niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
expect to incur liability in excess of the SIR amount. Ger-ling’s election not to exercise its right to offer Dorsey a defense left Dorsey to its own devices and thus free to agree to any reasonable, noneollusive consent judgment. The distinction between the rejection of a duty to defend and the rejection of a right to offer a defense is not, under the facts of this case, sufficient to effect a release for Gerling. See Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 1995), and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 547 So.2d 148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989)(both holding that an agreement to proceed only against available insurance proceeds is not a release of the insurer). F. Gerling’s Argument Concerning “Proper lusia Ready Mix[, Inc.], 436 So.2d 868, 871 [(Ala.1983)](<HOLDING>); Truitt Oil & Gas Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., [231 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy (B) holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs (C) holding that an insurer was obligated to pay for damages and a loss in value to a water treatment plant caused by the insureds defective product (D) holding that insureds demand to insurer was liquidated when insurer did not point to any evidence at trial in support of its contention that damages were disputed (E) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control
Output: (C)
of FOIA litigation. The first focuses on the sufficiency of the factual basis or, in other words, the Vaughn index. At this stage an agency may show that a generalized Vaughn index, one that presents the withheld documents in groupings rather than individually, is appropriate. See Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1389 (Exemption 7(A)); see also In re Department of Justice, 999 F.2d 1302, 1309 (8th Cir.1993) (describing the necessary showing to justify a generalized Exemption 7(A) index). The second stage confronts dispositive motions, e.g., at summary judgment. This refers to a court’s assessment of whether the exercise of the Exemption is legitimate. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1485-86, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988) (<HOLDING>). These two stages are somewhat different. An 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (B) holding that a draft rap constituted a final remedial design (C) holding that where a third partys conduct is closely related to the contractual relationship or the contractual dispute and where the third party enjoys financial benefit from the contract the forum selection clause applies to the third party (D) recognizing that a forum selection clause also applies to a nonsignatory third party where the third partys conduct is closely related to the contractual relationship or the contractual dispute and where the third party enjoys financial benefit from the contract (E) holding that exemption 7c categorically applies when a third party requestor seeks fbi rap sheets
Output: (E)
as the dissent seems to imply, for a court simply to state the legal standard borfectly. It must also apply that standard correctly. Here, after accdrately stating the standard for an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court “conflated the requirements for a postbonviction evidentia-ry hearing with the requirements for a new trial” when it evaliiated the credibility of Caldwell’s witnesses without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Id. (emphases in original omitted). To be sure, a postconviction court has discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing on grounds that are unrelated to a recanting witness’s credibility — for example, when an alleged recantatioh does not actually contradict a witness’s trial testimony. Cf. Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II), 710 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>). In such a situation, a petitioner would not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim (B) holding that relief was unavailable in part because some recanting witnesses reversed any recantation they may have made and others claimed merely that they did not give a full explanation of their testimony at trial (C) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (D) holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense (E) holding that bare conclusions of lay fact witnesses did not amount to any evidence at all and that the fact that they were admitted without objection added nothing to their probative force
Output: (B)
(Colo. 1982) (noting that strict prima facie case may be impossible at discovery stage). Decisions regarding discovery are best left to the trial court in its reasoned discretion; Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57, 459 A.2d 503 (1983); and employing the typical prima facie burden shifting could lead to endless minitrials to settle discovery matters in the underlying action. Accordingly, we reject a strict burden shifting approach and instead employ the test adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which requires a showing of probable cause to believe that the privileged communications were made with the intent to perpetrate a civil fraud and that the communications were made in furtherance of that fraud. See United States v. Zolin, supra, 491 U.S. 563 n.7 (<HOLDING>); Matter of Mendel, 897 P.2d 68, 74 (Alaska 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language (B) holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy (C) holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable (D) holding that eco nomic injury caused by contractual obligations that stemmed from compliance with a regulation were sufficiently caused by the regulation to support standing (E) holding under the policy language that diminution of market value is not a cause of loss but a measure of a loss caused by something else
Output: (A)
