niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
venture” (FAC ¶ 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... ”); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.”) cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc  216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc  1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc  1106a (C) holding under 29 usc  216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc  203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc  203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc  1108 from 29 usc  1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision
Output: (D)
Allwhite directs us to cases where a loss of consciousness by a driver qualified for an instruction of unavoidable accident. For example, in First City Nat’l Bank v. Japhet, 390 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1965, writ dism’d), the defendant suffered a heart attack while driving his vehicle; then, his car crossed the median, crossed the divided road, and drove onto the plaintiffs property, causing certain damages. On appeal, the appellate court found a fact issue had been raised of unavoidable accident and reversed and remanded the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 74. Other jurisdictions have found circumstances similar to this case also warranted an instruction on unavoidable accident. See Houston v. Adams, 239 Ark. 346, 389 S.W.2d 872, 875 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such a threat would not supply exceptional circumstances (B) holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court (C) holding that where the board of immigration is permitted to reopen proceedings in exceptional circumstances its decision not to reopen a case is unreviewable because there are no statutory regulatory or caselaw definitions of exceptional circumstances  and  thus no manageable standard to apply on review (D) holding hardship is discovered in the rare case based on exceptional circumstances (E) holding unavoidable accident instruction permitted in most exceptional circumstances such as unanticipated heart attack
Output: (E)
preferred. See D.D.C. R. 405. Indeed, the courts have developed rules and presumptions that enable the most efficient use of limited judicial resources while at the same time protecting the various parties’ rights to have their claims and arguments heard and decided by an impartial decision-maker. Trial judges frequently receive extraneous information about parties appearing before them but are presumed to disregard it. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 347, 102 S.Ct. 460, 465, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981). In the course of a trial, as well as at pre-trial suppression hearings or during discovery, a judge may inspect documents or evidence that go to the heart of a party’s case but are ultimately determined to be inadmissible. See United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265-66 (1st Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, a judge may have personal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion (B) holding that when defense counsel withdrew an objection to admission of evidence the defendant waived his right to a review of the courts ruling on appeal (C) holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered (D) recognizing that judges are necessarily exposed to matters outside the record in the course of ruling on the admission of evidence (E) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record
Output: (D)
court’s interim order and the entirety of its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1 . See Johnson v. Johnson, 836 P.2d 930, 933 (Alaska 1992); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1975). 2 . See Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska 1994). 3 . See Monette v. Hoff, 958 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Alaska 1998); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 375 (Alaska 1996); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 411 (Alaska 1996). 4 . See Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 552 (Alaska 1990). 5 . See Burrell, 537 P.2d at 7. 6 . See Vachon, 931 P.2d at 375. 7 . See Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Alaska 1991). 8 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a) (requiring trial courts to make findings in support of their decisions in non-jury cases); see also Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>); Bird v. Starkey, 914 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Alaska 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors (B) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (C) holding that wjhile trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written child custody orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review (D) holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently (E) holding that even though defendants response does not affirmatively state in the document itself that they are competent to testify as to the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony  so long as the record taken as a whole demonstrates that their testimony meets the requirements of rule 56
Output: (C)
to regulate conduct that occurs within its own borders. For example, the plaintiff in P.V. was a New Jersey resident pursuing a tort claim against a Pennsylvania charity for conduct that occurred in Pennsylvania. Id. at 153, 962 A.2d 453. The Court found both of the conditions that it noted for affording comity: (1) applying New Jersey’s broad charitable immunity to the activity in Pennsylvania would “substantially impair[ ]” Pennsylvania’s “ability to regulate the conduct of those who chose to operate within its borders,” and (2) applying Pennsylvania law would not prevent New Jersey from applying its law of charitable immunity to activities within New Jersey. Id. at 153, 962 A.2d 453. The parallel of this case to P.V. rests on the fa N.J.Super. 145, 159, 689 A.2d 158 (App. Div. 1997) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 152 N.J. 361, 704 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller (B) recognizing new jerseys interest in deterrence of tortious misconduct as a relevant factor in choice of law decisions applicable where two of defendants were new jersey residents from whom damages were sought for their negligent acts in new jersey (C) recognizing that alabama had no interest in denying its residents the procedural and substantive advantages afforded under new jerseys product liability and consumer fraud statutes but not alabamas for claims against a new jersey manufacturer (D) recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey (E) holding purposeful and deliberate omission on enactment of new jersey sales and use tax of exemption found in new york counterpart act which served as the model for new jersey act
