niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,-, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57. The detailed provisions of ERISA § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that “would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Similarly, we have held that state law tort and contract claims as well as violations of a state insurance statute are preempted by ERISA. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131 (<HOLDING>). In a factually similar case, we held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations (B) holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa (C) holding that erisa  514a preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
Output: (B)
employer is the sort of action that could dissuade an employee from filing a [workers’ compensation] claim.” ¶ 33. We agree with the State that the videotaping of Hall in connection with his second workers’ compensation claim cannot, in and of itself, support Hall’s retaliation claim. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that “he suffered adverse employment decisions, an n in the parties’ Agreement were found to preclude all claims associated with Hall’s demotion, the limited video surveillance done in connection with Hall’s second workers’ compensation claim cannot, as a matter of law, support the retaliation claim. Cf. Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 2005 VT 83, ¶ 39, 178 Vt. 244, 882 A.2d 1177 (<HOLDING>). The videotaping was done one day in public in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that videotaping incident among others was insufficient to establish prima facie case that he suffered adverse employment action due to retaliation for his protected activity in violation of vermont fair employment practices act (B) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action (C) holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two (D) holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity (E) holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action
Output: (A)
together is inconsistent. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). The guidelines require district courts to examine a defendant’s role-in-the-offense under § 3B1.1 before grouping or separating counts under § 3D1.2. See U.S.S.G. §§ IB 1.1(c) & (d) (setting forth the chronology to be followed in calculating a final offense level and requiring adjustments to be made under Part B of Chapter 3 before applying Part D of Chapter 3). Thus, when conduct from one count (or group of counts) has already been used to trigger an adjustment to another count (or group of counts), § 3D1.2(c) requires all those counts to be grouped together. We have several times prohibited the grouping of fraud and money laundering counts together into a single group. See United States v. Green, 225 F.3d 955, 958-59 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. O’Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 972-74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a count of 18 usc  1956 reinvestment money laundering should not be grouped with wire fraud counts under  3d12b (B) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (C) holding that a count of 18 usc  1957 money laundering should not be grouped with mail fraud counts under either  3d12b or d (D) holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 (E) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud
Output: (A)
outpatient care for Campbell and filed a certificate with the trial court. After receiving this certificate, the trial court conducted a hearing before the expiration of the commitment order, to determine if Campbell continues to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment and whether the trial court should order Campbell to participate in a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment on an outpatient basis. The hearings that resulted in the June 30, 2003 commitment order were conducted under article 46.03, section 4(d)(5). Under the unambiguous language of this statute, the trial court must conduct these hearings “pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health Code.... ” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 46.03, § 4(d)(5); Campbell, 85 S.W.3d at 181 (<HOLDING>). The Texas Supreme Court already has decided 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that texas legislature has no police power to violate article i section 16 of the texas constitution because section 29 emphatically and unambiguously excepts this power from the powers of the government of the state of texas (B) holding that article 4603 section 4d5 hearing was required to be conducted pursuant to the texas mental health code (C) recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records (D) recognizing counsels ability to waive statutory right to a mental health hearing (E) holding  574032 574035 and 574036 applied to one of campbells prior hearings under article 4603 section 4d5
Output: (B)
brought under rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 265 F.3d 171, 175-76 (3d Cir.2001); Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir.1999). ¶ 23 Federal courts have also recognized that an award of attorney fees and costs to a derivative plaintiff is justified “where the derivative action results in a substantial non-monetary benefit to a corporation.” Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 69; see Zucker, 265 F.3d at 176 (quoting same language from Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 69). In a context similar to a derivative action, federal courts have held that the promotion and vindication of shareholders’ voting rights is a substantial benefit to the corporation. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97, 90 S.Ct. 616, 627-28, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in suit brought by shareholders against corporation under federal securities laws that the promotion of corporate suffrage regarding a significant policy issue confers a substantial benefit regardless of the percentage of votes cast for or against the proposal at issue (B) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (C) holding that a corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders even where the corporation has but one shareholder the general proposition of corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude in accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions that the attorneys client is the corporation and not the shareholders (D) holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation (E) holding in suit brought by shareholders against corporation under federal securities laws that plaintiffs conferred substantial benefit upon corporation by vindicating statutory policy stressing the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage
