niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
contract or lease, not under other, substantially unrelated agreements. This principle applies where distinct agreements are set out in the same document. And, of particular relevance here, it applies where distinct agreements are linked by a cross-default clause, providing for a loss of rights under one agreement if another agreement is breached. Thus, as noted in In re Convenience USA, Inc., No. 01-81478, 2002 WL 230772, at *2 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Feb.12, 2002), assumption under § 365 is subject to a “well-established” cross-default rule: “[C]ross-default provisions do not integrate executory contracts or unexpired leases that otherwise are separate or severable.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n ng-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 54 B.R. 772, 779 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1985) (<HOLDING>), aff'd 67 B.R. 620 (W.D.Pa.1986); In re 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the employers principal production activity was the creation of insurance policies (B) holding that crossdefault provisions in insurance policies were unenforceable because they would impermissibly restrict the debtors ability to assume some of the policies and reject others (C) holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies (D) recognizing comity as a golden rule among nations  that each must give the respect to the laws policies and interests of others that it would have others give to its own in the same or similar circumstances (E) holding that subcontractors primary and excess insurance policies must pay first and before contractors own insurance
Output: (B)
civil action for their recovery. A. Equitable Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)(B) creates a civil action for equitable relief “(i) to redress ... violations [of any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan] or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). Therefore, by its terms, ERISA allows equitable relief in two situations: when a plaintiff seeks to remedy a plan breach, or when a plaintiff seeks to enforce rights granted under a plan or the statute. It provides no relief in the absence of a breach, e 208 (8th Cir.1981) (awarding prejudgment interest after a violation of ERISA). As the Depen-dahl court noted, the breach need not result from bad faith, but there must be a breach. Dependahl, 653 F.2d at 1219 (<HOLDING>). In the present case, plaintiff asks this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest on attorneys fees paid prior to the entry of judgment (B) holding in an erisa case decided after greatwest that monetary relief in the form of prejudgment interest may be equitable in nature (C) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent (D) holding the erisa plan administrators good faith to be only one of a number of factors considered in awarding prejudgment interest (E) holding that only relevant factors must be considered
Output: (D)
of experience, training or specialized knowledge withih the realm of an' expert, but because of the particularized' knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his-or herposition in the business. - The amendment does not purport to change this analysis. See also Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., Ltd., 320 F.3d 1213, 1217-23 (11th Cir.2003), However, Rule 701 “does not distinguish between expert and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment (emphasis original). Thus, within the testimony of a single witness, one opinion may fall under Rule 701 and another under Rule 702- Id.; see also. Lebron v. Secretary of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 772 F.3d 1352, 1372 (11th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 303 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that while a lay witnesses may testify about their own immediate perceptions under rule 701 testimony that blurs into supposition and extrapolation crosses the line into expertise (B) holding that a lay witness could not opine about whether something constituted a compelling state interest because it required legal expertise (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed (E) holding the testimony admissible as that of a skilled witness under indianas r 701
Output: (A)
93, 95 (1971) (attorney general, not county attorney, represents state’s interests with respect to revocation of drivers’ licenses). Because the county attorney did not represent the DOT in the criminal proceedings and had no independent authority, any representation by the county attorney that section 321.209 did not apply to Schumacher is not binding on the DOT. Cf. Bassion, 568 A.2d at 1320 (because department of transportation was not a party to criminal proceeding, any order entered in criminal case concerning the defendant’s operating privileges would not be binding on the department). For the same reasons, a county attorney does not have the authority to waive the applicability of section 321.209 as part of plea bargaining in a criminal case. State v. House, 192 N.W.2d at 95 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501, 503 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with a revoked license (B) holding that a guilty plea to underage drinking could not be withdrawn based on fact defendant was unaware that his drivers license would be suspended because of his conviction as the license suspension was a civil consequence of the conviction (C) holding that county attorney had no authority to agree during plea negotiations that defendants drivers license would not be revoked (D) holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal (E) holding that district attorney had no power during plea bargaining to bind the state department of transportation to forego license suspension
Output: (C)
although incorporated or approved in the decree, is not merged therein, the parties may enforce it by s clear that "jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.” Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (citation omitted). 18 . Courts in this district have long recognized that "a coiporation is an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action suit.” See Gibson v. BoPar Dock Co. Corp., 780 F.Supp. 371, 373 (W.D.Va.1991) (citing Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607, 50 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed. 650 (1930)); Bates v. Cekada, 130 F.R.D. 52, 59 (E.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Swirnow, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action
Output: (E)
