niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
case, the bankruptcy court determined, and the district court agreed, that Hilton was the initial transferee. On appeal, Hilton makes two arguments to the contrary. First, Hilton contends that Arlynn, not Hilton, was the initial transferee because Arlynn controlled Video Depot and directed that the funds be transfe .), 73 B.R. 52, 54 (D.D.C.1987) (concluding that principal of corporation was initial transferee when principal arranged for corporation’s purchase of cashier’s check to satisfy financial obligations independent of corporation); Still v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Jorges Carpet Mills, Inc.), 50 B.R. 84, 85 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1985) (same); see also Robinson v. Home Savings of America (In re Concord Senior Housing Foundation), 94 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1988) (<HOLDING>). Hilton urges us to reject the rule set forth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the recipient of funds had a contractual obligation to immediately transfer them he was not an initial transferee under  550 even though the funds were eventually used to purchase stock in his name (B) holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee (C) holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers  were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers (D) holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee (E) holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds
Output: (D)
the exception applies to cases where there is a “violation[ ] of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder.” Id. “Thus, in this case the exception would apply if the alleged wrongful conduct of [Manheim] is a violation of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise with [the Forshees], and owed directly to [the Forshees].” Stocks, 3 P.3d at 724 (quotations omitted). As noted by Judge Campbell in her summary judgment order, in Harris, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the assertion of standing by a stockholder who was also a joint-guarantor of a corporation’s debts. Although the court noted that the shareholder had “suffered ... losses as a result of his status as a shareholder and joint-guarantor,” it nonetheless c 898 P.2d 709, 717-18 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Wells Fargo AG Credit Corp. v. Batterman, 229 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual shareholders of a corporation could disregard the corporate form and assert that a loan made to their corporation was usurious where the lender insisted that the shareholders incorporate an entity to receive the proceedseven though the proceeds were for the individual shareholders benefitsolely to avoid the lower usury rate for individual borrowers (B) holding that a shareholders status as a guarantor of a corporations debts did not give him standing to assert individual claims against the directors of the corporation where the shareholder was not seeking to enforce any specific obligations owed to him under the terms of the guarantee (C) holding that a shareholders status as a guarantor of a corporations debts did not give him standing to assert individual claims against a creditor of the corporation where the guarantees were never enforced and all of the injuries alleged were indirect damages suffered by the parties in their capacities as shareholders or employees (D) holding that shareholders status as personal guarantors of the debts of several automobile dealerships did not give them standing to assert claims against a creditor that provided the dealerships with floor plan financing where the causes of action pleaded by the shareholders all asserted losses sustained by them as a result of the destruction of their eorporations  and the claims were entirely derivative of causes of action which  belonged to the corporations (E) holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation
Output: (C)
F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (mental incompetence may warrant equitable tolling where alleged mental incompetence has affected petitioner’s ability to timely file); State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn.2001) (due process requires tolling of PCR statute of limitations only if petitioner is unable to manage his affairs or understand his legal rights and liabilities); Seals v. Tennessee, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000) (due process considerations may toll statute of limitations if mentally incompetent petitioner was denied the opportunity to bring a claim in a “meaningful time and manner”). But see Allen v. State, — So.2d - (Miss.App.2008), citing House v. State, 754 So.2d 1147 (Miss. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Although we have not specifically addressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no authority to toll statute of limitations based on mental incompetence (B) holding petition for writ of mandate seeking return of property does not toll the statute of limitations (C) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations (D) holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim (E) holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations
Output: (A)
resolution of Appellant’s claims of deficient stewardship—evaluated in Pennsylvania according to the three-prong inquiry into arguable merit, reasonable strategy, and prejudice—are well developed in the decisional law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 572 Pa. 343, 364-65 & n. 14, 815 A.2d 598, 611 & n. 14 (2002). The cases also discuss the overlap between federal constitutional law and Pennsylvania practice in such regard. See id. 16 . While not confronting the matter squarely in its opinion, the PCRA court accepted as a fact, during the post-conviction hearings, that trial counsel did not review Ms. Halverson’s or Mr. Basten's reports with a defense expert. See, e.g., N.T., Aug. 10, 2009, at 158-60. 17 . See generally State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 882 P.2d 747, 759-68 (1994) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Accord David L. Faigman, Jeremy A. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community (B) holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community (C) holding that expert opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissible unless technique is generally accepted as reliable in relevant scientific community (D) recognizing that dna identification of humans is generally accepted by the scientific community and is based on knowledge about the extent of genetic variation in humans identification of discrete variable polymorphic dna loci and accurate probability estimates all of which were developed through years of extensive research and validation by the scientific community (E) recognizing universal acceptance in the scientific community of the principles and techniques on which dna typing and pcr replication are based
