niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
to the consuming public upon the franchised retailers” at the state level. Tracy, 519 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 820. Es sentially, utilities were principally an intrastate concern at this point. This began to change in the early twentieth century, when the natural gas industry, and later the electric industry, developed into more interstate concerns. As a corollary, the Supreme Court eventually confronted the issue of whether state regulation of the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce violated the Commerce Clause. Through its disposition of several eases, the Supreme Court devised a bright-line test to determine whether a state regulation of natural gas sales violated the Commerce Clause. See generally Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 544, 68 L.Ed. 1027 (1924) (<HOLDING>); Pub. Util. Comm’n for Kansas v. Landon, 249 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state restrictions on electronic license plates might constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce so the claim fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant commerce clause (B) holding that attempt by state to fix rates chargeable in sale of natural gas to distributor in another state is direct burden on interstate commerce (C) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (D) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce
Output: (B)
determines first what constitutes “adequate compensation,” “reasonable care,” or “customary or ordinary payments.” Such determinations require evidence which consists of similar factual situations which can be compared to the case at hand. If the case at hand falls outside the bounds permitted in the comparison cases, that result is deemed “excessive,” “negligent,” or “extraordinary.” Absent a definition from Congress, “we interpret the words using their ‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning[s].’ ” United States v. Migi, 329 F.3d at 1088. As is suggested in the district court’s order, the statute’s qualifying term “extraordinary” necessarily implies proof that the payments deviate from the ordinary. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1215 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable interpretation of the common 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (B) holding that counsels success was not extraordinary in light of the evidence presented at trial and the noncomplexity of the case (C) holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions (D) holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict (E) recognizing that the value of brady evidence must be evaluated in light of the other evidence admitted at trial
Output: (B)
(3) the de fendant’s culpability in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person. See Securities & Exchange Com’n v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996). First, as the Court has found, plaintiffs have failed properly to plead a violation of the 1934 Act. Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of “Merrill Lynch.” Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to “Merrill Lynch” as a controlling entity. See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”). See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Novak, 997 F.Supp. at 435. Finally the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (B) holding that district court has the power to decide what portion of subsidiarys income should be reallocated to its parent (C) holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself 
Output: (C)
See State v. Bell, 195 N.J.Super. 49, 55, 477 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.1984). “The warrant re quirement is predicated upon the premise that the necessity and reasonableness of a search can best be determined ‘by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of ... [a police] officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ ” State v. Malik, supra, 221 N.J.Super. at 118, 534 A.2d 27 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)). It is well settled, however, that there are several narrowly tailored exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. See Horton v. California, 495 U.S. ——, ——- n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 n. 4, 110 L.Ed.2d 112,120 n. 4 (1990); State v. Bell, supra, 195 N.J.Super. at 55, 477 A.2d 1272 (<HOLDING>). As our Supreme Court expressed in State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no general reasonableness approach to warrantless seizures (B) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (C) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances (D) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (E) holding the touchstone of determining existence of erisa plan is whether an administrative scheme is required
Output: (C)
ability to appeal. Id. at 509, 40 P.3d at 911. The supreme court held that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal order was not an acquittal because the trial court “did not rule on the merits of the case” and “did not enter any decisions as to the guilt of Poohina.” Id. at 510, 40 P.3d at 912. Accordingly, the protection against double jeopardy did not apply to the dismissal order. Id. at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12. Consistent with Poohina, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of the charges in Clemente’s case was not an acquittal, and, accordingly, the protection against double jeopardy does not apply. The District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not satisfy the Poohina test for an acquittal. It was not based on a resolution in Clem-ente’s fav 624, 626-28 (1985) (<HOLDING>); People v. Zagarino, 74 A.D.2d 115, 427 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy (B) holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause (C) holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds (D) holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges (E) holding double jeopardy prohibits government appeal and retrial following valid judgment of acquittal entered by trial court after jury deadlocked on criminal contempt charge
Output: (A)
judge is not a final order). Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231. See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (B) holding that partial summary judgment is not a final appealable judgment when it did not settle completely any of the matters in controversy or adjudicate completely the rights and liabilities of the parties (C) holding that a bankruptcy courts partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature and therefore not directly appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
Output: (C)