Output: (E)
suggests the FHA imposes a duty on a homeowner association or property manager to intervene in a neighbor-to-neighbor dispute. Pursuant to the governing documents, an owner cannot permit an activity to be conducted on their property that will interfere with the rights, comforts or conveniences of other owners. It is also true that the Association has the right to enforce all conditions imposed by the governing documents and the obligation to maintain the common area property, but the documents do not prevent racial harassment by one neighbor against another or require the Association or Property Manager to intervene in a neighbor-to-neighbor dispute. See and c.f Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass’n., No. CIV.A. 96-2495RMU, 1997 WL 1877201, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec.18, 1997) (<HOLDING>). The Lawrences erroneously equate an owner’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that only deliberate executive conduct gives rise to a familial association violation and explicitly noting that this rule applies to both minor and adult children (B) holding no violation of section 101 in spite of violation of union bylaws because plaintiffs do not allege that members or classes have been discriminated against in their right to vote (C) holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures (D) holding fha claim stated against association where bylaws authorized association to stop illegal conduct and expressly made any violation of local or federal law a violation of the associations rules (E) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation
Output: (D)
38 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(3). 39 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(3). 40 Cowell also appears to argue that Russell was unaware of the second HC’s findings. But the second HC’s report was issued on December 29, 2006. Russell voted to terminate Cowell’s privileges at the MEC’s August 7, 2006, meeting. 41 See Morgan, 101 Wn. App at 773 (“[T]he fact that varying review committees differed on its conclusions does not undermine the fairness of the procedures.”); cf. Singh, 308 F.3d at 41 (“The reversal of a peer review committee’s recommendation of an adverse professional review action by a higher level peer review panel does not indicate that the initial recommendation was made without a reasonable belief that the recommendation would further quality health care.”); Austin, 979 F.2d at 735 (<HOLDING>). 42 See Morgan, 101 Wn. App. at 772 n.4 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing confidentiality essential to function of medical peer review committees and to improvement of health care and protecting the records of such committees from discovery (B) holding that the medical review panel is authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendants treatment of a patient and that while a medical malpractice plaintiff must as a prerequisite to filing suit present the  proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim (C) holding that reversal of a medical executive committees recommendation by a judicial review committee failed to establish that the defendants did not have a reasonable belief that the suspension was warranted (D) holding that malpractice was not a jury issue where there was a lack of medical evidence that the defendants alleged failure to correctly diagnose was due to the fact that he failed to use care skill and diligence ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical community cited in the committee comment for uji 131115 (E) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error
Output: (C)
violator statute was “a discreet, separate, and independent habitual offender statute” and the enhancement of the defendant’s sentence under that statute was not subject to further enhancement under the general habitual offender statute. Id. at 153-54. After careful consideration of Ind.Code 35-47-2-23 and the above precedent, we do not believe that Thomas’s Class C felony conviction was a sentence enhancement as that term is contemplated in the habitual offender statutes. Rather, carrying a handgun without a license as a Class C felony is a separate and distinct crime from the misdemeanor crime of carrying a handgun without a li cense. Under the facts before us, Thomas’s crime is a Class C felony because he had been convicted of a felony within the preceding 15 years d.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the trial court in all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute (C) holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines (D) holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed (E) holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute
Output: (E)
Furthermore, just as the retired firefighters in Williams had no standing to seek a statutory interpretation for prospective relief because their alleged injury had already occurred and was not capable of repetition, Russell does not and cannot argue she will suffer from Metro repeating its course of action, as Metro’s subrogation lien can be satisfied only once. Finally, just as in Williams there was no plausible remedy the declaratory judgment could recommend other than money damages against an immunized governmental entity, here there is no relief a declaratory judgment can offer Russell that does not simply lay the predicate for a damages claim against Metro. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29; see also Castro v. McNabb, 319 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Russell goes to great effort in her briefing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory relief is not appropriate for determination of rights in anticipation of enforcement action that may never occur (B) holding that to establish jurisdiction in action for declaratory judgment controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to defendant (C) holding the burden of proof in a bankruptcy court action for declaratory relief as to the ownership of disputed property was on the party making an affirmative claim for relief (D) holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action (E) holding plaintiff may not reshape pleadings to support jurisdiction in an effort to use a petition for declaratory relief to establish a critical element in threatened tort causes of action
