiff returned to work with a note from his doctor stating that he was cleared for full duty. The meeting had no other purpose other than to discuss.the plaintiffs job status. The statements were made in the presence of the decisionmaker who affirmatively stated his agreement with them. And the statements “directly reflected] the alleged animus and b[ore] squarely on the contested employment decision.” Febres, 214 F.3d at 60. As said in another context equally applicable here, “[g]iven these attributes, the statement cannot be dismissed as mere background noise or as a stray remark.” Id. at 61 (citing Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 583 (1st Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>)). Further, in my opinion, the statements are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination (B) holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii (C) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (D) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (E) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii
Output: (B)
the alleged acts of discrimination occurred in New York.” Id. 23 . See also Funk, 43 F.Supp.2d at 216, 219-20; Casper, 1998 WL 150993, at *10; Kudatzky v. Galbreath Co., No. 96 Civ. 2693, 1997 WL 598586, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1997); Shapiro v. AEO/Ricoh, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7274, at *5, 1997 WL 452026 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1997); Olszewski v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 96 Civ. 3393, 1997 WL 375690, at *7-*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1997); Bonner, 916 F.Supp. at 276-78; Randall v. Tod-Nik Audiology, Inc., 704 N.Y.S.2d 228, 2000 WL 261041, at *1 (1st Dep’t Mar. 7, 2000); Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469, 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (2d Dep’t 1998); Carter v. Andriani, 84 A.D.2d 513, 443 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (1st Dep’t 1981); cf. Nunez v. A-T Fin. Info., Inc., 957 F.Supp. 438, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Chapman argues that, because he has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim for sons suicide was not actionable (B) holding statement that plaintiff was antisemitic not actionable (C) holding that conduct that was boorish vulgar and reprehensible was not actionable since it was unaccompanied by physical threats or abuse (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the plaintiffs sexbased hostile work environment claim because even though much of the complainedof conduct was boorish and offensive most of it was not personally experienced by the plaintiff
Output: (C)
Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex.1978). The Court previously rejected as a matter of law Defendants’ effort to use their own deposition testimony to avoid responsibility for their promise. Amended Report & Recommendation, # 52 at 5-6, adopted by District Court, # 55. After Prospect counterclaimed for breach of the Release and Covenant Not to Sue, Defendants asserted that Prospect sneaked the Release in at the midnight hour so they would not notice it was included; they also stated that they deliberately chose not to read it before signing the Agreement. The Court ruled that this evidence of willful ignorance did not raise a fact issue so as to defeat Prospect’s motion for summary judgment. Id. See also In re Intern. Profit Associates, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 921, 923-24 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus Defendants here are presumed to know the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision (B) holding that a plaintiffs failure to invoke  1983 is fatal to the claim because the constitutional provision that was allegedly violated does not itself create a means for recovery for a violation of that provision (C) holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision (D) holding that the court was bound to consider a contract provision that was plainly relevant to the central issue of contract interpretation raised on appeal despite the parties failure to cite or discuss the provision (E) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them
Output: (A)
114 (2d Cir.2000) (new claim does not relate back to dismissed petition), because filing the new claim in a second petition will encounter the severe limitations that AEDPA imposes on the filing of second or successive petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). If his petition contains unexhausted claims that he wishes to pursue, he must return to state court and exhaust these claims. Finally, he must make sure that he has complied with the one-year statute of limitations that AEDPA establishes for filing habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Id. at 378-79. (footnote omitted). The court concluded that although the petitioner had not requested a stay, he should nevertheless have received one. In addition, to address the concern that a petitioner might take an undue amount of time to pu 00), (<HOLDING>); James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing collateral attack on void order (B) holding that dismissal is not appropriate when that step could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack (C) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (D) holding that remand was the appropriate remedy when an erroneous step four determination has precluded any analysis under step five (E) holding that where a defendants claim did not amount to a complete denial of counsel it could not form the basis of a collateral attack
Output: (B)
