niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
have read the Supreme Court’s discretionary function cases as denying protection to actions that are unauthorized because they are unconstitutional, proscribed by statute, or exceed the scope of an official’s authority.” Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254-55 (1st Cir.2003) (col lecting cases). However, we have not resolved whether the discretionary function exception extends to actions that are otherwise outside the scope of an official’s actual federal authority, and we need not do so here. Nor do we address whether Desrosiers had implied federal authority to participate in the arrest to the limited extent of swearing out the criminal complaint, receiving the arrest warrant, and assisting Wing in the execution of that warrant. See, e.g., id. at 260 (<HOLDING>). Assuming, arguendo, that the USPS is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the discretionary function exception applied where the coast guard had implied statutory authority to order the evacuation of a sinking ship (B) holding that the coast guards forcible evacuation of a sinking sea vessel constituted a seizure of the persons therein (C) holding that the discretionary function does not apply where the decisionmaker lacks authority (D) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  (E) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver
Output: (A)
supervisory official may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue. [4] [A] supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. [5] [Supervisory liability may be imposed where an official demonstrates “gross negligence” or “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional practices are taking place. Wright, 21 F.3d at 501; see Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir.1986) (citations omitted); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 125 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). A review of the plaintiffs complaint reveals 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (B) holding that a defendant is entitled to credit only for periods in which defendant is in actual or constructive control of jail or prison officials (C) holding that because the hospital had no actual or constructive notice that the parties were separated at the time services were rendered the separation exception did not apply (D) holding that defendant coughlin had actual or constructive notice of unconstitutional procedures and therefore could not escape personal responsibility (E) holding trial court and appellate court erred in requiring defendant to show he had meritorious defense when record established that defendant had filed answer but had no actual or constructive notice of trial setting
Output: (D)
for the offenses on different days and under different cause numbers. Kennedy contends that, because the offenses were originally brought in the same indictment, they should have counted as one sentence for criminal-history purposes, but he fails to provide any legal authority either supporting his assertion or even addressing the district court’s implicit determination that the offenses being originally charged in one indictment did not alter the result under the guideline provision governing whether prior sentences are counted separately or as a single sentence. Accordingly, Kennedy cannot demonstrate counsel’s failure to object to the criminal-history calculation on prior felony offenses constituted deficient performance. E.g., McCoy v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 954, 968 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). As for Kennedy’s claim that counsel was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate counsel could not be found to have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise issues that are without merit (B) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (C) holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection (D) holding counsel was not deficient for declining to make a meritless argument (E) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit
Output: (E)
F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that differential diagnosis “has widespread acceptance in the medical community, has been subject to peer review, and does not frequently lead to incorrect results”) (citation omitted); Heller, supra, 167 F.3d at 154-55 (noting that “differential diagnosis consists of a testable hypothesis, has been peer reviewed, contains standards for controlling its operation, is generally accepted, and is used outside of the judicial context”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Several state courts also have accepted differential diagnosis as a reliable form of expert testimony. See, e.g., Carlson v. Okerstrom, 267 Neb. 397, 675 N.W.2d 89, 105-07 (2004) (finding rehable differential diagnosis testimony admissible); Easum v. Miller, 92 P.3d 794, 804 (Wyo.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because of the widespread 
 Holding statements: (A) holding doctors differential diagnosis testimony admissible (B) holding future dangerousness expert testimony to be admissible (C) holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors
Output: (A)
does not justify a warrant-less blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent... or objects to the blood draw .... Consent to a search must be voluntary."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (same); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 946 (Nev. 2014) ("The implied consent provision . . . does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver's so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary. Accordingly, we conclude that [the implied consent provision] is unconstitutional."); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 2014) (ruling that a Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances analysis must be performed to determine whether consent to a blood draw taken pursuant to state implied consent law was voluntary); Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 5 People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 966 (Colo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the implied consent law allows law enforcement officers to obtain blood in circumstances in which a warrant or actual consent may otherwise be required (B) holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test (C) holding that implied consent and blood draw statutes are not permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating that to hold otherwise flies in the face of mcneelys repeated mandate that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case (D) recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances (E) holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw
