niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). District courts within the Fifth Circuit have divided as to whether Woodfield’s fair-notice standard continues to apply to pleading affirmative defenses and counterclaims, or whether Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility standard applies. Compare, e.g., Vargas v. HWC Gen. Maintenance, LLC, 2012 WL 948892, at *2 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 20, 2012) (<HOLDING>); with Floridia v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., 2012 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions (B) holding that where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendants liability it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief  (C) holding that twombly and iqbals plausibility standard applies (D) holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to  523 claims (E) recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies
Output: (C)
“dismiss the charges in Perry County.” This court has held that a “petition for postconviction relief attacking a judgment, regardless of the label placed on it by the petitioner, is considered pursuant to our postconviction rule, Criminal Procedure Rule 37.” Bailey v. State, 312 Ark. 180, 182, 848 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1993) (per curiam) (citing Williams v. State, 291 Ark. 244, 724 S.W.2d 158 (1987)). However, Rule 37 is “applicable only to such persons who are in custody.” Bohanan v. State, 336 Ark. 367, 370, 985 S.W.2d 708, 709 (1999) (emphasis added) (rejecting argument that a person on parole was “in custody” of the Department of Correction and holding that a petitioner must be incarcerated to be entitled to Rule 37 relief). Compare State v. Herred, 332 Ark. 241, 964 S.W.2d 391 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, at the time Wilmoth filed his petition 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction (B) holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant rule 37 relief where petitioner herred was in custody at the time the court ruled on his motion (C) holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive (D) recognizing for the first time that the habeas court had the power to retain the petitioner in conditional custody before granting relief (E) holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date
Output: (B)
canons of interpretation. Lockhart, 126 S.Ct. at 703-04. In this case, for example, Section 408 exists to protect the United States’ obligations under NAFTA. Indeed, powerful canons do exist to protect such interests. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963) (overturning the NLRB’s construction of a statute because Congress did not clearly state that it intended to violate the law of nations); FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960) (Black, J. dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.”); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 237-38 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because Section 408 is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jones act insufficiently clear to abrogate immunity (B) holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause (C) holding that in an earlier version of 11 u s c  106 congress had failed to make sufficiently clear its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity (D) holding that congress must speak with a clear statement if it intends to abrogate an international agreement (E) holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity
Output: (D)
the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
Output: (A)
into Execution ... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Although other circuits have held that the combined effect of these provisions does not permit Congress to regulate “pure” state or local elections, see Bowman, 636 F.2d at 1011, elections in which federal and state candidates are on the same ballot are properly subject to federal regulation. Ibid, (observing that “Congress may regulate any activity which exposes the federal aspects of the election to the possibility of corruption, whether or not the actual corruption takes place and whether or not the persons participating in such activity had a specific intent to expose the federal election to such corruption or possibility of corruption”); see also McCranie, 169 F.3d at 727 (<HOLDING>). Under the Elections Clause, Congress is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government (B) holding no violation of federal establishment clause (C) holding that elections clause and the necessary and proper clause combine to provide congress with the power to regulate mixed federal and state elections even when federal candidates are running unopposed (D) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (E) holding that the power to regulate the business of another and especially of a competitor is a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause
Output: (C)
needlessly leave out of our decisions an important source of information about the child, and in the end, it is the dependent child who suffers. After all, the children count here, not the agency. I believe that we gain nothing, and lose precious information by refusing foster parents standing. Standing to sue simply ensures that a particular party has a sufficient stake in a controversy before the court to obtain a judicial resolution. It should not be a doctrine to close the court house doors on parties who have a real interest in the matter at hand. I believe that the Juvenile Act confers “standing,” subject to traditional jurisprudential limits, for the agency, the grandparent, and the foster parents to file these petitions. See also Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.1998)(<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1567 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child (B) holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter (C) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (D) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody (E) holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation
Output: (A)
ask us to review the Board’s decision denying their motion to reopen. A denial of a motion to reopen is a final order that may be appealed to this court. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (10th Cir.2004). In their petition for review filed with us on January 22, 2013, petitioners did request review of the denial of their motion to reopen as well as their motion for reconsideration. But this request came too late to obtain judicial review of the motion-to-reopen decision, which had been entered August 31, 2012. Petitioners failed to file a separate petition for review from the motion-to-reopen decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (establishing 30-day time period for filing petition for review); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394-406, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order (B) holding for the same reason that motion for appointment of counsel does not toll the period for filing a federal habeas petition (C) holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal (D) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review
