niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the fact that its analysis of whether the Ingram’s job performance justified the pay differential leads to the question of Merrill Lynch’s intent even though the EPA is a strict liability statute. The Settlement states that Merrill Lynch can rebut Class-wide statistical evidence of discrimination “with evidence related to the individual Claimant’s case.” (R. 112, Settlement ¶ 7.11(8)(e).) In addition, some appellate courts consider whether the employee’s actual job performance justified the pay differential, rather than only considering whether a job-wide wage disparity between male and female employees was due to a bona fide job evaluation system. See, e.g., Ryduchowski, 203 F.3d at 144, Ambrose v. Summit Polymers, Inc., No. 05-1048, 2006 WL 797939, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar.24, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Ingram herself raises the issue of Merrill 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs burden was to show that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a male employee whom her employer retained internal quotation omitted (B) holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired (C) holding that a plaintiff could not proceed on her procedural due process claim brought under  1983 because she did not show that she had exhausted her state law remedies or alleged that those remedies were inadequate (D) holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa (E) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position
Output: (D)
one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, then the motivation for the wrongdoing must be deemed irrelevant.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {21} Other courts have stated the intent to silence requirement as an element of their forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, but those courts have generally not analyzed the relative benefits of adopting or not adopting that element. See, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir.1996) (“[A] defendant who wrongfully procures a witness’s absence for the purpose of denying the government that witness’s testimony waives his right under the Confrontation Clause to object to the admission of the absent witness’s hearsay statements.”); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 814-15 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing doctrine (B) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive (C) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity (D) holding the doctrine applicable where the defendant acted with the intent to procure the witnesss unavailability (E) holding that the state must show that the defendant intended or was motivated in part to procure a witnesss unavailability
Output: (D)
involvement, and the participants laid low after the murders. Vernace makes too much of the similarities between his case and Bruno. For one, where it was understandable in Bruno that the defendant would violently retaliate for personal reasons against two individuals — who sought to collect tens of thousands of dollars of loansharking debts from him and who he suspected had robbed him in the past — the personal angle here is far weaker and not one the jury was obliged to credit. Further, even if the dispute at the Shamrock Bar was initially personal, it grew to be t sanctioned by the Gambino crime family, the family sought to discipline Riccardi, and Vernace went into hiding did not preclude a finding that the murders were related to the family’s activities. See Bruno, 383 F.3d at 84 (<HOLDING>). After all, Vernace was not punished for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy (B) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (C) holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise (D) holding that telephone conversations and meetings were overt acts in furtherance of a drug conspiracy (E) holdingthat in determining base offense level in a rico case district court should not limit its relevant conduct to predicate acts charged against the defendant but instead should consider all conduct reasonably foreseeable to the defendant in furtherance of the rico enterprise
Output: (C)
The parties have not briefed the choice of law issue on assumption of the risk, although both have referenced Pennsylvania law during their arguments. {See Docket Nos. 261, 264, 282, 285). As such, the Court will look to Pennsylvania law to determine if KBR’s defense of assumption of the risk is supported by evidence and legitimately implicates military judgments. See Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer., 609 F.3d 143, 170 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A v. Clover, 195 F.3d 161, 164 (3d Cir.1999)) (“the first question to be answered [under Pennsylvania law] is whether the parties explicitly or implicitly have chosen the relevant law.”); see also Allegrino v. Conway E & S, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-1507, 2010 WL 4052923, at *6 n. 16 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 14, 2010) (<HOLDING>). Although a system of comparative negligence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the implied consent to new york law manifest in the parties briefs was sufficient to establish choice of law (B) holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision (C) holding that we are required to predict the position which the pennsylvania supreme court would take in resolving this dispute  and in the absence of a clear statement by the pennsylvania supreme court to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in pennsylvania law we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of this court (D) holding that pennsylvania law applied as the parties did not argue choice of law issue and implied that pennsylvania law applied by focusing their arguments on same (E) holding pennsylvania state ethics act unconstitutional as applied to former judges
Output: (D)
substantially less than that amount. Having reviewed Zee Medical’s complaint, we are satisfied that federal jurisdiction is proper. Given the extensive claims made by Zee Medical in its complaint and the remedies available under those claims, it cannot be said with legal certainty that Zee Medical would recover less than $75,000 if it prevails in this matter. See Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society v. Manganaro, 342 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2003). B. Denial of Preliminary Injunction Ordinarily, this court reviews the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003). Zee Medical, however, argues that the district court applied the wrong standard when it ruled on the motion. See id. at 1188-89 (<HOLDING>). Even if we assume for purposes of this appeal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted (B) holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success (C) holding the interests of justice require that in a doubtful case  any error if there is to be one should be committed in favor of allowing a class action citations omitted (D) holding that when the three harm factors tip decidedly in the movants favor the probability of success requirement is somewhat relaxed and the movant need only show questions going to the merits so serious substantial difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation citations and quotations omitted (E) holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest
Output: (D)
for misrepresentation differs from the tort of deceit wherein plaintiff must prove intent on the part of the defendant to mislead or defraud.” Sims v. Craig, 96 N.M. at 35, 627 P.2d at 877. “The theory of liability for this tort[, negligent misrepresentation,] is one of negligence rather than of intent to mislead.” Sims v. Craig, 96 N.M. at 35, 627 P.2d at 877. The tort of negligent misrepresentation is available to a plaintiff that “ ‘cannot or does not wish to rescind, and cannot meet the proof required for the tort of fraud or deceit (as a) ... remedy for damages caused by misrepresentation short of fraud.’ ” Sims v. Craig, 96 N.M. at 35, 627 P.2d at 877 (quoting Maxey v. Quintana, 84 N.M. 38, 41, 499 P.2d 356, 359 (Ct.App.1972)). See Sims v. Craig, 96 N.M. at 35, 627 P.2d at 877 (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS The Court does not believe that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (B) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff (C) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract (D) holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void (E) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract
Output: (D)
the hearing cannot result in a due process violation. Instead, our holding requires weighing a claimant’s deprivation of an important private interest, such as unemployment benefits, relative to procedures used in such a deprivation. See Welch v. Thompson, 20 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring that if there is a deprivation, “we must determine whether the procedures relative to that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” (citation and footnote omitted)). {27} In New Mexico, the distinguishing factor used to determine whether there was or was not a violation of due process rights depends on whether the defective notice deprived the claimant of the ability to participate in the proceeding. See Franco v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 2001-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 6, 14, 130 N.M. 543, 28 P.3d 531 (<HOLDING>), recognized in Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where employee was aware of dissolution abatement of claims provision applied even in absence of written notice because employee had actual notice (B) holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process (C) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously (D) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (E) holding that a notice recommending termination of an employee to the board without notice to the employee of employees right to attend and dispute the claims violated due process
Output: (E)
above, there is some risk that the jury, relying solely upon the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4, would have thought it improper to consider such evidence at all. Consequently, we cannot conclude that it is more probable than not that the instructional error was harmless. Ill We hold that the District Court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, for purposes of proving a Monell claim, a custom or practice can be supported by evidence of repeated constitutional violations which went uninvestigated and for which the errant municipal officers went unpunished. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The numbers for these instructions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a municipality may be sued as a person under 42 usc  1983 when the municipalitys policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy inflicts a constitutional injury (B) holding that a municipality may not assert the defense of qualified immunity but may be held liable under  1983 only for a constitutional deprivation inflicted by the execution of a governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy  (C) holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury (D) holding that a local government may be held liable for its employees constitutional violation only when the employee is executing the governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy (E) holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom
Output: (A)
shall not be hable to the customer under any law or regulation of the United States or any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision thereof, for such disclosure or for any failure to notify the customer of such disclosure. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the alleged disclosures by Defendant Oxford Bank, which serve as the basis for the fraud claim, were made pursuant to § 3403(c). Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that § 3403(c) does not protect Defendant Oxford Bank, relying on Lopez v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Florida, 129 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1997). However, § 3403(c) on its face applies in the instant case such that Defendant Oxford Bank is immune from suit. See Waye v. Commonwealth Bank, 846 F.Supp. 321, 324 (W.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Lopez is clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action (B) holding that  3403 barred plaintiffs negligence and bad faith claims against bank for reporting to federal authorities that plaintiffs were involved in a check kiting scheme which they claim was untrue bank had no fiduciary duty to refrain from reporting suspected illegal activity on the part of their customers (C) holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor (D) recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check (E) holding that a bank receiving a check because of a encoding error is not a collecting bank
Output: (B)
may grant preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action if the granting of such relief is appropriate under the facts upon which the action is based.” 16 U.S.C. § 3117(a). 3 . As used in ANILCA, (1) The term "land” means lands, waters, and interests therein. (2) The term “Federal land” means lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980. (3)The term "public lands” means land situated in Alaska which ... are Federal lands.... 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1) — (3). 4 . Although navigability determinations have not yet been made on most of Alaska’s waterways, it is likely that few waterways of significance to fisheries will be classified as non-navigable due to the expansive definition of navigable. See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1402-08 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919, 110 S.Ct. 1949, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that river with depths of 1 to 3 feet and usable by inflatable rafts and small motorboats was navigable (B) holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream (C) holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature (D) holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states (E) holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable
Output: (A)
