niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
could not be read to require the payment of money for their breach). Money damages are the default remedy for breach of contract. San Juan City College v. United States, 391 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2004). The law presumes that damages will be available for breach of a contract by the Government. Id.; see also Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (stating that “in the area of government contracts ... there is a presumption in the civil context that a damages remedy will be available upon the breach of an agreement”); Taylor v. United States, 73 Fed.Cl. 532, 545 (2006) (noting that the “contract itself does not need to be money-mandating because money damages are the default remedy for a breach of contract.”). But see, e.g., Phillips, 77 Fed.Cl. at 518-19 (<HOLDING>). Phillips involved a settlement agreement that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages (B) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (C) holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach (D) holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract (E) holding that breach of a duty to seek reassignment for plaintiff did not create a substantive right to money damages
Output: (E)
and 2008, he saw 40 to 50 photographs of people posing in front of the brick Amberfield Subdivision sign, including Zamudio, Jacobo, Gonzalez, and a man named Flores, with the latter two making Sureños 13 “gang signs.” Zamudio argues on appeal that the State should have been required to produce the photographs or web pages themselves under the best evidence rule, while conceding that former OCGA § 24-5-4, which was applicable to this trial, did not generally apply to photographs or recordings. Assuming that the objection made at trial was sufficient to raise a best evidence objection, we find no error. Photographs were not considered writings under former OCGA § 24-5-4, and were therefore not subject to the best evidence rule. See Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 5, 8 (2) (222 SE2d 357) (1976) (<HOLDING>). Zamudio also argues that the detective’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the best evidence rule did not apply to a photograph of a police lineup (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion (C) holding that where the actual content of a 911 tape was never in dispute the best evidence rule was inapplicable (D) holding that best interest of child need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted
Output: (A)
claim of CUE is a collateral attack that can only be made on a final RO or Board decision, see id. at 1380-81, and generally, rating decisions by the VA are deemed “final and binding ... as to conclusions based on the evidence on file at the time the VA issues written notification” of a decision, 38 C.F.R. § 3.104(a). In cases of grave procedural error, however, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has consistently held that RO or Board decisions are not final for purposes of direct appeal. See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (concluding that “where VA has failed to procedurally comply with statutorily mandated requirements, a claim does not become final for purposes of appeal to the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims]”); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 VetApp. 662, 666 (1992) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where va never sent the claimant a formal application form pursuant to  3155 the oneyear time period to return it could not have begun to run and therefore the effective date of the claim was the date of the informal claim (B) holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury (C) holding that where an appellant never received notification of any denial  the oneyear period within which to file an nod which commences with the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial review or determination did not begin to run (D) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer (E) holding that the time in which to file a petition for review of a commissioners order commences upon the signing of the written order
Output: (C)
be given to the fact he did so, or that his parents and lawyers approved. 4 . At one point in his testimony, Hodges proudly proclaimed that during 1999 he had closed over 100 transactions for Defendant earning his employer over $600,000 in gross profit. 5 . Several of the lawyers who serve as officers for Defendant apparently graduated together from Rutgers Law School in New Jersey. 6 . Of course, if Wiggins was incapable of contracting with Defendant, which was likely the ultimate issue in any litigation, his agreement to litigate in New Jersey was also unenforceable. 7 . Defendant argued that Plaintiff should not be able to assert claims under the ICPA or for breach of fiduciary duty because those claims were not adequately pled in Plaintiff's complaint. See Supp.2d 319 (D.Vt.1999) (<HOLDING>); contra Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 254 
 Holding statements: (A) holding antiassignment clause in structured settlement is enforceable (B) holding hellorhighwater clause enforceable in the absence of fraud or deceit (C) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (D) holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract (E) holding antiassignment provision precludes assignment of structured settlement payments
Output: (A)
