niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
even presuming arguendo that the I.R.S. was a party-in-interest with respect to the instant bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), the I.R.S. nevertheless was not, as Plaintiffs apparently concede, one of the parties expressly described in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), which statutory provision, the Court holds, sets forth, with exceptions not applicable herein, the universe of parties that may be bound by a confirmed plan or order that confirms such plan, see In re Union Golf of Florida, Inc., 242 B.R. 51, 59-60 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1998). Order of Court, dat. May 27, 2005, at 2-3. Such decision is supported not only by the Union Golf decision but also by several decisions cited therein, see Union Golf, 242 B.R. at 56-57 (citing In re Food City, Inc., 110 B.R. 808, 813 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>), and In re Norwesco Development Corp., 68 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the instant case although creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay it failed to object or appeal from the confirmation order accordingly creditor is bound by the confirmation order (B) recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order (C) holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a (D) holding that the sec does not qualify as a creditor of the estate bound by the confirmed plan pursuant to  1141a and that therefore the sec would thus not be barred from enforcing the securities laws with respect to the violation arising out of the plan notwithstanding its confirmation by court order (E) holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan
Output: (D)
Assa’ad-Faltas’s claim regarding the University’s refusal to give her a certificate of completion for the residency program was previously challenged by Assa’ad-Faltas without success. See Assa’ad-Faltas v. Univ. of S.C., No. 96-2159(L), 1998 WL 792209 (4th Cir. Nov.16, 1998) (unpublished), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999). Thus, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir.1991). This is so even though the pri- or action was dismissed with prejudice based on Assa’ad-Faltas’s failure to comply with discovery and her abusive demeanor during a deposition, rather than on the merits of her claims. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the claim is barred by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata (B) holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (C) holding in res judicata context that  final judgment on the merits is synonymous with dismissal with prejudice  (D) holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (E) holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment
Output: (C)
investigation that the company believes to transgress separation-of-powers principles constitutes irreparable harm. See John Doe Co., 849 F.3d at 1135 (rebuffing Future Income Payments’ position that “any alleged separation-of-powers injury is by its very nature irreparable”); John Doe Co., 235 F.Supp.3d at 203-04, 2017 WL 663528, at *6 (same). Similarly, in Tilton v. SEC, a challenge to the constitutionality of the appointment of administrative law judges in the SEC, the Second Circuit held that “being subjected to an unconstitutional administrative process” and enduring the “expense and disruption” of these proceedings do not qualify as irreparable harm. 824 F.3d 276, 286 (2d Cir. 2016); see FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Future Income Payments’ averred injury proves 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate (B) holding the time trouble and expense of an unnecessary trial is not irreparable harm when determining whether the threshold elements of certiorari jurisdiction have been met (C) holding that where state rules of civil procedure apply to courts of the state they do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies (D) holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm (E) holding that the expense and disruption of defending oneself in protracted adjudicatory proceedings do not amount not irreparable harm
Output: (E)
to sign representing Morin was a subcontractor. Muldoon testified he filled out paperwork designating Lauth as the sole owner of Lauth Contracting, LLC and asked Lauth to sign the document before Muldoon faxed the document to WSI. The record supports the ALJ’s finding Muldoon willfully failed to provide workers’ compensation coverage. V [¶ 15] Finally, Muldoon argues he is not personally liable for past premiums and penalties owed to WSI. An employer who wilfully fails to secure workers’ compensation coverage is personally liable for past premiums and penalties owed. N.D.C.C. § 65-04-33(2). When an individual is employed by a partnership, the partners are employers subject to personal liability. Klemmens v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 54 N.D. 496, 499-500, 209 N.W. 972, 973 (N.D.1926) (<HOLDING>). If the employer is a LLC, personal liability 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent an agreement to the contrary any partner can act as an agent of the partnership when apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership  (B) holding one partner can not sic maintain an action at law against another partner to recover an amount claimed by him by reason of partnership transactions until there has been a final settlement of the affairs of the partnership (C) holding a mechanic working in a garage owned by a partnership is an employee of the partnership not the individual partner (D) holding that a partner who is without actual authority has no power to bind the partnership in a transaction that is not within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business any person dealing with a partner can only rely on the partners acts if they are within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business (E) holding that a partnership agreement that contained prohibitions against the sale or assignment of a partners interest in the partnership without the others consent would be enforced
Output: (C)
the robbery, via a police squad car, and was shown to Haley standing in the same place where the robber stood. Show-up procedures have been widely condemned because of their potential to render unreliable, mistaken identifications. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972-73, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (“The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.”). A show-up is inherently suggestive because the witness is likely to be influenced by the fact that the police appear to believe the person brought in is guilty, since presumably the police would not bring in someone that they did not suspect had committed the crime. See United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1055, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants (C) recognizing inherent suggestiveness of showups (D) recognizing courts inherent power to issue subpoenas (E) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals
Output: (C)
words are used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings.” Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Minn. 2013). Again, “inflict” means “to lay (a blow) on” or “cause (something damaging or painful) to be endured.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 1160. “[Cjause” means to “bring into existence” or “effect by command, authority, or force.” Id. at 356. Dorn cites a Sixth Circuit case for the notion that the “best” interpretation of “inflict” is “something more precise—and thus something narrower”—than “cause.” United States v. Zabawa, 719 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2013). Specifically, Zabawa concluded that “inflict” indicates “a sense of physical immediacy: to cause harm directly, by physical force.” Id. at 560; see, e.g., id. at 559-61 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jackson, 310 F.3d 554, 557 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if but only if said plaintiff 1 is closely related to the injury victim 2 is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and 3 as a result suffers serious emotional distress (B) holding that a photograph of the hands of the murder victim tied behind her back was properly admitted because it showed the considerable pain inflicted upon the victim by the defendant (C) holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred while the defendant applied force directly to the victims person (D) holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred as a result of the defendants combative conduct (E) holding that the injury was not inflicted by the defendant when it may have resulted from the actions ie the headbutt of the victim himself
Output: (E)
some other traditional damage, some personal injury must be demonstrated. In this case, Godfrey claims nothing more than the general vindication of the public interest in seeing that the legislature acts in conformity with the constitution. This is an admirable interest, but not one that is alone sufficient to establish the personal injury required for standing. Godfrey next argues she has standing as a private litigant to assert the rights of nonparty workers’ compensation claimants who are, in fact, injured under the statute. She argues she is the only litigant in Iowa who is able to assert a constitutional challenge to the statute because the window of opportunity for other litigants to file a single-subject challenge has passed. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990) (<HOLDING>). Third-party standing normally requires a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal (B) holding that the alc may not rule upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute but may rule upon an asapplied challenge (C) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (D) holding no singlesubject challenge to a statute may be brought after the act is codified (E) holding that if a person wishes to challenge a mere procedural violation in the adoption of a regulation or other agency action the challenge must be brought within six years of the decision and that similarly if the person wishes to bring a policybased facial challenge to the governments decision that too must be brought within six years of the decision
Output: (D)
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence' in’ 'support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must 'be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252,106 S.Ct. 2505. III. Discussion Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Dr. Huxol and OMHS deviated from the applicable 78 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that emtala does pot give patients a private cause of action against their physicians (B) holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action (C) holding that emtala does not provide a private cause of action against individual physicians or against physicians medical corporations (D) holding strict control test inapplicable in determining the scope of immunity for physicians under federal law because medical ethics require physicians to exercise independent judgment in the best interest of their patients (E) holding that emtala does not allow private suits against physicians
Output: (A)
971 F.2d at 6. “A contested collection proceeding will end in a judgment or a series of judgments granting supplementary relief to the plaintiff. The judgment that concludes the collection pro ceeding is the judgment from which the defendant can appeal.” Id. Thus, if the government discovered an asset from defendants’ disclosures on which it could bring a further judicial collection action, defendants could appeal from the interlocutory discovery order once judgment was entered regarding that particular asset. See id. In the alternative, defendants could refuse to comply with the discovery order, and if the district court entered a contempt sanction, that sanction would be immediately appealable. See Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 84 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Cent. States, 971 F.2d at 6; Fabric Garment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 (B) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 (C) holding that a trustee can recover damages in the form of costs and attorneys fees under section 105a as a sanction for ordinary civil contempt (D) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291 (E) holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss
Output: (A)
CURIAM: Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Juan Antonio Mijares-Andrade raises an admittedly foreclosed argument pursuant to Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (<HOLDING>), as well as an argument pursuant to Blakely v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 usc  1326b2 and not a separate criminal offense (B) holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury (C) holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical (D) holding that age factor in sexual assault statute pertains only to sentencing and is not an element of the offense (E) holding that prior final conviction is separate from conviction on which defendant faces sentencing if defendant had a meaningful opportunity to refrain from criminal activity and instead engaged in criminality anew
Output: (A)