interest in her bodily integrity, protected from certain unwarranted state deprivations. See Shilling-ford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1981). This protection extends to a student’s right to be free from corporal punishment in school if arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to a legitimate state purpose. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990) (citations omitted). The right also protects a fifteen-year-old student from a teacher who uses his authority to sordid sexual ends. See Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir.1993) (acknowledging student’s right to be free from sexual abuse by teacher). See also Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a students right to bodily integrity under the fourteenth amendment encompasses a students right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers (B) recognizing state constitutional right of individual privacy that    may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily integrity (C) recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed (D) recognizing stu dents right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to the students bodily integrity (E) recognizing that the right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to a persons bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process
Output: (D)
considered in the context of a traditional understanding of the larceny statute.’ ” Calonico, supra at 154, quoting People v. Camiola, 225 A.D.2d 380, 380-381 (N.Y. 1996). 9 The defendant’s argument mirrors the dissent in Commonwealth v. Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 532-533 (1997) (Gillerman, 1, dissenting), which posited that because a victim’s mental incapacity is not an element of the offense of larceny, it may not be offered as proof of the crime except by legislative intervention. As did the majority in Reske, we reject that limitation on the nature of evidence probative of the defendant’s guilt. 10 The lack of consent is an implicit factor in other context ) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 380-381 (<HOLDING>). Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident (B) holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victims intent (C) holding that a jury could reasonably infer defendant and his brother engaged in victims murder with deliberation where victims hands and feet were bound expert testimony was that victims injuries were inflicted when he was alive defendants gloves were discarded in victims trailer and defendant and his brother burned the trailer in an attempt to conceal the evidence (D) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same (E) holding that jury may consider victims mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victims knowledge and consent
Output: (E)
quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of  841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes
Output: (C)
is equal to the amount of the Trusts for Alison and Georgia.” However, this clause relates to Jae-quelin’s status as a beneficiary of the Trust and not as a third-party beneficiary of the property settlement agreement. Whether the Trust was in existence when the property settlement agreement was executed has no bearing on this analysis. Similar to the trust beneficiary in the above-noted fact pattern, Jacquelin is attempting to enforce a provision that requires funds to be contributed to a trust created for her benefit. Jaequelin’s status is not that of a third-party beneficiary, but that of a “beneficiary,” in the colloquial sense of the word, based on her status as the sole beneficiary of the Trust. Cf. Saks v. Damon Raike and Co., 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 869, 877 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We also note that cmt. £ emphasizes the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement (B) holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries  shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust (D) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (E) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust
Output: (C)
attack could establish such a violation. Obviously, if the record in any given case indicated that, irrespective of any statistics, the death sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor incident to that particular trial, there would be a violation of § 53a-46b (b) (1). We conclude only that, subject to the requirement that the defendant make his statistical challenge at trial, § 53a-46b (b) (1) provides an appropriate statutory vehicle for his statistical claim on appeal. 21 We do not decide whether, as a matter of state law, all other criminal defendants may raise the type of claim under consideration here in a habeas corpus petition when the claim was not raised at trial in the first instance. Cf. Summerville v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 421-22 (<HOLDING>). We merely decide that this defendant and any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception to cause and prejudice standard governing procedural defaults for claims of factual innocence (B) recognizing the public interest exception (C) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (D) recognizing such an exception (E) recognizing exception
Output: (A)
Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008). In fact we identify no error in this case, plain or otherwise, because the district court’s statement that it had “look[ed] at the relevant conduct, what happened with the fellow you got $250,000 from,” and its statement that it had reviewed the Pre-sentence Report (“PSR”) and “adopt[ed] the factual information that’s contained” therein, are reasonably construed as an explicit adoption of the PSR’s detailed explanation for why Patterson’s conduct causing a $250,000 loss to a California victim was fraudulent and qualified as relevant to the crime of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(2). See generally United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 539 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that the adopted PSR 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings (B) holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted (C) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (D) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (E) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous
Output: (C)
read to give these words effect in light of the law in certain states, under the plain meaning rule, Green Tree’s position must fail. Herrin, 2007 WL 1975573, at *3. The debtor’s position is also supported by the leading commentators on the Bankruptcy Code. Collier on Bankruptcy states, “[o]nly if a mobile home or cooperative is real property under applicable non-bankruptcy law would the limitations on modification apply, even though the mobile home or cooperative is considered the debtor’s principal residence.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.06[1][a][ii] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Revised 2005). Moreover, ignoring the term “real property” within § 1322(b)(2) is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. See Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) This Court does not believe that the result in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous (B) holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous (C) holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute
Output: (B)
not issue a permit to install” a waste disposal system unless that system “[m]eets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements .... ” Taken together, these provisions indicate a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to locate environmental permitting with the MDE, and zoning with local government. There is no reasonable way to construe these provisions of the Maryland Code as doing anything other than complementing local government’s role in planning and zoning. If we held otherwise, we would be reading an over-broad preemptive intent into an otherwise clear statutory scheme. MRA’s preemption argument fails because it does not account for the dual nature of this process. See Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Preemption Based on Legislative Changes to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (B) holding that the relevant body of state law did indeed regulate many aspects of sewage sludge utilization but was not so comprehensive that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled (C) holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption (D) recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way (E) recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine
Output: (B)
argues that the trial court erred in overruling their motion for remittitur. The Horners assert that section 510.265,. Missouri’s statutory cap on punitive damages, applies to limit damages for aggravating circumstances that are awarded in wrongful death cases. This is a question of first impression. Section 510.265 provides, in relevant part, that: 1. No award of punitive damages against any defendant shall exceed the greater of: (1) Five hundred thousand dollars; or (2) Five times the net amount of the judgment awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant. (Emphasis added.) “Punitive damages” is not defined in section 510.265. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review .on appeal. Hervey v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections, 379 S.W.3d 1 W.D.2004) (<HOLDING>). As discussed supra, section 510.263 generally 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent (B) recognizing that the aba guidelines and federal law are instructive (C) holding that even though the government retained discretion as to how to mark or fence dropoffs it did not retain discretion whether to do so (D) holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used (E) holding that legislatures failure to qualify a definition though it knew how to do so is instructive in construing statutes intended meaning
Output: (E)
Surprisingly, in spite of this rather lengthy dissertation on the Model Act, the majority in a footnote ultimately decline to answer the question of what “satisfactory evidence” is in Illinois. I would offer the following answer to that question. Professor Closen’s view is that two documents are required because the word “documents” is used in the plural. However, Closen’s position is wrong, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, and therefore Yamnitz’s training to get one photo identification was in compliance with the Illinois Notary Public Act. First, I note, as do the majority, that Professor Glosen is an expert, not a court, and it is not his prerogative to interpret a statute. Department of Corrections v. Illinois Civil Service Comm’n, 187 Ill. App. 3d 304, 308 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the appellate majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (B) holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence (C) holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation (D) holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review (E) holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard
Output: (C)
issues — liability and damages — the Rules do not require a party to wait to file a Rule 50 or Rule 59 until after _ the entry of such a “judgment.” Rule 50 states that a movant “may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(b). Rule 59 states that “any motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(b). These rules do not, by their terms, preclude the filing of post-trial motions before “judgment” has been filed; they merely require that once “judgment” has been filed, a party has only 10 days to file the motions. The caselaw supports this interpretation of Rules 50 and 59. See Jurgens v. McKasy, 905 F.2d 382, 386 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 
 Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment may only be entered for one who has filed a motion asking that relief and only after notice and hearing on that motion (B) holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment (C) holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous  because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained  (D) holding that any motion made within ten days of entry of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will be considered a rule 59e motion which suspends the finality of the judgment and tolls the time to appeal (E) holding that ten day limit in rule 59 sets only a maximum period and does not nullify an otherwise valid motion made before a formal judgment has been entered
Output: (E)
A court may take judicial notice of relevant facts in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Under Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), a court may judicially notice a fact not subject to reasonable dispute when the fact “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. .201(b). For example, a court may take judicial notice of “public disclosure documents required by law to be filed.” Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991). Judicial notice may also occur at any stage of a proceeding. Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). In applying FRE 201(d), the Fifth Circuit has permitted lower courts to take judicial notice at the motion to dismiss stage of a proceeding. See, e.g., Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 338 (<HOLDING>); Think3, Inc. v. Zuccarello (In re Think3, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (B) holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice (E) recognizing that a court is permitted to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice
Output: (C)
