niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
No. 25. The‘government asserts that “defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulgéd,” citing DOC’s written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov’t’s Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government’s position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (B) holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations where inmates received a handbook alerting them that all telephone calls were recorded and were exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials (E) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company
Output: (B)
loss of hearing was caused by exposure to the horn blasts (Danziger Aff. ¶ 19), he has not presented an analysis of the levels of noise exposure experienced by plaintiff, except to note that even noise found to be permissible under OSHA regulations might still cause injury. {Id. ¶ 16). The problem is that in the absence of any evidence as to the noise levels actually experienced by Mr. Tufar-iello, it is impossible for anyone to o railroad safety are concerned, courts have held that the failure to present expert testimony on those issues meant that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case. See, e.g., In re Amtrak “Sunset Ltd. ” Train Crash, 188 F.Supp.2d at 1347; see also Simpson v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 957 F.Supp. 136, 138 (N.D.Ill.1997) (<HOLDING>); Turner v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 785 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the connection is an element (B) holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint (C) holding that expert testimony usually is necessary to establish a causal connection between an injury and its source unless the connection is a kind that would be obvious to laymen such as a broken leg from being struck by an automobile  (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that there must be some causal connection between the accident and the automobile allegedly involved for coverage to exist
Output: (C)
dissent calls attention to the proper role which Congress should be filling (but has failed to fill) in providing the proper guidelines for jurisdictional determinations in the unincorporated, non-trust entity context. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 198-199, 110 S.Ct. at 1022-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). It is obvious that clearer, more appropriate guidelines must be dictated for diversity jurisdiction determinations in contexts such as this, either by Congress or by the Supreme Court. The issue of how to categorize Lloyd’s syndicates for jurisdictional purposes has not yet been addressed by the Third Circuit. The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has addressed the issue of citizenship of a Lloyd’s syndicate. See Certain Interested Underwriters v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). While the decision of the Sixth Circuit is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citizenship of active underwriters and names with lloyds london had to be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction (B) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (C) holding that by applying the real party in interest test in conjunction with tennessees law concerning suits involving principal and agent only the underwriters should be included for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction (D) recognizing that a narrow reading of missouri would suggest that the state is the real party in interest for diversity purposes only when the relief sought inures to the benefit of the state alone but noting that cases have only required a real interest pecuniary or otherwise in the outcome of the litigation (E) holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes
Output: (C)
debtors are accorded notice before their wages are garnished, are notified of the procedure by which to challenge the garnishment within ten days of receiving that notice, are given the opportunity to object after the court orders the garnishment, and are entitled to a hearing within seven days of that objection. R. 4:59-1(d). Consistent with Caldwell, those protections are at least as comprehensive, if not more so, than those required by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir.1985) (finding due process satisfied when judgment debtors are notified about garnishment and available exemptions after property is seized, and when they have opportunity to challenge seizure promptly); Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1368 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we agree with those courts that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of condemnation and availability of a state court injunction writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari in an eminent domain case satisfied due process (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that due process does not require a hearing where only a potential privilege to purchase united states land is involved (D) holding that due process does not require notice or hearing before writ of garnishment issues (E) recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process
Output: (D)
old. He claimed that he was “singled out and targeted for firing” and that “[n]o younger people were terminated for similar allegations.” Appellees moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the only proper defendant in an employment discrimination lawsuit against the United States government is the head of the agency, sued solely in his official capacity, and that Lynn’s claim for punitive damages should be dismissed as punitive damages cannot be sought against the federal government or an agency. Over Lynn’s objections, the District Court agreed, dismissing all defendants save the Secretary of Defense, as the head of the DLA, and dismissing Lynn’s claim for punitive damages. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (<HOLDING>); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (stating that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that physician was an independent contractor and thus could not sue hospital under title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 (B) holding that surgeon with surgical privileges was not an employee of hospital and thus could not bring suit under either the age discrimination in employment act or title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (E) recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap
Output: (C)
until all appellate rights are exhausted. These rules apply to a district clerk’s appeal of injunctions. Id. at 625 (citations omitted). As in Dallas Area Rapid Transit, however, the court in Long went on to emphasize that the appel-lee could have invoked the trial court’s discretion to deny suspension of the judgment but had not done so: [The appellee] had possible mechanisms for seeking enforcement of the injunction before February 13, 1995 [the date the mandate had issued]. [The appellee] could have sought denial of suspension of the injunction. See former Tex. R.App. P. 47(f) (allowing trial court to decline to permit other judgments to be suspended) (currently Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(3)); City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). But cf. Public Util. Comm’n v. Coalition of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal (B) holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion (C) holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal (D) holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction (E) recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence
Output: (A)
suggestive.”); Greenwood, supra note 4, 659 A.2d at 828 (“[I]f the identification procedures are not unduly suggestive, the details of those procedures are admissible and no reliability finding is necessary”). In short: if no undue suggestivity, no suppression—period—without regard to reliability. To the extent that rulings on sugges-tivity and reliability are factual, we are bound by the trial court’s findings if they are supported by the evidence and accord with the law. See Stewart v. United States, 490 A.2d 619, 623 (D.C.1985). On the other hand, because suggestivity and reliability ultimately determine the issue of admissibility—a question of law—they are both better characterized as mixed questions of fact and law. Cf. Funchess v. United States, 677 A.2d 1019, 1020 (D.C.1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, of course, the trial court failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case (B) holding that an error pertaining to a mixed question of law and fact under state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding (C) holding that joint employment determination was a complex mixed question of law and fact properly determined by jury (D) holding that probable cause determination presents a mixed question of law and fact (E) holding the manifest error standard of review is the proper standard to be applied to the mixed question of law and fact presented by a determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm
Output: (D)
of the debt. He further argues that a bankruptcy case that starts as a Chapter 11 is the same case after conversion to Chapter 7. Finally, White points out that as a United States citizen, he is entitled to protection of the federal bankruptcy laws, and that Col-ville Credit’s right to seek relief in tribal court is not at issue in this action. A We turn first to whether Colville Credit’s participation in White’s Chapter 11 waived sovereign immunity respecting the adjudication of its claim against White’s assets. No one disputes that Colville Credit, as an administrative arm of a tribal sovereign, enjoys common law immunity from suit. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1676-77, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 596-97 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). However, Indian tribes may consent to suit 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing sovereign immunity of forprofit corporation formed by a tribe to operate the tribes casino (B) holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity (C) holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act (D) holding that the sovereign immunity afforded to tribes extends to their governmental organizations and business entities (E) holding that tribes wholly owned commercial business enjoyed sovereign immunity
Output: (E)
claiming that all of Oja’s state law claims were preempted by the MDA. The district court denied Howmedica’s motion and its motion for reconsideration. At the close of the evidence, Howmedica moved for a directed verdict on all of Oja’s state law claims based on MDA preemption. The district court denied the motion. After the jury returned its verdict, Howmedica renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing only that the MDA preempted Oja’s negligent failure to warn claim. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Howmedi-ca again argues only that the MDA preempts Oja's negligent failure to warn claim. Thus, we do not address whether the MDA preempts any of Oja’s other state law claims. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n. 7 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Oja underwent her PCA hip surgery on July 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue (B) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (C) holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief (D) holding that a party abandoned an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief (E) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue
Output: (B)
as an exhibit, he was able to make his argument that the victim was vindictive towards defendant. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in this respect, we are not persuaded that it is more probable than not that any such error was outcome determinative. (MCOA Op. at 5.) Petitioner contends that, by barring the introduction of the actual letters sent by Gordon and barring cross-examination that quoted those letters, the trial court prevented him from effectively cross-examining Gordon about her bias and motive for giving false evidence against him. I disagree. Unlike in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, the trial court did not “prohibit! ] all inquiry” into Gordon’s possible bias and motivation to lie. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 571 (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, he 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (C) recognizing distinction between barring all inquiry into a witness bias and barring a particular form of crossexamination (D) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (E) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell
Output: (C)
no. 11-20057(25), filed in the 17th Judicial.Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. See DeGregorio v. Balkwill, 853 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2003); Hernandez v. Kissimmee Police Dep’t, 901 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Alvarez v. City of Plantation, 824 So.2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); cf. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 587 So.2d 1378, 1390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (noting statute seemingly mandatory in terms because of the use of the word “shall,” is designed simply to further the orderly conduct of business, and the provision is generally deemed directory only). Salter and Fernandez, Associate Judges, concur. 1 . We treat the petition for writ of prohibition as a petition for writ of certiorari, 2 . See State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 1995) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the federal character of a removed case is eliminated the court has discretion to retain jurisdiction to remand or to dismiss (B) holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case (C) holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court (D) holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits (E) holding an appellate court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits of a case notwithstanding the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal
Output: (E)
did occur and there was no match. Detective Daniels testified that the partial palm prints did not match with those of Overton. Second, Overton’s counsel did properly address the testimony of Dr. Nelms by presenting Dr. Wright as a defense expert. Wright expressed the opinion that it was possible that the murders occurred elsewhere and that there was more than one perpetrator. Thus, these claims were legally insufficient on their face. Contrary to Overton’s arguments, an evidentiary hearing was in fact granted 'on the allegations in paragraph 34 of the petition directed to counsels failure to prompt ly denied. As we have explained, all of Overton’s claims of error have been rejected which renders this cumulative error claim moot. See Marshall v. State, 854 So.2d 1235, 1252 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Claim XI, directed to a lack of effective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a remand and possibly an evidentiary hearing was necessary for reconsideration of the plaintiffs claim for injuries allegedly caused by the states negligent failure to maintain a public highway because court of appeals could not tell whether parties presented and court considered all relevant evidence on the issue (B) holding that a remand for an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary in part because the record negated the possibility that counsels omission was strategic (C) holding that the claim of cumulative error was rendered moot because all claims were rejected but one for which an evidentiary hearing would occur on remand (D) holding that the defendant was entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing on his claim of immunity based on selfdefense (E) holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing
Output: (C)
to kill Tevin if he told about the molestation and that, despite Tevin’s repeated requests to go home, Loyd took Tevin to a dump site, made him lie down on the ground and announced to him that he was about to die before repeatedly strangling the child, who struggled so fiercely that he kicked off his own shoes. The State’s expert testified that even a small child’s natural reaction to strangulation would be to struggle and that death by strangulation can take as long as ten minutes to occur. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture to the victim and the depravity of mind of the defendant. See Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 861-862 (3) (268 SE2d 339) (1980) (<HOLDING>). Accord Presnell v. State, 274 Ga. 246, 248 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another (B) holding that torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death that serious sexual abuse may constitute serious physical abuse that facts supporting a finding of torture will also support a finding of depravity of mind and that the age of the victim may be considered in determining whether the evidence shows depravity of mind (C) holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process (D) holding that torture of the victim or serious physical abuse language in the instruction cures vagueness of hac (E) holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim
Output: (B)
reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (3)). This is because supervised release “serves an entirely different purpose than the sentence imposed under § 3553(a).” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 502 n.15, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196. (2011). As the Supreme Court explained, ‘[supervised release fulfills rehabilitative . ends, . distinct from those served by incarceration.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59, 120 S.Ct. 1114. Pointing out that, “Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community -life,” id,, the Court has stressed that “supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides individuals with po-stconfinement assistance,” id, at 60, 120 S.Ct. 1114. See also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 708-09, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court’s view- of the role of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) recognizing the congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses (E) recognizing district courts broad discretion to impose prison term up to the statutory maximum for violations of supervised release internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (B)