Richard Baumgartner. Id. at *2. We stated: In the present case, the Trial Court did not hold ;that [plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata. Indeed, it could not have done so because the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals did not file its opinion in State v. Cobbins [No. E2013-02726-CCA-WR-CO (Tenn. Crim. App., filed Feb. 4, 2015) ] until February 2015, quite some time after the Trial Court’s November 20Í3 disposition in the present case. Typically, res judicata is asserted as an affirmative defense. However, when a plaintiff pursues two similar lawsuits in different venues, that plaintiff runs the risk of receiving an unfavorable result in the initial case and having that result bind the other case. See Crain v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, it is clear that from 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where first suit is filed in response to notice of a planned lawsuit by the plaintiffs adversary that lawsuit may be dismissed (B) holding defendants ownership interest in texas company that was not party to lawsuit was not relevant to specific jurisdiction (C) holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits (D) holding that a party may pursue what would be a compulsory counterclaim in a separate lawsuit but that party runs the risk of losing in the initial lawsuit and being bound by that result (E) holding first lawsuit and allegations in second lawsuit part of same transaction for res judicata purposes even though different theory of recovery and harm alleged in second lawsuit
Output: (D)
“words and phrases ... must be given a consistent usage and be read in pari materia [;] ... to do otherwise would attribute a schizophrenic intent to the drafters.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 21, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (first emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted). As we have seen, there is nothing absurd about applying Rule 45 to the Government. That reading, moreover, aligns the interpretation of Rule 45 with that of every other rule in which the word “person” means more than simply a natural person. (For an example of the latter sort, see Rule 4(c)(2), providing that service may be effected by any “person” meeting certain qualifications.) In addition to Rules 4(i)(3)(A) and 30(b)(6), see Carlson v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 510 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states (B) recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings (C) holding united states is a person described in rule 19a1 2 which governs joinder (D) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (E) holding that sovereign immunity does not bar extinguishment of united states junior lien in proceeding in which united states was not a party
Output: (C)
bar federal antitrust claims under the Filed Rate Doctrine.” Id. 12 . The USDA clearly had statutory authority. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the Secretary issued a rule that allowed for such review in 2007. Thus, even if the Secretary did not choose to review the accuracy of data reported to NASS, he had the power to do so. 13 . Defendants' citations are to the federal register and, hence, judicially noticeable. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507. 14 . Plaintiffs also cite three cases from the same district court which declined to apply the filed rate doctrine to Medicaid reimbursement rates for prescription drugs. Each case, however, rejected the application of the doctrine at least in part because there were no filed rates. Massachusetts v. Mylan Labs., 357 F.Supp.2d 314, 329 (D.Mass.2005) (<HOLDING>); In re Lupron Mktg. and Sales Prac. Litig., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (B) holding that the filed rate doctrine was inapplicable because the reported data do not control the rates which defendants can charge customers as a tariff would (C) holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number (D) recognizing that missing data were located in a laboratory within the constructive control of the state (E) holding that filed tariffs are presumed valid until the fcc determines otherwise and that carriers are unable to charge or receive any rate not specified in the tariff
Output: (B)
9006(b)(3). There is no excusable neglect basis for enlarging the claims bar date included in Rule 3002(c). Accordingly, the excusable neglect standard found in Rule 9006(b)(1) does not authorize extensions of the claims deadline imposed in chapter 13 cases. In re Oscar, 2005 WL 6522763 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Apr. 14, 2005). “[S]ince 1994, the courts have almost uniformly ruled that proofs of claim that are untimely filed in a Chapter 13 case may not be deemed timely filed, and that the claimants thereunder should not take from, or be permitted to recover from, the debtor’s estate under the Chapter 13 plan.” Daniels, 466 B.R. at 217 (listing examples). This Court has consistently held that late claims are not permitted in chapter 13 cases. In re Dumain, 492 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court will not allow Ocwen’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible (B) holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived (C) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (D) holding that secured creditors must comply with the bar date imposed by bankruptcy rule 3002c (E) holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor
Output: (D)
disclosure in any instance would pose the hazard that Congress foresaw.” Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C.Cir.1978). Therefore, “only explicit nondisclosure statutes that evidence a congressional determination that certain materials ought to be kept in confidence will be sufficient to qualify under the exemption.” Irons and Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1979). See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C.Cir. 2002). In these cases, the DOC relies on several statutes that qualify as Exemption 3 nondisclosure statutes and thus permit its withholding of docume 35 U.S.C. § 122, prohibiting disclosure of patent applications and information pertaining to such applications. See Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Sixth, the DOC properly invokes Federal Rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3 (B) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (C) holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute (E) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute
Output: (E)