for employers looking to trick prospective § 216(b) opt-in plaintiffs into signing damaging statements. Perhaps HL-A means to fall back on the distinction, recognized in Morgan and Cameron-Grant (and in this Court’s December 9 Order), between Rule 23 and § 216(b) proceedings. But so what? To say that Rule 23 class actions and § 216(b) actions are different is not to conclude that employers may resort with impunity to dishonest, misleading and abusive tactics to obtain declarations from their employees in § 216(b) actions, with courts being powerless to remedy the situation. And many cases have expressly recognized district courts’ discretion to regulate such communications in the § 216(b) context. See, e.g., Kerce v. West Telemarketing Corp., 575 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1366 (S.D.Ga.2008) (<HOLDING>); Maddox v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 499 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (B) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification (C) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative (D) holding that even if the offer of judgment was undisputed the case could not be dismissed in light of plaintiffs pending motion for conditional certification including authorization to issue optin notice to putative class members  and the fact that one additional plaintiff had already joined the action (E) recognizing that in appropriate circumstances the court may limit the parties communications with putative class members prior to decision on conditional certification question in a  216b action
Output: (E)
863 (Alaska App.2006). [34] 34. Crawford, 100 P.3d at 441 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11, 105 S.Ct. at 1294) (alteration in. Crawford). 35 . Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311, 105 S.Ct. at 1294 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). 36 . 903 P.2d 1090 (Alaska App.1995). [37] 37. Id. at 1098 (citations omitted). 38 . Id. at 1099 n. 4 (citing United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971, 975 (2nd Cir.1968)). 39 . Id. at 1098. 40 . See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275, 279-80 & n. 13 (Alaska 1978); Longley v. State, 776 P.2d 339, 343-44 (Alaska App.1989). 41 . See Munson v. State, 123 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 2005) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). 42 . See Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2259-60 (<HOLDING>); State v. Bailey, 714 S.W.2d 590, 593 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent (B) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (C) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent
Output: (E)
(1) the district court’s finding that he had actual or constructive knowledge as early as 1977 that the 1974 constitutional changes had been applied to his sentence or (2) the district court’s finding that he knew or should have known that laws, policies, and practices concerning sentence commutation that had been enacted or adopted between 1992 and 1994 had been applied retroactively to his sentence in 1994 when he sought to have it commuted. Instead, he reiterates his contention that the doctrine of contra non valentum applies to save his claims from a time-bar dismissal. Robinson’s reliance on Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, is misplaced. We have long adhered to the rule that Wilkinson later stated for all federal courts. See Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Serio v. Members, Louisiana State 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1983 was the proper vehicle for a prisoners challenge on due process and ex post facto grounds to parole procedures that were the challenge successful would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release (B) holding that habeas was the sole vehicle for an inmates constitutional challenge to procedures employed by state officials to deprive him of goodtime credits (C) holding that procedures adopted by the state to guide its parole release determinations are not themselves liberty interests entitled to constitutional due process protection (D) holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole (E) holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it
Output: (A)
for the purposes of our analysis. We begin with the pre-Code bankruptcy practice. The Debtor notes that courts interpreting the present Bankruptcy Code have referred to the practices under the Act of 1898 that preceded it, and in construing provisions of the Code that were codifications of earlier judge-made law, as § 523(a)(7) evidently was, courts interpret the codification to match the prior judge-made law absent evidence of specific intent that it be interpreted otherwise, see Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44, 47, 107 S.Ct. at 358, 359. Valid though this may be as an interpretive tool, it does not help us here where prior to the present Code courts treated bail bond surety obligations both as dischargeable and as nondischargeable, compare United States v. Hawkins, 20 F.2d 539 (S.D.Cal.1927) (<HOLDING>) with In re Caponigri, 193 F. 291, 292 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that debts owed to the united states for liabilities of the debtor as a surety on bail bonds are of a class as to which a discharge in bankruptcy is a release (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states (C) recognizing a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive a class of persons of their fundamental rights under the laws of the united states (D) holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer (E) holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states
Output: (A)
(Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1998); see also MCorp Management Solutions, Inc. v. Thurman (In re Thurman), 901 F.2d 839, 841 (10th Cir.1990); see also Northeast Neb. Econ. Dev. Dist. v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 305 B.R. 472, 475-76 (8th Cir. BAP 2004). 12 . Cassis, 220 B.R. at 984. 13 . Retz, 606 F.3d at 1204 n. 10. 14 . Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 307 (11th Cir.1994); 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 727.02[3][c] (16th ed. 2014). 15 . The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text. Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims (B) holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor (C) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent (D) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (E) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse
Output: (B)
Supreme Court on issues of federal law are bound to be followed.”). Jurisdictions that apply the same analysis as the Jenkins and Taylor courts regard sentenced prisoners awaiting transfer to a permanent institution as having the same status as pretrial detainees to whom the IAD does not apply. The rationale for this view is that, because it is designed to guard against interruption of prison rehabilitative programs, the IAD should not apply to prisoners in temporary facilities where rehabilitation programs are not available. See, e.g., Crooker v. United States, 814 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1987) (declining to apply the IAD to a prisoner who had been sentenced but not transferred to the correctional facility to commence service); United States v. Paige, 332 F.Supp.2d 467, 472 (D.R.I.2004) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fay, 763 So.2d 473, 475-76 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 180day statutory limit in the iad is tolled starting from the time that a defendant is not represented by counsel until new counsel is either appointed or retained when the defendant has not waived his right to counsel because during this period a defendant is unable to stand trial in accordance with the iad citation omitted (B) holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that iad is not applicable until a state lodges a detainer in the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated (E) holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution
Output: (B)
stressed, as to a claim involving a private right. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54-55, 109 S.Ct. at 2797. In the present case, as in Granfinanciera, the action to recover a preference seeks only legal relief, in the form of money damages. Further, Growers Packing has not filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate. In addition, the claim does not appear to involve a public right, but rather stems from an underlying breach of contract dispute involving a private right. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial on this claim, even though a proceeding to recover a preference is deemed “core” under the Bankruptcy Code. See also Friedman v. Gold Advice, Inc. (In re Fort Lauderdale Hotel Partners, Ltd.), 103 B.R. 335 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). Cf. In re Sunco, Inc., 113 B.R. 764 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (B) holding that preferential transfer claim was not entitled to jury trial but without any discussion of nature of relief sought or whether a claim against the bankruptcy estate had been filed (C) holding preference claim legal in nature where relief sought was for a definite sum of money (D) holding that where plaintiff sought only equitable relief up through the end of trial and only added claim for legal relief posttrial defendant was entitled to demand jury once legal claim was asserted (E) holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought
Output: (C)
no coercive or extortionate objective.” Framingham Auto Sales, Inc. v. Workers’ Credit Union, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 416, 418 (1996). While the jury did find that Killian breached some aspects of the parties’ contract causing the defendant $10,648 in damages, a breach of contract is insufficient as a matter of law to establish liability under c. 93A. At best, “[t]his [is] an ordinary contract dispute!.]” Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass.App.Ct. 492, 505 (1997). There is no evidence of any “conduct that was unethical, immoral, oppressive, or unscrupulous.” Id. (finding mere breach of lease insufficient to establish 93A violation); accord, Madan, 26 Mass.App.Ct. At 762-63 (rejecting 93A claim resting upon breach of lease); Gopen v. Am. Supply Co., Inc., 10 Mass.App.Ct. 342, 348 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Dowse, Inc. v. Brockunier, No. 9129, 1992 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a limitation of liability provision in a sales contract was enforceable to bar a breach of warranty claim brought pursuant to glc 93a 11 (B) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (C) holding tenants leasing house by oral agreement were coinsureds both landlord and tenants had liability insurance (D) holding that tenants had standing to bring fourth amendment claim where tenants were threatened with eviction unless they consented to allegedly unreasonable warrantless searches (E) holding tenants vacating premises allegedly in breach of a lease was not enough to trigger c 93a liability
Output: (E)
the owner has no duty to warn an invitee”). But, if the obviousness is not sufficiently great, “the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for his protection.” Id. “This duty may require him to warn the invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or obvious condition.” Id. The facts in Peterson did not require consideration of whether a possessor has a duty to reasonably anticipate that an invitee may be distracted when he encounters the known or obvious condition. Id. at 497-98, 144 N.W.2d at 558. But other Minnesota cases establish that the potential for distraction should factor into the reasonable-care analysis. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co., 235 Minn. 20, 23, 49 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Ober v. The Golden Rule, 146 Minn. 347, 348, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sufficient evidence supported jurys finding of negligence when invitee had tripped on frame in department store because she was distracted by displayed goods (B) holding that jury returning verdict 45 minutes after informed would be sequestered in hotel was not coerced into verdict (C) holding that it would not be unreasonable to find condition in hotel lunchroom unsafe because invitee would be distracted (D) recognizing that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures  would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion of an employee of the hotel (E) holding that no closure occurred where judge locked doors to ensure jury would not be distracted
