niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
denial of the conversation with Fultz appears for the first time in the form of an affidavit, completed one day before her response to Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment and four months after the deposition. In evaluating whether an employee has been disciplined or terminated “because of’ a protected trait, we must “look at the facts as. they appear to the person making the decision.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”); see also McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Before issuing the reprimand, Dixon informed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (B) holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations (C) holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiff failed to state a claim based on conclusory allegations that a locality failed to adequately supervise officers in the proper use of force where the complaint provided no factual allegations of known widespread conduct by the localitys employees comparable to that alleged as to the plaintiff (E) holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant
Output: (A)
and tie up our water resources in this state to the detriment of our true appropriators. Hearing on S.B. 481 Before the House Agriculture Committee, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.Sess. (hearing tape MIT-79 38A, May 7, 1979, at 10:15 a.m.). 9 . In Florence, we held that an applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the "can and will" statute has been satisfied. Florence, 688 P.2d at 718, 718 n. 7; accord In re Gibbs, 856 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Colo. 1993); FWS, 795 P.2d at 840-41; see Public Serv. Co. v. Board of Water Works, 831 P.2d 470,- 478 (Colo.1992); City of Thornton, v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 926 (Colo. 1992); Fox v. Division Eng'r, 810 P.2d 644, 646 (Colo.1991). We have applied this requirement in several contexts. See FWS, 795 P.2d at 840 (<HOLDING>); Fox, 810 P.2d at 646 (holding that an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unsuccessful job applicant for governmental employment had due process right to meaningful administrative appeal of rejection when regulations established right to such appeal (B) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings (C) holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal (D) holding that a plaintiff has no absolute unconditional right of access to the courts and no constitutional right of access to prosecute frivolous or malicious actions (E) holding that the applicant failed to satisfy the statute because the applicant did not have an ownership right or access right to the reservoir site
Output: (E)
506 F.3d 1211, 1237 (10th Cir.2007) (“[Defendant] has cited to no United States Supreme Court decisions, and our own independent research has failed to produce any, holding that a state court’s erroneous application of state criminal law can result in a violation of a criminal defendant’s equal protection rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2943, 171 L.Ed.2d 872 (2008). And any argument that the OCCA’s application of the Spuehler standard was an ex post facto violation, thereby implicating his due process rights, is unavailing. The decision in Easlick did not alter the definition of criminal conduct or change the punishment for any offenses. Thus, its application did not constitute an ex post facto violation. See Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1228 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, Mr. Bates argues that the evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation (B) holding that application of a judicial decision was not an ex post facto violation when the decision did not redefine any crimes defenses or punishments (C) holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law (D) holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause (E) holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation
Output: (B)
communications in those proceedings, free of the threat of legal actions predicated upon those communications, that is the heart of the rule. The nature of the underlying dispute simply does not matter.” Echevarria, 950 So.2d at 384. Because it is undisputed that the acts complained of here occurred during and were related to the judicial proceedings, we agree with the trial court that the litigation privilege applies to LatAm’s cause of action against Holland & Knight for abuse of process. See also Am. Nat’l Title & Escrow of Fla. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 748 So.2d 1054, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (affirming the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the law firm in an action for abuse of process on the basis of a ., 935 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court has also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy (B) holding that the litigation privilege did not prohibit the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because the confinement did not occur during the course of the judicial proceedings nor in an effort to prosecute or defend the lawsuit (C) holding in the context of an attorney malpractice suit an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney it selects to defend the insured while the insurer selected the attorney to defend the insureds and controlled the ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy there is nothing in the record to indicate the insurer had any control over the details of the litigation as it was being conducted by the the attorney (D) holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law (E) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act
Output: (B)
is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. The word in ordinary usage means “must” and is inconsistent with a concept of discretion. Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed.1990). The Supreme Court has also recognized that use of the word “shall” is “language of an ‘unmistakably mandatory character.’ ” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) (“Congress could not have chosen stronger words[, that is, ‘shall order,’] to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied....”); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 223-27, 107 S.Ct. 2802, 97 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the use of the word shall in the extradition clause and the extradition act creates a mandatory duty (B) holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons (C) holding that the word may in the declaratory judgment act does not mean shall  (D) holding that the use of the word shall in  1285a of subchapter ii of the act imposes a mandatory duty on the administrator to allot all the amounts authorized to be appropriated (E) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language
Output: (A)
