niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
than recommended. 19 . CCP argues, without citing any authority, that gel coat is not merchandise because it is not mass produced for sale to the general public and is not a product the average person would know how to use. This argument is not persuasive. The fact that CCP markets its gel coat for sale to manufactures rather than household users is insignificant because the Act is expressly not limited to the sale of items for "personal, family, or household use.” Hundred E. Credit Corp., 212 N.J.Super. at 354, 515 A.2d 246. Moreover, contrary to CCP's assertion, there is no requirement that "the average person walking down the street" know how to use a product for it to be considered "merchandise" under the Act. See, e.g., Coastal Group, Inc., 274 N.J.Super. at 174, 643 A.2d 649 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the gel coat at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a purchaser of prefabricated wall panels for installation could bring a claim under the njcfa (B) holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child (C) holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim (D) holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea (E) holding child could bring action for enticement of parent
Output: (A)
as that act is subject to innumerable interpretations.”). Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in some cases, whether a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error (B) holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty (C) holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt (D) holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt (E) holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty
Output: (D)
Clauses of both the Iowa and Federal Constitutions because paragraph P of the parole agreement constituted involuntary consent. The State argued the search was reasonable because Baldón consented to the searches by signing the parole agreement. It asserted Baldón was still serv 0) (avoiding consent issue by relying on the special needs doctrine to justify a parolee search); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (adopting Samson instead of analyzing the parole agreement’s search condition under a consent framework); State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn.Ct.App.2012) (“By agreeing to [the search] condition of parole, appellant diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 496 P.2d 763, 765-66 (1972) (<HOLDING>); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 401 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing repayment of damages to society as remedial (B) holding that imposing supervised release condition that defendant report to his probation officer upon reentry into the united states is not plain error (C) holding parolee voluntarily agreed to consentsearch provision as a condition of release into society (D) holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation (E) recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law
Output: (C)
that the officer’s observation of Kaigler sitting in his car was an insufficient basis for establishing a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity — in other words, that the stop was-illegal. After the trial court ordered the cocaine suppressed, defense counsel argued that the other two counts should be-dismissed because the State could no longer prove a statutory element of each of these charges: that the officer was “in the lawful execution of any legal duty,” § 843.01 (resisting with violence), or “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties,” § 784.07(2) (battery of a law enforcement officer). The court’s denial of the motion to dismiss these remaining counts forms the basis of this appeal. Narrowly stated, the question p an v. State, 807 So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA) (<HOLDING>), review granted, 835 So.2d 271 (Fla.2002). But 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (B) holding that while the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer (C) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial (D) holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884 (E) holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty
Output: (B)
factors); Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 11.493 (2007) (discussing similar factors in assessing the value of survey evidence). The Coulter-Renken Study is based on a sample of 3,116 internet survey respondents. However, the study itself does not provide any indication of how this sample was selected. (Rao Deck ¶ 17.) There is no indication of whether the universe from which these respondents were chosen was a properly defined universe, or whether the 3,116 respondents constituted a representative sample of that universe. Without any information as to the composition and selection methodology of the survey sample, the Coulter-Renken Study is simply not probative of irreparable injury. See Vista Food Exch., Inc., 2005 WL 2371958, at *6, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42541, at *18-19 (<HOLDING>). For all of these reasons, the Court finds 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that survey with improperly idefined sample was not probative (B) holding that plain error review was not available for alleged improperly admitted testimony (C) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (D) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative (E) holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness
Output: (A)
