niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem’s knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel’s family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
Output: (B)
and considering the totality of the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that they do not constitute reasonable suspicion for continuing to detain Garcia and Machacek. 1. Previous Arrests “Although a prior criminal history cannot alone establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support a detention or an arrest, it is permissible to consider such a fact as part of the total calculus of information in these determinations.” Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d 853, 858 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). Although the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether arrests, without accompanying convictions, may be considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus, it has implicitly found them to be relevant. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 603 Fed.Appx. 620, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Here, Detective Schaffner’s records check 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probable cause to stop a vehicle was supported by the fact that the defendant had previously been arrested for illegally transporting liquor (B) holding in an  unpublished opinion that information that the registered owner of a vehicle had previously been arrested for smuggling and was involved in a smugglingrelated seizure along with information that a border patrol alert had been issued regarding one of the passengers in the vehicle was relevant and probative to the reasonable suspicion analysis (C) holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with a revoked license (D) holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search (E) holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity
Output: (B)
court had not resolved, on the merits, whether LaConsay and Wetzel were entitled to recover litigation expenses in the condemnation action. Upon dismissal of their October 2006 appeals, LaConsay and Wetzel properly returned to the probate court for a ruling on their still pending motions for litigation expenses. The probate court subsequently ruled upon those pending motions, awarding litigation expenses to LaConsay and Wetzel. Langley appealed that award to the circuit court, and LaConsay and Wet-zel cross-appealed; those second appeals were timely and properly filed. See § 18-1A-283, AIa.Code 1975 (allowing parties to a condemnation action in the probate court 30 days in which to appeal to the circuit court for a de novo trial). See also Holman v. Bane, 698 So.2d 117, 120 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>); and Paulk v. McCarty, 855 So.2d 1123 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees (B) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (C) holding that correct way to perfect claim for attorney fees under  285 is through compliance with fedrcivp 54d2b which requires motions for attorney fees to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment (D) holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees (E) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees
Output: (A)
provision for premeditated murder, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, when it should have relied on the provision for non-premeditated murder, § 2A1.2. These claims do not rely on an intervening change in the law that has rendered the conduct for which he was convicted non-criminal. Massaro also invokes Alleyne v. United States in an effort to fit his sentencing claims within § 2255’s “safety valve.” In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury. 133 S.Ct. at 2155. Even assuming, arguendo, that Alleyne were relevant to Massaro’s sentence, we have made clear that Alleyne-based claims cannot be raised in a § 2241 petition. Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we conclude that this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court may not retain jurisdiction over a sentence when the defendant is sentenced under the guidelines (B) holding that only defendants who can allege they are actually innocent meaning they did not commit the crimes for which they are convicted may bring a petition for relief under crim proc  8301 (C) holding that prisoners sentenced prior to alleyne may not challenge their sentences under  2241 because alleyne did not render the crimes for which they were convicted noncriminal (D) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (E) holding that apprendi was not triggered because the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were within the maximum penalties for the rico offenses that they were found guilty of committing
Output: (C)
is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.”); cf. Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 2011 ND 78, ¶¶ 6-8, 796 N.W.2d 649 (contempt proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 held not an “action upon the judgment” under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(1)). [¶ 12] Because the statutory procedure for renewal by J11, 2007 WL 1453132, at *1 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. May 17, 2007) (stating Burk did not even consider § 108(c)). But see Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476,1483 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993) (agreeing with Burk that § 108(b) applies to filing of a notice of appeal); Di Maggio v. Blache, 466 So.2d 489, 490-91 (La.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 15] In support of its position that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal (B) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (D) holding  108b2 extended unexpired period for filing appeal but holding appeal was untimely (E) holding 11 usc  108b2 applied to extend unexpired 60day period to file notice of appeal to 60 days after order for relief but that appeal was untimely
Output: (D)
