niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
appropriate. Finally, even if we overlook Voltz’s failure to appeal his wage loss claim in his opening brief and his attempt to incorporate arguments by reference, his appeal would still fail because he references arguments that state grounds for affirming, rather then reversing the district court — as would be expected of arguments made by the defendant. Appellee Response Br. at 29-32. Therefore, in this appeal, we consider only the propriety of the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Coca-Cola on Voltz’s disparate treatment and disparate impact claims arising from his failure to be promoted in 1996 and 1998. 2 . The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is applicable only in considering summary judgment. Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Coca-Cola submitted a letter under Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action (B) holding that once there has been a full trial on the merits the mcdonnell douglas frame work drops out and there remains only a single overarching issue of whether the adverse employment action was taken against the plaintiff because of his or her protected status (C) holding that because the carrier contested the compensability of the claim and took the position that there was no evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course and scope of hernandezs employment there was no conclusion on the merits (D) holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force (E) holding the third element of the test requires a plaintiff to show that his or her protected activity was a butfor cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer
Output: (B)
district court on remand from this court; (2) Wayt is was not entitled to relief under Rule 35(b) because, inter alia, the government has not moved for a sentence reduction; and (3) Wayt is not entitled to relief under Rule 35(c) both because the motion was not filed within seven days of the imposition of sentence and because the motion failed to identify any arithmetical or technical error in the sentence. In fact, it is clear that the proper vehicle for seeking the type of relief sought by Wayt is a motion to correct or vacate illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, this court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and AFFIRMS the district court’s denial of Wayt’s Rule 35 motion. See United States v. McMillan, 106 F.3d 322, 324 n. 4 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). * This order and judgment is not binding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity (B) holding that jurisdiction to hear appeal from resolution of a rule 35 motion arises under 18 usc  3742 rather than 28 usc  1291 (C) holding that a nonparty may appeal an order of criminal contempt arising out of a pending action under 28 usc  1291 (D) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that the rule 21 severance rendered the district court verdict a final and appealable judgment under 28 usc  1291
Output: (B)
detention of the van, its driver, and its passenger exceeded the valid reason for the initial stop and violated the Fourth Amendment. The subsequent search of the vehicle was an unconstitutional search, and the drugs and drug paraphernaha discovered were fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to suppress should have been granted. In light of this holding, we need not address the third point, that omissions of facts in Ramsey’s affidavit for search warrant undermined the drug dog’s reliability and amounted to a Franks violation; or the fourth point, that the search warrant was objectively unreasonable and that there was no basis for a nighttime search. Reversed and remanded. Hart, Robbins, and Neal, JJ. te, 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, after Ramsey determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coming from the wrong neighborhood does not give rise to reasonable suspicion (B) holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion (C) holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics (E) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion
Output: (D)
acceptance of threat-based requests are appropriate for judicial resolution at this time. As a general proposition, it is true that a matter is not ripe for judicial review “[wjhere administrative proceedings are in process, and the agency has not adopted a final decision!.]” Special Commodity Group on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil v. Baldridge, 6 CIT 264, 269, 575 F.Supp. 1288, 1293 (1983). However, CITA’s final substantive decision is not, and indeed could not be, at issue in this case. This Court has held that CITA’s substantive decision to impose import restrictions pursuant to an appropriate exercise of validly delegated authority is nonjusticiable. See Am. Ass’n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Group v. United States, 7 CIT 79, 87, 583 F.Supp. 591, 599 (1984) (“AAEI-TAG I”) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, AAEI-TAG II, 751 F.2d 1239 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition (B) holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information (C) holding that citas decision to impose restrictions on textile imports and request consultations with foreign governments concerning such restrictions was beyond judicial re view (D) recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions (E) recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral
Output: (C)
