niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
claims and state law false arrest/false imprisonment claims. See Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435 (stating that probable cause constitutes an absolute bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest); Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.2002) (“[T]he existence of probable cause to arrest Dahl defeats her First Amendment claim.”). In addition, because any contact ■with Sada, and any injury therefrom, was incidental to a lawful arrest, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Sada’s battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress c arrest for battery, the district court properly concluded that the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct is moot. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause (B) holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant (C) holding that when an arrest is properly supported by probable cause as to any offense neither the officers subjective reliance on an offense for which no probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense vitiates the arrest (D) holding that the subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause (E) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed
Output: (C)
that the agents found items relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine both inside and outside of defendant’s residence. To the extent that defendant simply argues that there is a lack of evidence showing any connection between his possession of the firearms and his offenses, defendant both disregards the strong record evidence demonstrating otherwise and misplaces the burden of proof under § 501.2(a) upon the government. Additionally, to the extent that defendant, for the first time, asserts in his appellate brief that his possession of the firearms was for his personal protection, rather than for any purpose connected with his offenses, such an alternative explanation comes too late. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(a); cf. United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849-50 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In sum, because defendant did not demonstrate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed (B) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (C) holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument (D) holding that this courts consideration of a new argument in support of a sentencing objection raised before the district court was proper where the additional argument entailed a question of pure law and thus did not deprive any party of the opportunity to offer relevant evidence (E) holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it
Output: (D)
Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition and is therefore subject to the most exacting scrutiny. Shaw, at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. Such action will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2825. The defendants first argue that the court should not apply the strict scrutiny reserved for racial classifications to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim because Native Americans are a political group, not a race. They rely on a line of Supreme Court decisions holding that federal statutes singling out Native Americans for special treatment do not violate equal protection guarantees. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state failed to assume even partial jurisdiction in compliance with public law 280 (B) holding that a state law that allowed the state to assume only partial jurisdiction over indians and indian territory did not require strict scrutiny and was rationally related to a valid state objective (C) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (D) holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country (E) holding that the state of oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to make an arrest within indian country where the state had neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over the reservation
Output: (B)
The Court emphasized that reasonable strategic choices by counsel after an appropriate investigation of the facts and law are “virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Those “made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” .Id. The responsibility rests with petitioner to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”, Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citation omitted). The decision to. rely on the plea colloquy for evidence , related to respondent’s extreme stress, caused by his inability to support his family was found reasonable because it prevented the State from cross-e 2015) (<HOLDING>). With respect to ineffective assistance of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state court unreasonably applied strickland test because counsels failure to investigate expert testimony which called into doubt the central forensic evidence linking the inmate to the crime was ineffective assistance and prejudicial to defendant (B) holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy (C) holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding that counsels failure to present expert testimony explaining a possible causal link between defendants childhood and his crime was prejudicial (E) holding that the state court unreasonably applied chapman but that the error was not prejudicial under brecht
Output: (A)
When presented with claims of error in the district court’s admission of evidence, we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.1997). We give the district court great deference in such matters, and we will not substitute our judgment in place of the judgment of the district court. United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905-06 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir.1998). We only consider whether any reasonable person could agree with the district court. 1. Opening the door. Senffner argues that the district court erred by admitting his prior civil contempt at his criminal contempt trial, and that he was unfairly prejudiced by its admission, relying on United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) vacated on other grounds by Boyd v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exclusion of defendants nephews prior inconsistent statement constituted reversible error (B) recognizing potential reversible error by disclosing defendants prior jury conviction (C) holding that admission of evidence of defendants gross receipts was reversible error (D) holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error (E) holding that the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction
Output: (B)
rule never presented for approval by this Court, he argues that filing a complaint should not toll the statute of limitations when a complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. ¶ 23. The plaintiffs cite Jackpot Mississippi Riverboat, Inc. v. Smith as an example of this Court applying tolling to a case previously dismissed for want of prosecution. Jackpot, 874 So.2d 959, 961 (Miss. 2004). In Jackpot, when examining the dates relevant to a determination of whether the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs case, this Court stated: Smith and Richardson filed their “first” complaint for malicious prosecution on July 7, 1995, a little more than two months shy of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So.2d 1246, 1256 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). On April 7, 2000, Smith and Richardson’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same for malicious prosecution (B) holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed (C) holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution (D) holding when a motion for postconviction relief is not properly filed  2244s statute of limitations is not statutorily tolled (E) holding that the plain meaning of  2244d2 is that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any properly filed federal habeas corpus petition
Output: (B)
order is reversed; and (3) the need to develop a uniform body of law, giving consideration to the existence of inconsistent orders of other courts and whether the question presented by the challenged order will not otherwise be reviewable upon entry of final judgment. Tenn. R.App. P. 9(a). As applied to criminal actions, the Rule specifically provides that “[permission to appeal under this rule may be sought by the state and defendant in criminal actions.” Tenn. RApp appeal when a trial court precludes the death penalty by finding a defendant mentally retarded leaves no appellate recourse at all. We conclude that the question raised in this case is one appropriately raised under Rule 9(a)(1). Cf. People v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal.4th 999, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 851, 155 P.3d 259, 264-65 (Cal.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal (B) holding that because the standard of review for factual determinations on direct appeal is higher than the standard applied during an interlocutory appeal of a preliminary injunction the interlocutory appeal normally will not establish law of the case on factual matters (C) holding that although the california legislature did not expressly provide for appeal from a trial courts determination that a defendant was mentally retarded allowing such an appeal was consistent with california penal code section 1238 which provides for interlocutory review of orders or judgments dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any portion of the action (D) holding that a lower court should not take any action once appeal is filed which would interfere with the appeal process or with the appellate courts jurisdiction (E) holding that a district courts refusal to address the merits of defendants motion asserting qualified immunity prior to the close of discovery was a conclusive determination for the purpose of allowing an interlocutory appeal
Output: (C)
amicus brief filed in Lee, DOJ asserts, inter alia, that the lawsuits with similar allegations filed against other schools should not trigger the public disclosure bar.” Relators did not explain how the arguments made in the amicus brief applied to the district court’s order, how that brief showed an intervening change in the law, or how those arguments or legal authorities showed that the district court erred. Ill We recognize that by looking to the substance of the motion and the relief requested, we place the burden “upon the party seeking to appeal the obligation to determine for itself whether a motion denominated as a[n FRCP] 59(e) motion does in fact fall within the parameters for which that rule is designed.” Fincher v. Keller Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 691, 693 (3d Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). This result, however, is required by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence (B) holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider (C) holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal (D) holding that a motion filed as a rule 59e was not a motion to alter or amend the judgment and did not toll the time to file an appeal because the motion for costs was wholly collateral to thejudgment on the merits (E) holding that the march of time began for the period in which to file a rule 59e motion on the date the court entered an order that was immediately appealable
Output: (D)
in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required in an indictment against his principal. Idaho, consistent with many Thus, other jurisdictions, has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and instead treats aiding and abetting as a theory under which first-degree murder can be proved and not as a separate offense or a crime of a different nature. See State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 25, 211 P.2d 142, 145 (1949) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., United States v. Ginyard, 511 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory (B) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (C) holding the information charges one offense involuntary manslaughter and that it was sufficient to put defendant on trial upon either the theory that he was a principal or the theory that he was an aider and abettor (D) holding that plaintiff is entitled to damages in an amount to be calculated on the involuntary loan theory (E) holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges
Output: (C)