the executive branch of state government having statewide jurisdiction; (B) the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, or the State Bar of Texas or another judicial agency having statewide jurisdiction; or (C)an institution of higher education as defined by Section 61.003, Education Code. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.002(14). The legislature’s adoption of a broad definition of the term state agency evidences an intent to prohibit discrimination in state government. A narrow, extremely limited construction of the term “state instrumentality” as not including the DFW Board would permit workplace elopment corporation to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under TCHRA); Vela v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 69 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. withdrawn) (<HOLDING>); Crow v. Rockett Special Util. Dist., 17 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an entity majorityowned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is itself an agency or instrumentality of that foreign state under the fsia (B) holding special utility district to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under tchra (C) holding hospital district to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under tchra (D) holding economic development corporation to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under the tchra and explaining that the employment discrimination prohibitions in chapter 21 are to be generally applied (E) holding school district  in claim made pri or to amendment defining state agency to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under tchra
Output: (E)
to the introduction of the Bible based on relevance. The dissent claims that this objection “was clearly valid.” Dissenting op. at 640 n. 15. We agree with that contention as far as it goes. However, the issue Anthony argues before us now (prosecutorial misconduct) is not “the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection ... below.” Harrell, 894 So.2d at 940. At trial, defense counsel never argued that the prosecutor was engaging in misconduct. Therefore, it was not preserved for appeal. Furthermore, the issue also was not preserved because defense counsel did not obtain a ruling on the motion at trial. As we have held, the failure to obtain a ruling on a motion or objection fails to preserve an issue for appeal. Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 740 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>) (citing Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants pretrial request for a magnetic resonance imaging mri test was procedurally barred because the trial judge reserved ruling on the issue and never issued a ruling (B) recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling (C) holding if an appellant conceded trial courts ruling was not prejudicial he could not assert on appeal the ruling denied him a fair trial (D) holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue    for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial (E) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion
Output: (A)
is a taking, plaintiff has not alleged a property interest subject to a constitutional taking claim nor has plaintiff alleged any cognizable taking. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has explained that the Court of Federal Claims “does not have general equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.” Shemonsky v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding decision of the Court of Federal Claims that the courts jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief); see also Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed.Cir.) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006, 130 S.Ct. 3468, 177 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2010); Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003); Choate v. United States, 60 F.3d 840 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). As stated by the Federal Circuit: The Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms (B) holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases (C) holding that the eleventh amendment does not prevent private individuals from bringing suit against state officials for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief for ongoing violations of federal law (D) holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over tax claims for declaratory or equitable relief (E) holding that the tucker act does not provide a means by which the court of federal claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit does not involve a preaward protest or the application of section 7428 of the internal revenue code
Output: (E)
was compelling. As the BIA observed, the IJ also relied on a contemporaneous police report indicating that Nowak was arrested for possessing: (1) 18.3 grams of marijuana; (2) a digital scale coated with marijuana residue; (3) numerous small plastic bags of the sort commonly used to package drugs; and several legal pads containing names, phone numbers, and dollar amounts, which police suspected to be drug ledgers. See Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) 4; see also id. at 223. Because these facts alone were sufficient to provide “reasonable, substantial, and probative” evidence that Nowak was or had been an illicit trafficker in marijuana, his plea-based challenge necessarily fails. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C); cf., e.g., United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nowak’s various challenges to the police 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of plastic jeweler bags together with drug ledger amount of drugs and lack of paraphernalia to consume drugs was sufficient to support jurys finding of intent to distribute and absence of money and digital scales was not outcome determinative in light of other evidence (B) holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute (C) holding there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute where the defendant dropped a plastic bag containing loose white rocks of cocaine and there was no other indicia of the defendants intent such as the drugs being packaged in smaller baggies (D) holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (E) holding that defendants collective possession of plastic baggies beepers and scales  in conjunction with other evasive action  was sufficient evidence for jury to find conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine beyond reasonable doubt
Output: (E)