lied, he was allowed to undergo the procedure. Young was an adult and was told not to drive. The warning not to drive, especially where it is reinforced by having the patient sign a paper affirming he or she will not drive, is proportionate to the danger. After the procedure, it was learned that Young intended to drive. Nurse Diane Brown repeatedly asked Young not to drive. She made phone calls to try and get him a ride. When no one showed up to drive him, Brown offered to wait with Young at the Center until the medication wore off. Still, Young went on and drove his car to another medical appointment. Brown went well beyond what could be reasonably required. Short of tackling and forcibly restraining Young, which would not be legally permissible, there was nothing m S.W.3d 489 (2002) (<HOLDING>). A review of our case law reveals that in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care (B) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts (C) holding expert testimony not required to defeat summary judgment in medical malpractice suit because defendant doctors admissions were sufficient to establish the standard of care (D) holding that where patients expert witness did not testify to what degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed by doctors in good standing in little rock or similar locales was patient failed to establish applicable standard of care thereby warranting directed verdict in favor of appellant doctor (E) holding that evidence of prior similar acts was not proof of medical malpractice or whether the doctor lacked the proper degree of knowledge or skill
Output: (D)
the court explained: We note at the outset that § 724(b)(2) expressly limits the amount distributable to § 507(a) claimants to the “amount of such allowed tax claim that is secured by such tax lien.” In light of this qualification, it is clear that administrative and priority claimants are able to prime a tax lienholder under § 724(b)(2) only to the extent of the tax lien; if, as in this case, the sum of administrative and priority claims exceeds the amount of the tax lien, the excess amount is relegated to § 721(b)(6) status and paid in accordance with § 726. To hold otherwise would render meaningless the limiting language in § 724(b)(2). (Emphasis added.); see also King v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County (In re A.G. Van Metre, Jr., Inc.), 155 B.R. 118, 123 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hargrave v. Township of Pemberton (In re 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity (B) holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case (C) holding that priority unsecured claimants are entitled to payment only to the extent of the amount of the tax hens then if such claims happen to equal or exceed the amount of statutory tax liens the statutory tax hens are paid behind the claims of junior consensual henholders (D) holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full (E) holding that two federal tax liens had priority as a matter of law over the competing claims for fees and costs of a stakeholderbank
Output: (C)
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may challenge a plaintiffs complaint either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). When a defendant brings a facial challenge—a challenge that, even if truthful, the facts alleged in a claim are insufficient to establish jurisdiction—a court reviews the pleadings alone, and the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citation omitted). In a factual challenge to jurisdiction, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings, and the non-moving party does not benefit from the safeguards of Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 728-30 n. 4 (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) In deciding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may consider materials outside the pleadings to determine its jurisdiction (B) holding that a rule 12b6 motion is only converted to a motion for summary judgment when a court accepts and considers matters outside of the pleadings (C) holding that by considering matters outside of the pleadings the trial court converted a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion (D) holding that on a rule 12b1 motion challenging subjectmatter jurisdiction the court has authority to consider matters outside the pleadings (E) holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction
Output: (D)
doctrine is extended to instances in which “the possessor knows that children too young to appreciate such dangers are likely to trespass on his land.” The dissent cites a number of cases from foreign jurisdictions to the effect that water is an obvious danger to all children. These cases are not consistent with our own precedent, which has rejected blanket rules. Further, other courts across the country have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., King v. Lennen, 53 Cal.2d 340, 1 Cal.Rptr. 665, 348 P.2d 98, 99-100 (1959) (emphasizing that “the circumstance that a condition giving rise to injury is common in character does not necessarily exclude liability, that the ability to appreciate danger varies with the age and mental capacity of the c 2d 43, 914 P.2d 728, 729 (1996) (<HOLDING>). We decline to adopt a categorical rule that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts (B) holding in a ease involving a child less than 3 years old that a landowner is not exempt from the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against potentially dangerous conditions on the land solely because the potential danger includes risks which are inherent in a natural body of water (C) holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts (D) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties (E) holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons
Output: (B)
