niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007). Kyler Road Home Charles first argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by not awarding him an interest in the home on Kyler Road. Although he acknowledges that Myra had acquired this property prior to the marriage, he asserts that he is entitled to an interest in the home because | ^marital funds were used to reduce the debt on the properly and to make improvements. Our definition of marital properly excludes property acquired before the marriage. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(1) (Repl.2009). However, we have long held that a non-owning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds have been expended to improve or reduce the debt on the other spouse’s nonmarital property. See Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (B) holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them (C) holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital (D) holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
Output: (E)
secured proof of claim was properly filed. The Court again wishes to stress that its holding today is limited to the facts of the case before it. The Court is not generally holding that replacement windows can never become fixtures or do not typically become part of the real estate to which .2008). See also 35A Am.Jur.2d Fixtures § 19 (stating that "[t]he characterization put upon articles as fixtures or nonfix-tures by parties to a purchase contract should be upheld where the rights of third parties are not adversely affected, no statute suggests a contrary result, and the articles are not so completely merged with the realty as to prevent removal of the article without material injury to the realty.”) 16 . Id. at 745-46. 17 . 77 B.R. 34 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.1987). 18 . Id. at 36. 19 . Id. (<HOLDING>). 20 . 800 S.W.2d 755 (Mo.App. W.D.1990). 21 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when third party rights are involved the apparent intent to an outsider are determinative (B) holding that while general objections are discouraged they are valid to preserve error when the ground of the objection is apparent (C) holding that apparent authority refers to a third partys reasonable belief that the principal has authorized the acts of its agent it arises from the principals indirect or direct manifestations to a third party (D) holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party (E) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant
Output: (A)
remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf” to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery (B) holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law (C) recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages (D) holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law (E) holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law
Output: (D)
§ 924(c) conviction is invalid after Bailey and Bousley, it argues we are prohibited from reaching the merits of his claim because Abdullah did not present his Bailey/Bousley challenge on direct appeal or in the § 2255 proceedings below. Alternatively, the government argues the claim is barred by AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Abdullah did not procedurally default his Bailey claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Notwithstanding such an assumption, we conclude the claim is barred because Abdullah failed to adequately raise the issue before the district court in this § 2255 proceeding. Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a petitioner for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Petty v. Card, 195 F.3d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 78, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (C) holding that court may address procedurally defaulted claim on the merits where it is more efficient to do so (D) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted
Output: (E)
In other words, the statement is trustworthy because it represents an event speaking through the person rather than the person speaking about the event. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. The lapse of time between the event a e reasonably concluded that Anderson had not been able to reflect or fabricate and was still under the excitement and stress of the shooting at the time of the statement. Anderson’s statement was made only a few hours after the shooting, an event likely to produce extreme excitement and shock so as to ensure the statement’s spontaneity and reliability. Because of the extreme nature of the startling event, and the short passage of time, it is highly probable that Anderson was still dominated by the emotion caused by the startling event. See Lawton, 913 5.W.2d at 553-54 (<HOLDING>); Cf. Aguilera v. State, 75 S.W.3d 60, 68 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing statement could be admissible as an excited utterance and still constitute a testimonial statement for purposes of a confrontation clause analysis (B) holding that a statement made by a witness to a shooting an hour or two after the incident was not an excited utterance as it was not made while the speaker was laboring under excitement and before he had to time to reflect (C) holding eyewitnesss statement made an hour after the crime properly admitted as excited utterance based on magnitude of crime and officers testimony that witness was excited and upset when making the statement (D) holding that a victims statement to her sister that she had been raped was an excited utterance when between the time of the assault and her making the statement the victim dressed herself and walked down the stairs (E) holding that an officers hearsay statement was not cumulative to the eyewitnesss testimony where the officers statement provided the only evidence of a possible motive for the shooting and where the officers statement was based on his own observations not the eyewitnesss observations
Output: (C)