court stated that “because they are in plain view, no privacy interest exists in license plates.” It reasoned that the officer’s registration check on the defendant’s vehicle “neither unreasonably burdened nor restricted [the defendant’s] travel” because “[u]nless a registration check reveals information which raises a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the subject remains unaware of the check and unencumbered.” Id. {12} We agree with this reasoning of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Because a license plate is located in plain view, a license plate check is not intrusive, and because the United States Supreme Court has held that VIN searches are not Fourth Amendment violations because of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Class, 475 U.S. at 118-19, 106 S.Ct. 960 (<HOLDING>), license plate checks are not searches under 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as part of an undoubtedly justified traffic stop officers checking for the vin in order to run a search is sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vin (B) holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that this lack of any reasonable expectation of continued employment suffices to establish the lack of property in the constitutional sense and hence the lack of a viable due process claim (E) holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vin on a visible exterior portion of a vehicle and recognizing that a different fourth amendment question would have been presented if the vin had been on an interior portion of the vehicle
Output: (A)
premise. Landgraf holds that: When a ease implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). However, neither of these decisions addressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding new statute applicable only prospectively (B) holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively (C) holding that state statutes are exempt from the implied limitations of the commerce clause only when the congressional direction to do so has been unmistakably clear (D) holding that there is no clear congressional intent that firreas statutes of limitations 12 usc  1821e12a  apply only prospectively (E) holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent
Output: (D)
Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834 (citing Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 472, 55 Tex. B.J. 520, 521 (1992)). But we suggested that disqualification is required if the firm and nonlawyer fail to ‘‘strictly adhere ” to an effective screening process. Phoenix Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834 (citing ABA Comm, on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526 (1988)) (emphasis added). A law firm that directs a nonlaw-yer employee to work on a forbidden case and that reasonably should know about the conflict of interest is not strictly adhering to a screening process. When this happens, the threat that confidences will be shared becomes unduly high, and disqualification is required. See Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 467-68. This holding is in line with our previous opinions. See Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 468 (<HOLDING>); Am. Home, 985 S.W.2d at 76 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff was otherwise qualified for position where he had worked for defendant employer for approximately twentyeight years (B) holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination (C) holding that disclosure was required where the current employer permitted the paralegal to work on the same litigation she had worked for at her prior firm even after becoming aware that she had previously worked on the case (D) holding that under title vii a temporary employee was employed by both her temp agency and the business at which she worked on a temporary basis (E) holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants
Output: (C)
v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir.2007). This court has therefore recognized that: [a]n egregious, yet isolated, incident can alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and satisfy the fourth element necessary to constitute a hostile work environment. The inverse is also true: Frequent incidents of harassment, though not severe, can reach the level of pervasive, thereby altering the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such that a hostile work environment exists. Thus, the required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, while an 369, 2001 WL 1223628, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Paul’s claims are distinguishable from cases 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs allegations that coworker attempted to grab her breast and later touched and rubbed her thigh that customers made sexually threatening remarks and that supervisors did not respond to her complaints about these incidents did not support a hostile work environment claim (B) holding that two alleged incidents of hostile treatment in which a supervisor made a comment about the plaintiffs body and touched her breasts with some papers did not constitute a hostile work environment (C) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters (D) holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment (E) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim
Output: (A)
regarding the nature of an alleged debt is distinct from consulting an attorney to institute a CPA claim. Although the latter is insufficient to show injury to business or property, the former is not.” (citations omitted)). The injury element can be met even where the injury alleged is both minimal and temporary. Mason v. Mortg. Am., Inc., 114 Wn.2d 842, 854, 792 P.2d 142 (1990). ¶42 Here, Frias alleges she was denied the chance to obtain a reasonable loan modification because U.S. Bank refused to participate in mediation in good faith. Where a more favorable loan modification would have been granted but for bad faith in mediation, the borrower may have suffered an injury to property within the meaning of the CPA. Cf. Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 176 Wn.2d 771, 795, 295 P.3d 1179 (2013) (<HOLDING>). ¶43 Frias further alleges numerous illegal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default (B) holding a cpa injury was pleaded where a falsely backdated notarization allowed a foreclosure sale to happen earlier than it could have otherwise cutting short the borrowers chance to close sale on the real property with a private purchaser for a higher price (C) holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale (D) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser (E) holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable
