niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
immunity from a civil suit for damages, a court must first determine whether a prosecutor has performed a quasi-judicial function. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984. If the action was part of the judicial process, the prosecutor is entitled to the protection of absolute immunity whether or not he or she violated the civil plaintiffs constitutional rights. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (“Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity — absolute or qualified — for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.”); see also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502 (<HOLDING>); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional (B) holding that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense (C) holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity (D) holding that a prosecutors filing of an arrest warrant and charging documents are protected by absolute immunity (E) holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity
Output: (C)
The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding, on these facts, that defendants were not entitled to a qualified immunity and, accordingly, in denying defendants’ motion for a summary judgment. A Pratt Already Received Full Procedural Due Process. [¶ 18] The Superior Court found that “[b]y 1996, it was well established ‘that a constructive discharge of a public employee without procedural due process constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property.’ ... .Supp.2d 893, 906 (N.D.Cal.1997), aff'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that “Wasson, by acknowledging that she was placed on administrative leave, cannot claim that she was deprived of a property interest in her employment, as a matter of law”); Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 673 A.2d 514, 524 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Koelsch v. Town of Amesbury, 851 F.Supp. 497, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employers statement that he did not feel that he could afford the unions proposals did not trigger a duty to disclose because the overall context of bargaining did not suggest an inability to pay (B) holding that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay for the differential between unemployment compensation received and the salary he would have earned if not terminated (C) holding that a suspension with pay did not carry consto tutional ramifications because plaintiff did not prove that he was entitled to anything but his salary (D) holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights (E) holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act
Output: (C)
of a proceeding later that same day during which the earlier status conference was discussed. 13 . The Adoption and Safe Families Act of -1997, Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, has been amended numerous times'and is codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 14 . According to counsel, she cited one of the cases, an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion, for the proposition that a person accused of criminal contempt is entitled to a jury trial and all the process ordinarily due in such á trial if incarceration for at least six months or a '‘serious” fine is a possible sanction. See Riley v. Gibson, 338 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Ky. 2011) (citing Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974) for same proposition). Counsel did not, however, accompany t r.2013) (<HOLDING>). 20 . CR 1(2) provides in part that "These 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added (B) holding that compensatory contempt fines awarded against the secretary of health and human services were barred by sovereign immunity (C) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply (D) holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official (E) holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government
Output: (E)
policy becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the question, ‘How shall the losses be distributed?’ ”). Slain and Kripke argued that “[t]he situation with which we are concerned involves two risks: (1) the risk of business insolvency from whatever cause; and (2) the risk of illegality in securities issuance.” Slain & Kripke, supra, at 286. Analyzing the first risk — that of business insolvency-Slain and Kripke observed that the absolute priority rule allocates this risk to shareholders. Under the absolute priority rule, “stockholders seeking to recover their investments cannot be paid before provable creditor claims have been satisfied in full.” Id. at 261; see generally Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-21, 61 S.Ct. 675, 85 L.Ed. 982 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process (B) holding that stockholders cannot participate in a plan of reorganization unless creditors claims have been satisfied in full (C) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (D) holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive (E) holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding
Output: (B)
here. We fail to see how Petitioner’s statutory right to seek review of the City’s land use decision should be defeated by the subsequent execution of a private settlement agreement and the entry of a stipulated order of dismissal. The Dismissal Based Upon the Settlement Agreement is Not an Order Entitled to Preclusive Effect {9} The City and Wal-Mart contend that Petitioner’s appeal should be regarded as an impermissible col 122 (1918) (observing that judgments evidenced by patents are immune from collateral attack); VanderVossen v. City of Espanola, 2001-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 17-21, 130 N.M. 287, 24 P.3d 319 (applying the bar against collateral attacks in regard to a municipal authority’s final zoning decision); Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 122 N.M. 468, 469, 927 P.2d 23, 24 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Royal Int’l Optical Co. v. Tex. State Optical 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing collateral attack on void order (B) holding that an attempt to set aside a divorce decree constituted an impermissible collateral attack (C) recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict (D) holding that insofar as the university actions were taken in an attempt to comply with the requirements of title ix plaintiffs attack on those actions is merely a collateral attack on the statute and regulations and is therefore impermissible (E) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment
Output: (B)
“must be construed in its entirety and as a whole,” see Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1233 (Fla.2006) (quoting St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.2000)), and in such manner that it does not “render part of [the] statute meaningless.” Id. (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.1992)). To this end, “sexual intercourse” must be read in the context of not only section 384.24, but also in the context of Chapter 384 as a whole. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 986 So.2d at 1265-66; Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995) (“[T]he context in which a term is used may be referred to in ascertaining the meaning of that term.”); Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So.2d 475, 476-77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (<HOLDING>). Chapter 384, of which section 384.24(2) is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine (B) recognizing that our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire  act and that it is axiomatic that we construe the statute as a whole entity  in order to arrive at a construction which avoids illogical results (C) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (D) recognizing this rule but concluded that the statute in that case was incapable of a narrower construction because there is no logical way to read a specific intent element into the statute as it is currently written (E) holding that if precise issue is not clear in statute reviewing court must not simply impose its own construction but must determine whether agencys construction is permissible
Output: (B)
is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Id. The actual length of delay necessary to warrant an application of the other factors in the balancing test is not defined by the Constitution, but must be considered in light of the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. A delay of less than one year will rarely qualify as “presumptively prejudicial” for purposes of triggering the Barker inquiry. See Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, - n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). The legally relevant delay in this case was only ninety-two days, a period insufficient to presume prejudice. See United States v. Vanella, 619 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Under Barker, we need not even consider the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a relatively brief delay of less than one hundred days certainly does not rise to the level of presumptive prejudice (B) holding thirty days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment invoking the due process clause (C) holding that a limited financial hardship exception to the schools uniform policy does not rise to the level of a system of individualized exemptions  (D) holding any improper delegation did not rise to level of plain error (E) holding that apprendi does not apply where the defendant was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum
Output: (A)
purchase of a personal automobile policy in Alabama from an Alabama insurance company had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. We note that the policy did not cover an automobile used for business purposes, other than farming or ranching, and that there is no evidence that Knight was engaged in either farming or ranching. We can see only one conceivable connection between this insurance transaction and interstate commerce — this intrastate transaction may be one of many such transactions that help fund Southern United’s business, thus enabling it to issue other policies that substantially affect interstate commerce. However, we decline to hold, based on the record before us, that such a tenuous connection would be sufficient to invoke the FAA. See United States v. Lopez, supra (<HOLDING>). Southern United had the burden of proving 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unconstitutional 18 usc  922q as beyond congresss commerce clause power (B) holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act (C) holding that morrison does not change the holding in mcallister and that  922g is a constitutional exercise of congresss commerce power (D) holding that 42 usc  13981 exceeds congresss authority under the commerce clause (E) recognizing that there is an outer limit to congresss power under the commerce clause
Output: (E)
702; Thomas v. Alford, 230 5.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). The party offering the witness as an expert on causation must establish that the witness is qualified to testify under rule 702. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys. v. Burrell, 230 S.W.3d 755, 762-63 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (deciding that a doctor was qualified to opine about causation because his report demonstrated direct experience with treating decubitus ulcers, which was the condition at issue). To be so qualified, “an expert must have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the court that would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject.” Thomas, 230 S.W.3d at 857, 860 (citing Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153) (<HOLDING>). Further, to justify the submission of an 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the expert was particularly qualified to give his opinion (B) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiffs experts were not qualified to offer a medical opinion as to the cause of death because they are not physicians nor otherwise properly qualified to offer a medical opinion (D) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (E) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts
Output: (B)
