niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
policy. See generally Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009) (“Parties are free to contract, and the courts will enforce their contracts if they are not unconscionable, illegal, or in violation of public policy.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fitts, 120 Nev. 707, 708, 99 P.3d 1160, 1161 (2004) (considering a certified question regarding the enforceability of a provision in an insurance policy that required an insured to arbitrate or file suit on a claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage that was outside the statutorily proscribed statute of limitations, this court held that such a provision was “unenforceable and therefore void as against Nevada public policy”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 481, 488 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see also Fisher v. DCH Temecula Imports LLC, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued (B) holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer (C) holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination (D) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (E) holding that an insurance company may limit coverage only if the limitation does not contravene public policy
Output: (E)
Third, we agree with both the arbitrator and the district court that Polk and Standard Brands are distinguishable. Those cases involved only successorship provisions; here, we have an obligation that arose independently of a successorship clause and pursuant to a separate, specific contractual provision. Finally, we find no merit in Van Waters’ contention that a remedy which extends beyond the expiration date of a collective bargaining agreement is per se inappropriate. Indeed, in Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision that vacated an arbitral award because the award extended beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362; see also ILWU Local 142 v. Land & Constr. Co., 498 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages (B) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (C) holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement (D) holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement (E) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court
Output: (C)
concur. SHAW, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result. MOORE, C.J., and MURDOCK, J., concur in the result. 1 . Some offenses are outside the Criminal Code, such as drug offenses, which are governed by the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act, § 20-2-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. 2 . The plain meaning of "capital” is the possibility of the death penalty. "Capital” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as ”[p]un-ishable by execution; involving the death penalty.” Black's Law Dictionary 236 (9th ed. 2011). 3 . The Supreme Court stated that it believed "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to the harshest penalty will be uncommon.” 567 U.S. at-, 132 S.Ct. at 2455. 4 . Other jurisdictions have addressed Miller. See, e.g., Ortiz v. State, 119 So.3d 494 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2013)(<HOLDING>); People v. Banks, [No. 08CA0105, September 27, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that minor defendant was not entitled to a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to dismiss his capitalmurder indictments where he argued that only statutorily authorized sentences of death and life imprisonment without parole had been declared unconstitutional but the florida courts had established a valid sentencing option under miller (B) holding that sentence was erroneous but not void where sentence of life imprisonment without parole was imposed for first degree murder under unconstitutional penalty statute (C) holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing (D) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (E) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences
Output: (A)
proportion to the plaintiffs operations that the loss of the amount of money involved would ... cause extreme hardship to the business, or even threaten destruction of the business”). In the instant case, although the plaintiff has indicated that sales of Prograf® account for a sizable percentage of its U.S. revenues, Pl.’s Mot. at 26, it has failed to demonstrate how the introduction of generic tacrolimus would cause extreme hardship to the business or threaten its very existence, see Gulf Oil, 514 F.Supp. at 1026. The plaintiff has not indicated to what extent it predicts its revenues will decline following the introduction of generic tacrolimus or how such a decline would affect its overall business operations. See Mead Johnson Pharm. Group v. Bowen, 655 F.Supp. 53, 56 (D.D.C.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Mylan Pharm,., 81 F.Supp.2d at 42-43 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (B) holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief (C) holding that a drug manufacturer failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because its claim that it will suffer a loss of sales should an anda be approved and drug product marketed before this case is disposed of on the merits is pure speculation as it had failed to provide any proof of economic loss and merely states that it would probably lose 20 to 30 percent of its market during the first year (D) holding that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm because there is nothing before the court which would lead it to conclude that the competing drug will cause any harmful health effects (E) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss
Output: (C)