role had been limited in scope and analogous to the services contemplated by these rules, we must consider the par ties’ arguments regarding inherent judicial authority as the source of the judge’s authority to issue the order in this case. 2. Judge’s inherent authority to appoint a parent coordinator. The mother argues that without express authorization by statute or court rule, and without agreement of the parties, the judge was without authority to appoint a parent coordinator in this case. The father argues that the use of parent coordinators in Massachusetts has become increasingly common, and that in the absence of a statutory prohibition, it was a permissible exercise of the judge’s discretion to appoint a parent coordinator. See Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 561 (1982) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that judges in the Probate and 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the broad power of federal courts to fashion appropriate relief (B) holding that the finder of fact is given broad discretion in determining what promotes the childrens best interests (C) recognizing that in decidingclaims arising under the probate code a court may exercise its equitable powers unless explicitly forbidden to do so (D) recognizing broad equitable power of probate court to act in best interests of persons in its jurisdiction (E) recognizing broad district court discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its docket
Output: (D)
19, 28, 482 N.Y.S.2d 810, 818 (2d Dep’t 1984); Family Court Act § 439(e). Nevertheless, the issues underlying both orders were reviewable on appeal from the state court’s final order dated May 30, 2001. See Matter of Ise-Smith v. Orok-Edem, 296 A.D.2d 414, 414-15, 745 N.Y.S.2d 461, 461 (2d Dep’t 2002). To this extent, it appears that Edem was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the challenged orders, which suggests that his due process claim is frivolous. We do not, however, reach that issue. Rather, we summarize the state proceedings only to illustrate that Edem’s procedural due process claims are, in fact, inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment, and thus, outside our subject matter jurisdiction. See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As we observed in Hoblock v. Albany County 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court may not review family court determinations that were decided after providing plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues (B) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (C) holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator (D) holding that the concept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case (E) holding that the petitioner who was denied further appellate review by the supreme judicial court had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state trial court and appeals court and thus stone precluded federal habeas relief
Output: (A)
trial may nevertheless raise a material issue of fact on summary judgment if that evidence can be rendered admissible at trial. For example, in Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264 (7th Cir.1994), the Seventh Circuit explained that it is the substance of the affidavit and not the form that controls: The evidence need not be in admissible form; affidavits are ordinarily not admissible evidence at a trial. But it must be admissible in content .... Occasional statements in cases that the party op posing summary judgment must present admissible evidence should be understood in this light, as referring to the content or substance, rather than the form, of the submission. Id. at 1267-68 (citation omitted) (italics in original); see also McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), affd sub. nom, McMillian v. Monroe County, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (B) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial (C) holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage (D) holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial (E) holding that any evidence considered by a court at the summary judgment stage must be capable of being converted into admissible evidence id at 1369
Output: (B)
it from regulatory jurisdiction, which “extends to the entire surface and bed of all waterbodies subject to tidal action ... even though portions of such waterbodies may be extremely shallow.” 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(b). Once made, a determination of navigability applies over the entire surface of the water and “is not extinguished by later actions or events which impede or destroy the navigable capacity.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(c). Under this broad definition, the waters in which Gateway’s piers stand are clearly navigable. There is ample authority that under the RHA the government can remove structures that were erected lawfully but subsequently found to be in navigable waters under the RHA. See, e.g., Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 35 S.Ct. 551, 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (<HOLDING>); Donnell v. U.S., 834 F.Supp. 19, 25-27 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that secretary of war could not be enjoined from redrawing harbor lines effectively forcing owner to remove 200 feet of lawfully constructed wharf that obstructed channel widening and deepening project (B) holding that a landowner whose property was taken in a highway widening project could recover only for the lost land and not for losses caused by traffic islands constructed as part of the same project (C) holding that loss of access resulting from a median strip constructed as part of a highway widening project was a proper consideration because any factor that has a present quantifiable effect on the market value of the property is proper as an element of damages (D) holding that corps may order wharf owners to remove portion of legally constructed wharf in navigable waters to allow for construction of dock (E) holding that even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties
Output: (A)
the direction that McDowell testified the assailant fled. Other evidence also confirmed that Hayward’s blood was found in the victim’s pockets and on the car. The discrepancies in McDowell’s testimony did not prove that he failed to observe or could not recall the most important points about which he testified. Hayward is correct that the trial court relied on McDowell’s testimony that Des-tefano said “I don’t have no more” in finding that the murder occurred during a robbery for pecuniary gain. However, that aspect of McDowell’s testimony never wavered. Although McDowell was older, in poor health, and possibly confused about some aspects of the event he witnessed, that does not provide a basis to disqualify him. See, e.g., Belcher v. Johnson, 834 So.2d 422, 422-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Even insanity of a witness has been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an elderly woman with dementia is not disqualified as a witness simply for those reasons (B) holding that an order was final for these identical reasons (C) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (D) holding that juror was not automatically disqualified under beckett because of the jurors friendship with a law enforcement officer who was a key witness for the stale (E) holding outofcourt statements relating to reasons for investigation are not admissible where the reasons for the investigation are not at issue
Output: (A)
in determining whether a misrepresentation or omission is material. Pames, 122 F.3d at 547. In this case, the written notice in the supplement that the minimum offering was being lowered to $10,000,000 rendered any contrary oral misrepresentations immaterial. Carr, 95 F.3d at 547. iv. IPO in 2000 Blackmon claims that the Nexity defendants misrepresented the likelihood that Nexity would conduct an IPO in 2000. He argues that Nexity had not hired an investment advisor or otherwise prepared to conduct an IPO when it represented that it anticipated conducting an IPO. Thus, Blackmon argues, the Nexity defendants materially misrepresented that Nexity would conduct an IPO when there was no such prospect. Although the POM and Ken Vassey, a Nexity officer, may have , 357-58 (2d Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, any representation by Nexity and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate or reckless omissions of facts that tend to mislead are false statements for franks purposes (B) holding that written information cures oral misstatements and omissions (C) holding that representations and omissions must be considered together and in context to determine whether they affect the total mix of information and mislead a reasonable investor (D) holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent (E) holding that to determine whether minimum wage law has been violated one must divide total weekly pay received by total number of hours worked
Output: (C)
Duviella challenges the process used by JetBlue to investigate sexual harassment allegations against him, and he disputes the accuracy of the conclusions reached. “In a discrimination case, however, we are decidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against plaintiff. We are interested in what ‘motivated the employer.’ ” McPherson v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (emphasis omitted)). Duviella has not adduced any evidence tending to demonstrate that JetBlue’s procedures or sanctions were influenced by his age or race. This is fatal to his discharge claim. See, e.g., Graham v. Long Island, R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 44 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs assessment of the candidates qualifications cannot demonstrate a pretext for discrimination (B) holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error (C) holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination (D) holding the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the error satisfies each prong of the plain error test (E) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error
Output: (C)
new affirmative defense remedy under the ECOA that a debtor may use to invalidate the entire underlying debt when no language providing for such a defense is expressly or implicitly contained within the ECOA. See Ami L. Dilorenzo, Regulation B: How Lenders Can Fight Back Against the Affirmative Use of Regula .P., 51 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir.1995) (reasoning, at least in part, that a plaintiff could proceed with a defensive ECOA claim after the statutory period had run, by way of the right of recoupment); Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman, 839 F.Supp. 326, 330 n. 6 (E.D.Pa.1993) (recognizing an action by way of recoupment, which essentially functions as a defense, will lie where a party possesses an otherwise time-barred ECOA claim); In re Remington, 19 B.R. 718, 721 (Bankr.D.Colo.1982) (<HOLDING>); PNC Bank, Del. v. Turner, 659 A.2d 222, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the recoupment doctrine could allow a spouse to assert an ecoa affirmative defense against a creditor even after the statute of limitations had run (B) holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense (C) holding that ecoa violation cannot be asserted as affirmative defense (D) holding defendant was entitled to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the ecoa (E) holding even though an affirmative action for damages is barred the debtor may assert an ecoa violation defensively in the nature of recoupment
Output: (E)
