niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Drapeau’s cohorts, the cohort would be a “victim” of making the bomb. Further, firebombs are inherently dangerous. There is no peaceful purpose for making a bomb. Felony offenses that involve explosives qualify as “violent crimes” for purposes of enhancing the sentences of career offenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining a “violent felony” as: “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that ... involves use of explosives”). Courts have found possession of a'bomb to be a crime of violence based on the lack of a nonviolent purpose for a bomb and the fact that, by its very nature, there is a substantial risk that the bomb would be used against the person or property of another. See United States v. Newman, 125 F.3d 863 (10th Cir.1997) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dodge, 846 F.Supp. 181, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that possession of a pipe bomb is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  3142f1 (B) holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence (C) holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 (D) holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b (E) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16
Output: (A)
Colameta used customer information that he took from Protégé. Additionally, Colameta admits to having taken at least two Protégé proposals with him to Monument. This type of information may constitute trade secrets. See G.L.c. 266, §30 (defining “trade secret” as used in G.L.c. 93, §42, as including “anything tangible or intangible or electronically kept or stored, which constitutes, represents, evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production or management information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention or improvement”); Warner-Lambert Co., 427 Mass. at 49 (“ [Confidential and proprietary business information may be entitled to protection, even if such information cannot claim trade secret protection”); see, e.g., Augat, Inc., 409 Mass. at 173 (<HOLDING>). “Matters of public knowledge or of general 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even if a plaintiff claims certain information constitutes trade secrets its claim may not depend on that determination (B) holding that included among trade secrets employee may not appropriate from employer is certain information such as lists of customers (C) holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana (D) recognizing that customer lists may be protectable trade secrets (E) recognizing a legitimate need to protect an employee from disclosing an employers trade secrets or other confidential information to a competitor
Output: (B)
property tax sale. In reviewing section 6323(b)(6), this Court noted that it provides that a county’s tax lien has priority over a federal lien, and thus, Taylor purchased the property still subject to the county’s lien. Taylor v. Mill, 310 S.C. 526, 528, 426 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1992). Thus, this Court has already noted that section 6323 operates to establish priority, not extinguish ection in this manner will stifle tax sales, potential buyers must research tax sale property purchases and would be put on notice of any federal tax liens. Finally, Appellants argue that the master erred by not giving section 6323, a more specific statute, priority over section 7425, a general statute. See Capco of Summerville, Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Constr. Co., 368 S.C. 137, 142, 628 S.E.2d 38, 41 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While this is a correct statement of the law, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter (B) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (C) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision (D) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (E) holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one
Output: (E)
They also rely on Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 85 N.Y.2d 20, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 647 N.E.2d 741 (1995), which held that a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large.” Defs.’ Mem. at 14 (quoting Oswego Laborers’, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 647 N.E.2d at 744). As explained above, however, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants’ unauthorized use of the DEL MONICO’S name in connection with non-Ocinomled restaurants and products caused consumer harm or injury to the public, and that they had a broad impact on consumers at large inasmuch as such. use was likely to cause consumer confusion. See, e.g., CommScope, Inc. of N.C. v. Commscope (U.S.A.) Int’l Grp. Co., 809 F.Supp.2d 33, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (<HOLDING>); New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff stated a  349 claim where plaintiff alleged facts plausibly suggesting that defendant intentionally registered its corporate name to be confusingly similar to plaintiffs commscope trademark (B) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract (C) holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference (D) holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract (E) holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity
Output: (A)
did not affect the defendant’s guideline range, a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) was properly denied). Mr. Norwood concedes that the guideline range would have remained the same based on the findings that the district court had made at sentencing. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9. But Mr. Norwood challenges these findings, arguing that the district court violated the U.S. Constitution by failing to allow the jury to decide matters involving relevant conduct. In our view, this argument is not available under § 3582(c)(2). A § 3582(c)(2) motion is available to request a sentence reduction only for the sentencing range that was lowered by the Commission’s amendment, not to challenge other aspects of a defendant’s sentence. See United States v. Price, 438 F.3d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Gay, 771 F.3d 681, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence except upon the governments motion on the basis of substantial assistance (B) holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law (C) holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines (D) holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction under 18 usc  3582c (E) holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing
Output: (D)
887 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983). Because dangerous people do not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, the law should not either. It is a fact that many officers are killed during traffic stops for mere infractions. But, here’s the rub: the facts are disputed, and the disputed facts here should have been submitted to the jury, even when qualified immunity from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution so requires. Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir.1997) makes this as clear as the proverbial bell. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-18, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As for LaLonde’s claims of excessive force, I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (B) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (C) holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue
Output: (A)
In essence, Landowners argue that Star Enterprise’s negligence has interfered with their ability to contract with third parties for the sale of their homes, the same type of damages, for which the Virginia Supreme Court imposed a physical impact requirement in Philip Morris. Landowners rely upon Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Va.1981), in arguing that Virginia law permits recovery for pure economic loss in the absence of direct physical impact. In Pruitt, the plaintiffs were individuals who derived their livelihoods from marine life in the Chesapeake Bay which had been polluted by chemicals allegedly discharged into the Bay by the defendant. The federal district court, construing Virginia la L.Ed.2d 562 (1986); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F.Supp. 247 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting from defendants injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has contractual business relationship (B) holding commercial fishermen may recover for pollution resulting from defendants oil spill (C) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed (D) holding that impact in the district resulting from the defendants conduct that occurred outside the district must be deliberate not incidental (E) holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent
Output: (B)
Cas. and Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 260 (3d Cir.2006) (“It has long been the rule in this Circuit that insurance policies are considered part of the property of a bankruptcy estate”) (citing Estate of Lellock v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.1987)); In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir.1987); In re SN Liquidation, Inc., 388 B.R. 579, 583-584 (Bankr.D.Del.2008) ("Insurance policies purchased and paid for by a debtor are property of the estate.”); In re World Health Alternatives, Inc., 369 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr.D.Del.2007) ("It is clear that insurance policies purchased and paid for by a debtor are property of the estate."); In re A (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1999) (same); but see In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1990) (<HOLDING>). 31 . See In re Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the real estate sale proceeds (B) holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate (C) holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate (D) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (E) holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate
Output: (D)
no evidence that Georgia’s “general” K-12 local schools offer “a year round program with multi-age, student-centered classrooms featuring pedagogy that is based on constructivist and multiple intelligence learning” like CCAT. Why is that curriculum not sufficiently different to qualify as “special”? Again, the majority does not say. If a “special school” is to be compared to the ordinary local school and must only differ to some extent, then the Charter Schools Commission could create all sorts of commission charter schools that should satisfy constitutional scrutiny, even if the three charter schools at issue in this case are not “different” enough to satisfy the majority. If that is the case, the majority errs in striking down the 2008 Act on its face. See Blevins, 288 Ga. at 118 (<HOLDING>). In the normal course of constitutional 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep  citation omitted (B) holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application (E) holding that a statute may be facially challenged only  by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep 
Output: (E)
that the “Florida Legislature created the Fund as a self-insurance fund to provide liability insurance to governmental agencies and employees in civil rights cases” (citing § 284.30, Fla. Stat.)). Section 284.30 provides that when a party seeks attorney’s fees from a state agency, the party is required to serve notice with a copy of the pleading claiming the fees on DFS. On appeal, N.S. argues that a parent in a dependency proceeding does not fall within the plain language of the statute, which provides as follows: A state self-insurance fund, designated as the “State Risk Management Trust Fund,” is created to be set up by the Department of Financial Services and administered with a program of risk management, which fund is to provide insurance, as authorized by s. Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). However, courts have not addressed whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 12309 is a condition precedent to the accrual of rights against a municipality (B) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (C) recognizing that the notice required by section 28430 is a condition precedent to the recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to section 12057lb in hospitals suit against the state (D) holding that section 28430s notice requirement is a condition precedent for fees in action by taxpayer against dor pursuant to section 213015 (E) holding that the notice requirement is a condition precedent for attorneys fees from section 12069 proceedings in action by plaintiff against state
Output: (C)
the merits of these motions — were rendered moot by that order and are revived by this Court’s vacating the new trial order. Therefore, the majority’s opinion effectively deciding those motio ial while retaining jurisdiction over the proceedings necessarily mooted the pending motions for entry of judgment on the verdict and entry of JNOV. Under the mootness doctrine, this Court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment and opinion granting or denying either of those mooted motions. Upon this Court’s vacating the trial court’s order granting a new trial in response to this mandamus petition, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case until entry of final judgment in that court. See In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 230-32 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). The judgment rendered by this Court, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a resentencing court may reconsider a defendants criminal history category as long as the appellate court did not expressly or implicitly limit  the remand to only a portion of the sentence (B) holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current (C) holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages (D) recognizing that a reviewing court should not reconsider credibility determinations made by the alj as long as they find some support in the record (E) holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending
Output: (E)
