niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, asserting the Supreme Court established a new rule made retroactive when it held in Johnson v. United States that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutional. 576 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). The government joins his motion. We grant Woods authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition. In October 2002, a jury convicted Woods of being a felon in possession of a firearm and a felon in possession of ammunition, both in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1), and a felon in possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). While Woods’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) would typically carry a maximum sentence of ten years, Woods had (<HOLDING>); Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139, 140 
 Holding statements: (A) holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive (B) holding the same under blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 (C) holding that after blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 statutory maximum is the maximum that this particular defendant can face in light of his criminal history and the facts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant (D) holding that the safety valve provision of 18 usc  3553f is not unconstitutional under apprendi 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 or blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 (E) holding supreme court made new substantive rules retroactive in schriro v summerlin 542 us 348 351 124 sct 2519 159 led2d 442 2004 but finding johnson did not announce a new substantive rule under summerlin
Output: (E)
by well-reasoned medical opinion notwithstanding the presence of negative x-ray evidence under § 718.202(a)(4). See Newell v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 933 F.2d 510, 511 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991). Specifically, he cited the opinions of Dr. Robert Avena, Mr. Hubbell’s treating physician for his final three years who diagnosed pneumoconiosis; Dr. Frederick Ridge, who listed the disease as one of the causes of death; and Dr. Anand Bhuptani, who suspected that Mr. Hubbell had COPD, and hinted that it was related to his exposure to coal dust. Peabody does not contest that Mr. Hub-bell had pneumoconiosis; instead, it takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Hubbell’s pneumoconiosis hastened his death under 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2). See Peabody Coal Co., 972 F.2d at 183-84 (<HOLDING>); see also Livermore, 297 F.3d at 671. In doing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (B) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child (C) recognizing that any condition that hastens death qualifies as a substantially contributing cause or factor leading to death under  718205c2 (D) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (E) holding applicable the directors interpretation of 20 cfr  718205c2 to mean anything that has an actual or real share in producing an effect and that any condition which hastens death fits this description 
Output: (C)
to another’s infringement.' In that situation, it is not unfair to expect the defendant to plead contrary facts demonstrating that its actions did not involve such indirect infringement. Likewise, a counterclaim of invalidity must be measured against the Twombly standard. That is consonant with the clear directive from the Federal Circuit that Rule 18 only governs allegations concerning direct infringement. A counterclaim that “asserts no factual allegation on which th[e] Court or Plaintiff can pin the invalidity of any claim of the patent” is insufficient. PPS Data, LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-273, 2012 WL 243346, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2012). See also Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartman, No. 10-CV-4465, 2012 WL 1029645, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (<HOLDING>); Memory Control Enterprise, LLC v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that applicable federal patent law made patents personal and unassignable without consent of the licensor (B) holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked (C) holding that counterclaims for patent invalidity were insufficient under either the form 18 or twombly standard where the counterclaims conclusorily alleged that every claim in each of three patents failed to meet one or multiple unspecified conditions for patentability and were devoid of any facts that would suggest which deficiencyies applied to which patents or claims and therefore did not give fair notice  of the basis for the counterclaims (D) recognizing that in patent infringement eases a finding of noninfringement prevents a court from reaching an affirmative defense asserting the patents invalidity because the validity issue becomes immaterial to the disposition of the case and that any determination of the patents validity by the district court in such a case should be vacated (E) holding that when two patents issued from continuationinpart appliea tions derived from one original application the prosecution history of a claim limitation in the first patent to issue was properly applied to the same claim limitation in the second patent to issue
Output: (C)
the universe of payees has expanded to include the child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative. BAPC-PA also now provides that a DSO may be “owed to or recoverable by” the payees named in the statute. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006) (italics added). This new definition has spawned several lines of case law. Some courts infer that by identifying the universe of payees, Congress reinforced the restrictions on who could assert a DSO. See Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 379-81 (W.D.Okla.2010); see also In re Aguirre, Bankr.No. 11-41126-JDP, 2012 WL 632400 (Bankr.D.Idaho Feb. 27, 2012). Other courts read the new language to include obligations to make payments to third parties that are recoverable by a former spouse. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>). Other courts continue to ignore the payee 
