niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Doyle v. NAI Pers., Inc., 991 A.2d 1181, 1185 (D.C.2010) (“[T]he ALJ may consider the lesser included issue of whether petitioner's conduct amounted to simple misconduct justifying the more limited denial of benefits under § 51-110(b)(2). But die finding of gross misconduct may not stand.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 31 . Doyle, 991 A.2d at 1184 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). 32 .See Odeniran, 985 A.2d at 429 (reasoning that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because it "did not present evidence that [the employee’s] willful [violation] was other than an isolated incident, nor did it contend that its business had suffered serious consequences as a result”); see also Doyle, 991 A.2d at 1184 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Odeniran, 985 A.2d at 429). 33 . See, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct the employee may pursue a civil action against his employer and also pursue benefits under the workers compensation act (B) holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct (C) holding in a case in which the alj found the employer had failed to establish a rule violation under 7 dcmr  3127 but nevertheless determined the employer had established the employees gross misconduct that because there was scant evidence as to the employers written requirements pertaining to employee behavior this court could not conclude that there was substantial evidence that the employee had violated the employers rules in a manner that amounts to gross misconduct under 7 dcmr  3123 (D) holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability (E) holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict
Output: (B)
v. Savage, 228 F.3d 367, 370 (4th Cir.2000). This court recently decided a similar case, the facts of which are closely analogous to the case at bar. In Zimbelman, two employees were fired from their jobs with the Air Force under suspicion of having committed various acts of misconduct, including theft and fraud. See Zimbelman, 228 F.3d at 369. The employees brought suit against their supervisors and the Air Force investigators who had conducted the investigation into their misconduct, asserting several constitutional claims, including one under Bivens for a violation of their Fifth Amendment right to preserve their reputations. See id. at 370. This court affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens claims, concluding that they “indisputably ar[o]se from a federal e 959, 961 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Gleason v. Malcom, 718 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (B) holding csra controlled plaintiffs claims which arose as result of employment relationship (C) holding that plaintiffs were not released from the exclusive remedial framework of the csra when their claims arose from their federal employment even though the csra provided plaintiffs with no remedy (D) holding that plaintiffs claims were precluded by csra because actions complained of arose from federal employment relationship even though many of the alleged violations occurred after the employment relationship was terminated (E) holding that injury incurred when employee returned to retrieve paycheck six days after employment had been terminated occurred in course of employment
Output: (D)
CRCO’s first refusal rights to the NewVector interest. Oregon RSA, accepting the invitation of the district court, moved for sanctions on the basis of the defendants’ responses to discovery requests. The district court permitted the defendants to supplement the record by affidavits but did not hold an evidentiary hearing. By opinion of January 9, 1995 the district court awarded sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees caused by the defendants’ delayed responses to discovery requests. The district court found that the defendants had violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3) and that they had acted in bad faith. The defendants were found jointly and severally liable for the sa leged contract revoking the refusal. See McCombs v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311, 314 (1960) (<HOLDING>), nor was there evidence that the lawyer had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an interest obtained through an agreement supported by consideration is superior to that of a named beneficiary who has given no consideration (B) holding that an agreement in violation of antitrust laws may be enforceable where the parties underlying conduct is legal (C) holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable (D) holding that under oregon law an agreement must be supported by consideration to be legally enforceable (E) holding that under oregon law an acceptance of an offer must be positive unconditional unequivocal and unambiguous
Output: (D)
veniremembers before attempting to strike them, or (3) attempted a jury shuffle to remove black jurors from the strike zone. See, e.g., Moore, 265 S.W.3d at 89; see also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. at 2320-21 (court considered State’s use of jury shuffle to rearrange panel members when a number of black members were seated at front as indicative of a broader pattern of discrimination, and ultimately found that State’s strikes against blacks were also racially motivated). Significantly, the prosecutor’s conduct in exercising his peremptory strikes was consistent with his representation to the trial court that he used his strikes in an attempt to remove all veniremembers who, like Robertson, initially indicated that they could not consider life. See Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 453 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Specifically, of those 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reviewing record in its entirety prosecutors raceneutral reason was not a pretext where state applied this reason to strike black veniremember and most but not all similarly situated nonblack veniremembers (B) holding that where a nonblack juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual (C) holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons (D) holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason (E) holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror
Output: (A)
(Emphasis added.) Finally, paragraph 13 of the Restrictions states that “[n]o structure shall be commenced or erected on any of said lots” unless approved, either affirmatively or by default, by the architectural committee, “[pjrovided ... that the design, location and the kind of materials and the building to be built on said lot shall be governed by all of the restrictions herein set forth and said building shall be in harmony with existing buildings and structure 193, 197-98 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (interpreting restrictive covenants to manifest an intent to preserve the residential character of the properties, which included the prohibition of constructing roads, especially roads not bene-fitting the property owners); see also Rush v. Miller, 21 Wash.App. 156, 584 P.2d 960, 963 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Hanley v. Misischi, 111 R.I. 233, 302 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that a roadway benefitting land outside the subdivision was not a residential purpose and was therefore a violation of the restrictive covenant (C) holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable (D) holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable (E) holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes
Output: (B)
court, in addition to other disbursements allowed by law, the following costs: . . . For travel, such sum as the court may allow”); Mass.RCiv.P. 54(d) (“Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the Commonwealth or on these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing pariy unless the court otherwise directs”). However, the Supreme Judicial Court cautioned that “(i]n taxing costs, courts do not seek to compensate litigants fully for the cost of litigation.” Waldman v. American Honda Motor Co., supra, 413 Mass, at 322. Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has advised that “where such costs are permitted, an award of costs is allowable only when based on ‘specific affirmative authority.’ ” Demoulas v. Demoulas, 432 Mass. 43, 64 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4.Travel Costs of Prevailing Party In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding costs of service of subpoenas recoverable (C) holding that costs of daily transcripts during trial are not recoverable (D) holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered (E) holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged
Output: (C)
in them precludes the Commission from ascertaining and considering fair value in setting rates, and the Rules are otherwise consistent with the Commission’s constitutional mandate to ascertain fair value. The Cooperatives and the Council counter that the Rules are facially unconstitutional because they make no provision for finding fair value and R14-2-1611(A) is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement to determine and consider this factor in setting rates. ¶46 The Rules are unconstitutional on their face if they cannot be applied under any circumstances without violating Article 15, Sections 3 and 14. Reno, 507 U.S. at 301, 113 S.Ct. 1439. Otherwise, their eonstitu- tionality can only be attacked as applied in particular circumstances. Williams v. 29 P.2d 668, 670 (1942) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Rules empower the Commission to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that a statute is unconstitutional if it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision (D) holding constitutional provision selfexecuting if it grants right that can be put into operation without further legislative action (E) holding that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not extend to parental termination proceedings without identifying any specific constitutional provision
Output: (D)
the sentence “to show an appropriate measured consequence for the extraordinary breaches of trust,” and to protect others from the risk the Defendant posed. The sentence length was not substantively unreasonable. In light of the Defendant’s criminal history—involving the commission of several similar crimes against similar victims—the revocations of supervision in his 1999 case, and the two revocations in the current case, there is support in the record for the district court’s conclusion that the Defendant represented a danger to his community, and that his repeated violations of supervised release warranted imposition of a more substantial term. These rationales support an upward departure from the Guidelines range. See United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Leonard, 483 F.3d 635, 637 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the guidelines range when the record supported the courts conclusion that the defendant was a danger to the community because he had been convicted of a crime that involved a threat against another person (B) holding that district courts decision to exceed the advisory sentencing range in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines ussg  7b14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (C) holding that despite the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines they remain the starting point and the initial benchmark of a district courts sentencing analysis the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process and that failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range  or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceemdashincluding an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range constitutes significant procedural error  (D) holding that restitution is not a proper ground for departing downward from the guidelines range (E) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion although the defendant had been admonished incorrectly on the punishment range
