niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
owed to a licensee and those owed to an invitee in premises liability cases based on conditions of the land. Id. at 94. In neither case did the parties assert or the court address whether a premises liability claim could arise out of an activity on the land. Here, defendant’s activity of mopping the floor created a condition in the concourse that led to plaintiffs injury. The legal rules concerning defendant’s liability for that injury apply, even if its activity created the condition on the premises that led to plaintiffs injury. See Ragnone v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 291 Or 617, 621-22, 633 P2d 1287 (1981) (describing duties of an occupier of land as to both conditions of and activities on the land); Bryant v. Sherm’s Thunderbird Mkt., 268 Or 591, 602-03, 522 P2d 1383 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the evidence did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a company that cut removed and sold timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff (B) holding that a company that cut and removed timber from land that secured a debt held by the plaintiff was liable as a matter of law under an earlier version of the gtccs because it had not first obtained the written consent of the plaintiff (C) recognizing duty of possessor of land or chattels to control conduct of licensee (D) holding that as one who does an act or carries on an activity upon land on behalf of the possessor refrigeration supply company could be liable for physical injury caused to others on premises as though it were a possessor of land when its employees allegedly removed plywood covering trench inside market and plaintiff tripped over exposed cables (E) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land
Output: (D)
all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.’ ” Corus Staal BV v. United States, 515 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1345 (CIT 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1959 (2007)). Canex argues that the Government failed to exhaust administrative remedies by commencing this action for liquidated damages without engaging in mitigation proceedings. Under 19 C.F.R. § 172.1(b) and 19 U.S.C. § 1623(c), a principal or surety can petition Customs for relief from payment of liquidated damages through such proceedings. See United States v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc., 990 F.2d 610, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Mitigation proceedings are voluntary and informal, and relief is granted at the discretion of Customs. United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495, 502 (CIT 1993) (<HOLDING>); Cocoa Berkau, 990 F.2d at 615 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that liquidated damages under the flsa  are compensation not a penalty or punishment  (B) holding that a mitigation proceeding for liquidated damages under 19 usc  1623cis voluntary (C) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (D) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (E) holding that liquidated damages under fair labor standards act constitutes compensation for the retention of a workmans pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages
Output: (B)
he might have also attended other meetings where the Application was discussed, but he could not remember. After the Application was filed, D’Antonio and his staff assisted Applicant in drafting a public notice to be published in local newspapers pursuant to the statute. Once the notice was published, D’Antonio’s next contact with the Application was when he reviewed the findings and recommendations of the hearing examiner in his capacity as the State Engineer. Neither he nor any of his personnel assisted in drafting the Application. {70} Protestants rely on Reid and cite to other cases for the proposition that hearing officials like D’Antonio should be recused when there is an “appearance of bias.” See City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, 1997-NMCA-054, ¶¶ 15-16, 123 N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509 (<HOLDING>); see also Reid, 1979-NMSC-005, ¶ 5 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable (C) holding that recusal is appropriate when a reasonable person would seriously doubt the hearing officers objectivity (D) holding that denial of a prerevocation parole violation hearing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act
Output: (C)
Civ. P. 329b. If within that time a party files a motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment, then the trial court’s plenary power is'extended for thirty days after the last such motion is expressly or implicitly overruled. Id. The Manns contend that the sanctions order is void because the trial court signed it more than thirty days after it signed the final judgment even though no one filed a motion that extended the trial court’s plenary power. They acknowledge, however, that the Texas ■ Supreme Court has held that any timely filed motion for a substantive change in the existing judgment is a motion to modify that extends the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Manns attempt to distinguish Lane on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a timely postjudgment motion the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter amend or vacate a final judgment (B) holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties (C) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (D) holding that a postjudgment motion to incorporate a sanction as part of the final judgment is a motion to modify the judgment and extends the trial courts jurisdiction (E) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment
Output: (D)
to pay the full amount would cause an economic hardship or would be unfair and inequitable. A taxpayer files an offer-in-compromise by completing a Form 656, Offer in Compromise. In most cases, the taxpayer is of a more narrowly tailored statute does not necessarily prevent prosecution under a broader statute, so long as the defendant is not punished under both statutes for the same conduct.”); Hale, 1992 WL 163600, at *3 (same). 9 . See United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46, 73 S.Ct. 77, 97 L.Ed. 61 (1952) ("By providing that the sanction of s 145(b) should be 'in addition to other penalties provided by law,’ Congress recognized that some methods of attempting to evade taxes would violate other statutes as well.”). 10 . See Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d at 1187 (<HOLDING>). 11 . It is worth noting that while no other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 (B) holding that in a criminal mail fraud prosecution under 18 usc  1341 where proof of specific intent is required it may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless disregard for truth (C) holding that submitting false claims to the government could be charged under either the false claims act 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 because nothing in the statutory language of the relevant statutory provisions provided any evidence of an intent to withdraw from one statute a coverage it obviously has standing alone because of a coverage also afforded by another statute (D) holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments (E) holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 usc  286  a companion statute to the criminal fca  because his claims were false when submitted even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor
