niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Inc., No. 02-0260 at 6-7 (BRB Dec. 17, 2002). We agree with the Board that we need not read the phrase “customarily used” as modifying “pier” in order to arrive at the conclusion that the term “pier” in § 903(a) does not include every conceivable structure built on pilings over land and water, but rather only those serving some maritime purpose. The maritime nature of the LHWCA imparts a meaning to § 903(a)’s enumerat ed terms that goes beyond their use in ordinary language. Congress enacted the LHWCA pursuant to its maritime jurisdiction, having been twice rebuffed by the Supreme Court in its initial attempts to use state workers’ compensation laws to cover injuries occurring in navigable waters. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 117, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in enacting title vii congress abrogated eleventh amendment immunity (B) holding that congress acted within constitutionally conferred authority in enacting mdlea (C) holding congress did not exceed its authority in enacting the mdlea (D) holding that congress invoked its constitutional maritime power in enacting the lhwca in 1927 (E) holding generally that congress validly abrogated state immunity in enacting title vii
Output: (D)
and capricious agency action. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides a right to judicial review of all “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Although only the third claim is explicitly denominated as an APA claim in the complaint, the first three claims all involve challenges to the propriety of the BIA’s decision. All three may therefore be fairly characterized as claims for judicial review of agency action under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. See Skinner v. Switzer, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1296, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (“[lender the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiffs claim for relief to a precise legal theory.”); McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Alleging that the BIA has failed to fulfill 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fact that a constitutional claim is so novel that it is not reasonable for counsel to raise it until after the supreme court articulates that such claim is a basis for federal habeas relief constitutes cause for failure to raise that claim in accordance with applicable state procedures (B) holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it (C) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (D) holding that although the express warranty claim was not federally preempted the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts for the claim to survive dismissal under rule 8 where the pjlaintiff alleged no facts demonstrating that defendants made any affirmations specifically to plaintiff or her physician so as to form the basis of the bargain (E) holding that only one statutory basis is required to find a child in need of aid
Output: (B)
AEGIS Cruiser Program, a position which was being phased out when Schenk was hired, see Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 89, Schenk cannot even be termed McCann’s successor. 11 . For example, as a third option, Litton asked McCann if he would consider a transfer to its Canadian division, see Record on Appeal, vol. 3, at 237, where he had previously worked for a short time in 1978. See id. at 133. 12 . The other evidence offered by McCann—e.g., the preferential treatment of Schenk—speak, not to the issue of constructive discharge, but to the issue of whether McCann was discriminated against. Even assuming, arguendo, that McCann was discriminated against, the doctrine of constructive discharge requires that McCann show acts beyond that of the discrimination itself. See Jett, 798 F.2d at 755 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief (B) holding vague charge of discrimination in an internal letter or memorandum is insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice (C) holding that a patent alone does not confer market power necessary to show unlawful tying (D) holding that poor evaluations alone do not constitute an adverse employment action (E) holding that unlawful discrimination  alone cannot constitute such an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee would feel forced to resign
Output: (E)
interests inferior to the unsecured creditors [and, t]hus there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule____”). Sweetwater does not dispute that general proposition, but argues that the insider claims in this case should be subordinated to it, and not receive or retain any property since Sweetwater’s claim is not being paid in full. The Court disagrees. Several courts have expressed the opinion that the claim of an insider or equity holder may not be treated unequally unless the insider or equity holder used superior knowledge concerning the debtor’s affairs in an unfair manner or equitable subordination principles otherwise apply. See e.g., In re ARN LTD. Ltd. P’ship, 140 B.R. 5, 13 (Bankr.D.D.C.1992), citing In re Ho-lywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Org., 375 B.R. at 301 (agreeing that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process (B) holding that the mere fact that a claim is held by an equity security holder does not justify its subordination and insider claims may be equitably subordinated only based on evidence of unfair conduct (C) holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive (D) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (E) recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven
Output: (B)
Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except upon a “showing of bad faith, har-rassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 754-55. In later cases, the Court has held that the Younger doctrine is “fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S his lower court view, at least by negative inference. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 237-39, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-29, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Since the Commonwealth began this eminent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated (C) holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits (D) holding that younger abstention was not appropriate because eminent domain proceeding had not yet begun when plaintiffs began their federal court action (E) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded
Output: (D)
but that is no longer the case. Id. at 411, 130 S.Ct. 2896. Pellicano argues that the predicate acts of honest services fraud must be vacated because the jury instructions did not reflect Skilling’s narrowing of the crime. We disagree. The jury found that both Pellicano and Arneson committed bribery predicate acts under California law. Under Skilling, bribery remains a basis for honest services fraud. It is apparent from the jury’s findings regarding bribery that the Defendants would have been convicted on the bribery theory of honest services fraud by itself. The references to the invalidated conflict of interest theory in the jury instructions and the government’s argument at trial therefore did not prejudice Defendants. United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jurys verdict of acquittal on another count citations omitted (B) holding that the jurys guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery under federal law confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted the defendant of honest services fraud if the courts definition had been limited to the bribery basis that skilling expressly approved (C) holding that the proper harmlesserror inquiry asks whether absent the improperly introduced evidence it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict (D) holding that the proper harmlesserror inquiry asks absent the improperly introduced evidence is it clear beyond reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty (E) holding that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms statute and therefore the defendant was convicted of a felony during the interval between the jurys return of its guilty verdict and his scheduled sentencing
Output: (B)
the magistrate's role in assessing credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited and that the magistrate is to take reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor. {17 These statements, while true, do not limit the ability of a defendant to conduct a full eross-examination at a preliminary hearing. Although "principal fact finding" and determinations of credibility are left until trial, such considerations impose no obvious structural limitation on the seope or depth of cross-examination a defendant may conduct at a preliminary hearing. We are therefore unable to conclude that eross-examinations conducted within Utah's preliminary hearing framework can never satisfy a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541-42 (Utah 1981) (<HOLDING>). 1 18 We need not decide today whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (B) recognizing defendants right to due process includes the right to present a defense by crossexamining witnesses (C) holding that outofcourt statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature are barred under the confrontation clause unless witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them (D) holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony (E) holding that the defendants opportunities for erossexamination during a preliminary hearing were constitutionally adequate for confrontation clause purposes despite defense counsel being unaware of the witnesses prior statements to police and thus being unable to crossexamine the witnesses about those statements because defense counsel apparently advisedly and intentionally decided to refrain from crossexamining the witnesses about the challenged topics
Output: (E)
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (emphasis added). Here, “[t]he first half of this test is clearly satisfied: Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority with respect to Medicare to the Secretary of HHS, who in turn has delegated that authority to CMS.” Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.2008); 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(l) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under this subchapter.”); see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96, 115 S.Ct. 1232, 131 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The Court then “consider[s] whether CMS has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys (B) holding that a delegation of authority by the legislature must be express and provide clear statutory standards to guide the delegee (C) holding that a precondition to chevron deference is congressional delegation of administrative authority (D) recognizing the municipal authority to regulate traffic implies broad authority (E) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority
Output: (E)
uses the term "judgment” is not dispositive. Our Supreme Court and the Superior Court have held that where a trial court issues a decision or verdict following a trial, at which evidence was presented, thereby requiring .the tyial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. based on that evidence, post-trial motions are required to bé filed' in order to preserve issues for appellate review. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Pinkerton, 574 Pa. 333, 830 A.2d 958, 962-63 (2003); Chalkey v. Roush, 569 Pa. 462, 805 A.2d 491, 495-96 (2002); Baughman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 441 Pa.Super. 83, 656 A.2d 931, 932-33 (1,995). See also Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Markets, 617 Pa. 265, 52 A.3d 1233, 1248-49, 1251 (2012) (<HOLDING>). This is so even if a trial court's order 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under rule 5903 posttrial motions brought before either party served notice of filing of the courts order were timely (B) holding that successive posttrial motions do not toll the time for appeal (C) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (D) holding that issues are not waived for failing to file posttrial motions from a remand proceeding where no evidence was presented because no posttrial motions were required under those circumstances (E) holding argument based on economic loss rule waived when raised for first time in posttrial motions
Output: (D)
