niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
where he admitted that other Dunkin’ Donuts shops do sell soft drinks such as milk, juice or soda. See Trpko Taseski Depo., attached as Exh. 3B to plaintiffs motion, p. 61. Defendants’ only response to plaintiffs argument regarding the inapplicability of the rider are these two brief sentences: “Plaintiffs cases are inappositive. The controlling principle of law is that money paid under a mistake of fact can be recouped in an action assumpsit.” However, defendants’ claim of a “mistake of fact” is unsupported by the record. To the contrary, the facts presented confirm that no mistake was made because defendants’ were correct in voluntarily paying fees on the sales of such products. There is therefore no ground for an actio ranchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 11,290 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 30, 1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the Michigan Franchise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (B) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable (C) holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination (D) holding that franchisees illegal sale of cigarettes to minors provided cause for termination (E) holding that traditional commercial contract provided for termination at will under arkansas law
Output: (D)
the bankruptcy court’s power to control dissemination of information more broadly. Judge Steven Gerling, for example, observed in In re Bennett, that If the information [sought to be protected] does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. It requires the Court to examine the relevant facts and circumstances and then to balance the interests of the party opposing disclosure with that of the public. In re Bennett, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998); see also In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2nd Cir.1994) (discussing § 107 and use of records for improper purpose); In re Robert Landau Associates, 50 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Phar-Mor, 191 B.R. 675, 679 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (C) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (D) recognizing inherent authority but vacating order not supported by necessary findings (E) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect
Output: (C)
A review of the record, appellant’s response to this court’s October 17, 2005 order to show cause and the response, reply and sur-reply indicates that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard). The district court did not err in dismissing appellant’s action. See Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we summarily affirm the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision (B) holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case (C) holding that district court did not err in summarily granting defendants motion for summary judgment pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to motion after district court had warned plaintiff that it would deem his failure to respond a consent to granting of motion (D) holding that because plaintiff failed to advance evidence rebutting motion for summary judgment alongside a concession in their interrogatory response the district court did not err in granting defendants motion for summary judgment (E) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment
Output: (C)
or affect the issue under determination.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6 (emphasis added). Although the omitted financial data may not have had any actual effect on Miller’s fine or restitution amounts, it is certainly the kind of information which would “tend to influence” those determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 825 (5th Cir.1997) (“A statement to a probation officer concerning one’s financial resources will obviously affect the officer’s determination of ability to pay.” (quotation omitted)). There is no basis to deem the omitted information not material when it did not have, but was the kind of information which could have had, an influence on the relevant sentencing determinations. See United States v. Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 210-11 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Miller also contends that her errors were the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the applicability of the mcdonough standard to federal criminal proceedings (B) recognizing applicability of discovery rule (C) recognizing the applicability of rule 9b under such circumstances (D) recognizing the applicability of the obstruction enhancement in either scenario (E) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes
Output: (D)
to the military magistrate to search the appellee's buccal cells, contained significantly more information than what the military judge adopted in his reconsideration ruling. Compare AE CXIX at 9 with AE CXX at 6-7. Because this is an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, we may not consider facts from SA H’s affidavit as we are bound by the military judge’s findings. Cossio, 64 M.J. at 256. Additionally, we note that the military judge did not sever the information that he believed to be problematic from SA H’s affidavit and then examine "the remainder [of the information] to determine if probable cause still exist[ed]” to execute the search of the appellee’s buccal cells. United States v. Gallo, 55 M.J. 418, 421 (C.A.A.F.2001); see United States v. Cowgill, 68 M.J. 388, 393 (C.A.A.F.2010) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Because Edwards is a prophylactic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial courts finding omission of information was not intentional or with reckless disregard for truth was not clearly erroneous (B) holding that affidavit is inadequate if it fails to disclose facts which would enable the magistrate to ascertain from the affidavit that the event upon which the probable cause was founded was not so remote as to render it ineffective (C) holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit (D) holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause (E) holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police