 Holding statements: (A) holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that  523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements (B) holding where a debtor does not exercise hisher right to designate which one of several debts to which a payment should be applied creditor may apply payment as he she chooses even if there is a surety or guarantor liable on one of the debts (C) holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to another the receiving corporation is not responsible for debts of transferor unless it agrees to assume these debts (D) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (E) holding that the code excepts from discharge debts resulting from agreements by the debtor to hold the debtors spouse harmless on joint debts to the extent those debts are in the nature of alimony maintenance or support
Output: (E)
valid time, place, manner restrictions. New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1256 (3d Cir.1986). This Circuit has held that “regulations of door-to-door canvassing must be precisely drawn to serve the interests they are designed to further.” Id. at 1255 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)(emphasis in original). In other words, the restriction must be tailored so as not to “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interest.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Courts have not been hesitant to find that purported governmental interests, although compelling, do not justify sweeping bans on speech. E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 424, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (B) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (C) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted (D) recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other (E) recognizing this distinction
Output: (C)
agree that Mikulin failed to demonstrate that he possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications under Gov.Bar R. 1(11) to be admitted to the bar. Specifically, we conclude that his disregard of traffic laws and his neglect of his financial responsibilities present sufficient grounds for disapproving his application. See Gov.Bar R. I(ll)(D)(3)(f) and (k); see also In re Application of Kapel, 72 Ohio St.3d 532, 651 N.E.2d 955 (1995) (finding that the applicant’s disorderly conduct conviction and repeated traffic violations, including speeding, demonstrated that the applicant lacked the requisite character and fitness for the practice of law but permitting the applicant to reapply); In re Application of Acton, 121 Ohio St.3d 154, 2009-Ohio-499, 902 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 26 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 10} We therefore accept the board’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight afforded to the applicants evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency (B) holding that ability of applicants family to remain unharmed cuts against finding of wellfounded fear (C) holding that the weight afforded to the applicants evidence in immigration proceedings lie largely within the discretion of the ij (D) holding that a husband cannot be required to pay a support award that exceeds his financial ability (E) recognizing that an applicants neglect of his or her own financial responsibilities bodes ill for the applicants ability to oversee the interests of clients with the diligence and integrity required of the profession
Output: (E)
for 300 grams of heroin, and because, in any event, she was a broker and not a dealer, we find that the district court correctly held her accountable for the higher amount originally contemplated. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 n. 12 (“In an offense involving an agreement to sell a controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to determine the offense level unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense .... [I]n a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance would more accurately reflect the scale of the offense because the amount actually delivered is controlled by the government----” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Ynfante, 78 F.3d 677, 681 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Podlog, 35 F.3d 699, 707 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment (B) holding that apprendi is not implicated where the defendant has stipulated to the amount of drugs for which he was held responsible and the district court did not rely on any fact outside of the plea agreement to determine drug quantity at sentencing (C) holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy (D) holding that the quantity of drugs that the defendant had originally agreed to sell to undercover agents was attributable to him notwithstanding the fact that at the agents request he ultimately agreed to complete the deal for a lesser amount (E) holding that the quantity of drugs negotiated was properly attributed to the broker even though the seller ultimately could not supply the requested amount
Output: (D)
of burglary by itself was excluded as a crime of violence was dictum, and that “the crime of burglary has always been and continues to be viewed as a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Id. at 15, 549 A.2d at 559. The principal reason offered for this holding was the observation that “[e]very ... burglar knows when he attempts to commit his crime that he is inviting dangerous resistance.... It is this threat of violence to persons that has prompted the Legislature into expanding the definition of burglary to include all those entries without privilege into places where people might be present.” Id. at 14, 549 A.2d at 559. This Court’s subsequent holdings have consistently followed Rolan. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 549 Pa. 593, 606, 702 A.2d 540, 546 (1997)(<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322, 349 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants juvenile convictions for burglary were crimes of violence for purposes of the section 9711d9 aggravating circumstance (B) holding jury verdict unanimous where jury was charged with alternative aggravating circumstance of burglary involving two different victims (C) holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines (D) holding that all convictions under wisconsin sexual assault statute were not per se convictions for crimes of violence (E) holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes
Output: (A)