was a member of an identifiable group which is distinguishable from “white persons”. Other courts have attempted to ascertain, regardless of any “objective” definition of race and without questioning the existence thereof, whether the discrimination alleged was based upon “racial animus.” In any event, the cases applying this third approach abandon a rigid distinction between race and national origin and attempt to determine the “racial character” of the allegations in a more practical manner. Thus many of the courts in this third category conclude that plaintiffs state a valid claim under section 1981 regardless of whether their claim is characterized as one of national origin, race, alienage or ethnicity. See Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970-72 (10th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>); Madrigal v. Certainted Corp., 508 F.Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff could not assert a  1981 claim based on gender discrimination (B) holding that plaintiff who alleged discrimination on the basis of his mexicanamerican descent had stated a valid claim under section 1981 (C) holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee (D) holding by implication that plaintiff a brownskinned person of east indian descent had stated a proper claim under section 1981 (E) holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin
Output: (B)
2001 V. FAME JEANS, INC., 2006 WL 337552, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1861, 1862 (T.T.A.B.2006). 2 . Opposition No. 91163436. 3 . See, e.g., WamerVision Entertainment, Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir.1996) (intent-to-use applicant could assert its constructive use date to defend an infringement action); Mitchell Cosmetics SARL v. Pramil S.R.L. (Esphanna), No. 04-1557, 2005 WL 3273371, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18915 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2005) (Lamberth, J.) (affirming priority determination by TTAB that relied on constructive use); Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 986 F.Supp. 253, 258 (D.Del.1997) (defendant could rely on its intent-to-use application date for priority in defending an action). Cf. SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 539 F.2d 196, (D.C.Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Talk To Me Products, Inc. v. Larami Corp., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law not facts changed between filing and conversion law in effect on date of filing controls (B) holding the correct date to use when determining the controlling statute is date upon which the claim arose (C) recognizing section 44d applicants constructive use date based on foreign filing (D) holding correct date to use when determining controlling statute is date upon which claim arose (E) recognizing theory of constructive possession
Output: (C)
Supreme Court rejected Cook’s claim of error on direct appeal, finding that the prosecutor’s comments were not directed at Cook’s decision not to testify, and that the comment about the videotape was invited by Cook’s cross-examination and argument. Cook, 821 P.2d at 741-43. The district court agreed that the comments were either comments on the state of the evidence or invited by Cook’s arguments and cross-examination. In addition, the district court found that, if there was error, it was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Comment on the refusal to testify at trial violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Also, a prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify (B) holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accuseds postarrest silence (C) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation (D) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds testimonial silence (E) holding that the fifth amendment  forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accuseds silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt
Output: (E)
party have entered into an explicit agreement that the government will maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed materials.” Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236 (emphasis supplied) (citing Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 817). Here, however, neither Lloyd Blankfein nor Goldman Sachs share any such common interest with the SEC or the USAO that saves these disclosures from waiver. Blankfein is simply a third-party witness in this case. He is represented by his own attorneys, not the Government, and neither he nor his attorneys takes a position in the instant dispute. See Blankfein Dep. at 17. Goldman Sachs is not pursuing its own independent claims against Gupta, nor is it coordinating with the SEC or USAO in developing legal theories or analyzing information. See AT & T Corp., 642 F.2d at 1300 (<HOLDING>). The SEC and the USAO chose to meet with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit (B) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (C) holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts (D) holding no waiver where mci corp shared its work product with department of justice antitrust attorneys as doj and mci had common interests in pursuing their respective public and private antitrust claims against at  t (E) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing
Output: (D)
the period allowed for redemption the creditor file for record notice of intention to redeem with the county recorder or registrar of titles of each county where the mortgage is recorded. Minn.Stat. § 580.24 (1990). 13 . The City concedes that it forfeited its interest in the property under the mortgage by not redeeming under the Bank's foreclosure sale. 14 . The debtor's redemption period expired on December 2, 1988, and the City's redemption period expired five days later. 15 .The City would have no interest in the escrow fund under its assignment of rents even if it had redeemed under the Bank’s foreclosure sale because it obtained full satisfaction of the underlying mortgage debt through foreclosure. Compare Cross Cos. v. Citizens Mortgage Inv., 305 Minn. 111, 232 N.W.2d 114 (1975) (<HOLDING>) with G.G.C. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of St. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the assignment of rents clause contained in the mortgage was enforceable during the period of redemption for the purpose of securing the 300000 deficiency existing after foreclosure of the mortgage (B) holding that the mortgagee had no right to rents under its assignment of rents during the redemption period because it purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt at its foreclosure sale (C) holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage (D) holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt (E) holding that an assignment of rents clause in a mortgage is enforceable after foreclosure during the redemption period to secure any deficiency and to pay any expenses associated with maintaining the property