Output: (A)
strips circuit courts of the authority to impose sanctions against parties filing frivolous lawsuits. I do not take this position lightly. Prior to this decision, our law was clear. Sanctions may be imposed against a party “as the result of his or her vexatious, wanton, or oppressive assertion of a claim or defense that cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the application, extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Syl., in part, Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Canady, 175 W.Va. 249, 332 S.E.2d 262 (1985). See, e.g., Pritt v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 204 W.Va. 388, 513 S.E.2d 161 (1998) (per curiam) (affirming sanctions against plaintiff for filing a baseless lawsuit); Syl. pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 196 W.Va. 624, 474 S.E.2d 554 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, this Court has held that “[t]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a circuit court has discretion under rule 11 to impose attorneys fees on litigants who bring vexatious and groundless lawsuits (B) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award appellate attorneys fees due to similar concerns (E) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions
Output: (A)
law enforcement objectives, and the concomitant need for the courts to maintain vigilance, is a recurrent theme in our cases and those of other courts. In United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881, 93 S.Ct. 211, 34 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972), for example, we upheld the admission of evidence inadvertently discovered during a routine agricultural quarantine search, but were careful to note that “[n]othing in the record suggests that the administrative search in this case was ‘employed as an instrument of criminal law enforcement to circumvent the latter’s legal restrictions....’” Id. at 859 (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230, 80 S.Ct. 683, 692, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960)). See also United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); United States v. Epperson, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all (B) holding that a visual inspection and limited hand search of luggage which is used for the purpose of detecting weapons or explosives and not in order to uncover other types of contraband is a privacy intrusion we believe free society is willing to tolerate (C) holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search (D) holding that defendants consent to a search of their luggage was undermined by officers misrepresentation that a drug dog had alerted to their luggage (E) holding that there is no intrusion on a legitimate privacy interest where a dog sniff of an automobile reveals only information regarding contraband items and concluding that society does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the public airspace surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interi or of a vehicle into that public airspace
Output: (B)
to Richardson. 6 . In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended Batson and its progeny to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 7 . The Slate also points out that the presiding judge in the instant case is an African American jurist. Judge Green's sensitivity and efforts to seat a constitutional and racially-diverse jury for defendant, is evidenced in the debate over Richardson. Even though the judge originally found the state’s race-neutral reasons as to Richardson valid, he became concerned about the exclusion of African Americans from defendant's jury. However, the judge’s race is not relevant to Batson analysis. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 8 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 15 (<HOLDING>). 8 . A discussion of the assignments of error 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (B) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that custody decision based on race is not justified (E) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant
Output: (E)
at 134; Nelson, 215 Kan. at 634, 527 P.2d at 1062; DeVore, 207 Kan. at 503, 485 P.2d at 1017; Atchison County Auction, 10 Kan.App.2d at 389, 699 P.2d at 1038. All of the Kansas cases holding an auctioneer liable for conversion despite its good faith and lack of knowledge have dealt with sales in violation of perfected security interests. But because the Kansas cases make the commission merchant liable because it stands in the principal’s shoes, and not based upon any perception of duty of inquiry or action by anyone, we can discern no basis to distinguish between the liability of an auctioneer based on the debtor’s violation of a perfected security interest and the violation of an unperfected security interest. See United States v. Friend’s Stockyard, Inc., 600 F.2d 9 (4th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); Commercial Bank v. Hales, 281 Ark. 439, 665 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a principal liable for its sales agents misrepresentations (B) holding an auctioneer liable for conversion when sales violated an unperfected security interest (C) holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest (D) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (E) holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court