Output: (D)
of serious physical harm,” Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict” and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict” have been replaced by the single term “judgment as a matter of law.” 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: “Furthermore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
Output: (E)
LLC v. United States Dept. of Treasury, I.R.S., 570 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir.2009) (recognizing “Service’s obligation to administer and enforce Congress’ power to lay and collect taxes.”). Further, the Supreme Court “has consistently construed congressional intent to require that if the summons authority claimed is necessary for the effective performance of congressionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the tax Code, that authority should be upheld absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing policies.” United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711, 100 S.Ct. 874, 63 L.Ed.2d 141 (1980). The IRS need not prove that the Tribe actually failed to properly withhold taxes and report payments to obtain enforcement of a summons. Cf. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57, 85 S.Ct. 248 (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. White, 853 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the objective standard for determining probable cause obviates the need to analyze the officers subjective motivation (B) holding that new york law reasonable cause standard is equivalent to fourth amendments probable cause standard (C) holding that a summons is sufficient restraint to invoke probable cause requirement where failure to appear on summons may result in issuance of warrant (D) holding irs need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of a summons   (E) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury
Output: (D)
1167 (E.D.Mich.1994). There is no issue as to whether plaintiff and Irene were disabled, “otherwise qualified,” or that defendant received federal funds. The only dispute is whether defendant provided effective communication with plaintiff and Irene without a trained ASL interpreter. Courts have found violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA where sign language interpreters have not been provided for a qualified deaf person. See e.g. Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that school system must provide an enrolled hearing student’s deaf parents with a sign language interpreter at “school initiated conferences incident to the academic and/or disciplinary aspects of their child’s education”); Randolph v. Rodgers, 980 F.Supp. 1051 (E.D.Mo.1997) (<HOLDING>), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 170 F.3d 850 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act (B) holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable (C) holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act (D) holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment (E) holding that prisoner whose primary means of communication was sign language was entitled to interpreter under the ada and rehabilitation act for disciplinary procedures medical care education programs and counseling
Output: (E)
... by the actual application of all of the water to the use designed” is an appropriation of the water. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist. v. Ford, 1942-NMSC-042, ¶ 14, 46 N.M. 335, 128 P.2d 1047 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Thus, any diversion for a beneficial use must be accompanied by a right to the water acquired by the user’s appropriation of the water to be diverted. See State ex rel. State Eng’r v. Comm’r of Pub. Lands, 2009-NMCA-004, ¶ 15, 145 N.M. 433, 200 P.3d 86 (“[W]ater rights are both established and exercised by beneficial use, which forms the basis, the measure[,] and the limit of the right to use of the water.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); In re Water Rights in Rio Grande Cnty., 53 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>)-. We now turn to the import of consumptive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use (B) recognizing the right to use water to generate power (C) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (D) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (E) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested
Output: (A)
the residential program. The remain der of the terms and conditions of the disposition order are affirmed. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R. B, JJ., concur. 1 . We affirm the remaining issues advanced by I.B. on appeal without discussion. 2 . Fearing that this legislative change left juveniles without a procedure to correct unpre-served disposition errors that did not constitute fundamental error, the Florida Supreme Court adopted ) (concluding that juvenile could not be sentenced to commitment not to exceed 364 days followed by post-commitment community control not to exceed 364 days for battery, where maximum term that juvenile could have received for offense as an adult was one year); see also J.G. v. State, 783 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Some Florida courts have held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum (B) holding pursuant to section 985231 ld florida statutes 1999 that duration of commitment which includes any period in an aftercare program may not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense (C) holding apprendi is not implicated where sentence does not exceed statutory maximum sentence authorized for the offense in its simplest form (D) holding that a defendant could not assert an error under apprendi v new jersey because his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum
Output: (B)