objectively by a reasonable person. Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244-45 (Mo.App.E.D.2006). Here, the trial court found that the Employer’s alleged conduct was not sufficient as a matter of law to objectively establish severe or pervasive hostility based on a disability. Whether “a reasonable person would objectively consider [an employer’s] behavior towards [a claimant] severe enough to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment” is a question of fact. Cooper, 204 S.W.3d at 245; see also Howard, 149 F.3d at 840; 37 William C established, whether a reasonable person would similarly find the conduct offensive will generally be a question of fact for the jury. Cf. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (<HOLDING>); Y.G. v. Jewish Hasp, of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that whether misrepresentations would be highly offensive to a reasonable person are questions for a jury (C) holding that questions of proximate cause are within the exclusive domain for the jury and may only be removed when reasonable minds cannot differ (D) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (E) holding that whether an encounter is consensual hinges on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business
Output: (B)
a grade 13. Pl.’s Ex. N, Kress Dep. 14:1-6. And Allen says that Fiegel, Brockhouse, and he at one time all worked as Team Leaders at a grade 13 level before they earned additional tasks, titles, and promotions. Pl.’s Ex. B, Investigation Report, Statement of Shelton Allen at 152. Plaintiff cannot show that similarly qualified employees who were not members of plaintiffs protected class were promoted when plaintiffs request was denied, and hence cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court “may not ‘second-guess an employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.’ ” Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corrs., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996) (quoting Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 100 (D.C.Cir.1982)); see also Taylor, 350 F.3d at 1295 (<HOLDING>); Bolden v. Ashcroft, 2007 WL 2727221, *4 
 Holding statements: (A) holding monell claim fails as a matter of law unless a city employees conduct violates one of the plaintiffs federal rights (B) holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine (C) holding that because plaintiff falls far short of showing that the employer promoted other employees of similar qualifications bundy 641 f2d at 951 the district court properly held her claim fails as a matter of law (D) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (E) holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea
Output: (C)
Court addressed Jefferson’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, máde in his motion for a new trial. Jefferson pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. His motion did not set forth any facts supporting his claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the motion for a new trial raised only a general claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim was not properly presented to the trial court or preserved for appellate review. In his petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, Jefferson contended that facts in the record supported his motion and, therefore, that he was not required to make a more specific assertion. See Hill v. State, 675 So.2d 484 (Ala.Crim.App.l995)(<HOLDING>). Jefferson argued that the record on its face 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (B) holding that when the grounds stated in the motion for a new trial are evident in the record a hearing is warranted even though the motion is not supported by affidavits or other extrinsic evidence (C) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (D) holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial (E) holding that ajffidavits in support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgment must be filed into evidence at the hearing on the motion or filed into the record in order for the affidavits to be part of the record on appeal emphasis added
Output: (B)
court may not impose multiple gun minimum sentences on convictions arising from the same criminal episode. To the extent that the state’s assignment of error implicitly raised that issue, I would hold that defendant is correct. See State v. Hardesty, 298 Or 616, 618-19, 695 P2d 569 (1985); see also State v. Wells, 82 Or App 283, 285-86, 728 P2d 533 (1986). I conclude, therefore, that the sentencing court did not err when it imposed a gun minimum sentence on only one count in this case. 2 The inclusion of the language “with a firearm” in the title of the offense for which defendant was sentenced in 1991 is and was sufficient under ORS 161.610(2) to allege use or threatened use of a firearm as an element in aggravation. But see State v. Pies, 104 Or App 646, 650-51, 802 P2d 702 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 The judgment in that case simply sentenced 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting (B) holding that to be guilty of aiding and abetting under  924c the defendant must have directly facilitated or encouraged use of the firearm mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that the crime is being committed is not enough (C) holding that a defendant convicted of committing a felony with a firearm on an aiding and abetting theory might not personally have used or threatened to use the firearm and thus that the conviction might not count for purposes of imposing a gun minimum sentence under ors 161610 (D) holding that no active facilitation of the principals use of the firearm is necessary for an aiding and abetting conviction under  924c (E) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used
Output: (C)
the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. Such traditional legislation includes “policymaking decisions] implicating budgetary priories ... and the services the [government] provides to its constituents.” Id. Legislative immunity applies to acts within the “legislative sphere” even w sparse record, the Court cannot state as a matter of law that Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity. See Phillips v. Town of Brookhaven, 216 A.D.2d 374, 375, 628 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep’t 1995) (stating that “[i]t cannot be determined on the instant record that the individual defendants were acting exclusively in a legislative capacity, which is required for immunity to attach”); see also Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F.Supp.2d 648, 662 (D.Md.2009) (<HOLDING>). This ruling does not prevent Defendants from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity (B) holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights (C) holding that the doctrine of legislative immunity is not uniquely asserted on motions to dismiss (D) recognizing the authority of the district court to dismiss an action pursuant to  1915d based on the doctrine of qualified immunity (E) holding that the federal government does not waive its immunity where there is no private counterpart even when uniquely governmental functions are involved
