niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
but they do not require it. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Swan Landing’s motion to compel arbitration of the foreclosure count of the complaint. As to the other two counts of the Bank’s complaint, however, the result is different. The counts asserting claims under the note and guaranty are breach of contract counts, which allege that Swan Landing and Yazdani have failed to perform their respective obligations under those contracts by failing to make the required payments. Both counts seek awards of money damages due to the alleged nonpayment, including amounts for unpaid principal, interest, and late fees. Thus, both counts are seeking legal (as opposed to equitable) relief. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Cerrito v. Kovitch, 457 So.2d 1021, 1022 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing one definition of prosecution as used in section 1 of article 3837 is criminal action meaning the entire course of an action at law1  (B) holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law (C) recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists (D) holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law (E) holding that  where an action is simply for the recovery  of a money judgment the action is one at law1  quoting whitehead v shattuck 138 us 146 151 11 sct 276 34 led 873 1891
Output: (E)
(defining “coercion” as used in Penal Code). 5 . Tex.R. Civ. P. 91. 6 . Id, R. 166a. 7 . Id. R. 91a. 8 . See In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.2014) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief to remedy trial court’s erroneous denial of Rule 91a dismissal motion; reasoning, under Texas Supreme Court's contemporary mandamus standards, that remedy of ordinary appeal after final judgment was "inadequate” because immediate relief "is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings” (citing In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex.2010) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.2004)))). 9 . See, e.g., State ex ret Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 909 (observing that Texas 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ricos reference to state law is not meant to incorporate state procedural law (B) holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable (C) holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law (D) holding that there is no basis under texas law to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the as applied constitutionality of a state penal law or state criminal procedural statute and that such a challenge must await trial (E) holding that a state statute that affects the governments ultimate liability is to be applied as substantive state law under the ftca
Output: (D)
not explain why “installation and assembly manuals,” “power and control diagrams,” and “drawings and part lists” for the installation of a megapixel camera that incorporates third party technology “derive economic value” from an element of secrecy that is known only to EarthCam and its employees. EarthCam simply relies on Mr. Sharp’s affidavit to conclude that the information contained in OxBlue 3019 “was not publicly available and gave EarthCam a competitive advantage.” In his affidavit, Mr. Sharp does not specify why the information on OxBlue 3019 was “not publicly available and gave EarthCam a competitive advantage.” Mr. Sharp’s belief and eonclusory allegations are insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Ojeda v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 410 Fed.Appx. 213, 214 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). EarthCam also does not explain why its 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing wjhen the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact (B) holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment (C) holding that a nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying on conclusory statements (D) holding party opposing summary judgment does not show genuine issue for trial by replacing conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit (E) holding that conclusory allegations in an affidavit have no probative value and a nonmoving party cannot rely on the eonclusory allegations to avoid summary judgment
Output: (E)
Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Gasaway, 863 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination (B) holding that juveniles request to call parent is assertion of fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination (C) holding that the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination was not prejudiced by a prior administrative proceeding based on the same facts (D) holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific (E) holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
Output: (C)
Perkins did not involve a situation, as here, in which the Board terminated an interference that was mistakenly declared because it initially overlooked the applicability of § 135(b). Because the Board should terminate an interference once it determines that there is a § 135(b) bar, the Board acts in accordance with § 135 when it refuses to address other issues of priority or patentability raised in that interference. Furthermore, the issues presented in the remaining cases cited by Berman, Quinn, Wu, Schulze, and Gartside, did not concern whether the Board is compelled to decide certain issues of patentability, and did not involve a § 135(b) bar. Rather, those cases merely applied the holding of Perkins to facts not presented here. See Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1421-22, 40 USPQ2d at 1159 (<HOLDING>); Wu, 129 F.3d at 1242, 44 USPQ2d at 1645 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys filing of a statutory disclaimer of all interfering claims does not divest the board of jurisdiction to enter judgment against that party (B) holding that section 1429 does not divest district court of jurisdiction when deportation proceedings are pending (C) holding that summary judgment on one claim that reduced amount in controversy below statutory minimum did not divest court of jurisdiction (D) holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending (E) holding that bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to enter money judgment in noncore proceeding against third party