more. For Vernace and Barlin, the spilled drink was not entirely personal: They were uninvolved; they were not there. We certainly did not hold in Bruno that a jury must find that all predicate acts with a personal dimension are unrelated to a charged RICO conspiracy. As to the other factual similarities with Bruno that Vernace draws on, the jury could have rejected the weight that Ver- nace now assigns to that evidence. The fact that the three participants in the Shamrock Murders were only Gambino associates and not inducted soldiers was not dispositive. We look at the criminal activities in which alleged participants in the racketeering enterprise engage, not merely the labels that the enterprise uses to describe them. See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 289-90 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the evidence that the murders were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that significant criminal activity engaged in on behalf of the family by associates who were not made members could support rico liability (B) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (C) holding that student plaintiffs could bring retaliation claims where they were allegedly retaliated against for complaints made by their parents on their behalf and noting that ollier allowed the same and that thompson allowed a retaliation claim by a plaintiff who was fired because his fiancee who was also his coworker engaged in protected activity and firing him was intended to harp her (D) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (E) holding an anonymous tip insufficient to support reasonable suspicion based on the fact that defendant was suspected of drug activity in his community failed to corroborate he currently was engaged in drug related activity and surveillance failed to uncover any independent information that defendant was engaged in any criminal activity
Output: (A)
Id. at 1049. Though we concluded that none of the factors on which the Upjohn court relied were present in National Farmers, our analysis in National Farmers adopted the factors set forth in Upjohn and applied them to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protected communications between a corporation's officers and employees and corporate counsel. Indeed, we adopted the Upjohn court's reasoning that the attorney-client privilege protects communications made to the attorney to enable him to give sound and informed legal advice. Nat'l Farmers, 718 P.2d at 1049 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91, 101 S.Ct. 677); see also Gordon, 9 P.3d at 1123 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390, 101 S.Ct. 677); Denver Post Corp. v. University of Colorado, 739 P.2d 874, 880-81 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents (B) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege (C) holding that an identity of interest existed between the university and one of its doctors because the university took steps to provide counsel for the doctor and required that all communications concerning the plaintiffs claim be sent to the universitys risk management attorney or to the doctors counsel (D) holding communications between corporate counsel and corporations employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorneyclient privilege (E) holding state university is not a person under  1983
Output: (A)
methodologies in rendering his expert opinions, and unreliably applied his principles and methodologies to the facts and data on which he relies. It specifically argues that Dr. Bailie’s opinions are not supported by the scientific evidence provided in the articles he reviewed. As stated above, the Court finds sufficient support for Dr. Bailie’s opinions through the literature and his clinical experience. 19 . The Court notes that this motion in part repeats challenges to the medical literature that the Court has already addressed. 20 . See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ("[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation"); Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 21 . Woo Young also argues that Dr. Parisian 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that while a testifying expert may rely upon facts or data made known to the expert before the hearing and even may rely upon opinions if reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field the ipse dixit of that reliance does not make those facts data or opinions true particularly where  they are derived largely from hearsay (B) holding that due process is violated if evidence of prior bad acts goes only to character and there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from it internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause or otherwise internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that an expert may base his or her opinions and inferences on facts andor data perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony
Output: (D)
apply to off-reservation conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.... There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.”). Congress can impose substantive constraints upon a tribe without subjecting the tribe to suit in federal court to enforce those constraints, as the Supreme Court made clear in Santa Clara Pueblo. In that case, an individual Indian sued her tribe in federal court, alleging gender dis crimination in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Despite the ICRA’s imposition of substantive constraints upon the tribe, the Supreme Court held the suit barred by tribal sovere F.3d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist (B) holding that tribal entity was not equitably estopped from asserting immunity because misrepresentations of the tribes officials or employees cannot affect its immunity from suit (C) holding the copyright act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity where nothing on the statutes face could be so construed (D) recognizing that tribes have an interest in a uniform body of federal law in the area of tribal immunity (E) holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act
Output: (E)
unwillingness to participate in this litigation. Here, Hai Yun’s conduct in failing to obey court orders is clearly willful and has resulted in significant delay of this proceeding. The Court gave Hai Yun multiple opportunities to cure its deficiencies, and to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed and it has failed to do so. Furthermore, the fact that the entry of default against Hai Yun has not inspired its cooperation in this suit suggests that lesser sanctions are insufficient to gain Hai Yun’s compliance with this Court’s rules and orders. Several federal courts have held .that dismissal of an action with prejudice is an appropriate sanction for conduct similar to that exhibited by the Defendant in this ease. See, e.g., Royal Palace Hotel Assoc., 178 F.R.D. 588 (<HOLDING>);. Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (B) holding that sanctions including striking plaintiffs pleadings entering judgment for defendant and dismissing plaintiffs counterclaim were proper under the federal rules of civil procedure and local rules where plaintiff failed to file its final pretrial  statement by specified date as required by court scheduling order failed to file a motion requesting an extension of time to prepare and file final pretrial statement and where counsel failed to appear at the final pretrial conference (C) holding that we will not review under any standard the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits (D) holding that the plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file appeal qualified as a notice of appeal because it met the requirements of rule 4 of the federal rules of appellate procedure (E) holding that it is proper to dismiss an appellants appeal for failure to file a brief or request an extension within the time allotted by the bankruptcy rules
