niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
F.Supp. 842 (E.D.Pa.1974): To be sure, there are reasons for requiring the defendant to carry the burden of coming forward and alleging a substantial change. In many cases, the alleged substantial change is perceived only by the defendant who should, therefore, . 219, 491 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1986) (stating that “there is no duty upon plaintiffs in making a prima facie product liability case to eliminate all possible causes of the incident other than the one they alleged” (citation omitted)); Kuhnke v. Textron, Inc., 140 Ariz. 587, 684 P.2d 159, 162 (1984) (ruling that “once a defendant comes forward with some evidence of substantial change, the burden is on the plaintiff to show no substantial change” (citing Southmre)); Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A, 671 P.2d 369, 372 (Alaska 1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no authority that provides that the mere sale of a consumer electronics product in california can create a duty to disclose any defect that may occur during the useful life of the product (B) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury (C) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (D) holding that the plaintiff must first establish that the product left the sellers hands in a defective condition after which the seller may introduce evidence that its product was substantially altered after leaving its possession which evidence may rebut or overcome the plaintiffs showing that his injuries were a result of the products defect (E) holding that a cause of action does not arise in negligence when a product malfunctions or is defective and the malfunction or defect results in damage only to the product itself and produces only economic loss
Output: (D)
human characteristics would no doubt be endless and the case law addressing them would be voluminous. We conclude that the APD’s findings merely reflect a disagreement with the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence, not a finding on a factual matter infused with policy considerations. Such a disagreement cannot form the basis to reverse an ALJ’s factual determinations. See Heifetz, 475 So.2d at 1281. Furthermore, the APD’s order did not focus on anything that Bridlewood (through Tomlinson) did leading up to the sexual battery. Rather, the APD focused on Tomlinson’s post-incident conduct. But that conduct was not the basis for the administrative complaint, and the APD cannot impose discipline for violations not charged. See Cottrill v. Dep’t of Ins., 685 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). The APD’s final order was predicated on its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (B) holding that complaint alleging that creditors failed to comply with the notice provisions contained in the security deed stated a claim for breach of contract (C) holding that where administrative complaint contained references to statutory provisions but failed to allege any act or omission in violation of those provisions the complaint did not afford proper notice to the licensee and that therefore disciplinary action could not be predicated on those statutes (D) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (E) recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice 
Output: (C)
519 S.E.2d at 101. 13 . Id. at 153, 519 S.E.2d at 101-02. 14 . Id. at 152-53, 519 S.E.2d at 101-02. 15 . We note that Davis may have wrapped the head of the sledgehammer in a towel. There is no evidence, however, that this lessened the tendency of a five-pound sledgehammer to cause death or great bodily injury if used to strike someone in the head. See State v. Bennett, 328 S.C. 251, 262, 493 S.E.2d 845, 850-51 (1997) (“A deadly weapon is generally defined as any article, instrument or substance which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm."); Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095, 1100 (Pa.Super.1997) (categorizing a sledgehammer as a deadly weapon when used upon a vital part of the body such as the head). 16 . See State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 550, 446 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Morris, 307 S.C. 480, 484, 415 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process (B) holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon (C) holding the intentional use of a dangerous instrumentality does not support the allegation of mere criminal negligence (D) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (E) holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort
Output: (C)
was indeed barred (or limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the alternative sentencing methodology employed by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating arguments, regardless of whether they would have been available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a series of factors in support of a sente 440 (D.C.Cir.1995). In later cases, we settled on a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1173 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable (B) holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error (C) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (D) holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error (E) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error
Output: (D)
or possess child pornography directly contribute to this continuing victimization.”). Also, the fact that the offender did not commit a more serious crime by molesting a child, did not mean his offense was dramatically different from other child pornography cases so as to warrant a substantial downward variance. Id. at 260. We have no difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the seriousness of the offense by finding that the further distribution of child pornography by defendant involved re-victimization of the children in those images, or by rejecting the claim that the sharing and redistribution of child pornography already in circulation did not result in additional harm. See United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography (C) recognizing common use of computers and internet in child pornography offenses (D) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (E) holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession
Output: (B)