whether the variance application will be detrimental to the use of adjacent property; will cause undue congestion or danger to pedestrians, endanger the safety of persons or property by location or design of facilities for ingress or egress; will increase the danger of fire or otherwise endanger public safety; and will adversely affect the public health, morals, safety or general welfare. (R.R. at 546a-47a.) 6 . We note that our analysis is consistent with Pa. R.E. 701, which permits lay opinion testimony based on a witness’s personal knowledge, as well as the common law rule that lay witnesses may testify to those things they had seen, heard, felt, tasted, or smelled. See Gibson v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Armco Stainless & Alloy Products), 580 Pa. 470, 861 A.2d 938 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 7 . This Court is sensitive to Objectors' 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion (B) holding that a lay witness could not offer opinion testimony that required technical or specialized knowledge of what security measures could or should have been taken to prevent a crime (C) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace was admissible because it was rationally based upon the perception of the witness (D) holding that lay witness opinion as to guilt of defendant inadmissible (E) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted
Output: (A)
other circuits which indicate that the failure to provide such notice is reversible error, as the parties may have engaged in a different trial strategy had they known of the jury's advisory capacity. See Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1992) (examining the plain language of the rule and policy considerations of trial tactics and concluding "the rule requires that the court’s initiative in ordering a trial to an advisory jury must occur, and the parties be made aware of it, before the case is submitted”); Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.1989) (requiring a district court to "notify both sides of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun”); Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); cf. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that there are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a court as opposed to a jury the parties are entitled to know at the outset of the trial whether the decision will be made by the judge or the jury (B) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (C) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded (D) holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict (E) holding that the trial judge rather than the jury makes the determination of whether the defendant violated the implied consent law
Output: (A)
employees. In support of his claim, Gross suggests that our reading of “any benefit of employment” fails to account for the fact that as an anti-discrimination provision, § 4311 protects a broader category of rights than those outlined in § 4316 applicable to service members on leave. In Crews, we first considered the plaintiffs claim under § 4316 and concluded that because subsection (b)(1) requires ‘“only equal but not preferential’ ” treatment for military employees the police department had no obligation under § 4316 to afford preferential scheduling benefits to its Guard employees. Crews, 567 F.3d at 865 (quoting Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 769 (5th Cir.2004)); see also Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 561, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Despite Gross’s insistence that the language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that userras predecessor statute did not require employers to provide special benefits unavailable to other employees to military reservists (B) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (C) holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits (D) holding that an employers knowledge that an employee was diabetic did not equate to notice that the employees diabetes was so limiting as to be disabling and to require special accommodations (E) holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act
Output: (A)
no evidence or argument to rebut the presumption of prejudice or to establish that the improper contact was harmless to Davis. Therefore, the Court believes that this conduct likely affected the jury’s impartiality. Owen, 727 F.2d at 646. This is so because juries tend to view the presiding judge as the embodiment of the law; the jury could have interpreted even an innocuous comment by Judge Riley or his body language (either correctly or incorrectly) as revealing his view of the case, thus influencing its deliberations and/or verdict. At a minimum, the contact tarnished the appearance of justice and deprived the parties of their ability to make a contemporaneous record as to the context in which Judge Riley’s remarks to the jury were made. United States v. Tou , 59-60 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Judge Riley’s ex parte communication with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review not merely at the time the complaint is filed (B) holding that defendants constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial does not arise before the trial begins (C) holding that the right to counsel applies in all critical stages of state and federal criminal proceedings (D) holding that rule 43aentitles a defendant to be present at all stages of his trial and that cjommunication between the judge and the jury or a single juror is one of those stages (E) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages
Output: (D)
in her favor on her sleep apnea claim, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate on Counts 1 and 3 of plaintiffs first amended complaint. See Biester, 77 F.3d at 1266. D. Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in hiring Mullins and in entrusting a company truck to him because defendant knew or should have known that Mullins suffered from sleep apnea and was at an increased risk of falling asleep on the job while driving. As the district court noted, in order to survive summary judgment on either of these claims, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent act of Mullins in falling asleep at the wheel. See DeMatteo v. Simon, 112 N.M. 112, 812 P.2d 361, 363 (Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Valdez v. Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue (B) holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense (C) holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage (D) holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims (E) holding that to recover on claim of negligent entrustment plaintiff must establish that 1 defendant entrusted its vehicle to the entrustee 2 defendant knew or should have known that the entrustee was an incompetent driver and 3 the entrustees incompetence caused the injury at issue
Output: (E)
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must' determine whether, the group engages in ‘expressive association.’ ■ The First Amendment’s protection of éxpressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private. Because A.M. does not allege that the Individual DOH Defendants restricted her ability to associate for an expressive purpose — like voting, protesting, or otherwise organizing for political, educational, economic,' civic, or religious functions — she has failed to state a plausible claim. Cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972) (<HOLDING>); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (B) recognizing women as a distinct group (C) holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion (D) holding that refusal to join guerrilla group is itself not affirmative expression of political opinion (E) recognizing a right to organize campus political group
Output: (E)