niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the Chapter 13 Plan, and by selecting which exemptions, if any, the Debtor should claim on Schedule C, the Defendants engaged in providing legal advice to the Debtor in violation of § 110(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. “Advising of available exemptions ... or actually choosing an exemption for the debtor ... requires the exercise of legal judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay persons.” In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102, 110 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1998). See also In re Dunkle, 272 B.R. 450 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2002) (classifying and selecting exemptions violates § 110); In re Moffett, 263 B.R. 805 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2001) (advising upon available exemptions violates § 110). Such business practice also constitutes the unlawful practice of law. See In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 110(Z)(1), the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing legal services organizations first amendment right of associating to advocate legal rights (B) holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions (C) recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance (D) recognizing that courts may make reasoned adjustments in legal system (E) holding that many courts have recognized that an employer may make reasonable inquiries into the retirement plans of its employees
Output: (B)
exclusion states: “If you have asked us to exclude any person from coverage under this policy, then we will not provide coverage for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by that excluded person.” We agree with the insurer that this sentence, at least when considered in isolation, clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for Scott’s UIM claim. The word “you” is defined in the policy as the person shown as the named insured on the declarations page. For this policy, that person is Rhonda. There is no dispute that Rhonda asked the insurer “to exclude [a] person from coverage under this policy” and that person was Scott. It is also undisputed that the UIM claim asserted by Scott arose from an accident involving a 10 (Okla.Civ.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). We turn now to the plaintiffs’ contention 
 Holding statements: (A) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (B) holding similar exclusion excluding coverage for any loss was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for um claims even though such claims were not expressly mentioned in the exclusion (C) holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver (D) holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage (E) holding nearly identical named driver exclusion was plain and unambiguous and excluded claim brought under um coverage
Output: (B)
weight.’” NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 1957 (quoting Chevron, supra, at 844). Haggar, 526 U.S. at 392. Applying these principles in this action, the court notes that the HMT statute does not address the specific method for refunding HMT collections, and therefore, the court must consider whether Customs’ refund regulation reasonably accomplishes the statutory purposes. The purpose of the HMT statute is to provide revenue for the maintenance and development of U.S. ports and harbors. Although the section related to export-related payments was declared unconstitutional, the rest of the statute remains in effect. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461, 4462 (2000); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 200 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Customs must still collect and deposit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding boards unconstitutional regulations severable from remainder (B) holding export provision severable from other hmt provisions (C) holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced (D) holding hmt on exports unconstitutional (E) holding that costsplitting provision in pep boys arbitration agreement is severable from the rest of the agreement
Output: (B)
while clearly a cause of the plaintiffs harm, do not create liability because of the intervention of independent judicial review, a superseding cause. We conclude that where, as here, the judicial officer is provided with the appropriate facts to adjudicate the proceeding but fails to proper ly apply the governing law and procedures, such error must be held to be a superseding cause, breaking the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983 and Bivens liability. Cf. Sheppard v. E.W. Scripps Co., 421 F.2d 555, 558 (6th Cir.1970) (concluding that any deprivation of a criminal defendant’s rights in a high profile murder case was a result of the manner in which the judge conducted the trial, thus breaking the chain of causation); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810, 811-12 (5th Cir.1953) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we reject Egervary’s argument that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause (B) recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard (C) holding that an opportunity to be heard by a contracting officer the very person deciding whether the plaintiff is a responsible contractor satisfies due process (D) holding that attorneydefendants role in instituting commitment proceedings was not the proximate cause of the due process violation suffered by the plaintiff where the presiding judge elected not to provide the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard (E) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
Output: (D)