919 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1990) (same). 47 . Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.1989). 48 . See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 49 . (1) "I want to see if my mom got me a lawyer yet. I don’t know, I ain’t got in contact with her yet.” (2) "Yes, sir, the reason I was wanting one here.” (3) "That is why I was wanting my lawyer. I want to see if my mom has a lawyer so I can have him with me." (4) "I was waiting on — I want my mom to get me a lawyer.” (5) “Another one.” 50 . (1) "Well, I’m acting as your attorney today.” (2) "Well, that’s why I’m representing you today."' 51 . "I went back and explained to you that you did have a lawyer appointed for you." 52 . See Cannady v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 752, 755 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Fleming, 837 F.2d at 947 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous (B) holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer (C) holding that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel because his statement i wanna call my lawyer when read in context did not represent a request to terminate the interrogation until his counsel was present (D) holding that appellants statement i think i need a lawyer     is just as ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in davis (E) holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel
Output: (E)
conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole. That is, the policy avoids a detrimental conflict of interests between team shareholders and the league. We disagree, however, that these factors are sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the NFL’s ownership policy does not unreasonably restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The holdings in Broadcast Music, Rothery Storage, and Northwest Stationers, do not throw the “rule of reason” out the window merely because one establishes that a given practice among joint venture participants is ancillary to legitimate and efficient activity — the injury to competition must still be weighed against the purported benefits under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24, 99 S.Ct. at 1565 (<HOLDING>); Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 293-98, 105 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (B) holding a concerted boycott to be a per se violation of  1 of the sherman act (C) holding that a state as a purchaser of asphalt was a person when suing under the sherman act for restraint of trade (D) holding only that a particular ancillary restraint did not constitute a per se violation of the sherman act and remanding for a determination  of the case under a rule of reason analysis (E) holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se
Output: (D)
of whether the images on the site constituted child pornography, the receipt shows Shiver’s familiarity with making commercial transactions for pornographic images on the Internet. The government also presented evidence specifically showing that the image of one child in particular had been produced in North Carolina. That the latter image ended up on Shiver’s computer in Florida strongly suggests that it traveled in interstate commerce. We likewise reject Shiver’s contention that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he “knowingly possessed” the images of child pornography on his computer. Although we have interpreted the meaning of “knowing possession” in other contexts, see, e.g., United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted), we have not yet had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession (B) holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved (C) recognizing theory of constructive possession (D) holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others (E) holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession
Output: (E)
from claims of misfeasance is void as a matter of statute. Section 310 of the Companies Act of 1985 provides that “any provision ... in any contract with the company or otherwise,” which purports to exempt a director from liability for “negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust” in relation to an English company, is void. While the Companies Act of 1985 expressly applies to English companies, courts must construe the release in accordance with English law. The statute appears to apply here — despite Gulfs incorporation in the United States. English common law provides that releases will not be construed to apply to facts of which the releasing party is unaware at the time of entering the agreement. See Ecclesiastical Comm’n for England v. N.E. Ry, 4 Ch.D. 845 (1877) (<HOLDING>). As we held above, the record does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release (C) holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement (D) holding that release did not bar plaintiffs claim because plaintiff had no ground to suspect that act complained of had taken place when giving release (E) holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release
Output: (D)
8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.1993) (“The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions.”); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir.1979) (purely financial interests are outside of NEPA’s zone of interests). Accordingly, we have consistently held that purely economic interests do not fall within NEPA’s zone of interests: “[A] plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under NEPA.” Nevada Land Action Ass’n, 8 F.3d at 716; see also Ranchers Cattleman v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 (9th Cir.2005) (an economic injury alone will not support a claim under NEPA); Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that a plaintiff whose only complaint was that agency action would cause economic harm asserted an interest outside nepas zone of interests (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that the public interest in expression must be weighed against the plaintiffs economic and noneconomic interests