clause is limited to legal impossibility because “Florida law construes force majeure clauses to exclude only those delays that are excusable under the doctrine of impossibility.” To support that contention, Paradigm cites Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671, 675 (1944), but that decision does not shoulder the proposition. In Florida Power the delay was caused by a hurricane — an act of God. Id. The court was concerned with only that kind of delay. That does not mean the court was narrowing the force majeure clause at issue (and all force majeure clauses in all Florida contracts) to cover only acts of God. It appears to us that force majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable under Florida law. See Devco, 518 So.2d at 923 (<HOLDING>); St. Joe Paper Co. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims (C) holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term (D) holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment (E) holding that excessive rain excused delay under the contracts force majeure clause as a condition outside of the sellers control
Output: (E)
in which ease imputing the subsidiaries’ jurisdictional contacts to the parent would be improper. Id. at 1085 (citing Bellomo, 488 F.Supp. at 746). Similarly, the New York district court in Bellomo held that: [wjhere a holding company is nothing more than an investment mechanism[, i.e.,] a device for diversifying risk through corporate acquisitions^] the subsidiaries conduct business not as its agents but as its investments. The business of the parent is the business of investment, and that business is carried out entirely at the parent level. Where, on the other hand, the subsidiaries are created by the parent, for tax or corporate finance purposes, there is no basis for distinguishing between the business of the parent and the business of the subsidiaries. 488 F.Supp. at 746 (<HOLDING>); but see Arch v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding foreign insurance company was supercorporation engaged in underwriting and selling insurance policies through its subsidiaries (B) holding that subcontractors primary and excess insurance policies must pay first and before contractors own insurance (C) holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates (D) holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies (E) holding negligent failure to notify regulatory body of lapse of insurance policy did not arise out of underwriting of insurance
Output: (A)
concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) does not permit an award of money damages against the IRS for violating the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the court examines 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) and (b) for authority to support the judgment of the bankruptcy court. Section 106(a) and (b) addresses to what extent the government is deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings when it pursues a claim against a debtor. Subsection (a) “provides for ‘affirmative recovery/ including money judgments,” but only in limited circumstances. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance (In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc.), 850 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir.1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S.Ct. 2818, 106 L.Ed.2d 76 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Inslaw, 113 B.R. at 812-13 (<HOLDING>). The waiver of sovereign immunity under this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate the payment of money by the united states (B) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply (C) holding that the united states department of justice waived its immunity from money damages under subsection a (D) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (E) holding a claim for injunction but not money damages against a state officer for a violation of the age discrimination in employment act enacted under article i section 8 of the united states constitution was not barred by sovereign immunity under the ex parte young exception
Output: (C)
11 U.S.C. § 303(i). When a court dismisses an involuntary petition, § 3 Focus’ appeal as equitably moot. Appellees have not demonstrated that this case “present[s] transactions that are so complex or difficult to unwind that the doctrine of equitable mootness would apply.” Lowenschuss v. Selnick (In re Lowenschuss), 170 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir.1999). Because Focus seeks an exit instead of a do-over — i.e., the termination of bankruptcy proceedings and the dismissal of the trustee, rather than a complex corporate restructuring — the requested relief is not only possible but decidedly more practicable than the relief sought in other bankruptcy appeals we have dismissed as moot. See Baker & Drake, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (In re Baker & Drake, Inc.), 35 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); cf. Mann v. Alexander Dawson Inc. (In re 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined (B) holding that a plaintiff must allege either an interference with specific third parties or an identifiable class of third persons (C) holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party (D) holding appeal not moot where bankruptcy proceedings involved third parties but unlike robehs farms and rochman v northeast utils serv group in re pub serv co 963 f2d 469 1st cir1992 the reorganization plan is not a complex billiondollar affair that has affected innumerable third parties (E) holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties
Output: (D)
search a premises, Weston, 67 M.J. at 393 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988), I do not believe that case to be controlling. Matlock was arrested on the front lawn of the house, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988, and placed in a nearby police car. Id. at 179, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The arresting officers subsequently approached the house, spoke with a resident who shared a bedroom with Matlock, and received permission to search that bedroom. Id. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988. The police did not ask Matlock for his consent to search the bedroom, nor did he offer it. Id. The Supreme Court recognized the consent of the cotenant may be valid against a eotenant who has not objected. Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (<HOLDING>). This case differs from Matlock and Rodriguez 
 Holding statements: (A) holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises (B) holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez (C) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that there is no violation of the fourth amendment when the government reasonably believed that the individual giving consent to the search had authority to do so
Output: (A)