Output: (D)
§ 15-5-7, Ala.Code 1975, because the warrant was executed by officers other than those to whom it was directed. The trial court found that this defect in the execution of the warrant required the suppression of the evidence seized at the subject property. “Section 15-5-7 provides: “ ‘A search warrant may be executed by any one of the officers to whom it is directed, but by no other person except in aid of such officer at his request, he being present and acting in its execution.’ “This statute has been strictly construed, and compliance with its formality has been required. See Yeager v. State, 500 So.2d 1260 (Ala.Crim.App.1986); Rivers v. State, 406 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Crim.App.1981), cert. denied, 406 So.2d 1023 (Ala.1981); see, also, United States v. Martin, 600 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds, United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the government generally has the right to insist on performance in strict compliance with the contract specifications (B) holding that strict compliance is not required (C) holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute (D) holding that strict compliance with the 30180day time limit set forth in krs 4392651 is required (E) recognizing that strict compliance with  1557 is required
Output: (E)
no meritorious issues for appeal. After a Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 hearing at which Blackmon admitted his guilt and attested that his plea was knowing and voluntary, the district court sentenced Blackmon to the statutory minimum of life in prison based on prior convictions admitted to by him in his plea agreement. Because Blackmon did not dispute that he absconded for nearly three and a half years after entering his guilty plea, thereby triggering the imposition of the enhanced penalty pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, his mandatory life sentence was appropriate. See United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.2008) (“A statutorily required sentence ... is per se reasonable.”); see also Burgess v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 1577-80, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Although Blackmon purports to have withdrawn 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (B) holding that a felony drug offense is an offense punishable by more than one year as defined in 21 usc  80244 2000 regardless of whether the state of conviction classified the particular offense as a misdemeanor or felony (C) holding that for purposes of applying enhanced penalty in  841b1a felony drug offense includes any crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment regardless of whether it is classified as a felony or a misdemeanor (D) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (E) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction
Output: (B)
expert’s valuation without adequate support for that expert’s disregard of certain partnership debts requires reversal. Finally, I disagree with the majority’s command that the trial court consider only the value of the marital estate as of the time that the bankruptcy ended for purposes of determining equitable distribution. In my view, the task is a bit more complicated than that. I. ¶ 49. Generally, the valuation of a marital estate is as of a date coinciding with the dissolution of the marriage. This may be deemed the date of filing for divorce, the date of the hearing at which a divorce is granted or the date of the hearing at which property issues are determined depending upon the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Catalfumo v. Catalfumo, 704 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Ackerman, 964 S.W.2d 865, 869 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the date of filing the petition for dissolution as the valuation date for equitable distribution (B) holding that valuation should occur on the date of the trial at which property issues are determined (C) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (D) holding the petition date is the appropriate date to value the collateral when the debtors intend to remain in the home (E) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
Output: (A)
(“Rule 804(b)(6) is an attempt to respond to the problem of witness intimidation[.]”). As a result, the plain language of the rule requires that the defendant not only be involved in causing the witness’s unavailability, but also that the defendant commit the relevant act with the intent to prevent the witness from testifying. {20} Some state and federal courts, however, have decided that the “intent to silence” requirement is only mandated by the federal rules and not by the constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir.2005) (“Though the Federal Rules of Evidence may contain [the intent to silence] requirement, the right secured by the Sixth Amendment does not[.]” (internal citation omitted)); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tex.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Ruiz, 2005 WL 1670426, at *6 (“Ultimately, if 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that some states it should be noted have adopted a hybrid approach (B) holding that since the reference in  2461c to the procedures of  853 includes the latter statutes implicit authorization of in personam money judgments we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets (C) holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit (D) holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases (E) holding that the fifth amendment in its direct application to the federal government and in its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt
Output: (D)
to submit to testing or his license would be suspended. The implied consent law, however, nowhere “requires” a DUI arrestee to submit to testing, and the DPS officer’s admonition therefore did not mirror the statute. See A.R.S. § 28-1321(A), (B) (stating that although a DUI arrestee “gives consent” to testing of blood, breath, or other bodily substance, he “shall be requested to submit to and successfully complete” any such test) (emphasis added). But even assuming that the officer accurately paraphrased the law, this distinction is immaterial. The Bumper Court’s ruling turned on the grandmother’s acquiescence to the officer’s assertion of lawful authority to search regardless of the truthfulness of the officer’s claim to possess a warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (<HOLDING>). The officer’s claim of authority to search 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that custody while not determinative in itself places a heavy burden in showing consent was voluntarily given and noting that custody when coupled with other coercive factors will normally necessitate the conclusion that the consent is not effective (B) holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given (C) holding that the prosecutors burden to prove that consent was voluntarily given cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority (D) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (E) holding that the state must prove consent was voluntary not simply a submission to authority