Output: (B)
dangerousness is nowhere mentioned in the list of sixteen statutory aggravating factors for homicide. See FDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994 and Supp. II 1996). Second, given the broad language of the FDPA as to the allowance of nonstatutory aggravating factors, there is no reason under the FDPA why future dangerousness cannot be presented to the jury. See id. § 3592(c) (“the jury ... may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists”). Furthermore, we have little doubt that future dangerousness to society and to prison officials and other inmates during incarceration is relevant to the jury’s final determination of whether a death sentence should be imposed. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Holder’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state may consider and rely upon a defendants future dangerousness in its decision to seek a death sentence (B) holding that when a state asserts future dangerousness as grounds for imposing a death sentence due process requires that a defendant be entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible (C) holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole (D) holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible (E) holding state court improperly refused to admit evidence of defendants adaptation to prison because it was clearly relevant to future dangerousness
Output: (A)
marks omitted); see, e.g., Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 779-80 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985) (recog nizing that 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) precludes all review of the Secretary of Labor’s compensation decision under the Federal Employee Compensation Act); Collins v. United States, 67 F.3d 284, 287-88 (Fed.Cir.1995) (finding that the plain language of the Military Claims Act, which states that “the settlement of a claim under [the Act] is final and conclusive,” provides clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent to preclude judicial review). Further, reviewability is not an all or nothing question: Congress may allow review of some issues underlying a decision, but prohibit review of others. See, e.g., Lindahl, 470 U.S. at 779-80, 105 S.Ct. 1620 (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 946, 948 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate review of an administrative agencys factual determinations is circumscribed (B) holding 5 usc  8347c bars review of agencys factual determinations but not questions of law and procedure (C) holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts (D) holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure (E) holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo
Output: (B)
argument, and we decline to address it further. IX. Attachment of Loan Proceeds Jeff also argues that the writ of attachment erred by stating that it applied to money that the Crider Entities might loan to him in the future. He asserts that any loan proceeds he might receive are not subject to garnishment or attachment because he must pay back such funds and, therefore, such funds are the property of the lender, not him. We disagree. Indiana’s statute listing property exempt from garnishment and attachment does not include loan proceeds as being exempt. See I.C. § 34-55-10-2. In fact, there is a federal statute that expressly exempts federal student loan proceeds from garnishment and attachment. See Brindle v. Arata, 940 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1095a(d)) (<HOLDING>). Such a statute would seem to be unnecessary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate (B) holding that the entirety of litigation settlement proceeds was taxable income to client not net after payment of attorney fees (C) holding that proceeds of a personal injury settlement are not exempt under missouri law (D) holding student loan proceeds did not lose exempt status after excess of proceeds after payment of tuition and fees was deposited in students bank account (E) holding payment in kind contracts are proceeds
Output: (D)
utility requires a flexible rule. See A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Bd. of Ravenna Township Trs., 596 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ohio 1992). No single factor is controlling in determining whether an entity is a public utility, although each must be weighed, including lack of competition in the local marketplace, the good or service provided, and the existence of regulation by government authority. See Campanelli v. AT&T Wireless Serv. Inc., 706 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ohio 1999) (noting no one factor is determinative). It is important to note that the emphasis in such a determination should be placed on the function of the service provided rather than a literal interpretation of the definition of a public utility. Utilities Comm. v. Southern Bell, 326 N.C. 522, 527-28, 391 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Nor does the number of subscribers matter in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (B) holding the function of a public utility is controlling not how the term is defined (C) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (D) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (E) holding that the wellestablished rule is that it is the function of the state to determine how its residents may enter into the marital relationship
Output: (B)