Output: (C)
Sept. 3, 1998)(variance is not material “where the allegations and proof substantially correspond, the variance is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at trial and is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense”). A material variance is sometimes referred to as a “fatal variance.” We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality. Compare Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 625, 124 S.W. 668 (1910)(variance is not material unless it could mislead defense or expose defendant to danger of subsequent prosecution for same offense); Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)(<HOLDING>) with Pedrosa v. State, 155 Tex.Crim. 155, 232 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error (B) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (C) holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea (D) holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material (E) holding variance in style of case pled for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice
Output: (E)
relation to the grant of relief from the automatic stay. 28 . In following the analytic framework of Hernandez, I recognize that the case may hold implicitly that the fact that a debt is nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(8) and that, outside the ba (concluding that a plan to fully pay a student loan obligation while paying all other unsecured claims a dividend of 3% unfairly discriminated against the class of other unsecured creditors) and In re Thibodeau, 248 B.R. 699 (Bankr.D.Mass.2000) (applying four-prong test of In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669 (8th Cir.1991) to conclude that a 36-month plan unfairly discriminated where it proposed to fully pay student loan debt while providing only a 27% dividend on other general unsecured claims) with In re Dodds, 140 B.R. 542 (Bankr.D.Mont.1992) (<HOLDING>) and In re Boggan, 125 B.R. 533 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unsecured creditor could not appeal decision determining priority among secured creditors because it would not affect the payment of his claims (B) holding that plan proposing and payment of nondischargeable student loan in full outside plan according to its terms for 54 months and 79 payment to unsecured creditors over 36 months did not discriminate unfairly among unsecured class (C) holding that plan did not unfairly discriminate against unsecured noteholder class receiving 327 percent recovery while awarding general unsecured creditors a 100 percent recovery because differing treatment was justified (D) holding that the fresh start was a legitimate interest to discriminate in a plan whereby the debtor proposed to pay the student loan in full while paying 15 of the other unsecured claims (E) holding that a 56month chapter 13 plan that proposed to pay 17 of the anticipated dividend to student loan creditors while making no distribution to other unsecured creditors unfairly discriminates and could not be confirmed
Output: (B)
that Dina told him about the allegations, the court must have believed that James did not obtain the information illegally. We find both parties’ reasoning to be flawed. The Fourth Amendment has no application in this context. James Pannunzio committed the illegal act without the assistance or appeal of the government. See United States v. Jacobsen (1984), 466 U.S. 109, 113-114, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 94. See, also, State v. Ford (Oct. 9, 1987), Lucas App. No. L-86- 338, unreported, 1987 WL 18126 (explaining that even though evidence is secured illegally by a private person and turned over to the police, possession by the police does not invoke the exclusionary rule); and Walter v. United States (1980), 447 U.S. 649, 657, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2402, 65 L.Ed.2d 410, 418 (<HOLDING>). Davies’ reliance on Perkins and Nix is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant consented to search of his car and stood by as agent conducted a thorough and systematic search which included removal of vehicles back seat and raising of cars rear quarter panel defendants failure to object to search indicated search was within scope of consent (B) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (C) holding that a significant expansion by police of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party must be characterized as a separate search (D) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (E) holding that contraband would have been inevitably discovered where agents conducted a warrantless search while obtaining a search warrant and later conducted a second legal search in which agents discovered contraband
Output: (C)
by testimony from Alan W. Pullen, president of Community. 5 . Hudson v. Inman, 179 S.C. 399, 184 S.E. 102 (1936). 6 . Community argues again on appeal that this issue is moot. A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. Mathis v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 260 S.C. 344, 195 S.E.2d 713 (1973), cited in Arnold v. Association of Citadel Men, 337 S.C. 265, 523 S.E.2d 757 (1999). This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief. Id. However, a foreclosure sale that was improperly conducted so as to prejudice interested parties is void and, therefore, the sale may be set aside by the reviewing court. Howell v. Gibson, 208 S.C. 19, 37 S.E.2d 271 (1946) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Farr v. Sims, 9 S.C. Eq. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a mistake or surprise in connection with the sale is grounds for setting it aside provided the mistake is harmful and not a mistake of law or one due to the negligence of the party complaining (B) holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities (C) holding that it is unlawful for a person to omit material facts in connection with the offer or sale of a security (D) holding that common law grounds such as manifest disregard of law and gross mistake were not valid grounds for vacatur of arbitration award as hall street forecloses any common law grounds for vacatur (E) holding that the role of the courts is limited to ascertaining whether there exists one of the specific grounds for the vacation of an award as provided in  10 of the arbitration act and that the court should not review the arbitration proceeding for errors of law or fact
Output: (A)