Output: (D)
the law and policy of the United States.”); Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritchenko, No. C-99-3073, 2007 WL 2669841, at *8 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (“The act of state doctrine ordinarily does not preclude judicial review of the extraterritorial effects of acts of state.”). Federal courts considering the extraterritorial effect of foreign state actions involving property have generally looked to the situs of the property in question. See, e.g., Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1172 (6th Cir.1988) (“Generally speaking, an act of state will go unquestioned in United States courts only to the extent that it affects property whose ‘situs’ is within the territorial jurisdiction of the acting state.”); Drexel Burnham, Lambert Group Inc. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877, 881 (2nd Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Allied Bank, Int'l, 757 F.2d at 521-22 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met (B) holding that the situs of debt  for purposes of the act of state doctrine  was not in dubai when the terms of the relevant promissory note provided that the note was payable in united states dollars at the place of the holders designation (C) holding that standing at inception of the suit was not established where the note attached to the complaint was not made payable to the plaintiff and contained no endorsement even though the original note endorsed in blank was introduced at trial (D) holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder (E) holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty
Output: (B)
so-called “partial birth abortion” unconstitutional under undue burden standard). Despite the Supreme Court’s clear application of the undue burden standard in Casey and Stenberg, it has never explicitly addressed the standard’s tension with Salerno. In the instant case, while recognizing that this court has yet to address the issue, the district court followed the majority of circuits that apply the Casey and Stenberg standa .3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir.1999) (noting inconsistency between Casey and Salerno, and following “great weight of circuit authority holding that Casey has overruled Salerno in the context of facial challenges to abortion statutes”), amended on denial of reh’g, 193 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.1999); Women’s Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193-96 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that schlitz was overruled to that extent (B) holding that the bankruptcy reform act effectively overruled wrenn (C) holding that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi (D) holding that casey effectively overruled salerno (E) holding that lynch has been effectively overruled by subsequent cases
Output: (D)
is no dispute that Lin’s second motion to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely and number-barred because her removal order became final in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). Lin contends that the Chinese government’s awareness of her religious activities in the United States, and changed conditions for Christians in China, constitute a material change in country conditions excusing her motion from the applicable time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). We do not reach that issue, however, because we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion based on her failure to demonstrate her prima facie eligibility for the underlying substantive relief. See Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Lin’s assertions, the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing that an aliens ability to secure reopening depends on a demonstration of prima facie eligibility for relief which means she must show a realistic chance that she will be able to obtain such relief internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that the act of slamming  is objectively sufficiently serious to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted (D) recognizing that to survive dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that remand is not required where there is no realistic possibility that absent the errors the ij or bia would have reached a different conclusion internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (B)
to appeal an order overruling a claim of privilege would both cause the privilege-holder’s fears to be realized and deprive the privilege-holder of any meaningful remedy. Absent a stay and an immediate appeal, the possessor of putatively privileged material will repeat to others what the client told him or her in confidence, and, if it turns out that the claim of privilege was meritorious, a later appeal will not be able to undo the harm. Once putatively privileged material is in the open, the bell has been rung, and cannot be unrung by a later appeal. See Kennedy, supra at 944 (“There is no effective means of reviewing[,] after a final judgment!,] an order requiring the production of putatively protected material.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Dennis, 859 A.2d at 1270, 1278 (Pa.2004)) (<HOLDING>) (alterations in Kennedy)). In our view, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire (B) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding that appellant is entitled to prosecutors voir dire notes if they were actually used by prosecutor to refresh his memory (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding that an order requiring a prosecutor to disclose his notes from voir dire over a claim of workproduct privilege was immediately appealable under rule 313
Output: (E)
28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) for the period prior to October 1, 1982 and 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date (B) holding that the fcia rate should apply to a march 30 1982 judgment against a private party for the entire postjudgment period (C) holding that the fcia does not apply to a july 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment (D) holding that the fcia does not apply to a september 1981 judgment against the united states for interest accruing after the acts effective date (E) holding that the fcia does not apply to a june 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date
Output: (C)