Appellant’s point regarding expert testimony is moot because we have disposed of the statutory claim. Because we are reversing the judgment for damages, we also reverse the attorney’s fees award. REVERSED AND REMANDED. LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur. TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion. 1 . Appellees’ counsel commendably conceded at oral argument that these assaults did not occur within the scope of the agency. 2 . Because the judge charged the jury that a violation of the statute is negligence, it is impossible to tell whether the verdict for Ap-pellees on the negligence count was premised on a violation of the statute or a violation of the common law duty. 3 . See Hinckley v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 801 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). TORPY, J., concurring specially. I do not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (B) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (C) recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding special relationship existed between caregiver and developmentally disabled individual
Output: (E)
have expected that policyholders would assert claims and that some of the claims would be disputed. For some reason, EDS did not install a procedure for forwarding claims or notices served in its mail room. Nothing in the record excuses EDS’s misplacing of those claims and notices or its resulting failure to respond. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 67 comment b (1980) (“In the case of ... organizations that ought to expect to be sued from time to time, the question [in determining whether neglect is excusable] is whether their procedure for responding, particularly the procedure for putting the case in the hands of counsel, could be expected to function within the time al lowed.”); see also Secretary of State v. GPAK Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 82, 230 A.2d 146 (App.Div.1967) (<HOLDING>). EDS, therefore, is not entitled to relief 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that corporations neglect in receiving notice of entry of judgment against it and not forwarding notice to corporations registered agent was inexcusable (B) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (C) holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment (D) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (E) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner
Output: (A)
Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Del.1992)). 10 . Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 926 (Del.1982). 11 . Id. 12 . 18 Del. C. § 3902(b). 13 . Frank v. Horizon Assur. Co., 553 A.2d 1199, 1201-02 (Del.1989) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Abramowicz, 386 A.2d 670, 673 (Del.1978)). 14 . Temple, 2000 WL 33113814, at *6. 15 . Temple, 782 A.2d 267, 2001 WL 760864, at *1. 16 . Adams-Baez, 2005 WL 2436220, at *3. 17 . Appellant’s Amended Opening Br. at 28. 18 . White v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 975 A.2d 786, 790-91 (Del.2009) (alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 248 (Del.2001)). 19 . White, 975 A.2d at 788. 20 . Id. at 789. 21 . See Eaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 P.3d 901, 904 n. 5 (Utah 2005) (<HOLDING>). 22 . Gloe v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 694 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that premature payment of estate taxes was not a recoverable loss in a wrongful death action because the test is a measurement of benefits of pecuniary value that the decedent might have been expected to contribute to the surviving spouse and children had the decedent lived (B) recognizing the majority rule (C) recognizing that a majority of courts hold that uim benefits for wrongful death are not available for a noninsured decedent (D) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (E) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death
Output: (C)
INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993). For relief under the CAT, an applicant must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to her country of origin. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Kupczyk bases her application for relief on three specific incidents which occurred in Poland, allegedly due to her status as a Jehovah’s Witness. First, she claims that on July 28, 1996, she was attacked by “a band of thugs” and suffered bruises and abrasions, as well as a broken nose, and had to spend three days in the hospital. She then began receiving phone calls late at n ed to offer any evidence that they are likely to be detained, let alone tortured, should they be removed to Poland or the Slovak Republic. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 183 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). As we cannot conclude that the evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to qualify for protection under the convention against torture an alien must show that he will more likely than not be tortured in his home country if removed (B) holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return (C) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed (D) holding that cat applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country (E) holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return
Output: (E)
was “drowsy” and “in a lot of distress” on the day the statement was made. Furthermore, a nurse in the room heard her say “Donna” rather than “Daddy.” Because this was an out-of-court statement and Quattura was deemed incompetent to testify, cross-examination was impossible. Given the age and mental state of Quattura and the conflicting versions of what she said, we find unwarranted the state’s rebanee on this statement, and virtually this statement alone, to support the petitioner’s conviction. While such evidence could certainly be used to add to the prosecution’s case, a statement made under circumstances such as those in this case by an “incompetent” declarant simply does not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113 (6th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). There was circumstantial evidence that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding past recollection recorded and prior inconsistent statement insufficient standing alone to establish central element of alleged offense (B) holding that a police officers notes were relevant as prior and possibly inconsistent statements made and recorded by the witness (C) holding audiotape recordings were inadmissible as past recollection recorded where witnesses did not testify that the recordings accurately reflected their memories of events when made (D) holding that where witness was unable or unwilling to attest to the accuracy of the taped conversation the state could not introduce the same as a past recollection recorded (E) holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution
Output: (A)
illness.... While the seizure may have been the cause of the crash, it was not the cause of Brad Kellogg’s death. The Plan does not contain an exclusion for losses due to accidents that were caused by physical illness, but rather excludes only losses caused by physical illness. Because there is no evidence that the seizure caused Brad Kellogg’s death, MetLife’s argument fails. The fact that the policy at issue here excludes losses that were caused or contributed to by physical illness does not change this analysis. A reasonable policyholder would understand this language to refer to causes contributing to the death, not to the accident. Id. at 832-33 (citations, footnote omitted); see also Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 998-1000, 1009-10 (10th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Metro. Life 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on rehearing that exclusion for disabilities caused by a preexisting medical condition would not support denial of benefits caused by staph infection resulting from surgery for a preexisting condition (B) holding that treatment for symptoms of undiagnosed multiple sclerosis activated the preexisting condition exclusion and stating that there is no requirement that a diagnosis definite or otherwise of the preexisting condition must be made during the preexisting condition period (C) recognizing that medical condition of cook who contracted staph infection that was so severe that she was treated by induced coma and not expected to survive sufficed for extraordinary circumstances test (D) holding that the preexisting duty exception does not apply where the preexisting duty is a limited one and the alleged negligence is the failure to provide a level of assistance beyond that required by the preexisting duty (E) holding that receiving advice or treatment during the exclusionary period for a condition which proves to be the same condition the claimant seeks benefits for qualifies as a preexisting condition regardless of whether there was an accurate diagnosis
Output: (A)
be employees to be “teachers” — and thus covered by the retirement system’s pension plan. But the STRS determined that Nese, Williams, and Miles were not “teachers,” because they were independent contractors rather than employees when they worked as VLA instructors for Jefferson County ESC. We thus turn to the legal tests for distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. Common Law: Distinguishing Employees from Independent Contractors {¶ 33} “The chief test in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner or means of performing the work.” Bobik v. Indus. Comm., 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus. See also Foran v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 17 Ohio St.3d 193, 194, 478 N.E.2d 998 (1985) (<HOLDING>). “If such right is in the employer, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work (B) holding that the tort of conversion accrues where a party exercises wrongful dominion and control over the property to the detriment of the rights of its actual owner (C) holding that one who exercises daytoday control over the employee will be considered as the employer (D) holding corporations president personally liable where he had ultimate control over businesss daytoday operations and was the corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment practices (E) holding that where daytoday operations were within sole control of the franchisee no agency relationship existed with franchisor
Output: (C)
that Officer Pritchard “knew the area of Chandler and Amanda Place to be a well known drug location with a high drug activity.” Thus, given the trial court’s finding that Officer Pritchard “knew the area of Chandler and Amanda Place to be a well known drug location with a high drag activity,” the first basis upon which the dissent attempts to distinguish Butler is not persuasive. Secondly, the dissent points out that, “as to the alleged transaction, Officer Pritchard did not see any exchange.” Although the dissent suggests that this factor, along with others, serves to “render Butler inapplicable to this appeal,” we do not agree. The existence of evidence tending to suggest, as the trial court found, that a hand-to-hand drag transaction had occurred in 5 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1992) (<HOLDING>). However, the trial court’s findings disclose 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention (B) holding that an officers diligent pursuit of an investigation during the detention is a factor in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop (C) holding that the fact the defendant matched an anonymous tips description was seen in a high crime area and walked away when police approached was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion (D) holding that the fact that defendant was standing in an open area between two apartment buildings and walked away upon the approach of law enforcement officers did not justify an investigatory detention (E) holding that information that a suspicious person wearing baggy clothes had been seen in a drugridden area and that he walked away upon the approach of law enforcement officers did not suffice to support an investigatory detention
Output: (D)
