niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
a private residence without first knocking and identifying themselves. Of these three incidents, only once did an individual actually testify the police did not knock and announce; in the other two, the individuals merely stated that they did not know whether the police did so or not. As the district court found, identifying three possible incidents is a far cry from producing evidence sufficient to show that the City had an official policy or custom of failing to knock and announce. Whittier cannot avoid summary judgment by identifying merely a small handful of instances in which the officers may have failed to knock and announce. Three violations do not a custom make. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmovant may not carry its burden by simply showing that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts (B) holding that the nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts (C) holding that the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial (D) holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question (E) holding that the nonmoving parly must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question
Output: (B)
experience during the period of time she worked for AORN. In summary, the undisputed facts indicate that Weissman concealed her employment with AORN, in part, because she believed she would increase her chances of gaining employment with Crawford by not listing a negative reference. Additionally, the undisputed facts indicate that Weissman listed Kirk Advertising as a full-time employer, even though she had only worked for Kirk Advertising on a sporadic basis. Because Weissman’s intent may be inferred from her actions and statements, these facts support the trial court’s conclusion that Weissman concealed her employment with AORN and listed her employment with Kirk Advertising with the intent to create a false impression on her employment application. See Kopeikin, 679 P.2d at 602 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court, which considered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence (B) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (C) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence including such badges of fraud as understatement of income inadequate records and implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior (D) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (E) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances
Output: (D)
sentence, Baldón appealed. II. Scope and Standard of Review. “We review claims the district court failed to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the federal and state constitutions de novo.” State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 2012). When presented with such a claim, “ ‘we make an independent evaluation [based on] the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.’ ” State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 522-23 (Iowa 2011)). “ ‘Each case must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d at 523). III. Issue Presented. The fighting issue presented to the district court in response to the motion to suppress was whether Baldón consented to the search by signing 1977) (<HOLDING>); People v. Reyes, 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding released offenders do not voluntarily consent to all conditions of parole (B) holding probationers acceptance of search provision of parole agreement did not constitute freely and voluntarily given consent (C) holding that the collateral consequences of a parole revocation were insufficient to create a case or controversy after the petitioner was released (D) holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania (E) recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole
Output: (A)
are deemed removable because they were convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See INA § 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) ] (precluding jurisdiction where alien is removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)). In addition, we lack jurisdiction to review purely discretionary decisions, see INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ], such as the “manner in which the BIA balanced the various positive and negative factors which typically inform the exercise of its discretion under” INA § 240A. Cruz-Camey v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 28, 29 (1st Cir.2007). Despite these jurisdiction-stripping provisions, we may review “constitutional claims and questions of law presented in petitions for review of fin scretion. See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief (C) holding pendency of postconviction judicial proceedings relevant to immunity determination (D) holding that regulations that permitted an immigration official to reinstate removal orders violated the immigration and nationality act (E) holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes
Output: (E)
created by the alleged misstatements.’ As the Court of Appeals has noted, ‘[t]he truth on the market defense is intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a § 10(b) complaint for failure to plead materiality.’ Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 2005 WL 2148919, *6 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (citations omitted). To be sure, there has been some debate regarding the applicability of the fraud-on- the-market presumption to analyst cases, albeit in a different context, namely, class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. See, e.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.2004) (granting petition for interlocutory appeal to review this “novel question”); Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 232 F.R.D. 176, 185 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 222 F.R.D. 243, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (B) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that plaintiffs need not offer evidence that analyst reports actually distorted market price because it is a question of fact (E) holding it is a question of fact