Output: (B)
supra, with approval). Of course, where the submitted materials “capture[] only part of the incident and would provide a distorted view of the events at issue, ... we do not require a court to consider that evidence on a 12(b)(6) motion.” Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based upon the foregoing discussion of legal principles, this Court con-eludes that, when ruling on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 24), it is appropriate to consider the public securities filings by Huffy and statements to analysts and to the press (i.e., conference calls and press releases) which have been referred to in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. # 22), given that those materials are central to Plaintiffs’ claims. Jackson, supra (<HOLDING>). It is also appropriate for the Court to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint (B) holding that plan documents could be considered without converting the motion to one for summary judgment even though the complaint referred only to the plan and not its associated documents (C) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint (D) holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim (E) holding that a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document that is referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claims
Output: (D)
to the grand jury testimony and debriefing statements considered by the court, or that he had no opportunity to explain or rebut the information. Moreover, the sentencing guidelines permit the district court to estimate the drug quantity when there has been no seizure of drugs or when the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 12. Linton also challenges the district court’s use of his co-defendants’ presentence reports. As previously mentioned, the sentencing court may not rely on factual information from sources not disclosed to the defendant. Helton, 975 F.2d at 434. To do so would deprive the defendant of his opportunity to explain and rebut any claimed errors in the information. See also United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 860, 867 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, in this case, the district court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant did not offer any rebuttal evidence to refute presentence report district court  was free to adopt facts in psi without further inquiry (B) holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report (C) holding that a defendants objection to facts in the presentence report on the basis that they went beyond any prior jury verdict or guilty plea is sufficient to prevent those facts from being relied upon in sentencing (D) holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant (E) holding it insufficient when the sentencing judge only questioned defendant on certain aspects of the presentence report
Output: (D)
care described in Dr. Helge’s report with James’s resulting injury. However, after describing that injury in his report, Dr. Rushing states specifically that the injury was “a result of improper amphetamine prescription and improper supervision.” [Emphasis added.] To fulfill the requirements of section 74.351(i) by supplementing Dr. Helge’s report as to Dr. Davisson, Dr. Rushing was not required to mention Dr. Helge’s exact description of the standard of care applicable to Dr. Davisson, especially when, as here, that standard of care is accurately described as a failure to properly supervise or monitor, which is precisely the conduct that Dr. Rushing implicates as causing James’s injuries. See Packard v. Guerra, 252 S.W.3d 511, 526-27 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Perez v. Salinas, No. 13-08-00192-CV, 2008 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (B) holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence (C) recognizing that we have consistently held that a party who wishes to introduce evidence of past false reports of sexual assault bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the past reports (D) holding that we must review multiple reports in the aggregate to determine if they are adequate as to liability and causation (E) holding that if no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law we apply de novo review
Output: (D)
look first to the bottom line to see whether the overall fee is reasonable. If it is, they pay the bill. If it is not, they challenge enough of the hours so that the result will produce a reasonable fee. 6 .See Florida v. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6, 105 S.Ct. 308, 310-11, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (finding that articulable suspicion, rather than probable cause, was sufficient for seizure of defendants in a major international airport, and noting that extensive anti-hijacking surveillance and equipment created a lesser reasonable expectation of privacy (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1333, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 47-49 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840, 94 S.Ct. 94, 38 L.Ed.2d 76 (1973) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Counsel's suggestion to the jury that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (B) holding that fourth amendment applicable in administrative searches for safety inspections (C) holding that the threat of air piracy justifies special fourth amendment considerations in airports akin to those at border crossings which allow warrantless searches in certain cases (D) holding that such interactions in airports are the sort of consensual encounters that implicate no fourth amendment interest (E) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case
Output: (C)