can prevail under Ebel’s balancing test. We are not convinced. Nothing in the Constitution forbids municipalities from requiring non-conforming uses to close, change their business, or relocate within a reasonable time period. Here, as in Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 247 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.2001), World Wide “furnishes no authority for the proposition that a zoning ordinance may not prohibit a use in existence before its enactment,” id. at 1006. As a general matter, an amortization period is insufficient only if it puts a business in an impossible position due to a shortage of relocation sites. This issue is conceptually indistinguishable from the First Amendment requirement of alternative avenues of communication. See Jake’s, Ltd. v. City of Coates, 284 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 948, 123 S.Ct. 413, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that form 1040 complies with pra (B) holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration (C) holding that once consent to settlement agreement is withdrawn agreement can only be enforced as a binding contract that complies with rule 11 as established by proper pleading and proof (D) holding that rcw 3712010 complies with public law 280 and is constitutional (E) holding that application of an amortization provision is constitutional as long as it complies with renton
Output: (E)
claim did not accrue until the moment of execution. McNair deemed such a time-of-harm accrual principle to have no application “where the ultimate injury is reasonably likely and wholly foreseeable.” 515 F.3d at 1174. The court went on to explain, “It is clear a capital litigant may file suit and obtain injunctive relief long before he is executed.” Id. After detailed analysis of various alternative dates, the McNair panel concluded that the appropriate accrual date for a method-of-execution challenge was the date that Alabama’s execution protocol became applicable to the plaintiff because by that time “the facts which would support a cause of action should have been apparent to any person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Id. at 1177; see also Crowe, 528 F.3d at 1293 (<HOLDING>). A similar conclusion was reached in Lovett v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that methodofexecution challenge accrued for limitations period when after direct review of his convictions had been completed crowe became subject to the method of lethal injection that he chal lenges (B) holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules (C) holding that the statute of limitations accrued when the minors father was appointed his guardian and not when the minor became comatose (D) holding that a conviction became final when the ninetyday period to seek direct review from the  supreme court by way of certiorari expired (E) holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed
Output: (A)
U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., at 1510; Travelers Indemnity Corp. v. School Bd. of Dade County, 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir.1982). That it may be immune under state sovereign immunity principles does not mean that it is immune under eleventh amendment jurisprudence. In fact, the Authority, here, may be entitled to immunity from suit under Georgia law. Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989). However, a defendant may not “conflate sovereign immunity with regard to a state created tort with Eleventh Amendment immunity for a federal cause of action.” Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d at 1510 n. 6; see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Howlett By and Through Howlett v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alien tort statute itself is not a waiver of sovereign immunity (B) holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits (C) holding that the new mexico school district and their governing boards are not arms of the state entitled to eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment
Output: (B)
Martinez: When my dad passed away, I was holding his hand. He passed away holding my hand and I knew that I had to go on with my life because that’s part of life. You know, go on. But when we got down to SCI to my dad [sic], it’s not part of my life. I didn’t have to accept that and I did not accept it and I won’t accept it. Gracie Little: It’s the same thing as my mother and my sisters. We’re not at peace. We’re always wondering. You know, we were always wondering where our father was. It was very hard to hear how this company stole our father from his grave and moved him. That was hard. And I pray none of you have to go through this. We conclude that appellees presented direct evidence of Mrs. Guerra’s mental anguish. See Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 797-98 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>); Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 606-07 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs own testimony that he was embarrassed and humiliated by defendants conduct was sufficient to support compensatory damages award (B) holding trial court should not have granted summary judgment to employer when employee offered evidence a company security officer falsely accused him of stealing a calculator and coerced him into signing a confession resulting in his loss of his job not fear for his life like gantt and loss of sleep for weeks not still reoccurring nightmares like gantt (C) holding that plaintiffs testimony that he was depressed humiliated unable to sleep and suffered from headaches and nightmares was sufficient (D) holding that a title vii plaintiffs testimony that her employment discharge resulted in sleep loss smoking and weight loss was sufficient to support an award of 100000 in compensatory damages (E) holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been
Output: (C)
That decision will not be disturbed on appeal even in cases in which the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671. As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State’s appeal. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process. Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (E) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion
Output: (A)