Output: (A)
to deter. The specific fees and costs are discussed below. See infra Section II.E. d. Mitigation of Damages In determining whether the injured party’s fees are reasonable, the court must consider whether the injured parly fulfilled its “duty to mitigate costs by not overstaffing, overresearching or overdiscovering dearly meritless claims.” White, 908 F.2d at 684 (emphasis added). Defendant included in its statement the staffing expenses incurred by six attorneys, seven non-attorneys (support staff) and seven expert witnesses. Def.’s Statement at 3-5. Defendant also included travel expenses for three attorneys. Id. at 6. Many of Austin’s misrepresentations were contentions of fact that Austin falsely claimed he could prove. The contentions were rs, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see Kirk Capital, 16 F.3d at 1490 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that a district courts choice of deterrent is appropriate when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior  (C) holding inference appropriate when reliance is the only logical explanation to explain behavior (D) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (E) holding that it is not
Output: (B)
evaluate each piece of evidence according to its independent worth. B. The Copyright Act of 1909 The plaintiff renewed its copyright in The URANTIA Book in 1983, by which time the Copyright Act of 1976 had become effective. However, the renewal section under which the book falls, Section 304, is identical to that of Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Furthermore, as the plaintiff correctly states, “[t]he passage of the [1976 Act] did not alter the definition of a Svork for hire’ for the purpose of renewing a copyright originally registered under the [1909 Act].... Thus, whether The URANTIA Book is a ‘eommis-sioned work’ must be decided under the Copyright Act of 1909.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 n. 4.) See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1758, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 n. 2 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court (B) holding renewal rights in pre1978 works require court to look to the language of and case law interpreting  24 (C) recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result (D) holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent (E) holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language
Output: (B)
the factual dispute at trial. Whether otherwise reliable testing procedures were performed without error in a particular case goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Only if a party challenges the performance of a reliable and relevant technique and shows that the performance was so particularly and critically deficient that it undermined the reliability of the technique, will evidence that is otherwise reliable and relevant be deemed inadmissible. “Of course, once a particular theory or technique has satisfied § 36-18-30, a court may take judicial notice of that theory or technique’s reliability. See Perry, 586 So.2d at 251; [United States v.] Beasley, 102 F.3d [1440] at 1448 [(8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1246, 117 S.Ct. 1856, 137 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1997)] (<HOLDING>); [United States v.] Martinez, 3 F.3d [1191] at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court (B) holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice (C) holding that reliability of the polymerase chain reaction pcr method of dna typing would be subject to judicial notice in future cases (D) holding pcr motions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to the timebar (E) holding that the reliability of the restriction fragment length polymorphism rflp procedure was subject to judicial notice
Output: (C)
in Palmieri v. State, 745 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the opinions in McKnight v. State, 727 So.2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), approved, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000), and Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved sub nom. State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Palmieri challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (“the Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by previous opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the decision in Palmieri is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved (B) holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law (C) holding that the act does not violate separation of powers is not void for vagueness and does not violate principles of due process by allowing a victim veto precluding application of the act (D) holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment (E) holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment
Output: (D)
filed August 1, 2003). Various bankruptcy courts have disagreed on whether a live-in companion’s financial circumstances should be considered under the “ability to pay” test. Although statutory authority is absent, this Court agrees with the reasoning of those courts which conclude that its inclusion is necessary if they are financially interdependent on each other. See e.g. Short v. Short (In re Short), 232 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir.2000), In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879 (7th Cir.1998); Simon v. Murrell (In re Murrell), 257 B.R. 386 (Bankr.D.Conn. 2001); Foto v. Foto (In re Foto), 258 B.R. 567 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2000); Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394(Bankr.N.D.Ga.1996); Koons, 206 B.R. 768. Cf. Willey v. Willey (In re Willey), 198 B.R. 1007 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996)(<HOLDING>). In this case, a look at the complete economic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a public employee plaintiff is not required to show that the defendants action had an actual chilling effect (B) holding remarriage of exspouse and loss of income not to be a substantial change in circumstances (C) holding that projected disposable income for an abovemedian income debtor would not include a deduction for contractual payments on undersecured debt that the debtor would not actually be required to pay because the plan bifurcated the claim or surrendered the collateral (D) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default (E) holding that imputing girlfriends income on debtor could lead to a chilling effect on courtship and remarriage of divorced partners