Output: (C)
arises from the events of May 31, 2007. Jones alleges that he was served and ate part of a tamale pie without having been- notified of its pork contents. Nopp declares, however, that he did not order cooks to add pork to the tamale pie and that the tamale pie did not contain pork. Jones’s evidence is not sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the tamale pie contained pork and or whether Nopp ordered cooks to add pork to the dish. The unsworn statements of the inmate cook who told Jones that Nopp had -directed the cook to mix pork in with the meat used in the tamale pie are hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and cannot properly be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Raymond Mayes, another inmate kitchen worker, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (B) holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion (C) holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge (E) holding that an affidavit  consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment
Output: (D)
Schwan’s three unsuccessful applications before the PTO demonstrate that BRICK Oven is generic or, at most, descriptive without secondary meaning. As noted above, both of the PTO’s final rejections of Schwan’s applications stated, The overwhelming evidence shows that BRICK Oven is a generic term when used in connection with pizza, including frozen pizza. For these reasons the [agency’s provisional decision] is maintained and made FINAL. (PTO Office Action dated Apr. 29, 2005; PTO Office Action dated May 18, 2005) (emphasis in original). Schwan’s objects to the introduction of this evidence, claiming that — despite the PTO’s use of the word “final” — their rejections are not, in fact, final decisions. See Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 764 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (citing Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative (B) holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony (C) holding that district court acted within its discretion in excluding from the jury evidence of ptos tentative opinion as unfairly prejudicial under fedrevid 403 (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion (E) holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel
Output: (C)
morning. However, he asserted that he hoped to represent Plaintiff if the case were reopened. 9 .Plaintiff testified that attorney Weeks advised her to let Watkins and Andrews proceed with reopening her case. 10 . Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981). 11 . Dr. Kilgore’s testimony that he observed a gradual but severe decline in Watkins' health in the two to three years prior to the grievance proceeding is not conclusive of Watkins’ alleged incapacitation from the date of removal to the date of dismissal. Compare Benjamin v. Lockhart, No. 94-3020, 1996 WL 44197, *3 (E.D.La. Feb. 2, 1996) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>) with Russell v. Henderson, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances (C) recognizing that debilitating illness which precludes all participation in the litigation may constitute compelling reason for relief under rule 60b6 (D) holding that rule 60b6 may be used to grant relief in case of extreme and undue hardship (E) holding that relief under rule 60b6 is not available unless the other clauses 1 through 5 are inapplicable
Output: (C)
show that the identification was unreliable. See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1102. During the robbery, Spence did not wear a mask or hat, and the teller was face-to-face with Spence for a "significant amount of time.” [Dkt. 72 at 50], The next morning, the detective prepared the photograph lineup, and he told the teller that the suspect’s photo might not be included. The teller still identified Spence without any doubt or hesitation. [Dkt. 76 at 55], 2 . Even assuming arguendo that there was error in failing to strike Yunta, Spence still cannot show reversible error. Yunta ultimately did not sit on the jury because Spence struck her with a peremptory strike. Spence must show that his actual jury still included an impartial juror. See United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1566 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Spence contends that because he improperly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat (B) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (C) holding that the defendants right to an impartial jury was not impaired when there was no common thread or similarity among the group of excluded jurors (D) recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial (E) holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors
Output: (A)
is the only entity with the capacity to impose or implement SEQRA, and the Villages have only attempted to ensure such action through a lawsuit. Cf. Westchester Day Sch., 386 F.3d at 189 (equating “implementation of a land use regulation” with “regulation or rejection” of actions by a zoning board). This interpretation is borne out in what actually happened in the Chestnut Ridge Action: Defendants did not prevail, and as such, the lawsuit had no bearing on the actions that Ramapo took in implementing SEQRA. It is also consistent with the plain meaning of RLUIPA; Congress made no mention of “enforcing,” or “litigation relating to,” land use regulations in RLUIPA, even though it could have easily done so. Cf. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F.Supp.2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore agrees with Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings (B) holding that rluipa does not apply to eminent domain proceedings because congress made no mention of it and the concept is hardly  arcane or littleknown (C) holding that the right of privacy does not attach to matters already within the public domain (D) holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc  2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction (E) holding that it is not