is in the child's best interest; (h) that, after ... the child was returned to live in the child's own home, the parent ... refused or failed to give the child proper parental care and protection; or (i) the terms and conditions of safe relinguishment of a newborn child have been complied with.... Id. § 78A-6-507(1)(a)-@). 12 . Id. § 78A-6-507(1)(a). 13 . Id. § 78A-6-50700(00). 14 . See id. § 78A-6-506(3) ("[The welfare and best interest of the child {is] of paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered."); see also State ex rel. A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 23, 221 P.3d 185 (stating that a best interest analysis is the second step in terminating parental rights). 15 . Uraw Cope Amn. § 78A-6-509(1)(a) (Supp. 2011). 16 . See id. § 78A-6-509(1) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See Urax Copp Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(a) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (B) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith (C) recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated (D) holding that due process allows parental rights to be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of unfitness (E) holding the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings
Output: (C)
the judicial proceedings were effected by the district court’s ruling. Instead, Miller argues that the district court was obligated to award nominal damages, régardless of the timeliness of the request, once the jury found that Albright and Cobb violated his constitutional rights. In support of his position, Miller cites Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (“[T]he denial of procedural due process is actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (“[A] court [must] award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes a violation of his right to procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.”); and Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1072-73 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). These cases, however, do not address whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict (B) holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict (C) holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative (D) holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff (E) holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction
Output: (E)
though it may be more expedient for the legislature to redraft the statute in its entirety. See Hill, 202 Ill. 2d at 156; McDougall, 389 Ill. at 155. Defendant further contends that the decision by another division of this appellate district in In re E.H., 355 Ill. App. 3d 564 (2005), which he claims held section 115 — 10 to be facially unconstitutional en toto, is “controlling.” We begin by initially noting that defendant misstates the effect that the decision of one appellate court panel has upon the subsequent considerations of another. We are not bound by the decisions of the other divisions of this district so that even if E.H. held as defendant claims, it would not be “controlling” over our analysis. Muller v. Health & Hospital Governing Comm’n, 106 Ill. App. 3d 383, 386 (1982) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 93 Ill. 2d 543 (1983) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement (B) holding that appellate court is not bound by the agencys interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue (C) holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending (D) holding itself not bound by the opinion of another division of its own appellate district (E) holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues
Output: (D)
beneficiaries, he is not afforded the personal right of self-representation. Secondly, the Texas Legislature has defined the practice of law to include, among other things, “the preparation of pleadings or other documents incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court....” Consistent with that legislative mandate, Relator’s appearance in the trial court in his capacity as trustee falls within this definition of the “practice of law.” Accordingly, if a non-attorney trustee appears in court on behalf of the trust, he or she necessarily represents the interests of others, which amounts to the unauthorized practice of law. See Ziegler v. Nickel, 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 549, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code (B) holding that creditors of a trust beneficiary were prohibited from intervening in an action involving a dispute between the trustee and a beneficiary concerning distribution of the trust corpus (C) holding that a nonattorney trustee who represents the trust in court is representing and affecting the interest of the beneficiary and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (D) holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust (E) holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction
Output: (C)
644, 646 (Fed.Cir.1994). However, “[mjany, if not most, suits for patent infringement give rise to numerous and complex fact issues, rendering those suits inappropriate for summary disposition.” Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1984). An issue of material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where the party opposing summary judgment raises a genuine issue of material fact by proffering expert testimony in conflict with the positions of the moving party, summary judgment is properly denied. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bancorp Serv., L.L.C., 527 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether summary judgment is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a plaintiff seeking an injunction raises a genuine issue of fact material to the defendant governments claim regarding its justification for a policy summary judgment is inappropriate (B) holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact (C) holding the conflict in expert declarations created a genuine issue of materi al fact that made summary judgment inappropriate (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) holding summary judgment inappropriate to resolve an essentially procedural conflict
Output: (C)