will be set aside.” High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 640 (9th Cir.2004). 8. However, a court may not issue an injunction under NEPA that would cause a violation of other statutory-requirements, such as those found in section 7 of the ESA. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497, 121 S.Ct. 1711, 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001) (“A district court cannot, for example, override Congress’ policy choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be prohibited”). Nor should an injunction issue under NEPA when enjoining government action would result in more harm to the environment than denying injunctive relief. Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir.1984); Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc’y v. Schlapfer, 518 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need for natural gas supply as a substantial public interest (B) holding that any member of the general public can initiate an action to raise issues involving the public trust in air water or other natural resources of the state (C) holding public interest does not favor granting an injunction where government action allegedly in violation of nepa might actually jeopardize natural resources (D) holding on motion for preliminary injunction that balance of hardships tipped in favor of public (E) holding that inevitable harm of limiting public resources does not trump lawful department action
Output: (C)
in its legislative history remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act’s extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes into little more than ‘private, voluntary organizations.’ ” Id., 426 U.S. at 388, 96 S.Ct. at 2110. One court with Public Law 280 jurisdiction has suggested that it, too, must determine whether state exercise of jurisdiction infringes the Indian right to self-government, as set forth in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). Duluth Lumber and Plywood Co. v. Delta Development, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1979). See Note, State Jurisdiction Over Indians as a Subject of Federal 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation (B) holding that an action against a tribal enterprise is an action against the tribe itself (C) holding that state has standing to appeal an action initiated by a tribe based on its statutory obligation to oversee the  reservation which made it responsible under the statute for damage to the reservation and misuse of tribal funds  and thus authorized to appeal (D) holding gross receipts provision provides exception for trade or business to general meaning of gross income provided in section 61a so reporting of gross proceeds alone from sales of commodities would not prevent application of irc  6501e1a (E) holding the state can tax gross receipts of tribal enterprise operated off the reservation
Output: (E)
Defendants further correctly assert that the patent specifications suggest that the behavior illustrated in figures 2F and 2H — spontaneous return precisely to original shape from strains of up to 6% — can be achieved by the claimed invention at temperatures as low as — 20°C. While it is certainly appropriate to consider a patent specification when constru ing a disputed claim term, it is not proper to read limitations into a claim from the specification. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (noting that the specification “does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of the patent claims.”); Electro Medical Sys. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Figures 2F and 2H are therefore relevant only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims (B) holding that courts must not import limitations from the specification into the claim (C) holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite (D) holding improper reading into claims a limitation appearing only in the specification (E) holding that claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only in the specification
Output: (E)
Dismissal of Ogden Teck’s potentially meritorious cross-claim against Terrazzo serves no one’s interest but Terrazzo’s. Terrazzo’s discovery rights are simply not the discovery rights that the trial court was properly protecting by imposing the sanction in this case, and it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to attempt to do so in this instance. In essence, Terrazzo received a windfall due to the over-breadth of the trial court’s sanction, because Terrazzo was wholly removed from the instant discovery dispute. The trial court failed to aim its sanction at the specific misconduct of Ogden Teck, and in so doing, ran afoul of the requirement that the sanction imposed be reasonable — comprehensive, yet not overly broad. See Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 362 S.E.2d 317 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the sanction imposed in this case is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction (B) holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim (C) holding that the trial court erred by imposing a sanction that was too lenient to adequately serve to protect the rules (D) holding that trial court erred by imposing sanctions against attorney without notice and hearing but error was cured by attorneys subsequent challenge to sanctions (E) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss
Output: (C)
in the city’s park' alongside other religious and secular displays.' Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). Explaining its rationale, it cited the history of government use of monuments to speak to’ the public; the fact that observers generally expected permanent monuments to convey a message on the property owner’s behalf; and the.city’s control over the selection of monuments. Id, at 470-73, 129 S.Ct. 1125. At the same . time, however, speech that is otherwise private does not become speech of the government merely because the government provides a forum for the speech or in some way allows or facilitates it. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811-13, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Latino Officers Ass’n, N.Y., Inc. v. City of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a charity drive organized by government was nonpublic forum for private speakers to solicit donations and therefore that viewpoint discrimination was prohibited (B) holding unconstitutional a rule excluding all religious speech as viewpoint discrimination (C) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (D) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (E) holding that an underinclusive regulation will violate the first amendment only if it favors a particular viewpoint