It is true that “[i]f a party timely files a petition for rehearing or reconsideration in accordance with the rules of the agency, the time to petition for review [by this court] runs from the date when notice of the order denying the petition is given.” D.C. App. R. 15 (b). By referring to “a petition,” the rule seems to allow only one motion for reconsideration to toll the time for appeal. Id. However, we need not rely solely on such a close parsing of the rule. There are sound policies behind permitting only one motion for reconsideration to extend the time for seeking review. Otherwise, a party could defeat the purpose of setting time limits for seeking appellate review by repeatedly filing motions for reconsideration. See, e.g., Yates v. Behrend, 280 F.2d 64, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (<HOLDING>); De Foe v. Nat’l Capital Bank, 90 A.2d 242, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal (B) holding that a second motion for reconsideration did not toll the time for appeal because to hold otherwise would permit dilatory tactics destructive of the finality of the judgment (C) holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review (D) holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order (E) holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending
Output: (B)
first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney’s fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney’s fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge’s ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney’s fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances
Output: (A)
the income from trusts which had been established in their names by the maternal grandparents. Despite the father’s request for a guidelines child support award, the trial court ordered no child support by either party, but ordered the parties to “share equally [in] the children’s private school expenses as well as medical and dental insurance premiums and expenses.” Id. at 179. On appeal, the court held that, while the trial court properly considered the needs of the children and the custody situation, the court erred by failing to make adequate findings as to the earning ability of each parent and determining a guideline amount before ultimately exercising its discretion to deviate from the guideline suggestion. Id.; see also Navarro v. Navarro, 906 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>), and Escribano v. Coviello, 698 So.2d 934 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that final judgment ordering 4000 in monthly alimony created presumption in subsequent proceedings that husband had ability to pay that amount (B) holding that benefits in excess of the support obligation could not be credited against future support (C) holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child (D) holding that it is plain error for a trial court to require a defendant to pay courtappointed attorney fees in the absence of legally sufficient evidence that defendant has the ability to pay the amount imposed (E) holding that a determination by the trial court of a clear and definite amount for support is necessary in establishing a partys ability to pay and in enforcing the obligation in future proceedings
Output: (E)
was signed and deemed filed on February 2, 2011. Thus, his federal habeas petition was untimely. According to Weddington, the district court erred in dismissing his petition because the limitations period should have been equitably tolled by the state’s confiscation of his legal papers. The state responds that the record fails to support his contention. Its argument against equitable tolling, on appeal as in the district court, is based solely on its challenge as to whether Weddington was prohibited access to his legal materials while he was housed in disciplinary segregation. “The intentional confiscation of a prisoner’s ha-beas corpus petition and related legal papers by a corrections officer is ‘extraordinary’ as a matter of law.” Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisons complete confiscation of petitioners legal materials six weeks before filing deadline and its holding of papers until after limitations period expired constituted an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling (B) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (C) holding that a corrections officers confiscation of a prisoners draft habeas petition and related legal papers can justify equitable tolling of the oneyear limitations period (D) holding that attorney miscalculation of aedpa time period did not justify equitable tolling (E) holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling
Output: (C)
the courts of this state, unless the cause of action arose out of such ownership. See 48.193(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1991). Further, the mere execution of a guaranty generally is insufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of a Florida court. See Holton v. Prosperity Bank, 602 So'.2d 659, 662-63 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). See also PluessStaufer Industries v. Rol-lason Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc., 635 So.2d 1070, 1073 n. 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Cf. Hamilton v. Business Assistance Consortium, Inc., 602 So.2d 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). 6 . In reaching this conclusion, we did not consider any activities Nichols performed as an officer or director of the different NTS corporations, including NTS, NTS/Residential, and OLF, Inc. See Doe v. Thompson', 620 So.2d 1004 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accord Eller v. Allen, 623 So.2d 545 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing distinction between corporate officer acting on behalf of himself and corporate officer acting on behalf of his corporation (B) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents (C) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law
Output: (A)