Output: (B)
was more important than his prosecution, considering the context, we can find no error, let alone plain error. That statement related to the evidence of record which showed that Bond’s testimony was gained by virtue of an agreement and that the Government’s star witness had his own credibility problems. Indeed the making of such “judgments” - routine exercises of prosecutorial discretion - commonly form the basis of defense attacks upon the prosecution when an uncharged accomplice cooperates by providing testimony. Since it was obvious to the jury that the Govern ment had charged Brennan, and since they learned from the testimony that the Government had not charged Bond, the prosecutor’s remark conveyed to the jurors no more than they already knew. See Saada, 212 F.3d at 225 (<HOLDING>); Milan, 304 F.3d at 289-90 (holding that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors reference to code of silence among witnesses to shooting not plain error where argument finds support in record (B) holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error (C) holding prosecutors reference to defendant being only witness in courtroom during testimony as tailoring opportunity not plain error (D) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors (E) holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error
Output: (B)
was inconsistent with the large amount of blood at the crime scene. Detective Garretson also testified that an informant told him appellant said she hid her bloody clothes at an abandoned house. The jury had the duty to resolve the conflicting evidence in this case. See Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). “Simply because the jury found appellant’s evidence unconvincing is not grounds for finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict.” Id. Detective Garretson’s expert testimony discredited appellant’s statements that a third person was present, that she hit the complainant (but did not stab him) and that she was wearing the unstained clothes and shoes at the crime scene. See Barcenes v. State, 940 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>). If the jury believed appellant attempted to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence that appellant tried to cover up his actions and expert medical testimony discrediting appellants explanation of inju ries was sufficient to sustain murder conviction (B) holding that the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may be sufficient to sustain a conviction (C) holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft (D) recognizing that if there is evidence upon which one may reasonably infer an element of the crime the evidence is sufficient to sustain that element and where reasonable minds could differ the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction (E) holding that uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction
Output: (A)
opposing party access to the terms of the agreement between the paying party and the compensated witness. Many courts, including courts in this Circuit, have found that a compensated fact witness is competent to testify as long as the fact that payments were made to that witness is disclosed to the trier of fact. See Jamaica Time Petroleum, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 366 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir.1966) (finding that an agreement to pay a reward or “[t]he payment of the reward affects the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his testimony. These factors are not determinative of competence to testify.”); Goldstein v. Exxon Research and Eng’g Co., No. 95 Civ. 2410, 1997 WL 580599, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997); New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284, 291 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the “newly discovered evidence” put 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that the defendant and a witness sold drugs together was relevant to prove how the witness knew the defendant (B) holding that the constitution does not require the government to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant (C) holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness (D) recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury (E) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case
Output: (C)
instruct the jury on all elements of self-defense. See Rule 5-608(A) NMRA (requiring that the “court must instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction”); Foxen, 2001-NMCA-061, 1112, 130 N.M. 670, 29 P.3d 1071 (discussing the “well-established principle that adequate instruction on self-defense is the duty of the courts where it finds support in the evidence”). The deficiency in the given instructions did not comport with the district court’s position that Defendant be able to present his theory that he was defending himself and Crouch against all three assailants. The court’s failure to adequately and accurately describe Defendant’s theory of defense violated Defendant’s fundamental rights. Cf. State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (<HOLDING>). {29} In addition to failing to present 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions that taken together fairly and adequately conveyed the issues to the jury (B) holding that when both parties agree that the facts of the case entitled defendant to a selfdefense instruction failing to so instruct the jury was error (C) holding that it is not reversible error to reject a defendants proposed instruction on his theory of the ease if other instructions adequately cover the defense theory internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that jury instructions that included both victims and their alleged threatening actions adequately and accurately reflected the defendants selfdefense theory and were not in error (E) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory
Output: (D)