Output: (C)
estate professionals, bankers, appraisers and prospective buyers often view property while it is under construction." Appellant's Appendix at 18. We agree. It was reasonably foreseeable that other construction workers, prospective buyers, and other necessary professionals would be visiting the construction site. Further, it was reasonably foreseeable that a person would step on the Celotex. Guy's Concrete and Modern were performing work and had some control over the opening to the basement and the Celo-tex. Further, Dawn was rightfully on the premises. Consequently, Guy's Concrete and Modern owed a duty of care to Dawn, and the trial court did not err by denying the motions for summary judgment filed by Guy's Concrete and Modern on this issue. See, eg., Blake, 674 N.E.2d at 170-173 (<HOLDING>). II. Proximate Cause The next issue is whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues (C) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (D) holding that summary judgment was improper where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether prison officials prevented inmate from filing grievances (E) holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the contractor where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding a duty to an injured construction worker
Output: (E)
the plaintiffs burden on the ultimate issue at trial.” -(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir.1996) (“We do not require a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels of harm, but there must be evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that a defendant’s emission has probably caused a particular plaintiff the kind of harm of which he or she complains.... ”); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1157 (E.D.Wash.2009) (“[I]t is not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely or use the dose-response relationship, provided that whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation are generally accepted d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Although Judge Workman expressed concern that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that differential diagnosis rendered expert opinion on causation sufficiently reliable for admission (B) holding that lower court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiffs expert where experts opinion was based on a differential diagnosis rather than epidemiologic evidence (C) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (D) holding that a reliable differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion even when no epidemiological studies peerreviewed published studies animal studies or laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion (E) holding that testimony of defense expert on false confessions properly excluded as not sufficiently reliable
Output: (A)
subject-matter jurisdiction over tort claims that are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations or proceedings involving the employment or discipline of clergy. Ex parte Bole, supra. In Ex parte Bole, the plaintiff was a pastor emeritus of a church and the defen dant was a lay member of the church. 103 So.3d at 42. After the lay member made statements to the church’s hierarchy (“the Conference”) concerning the pastor, the Conference initiated an investigation that ultimately led to the pastor being asked to refrain from further activities with the church. 103 So.3d at 48. The pastor sued the lay member, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (1995) (same). “Federal courts: Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1427 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1250 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty against pastor for sexual relationship with parishioner during the course of pastoral counseling was tantamount to impermissible clergy malpractice claim (B) holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship (C) holding that negligent retention and supervision claims based upon a pastors sexual contact with parishioners was barred by the first amendment (D) holding that first amendment barred adults breach of fiduciary duty claim against pastor for actions that occurred when parishioner was a minor (E) holding that first amendment barred negligent supervision claim against a church regarding sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest during the course of a marital counseling
Output: (B)
“that an implied warranty to repair or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workmanlike manner is available to consumers suing under the DTPA.” Id. at 358-54. Although Nelda’s petition alleged a claim for breach of a common law implied warranty and a claim for breach of the DTPA implied warranty, “consumers of services do not have the protection of a ... common law implied warranty scheme.” See id. at 353. Following Melody Home, a claim for such a breach is available under the DTPA. Accordingly, we conclude the DTPA’s two-year statute of limitations applies. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.565 (Vernon 2002) (limitations); see also Koehler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 05-98-01325-CV, 2001 WL 611453, at *5 (Tex.App.-Dallas June 6, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Fiesta Tex. Show Park, Inc., 980 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years (B) holding that an implied warranty to perform services in a good and workmanlike manner is an action available under the dtpa and is subject to the twoyear limitations provided by the dtpa (C) holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty (D) holding that texas law does not recognize an implied warranty that services incidental to helicopter maintenance will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner (E) holding that because the dtpa is the only way of pursuing an implied warranty claim for repairs to existing tangible goods such a claim must necessarily be brought within the twoyear dtpa limitations period
Output: (B)