MCI's third-party action against Marcopolo. In MCI’s appeal of the special appearance ruling, we affirmed the trial court’s decision. See Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Marcopolo, S.A., 2007 WL 4157241 (Tex.App.-Waco Nov.21, 2007, no pet.). MCI's eighth issue contends that, if the trial court erred by granting Marcopolo's special appearance, its severance of MCI’s third-party action against Mar-copolo would have been erroneous and the judgment should be reversed. Because we affirmed the trial court's decision on Marco-polo's special appearance, we overrule MCI's eighth issue. 2 . Two Texas Supreme Court decisions have addressed the implied preemption of state common-law tort claims by federal motor vehicle safety standards: Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 974 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); and Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding that the safety act and fmvss 108 did not impliedly preempt commonlaw conspicuity tort based on inadequate lighting and reflectors on truck trailer (C) holding that the coast guards decision not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly preempt petitioners tort claims (D) holding that the safety act and fmvss 208 did not expressly or impliedly preempt a tort claim based on the manufacturers failure to install lap belts (E) holding that claims were nothing more than a backdoor attempt to attack once again the manufacturers exercise of one of the restraint options under fmvss 208  it therefore frustrates the purpose and objective of the federal regulation and invokes implied preemption under the holding in geier 
Output: (D)
against its probative value.” Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶55, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789. We review the admission of photographs under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pettigrew, 116 N.M. 135, 139, 860 P.2d 777, 781 (Ct.App.1993). In this case, the photographs of Victim after death were used to show the nature of the injury, to explain the basis of the forensic pathologist’s opinion, and to illustrate the forensic pathologist’s testimony. It is well established that photographs may properly be admitted for such purposes, even if they are gruesome. See, e.g., Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶¶ 54-55, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789 (upholding the admission of photos of a child homicide victim on grounds they were illustrative); State v. Perea, 2001-NMCA-002, ¶ 22, 130 N.M. 46, 16 P.3d 1105 (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part and vacated in paH, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime (C) holding that the admission of a photograph of a homicide victim for the purpose of identification was within the discretion of the district court and determining that a family photo excluded by the court as prejudicial that was inadvertently seen by two jurors was harmless error (D) holding that a potentially inflammatory photograph of a victims face was relevant and that its admission was well within the discretion of the district court (E) holding that the exclusion of marginally relevant evidence was within the courts discretion
Output: (D)
minutes; (2) see the assailant “well;” (3) provide a description of the assailant that is consistent with Respondent’s height, (see Ex. 24); (4) appear confident of his photographic identification of Respondent as the person driving the black pickup truck that was left at the parking lot; and (5) identify Respondent’s photograph nine days after the shooting occurred. After considering the relevant factors for each witness, the Court finds that each of the witness’s statement is independently reliable for purposes of determining probable cause. The Court further notes that any one of the three w weakness in Mexico’s ease against Respondent, but it does not “completely obliterate” evidence of probable cause, and such evidence could be properly excluded. See Garza, 180 Fed.Appx. at 523 (<HOLDING>); see also Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility (B) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (C) holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility (D) holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility (E) holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added
Output: (D)
no uncertain terms, Congress, for whatever reason, has chosen, through the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, to protect “employees,” i.e., “individuals] employed by an employer,” and “applicants for employment,” but not to protect former employees. Because Robinson’s complaint alleges post-employment retaliation, the district court properly dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . The Supreme Court vacated this court’s judgment in Polsby and remanded the case to this court "for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Acting Solicitor General in his brief for the United States filed March 5, 1993 Cir.1988); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869 
 Holding statements: (A) holding employee under fair labor standard acts antiretaliation provision includes former employees (B) holding that the adeas parallel provision prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains of age discrimination (C) holding that former employees subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination without more is not enough to survive former employers summary judgment motion (D) holding employees under adeas parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship (E) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment
Output: (D)
720 (1978), the court found that an article stating that the plaintiff paid agents of foreign governments to win contracts was not actionable under the UDTPA because it impugned the plaintiffs integrity, rather than the quality of his services as an executive. See also Republic Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 254 F.Supp.2d 985, 998 (N.D.Ill.2002). Unlike the statement in Crinkley, the statement at issue in this case impugns the quality of M & R’s business and services. Stating that M & R is bankrupt directly attacks the quality of M & R’s business and indirectly undermines the quality of M & R’s services — an insolvent company cannot reliably deliver on-going services. See also Zahran v. Nat’l Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 90-C-907, 1993 WL 116738, at *3 (N.D.Ill. April 19, 1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find that count four properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding denial of deserved rise in performance rating may be actionable (B) holding implied false certifications must be material to the governments payment decision in order to be actionable under the false claims act (C) holding statement that plaintiff was antisemitic not actionable (D) holding that accurate statements about past performance are not actionable under the securities laws (E) holding that a false statement about a credit rating is actionable under the udtpa