obligations, the United States government must conform its conduct to constitutional requirements. Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184, 23 S.Ct. 98, 100, 47 L.Ed. 130 (1902). See In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1485 (7th Cir.1984) (“when the conduct of the United States government is challenged, such conduct must be assessed in light of the Constitution”); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir.1983). Where an extradition court finds that extradition would violate the relator’s constitutional rights, the Executive branch may not extradite him. In re Burt, supra, 737 F.2d at 1484; Plaster v. United States, supra, 720 F.2d at 349. See also In re Extradition of Mahmoud Abed Atta, 1988 WL 66866 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988) (unreported slip op.) (available on Westlaw, federal database) (<HOLDING>). However, an American court may not deny 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights (B) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (C) holding in the private sector context that flsa rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived  and stating that in any event congressionally granted flsa rights take precedence over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation arrangement (D) holding that constitutional rights in extradition take precedence over treaty terms (E) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights
Output: (D)
Granite thus assumed "an advocacy role" "almost akin to Granite entering a general appearance for the trial court." This "desperate act," they contend, "constitutes nothing but a transparent effort to curry favor with the trial court." Granite's filing, they conclude, "has denied [the Spaffords] any meaningful opportunity to try their case, upon remand, before an impartial and disinterested tribunal within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." A due process challenge is a question of law, which we review for correctness. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177. 1 36 To begin with, this case presents nothing remotely approaching a violation of the Due Process Clause. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2256-57, 178 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (<HOLDING>). But see id. at 2272-74 (Roberts, C.J., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion (B) holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court (C) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction (D) holding that due process required disqualification of a state supreme court justice from an appeal where the appellants chairman and president contributed 8 million to that supreme court justices election campaign after a 50 million verdiet was entered in the trial court (E) holding that the question of recusal of a supreme court justice is to be left to the individual justice
Output: (D)
found it “difficult to maintain on a priori grounds that sex is physically dangerous” to every potential victim under the statute. Id. at 299. The First Circuit examined a similar statute-punishing a person over the age of 18 who engages in sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 16-in United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999). The court determined that statutory rape crimes fall within the exception to the categorical approach because they “cover[ ] conduct both inside and outside the ‘violent felony’ sphere.” Id. at 4-5. We agree with the First and the Seventh Circuits that statutory rape statutes that include more mature victims and do not contain aggravating factors are not subject to the strict categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case should be remanded for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (B) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 (C) holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime (D) holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction (E) holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
Output: (C)
¶84 Nonetheless, for reasons hereinafter discussed, I firmly believe that, independent of any federal jurisprudence, federal constitutional authority, the common law, or other authority, the foundation for private causes of action for damages for constitutional violations is found in the language of Montana’s 1972 Constitution and in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. I suggest that it is important to acknowledge this principle, because the greater guarantees of individual rights afforded by Montana’s Constitution may be neither bounded nor frustrated by federal court decisions which, with seeming increasing frequency, are weakening similar protections of the federal constitution. See Trankel v. Department of Military Affairs (1997), 282 Mont. 348, 362, 938 P.2d 614, 623 (<HOLDING>). ¶85 Moreover, Montana’s Constitution 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the event that parties are from different states and the subject matter is national in scope and where the contract states it shall be deemed to be made under the laws of the state of new york and for all purposes construed in accordance with laws of said state new york law applies as the parties choice of law (B) holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 (C) holding that the sentence in article ii section 16 constitution of montana that guarantees an employee the right of full legal redress against third parties is mandatory and self executing and leaves no room for erosion based on what federal courts or the courts of other states would do pursuant to federal laws or the laws of other states (D) holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution (E) holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution
Output: (C)
only as part of the presentations to a group, or whether appellees had any conversations with Hoagland, and, if so, the content of those conversations. Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions. See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court’s exclusion of nonresident’s statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs’ claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant’s activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (<HOLDING>). Kassoffs affidavit is similarly concluso-ry. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute (B) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied (C) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation (D) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (E) holding nonresidents statement that he had committed no torts in texas was properly excluded as conclusory