physiological, or euphoric effect in a human being, Judge Town impliedly rejected Oughterson’s argument that twelve milligrams of cocaine residue constituted an un-useable amount in concluding, to the contrary, that it was “a substantial amount.” Reviewing Viernes before entering his written order, Judge Town further impliedly determined that Viernes did not alter his conclusion that Oughterson’s possession of twelve milligrams of cocaine residue did not constitute a de minimis infraction. Thus, inasmuch as the parties’ arguments tracked the considerations at issue in Viernes and the record clearly reflects that Judge Town considered Viernes before entering his order denying Oughterson’s motion to dismiss, Viernes could not provide Oughterson with a basis 6, 590-92 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as we noted on the record presented 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible (B) holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants de minimis motion because defendant established that his conduct in connection with benevolently assisting a runaway did not alter the custodial relationship with which prosecution accused him of interfering (D) holding that where there is evidence sufficient to sustain finding of trial court that prejudicial error was contained in record there is no basis for stating that trial court abused discretion in granting new trial (E) holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants de minimis motion because there was no evidence showing that their conduct was in fact an innocent technical infraction not actually causing or threatening any harm or evil sought to be prevented by the statute that they were accused of violating
Output: (E)
S.Ct. 2363. Then, in 1991, in its efforts to restore and strengthen the civil rights laws, Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act. With respect to section 1981, the 1991 Act supplied a broader definition of “make and enforce contracts” to ensure that all persons would not be discriminated against in any aspect of contracting because of their race. It added: For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship. 42 U.S.C. section 1981(b). In short, then, section 1981, as it stands today, prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in almost every aspect of contract. Spriggs v 832 (D.N.M.1999) (<HOLDING>), a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981 (B) holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 (C) holding that an atwill employment relationship is contractual and may serve as a predicate contract for a  1981 claim (D) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law (E) holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination
Output: (B)
Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in reaching h'er final decision. See Pl. Mot. at 20 n.16. She does so only in a footnote, however, and never affirmatively argues that “manifest disregard” is still a proper ground for vacatur in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. Id.; see also ARMA, S.R.O. v. BAE Sys. Overseas, Inc., 961 F.Supp.2d 245, 268 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing Supreme Court’s equivocation in Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 585, 128 S.Ct. 1396, on whether manifest disregard of law can be basis for vacatur of arbitral award). The Court thus considers the issue forfeited. Huntington v. Dep’t of Commerce, 234 F.Supp.3d 94, 101, 2017 WL 211301, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2017); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 146 F.Supp.3d 112, 126-27 (D.D.C. 2015) (<HOLDING>); see Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue (B) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (C) holding that failure to raise issue at district court forecloses party from raising same issue on appeal (D) holding obliquely raising issue in footnote insufficient to surmount waiver threshold (E) holding that an argument raised only in a footnote of a brief is waived
Output: (D)
information: plaintiff had been eating and dining at the BEQ without paying; plaintiff had a $300.00 unpaid bill from a previous stay at the BEQ; a Pennsylvania court had issued a warrant for plaintiffs arrest for theft; and plaintiff resisted arrest when the Horsham Township Police were taking her into custody. These reasons are well within the Captain’s broad authority to “summarily exclude civilians from the area of -his command.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, 367 U.S. at 893, 81 S.Ct. 1743. Even if the information given to Captain Blake regarding Fields’ outstanding bill and arrest warrant were ultimately shown to be false, it was objectively reasonable for him to rely on this information and issue the Ejectment Order. See Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence of a constitutional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (B) holding that an officers report of misconduct by fellow officer is a matter of public concern (C) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (D) holding that the actions of an officer in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow officer may be reasonable nonetheless and thus protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity
Output: (D)
made by the jury for loss of consortium. In Massachusetts, a parent of a minor child has a statutory claim for loss of consortium to recover for the loss of society and companionship caused by the negligent injury of the child. M.G.L.c. 231, §85X. Massachusetts courts have also recognized a child’s right to recover for loss of a parent’s society and companionship through a defendant’s negligence if the child is a minor who depends on the parent both economically and in filial needs for closeness, guidance and nurture. See Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507 (1980). A claim for loss of consortium stands on its own, separate and distinct from the cause of action of the person seeking compensation for injury. See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 421 N.E.2d 67, 71 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Pinheiro v. Medical Malpractice Joint 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium (B) recognizing loss of consortium claims (C) holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse (D) recognizing that loss of consortium is a right of action separate from that of the spouse (E) holding that a loss of consortium is separate and independent from the primary action
Output: (C)