that their complaints about working conditions were protected by the First Amendment: A “public employee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.” “[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the public would be interested in the topic of the speech at issue but rather is “whether the purpose of the [the plaintiffs] speech was to raise issues of public concern.’ ”... The record in this case reveals that the speech of [plaintiffs], while ostensibly intermingled with issues of child safety and DeKalb DFCS mismanagement, was not intended to address matters of public concern from the perspective of a citizen. See White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 510 F.3d at 1344-45 (some internal citations 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even as to an issue that could arguably be viewed as a matter of public concern if the employee has raised the issue solely in order to further his own employment interest his first amendment right to comment on that issue is entitled to little weight (B) holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   (C) holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief (D) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (E) holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech
Output: (A)
where the petitioner is in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed). In addition, we agree with the Commonwealth that to the extent that due process guarantees an opportunity to be heard on her ineffectiveness claim, Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard within the limitations imposed by the PCRA under the facts of this case: she was sentenced January 14, 2008; declined to raise her ineffectiveness claims on direc't appeal pursuant to Bomar; filed a PCRA petition on January 12, 2009; and raised the claim on which the PCRA court ultimately granted relief a mere eleven days prior to the expiration of her two-year probationary sentence. During the two years of her sentence, PCRA relief was available. See Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720 (<HOLDING>). Yet Petitioner neither requested expedited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of pcra relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel (B) holding that under section 9543a1 a pcra petitioner is not eligible for relief where the petitioner has completed serving the sentence before final adjudication on the petition (C) holding pcra statute requires that petitioner must be currently serving sentence of imprisonment parole or probation on underlying crime not only when petition is filed but also when decision on petition is rendered (D) holding that the plain language of this section requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his sentence (E) holding the bia did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner did not satisfy the procedural requirements for his motion in part because petitioner failed to submit a completed application for relief
Output: (B)
behavior of which they were aware); Gallo v. Wonderly Co., Inc., 2014 WL 36628, *8 (N.D.N.Y.2014) (a person may be liable under § 296 for taking no action to remedy discriminatory behavior); Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Autk, 77 F.Supp.2d 376, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (“the case law establishes beyond cavil that a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can rise to the level of ‘actual participation’ under HRL § 296(6)”) accord Cid v. ASA Institute of Business & Computer Technology, Inc., 2013 WL 1193056, *6 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (failure to investigate complaints of discrimination provides sufficient basis for aiding and abetting liability under New York City Human Rights law) (citations omitted); cf. Morgan v. NYS Atty. Gen. ’s Office, 2013 WL 491525, *13 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (<HOLDING>). Defendant also argues that his alleged 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that in this circuit a plaintiff may plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the ats (B) holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to  1985 for failure to allege a meeting of the minds (C) recognizing aiding and abetting conversion (D) holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position (E) recognizing that the failure to investigate could constitute aid and abetting liability but finding this plaintiff failed to allege that he ever brought the discriminatory conduct to his superiors
Output: (E)
regarding Ragnoli. App. 79. The letter explained that Ragnoli had requested that the BOP run his federal sentence concurrently with his state sentence. The BOP could accomplish this by retroactively designating the state prison as the institution for service of Ragnoli’s federal sentence. This retroactive designation would reduce the total amount of time Ragnoli spent in custody, as the State Court had ordered. The letter indicated that it is the BOP’s “preference” to obtain the federal sentencing court’s position on any such retroactive designations, but that the BOP would make its own decision if it had not heard back from the District Court within 60 days. If the District Court stated its position within 60 days, the BOP would designate Ragnoli’s place of imprisonment acco ir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Since the District Court’s letter was not an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the portion of a district courts order that included a specific place of imprisonment was only a nonbinding recommendation to the bop and therefore not appealable (B) holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation (C) holding that district courts nonbinding recommendations to the bop are not appealable (D) holding that a district courts recommendation that the bop not credit the defendant for his time in state custody was not appealable because the district courts recommendation was not binding on the bop (E) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error
Output: (D)
and to allow it to brief the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled as to potential opt-in plaintiffs in this action. ECF No. 14. The motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs response, and defendant’s reply amount to the' very briefing of the issue that the motion seeks. See ECF Nos. 14, 15 and 16. It boils down to a simple proposition, succinctly summarized by Judge Blackburn in a case cited by the defendant: “Tolling is available' only ‘when [a plaintiff] diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.’” Young v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 11-cv-REB-MJW, 2013 WL 1223613, R *2 (D. Colo. March 25, 2013). Cf. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, we have a district court order in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence (B) holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling if ae petitioner demonstrates  1 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 2 that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filling quoting pace v diguglielmo 544 us 408 418 125 sct 1807 161 led2d 669 2005 (C) holding that extraordinary circumstances did not include the mere neglect of the professional who was in a position to file a timely application (D) holding in a habeas case that tolling is available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control (E) holding that ejquitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence
Output: (D)
a pending criminal investigation, we conclude that a remand to the trial court is appropriate to allow the City an opportunity to review the field interview cards and to submit to the trial court for in camera review those cards or portions of cards which the City maintains are involved in an ongoing criminal investigation and exempt from disclosure. Petitioners shall be granted immediate access to all field interview cards not submitted to the trial court for in camera review. The trial court shall determine which of the field interview cards or portions of them are exempt from disclosure. An entire field interview card should not be deemed exempt simply because it contains some exempt information. Rather, redaction of the exempt information is appropriate. Eldridge, 86 S.W.3d at 574 (<HOLDING>). The trial court has discretion to prescribe 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records (B) recognizing medical records contain the same protected confidential information as a physicians direct testimony about the communications (C) holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential (D) holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information (E) holding that county could redact from public records any information made confidential by statute with any redaction  subject to review by the chancellor
Output: (E)
that Nusspickel was guilty of the aggravated battery charges even though the jury convicted her on each charge of the lesser-included offense of simple battery and (2) misconduct that had not been charged and proved relating to her alleged contact with one of the victims after the charged incidents. She also asserts that the State cannot carry its burden to show that the judge did not rely on these impermissible considerations. Generally, the trial court’s imposition of a sentence that is within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislature “is a matter for the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion, which cannot be inquired into upon the appellate level.” Shellman v. State, 222 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see also Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1987) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. State, 216 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (B) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (C) recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence (D) holding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the limits prescribed by statute which is not the result of oppression prejudice or corrupt motive (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
Output: (C)
should be excluded as part of his motion to dismiss, which the trial court again denied. This case can be distinguished from Stewart, supra, and Cole, supra, because Hilton did make a contemporaneous objection when the contested evidence was introduced. Although there are no cases involving the particular situation in this case, a review of Stewart, Cole, and other cases leads us to the conclusion that Hilton’s argument is preserved for our review. See Vaughn v. State, 338 Ark. 220, 992 S.W.2d 785 (1999) (stating that where defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress that was not ruled upon, defendant was required to renew objection and obtain ruling when that evidence was introduced at trial to preserve issue for appeal); Holt v. State, 15 Ark. App. 269, 692 S.W.2d 265 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In reviewing the denial of a motion to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence (B) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence (C) holding that a statute of limitations defense first raised in a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs evidence was untimely (D) holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion (E) holding that a litigants summary judgment motion does not satisfy the requirement for a motion for jmol at the close of the evidence
Output: (B)
2010 WL 877569, at *3; Hart, 1999 WL 225956, at *2). The court reasoned that because Samshi Homes acknowledged that the documents filed by De Leon were in the form of mechanics liens, the documents were instruments “provided by the ... laws of this state” and were “therefore not presumed to be fraudulent under section 51.901(c)(2)(A).” Id. The court concluded, “Samshi Homes[’s] complaints based on section 53.054 are therefore beyond the scope of the current proceedings.” Id. at 668. The court further concluded that “Sam-shi Homes’ substantive evidentiary claims — that it, rather than Kama, owned the subject properties and that Kama never entered into an agreement with De Leon — are also beyond the scope of the section 51.903 proceedings.” Id. (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *3 (<HOLDING>)). Although it is factually distinct from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action (B) holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured (C) holding that movant converted his motion for judicial review into an action seeking declaratory judgment by requesting rulings on underlying rights of the parties (D) holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits (E) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment
Output: (C)
