niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
documents consist of letters, memoranda or e-mail between in-house attorneys or between an in-house attorney and outside counsel concerning the patents at issue. Although communications between in-house counsel are not communications directly to or from the client, it appears implicit in present day litigation with multiple attorneys required for proper representation that attorneys must be allowed to confer with each other regarding the representation of a client on a privileged basis in the same way that clients must be able to discuss the advice of counsel amongst themselves on a privileged basis. Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d at 637 n. 3. See also Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 1996 WL 341537 at *4; Wilstein v. San Tropai Condominium Master Assoc., 189 F.R.D. 371 (N.D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>) To the extent that the communications are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneyclient privilege could apply to communications of legal advice between nonlawyer members of management and human resources department if the communication was made in confidence for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice (B) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (C) holding that retention of an attorney to investigate an insurance claim and make a coverage determination under a policy is a classic example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney (D) holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice (E) holding that discussions between management personnel concerning legal advice given by attorney is privileged even when attorney is not physically present
Output: (E)
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Id. (quoting 13A Wright, § 3532, at 104 (2001 Supp.)). When assessing ripeness, we are required “ ‘to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 250 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). In this case, the Commission, at the parties’ request, issued an advisory statement concerning its position on the legal question of the application of the 2011 FCC amendments going forward. The parties concede and the record supports a conclusion that this dispute was b Res. Corp., No. 03-13-00533-CV, 2014 WL 4058727, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). As for the element of hardship if judicial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that requiring the utility to relocate its pipes at its own expense did not constitute a legal injury (B) holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties (C) holding that agency order requiring utility to meet certain evidentiary requirements in future proceedings did not establish imminent or sufficiently likely enforcement (D) holding that a landlords alleged threats that tenants who did not sign a lease would have to pay their own utility bills and be subject to future rent increases did not constitute a wrongful use of force or fear (E) recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings
Output: (C)
furnished”). This court need not decide at this time whether or not the Utah Supreme Court would follow Hootch. The plaintiffs’ specific claims in this case are for violations of the federal constitution’s equal protection provisions and for violations of various federal laws. Kowallis’s “rather broad dicta” appears to make the state constitutional guarantee of open schools coextensive with equal protection guarantees. The court will therefore address the defendants’ duty in the context of the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. G. The Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim (First Claim for Relief) The plaintiffs’ first claim for relief alleges that the defendants have deliberately discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their race, in violat 96 S.Ct. 943, 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55, 94 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the argument that the state and federal constitutions required appointed counsel in adoption proceeding was not preserved (B) holding that defamation action is not a proceeding arising in a bankruptcy case (C) holding no state court jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding (D) holding that parties not related to the child could not file an adoption petition and later prove the unfitness of the natural parents because the child was not available for adoption as defined in the adoption act parents had to be found unfit before petition could be filed (E) holding that indians could be denied access to state courts in connection with an adoption proceeding arising on a reservation
Output: (E)
.784 F.Supp. at 603. When plaintiffs urge a supplemental EIS should be conducted based on effects already adequately considered by the original EIS, a supplemental EIS is not required. Cronin, 919 F.2d at 449; Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1178; Hickory Neighborhood Defense League, 893 F.2d at 63; and Texas v. United States Forest Serv., 654 F.Supp. 296, 298 (S.D.Tex.1987). The burden is on the plaintiff to show that grounds exist requiring the preparation of an EIS. Robertson, 784 F.Supp. at 606. In Robertson, the district court held that when the timber cutting proposed in a site-specific project did not differ significantly from the timber cutting anticipated and evaluated in the programmatic EIS, no supplemental site-specific EIS was required. Id. See also Cronin, 919 F.2d at 449 (<HOLDING>); Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1180 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs statistics did not shed any light on the legally relevant issue because they did not indicate the group of applicants who were interviewed or even the group of applicants found qualified or the group of all applicants (B) holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific timber sale where programmatic eis considered effects of both clearcutting and group selection and sitespecific project authorized group selection (C) holding that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case need show only that he is a member of a protected group and whites are a protected group under title vii (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims
Output: (B)