evidence of Joseph Grendi’s activities that the plaintiffs have presented, there is clearly evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Joseph Grendi exercised actual control over JWP’s procedures and activities. Joseph Grendi next argues that he may not be subject to control person liability based on the activities of McGinn and McQuade because the class plaintiffs have failed to allege that McGinn and McQuade committed primary violations of the securities laws. This argument is more persuasive. While the class plaintiffs need not name McGinn and McQuade as defendants in order to recover under § 20, they must at least allege that McGinn and McQuade committed primary violations. See In re Citisource, Inc. Securities Litigation, 694 F.Supp. 1069, 1072, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). The class plaintiffs’ complaint is, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presence of conclusory terms in a complaint does not insulate it from dismissal when the facts alleged cannot support the charges contained in the complaint (B) holding that plaintiff need not name alleged primary violators as defendants but describing detailed allegations of their wrongdoing contained in complaint (C) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint (D) recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice  (E) holding that a complaint that included only allegations of intentional wrongdoing also set forth grounds for liability based on unintentional wrongdoing
Output: (B)
91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). “[T]he purpose of the work product privilege is to protect the integrity of the adversary process.” Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir.1983); see also Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Az., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir.1989) (“The conditional protections afforded by the work-product rule prevent exploitation of a party’s efforts in preparing for litigation.”). Not surprisingly, it does not apply to foster a distortion of the adversary process by protecting illegal actions by an attorney. Because its purpose “is to protect the integrity of the adversary process[,] ... it would be improper to allow an attorney to exploit the privilege for ends that are antithetical to that process.” Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1271 (<HOLDING>) (citing Moody v. I.R.S., 654 F.2d 795, 800 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an attorneys unethical conduct in secretly recording conversations with witnesses vitiated the work product protection as to those recordings (B) holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies (C) holding that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the protection of the work product doctrine (D) holding that opinion work product is entitled to nearly absolute protection with limited exceptions (E) holding that the protection of the work product rule continues after litigation has terminated
Output: (A)
CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Robinson v. Sun Bank & Trust Co., 685 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). THOMPSON, TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (B) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (C) holding that appeal of order became moot when order was complied with and court of appeals was notified and that court of appeals erred in issuing advisory opinion on merits of appeal (D) holding that the case must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction where notice of appeal was untimely (E) holding that the appellate court must accept appeals referees finding of untimeliness and affirm unemployment appeals commissions order dismissing claimants appeal as untimely where it appeared that claimant did not appeal decision within twenty days and did not dispute that notice of appeal was untimely
Output: (E)
of state law disputes between instate defendants. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”); see also Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir.1997) (“State courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law.”); Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No. 5:04-cv-301, 2005 WL 4145745, at *10 (M.D.Ga. Jan. 13, 2005) (“[I]t is preferable for the courts of Georgia to make rulings on issues of Georgia law rather than to have federal courts do so, even when those federal courts are in Georgia.”).; cf. Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The convenience and fairness factors do not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident (B) holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court (C) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (D) holding that in nonremoved cases the district court must dismiss a federal question case if the plaintiff later drops its federal claims (E) holding that federal express despite the use of the word federal in its name is not a federal agency and therefore cannot be sued in this court
Output: (D)
that the two-level increase is a misapplication of the Guidelines because § 2B1.1(b)(12)(A) applies only when it is the fraudulent offense itself that carries the risk of death or serious bodily injury. Rizzo contends that the increase was applied based on his attempt to elude apprehension and did not relate to his theft of mail offense. Rizzo argues that trial counsel’s failure to make these objections fell below objective standards of practice and that prejudice resulted. Rizzo’s argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the application of both § 3C1.2 and § 2Bl.l(b)(12)(A) has no merit because the enhancements were based on two separate instances of flight, one on July 25, and one on August 10. See United States v. Gillyard, 261 F.3d 506, 509-12 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Government concedes that § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial (B) holding that there was no legal separation where there was no evidence  that the orders at issue mandated or acknowledged separate existences (C) recognizing that separate ratings can be assigned for separate periods of time based on facts found (D) holding that there was no double counting in applying  3c12 and  3a12b because they were based on separate acts (E) holding that the defendants sentences were properly enhanced under  3a12b because they assaulted an officer employed by the mississippi bureau of narcotics and during the assault made statements including they are the police lets kill them
Output: (D)