suit are Riverside Healthcare System, LLC ("RHCS”), a limited partnership doing business as Riverside under California law, and Columbia/HCA Western Group, Inc., a Tennessee corporation with an ownership interest in RHCS. Hereinafter, all three entities will be referred to collectively as “Riverside.” 2 . In Strother, we acknowledged that California courts have allowed parties who were “not 'clients, patrons, or customers,' in the traditional sense” to bring claims under § 51. Id. at 873. Nevertheless, we determined that the plaintiffs in each of these cases stood in a position with the defendant similar to that of a customer in the “customer-proprietor relationship” the Unruh Act was designed to protect. Id. at 873-74 (citing O’Connor, 33 Cal.3d at 796, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 (<HOLDING>); Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding (B) holding unconscionable under california law employment contract compelling arbitration of claims employee most likely to bring against employer but not claims employer most likely to bring against employee and requiring first 125 of arbitration fees to be paid by employee (C) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (D) holding that condominium owners could bring  51 claims against their condominium owners association (E) holding that female children excluded from membership in the boys club could bring claims against the organization
Output: (D)
benefits as a common denominator. I therefore dissent. 1 .This is the only evidence in the record about Bruce's involvement with tribal authorities. Bruce (quite properly) does not rely on anything else. While the majority disclaims reliance on two arrests reported in the Presen-tence ■ Investigation Re al.1958) (finding no doubt that petitioner is an Indian subject to the Major Crimes Act as he is an' Indian by blood and enrolled as a member of the Mono tribe), aff'd sub nom. Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1959); see also Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 762-63, 51 S.Ct. 615, 75 L.Ed. 1389 (1931) (noting the general rule that the right of individual Indians to share in tribal property depends on tribal membership); Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir.1917) (<HOLDING>). 5 . As we observed in United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the oregon constitution when a person consents to have their blood drawn and tested for specified substances the scope of that consent limits the scope of the states power to test the blood without a warrant (B) holding that person who was by blood of the fond du lac band of the chippewas of lake superior who moved to the reservation was recognized enrolled and secured allotments upon the reservation were members (C) holding that an appeal was not equitably moot because the person who was issued the money was a party and was aware when the payment was made that the award would be appealed (D) holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs (E) recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court
Output: (B)
injuries. On August 2, 1999, the State charged Sanders with vehicular homicide in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (1999). This statute makes it a class “B” felony to “unintentionally cause [ ] the death of another by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.” Iowa Code § 707.6A(1). Several months after commencement of the criminal prosecution the prosecuting attorney obtained a subpoena directed to the hospital commanding it to produce Sanders’ medical records from July 7 and July 8,1999. Sanders filed a motion to quash. The district court ruled that the records fell within the physician/patient privilege but were not protected from discovery by Iowa Code section 622.10 because the subpoena did not seek testimony. See Chidester v. Needles, 353 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1984) (<HOLDING>); Iowa Code § 622.10 (prohibiting a physician 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a subpoena for medical records may be issued only on a reasonable basis thus implying a privacy interest (B) holding that section 62210 did not prevent a county attorney from obtaining a precharge subpoena for medical records because the subpoena did not require the disclosure of privileged communications by the giving of testimony (C) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (D) holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena (E) holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena
Output: (B)
some recognized legal théory. Spinale v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 621 F.Supp.2d 112, 119 (S.D.NY 2009) (McMahon, J.) aff'd sub nom., 356 Fed.Appx: 465 (2d Cir.2009). However, a complaint containing “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” will survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). B. Prison Litigation Reform Act As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) bars Plaintiffs from recovering compensatory damages. In relevant part, the statute states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a priso N.Y.2002) (Scheindlin, J.) aff'd, 56 Fed.Appx. 43 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). For the well-articulated reasons in Judge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (B) holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time (C) holding that the plra only applies to plaintiffs who are incarcerated at the time an action is commenced (D) holding that the plra bar applies to lawsuits brought by inmates regardless of whether the inmate is incarcerated at the time of filing or whether the plaintiff is subsequently paroled sentenced or released (E) holding that the donovan rule applies regardless of whether the injunction is issued before or after the federal court filing
Output: (D)
it is "premised on the theory that the [Djistrict !C]ourt misapplied the Guidelines.” United States v. Shaw, 313 F.3d 219, 222-23 (4th Cir.2002); see United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir.2008). 5 . Erwin contended at oral argument that there was no breach because he merely waived the right to file an appeal as opposed to promised not to file an appeal. See, e.g., Oral Arg. Tr. 4:08-5:23, 7:46-8:25 (3d Cir. May 20, 2014); see also Erwin Supplemental Br. 1 n. 1. Erwin has not proffered any principled basis for drawing this distinction, and common sense dictates that there is none. A "waiver” is defined as "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of , 106 F.3d 427 (Table) (Fed.Cir.1997); Maslow v. Vanguri, 168 Md.App. 298, 896 A.2d 408, 423 (Md.Ct. Spec.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Of the 2,920 convictions in the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (B) holding that a motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict where sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict (C) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (D) holding that the appellants appeal of the jurys verdict was a material breach of the no appeals provision in the parties settlement agreement (E) holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict
Output: (D)
a challenge to a regulation that “implicate[d] only the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245, 96 S.Ct. at 1444. Unlike the court in Pienta, however, we do not read Kelley as applicable only to challenges based on general liberty interests, and we decline to follow the approach taken in Pienta. There is ample support for Kelley’s status-oriented approach. Regulations limiting even those rights guaranteed by the explicit language of the Bill of Rights are reviewed more deferentially when applied to certain public employees than when applied to ordinary citizens. See United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2891, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that activities of stateregulated political parties constitute state action (B) recognizing that discrepancy regarding political activities went to the heart of petitioners claims where those activities formed the basis of the persecution claim (C) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (D) holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force (E) recognizing the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters regardless of their political persuasion to cast their votes effectively
Output: (D)
but require automatic reversal”). In Arizona v. Fulminante, the United States Supreme Court distinguished between structural errors, which are not subject to the harmless-error analysis, and “trial errors.” 499 U.S. 279, 306-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263-64, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Trial errors occur during the presentation of a case to the jury and may be quantitatively assessed in the context of all evidence presented to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In determining whether an error is a structural error, the Supreme Court looks to: (1) “the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error” on the trial; and (2) “the irrelevance of harmlessness.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2564 n. 4, 165 L.Ed.2d 4 05) (<HOLDING>). But the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the sixth amendment right to trial by jury aggravating factors that operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a charged offense must be found by a jury (B) holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial (C) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial (D) holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis (E) holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error
Output: (E)
states in which we have made zero or very few sales. In addition, there are many local jurisdictions in which we have never made a sale.”). Preliminary injunction hearings are ill-suited for such fine tailoring. More fundamentally, we are not convinced by the government’s premise: that Gordon may challenge the PACT Act only “as applied” against his sales into jurisdictions with which he lacks minimum contacts. The government points out that a court may find a statute to be invalid on its face only if a plaintiff has shown that the Act has no “plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The government argues that any facial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence (B) holding that facial challenges will be sustained only if no set of circumstances exist under which the act would be valid (C) holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges (D) holding that on appeal a summary judgment ruling will be upheld if it can be sustained on any grounds even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its ruling (E) holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances
Output: (B)
values,” Fait’s standard applies. Id. b. Whether the CAC Pleads Subjective and Objective Falsity Because the Court concludes that MF Global’s statements about its DTA were opinions, it must next determine whether the statements “were both false and not honestly believed at the time they were made.” Fait, 655 F.3d at 113. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to meet this standard. First, the Court finds that Plaintiffs plausibly allege that MF Global’s statements about its DTA were objectively false. Most significantly, MF Global’s United States operations were in a three-year loss position at the start of the Class Period, which served as significant negative evidence against recognizing the DTA. See Hoff v. Popular, Inc., 727 F.Supp.2d 77, 90 (D.P.R.2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec. Litig., 524 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the elevated class c felony penalty for the offense of criminal recklessness by shooting a firearm from a vehicle into a place where people are likely to gather did not shock public sentiment or violate the judgment of reasonable people because among other things the use of a vehicle would make it less likely that the person would be identified which in turn would make it more likely that the offense would be committed (B) recognizing threeyear loss position as strong evidence that at the beginning of the class period it was more likely than not that the company would not be able to realize dta (C) holding that cat applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country (D) holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger (E) holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return
Output: (B)
hearing, both because it referenced conduct not charged, proven, or admitted prior to sentencing and because the standard at sentencing was a lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Id. at 791. The government, however, admitted to the fact that the restitution order was based on acts other than the offense of conviction. Id. at 789-90. Here, Ragoonath initially challenges the characterization of her conviction as categorically an aggravated felony and the retroactive application of the necessary loss amount for a fraud and deceit conviction to qualify as an aggravated felony. We have already addressed both issues, and the claims are without merit. Moore, 251 F.3d at 923; Maldonado, 664 F.3d at 1378-79; see also Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Ragoonath also argues that DHS failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we must follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the supreme court quotation marks omitted (B) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (C) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc (D) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (E) holding ajbsent en banc reconsideration we are bound by prior decisions of this circuit