Output: (B)
which states that: An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceed ing, or in the institution of, or during the course and as part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding. Since the rules of absolute privilege to publish defamatory materials apply to the publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy, Rohda’s tenth claim for relief is dismissed. Moreover, at least with respect to a claim based on Section 652D, publicity given to private life, the matters disclosed were of legitimate public concern as a matter of law. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 329 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Peterson’s Motion for Summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unconstitutional a state decision awarding damages against a broadcasting company for invasion of privacy by disclosing the name of a rape victim in violation of a state statute which prohibited such disclosures (B) holding that  14 prohibits the awarding of costs against the state as a defendant (C) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state
Output: (A)
evidence in the record that union funds were used to create or facilitate distribution of these lists, Section 401(g) appears to be inapplicable on these facts. 21 . The majority of courts presented with this issue have similarly recognized the inflexibility of Section 402's mandate with respect to the statutory remedy for established violations of LMRDA. See Usery v. Dist. 22, United Mine Workers of America, 543 F.2d 744 (10th Cir.1976) (citing Wirtz and the “mandatoiy language” of Section 402 in reversing district court's decision not to order new elections following a finding that the defendant had violated Section 401); see also Marshall v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 486 F.Supp. 79, 85 (D.D.C.1980); Wirtz v. Local Union No. 1622, 285 F.Supp. 455, 456 (N.D.Cal.1968) (<HOLDING>); Brock v. Local 630, Int’l Brotherhood of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in light of the established violation of section 401 and the supreme courts decision in wirtz the court has no discretion as to whether or not to order new elections (B) holding that the section is unconstitutional as applied to private individuals in nonfederal elections in light of supreme court precedent (C) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (D) holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states (E) holding that the balancing test established by the united states supreme court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision
Output: (A)
(quoting Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir.1986)). 17 . See Zambuto v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 544 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir.1977); Tatum v. Community Bank, 866 F.Supp. 988, 994 (E.D.Tex.1994). 18 . Dft.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2. 19 . See generally Pit's Aff., Affidavit of Carla Nowell set forth in Plt.’s Resp., and Cloutman Aff. 20 . See Cloutman Aff. at Ex. A & Ex. C(3). 21 . See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996). 22 . Franks v. Bowman Transportation, 495 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir.1974) (addressing limitations period under predecessor statute to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); see also Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 23 . See Zambuto, 544 F.2d at 1335; Tatum, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although it was not clear why plaintiff apparently filed the complaint in this action prior to his receipt of the righttosue notice since issuance of a righttosue notice is not a jurisdictional requirement however the eeocs subsequent issuance of the notice satisfies the statutory requirements in this case (B) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (C) holding that mailing of eeoc righttosue notice to address designated by claimant suffices to start 90day period for bringing title vii action unless claimant through no fault of his own failed to receive the notice or for some other equitable reason statute should be tolled until he actually receives notice (D) holding that the state was estopped to argue that the 90day notice period  expired on a date prior to the expiration date it cited to the claimant (E) holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant
Output: (C)
that both designated representatives for each of the proposed initiatives at issue here complied with this statutory mandate. In so doing, they certified that they were aware not only that they were required to attend all meetings at which their proposed initiatives would be considered, but also that any motion for rehearing would be heard at the Board's next meeting or within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the seven-day deadline for filing such motions. See § 1-40-107(1)(a). The email to Mr. Ottke and Mr. Slota from the Secretary of State's office suggesting that they were not required to attend the meeting on the motion for rehearing did not relieve them of their clear statutory obligation to do so. Cf. Comm. for Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 892 (Colo.1992) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion T31 Because the Title Board 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 1991 mixedmotive amendments do not apply to  1981 based on an independent analysis of the amendments and  1981 (B) holding that the ada amendments act does not apply to preamendment conduct (C) holding that where initiative proponents were provided with copies of relevant statutory amendments and related documents proponents did not reasonably rely on statements by the secretary of state to assume that amendments did not apply to their initiative (D) holding that amendments to procedure apply to both pending and future matters (E) holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively
Output: (C)