child's IEP in some fashion); Rome Sch. Comm., 247 F.3d at 33 (issue was "extent of [the already eligible child's] needs for behavior management services,” and whether such services must be provided to child in IEP. to address behavior spilling over into school). While I can glean some guidance as to "need” from these cases, the fact that those children were already receiving services as eligible special education students makes the analysis somewhat different. Further, even in cases where eligibility is the predicate issue, courts do not engage in extended analysis of the differences between an ordinary understanding of "need,” as used by many parents or experts, and the statutory meaning assigned by the IDEA. See, e.g., Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.33 1369, 1374 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); but see Garda, supra, at 499-501 (stating 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed (B) holding evidence of apparent authority insufficient where patient sought services of particular doctor rather than services of hospital generally (C) holding that child who received services that school deemed 504 accommodations was ideaeligible because services rose to the level of specially designed instruction without analysis of need (D) holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption (E) recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case
Output: (C)
contains the right of passage and access to the premises. Thus, the fact that TIA had such a right does not distinguish the present case from Gibbs, in which the defendant also had a license to use the premises but was not found to have maintained or controlled the premises. The plaintiffs’ argument in this case is further weakened by the fact that, under the contract between NYCCOC and TIA, just as was the case in Gibbs, NYCCOC, the “licensor,” explicitly retained the duty of maintenance and repair. (Varvaro Deck Ex. I, Feb. 10, 2006 Revised Agreement ¶ 22.) Hence, the plaintiffs have failed to present evidence showing that TIA owned, maintained, or controlled the space to justify imposing on TIA the nondelegable duty of the owner of premises. See Lyons, 2007 WL 2265577, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiffs have not proffered any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center (B) holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own occupy or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition (C) holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises (D) holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage (E) holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability
Output: (A)
The policy’s one year limitation period “runs from the date of the occurrence of the destructive event or casualty insured against.” General State Authority v. Planet Insurance Company, 464 Pa. 162, 346 A.2d 265, 267 (1975). In General State Authority, the insured’s rental property was destroyed by fire on January 2, 1969, but it was unaware of the loss until May 10, 1971. After the claim was denied by its insurer, the insured filed suit on November 11, 1971. The policy required the insured to file suit “within twelve months next after inception of the loss.” Id. The insured argued that the one year should be measured from the date of discovery. The court held that the limitation does not run from the date the insured discovers the loss. Id.; see also Lardas, 426 Pa. 47, 231 A.2d 740 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ interrogatory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action  (B) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (C) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss (D) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a loss occurs and has its inception whether or not the insured knows of it
Output: (E)
of review and reaching its conclusion, the majority does not address whether the trial court abused its discretion in light of evidence in the record. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664 (setting out discretionary standard of review of order denying habe-as corpus). Nor does the majority give weight to the trial court’s statutory right to rely on its own personal recollection of the prior proceedings in making its determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072 § 6(b). Thus, the majority fails to consider the stipulations and waivers in the record, or any of the documents in the record other than appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, which appellant attached to his application for writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664 (<HOLDING>); Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate court can uphold a trial courts ruling on any ground appearing in the record whether urged in the trial court or not (B) holding court of appeals was to review facts in light most favorable to trial courts ruling even when no witnesses testified and all evidence was submitted in written affidavits (C) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion (D) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (E) holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant
Output: (C)
286 F.R.D. at 252. According to the Short court, the party seeking the issue-related sanction must show: "(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to timely produce it; (2) that the party that failed to timely produce the evidence had a culpable state of mind; and (3) that the missing evidence is relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 4 . The Court also notes that other courts have neglected to impose issue-related sanctions in cases involving document productions that were significantly more untimely than 3E’s late production. See e.g., Williams v. Saint-Gobain Corp., No. 00 Civ. 502, 2002 WL 1477618, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the agency cannot use insufficient evidence as a basis for finding no adverse impact (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that there was no basis for adverse inference instruction for failure to produce emails until five days before trial (E) holding that committing prisoner to administrative segregation for five days was adverse
Output: (D)