Output: (C)
requirements for maintaining a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to dismiss or strike the section 17200 claim. The district court granted that motion and gave Kennedy leave to amend to proceed only on her individual claims. When Kennedy declined to amend the district court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review de novo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001). We may affirm a dismissal on any proper ground. See Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir.2001); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). As an initial matter, we reject Kennedy’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious (B) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (C) recognizing that this court may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record quotation omitted (D) holding that a reviewing court may affirm denial of class certification on any grounds (E) holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds
Output: (D)
its property without permission from the Corps. The Court discussed how government land use regulations may “under extreme circumstances” amount to a taking of the subject land. Id. 474 U.S. at 126, 106 S.Ct. at 459. Even if a permit is denied there may be other viable uses available to the owner. “Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.” Id. 474 U.S. at 127, 106 S.Ct. at 459. “Whether the denial of a permit would constitute a taking in any given case would depend upon the effect of the denial on the owner’s ability to put the property to productive use.” Id. n. 4. See also Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 563 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). It cannot be concluded that a permit denial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a zoning regulation which deprives property of all economically beneficial or productive use is a categorical regulatory taking (B) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (C) holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property (D) holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property (E) holding that although authorization was initially given for property exercise of that control continued to be authorized only because the defendant deceived the rightful owner of the property into believing that a legitimate use was being made of the property
Output: (C)
the appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and whether the delay warranted some form of relief. Id. 25 . Id. at 102 (deriving these factors from the Supreme Court’s speedy trial analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). 26 . 63 M.J. at 136. 27 . It is also noteworthy that it took 1,179 days (approximately three years, two months) for the briefs to be filed after the Court of C 59 M.J. 34, 39-40 (C.A.A.F.2003). 33 . Moreno, 63 M.J. at 138-39. 34 . Dearing, 63 M.J. at 485; Moreno, 63 M.J. at 140. 35 . The Government's motions to file the declarations of Commander S.D. Rhoades and Mr. Robert Troidl are granted, and we have considered the contents of those declarations. 36 . United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 24-25 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that counsels conduct may be so egregious that no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it (B) recognizing that plain error exists only if failure to recognize the error would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings and that the plainerror doctrine is to be used sparingly solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that if trial courts verdict was based on hearsay statements of victim admitted in violation of the confrontation clause the error clearly would not only affect substantial rights but would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the proceedings (D) holding that a tenmonth delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of prejudice and because disqualification is in the public interest where there is an ethical violation (E) holding that where there is no finding of barker prejudice we will find a due process violation only when in balancing the other three factors the delay is so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the publics perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system
Output: (E)
the magistrate’s finding — which was adopted by the district court — that “[o]n December 18, 1981, JESUS GUADALUPE OLIVAREZ was the record owner of the property [at 814 East Citrus Street].” 4 . See also Capitol Aggregates, 448 S.W.2d at 836 (noting that where “the claimant would not have the right of possession or title ... there would be nothing to which a claim of homestead could attach”). 5 .See also Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S.W.2d 472, 475 (1943) ("Possibly the homestead laws, liberally construed, would have prohibited interference by judicial process with Milner's possession of the premises in a contest between him and his creditor.... Milner had merely permissive and partial possession....”) 6 . See Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 S.W.2d 575, 579, 586 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Rettig v. Houston West End Realty Co., 254 
 Holding statements: (A) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead (B) holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title (C) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (D) holding that even if divorced wife only owned a beneficial interest and not title interest in the residence constituting her homestead she was nonetheless entitled to claim a homestead exemption from the forced sale of the property (E) holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust
Output: (B)