had consented in cases of direct appeal to review post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where a record in the trial court was sufficient to permit appellate review. Id. The court declined Mr. Wheat’s argument and held that the new rule explicitly provides the “exclusive procedure” by which a person may seek relief in the sentencing court for ineffective assistance of counsel, and “failure to file such motion constitutes a complete waiver of the right.” Id. at 157-58. A change to the Rule 29.15 timing requirement does not change its plain language, which continues to provide the exclusive means by which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be raised. And this has been confirmed in cases decided since Wheat. See, e.g., Brown, 438 S.W.3d at 506 n.5 (<HOLDING>); State v. Celis-Garcia, 420 S.W.3d 723, 731 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not cognizable on direct appeal because it was not presented under the postconviction procedures set forth in rules2915 or 24035 which allow for the development of a full and complete record (B) holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal (C) holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced (D) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record (E) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record
Output: (A)
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we consider, below, under the Fourteenth Amendment Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’ actions violate their due process rights. 5. Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment Plaintiffs raise a number of procedural due process violations against Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants force them to participate in the five-phase treatment program at Atascadero; force them to take medication in non-emergency situations; and subject them to privilege reductions, access level reductions, and re-classifications. Plaintiffs allege that these deprivations occur without adequate notice of or opportunity to respond to accusations of alleged sanctionable conduct. The Fourte (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiffs may have a liberty interest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest (B) holding plaintiffs are not deprived of a liberty interest because they cannot have the best job in their field (C) holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest (D) holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison (E) holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges
Output: (E)
the issue, and whether the issue was proffered by one and controverted by another. See Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis.2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519, 525 (1973). The Wisconsin Supreme Court considers an issue to be “joined” between the parties when one party has served a formal pleading asking for relief against the other party. See id. (first co-defendant who served cross-claim for contribution on second co-defendant had joined the issue of their respective liability to the plaintiff; thus, first co-defendant was bound by judgment in that action, which dismissed second co-defendant). The formal-pleading requirement serves to ensure that the parties joined the issue between them by requesting relief, and that either party can enforce such requested relief. See, e.g., Goldblatt, 417 N.W.2d at 419 (<HOLDING>). The Streitzes and Marshall were not formal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim preclusion did not bar fire insurer from bringing a second action against its coplaintiff in first action (B) holding claim preclusion did not foreclose plaintiffs second action even though it arose out of the same lease agreement as that of a prior action (C) holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second (D) holding that entire controversy doctrine did not bar second lawsuit against defendant who was not party to first lawsuit in another state (E) holding res judicata precluded landlord from bringing second action for damages of unpaid future rents after a final judgment determined tenants damages arising out of the breach of lease in landlords first action
Output: (A)
that there is no coverage for diminished value claims are: Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 00-1503 (Fla. App. 4th Dist.6/13/2001), 788 So.2d 355 (finding no ambiguity and concluding there was no reading of the policy that obligated the insurer to pay for inherent diminution in market value where the insurer’s liability was limited to the lesser of the actual cash value of the property or the “amount necessary to repair or replace the property with other of the like kind and quality;” this loss is simply not the type of damage that is subject to repair and, thus, is not a covered loss where the policy |islimits the insurer’s liability to the amount necessary to repair the vehicle); Rezevskis v. Aries Ins. Co., 2000-1985 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 3/14/2001), 784 So.2d 472, 474 (<HOLDING>); O’Brien v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the repair or replace limitation of liability capped the insurers liability at the amount necessary to return the car to substantially the same condition as before the loss and did not include liability for loss due to stigma on resale (B) holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation (C) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous (D) holding car lessee specifically contracted with car lessor for liability for any and all loss or damage to rental car thus barring recovery from insurer under exclusion for liability assumed by contract (E) holding that if the insurer has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss that liability is for the face amount of the policy citation omitted emphasis in original
Output: (A)