The conduct charged in Counts Eight and Ten would probably also be admissible on the other counts to show the scope of the scheme. Theriault’s conclusory assertion that a jury could “infer criminal conduct” from one group of counts to the other falls far short of showing the kind of pervasive prejudice needed to sever counts due to evidentiary spillover. To prevail on a motion to sever based on a need to testify (apparently Count Eight, the false loan application), a defendant must make “a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” Richardson, 515 F.3d at 81 (quoting United States v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (quoting United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 14 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success (B) holding that success on a motion to sever requires a strong showing of prejudice (C) recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant (D) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (E) holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury
Output: (B)
statutes. A similar argument was made and rejected in Columbia Park. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16370, at *9. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s statement in Wright v. Terrell is a clear indication that the rule announced in Wilson continues to be adhered to by our highest court. ¶12 The City also contends that had the Supreme Court disagreed with Harberd, it would not have denied the petition for review of that decision. A similar argument was also rejected in Columbia Park. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16370, at *3. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s denial of review has never been taken as an expression of the court’s implicit acceptance of an appellate court’s decision. State v. Rudolph, 141 Wn. App. 59, 67, 168 P.3d 430 (2007); accord In re Estate of Borghi, 141 Wn. App. 294, 301, 169 P.3d 847 (2007) (<HOLDING>). ¶13 We are not free to ignore controlling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions (B) holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court (C) holding that it is not our prerogative to overrule or ignore clearly written decisions of our supreme court (D) recognizing that our supreme court does not overrule binding precedent sub silentio and noting that because an appellate court opinion did not mention a contradicting supreme court decision the conflict between the two decisions was not called to the attention of the court which denied review of the appellate decision (E) holding that even though petition for allowance of appeal was pending before the pennsylvania supreme court decision remained binding precedent as long as the decision had not been overturned by our supreme court
Output: (D)
intermediate appellate court relied on the fact that the incident in Olive Branch, Mississippi, as well as that the incident at the Watkins residence/ occurred on July 20, 2010, rather than July . 21, 2010. Id. However, as indicated above, the victim’s testimony was unclear as to whether the incident at the Watkins residence occurred on July 20 or 21, 2010. Moreover, the testimony of the MPD officers does not exclude July 21, 2010, as the date of the Watki l Appeals do not use’ language as strong as “cure” or “effective substitute” and rather merely consider a prosecutor’s’ closing argument in determining whether the failure to- elect was harmless beyond a reasonable' doubt. See, e.g., State v. Osborne, No. M2005-00893-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2682773, at *5 (Tenn.Crim.App.-Sept. 7, 2006) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ramey, No. E2003-01840-CCA-R3-CD, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any error was harmless when prosecutor stated in closing argument that the state was electing a specific incident the victim had testified to with particularity (B) holding that it was harmless error when the prosecutor focused on a single incident in closing argument (C) holding exclusion was harmless error (D) holding that plainerror exception did not apply where prosecutor asked jury to assume the role of the victim in closing argument (E) holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument
Output: (B)
with the above, the Debt- or is not entitled to an exemption in the $61,646.00 in his Merrill Lynch IRA. An Order consistent with this Memorandum will be entered. 1 . Exemptions for the purpose of bankruptcy. — The personal property exemptions as provided for in this part, and the other exemptions as provided in other sections of the Tennessee Code Annotated for the citizens of Tennessee, are hereby declared adequate and the citizens of Tennessee, pursuant to section 522(b)(1), Public Law 95-598 known as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Title 11 use, section 522(b)(1), are not authorized to claim as exempt the property described in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 USC 522(d). Tenn.Code Ann. § 26-2-112 (2000); see also Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1983) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The binding authority of an advisory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statute is unconstitutional if it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision (B) holding that tennessees optout statute is constitutional (C) holding that the uaa appeals statute is a limited exception to tennessees general appeals statute (D) holding that  106a is constitutional (E) holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims
Output: (B)