Output: (B)
still stands at the threshold of the qualified immunity analysis. See, e.g., Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir.1997) (“The question whether the uncontested facts demonstrated a constitutional violation is a pure question of law — and one from which an immediate appeal can be taken where qualified immunity has been denied.”); Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 153 n. 2 (6th Cir.1995) (“the plaintiffs version of events, regardless of the sufficiency of the supporting evidence, does not state a claim”). Finally, it is clear that before addressing the substance of a claim of qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim of a constitutional violation at all. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The district court’s failure to rule on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right (B) holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established (C) holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated (D) holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question (E) holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity
Output: (D)
found in this case, that the determinative weight of marijuana for purposes of the trafficking statute is when the marijuana is usable or suitable for consumption. We disagree. Defendant cites United States v. Lipp, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Kan. 1999), aff’d, 215 F.3d 1338 (2000), as guidance for their interpretation of “marijuana” as read in the North Carolina statutes. The Lipp case, also dealing with moist marijuana and its weight for the purpose of federal sentencing, interpreted 1993 and 1995 amend ments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG). These amendments came in response to district courts that were issuing sentences for trafficking based on a weight of marijuana that included its natural water content. See United States v. Pinedo-Montoya, 966 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Garcia, 925 F.2d 170 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing courts drugquantity calculation can exceed the jurys drugquantity calculation  by over fifty times  so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum allowed by the jurys calculation and the sentencing courts calculation was supported by sufficient evidence (B) holding that the weight of the blotter paper used as the distribution medium for lsd is included in the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes (C) holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court (D) holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes (E) holding that district courts calculation of drug quantity under guidelines for purposes of sentencing did not violate stare decisis under neal because such calculation did not conflict with any controlling sentencing precedent
Output: (D)
Cir.1994) (A “defendant’s right to compulsory process does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination.”). Finally, Warfield claims that if Davis had exercised his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court could have granted Davis “judicial” immunity or compelled the government to offer Davis use immunity. This argument also fails. We have not heretofore recognized the concept of “judicial” immunity, see Robaina, 39 F.3d at 863, and decline to do so here. Additionally, use immunity can only be granted when it is formally requested by the Attorney General, id., and the district court is without power to compel the government to grant a witness immunity. Doddington, 822 F.2d at 821. See also Robaina, 39 F.3d at 863 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject Warfield’s claims that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis (B) holding that district court correctly concluded that it could not order the government to grant use immunity (C) holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (E) holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine
Output: (B)
to commit himself to such an alternative to a federal sentence. 2 . Defendant also raises two additional arguments: (1) that the district court improperly based its sentence on the defendant’s refusal to waive his constitutional and statutory rights to oppose his deportation; and (2) that the district court failed to appreciate the scope of its authority to consider, as a mitigating circumstance upon which to base a departure, defendant's vulnerability and susceptibility to abuse in prison due to his physical condition. Both arguments lack merit. As to the first argument, the conditioning of a downward departure on the surrender of a statutory right to a deportation hearing would not have offended due process. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart (B) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (C) holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward (D) holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart (E) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent
Output: (E)
when there has been neither agreement nor adjudication of the fact. In that situation, the question is one of historical fact, which, until decided, cannot have anything to do with the child’s best interest. A different situation is presented, however, after paternity has been determined, whether by agreement or adjudication. Then, the best interest of the child necessarily is involved. The historical fact of parentage no longer stands alone; now it is intertwined with the interests of the child and no longer is capable of separation. Once paternity is established, § 5-1029 has no further role to play in that arena. The amendment to § 5-1038 does not change that, in my view, without, as there is not in this case, an amendment making it so. Contrary to the majorit , 1083 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (B) holding the best interest of the child standard does not violate federal constitutional principles (C) holding that the best interest of the child standard should be used in deciding whether to grant a paternity petition (D) holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity (E) holding court properly applied best interest of child standard when determining whether placement goal should be changed