the content of his conversation with Wise, and by detailing the unusual circumstances surrounding his transfer to Donaldson. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Accordingly, regardless of whether Jemison’s retaliation claim ultimately has merit, the district court erred by dismissing Jemison’s complaint with prejudice before providing him with an opportunity to amend. Finally, we note that we do not consider the exhibits that Jemison has attached to his brief on appeal. Because Jemison failed to submit these exhibits to the district court, they are not relevant to the issue of whether the court erred in dismissing his complaint. See Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . Jemison also raised 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a complaint makes express reference to attachments that are central to the plaintiffs claims those documents may be considered on a motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice (C) holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion (D) holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 (E) holding that the analysis of a motion to dismiss under fedrcivp 12b6 is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto
Output: (E)
to a jury trial to juveniles. See, e.g., David G. v. Pollard ex rel. County of Pima, 207 Ariz. 308, 314, 86 P.3d 364 (2004) (concluding trial court erred when it allowed a jury trial for a juvenile charged with traffic offenses because forcing a juvenile to be tried by a jury did not promote informality and flexibility of juvenile system and subjected juvenile to very stigma leg islature sought to prevent); A.C., IV v. People, 16 P.3d 240, 244-45 (Colo. 2001) (upholding statute that allowed trial court discretion in determining whether to allow a juiy trial); In re J.T., 290 A.2d 821(D.C.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 986, (1972) (upholding statute that required trial court to hear and adjudicate juvenile cases without a jury); McMullen v. Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 584, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969) (<HOLDING>); R. v. Cory, 44 App. Div. 2d 599, 353 N.Y.S.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury (B) holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials (C) holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals (D) holding juveniles do not have right to jury trial because it is a civil proceeding under states parens patriae authority four justices dissented (E) recognizing that juveniles have no right to jury trial and that juvenile proceedings unlike adult prosecutions are rehabilitative in nature
Output: (D)
that Countrywide's actions must have been relatively limited because it did not succeed to Washington Mutual's interest until sometime in early 2007— approximately four and a half years after the judgment of foreclosure and approximately four and a half years into the bankruptcy process. 24 . See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 and comment a ("Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.... Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed.”). 25 . See Ogbin v. Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, PC, No. 08-4138, 2009 WL 1587896, **3-4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46954 at *9-10 (D.NJ. May 29, 2009) (Cavanaugh, D.J.) (<HOLDING>). 26 . Moreover, even if Shapiro & Diaz had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs met their burden by highlighting the experience and qualifications of plaintiffs counsels firm and the firms long history of practice in this area of law (B) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (C) holding that punitive damages award against vicariously liable law firm was not excessive in part because the award is proportionate to the law firms financial position (D) holding that plaintiffs law firm was subject to disqualifica tion when after unsuccessful mediation the plaintiffs firm hired the mediator appointed to settle the case (E) holding that law firm who was plaintiffs adversary in foreclosure proceeding owed no duty to plaintiffs as law firm could not have expected that plaintiffs would rely on law firms representations about payoff amounts
Output: (E)
¶ 522.1 l[6][d] ("[T]he definition refers to a VCR even though many debtors had replaced this item with a DVD player by the time the definition was enacted in 2005. Given the impracticality of an exclusive list of items in a statutory provision that will inevitably become obsolete if not amended, courts may feel compelled to expand the list to include reasonable substitutes for the listed items.”). 7 . The Illustrated Oxford English Dictionary 47 (1988); see also Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language 67 (2d coll, ed 1980) (defining “appliance” as "a device or machine for performing a specific task, esp. one that is worked mechanically or by electricity (stoves, irons, etc. are household appliances).”). 8 . See In re Wiford, 105 B.R. 992, 1002 (Bankr. N.D.Okla.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Irwin, 232 B.R. 151, 153-54 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawn mower seems to fit reasonably well within the common meaning of the terms household good and appliances  it is a large appliance but not all that different from eg a vacuum cleaner (B) holding that where only one interpretation of contractual terms is possible a court may decide the meaning of those terms as a matter of law (C) holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 (D) holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute (E) holding that ambiguity exists if the meaning of contractual terms cannot be deciphered from reading the entire instrument or if the terms are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation
Output: (A)