Output: (E)
been completed and 2) further investigation into issues such as whether there was hair in the shotgun hole was not necessary because, if used at trial, it would have been perceived as “tearing apart the victim.” Thus, Roark’s decision to not investigate was essentially a combination of acts within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and one that falls within the category of strategic or tactical decisions that should not be second guessed. Hollon does not present any persuasive argument that' the investigation was below an objective standard. Consequently, we uphold the district court’s determination that Hollon has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. D. Suppression of Hollon’s Confession Hollon argues that Roark rendered in ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (C) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (D) holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different (E) holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
Output: (E)
language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability “from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik’s] attendance” it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik’s attendance at the gym — in essence all of Sydlik’s claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
Output: (C)
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 1209 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir.1985)). The district court must evaluate the record, including pleadings, affidavits, or declarations on file, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Missouri Coalition, 542 F.3d at 1209. Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations of his pleadings but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Gannon Intern., Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In considering a motion for summary judgment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact (B) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed (C) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial (D) holding that unrebutted evidence can and should form the basis for summary judgment (E) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed
Output: (D)
available — beginning on January 4, 2011. Moreover, he noted that Courville had failed to exercise due diligence in seeking to obtain that employment. Additionally, while the ALJ acknowledged the conflicting medical opinions of the physicians who had evaluated Cour-ville, he also noted that, in certain circumstances, the opinion of a treating physician may be entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-treating physician. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 830 n. 3, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003). Thus, he found that Courville had established a prima facie entitlement to the medical treatment recommended by his treating physician Dr. Sledge — including the surgery. See Turner v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 16 BRBS 255, 257-58 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, he concluded that, based on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions (B) holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing (C) holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician (D) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (E) holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith 
Output: (D)
Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory (B) holding that even though the guidelines are advisory a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendants guidelines range (C) holding guidelines to be only advisory (D) holding that the cocaine guidelines  are advisory only (E) recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts
Output: (E)
the crime of attempt. State v. Martens, 274 Kan. 459, 466, 54 P.3d 960 (2002). We have previously determined that the crime of attempted rape does not require evidence of attempted penetration. State v. Gonzales, 245 Kan. 691, 698, 783 P.2d 1239 (1989). Although the overt act does not have to be the last proximate act in the consummation of the crime, it must be either the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement toward the commission of the crime after the preparations are made. Hedges, 269 Kan. at 905. Mere preparations include “devising or arranging the means or measures necessary” for committing the offense. State v. Garner, 237 Kan. 227, 239, 699 P.2d 468 (1985). It may be enough for the defendant to arrive at the scene where the crime is to occur. 237 Kan. at 238-40 (<HOLDING>). Each case is dependant on its particular 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant committed an overt act toward the crime of attempted theft when he went to the owners property to prepare the cattle for shipment the next day (B) holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment (C) holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy (D) holding that an overt act may be a verbal statement or a physical act (E) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins
Output: (A)