Output: (B)
to the facts of this case. Division orders are binding until terminated. See id. § 91.402(g) (providing that division orders are binding for the time and to the extent that they have been acted on and made the basis of settlements and payments, and, from the time that notice is given that settlements will not be made on the basis provided in them, they cease to be binding, and that division orders are terminable by either party on 30 days written notice); see also Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Tex.1987); Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1986); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 618 S.W.2d 240, 25 r, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); Sun Operating P’ship v. Oatman, 911 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); see also Bailey v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 555 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term (B) holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease (C) holding that lease was ratified when lessors executed division orders showing lower royalties and accepted royalty payments thereon (D) holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division (E) holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments
Output: (C)
Inc., 117 Misc.2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1983) (emphasis supplied). However, New York’s First Department has cautioned that courts are not to lay aside traditional notions of remoteness, proximate cause, and duty when evaluating public nuisance claims. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 309 A.D.2d 91, 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 199, 200-02 (1st Dep’t 2003); see also id. at 198 n. 2 (explaining that public nuisance claims generally may proceed where they “involve specific harm directly attributable to defendant or defendant’s activity”). Thus, the question here is whether UCC played a sufficiently direct role in causing the hazardous wastes to seep into the ground to be held liable. Cf. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, substantially for the reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (B) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (C) holding a corporate officer individually liable without piercing the corporate veil because he specifically directed sanctioned and actively participate in the maintenance of the nuisance (D) holding corporate officers and board members liable where they were actively engaged in the management supervision and oversight of the corporations affairs (E) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant
Output: (C)
hand, is the loss of an incident of ownership—the right to use. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 470 F.Supp. 105, 108 (1979). A. Because United is seeking loss of use damages related to the time required to replace the property, we are presented with the issue of whether or not loss of use damages are recoverable in a case of total loss of property. While loss of use damages are normally awarded to a party deprived of a vehicle during the period of repair, traditionally, recovery could not be had for loss of a vehicle’s use at regardless of whether the plaintiff furnishes the funds to hire a substitute vehicle, he or she still suffers an injury while deprived of the vehicle and should be awarded damages for the inconvenience. Annot., Recovery For Loss (1964) (<HOLDING>); Chlopek v. Schmall, 224 Neb. 78, 396 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent (B) holding plaintiffs could not obtain compensation for both lost value and lost profit (C) holding that plaintiff whose truck was demolished in an accident could not recover lost profits unless he could show that he could not obtain a suitable substitute vehicle (D) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (E) holding that in an action to recover damages to a pulpwooder truck where there was testimony that pulpwood machinery could not be rented the jury was properly instructed as to lost profits
Output: (C)
August 2001. He then made a payment of $658.19 in October 2001 but did not make any other payments until a year later, on October 28, 2002, when he began making weekly payments of $155.48 through the first week of December 2002 (for a total of six payments). In addition, on December 5, 2002, Roberts made two payments in the amounts of $2,250.00 and $1,363.95. 10 . We do not address the remainder of the issue, in which Roberts asks the court to remand the case for consideration of his attorney’s fees, because he provides no discussion or citation to authority for this request and because he does not point us to anywhere in the record showing that he requested attorney’s fees from the trial court. See Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454, 466-67 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable (B) holding that appellate court will not consider an argument on appeal that is different from the specific argument presented to the trial court even if it relates to the same general issue (C) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (D) holding the appellate standard of review in fourth amendment search and seizure cases is limited to determining whether any evidence supports the trial courts finding and the appellate court may only reverse where there is clear error (E) holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error
Output: (C)