Output: (C)
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963. Although not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the Fifth Circuit defines a claim as contingent if the debt “is one which will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event that will trigger the liability of the debtor to the alleged creditor.” Beaumont v. Durkay (In Matter of Ford), 967 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir.1992). While a claim may not have yet accrued under state law, it may nonetheless be treated as a contingent claim within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Olin Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp.), 225 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1998) aff'd, 209 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.2000); see also Hassanally v. Republic Bank (In re Hassanally), 208 B.R. 46, 50 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (<HOLDING>). Among the circuits, several approaches have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (B) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (C) holding that state law determines when an interest is perfected when interpreting the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy act (D) holding for  1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (E) holding that state law determines when perfection occurs for purposes of the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy code
Output: (B)
Fiberglas Corp., 196 U.S. Pat. Q. 726, 745 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (defendant promoted and sold product “with the specific recommendation that they be used in an infringing manner,” i.e., molded under heat and pressure to approximate a patented product). Here, North American Philips’s complaint did not allege that Konami provided any detailed instructions to its customers on how to infringe the patent. Indeed, as noted above, North American Philips’s complaint did not allege that it was injured at all in the course of Konami’s advertising. Without such a connection to advertising activities, Konami cannot be afforded coverage under the advertising injury provision of the CGL policy. See International Insurance Co. v. Florists’ Mutual Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 428, 433 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we believe Konami’s reliance on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that causal connection between alleged injuries and advertising activity cannot be satisfied by a mere showing that the allegedly infringing product was advertised (B) holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint (C) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury (E) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury
Output: (B)
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. We assume, without deciding, that the Sexual Solicitation Statute may place some incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms, but we conclude that each of the O’Brien factors is met in this case. Thus, any incidental limitation on expression protected by the First Amendment is justified. We will address each factor in turn. First, it is within the power of the state to enact the Sexual Solicitation Statute. “The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and [the U.S. Supreme Court has] upheld such a basis for legislation.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that significant involvement of government agency charged with protecting public environmental interest satisfies public participation requirement in certain circumstances (B) holding that a public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality (C) recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy (D) holding that governments asserted interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees is substantial under central hudson (E) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child
Output: (B)
at *13-*14. We overrule Palavan’s third and fifth issues. Declaratory Judgment Action In his fourth issue, Palavan argues the county court improperly granted summary judgment on McCulley and TBW Development’s declaratory judgment action. Even if we agreed with Palavan, however, he has failed to establish how he has been injured by a dismissal of McCulley and TBW Development’s declaratory judgment action. See CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Potter, No. 01-11-00650-CV, 2013 WL 269091, at *17 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 24, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (“In order to obtain reversal on appeal, the appellant must show that it suffered harm as a result of an alleged error.”). We overrule Palavan’s fourth issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . See Palavan (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>); Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that what constitutes a criminal instrument is determined by both its design or adaptation and its intended use (B) holding nature of motion is determined by its substance not its title (C) holding that because pleadings are to be liberally construed if the nature of the motion is clear from its substance an improper caption is not fatal (D) holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance (E) holding that the economic substance of a transaction rather than its form determines its tax treatment
Output: (B)