Output: (E)
or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.” Id. at 835. The dispositive issue in the instant case is whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient allegations to show that drag racing is a “dangerous condition” as that term is used in § 537.600.1(2). See Johnson v. City of Springfield, 817 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1991). In Missouri, three major lines of case authority define the term “dangerous condition” as found in § 537.600.1(2). See parallel discussions in Johnson, supra. In the first line of case authority, “dangerous condition” has a narrow meaning and refers to defects in the physical condition of a public entity’s property. Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 835; Chase v. City of St. Louis, 781 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo.App.1989) (<HOLDING>); Zubcic v. Mo. Portland Cement Co., 710 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire (B) holding that the land contract vendor was entitled to fire insurance benefits when the fire occurred after a judgment for possession was obtained by the vendor pursuant to summary forfeiture proceedings (C) holding that petition failed to allege fire hydrants were physically defective where fire hydrants did not work and plaintiffs decedent was killed in fire (D) holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable (E) holding where the defendants conduct in setting a fire was a proximate cause of a fire fighters death the death occurred in course of and in furtherance of the arson
Output: (C)
between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance
Output: (E)
evidence which demonstrates the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir.2013) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwoo be considered when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1314 (10th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion (B) holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion (C) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (D) holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion (E) holding that hearsay ev idence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion
Output: (E)
If a statement does not contain any expressly exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense. To hold otherwise would impose an insuperable burden on the Government to determine what facially non-exculpatory evidence might possibly be favorable to the accused by inferential reasoning. We are confident that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brady holding to sweep so broadly. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988); see also Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir.2007) {“Brady does not require that police officers or prosecutors explore multiple potential inferences to discern whether evidence that is not favorable to a defendant could become favorable.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that just such inferential 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b (B) holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence (E) holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case
Output: (E)
CURIAM: Carlo Junior Seneeharles appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Sen-echarles’s con earm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles’s firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). B. Armed Career Criminal Act Senecharles also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce (B) recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce (C) holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs (D) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
Output: (A)
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Cabrera contends that the district court did not adequately explain the reaso tantively unreasonable. We review for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169. L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district1 court did not abuse its discretion. The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including not only Cabrera’s state prison sentence and efforts towards rehabilitation, but also his rejection of the fast-track plea agreement and his criminal history, which is entirely distinct from the offense at issue here. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; cf. United States v. Defterios, 343 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that delay in indictment may sometimes be a basis for a sentencing departure but holding that district court erred when it decreased sentence based on a delay in an indictment where the offenses were separate crimes distinct in time place and victims (B) holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient (C) holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence (D) recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part (E) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense
Output: (A)
begins to run at the time of the alleged breach and not after the conclusion of the appeals. Allison, 209 F.Supp.2d at 60. In Allison, a law student at Howard University brought a breach of contract claim related to his expulsion. After learning of his expulsion on May 22, 1996, the student filed multiple appeals and made numerous requests for readmission but did not file his lawsuit until June 17, 1999. Id. The Court held that the statute of limitations began to run at the time the expulsion decision was “made and communicated” to the student and that the “pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review, does not toll the running of the limitations period.” Id., citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that defendants are relying 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run (B) holding that the statute of limitations for an employment discrimination lawsuit by a college professor who did not receive tenure began when the college made the tenure decision and communicated that decision to the plaintiff (C) holding that the only alleged discrimination occurred  and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced  at the time the adverse employment action was made and communicated to the plaintiff (D) holding that the limitations period for a discrimination charge based on tenure denial begins when aggrieved person receives notice of denial not on the last day of employment (E) holding that the statute teacher tenure act does not allow termination on the basis of a regulation which neither forbids nor commands action