Output: (A)
his duty of good faith to A&P. The district court also properly determined Gillis’ conduct could not be sanctioned under a fair reading of the lease provisions. Throughout the proceedings, Gillis has argued that the arbitrary period of ten days set out in the default notice was to begin the date he mailed the letter (August 31, 2000) and not on the date A&P received the letter (September 5, 2000). This position means, however, that Gillis only allowed A&P six days from receiving notice to cure its default before he cancelled the lease. Al riate, federal jurisdiction was proper because the alternative standard applied to the facts of this case leads to the same result. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 3 . A party may be joined as an involuntary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state defendant waives sovereign immunity when it removes a state court case to federal court thereby deliberately invoking the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their subject matter jurisdiction despite the pendency of state court proceedings (C) holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine
Output: (B)
to deal “honestly and openly” arose from the special relationship he fostered with plaintiffs over numerous years as their guru and spiritual counselor. It is well established that a fiduciary duty arises when one reposes faith, confidence, and trust in another’s judgment and advice. Van Brode Group, Inc. v. Bowditch & Dewey, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 509, 516, 633 N.E.2d 424 (internal quotations omitted),further appellate review denied, 418 Mass. 1105, 639 N.E.2d 1081 (1994). However, plaintiffs cite no Massachusetts cases, nor is the court aware of any, that recognize a fiduciary duty in the spiritual counseling context. It is true that some jurisdictions have acknowledged such a duty. See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F.Supp.2d 138, 1998 WL 338213 (D.Conn.1998) (<HOLDING>); DeStefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred consideration of negligent supervision claim against diocese for sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest while the priest was counseling the parishioner in his position as a hospital chaplain (B) holding that first amendment barred negligent supervision claim against a church regarding sexual relationship between adult parishioner and priest during the course of a marital counseling (C) holding that first amendment barred adult parishioner who engaged in sexual relationship with priest during the course of pastoral counseling from bringing intentional infliction of emotional distress negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims (D) holding that first amendment barred adults breach of fiduciary duty claim against pastor for actions that occurred when parishioner was a minor (E) recognizing fiduciary relationship under connecticut law between parishioner and diocese where parishioner had been sexually abused by diocesan priest
Output: (E)
this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See § 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife
Output: (C)
by riveting different types of metal and roofing material into the boot, together with a stainless steel bolt obtained from a hardware store. Adair specifically characterized this arrangement as "homemade.” 10 . See generally Ken Driggs, A Current of Electricity Sufficient in Intensity to Cause Immediate Death: A Pre-Furman History of Florida’s Electric Chair, 22 Stetson L.Rev. 1169 (1993). 11 . See, e.g., Buenoano, 565 So.2d at 315 (Kogan, J., dissenting): An expert in the design and construction of electric chairs, Fred Leuchter, Jr., reported that the Florida chair was not functioning properly because of its use of only a single "homemade” leg electrode. According to Leu-chter, an electric c urder, see, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that defendant spent years on death row awaiting execution does not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment (B) holding aiding and abetting is not a discrete criminal offense (C) holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for the crime of rape (D) holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for aiding and abetting a robbery resulting in murder (E) holding that seventyfive to ninetynine years for robbery is not cruel and unusual punishment
Output: (D)
of the confrontation rule from its inception is not a new rule of constitutional procedure and cannot be restricted to prospective application starting with cases still pending as of 2004. Certainly, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Brown v. Uphoff correctly noted that “[a] decision by the Supreme Court announces a new rale if ‘the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time [a] defendant’s conviction [becomes] final,’ ” Crawford cannot be said to be new if the precedent was wrong under originalist constitutional principles. That said, we must await the Supreme Court’s final pronouncement as to whether Crawford must be applied retroactively, or only prospectively from the date dictated by it as a “new” rule. 1 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 2 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 3 Id. at 66. 4 121 Nev. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made (B) holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness (C) holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (D) holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine (E) holding that outofcourt statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature are barred under the confrontation clause unless witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them