The district court found that there was “no possibility of confusion by the purchaser at or near the point of sale.” 894 F.Supp. at 1200. The grounds for this conclusion are apparent, but are certainly useful to discuss. Companies in the corn wet milling industry purchase clamshells directly from the manufacturers, after extensive negotiations and discussions. Fluid-Quip held itself out to this limited market as a competitor of Dorr-Oliver and conspicuously marked its elam-shells with its company name. Clearly, any purchasers of clamshells would know from whom they were buying. There is therefore no realistic possibility that anyone would purchase a Fluid-Quip clamshell believing it to be a Dorr-Oliver clamshell. See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. Mfg. Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 212 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 54, 133 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion (B) holding that most important factors in evaluating confusion in product configuration eases are marketing and labeling of products (C) holding that although the district court recognized confusion based on similarity of products it failed to give proper weight to the virtual identity of the parties products (D) holding attending and marketing products at national trade show in texas insufficient to confer general jurisdiction (E) recognizing that among other factors the location and level of the precedent as well as its age are important factors in a qualified immunity analysis
Output: (B)
States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have previously rejected this analysis on multiple occasions. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (finding that ERISA Section 502(a)(3) strictly limits the “universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”) (emphasis in original); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (“ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under [§ 502(a)(3) ]; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action.... ”); Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan (B) holding that collective bargaining agent representing employees had representational standing and therefore could bring an action under section 502 of erisa (C) holding that a lawyer who is fully aware of his clients obligation under an erisa plan to honor the subrogation interest of his employer may be held liable under section 502a3 of erisa (D) holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa (E) holding that only members of the enumerated classes have standing to bring a civil action under erisa section 502a3
Output: (E)
of class members with only Purchase Claims are represented by class representatives with Purchase Claims, and the settlement provides up to $250,000 for these claims. Moreover, class members with only Purchase Claims do not receive less value for identical claims asserted by other class members. Objectors contend inadequate representation is demonstrated in the settlement’s allocation terms, which designate the vast majority of the fund to Injury Claims, while Purchase Claims are capped at $250,OOO. But varied relief among class members with differing claims in class settlements is not unusual. See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) (“[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.”); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (<HOLDING>). Such differences in settlement value do not, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions (C) holding that once district court entered order approving the settlement of class claims it could not alter the class in the absence of egregious error (D) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (E) holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted
Output: (E)
Count I of the Indictment in Bradford II, a potential charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement in the case. Second, such conduct did not enter into the determination of the applicable guideline range. Arguably, § 2D 1.1 takes into account some of the pernicious effects of unlawful substances, because it is directed at the unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting and trafficking of controlled substances. See USSG § 2D1.1, passim. Defendant’s distribution of heroin resulting in the death of J.H., however, clearly did not enter into the determination of the applicable range. As the court made clear in its discussion of Rebmann II, see supra Parts V(A)(2)(a) and (b), USSG § 2D1.1 contains a specific provision for death: USSG § 2Dl.l(a)(2). This provision was ina D.C.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). “Under [§ J2D1.1, the base offense level for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury (B) holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim (C) holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16 (D) holding that  2d11a2 applied because defendant pled guilty to a crime that contemplated death or serious bodily injury from the use of heroin (E) holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury
Output: (D)
of a portion of their property to Greenheart constituted a transaction for a commercial purpose is supported by the evidence. The Browns owned 320 acres that they used for ranching and farming — operations on which the Browns relied to derive income. The Browns also acquired water rights for a portion of their land which they leased out and eventually sold. The Brown Property had a portion that lacked water rights and it was this portion — without any improvements — that the Browns sold. Although the Brown Property did include their residence, the portion sold to Greenheart did not include the residence, and the existence of a residence on the property does not automatically disqualify a land conveyance from being a commercial transaction. See Watson, 144 Idaho at 219, 159 P.3d at 856 (<HOLDING>); Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was for both a family retreat and for logging (E) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property
Output: (D)
the B-side breakers were cross-phased caused transformer B to fail, and the failure of transformer B necessitated its testing, removal, oil disposal, repair and reinstallation. No additional link in the causal chain was necessary to bring about the injury or damages. The parties can be “conclusively presumed to have foreseen” that Powell’s substandard performance would result in the failure of the transformer and that failure of a transformer would require HP to incur costs associated with repairing it. Cf. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. We are not persuaded otherwise by Powell’s argument that direct damages in this case should be limited to the cost of uncrossing the wrongfully crossed cables or the difference between the value of Powell’s actual services and the value of t *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Powell asserts that these provisions refer to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (B) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (C) recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract (D) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (E) holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties
Output: (B)
not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. The Superior Court nevertheless quashed the appeal in a per curiam order dated April 10, 2015, concluding the trial court’s order denying the petition to intervene was “not a final order in the custody matter and thus not final or appealable.” K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., 499 EDA 2015, 1 (Pa.Super. filed 4/10/15) (order) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (“A final order is any order that: (1) dis poses of all claims and of all parties”); G.B. v. M.M.B., Pa.Super. 133, 670 A.2d 714 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father (B) holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable (C) holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under rule 341 (D) holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period (E) holding that temporary order completely transferred custody without setting further hearing writ action was fully terminated and final adjudication of custody was affected
Output: (C)
of the only true claim in this case, i.e, that appellees had misrepresented who held record title to the 4.58 acre tract, a claim that is not actionable. Further, the provisions of 17.46(b) pled by Tri-Legends to support its article 21.21 claim, (5), (7), and (19), apply to “good or services” which are purchased or leased. The summary judgment proof, even when viewed in the light most favorable to TriLegends, conclusively shows that the title commitment was not purchased or leased by anyone; it was issued to Allied without charge. A service that is performed gratuitously is not purchased or leased within the meaning of the DTPA. Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, no writ); Hall v. Bean, 582 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1979, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Tri-Legends’ next argument concerns its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no unitary business in part because there is no flow of international business (B) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii (C) holding that when no consideration given for contest prize there is no purchase under dtpa (D) holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability (E) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify
Output: (C)
State of Georgia under USERRA is only permissible to the extent the state has explicitly waived its sovereign immunity. Having considered the applicable US-ERRA principles, we turn our attention to Tennessee’s sovereign immunity. II. Tennessee’s SOVEREIGN Immunity Tennessee’s sovereign immunity arises from its constitution. Article I, section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” Based upon this constitutional provision, no civil action against the State may be sustained absent express authorization from the Tennessee General Assembly. Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986); see also Chumbley v. State, 183 Tenn. 467, 192 S.W.2d 1007 (1946) (<HOLDING>). This principle of law has also been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the test of admissibility of an incriminating statement under article i section 9 of the tennessee constitution is whether it was freely and voluntarily made (B) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (C) holding that the tennessee plan as it relates to state appellatecourt judges does not violate the state constitution (D) holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the eighth amendment to the united states constitution and article i  16 of the tennessee constitution (E) holding that a suit against the state of tennessee is barred by tennessee constitution article i section 17 when it is not brought in such manner as the legislature has directed
Output: (E)
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, we deny his motion that we disregard them. 2 . Dunn asserts that Officer McClain’s, self-described "evasive maneuver” involved only taking his foot off the accelerator and did not involve braking' or making a quick movement. Regardless, deceleration, whether by braking or discontinuing acceleration, in response to a weaving driver, is evasive, and unsafe weaving does not require that other drivers brake or make quick, furtive movements. See Taylor v. State, 916 S.W.2d 680, 681-82 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref'd) (considering swerving into another lane and almost hitting an officers’ vehicle therein to be unsafe driving); see also Yeakley v. State, No. 03-09-00584-CR, 2011 WL 677391, at *4 (Tex.App-Austin Feb. 25, 2011, pet. dism’d) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics (B) holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession (C) holding that surrounding drivers use of caution to avoid the appellants weaving vehicle did not render the weaving safe (D) holding that drivers decision to use alternate vehicle to avoid inconvenience of stopping at gas station did not render vehicle temporary substitute (E) holding that where uncontroverted evidence rebuts a presumption that a defendant consented to the drivers use of his vehicle the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Output: (C)
on the Ohio River. In the first stage of the litigation, the Court issued an injunction requiring the defendant to remove or elevate the bridge. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 626-27, 14 L.Ed. 249 (1851). After this earlier ruling, Congress passed a statute establishing the bridge as a post road and requiring vessels using the Ohio to avoid interfering with the structure. A storm then destroyed the original bridge, prompting the parties to return to the Court when the bridge company sought to rebuild. Pennsylvania attempted to interpose its original injunction, claiming that Congress lacked constitutional authority to reverse the effects of that injunction through subsequent legislation. The Court disagreed and 1 F.2d 811, 818 (D.C.Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). The Rufo Court'itself noted the distinction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that called party in  227b1 means the person subscribing to the called number at the time the call is made and not the intended recipient of the call (B) holding that vulnerability to legislative alteration would seem to depend on the character of the compliance called for (C) holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity (D) holding that its appellate jurisdiction does not extend to the adjudication of administrative or legislative issues or controversies but rather only to decisions of a judicial character (E) holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights
Output: (B)