the rate must make a threshold showing that the rate at issue is unreasonable. Milne, 970 F.2d at 570; Covey, 763 F.Supp. at 482-83. Relevant factors in the determination include “relevant rate comparisons, a carrier’s proffer of a particular rate, and whether the rate would have moved the traffic had it been asserted at the time the shipments took place.” Matter of Brown Transport Truckload, Inc., 144 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992). One common method of making a prima facie showing of unreasonableness is to provide affidavit testimony demonstrating a significant disparity between the rates sought to be charged by the carrier and the rates charged by competing carriers at the time in question. See, e.g., Vining v. The Eureka Co., 1992 WL 370520, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Brown, 144 B.R. at 187 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (B) holding eighty percent increase in demanded rates and showing that original rates were competitive with other carriers was prima facie unreasonable (C) holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service (D) holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
Output: (B)
remedy in the instant case. Defendant maintains that the grand jury’s failure to return an indictment before hearing Dr. DeHaan’s testimony, which was based in part on Ms. Thomas’ grand jury testimony, and that the grand jury’s subsequent indictment of Defendant almost immediately after Dr. DeHaan’s interview was greatly significant. Defendant points out that, as early as its decision in State v. Hopkins, 115 La. 786, 40 So. 166 (1906), the Louisiana Supreme Court had applied the grand jury secrecy rule to the district attorney, the courts, and the defense. The supreme court has consistently applied the | figrand jury secrecy rule to both the prosecution and the courts since the Hopkins decision. In re Matter Under Investigation Grand Jury No. 1, 04-672 (La.5/14/04), 875 So.2d 33 (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury, 98-2277 (La.4/13/99), 737 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose (B) holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury (C) holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury (D) holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings (E) holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings
Output: (B)
Over Plaintiffs’ Refund Claim. The June 4, 2009 Second Amended Complaint also could be construed as alleging a claim for tax refund, because Plaintiffs request the return of taxes that they allegedly paid. Sec. Am. Compl. at 1-2. The court, however, does not have jurisdiction over this claim, because Plaintiffs have failed to pay the taxes owed in full. 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). Plaintiffs insist that they fully paid the taxes in intiffs’ Takings Claim. Although Plaintiffs also argue the court has jurisdiction “as described in 28 U.S.C. § 1491, for a claim for just compensation for the taking of property [ ] by the government,” as a matter of law, tax collection is not a cognizable taking under the Fifth Amendment. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As the United States Court of Federal Claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable (B) holding that taxes are not private property that can be physically taken by the government (C) holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction (D) holding that when federal government acquires property through condemnation it must account for state and local property taxes interest and penalties (E) holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him
Output: (B)
was reasonable. Cf. Vt. Elec. Power Co., 131 Vt. at 434-35, 306 A.2d at 692 (approving process whereby Board gave parties in post-certification proceeding opportunity to comment and convince Board that hearing was necessary for further review as to location of transmission lines). ¶ 82. The real question is whether the Board abused its discretion in denying a hearing in this instance, given the com ments it received from the parties. The Towns do not challenge the Board’s finding that their expert was unqualified, which was the basis for the Board’s conclusion that they failed to raise a significant issue warranting a technical hearing. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s decision not to hold a hearing. Cf. In re D.B., 161 Vt. 217, 222, 635 A.2d 1207, 1210 (1993) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 83. Regarding the merits of the Board’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vrcp 78b2 which gives trial courts discretion whether to hold hearings on written motions provides trial courts with discretion to deny evidentiary hearings on posttrial motions (B) holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal (C) holding that issues are not waived for failing to file posttrial motions from a remand proceeding where no evidence was presented because no posttrial motions were required under those circumstances (D) holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings may be preserved for appeal (E) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions
Output: (A)