those reasons. In its Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanctions, the petitioner offered the following rationale for its recommendation that the respondent be disbarred: “Respondent’s conduct constituted a betrayal of the trust placed in him by his law partner and clients. Respondent engaged in further dishonest and deceitful conduct in his representations to Bar Counsel in order to cover up his misconduct. Judge Norman found no mitigating factors. Absent compelling extenuating circumstances, intentional misappropriation of another’s funds is deceitful and dishonest conduct which justifies disbarment. See e.g. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Carithers, 421 Md. 28, 58-59, 25 A.3d 181, 199 (2011), citing Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vlahos, 369 Md. 183, 186, 798 A.2d 555, 556 (2002) (<HOLDING>) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Spery, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that outofstate plaintiff had procured his own absence at trial of his case where record contained no intimation that his absence resulted from any reason other than his own volition (B) holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated funds from his real estate partners (C) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (D) holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who converted partnership money to his own use without authorization and without disclosure to his other partners (E) holding that disbarment was proper where the attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm
Output: (E)
determination is whether the state law relied upon in the well-pleaded complaint “relates to” an employee benefit plan. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 138, 111 S.Ct. at 482; Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1292 (5th Cir.1989). A state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S.Ct. at 2899-2900. Therefore, a state law may “relate to” an employee benefit plan even if the law is not designed to affect the plan or does so even in an indirect manner. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47,107 S.Ct. at 1552-53. Nevertheless, the reach of ERISA preemption is not limitless. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa did not preempt a states general garnishment statute even when applied to collect judgments against plan participants (B) holding that erisa does not preempt section 22213b7 (C) holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan (D) holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims (E) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan
Output: (A)
have motivated their actions in other areas of the system.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208, 93 S.Ct. 2686. Plaintiffs quote Dayton II for the proposition that such a system is “under a continuing duty to eradicate the effects of that system, and [ ]. the system-wide nature of the violation furnished pri-ma facie proof that current segregation in the [ ] schools was caused at least in part by prior intentionally segregative official acts.” Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536, 99 S.Ct. 2971 (internal citation omitted). Keyes and Dayton II were ongoing school desegregation cases that involved purposeful discrimination by school systems attempting to avoid their affirmative obligation to undo systemic discrimination under Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (Brown I) (<HOLDING>) and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the classofone equal protection theory has no place in the public employment context (B) holding that the concept of separate but equal has no place in public education (C) holding section 625 only requires a showing that the conduct was done in a place that is open to the public or where the public has a right to be (D) holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws (E) holding that wisconsin violated equal protection rights of handicapped children by denying them an education at public expense
Output: (B)
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Arrington asserts that he meets either definition (A) or definition (B) because he suffers from diabetes. Specifically, he argues that this circuit held, in Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834, 837 (5th Cir.1999), that insulin-dependent diabetes is a “disability” as that term is defined in the ADA. SW Bell disagrees, and contends that Arrington must produce evidence suggesting that his diabetic condition “substantially limits” at least one of his “major life activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). SW Bell correctly identifies the flaws in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs ability to work is substantially limited when his impairment foreclosed him generally from obtaining jobs doing the type of work plaintiff has chosen as his field (B) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (C) holding that 42 usc  405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment (D) holding that impairment has not substantially limited the major life activity of lifting where an individual could clean his dishes clean the yard bathe his dog do the groceries take out the garbage and prepare his own meals (E) holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities
Output: (E)
a year to file Edwards’s fifty-one page federal habeas petition. War-droup accepted full-time employment and allegedly ceased working on Edwards’s case four months after he had timely filed Edwards’s habeas petition and the limitations period expired. See Mem. Op. at 9. Thus, to the extent that Wardroup “abandoned Edwards,” it was after Wardroup had shepherded Edwards’s federal habeas petition to court. Further, after he accepted this employment, Wardroup submitted a reply to Texas’s response to Edwards’s habeas submission, as well as a notice and full and timely briefing to us on his first COA request. It is difficult to see abandonment here, where Wardroup missed no deadlines and filed substantive arguments. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Stephens, 560 Fed.Appx. 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Edwards has not alleged any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was sufficient where inter alia the victim woke up to find the defendant on top of her and engaged in sex (B) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted (C) holding inter alia that appellant must use local cpiu where available (D) holding no abandonment where inter alia counsel never missed a filing deadline and filed a lengthy petition on petitioners behalf (E) holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination
Output: (D)