Output: (C)
contractual obligation.” Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d at 65. See Belgrave v. City of N.Y., 1999 WL 692034, *45 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (Gleeson, J.)(dismissing the plaintiffs breach of contract claim where employee claimed that employer failed to follow its procedures for providing equal opportunity to employees); Mutua v. Tex. Roadhouse Mgmt. Corp., 753 F.Supp.2d 954, 968-69 (D.S.D.2010) (Schreier, J.Xgranting summary judgment on a breach-of-contract claim seeking to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions in the employer’s employee handbook, because the employer already must abide by Title VII and a promise to perform a legal duty is not consideration for a return promise); Byra-Grzegorczyk v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 572 F.Supp.2d 233, 254 (D.Conn.2008) (Kravitz, J.)(<HOLDING>); Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F.Supp.2d 199, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea (B) holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer (C) recognizing that an antidiscrimination policy does not indicate that an employer is undertaking any contractual obligations towards the employee rather it requires the employer to comply with federal and state antidiscrimination laws (D) holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
Output: (C)
for new trial because judge’s tirade to defense attorney that evidence he sought to admit was “outrageous” and “illegal” prejudiced “defendant’s receiving a fair trial.”); People v. Conyers, 194 Mich.App. 395, 400, 404, 405, 487 N.W.2d 787, 788, 791 (1992) (determining that judge violated impartiality requirement in his statement to the jury: “I cannot, in honesty, say as I look at [the defendant], that I presume him to be innocent,” and that judge’s “excessive interference in the examination of witnesses, repeated rebukes and disparaging remarks directed at defendant’s counsel, and marked impatience in the presence of the jury displayed an attitude of partisanship, which resulted in the denial of a fair trial.”); State v. Staley, 292 N.C. 160, 165-70, 232 S.E.2d 680, 684-86 (1977) (<HOLDING>); McMahan v. State, 96 Okla.Crim. 176, 177-78, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial judges act of implying to jury that defense witnesses were lying his overly interrogative role in favor of prosecution his failure to rule on defense motions and multiple reprimands to defense counsel for speechmaking prejudiced jury against defense (B) holding prosecutors statement that defendant and defense counsel were lying when they pleaded not guilty was improper (C) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (D) holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second (E) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense
Output: (A)
Clause even when a criminal conviction arises out of the same incident. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502. Furthermore, defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the domestic violence proceeding was between the victim and defendant and did not involve the State. Halper states that “[t]he protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties.” Id. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903, 104 L.Ed.2d at 503. Since the domestic violence action in this case did not involve the State, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated. Ibid., see also Browning-Ferns Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2912, 106 L.Ed.2d 219, 228 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the trial court properly denied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeitures may violate the eighth amendment excessive fines clause (B) holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable (C) holding that punitive damages are not fines (D) holding that excessive fines clause of eighth amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards between private parties (E) holding that excessive fines clause does not apply to civiljury award of punitive fines
Output: (D)
The existence of an attorney-client relationship and privilege is not dependent on the client himself paying the attorney. The relationship and the privilege may exist even though the attorney's fees are paid by a third party. Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 888 n. 5 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Edwards, 39 F.Supp.2d 716, 722 (M.D.La.1999). 7 . Most of the reported cases addressing the issue are discussed and analyzed in I. Labovitz and Wm. Labovitz, Attorney Client Privilege in Individual Bankruptcy Cases: An Emerging Qxymoron, 104 COM. L.J. 301 (1999); see also, Miller, 247 B.R. at 709. 8 . Courts have cited the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir.1981) to support both sides of the debate. See In re Smith, 24 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Silvio De Lindegg Ocean Dev. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorneyclient privilege always passes to the trustee even if the debtor is an individual (B) holding that an appurtenant easement is an incident of the estate granted and passes with it (C) holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors (D) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser (E) holding that wjhile the administrator has a right of possession until the estate is settled    the property passes to the heirs
Output: (A)
as well as Dr. Kirkham. In other words, an expert, regardless of his credentials, is no more able than a jury to view and interpret the video. In fact, Dr. Kirkham’s two-cents, if you will, may only confuse the jury or, at worst, mislead them with his characterizations of what is on the film. Indeed, a expert’s evaluation, in this instance, may supplant the jury’s exercise of common sense. Although the Sixth Circuit has not ruled explicitly in this regard, other courts have held that when cases involve review of videotaped events, an expert’s opinion should not be permitted when the expert is no better suited than the jury to interpret the video’s contents. Dunlap v. Hood, 2009 WL 362292 at * 1 (N.D. Tex. 2009) citing Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance (B) holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance (C) holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge (D) holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge (E) holding admissible testimony of jurors describing jury review of information not admitted into evidence