shall have the same force and effect as judgments in civil actions. (Emphasis added.) 7 57 Wn. App. 542, 789 P.2d 108 (1990). 8 Singer, 57 Wn. App. at 546. 9 38 Wn. App. 170, 684 P.2d 1341 (1984). 10 Valley, 38 Wn. App. at 172. 11 RULE 7.1 REQUEST FOR TRIAL DE NOVO (a) Service and Filing. Within 20 days after the arbitration award is filed with the clerk, any aggrieved party not having waived the right to appeal may serve and file with the clerk a written request for a trial de novo in the superior court along with proof that a copy has been served upon all other parties appearing in the case. The 20-day period within which to request a trial de novo may not be extended. 12 See MAR 7.1; see also Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Alternate Dispute Resolution Deskbook § 2.3(7)(a)(i), at 2-48 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 13 “ [N] o party needs to file any kind of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that to preserve right the aggrieved party must file request with clerk (B) holding that de facto type a status was achieved where the only violation of the statute was the failure to file the ordinance with the county clerk (C) recognizing that the party can instead file a claim against the estate (D) holding that a party is not aggrieved by a district court ruling in that partys favor (E) holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it
Output: (A)
eligibility for coverage; and 4. Determine whether proof of your loss is satisfactory for receipt of benefit payments according to the terms and conditions of the Plan. (See id. at P0433-034.) Defendants argue that because the above-quoted language is contained in the same document as the STD Plan Summary, the Court should interpret it to apply to the STD Plan as well. The above-quoted language, however, appears in a section generally headed “LTD Plan Summary.” (See id. at P0414, P0427.) Because the document is, at best, ambiguous as to whether the quoted language applies to both plans, the Court cannot say that it unambiguously grants Kemper discretion to determine eligibility for benefits under the STD Plan or to interpret the terms of the STD Plan. See Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1089-90 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator (B) holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion (C) holding plan language requiring satisfactory written proof that you have become disabled did not unambiguously confer discretion in the plan administrator (D) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (E) holding that even though the summary plan description did not include discretionary language the grant of discretionary authority in the plan controlled
Output: (D)
identified a single case that has extended the policy-based duty of good faith and fair dealing to a person or entity besides the insurer. Nor have Plaintiffs offered any facts showing that they and Carmichael have a special relationship, not rooted in the policy, that would justify placing a duty on Carmichael. Cf. Natividad, 875 S.W.2d at 701 (Gamage, J. dissenting) (making an argument that an adjusting company to which an insurer delegated total control for claims handling had a special relationship with the insureds); William H. McGee & Co., Inc. v. Schick, 792 S.W.2d 513, 521 (Tex.Ct.App.1990), vacated on other grounds, 843 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.1992) (similarly recognizing a special relationship in specific circumstances); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1272-74 (Colo.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Court recognizes that the rule is often 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims (B) recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer (C) holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy (D) holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies (E) holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier
Output: (B)
the fair market value of assets” at the time immediately before the discharge of the debt. 26 U.S.C. § 108(d)(3); see Merkel v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 192 F.3d 844 n. 3 (9th Cir.1999) (applying definition). The overall effect of these provisions is that, at the end of the 25-year period, a participant in the ICRP will experience a taxable event only to the extent that, after the discharge, her assets exceed her liabilities. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (d)(3); Toberman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 294 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir.2002)(quoting Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 1826, 75 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983)). Accordingly, it was legal error for the Bankruptcy Court to hold that “participation in the program would result in a tax liability,” because .Tex.2007)(<HOLDING>). There are possible circumstances in which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that seeking out loan consolidation options such as the icrp is an important component of the good faith inquiry under the brunner test (B) holding that a debtors ability to make reduced payments under the icrp is relevant to the inquiry of whether the debtors reasonable future financial resources will cover payment of the debt while still allowing a minimal standard of living (C) holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith (D) holding when applying the brunner test that while not a per se indication of a lack of good faith debtors decision not to take advantage of the icrp is probative of her intent to repay the loans (E) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause
Output: (D)
Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29, 99 S.Ct. at 1458-59. Louisiana-Pacific addresses the first two Kimbell Foods concerns in a footnote about “the need for national uniformity in the successor liability area” and “the possibility that CERCLA’s purposes could be frustrated by state law” if a state law unduly limited successor liability, thus cutting off the EPA’s ability to seek compensation. 909 F.2d at 1263 n. 2. O’Melveny and Atherton indicate more is required. Although Louisiana-Pacific refers to the “need for national uniformity” as a reason for developing federal rules for successor liability, 909 F.2d at 1263 n. 2, Atherton notes that “[t]o invoke the concept of ‘uniformity’ ... is not to prove its need.” — U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 671; see also O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87, 114 S.Ct. at 2055 (<HOLDING>). Although often invoked in this context, there 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need for judicial economy in family issues as well as  the need to avoid fundamental unfairness (B) holding that a database is a generic computer element (C) holding that liquid controls is generic (D) holding that light beer is generic (E) recognizing how generic and lightly invoked is the need for uniformity