Output: (E)
as it may sound. While our approach to constitutional interpretation ordinarily requires us to begin with the text of the pertinent provi sion, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “the sovereign immunity reflected in (rather than created by) the Eleventh Amendment transcends the narrow text of the Amendment itself.” College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (describing the “whole point” of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)). Consistent with this conception, the Court has repeatedly recognized sovereign immunity outside the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (B) holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens (C) holding state immune from suit brought in state court (D) holding state immune from suit involving a federal question (E) holding that the state is immune from punitive awards
Output: (C)
judgment of the district court is affirmed. 1 . The Honorable Rodney W. Sippell, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 . Trotter frames his argument on appeal as a challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Because Trotter was charged with an offense against the laws of the United States, the court clearly had jurisdiction and his motion to dismiss was properly denied. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction ... of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”). A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute as applied to a particular defendant does not extinguish jurisdiction. See, e.g. United States v. Foster, 443 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The substance of Trotter's argument, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce (B) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (C) holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law (D) holding that the district court properly denied defendants motion to dismiss based upon a lack of jurisdiction when defendant challenged the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act (E) holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act
Output: (D)
dated July 23, 2004 that he was arrested by a non-uniformed officer he met with as a result of telephoning the Warrant Unit of the New York City Police Department. Lewis Aff. ¶ 10-11. He does not allege that he was arrested by Agent Mueller. At the time of Plaintiffs arrest, Agent Mueller avers, without dispute, that he was involved in a trial outside of New York and was therefore not present for Plaintiffs arrest. Mueller Decl. ¶ 8. Because Plaintiff has not asserted otherwise, I must find that Agent Mueller was not present at the arrest and thus is entitled to summary judgment on the claim. Furthermore, the warrant pursuant to which Mr. Lewis was arrested was issued by a neutral magistrate, automatically inuring Agent Mueller with qualified immunity. See Golino, 950 F.2d at 870 (<HOLDING>). For Plaintiff to challenge that immunity, he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop (B) holding that a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate creates presumption that officers belief in probable cause was objectively reasonable (C) holding that evidence should not be suppressed if police officers acted in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate (D) holding that a plaintiff must show his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented (E) holding that under payton a lesser reasonable belief standard and not probable cause is sufficient to allow officers to enter a residence to enforce an arrest warrant
Output: (B)
by $18,976). As a result, the 1992 payment, despite satisfying part of the Greers’ 1982 tax liability, was not a "pay ment of the [full] tax,” and therefore did not end the penalty period for the 1982 underpayment. Because this complication is irrelevant to our resolution of the Greers' appeal, we ignore it. 4 . There is a tension between the Greers’ argument and their failure to challenge the IRS's assessment of the amount of the 1995 refund as a tax liability. A similar tension is evident in some of the erroneous nonrebate refund cases. See, e.g., Bilzerian, 86 F.3d at 1069 (stating that although "no erroneous refund— whether rebate or non-rebate — can revive [a paid tax liability],” nonrebate refunds may be recovered through a supplemental assessment); cf. Frontone, 383 F.3d at 662 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing and resolving tension among ninth circuit cases applying conflicting versions of the harmless error standard in civil cases (B) recognizing this method (C) recognizing this tension (D) recognizing this rule (E) recognizing this presumption
Output: (C)
re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although § 105 “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law,” Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; “[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct.” Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts “to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
Output: (D)
with adequate information concerning the nature of his plea and his constitutional and statutory rights. He also contended that he pleaded guilty without the advice of counsel. [¶ 4.] The written records relating to the 2005 plea indicated that Wolf had waived his statutory and constitutional rights, including his right to counsel. There were, however, no recordings or transcripts of the 2005 proceedings. The circuit court ruled that because there was no transcript showing, the colloquy between Wolf and the court, Wolfs advisement and waiver of rights records were insufficient to establish that his plea was voluntary, that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty, and that he waived his Boykin rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Allen, 153 F.3d 1037, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel (B) holding that a prior conviction in a georgia state court was appropriately used to qualify the defendant as a career offender because he failed to prove he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel (C) holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense (D) holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself (E) holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines
Output: (B)
from the entity whose real interests are at stake in the proceedings, thereby giving rise to a possible conflict of interest. Id. A collection agency may file suit in its own name only when it has become the legal and equitable owner of the debt through an assignment that satisfies all of the requirements set forth in Ohio Revised Code § 1319.12. See Ohio Rev.Code § 1319.12(C). The collection agency need not adhere to the assignment requirements in § 1319.12(C) if it restricts its collections methods to exclude legal action. See Ohio Rev.Code § 1319.12(B). When a collection agency engages in the unauthorized practice of law, it constitutes an “action that cannot legally be taken” within the meaning of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Poirier v. Alco Collections, Inc., 107 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1997)' (<HOLDING>); Marchant v. U.S. Collections West, Inc., 12 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collections agency violated  1692e5 when it engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by instituting a lawsuit against a debtor since the debt had not been properly assigned (B) holding that a lawsuit against a corporation that purchased assets from a bankrupt is not a claim against the debtor (C) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded (D) holding that college violated stay by not delivering transcript to chapter 7 debtor when debt had not yet been determined dischargeable (E) holding that an answer that asserts a counterclaim against a plaintiff who then becomes a bankruptcy debtor is an action or proceeding against the debtor within the meaning of  362a1 notwithstanding the fact that the debtor initiated the lawsuit
Output: (A)
however, can be a strong disincentive to parties who wish to make an offer that settles the entire case and spares them of the expense of litigation. See Patrick E. Broom & Anders T. Aanestad, Rule 68 Offers of Judgment—Problems Created by Duke v. Cochise County, Arizona Attorney, Aug.-Sept.1998, at 29. ¶22 Apportionment makes it “no longer ... enough to figure out what it would be worth to end a matter entirely. It [becomes] necessary to work into the total dollar amount that is offered figures which could be accepted by the other side and still allow enough money in the budget for defense of those unaccepted claims.” Id. With apportionment, “[o]ne cannot guarantee oneself freedom from litigation.” Id.; see also Wiese v. Dedhia, 354 N.J.Super. 256, 806 A.2d 826, 831 (Ct.App.Div.2002) (<HOLDING>) (certif. granted Feb. 9, 2006). When being 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller (B) holding that the new jersey blue sky law simply allows the bureau to regulate its half of the transaction  the offer that occurs entirely within the state of new jersey (C) recognizing burden placed on plaintiffs making a joint offer if the new jersey rule were construed to require spousal plaintiffs with interrelated claims in the absence of any conflict of interest to submit separate offers of judgment (D) recognizing new jerseys interest in deterrence of tortious misconduct as a relevant factor in choice of law decisions applicable where two of defendants were new jersey residents from whom damages were sought for their negligent acts in new jersey (E) recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey
Output: (C)
are related to, or are directed to the same embodiment as in the original application. The PTO’s approach is, moreover, unmanageable. Every claim must, by definition, be different in scope than the other claims of the patent, and it is difficult to distinguish one patent embodiment from another or to determine when a later claim is related to an earlier claim. A rule requiring that the new claims be related to the previously submitted claims, or be directed to the same embodiment, would be difficult to administer in a consistent and predictable way. In short, this panel is bound by Doll. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed.Cir.1982) (en banc) (adopting the decisions of the CCPA as binding precedent); In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). If the PTO believes we should overrule Doll, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an earlier precedential decision is binding precedent on later panels (B) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (C) holding that where a statement is merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panels full attention it is not binding on later panels (D) holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels (E) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding
Output: (A)
is raised in a 60-1507 motion, as here. This view holds some support in Kansas law. Kansas case law ... plainly holds that constitutional challenges to presumptive sentences under the KSGA cannot be reviewed on direct appeal and must be raised in post-conviction proceedings under K.S.A. § 60-1507. Id. at 7-8 (citing State v. Lewis, 27 Kan.App.2d 134, 140-42, 998 P.2d 1141 (Kan.Ct.App.) (“[Because the issue is not one that could have been presented on direct appeal, it necessarily is one whose only chance of review is by collateral attack, i.e., a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.”)), rev. denied, 269 Kan. 938 (Kan.2000). Hopper v. Cline, 2011 WL 6372960, *3 (D.Kan.2011). See State v. Mitchell, 45 Kan.App.2d 592, 605, 252 P.3d 586 (2011); State v. Lewis, 27 Kan.App.2d 134, 998 P.2d 1141 (2000) (<HOLDING>). And here, the KCOA addressed this claim on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved (B) holding the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may be waived (C) holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal (D) holding defendants claim that the presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment was statutorily barred from being considered on direct appeal but could be raised in a postsentence collateral attack (E) holding that a cruel and unusual punishment claim is not jurisdictional and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal
Output: (D)
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Common sense casts significant doubt on Robinson’s causation allegations. Standard Mortgage repeatedly notified Robinson that her insurance coverage had' lapsed and that, if she failed to take corrective action, it would become “necessary for us to secure coverage at your expense.” Standard Mortgage’s letters did not mislead Robinson about how much she would be charged for force-placed insurance coverage; they plainly stated that “[t]he premium will be $8,845.20.” Nor did the letters attempt to “lull” Robinson into inaction by suggesting, for example, that Robinson would be unable to obtain cheaper coverage on the insurance market. Cf. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 445 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, Standard Mortgages’s letters 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rico bar applies even where the plaintiff does not have standing to bring a securities fraud action (B) holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer (C) holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction (D) holding that the nlra preempts a rico claim when the underlying conduct of the plaintiffs rico claim is wrongful only by virtue of the labor laws  (E) recognizing that publications if used to lull plaintiff into not resisting the efforts to fire him could be part of the fraud underlying the rico offense
Output: (E)
H.D.’s initial removal from respondent’s custody and respondent’s entry of the consent order granting guardianship to petitioners, we conclude that the requirements set forth by N.C. G admission of hearsay “was highly prejudicial.” This general argument is not sufficient to establish that the admission of the alleged hearsay evidence prejudiced him. Further, the court’s findings and conclusions here are supported by evidence other than the evidence challenged as hearsay. Respondent’s own testimony, and that of respondent’s father, contained competent evidence to support the findings that grounds existed for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-llll(a)(2). See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 411, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is a presumption in a bench 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge as trier of fact is able to distinguish between competent and incompetent evidence and consider only that evidence which is admissible (B) holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the rowe factors reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorneys fees (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial (E) holding that the trial courts classification of property will not be disturbed as long as there is competent evidence to support that determination
Output: (D)
Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making decision of a general scope or, to put it another way, legislation involves line-drawing. Where the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration. In addition, the act must be “procedurally” legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. This principle requires that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people which the governing body has been chosen to serve. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the procedure the legislature follows 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on the merits that the existence of an unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute would render invalid actions taken under the statute unless the legislative veto provisions were severable from the portion of the statute pursuant to which the challenged actions were taken (B) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (C) holding onehouse legislative veto unconstitutional (D) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (E) holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative
Output: (C)
evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.” Sweats Fashions, 833 F.2d at 1562. Plaintiff has neither submitted materials of his own, nor shown how the materials already in the record create a genuine issue of material fact. He has done nothing more than rest on an ambiguous “general denial”: that he has either “refused to accept” his severance pay, or that such pay was never “conveyed” to him.” Pl.’s Opp. at 4. This is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. Put simply, while defendant has met its burden under Celotex properly to support Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Defendant cannot be faulted for failing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (B) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under rcfc 12b6 by asserting a new claim (C) holding that a respondent cannot avoid the initial pleading element by obtaining a dismissal and filing her own suit (D) recognizing that a rule 12b6 motion is an appropriate vehicle on which to seek dismissal of a claim barred by a prescription statute (E) holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face
Output: (B)
first, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), we will begin with the question whether the troopers violated Quick’s Fourth Amendment rights. A The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures.” To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). There is no dispute that the troopers “seized” Quick when they shot and killed him. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The question, instead, is whether the seizure 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (B) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (C) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (D) holding the time frame is crucial and evaluating reasonableness of officers use of deadly force at the time of the seizure irrespective of their prior unreasonable conduct in creating the circumstances (E) holding the use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure the alleged unreasonableness of the officers conduct cannot serve as a basis for a  1983 cause of action
Output: (C)