and that it thus erred in relying on that factor in exercising its discretion to deny his application. First, Rendon argues that, because Ramos was already married when he married her, his marriage was void ab initio and had no legal effect. Thus, he reasons, he cannot be found to have entered into a fraudulent marriage if he cannot legally be deemed to have entered into a marriage at all. We are not persuaded. The IJ rejected this argument on the grounds that Rendon could still be deemed to have committed fraud whether his marriage turned out to be legally valid or not (IJ Dec. at 4), and we agree. The legally relevant factor in this case is the fraud, not the validity of the marriage that was the subject of the fraud. Cf. Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 230, 234-35 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Second, Rendon argues that the IJ deprived 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage (B) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (C) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (D) holding that where the petitioners prior marriage was dissolved after the subsequent marriage the subsequent marriages validity should be analyzed under the law of the place where it was celebrated (E) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred
Output: (C)
Angelina Damitas Echeverria-Ruiz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal ng that it is “more likely than not” that the government would persecute her upon return to Guatemala. See Hakeem, 273 F.3d at 816. Echeverria-Ruiz’s due process claim fails, because even if the corroborating declaration were given full weight, it would merely confirm rather than add to other evidence in the record, and EcheverriaRuiz would still be unable to establish entitlement to withholding of removal. See Halaim v. INS, 358 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Echeverria-Ruiz did not raise, and therefore 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim (B) holding that a petitioner must show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim that he or she was denied a full and fair hearing in violation of due process (C) holding that to prevail on a claim that an immigration hearing was procedurally insufficient the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice (D) holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim (E) holding petitioner must show prejudice to prevail on due process claim
Output: (E)
burden of proving that she suffered carpal tunnel syndrome during the course and scope of her employment. Thus, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court erred in awarding workers’ compensation benefits based on the ground that the WCJ capriciously disregarded Claimant’s medical evidence. The fact that Employer presented factual evidence as opposed to medical evidence does not alter the analysis. As to the application of the capricious disregard standard in the appropriate case, I would adhere to the case law holding that such standard applies only where the party with the burden of proof is the sole party to present evidence, yet does not prevail before the fact finder. See Russel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436, 550 A.2d 1364 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The majority finds difficulty with this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies (B) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (C) holding that error is harmless if there is substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction (D) holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service (E) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award
Output: (A)
Clause. ¶50 In addition to Medina’s holding regarding nontestimonial reports, this Court has held that a testifying medical examiner may offer an opinion based on the autopsy performed by a non-testifying expert without violating the Confrontation Clause so long as the examiner testifies as to his or her own conclusions, is subject to cross-examination, and the report is not admitted into evidence. State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz. 296, 298 ¶¶ 8-9, 283 P.3d 27, 29 (2012); see also State v. Smith, 216 Ariz. 221, 228 ¶ 23, 159 P.3d 531, 538 (2007) (“Expert testimony that discusses reports and opinions of another is admissible ... if the expert reasonably relied on these matters in reaching his own conclusion.”); State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 187 ¶¶ 19-21, 236 P.3d 409, 414 (2010) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 51 Because the autopsy repoi*t was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no violation of defendants confrontation rights where minor victim testified at trial and was available for recall after admission of her hearsay statements (B) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed (D) holding that the elevenyearold victims twentyonemonth delay in reporting her grandfathers inappropriate sexual conduct was adequately explained where the child testified that she did not tell anyone about the incident because her grandfather told her not to tell she did not think anybody was going to believe her and she felt scared and threatened by the defendant (E) holding no confrontation clause violation occurred because the medical examiner testified that she formed her own opinions after reading the autopsy report was confronted and crossexamined about her opinions and the autopsy report was not admitted into evidence
Output: (E)
only a potential claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant has argued in its motion for summary judgment that plaintiff has failed to show that she suffered a physical injury. See Randolph v. Lambert, 926 So.2d 941 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that plaintiff prove “some sort of physical manifestation of injury or demonstrable harm, whether it be physical or mental, and that harm must have been reasonably forseeable to the defendant”) (quoting American Bankers’ Ins. Co. of Florida v. Wells, 819 So.2d 1196, 1208 (Miss.2001)). In response, plaintiff argues that as a result of defendant’s actions, she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication. This is insufficient to sustain her claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). Conclusion Based on the foregoing, it is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that plaintiff did not regularly perform her prescribed exercises was insufficient to support a mitigation of damages claim in the absence of physician testimony that she failed to mitigate her damages (B) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (C) holding the claimant established by clear and convincing evidence that her depression was caused by her compensable physical injury (D) holding in a case arising under the fcra that the remainder of plaintiffs complaints such as feeling frustrated and degraded are insufficient standing alone to support damages for mental anguish (E) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient
Output: (B)
consider first whether misdemeanor battery is an “infamous crime” for purposes of the Infamous Crimes Clause. Indiana courts have been asked on a handful of occasions to determine whether a particular offense falls within the Infamous Crimes Clause, and in each of those cases the offense was held to be an infamous crime. See Crampton v. O’Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923) (restraining freedom of elections); Baum v. State, 157 Ind. 282, 61 N.E. 672 (1901) (vote selling); Crum v. State, 148 Ind. 401, 47 N.E. 833 (1897) (felony larceny); “each of Taylor’s class D felony convictions was a felony which was punishable by imprisonment for a term of years[, e]ach was, therefore, an infamous crime” (citations omitted)); cf. Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, 27 Ind.App. 301, 61 N.E. 206, 206 (1901) (<HOLDING>). Compare Crampton, 193 Ind. at 557,139 N.E. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty (B) holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime (C) holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony (D) holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal (E) holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage
Output: (C)
against using other discovery methods to identify witnesses and depose them. In re Markle, 174 W.Va. at 557, 328 S.E.2d at 163 (1984). Rule 26(b)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to its federal counterpart. Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), W.V.R.C.P., a party is entitled to discover “the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.” As Professor Moore recognizes in his treatise, “Rule [26(b)(1) ] has ... been applied to permit inquiry of the names and addresses of persons from whom the interrogated party has obtained statements or otherwise interviewed in the course of trial preparation.” 4 Moore’s Federal Practice P 26.57[1], at 26-163 (1980 ed.). See also Ballard v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 67, 69 (E.D.Pa.1972) (<HOLDING>); Kelleher v. Omark Indus., Inc., 20 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (B) holding information sought by interrogatories asking whether any witnesses gave defendant a statement to be precisely the type of discovery sanctioned by rule 26bls provision for discovery of the identity and location of person having knowledge of any discoverable matter (C) recognizing applicability of discovery rule (D) holding that plaintiffs right to argue a need for discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment was preserved since plaintiff moved to vacate summary judgment ten days later and included precisely the discovery needed and not generalized statements of necessary discovery (E) holding that rejection of the appellants rule 56f request for additional discovery was proper where the information as to which he sought discovery was immaterial to the question of whether he is liable
Output: (B)
that in prior decisions, this court has dealt with the issue of duty of care owed in medical-malpractice cases in terms of the standard of care offered by providers of the same specialty in the same or similar locality. That standard is fixed by the General Assembly and reads as follows: (a) In any action for medical injury, when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving: (1) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession of the medical care provider in good standing, engaged in the same type of practice or spec .2d 636 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Courteau v. Dodd, 299 Ark. 380, 773 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate where a plaintiff failed to name each of the persons alleged to have violated the appropriate standard of care (B) holding that appellant failed to preserve error because it did not present appellate complaint to trial court (C) holding that where appellant failed to meet proof with proof in the form of expert testimony to demonstrate that appelleedoctor violated appropriate standard of care trial court did not err in granting appelleedoctors summaryjudgment motion (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding the appellant was deemed to have abandoned an issue for which he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority
Output: (D)
this may be the case, the fact that Plaintiff Berrios knew about his rights under COBRA does not relieve Defendants from their obligations under the statute. Neither a plaintiffs actual knowledge of his rights under COBRA nor his prior COBRA-related job responsibilities, dispenses with a plan administrator’s obligation to give the employee the notifications enumerated in 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a). Rodríguez v. Int'l College of Bus. & Tech., Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.P.R.2005); Torres-Negrón v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, 203 F.Supp.2d 120, 124-25 (D.P.R.2002) (stating that even where the former employee’s duties during employment included the distribution of COBRA notices, the plan administrator must provide COBRA notice); see Mlsna v. Unitel Communs., 41 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, on the record before the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (B) holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted (C) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (D) holding an employees knowledge of his cobra rights does not relieve the plan administrator of its notification duties (E) holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review
Output: (D)