the defendant’s only link to the crime is eyewitness identification. Subsequent to our decisions in Davis and Randle, studies have shown the primary cause for the conviction of innocent people in our criminal justice system is mistaken eyewitness identification. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, 29 Champion 12 (2005). DNA exoneration ca subsequently litigate whether an identification made as part of such a deposition should be admitted because it was reliable, as required by the second part of the test set forth in Neil. Judicial resources can be preserved by avoiding a situation that will likely create an impermissibly suggestive procedure and result in an inadmissible identification. See United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Rule 2.13(1) was implemented to protect a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial (B) holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial (C) holding an incourt identification made with the defendant sitting next to his attorney at the counsels table is so clearly suggestive as to be impermissible (D) holding when the defendant timely objected to an incourt identification by an eyewitness the trial judge should have directed the government to provide an outofcourt lineup or other protective procedure to avoid an impermissibly suggestive incourt identification (E) holding that witness had an independent basis to support incourt identification where the description made prior to any pretrial identification was substantially an accurate description of the defendant
Output: (D)
these allegations and materials are sufficient to plausibly allege ACI and Adderley are an integrated enterprise under the FLSA. See Perez v. Westchester Foreign Autos, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6091(ER), 2013 WL 749497, at **7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013). Plaintiffs also allege that the proposed individual defendants were owners and corporate officers of Adderley and ACI, and had authority over matters including payroll, personnel, and the supervision and hiring and firing of employees of both companies. (PAC ¶¶ 43-130.) Discovery allegedly supports the assertion that Messers. Presser, Misseri, and Cestaro are the sole shareholders of both Adderley and ACI. (Kessler Decl. ¶ 8). Under the FLSA, these allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege employer status. See Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 116 (<HOLDING>); Perez, 2013 WL 749497, at *8. The NYLL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company (B) holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal (C) holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa (D) holding that the responsibility of another did not absolve the plaintiff of his own responsibility where the plaintiff helped incorporate the company served as vice president and president owned varying levels of stock and possessed authority to hire and fire (E) holding in context of control person analysis that because defendant founded the company and was its largest shareholder he may be able to influence the company
Output: (A)
(citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
Output: (C)
practice and protocol. We do not question that Amanda’s proof is sufficient for a negligence claim against Nissan. Our review, however, extends to the enhanced culpability required for punitive damages. Proving Gross Negligence Successful completion of regulatory product testing weighs against a finding of gross negligence.' Accordingly, exceeding mandatory requirements by successfully completing more rigorous testing strongly weighs against such a finding. The logic is clear. Meeting and then exceeding base safety requirements is, at the- very least, facial evidence of exercising slight care. Federal courts applying Kentucky law have correctly- observed this standard. E.g,, Cameron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. Civ.A.5:04-CV-24, 2005 WL 2674990, at *9 (E.D.Ky. Oct. 20, 2005) (<HOLDING>). This approach has also been adopted by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the undisputed fact that manufacturer complied with federal safety standards weighed against punitive damages (B) holding that a reduction in punitive damages to comply with the due process clause is a federal constitutional issue not a fact issue requiring jury consideration (C) holding that indemnification by excess liability insurer for punitive damages imposed on drug manufacturer contrary to public policy (D) holding a court may not award punitive damages (E) holding that punitive damages could not be granted because punitive damages are a matter of substantive law and substantive state law  must yield to federal limitations
Output: (A)
where the suit is brought; that is, in Ecuador. First, as Gallo points out, Ecuador’s repeal of Decree 1038-A is a strong indication that the portion of that decree that invalidates forum selection and choice of law clauses does not constitute strong public policy. Second, to the extent Decree 1038-A may have expressed a public policy against forum selection clauses, the strength or extent of that policy is not sufficient to justify the non-enforcement of the forum selection and choice of law provisions of the contract. Public policy against a forum selection clause will not prevent enforcement of the clauses where the contract implicates international trade and where the complaining party’s substantive rights are not subverted by the choice of law or forum. See Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162 (<HOLDING>). While Andina argues that Bonny, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding antiwaiver provision of securities laws does not prevent enforcement of contract provision choosing english forum (B) holding federal law does not prevent a state from choosing between prospective operation of its decision and that of relation backward (C) holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws (D) holding that in interpreting a contract we look to the conflict of laws rules of  the forum state  to determine which states laws will be controlling (E) holding that provision of securities exchange act allowing injunction against one who is violating or will violate securities laws does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over dispute with individual not accused of such violations
Output: (A)
testimony. Moreover, we find that the written order excluding the victim’s statements to Marvin Bynum states, “The proffered statements do not possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as required by Rule 804(B)(4) [sic] of the Rules of Evidence.” The better practice would have been for the trial court to specify in the other orders that the evidence was admissible under Rule 804(b)(5). However, from the transcript and the nearly identical findings and conclusions in all the written orders in the record, it is clear that the hearsay testimony admitted by the court was admitted pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5). Therefore, omission of the rule number from the orders admitting the testimony was harmless. Cf. State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 97, 337 S.E.2d 833, 847 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Defendant argues further that there was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is incumbent upon the trial court to enter into the record findings of fact and conclusions that the manner of payment is reasonable and one which defendant can afford (B) holding that before admitting rule 80324 hearsay statements the trial court must enter in the record appropriate statements rationale or findings of fact and conclusions of law (C) holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law (D) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (E) holding court must conduct new trial absent parties consent where deceased judge had not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law before death