Output: (B)
and admitted evidence in deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding an -alternative perpetrator defense). a. S.H. Trial testimony reveals S.H. visited the home Meisel shared with Thomas, Thomas regularly slept during the day, and Meisel left his computer on with a slots program running. Given this extremely limited evidence, we have no doubt the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence for the purpose of arguing S.H. is the person who committed the child pornography crimes set out in the indictment. If mere proximity and potential access were sufficient to argue an alternative perpetrator committed the crime, this court can hardly envision a criminal trial that would not involve such a defense. But see id. at 1220-22 (<HOLDING>). b. W.R. Evidence implicating W.R. as the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony (B) holding that the trial court must apply the provisions of the statute and specifically determine whether the perpetrator of domestic abuse had rebutted the presumption against an award of joint custody (C) holding unconstitutional a state evidentiary rule automatically excluding alternative perpetrator evidence when the prosecution case was strong (D) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting alternative perpetrator evidence where the record demonstrated the supposed alternative perpetrator was near the victim no more than ten minutes before the crime (E) holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment
Output: (D)
since she testified live at trial. See CP at 778. The city also argues this case is analogous to Noltie, where we held gruesome photographs were properly admitted so long as they were relevant and accurate. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d at 852. We do not see the comparison, since in this case, the city admits the most gruesome and repetitive aspect of the 911 tape was not accurate. See Revised Opening Br. of Resp’t/Cross-Appellant at 44. ¶20 The use of the caller’s assertion, repeated no less than five times during the call, that someone had been decapitated appears calculated to inflame the passions of the jury, especially since it was conceded to be untrue. CP at 782-84; Revised Opening Br. of Resp’t/Cross-Appellant at 44; see also State v. Pendergrass, 179 Mont. 106, 111-12, 586 P.2d 691 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Although the city claims the 911 tape could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (B) holding trial court abused its discretion in admitting rape victims 911 call because the emotional and nearly incoherent outpourings of the victim in the immediate aftermath of a violent crime necessarily induced a feeling of outrage against the defendant (C) holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident (D) holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body (E) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial
Output: (B)
parties to the charge indicating the finding. The Commission's letter of determination shall be the final determination of the Commission.” 2 . The Florida Omnibus Aids Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.50, prohibits employers from discharging an employee or otherwise discriminating against any employee on the basis of knowledge or a belief that the employee has HIV. 3 . The Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq., prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee with a "handicap” because of the employee’s "handicap.” 4 . We reject BT Foods’ position that Byrd failed to preserve this issue by later stipulating to admission of the entire EEOC file, including the determination letters. See Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2001) (<HOLDING>). However, because the trial court's ruling was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a trial court makes an unequivocal ruling admitting evidence over a movants motion in limine the movants subsequent introduction of that evidence does not constitute a waiver of the error for appellate review (B) holding grant or denial of motion in limine is preliminary ruling and normally preserves nothing for appellate review (C) holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial (D) holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered (E) holding that a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review without the need for later objection
Output: (A)
product as a treatment for depression; Unigen and Univera further point out that Univera is in fact prohibited from doing so by FDA regulation. The question is, then, does Univera infringe Claim 16 of the '308 patent by marketing and selling, products containing 6-MBOA as a treatment for stress? In other words, is treating “stress” the same as treating “depression” as used in Claim 16? The answer depends on how the court construes the term “depression” as used in Claim 16. Several considerations are important in addressing this question. First, on a motion for a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement dispute, a court is not required to engage in a comprehensive and final claim construction See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Further, when construing a claim term: ... a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts interpret indemnity provisions same as written contracts (B) holding a state court has an inescapable obligation to interpret and apply the federal statute (C) holding that trial courts have no obligation to conclusively and finally interpret claims when considering a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing that the rules of statutory construction apply when we interpret constitutional provisions (E) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation
Output: (C)
Peay, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 473 (1967); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, n rule, stating the rule was limited to criminal cases. After the court’s ruling, Goodman used his three peremptory challenges to strike two black jurors and one white. A third black juror was seated to hear the case. It appears that after the conclusion of the case and before submission (there having been seated thirteen jurors), the single black juror was removed from the panel by lot, thus leaving the decision in the hands of twelve white jurors. To create the issue presented for our conside 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (19716) (recognizing prospective application of a new rule where, inter alia, inequities might arise from retroactive application); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule (B) holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials (C) holding a court may apply a new rule in the criminal case before it but return to the old rule as to all other cases arising on facts predating the pronouncement (D) holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past (E) holding that when the supreme court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule
Output: (C)
Certification Regarding requirements for certification, a settlement class must meet the re quirements for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Thus, the named plaintiffs must meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir.2003). The practice in this circuit is “to give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction, adopting a standard of flexibility in application [that] will in the particular case best serve the ends of justice for affected parties and promote judicial efficiencies.” Id. at 424 (quoting In re A.H. Robins, Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). In the instant case, plaintiffs seek 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification (B) holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class (C) holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding need certification filed after information returned was timely because the statute includes no deadline for filing a certification  and no court has imposed one
Output: (D)
has not undertaken any consumer surveys and the record contains no sworn consumer testimony. Similarly, with respect to trade dress infringement, the evidence presented by Hi-Tech does not clearly demonstrate that its trade dresses are distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1540 (11th Cir.1986) (recognizing that extensive sales and advertising alone do not necessarily establish secondary meaning). B. Irreparable Harm Even assuming that Hi-Tech had established a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims, the Court nevertheless concludes that Hi-Tech is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because it has not demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable harm. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In its brief, Hi-Tech argued that irreparable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of specific competitive injury establishes irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief (B) holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest (C) holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury (D) holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction (E) holding that even when likelihood of success has been established the absence of irreparable injury standing alone makes preliminary injunctive relief improper
Output: (E)
by § 1681a(r)(5), and there was no “credit transaction” within the meaning of § 1681b(a)(3)(A). PCA, therefore, had no purpose specified as permissible under the statute to obtain Pintos’s credit report. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court relied on our decision in Has-bun. Hasbun presented the question of whether a government agency looking to enforce a child support judgment could obtain a credit report on a judgment debt- or under § 1681b(a)(3)(A). 323 F.3d at 802-03. The court determined that debt collection was generally a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports under § 1681b(a)(3)(A), and that the government, which stood in the shoes of the judgment creditor, could, like any other creditor, obtain credit reports for debt collection. Id. at 803-04, 805 (<HOLDING>). Relying on Hasbun, the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1681ba3a applies only if the con sumer initiates a credit transaction (B) holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government (C) holding that the government agency was engaged in the collection of an account under 15 usc  1681ba3a and therefore had a permissible purpose for obtaining the credit report (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency (E) holding in the context of a fcra violation that a jury could find that a consumers credit score was negatively influenced by the failure to list a debt as disputed because evidence was presented that when a credit reporting agency received notice of a dispute it records the dispute in the credit report and does not include the derogatory information in assessing the credit score
Output: (C)
over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” Id. at 1518. The Court, however, also held that, as between a wife’s consent to a search of the family residence and her husband’s refusal to consent, "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.” Id. at 1519. Comments, Model Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 9.13 (2007). 13 . See also Cal. Penal Code § 3067(d) (in the context of parole searches, noting "[i]t is not the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”). 14 . But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52, 657, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional (C) recognizing a claim for civil liability against municipalities  under  1983 (D) holding individual officers entitlement to qualified immunity does not immunize municipalities from monell liability (E) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit
Output: (D)
Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) (emphasis added). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, whether they can prove membership in a specially protected class or not. The Court does not, in so holding, suggest that membership in a particular class of persons is irrelevant to a determination of whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Courts must evaluate discrimination based on membership in an identified suspect class such as race, alien-age, or national origin, with the most strict scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling (B) holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest (C) recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety (D) holding that such classifications are permissible only when suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest (E) holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest
Output: (D)