Output: (E)
judicial responsibility.” Sentencing discretion — the choice of a penalty within the range fixed by legislation — is part of the judiciary's responsibility. Id. at 583-84, 789 P.2d at 1084-85 (citations omitted). When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional (B) holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole (C) holding that the sentence entered by the circuit court was illegal because the court had no authority to impose a sentence that exceeded the punishment fixed by the jury (D) holding that dui sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence based upon the prosecutors recommendation was unconstitutional in violation of article 3 because the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor (E) holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed
Output: (D)
Typically, the following four policy considerations are cited: First, the potential of a claim interferes with a lawyer’s obligation of undivided loyalty. Second, allowing a claim creates a conflict of interest with the client and potential problems for the lawyer as a witness, which may require withdrawal or disqualification. Third, the lawyer’s independent judgment is adversely influenced by the risk of a claim, interfering with the lawyer’s counseling role. Fourth, the lawyer’s need to defend a contribution or indemnity claim may imperil the client’s confidences. MALLEN & SMITH, supra, at 898. Nonetheless, a significant number of well-reasoned decisions concur with the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in Maddocks. See, e.g., Goran v. Glieberman, 659 N.E.2d 56, 61 (Ill.App.Ct. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Strockbridge, 756 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy (B) holding contribution claim against attorney not contrary to illinois public policy (C) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (D) holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney (E) recognizing a right to contribution
Output: (B)
and detachment from her family. She became increasingly more angry and had some — Defense Counsel: Your Honor, Pm going to object. The Court: I overrule your objection. Go ahead. Roseborough: Thank you. Had some very violent outbursts toward people in her family, her dad and her brothers. And she became more withdrawn. She had a lot of feelings of loneliness and detachment. She became so clinically depressed that I was concerned about her and referred her to a psychiatrist. The State argues Berry’s counsel did not address vouching, bolstering, or Kromah in her objection regarding Rosebor-ough’s testimony as to trauma symptoms and PTSD. Therefore, the State contends Berry’s argument on appeal is not preserved. See State v. Freiburger, 366 S.C. 125, 134, 620 S.E.2d 737, 741 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Berry maintains the specific ground of his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (B) holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal (C) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion
Output: (B)
its inquiry on the alleged lack of independence and interestedness of the remaining seven directors. C. Independence “Independence is a fact-specific determination made in the context of a particular case.” Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1049. To satisfy Rales, plaintiffs must point to a relationship that is so substantial that “the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director.” Id. at 1052. “This doubt may arise either because of financial ties, familial affinity, a particularly close or intimate personal or business affinity or because of evidence that in the past the relationship caused the director to act non-independently vis á vis an interested director.” Id. at 1051; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs argue that all seven Outside 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case (B) holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government (C) holding that plaintiffs need not plead facts rebutting the esop presumption (D) holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence (E) holding that a civilrights plaintiff need not plead facts relevant to a qualified immunity defense in order to state a claim
Output: (D)
challenging the convening authority’s denial of a government-funded forensic psychologist, failed, after the Government subsequently presented rebuttal testimony of a forensic psychiatrist, to revisit the earlier ruling or take some other action. A trial is fundamentally unfair where the government’s conduct is “so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973) (citation omitted). Appellant did not object to the testimony or qualifications of the Government’s rebuttal expert, and we therefore review the military judge’s failure to act for plain error. See United States v. Powell, 49 M.J. 460, 463-65 (C.A.A.F.1998) (<HOLDING>). As a threshold matter we note that Appellant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that litigant must object at trial to preserve error for review (B) recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings (C) holding that failure to object at trial should cause this court to review solely for plain error ie error that is clear or obvious and materially prejudicial to an appellants substantial rights (D) holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious (E) holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law
Output: (C)
that such an agreement permits a court to force the EEOC into arbitration under the FAA. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 462 (observing that “courts may not treat the agreement of a private party to arbitrate her action as the agreement of the EEOC to arbitrate its action”); Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 301-02 (upholding the district court’s grant of the employer’s motion to dismiss the EEOC’s ADEA suit seeking solely monetary damages but not addressing the issue of compelling the EEOC to arbitrate because the employer did not seek to do so). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized implicitly that the EEOC, acting in its public role, is not bound by private arbitration agreements. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Although a private arbitration agreement does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees (B) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (C) holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff (D) holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea (E) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs
Output: (D)
1997))). However, most courts have interpreted “conduct” to refer to the defendant’s underlying conduct giving rise to the plaintiff-relator’s cause of action. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbot Labs., 995 F.Supp.2d 357, 380, No. 09-4264, 2014 WL 348583, at *17-18 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 30, 2014) (noting a ease “allowing claims under the Texas statute to proceed without intervention if filed after the date of the amendment, but only as they pertain to fraudulent conduct occurring after the date of amendment” and dismissing a plaintiff-relator’s TMFPA claims as “ap-plie[d] to allegedly fraudulent conduct that occurred before May 4, 2007” (citing United States ex rel. Streck v. Allergan, Inc., 894 F.Supp.2d 584, 604 (E.D.Pa.2012))); Streck, 894 F.Supp.2d at 604-05 (E.D.Pa.2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. HCA Health Servs. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 2007 amendments to the tmfpa allow a plaintiffrelator to proceed without the state only with regard to fraudulent acts that occurred after the effective date of the amendment (B) holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity (C) holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective (D) holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury (E) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act
Output: (A)
the rule of completeness is served, such that omitted portions must relate to the subject matter of the portions the State has introduced. State v. Williams, 448 S.W.2d 865, 868-69 (Mo. 1970) (“Where a witness has been cross-examined as to a part of a conversation [with a defendant] the whole thereof, to the extent that it relates to the same subject matter and concerns the specific matter opened up, may be elicited on redirect examination”) (quotation omitted); State v. Perkins, 92 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Mo. 1936) (“[I]t is ... well settled that where declarations of the defendant are put in evidence against him he has a right to insist that the whole thereof bearing on the matter under investigation be presented to the jury.”) (emphasis added); State v. Sibley, 207 S.W. 806, 808 (Mo. 1918) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hodges, 575 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Mo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate (B) holding no error occurred in excluding portion of statement offered by defendant because the rejected portion of the conversation in no manner explains or modifies that portion of the conversation which came into evidence (C) holding that error if any in excluding portion of defendants statement to police was harmless because similar evidence was admitted through the testimony of another witness (D) holding that the portion of the retirementplan annuity paid for by the employer but not the portion paid for by the employee  is includable in the marital estate  (E) holding that because defendant initiated conversation leading to statement trial court did not err in admitting statement
Output: (B)
in the state courts of Arizona. The Supreme Court reversed the Arizona court judgment in favor of the trader, holding that no jurisdiction existed therefor. That holding appears based on two grounds: one, that Arizona had not accepted and assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction; and two, that to allow “the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.” Id., 358 U.S. at 223, 79 S.Ct. at 272. Most of the succeeding litigation has been attempts to apply that test rather than focusing on the exceptions to Public Law 280 jurisdiction. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (<HOLDING>); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states have authority to tax sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the tribe (B) holding that an express pass through statement is not necessary before an indian tribe may be required to collect cigarette taxes (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax (E) holding that both the state and the tribe can tax cigarette sales to nonindians
Output: (E)
creditor had neither actual or constructive notice of the sales contract. However, as explained by the Fields Motor court in its opinion, the basis for this conclusion was that, under the law at that time, conditional sales contracts were in the nature of chattel mortgages, which were perfected merely by filing or lodging the appropriate documents with the clerk. Id. at 1004-1005. Thus, it was not surprising that the court concluded A., 946 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Ky.App.1996) (“[A]s to any property for which a certificate of title is required by KRS Chapter 186A, a security interest in that property may be perfected or discharged only by a notation in that vein on the certificate of title.”); Frank v. Second Nat’l Bank of Saginaw (In re Gilbert), 82 B.R. 456, 458 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1988) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The dissent attempts to distinguish Baker 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the choice of law rules of pennsylvanias revised article 9 directs a trial court to apply the substantive local laws of the perfection state to determine whether  a security interest was perfected thus florida law controlled the perfection of a security interest (B) recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle (C) holding security interest enforceable at time of creation when state statutory law silent on perfection (D) holding that kansas law provides that perfection of a purchase money lien in a motor vehicle absent the filing of an nosi occurs when the electronic title and notation of the lenders lien thereon issues (E) recognizing kentucky as a state where actual notation of the secured partys lien on the certificate of title is a prerequisite for perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle
Output: (E)