to enter a home, a defendant's failure to object to such entry is not sufficient to establish free and voluntary consent. We will not infer both the request and the consent.”). 2 . The evidence supports the district court’s finding that isolated pieces of evidence not immediately visible in the warehouse area— most importantly, a “booster list’’ of stolen items on a desk in the officer area of the building — were in plain view while the agents were lawfully attempting to get Kheir’s written consent to search the building. 3 . Kheir declined to memorialize this consent in writing without first speaking to a lawyer. But declining to sign a consent form does not automatically withdraw previously given oral consent. See United States v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 240-41 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 712 F.2d 949, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding consent where two agents testified that the defendant orally consented but the defendant denied having orally consented and would not sign a written consent form (B) holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant (C) holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert (D) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form (E) holding consent invalid where defendant threatened by officer that everyone in the house would go to jail if he did not sign consent form
Output: (A)
dismissed by the district court as alleging only one cognizable federal cause of action, that is, for arrest without probable cause. We also hold that the defendants sufficiently pleaded qualified immunity with respect to count one. 8 . The insufficiency of counts two and three, which were dismissed for reasons other than qualified immunity, is not before us under the collateral order doctrine which permits us to consider the immunity issue. See Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1992). Nor does this case present us with an opportunity to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to pass on the propriety of the district court's disposition with respect to these counts. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, —U.S. —, —, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-12, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The district court's dismissal of these two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pendent jurisdiction allows review of an unappealable order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one  (B) recognizing the rulings in cook and weinberg and holding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review an order that was not a preliminary ruling upon which the appealed order was predicated (C) holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter (D) holding that certiorari petition is appropriate to review nonfinal pretrial evidentiary order in criminal case (E) holding that an order requiring an employercarrier to provide an ime is a nonfinal order for purposes of invoking appellate jurisdiction
Output: (C)
10 . The district court repeatedly referred to the implied preemption of Hughes's "negligence per se claim.” 11 . § 337(a) states that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b), all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this Act shall be by and in the name of the United States.” 12 . Hughes has asserted other causation theories which are untenable. She asserts that had Boston Scientific properly reported all bums (1) the FDA would have taken some regulatory action against the HTA, including but not limited to removing the HTA from the market; and (2) the HTA labels or user manual would have warned of the risk of burns associated with use of the HTA. The first theory is entirely speculative, Rod v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 931 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>), and could impermissibly allow the juiy to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice cannot merely be alleged it must be affirmatively proved (B) holding that causation cannot be proved based on speculation (C) holding that court may not accept claims of fraud based on speculation (D) holding that securities fraud claims cannot rest on speculation and conclusory allegations (E) holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding
Output: (B)
or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. These provisions have been narrowly construed to prohibit certain forms of direct discrimination between States within the legislative spheres to which the provisions apply: taxation and port-related commerce-and-revenue regulation,' respectively. See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85-86, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 2245-46, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) (upholding against a Uniformity Clause challenge an oil taxation scheme that had the effect of giving a unique exemption to Alaskan oil, on the grounds that the exemption was based on “neutral factors” and was not intentionally discriminatory); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433-35, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855) (<HOLDING>). Nevada correctly notes that the Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding over (B) holding that the port preference clause prohibits only positive legislation by congress that gives a direct privilege or preference to the ports of any particular state over those of another not federal enactments that merely confer incidental advantages on one port over others (C) holding that congress may not direct a state to enact or enforce a particular law or type of law (D) recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation (E) holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services
Output: (B)
requires. Appellees nevertheless invoke the broad purposes and legislative history of the Civil War statute. We think that is not helpful because, as the Supreme Court has said, Congress’ primary concern at the time — admittedly not its exclusive one— was to put an end to “frauds perpetrated by large [military] contractors during the' Civil War.” United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309, 96 S.Ct. 523, 46 L.Ed.2d 514 (1976); see United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York, 8 F.Supp.2d 343, 352 (S.D.N.Y.1998). Appellees point to the Supreme Court’s statement that Congress sought to “reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government.” United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232, 88 S.Ct. 959, 19 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1968) (<HOLDING>). But we think that description is too general 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract (B) holding that the term claim was not limited to claims submitted for payments due and owing from the government but included claims for favorable action by the government upon applications for loans (C) holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation (D) holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government (E) holding that the alien was entitled to performance by the government of its promise that the government would not oppose any of his motions for relief from deportation