disputes. This purpose makes litigation less of a game of ‘blindman’s bluff and more of a contest that seeks a fair and adequate resolution of a dispute.” Cleckley, Litigation Handbook, § 26, at 540. With this purpose in mind, we need not determine whether the pre-answer discovery by the parties was solely to accommodate the defendants’ efforts to obtain summary judgment. We believe as a matter of fundamental fairness, and so hold, that when a dispositive pre-answer motion by a defendant is denied by a trial court, or granted but reversed by the Supreme Court, a plaintiff must be permitted to conduct discovery after the defendant files an answer even though the parties may have previously engaged in pre-answer discovery. See Gray v. Whisenaut, 258 Ga. 242, 368 S.E.2d 115, 116 (Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>). In the instant proceeding, the defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery (B) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (C) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (D) holding that the states rule dates the beginning of the discovery period only from the filing of the answer (E) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law
Output: (D)
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) (“We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a ‘blocked asset’ at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... ”). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran’s interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked
Output: (C)
his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to commit hostage taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1203, and conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (a)(l)(A)(v)(I)(II). We previously held that Avilez-Zamora’s plea agreement waived his right to appeal all aspects of his sentence, except for the court’s application of grouping under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Avilez-Zamora, 168 Fed.Appx. 803 (9th Cir.2006) (unpublished decision). Avilez-Zamora does not raise any challenge to grouping in his briefs. Accordingly, the law of this case dictates that the appeal waiver in Avilez-Zamora’s plea agreement precludes this current appeal. See id.-, see also Snow-Erlin v. United States, 470 F.3d 804, 807 (2006) (<HOLDING>). DISMISSED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive (B) holding that the appellate court does not reconsider matters resolved on a prior appeal (C) recognizing the general rule that an appellate court will not address matters that were not raised or decided in the trial court   (D) recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal (E) recognizing rule that appellate court may not consider matters outside the record is so elemental that there is no excuse for any attorney to attempt to bring such matters before the court
Output: (B)
State, after expressing its clear and accurate understanding of the ... issue ..., deliberately steer[s] the District Court away from the question and towards the merits of [the] petition.” Wood v. Milyard, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (internal citation omitted). In Wood, the state had assured the district court that it was “not challenging, but d[id] not concede, the timeliness of the petition.” Id. at 1830. As in Wood, the state’s words and conduct cannot be described as an inadvertent mistake or forfeiture of the exhaustion defense, as was the case in Day, but instead they clearly evidence an express intention to waive the exhaustion requirement. As the First Circuit said, “[t]hat was game, set, and match.” Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 71-72 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have also held this type of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (B) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (C) holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error (D) holding statement that  petitioner is correct in her assertion that the claims presented  have been exhausted  was unmistakably clear and could not be resurrected on appeal alteration in original (E) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court
Output: (D)
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76, 116 S.Ct. 1114. The Court held that while Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity it was without the authority to do so. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73, 116 S.Ct. 1114. b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff contends all defendants individually and collectively, acting under the color of state law, deprived her of her property (gaming license) without due process of law and are thus liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the State and the KSGA may not go forward because a state or state agency is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Reiger v. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 755 F.Supp. 360 (D.Kan.1990) (Saffels, J.)(<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs assertion that KSGA is considered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under  1983 because it is a sovereign entity (B) holding state university is not a person under  1983 (C) holding kansas public employees retirement system is not as a state agency considered a person for purposes of  1983 liability (D) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (E) holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983
Output: (C)
Ass'n of Comm’y Org. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir.1995). 143 . 133 S.Ct. at 2262-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 144 . Id. at 2268 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 145 . Id. at 2270 (Thomas, J,, dissenting). 146 . Id. at 2274 (Alito, X, dissenting). 147 . Id. at 2255 (footnote omitted). 148 . See id.; 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1). 149 .Prior to the EAC’s January 29, 2016 decision to modify the state-specific rules for the Kansas Federal Form, the State was required to conduct a two-tiered system for those who registered by mail. Under Kobach, tire EAC’s earlier decision to reject the state-specific instructions requiring DPOC was upheld, but the State form continued to require DPOC. 150 . Compare U.S. Student Ass’n Found. v. Land, 546 F.3d 373, 382-83 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), with Common Cause of Colo. v. Buescher, 750 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law defines fiduciary capacity and fraud or defalcation (B) holding claims preempted where plaintiffs sought to enjoin and declare unlawful the very statement that federal law permits and defines because sueh relief would impose a burden through state law that is not identical to the requirements under section 343r (C) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (D) holding that missouri law applied to the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is corporate law that defines the contours of that duty (E) holding federal and not state law defines the term registrant
