niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
rather than the neutral principles of law method. Michigan law provides that courts should generally use the hierarchical method. See, e.g., Calvary Presbyterian Church, supra-, Bennison, supra. However, the neutral principles of law method may be appropriate in situations such as those where “it appears from the church constitution, canons or rules, or from some other source, that an express trust exists in favor of one or the other of the contending parties . . . Bennison, supra at 724. LCC argues that this ty is limited because “civil courts may not redetermine the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to government of the religious polity.” Smith, supra at 684 (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also Milivojevich, supra at 709 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Denomination, through the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding certification is not an occasion for inquiry into the merits (B) holding that when disputes require inquiry into religious law and polity civil courts shall not disturb the ecclesiastical bodys decision (C) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (D) holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper (E) holding that a bare allegation of bad faith is insufficient to require an inquiry into the governments decision not to file  5k11 motion
Output: (B)
I believe Alvarez has established enough facts to survive summary judgment. That is because “[o]nce there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.” Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir.1998). I recognize that the hostile environment factor is difficult to analyze in light of our varying jurisprudence. Compare Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir.2002) (finding that a single request for a relationship, four or five isolated touching incidents, a request to draw a phallic symbol and teasing in the form of a gender-based poster were not severe enough to meet this element); with Eich v. Bd. of Regents, 350 F.3d 752 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). However, “[ejach case must stand on its own 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct of supervisor who grabbed plaintiff on the buttocks and made suggestive comments while she was conversing with another employee was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term or condition of plaintiffs employment (B) recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex (C) holding that several touching incidents standing behind the plaintiff simulating a sex act and another incident of simulating a sex act were severe or pervasive enough to affect a term or condition of employment (D) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (E) holding that conduct that a jury finds to be based on sex and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex
Output: (C)
persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). The collection and analysis of a DNA sample through either a blood draw or a buccal swab is a search. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (noting that analysis of blood reveals private facts); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir.2007) (“[T]he extraction and analysis of plaintiffs’ blood for DNA-indexing purposes constitute^] a search.” (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir.2005))). Fourth Amendment protections extend to children. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2643-44, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d at 14. Under the Fourth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that search of middle school student violated her fourth amendment rights (B) holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights (C) holding that a warrant issued by a judge lacking authority violated defendants fourth amendment rights (D) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver (E) holding that a warrantless search of garbage located within the curtilage of the defendants home violated his fourth amendment rights
Output: (A)
portion of the district court’s written judgment ordering as a special condition of supervised release that “upon completion of his term of imprisonment, the defendant is to be surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration official for deportation.” The district court did not mention this provision at the sentencing hearing, and the Government concedes that it conflicts with the oral pronouncement of sentence. We agree. The condition imposed is not listed in the sentencing guidelines as a standard or mandatory condition of supervised release, and it is not among the conditions recommended by the Sentencing Commission insofar as the record does not support its application here. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) & (d)(6); see also United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 938 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The written judgment improperly conflicts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conflict with oral pronouncement is not creat ed by including conditions that are standard mandatory or recommended by the sentencing commission (B) holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls (C) holding that written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement (D) holding that when there is a variation between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence the oral pronouncement controls (E) holding that imposition occurs at time of oral pronouncement
Output: (A)
of “Defendant’s practice of denying employees an impartial review of discipline actions and Plaintiffs independent acts of retaliation.” See Am. Compl. at ¶ 83. Mr. Black does not allege that his reassignment constitutes a demotion in rank or salary. Absent any allegation of demotion, Mr. Black’s claim of pure reputational damage fails as a matter of law because such claims are not protected by the due process clause. Coleman v. Napolitano, 65 F.Supp.3d 99, 107 (D.D.C.2014) (“[C]ourts have routinely rejected claims that a mere reassignment or change of duties, without a corresponding reduction in rank or pay, amounts to a divestment of a property interest.”) (citations omitted); see also New Vision Photography Program, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 54 F.Supp.3d 12, 31 (D.D.C.2014) (<HOLDING>). Beyond alleged reputational damage, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief (B) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did (C) holding that a period of paid leave does not qualify as a suspension (D) holding that purely reputational damage does not qualify for dueprocess protection (E) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief
Output: (D)