Jose Antonio Bonilla-Guzman appeals the judgment of conviction and his 77 month sentence following his guilty plea to a single count of being a deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Bonilla-Guzman contends that in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the district court erred by imposing a sentence in excess of the two-year maximum set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) on the basis of prior convictions for aggravated felonies that were not .charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Bonilla-Guzman also contends that Apprendi renders inapplicable Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (<HOLDING>). These arguments are foreclosed by this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 8 usc  1326b2 is a sentencing factor and not a separate offense (B) holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing (C) recognizing that 8 usc  1326b contains sentencing facts not elements of the offense (D) holding that age factor in sexual assault statute pertains only to sentencing and is not an element of the offense (E) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor
Output: (A)
informant’s relation to the crime. Landano, 508 U.S. at 172, 113 S.Ct. 2014 (“A source is confidential within the meaning of Exemption 7(D) if the source ‘provided information ... in circumstances from which an assurance [of confidentiality] could be reasonably inferred.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Amuso v. DOJ, 600 F.Supp.2d 78, 100 (D.D.C.2009) (“[t]he nature of the crime investigated and [sic] informant’s relation to it are the most important factors in determining whether implied confidentiality exists.”). “Violence and risk of retaliation attendant to drug trafficking warrant an implied grant of confidentiality to a soured who provides information to investigators.” Lasko v. DOJ, 684 F.Supp.2d 120, 134 (D.D.C.2010); see also Mendoza v. DEA, 465 F.Supp.2d 5, 13 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). Notably, Lasko and 'Mendoza and other cases 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court committed prejudicial error in admitting expert testimony about the structure of drug trafficking organizations because the testimony portrayed the defendant as a member of such an organization and implied the defendant knew the drugs were in his vehicle (B) holding five expert opinions by two government agents and the confidential informant regarding the operations and methods of drug trafficking not impermissible profile evidence because it was not offered for that purpose (C) recognizing the inherent danger in stopping those suspected of drug trafficking for which guns are known tools of the trade (D) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking (E) holding that because violence and danger are inherent in drug trafficking activity the court can reasonably infer that the informant cooperated under an implied assurance of confidentiality
Output: (E)
traceable to the shock or disturbing effect on the nerves of the patient, and that in turn, the irritation of the nerves caused functional disorders, and, that whether the disability resulted from nervous reaction or from auto-suggestion set in motion by memory of the accident, the result was the same to the injured person. Id. at 209, 13 S.E.2d at 293. The Supreme Court pointed out in Burlington Mills Corp. that the claimant’s disability was occasioned by an injury which “may be fairly traced” to a risk which arose out of and in the course of her employment. There was a direct causal relation between the electric flash and the irritated condition of her nervous system. Id. at 210, 13 S.E.2d at 293; see also E.C. Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 592-93, 166 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Imperial Trash Service v. Dotson, 18 Va.App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (B) holding injuries suffered on trip for business and pleasure were compensable (C) holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets (D) holding that psychiatric symptoms resulting in disability from work flowed from injuries received in primary accident and were compensable (E) holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident
Output: (D)
using means plus function language. In In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed.Cir.1994) that court stated that “[a]lthough paragraph six [of § 112] statutorily provides that one may use means-plus-function language in a claim, one is still subject to the requirement that a claim ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim’ the invention... If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112.” 16 F.3d at 1195 (en banc). Accordingly, defining a limitation purely by function, such that it covers all means of achieving the function, renders a claim indefinite. See MDS Associates Limited Partnership v. United States, 37 Fed.Cl. 611, 625 (<HOLDING>). The only guidance Plaintiffs have provided 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurer was not the plan administrator and thus was not liable under erisa  502c for failing to disclose certain information (B) holding a claim indefinite for failing to disclose any means for calculating cpa range and cpa bearing using particular input signals (C) holding that claim limitation using the term means for and not reciting any structure presumptively falls within the scope of  112  6 (D) holding claim indefinite as the specification did not disclose sufficient structure where disclosure stated one of ordinary skill in the art could program a computer with appropriate programming to perform a control means function (E) holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art
Output: (B)
in all branches of the law for generations,” and that it was sufficiently objective to save the ordinance from vagueness. Id. at 677, 683, 470 N.W.2d 296. Although there are cases to the contrary, see, e.g., Langford, 755 F.Supp. 1460, and Dupres v. City of Newport, 978 F.Supp. 429 (D.R.I.1997), anti-noise ordinances that incorporate a “reasonable person” standard have generally withstood constitutional scrutiny. Gruwell, supra, at 367; e.g., Howard Opera Assocs. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 322 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding noise ordinance prohibiting “unreasonable noise,” defined as that which “disturbs, injures or endangers the peace or health of another or ... endangers the health, safety or welfare of the community”); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 386. (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Jim Crockett Promotion, Inc. v. City 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute prohibiting conduct that obstruets or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings was not impermissibly vague (B) holding that term unreasonably loud is not impermissibly vague (C) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (D) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (E) holding that term unreasonable noise was not vague
Output: (B)