Output: (E)
opposing party’s motion. We have held that there is an “overarching liberal policy of allowing amendments under Rule 15.” Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 858 So.2d 950, 954 (Ala.2003). However, Rule 15 “‘is not carte blanche authority to amend ... at any time.’ ” Burkett v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 607 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala.1992)(quoting Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So.2d 942, 947 (Ala.1980)). The trial court has discretion to deny an amendment for good cause. Ex parte GRE Ins. Group, 822 So.2d 388, 390 (Ala.2001); Stallings, 388 So.2d at 947. The deadline in the scheduling order does not curtail the trial court’s discretion in considering the merits of the offered amendment. See Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1066 (8th Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). The trial court can refuse to allow an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (C) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice
Output: (E)
or hold harmless the promisee, the promisee’s independent contractots, agents, employees, or indemnitees against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property proximately caused by or resulting from the negligence, in whole or in part, of the promisee, its independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-1 (2007) (emphasis added). This statute is not applicable in the present case. The contract at issue involves a clause that limits a party’s liability, not an indemnity clause whereby one party agrees to be liable for the negligence of the other party. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Corporex Constructors, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 312, 315, 385 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Further, the language of the statute only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (B) holding that the indemnity provisions to which gs  22b1 apply are those construction indemnity provisions which attempt to hold one party responsible for the negligence of another (C) holding that courts interpret indemnity provisions same as written contracts (D) recognizing that the rules of statutory construction apply when we interpret constitutional provisions (E) holding that such provisions are valid
Output: (B)
house. Id. ¶ 38. Again, that is not the situation here. {19} In sum, none of the cases cited by the State support the propriety of the sweep in this case because there was no specific showing that Defendant and his wife were armed or that other persons might be with them. Allowing the agents to justify the protective sweep in the absence of information suggesting there may be a danger posed by others would be “directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s explicit command in Buie that the police have an articulable basis on which to support their reasonable suspicion of danger from inside the home.” United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 300 (6th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we conclude that, based on the agents’ lack of information, the sweep of Defendant’s house was unauthorized. See id. (<HOLDING>). {20} Perhaps recognizing the consequences of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (B) recognizing that cjlearly buie requires more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present in a residence (C) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (D) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim (E) holding that a noticeofrights form that plainly affects more than one person and encompasses more than an immediate set of facts and is applicable  to all inmates in a particular category is a rule
Output: (B)
to take responsibility for criminal acts and all repercussions that flow from them); State v. Nelson, 587 So.2d 176, 178 (La.Ct.App.1991) (finding that a voluntary act cannot be used to justify the extinction of a protected right such as child support); Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299, 301 (N.D.1990) (finding that a voluntary change of circumstances does not justify modification, espe ated obligor will be relieved of the support obligation unless other assets are available to satisfy it. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 69 Ohio App.3d 275, 590 N.E.2d 777, 778-79 (1990) (finding that elimination of income resulting from incarceration is not a voluntary act and that obligation should be suspended unless obligor had other assets); Nab v. Nab, 114 Idaho 512, 757 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, some jurisdictions grant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a party cannot attempt to modify the allocation of the income tax dependency exemption within the oneyear period imposed under ndcc  14090844 because allowing an obligor or obligee to parse various facets of a child support obligation through numerous chai lenges  would defeat the limited finality feature of the law (B) holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid (C) holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners (D) holding that obligor who is incarcerated for crime other than failure to pay support should be relieved of obligation unless obligor has other income or assets (E) holding that a rule presuming a change of circumstances when the amount of child support ordered deviates more than fifteen percent from what would be owed under a current application of the guidelines does not apply if obligor agreed to the deviation