put forth anything to convince the Court that further discovery could rectify this issue. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to deny or defer Defendant’s Motion as premature. 4. Contractual Limitations on Time to Bring Suit A. How does KRS § 304.14-370 affect contractual limitation provisions? Kentucky law has long recognized “the validity of insurance contract provisions requiring as a condition to sue that the action must be ‘commenced within the time specified by the policy.’ ” Edmondson v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ky.1989) (internal citations omitted). Courts typically enforced such provisions unless they unreasonably limited the time in which parties could sue. See Ashland Finance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (<HOLDING>). However, KRS § 304.14-370 does place 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable (B) holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable (C) holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation (D) holding that cogsa claims must be brought within one year from the time at which the loss occurred (E) holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable
Output: (E)
Section 624.155 does not delineate the procedure by which a claim for punitive damages is to be pled, section 768.72 provides that procedure. Key West Convalescent Center v. Doherty, 619 So.2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) supports the insurer’s analysis. In Doherty, this court observed that section 768.72 created a positive legal right not to be subjected to financial worth discovery until after there has been an affirmative finding of a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages. While Doherty concerned the statutory provision setting the standards for nursing home facilities, and the case sub judice calls for application of the insurance code, the observations of Doherty are nonetheless applicable here. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Noordhoek, 672 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). The insurance company has a substantive right 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages (B) holding that an award for punitive damages must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence (C) holding what section 76872 requires is that a plaintiff who has pleaded punitive damages must offer a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages and obtain an order authorizing the maintenance of the punitive damage claim as a predicate to conducting discovery of a defendants financial worth (D) holding a court may not award punitive damages (E) holding punitive damages claims must be stricken absent a reasonable evidentiary basis for their award
Output: (E)
the search and seizure. We determined that they failed to prove “that the property or possessions seized and searched were owned, leased, controlled or rightfully possessed by them or that they had any interest in them,” and so lacked “a valid claim of lawful occupancy” in order to challenge the search warrant. Id. at 18, 36 A.2d at 348. In Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 75 A.2d 327 (1950), we explained that one must “lawfully occupy” the premises; mere presence is not sufficient: [O]ne cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure of premises or property which he neither owns, nor leases, nor controls, nor lawfully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has no interest 10. Only recently we cited the cases which followed that formula, and re-affirmed i d 758, 763 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209, 93 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that ferguson had no right to complain of search because he was not in lawful possession of the property (C) holding that defendant could not complain of search and seizure of bags in which he disclaimed any ownership (D) holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal (E) holding where the commonwealth is not in possession of property in question petition for return of property is moot
Output: (B)
not persuade this Court to apply Turner to the facts at bar. Ultimately, defendant’s Turner argument fails for the same reason that defendant’s Hudson argument failed. Like Hudson. Turner cited Bell with approval and did not at any point suggest that Bell’s approach to Fourth Amendment claims should no longer be controlling law. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citing to the portions of Bell which discussed petitioners’ First Amendment claims). This Court will not disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent that has not been specifically overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases. See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302 (declining to apply the Turner test to custodial strip searches on this ground); cf. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Like the many courts that have addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing in a  1983 case brought by a deathrow prisoner that the deferential turner standard differs from the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the con stitutional rights of persons in free society (B) holding that strict scrutiny applies (C) holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context (D) recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class (E) holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons
Output: (E)
on November 24, 2015 (the “SecNav Report”), found that plaintiff failed, in his request and in his letter of deficiency, to adequately explain why the requested documents, assuming they existed, were relevant. With respect to Major Brezler’s request for documents (“e-mails since July 1, 2012, regarding Brezler, Sarwar Jan, Ainuddin Khudair-aham or the August 10, 2012 attack by Generals Flynn and Mills, or any commander or principal staff officer within the 3rd [sic] Battalion, 8th Marines from July 1 to August 10, 2012”), documents not provided were not relevant, did not exist, or were not within the control of [the Marine Forces Reserve]. (R. at 2626.) 2. Analysis The Navy, like any other agency, must comply with its own binding rules. Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969) (<HOLDING>). Although the government contends that this ■ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1252a2bii barred jurisdiction of decisions specified by statute as discretionary but did not bar decisions specified by regulation as discretionary (B) holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies (C) holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued (D) holding that mandatory military procedures and regulations cannot be ignored by the agencies themselves even where discretionary decisions are involved (E) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence
Output: (D)
156 F.3d at 194 n. 1 (In prison, “[w]here the government absolutely monopolizes the means of speech or controls a bottleneck, ... a refusal to fund functions the same as an outright ban.”); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 318 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C.Cir.2003) (BOP’s interpretation of Zimmer Amendment as imposing an outright ban of electrical instruments was reasonable; the restriction on using appropriated funds for the “use or possession” of electric and electronic instruments may reasonably be construed to prohibit paying for costs incidental to such use or possession, including costs incurred for storage, supervision and electricity), reh’g en banc denied, 351 F.3d 1165 and 1166 (D.C.Cir.2003). See also Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Given the context in which the challenged 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in part because he never reported alleged gang incidents to the government and therefore could not prove that the government was even aware of a problem (B) holding that the alien was entitled to performance by the government of its promise that the government would not oppose any of his motions for relief from deportation (C) holding that preservation of government resources cannot as a matter of law justify barring some arbitrarily chosen group from a government program (D) holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government (E) holding that the use of any government resources   whether salaries employees paper or buildings  to accomplish a final listing of a species as endangered would entail government expenditure and thereby run afoul of statutory moratorium on spending for such purpose the government cannot make expenditures and therefore cannot act other than by appropriation
Output: (E)
(10th ed.2014); see also Allie v. Ionata, 503 So.2d 1237, 1240 (Fla.1987) (defining statute of limitations). In contrast, a statute of repose bars a suit after a specified time that is based solely on the actions of the defendant that gave rise to the claim. As á result, the time constraints of a statute of repose are wholly unrelated to when a plaintiff suffers or discovers an actual injury. See Statute of repose, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014); see also Universal Eng’g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463, 465 (Fla.1984) (quoting Bauld v e, not a limitations statute. The introductory clause of the statute provides that “[a] cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer ... is extinguished unless action is brought” within the time periods pr B.R. 104, 123 (Bankr.D.N.J.1999) (<HOLDING>); Carpenter v. Granderson, 214 B.R. 671, 675 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose (B) holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed (C) holding that a statute of repose sets absolute parameters of any action (D) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (E) holding that defendant bore burden of establishing right to summary judgment on basis of statute of repose defense
Output: (B)
charge so that its deliberations on percentages of negligence will not be had in a vacuum, or possibly based on a mistaken notion of how a statute operates.” 82 N.J. at 345, 413 A.2d 322. We emphasized that “a jury informed of the legal effects of its findings ... is better able to fulfill its fact finding function.” Id. at 345-46, 413 A.2d 322. See also State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 485, 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (“As we have repeatedly stated, trial courts ... must inform juries of the effect of their findings.”) (citations omitted); Campo v. Tama, 133 N.J. 123, 140, 627 A.2d 135 (1993) (“We have always emphasized that juries must understand the import of their findings.”) (O’Hem, J., dissenting); Chavanne v. Clover Financial Corp., 206 N.J.Super. 72, 80-81, 501 A.2d 1024 (App.Div.1985) (<HOLDING>); Dimogerondakis v. Dimogerondakis, 197 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (B) holding that ultimate outcome charge should be used to inform a jury of fact that its award will be subject to courts control until child reaches age of maturity (C) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (D) recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child (E) holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review
Output: (B)
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. The plaintiffs contend that FIRREA does not expressly state that it applies retroactively. Therefore, because it imposes new duties and affects the plaintiffs’ vested pension rights which arose in 1987, it cannot be applied retroactively to require them to follow an administrative claim procedure and now bar jurisdiction over their claims. The court agrees that FIRREA does not contain an express retroactivity provision. However, this does not require the court to find that the claims bar provision cannot apply to pension benefits which vested prior to FIR-REA’s enactment. The Ninth Circuit has had occasion to address the question of whether FIRREA applies retroactively. See Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 38 F.3d 1490, 1501 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); F.D.I.C. v. New Hampshire, 953 F.2d 478, 486 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely (B) holding that 12 usc  1821d9 does not apply retroactively (C) holding miranda decision does not apply retroactively (D) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively (E) holding that  523a13 does not apply retroactively
Output: (B)
identically.” Id. (citation omitted). The most frequent way that a case arises under federal law is “when fede erty that were allegedly set out in a partnership agreement. Accordingly, all of the claims that Plaintiffs pursued in their First Amended State Court Petition — declaratory judgment, breach of partnership agreement, misappropriation of trademark, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and tortious interference — are venerable state law causes of action. Docket Entry No. 1-1 at 26-33. Even the misappropriation claim — which could, but does not necessarily, involve a federal trademark — arises under state law. See U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The one potential wrinkle is that Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a cause of action under texas law for misappropriation (B) recognizing this texas rule (C) recognizing the cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied
Output: (A)