Output: (D)
of review set forth in Jones does not apply to her case because Jones only addressed upward departures. We disagree. Title 18, section 3742(e) of the United States Code, the statutory subsection that mandates de novo review, does not distinguish between upward and downward departures, stating only that “[w]ith respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4). Further, subsections (3)(A) and (3)(B) apply to all sentences “outside the applicable guideline range.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3). This plain reading of the statutory language finds support in the decisions of other circuits. See United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 945-7 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relating to parenthetical in 18 usc  1961 was merely to aid identification of 18 usc  2314 rather than to limit its application (B) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (C) holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b (D) holding that 18 usc  3742e applies to downward departures (E) holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c
Output: (D)
invocation, rather than the adequacy of the detective's subsequent advisement; Sessoms does not challenge the propriety of the warnings. Nonetheless, that the detectives actively undermined Sessoms’s understanding of his right only further indicates that their failure to provide him with counsel upon his initial request was deliberate, strategic, and unlawful. 6 . This reasoning runs directly afoul of Alvarez v. Gomez, 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir.1999), where we construed the suspect's statements ("[c]an I get an attorney right now, man?”, "[y]ou can have an attorney right now?”, and "[w]ell like right now you got one?”) to be unambiguous requests for counsel rather than clarifying questions regarding the right to counsel. Accord Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Although Alvarez does not serve as "clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (B) holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview (C) holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel (D) holding that request for counsel was not unequivocal when suspect wrote i need a lawyer on the blackboard among several of other statements while alone in the interview room then responded to officers clarifying questions that he did not want a lawyer (E) holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking
Output: (E)
proceeding, see DelMonico, 116 So.3d at 1213-14, 1217-20, we decline to reach the qualified immunity issue because it was not raised below. See AGM Invs., LLC, 219 So.3d at 927 n.5. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on count one and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm. AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. ORFINGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur. 1 . See Perl v. Omni Int'l of Miami, Ltd., 439 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (concluding that fraud count in complaint based on earlier unemployment compensation case was barred by litigation privilege (citing Robertson v. Indus. Ins. Co., 75 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1954))). 2 . See LatAm Invs., LLC v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 88 So.3d 240, 242-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Although count three is actually a claim for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (B) holding that an escrow agent and title insurer may have voluntarily assumed a duty to advise the buyers on their potential legal liability for  subcontractors liens on the property in addition to the defendants ordinary contractual and professional duties as an escrow agent and title insurer (C) holding litigation privilege applied to action for abuse of process citing am natl title  escrow of fla v guar title  tr co 748 so2d 1054 1055 fla 4th dca 2000 (D) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
Output: (C)
for constitutional tort claims.” Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 8 (quoting Harris v. Holder, 885 F.Supp.2d 390, 397 (D.D.C.2012)). Defendants are also right in noting that although Plaintiffs reference 22 U.S.C. § 1623 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 throughout their complaint, see Compl. 5-9, neither statutory provision contains a waiver of sovereign immunity. Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 8. For their part, Plaintiffs point out only that their complaint does not contain the word “damages.” Mem. Supp. Pis.’ Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9, ECF No. 12. But Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that a complaint’s literal avoidance of the term “damages” compels a finding that the claim “seek[s] relief other than money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; cf. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at 263, 119 S.Ct. 687 (<HOLDING>). Both parties, however, overlook the fact that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding also that the money in the hands of the sheriff for distributions was  created or at least made available by the efforts of counsel (B) holding that action for lien seeks money damages because its goal is to seize or attach money in the hands of the government as compensation   (C) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (D) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money (E) holding that the due process clause does not obligate the government to pay money damages
Output: (B)