would result from pretrial publicity or the kind of prejudice that would require a change of venue. Moreover, the court finds that Johnson waived the issue by failing to renew or reurge her motion for a change of venue at the conclusion of jury selection on the ground that the voir dire of potential jurors demonstrated that the pool was so tainted with prejudice that she could not obtain a fair trial in this district. As the court observed in its pretrial ruling, at the second tier of the analysis of a motion for a change of venue, if the court concludes that no presumption of prejudice is warranted pretrial, the court must look at the voir dire testimony of potential trial jurors to determin 7 L.Ed.2d 909 (2004); People v. Burnham, 2001 WL 936764, *1 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug.17, 2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Couture, 587 N.W.2d 849, 852 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (B) holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified (C) holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal (D) holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived (E) holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue
Output: (E)
she did not remember demanding money of the store clerk and states that her companion told the clerk to open the cash register. Yet, according to the clerk’s testimony, it was she, the female robber, who demanded money. She emphasized her drunken state and implied that her accomplices threatened her. Because Miles may reasonably have thought such a statement would decrease her practical exposure to criminal liability, the statement was not reliable as being against her penal interest. Cf. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601, 114 S.Ct. at 2435 (stating that court “may not just assume ... that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else”); id. at 604, 114 S.Ct. at 2437 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>); Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134 (noting that proper 
 Holding statements: (A) holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless (B) holding that codefendants statement was not properly admitted because a reasonable person in declarants position might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability at least as far as sentencing goes (C) holding that discrepancy between declarants testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement (D) holding that appellants statement i think i need a lawyer     is just as ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in davis (E) holding that when the testimony relating each of the statements by codefendants was admissible against at least one of the codefendants the statements were not rendered inadmissible because each statement would be hearsay as to the other two defendants
Output: (B)
sentences for bank robbery consecutively or concurrent ly. However, the statute does not permit the court to decide whether any future sentence would be consecutive or concurrent to those five sentences. Rather, when sentences are imposed at different times, § 3584(a) only authorizes a court to determine whether a sentence should be consecutive or concurrent if the defendant is “already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (emphasis added). Another sentence must exist at the time a district court imposes its sentence; a court cannot impose its sentence consecutively to a sentence that does not yet exist. The better-reasoned cases from our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced (B) holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  (C) holding that  5g13c applied because the defendants case involved multiple undischarged terms of imprisonment only one of which was used to enhance his instant sentence (D) holding that the term of imprisonment for purposes of application note 5 is the sentence imposed by the state court and that it shall not be decreased to reflect a suspension of any part of the sentence (E) holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing
Output: (B)
program” were eventually incorporated into the final remedial plan for the site in September 1991. Id. at 806-07. A CERCLA cost recovery suit for contribution was filed in September 1997. Id. at 807. The court considered whether the initial installation of the wells constituted a remedial action which would trigger CERCLA’s six-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that no remedial action could take place until a final remedial plan had been officially approved. Id. at 811. The court rejected that bright-line test in favor of an analysis of the proximity of the action to the “disclosure of the final remedial design, which may occur prior to approval of the final remedial plan.” Id. at 812; see also State of California v. Hyampom Lumber Co., 903 F.Supp. 1389, 1393 (E.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Geraghty and Miller, 234 F.3d at 927 (actions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a draft rap constituted a final remedial design (B) holding that employees conviction for possession of a controlled substance constituted gross misconduct (C) holding that director of taxation may select remedial option (D) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (E) holding that exemption 7c categorically applies when a third party requestor seeks fbi rap sheets
Output: (A)
ignoring the “series of events” that occurred between May 2006 and January 2007, and that those events establish the requisite causal connection. The anti-retaliation provision of the FCRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person for opposing an unlawful employment practice or for making a charge of discrimination. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). The district court correctly found that Jiles had not put forth any evidence to show a causal connection between the protected activity of his administrative charge of race discrimination in May 2006 and his January 2007 termination. Further, the district court did not err when it reasoned that the time-frame of eight months does not sufficiently proximate to establish a causal connection. Doc. 72 at 12; see Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (<HOLDING>). We therefore find no error in the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity (B) holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation (C) recognizing temporal proximity when agency had knowledge of employees protected activity (D) holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity (E) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection
Output: (A)
for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another crime: [T]he definitions accorded the crimes determine whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another crime. In other words, all of the essential elements of the lesser crime must also be essential elements included in the greater crime. If the lesser crime has an essential element which is not completely covered by the greater crime, it is not a lesser included offense. State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 635, 295 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1982) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 61, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993); accord State v. Hedgepeth, 165 N.C. App. 321, 324, 598 S.E.2d 202, 205, disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 193, 607 S.E.2d 656 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Defendant was indicted for first degree rape. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime (B) holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime (C) holding that the crime of rape is a lesser included offense of the crime of felony murder in the perpetration of rape and that since the latter crime included all of the elements of the former consecutive sentences were therefore improper (D) holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense  (E) holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense
Output: (A)
as McColman argues. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) provides: When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move — at any time, even after judgment — to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue. By its plain terms, Rule 15(b)(2) only applies to claims that are tried, and this case was disposed of on summary judgment. Further, Doan did not consent to trying the handcuffing claim — he objected to the claim in both his motion for summary judgment and at oral argument on that motion. Cf. Siler v. Webber, 448 Fed.Appx. 50, 58 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Doan would not have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding unpleaded claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of parties are treated as if they had been raised by pleadings even in summary judgment proceedings (C) holding an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by implied consent where the issue is presented considered and ruled upon by the trial court without objection (D) holding that an issue cannot be tried by the parties consent pursuant to rule 15b2 where one of the parties opposes trial by moving for summary judgment (E) holding order nonfinal where parties agreed to reserva tion on issue ripe for adjudication and tried by parties
Output: (D)
(“No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” (emphasis added)); Petersen, 301 F.3d at 1188 (“An employer’s action against an employee cannot be because of that employee’s protected opposition unless the employer knows the employee has engaged in protected opposition.”). In other words, Mr. Jones cannot establish a causal link between his allegedly protected activity and UPS’s refusal to return him to work unless he can show that UPS knew he was engaging in protected activity. See Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). To establish causation, Mr. Jones must 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding in the title vii context that the plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him know of the employees plaintiffs protected activity (E) holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his protected activity
Output: (C)
to the present tense, it is doubtful that this change prejudiced defendant when defendant’s response to Mr. Falvey’s question is examined in context. First, it appears that defendant’s use of the past tense was a slip of the tongue because he was responding to a question asked of him in the present tense. In addition, he began his response with the word “currently.” Moreover, defendant’s lawyer, in his cross-examination of Lieutenant Commander Donald Ray Opedal, elicited testimony to the effect that defendant represented at the August 9, 1985 meeting that he was unemployed. Finally, the Court instructed the jurors that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and that their recollection of the evidence controlled. See, e.g., United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 267 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 762 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (B) holding prejudicial effect of prosecutors comment not rendered harmless by courts general instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence (C) holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence (D) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (E) holding that district court acted within its discretion in denying motion for mistrial when prosecutor commented on matter not in evidence in closing argument because comment was not sufficiently prejudicial when taken together with the courts later jury instruction that the jurys recollection of the evidence controlled and that the attorneys arguments were not evidence 
Output: (E)
an offset against the alimony award by the amount stolen by defendant and now due to plaintiff. We recognize, as did the trial judge, that alimony and equitable distribution are distinct but related types of relief. However, the discretionary application of the equitable maxim of unclean hands applies to matrimonial cases. Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238, 704 A.2d 913 (1998). It is well settled that a party “ ‘in equity must come into court with clean hands and ... must keep them clean ... throughout the proceedings.’ ” Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, 260 N.J.Super. 50, 53-54, 615 A.2d 266 (App.Div.1992) (quoting A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246, 66 A.2d 319 (1949)). See also Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 384, 921 A.2d 427 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  he who seeks equity must do equity  (B) holding that the formula in section 522f2a creates equity for purposes of lien avoidance even if debtors otherwise have no equity in the property (C) holding that an insufficient pleading in equity is a nullity (D) holding that an action for specific performance lies in equity (E) holding that when the company seeks cancellation or rescission it must as a condition of obtaining relief do equity by returning or tendering back the premium paid with interest
Output: (A)
Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 39 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, the federal questions “must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.” Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). A federal defense cannot serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (“Thus, it is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense.”)(emphasis in original). Similarly, federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on a counterclaim. Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831, 122 S.Ct. 1889, 153 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002)(<HOLDING>) Fannie Mae’s Charter The Davises final 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants counterclaim that is based on the breach of the same maritime insurance contract as the main claim  cannot be granted a jury trial because the resolution of the defendants claim would dispose of all or part of the plaintiffs action the net result would be to resolve the case in a jury trial despite the plaintiffs 9h election (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a (C) holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court (D) holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim (E) holding that a counterclaim  which appears as part of the defendants answer not as part of the plaintiffs complaint  cannot served as the basis for arising under jurisdiction
Output: (E)