were issued because in order to market a pesticide in the United States, the pesticide product must be registered with the EPA or be allowed within the provisions of FIFRA § 25(b). Despite discussions and correspondence between ACM and the EPA, which indicated that ACM's pesticide products were exempt under § 25(b), Rick Reaves pointed out an ambiguity on the labeling of ACM's pesticide products which caused the EPA to issue the stop orders. These stop orders do not preclude ACM from registering the pesticide with the EPA, and then selling the product. 7 . “Under Texas law, an action for money had and received is an equitable doctrine applied to prevent unjust enrichment.” Doss v. Homecoming Financial Network, Inc. 210 S.W.3d 706, 709, n. 4 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pel. denied) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The only valid and enforceable contract 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed (B) holding that although money had and received and unjust enrichment were pled as separate causes of action they are really the same cause of action (C) holding that a preliminary injunction was a reasonable means of preserving the status quo and was of the same character as the ultimate relief sought when a few but not all of the causes of action in the complaint were of an equitable nature including causes of action for unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust (D) holding that antelitem notice statute did not apply to claims for unjust enrichment money had and received and breach of city code because they are not claims for injury to person or property (E) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment
Output: (B)
fatal to the reasonable suspicion analysis nor completely undermines the officers’ testimony, which the district court found credible. See United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.2013) (“[I]t is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.”). Lieutenant Hart was armed with sufficient knowledge to form a reasonable suspicion that the Impala was involved in criminal activity even without a description of its color. He reasonably relied on the information provided by the Cl, whom he knew to be reliable and truthful, and by Detective Bacon, who recently had participated in surveillance involving a controlled purchase by the Cl in the same area. See United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Cl informed Lieutenant Hart (through 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that information imparted by a citizen informant is generally reliable (B) holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police (C) holding that an unverified tip from a known informant was sufficiently reliable to justify a terry stop and frisk (D) holding that information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a terry stop (E) holding that tip from known reliable informant that was immediately verifiable at the scene could form basis for reasonable suspicion and forcible terry stop
Output: (D)
of his experience’ in detecting criminal activity”) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers’ suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible
Output: (D)
(D.C.Cir.1979).” The rationale for the business-records exception to the hearsay rule is that reliability is assured because the maker of the record relies on the record in the regular course of business activities. See Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1987). The “regular course” of business “must find its meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question and in the methods systematically employed for the conduct of the business as a business.” Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943). When an organization does not rely upon particular records for the performance of its functions, those records are not business records within the meaning of the Rule 803(6) exception to the hearsay rule. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. at 114, 63 S.Ct. 477 (<HOLDING>). It is not enough to qualify under the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that accident report provided by railroad company employee did not qualify as business record where essentially prepared for use in litigating not in railroading (B) holding that gradecrossing accident reports prepared by a railroad were not business records because they were not prepared for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business rather the reports are calculated for use essentially in the court not in the business their primary utility is in litigating not in railroading (C) holding that daily reports prepared by agency investigator were not records within a system of records since they were retrievable by the investigators identifier and not accessed by plaintiffs name (D) holding that warrants of deportation were properly characterized as nontestimonial official records that were prepared independent of this litigation and were not prepared to prove facts for use in future criminal prosecutions (E) holding that documents that were not created by but that were received maintained and relied upon by a business are business records under  8036
Output: (B)
11, 2006, which appear to be duplicates. 7 . See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (finding adverse inference acceptable based on an inmate’s silence during disciplinary proceedings); SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.1998) (finding adverse inference and other penalties appropriate where plaintiff invokes privilege); Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir.1979) (permitting three-year stay of discovery where plaintiff invoked Fifth Amendment privilege); Steiner v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 85 P.3d 135, 136 (Colo.2004) (propounding factors for consideration before dismissing the case where a plaintiff invokes Fifth Amendment privilege prior to trial); Chaffin, Inc. v. Wallain, 689 P.2d 684, 688-89 (Colo.Ct.App. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Especially surprising is Plaintiff's heavy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege (B) holding adverse inference permissible in the face of defendants repeated invocation of fifth amendment privilege in discovery responses (C) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights (E) holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition
Output: (B)