(applying Tennessee law); see also Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969). Most other courts, however, have set a lower bar. For example in Mondido v. Cory Corp., 483 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the plaintiff was injured when the glass carafe from her coffee pot broke. The carafe itself was manufactured by Corning, but it was converted into a coffee decanter and sold by Cory, a separate company. Id. at 27. After both companies were found liable, Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the carafe was defective when it left Coming’s plant. Id. The court rejected the motion, noting the plaintiffs evidence that Cory converted the 1967) (<HOLDING>); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed (B) holding that plaintiff had successfully traced the defective condition to the manufacturer where there was no evidence of tampering by the retailer (C) holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers (D) holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer (E) holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool
Output: (B)
at the La Vega site. The fact that the Esso station at La Vega ceased its operations in 1998 does not change the prospective nature of plaintiffs’ suit at the time it was brought. Moreover, in PauÉuxet the Court stated that it did not agree “with the reasoning which, apparently, led the Louisiana district court, following the Hamker decision, to dismiss a number of actions simply because no violations occurred on the dates the complaints were filed. A plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive relief in good faith, judged objectively, may recover a penalty judgment for past violations even if the injunction proves unattainable.” Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094 (citing .1992); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1312, 1322 (D.Or.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters (B) holding that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered under the lhwca (C) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (D) holding a discharge of pollutants is ongoing if the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters even if the discharger is no longer adding pollutants to the point source itself (E) holding that to achieve goals of cwa epa is required to establish and enforce technologybased limitations on individual discharges into the countrys navigable waters from point sources
Output: (D)
199 F.3d at 248 n. 6. Moreover, when the plaintiff declares the sufficiency of his pleadings and makes no attempt to amend his complaint in response to the defendant’s challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when the plaintiffs allegations fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Spiller v. City of Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.1997). In addition, a plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend after being afforded repeated opportunities to do so. See Wilkins, 173 F.Supp.2d at 614; accord United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that “pleading review is not a game where the plaintiff is permitted to file serial amendments until he finally gets it right”); Willard, 336 F.3d at 387 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “where a proposed amendment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding leave to amend was properly denied where the relator had previously filed two amended complaints (B) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (C) holding district court properly denied leave to amend where application was four months late and appeared to be futile (D) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (E) holding that the trial court properly refused to consider allegations in the disallowed amended complaints
Output: (A)
interest in the Annuity to remain with [Claude].” Supporting the trial court’s finding is a letter from Jean to Cindy Lott, Jean’s daughter and the personal representative of her estate, and testimony from Lott. Jean’s letter stated “I went to United today and had my beneficiary changed on my IRA account. I put it in your name and Dianne as [contingent] in case something happens to you. Dianne is beneficiary to my annuity account.” Lott testified that Jean attempted to change the beneficiary of annuity and that Jean thought that the beneficiary was changed. Claude argues, however, that both Jean’s letter and Lott’s testimony violate the Dead Man’s Statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 19-11-20 (1985). Unquestionably, Jean’s letter is admissible. Harris v. Berry, 231 S.C. 201, 98 S.E.2d 251 (1957) (<HOLDING>). In addition, because Lott’s testimony is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983 (B) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (C) holding that letters written by decedent to the testatrix and a first cousin who were designated as beneficiaries under the will were not within prohibition of the dead mans statute and were improperly excluded (D) holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding (E) holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court  we must assume that they were considered
Output: (C)
... I believe the low end of the Guideline range is appropriate and will satisfy and address the factors in Section 3553 that I have just reviewed. R.30 at 15-16. II DISCUSSION A. Mr. Diaz contends that the district court misapprehended the extent of its authority to impose a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range. In support of this contention, he relies on the district court’s statement that factors such as the conditions of his pretrial confinement did not “warrant any deviation from the Guidelines.” R.30 at 15 (emphasis added). Notably, Mr. Diaz acknowledges the court’s affirmative statement that it was basing its sentence on the factors in section 3553(a). In Mr. Diaz’s view, however, this reference to section 3553(a) merely shows that the court was “confused th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Reading the district court’s statement in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentencing error did not affect defendants substantial rights because error did not result in longer term of imprisonment (B) holding that use of the pr ebooker term departure was not error because it did not make a substantive difference (C) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error (D) holding that the erroneous use of the term burglary in the beginning of the written jury instructions was not fundamental because any error was cured by the correct use of the term theft in the latter portion of the written instructions (E) holding that use of the term enhancement also a pr ebooker term did not require reversal where district court properly considered the guidelines to be advisory
Output: (B)