added)). 3 . The district court "preliminarily” found statutory jurisdiction to be proper. Because it believed statutory jurisdiction to be an element of an offense under United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.2002), the court then submitted the question of consent to the jury. The district court need not have taken this second step since consent was uncontested. 4 . We do not require nexus for stateless vessels. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161; United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 829 (9th Cir.2003). 5 . The First and Fifth Circuits have rejected the position that nexus is required for foreign vessels when the flag nation has consented to the application of United States law to the defendants. See United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627-28 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by the introduction and admission of the delawares as part of the cherokee nation they became a part of the people of such nation and bound in common with the cherokees by the political power of the nation (B) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature (C) holding gwaltney limited to jurisdictional question and does not prohibit recovery of past penalties in citizen suit if jurisdictional requirements met (D) holding that as a matter of law the embassy of a sovereign nation is a foreign state (E) holding that jurisdictional requirements were met because the flag nation consented to the enforcement of the mdlea over the foreign vessel
Output: (E)
285 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (quotation omitted). B. Crush Analysis Testimony Yergin was apparently planning to testify about estimated speeds of the F-250 and the Hyundai based on the amount of “crush” to the Hyundai. Although Yer-gin testified in front of the jury that there was probably a difference in speed between the two vehicles of 10 to 20 miles per hour, she never stated at any time what speeds she estimated the vehicles to be traveling. Nor did appellant’s counsel explain to the court what speeds Yergin concluded the vehicles were traveling. This information would be crucial to understanding what testimony was excluded and whether the exclusion was harmful. See id. A general statement that she would testify about the vehicles’ speeds is insufficient. See id. at 891 (<HOLDING>). Further, appellant’s trial counsel explained 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of impaired mental functioning is inherently mitigating and that a defendant is not required to demonstrate a nexus between his mental capacity and the crime committed (B) holding defendant was not required to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee because the employee did not apprise defendant that she suffered from a mental impairment (C) holding that counsels performance was deficient for failing to investigate readily available evidence of mental impairment (D) holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold (E) holding that a general statement about how the defendant wanted to introduce evidence of medical or mental impairment to show that the defendant lacked the proper mental state was an insufficient offer  there must be some meat of the actual evidence
Output: (E)
to clarify” it. Furthermore, the specific objection that counsel was purportedly required to make goes unmentioned, as does any authority supporting the conclusion that the evidence was inadmissible. Thus, we are left to guess at the reasoning underlying appellant’s claim and at the legitimacy of that reasoning, if any. And, because of that, the complaint was waived due to insufficient briefing. See Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 880-81 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (overruling the claim that counsel was ineffective due to his failure to object since the appellant failed to explain “how counsel might have kept the statement out”); Melonson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). As to the out-of-court identification by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to carry his burden to demonstrate prejudice a petitioner must show when making a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to raise an objection or  poinake an argument that the objection or argument would have been successful if made (B) holding that a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection but also by making the wrong specific objection (C) holding that an appellant must not only specifically identify the deficiencies in counsels performance but also identify the specific objection that should have been made and provide authority in support of his argument that the objection would have been meritorious (D) holding that child support should have been made retroactive (E) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court
Output: (C)
under § 1983 has not been established. [¶ 31.] In addition, [t]o state a claim under 42 USC § 1985(3), a plaintiff must plead 1) the existence of a conspiracy; 2) a purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws; 3) an act in the furtherance of the alleged conspiracy; and 4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of a right or privilege granted to a United States citizen. Additionally, a plaintiff must show “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator’s action." Biby v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, 338 FSupp2d 1063, 1074 (D.Neb.2004) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 32.] On appeal, the parents do not assert, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (B) holding that a claim under the equal protection section of section 19853 requires proof of classbased animus (C) holding that equal protection requires that state legislative districts be roughly equal in population (D) holding that defendant had qualified immunity under section 19853 claim where underlying claim failed as a matter of law (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection
Output: (B)
part by an officer’s interest in ensuring his own' protection and preventing a suspect’s flight during a Terry stop, most circuits today have approved police use of drawn weapons or handcuffs to restrain criminal suspects. Courts have' also permitted police to demand a suspect to lay prostrate on the ground during a stop and frisk search. In addition, .courts have allowed police to forcibly transport suspects (most notably to a patrol car) under a válid Terry stop. As a result, lower courts, while maintaining that Terry remains a limited exception, have authorized conduct similar to that associated with custodial arrest without converting that stop into a full-fledged arrest. Id. at 2805 (citations omitted); see also State v. Sheppard, 271 S,W.3d 281, 289 n. 28 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). 33 . See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause (B) holding that the limits of fourth amendment protection relate to the boundary between arrest and pretrial detention (C) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (D) holding that in  1983 claims for malicious prosecution the fourth amendment applies to those actions which occur between arrest and pretrial detention (E) holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest
Output: (E)
is minimized if officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 786-87. Here, evidence supports the district court’s finding that Hollins’s behavior gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe that Hollins was armed and dangerous when they searched him. First, Hollins repeatedly refused to follow instructions to keep his hands in plain view, and he would slide his hands toward his waist while he was seated in the vehicle. Nervous, evasive behavior, which Hollins exhibited, is one of several factors which may be pertinent in determining reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir.2000). Second, Hollins repeatedly refused to obey an officer’s instruction to exit the vehicle. See Maryland, 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. at 884 (<HOLDING>). Third, Hollins repeatedly disregarded an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (B) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (C) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (D) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (E) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred
Output: (D)
that a stipulation “waives the requirement that the government produce evidence (other than the stipulation itself) to establish the facts stipulated to beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 406 (4th Cir.1993)). Arguably, the italicized phrase contemplates a formal reading to the jury of all necessary stipulations. But that issue was not before the court. The stipulation was read aloud in Muse (and in the case it cited for support), see id. at 678; the actual issue was the propriety of a jury instruction. See id. at 677. Therefore, while' the Muse court accurately described normal trial practice to include the reading of stipulations, it had no occasion to consider the situation before us today. See Hardin, 139 F.3d at 817 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that references to reading stipulations in muse are dicta (B) holding that everything after denial of jurisdiction is dicta pure and simple (C) recognizing such limitations in dicta (D) recognizing that alternative holdings are not dicta (E) recognizing that a reading of the oregon criminal statute indicates that the acts prohibited are those which are performed upon the mother rather than any action taken by her
Output: (A)
in open court,” Defendant’s characterization is probably accurate. State v. Tollardo, 2003-NMCA-122, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 430, 77 P.3d 1023. However, Rule 5-502(A)(l) does not exempt demonstrative evidence from a defendant’s duty to disclose. To the contrary, it expressly applies to forms of evidence that are classically demonstrative, such as “tangible objects.” Id. As such, we reject Defendant’s suggestion that demonstrative evidence is subject to a blanket exemption from the general duty of disclosure. {42} Defendant may rely upon the distinction between the use of demonstrative material as an aid to cross-examination and the designation of such material as “evidence” that is fit for use as a formal exhibit. See State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 370, 379, 588 P.2d 1045, 1054 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). However, even if we were to assume that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession (B) holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state (C) recognizing the defense has a right to comment on the presentence report and may introduce evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second (E) holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act
Output: (B)
106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). “A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” Id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. Because Plaintiffs’ section 1962(c) claim is based on an alleged pattern of racketeering consisting entirely of the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, their substantive RICO allegations must comply not only with the plausibility criteria articulated in Twombly and Iqbal but also with Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, which requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” See also Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We have held that pursuant to Rule 9(b), a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 9b applies to  11 and 12a2 under the act despite fraud not being an element since they are grounded in fraud (B) holding that californias ucl claims are subject to rule 9b pleading standards (C) holding that because civil rico is penal in nature illinois twoyear statute of limitations for actions based on a statutory penalty applies to civil rico claims (D) holding that civil rico claims which are essentially a certain breed of fraud claims must be pled with an increased level of specificity under rule 9b (E) holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action
Output: (D)
Smith to provide a bare legal conclusion without explaining the criteria he used to reach that conclusion. Because we agree with the defendants that the district court erred by admitting this portion of Mr. Smith’s testimony, we must determine whether this error requires reversal of the defendants’ convictions. “In order for an error of this nature to be reversible, the error must affect substantial rights and must result in actual prejudice. Error which does not rise to the magnitude is harmless.” Evans ex rel. A.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472, 476 (10th Cir.1991). “The question is not whether, omitting the inadmissible statements, the r r admission of evidence was prejudicial where the erroneously admitted evidence was “extremely compelling”); Specht, 853 F.2d at 808-09 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 942 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony (B) holding that improper admission of expert testimony was harmless in light of otherwise overwhelming evidence and fact that testimony covering substantially the same area was introduced without challenge (C) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (D) holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony (E) holding that admission of hearsay testimony was harmless where the jury heard admissible testimony from three other sources to the same effect
Output: (C)