the motion court found: Movant’s counsel’s strategy was to resolve the Federal Charges before the State Court charges, so that any sentences on the State Court charges could be run concurrently with the sentences imposed on the Federal charges. Trial counsel believed that if Movant was first sentenced on the State Court charges, the subsequent federal sentences would almost certainly be run consecutive to the State Court sentences. Therefore, trial counsel’s trial strategy was to continue Movant’s State Court case [ ] to be resolved after the Federal Court case was resolved. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to make a reasonable strategic decision designed to benefit a defendant in the sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 923 (Mo. banc 1996) (<HOLDING>). Point denied. 2. Alleged Violation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing because the trial record clearly indicated that the sentencing judge was aware of many of the mitigators that counsel was presenting to this court on appeal (B) holding that because appellant had waived review of constitutional challenge to sentencing statute by failing to raise it at the first opportunity the trial court correctly proceeded to examine whether the appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to the sentencing statutes (C) holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury (D) holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court (E) holding that constitution protected right to counsel at sentencing even where it was waived at trial
Output: (C)
experts. 5. Applying the Balancing Standard Assuming, arguendo, the balancing standard applies to this case, BNSF’s showing is still inadequate to permit it access to FMC’s experts. “The claimed importance of expert testimony underscores the need for [BNSF] to have timely designated [its] expert witness so that [opposing counsel] could prepare for trial. The importance of such proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.” Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792 (footnote omitted). BNSF created the situation in which it finds itself by not cross-designating FMC’s experts to give notice it intended to rely on FMC’s witnesses without a formal agreement as to their shared use. See State ex rel. Ward v. Hill, 200 W.Va. 270, 278, 489 S.E.2d 24 (1997) (<HOLDING>). BNSF has not been diligent so as to entitle 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception (B) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (C) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (D) holding that absent a formal agreement among defendants in a litigation proceeding involving multiple defendants the circuit court should not generally permit a settling defendants expert witnesses to testify for the remaining defendants especially where doing so would violate the settlement agreement (E) holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify
Output: (D)
provides: (d) Service and Filing. A proposal shall be served on the party or parties to whom it is made but shall not be filed unless necessary to enforce the provisions of this rule. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(d) (emphasis added). Section 768.79(3) provides: (3) The offer shall be served upon the party to whom it is made, but it shall not be filed unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce the provisions of this section. § 768.79(3), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). The offer of judgment statute and rule are in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay its own fees and are, therefore, strictly construed. Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla.2003); see Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1077-78 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>); Dade County v. Pena, 664 So.2d 959, 960 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in presence of any doubt a penal statute is to be strictly construed (B) holding that sjection 76879 and rule 1442 are strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay their own fees  (C) holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   (D) holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
Output: (C)
of the court, under the guise of judicial restraint, reverses on a motion for reconsideration of our decision in State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862 (“Aalim I”). But make no mistake: the court’s decision approves the arbitrary deprivation of access to the juvenile system and what should be the sine qua non of juvenile-transfer hearings—the determination whether the juvenile is amenable to rehabilitation. The majority does so by affording blind deference to the legislature, ignoring the requirements of due process and fairness, and artificially constraining the United States Supreme Court’s commands that we must consider juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders, see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (<HOLDING>); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses violates the eighth amendment (B) holding that the eighth amendment forbids life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense (C) holding that sentences imposing mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on individuals who committed their crimes when under the age of 18 violates the eighth amendment to the united states constitution (D) holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment (E) holding that the execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed capital crimes violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution
Output: (C)
to search effectively. Id. at 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861. [¶ 11] Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell, several federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of “publisher-only” rules similar to the rules at issue here. See Cotton v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 670, 672 (8th Cir.1980) (upholding constitutionality of “publisher-only” rule applying to magazines, newspapers, and books under reasoning of Supreme Court in Bell because rule is a reasonable and constitutional response to a legitimate and substantial concern for institutional security); Ward v. Washtenaw Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 881 F.2d 325, 330 (6th Cir.1989) (extending the Bell decision to include magazines because the rule was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Kines v. Day, 754 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Avery v. Powell, 806 F.Supp. 7, 11 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a us department of labor drug testing plan did not on its face violate the fourth amendment but emphasizing that the ruling did not preclude an as applied constitutional challenge (B) holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face (C) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (D) holding employers admitted policy discriminatory on its face (E) holding a publisheronly rule applying to hardcover softcover and newspaper publications did not violate the constitution on its face