of wrongdoing, it is not probative enough to meet Todd’s burden of production that Montoya acted in a negligent manner or that Montoya proximately caused his injury. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d at 528-29 (“Northwest’s rewiring of the CAWS is circumstantial evidence, if only of a weak and suspect sort, that the CAWS as it existed at the time of the accident was not foolproof.”). Even if the evidence is not technically within rule 407’s scope: (i) rule 407’s underlying concerns are persuasive when evaluating the probative value of the evidence; and (ii) the circumstances of Montoya’s resignation in light of the other evidence in the record make the inference of wrongdoing one can draw from his resignation a weak one. See Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 Fed.Appx. at 646-47 (<HOLDING>). It is the proverbial scintilla of evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing high probative value of evidence providing conduct that was part of the very act charged (B) recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing (C) recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal (D) holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice (E) recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence
Output: (C)
paid with Vested Funds and Seized Funds. And while the majority of the ICE contract price was paid with DFI money, approximately $12 million, the record reflects that $8 million of the contract price was paid with Seized Funds. Thus, defendants have failed, with respect to either contract, to demonstrate that no “claim” was submitted within the meaning of the-FCA. And, accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. B. Presentment Before FCA liability will attach to a “claim” for payment under § 3729(a)(1), the false or fraudulent “claim” must be “knowingly presented], or caus[ed] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United Government or a member of the Armed Services of the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); see also Totten II, 380 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>). This requirement ultimately presents no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (B) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (C) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (D) recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment (E) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment
Output: (B)
this Court overruled the portion of Jeune that denied a wife’s right to recover for loss of her husband’s consortium. Our court of appeals recognized a cause of action for parents’ loss of an injured minor child’s consortium. Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ct.App.1985). In 1986, we extended Reben to allow parents to recover for loss of an adult child’s consortium. Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986). Today, we take a final step in overruling Jeune and recognize a child’s right to recover for loss of parental consortium. See Comment, Frank v. Superior Court: Purging the Law of Outdated Theories for Loss of Consortium Recovery, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 541, 547-48 (1987) (discussing Frank and noting that “the next logical step in this pro L.Ed.2d 56 (1973) (<HOLDING>). In Arizona, the legislature enacted a number 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (B) recognizing equal protection right of illegitimate children to maintain civil action for nonsupport against parent (C) recognizing that third party may not recover contribution against parent where child has no cause of action against parent for negligent supervision (D) holding a parent is excused from maintaining contact with his or her children when the failure to maintain contact is caused by the involuntary confinement of the parent and the parent is precluded from contacting the children during such confinement (E) holding both legitimate and illegitimate children to be proper claimants under georgia wrongful death statute
Output: (B)
equitable-relief claims and that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper. Following the lead of the many other courts who have considered the issue, the Court will also certify Plaintiffs’ FDCPA statutory-damages claims under (b)(2). Ac cording to Cheek & Zeehandelar, its net worth as of August 24, 2006, was $283,900.17. The FDCPA permits successful plaintiffs to recover statutory damages equal to $500,000 or one percent of the debt collector’s net worth. Assuming that the class consists of just the 1,236 people for whom Cheek & Zeehandelar has produced garnishment affidavits, and assuming also that Plaintiffs prevail in this litigation, each class member would be entitled to receive approximately $2.30 each. Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 546-47 (N.D.Cal.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, this Court would be remiss were it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages (B) holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions (C) holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages (D) holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class (E) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members
Output: (A)