inmates and their attorneys. See id. ¶ 2. {12} Although inmates have a diminished expectation of privacy in prison, they are nonetheless protected by the provisions of the Abuse of Privacy Act. See generally Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶¶8-16, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882. Thus, to the extent that the district court below relied on Defendant’s 8, 189 (Ct.App.1972) (stating that this Court will affirm if the district court is right for any reason, as long as the opposing party had an opportunity to respond). {14} In determining whether Defendant’s telephone calls were recorded in violation of the Abuse of Privacy Act, the dispositive question in the present case is whether Defendant consented to the recording. See § 30-12-l(E)(3); see also Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶9, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882 (<HOLDING>). In Coyazo, our Court recognized that an 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception (B) recognizing a childabuse exception to marital communications privilege (C) recognizing that a partys prior consent  to the recording or monitoring of communications constitutes an exception to the abuse of privacy act (D) recognizing the prior conviction exception of almendareztorres (E) recognizing such an exception
Output: (C)
provision relevant to pretrial motions filed by a criminal defendant excluded the “time after a hearing has been held where a district court awaits additional filings from the parties that are needed for proper disposition of the motion.” 476 U.S. at 331. The Court of Appeals thus did not err in affirming the finding of the district court that the entire period between filing and final disposition of Feldhacker’s pretrial motions was excluded from the speedy trial computation. In computing the excluded period, the Court of Appeals correctly followed State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 652 N.W.2d 612 (2002), and determined that the first excludable day was September 22, 2000, the day after Feldhacker filed his pretrial motions. See, also, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. at 443, 461 N.W.2d at 561 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that State v. Recek, 263 Neb. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an excludable period under  2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion (B) holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under  3161h7a (C) holding that the 120day period commences when the applicant appears in person for the interview (D) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer (E) holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act
Output: (A)
National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 680-82, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In National Treasury Employees Union, the contested search involved urine testing of Customs Service employees to protect the integrity of the agency by discharging employees who, through their own drug use, would allegedly be unable fully to perform their duty to interdict narcotics. Id. at 682, 109 S.Ct. 1384. Justice Scalia argued that the governmental purpose provided was too generalized and speculative to find the drug testing reasonable. See id. at 684, 109 S.Ct. 1384. Thus, when operating outside the warrant requirement, a “special needs” search must be narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate purpose. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (<HOLDING>). D. Focusing the Appropriate Fourth Amendment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued (B) holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment (E) holding that random spot checks were not narrowly tailored to the purpose of ensuring an adequate amount of insurance coverage
Output: (E)
the rulings of the Alaska Supreme Court regarding releases ..., and it remains its intention to release the above described Claims. Section 3. Release by [Old Harbor]. [The release language is virtually identical to Section 2 with Old Harbor replacing Akhiok]. 8 . 852 P.2d 1146, 1150-52 (Alaska 1993). 9 . Id. at 1152. 10 . See Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Alaska 1978). 11 . See id. 12 . See Diagnostic Imaging Ctr. Assocs. v. H & P, 815 P.2d 865, 867-68 (Alaska 1991). 13 . See National Soil Servs., Inc. v. Hurst, 630 P.2d 3, 7 (Alask d 438, 440 (1963) ("joint venturers like partners owe the duty of finest loyalty and such loyalty continues throughout the life of the venture and its dissolution"); accord Lavin v. Ehrlich, 80 Misc.2d 247, 363 N.Y.S.2d 50, 52 (N.Y.App.1974) (<HOLDING>). t 19 . See Karchmar, 236 Ill.Dec. 378, 707 
 Holding statements: (A) holding partner owes fiduciary duty in dealings effecting the winding up of the partnership and the proper preservation of partnership assets during that time (B) holding that a retiring partner or the representative of a deceased partner is a creditor of the partnership in the amount of the retiring or deceased partners partnership interest (C) holding only a party to the partnership agreement can breach it and be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty relating to partnership obligations (D) holding that under the texas uniform partnership act the government was entitled to collect the  tax liability indisputably a partnership debt from any one of the general partners (E) holding that under texas law limited partner could not bring breach of fiduciary duty claims without the partnership because the partners claims would be indirect and duplicative of the partnerships claims
Output: (A)
Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1973, writ dism’d). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties
Output: (E)
him. Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 61, at 429. In addition, the law presumes that the business owner has prepared the way for those who are advancing its business interests. Caroff, supra, 146 N.J.Super. at 359-362, 369 A.2d 983; The Law of Premises Liability, supra, § 5.11; Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 61, at 429. Likewise, where an official enters an area of private property to which the public is invited, like a shopping center, he is given the protections accorded to an invitee. Knoetig, supra, 255 N.J.Super. at 40-42, 604 A.2d 619. Again, the assumption underlying that status is that the landowner has prepared the way for the entry of the public and the public official should be treated accordingly. Ibid, (citing Caroff, supra, 146 N.J.Super. 353, 369 A.2d 983 (<HOLDING>)). To the contrary, where the officer, in the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the public interest exception (B) recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other (C) recognizing distinctions between public and private areas (D) recognizing private right of action (E) holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use
Output: (C)