the statute unambiguously defines the operative event as the discovery of the disposition of the asset, the statute cannot mean, that the one-year period runs from the claimant’s discovery of facts showing that the disposition of the asset may have been fraudulent as to creditors. To make the existing statutory term “transfer” carry that meaning, we would in effect have to delete it and replace it with a phrase like “fraudulent nature of the transfer” or “facts constituting the cause of action.” It is not within our authority, however, to rewrite an unambiguous statute. See Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999) (“We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature.”); FINR II, Inc. v. Hardee Cty., 164 So.3d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>). That exercise is instead the respo'nsibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court may not under the guise of statutory construction rewrite a statutory provision (B) holding that a court may not rewrite the statute to insert an additional requirement not placed there by the legislature (C) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (D) holding that the legislature may create or expand privileges by statute (E) holding that a court may not rewrite the insurance contract under the guise of judicial interpretation
Output: (B)
“changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.” By their express terms §§ 203(o) and 254(a) do not apply to activities that occur during the continuous workday. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (excluding time spent changing clothes or washing “at the beginning or end of each workday”), § 254(a) (limiting exclusion to activities “prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities”); see also Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37, 126 S.Ct. 514 (<HOLDING>). With these legal principles in mind, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that walking time performed after an employee performs the first principal activity and before the end of the last principal activity is not excluded by  254a (B) holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal (C) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (D) holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police (E) holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity
Output: (A)
207 S.W. at 516. Similarly, when a widow filed suit in her individual capacity and later amended her pleadings to assert her capacity as administratrix, we held “[t]hat this defect did not prevent her suit from being ‘properly commenced,’ ” prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. Davis, 16 S.W.2d at 118. We noted that: The defect in her petition was that she sued as an individual, instead of as ad-ministratrix. She was the real party at interest, no matter by whom the suit was prosecuted. This action was commenced before it was barred under the terms of any statute of limitations by the filing of the original petition and the service of citation on the Director General. Id.; see also Mo., Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 575-78, 33 S.Ct. 135, 57 L.Ed. 355 (1913) (<HOLDING>); Flores, 92 F.3d at 272-73 (5th Cir.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity (B) holding that a pension plan participants son not designated a beneficiary lacked standing to maintain an erisa action in both his individual capacity and his capacity as the representative of the deceased participants estate (C) holding ftca jurisdictional requirements satisfied in wrongful death action by substituting husband in his individual capacity who had filed timely administrative claim for husband in his capacity as personal representative of decedents estate who had not filed claim and could not bring wrongful death action under state law (D) holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity (E) holding that an amendment by a plaintiff to allege a claim in her representative capacity as adminis trator of estate under federal law related back to claims brought in her individual capacity under state law such an amendment was not equivalent to the commencement of a new cause of action so as to subject the amendment to the statute of limitations
Output: (E)
regarding the Marshals’ advance notice requirement did not, standing alone, provide the court with a basis upon which to grant a continuance under § 3161(h)(3). Compare United States v. Burrell, 634 F.3d 284, 292 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (concluding the essential witness exclusion could not apply where the government failed to present any evidence showing its witness’s presence could not be obtained through reasonable efforts) and United States v. Ferguson, 574 F.Supp.2d 111, 115 (D.D.C.2008) (concluding an exclusion of time under § 3161(h)(3) was not warranted where the government failed to present any evidence to support its claim the Marshals were unable to transport two of its witnesses in time for trial) with United States v. Patterson, 277 F.3d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). After concluding the district court violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not err in granting a continuance where the government presented testimony from a deputy marshal describing the hardship it would work on the agency (B) holding that trial court did not err (C) holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury not to draw any adverse inferences from the governments failure to call a witness because the witness did not have a relationship with the government such that one would expect him to give testimony in favor of the government (D) holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past (E) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment
Output: (A)
improperly removed the action as there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy fails to meet the $75,000 threshold. (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “compensatory, special and general damages in an amount according to proof at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.” (Dkt. No., Ex. A.) Plaintiff further states that the amount of the Note on the property in question is $440,000 (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. The question before the Court is whether, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Wells Fargo is also a citizen of California. See, e.g., Uriarte v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127497 at *9, 2011 WL 5295285 at *2-3 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 3, 2011) (<HOLDING>). But see Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2012 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count (B) holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center (C) holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes (D) holding that wells fargo is also a citizen of california where it has its principal place of business (E) holding that for diversity purposes a national bank is  a citizen of  the state of its principal place of business and the state listed in its organizational certificate