more forgiving principle of relation back than the one provided in this rule, it should be available to save the claim."); Arendt v. Vetta Sports, Inc., 99 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.1996). There is no meaningful distinction, however, between Illinois law on relation back and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B). See Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir.2001) ("Illinois law on relation back is not more forgiving [than federal law].”). Illinois permits relation back when the same two requirements are met: "(1) the original complaint was timely filed, and (2) the amended complaint grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading.” Id.; see also Porter v. Decatur Mem'l Hosp., 227 Ill.2d 343, 317 Ill.Dec. 703, 882 N.E.2d 583, 591-92 (2008) (<HOLDING>). 38 . See R.46 at 3. 39 . There are several 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing similarities between illinois and federal law on relation back (B) holding expert testimony on probative similarities between works is unnecessary where the works are not highly technical and the jury is capable of recognizing and understanding the similarities between the works without the help of an expert (C) holding that despite some differences between the charged offense and the collateral crime similarities between the two were striking enough to establish a unique crime pattern (D) holding federal law does not prevent a state from choosing between prospective operation of its decision and that of relation backward (E) holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law
Output: (A)
may be proper where the defendant shows that undisputed facts negate any one element of a cause of action. See Jones v. St. Charles County, 181 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Mo.App. E.D.2005). Missouri Approved Instruction (“MAI”) 26.01 sets out the required elements for a breach of unilateral contract claim. MAI—Civil 6th 26.01; Cf. Gramex Corp. v. Green Supply, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Mo. banc 2002) (stating that MAI 25.04 sets out the required elements for a products liability claim). Analyzing the summary judgment decision in this case under the elements set forth in MAI 26.01 is appropriate because Garst has no higher standard to survive summary judgment than is required to submit the claim to a fact finder. Cf. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. banc 2007) (<HOLDING>). MAI 26.01, the verdict director for a breach 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court may not grant summary judgment without giving plaintiff an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or allowing a hearing on defendants motion (B) holding that analyzing summary judgment decisions under the standards set forth in mai 3124 is appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive summary judgment than is required to submit the claim to a jury (C) holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification (D) holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment (E) holding because trial court fully considered plaintiffs response to summary judgment motion failure to render summary judgment without notice or hearing harmless thus trial court was not required to vacate the summary judgment and then reinstate it to accomplish the same end
Output: (B)
a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) Even assuming that Petitioner’s crime was a misdemeanor, the statute permits imprisonment “in a county jail for not exceeding one year.” Id. Because the statute permits imprisonment for one year, the one-year requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) is met even if Petitioner’s crime was a misdemeanor. iar-Lopez, the state court never declared Petitioner’s offense to be a misdemeanor. Id. at 845. Because section 17(b) does not apply and because the minute order designated Petitioner’s conviction as a felony, we hold that Petitioner’s conviction was a felony. See United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), recognized as overruled in other part by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the standard was met when two actions were related to the same assets and were based upon almost identical breaches of fiduciary duty (B) holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense (C) holding that proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not a necessary element in a conviction for the commission of the felony (D) holding in circumstances identical to petitioners here that the requirements of  17b1 and 3 of the california penal code were not met and accordingly the conviction was a felony (E) holding that requirements of apprendi were not met where facts on which sentence enhancement was based were not charged and submitted to the jury
Output: (D)
with WTA and WPLLC amount to no more than providing counsel to his clients and being copied on various emails written by WTA members. Second, Wright’s claims under Title 18, except the civil RICO claims, failed as a matter of law because no private remedy exists for the criminal violations Wright alleged. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979) (noting that the Supreme Court “has rarely implied a private right of action under a criminal statute”). Third, Wright’s First Amendment claim failed to state a cause of action because he had failed to allege any factual evidence indicating a nexus between the conduct of Defendants — all of whom are private actors — and state action. See Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the  entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (B) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (C) holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law (D) holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver (E) holding that there is no private right of action against a state governmental entity for violations of the texas constitution
Output: (A)
and that the court finds that as such it does not offend the First Amendment. D. The City’s Required Message Does Not Violate the First Amendment The Ordinance requires Plaintiffs to inform City residents on the cover of Plaintiffs’ yellow pages directories and on their websites about the City’s opt-out procedure. SMC 6.255.110. Plaintiffs assert that the City’s required message is compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. (Pis. Reply at 11-12.) The Supreme Court has upheld compelled commercial speech where the state required inclusion of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in advertising. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985); see also United States v. Schiff 379 F.3d 621, 630-31 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the media has a qualified privilege to report the information they receive from government officials (B) holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt (C) holding employer thirdparty beneficiary could compel arbitration (D) holding that government could compel website operator to post factual information about potential criminal liability patrons could face if they used the website to evade taxes (E) holding that a summary plan description need only provide information about the general circumstances in which benefits could be lost