Output: (C)
conduct). Lacking explicit precedent in this state, we turn to other jurisdictions to seek guidance. In doing so, we find many other jurisdictions, particularly federal courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have addressed the issue of the admissibility during the trial of threats against a witness made by the defendant. The federal court cases generally conclude such threats indicate the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt” and are therefore admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See U.S. v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 352 (4th Cir.1998); U.S. v. Guerrero-Cortez, 110 F.3d 647, 652 (8th Cir.1997) (acknowledging that “[a]n effort to intimidate a witness tends to show consciousness of guilt”); U.S. v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 454-55 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt (B) holding evidence of prior witness intimidation admissible to show criminal intent and guilty conscience (C) holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding criminal acts designed to reduce the likelihood of conviction including threats against witnesses are admissible under rule 404b as showing consciousness of guilt
Output: (A)
all of the requested documents meet that definition however. That is an issue for the trial court to resolve when it reconsiders Gulfcoast’s objections. We next address the issue of the trial court’s failure to perform a balancing test or conduct an in camera review. “When a party asserts the need for protection against disclosure of a trade secret, the court must first determine whether, in fact, the disputed information is a trade secret [which] usually requires the court to conduct an in camera review.” Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. v. 1221 Palm Harbor, L.L.C., 67 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Ameritrust Ins. v. O’Donnell Landscapes, 899 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)); see also Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis’ Gardening & Trimming, 26 So.3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). This court has previously held that internal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (B) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (C) holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test (D) recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court (E) holding that in eases where the state fails to disclose to the defendant prior to trial the substance of any oral statement allegedly made by the defendant then the state has committed a discovery violation and the trial court must conduct a richardson hearing upon learning of the possible violation
Output: (A)
the interests of and pursue relief on behalf of an alleged victim in a criminal matter). We also conclude that J.W. fails to show the existence of a reasonable expectation that she will be subject to the same order compelling the gynecological examination again. Jason Wilson entered a guilty plea, and J.W. simply does not articulate why it would ever be necessary for the state court to order her to submit to another examination. Additionally, although J.W. maintains that the issues presented in her lawsuit will recur in West Virginia’s criminal justice system and continue to affect other victims of sex crimes, these concerns have no bearing on this case because it was not brought as a class action. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Further, although J.W. makes note of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory (B) holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification (C) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (D) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (E) holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint
Output: (C)
that became vacant in 2000. Similarly, the interviewers in 2001 unanimously concluded that Perry was the most qualified candidate of those interviewed. This evidence strongly suggests that Miller’s assertion that Perry would not be a good senior court clerk was pretextual. Miller also gave a patently illegitimate reason for not promoting Perry to the senior court clerk position. At one point, Miller told Thomas tha ler that she believed Miller was unlawfully retaliating against Perry, an employee need not expressly accuse her supervisor or employer of illegal activity. Rather, she may convey an implicit message of disapproval of the illegality of the activity through her conduct by refusing to facilitate or participate in it. See Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The question then is whether Thomas’ actions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern (B) holding that an employees refusal to limit attendees at training seminars to those court employees who had worked on her supervisors reelection campaign was expressive conduct on a matter of public concern (C) holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern (D) recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern (E) holding that a public employees expressive conduct in support of a coworker in her personnel dispute was a matter of public concern because it helped expose potential government misconduct
Output: (B)