Output: (E)
petition if this Court eventually affirmed the grant of visitation rights to Vest, I find the quoted passage to be possible support for granting Vest visitation rights, rather than for denying them. 2 . My preference would be to remand to the children’s court for further findings on the issue of visitation. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't v. Coleman, 104 N.M. 500, 505, 723 P.2d 971, 976 (Ct.App.1986). As already noted, the children’s court's inquiry into this issue was too limited in scope. Additionally, there has been a significant lapse of time since the children’s court’s determination. This appellate delay may have had a crucial effect on the issues before the children’s court. See generally State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Geist, 310 Or. 176, 796 P.2d 1193, 1200-01 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Because the paramount concern here is the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights (B) holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest (C) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (D) recognizing that protracted litigation regarding parental rights is detrimental to children (E) holding that evidence did not support termination of parental rights to two children despite mothers prior conviction for killing her stepchild
Output: (D)
among the nation’s veterans is not uncommon. VA statistics show that, as of January 2011, “there were 67,495 homeless Veterans[, a]nd an estimated 144,842 Veterans spent at least one night in an emergency shelter or transitional housing program in a recent year.” (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). The Secretary asserts that it is due to the pervasive nature of the problem that he concedes that homelessness may be an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See Secretary’s Response at 2. Despite our recognition of the problem of homelessness among veterans, we are not bound by the Secretary’s concession when considering whether Ms. Checo’s homelessness is an extraordinary circumstance. See Bove, 25 Vet.App. at 140-41 (<HOLDING>); see also McCreary, 19 Vet.App. at 332 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 120day judicial appeal period is not subject to waiver or forfeiture by the secretary (B) holding that issue of whether the 120day judicialappeal period prescribed by 38 usc  7266a for seeking judicial review of a board decision is subject to equitable tolling is a legal question (C) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (D) holding that the right to support is not subject to waiver by either parent (E) holding that due process right to present a defense is subject to forfeiture if not properly asserted in the trial court
Output: (A)
from New York’s surcharge program and was not preempted. The prevailing wage law merely “alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans,” Id. at 334, 117 S.Ct. 832, and thus is “no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.” Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668, 115 S.Ct. 1671. More recently, in De 6th Cir.1995) (ERISA preempted claim for the refusal to authorize inpatient treatment for a mental health patient); Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.1993) (ERISA preempts malpractice claim against an HMO for denying precertification for heart surgery); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding that erisa preempts wrongful death and state common law actions when plaintiff asserts insurers delay in authorization of procedure caused the patients death (D) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (E) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death
Output: (C)
trial court as a prerequisite to appellate review are rooted in the well-established principle that appellate courts are courts of review, and that trial judges should be given an opportunity to correct any errors occurring in trial proceedings before complaint is taken to a higher court. Application of those rules makes perfect sense in normal instances of trial error; however, the instant issue presents a rare example of an issue where fundamental fairness requires an exception to the rule. The view that a defendant’s failure to object to denial of the right against self-incrimination does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right to assert such error on appeal was supported inferentially in O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 93, 87 S.Ct. 252, 253-54, 17 L.Ed.2d 189, 191 (1966) (<HOLDING>), and expressly in Walker v. United States, 404 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination (B) holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific (C) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state (D) recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination (E) holding state procedural rule requiring trial objections could not bar an appellant from asserting a violation of his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination
Output: (E)
A.2d 22, 25 (1984). Accordingly, “the privilege extends not only to communications made in open court, but also encompasses pleadings and even less formal communications such as preliminary conferences and correspondence between counsel in furtherance of a client’s interest.” Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa.Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36, 41 (1991) (citations omitted). In fact, the absolute privilege has been extended to statements made by private parties to law enforcement officials for the purpose of initiating the prosecution of criminal charges, see id. at 42, as well as to statements made to mental health officials for the purpose of initiating involuntary commitment proceedings, Marino v. Fava, 915 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa. Super. 2006). Cf. Schanne v. Addis, 632 Pa. 545, 121 A.3d 942, 952 (2015) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Our 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding (B) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (C) holding that the judicial privilege does not apply to an allegation concerning a school teacher made by an adult former student before commencement of any quasijudicial proceeding and without an intent that it lead to a quasijudicial proceeding (D) holding that a statutory basis is necessary for an administrative body to initiate reconsideration of its prior final quasijudicial decisions (E) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding
Output: (C)
§ 158 cmt. m (“An unprivileged remaining on land in another’s possession is a continuing trespass for the entire time during which the actor wrongfully remains.”). The continuing presence of MCI’s fiber optic cables on Browning’s land therefore could give rise to a claim of continuing trespass, assuming that the original installation of the cables was tor-tious (which MCI denies). Nevertheless, even assuming that MCI committed a continuing trespass, any such claim was discharged by confirmation of MCI’s plan of reorganization, due to the expansive scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim” and Browning’s failure to allege any relevant post-confirmation conduct or unforeseeable damages. It is well-established under Kansas law Co., 64 Kan. 403, 403, 67 P. 831, 833 (Kan.1902) (<HOLDING>). Whether Browning would have been required 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing fundamental principle that utility rates are set for the future and not the past (B) recognizing that when a defendants negligence causes bodily injury the plaintiff can recover damages for past present and future medical expenses bodily injury and emotional distress (C) holding plaintiff must move before public interests are involved to bring suit for ejectment but allowing single action for past present and future damages (D) holding that prejudgment interest may properly be added to damage awards for past lost wages medical expenses that have been incurred and past pain and suffering but not future loss of earnings future medical expenses andor future pain and suffering (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs
Output: (C)
three additional bases for equitably tolling § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period: (1) "his lack of access to legal resources,” (2) "his lack of legal knowledge,” and (3) his "medical disability” (depression). R. at 64. In his filings with this court, however, Mr. Sandoval does not renew these claims. Instead, he simply states that he "explained the circumstances beyond [his] control” during "habeas review.” Aplt. Opening Br. for Appl. for COA at 2. Insofar as this could be read as an attempt to incorporate the three arguments by reference, this practice is generally disfavored in this circuit. See 10th Cir. R. 28.4 (“Incorporating by reference portions of lower court or agency briefs or pleadings is disapproved.”); see also Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 963-64 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance (B) holding that courts must construe pro se filings liberally (C) holding that the appellant could not incorporate district court filings into his appellate brief by reference and that his pro se status did not except him from such established rules (D) holding that nonlawyer proceeding pro se could not represent his children (E) holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them
Output: (C)
offense, and the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses. Defendant argues that the Career Offend er Guideline should not have been applied to him, because the instant offense was not a crime of violence. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 582 (9th Cir.2004). Defendant is correct with respect to the counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). “‘Crime of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.... ” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 1; see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45-47, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, Defendant is incorrect with respect 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commentary in the guidelines manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline (B) holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment (C) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative (D) holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets (E) holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself
Output: (E)
to adjudicate Mr. DeBatto’s claims. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4. The government initially contested this court’s jurisdiction over those claims, Def.’s Mot. at 7, referring to plaintiffs failure to cite the fact that his claims for disability retirement benefits fall within the ambit of 10 U.S.C. § 1201. Section 1201 provides that if the Secretary concludes that a service member is “unfit to perform the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability incurred while entitled to basic pay ... the Secretary may retire the member.” 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that Section 1201 is money-mandating. See Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1223-24 (citing Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1174-75); Sawyer v. United States, 930 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Based upon Section 1201, Mr. DeBatto can 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis (B) holding that an attempted service on the partys counsel was insufficient without proof of the counsels actual authority to receive service (C) holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages (D) holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision (E) holding that section 1201 is moneymandating and that when the terms of the statutory provision are met the service member is entitled to receive compensation
Output: (E)