revenues, income, earnings per share, and other financial items; statements of plans and objectives of management for future operations; and statements of future economic performance. Id. § 78u-5(i)(l)(A)-(C). Additionally, “any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any [such] statement” is classified as forward-looking. Id. § 78u-5(i)(l)(D). Once it is determined that the statement is indeed forward-looking, the safe harbor provides two alternative paths to immunity where: (1) the statement was accompanied by meaningful cautionary language, id. § 78u-5(e)(1)(A); or (2) plaintiff fails to provide the projections were made with actual knowledge that they were false or misleading, id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). See In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). A. Forward-Looking Statements The majority of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior judgment resting on two or more independent alternative grounds is not conclusive as to issues which were necessarily found in order to establish only one of those grounds (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (D) holding that this court must determine by independent review the actual grounds upon which the remand was based (E) holding that the safe harbor provides two independent grounds for protection
Output: (E)
the statutory restrictions were justified. See generally 696 F.3d at 458-⅜7. 209 . Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); 210 . Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). 211 . Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting this statement of the principle — as the first sentence of the opinion — from Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (explaining that the first case in the line, Pickering, was rooted in same rationale as 1950s-era cases invalidating loyalty oaths and political disclosure requirements made a condition of government employment). 212 . See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, 126-S.Ct. 1951 (<HOLDING>). 213 . See .Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19, 126 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that georgias revised death 4356 penalty sentencing scheme differed from that ruled unconstitutional in furman v georgia 408 us 238 92 sct 2726 33 led2d 346 1972 because it focused the jurys attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant (B) recognizing that the first amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict incidentally or intentionally the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens citing perry v sindermann 408 us 593 597 92 sct 2694 33 led2d 570 1972 (C) holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline (D) holding that if the harm alleged in fact affects the recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff that will suffice for standing purposes citing sierra club v morton 405 us 727 73436 92 sct 1361 31 led2d 636 1972 (E) holding that a new york city family court judge had no constitutionally protected property right to reappointment after her tenyear term expired and the mayor decided not to reappoint her and explaining that the fact that many or even most incumbent judges have been reappointed cannot operate to raise appellants subjective expectation to a constitutionally protected right  appellant has failed entirely to demonstrate any mu tually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a property right citing perry 408 us at 601 92 sct 2694 bd of regents of state colls v roth 408 us 564 577 92 sct 2701 33 led2d 548 1972
Output: (B)
minimum period of incarceration. Id. at 142-43, 417 A.2d 1075. Simply put, the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code), N.J.S.A. 2C:1 to :104-9, does not permit convicted murderers to receive any sentence less than thirty years of incarceration. In addition, an examination of the legislative history behind the statute undeniably indicates that anyone not sentenced to death for a murder conviction must serve thirty years of incarceration prior to release. When enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b, the Legislature made it plain that convicted murderers would have to remain in prison for a minimum of t .2d 1144 (1991) (explaining that a “sentence of thirty years without parole [is] required for murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11 — 3”); State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263, 274 n. 4, 478 A.2d 408 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Johnson, 206 N.J.Super. 341, 343, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence (B) holding that njsa 2c113b requires a minimum sentence of thirty years without parole eligibility (C) holding that purported calculation error in mandatory minimum was harmless because challenged sentence was 60 months longer than presumed minimum and was imposed according to guidelines without reference to statutory minimum (D) holding defendant did not show required prejudice from counsels alleged failure to advise him about eligibility for parole under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain (E) holding that defendant has due process right to introduce evidence on minimum parole eligibility in sentencing phase
Output: (B)
related to the illegal search. Without the information gained by the illegal GPS tracking, Hutti would not have known where to find Lee, when to find him there, or that he should “develop” probable cause to stop him. As a result, the seatbelt violation was not a “new, distinct crime” that could establish attenuation. Id. (quoting United States v. Castillo, 238 F.3d 424, 2000 WL 1800481, at *6 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision)). In its objections, the United States also raises the possibility that the dog searches and Lee’s confession could be intervening circumstances. R. 34 at 4. Those events could, in some contexts, sever the chain of causation stemming from an illegal search. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hospitalization of witnesss wife and his desire to be by her side was not a substantial basis for admitting witnesss testimony from first trial (B) holding that a videotaped interview between the child and an investigator was admissible (C) holding that taking an individual who was not suspected of any crime to a police station and into an interview room and detaining her for approximately four hours where it was made clear she was not free to leave violated the fourth amendment (D) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility (E) holding a witnesss testimony admissible because it derived from a police interview of her and was in no way connected to an illegal search of the defendants business four months earlier
Output: (E)