[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court’s inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O’Neal (“O’Neal”), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
Output: (C)
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Haire, 719 F.3d at 362, B. Giles argues that Defendants -discriminated against her due to her gender in violation of Title VII and the equal protection clause. She cites both Defendants’ nonrenewal of her employment and the decision to not approve a pay increase. Giles has not presented any direct evidence of discrimination; therefore, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, she must first establish a pri-ma facie case of gender discrimination. Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)); Lee v. Conecuh Cty. Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>). To establish a prima facie case, Giles must 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (B) holding that we lack jurisdiction over unexhausted equal protection claims (C) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (D) recognizing the application of mcdonnel douglas to equal protection claims (E) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles
Output: (D)
was not “otherwise privileged.” Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir.1991). If probable cause for the arrest existed at the time of arrest, the confinement is privileged. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir.2003). “Probable cause ‘exists when [one] ha[s] knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.’ ” Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir.2007)). As in this case, a mistaken identity can provide the basis for probable cause. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-03, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971) (<HOLDING>). If officers arrest an individual based on a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have probable cause to arrest an individual with a sufficiently similar appearance to the description in a warrant (B) holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within (C) holding that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry
Output: (A)
nature of a tort claim. Alabama law has long embraced the common-law doctrine of local-governmental immunity applicable to tort actions against municipalities and counties. Indeed, this Court has explained that the doctrine predates, but survived, the adoption of the 1901 Constitution. Gamer v. Covington Cnty., 624 So.2d 1346 (Ala. 1993); Home Indem. Co. v. Anders, 459 So.2d 836 (Ala.1984). It is a doctrine designed to protect local governments and their coffers. See, e.g., Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334, 1343-44 (Ala.l995)(abro-gated on other grounds, Ex parte Apicella, 809 So.2d 865 (Ala.2001)); Gamer, 624 So.2d at 1351. Because it was in fact a common-law doctrine and not created by the constitution, it was and is subject to modification by the legislature. Smith v. Schulte, supra (<HOLDING>); Gamer, 624 So.2d at 1351. Our legislature has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar (B) holding that eleventh amendment immunity does not extend to independent political subdivisions created by the state such as counties and cities (C) recognizing legislature reallocated the regulatory authority from the cities over the property on which dfw airport is located to the airport board (D) recognizing the immunity of counties unless an action is authorized by the legislature (E) recognizing the unique status of counties and cities that enables the legislature to regulate their tort liability
Output: (E)
breach occurs after the date of judicial demand. In support it cites Miller v. Louisiana Gas Service Co., 95-874 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 680 So.2d 52; and City of New Orleans v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 517 So.2d 145 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987). Continental further contends that the trial court’s award of interest on the 2005 settlements from the date of the July 2003 judicial demand is, in essence, a penalty award and thus is inconsistent with the compensatory purpose of prejudgment interest. See Trans-Global Alloy Ltd: v. First Nat’l Bank of Jefferson Parish, 583 So.2d 443 (La.1991). We agree. The interest on these settlement awards should not begin to accrue until the date Tate & Lyle paid these amounts, giving rise to an indemnity obligation on Continental’s part. See Miller, supra (<HOLDING>); see also United, 517 So.2d at 165 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns (B) holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled (C) holding that because an indemnitor is not liable until the indemnitee actually makes payment interest does not accrue until the payment is made (D) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (E) holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment
Output: (C)
from the past discrimination. But of course, if an employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. Id. at 628, 127 S.Ct. 2162, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In response to Ledbetter, Congress passed the Fair Pay Act in order to overturn and reverse its effects. See, Pub.L. No. 111-2, 125 Stat. 5 (2009); see also, Johnson v. District of Columbia, 632 F.Supp.2d 20, 21 (D.D.C.2009) (“Through the Fair Pay Act, Congress intended to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter * * *.”); Mays v. Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 2009 WL 2163177 at *2 (D.Kan., July 1, 2009) (<HOLDING>). For our purposes, the Fair Pay Act changed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandatory language such as will pay or shall pay creates the necessary moneymandate for tucker act purposes (B) holding statute of limitations for discriminatory pay practices begins when initial pay decision was made (C) recognizing that the fair pay act overturned the ledbetter decision (D) holding that the defendants could not be held in contempt for failure to pay more than the fee cap amount because the court cannot order the djefendants to violate an act of congress to pay the total award (E) holding that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question but in a different case unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court
Output: (C)