to maintenance and operation of the camp was improper because the record indicated that part of this amount included the replacement cost of equipment which the seller continued to own. The court then remanded the cause for a re-determination of the consequential damages. From these cases, we cannot agree with the Rogerses that consequential damages are improper in the context of a breach of a contract for the purchase of real estate. As noted above, the Hill case makes no mention of consequential damages. And the implication of the Showalter holding is that some consequential damages might have been proper. Therefore, we see no reason why the general rule for consequential damages resulting from breach of contract should not apply. Cf. Stoneburner v. Fletcher, 408 N.E.2d at 551 (<HOLDING>). The Rogerses further note that "nowhere in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion (B) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (C) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages (D) holding that if respondents suit is one for permanent damages to the land the measure of damages is the decreased value of the land (E) holding that where the customary measure of damages for a vendors failure or refusal to convey land was inapplicable the measure of damages must be flexible enough to vary with the necessities of the situation
Output: (E)
together, the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution “entitle a criminal defendant to a ‘jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 federal constitutional rule: This court has repeatedly . . . held that Apprendi and its progeny do not require the State to submit a defendant’s prior convictions to a jury and prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d 409, 418, 158 P.3d 580 (2007) (citation omitted); see also State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186, 193 n.5, 196 P.3d 705 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Until such time as our Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi carved out an exception for prior convictions that specifically preserved the holding of almendareztorres (B) holding that almendareztorres rejected the argument that the fact of a prior conviction must be found by a jury (C) recognizing exception carved out by almendareztorres (D) recognizing the prior conviction exception of almendareztorres (E) recognizing exception
Output: (D)
noted that “Plaintiff [Liddy] and similarly situated voters would be prejudiced if an ineligible candidate were to remain on the ballot because of a delay in finding out about the lack of eligibility.” Although the appellant prevailed on the dispositive motions, the Circuit Court ultimately ruled in favor of Gansler and his continued candidacy for the office of the Attorney General. The appellant, pursuant to § 12-203(a) of the Election Law Article, in response, noted an appeal to this Court and to the Court of Special Appeals , 468, 150 A.2d 433, 435 (1959) (noting that, although it is essential to raise the defense of laches in the pleadings, “equity may decline relief for a stale claim after the facts are fully developed”); Warburton v. Davis, 123 Md. 225, 231, 91 A. 163, 165 (1914) (<HOLDING>), citing Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288, 319 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court in a proper case and on its own motion may refuse to grant relief to a complainant who on the final hearing appears to have been guilty of laches although the defense was not interposed by the defendant (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant (C) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion (D) holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties (E) holding the master shall consider the following factors in deciding whether to grant relief from an entry of default 1 the timing of the motion for relief 2 whether the defendant has a meritorious defense and 3 the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted
Output: (A)
the sentencing decision is properly channeled. McCleskey v. Kem.p, 481 U.S. 279, 307 n. 28, 313, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1775 n. 28, 1778, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). As noted above, Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute appropriately limits the discretion involved in both seeking and imposing the death penalty, setting forth objective criteria in the form of aggravating circumstances that are completely unrelated to the socioeconomic status of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). Moreover, Crews does not demonstrate or, for that matter allege, how prosecutorial discretion was abused in the selection of cases in which the death penalty was sought. Hence, his claim in this regard lacks a necessary foundation and is, therefore, merit-less. See Hardcastle, 519 Pa. at 258, 546 A.2d at 1111 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 261-62, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although there were no limits placed on the defense counsels preparation it was surely reasonable for the defense to assume that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed at whether the death penalty was either appropriate or permissible where the prosecution never argued for the application of the death penalty (B) holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender (C) holding that absent some showing that prosecutorial discretion was abused in the selection of cases in which the death penalty was sought there is no basis for either a claim under the eighth amendment or a claim under the equal protection clause (D) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (E) holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim
Output: (C)
§ 7553b(b) and claim the court was divested of authority to maintain the hold-without-bail order after two months. The delay in trial pending pretrial discovery would be attributable to defendant within the meaning of the statute. ¶ 11. At heart, § 7553b is a speedy trial rule. It is a fundamental characteristic of speedy trial assertions that a defendant must make his or her desires to get to trial known to the court. Indeed, this Court adopted this principle in response to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This adoption — as well as the four factors used to determine whether violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial has occurred — was described in State v. Unwin, 139 Vt. 186, 424 A.2d 251 (1980). There, this Court stated that “[i]n Barker, the Cou 971 A.2d 665 (mem.) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 13. Following this precedent, it is clear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial two months before his trial began did not satisfy this barker factor (B) holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial (C) holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand (D) holding original proceeding appropriate vehicle for resolution of defendants pretrial claim that he has been denied a speedy trial (E) holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal
Output: (E)
cannot be resolved on summary judgment regarding the enforceability of the provisions in the Agreements barring consequential damages. Thus, summary judgment is only proper if Defendants have established that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the availability of the damages sought by Plaintiffs under California law in the absence of enforceable provisions in the Agreements limiting liability. The Court concludes that Defendants have met this burden as to diminution in value damages but not as to lost rent. 1. The Limitati racts which “have for their object ... to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud ... are against the policy of the law.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1668; see also Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 217 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1471, 266 Cal.Rptr. 593 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have presented evidence which, if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rochez did not foreclose respondeat superior liability for brokerdealers for the fraudulent acts of their employees (B) holding that intentional acts exclusion applies to intentional act of child molestation (C) holding that under  1668 a party may not contract away liability for fraudulent or intentional acts (D) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (E) holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts
Output: (C)
traumatic. See Li, 356 F.3d at 1158 n. 4. She actually testified that she did not know how her examination would have been conducted. The evidence also does not compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Lin has a well-founded fear of sterilization upon her return to China. Lin does not provide any evidence that women (to say nothing of women who are not and have never been pregnant) who simply fail to take required pregnancy tests, have actually been sterilized. She also does not present evidence that the family planning committee in her town fined her for failing to appear for her first appointment, that they have issued a warrant for her arrest, or that they actually would sterilize her if she returned home. See Zhang v. Attorney General, 128 Fed.Appx. 287, 289 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). She also does not refer to any law or 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the governments inability to control the source of persecution may support a finding of a wellfounded fear (B) holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution (C) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (D) holding that an alien had no wellfounded fear of persecution for resisting chinas coercive population control program in part because he was not charged with a crime and there was no warrant issued for his arrest (E) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable
Output: (D)
upheld the 'blue-penciling' of contracts by trial courts”); McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 138 Ill.App.3d 1045, 93 Ill.Dec. 471, 480, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1315 (1985). 9 . To be sure, employers who provide professional services — such as lawyers and accountants— are more likely to have a near-permanent relationship with their clients, as opposed to employers who sell non-unique goods. See Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 250 Ill. App.3d 922, 189 Ill.Dec. 511, 512-13, 620 N.E.2d 479, 488-89 (1993). Nonetheless, simply because Loewen provides professional-like services does not necessarily demonstrate that it has a near-permanent relationship with its customers. See Williams & Montgomery, Ltd. v. Stellato, 195 Ill.App.3d 544, 142 Ill.Dec. 359, 366, 552 N.E.2d 1100, 1107 (1990) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurance defense law firm did not have nearpermanent relationship with its clients (B) holding that a suspended attorney should not be permitted to have contact with clients (C) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (D) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee (E) holding that disbarment was proper where the attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm
Output: (A)
marks omitted)). Here, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Gray’s actions in asking a group of fellow customers to quiet down was not a normal and foreseeable consequence of Denny’s failure to act on her request that an employee do so. Indeed, if Gray’s version of events is credited, then her conduct evokes the precise risk contemplated by the scope of Denny’s duty of care. See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169, 414 N.E.2d 666 (1980) (“An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.”); see also McKinnon v. Bell Sec., 268 A.D.2d 220, 221, 700 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (1st Dep’t 2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a fact question arises as to whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (B) holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it (C) holding it not unforeseeable as matter of law that plaintiff would approach suspect after security guard inexplicably released him (D) holding that it may be decided as a matter of law (E) holding that arkansas would not adopt the approach of reliance to resolve this case
Output: (C)