parties’ memoranda of law in assessing the facts relevant to the arbitration issue. The trial court concluded that, although there was a valid agreement to arbitrate to which Epstein was not a party, he was nevertheless bound based on an agency relationship and the fact that the issues relating to him were intertwined with the issues already being litigated. While these theories might, if proved, subject Epstein to the authority of the arbitration clause, see generally Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 688 (Fla.1999); Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So.2d 952, 957-58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), the facts supporting the issues of arbitration were disputed and the trial court should have held an eviden-tiary hearing to resolve them. See Sanchez v. Woemer Mgmt., Inc., 867 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). We accordingly reverse and remand for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unsworn memorandum is a pleading and not an evidentiary document therefore it had no evidentiary value and should not have been admitted as an exhibit (B) holding that the supreme court does not require an evidentiary hearing in every case (C) holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources (D) holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute (E) holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing
Output: (A)
upon ‘counsel’s investigation.’ ” (plf. memo in opp. at 9). Thus, they conclude, plaintiffs are not subject to the heightened pleading standard established by § 78u — 4(b)(1)(B). Several courts have held that when pleadings are based on counsel’s investigation of SEC filings, securities analyst’s reports, and information obtained from former employees, they are not pleading “based on information and belief’ and are therefore not subject to final provision of § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F.Supp. 910, 915 (N.D.Cal.1997); Warman v. Overland Data, Inc., 1998 WL 110018, *3 (S.D.Cal.). Other courts have held that a general statement regarding “investigation of counsel” is insufficient to avoid PSLRA requirements. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F.Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). These holdings are not necessarily 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single paragraph asserting that plaintiffs based their information and belief on investigation of sec filings analysts reports press releases and discussions with consultants neither provided required facts underlying complaints allegations nor directed court to where facts could be found (B) holding that plaintiffs need only allege that defendants provided information to the securities analysts upon which the reports were based (C) holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints (D) holding that plaintiffs may plead on information and belief if matters are not within their personal knowledge (E) holding that scienter had not adequately been pled where the plaintiffs provided none of the required facts underlying the complaints allegations as to the information that was supposedly available to the individual defendants
Output: (A)
in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Withholding of removal requires a “clear probability” of persecution. Toussaint v. Attorney Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir.2006). The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that persecution will be “committed either by the government or by forces that the government is either unable or unwilling to control.” Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.2003). Where violence is “primarily wrought by fellow citizens and not the result of governmental action or acquiescence,” there is no pattern of persecution sufficient to support the granting of withholding of removal. Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537-38 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, to obtain relief under the CAT, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners who apply for withholding of removal must establish that a statutorily protected ground was a reason for their persecution (B) holding that petitioner an ethnic chinese christian from indonesia did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution in indonesia because she failed to demonstrate that she would be individually targeted for persecution and country reports indicate that religious discrimination and harassment of ethnic chinese have declined in previous years (C) holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best (D) holding that evidence of antichinese violence in indonesia did not support the petitioners claim that persecution would result from removal (E) holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing
Output: (D)
for the district court to grant his motion to withdraw his plea. But Harvey has not challenged the district court's ultimate finding that he was competent to stand trial based on the court's consideration of the opinions of all three psychiatrists. In light of the district court's unchallenged and supported determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial (and therefore competent to plead), Harvey cannot argue that the court committed obvious error in failing to sua sponte permit him to withdraw his plea on the basis of his "marginal competence." Nor can he claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Harvey's marginal competency as a reason for withdrawing the plea. Harvey's claims related to his competency therefore fail. { 18 We affirm. 1 . The court stat Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-42 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (C) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum
Output: (B)
344 U.S. 590, 596, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953). For instance, an LPR who left the United States briefly to undertake illegal activity abroad, such as alien smuggling, would clearly be included in the 1225(b) subclass; under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii), he would be treated as an alien seeking admission on account of having “engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States.” See United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 696 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002). But in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982), the Supreme Court specifically held that an LPR arrested for alien smuggling upon return from a brief trip abroad is entitled to due process protection, specifically because Mezei is inapplicable in such a scenario. See id. at 34, 103 S.Ct. 321 (<HOLDING>). As such, it is clear that the 1225(b) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff state employees contract right to be discharged only for cause was not protected by due process clause because it did not rise to level of fundamental right (B) holding that the defendant failed to preserve a due process objection to a sentencing policy because sjimply saying that something is unfair does not suggest that it violates due process (C) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (D) holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident (E) holding that mezei did not suggest that no returning resident alien has a right to due process and that it does not govern this case for plasencia was absent from the country only a few days