Output: (D)
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 142 . See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4). 143 . See Compl. ¶¶ 75-78. 144 . Id. ¶ 78. 145 . See Caiola, 295 F.3d at 331. 146 . Compl. ¶ 78. 147 . Id. 148 . See id. 149 . See id. V 8. 150 . See id. ¶¶ 131-132. 151 . Novak, 216 F.3d at 309 (quotations omitted). 152 . See Compl. ¶¶ 133-137. 153 . See id. ¶¶ 6, 44, 48-49, 54-56, 62, 108. 154 . In re Scottish Re Group, 524 F.Supp.2d at 392 (quotations omitted). 155 . See Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2511. 156 . See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 130. 157 . See Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139 (“Motives that are generally possessed by most corporate directors and officers do not suffice; instead, plaintiffs must assert a concrete and personal benefit to the individual defendants resulting from the fraud.”). See also Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 939 (<HOLDING>). 158 . See Compl ¶¶ 8, 130. 159 . See In re 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a private plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an aiding and abetting action under  10b or rule 10b  5 (B) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (C) holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities (D) holding that a pledge is a sale and purchase of a security under  10b (E) holding that the wording of  10b making fraud in connection with purchase or sale of security a violation of the act is surely badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action not to purchasers or sellers of securities but to the world at large
Output: (D)
employer’s passive acquiescence in her leaving the premises and driving away in her own vehicle, acts they had no legal right to prevent, is simply not enough to impose a duty on this employer who was totally blameless in the condition — [the employee’s] intoxicated state — that led. to the accident and the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 105. See also Riddle v. Arizona Oncology Servs. Inc., 186 Ariz. 464, 924 P.2d 468 (App.1996) (finding no duty where supervisor ordered the employee to leave the defendant’s premises prior to the end of her shift; employer did not order or require the employee to drive; and the employee’s intoxication was not caused, contributed to, or condoned by the employer); Howard v. Delco Div. of General Motors Corp. Inc., 41 Ohio App.3d 145, 534 N.E.2d 936 (1987) (<HOLDING>). As the Tennessee Court of Appeals found in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made (B) holding that employee who resigned left voluntarily where employer accepted resignation told employee not to come to work anymore and paid employee through end of notice period (C) holding that employer did not have duty to protect allegedly intoxicated employee from risk that employee would have automobile accident after leaving work (D) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (E) holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project
Output: (C)
703; United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1426 (7th Cir.1996); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.7(c), at 366-67 (3d ed.1996) (stating that to establish probable cause for anticipatory warrant, affidavit must “indicate how it is known that the items to be seized will on a later occasion be at the place specified” and stating that more details will be necessary in non-controlled delivery eases). Similarly, when a controlled delivery is not made to the place to be searched, such as when a defendant is required to pick up a package containing contraband at a post office, the warrant application must present additional facts establishing the contraband will be taken to the place designated for search. Cf. Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-55 (<HOLDING>). II. VALIDITY OF ANTICIPATORY WARRANT TO 
 Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place (B) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home (C) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendants house (D) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home (E) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home
Output: (B)
of land on which he resided does not extinguish the rural homestead character of the property. The Fifth Circuit has stated the following with respect to this issue: "Neither the Texas Property Code, nor the Texas Constitution, bar a rural resident from operating a business, per se, on the property on which he resides. Because the 'business' or 'calling' of rural residents has traditionally been agricultural, the Texas Supreme Court has not yet been presented with the opportunity to pass upon a case that involves (a) a rural resident, who claims (b) rural property, that is (c) on the same tract as his residence and (d) is used for non-agricultural business purposes, as part of his homestead. But see, Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717; 717-721 (Tex.Civ.App.1974), writ ref'd, n.r.e. (<HOLDING>); In re Buie, 287 F. 896 (N.D.Tex.1923), aff'd, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where appellants owned and resided upon contiguous 60acre rural farm and used 18 acres as a mobile home park 18acre tract was part of the rural homestead (B) holding that an assembler of a mobile home is deemed to be a manufacturer of a finished product that is the mobile home for purposes of determining the applicability of the affirmative causalrelation defense under the aemld (C) holding that despite moving mobile homes onto the property a mobile home park was not in operation since regulations required permits to operate such a park and the property owner had not applied for such permits (D) holding that debtor could not claim homestead in rural property which he owned but did reside and to which he indicated no intent to return (E) holding that landowners testimony based on lot method was properly excluded in condemnation case involving property  that owner proposed to develop as mobile home park where subdivision development was speculative