resulting injury.” Id. at 643, 904 P.2d at 1068. We note, however, that DeFeo also contains the following language: “Without an explicit waiver, the Nation is immune from suit in state court — even if the suit results from commercial activity occurring of the Nation’s reservation.” Id. {7} Worker next asserts that Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, 114 N.M. 202, 836 P.2d 648 (Ct.App.1992), stands for the proposition that Ski Apache is not immune from suit where a skier was injured within the boundaries of New Mexico. However, the Court in Lopez makes no mention of tribal sovereign immunity. {8} Worker also argues that commercial off-reservation activity by a tribal entity is not protected by sovereign immunity under Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 107 N.M. 174, 179-80, 754 P.2d 845, 850-51 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the Tribe asserts that Kiowa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity (B) holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity (C) holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body (D) holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation (E) holding that the district court may exercise jurisdiction over an indian tribe when the tribe is engaged in activity off of the reservation as an unincorporated association registered and authorized to do business in this state and is sued in that capacity for breach of a written contract
Output: (E)
07 (E.D.Ky.2001) (finding temporary deprivation of Husband's property right to enjoy firearms during three-day, pre-hearing seizure period was outweighed by government's interest in protecting victim of domestic violence from further violence and potential death); see also Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ind.1990) (discussing due process implications of Second Amendment right to bear arms in conjunction with issuance of civil temporary injunction). 5 . We note that if the findings are temporary, a respondent should no longer suffer the consequences under the federal statute given a respondent would no longer be "subject” to the court order. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) (2000 & Supp.2007); cf. Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Court for Warren County, 740 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 2007) (<HOLDING>). 6 . In light of the problems highlighted by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that husband was prohibited from possessing firearms pursuant to 18 usca  922g8 where he was subject to a continuing nocontact order with wife (B) holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety is exempt from attachment or execution for the sole debts of husband (C) holding that alimony was justified where wife was homemaker with lesser job skills than husband wife had lesser earning capacity and husband was guilty of marital misconduct (D) holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted (E) holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property
Output: (A)
(“Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his ‘day in court.’ ”). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no “fair opportunity” to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens’ claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause
Output: (E)
he called the dispatcher for assistance, the occupants had already been handcuffed. And the record provides no indication that the occupants threatened his safety. Moreover, if Reilly had not been concerned that the occupants would discard evidence, he and Horn could have driven the four, two to a car. Instead, he opted to wait for separate transportation, so the suspects could not leave contraband in the patrol car and possibly blame their fellow passengers. Reilly also had an objective reason to believe that Voichahoske was concealing evidence and that given the opportunity, he might destroy it. Reilly already had probable cause to believe Voichahoske was concealing drugs on his person, which, in turn, justified his arrest. See State v. Dussault, 193 Neb. 122, 225 N.W.2d 558 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Because a search of his person was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (B) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (C) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (D) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
Output: (D)
the degree to which they will be injured by the Department’s plan, as compared to a head count. Courts have never required such a showing under Article III especially in the context of a motion to dismiss where courts “presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support [each] claim.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, -, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1164, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). General factual allegations of injury resulting from Defendants’ conduct may suffice to establish Plaintiffs’ Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; see also Tucker v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1415 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs have demonstrated that they 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that standing is an essential component of our appellate jurisdiction and permitting party to appeal only after determining that they had met the requirements of article iii standing (B) holding requirements of article iii were met in a challenge to the validity of the census where plaintiffs alleged some probability of a tangible benefit from winning the suit (C) holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied (D) holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements (E) holding that the requirements of article iii are consistent with the establishment by congress of nonarticle iii courts to enforce federal criminal laws in clause 17 federal enclaves
Output: (B)
misapprehension, particularly when it knew that WSI sought dismissal of all Weaver Cooke’s claims. By remaining si lent, Weaver Cooke implicitly agreed WSI’s expansion joint work was not an issue and waived any argument to the contrary. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned” and holding that where summary judgment movant asserted that non-movant’s claims were based on oral agreements and in response non-movant did not suggest to the contrary, non-movant could not later argue on appeal a different basis for the claims); Alston v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, Civil Action No. TDC-13-1230, 2016 WL 5231708, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 2016) (<HOLDING>); Njema v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (C) holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims (D) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (E) holding that in connection with crossmotions for summary judgment the substance of the plaintiffs motion and her silence in response to the defendants characterization of her claims as being based on violations of specified statutory provisions established abandonment of claims based on other statutory provisions set forth in her complaint