2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332-33); accord Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The arbitrary and capricious standard ... requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814 (“The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). In addition to showing “a significant error in the procurement process,” a protestor must show “that the error prejudiced it.” Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). “To establish prejudice ..., a protester must 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure (B) holding that if the procuring agencys decision lacked a rational basis or was made in violation of the applicable statutes regulations or procedures the court must then determine as a factual matter if the bid protester was prejudiced by that conduct (C) holding a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 if the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure (D) holding that a protester must show that the governments error in a bid evaluation was so significant that the government had no reasonable basis for its best value determination (E) holding that in bid protest cases  a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure 
Output: (B)
to bear any and all costs, expenses, responsibilities, burdens, damages, and the like, relating to matters inherent to sales effected (directly or indirectly) by OAM in the United States of America, pursuant to the laws and rules of that country.” 1 App. in Supp. of Defs. ’ and Intervenor’s Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. A.22 at Art. 4, ¶ D (May 17, 1993 Agreement among Fiat Auto, American Finance S.p.A., and OAM); and A.23 at Art. 4, ¶ D (English translation) (emphasis added). Maserati II and MNA assert that there must be a showing of intent by the purchasing company to assume the old corporation’s liabilities in whole or in part in order to show an implied assumption, and Majestic has not done so. They rely on Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F.Supp. 834, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (<HOLDING>). Maserati II and MNA assert that the OAM-MAI 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession (B) holding that conduct or representations relied upon by the party asserting liability must indicate an intention on the part of the buyer to pay the debts of the seller (C) holding that an agreement on the one side to sell and on the other to buy does not constitute a conspiracy even if the buyer intends to resell the drugs so long as the buyer and seller do not have an agreement to further distribute the drugs (D) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (E) holding an arbitration clause contained in confirmations sent to buyer by seller was part of parties course of dealing and therefore part of the contract after buyer had repeated opportunities to object to the clause and had failed to do so
Output: (B)
150, 155, 907 P.2d 536, 541 (App.1995) (relying on Principles as authoritative in a different context). Section 7.22 of Principles provides, in relevant part: (a) The fair value of shares under [corporate transactions giving rise to appraisal rights] should be the value of the eligible holder’s proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of marketability. Subject to Subsections (b) and (e), fair value should be determined using the customary valuation concepts and techniques generally employed in the relevant securities and financial markets for similar businesses in the context of the transaction giving rise to appraisal. (Emphasis added.) See also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A2d 701, 713 (Del.1983) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 Both parties here cite a rule of law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that determining corporate value may be done by including proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court (B) holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value (C) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (D) holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community (E) holding in an equitable distribution case that the trial court should make specific findings regarding the value of a spouses professional practice and the existence and value of its goodwill and should clearly indicate the evidence on which its valuations are based preferably noting the valuation method or methods on which it relied internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (A)
that, upon a proper objection, “the trial judge must conduct a Neil inquiry,” and “that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial.” Id. at 1322. A rule mandating reversal whenever the trial court fails to require the party exercising the challenge to articulate a race or gender-neutral reason in response to a sufficient objection has some appeal, given the fact that, in Melbourne, the court stated that the trial court’s task is to determine the “genuineness” of the reason for the challenge, 679 So.2d at 764; and it is difficult to discern precisely how one would go about determining the genuineness of a reason that was never given. But see Plaza v. State, 699 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 717 So.2d 58 (Fla.1998). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (B) holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race (C) holding that if a race or genderneutral reason for a peremptory challenge is apparent from the record the trial court may deny an objection to the challenge without requiring the party exercising the challenge to articulate a race or genderneutral reason (D) holding that where the defense peremptorily challenged a prospective juror and the prosecutor merely stated that she would challenge that strike the states objection was sufficient to allow inquiry into whether the juror was being challenged for nonracial reasons where the trial court clearly understood that the objection was that the challenge had been exercised because of the prospective jurors race (E) holding lack of factual basis for preemptory challenge renders avowed reason for challenge a pretext
Output: (C)