Output: (B)
remained at all times with the Trustee, but did assign to the Arbogasts “the burden of producing at least some useful evidence regarding what the funds deposited into an entireties account are ultimately spent on.” Arbogast, 466 B.R. at 308. The Trustee argues that the law’s exemption for constructive fraud purposes of funds later used for “reasonable and necessary expenses” constitutes an affirmative defense, and that the burden of persuasion should therefore have rested with the Arbogasts. Pennsylvania law appears to us to be silent as to whether the demonstration that funds were used for “reasonable and necessary expenses” is an affirmative defense or instead, a negation of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See, e.g., Watters v. DeMilio, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 747, 752-53 (Ct.Com.Pl.1957) (<HOLDING>). Cases from other jurisdictions arising in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding nature of motion is determined by its substance not its title (B) recognizing this rule (C) recognizing this as the general rule (D) recognizing rule (E) recognizing the rule but offering no hint as to its nature
Output: (E)
the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality.” Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). We conclude that prospective jurors Forber and Spurlin’s responses were sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to their impartiality. Admittedly, the State attempted to rehabilitate these prospective jurors and they said they could follow the jury instructions and be fair and impartial. However, based on the totality of the answers given, we find a reasonable doubt as to the ability of these two prospective jurors to serve impartially in this case. Consequently, they should have been stricken for cause. See, e.g., Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case (B) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (C) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (D) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented
Output: (B)
27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 734-35 (1980) (declining to extend holding in Tarasoff when neither a special relationship existed nor had a specific individual been threatened); Brenneman v. State, 208 Cal.App.3d 812, 256 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367 (following Thompson in holding that “public entities and employees have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims”); Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hospital, 425 Pa.Super. 540, 625 A.2d 1228, 1232 (1993) (following Thompson, finding "no common law rule that imposes a duty on a psychologist or psychiatrist to warn a non-patient of a patient’s dangerous propensities”). But see, e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Co. 1989) (<HOLDING>). 6 .Among those who have been held in certain 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties (B) holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise (C) holding courts have held that hospitals have a duty to protect its patients from the tortious or criminal actions of third parties due to the special relationship between the hospital and the patient (D) holding that when a psychiatrist determines or  should determine that a patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party the psychiatrist has a duty of reasonable care to that party (E) holding that psychiatrist has duty to third parties to exercise due care in treatment and release of committed patients
Output: (E)
69 P.3d 318 (2003). In conducting this review, our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Id. Further, “it is the duty of this court to construe two statutes dealing with the same subject matter so that the integrity of both will be maintained.” Gilbert v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 127 Wn.2d 370, 375, 900 P.2d 552 (1995). ¶19 Petitioner mistakenly focuses on whether appointment of guardians is discretionary or mandatory. The plain language of the TAA is unambiguous and requires that appointment of guardians under the TAA be governed by TEDRA’s procedures. Because TEDRA makes appointment of guardians discretionary, so too must appointment of guardians be discretionary under the TAA. See In re Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 93 P.3d 147 (2004) (<HOLDING>). ¶20 In any event, the parties focus on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one provisions permission for removal only for  reasons specified  in a second provision incorporated the second provisions catchall phrase  for any other cause or reason which to the court appears necessary  emphasis omitted quoting in re estate of jones 116 wn app 353 363 67 p3d 1113 2003 rcw 1128250 (B) holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (E) holding that such provisions are valid
Output: (A)
noted, “do[es] not dictate the forum.” Id. at 535. Rather, the clause “should be enforced as a matter of contract law [which does] not [involve the] issue of proper venue.” Id. at 535. The Kerobo Court ultimately analyzed the enforceability of the forum-selection clause under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which allows a district court to “transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” That particular statutory provision cannot govern the enforceability of the selection clause at issue here, as Heinz would have this Court believe, because the contractually agreed upon forum, Basel, Switzerland, is not within any United States district court. Royal Bed and Spring Co., Inc. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus, upon first blush, there appears to be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts (B) holding that title vii is subject to the transfer provisions of section 1404a (C) holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding that since we are dealing with a forumselection clause that refers to a forum outside of the united states and not within the scope of the statute section 1404a does not apply (E) holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims
Output: (D)