Output: (B)
Court accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, “the court neither weighs the evidence, nor determines the credibility or reliability of the witnesses.” State v. Daleske, 866 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Mo.App.1993) (citing State v. Middleton, 854 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo.App.1993)). The appellant concedes in his brief that our appellate courts have routinely recognized the fact that a fingerprint at the scene of the crime may in and of itself be sufficient to convict. See State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 413 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Bland, 757 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Mo.App.1988) (citing State v. Thomas, 452 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.1970)) (<HOLDING>). However, he contends that “a partial palm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a terry stop (B) holding that evidence was sufficiently reliable because there was corroboration (C) holding that due to the reliable and unique quality of an individuals fingerprint fingerprint evidence by itself is enough to support a criminal conviction (D) holding that it was sufficient that the government submitted unchallenged certified records of conviction and other clearly reliable evidence (E) holding that a judicial confession in a guilty plea is itself sufficient evidence to support the crime charged
Output: (C)
“writing and uploading reports.” (FAC ¶ 58.) The Court finds that these facts alone are insufficient to state a claim that the time is compensable because the FAC contains no facts indicating whether it was necessary for Wolman or Iwasiuk to complete these tasks outside of their scheduled shifts. With respect to Lundy, the FAC states that he arrived thirty minutes early to each shift to be updated by the nurse working the prior shift and he stayed thirty minutes after each shift to finish charting and update the nurse working the following shift. (FAC ¶ 60.) The Court finds that these facts state a plausible claim that his off-shift work was necessary for the proper and efficient performance of his job. See Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 718 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). in. Training Programs “Time spent attending 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a radiological technologist was entitled to compensation for the fifteen minutes spent before her shift each day turning on the xray processing machine letting it warm up and performing tests on the machine because the proper performance of her job required this preparatory work to be completed when the first walkin patient could potentially arrive (B) holding the government proved the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the minor when among other things he spent twenty minutes taking pictures of her for her backpage ad (C) holding that it was proper for the medical examiner to estimate the victims time of death based on the results of her investigators lividity test as it was standard procedure for her to rely on tests performed by members of her office (D) holding that the something more requirement was met when after a factory worker complained to her supervisor that her machine was not operating properly the workers supervisor told her to go back to work quit whining and just deal with it (E) holding that an applicant who convincingly demonstrated that she could not rely on the authorities to protect her from her fathers abuse and that by turning to governmental authorities for help her circumstances may well have worsened was not required to report private persecution to government authorities to qualify for asylum
Output: (A)
rise to a duty of reasonable care to third parties. Shepard, 390 N.W.2d at 241. Thus, the physician’s special relationship to Eric’s mother gave rise to a duty that also extended to Eric, who was, “[a]s plaintiffs son and a member of her household,” a “foreseeable potential victim of [the physician’s] conduct.” Id. Similarly, in Welke, the court concluded that a duty existed for the benefit of a third party where a physician injected his patient with an unknown substance, let the patient drive his vehicle, and the patient subsequently killed another individual while driving. 375 N.W.2d at 406. The third party, the court held, was “an innocent driver within the scope of foreseeable risk” by virtue of the physician’s relationship with his patient. Id.; see also Duvall, 362 N.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich.App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty to a person foreseeably injured by his patient (B) holding that psychiatrist has duty to third parties to exercise due care in treatment and release of committed patients (C) holding that when a psychiatrist determines or  should determine that a patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party the psychiatrist has a duty of reasonable care to that party (D) holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave (E) holding that psychiatrist had duty to protect individuals endangered by his epileptic patient
Output: (E)
in your office as a patient, he came in with his contact lenses in, he had a prior history of refractions that you believe indicated stability, you still would have remeasured him prior to surgery; correct? A. That's just my habit. Q. And your habits are the ones that you believe are what a prudent ophthalmologist should observe? A. As stated in the context of my deposition. Q. Do you know what the standard of care is in Arizona, Doctor? A. No. 7 . See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34, 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49, 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339, 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Peacock v. Samaritan Health Serv., 159 Ariz. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a manufacturers insert in and of itself may not establish the relevant standard of care in a medical negligence action but may be considered by the fact finder along with expert testimony to define the standard of care (B) holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard (C) holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care (D) recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care (E) holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider
Output: (D)