and the statute of limitations did not start to run, prior to that date. It was in January 2006 that Gottex alleges it first learned that Veras would be allocating the Settlement Expense among its investors on a pro rata basis and, as a result, Gottex would lose some of its principal investment. According to Gottex, prior to January 2006, it believed, based on representations made by Veras, that its portion of the Settlement Expense would not exceed the amount of its profits. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97, 107-114. [14] However, in a securities fraud action, the injury occurs “at the time an investor enters ... a transaction as a result of material misrepresentations.” Lenz, 833 F.Supp. at 370; see also CSI Investment Partners II, L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 180 F.Supp.2d 444, 457-59 (S.D.NY.2001) (<HOLDING>). Gottex alleges that if it “had known of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding accrual of cause of action for purposes of statute of limitations occurs on the date on which the right to institute and maintain a suit first arises (B) holding that for a section 10b violation the sec must prove that the defendant in connection with the purchase or sale of securities made a materially false statement or omitted a material fact with scienter and that the plaintiffs reliance on the defendants action caused injury to the plaintiff (C) holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities (D) holding that for statute of limitations purposes the injury in a section 10b action occurs at the time of plaintiffs entry into purchase agreement not on later date when plaintiffs failed to receive expected payment (E) holding that a purchase agreement for a foreign corporations stock is not subject to section 10b even if the closing occurred in the united states
Output: (D)
Progressive argues that reforming policies to provide UM/UIM coverage equal to the liability limits would undermine freedom of contract. We disagree. As this Court has explained, “although ... public policy generally supports freedom of contract, the necessity of meeting the statutory and regulatory requirements plainly conditions freedom of contract” in the context of UM/UIM insurance. Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 18, 147 N.M. 678, 228 P.3d 462 (citation omitted). We seek an approach to UM/UIM coverage that “best balances the interests in permitting private contractual relations between the parties, and honoring the broad intent of the [UM/UIM] statute.” Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2004-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 18-19, 135 N.M. 681, 92 P.3d 1255 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). {24} In Montano, this Court struck that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance company should obtain written rejections of stacking in order to limit its liability based on an antistacking provision (B) holding that a closing protection letter offering to indemnify a mortgage company was not an insurance contract where although issued by an insurance company there was no distribution of the risk (C) holding that an insurance company may limit coverage only if the limitation does not contravene public policy (D) holding that when an insurance policy contains an antistacking clause the insurance company must obtain a written rejection of um coverage for each additional vehicle covered by a policy in order to clarify the insureds expectations and to make certain that the insured gets only what he or she has paid for (E) holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates
Output: (A)
§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the upward variance. AFFIRMED. 1 . We note that the guidelines provide that an upward departure may be warranted if “the defendant’s criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the defendants conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). Calderon does not argue that if the nature of his criminal history was actually underrepresented the district court could not consider that as a factor supporting its imposition of an upward variance instead of a departure. See United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 983-84 (11th Cir. 2015) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history (C) holding that defendants history of deportation and illegal reentry together with his serious criminal record justified the district courts upward variance (D) holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category (E) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category
Output: (B)
and Kee-ton to find that a Texas court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a defamation case for the distribution of allegedly defamatory printed material in Texas and elsewhere. Paul Gillrie Inst., Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting, Ltd., 183 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In that case, the Paul Gillrie Institute allegedly defamed a corporation with its headquarters and principal place of business in Texas and mailed the trade publication containing the article to subscribers across the country, including approximately fifty subscribers in Texas, some of whom were customers of the corporation. Id. at 760-61. I would hold that this case is similar to Calder a 875 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Wilkerson argues that he did not purposefully 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the mere operation of a commercially interactive website is not by itself an adequate basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction anywhere the site can be viewed (B) holding that postincident conduct does not establish the purposeful availment necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction (C) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that a trial courts decision on whether to exercise jurisdiction in a proceeding under the uniform child custody and jurisdiction enforcement act is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived
Output: (C)