Output: (B)
Dubé, who held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on December 11, 2003. On January 14, 2004, Judge Dubé issued his R & R, which recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that Defendant’s Motion be denied, thereby reversing the decision of the Appeals Council. Having received objections from both parties, the R & R is now ripe for consideration by this Court. Analysis The issues appealed from the Appeals Council are purely questions of law. Although a more restrictive standard of review applies if an appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is based on that decision’s factual findings, no presumption of validity attaches to the Commissioner’s conclusions of law. See Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore; the Court must conduct its own 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the district court was not required to discuss each of the factors on the record a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the district courts reasoning (B) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (C) holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact  (D) recognizing that when reviewing for clear error we usually must reverse if the district court applied incorrect legal standards to reach its findings (E) holding the district court can reverse the commissioners decision based on her failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
Output: (E)
159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The Court held: Our precedents make clear ... that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d at 413-14 (citations omitted). Thus, if a defendant’s authorized punishment may be increased upon the finding of a fact, that fact — “no matter how the State labels it” — is treated as an element of the crime for constitutional purposes. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. at 2439, 153 L.Ed.2d at 572 (<HOLDING>); accord United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that under the sixth amendment any fact which increases the penalty for a crime  eg by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding factual finding authorizing death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (E)
Defendants’ Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 22 (“Plaintiffs appear to be claiming that they are entitled to ‘Class of One’ review[.]”)) Furthermore, County Defendants did not explicitly address the appeal issue anywhere in their motion. Given this background, it was not error for the Court to ascribe the “class of one” argument to Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, nor was it error for the Court to find that County Defendants had not met their burden on the question of summary judgment. To the extent that County Defendants now contend that Plaintiffs “class of one” argument must fail because no other party has appealed for a waiver, this is a new argument that is not appropriate in a motion for reconsideration. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (D.Haw.2005) (<HOLDING>). Should County Defendants wish to re-visit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court will generally not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal (B) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions (C) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (D) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (E) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration
Output: (D)
culverts created a private nuisance for which it is liable without regard to the plaintiffs comparative negligence. We conclude, on the basis of the jurors’ answers to the special questions, that LWSC’s actions did not create an actionable private nuisance and that LWSC was therefore not liable under a private nuisance theory. In Massachusetts, liability for a private nuisance caused by the flow of surface waters from a landowner’s property to that of an adjoining landowner depends on whether the landowner is making a reasonable use of his land. See Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 916-917 (1978) (Kaplan, J., concurring) (announcing intention to replace rigid and anarchic “common enemy” rule with reasonable use doctrine). See also yon Henneberg v. Generazio, 403 Mass. 519, 522 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Triangle Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Pub. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing doctrine (B) holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims (C) holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law (D) holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with regard to railway traffic (E) recognizing that since tucker supra reasonable use doctrine is law of massachusetts with regard to claims of private nuisance resulting from the flow of surface water
Output: (E)
in tort; that will depend on whether the plaintiff can prove the elements of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress that we set out in this opinion. The extent to which tort claims could be disclaimed, liquidated or otherwise limited by contract is beyond the scope of this opinion. We note, however, that we generally permit exculpatory clauses so long as they do not purport to waive liability for gross negligence, fraud or other willful wrongful conduct. See Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 181 (D.C.2006). Such clauses may not be valid, however, in the context of transactions that affect the public interest. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522, 525-26 (1994) (citing Tunk1 v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 495-46 (1963) (<HOLDING>)). 19 . Alabama does not recognize the separate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public policy claims are unavailable where the statute in question provides the employee with a wrongful discharge remedy (B) holding that release of patients claims for negligent and wrongful conduct in hospitals preadmission form was against public policy and not enforceable (C) holding that claims for relief premised on alleged negligent wrongful or unauthorized conduct by the irs are based in tort and not within the jurisdiction of this court (D) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (E) holding that motorcycle training course is not a matter of public necessity and release does not violate public policy