devised for low-value convenience accounts. Meanwhile, brokerage houses with their so-called cash management accounts and mutual funds with their money market accounts have rendered securities subject to small recurrent transactions. In the latest developments, even the line between real estate and bank accounts is becoming indistinct, as the “home equity line of credit” creates a check-writing conduit to real estate values. Uniform Probate Code art. VI prefatory note (revised 1989 version), 8 U.L.A. 428 (1997). On this record, therefore, and in light of the realities of the financial industry, I agree that there is sufficient evidence to apply Section 6303(a) of the Multiple-Party Accounts Act, 20 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a). Cf. In re Estate of Ashe, 117 Idaho 266, 787 P.2d 252, 254 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the evolving nature of financial services in acknowledging that litigants may be able to demonstrate that stock brokerage firms are financial institutions under idahos probate code (B) holding that punitive damages award against vicariously liable law firm was not excessive in part because the award is proportionate to the law firms financial position (C) holding that representation as to financial solvency of partnership was statement of financial condition because it reflected overall economic condition of partnership (D) holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes (E) holding that the definition of covered business method patent is not limited to products and services of only the financial industry or to patents owned by or directly affecting the activities of financial institutions
Output: (A)
as dictum, we are obligated “ ‘to accord great deference to Supreme Court dicta,’ absent a change in the legal landscape.” Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164, 179 (2d Cir. 2012)). Harris has demonstrated no such change, and certainly none warranting a plain error conclusion. See United States v. Wagner-Dano, 679 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (“‘The burden of establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant claiming it.’ ” (brackets omitted) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004))). If anything, the post-Johnson landscape in this circuit suggests the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347-48 (2d Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vargas, 564 F.3d 618, 623-24 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability (C) holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite (D) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (E) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody
Output: (A)
sold these individuals various children’s Social Security information. Defendant instructed the taxpayers which particular tax return preparer to use— typically, Wanda Marion at the Memphis Currency Exchange — , and often transported them to that location and waited while the returns were being processed and filed. Each taxpayer’s individual return listed the false dependent as a “foster child” so as to entitle the taxpayer to head-of-household filing status, a dependency exemption, and earned income credit. As the mothers testified, none of the taxpayers who claimed a child as a foster child on his federal we review for clear error a district court’s application of an obstruetion-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1); United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 363, 375 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Orlando, 363 F.3d 596, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo (B) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination as to whether prior cases were consolidated for sentencing under ussg  4a12a2 and that we give the court due deference in its application of the guidelines to that determination (C) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination concerning the amount of loss for which the defendant is to be held accountable as relevant conduct under   1b13a1 (D) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination of the conduct in which defendant engaged but that we review de novo the district courts determination of whether that conduct constitutes relevant conduct for purposes of ussg  1b13a2 (E) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination of a defendants role in an offense for purposes of applying ussg  3b11a
Output: (D)
award plaintiff more than $18,513 and that it was to subtract from that amount any income actually earned by plaintiff after he left defendant. Defendant’s position at trial was that it fired plaintiff for just cause, i.e., his continual inability to get along with his coworkers. The jury was presented with a jury verdict form that permitted it to award the verdict to defendant and, instead, it rendered a verdict for plaintiff and awarded damages. Our examination of the evidence and the parties’ positions at trial in light of the jury’s verdict persuades us that it is more likely than not that the court’s instruction created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the jury that affected its award. ORS 19.125(2). See also Baker v. English, 324 Or 585, 590, 932 P2d 57 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded. 1 Three of those 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings (B) holding that the affecting substantial rights language of rule 52b means that the error must have been prejudicial it must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings (C) holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden (D) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (E) holding that the rights of an aggrieved party are substantially affected if the outcome either would have or may have been different had the error not occurred
Output: (E)
v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (6th Cir.1991). However, legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences should not be accepted as true. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405. III. Analysis A. Section 1983 claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Section 1983 is not the source of any substantive right, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). A municipality is subject to liability only if a claimant’s constitutional rights have been violated. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, finding municipal liability 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii (B) holding that in the fourth amendment context absolving the individual officer of liability shields the municipality from liability (C) holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government (D) holding that legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity (E) holding no individual liability under the adea
Output: (B)
case. In light of our decision that the parties’ dispute will not be resolved by an appraisal proceeding, we need not decide, as appellants assert, whether the district court erred by observing that the appraisal process would be subject to the statutes governing confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award. Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Compare QBE, 778 N.W.2d at 398 (stating that “[ajppraisal decisions are subject to Minn.Stat. § [§ ] 572.08-.30 (2008), the arbitration statute”) and David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required (B) holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards (E) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope
Output: (D)
in determining that Kaur failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We lack jurisdiction to consider Kaur’s contention that the immigration judge did not advise Kaur of the relief available to her because she failed to raise that issue before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional (C) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement (E) holding that the ftcas exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional
Output: (C)
habit or practice, or any other writing. In the event of conflict between this disclaimer and any other statement, oral or written, present or future, concerning terms and conditions of employment, the at-will relationship confirmed by this disclaimer shall control. Additionally, Plaintiff does not provide evidence that, notwithstanding the clear at-will disclaimer in the Employee Manual, that the Board took any actions which created an expectation that he was not an at-will employee. In fact, he admitted in deposition testimony that he understood he was an at-will employee. (Doc. # 20-2 at 168:9-169:15.) Accordingly, Plaintiff had no sufficient expectation of continued employment, and lacked any property interest that might flow from that expectation. Rooker, 841 F.Supp.2d at 1220 (<HOLDING>). The only property interest claimed here by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of a property interest in his continued employment because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned when he refused to report to work after being transferred to a new position (B) holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position (C) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law (D) holding that plaintiff did not have dueprocessprotected property interest because he failed to sufficiently plead a rule or other mutually explicit understanding from the manual or otherwise bridling the reason for which he could be terminated and thereby creating a sufficient expectation of continued employment  the critical component herewithout alleging such a bridle plaintiff was an atwill employee consequently he lacked a property interest in his continued employment (E) holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment
Output: (D)
§ 3727 does not forbid assignments of claims against the government for the benefit of creditors). Furthermore, the transfer occurred pursuant to the bankruptcy court order dated April 15, 1996, which appointed the receiver of the claim against the government “for the benefit of those entitled thereto.” Price, 173 U.S. at 424-25, 19 S.Ct. 434. The Price court made clear that transfers to an appointed receiver for the benefit of creditors exempts the debt owed from the nullifying effects of § 3727. See id. Thus, the Court finds that any assignment or transfer of Mrs. Roger’s tax refund claims to the bankruptcy trustee arose by operation of law, a transfer not affected by the proscriptive demands of the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727. See Redfield v. U.S., 27 Ct.Cl. 393 (1892) (<HOLDING>). Second, the government maintains that a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (B) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state (C) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (D) holding that an appointment by a state court in proceedings supplementary to execution against an insolvent effects a transfer of his claim against the united states by operation of law and does not come within the act prohibiting the assignment of claims (E) holding that the accused item was used by the government under an older version of  1498 and that therefore the only remedy was a suit against the united states in the court of claims now the court of federal claims
Output: (D)
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(g) provides that the court may order disclosure of information not otherwise addressed in the rule if the defendant shows a “substantial need” for the information and “the defendant is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means.” Ariz. R.Crim. P. 15.1(g). To support his motion, Benson submitted transcripts from an evidentiary hearing addressing an identical request in an unrelated case, State v. DeLuca, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CR-2001-005011. In DeLuca, experts for each side agreed that the “product rule” is the accepted model used to compute the probability and frequency of random DNA matches among a general population. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 209-10 ¶ 68, 84 P.3d 456, 474-75 (2004) (<HOLDING>); cf. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 582-83, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing continuing validity of the butner decision (B) recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented (C) recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions (D) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (E) recognizing the validity of the product rale
Output: (E)
strip frisk of an employee may only be conducted on the order of the Superintendent or Acting Superintendent. (The Officer of the Day may issue this order if the Superintendent or Acting Superintendent is absent from the facility and cannot be contacted). b. Strip frisks must be supervised by a uniformed supervisor having at least the rank of Lieutenant. c. No more than two frisking employees are to be present in addition to the supervising officer. d. Strip frisks shall be conducted in a location and manner which will cause the least possible embarrassment to the employee being searched. e. The supervising and searching officers must be of the same sex as the employee being searched. If a ranking female security supervisor is not available, the Superintendent shall designate a female (<HOLDING>) to conduct the search. f. An employee may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because there was no evidence before the court of any similarly situated employees who were promoted to a higher salary grade when plaintiff was denied a promotion plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote (B) holding that a retiree with a sixth grade education who was given little time to review the terms had stated a claim (C) holding that the record did not belie the claimants iq of 58 where he attended special education classes did not live independently and dropped out of school at a low grade either in the sixth or eighth grade (D) holding a higher grade than the employee being searched (E) holding the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than the law required is a valid raceneutral reason for excluding a juror
Output: (D)