§ 243(4) ("Every court shall have power ... [t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in all actions, or proceedings pending therein[.]”); 4 V.I.Code § 281(2) (“Every judicial officer shall have power ... [t]o compel obedience to his lawful orders!]]”); Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 793, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (“[I]t is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders....”). We have certiorari jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613, which grants the Third Circuit certiorari jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. See Kendall v. Daily News, 716 F.3d 82, No. 11-4162, 2013 WL 856433 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2013) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The ACLU, as amicus, argues that Kendall 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari (B) holding that congresss recent elimination of the third circuits certiorari jurisdiction over decisions of the virgin islands supreme court does not affect at a minimum certiorari petitions filed before the effective date of the jurisdictionstripping act (C) recognizing that where a state prisoner declines to pursue certiorari in the united states supreme court that petitioners conviction is not final  until  after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the supreme court has passed (D) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the supreme court of the commonwealth of the northern mariana islands which were not completed before may 1 2004 (E) holding that pursuant to the language of hr 6116 the third circuit court of appeals retains certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in virgin islands courts before the enactment date of hr 6116
Output: (B)
of Defendant’s total annual income is inherently subject to potential dispute if paid periodically, unless all restitution payments are postponed to the end of a designated “year.” I must disagree, therefore, that the percentage approach is “better” than an order requiring specific monthly payments. Specific monthly payments establish certainty for both victim and defendant, can be conveniently accounted for and verified, and thus, I believe, provide more incentive for compliance, especially when enforced by the court. It is because monthly income may be “too much or too little” that the percentage approach is cumbersome and, I submit, unworkable; any material change in financial circumstances may be dealt with in the future by new court orders. Id at 154 n. 50, 890 P.2d at 1194 n. 50 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts have the statutory authority to alter amend or revoke restitution orders on the basis of unforseen or changed circumstances and to impose consequences upon defendants who fail unjustifiably to discharge their obligations thereunder (B) holding that the circuit court did not have the statutory or inherent authority to order restitution in part because the statutes did not envision such an obligation (C) holding that the court erred in failing to inform the defendant that it could impose restitution but that the error did not affect the defendants substantial rights because the court informed the defendant that it could impose a maximum fine of an amount higher than the restitution amount imposed (D) recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders (E) holding that an alien failed to qualify for the changed circumstances exception by asserting only that his personal circumstances had changed by the birth of a child
Output: (A)
Both professionals advised Grisez that there was no basis for an insanity or diminished capacity defense. Under the applicable law, Grisez’s reliance on the experts’ opinions was justified. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1037-38 (9th Cir.1995); see also Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116-18 (9th Cir.1999). Although Grisez did not provide the experts with background information about Easley and his case, we have held that an attorney’s failure to volunteer information to an expert who does not ask for it does not show ineffective assistance at the guilt phase of a trial. See Wallace, 184 F.3d at 1118; Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037-38. Additionally, the defendant himself insisted on using an alibi defense. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Grisez’s performance in forgoing a mental 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an entrapment defense that was legally available and where there was no other viable defense to present (B) holding that an attorney was ineffective for failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense because he did not understand the elements (C) holding that where defense turned on defendants credibility there could be no strategic basis for allowing jury to hear defendant had prior conviction for same offense for which he was being tried and concluding counsel rendered ineffective assistance (D) holding that a defendant abandons an issue for which no argument is offered on appeal (E) holding that there is no ineffective assistance if an attorney makes a strategic choice to pursue one defense and abandons a conflicting defense
Output: (E)
(1989). A reasonable attorneys fee should be “consistent with market rates and practices” in the community. Id. at 287, 109 S.Ct. 2463. Such a fee, of course, must include “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys.” Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 294-95 (characterizing the inclusion of charges for long distance telephone calls, facsimile transmissions, messenger services, and express mail as taxable costs under § 1920(4) as harmless error “because such costs were reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by, attorneys, and thus should have been included as part of the reasonable attorneys fees awarded”) (citing WVUH, 499 U.S. at 87 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 1138); Neufeld v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 335, 342 (8th Cir.1989). (<HOLDING>). Thus, even though plaintiffs improperly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint (B) holding that district court abused its discretion in refusing to include in its attorneys fees award the depositionrelated travel expenses incurred by prevailing plaintiffs counsel in an adea case (C) holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 (D) recognizing that a court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party as long as the court states its reasons for refusing to permit the award (E) holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees
Output: (B)