Output: (B)
defenses to the existence or amount of its withdrawal liability, even a defense based solely on statutory interpretation.”); Robbins v. Chipman Trucking Inc., 1987 WL 13571, 1987 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6208 (N.D.Ill.1987) (failure to initiate arbitration within statutory time periods results in waiver of right to have an arbitrator decide the question of waiver; also stating that under the previous opinion, “[o]nce the federal court finds that the employer has waived his right to contest the withdrawal amount in arbitration, the employer loses. We believe this was the intention of the MPPAA framers. To give the employer one chance to contest withdrawal liability and to give that chance in the arbitral setting.”); Bowers v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, S.A., 689 F.Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Metro Transp. Co., 82 B.R. 351 (Bkrtcy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments failure to argue harmless error results in a waiver of the argument (B) recognizing rule that failure to initiate arbitration within statutory time limits constitutes a waiver of the opportunity to do so however in that case the alleged employers filing of declaratory action tolled the statutory time frames (C) holding failure to object in timely fashion at trial results in waiver of issue for appeal (D) holding that failure to develop a legal argument supporting a claim results in waiver of the claim (E) recognizing in dicta that failure to initiate arbitration results in waiver of defenses citing clinton engines
Output: (E)
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, implemented in the United States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231). 3 . Kamara also filed a motion for emergency stay of removal, which the District Court elected to treat as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and by order dated May 30, 2002, consolidated the actions. On July 25, 2002, the District Court issued an Order stating that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the habeas petition. On appeal, this court issued a judg ment vacating the District Court's July 25, 2002 Order and remanding the case, in light of our decision in Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 4 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar (C) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc  2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes (D) holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo (E) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608
Output: (C)
meaning of our statute! ] is a question of fact which must be proved or disproved by the evidence in each case.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Clark v. State, 169 Ga. App. (4) (61 SE 917) (1908) (analyzing the nature of “public places” and holding that “while a town guardhouse may be made a public place by an assemblage of persons there, it is not primarily nor per se such a place” in context of prohibited liquor sales). 8 OCGA § 16-6-8 (d) (emphasis supplied); see Ga. L. 1996, pp. 312-13, § 1; see also Minor v. State, 232 Ga. App. 246, 246 (1) (501 SE2d 576) (1998) (“Correctional institutions are public places within the meaning of the public indecency statute.” (citing OCGA § 16-6-8 (d))). 9 See Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 654 (6) (c) (627 SE2d 391) (2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United Savings Ass’n of Tex. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that laterenacted provision governed over earlierenacted provision and that a specific statute will prevail over a general statute absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent to resolve any inconsistency between them citation and punctuation omitted (B) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision (C) holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one (D) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (E) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter
Output: (A)
of common law fraud, it is considered a fraudulent act and is protected by 9(b)). We conclude that 9(b) applies to FCA fraud claims because not only is such a conclusion in accord with other courts and our more recent decisions, but also because its applicability is consistent with the purposes of Rule 9: (1) to inhibit claims that are filed as a pretext to uncover unknown wrongs; (2) to protect defendants from the harm that results from charges of serious wrongdoing; and (3) to give defendants notice of the complained-of conduct, enabling defendants to prepare a defense. Coronet Insurance Co. v. Seyfarth, 665 F.Supp. 661, 666 (N.D.Ill.1987). See also U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (S.D.Ga.1990) (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b (B) holding that rule 9b applies to fca (C) holding that californias ucl claims are subject to rule 9b pleading standards (D) holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b (E) holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements
Output: (B)
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring. Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I hesitate to concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion because of the possibility that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to impose a sentence below the applicable statutory minimum sentence. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 130-31, 116 S.Ct. 2057, 135 L.Ed.2d 427 (1996) (<HOLDING>). However, the jurisdictional issue, which was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum (B) holding that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 usc  3553e and ussg  5k11 or the defendant falls within the safetyvalve of 18 usc  3553f (C) holding that a district court lacks authority to pierce a statutory minimum sentence under ussg  5k11 (D) holding that a motion under  5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under  3553e (E) holding that government waived right to challenge alleged error of district court in failing to impose statutory minimum sentence under  841b1b by failing to object to sentence announced by district court
Output: (C)