Output: (A)
Formal proceedings can only be commenced after a finding by the commission of substantial evidence to support the charges. See § 8 — 16—4(c). We are of the opinion that these procedures ensure expeditious review of complaints of judicial misconduct while safeguarding the rights of judges and their judicial independence. Furthermore, unlike many quasi-judicial bodies, the commission’s role is restricted to making recommendations to this Court. Upon a finding of judicial misconduct, it is the responsibility of the commission to recommend a sanction including, but not limited to, censure, suspension, or removal from office. See § 8-16-4(e). We have steadfastly held that the authority of this Court to discipline judges is plenary and exclusive. See In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 925 (R.I.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing In the Matter of Almeida, 611 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court (B) holding that the authority of the supreme court to discipline judges and members of the bar is plenary (C) holding that the punitive provisions of the delaware consumer fraud act were not applicable to attorney conduct occurring within the practice of law given the state supreme courts inherent constitutional and statutory authority to discipline members of the state bar noting the lack of consensus in different jurisdictions as to the applicability of state consumer fraud acts to attorney conduct (D) recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar (E) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction
Output: (B)
state could have an interest in the cleanup. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(3)(i)(A) (contemplating publication of notice in a “major local newspaper” (emphasis added)). It does require, however, that the party contact those whom it might hold financially responsible for the cleanup. See 55 Fed.Reg. 8795 (“PRPs ... have a strong interest in participating in cleanup decisions that may affect them[.]”). A foreseeably affected party’s opportunity to comment must also be “meaningful.” 55 Fed.Reg. at 8793 (“[M]eaningful public participation ... is necessary to the achievement of a CERCLA-quality cleanup.” (emphasis added)). This means, at a minimum, that the party’s views must be considered before any final decisions are reached on the key issues. See Reg’l Airport Auth., 460 F.3d at 708 (<HOLDING>); Union Pac., 215 F.3d at 837-38 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful (B) holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees (C) holding while florida courts have recognized that notice of public meetings is mandatory the preparation of an agenda that reflects every issue that may come up at a properly noticed meeting is not and notice need not be given of every potential deviation from a previously announced agenda the public has the right to attend open meetings but no authority to interfere with the decisionmaking process (D) holding that public meetings were not adequate where first was held without sufficient notice and second was held after remedy was already selected by means of consent judgment (E) holding that public meetings were not meaningful where first was held without adequate notice and second was held after remedy was already selected by means of consent judgment
Output: (A)
& Families Dep’t v. Christopher B., 2014-NMCA-016, ¶ 7, 316 P.3d 918 (“[I]n order to show a denial of due process, we do require the [claimant] to ‘demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different}]’ had the denied procedure been afforded.” (Third alternation and emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {30} Garduño relies on Waters-Haskins v. Human Services Department, Income Support Division to argue that DWS’s late notice of the pending appeal amounted to “a false representation or concealment of material facts,” which implied “‘representations that are contrary to the essential facts to be relied on, even when made innocently or by mistake’.” 2009-NMSC-031, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 391, 210 P.3d 817 (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). In that case, this Court applied a theory of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state agencys voluntary reinstatement of benefits after agency had previously announced that recipients no longer met the eligibility requirements for those benefits did not moot suit challenging the termination of the benefits when agency remained free to reassess the recipients needs and cancel their benefits at any time (B) holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits (C) holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability (D) holding that the government cannot be forced to pay monetary benefits to an applicant who is statutorily ineligible for the benefits even if the applicant became ineligible due to reliance on the misadvice of a federal employee (E) holding that because the agency clearly knew of claimants ineligible status but continued to pay her food stamp benefits for eight years while the claimant had no way of knowing she was ineligible the agency was estopped from later attempting to recoup the paid benefits