Output: (D)
discretion in determining the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.” United States v. Wallace, 722 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir.1983). Miller first asserts the lyrics were irrelevant. To the contrary, Miller testified at trial that he did not possess the handgun. Miller’s testimony made possession of the handgun a fact of consequence at trial. Accordingly, the lyrics became relevant on cross examination to show Miller, in fact, possessed the handgun because police confiscated the handgun with “one in the chamber,” paralleling the lyrics posted by Miller. The lyrics, thus, had a “tendency to make a fact”—Miller’s possession of the handgun—“more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R.Evid. 401; see also United States v. Moore, 639 F.3d 443, 447-48 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Miller also claims the lyrics were “unfairly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack (B) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (C) holding rap recordings about dealing cocaine were relevant to show knowledge and motive when the defendant testified he had never purchased or sold cocaine (D) holding that the term cocaine base in 21 usc  841b1 refers to cocaine in its chemically basic form which includes but is not limited to crack cocaine (E) holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine
Output: (C)
of the state’s expansive definition of "building” to include "any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons ... or an inclosed motor truck, or an inclosed motor truck trailer.” N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00(2). 9 . Lynch asserted that the district court's consultation of the facts underlying his attempted burglary conviction, as stated in his federal PSR, violated Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607, and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). Shepard instructed .1995) (concluding district court may not use facts alleged in federal PSR prepared for current conviction to determine whether prior conviction was "crime of violence” under the Guidelines); United States v. Pearson, 77 F.3d 675, 677 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Although New York Penal Law § 265.03 was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand not required where district court relied on federal psr that incorporated facts from state psr not objected to by defendant to determine prior conviction was controlled substance offense for purposes of career offender sentence enhancement under guidelines (B) holding that district court may find facts to support both factors by adopting psr (C) holding that defendant adopted facts found in the psr by not objecting (D) holding that the career offender guideline could not directly apply when there was an unsentenced conviction but allowing the district court on remand to consider departing from the guidelines in order to sentence a defendant whose conduct delayed his convictions as if the career offender provision applied (E) holding that the district courts reliance on the psr to characterize the defendants prior offense for enhancement purposes was error
Output: (A)
of death which does not meet these requirements is voidable by the donor (if he recovers) or his personal representative. Hulley v. Chedic, 22 Nev. 127,146, 36 P. 783 (1894). In other words, a gift in contemplation of death'is presumptively voidable by the personal representative of the deceased, and the presumption may be rebutted by the donee with clear and convincing evidence of the six elements listed above. Although Goldsworthy and Hulley are the only Nevada cases ever to have examined the gift causa mortis doctrine, and they have never been overruled, at least one Nevada case has suggested (in a different context) that the burden of proof may not be on the donee. North Arlington Medical Building, Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Company, 86 Nev. 515, 521, 471 P.2d 240, 244 (Nev.1970) (<HOLDING>). North Arlington is not really on point, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable (B) holding that inter vivos gift to minor is presumptively effective under nrs 167040 (C) holding that the purpose of nrs 1760551 is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendants ultimate sentence (D) holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable (E) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable
Output: (B)
support a suppression court’s finding that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c) has occurred, the officer must articulate at least some fact or facts to support his inference or conclusion that the object materially impaired the driver’s view. Our consideration of other sections of the Motor Vehicle Code informs our conclusion. For example, in order to independently assess whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to suspect a violation of Section 3361 (Driving vehicle at a safe speed), a suppression court would require more than a single statement from an officer that a motorist was driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361; see Commonwealth v. Perry, 982 A.2d 1009 (Pa.Super.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we question how a suppression 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court properly determined that police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellants vehicle based on suspected violation of section 3361 where officer testified that appellant was driving fifteen miles over the 25 mph speed limit and the road was wet and slushy (B) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (C) holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation (D) holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation
Output: (A)