drugs does. See id. Although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, ... lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying or penal system.” Id. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301 (citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). Under certain circumstances, administrative segregation is a necessary limitation of privileges and rights that incarceration demands. The extended duration of Al-Amin’s confinement in administrative segregation does distinguish the facts of his case from some other disciplinary or administrative segregation situations in which it was held that no liberty interest existed. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. at 2301 (<HOLDING>); Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inmates mandamus petition challenging a disciplinary report imposing 15 days disciplinary confinement was a collateral criminal proceeding because the disciplinary confinement limited petitioners ability to earn gain time (B) holding that the plaintiffs disciplinary segregated confinement for thirty days did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest (C) holding that 30day segregated confinement in hawaii penitentiary did not present such atypical hardship so as to create liberty interest (D) holding that 30day disciplinary confinement did not present the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest and further stating that the chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance in consideration of parole is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the due process clause (E) holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest
Output: (B)
would seem to be an outstanding liability of CCI that would affect its net worth and, therefore, Jeff's total net worth as a CCI shareholder. 7 . We are cognizant that our refusal to consider this issue now could lead to more litigation in the future, given the litigiousness of these parties, but this does not permit us to ignore jurisdictional rules. See In re Guardianship of Hickman, 811 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. We further note that even if the trial court revisits the question of modifying Jeff's child support obligation upon termination of this appeal, such modification could only be made effective upon the date the trial court reobtains jurisdiction following certification of this appeal as final. See Harris v. Harris, 800 N.E.2d 930, 937 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 8 . Despite the Crider 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court was permitted to rule on child support modification request filed before appeal was certified as final but that effective date of modification could be no earlier than when indiana supreme court denied transfer on appeal and trial court reobtained jurisdiction (B) holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed (C) holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits (D) holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction (E) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal
Output: (A)
had been referred to Healy and Gardner, Fitzgerald was no longer functioning as a prosecutor. Cf. Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1467 (affirming denial of absolute immunity because the prosecutor was no longer assigned to the case when the challenged activity occurred). Moreover, the forwarding of materials constitutes an “administrative” function which is somewhat analogous to an investigative officer supplying a prosecutor with evidence discovered during the course of an investigation. However, Cignetti’s claims based on the second, fifth and sixth acts are barred by absolute immunity. With respect to the second and the fifth acts, it has long been settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for initiating and pursuing a prosecution. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984 (<HOLDING>); Butz, 438 U.S. at 515, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (“The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution (B) holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasiprosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings (C) holding that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from  1983 suits for initiating a prosecution and presenting the case at trial (D) holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity (E) holding that officials charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoy absolute immunity
Output: (A)
persecution. See Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 612 (8th Cir.2004). Being forced on occasion to work without pay for the police is troublesome, but we cannot conclude that this alone rises to the level of persecution. “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept” and low-level types of intimidation or harassment are not sufficiently severe. Shoaira, 377 F.3d at 844 (internal marks omitted). We have stated that brief periods of detention, ethnic conflict, or isolated violence do not necessarily constitute persecution. See Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir.2004) (noting isolated violence does not compel a finding of persecution); Al Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir.2004) (noting brief detention not necessarily persecution); Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).' We conclude that substantial evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding political unrest and ethnic conflict do not compel a finding of persecution (B) holding that a minor beating even in conjunction with threats did not compel a finding of persecution (C) holding that evidence of multiple interrogations and 24hour detention did not compel finding of persecution (D) holding that evidence of kidnapping at gunpoint interrogation and beating did not compel finding of persecution (E) holding that minor abuse during brief detention did not compel finding of past persecution
Output: (A)
1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004); Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir.2001). In this case, the court did not remand based on § 1447(c), but rather on the basis that it was declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Review of a district court’s discretionary decision to remand under § 1367(c)(3) is not treated as a § 1447(c) remand, and therefore it is not subject to § 1447(d)’s statutory bar to review. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 152-53 (10th Cir.1995). As a logical corollary, then, § 1447(d) likewise does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to reconsider its prior orders in this case. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a district courts power to remand pendent state claims to state court is inherent in statutory authorization to decline supplemental jurisdiction under  1367c (B) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (C) holding the district court retained jurisdiction to reconsider its order granting the defendants motion to dismiss notwithstanding the fact that the district court had remanded the remaining pendent state claims to state court pursuant to 28 usc  1367c (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had invested time and resources in the case