Output: (A)
Original Petition does not affirmatively reveal that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional minimum, despite the existence of statutory caps on the kinds of damages claimed by Plaintiff in excess of the required amount for federal jurisdiction. Because Plaintiffs Original Petition does not contain “a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount,” the Court finds that Plaintiffs Original Petition did not start the thirty-day time limit for removal set forth in § 1446(b). Chapman, 969 F.2d at 163. Furthermore, Defendant timely removed the instant cause upon receipt of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, which unequivocally asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional requirement. See Bosky, 288 F.3d at 212 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court’s exercise of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute (B) holding other paper must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446b (C) holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal (D) holding that the information supporting removal in a copy of an amended pleading  must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal internal quotation omitted (E) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand
Output: (D)
inference that the defendants engage in those activities or “may be present—whether officially or unofficially—in and around the Chagos Archipelago.” Pis.’ Reply to Brown & Root Opp’n at 4. Likewise, assuming ar-guendo that certain former board members were fully aware of the plaintiffs’ removal from Chagos, that knowledge or awareness is not sufficient to infer that they (and by extension, the defendants) engaged in some kind of a conspiracy to remove the plaintiffs. Id. at 5. As a result, the plaintiffs’ optimistic conclusion that these facts “create!] a reasonable basis for Plaintiffs’ conspiracy and continuing involvement theories” is a classic example of a conclusory allegation unsupported by factual data. Pis.’ Reply to Brown & Root Opp’n at 4; accord Byrd, 174 F.3d at 248 n. 8 (<HOLDING>); Exxon Corp., 40 F.3d at 1487-88 (viewing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim (B) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (C) holding party opposing summary judgment does not show genuine issue for trial by replacing conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit (D) holding that the plaintiffs allegations that there may well be agency knowledge or documents that could aid his case was plainly conclusory (E) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint
Output: (D)
be the trustee of the trust.”). However, because this error does not affect our analysis of the dispositive issues on appeal, we need not disturb the court’s judgment on this ground. 2 . Because we conclude that the court properly voided the transfer from the trust to Richard as a result of Richard’s breach of the duty of loyalty, we need not address whether the transaction was supported by adequate consideration. However, if we were to reach that issue, we would find that the forgiveness of the debt owed to Richard in addition to the $12,000.00 given to the trust for each beneficiary constituted adequate consideration, and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. See Smith-Douglas, Div. of Borden Chem., Borden, Inc. v. Kornegay, 70 N.C. App. 264, 268, 318 S.E.2d 896, 896 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Because we conclude that the subsequent 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing debt cancellation as consideration (B) holding that satisfaction of preexisting debt of corporate affiliate was sufficient to support jury finding of fair consideration for the transfer of valid security interest (C) holding transfer of legal title to property as a capital contribution to llc was in exchange for valuable consideration and constituted a sale of the property (D) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (E) recognizing satisfaction of a valid debt as adequate consideration in a transfer of real property
Output: (E)
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing unnecessary security measures on him, rendering him incapable of participating meaningfully in his trial. Specifically, he claims that the Commonwealth treated him with an unusual and unnecessary combination of mood-altering drugs, including Depakote, Risperdal, Paxil, and Zoloft, at the same time, which made him appear “cold, expressionless, and remorseless during the trial.” Pet. at 32. He was also forced to wear a stun belt during the trial for security reasons. Powell does not allege that the jury saw the stun belt, but claims the owell allege that the drugs he received were involuntarily administered. Powell, 2005 WL 2980756, at * 13. Cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Powell cites no U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a medical professional was not deliberately indifferent where the prisoner alleged that the professional performed some investigation and determined that the prisoner does not have the condition he thinks he has (B) holding that charging fees for medical services did not violate the eighth amendment where prisoner did not allege denial of medical care (C) holding that it was not clearly established in 2002 that forcing a prisoner to sleep without a mattress but with a bed and a blanket violated the eighth amendment (D) holding that forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness (E) recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner
Output: (D)