227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) — applied retroactively to vacated Pizarro’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, and after Pizarro had filed his opening brief in this third appeal. The fact that the Supreme Court denied Pizarro’s petition for a writ of certiorari after his first appeal, Pizarro-Morales v. United States, 546 U.S. 1199, 126 S.Ct. 1397, 164 L.Ed.2d 99 (2006), does not change the fact that his judgment of conviction was not final at the time Alleyne was decided, given that we had vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Berman, 302 U.S. at 212, 58 S.Ct. 164 (indicating that a judgment of conviction would not be final if the sentence were vacated); see also Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 153, 84 S.Ct. 1157, 12 L.Ed.2d 206 (1964) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Dodson, 291 F.3d at 276 n. 3 (citing Mercer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari (B) holding that even a remand by the supreme court for reconsideration in light of an intervening court opinion does not require the court to consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari (C) holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available (E) recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review
Output: (C)
in an IRA were exempt. The court determined that the Wisconsin statute continued to exempt pension-plan proceeds after receipt by the beneficiary. Because the exemption statute in Woods differs substantially from § 522(d)(10), the holding in that case is inap-posite to the present matter. Notwithstanding the specific language of § 522(d)(10), the debtor argues that whenever a debtor rolls over funds from an exempt pension plan to an IRA, “equity dictates that the exemption should remain.” Debtor’s Brief at 2. ‘Whatever the ‘equitable’ considerations to which [the debtor] refers, ... his right to an exemption is governed by statute, and ... none of the statutory exemption provisions applies....” In re Clark, 711 F.2d at 23. But cf. In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 678-80 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). The debtor has presented no evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a ease where debtor elected for reasons of ill health and in order to meet present needs to take pension benefits in one lumpsum payment three weeks before filing bankruptcy petition that the proceeds would retain the exempt status provided by  522d10e because they were a tangible reflection of the debtors right to receive  a payment under a  pension  plan  (B) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan (C) holding that the son of a pension plan participant who had not been designated to receive any of his fathers pension benefits stood no closer to beneficiary status than any other person (D) holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan (E) holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment
Output: (A)
any physician that described her as obese, much less gave an opinion that her weight imposed additional limitations upon her or exacerbated her other conditions. Therefore, even if Reynolds’ silence on the issue of obesity is not deemed to waive consideration of that issue, it does not appear that evidence existed regarding her obesity that the ALJ should have considered. The ALJ also did not err in assessing Reynolds’ credibility. An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses’ de meanor and to make an appropriate evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, an ALJ’s credibility assessment will not be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). In making a credibility determination, Social 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (B) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (C) holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error (D) recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference (E) holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight
Output: (D)
debtor and made within 910 days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. As discussed in more detail below, 910 car loans receive special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. 7 . This case was filed after October 17, 2005, when most provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) became effective. Pub.L. 109-8. All future statutory references are thus to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2005), unless other specifically noted. 8 .541 U.S. 465, 484-85, 124 S.Ct. 1951, 158 L.Ed.2d 787 (2004) (adopting formula approach, requiring adjustment of prime national interest rate based on risk of nonpayment). 9 . Section 1325(a) (emphasis added). 10 . In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) and In re Horn, 338 B.R. 110, 113 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral (B) holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract (C) holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest (D) holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing (E) holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58
Output: (D)
in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent’s life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent’s physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (D) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (E) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action
Output: (B)
Accordingly, the second Olano prong is satisfied: the error, both as to the absence of a jury determination on an essential element of the offense and the failure to include that element in the indictment, was indeed “plain.” c. Did the plain error affect Thomas’s substantial rights? An error affects a defendant’s “substantial rights” if it is “prejudicial” and it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Gore, 154 F.3d at 47. “Though ‘prejudice’ is also required to show that an error is not ‘harmless,’ pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), the important difference of plain error prejudice [in most cases] is that ‘[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of pers , 2001), with United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100-01 3d Cir. (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (B) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (D) holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in both the trial and sentencing (E) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error
Output: (D)
as a special education teacher, and commencing her intended career. Compl. at ¶ 77. These allegations are sufficient to demonstrate ongoing harm. Likewise, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief — that the Individual Defendants change Plaintiffs grade and permit her to continue her studies at Hunger College — is purely prospective, as it would require state officials to take future action to prevent present and future harm. See Flint, 488 F.3d at 825. The fact that this injunction also remedies a past harm does not “render[ ] an otherwise forward-looking injunction retroactive. If it did, the rule allowing prospective relief would be substantially undermined because the need for prospective relief often arises out of a past injury.” Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard (B) holding that courts should order reinstatement under the adea whenever it is an appropriate remedy because reinstatement best serves congress purpose in enacting the adea and an award of front pay is always somewhat speculative (C) holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy (D) holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect (E) holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action  already taken
Output: (E)