of properties served by the town’s water and sewer systems, the minimum rates “help[] to maintain rate stability and insure}] that everyone who benefits from the system helps to defray the fixed costs of delivering the product that do not vary with the level of individual consumption.” This ruling is supported by the evidence. We similarly uphold the trial court’s finding that the $20.00 per quarter availability charge is just, as this finding is also supported by the evidence. See Andrews v. Town, of New London, 117 N.H. 747, 749 (1977) (“absolute mathematical equality” not required). The plaintiffs assertion that equitable rates must be based upon use is belied by the plain language of the statutes themselves, which permit rates to be based upon “some other equitable basis.” See id. (<HOLDING>). His reliance upon Concord Steam Corp. v. City 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that residential rate not based upon water usage is reasonable (B) holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine (C) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (D) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract (E) holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate
Output: (A)
date of sentencing. See United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.1998) (“If the defendant has completed his state prison term before the federal sentence is imposed, § 5G1.3 does not apply, and his federal prison term cannot be imposed concurrently.”). While not technically incarcerated at the time of his sentencing, Scott nonetheless argues that his term of term of imprisonment was not “discharged” because New York law defines parole as a part of the sentence of imprisonment. See New York Penal Law § 70.40(l)(a) (“Release on parole shall be in the discretion of the state board of parole, and such person shall continue service of his or her sentence or sentences while on parole, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the executive law and the c Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ramirez, 252 F.3d 516, 519 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution (B) holding that because the defendant was not imprisoned  incarcerated in a penal institution  when he was sentenced  he was not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment and could not invoke  5g13 (C) holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing (D) holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  (E) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced
Output: (B)
misdemeanor in superior court is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether the sentence imposed: (1) Results from an incorrect finding of the defendant’s prior record level under G.S. 15A-1340.14 or the defendant’s prior conviction level under G.S. 15A-1340.21; (2) Contains a type of sentence disposition that is not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant’s class of offense and prior record or conviction level; or (3) Contains a term of imprisonment that is for a duration not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defenda fendant essentially stipulated to matters that moot the issues he could have raised under subsection (a2), his appeal should be dismissed. See State v. Simmons, 64 N.C. App. 727, 308 S.E.2d 95 (1983) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 310, 312 S.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury (B) holding that under subsection al as then written the defendant had no right to appeal whether his sentence was supported by evidence presented because he entered into a plea agreement as to the sentence (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added (E) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence
Output: (B)
Dr. Brewer’s reports addressed the conduct of OGA’s employees, Drs. Jacobs and Gunn, the reports identified Dr. Gunn as OGA’s employee, and McCoy’s original petition alleged that OGA was vicariously liable for the conduct of Jacobs and Gunn under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the requirements of the Texas Professional Association Act. See Troeger v. Myklebust, 274 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (rejecting claim that conduct of dentist, who was sole defendant, was not implicated because her name was omitted from expert report and holding that dentist waived challenges to expert report by failing to raise objections within twenty-one days after service); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Dale, 188 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet) (<HOLDING>). In response, OGA disputes that its conduct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that medical center was not required to be named in expert report addressing its residents conduct because plaintiffs alleged no directliability claims against it and noting that medical center was implicated in report and so waived all its objections when it failed to object to sufficiency of report within twentyone days after service (B) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (C) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (D) holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required (E) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a
Output: (A)
Essex Ins. Co. v. Bhavan, Inc., 2002 WL 1398551, at *1-4 (N.D.Tex. June 26, 2002) (victim shot by an unknown assailant while in insured’s parking lot; court held that assault and battery exclusion precluded coverage for negligence action against insured); Audubon Indem. Co. v. Patel, 811 F.Supp. 264, 264 (S.D.Tex.1993) (“Upon reviewing the insurance policy and the assault and battery exclusion, this Court finds that, as a matter of law, the insurance policy excludes any coverage arising out of the assault and battery committed upon [victim] and his wife [in insured’s motel room] even if the legal theory for which [the insured] is found liable is negligence.”); Burlington Insurance Company v. Mexican American Unity Council, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (<HOLDING>). As applied here, Mitchell’s claims in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sexual assault on a youth homes resident was excluded from an insurance policys coverage by an assault and battery exclusion notwithstanding that the claim was couched in negligence (B) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two (C) holding that coverage arguably existed under an insurance policy for claims against an employer and employees for an alleged assault and battery of bar patrons and that the insurer had a duty to defend (D) holding that claims were clearly excluded from coverage under assault and battery exclusion and therefore insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify (E) holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct
Output: (A)
fact that the fielding of payments was one of the services that ICTS chose to provide to the shippers for whom it consolidated. Its provision of that service in no way indicates that it was acting as Hawkspere’s collection agent. See Strachan Shipping Co., 701 F.2d at 486 (refusing to infer agency from fact that carrier initially directed its collection efforts to cargo consolidator). The Shippers next point out that they both “presented unrefuted testimony, that each reasonably believed that ICTS was acting for Hawkspere and relied on that.” Appellants’ Br. at 20. Under United States law, however, the Shippers’ subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the inquiry; only evidence of Hawkspere’s conduct can prove agency. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 266-67 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Auvil v. Grafton Homes, 92 F.3d 226, 230 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that statements made by agent on behalf of principal to principals attorney may be protected by principals attorneyclient privilege (B) holding that it is the principals conduct attitude and knowledge that determines whether an agent had apparent authority (C) holding that agency is provable only by principals conduct and not by subjective beliefs of those dealing with alleged agent (D) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (E) holding that the lack of evidence of the alleged principals control over the alleged agent precludes the finding of an agency relationship
Output: (C)
their work. Although the parties in Lansing focused their arguments on whether the airline was an ISP, the court observed that an ISP was neither mentioned nor defined by the CDA. Instead, the proper focus was on whether the airline was a provider of an interactive computer service. The court answered this question in the affirmative: We find that, under the plain language of the statute and its broad definition of an ICS [interactive computer service], an employer like defendant qualifies as a provider or user of an ICS because defendant uses an information system or service that multiple users, like defendant’s employees, use to access the Internet. Lansing, 366 Ill.Dec. 537, 980 N.E.2d at 637. Cf. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, 777 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, the designated evidence clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public library was immune from suit under section 230 because it provided an interactive computer service by enabling multiple users to access the internet through its public computers (B) holding that public officials are immune from suit for discretionary functions like training under louisiana law (C) holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts (D) holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens (E) holding that a schools internal mail system was not a public forum because users needed a principals permission for access
Output: (A)
could not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss,” and “the court of appeals correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over [the healthcare defendant’s] appeal.” Id. Since Ogletree, many healthcare defendants have argued that courts of appeal have interlocutory jurisdiction under section 51.104(a)(9), even when a trial court enters an order denying a motion to dismiss which includes a section 74.351(c) order granting an extension, because if a timely served report is “so deficient that it [is] no report,” the trial court has no discretion to grant a thirty-day extension. In McKeever v. Cerny, two doctors appealed an order granting an extension and made such an argument. 266 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). The rep (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In support of his argument that this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (B) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (C) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (D) holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension even though appellants argued expert report was so woefully deficient on necessary elements so as to constitute no report and report was missing experts curriculum vitae (E) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension
Output: (E)
the sentencing information balancing test urged by the dissent. The ongoing confusion concerning the breach of Wisconsin plea agreements is further highlighted by this district's issuance of an unusual, three-legged opinion. ¶ 24. While I have some sympathy with the dissent's concern about the continued integrity of the plea bargaining process, I disagree that the facts in this case can result in an unwarranted sentencing "clam up" restriction. The prosecutor not only has a right but a duty to provide information to the sentencing court. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with the prosecutor providing his or her opinion of the defendant's character, even if negative, to the sentencing court so long as the opinion is used to support the recommendation. See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324-25 (<HOLDING>). But it makes no sense to allow the prosecutor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erroneous use of statutorily unqualified person to prepare posttrial recommendation requires new recommendation and action (B) recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures (C) recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation (D) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (E) holding that if counsel raises an issue the failure to convince the court to rule in an appellants favor is not ineffective performance
Output: (C)