and to specify the period of time during which the interception is authorized. 26 . See United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir.1985). 27 . Id. The Second Circuit has held that compliance with Title III amounts to compliance with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir.1993) ("Surveillance that is properly authorized and carried out under Title III complies with the fourth amendment.”). 28 . 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 29 . Id. § 2518(10)(a). 30 . United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). 31 . 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 32 . See id. at 357-59, 88 S.Ct. 507. 33 . Donovan, 429 U.S. at 436 n. 24, 97 S.Ct. 658. 34 . Cf. United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071, 1085 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 35 . In the context of traditional land 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a modern cell phone is a computer and not just another purse or address book so that the potential invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a container in a conventional sense (B) holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone (C) holding that a wiretap orders failure to identify the electronic serial number on the interceptees new cell phone was not a warrantless search requiring suppression under katz (D) holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest (E) holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control
Output: (C)
the merits, however, we first must assure ourselves of our-jurisdiction in light of changed circumstances. Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. 42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he condition of mootness is not a defense that c[an] be waived ... but rather is a condition that deprives the court of subject matter juris* diction.”). Notably, Petitioners’ submission of the discovery in the Monégasque proceeding arguably mooted the question whether the district court erred in granting-discovery as to that proceeding. That development, together with the indefinite stay of the Singaporean litigation, leaves as a live controversy only that portion of the Section 1782 application as applied-to the French proceeding. See Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the pending French 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants discovery requests were untimely because they were not served in time for the responses to be due before the discovery deadline (B) holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state (C) holding that the district court was correct in dismissing the section 1782 application as moot because at that time there were no foreign proceedings within the meaning of the statute in which the discovery could be used (D) holding that a statutory amendment characterized by the state as a clarification could not be applied retroactively because the statute as written at the time of the crime was unclear and retroactive application of the statute as amended would result in an increased period of incarceration (E) holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute
Output: (C)
from the instant case, which involves a timely appeal from a final judgmen 1, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (“A mistake in designating the judgment appealed from is not always fatal, so long as the intent to appeal from a specific ruling can fairly be inferred by probing the notice and the other party was not misled or prejudiced.”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Association, 503 F.3d 217, 225, n. 6 (3rd Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed (B) holding that the same principles of commonsense  that led the court  to conclude that the technical requirements for a notice of appeal were not mandatory where the notice did not mislead or prejudice the appellee demonstrate that parties to an appeal may waive the separatejudgment requirement of rule 58 (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (D) holding that technical inadequacy in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction (E) holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal
Output: (D)
20 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."). [ 21] 21. State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 113 (Alaska 1984) (adopting four-part test from Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (D.C.Cir.1981)). 22 . Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 799 (Alaska 2007). [23] 23. Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138, 143 (Alaska 2005) (citing Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1231 (Ist Cir.1992)); see also Kirk v. Demientieff, 145 P.3d 512, 520 (Alaska 2006) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Ulak, 126 P.3d at 143. 25 . AOIC's May 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee (C) holding attorneys motion to intervene in former clients tort suit untimely because attorney had clear and early notice that former client would not adequately represent his interests (D) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (E) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted
Output: (C)
and allowing them to respond to Kuljis’s claims would not cause undue delay or injury to Kuljis. They averred that they were ready for trial, that they would reimburse Kuljis for all reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the “default” judgment, and that they were willing to refund the security deposit immediately, subject to its being accepted by Kuljis and his attorney. ■ On appeal, the Nguyens argue that they have established that their collective failure to respond adequately to Kuljis’s motions for summary judgment was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of accident or mistake. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442-44; Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685; see also Imkie v. Methodist Hosp., 326 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The majority agrees that Tho and Giang 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pro se litigant who appeared in court under belief that her appearance was all that was needed to respond to summary judgment established that her failure to respond or ask for extension of time were mistakes based on misunderstanding of law and satisfied wheeler test (B) holding that district court did not err in summarily granting defendants motion for summary judgment pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to motion after district court had warned plaintiff that it would deem his failure to respond a consent to granting of motion (C) holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case (D) holding that upon a demon stration of abuse a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond (E) holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond
Output: (A)
principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. Thus, in the absence of The Brigham, there would be complete diversity and this Cou (Ala.1984) (finding that a hospital can be liable as a seller of goods for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose for using a defective suturing needle during surgery). This case law indicates that there may be a reasonable basis in law for the Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims against The Brigham. The Plaintiffs argue that a hospital may have some duty to warn patients of defects in a medical device or drug by pointing to Massachusetts cases in which the courts held that a pharmacy has a duty to warn customers about side effects in certain circumstances. Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316, 764 N.E.2d 814, 823 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Brienze v. Casserly, No. 01-1655-C, 2003 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (B) holding that employer has nondelegable duty to provide safe workplace (C) holding that there was not complete preemption because the applicable federal statute did not provide a private right of action to redress the same kind of injury alleged in the plaintiffs statelaw claims (D) holding that a pharmacy has a duty to provide a complete list of side effects when they provide a list that a customer would reasonably interpret as complete (E) holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication
Output: (D)
§ 4.3(e), at 473 n. 56. As the Second Circuit has held: The moral, religious and legal significance of the undertaking remains the same whether the oath taker and the witness communicate face-to-face or over the telephone. In a ritualistic sense, it may be that an oath taken over the telephone appears less formal or less solemn than one taken in the physical presence of the oath taker. The constitutionality of oaths does not depend, however, on such purely ritualistic considerations. Turner, 558 F.2d at 50. So, here, the mere fact that the Probable Cause Statement was faxed, rather than presented in person, to the magistrate judge does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Jones v. City of Santa Monica, 382 F.3d 1052, 2004 WL 2047140, 2004 WL 2021285, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2004) (<HOLDING>). Because he gave the Statement under penalty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (B) holding that a preprinted probablecause form sent to the magistrate judge which requires a signed statement by the declarant under penalty of perjury that the statements that follow are true satisfies the fourth amendment (C) holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment (D) holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant (E) holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission
Output: (B)
Michael Brewer appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 210-month sentence for receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b). Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Brewer’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel. Brewer has filed a pro se supplemental brief. No answering brief has been filed. With the exception of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Brewer waived his right to appeal his conviction and 210-month sentence. We decline to review Brewer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. See United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). The waiver of the right to appeal the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be decided on direct appeal where the district court has developed a record on the ineffectiveness issue (B) holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel (C) holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal (D) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (E) holding that we review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal only in the unusual cases where the record is sufficiently developed or the legal representation is so obviously inadequate that it denies a defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel
Output: (E)
that time. I think — I thought that a reasonable and just and sufficient sentence was the 41 months, and I think that now with credit for time served. The sentence is within the guideline range. That range does not exceed 24 months. The Court finds no reason to depart from the sentenced called for by the application of the guidelines. The Court finds the sentence to be reasonable and sufficient. And even though you did make a request for it, under 3553(a)(1) through (7) of 18 U.S.C., the Court specifically finds that the sentence is reasonable, sufficient, and adequate. We find it plain that the court treated the Guidelines range as advisory on resentencing, and therefore, Booker did not preclude the court from making and relying on the challenged fact findings. Chau, 426 F.3d at 1323 (<HOLDING>). It is now well-settled that a district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (B) holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature (C) holding guidelines to be only advisory (D) holding that the use of extraverdict enhancements in an advisory guidelines system is not unconstitutional quotation omitted (E) holding that the cocaine guidelines  are advisory only
Output: (D)
dismiss. See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 228, 294 A.2d 7 (“[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit may not proceed as a class action.”). Plaintiffs suggest the “circumstances in Riley, where premature dismissal was reversed, are identical, if not less egregious than, those in this case.” Although we agree courts must liberally view class allegations and allow reasonable inferences to be gleaned from the complaint’s allegations and search for a possible basis for class relief so as to avoid premature dismissals, Carter-Reed, supra, 203 N.J. at 505-06, 518, 4 A.3d 561 we do not abide a view that precludes dismissal, following the required analysis, when a court determines alleged claims do not properly lend themselves to class certification. See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 225, 294 A.2d 7 (<HOLDING>). In Riley, the Court examined the pre-trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action (B) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (C) holding that it is elementary that in order to maintain a class action the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable (D) holding a class action should lie unless it is clearly infeasible (E) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action
Output: (D)