Output: (E)
605 N.E.2d 344; accord Albert, 239 F.3d at 271. To find that a statement qualifies as one that tends to injure another in his or her “trade, business, or profession,” the statement “must be made with reference to a matter of significance and importance for [the operation of the business], rather than a more general reflection upon the plaintiffs character or qualities.” Liberman, 80 N.Y.2d at 436, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857, 605 N.E.2d 344. The allegedly defamatory statement must be targeted at the specific standards of performance relevant to the plaintiffs business and must impute conduct that is “of a kind incompatible with the proper conduct of the business, trade, profession or office itself.” Id.; see also Aronson v. Wiersma, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 593, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 483 N.E.2d 1138 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Van-Go Transp. Co. Inc. v. New York City Bd. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se (B) holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision (C) holding statements regarding plaintiffs unsatisfactory job performance not defamatory per se (D) holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under colorado law (E) holding that news broadcast which fell within several of the historical categories for per se defamation was not defamatory per se where plaintiffs identity was not shown on its face
Output: (C)
us to “refrain from adjudicating these issues at this time because the record on appeal is incomplete,” and because the appropriate tool for raising these claims is a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas corpus petition. However, the government contends that if we do address DeCecco’s ineffective-assistance claims, we should reject them because the representation provided by defense counsel was not substandard and did not prejudice DeCecco. Because the present record is sufficient for us to conclude that DeCecco’s defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, we find it efficient to address his claims now. None of the instances of allegedly ineffective assistance to which DeCecco points caused him prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (<HOLDING>). The district court clearly decided to deny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that noneonstitutional errors in civil suits are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case (B) holding that even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable he must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense and not merely that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding (C) holding that the combined effect of trial counsels errors should be considered (D) holding that a habeas petitioner must show that counsels errors  actually prejudiced him (E) holding counsel cannot be ineffective based on errors that the appellate court determined on direct appeal were not errors plain or otherwise
Output: (B)
purpose of talking with Lopez and Cronin — precisely what he was doing when he saw appellant in plain view. The predicate for appellant’s subsequent arrest was the consensual entry coupled with the totality of circumstances leading up to his arrest. Information received from DiLaura and the officers’ observations of appellant’s behavior before and after the entry of the Lopez apartment provided them with a reasonable suspicion that there was a valid warrant existing for appellant’s arrest and that he was in the room hiding and otherwise actively trying to avoid apprehension — reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify appellant’s short detention pending confirmation of the existence of an outstanding warrant. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (<HOLDING>). In Payton v. New York, the United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to justify detention of a criminal suspect the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion (B) holding that for a terry stop to be considered valid from its inception the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion  quoting terry 392 us at 21 88 sct at 1880 (C) holding that although roving patrols in which officers stop and question motorists about their resident status may be conducted without probable cause such stops must at least show that the stopping officer is aware of specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that a vehicle contains illegal aliens who may be illegally in the country (D) holding that an investigatory stop must be supported by specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion (E) holding that search of the passenger compartment of an automobile limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons
Output: (A)
J. Appellant believe that a traffic infraction had occurred, his stop of appellant’s car was permissible. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (B) holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent (C) holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring (D) holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion (E) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred
Output: (E)
competing for pay phone locations of location owners, neither reason compels the Plaintiffs’ definition of the relevant product market. In du Pont, the government accused du Pont of monopolizing the market for cellophane, and the issue before the Court was whether the relevant product market consisted of cellophane alone or all flexible wrappings. Id. at 380-81, 76 S.Ct. 994. Notwithstanding the government’s attempt to define the relevant market narrowly, the Court held “that cellophane’s interchangeability with the other materials mentioned suffices to make it part of this flexible packaging market.” Id. at 400, 76 S.Ct. 994. In this case, the Plaintiffs argue for a narrower market, one lacking any interchangeable commodities. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481, 112 S.Ct. 2072 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that no public cellphones 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product (B) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury (C) holding that the determination of whether a products dangers are obvious is made from the perspective of an ordinary user of the product rather than an ordinary person who is unfamiliar with the product (D) holding that a relevant market may consist of a single product or service and must be evaluated from the perspective of the choices available to kodak equipment owners (E) holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2
Output: (D)