because the complaint seeks only an injunction against future enforcement of the helmet law. Any past injury suffered by the plaintiffs does not give them standing to enjoin future enforcement of the helmet law. Insofar as the complaint seeks an injunction against future enforcement of the helmet law based on the possible vague application of the law to the individual plaintiffs, such a claim is not ripe for review. Where there are insufficient facts to determine the vagueness of a law as applied, the issue is not ripe for adjudication. See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir.1996) (concluding that vagueness of one provision of a regulation was not ripe for review due to insufficient facts); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 2521, 135 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment (B) holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court (C) holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial (D) holding that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment but also for expenses of his defense (E) holding that the vagueness of brady handgun act not ripe for adjudication in suit for injunction but could be raised as a defense in the case of an unlikely criminal prosecution of law enforcement agents
Output: (E)
adopted by this court. Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir.2003). On this record, the district court did not err when it determined that Roberts had not offered evidence that the monitor was defective. Roberts presented only circumstantial evidence that the monitor was defective. Nevada courts have never directly held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a defect, yet some Nevada cases have relied on circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of a defect. See Van Duzer v. Shoshone Coca Cola Bottling Co., 103 Nev. 383, 741 P.2d 811, 812-14 (1987) (finding that a bottle was unreasonably dangerous and defective based on supermarket customer’s testimony); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 686 P.2d 925, 928 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In this case, even if circumstantial evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience (B) holding that drivers and witnesses testimony about car steering malfunction could be proof of defect without establishing the mechanical cause of the malfunction (C) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (D) holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony (E) holding that a cause of action does not arise in negligence when a product malfunctions or is defective and the malfunction or defect results in damage only to the product itself and produces only economic loss
Output: (B)
473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “To adequately invoke this right- and effectively cut off questioning, a suspect must indicate ‘a clear, consistent expression of a desire to remain silent.’ ” United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir.1989)). “We consider the defendant’s statements as a whole to determine whether they indicate an unequivocal decision to invoke the right to remain silent.” Id. After Adams said “Nah, I don’t want to talk, man. I mean, I,” he immediately proceeded to engage in an exchange with Ball. The phrase “I mean” signaled that Adams intended to clarify the statement, “I don’t want to talk; man,” and the statement was therefore ambiguous. See United States v. Havlik, 710 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Adams thereafter continued to talk with Ball 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action (B) holding the statement shouldnt i have an attorney so you dont ask me any illegal questions as an equivocal request for counsel (C) holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute (D) holding that the statement i guess you better get me a lawyer then was not an unequivocal invocation of the right to an attorney because the phrase i guess was equivocal (E) holding that an unequivocal invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel must be presented in a manner that a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for the presence of an attorney
Output: (D)
U.S.C.App. § 762; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 622-26, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 2013-15, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978). We disagree. In Lockerbie I, we adopted the federal common law to govern causes of action under the Warsaw Convention. 928 F.2d at 1278. In Lockerbie II, we held that damages under the Warsaw Convention should be determined “by an examination of maritime’law, which is probably the oldest body of federal common law.” 37 F.3d at 828. While two maritime statutes — DOHSA and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988) — preclude recovery for non-pecuniary loss, general maritime cases not brought under such statutory restrictions allow recovery. Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 829; Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-88, 94 S.Ct. 806, 814-16, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Looking at the language and underlying 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although congress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code federal courts may not award loss of society damages under general maritime law because the death on the high seas act expressly prohibits recovery of such damages (B) holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law (C) recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law (D) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (E) holding punitive damages not recoverable for retaliatory discharge claim under general maritime law
Output: (C)
of the offense”). 14 . 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005); see also Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d at 784. 15 . Snellenberger, 548 F.3d at 701. 16 . 520 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 433, 172 L.Ed.2d 314 (2008); Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d at 784. 17 . See United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, 125 S.Ct. at 1262). 18 . 414 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.2005) ("Although police reports and complaint applications, standing alone, may not be used to enhance a sentence following a criminal conviction, ... the contents of these documents may be considered if specifically incorporated into the guilty plea or admitted by a defendant.”). 19 .See, e.g., Almazan-Becerra, 537 F.3d at 1098-1100 (<HOLDING>); Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d at 1132 (district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (B) holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient (C) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea (D) holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction (E) holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea
Output: (C)
determined that Salim lacked standing under the doctrine of third-party standing. See App. 19. It is true, as the bankruptcy court noted, that a plaintiff generally may not establish standing on ng does not undermine the Court’s conclusion that Salim has standing to bring this case. In sum, the Court concludes that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that Sal-im lacks standing. If Salim lacked standing, the Court would not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of the parties’ dispute. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Since it concludes that Salim does’ have standing to pursue his claims, however, the Court may now consider the bankruptcy court’s determination that Salim failed to state a claim. See, e.g., Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Mera v. City of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (B) holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial (C) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (D) holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim (E) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
Output: (E)
by Title VII, may be subject to mandatory arbitration only if the arbitral forum permits the effective vindication of those rights. “So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (quotation omitted). If, then, the splitting or sharing of the costs of the arbitral forum under a particular arbitration agreement effectively prevents the vindication of a plaintiffs statutory rights, those rights cannot be subject to mandatory arbitration under that agreement. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 763 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1099, 120 S.Ct. 1833, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that gilmer plainly indicates that an arbitral cost allocation scheme may not be used to prevent effective vindication of federal statutory claims (B) holding the plain language of  1325b2 unambiguously indicates that prospective not historical expenses are to be used to calculate disposable income (C) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state (D) holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure (E) holding that igras specific grant of federal jurisdiction for certain actions indicates congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to those instances
Output: (A)
only to effect the property and income of the Corporation. {11} Here, Plaintiff has offered no proof that a resolution was adopted by Defendant’s board of directors, and since Article VIII’s sue or be sued clause can only be made effective pursuant to the requirements set out in Section D of Article XVI, we conclude that no waiver was created. See Ninigret Dev. Corp., 207 F.3d at 30. {12} Plaintiff contends that federal law is clear that the simple appearance of a sue or be sued clause in the charters of Section 17 corporations serve as a general waiver of sovereign immunity. We disagree. Our review of the law indicates that a sue or be sued clause will only accomplish a waiver when the clause clearly expresses an intent to waive immunity. Parker Drilling Co., 451 F.Supp. at 1136-37 (<HOLDING>); S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sue or be sued clause in corporate charter served as a waiver because the clause had no restrictions or limitations and was a clear explicit and unambiguous waiver (B) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous (C) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (D) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (E) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
Output: (A)
8 OES 136.643 provides, in relevant part: “In the trial of * * * a person accused or charged with the commission of a crime, the person so charged or accused shall, at the own request of the person, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness!.] * * * The defendant or accused, when offering testimony as a witness in the own behalf of the defendant, gives the prosecution a right to cross-examination upon all facts to which the defendant or accused has testified and which tend to the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or accused.” 9 In Lotches, the court noted that, in addition to the federal constitution, Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution gives criminal defendants a right to testify in their own behalf. 331 Or at 483 n 10. But see Rogers, 330 Or at 298-99 (<HOLDING>). 10 State v. Mai, 294 Or 269, 656 P2d 315 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (B) holding violation of right to testify could not be harmless (C) holding that right to be heard in article i section 11 incorporates framers contemporaneous understanding which did not recognize criminal defendants right to testify (D) recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected (E) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right
Output: (C)
elderly father who was not active in Tejas’s business. Since 1993, Payne and his father have been the only directors. The record also raises other fact questions as to alter ego; for example, in Payne’s deposition testimony (which was offered in the motion to deny summary judgment) Payne testified that he neither knew his specific title nor who the other directors were. Tejas’s corporate meetings were held at Payne’s car dealership office. The record also shows that Payne used some of his personnel from the dealership to handle bookkeeping functions for Tejas. Moreover, the record reveals that of the $379,510.13 fisted as accounts receivable in Tejas’s balance sheet, $292,162.00 of that amount is allocated as accounts receivable payable to “EM Payne.” See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 (<HOLDING>). Payne argues that these facts are not enough 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person (B) holding that the us attorneys office is the alter ego of the united states exercising its sovereign power of prosecution (C) holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation (D) holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law (E) holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud
Output: (C)