Output: (E)
or subject that person to a sexual offense; [or] (e) Terrorize that person or a third person[.] (Emphasis added.) Petitioner stated that “[i]n his case, for both trials, the court gave the following definition of kidnapping, which covered only [HRS § 707-720(d) and HRS § 707-720(e)]: “ ‘A person commits kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person with intent to inflict bodily injury upon that person or terrorize that person.’ ocedure Rule 28(d) (2005) (providing that “[t]he reply brief shall be confined to matters presented in the answering brief’). However, because Petitioner’s assertion relates to jury instructions, whether the court’s instruction was plain error is briefly discussed. See State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 335, 141 P.3d 974, 982 (2006) (<HOLDING>)” and, thus, “the same standard of review is to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal (B) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (C) holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
Output: (C)
Id. § 815.9(4). If the costs and fees are not paid within this time frame, the court is required to enter judgment against the person for any unpaid amounts. Id. § 815.9(9). This process takes place entirely in the context of the criminal case. Under this statutory scheme, as applied to an acquitted defendant, the “final judgment on behalf of the state” in the criminal proceeding is the cost judgment entered against the acquitted person in favor of the state. Therefore, under the definition of “prosecution” applicable to chapter 815, the criminal prosecution includes the pos-tacquittal proceedings. We conclude these statutory provisions evidence a legislative intent to extend a defendant’s right to counsel to these postacquittal proceedings. Cf. White, 201 F.3d at 745, 752-53 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 92 Wash.App. 555, 964 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal (B) holding that the granting of an application to file an appeal out of time is considered part of the direct appeal process under oklahoma law (C) holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived (D) holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal (E) holding that because ohio law required ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claims be raised in an application to reopen the direct appeal of the criminal case such claims were part of the direct appeal entitling defendant to the assistance of counsel
Output: (E)
without comment. We reverse the denial of claim eight and remand for further proceedings. Nesbitt entered an open plea of guilty to two counts of armed robbery and one count of armed burglary of a conveyance. In claim eight, Nesbitt claims that his two convictions for armed robbery violate his constitutional protection from double jeopardy because they occurred during the same criminal episode and the State charged him with taking the same item — a purse and its contents — in each. In summarily denying the claim, the postconviction court attached a copy of the felony information and found that the convictions did not violate the protection from double jeopardy because each charge of armed robbery identified a different victim. See Hillman v. State, 410 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms (B) holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case (C) holding that two distinct acts of assault with a deadly weapon taking place within a fifteen minute period were a part of the same incident and they could not reasonably be held to constitute two separate offenses each complete in itself and each of which would require a separate charge (D) holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment (E) holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction
Output: (D)
of Alaska, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Ret. & Benefits, No. 3AN-01-06171 Civ. (Alaska Super., April 2, 2002). 12 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Alaska 2003). 13 . McMullen v. Bell, 128 P.3d 186, 190 (Alaska 2006). 14 . Id.; see also Lopez v. Adm'r, Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 20 P.3d 568, 570 (Alaska 2001) ("Questions of law not involving agency expertise are reviewed under the 'substitution of judgment' standard."). 15 . Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979). 16 . Lopez, 20 P.3d at 570. 17 . Alyeska Pipeline, 77 P.3d at 1231. 18 . Lopez, 20 P.3d at 570 (citation omitted). 19 . Alaska Const. art. XII, § 7. 20 . Alaska Const. art. I, § 15. 21 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1053-55, 1059. 22 . Id. at 1057. 23 . Id.; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (<HOLDING>). 24 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1058-59. 25 . Id. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costofliving increases are not the result of any postdivorce labor but rather are a means of offsetting the otherwise declining value of retirement benefits after they become fixed (B) holding that retirement benefit increases due to postdivorce promotion were separate property (C) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (D) holding that the state cannot make changes to the retirement system that will diminish a members benefit without providing an offsetting advantage (E) holding pension conferred cola was an accrued benefit and not ancillary because it was intended to provide retirement income commenced only at retirement and was a benefit generally transferrable to succeeding employers
Output: (D)