by detective," taken as true, would amount to constitutional violation). The Supreme Court has also made clear that “the Sixth Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses,” but only “witnesses in his favor.” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (emphasis in original). Consequently, even where there may have been governmental misconduct, a criminal defendant cannot establish a violation of his compulsory process right unless he “make[s] some plausible showing” of how the potential witness’s “testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” Id.; see also Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). To state a claim for violation of her fair 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating (B) holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement (C) holding sixth amendment witness interference claim fails without showing of relevance and materiality (D) holding that exclusion of testimony as collateral and of speculative relevance did not violate defendants sixth and fourteenth amendment rights (E) holding that 18 usc  1014 has no materiality requirement because the statute does not so much as mention materiality
Output: (C)
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LexisNexis 2002). 6 . Given our disposition and the posture of the case, we need not determine whether the Howeth parties’ reservation of section-1983 claims against the individual defendants, based on the individuals’ participation in an alleged regulatory taking, was effective. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of S.F., Cal, 545 U.S. 323, 346, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2506, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Halloo Tex., Inc. v. McMullen County, 221 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a determination of whether the defendants actions constituted a taking under the louisiana constitution does not implicate any issues of federal law and thus does not provides a basis for a federal district court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that collateral estoppel applies only where the antecedent judgment was a final judgment (C) holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims (D) holding that the domesticrelations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction does not prevent federal courts from adjudicating a tort action when the plaintiffs do not contest the validity of the state custody decree because the tort issues  were not entangled with issues that only state courts are competent to resolve (E) holding that reservation of federal asapplied takings claims that have issues that are not distinct from antecedent state issues does not defeat application of collateral estoppel in later federal suit
Output: (E)
10. Therefore, any conclusions based upon the interview responses of older children are irrelevant to the conclusion asserted by the plaintiffs. Finally, and perhaps most important, the Court’s concern extends beyond the children who are parties to this case. The constitutional dimensions implicated here affect all of the children at H.M.E.S., not merely the plaintiffs. Even if the proffered expert testimony were valid, it strains credulity to suggest that a ten-year old child, not to mention a five-year old, could possibly have the cognitive function and the Solomonic wisdom to discern questions of the jurisprudential complexity posed here. Although the courts continue to lower the age at which students are capable of participating fully in the marketplace of ideas, see, e.g., Widmar (<HOLDING>) and Gregoire (recognizing a high school as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) recognizing a university campus as limited public forum (D) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum (E) recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties
Output: (C)
of its opinion, the majority states that various actions in Israel regarding land known to be in Texas do not constitute contacts with Texas. These conclusions conflict with the broad construction that the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Texas, and this court have given as to what a “contact with the forum state” is for purposes of a personal-jurisdiction analysis. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (“So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another state, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”); Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 338, 337-40 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); Alenia Spazio, S.p.A. v. Reid, 130 S.W.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the transfer of all rights interests and control in property assigned was an effective assignment occurring at the time the assignment was perfected not later when proceeds paid (B) holding that a defendants acceptance in california of an assignment of oil and gas leases was a contact with texas for personaljurisdiction purposes because the assignment was of real property interests located in texas even though the defendant never physically entered texas (C) holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments (D) holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate (E) holding that suit arose from alleged fraudulent transfer of real property located in texas even though the allegedly fraudulent assignment occurred in california
Output: (B)
any records it has linking Gordon, Langford, or Ford to its investigation into the four murders, or it must follow the normal practice in FOIA cases of identifying the records it has withheld and stating its reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1182. Although the plaintiff maintains a claim of innocence, unlike in Roth, any public interest in knowing whether the defendant withholds information that could corroborate that claim does not outweigh the privacy interests at stake. c. Balancing the Privacy and Public Interests If there is a privacy interest in the requested materials and no public interest in disclosure, “[w]e need rcement agents. However, individuals mentioned in law enforcement files also have a recognized privacy interest. See Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). And plaintiff has failed to show how the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the privacy interests of the employee police officers did not exceed the publics right to know (B) recognizing the strong privacy interests of the suspects and law enforcement officers identified in the withheld documents (C) holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure (D) recognizing the privacy interests when requested documents neither confirm nor refute the plaintiffs allegations of government misconduct (E) holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure  
Output: (B)