(1934), 356 Ill. 340, 343-46 (deficient signatures on petition in court-approved annexation challenged by quo warranta; burden of justification was on defendant); accord People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 438, 441 (collateral attack upon proceedings of county court purporting to establish fire district permissible to reach jurisdictional defect in petition); People ex rel. Mills v. Fairfield Community High School District No. 225 (1947), 397 Ill. 233 (in annexation case, where record of court proceedings showed court did not have jurisdiction of subject matter because of defective petition, attempted judgment was a nullity that could be challenged by quo warranta despite court’s finding that it had jurisdiction); see City of Wood Dale, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 834-36 (<HOLDING>); People ex rel. Village of Long Grove v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction (B) holding that deficient jurisdictional facts insufficient number of valid signatures in petition will not confer subjectmatter jurisdiction for court to act (C) holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction (D) holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction (E) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case
Output: (B)
as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
Output: (D)
from this guard which, in combination, may suggest an ethnicity or national origin-based animosity predating the August incident. In light of these combined facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was, in fact, selected either as the target, or at least the “subject,” of the call precisely because of his known ethnicity or national origin. As noted in the Report, it has long been settled that “[prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause ... from invidious discrimination.” Report at 57 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). These rights, extend, for example, to claims based on denial of a right to participate in specific prison work assignments based on race. LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In a recent decision, a district court relied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population (B) holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison (C) holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison (D) holding that an inmate has no right to any particular prison job but prison officials cannot discriminate against him on the basis of his race in work assignments (E) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials
Output: (D)
Hill’s case, Ischa the drug dog was called out to inspect Hill’s car after Hill had already been arrested. Since the use of a canine here did not result in any seizure of Hill or his car beyond what he would have otherwise endured, officers did not need any justification for holding the car pending the canine inspection. By Edwards’s account, Ischa alerted on the outside of the car. Given Hill’s nervous behavior, his warrant for a controlled substance crime, his reputation for engaging in drug activity, and, most importantly, the indication from a qualified drug dog that drugs were in the vehicle, we hold the district court did not err in finding there was probable cause to search the vehicle’s interior for such contraband. See United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Munroe, 143 F.3d 1113, 1116 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a qualified drug dog alerts to the presence of contraband in a vehicle officers have probable cause to search the vehicle (B) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (C) holding that officers had probable cause to arrest driver and two passengers where cocaine and contraband were found in glove compartment and backseat armrest of vehicle and none of the men offered any information regarding the ownership of the drugs and contraband on the ground that the drugs and contraband could have been in the possession of any one of the three vehicle occupants or all three of them jointly (D) holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle (E) holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle
Output: (A)
references to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32 are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 2 A "Johnny cab" is a private vehicle driven by a retired person who provides an informal, unlicensed transportation service for a fee. 3 The Supreme Court has specifically held that Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.32(1), as interpreted by this court, meets the constitutional requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 440 (1988). 4 The current rule contains a more detailed procedure and several additional provisions than the version in effect at the time of Allen's no-merit appeal. See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.32 (2007-08). 5 See Wis. Stat. § 809.32(l)(b) (2007-08). 6 See State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 7 In State v. Tillman, the court of appeals 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus (B) holding the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition challenging a  1231a5 reinstatement proceeding explaining the appropriate court of appeals is the sole and exclusive means to review a  1231a5 order reinstating a prior removal order (C) holding that a habeas petition in the court of appeals is the exclusive remedy for challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel (D) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction (E) holding habeas petition challenging denial of custody credits is not related to the conditions of  confinement and was properly brought in the district of conviction
Output: (C)
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remand for the entry of an order dismissing Walker’s complaint. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Ellington, C. J., and Phipps, P. J., concur. Decided September 6, 2012. Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Dalton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Hube & Tucker, Josh D. Tucker, Douglas G. Exley, for appellee. 1 See Welch v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 276 Ga. App. 664, 665 (624 SE2d 177) (2005) (“We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under the de novo standard of review.” (punctuation omitted)). 2 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). 3 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (4). 4 Id. 5 Cummings v. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 2 86 SE2d 826) (1997) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Camp v. Coweta County, 280 Ga. 199, 201 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice (B) holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute (C) holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after (D) holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice (E) recognizing that the applicant received notice from the plea form even though such notice was not required