Output: (C)
In other words, Long argues, there is no temporal limitation imposed by the opening clause of Subsection (A), and thus it applies, for example, to insurance section (A) would exclude any money or benefits that have already been paid to an insured or beneficiary. Two longstanding decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, lead us to conclude that the opening clause of Subsection (A) must be interpreted in the broader manner argued by Long. See Etherton v. Owners Ins. Co., 829 F.3d 1209, 1223 (10th Cir. 2016) (“If the state’s highest court has interpreted a state statute, we defer to that decision. If the state’s highest court has not interpreted a state statute, we instead predict how that court would rule.”) (citation omitted); In re Borgman, 698 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). In State ex rel. Lankford v. Collins, 70 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law (B) holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations (C) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (D) holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law (E) holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts
Output: (B)
third, [we pay] principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections. 501 U.S. 1, 11, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 2112, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). The first factor weighs in Claimants’ favor. See id. at 11, 111 S.Ct. at 2112-13 (listing the “significant” consequences of attachment). Although Plaintiffs point out that SDNTs have a diminished interest in their blocked assets because their ability to alienate that property is already restricted, SDNTs do retain some interest, especially because the possibility of unblocking remains, as occurred with a number of Claimants here. Cf. Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1352-54 (<HOLDING>). As discussed below, delisting does not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the continued interest of a criminal defendant in frozen property prior to forfeiture (B) holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture (C) holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property (D) recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment (E) holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment
Output: (A)
deferential standard. However, there is more. Liberty’s dealings with Plaintiff, particularly during the period before Plaintiff retained counsel, were inconsistent. Plaintiff was preliminarily approved for benefits, and then denied, first because of the pre-existing condition exclusion, then because of a failure to provide “objective medical” evidence of disability, and finally because of the pre-existing condition exclusion. Plaintiff correctly points out that the policy includes no requirement that Plaintiff present objective medical evidence to support her claim. See Canseco v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 93 F.3d 600, 608-9 (9th Cir.1996) (implied additional plan terms are disfavored); Duncan v. Continental Cas. Co., 1997 WL 88374, *4 (N.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>). In deciding Plaintiffs appeal, Liberty relied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance company could not deny a claim for longterm disability benefits based on a lack of objective medical evidence when the original policy did not refer to the objective medical evidence standard and never defined that term (B) holding that plan administrator could appropriately require objective medical evidence supporting disability claim where such a requirement is not contradicted by any provision of the administrators own policy (C) holding that it was wrong for an administrator to require a claimant suffering from fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome to submit objective medical evidence in support of her claim for benefits when the plan did not require such evidence (D) holding that plan administrator cannot exclude a claim for lack of objective medical evidence unless the objective medical evidence standard was made clear plain and conspicuous enough in the policy to negate layman sic plaintiffs objectively reasonable expectations of coverage  (E) holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available
Output: (D)
Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir.1994); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). Under the incorporation by reference doctrine, the court may also consider documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.2002). Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only when the court is satisfied that the deficiencies in the complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir.2003); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (B) holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order (C) recognizing utility of amendment as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend (D) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (E) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court
Output: (D)
not a legislator and therefore not entitled to assert legislative immunity. (Pls.Mem. in Opp’n at 24.) Presumably plaintiffs are analogizing the dictum of Forrester that state executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official acts to the same extent as the President of the United States. See 484 U.S. at 226, 108 S.Ct. at 543-44. However, the Municipal defendants do not assert Zwim’s immunity as an executive, but only with respect to his participation in approving legislated Board resolutions. (Mun. Defs.Mem. of Law at 21.) Although defendant Zwirn is chief executive of the Town, he has legislative responsibilities in his dual capacity as a Town Board member. N.Y.Town Law §§ 60, 63 (McKinney 1987); see also Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Orange, 830 F.Supp. at 706 (county executive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding chief of police an executive officer because a member of the executive branch and an officer (B) recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation (C) holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself (D) holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available (E) holding that a mayor although the executive officer may still have legislative functions
Output: (E)