Output: (E)
Williams was in the community unsupervised. Moreover, no one she spoke to, including police, firefighters, and members of the community, mentioned that Williams was under house arrest or that he was being supervised. Thus, Judge Kendall’s contention that Blackburn testified that she had no source for her statement that Judge Kendall had released Williams “unsupervised” into the community is not supported by the record. And while further investigation may have allowed Blackburn to more accurately report the specific circumstances surrounding William’s release, Judge Kendall has failed to clearly and convincingly establish that the Daily News or Blackburn either knew that the statement was false or recklessly disregarded the truth. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. at 688 (<HOLDING>); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (B) holding failure to investigate before publishing is not sufficient to prove actual malice (C) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (D) holding under federal law that public figure claiming iied based on defamatory nature of speech must prove actual malice (E) holding plaintiff failed to prove actual malice when author was never called as a witness to confirm that he wrote the article
Output: (B)
tire wear to plaintiffs’ CLRA claim. As noted, the defect plaintiffs allege is a design specification that requires the back tires of each class vehicle to have 1.5 degrees of negative camber (within certain design tolerances). There is no dispute that this specification is common to the entire class of vehicles. Plaintiffs are thus correct that defendants repeatedly “confuse!] the defect at issue ... with the consequences of that defect, which include!] premature or uneven tire wear.” The Ninth Circuit disfavors this type of mingling of issues, and requires that courts accept plaintiffs’ theory of relief as it is stated. See United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Service Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). !27] Nonetheless, whether class vehicles are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court was incorrect to treat  plaintiffs actual legal theory as all but beside the point because it questioned their ability to prove that theory and was concerned about the individualized inquiries that would result if they failed (B) holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim (C) holding that the failure to draw the district courts attention to an applicable legal theory waives pursuit of that theory in this court (D) holding that the plaintiffs misconceived legal theory did not preclude it from obtaining relief under another theory (E) holding that if basis described the parties were therefore aware of plaintiffs legal theory even where the theory was mischaracterized citation omitted
Output: (A)
and began questioning the two men. The fact that the detectives in this ease requested that Peterkin answer questions apart from Durovic, and separated them by about ten feet, does not convert an otherwise voluntary encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The first moment at which Peterkin may have been seized was when Detective Lascik took Peterkin’s identification back to the van to run a background cheek. By that time, however, Peterkin and Durovic had already given the detectives conflicting stories, including whether they knew each other. This inconsistency, together with the detectives’ earlier observations of their unusual behavior, was enough to create reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that after receiving conflicting stories from a driver and passenger the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the terry stop and conduct background checks on them both (C) holding that receiving conflicting stories from the driver and passenger of a stopped car about their travel gave the officer reasonable suspicion to extend the terry stop (D) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation
Output: (C)
under a ... will ... may have determined any .question of ... validity arising under the instrument ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Ark.Code Ann. § 16 — 111— 104. Whether a plaintiff may contest the validity of a will under the Arkansas declaratory judgment act is an issue of first impression. This Court has located no Arkansas authority that suggests an answer to this question. The most apposite federal authority is Kausch v. First Wichita Nat. Bank of Wichita Falls, Tx., 470 F.2d 1068, 1069 (5th Cir.1972). In Kausch, the plaintiff claimed that the federal court had jurisdiction to declare a will invalid in an action brought under the Texas declaratory judgment act. The language of Texas’s declaratory judgment act was identic 95) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Moerschel’s Estate, 86 Ill.App.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action under the illinois declaratory judgment act to void a will must be construed as a will contest that is governed by the laws controlling such contests in probate proceedings (B) holding that the trial courts determination that the invalidity of an unprobated will under texass declaratory judgment act was not error where the action was joined with a probate action and multiple wills were before the court (C) holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act (D) holding that texass probate statute does not affect whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to a case (E) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment
Output: (B)