forth in the Memorandum Opinion issued this date; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The Debtors’ Motion To Dismiss Appeal Filed By Regal Ware Inc. Of Order Approving Motion Of The Debtors For An Order (I) Approving Sale By The WearEver Debtors Of Substantially All Of Wear-Ever Debtors’ Assets Free And Clear Of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances And Other Interests Pursuant To Sections 363(b), (f), And (m) Of The Bankruptcy Code, (II) Assuming And Assigning Certain Executory Contracts And Unexpired Leases, And (III) Granting Related Relief (D.I. 27) is GRANTED. 2. The above-captioned appeal is DISMISSED as moot. 1 . See Operating Tel. Co. Subsidiaries of Verizon Communications, Inc. v. NET2000 Communications, Inc. (In re NET2000 Communications, Inc.), 2004 WL 2346148, *2 (D.Del. Oct. 5, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Polaroid Corp. (In re Polaroid 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens (B) holding that validity of sale would be affected where settlement was approved and the debtors assets were transferred free and clear of all liens (C) holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable (D) holding no implied assumption of liability under missouri law when asset purchase agreement expressly denied liability and bankruptcy court confirmed sale free and clear of all liens claims or other interests of all of the creditors of the seller (E) holding that sale of accounts receivable under section 363 was not free and clear of defenses such as recoupment but was free and clear of setoff rights unless the setoff was actually taken prepetition
Output: (B)
or development.” Id at 489-90. Applying this interpretation of what constitutes “internal tribal matters,” we held that the Penob-scot Nation’s operation of beano games was “fundamentally unlike” the listed internal tribal matters, was “not embraced within the general term” of “internal tribal matters”, and was, therefore, subject to enforcement under state law. Id. [¶ 16] In Great Northern Paper, we did not discuss the ejusdem generis approach taken in Stilphen. Instead, we adopted the non-exclusive, non-dispositive factors described in Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 486-87 (1st Cir.1997), and we reviewed legislative history, to aid in determining whether the disputed issue related to an internal tribal matter. Great N. Paper, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 48-50, 60, 770 A.2d at 588-89, 591 (<HOLDING>). The factors applied in Great Northern Paper 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (B) holding that the maine freedom of access act does not apply pursuant to section 62061 to the tribes internal conduct of their government but does apply when the tribe communicates and interacts with other governments (C) holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government (D) holding that the ada amendments act does not apply to preamendment conduct (E) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct
Output: (B)
evidence was “fairly overwhelming” that Wilson acted knowingly and willfully, and certainly sufficient to support his convictions for theft of government funds. Tr. Trans., Doc. 106, p. 102-103. B. Aggravated Identity Theft and ■ “Means of Identification” Wilson further argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated identity theft. He claims the use of the victims’ names on the refund checks, with no other identifying information, is not sufficient to identify a specific individual, and thus cannot constitute a “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. We disagree. This issue is one of statutory interpretation. We must determine whether the use of someone’s name and forged signature on a United States Treasury check sufficiently iden Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). While there can usually “be no plain error 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (B) holding that a defendants use of a persons name and social security number without permission constituted the use of a means of identification without lawful authority (C) holding a forged signature constitutes the use of that persons name and thus qualifies as a means of identification under the statute (D) holding that a party failed to meet this burden when he presented no corroborating evidence by the persons who could have given testimony regarding the execution of the deed such as the person signing as witness to his signature and the notary public who subscribed as having notarized his signature or a handwriting expert in support of the contention that his signature to the deed was forged (E) holding that even with substantial mitigation disbarment was warranted for an attorney who had forged his chents signature on a will when the chent died without signing and then submitted this forged document into court
Output: (C)
of notice pleading.”). For instance, the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) “may be relaxed somewhat if the defendant controls information required for proper pleading.” ilure to provide further details regarding any alleged fraudulent concealment was the result of the defendants’ control of the relevant information. She does in her subsequent brief, however, attribute her failure to identify which of the defendants was her employer to the defendants’ superior knowledge; but even this justification, if extended to her allegation of fraudulent concealment, cannot save her Spartanly worded claim. In those cases where the defendant controls information required for proper pleading, “the complaint must still ‘adduce specific facts supporting a .2d 1223, 1240-41 (N.D.Ala.2001) (<HOLDING>). In fact, if the damages sought by Morrow are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs wage and invasionofprivacy claims (B) holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim (C) holding flsa enforcement scheme preempted contract negligence and fraud claims (D) holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim (E) holding under flsa
Output: (D)
statutory considerations favored dismissal without prejudice. “[T]he district court’s judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not lightly be disturbed.” Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337, 108 S.Ct. 2413. We discern no reason to overturn the district court’s dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. AFFIRMED. 1 . In this appeal, Defendant does not dispute the propriety of trying him jointly with his codefendants. 2 . Although the Supreme Court has never held that a delay attributed to a codefendant must be reasonable in order to exclude that time from a defendant’s speedy trial clock, it has held that subsections of § 3161 may need to be analyzed together before properly excluding a period of delay. See Bloate v. United States, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Thus, our circuit’s precedent requiring that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under  3161h7 (B) holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation (C) holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7 (D) holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act (E) holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under  3161h7a
Output: (A)