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” though it may be admissible for other purposes. If a trial judge overrules a Rule 404(b) objection, finding the evidence of another crime or wrong admissible for one of these other purposes, the trial judge must also conduct a Rule 403 balancing test. This filtering analysis requires assessing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of undue prejudice before evidence may be admitted. Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364, 1368 (Miss.1994). ¶ 56. Once again, Grindle did not object or in any way argue that the evidence of his subsequent arrest was being elicited in violation of Rule 404(b). So his Rule 404(b) argument is waived. See Ruben-stein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 760 (¶ 87) (Miss.2006) (<HOLDING>). And by not objecting under Rule 404(b), his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (B) holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case (C) holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant (D) holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred (E) holding that failure to object to statements of prior bad acts barred argument on appeal that statements violated rules 404b and 403 without conducting any plainerror analysis
Output: (E)
of a fatally flawed theory. In other cases, prejudice will be minimized by the fact that the party has notice of the need to adduce evidence in support of Article III even though neither the court nor the defendant makes a formal motion. For example, in Bischoff v. Osceola County, Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 882 n. 8 (11th Cir.2000), the Eleventh Circuit held that it was proper for the district court to apply a summary júdgment standard on a sua sponte challenge to standing because the plaintiffs were on notice that standing was an issue, as they raised it themselves in briefs. Similarly, to the extent that identical issues have already been raised in the litigation, the threat of procedural prejudice is greatly diminished. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, although defendants had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sovereign immunity issues may be raised sua sponte as they bear on subject matter jurisdiction (B) recognizing that in the interest of judicial economy res judicata may properly be raised by a district court sua sponte particularly where both actions are brought in the courts of the same district (C) recognizing reduced threat of procedural prejudice where courts sua sponte determination is based on issues identical to the raised by the moving party (D) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (E) holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims not raised below by the alien even when the bia reviews the claim sua sponte
Output: (C)
as the California Legislature may well have recognized when it specifically provided that a prosecutor may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction “in the furtherance of justice.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 667(f)(2) (West 1999). In this case, the statutory safeguard failed, and the state court was left to ensure that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on grossly disproportionate sentences was met. If Andrade’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning. The California court’s holding was an unreasonable application of clearly established precedent. 1 This point is independent of the fact, recognized by the Court, ante, at 68, that it remains open to Andrade to appeal his sentence under People v. Garcia, 20 Cal. 4th 490, 976 P. 2d 831 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 2 Implicit in the distinction between future 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute is mandatory (B) holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence for a  924c conviction and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction (C) holding that under a federal three strikes law the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction (D) holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion (E) holding trial court may dismiss strikes on a countbycount basis such discretion is consistent with mandatory consecutive sentencing provision
Output: (E)
“[r]ecognized standards of business ethics and business customs and practices are pertinent”). FMS specifically complains that Hawkeye used “the FMS customer list and the FMS licensed agents to compete directly for the FMS book of business.” There is no evidence that Hawkeye sought a customer list in the possession of FMS. Rather, Hawkeye merely compiled such a list from its own records; after all, FMS’s clients were originally bank customers and were referred to FMS by the Hawkeye banks. There is nothing improper about Hawkeye using information in its own files for purposes of soliciting business. See Burke, 474 N.W.2d at 113 (citing Ballagh v. Polk-Warren Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 257 Iowa 1334, 1343, 136 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1965)); cf. Lemmon v. Hendrickson, 559 N.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Iowa 1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to Hawkeye’s use of “FMS 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable (B) holding that arbitration clause which was included with product mailed to customer and with proviso that customer could return product within 30 days was binding on customer who did not return computer (C) holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list (D) holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list (E) holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer
Output: (C)
Cir.2008). If a defendant puts his intent and knowledge of a drug conspiracy in issue, the government can introduce evidence of a defendant’s prior similar acts to help prove its case. United States v. Banks, 706 F.3d 901, 906-07 (8th Cir.2013). Wiggins put his intent and knowledge at issue at trial, and thus, if the conviction was (1) relevant, (2) similar in kind and not too remote, (3) supported by evidence and (4) not substantially more prejudicial than probative, it was admissible under Rule 404(b). Id. Of these four, the only plausibly contested element is remoteness, but since the convictions were in 2000, and the current conspiracy conduct occurred in 2009, they are not too remote according to our precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Ironi, 525 F.3d 683, 688 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly the district court did not abuse 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote (C) holding that collateral crime that occurred twelve years prior to charged offense not too remote in time (D) holding that eight years between prior convictions and the beginning of the charged conspiracy was not too remote (E) holding that a six year span between the prior offense and the charged conduct did not render the previous conviction too remote to be relevant to the defendants intent in the case then at bar