of the kind defined in [26 U.S.C.] § 5845 ... involves the substantial risk of violence necessary to label the possession a crime of violence,” United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.1991), and Defendant’s sawed-off shotgun is of the type described in § 5845(a). The district court therefore should have applied the Career Offender Guideline only to Count 4, possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. Instead, the district court erred by imposing a Career Offender sentence on all counts. If a district court incorrectly applies the Sentencing Guidelines and its error is not harmless, then we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1279 (9th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, we cannot say with certainty that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that any error would be harmless to the government in this case because the district court couldand wouldimpose the same sentence again under the nowadvisory guidelines regime (B) holding that any error was harmless because under the unusual circumstances present in this thirdtime appeal we recognize that the district court could  and would  impose the same sentence again (C) holding a constitutional booker error harmless on the ground that because the district court stated its sentence would be the same even if the guidelines were only advisory  we know with certainty beyond a reasonable doubt what the district court would do upon remand (D) holding any possible error in a guidelines calculation harmless where this court was confident  that the district court could  and would  impose the same sentence again under the nowadvisory guidelines regime (E) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence
Output: (B)
indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the “benefit” to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory “benefit”. E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a (B) holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that the remedies are exclusive (E) recognizing that  1983 and  2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding
Output: (B)
App. 34, 587 S.E.2d 470. Here, MedAmerica does not assert that there was an indemnity clause in their contract with the State, instead seeking indemnity based on implication. A right of indemnity implied-in-fact stems from the existence of a binding contract between two parties that necessarily implies the right. The implication is derived from the relationship between the parties, circumstances of the parties’ conduct, and that the creation of the indemnitor/indemnitee relationship is derivative of the contracting parties’ intended agreement. Id. at 38, 587 S.E.2d at 474. In order to establish such a right to indemnity, this Court has required a plaintiff to show special circumstances from which such an agreement might be implied. See, e.g., McDonald, 91 N.C. App. 13, 370 S.E.2d 680 (<HOLDING>). Indemnity implied-in-law is a quasi contract, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract (B) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (C) holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense (D) holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract (E) holding that a defendant had submitted sufficient evidence to establish the existence of an impliedinfact contract for indemnity with respect to attorneys fees where another defendant had orally agreed to provide him with an attorney in the event he was sued by plaintiff for breach of contract
Output: (E)
offerings) and due diligence binders (“DDBs”) (for purported real estate offerings).” This distinction between securities offerings and real estate is máintainéd throughout the Com plaint. (Complaint, ¶¶ 538, 554, 585, and 609). Just because the TIC investments involved real estate does not obviate the possibility that they were structured in such a way that they meet the definition of securities under federal law. Indeed, the Trustee acknowledges having filed lawsuits in other jurisdictions in which this very assertion is made. Whatever the case, the structure and characterization of the TIC investments is not something the Court is prepared to address in the context of a motion to dismiss. Cf., San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. Amado, 773 F.Supp.2d 822, 829 (N.D.Cal.2011) (<HOLDING>). The Trustee is correct that alternative 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an investment contract with a fixed return can still be security (B) holding as an investment for future development (C) holding that whether a tic investment could be characterized as a security was a factbased inquiry (D) holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees (E) holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court
Output: (C)
proper, and that we should affirm those rulings. It is important to note that the majority opinion would have the effect óf heightening the plaintiff’s proof requirements in race discrimination cases, and would push our State’s law outside the national mainstream, to the detriment of those who seek redress for discrimination based on race. Although this case involves “reverse discrimination” against a white plaintiff, the primary impact of the decision will be on those individuals and groups who have historically suffered the most from discrimination in our State. The United States Supreme Court has continually cautioned lower courts against attempting to impose heightened burdens on plaintiffs in race discrimination cases. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 95 (<HOLDING>). I do not believe this Court should increase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no federal nexus is required (B) holding that no heightened showing is required (C) recognizing that opinion work product subject to discovery upon heightened showing of compelling need (D) recognizing chat iqbal may have heightened the requirements for showing a supervisors personal involvement with respect to certain constitutional violations (E) holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required
Output: (B)
cases such as this. In analogous situations where clearer statements of law or references to the record are necessary to facilitate meaningful appellate review, this Court has announced supervisory rules regulating important procedural matters. For example, in Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 253 (3d Cir.1990), we reviewed a grant of summary judgment whose reasoning was not apparent from the reco Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.1982) (ruling that “a dismissal of a complaint with prejudice as a Rule 37 sanction must be accompanied by some articulation on the record of the court’s resolution of the factual, legal, and discretionary issues presented”); and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). “It is essential ... that a reviewing court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification (B) holding that it had jurisdiction to review denial of motions under rules 59 and 60 that were filed and denied after the entry of judgment under rule 54b (C) holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification (D) holding that dismissal of some but not all claims or parties not immediately appealable absent rule 54b certification (E) holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification
Output: (E)
(Black, J., concurring)). We are also troubled because, given that there was nothing about the officers’ appearance or conduct that revealed that they were engaged in the performance of their duties, Davis lacked fair notice that mere spoken words, which did not disturb the peace, could nonetheless constitute the crime of obstructing the officer’s performance of duty. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311, 60 S.Ct. at 906. “It is an elemental requirement of our constitutional jurisprudence that laws be reasonably intelligible, providing citizens with fair notice as to what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal.” Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 6:13 (1996) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (<HOLDING>)). We reiterate that we recognize the need to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding unconstitutional vagrancy statutes that were purposely designed to grant police broad discretion (D) holding unconstitutional ordinance that gave executive director excessive discretion in deciding whether the grant of a permit would be detrimental to the public (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
Output: (C)
244 (2d Cir.2006) (remanding where district court made “anomalous and incomplete” factfindings); United States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir.1992) (remanding where record did not allow the panel to determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car being searched); United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1988) (remanding where there was no evidence that it was inevitable that an inventory search would be conducted). 5 . See United States v. Matsushita, 794 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1986) (remanding where it was unclear whether the district court's probable cause finding referred to the initial seizure or the defendant's eventual arrest at the police station). 6 . See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a telephone companys white pages lack the requisite originality for copyright protection where the telephone company merely published basic subscriber information  name town and telephone number  and arranged it alphabetically based on surnames (B) holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed (C) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (D) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (E) holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider
Output: (D)
remote and even imaginary and cannot be squared with the reality that the opinions of IPRA and their investigations are frequently scrutinized in the public forum.” Pl.’s Sur-Reply Br. at 4. The Court does agree that there is some danger that compelling disclosure of the draft summary reports could impede the candor of IPRA pre-decisional discussions in the future. See Guzman, 2011 WL 55979, at *4 (positing that “requiring the production of communications among IPRA investigators and their supervisors constitutes an intrusion that would seriously hinder the frank discussion that governmental decisions deserve”). That IPRA investigative files are often sought in excessive force cases only increases the risk that disclosure could chill future deliberations. Cf. Evans, 231 F.R.D. at 317 (<HOLDING>). But the extent of the impact on IPRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues (B) holding that disclosing prepardon discussions would not hinder future pardon decisions because most pardon decisions are never the subject of or relevant to any litigation (C) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding (D) holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions (E) holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca
Output: (B)
are alleged to establish this claim. Id. And, although the Government had considerable leeway to make or withhold payments to affect contract completion, only payment to Plaintiff (or withholding payment altogether) would achieve Contract completion in this case. Id. at 10. The Government failed to do either. Id. B. The Court’s Resolution. The June 30, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Final Order considered Plaintiffs argu ment that notification of default or imminent default was “superfluous and unnecessary.” United Surety, 87 Fed.Cl. at 589. The court rejected this argument, as a matter of law. Id. at 591. Instead, the court held that the Government owed no duty to a surety until notice is received. Id. (citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 495, 499 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff also argues that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that obligee can recover from surety attorneys fees that are provided for in obligees subcontract so long as the total recovery against the surety does not exceed the penal amount of the bond (B) recognizing that the gjovernment as obligee owes no equitable duty to a surety  unless the surety notifies the government that the principal has defaulted under the bond  notice by the surety is essential before any governmental duty exists (C) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (D) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety
Output: (B)
claim. Hall avers that the review procedures only allow United to consult with a health care professional. Thus, he concludes that the structure and organization of the plan prove that United did not have the right to demand an IME when reviewing an appeal after termination of benefits. The Court rejects Hall’s suggested interpretation of the plan. When interpreting the plan at issue, the Court is to “tak[e] all the provisions as a part of an integrated Agreement and view[ ] the provisions in the light of ERISA’s integrated statutory scheme.” Bickley, 461 F.3d at 1329. Thus, Hall’s suggestion that the Court should only look to one part of the plan is unreasonable, as the Court must look at the entire plan. See also Babikian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 63 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Looking at the language addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an erisa insurance policy is governed by a uniform body of federal common law which requires policy language to be interpreted in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) holding that policy terms must be read in their ordinary and popular sense (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy
Output: (A)