not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of any material issue of fact with regard to Defendants’ safety reasons for the denial of Mr. Satawa’s permit application such that the safety reasons given by Mr. Hoepfner should be discredited. “As a general matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2565, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct. 855, 866, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1569, 176 L.Ed.2d 110 (2010) (<HOLDING>). As this Court previously observed, “even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state (B) recognizing the public interest exception (C) holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance (D) recognizing a somewhat greater governmental interest in regulating expressive activity on city streets because of the public safety concerns raised by vehicular traffic (E) recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation
Output: (D)
Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 303 F.3d 419, 424 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 80 N.Y.2d 640, 648, 593 N.Y.S.2d 966, 609 N.E.2d 506 (1993)). Accord Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cook, 7 N.Y.3d 131, 137, 818 N.Y.S.2d 176, 850 N.E.2d 1152(2006). 94 . Maryland Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 332 F.3d 145, 160 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Continental, 80 N.Y.2d at 648, 593 N.Y.S.2d 966, 609 N.E.2d 506). Accord Feldman Law Grp. P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 819 F.Supp.2d 247, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (noting that New York law permits consideration of facts extrinsic to the four comers of the complaint in determining a duty to defend); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 67, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672, 575 N.E.2d 90 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 95 . See Auriemma v. Biltmore Theatre, LLC, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage (B) holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense (C) holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy (D) holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage (E) holding that rather than mechanically applying only the four corners of the complaint rule  the sounder approach is to require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage
Output: (E)
impact’ upon the duration of his custody.” Bourke v. Hawk-Sawyer, 269 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.2000)) (“habeas is indeed exclusive even when a non-habeas claim would have a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of custody.”). In Razzoli, the Circuit Court held that a prisoner could not assert a claim under the Privacy Act because his only recourse was to seek relief through a habeas petition. 230 F.3d at 376. As in this case, the prisoner’s Privacy Act claim in Razzoli alleged that the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission had “violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) by maintaining in their files and using a false record, [a] report of [a] drug possession incident, even though the .C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In this case, as in Razzoli and Bourke, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible (C) holding that federal prisoners claim was properly filed as an action for habeas although he was not laying claim to an immediate release or release in the near future he is however maintaining that he is being deprived of the chance to secure his release  by unlawfully being declared ineligible for parole consideration (D) holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole (E) holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release
Output: (C)
Suggesting an Initial Written Warning." At the end of that list, Policy 210 warns, "Repeated violations of any of the above examples or other more serious offenses will result in more extreme disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment." Policy 210 then provides thirteen "Examples of Misconduct Suggesting Termination." The misconduct section of Policy 210 states, "Misconduct, depending on its seriousness, will generally be addressed by means of written warning ... or other discipline up to and including termination." Thus, the misconduct provisions of Policy 210 indicate that NCR retains some discretion as to when and whether to provide a written warning before terminating an employee. See Sanderson v. First See. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 308, 306 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>). €89 With respect to performance issues, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding failure to follow progressive discipline policy does not constitute pretext when employer reserves right to fire atwill employees without notice (B) holding that the statement in the employers progressive discipline policy that in situations where employee behavior warrants immediate termination the stages of this process do not need to be followed granted the employer unbounded discretion to discharge employees without following the guidelines (C) holding no pretext for not following progressive discipline where policy contemplated immediate termination for certain offenses (D) holding the employer breached the duty owed to its employee by erroneously advising the employee he would continue to have coverage for 30 days following his termination of employment under the employers group policy (E) holding failure to follow progressive discipline does not demonstrate pretext when use of the policy is entirely discretionary
Output: (B)
exchange or giving away of [controlled substances] ... ****** (b) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any law enforcement officer upon process issued by any district court having jurisdiction over the property. Seizure by a law enforcement officer may be made without process if: ****** (3) there is probable cause to believe that the property was used in violation of this act K.S.A. 65-4135(a)(4) and (b)(3). Once property is seized pursuant to subsection (b)(3), proceedings pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4171 must be implemented promptly. K.S.A. 65-4135(c). The court notes that K.S.A. 65-4135 is virtually identical to the federal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881. See State ex rel. Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino, 247 Kan. 469, 473, 799 P.2d 1043 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the federal statute, courts have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the two statutes are nearly identical (B) holding that trial judge is legally correct in dismissing declaratory action when two actions are substantially the same issues were identical and the identical action was still pending (C) holding that though mississippi law governs the amount of the fee award here because the factors considered under state and federal law are nearly identical both state and federal cases are instructive (D) holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing (E) holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical
Output: (A)