Output: (E)
by needlessly delaying the trial. He had never requested to substitute counsel previously and had no history of “gaming” the system. The trial judge repeatedly referred to Carlson’s motion as “late,” but considering that the charges against him had been pending such a relatively short time and that he filed his motion to substitute immediately after he retained new counsel, the timing of his motion was certainly understandable. Finally, Carlson was not asking for a long continuance. Notably, we do not know how long Ms. Shellow would have needed to prepare because the trial judge never asked her. Apparently, any delay would have been unacceptable to the trial judge. That sort of rigidity can only be characterized as arbitrary. See, e.g., Linton v. Penny 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The State’s argument that Carlson was not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the length of a continuance was not unreasonable because of defendants part in extending the delay (B) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (C) holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay (D) holding a fivemonth delay in searching a computer did not invalidate the search because there was no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause that it created prejudice to the defendant or that officers acted in bad faith (E) holding that in a case involving serious charges a trial judge acted arbitrarily in denying a continuance where there was no evidence of a scheme to delay the trial no showing of inconvenience to the witnesses opposing counsel or the court and the length of the requested delay was not unreasonable
Output: (E)
process, i.e., Microsoft critically failed to disclose its knowledge that certain versions of MS Word used in the Student Media contained the '449 patent. But the defendants’ only allegation about “inaccurate information” is that: “Based on the Texas judgment and findings the applications submitted by Microsoft to the Registrar of Copyrights contained knowingly false information. Therefore, Microsoft’s claims related to Microsoft Word and Microsoft Office in this action are barred.” Defs.’ Mot. Sum. Judgment, p. 4 ECF No. 158-1. This allegation of “inaccurate information” is insufficient to trigger the Court’s obligation to seek advice from the Register of Copyrights under § 411(b)(2). Cf Olem Shoe Corp. v. Washington Shoe Co., 2010 WL 3505100 at *2 (S.D.Fla., Sept. 03, 2010) (<HOLDING>). It has already been decided in this case that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different (B) holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant (C) holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions (D) holding that allegations of inaccurate information are sufficient to trigger advisement requirement (E) holding that clearly dishonest conduct is sufficient to trigger investigation and ultimately justify a decision to remove a special agent
Output: (D)
second and third elements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the existence of a sufficient interest, and whether disposition of that interest would effectively impede the putative intervenors’ ability to protect that interest. Among the interests that satisfy these criteria are injury to reputation, see Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 373, 392 (2d Cir.1981), need to protect the attorney-client privilege, see In re Katz (Jamil v. United States), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980), and need to protect the attorney work-product privilege. See United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1290-92 (D.C.Cir.1980), citing, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445, 84 S.Ct. 508, 511-12, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 735 F.2d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised (B) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (C) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (D) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege
Output: (A)
not be unjustly prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint. The defendant also opposes the plaintiffs motion on the ground that the “[pjlaintiff seeks to add new causes of action ...” See Def.’s Opp’n at 1. Failing to explain why the court should deny an amended complaint on that basis, the defendant makes this assertion without providing any discussion, argument, or analysis of the point. The court can only speculate as to the reasons why the defendant opposes amendment on this ground, especially since courts have generally held otherwise. See Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir.1999) (allowing a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint in order to add a claim); Ruf v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1092 at *5-8 (D.D.C.1999) (Hogan, J.) (<HOLDING>). Without engaging in speculation, the court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff should be allowed to amend the complaint to add a claim (B) holding that a plaintiff should be allowed to vacate a judgment and amend the complaint to proceed under a new legal theory (C) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay (D) holding that district court erred in denying leave to amend complaint to add new legal theories even though trial was approaching (E) holding that dismissal of a complaint for insufficient jurisdictional allegations should be without prejudice to amend
Output: (A)
is devoted to contesting that Plaintiffs statements on the first day of the Harvard program fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. See Def. Hall Mot. at 14-15. However, even assuming that Plaintiffs statements at the Harvard program were not protected conduct, Plaintiffs other alleged actions—filing a lawsuit contending that government officials violated state law and criticizing one of those officials in the media—clearly are protected. See Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir.2010) (comments in press protected activity); Eckerman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d 202, 208 (6th Cir.2010) (“The filing of a lawsuit to redress grievances is clearly protected activity under the First Amendment.”); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 587-588 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Hall does not suggest otherwise. See Def. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) recognizing that the first amendment encompasses criticism of government officials (C) recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment (D) holding that criticism of the defendants failure to express remorse penalized his assertion of fifth amendment rights (E) recognizing that the first amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power
Output: (B)