raises a novel issue of state law. “[District courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 281-82, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2140, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942)). In declaratory judgment actions, “[T]he normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.” Id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. at 2143. Here, there is no pending state court proceeding on the same issues involved in this action. Cf. id. at 289-90, 115 S.Ct. at 2144 (<HOLDING>). Wiggins contends that this action presents an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pursuit of a parallel state court lawsuit involving claims and parties common to the federal action does not justify the district courts intervention in state court proceedings (B) holding that the district court act ed within its bounds in staying this action for declaratory relief where parallel proceedings presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues were underway in state court even when the federal proceeding began before the state one (C) holding that allegation of inadequate ventilation in prison may state a claim for relief (D) holding that the district court in that case properly abstained from hearing a case brought under the declaratory judgment act as a matter of its discretion where a parallel or concurrent action in state court was already underway (E) holding that the district court had discretion to stay declaratory judgment action where parallel proceedings presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues were underway in state court
Output: (E)
only issues of law. Accordingly, we review de novo the conclusions of the bankruptcy court and the district court. See Shapiro v. Saybrook Manuf. Co. (In re Saybrook Mamif. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1492 (11th Cir. 1992). IV.DISCUSSION We reject Capital Factors’ argument that the funds in its possession were not property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Section 541(a)(1) defines the property of the estate to include “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 1993). This language plainly includes the funds held by Capital Factors, even though those funds were subject to Capital Factors’ security interest. Cf. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Once we have concluded that the funds were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (B) holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate (C) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (D) holding jurisdiction over creditor disputes only involves property of estate or resolution affects some other creditor (E) holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property
Output: (E)
employee of Chevron Products Company, not Chevron, and because Kehm provides no reason to ignore the corporate separateness of these two entities, Barnes’s acts cannot be attributed to Chevron. See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir.1980) (“The mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the fact that Chevron sent Kehm a cease and desist letter does not rise to the level of purposeful availment for purposes of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, since the letter expresses the goal not to do business in Pennsylvania. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, Kehm has not shown sufficient 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (B) holding that the massachusetts longarm statute provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident personal representative when the decedent had sufficient contacts with the forum such that the decedent would have been subject to personal jurisdiction had he lived (C) holding that the effects of a tortious act cannot subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where no other contacts exist (D) holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts (E) holding that a patentee does not subject itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum solely by informing a party who happens to be located there of suspected infringement as grounding personal jurisdiction on such contacts alone would not comport with principles of fairness
Output: (E)
with the majority opinion affirming the order of the superior court dismissing the declaratory action brought by Hudson International, Inc., et. al. I write separately to note that in this case, there exists an unusually close relationship between Fitzgerald' S. Hudson and Hudson International. Furthermore, the trial court in the action filed in District Court, Wilson County, found that the “Southerly” property was within the jurisdiction of the district court to be equitably distributed as marital property; additionally, the trial court found that Fitzgerald Hudson’s actions with respect to “Southerly” evidenced his “calculated intent ... to divest the Plaintiff of her marital property rights” therein. Thus, the decision of Garrison v. Garrison, 90 N.C. App. 670, 369 S.E.2d 628 (1988) (<HOLDING>), controls the outcome of this case. However, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding citys plea to the jurisdiction in rule 202 proceeding properly denied because district court had jurisdiction over portion of claim under investigation even if city and governmental agency had exclusive jurisdiction over another portion of claim (B) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (C) holding over (D) holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property (E) holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
Output: (D)
the interests of the group of claimants as .a whole necessitates the setting of deadlines to dislodge claims stalled in the claims resolution process. Finally, the Court notes that this conclusion is completely consistent with prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, the Court has, on several occasions, upheld Trust deadlines. See Almalich v. Dalkon Shield Claimant’s Trust, Docket No. 19103 (July 29,1994) (deadline regarding submission of claims material within day-to-day operations); Gunnell, Docket No. 19331 (ADR deadlines within day-to-day operations). Moreover, the Court has affirmed the Trust’s disallowance authority. See e.g., Almalich, Docket No. 19103 (affirming disallowance of claims for failure to submit final claim materials by the stated deadline); Mantush, Docket No. 18298 (<HOLDING>); Besag, Docket No. 19492 (affirming Trust 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust (B) holding that statutory grounds for recusal can be waived both by failing to object and by failing to assert error on appeal (C) recognizing where naked trust created the division of naked legal title and equitable title which may be united at option of cestui que trust (D) recognizing trust authority to disallow claims for failing to select an option by july 1 1991 deadline (E) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust
Output: (D)