Output: (B)
postconvietion proceeding. Therefore, the narrower approach does not clearly establish judicial economy. T48 Hinojos-Mendoza does not require a different conclusion. There, the supreme court recognized judicial economy in taking up an unpreserved confrontation issue under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The court explained that the defendant could rely on Crawford because it had been decided during his direct appeal. But trial counsel could hardly have been expected to raise the issue the Crawford court decided, contrary to controlling Colorado precedent. See People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 680-81 (Colo.1983) (relying on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)), abrogated by People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo.2004) (<HOLDING>). 1 44 Here, in contrast, defendant does not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing same (B) recognizing crawford partially abrogated alacode  152532 (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing general rule but treating as legal question because ohio statute set out qualifications for position that were not met by applicant (E) recognizing the rejection of ohio v roberts by crawford v washington
Output: (E)
if the franchisor terminates the franchise relationship. See Valentine v. Mobil Oil Corp., 789 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir.1986); Svela v. Union Oil Co., 807 F.2d 1494, 1500-01 (1987). A “franchise relationship” means “the respective motor fuel marketing or distribution obligations and responsibilities of a franchisor and franchisee which result from the marketing of motor fuel under a franchise.” 15 U.S.C. § 2801(2); Du Fresne’s Auto Service Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir.1993). A franchise is a contract. 15 U.S.C. § 2801(1). The Ninth Circuit has previously held that absent breach of the agreements that constitute components of the franchise, there is no termination. See DuFresne’s Auto Service, 992 F.2d at 927; Fresher v. Shell Oil Co., 846 F.2d 45, 47 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs did not allege a breach of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death (B) holding that the transfer of all rights interests and control in property assigned was an effective assignment occurring at the time the assignment was perfected not later when proceeds paid (C) holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9 (D) holding that assignment of property without more did not terminate the franchise relationship (E) holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments
Output: (D)
District Court Executive is directed to: (a) File this Order; (b) ENTER JUDGMENT consistent with this Order; (c) Provide copies of this Order and the Judgment to counsel; and (d) CLOSE THIS FILE. 1 . These facts can be found in the parties' Statements of Material Facts, submitted with briefing on the pending Motions pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 56.1. The Court deems admitted any material fact asserted by a party and not rebutted by the opposing party. The parties agree on the facts recited in this section, except where otherwise noted. 2 . Several courts have held that Title III applies only to actual places, and that membership organizations are not subject to Title III. See, e.g., Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F.Supp. 217, 223 (E.D.Mo.1996) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hockey organization was not sufficiently linked to a place so not subject to ada (B) holding ada claim was discharged (C) holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government (D) holding that national football league was not a place and therefore not subject to ada (E) holding that group organizing bike race was not subject to ada
Output: (A)
CLC received was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the dividend, 740 ILCS 160(5)(b)(8) (2002); and (3) CLC was insolvent when the dividend was paid, 740 ILCS 160(5)(b)(9) (2002). The Trust contends fraud can be inferred from these three badges. But in fact only two of the badges are present. First, no reasonably equivalent value was given for the dividend. There is no “reasonably equivalent value” when the consideration for a transfer is either inadequate or nonexistent. Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.1998). The dividend here was a unilateral transfer of $30,748, and no evidence has been offered that anything was given in return. See Fisher v. Hamilton (In re Teknek, LLC), 343 B.R. 850, 861 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2006) (<HOLDING>). Second, it is undisputed that CLC was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dividend paid to llc members was not a transfer for reasonably equivalent value (B) holding transfer of capital accounts from a limited partnership to a llc was valuable consideration for purposes of imposing state real estate transfer fee because the members received new rights and privileges (C) holding that it is not a collusive transaction when valuable consideration is paid to transfer a debt to a bona fide purchaser even if the transfer was for the purpose of invoking diversity jurisdiction (D) holding that transfer of property to llc involved no consideration for state conveyance tax purposes because it was a unilateral act and not the result of a bargainedfor exchange (E) holding transfer of legal title to property as a capital contribution to llc was in exchange for valuable consideration and constituted a sale of the property
Output: (A)