loss as of that date. Blackmon further argues that the net operating loss of $5,657,287 in 1999 was not indicative of the loss Nexity might incur in the future because he understood from one and omissions regarding Nexity’s financial performance in the year 2000 were immaterial as a matter of law. ii. June 15, 2000, Closing Blackmon argues that the Nexity defendants misrepresented the closing date of the offering as June 15, 2000, because Nexity actually allowed investors to purchase stock even after August 2000. Blackmon bases this argument on the new factual allegation in the stricken amended complaint. Because we hold that the amended complaint was properly disallowed, the trial court was correct in not addressing this argument. See Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, we do not consider this argument. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints (B) holding that the trial court properly refused to consider allegations in the disallowed amended complaints (C) holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action (D) holding leave to amend was properly denied where the relator had previously filed two amended complaints (E) holding that the trial court properly refused defendants instruction because it invaded the province of the jury
Output: (B)
substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in Rule 403. Rule 404(c)(l)(C)-(D); State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49 ¶ 30, 97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). Benson argues the trial court erred by making this finding because the attack on Yolanda was dissimilar to and remote in time from the other crimes. See Rule 404(e)(l)(C)(i)-(ii) (listing dissimilarity and remoteness as factors to consider). ¶ 14 The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although the attack on Yolanda differed in some ways from the attacks on the other victims (for example, it involved a second assailant and the use of a chemical to render her unconscious), the attacks did not have to precisely align for the evidence to be cross-admissible. See State v. Lehr (Lehr III), 227 Ariz. 140, 147 ¶ 21, 254 P.3d 379, 386 (2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 404 emt. to 1997 amendment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment (B) recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true (C) holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal (D) holding that ajets need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under rule 404 (E) holding that the 1979 policy interpretation need not be approved by the president in order to become effective as it is not a rule regulation or order
Output: (D)
township in the RLCWA’s district took on a different status simply by virtue of its annexation by another township in the RLCWA’s district. Second, the federal anti-curtailment statute specifically anticipates that a city will use its annexation of property located within the service area of a rural water association as a basis to provide service to that property, and expressly prohibits such provision of service while the water district is indebted to the federal government. See 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). Third, case law shows that a municipality’s annexation of property located within a rural water association does not, of itself, remove it from the water district for § 1926(b) purposes. See, e.g., Glenpool Util. Serv. Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Disk, 861 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Bell Arthur Water Corp. v. Greenville Util. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that  1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (C) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of  1926b (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted
Output: (B)
this Court will not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla.1999). The referee’s findings of fact demonstrate that Mirk misappropriated $31,487.50 in client funds held in his trust account. This Court has long held that attorney misconduct involving the misuse or misappropriation of client funds is unquestionably one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit. See Fla. Bar. v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So.2d 241, 246 (Fla.2007). Indeed, disbarment is presumed the appropriate discipline when an attorney engages in this type of misconduct. Id.; see also Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So.2d 333, 338 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>). We have also emphasized that the presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction under both the florida standards for imposing lawyer sanctions and case law when a lawyer misappropriates trust funds (B) holding that a finding of bad faith on the part of the offending lawyer is a prerequisite for imposing sanctions under 1927 (C) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (D) holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorneys repeated material misrepresentations (E) holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated funds from his real estate partners
Output: (A)
119 (1996); Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 346 (8th Cir.1974) (officers are not required to “conduct a mini trial” before making an arrest). Probable cause is to be determined upon the objective facts available to the officers at the time of the arrest. See id. At the time of appellees’ arrest in this case, the officers had, at least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Smithson and his son Ryan had committed an assault. Even if this were a mistaken belief the officers would still be entitled to a qualified immunity defense. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. Accordingly, we conclude that Stanley and Aldrich are entitled to qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. See Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). B. Due Process Appellants Stanley and Aldrich 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim (B) recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest (C) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury (D) recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to  1983 claims (E) holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause
Output: (D)
Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
Output: (D)