at 1034-35, we are compelled by our precedent to decide the Eleventh Amendment issue first. See Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir.1999) (“Because the State’s assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, the issue must be resolved before a court may address the merits of Martin’s underlying ADA claim.”), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Once effectively raised, the Eleventh Amendment becomes a limitation on our subject-matter jurisdiction, and we may not then assume “hypothetical jurisdiction” to reject a plaintiffs claim on the merits. Id.; cf. Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 558-59 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Some statutory questions are both logically 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc  1447c (B) holding that under 28 usc  1447c and d federal jurisdiction terminates once a section 1447c remand order has been mailed to the state court (C) holding that a proper eleventh amendment challenge strips the courts of jurisdiction for the purposes of the removal statute 28 usc  1447c (D) holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment (E) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment
Output: (C)
in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code”); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor’s estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past’ but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start”). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate
Output: (D)
three officers observed that the green sedan had side windows that appeared to be tinted beyond the legal limit, and both Garcia and Char-bonier admitted that the windows were tinted. (Tr. at 155; GX 2.) The fact that Officer Argila never tested the windows with a “tint meter” to determine if they were, in fact, in violation of the law is immaterial, as only an objectively reasonable belief or suspicion of a violation, supported by articulable facts, is required. See Harrell, 268 F.3d at 149 (probable cause to stop car existed because “an ‘objectively reasonable’ police officer would have suspected the windows were tinted in violation of § 375(12 a)(b) of the Vehicle & Traffic Law”); accord Scopo, 19 F.3d at 781-82; see also United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Officer Argila formed such a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant (B) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (C) holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself (D) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (E) holding that an officers misunderstanding of the tinting law was immaterial because the officer was not taking the bar exam the issue is not how well the officer understood californias window tinting laws but whether he had objective probable cause to believe that these windows were in fact a violation
Output: (E)
method that is fairest given the prevailing circumstances. The interpretation championed by the second line of cases renders the second sentence of § 506(a) virtually meaningless. Moreover, it would allow a reorganizing debtor to reap a windfall by stripping down the hen to liquidation value and quickly selling the collateral at fair market value, thus pocketing equity that would have been completely beyond reach save for the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (bankruptcy law should “prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy”) (quotation omitted). It is true that the debt- or’s intention to reorganize under Chapter 11 is w 4-86 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor (B) holding that second sentence of  506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debt ors real property to be retained by debtor (C) recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20  (D) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or (E) holding that  506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence
Output: (B)
in ways that create a substantial risk of producing or exacerbating personal injury to her child, to exercising too much or too little, indeed to engaging in virtually any injury-prone activity that, should an injury occur, might reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of the child. Such ordinary things as skiing or horseback riding could produce criminal liability. If the State’s position were to prevail, there would seem to be no clear basis for categorically excluding any of those activities from the ambit of the statute; criminal liability would depend almost entirely on how aggressive, inventive, and persuasive any particular prosecutor might be. Kilmon v. State, 394 Md. 168, 177-78, 905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Ct.App.2006). Additionally, the State’s suggested con 0 (1992) (<HOLDING>); People v. Morabito, 151 Misc.2d 259, 580 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse (B) holding a criminal charge of endangerment of a child does not apply to a pregnant woman who ingests an illegal substance that results in the transmission of drugs to her child through the umbilical cord (C) holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy (D) recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined (E) holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy
Output: (C)
a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence
Output: (B)
to Garrett, because he was still a member of the armed services at the time of the Board proceedings. The issue before the court in Keating was whether the plaintiff was a member of the armed services at the time of his court-martial. He had earlier been given an honorable discharge. In holding that the Navy had no jurisdiction to conduct the court-martial proceedings under the facts before him, the court noted that "an honorable discharge is an extremely valuable property right." Id. at 479. In the matter before us, there is no dispute that Garrett was a member of the Marine Corps at the time of the administrative discharge proceedings. 8 . A long line of authority supports the reasoning of Chappell: Rostker v. Goldburg, 453 U.S. 57, 66, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2652, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360, 100 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing judiciarys customary policy of deference to the president in matters of foreign affairs (B) recognizing strong need for a healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs (C) recognizing in the psc context that a legislative delegation of power to a legislative or executive agency permitting an agency to declare what the law is violates floridas separation of powers doctrine (D) holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege (E) recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor
Output: (B)
SSM violated duties it owed to him under the Hospital Services Agreement — to which he is a party — and that he is a third-party beneficiary to the Provider Agreement. See Denver Health & Hosp. Auth. v. Beverage Distrib. Co., 546 Fed.Appx. 742, 747 (10th Cir.2013) (unpublished) (“[E]xtrinsic documents relevant to the plan ... do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan for purposes of § 502(a)(1)(B).” (quotation omitted)). Sal-zer also alleges in these claims that by improperly billing him in violation of the above-cited agreements, SSM violated state statutory duties and common law tort duties. Some courts have held that patients cannot make out claims under provider agreements. Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assoc. Med. Grp., Inc., 187 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys. v. Aetna Health 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (B) holding that a negligent misrepresentation claim brought by an independent third party health care provider was not preempted by erisa (C) holding that health care providers claims against insurer for violation of a provider agreement were not covered by  502a1b in part because direct contract claims could not have been asserted by patients (D) holding that a thirdparty providers claim against insurer for promissory estoppel was not preempted by erisa because the thirdparty provider was not bound by the terms of the erisa plan (E) recognizing that a patients choice of a health care facility does not render the facility a beneficiary under 502a1b
Output: (C)
police informant that was going to testify against him and his brother. The manner in which Davis committed these offenses was cold, callous, and demonstrated a complete disregard for the dignity of human life. The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing by Davis and the State proved beyond all doubt that Davis knew right from wrong, also that Davis was solely responsible for conceiving a chain of events that resulted in two completely innocent people being killed and another being seriously wounded. “Even if this Court were to find that Copeland’s investigation for mitigating evidence was not as extensive as his collateral counsel, Davis would not be entitled to relief because he has failed to prove he was prejudiced. See Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364, 379 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). “Davis’s allegation his trial counsel were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel may well have made a reasonable tactical choice to not object to arguably inadmissible testimony (B) holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence (C) holding that it is unnecessary for government employees to make an actual conscious decision regarding policy factors for it is irrelevant whether the alleged failure  was a matter of deliberate choice or a mere oversight (D) holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence (E) holding that even if the alleged failure to present mitigating evidence was an oversight and not a tactical choice by counsel it was harmless
Output: (E)
not dispute the fact that the BVA decided that issue correctly. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the Board. A remand should be based on some type of error committed by the Board. The majority’s opinion basically says “try again,” without pointing to any error committed by the Board. The reason for the majority’s action is that their decision is based on an issue raised sua sponte. The appellant has not addressed a possible claim for total disability based on individual unemployability that may be still pending before VA. If there is one, she is free to pursue it without a remand from this Court. See Hanson v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 29 (1996) (stating that an unadjudi-eated claim generally remains pending before VA until withdrawn); Meeks v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>). This Court has consistently held that it will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a board affirmance of an ro decision subsumes that decision (B) holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack (C) holding that a claim before an ro remains pending until a final decision is rendered (D) holding that the ros failure to issue an soc prevented the disputed ro decision from becoming final and appealable to the board and the claim therefore remained pending (E) holding vcaa inapplicable to claim that ro decision contained cue
Output: (C)
the Government charged Acosta with criminal activity in both the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and because the “jurors by their verdict rejected that there was any criminal conduct within” the Southern District of New York, the Court “must accept the jurors findings” in concluding that venue does not properly lie within this District. (Id. at 9.) The Court disagrees. As a threshold matter, Acosta waived any challenge to venue by not raising a specific objection to venue until after the jury returned its verdict. This approach is implicit in Second Circuit case law, which requires that a defendant’s objection to venue must be specifically articulated by the close of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, No. 96-1519, 1997 WL 321809, at *2 (2d Cir. June 13, 1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mancebo-Santiago, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver (C) holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue (D) holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue (E) holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error
Output: (D)