Output: (C)
803 So.2d 598, 605-07 (Fla.2001); Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 511 (Fla.2005) (citing Escobar for the proposition that “police misrepresentations alone do not necessarily render a confession involuntary,” but rendering this holding in the context of a case in which the police investigator misrepresented the extent of the inculpatory evidence in the case he was actually investigating)-, Davis v. State, 859 So.2d 465, 472 (Fla.2003) (confession voluntary despite law enforcement’s characterization of the situation confronting the defendant as a “missing-person ease”; the detectives accurately informed the defendant of the identity of the missing person and simply neglected to inform him that they already knew the victim was dead); Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521-22 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). In short, the common theme linking each of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless (B) recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion (C) holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature (D) holding confession voluntary despite police misrepresentation of the thenunknown inculpatory nature of the applicable dna evidence (E) holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue
Output: (D)
on the meaning of this phrase. We disagree with Sachs's argument that the sale of only UPCM's stock and not its real property assets automatically places this transaction outside the reach of UREBA. Despite the fact that stocks or shares in a corporation are generally considered personal property, there are occasions when their transfer is entirely secondary to the transfer of real property assets. See J.I. Kislak v. Carol Mgmt. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 428, 184 N.Y.S.2d 815, 318 (N.Y.App.Div.1959) ("A sale of all of the stock of a corporation has been held to be a sale of its assets.") (internal quotation marks omitted). A number of jurisdictions analyze such transactions in terms of their substance rather than their form. See, e.g., Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 86-89 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Shochet See., Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale (B) holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made (C) holding the real estate sale proceeds (D) holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale (E) holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale
Output: (E)
1068 (1952) (free speech and equal protection); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (equal protection). The government argues that the parts of the regulations authorizing cable operators to deny access to indecent material do not trigger First or Fifth Amendment analysis because a private cable operator — not the government — would be denying access to indecent material. See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief at 16. However, even where it is the decision of a private person which ultimately triggers the abridgment of speech, or effects the challenged discrimination, the state may nevertheless be held responsible if it significantly encouraged the private actor to commit the infringement. See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 592 n. 38 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). We hold that section 10 significantly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding governments encouragement through witness protection program of mothers decision to keep children from father constituted state action (B) holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother placed children with father who lived transient lifestyle with children (C) holding evidence supported termination of mothers parental rights where among other factors mother knowingly allowed abusive and sexually deviant father to have access to children (D) holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree (E) holding fathers pleadings representing himself to be the father of the children constituted a judicial admission
Output: (A)
injuries, except her aff concerning the degree of disability associated with the preexisting condition versus that arising from the falls, the Commission was not compelled to believe it and could reject all or any part of it which it did not consider credible. Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo.App. S.D.1986). “The degree of disability resulting from an injury and preexisting conditions are questions of fact resolved by the Commission.” Carter v. Frito-Lay, 913 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Mo.App. E.D.1995). “The decision to accept one of two conflicting medical opinions is an issue of fact for the Commission.” Johnson v. Denton Constr. Co., 911 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo.banc 1995); see also Duncan v. Springfield R-12 Sch. Dist., 897 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Mo.App. S.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Commission chose to accept the testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight of a classification determination depends upon all those factors which give it power to persuade (B) holding that the interests of two insurance companies were adverse under wis stat  102231a 19891990 relating to workers compensation when the respective liability of the two insurance companies depends on the determination of the date of injury (C) holding that under the doctrine the district court should have stayed the diversityjurisdiction case pending the state workers compensation commissions final decision on whether the defendant properly paid certain workers compensation claims (D) holding that wjhere the right to compensation depends upon which of two conflicting medical theories should be accepted the issue is peculiarly for commissions determination (E) holding that deference to the guidelines depends on the thoroughness of the commissions analysis and the validity of its reasoning
Output: (D)