to light and be appropriately remedied if the person who is suffering from this inadequacy is not permitted to do so. Simply ignoring a pretrial assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in post conviction relief proceedings. Graves, 642 So.2d at 144. We do not believe this reasoning extends to a motion to disqualify. Unlike a motion to dismiss counsel, the effectiveness of the defendant’s court-appointed attorney is not at issue, and the attorney has no incentive to refrain from adopting his client's motion if that claim has any merit. If counsel chooses not to adopt the pro se motion, the defendant may opt to represent himself and file the motion to disqualify at that time. See Logan, 846 So.2d at 475. 15 . See Nelson, 274 So.2d at 258-59 (<HOLDING>), approved of in Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a defendant raises a claim on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective defendant bears the burden of assuring record is adequate (B) holding that when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the trial judge must conduct an inquiry into the claim (C) holding that a defendant must show actual prejudice to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim (D) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (E) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate
Output: (B)
support a breach of contract claim. See Colomar, 461 F.Supp.2d 1265 (allegations that patients with insurance and government benefits received significant discounts in price they paid for hospital’s services supported plaintiffs claim for breach of contract for unreasonable pricing); Payne v. Humana Hospital, 661 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reversing dismissal of putative class action suit premised on unreasonable rates charged by a hospital even though contract required the payment of “prevailing rates” and “regular charges,” but did not “express prices within the four corners of the document.” The court described the charge master as a “complicated and unobtainable master charge list containing hundreds of items”); Mercy Hospital v. Carr, 297 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the PIP statute imposes a duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal (B) holding that statute provides medical bill is admissible to prove amount fairness and reasonableness of charges (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges (E) holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges
Output: (E)
(“It is immaterial that [the defendant’s] firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior to [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9)’s enactment because the conduct prohibited by [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) is the possession of a firearm .... [Thus,] the application of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) to [the defendant] does not run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition.”); United States v. Boyd, 52 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1236-37 (D.Kan.1999), aff'd 211 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.2000), (concluding the illegal act was not completed until after 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) became effective because the illegal act in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is the possession of the firearm, not the misdemeanor domestic violence conviction); United States v. Meade, 986 F.Supp. 66, 69 (D.Mass.1997), aff'd 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir.1999), (<HOLDING>); NAGE, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F.Supp. 1564, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18 usc  3559c did not violate separation of powers doctrine or ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc  922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted (D) holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute (E) holding 18 usc  922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause
Output: (E)
(2013) (ex plaining the FDA’s view that “promoting a drug for an off-label use is a violation” of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions). Based on this view, the FDA has recovered millions of dollars in settlements from drug manufacturers that have engaged in off-label promotion. See, e.g., id. at 232 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, (Sept. 2, 2009) (trumpeting a mul-ti-billion dollar fine imposed against a drug company that promoted its drugs for uses and dosages that the FDA specifically declined to approve)). The FDA’s informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to some deference from courts. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (<HOLDING>). But courts have not always agreed with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation (B) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference (C) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (D) holding that an agencys informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade (E) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference
Output: (D)
in the course of interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), which required the application of strict scrutiny to government policies that imposed a "substantial burden” on religious beliefs. See Pub.L. No. 103-141, 107 STAT. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seg.), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). In Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir.1996), we defined a substantial burden as a situation where "the state 'puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' " 5 . For other applications of the substantial burden requirement in the prison religious free exercise context, see, for example, Cane.ll v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), and Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir.1997) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that docs may place reasonable limitations on an inmates right to the free exercise of religion including a requirement that the inmate register his religious affiliation (B) holding that  relatively shortterm and sporadic  intrusions on an inmates prayer activities did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of his religion (C) holding that corrections officers mockpreaching and espousal of religious views did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of religion (D) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (E) recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion
Output: (C)
order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 [civil rights cases] of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 6 . Compare In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 919 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.1990) (granting writ of mandamus after noting that the trial court did not state that jurisdiction was lacking but affirmatively reflected that remand was based solely on a state statute) with In re Weaver, 610 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.1980) (denying writ of mandamus despite the absence of specific § 1447(c) words, when the district court based remand upon its belief that jurisdiction was lacking). See also Merrimack, 587 F.2d at 647-48 (<HOLDING>). 7 . The Eleventh Amendment states that: "The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a proper eleventh amendment challenge strips the courts of jurisdiction for the purposes of the removal statute 28 usc  1447c (B) holding that under 28 usc  1447c and d federal jurisdiction terminates once a section 1447c remand order has been mailed to the state court (C) holding that we have jurisdiction to review the award or denial of attorney fees under  1447c (D) holding that the district courts order while not referring to  1447c by number stated one of its grounds no jurisdiction thereby precluding review by mandamus (E) recognizing the supreme courts longstanding jurisdiction over writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction
Output: (D)
Hall, because the exposure was not alleged in the allegations of the indictment, nor could it be deduced from the face of the indictment. Id. Moreover, the State argues that the court of appeals expressly relied on the facts of the case to reach its conclusion, but the facts of the case are irrelevant in a cognate-pleadings analysis. See Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 535-36. The State also argues that if two offenses are not the same under Block burger, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to allow multiple punishments, absent a clear manifestation of intent to the contrary. See Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 845 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. And the State contends that, if the Legislature’s intent is unclear as to w (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the State argues that indecency with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses (B) holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted (C) holding in a multiplepunishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct (D) holding attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer is not a crime in florida (E) holding unlawful restraint an included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault so conviction on the former was vacated
Output: (C)
to a hypothetical knowledgeable buyer, which should be factored into the discount, include (1) that the family had experienced prior disagreement which precipitated the creation of the trust; and (2) that one family member had been allowed to independently manage the 16 parcels and that his management was poor. The Tax Court stated that these circumstances, that would have been perceived by a willing buyer, indicate that the remaining family members would be resistant to and make it difficult for an outside buyer. If these facts were available to a knowledgeable buyer, it is obvious th ing ownership of apartments “was not a sufficient basis for issuance of the notice [of deficiency], in light of the opportunity for further, and much needed, investigation”); Nicholson, 60 F.3d at 1029 (<HOLDING>). The IRS cannot merely rely on an expert’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that irs could have discovered that its position was not justified had it adequately investigated the case before issuing the notice of deficiency (B) holding that former sec 272f does not require that the commissioner wait until the period for filing a petition as to a deficiency notice expires before issuing another deficiency notice as to the same taxable year (C) holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice (D) holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid (E) holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination
Output: (A)
not have described his encounter with K.K., regardless of whether the nurse testified about K.K.’s bloody nose. In other words, Torrence’s argument that the erroneous admission of the nurse’s testimony about K.K.’s nosebleed affected the testimony of other witnesses for the Commonwealth is illogical speculation. We affirm, finding any error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. III. CONCLUSION. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. All sitting. All concur. 1 . Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). 2 . Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.24 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.’’). 3 . Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Ky.2007) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See, e.g., Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error is considered harmless if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction (B) holding that the harmless error test places a burden on the state to prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction (C) holding that error is harmless if there is substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction (D) holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction (E) holding that under the harmless error standard an appellate court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction
Output: (D)
the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief — an order compelling arbitration— among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it  parties who signed arbitration agreement  and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration
Output: (E)