Output: (E)
trial that he believed the behavior he personally observed did not warrant issuing a citation. Under Colin, these observations do not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion. Our precedent prior to Colin is clear that common, non-illegal motorist behavior does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. [BJecause most people are not such paragons of driving skill and virtue that they consistently adhere to each one of the complex laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles, there are many opportunities to stop targeted vehicles ... But those opportunities are not limitless. Suspicions must be reasonable, and they cannot be if they are not sufficient to cause an officer to believe that the driver has done something illegal. United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130(9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). This circuit has repeatedly held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a police communique has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion any authorized officer may make an investigatory stop on the basis of that bulletin even though the officer making the stop is not aware of the underlying facts (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity (D) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (E) holding that officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle that was under surveillance on the basis of its making a right turn without signaling
Output: (E)
The several eonflict>of-interest eases on which plaintiffs rely all involved elected officials of political subdivisions such as cities and towns which do not raise similar separation-of-power concerns. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), on which plaintiffs also substantially rely, is equally unavailing. There the Supreme Court held that twenty state senators from Kansas had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a vote on a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution based on their claim that a tie-breaking vote east by the state’s lieutenant governor did not represent a ratification by the state “Legislature,” as required by Article V of the United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court more recently explained in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997) (<HOLDING>), Coleman stands “at most” for the narrow 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the hatch act because the nature of the political activities they intended to engage in was a matter of speculation (B) holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant (C) holding that members of congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the line item veto act (D) holding that a passenger who lacked a property or possessory interest in the automobile or property seized lacked standing to challenge a search of the car (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
Output: (C)
evidence of a factual dispute. Initially, Plaintiff testified (and re-affirmed) that the picture looked like Midnight. Manson Dep. 360. Only when pressed about whether he had any reason to doubt the picture’s authenticity did Plaintiff voice doubts about the picture. He stated that Midnight had a “[sjhorter nozzle, bigger head, [and] nowhere near that many scar, if he had any.” Id. Plaintiff then testified that the pictured animal was not his dog, then hedged again, stating “It might'be, it just don’t look like him.” Id. at 360-61. In the absence of any independent evidence, Plaintiffs equivocal deposition statements could not prevent a reasonable juror from eonclud ing that the pictures are authentic. See S. Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 796, 809 (N.D.Ill.1998) (<HOLDING>). More importantly, the Officers had probable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may be sufficient to sustain a conviction (B) holding deposition testimony failed to create fact issue because it was internally inconsistent flatly contradicted by documentary and physical evidence and uncorroborated (C) holding that physicians affidavit created genuine issue of material fact even though it directly contradicted his prior deposition testimony where physician offered a plausible explanation for the change in his testimony (D) holding that an uncorroborated callers tip did not create reasonable suspicion (E) holding that uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction
Output: (B)
Matter Jurisdiction A. Sovereign Immunity The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity — embodied in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution — is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Article III, Section 2, in actions brought by a citizen against his own state. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Specifically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars state agencies and state officials from being sued in their official capacities for monetary damages. Keenan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 643 F.Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C.1986) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (<HOLDING>)). While a state may waive its sovereign 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when a state employee is sued in his official capacity the state is the real party in interest and as a result the eleventh amendment is implicated (B) holding suits against state officials for monetary damages impermissible where the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state rather than against the officer in his individual capacity (C) holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants (D) holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest (E) holding that sovereign immunity barred a suit against state officials when the relief sought required state officials to retroactively pay federal benefits
Output: (C)