the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because “the State failed to present any nonhearsay evidence to establish that D.M.D. was a ‘child’ when she was found in the bedroom with Sams,” a “necessary” element to establish a prima facie case of contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child or to a child’s being in need of supervision, “the circuit court erred in revoking Sams’s probation.” 48 So.3d at 663. The State petitioned this Court for cer-tiorari review to determine whether the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with well settled caselaw holding that a circuit court may consider both hearsay and nonhearsay evidence in determining whether a probationer violated the terms of his or her probation. See Ex parte J.J.D.,778 So.2d 240, 242 (Ala.2000)(<HOLDING>); Ex parte Toney, 854 So.2d 37, 39 (Ala.2002) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that   the court is not bound by the strict rules of evidence   at a probationrevocation hearing and must only be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated a condition of his or her probation quoting martin v state 46 alaapp 810 312 241 so2d 839 341 alacrimapp1970 quoting in turn state v duncan 270 nc 241 245 154 se2d 53 57 1967 (B) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence (C) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (D) holding that the evidence that the defendant violated a probation condition was not competent and substantial because the state presented only hearsay evidence (E) holding that the state must establish by the greater weight of the evidence that a defendant violated a term of his probation
Output: (A)
impose an informal fiduciary duty in a business transaction, the special relationship of trust and confidence must exist prior to, and apart from, the agreement made the basis of the suit.” Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 287 (Tex.1998). Texas courts have held that the relationship between a borrower and lender is not a fiduciary one. 1001 McKinney Ltd. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital, 192 S.W.3d 20, 36 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“Generally, the relationship between a borrower and a lender is an arm’s length business relationship in which both parties are looking out for their own interests.”); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Inv. Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.-Houston. [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Williams’s claim also fails the second and 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this as the general rule (B) recognizing general rule (C) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (D) holding as a general rule that a bank and its customers do not have a special or confidential relationship (E) recognizing the existence of the special relationship
Output: (D)
justified.” (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B))); see also Schlicher v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2501, 2503 (1997) (amendments to I.R.C. Section 7430 shifted the burden to the Government to establish whether its position was substantially justified in proceedings commenced after July 30,1996). I.R.C. Section 7430 does not define “substantially justified,” however, federal appellate courts have interpreted this phrase in considering fee requests under the EAJA. See Sharp v. United States, 20 F.3d 1153, 1154 (Fed.Cir.1994). In the context of an award of attorney fees under the EAJA, the United States Supreme Court has defined “substantially justified” to mean “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (<HOLDING>); see also Huffman v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments position must be justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person and have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (B) holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary (C) holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith (D) holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact (E) holding that congress did not want the substantially justified standard to be read to raise a presumption that the government position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case citations omitted
Output: (A)
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 938 (3d Cir.1997) (“Some individuals suffer from relatively mild forms of epilepsy which cause nothing more than ‘minor isolated mus cle jerks'-so we cannot and do not conclude that all epileptics are substantially limited by the impairment."). See also, e.g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Limited, 149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.1998) (insulin dependent diabetes is not a per se disability under the ADA); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, - U.S. 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998) ("Unlike HW infection, the EEOC has not attempted to classify alcoholism as a per se disability, and we decline to adopt such a questionable position."); Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 52 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 336 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim (B) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (C) holding disability discrimination claim barred (D) holding that blindness in one eye did not automatically constitute a disability (E) holding that an individual alleged a disability under the ada because he was blind in one eye and had severe diabetes causing him to fall asleep at unpredictable times
Output: (D)
the protective sweep, and the exclusion of Defendant’s family from the home. {19} Functionally, the service of the warrant in this case was simply a continuation of a process that had begun earlier that day. If, for example, APD had obtained its warrant and begun the process of clearing and securing the home at 8:00 p.m., but search personnel did not actually arrive and begin to examine and inventory the contents of the house until after 10:00 p.m., we would be hard-pressed to say that Rule 5-211(B) had been violated. In applying our rule, we would focus on the substance of when the police first breached the privacy of the household, not on the formality of the officers’ titles or their specific activities once inside the home. Cf. Jones v. State, 128 P.3d 521, 537 (Okla.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). {20} Of course, in our ease the initial sweep 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge issuing the search warrant plainly had a substantial basis for determining that there was probable cause to issue the warrant for the search of a residence when inter alia a reliable cl went to the residence knocked on the door entered and then made a controlled purchase of what appeared to be heroin (B) holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found (C) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (D) holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment (E) holding that service of a warrant occurs once an officer crosses the threshold for the purpose of beginning the search or for securing the residence for a later search
Output: (E)