be granted. However, the motion may not be granted in full because the Court, upon its in camera review of the disputed documents, has discovered a few minor instances where disclosure is required. As discussed above, under the exception for official disclosure, the Government waives the right to withhold information if: (1) “the information requested [is] as specific as the information previously released”; (2) “the information requested [matches] the information previously disclosed”; and (3) “the information requested [was] already ... made public through an official and documented disclosure.” Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765. A disclosure is official “when the agency responsible for protecting the information discloses it.” Wilson v. McConnell, 501 F.Supp.2d 545, 559 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>). See also Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court need not inquire into the veracity of a classified affidavit unless the information it provides is insufficient or contradicted by the record or there is evidence of bad faith on behalf of the agency (B) holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights (C) holding that order mandating disclosure of classified information to habeas petitioners counsel was an important issue entirely separate from the merits of this case (D) holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights (E) holding that a congressional publication of classified cia information does not bind the cia
Output: (E)
Ramage from possible and foreseeable injuries. GET breached these duties by not inquiring and determining that all motor-coach seats had seatbelts, and the lack of a seatbelt was the proximate and legal cause of Ramage’s injuries. Fifth, Ramage argues GET owed him a duty created by the contract warranty, and breach of the duty by GET created a cause of action based on negligence. Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal.2d 807, 810-11, 249 P.2d 257 (1952). GET had total control of the arranging of motorcoaches, and had a duty to insure that the motoreoaeh in question had seat-belts. Ram he “Responsibility” disclaimer is immaterial. He had the chance to read it, and he signed it. Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 245 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 852, 108 S.Ct. 155, 98 L.Ed.2d 110 (1987) (<HOLDING>). GET reasserts that the “Responsibility” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile (B) holding that omission was not plain error (C) holding that the passenger who omits toread the contract takes the risk of omission (D) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (E) holding that full performance takes a contract outof the statute of frauds
Output: (C)
options,” including by streamlining communication between the distressed borrower and foreclosing party. See Assemb. B. 278, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); S.B. 900, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). There has been a wave of litigation in state and federal courts challenging various aspects of the MERS System. Almost all of the relevant law is state rather than federal. The results under state law have been inconsistent. See Weber, supra, at 246-56 (cataloguing the “schizophrenic position of state courts” on issues relating to the MERS System). Some state supreme courts have upheld the MERS System on issues ranging from foreclosure authority to recording requirements. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 155 Idaho 656, 315 P.3d 844, 846-47 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers lacked standing to foreclose as the lenders nominee (B) holding that because mers receives no payments on the debt it is not the beneficiary even though it is so designated in the deed of trust (C) holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act (D) holding that mers may be a beneficiary as nominee for the lender that assignments of the deed of trust between mers members need not be recorded that mers was not liable to the borrower in negligence and that the idaho consumer protection act did not provide a cause of action to the borrower (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee
Output: (D)
the jury during final jury instructions not to consider any testimony it had stricken or ordered the jury to disregard during trial. See United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344, 53 V.I. 890 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile curative instructions cannot repair every error, we do generally presume that juries follow their instructions.”). Finally, as discussed above in section B, the People presented overwhelming evidence that Augustine was the individual who pulled a gun and started shooting at Officers Greaves, Wharton, and Allen. Based on these factors, Officer Wharton’s statement — given in response to a question — would not have been sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial even if Augustine’s attorney had requested one at trial. See Ethridge v. State, 418 P.2d 95, 100 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (B) holding mistrial not warranted for improper statement by police officer where court sustained defendants objection and admonished jury to disregard statement and where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question (D) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (E) holding that while the prosecutors question was improper in light of the overwhelming evidence there was no reversible error in the denial of defendants motion for mistrial
Output: (B)
has not shown that it was forced to lease the Lynch figures as part of appellees’ alleged conspiracy to monopolize the wax museum display figure market. Leasing requirements, in combination with other practices, can sometimes impede competition and thereby violate the antitrust laws. For example, in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass.1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 910 (1954) (per curiam), the defendant shoe-making equipment manufacturer used an array of practices, including a lease-only policy, both to keep its customers from looking to other suppliers and to prevent its competitors from entering into the shoe machinery field. The court condemned the defendant’s “refusal to sell” practices, finding them to be exclusionary. See id. (<HOLDING>); see also Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that uniteds lease provisions violated  4 of the sherman act (B) holding ncaas television restrictions violated  1 of the sherman act (C) holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act (D) holding ban violated the sherman act (E) holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act
Output: (A)