testimony, found thatthe agents were authorized to enter Defendant’s home in order to conduct a protective sweep incident to Defendant’s arrest because it was reasonable for them to ensure that no one was in the house before proceeding with the warrant. See State v. Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 22-27, 142 N.M. 18, 162 P.3d 173 (discussing the law of protective sweeps and what is needed to justify a sweep pursuant to an arrest). We disagree. {14} We recognize that a protective sweep of a residence may be reasonable whether incident to an arrest taking place inside the residence or to an arrest taking place a short distance from the residence if a reasonably prudent officer would anticipate a threat to officer safety. See United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 776-77 (6th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282, 1284 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence (B) holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence (C) holding that the search of purses could not be justified as a protective search for weapons when police had control of the purses (D) holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances (E) recognizing that a protective search of a residence may be justified when the defendant is arrested outside of the home
Output: (E)
in keeping with the literal direction of the writ and order — not the mere fact of removal— that gives rise to Pahnke’s cause of action. We must therefore decide whether Pahnke’s immediate removal consistent with the express declaration of the writ and order is the kind of discretionary act that warrants the protection of official immunity. See Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 656. A nondiscretionary, ministerial duty is one that is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. at 659 (quotation omitted). Minnesota appellate courts have recently applied the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties to various law-enforcement actions. See, e.g., Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 492 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Thompson, 707 N.W.2d at 675 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant (B) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (C) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search (D) holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records (E) holding that policy requiring police officers to discontinue vehicular pursuit if they could establish offenders identity imposed a ministerial duty and that officers did not have discretion to ignore the policy
Output: (E)
the jury with explicit details of the contents of the video that the jury could use to assess the film's appeal to children's prurient interests, its offensiveness to community standards about what is appropriate for children and its lack of other value for 12- to 14-year-olds. The jury was able to make its own decision as to the credibility of the witnesses. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506. ¶ 24. The United States Supreme Court, federal courts, and Wisconsin courts are uniform in concluding that questions of whether material appeals to prurient interests, satisfies community standards for potentially obscene material or has literary, artistic, political, scientific or educational value may be appropriately decided by a jury. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in an obscenity case it was not error to fail to require expert affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene (B) holding that disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission was harmless error (C) recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case (D) holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance (E) holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible
Output: (A)
only shortly after the events at issue here.”). 36 . In Daniels, an inmate brought a civil rights action to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell on a pillow, left by a deputy sheriff, on the stairs of the jail where he was confined. 474 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 662. 37 . It bears noting that circuit courts are split to this day as to whether a showing of intentional interference with the familial relationship is required. Six circuit courts require a showing of intentional interference with the familial relationship, and either explicitly state or suggest that the intent requirement applies to parents’ relationships with both minor and adult children. See Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 190-92 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Lowery v. Cnty. of Riley, 522 F.3d 1086, 1092 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983 as any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it because njeither the supreme court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association (B) holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act (C) recognizing this rule (D) holding that only deliberate executive conduct gives rise to a familial association violation and explicitly noting that this rule applies to both minor and adult children (E) holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action
Output: (D)
guilty of the aggravated robbery committed on the dates alleged in the indictment. Appellant also admitted using a knife in all four of the aggravated robberies. He persisted in and adamantly stuck to his admission of guilt. Because appellant at the punishment phase of his trial clearly and unequivocally admitted he was guilty of each of the four aggravated robberies of which the jury found him guilty, he has waived any evidentiary errors which occurred during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. McGlothlin, 896 S.W.2d at 186; DeGarmo, 691 S.W.2d at 661. Appellant’s error complained of in point of error number four is specifically waivable. Sims, 502 S.W.2d at 731; Creel v. State, 493 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Sheridan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, appellant’s complaints raised in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial (B) holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial (C) holding defendant waived right to contest lawfulness of search on appeal after he had admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial (D) holding that a showing of actual prejudice was required where the defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial (E) holding evidence admissible in punishment phase of trial because evidence had bearing on appellants personal responsibility and moral guilt
Output: (C)