unnee-essary given that the defendant is not very likely to reoffend. The defendant's correctional and rehabilitative treatment can best be provided by commitment to a penal facility. The defendant must be responsible and accountable for the crime he has committed. Being responsible and accountable means there will be consequences. These consequences are correctional and rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by commitment to a penal facility. Incarceration is most appropriate for this crime and this defendant. Appellant's Appendix at 384. Here, the trial court failed to provide the necessary explanation of why Ray needed treatment in a penal facility. Accordingly, the trial court abused its disceretion by relying on this factor. See, e.g., Laughner, 769 N.E.2d at 1161-1162 (<HOLDING>). The trial court considered one improper 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case (B) holding that apart from its reference to facts inherent in the crime of which the defendant was committed the trial court failed to provide the necessary explanation of why the defendant needed treatment in a penal facility (C) holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime (D) holding that the defendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was (E) holding that a defendant more likely committed multiple acts if the defendants conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime
Output: (B)
Subsection (d) provides that a complaint regarding the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence in a nonjury case may be made for the first time on appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(d) (emphasis added). The State contends that, by implication, the amendment recognizes the general rule — that complaints must be preserved to ensure appellate review — applies to all cases tried before a jury. We disagree. In criminal cases, an appellate court must always review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Rankin v. State, 46 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). “A claim regarding sufficiency of the evidence need not be preserved for review at the trial level and is not waived by the failure to do so.” Id.; see also Grayson v. State, 82 S.W.3d 357, 358-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Davila v. State, 930 S.W.2d 641, 648 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (B) holding that a factual sufficiency complaint in a parental termination case may be reviewed even though it was not preserved in the trial court (C) holding that factual sufficiency claim need not be preserved pursuant to texas rule of appellate procedure 331 (D) recognizing this texas rule (E) holding that a sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in a parental termination case to be reviewed on appeal
Output: (C)
“clearly indicated] that it [wa]s mandatory in nature.” Id. at 829. As such, Broward County was “the exclusive and mandatory forum in the case at bar.” Id. Without any discussion, this court reversed and remanded for dismissal, not transfer. Id There is nothing in Golf Scoring to suggest that the notion of a transfer to Broward County was ever presented to the trial court or to this court'. Because the transfer/dismissal issue was not a litigated issue in the case, Golf Scoring does not stand for the proposition that dismissal is the proper remedy in all ca CA 1999) (reversing the order of dismissal for improper venue and remanding for the trial court to transfer the case to a proper venue because dismissal is disfavored); McClain v. Crawford, 815 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Gross v. Franklin, 387 So.2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (B) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue (C) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (D) holding habeas petition should be transferred not dismissed for improper venue (E) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings
Output: (A)
explained that' [t]he distractions of the litigation pose a serious threat to the continued successful operations of [SGL Carbon]. Further, the potential liability faced by [SGL Carbon] could very well force it out of business. Consistent with the policies and purposes of Chapter 11 which encourage early filing so as to increase the possibility of successful reorganization, the Court will not allow [SGL Carbon] to wait idly by for impending financial and operational ruin, when [SGL Carbon] can take action now to avoid such a consequence. SGL Carbon Corp., 233 B.R. at 291. The Committee has appealed. II. The District Court had jurisdiction over this bankruptcy case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See In re Brown, 916 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We have not yet had occasion to decide what 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule 21 severance rendered the district court verdict a final and appealable judgment under 28 usc  1291 (B) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 (C) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (D) holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity (E) holding that a nonparty may appeal an order of criminal contempt arising out of a pending action under 28 usc  1291
Output: (B)
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1346 (1994)). Consequently, Quartaro was the preeminent testifying witness. He testified as to his own conclusions; he did not act as a conduit of the opinions of, or parrot the data produced by, other analysts. Cf. United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2011) (“Where an expert witness employs her training and experience to forge an independent conclusion, albeit on the basis of inadmissible evidence, the likelihood of a Sixth Amendment infraction is minimal. * * * Where an expert acts merely as a well-eredent-ialed conduit for testimonial hearsay, however, the cases hold that her testimony violates a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation.”); Commonwealth v. Munoz, 461 Mass. 126, 958 N.E.2d 1167, 1174 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Quartaro, as the author of the DNA profiles 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of the testimony of a substitute analyst who offers an independent opinion does not violate the confrontation clause however a substitute analyst cannot testify to or otherwise introduce the original analysts reports and conclusions on direct examination (B) holding that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors of a corporation  (C) holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency (D) holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board (E) holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts
Output: (A)
504 U.S. 655, 659-60, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992) (recognizing the continuing authority of Rauscher)). 47 . Id. at 1244. (Emphasis added) (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4 th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J. concurring) (stating, that "[t]he provisions of the Conventions should be implemented before trial when they can be appropriately addressed.”)). 48 . Id. (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 622 (Butzner, J. concurring)). 49 . See State’s Let. of June 23, 1999, at 6. 50 . See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 38, para. 1(c). 51 . See State’s Let. of June 23, 1999, at 2. 52 . See State’s Let. of June 23, 1999, at 6-7. 53 . See Kadish, supra note 10, at 605 (referring to Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377, 91 S.Ct. 1848; 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (<HOLDING>)). 54 . See Aceves, supra note 5, at 314-315 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (B) holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution (C) holding that state outdoor recreational immunity statute did not violate equal protection clause of united states constitution under rationalbasis test (D) holding that aliens constitute a specific minority deserving enhanced judicial protection and making alienage a suspect classification under the equal protection clause of the united states constitution (E) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause
Output: (D)
Corbin v. Langdon, 23 N.C. App. 21, 26, 208 S.E.2d 251, 254 (1974). The three requisite elements to form an enforceable contract are offer, acceptance, and consideration. Cap Care Grp., Inc. v. McDonald, 149 N.C. App. 817, 822, 561 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2002). Consequently, we must consider whether each element exists to determine whether a modified employment contract was formed between Plaintiff and U.S. Foods. “It is essential to the formation of any contract that there be mutual assent of both parties to the terms of the agreement so as to establish a meeting of the minds.” Harrison v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C. App. 545, 550, 613 S.E.2d 322, 327 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wooten v. S.R. Biggs Drug Co., 169 N.C. 64, 68, 85 S.E. 140, 142 (1915) (<HOLDING>). As such, a contract modification must also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (B) recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced (C) holding that the one thing without which a contract cannot be made  is the assent of the parties to the agreement the meeting of the minds upon a definite proposition (D) holding that a valid contract requires a meeting of minds that gave rise to an obligation situation or state of law resulting from an agreement and that created certain expectations on the basis of which the parties acted (E) holding mutual assent in contract law is elementary and it must be expressed by the parties
Output: (C)
to § 362(c)(1). Collier, ¶ 362.06 at 362-72 (“Section 362(c) describes when the stay terminates in a bankruptcy ease. It provides that, unless relief is granted earlier by the court, a stay of an act against property of the estate expires when the property is no longer property of the estate, and other stays expire at the earlier of the time that (1) the case is closed, (2) the case is dismissed, or (3) the debtor receives a discharge.”). Pursuant to § 362(c)(2), the automatic stay was lifted upon the earlier of the closing of the case and the discharge. Since the automatic stay has already been terminated by operation of § 362(c), I am incapable of granting the Bank’s motion to modify the stay. See Dep’t of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp., 907 F.2d 1469, 1474 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). While I find that I am incapable of modifying 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay (B) recognizing that after provisions of  362c have been met there can be no further application of the automatic stay (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order (E) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay
Output: (B)
(Univ. of Chicago Press ed. 1979) ("The lea[s]t touching of another’s per[s]on wilfully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the fir[s]t and lowe[s]t [s]tage of it: every man’s per[s]on being [s] acred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the [s]lighte[s]t manner.”) (alterations from Old English). 8 . We are not persuaded by respondent's reliance on a First Circuit case interpreting “physical force,” in a federal statute prohibiting possession of a firearm by one previously convicted of a crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), to include all physical force, regardless of its propensity to cause injury. See United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16-18 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Nason addressed a Maine assault statute that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) recognizing that an arrest requires either physical force  or where physical force is absent submission to the assertion of authority (D) holding that congress intended the phrase physical force incorporated into  922g9 to encompass crimes characterized by the application of any physical force (E) holding iowa common law touching assault met use of physical force required for enhancement under 18 usc  922g9 be cause any physical contact by necessity requires physical force to complete
Output: (D)