of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that “whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court”). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (D) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (E) holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice
Output: (E)
by Kratzer’s testimony, not wife’s. As such, it is admissible béeause it is the admission of one co-conspirator uttered in the furtherance of a conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 489 Pa. 85, 413 A.2d 1025 (1980). If any portion of the transcript should have been redacted to exclude wife’s conversation, such an omission was harmless error, since appellant’s participation in the conspiracy was established beyond a reasonable doubt through the conversations with Kratzer. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 540 Pa. 442, 446-447, 658 A.2d 746, 749 (1995) (stating that error is harmless when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error insignificant so that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict); see also Evans at 92-94, 413 A.2d at 1029 (<HOLDING>). In sum, it was not an abuse of discretion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy (B) holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy (C) holding that admission of evidence of activity not done in furtherance of the conspiracy was harmless error where defendants participation was fully established by the testimony of another coconspirator (D) holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy (E) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt
Output: (C)
believed the victims and that the defendant was not being truthful. Id. at 325-26. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to redact those statements as impermissible comments on credibility. Id. at 327. On review before the Supreme Court, the issue was how the vouching rule, which developed as a principle applicable to in-court testimony, applies to a witness’s out-of-court comments on credibility. Id. at 331. To answer that question, the court was required to reconcile the apparent tension between its decisions in State v. Odoms, 313 Or 76, 83, 829 P2d 690 (1992) (explaining that “a relevant out-of-court statement, recounted at trial, generally may not be excluded merely because it is phrased in the form of an opinion”), and State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 48, 913 P2d 308 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Chandler, 360 Or at 333 (“Whereas Charboneau 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (B) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility (C) holding that hospitalization of witnesss wife and his desire to be by her side was not a substantial basis for admitting witnesss testimony from first trial (D) holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay (E) holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility
Output: (B)
is reasonable only if the notice includes the date on which and the county in which the alleged crime or bad act occurred and the name of the alleged victim of the crime or bad act.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(g). The record reflects that the State provided notice to appellant of its intention to use evidence of prior convictions and extraneous offenses, and it supplemented its notice. The notices included the information required by Article 37.07, Section 3(g). Additionally, appellan im.App.1998) (analyzing former appellate rule and holding review not preserved unless defendant brings matters to trial court’s attention in a motion for new trial and trial court rules on the motion); Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 762 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.2004, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). Thus, appellant has waived his contention 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal (B) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (C) holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court (D) holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial (E) holding where record fails to establish whether and how appellant presented motion for new trial to the trial court it was not timely presented
Output: (E)
speculate as to whether the operator had sufficient time to stop the machine safely even if he had been watching a CCTV screen. Beauregard’s argument therefore reduces to the possibility that a CCTV system would have captured Bourgeois’s image in time for the operator to stop the machine safely and that the operator would have been paying attention and done so. Drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in Beauregard’s favor, a jury could conclude only that a CCTV system possibly, but not probably, would have prevented the accident that killed Bourgeois. Causation framed in terms of possibilities does not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a design defect that caused an injuiy. See Goffredo v. Mercedes-Benz Truck Co., 402 Mass. 97, 102-03 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Sweeting v. Cairns & Brother, Inc., 32 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court properly granted directed verdict when plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to state cause of action under the dtp a (B) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (C) recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party (D) holding that a directed verdict in defendants favor was appropriate where plaintiff s expert was able to state his opinion regarding the cause of plaintiffs injuries only in terms of possibility but not of probability (E) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict
Output: (D)
County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy
Output: (C)
ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
Output: (B)
and would prevent law enforcement from getting inside without same). 38 United States v. Santos, 403 F3d 1120, 1132 (II) (B) (2) (e) (10th Cir. 2005); see Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 830, 832-33 (2), n. 2 (504 SE2d 443) (1998) (listing as “reasonably-founded suspicious factors” the following: “an officer’s knowledge of past criminal involvement by individuals inside the stopped vehicle', irregularities in licensing and insurance documentation or the driver’s authority to be operating the stopped vehicle; and the location where the stop occurred” (emphasis supplied)); Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 4 (1) (642 SE2d 921) (2007) (considering prior arrest history as a relevant factor in totality of circumstances analysis). Cf. Martin v. State, 316 Ga. App. 220, 226 (2) (729 SE2d 437) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 39 Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 716 (1) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction (B) holding that a past arrest for possession without more is simply not enough to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is currently in possession (C) holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession (D) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession (E) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct
Output: (B)