Output: (D)
a paid-up license was awarded. Although the jury heard evidence of two lump-sum licenses WhitServe had previously granted, the parties limited their damages arguments to past infringement rather than projected future infringement. The jury was instructed to award “damages,” which by definition covers only past harm. The jury’s verdict did not indicate that the award was meant to cover future use of WhitServe’s patents, and the trial court did not interpret the award as such. See Telcordia, 612 F.3d at 1377-78 (Fed.Cir.2010) (explaining trial courts have discretion to interpret verdict forms). We, accordingly, decline to find that post-trial relief was properly denied because a paid-up license was awarded. Cf. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). As for the injunction, while the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief (B) holding that the eleventh amendment precludes an award of injunctive or declaratory relief that is not prospective in nature (C) holding that eleventh amendment does not bar federal suit against state official for prospective injunctive relief (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that in a suit against state officials in their official capacities monetary relief unlike prospective injunctive relief is generally barred by the eleventh amendment
Output: (A)
of the Restatement of Torts, 2d.”). In Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 785 P.2d 726 (1990), the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated: “We have also been very willing to adopt the view of the Restatement of Torts to assist our development of new tort areas.” 109 N.M. at 393, 785 P.2d at 736. The Supreme Court of New Mexico explained: Accordingly, New Mexico has recognized as tortious inducing a breach of contract, adopting the view promulgated in Restatement of Torts § 766 (1939). Wolf v. Perry, 65 N.M. 457, 461, 339 P.2d 679, 681 (1959)(requiring that “one who, without justification or privilege to do so, induces a third person not to perform a contract with another, is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby”); see also Williams v. Ashcraft, 72 N.M. 120, 381 P.2d 55 (1963)(<HOLDING>). We have adopted the cause of action of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sovereign immunity applies to claims alleging tortious interference with business relations because the tort requires proof of malice (B) recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage (C) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge (D) recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations (E) holding that the difference between interference with contract and prospective relations is that second tort requires showing of malice
Output: (D)
was involved.” Finally, we are not persuaded by Quin-tana’s argument that the government’s presentation of evidence that might have indicated Quintana was a manager necessarily demonstrated that the government was on notice regarding the managerial role criterion. In any drug conspiracy hearing, questions may be asked in an attempt to demonstrate the defendant’s involvement. Such questions do not mean that the government is attempting to prove the defendant served in a particular capacity. Based on the general nature of Quinta-na’s objections, and the course of the proceedings as just described, we are convinced that Quintana’s objections were not sufficiently specific to preclude the district court’s reliance on the PSR. See United, States v. Flores, 9 F.3d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also, United States v. Coleman, 132 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners general objection to each and every recommendation was not specific enough to preserve an issue under section 10e (B) holding that a defendants general objection to his psrs recommendation of a sentence increase did not serve as an objection to specific factual allegations in the psr (C) holding that error was preserved by running objection because of defendants immediate objection to states specific question in combination with trial courts comments showing that it understood nature of defendants objection (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully
Output: (B)
in subsections (1) through (3). § 726.110 (emphasis added). The unambiguous text thus performs the exact function that distinguishes a statute of repose from a .statute of limitations; ,it extinguishes the cause of action rather than merely barring the remedy. For this reason, a number of courts in other jurisdictions interpreting various state codifications of the Uniform Act .have held that the statute is one of repose. See, e.g., MSKP Oak Grove, LLC v. Venuto, No. 10-6465(JBS/JS), 2014 WL 4385979, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2014) (“The use of the term ‘extinguished’ manifests legislative ■intent to eliminate a cause of action after a predetermined time period, a distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose.”); In re Jamuna Real Estate LLC, 365 B.R. 540, 567 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (<HOLDING>); Forman v. Jeffrey Matthews Fin. Grp., LLC, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute (B) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (C) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute (D) holding that provision is a statute of repose and noting that the word extinguished is emphasized because of its substantive effect (E) holding that provision is a statute of repose because by its own terms the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim it substantively extinguishes the cause of action
Output: (D)
drug trafficking activity and not mere possession. Information related to drug trafficking does not grow stale as quickly as information regarding mere possession. Payne, 181 F.3d at 790. Further, in rejecting the defendant’s staleness arguments, the Court in Murphy noted that the information provided by the task force agent [to the issuing judicial officer] and the execution of the search occurred on the same day. Murphy, 241 F.3d at 458. In any event, under the standard enunciated in Spikes, we believe a close question exists as to whether the information in the affidavit, alleging that an unnamed Cl had seen Defendant possess an unspecified amount of cocaine at least two days before the warrant was obtained and executed, had grown stale. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (<HOLDING>). However, Defendant’s probable cause argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place (B) holding that probable cause inquiry is whether considering totality of the circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband  will be found in a particular place (C) holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances (D) recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest (E) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable
Output: (B)
may not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended or rewritten.” Syl. Pt. 1, Consumer Advocate Div’n v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 182 W.Va. 152, 386 S.E.2d 650 (1989). As Syncor argues, the purpose of regulations is to give effect to the governing statute; such regulations cannot be used to alter or narrow the statute’s application. See Boley v. Miller, 187 W.Va. 242, 246, 418 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1992) (recognizing that agency’s statutory interpretation is inapplicable where such interpretation “‘is unduly restricted and in conflict with the legislative intent’ ”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Hodge v. Ginsberg, 172 W.Va. 17, 303 S.E.2d 245 (1983)); see also Syl. Pt. 4, Security Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. First W.Va. Bancorp, Inc., 166 W.Va. 775, 277 S.E.2d 613 (1981) (<HOLDING>). It is axiomatic that: “Where the language of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state board of administration is charged with investing and reinvesting funds of the state retirement system and is clearly an agency as defined by section 1190112 florida statutes (B) holding that legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute (C) holding that ijnterpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are given great weight unless clearly erroneous (D) holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (E) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous
Output: (C)
Through these amendments, Congress increased the liability imposed by the statute from double to treble damages, raised the civil penalty limit by five times, and added section 3730(d)(5), which provides for attorneys’ fees to successful claimants. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730(d)(5). In light of these significant amendments, courts were forced to decide whether Congress changed the remedial nature of the statute, and if so, whether municipalities were encompassed within its scope, b. Pre-Stevens FCA jurisprudence Before the Supreme Court decided Stevens, the lower courts were split over whether states and local governmental entities were “persons” capable of being sued under the FCA. Compare United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 738-40 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qui tam relator had right to proceed against county defendant (B) holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial (C) holding that right of selfrepresentation did not attach because defendant had made no indication of his desire to proceed without counsel (D) holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so (E) holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense
Output: (A)
to § 501.2105, Florida Statutes (2009), because Goble did not discuss any of the factors that may justify an award of attorneys’ fees or demonstrate that his attorneys expended any meaningful time defending BCS’s FDUTPA claim. (Doc. No. 165 at 6.) Goble objected to the Magistrate’s finding by reprinting nearly verbatim the arguments made in his Motion for Attorneys’ Fees which the Magistrate rejected in the Report and Recommendation. (Compare Doc. No. 155 at 5-6, with Doc. No. 165 at 10-11.) By merely reprinting verbatim the arguments made in his Motion for Attor neys’ Fees, Goble has failed to “specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” See Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. at 785 (<HOLDING>). Goble’s actions are akin to lodging a general 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (B) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo (C) holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing (D) holding that this court is not bound by the conclusions of law reached by the trial court and the applicable standard of review for such issues is de novo (E) holding that merely reciting language from a previous order of the court or failing to set forth the applicable law is not a specific objection to anything in the report and recommendation that would trigger de novo review by the district court
Output: (E)
did not present any evidence before the district court to meet his burden of showing that the affidavit, which directly corroborates Johnson’s testimony before the magistrate judge, is false or unreliable. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we readily conclude that any error was harmless. B. Credibility of Witnesses The district court’s findings of fact at a revocation hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.1993). “The credibility of a witness is in the province of the factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the factfinder’s determination of credibility.” United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We defer to the lower court’s credibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (C) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony (D) holding in the context of a criminal trial that a courts choice of who to believe is conclusive unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony (E) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it
Output: (D)