in rule 9.190 addresses concurrent jurisdiction, rule 9.600(a) applies in this case. Thus, the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to make the two corrections given that the record in Appellant’s appeal from the initial support order was filed prior to the ALJ’s ruling and given that no leave of this Court was requested and granted. We, therefore, quash the Order Denying Motion for Rehearing but Granting in Part Motion to Amend Final Administrative Paternity and Support Order and the Amended Final Administrative Paternity and Support Order. See 14302 Marina San Pablo Place SPE, LLC v. VCP-San Pablo, Ltd., 92 So.3d 320, 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quashing the order on appeal where the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order); Wilkinson v. Clarke, 91 So.3d 897, 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>). ORDERS QUASHED. LEWIS and MAKAR, JJ., concur; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amended order which made more than clerical corrections was a nullity when it was entered after notice of appeal (B) holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity (C) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that if service is inadequate defendant never submitted to courts jurisdiction and underlying judgment is therefore a nullity (E) holding that the final judgment was entered without jurisdiction while a nonfinal appeal was still pending
Output: (B)
of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A commonsense reading of this statement strongly suggests that the statute includes a requirement of intentional discrimination. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.1996) (“It would be a stretch to read the phrase ‘because of such individual’s age’ to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that resulted because of employment decisions which were made for reasons other than age.”) (emphasis in original). However, Title VII contains parallel language, and the Supreme Court concluded almost three decades ago that such language encompassed a theory of liability based on disparate impact. See Chiggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (<HOLDING>). The question, then, is whether the ADEA, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (B) holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity (C) holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites (D) holding that title vii proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation (E) holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix
Output: (D)
about the occupants during the stop — questioning, asking for documentation — so long as one acts consistent with the limited information he has. What one cannot do is carry the stop beyond its rationale. Otherwise, more than the traffic stop rationale would be illusory; Fourth Amendment protection would be, as well. C. The Abandoned Drugs After Siri was frisked and cocaine was found, Berio used his dog to search the area surrounding the car. At that point, he found oxycodone pills, which neither of the defendants claimed. They did not admit that the pills were theirs during the stop; they did not admit an interest in them during this suppression hearing. As such, neither have standing to challenge their seizure. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sealey, 30 F.3d 7 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of espionage found in a wastepaper basket could be seized and were admissible because there can be nothing unlawful in the governments appropriation of  abandoned property (B) holding no 4th amendment violation where officers seized items abandoned in hotel wastepaper basket after checkout (C) holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception (D) holding that because original interception was not unlawful subsequent use by prosecutor could not be found unlawful (E) holding that when a person checked out of a motel leaving behind certain items in the waste basket of his room he had abandoned the property and thereby lost any fourth amendment right to privacy in the property
Output: (A)
dissent below, Judge Morgan discusses Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991). There, several young girls were placed in foster care with a man who sexually abused them. It was alleged the abuse would not have occurred had the State conducted a proper investigation. Id. at 604-06. In Yonker an ex-wife complained to DSHS that she suspected child abuse and DSHS took no action. Yonker v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 85 Wn. App. 71, 72-73, 930 P.2d 958 (1997). In both cases the injury was not placement, but what happened as a consequence of negligent investigations. Also in Rodriguez the Court of Appeals was concerned with negligent investigation methods and intimidation of children alleged to have been abused. Rodriguez v. Perez, 99 Wn. App. 439, 441-42, 994 P.2d 874 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The court in Rodriguez recognized what we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding law enforcement owed duty similar to that owed by dshs under rcw 2644050 (B) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (C) holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law (D) holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty to a person foreseeably injured by his patient (E) recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee
Output: (A)
mask prior to the robbery. As the State points out, however, the court, in denying the motion for a new trial, relied on the fact that Kelly’s counsel was fully aware that defendant had worn the mask on at least one occasion prior to the time of the robbery. On a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defen dant must show, by convincing evidence, the following: “(1) That the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) that it has been discovered since the trial; (3) that it could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise o ) (same); State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710, 714 (R.I.1994) (same); State v. Cotton, 99 N.C.App. 615, 394 S.E.2d 456, 460 (1990) (same); Dewberry v. State, 743 S.W.2d 260, 268 (Tex.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 776 S.W.2d 589 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state (B) holding no abuse of discretion to deny  a third chance to offer more details (C) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (D) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife
Output: (C)
1. In light of Lewis’ refusal (or inability) to hire her own attorney, to accept appointed counsel, or to represent herself, the district court’s determination that she forfeited her right to counsel was “fair and reasonable.” United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 2. The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured (B) holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct (C) holding courts have inherent authority to compel compensation for an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant (D) holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term (E) holding that in light of kelms persistent refusal to accept an appointed attorney to hire his own attorney or to expressly waive his right to an attorney the district courts decision forcing kelm to represent himself was fair and reasonable
Output: (E)
65, 71, ¶ 24, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1998). Nevertheless, Arizona courts normally impose standing requirements as a matter of judicial restraint to ensure that their decisions are not moot or merely advisory, “and that the issues will be fully developed by true adversaries.” Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914, 919 (1985). A plaintiff may gain standing by alleging an injury resulting from the defendant’s putatively unconstitutional conduct. Cf. Sears, 192 Ariz. at 70, ¶ 23, 961 P.2d at 1018. ¶ 13 US West intervened in the administrative proceedings resulting from the Commission’s grant of CC & Ns to the Competitors, and it appears to have vigorously litigated the issues before us both in those proceedings an 9 P.2d 394, 397 (1997) (<HOLDING>). C. US West’s Constitutional Issues ¶ 14 US 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city (B) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (C) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (D) holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation (E) holding that the city had standing to challenge the formation of a water improvement district that might impede the citys expansion
Output: (B)
the Guidelines by considering them as binding as opposed to advisory.” Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1330-31. Because the district court considered the guidelines to be mandatory, it committed statutory Booker error. The government bears the burden of showing that the statutory error was harmless. United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir.2005). The government argues that the error was harmless because the sentencing judge considered Soreide’s lavish lifestyle, the effect on the victims, and the extent of punishment and deterrence stemming from a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range. We have previously ruled that a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range is insufficient to prove harmless error. United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749-750 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the government must set forth 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed (B) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (C) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (D) holding that the sentence alone tells us nothing about whether the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence (E) holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless
Output: (D)
ability to avail itself of the court system to enforce its private restrictions and regulations is state action. In support of this position, Mr. Westphal cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). In contrast to Mr. Westphal’s claim, the Supreme Court in Shelley did not hold that the ability of a private entity to avail itself of the court system to enforce any private restriction is state action. Rather, the Court, held that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by state courts was a state action and, by granting judicial enforcement of the racially restrictive covenants, the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18-20, 68 S.Ct. at 844-45. See Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Mo. banc 1975) (<HOLDING>) Here, there was no judicial enforcement of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the question of whether the defendant knew his actions were legal demanded a conclusion as to the legality of the defendants conduct which is unhelpful to the jury under rule 701 (B) holding that the state attorney generals duty to support the constitutionality of challenged state statutes and his duty to defend actions in which the state is interested do not constitute enforcement of the statute in question (C) holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff (D) holding that shelley does not support the conclusion that mere availability of the courts means that the actions of the individuals with respect to the contract in question involve state action (E) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury
Output: (D)
context of Rule 407’s exceptions to prevent them from overwhelming the general rule, thus undermining its supporting policy goals. See Cyr, 652 A.2d at 694; Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir.1991); McPadden v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc. (In re Joint E. Dist. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir.1993) (indicating that the feasibility exception is not an “open sesame”). Accordingly, the feasibility exception has not been applied where a defendant merely suggests that an original design is acceptable, or argues about tradeoffs involved in taking precautionary measures. See, e.g., Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 638 (citing Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 468); Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888; Tuer v. McDonald, 347 Md. 507, 701 A.2d 1101, 1113 (1997) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that remedial measures evidence was not admissible to impeach testimony that at the time of the event the measure was not believed to be as practical as the one employed (B) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (C) holding that the admission of a report was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth but to impeach the veracity of the witnesss direct testimony (D) holding that evidence of subsequent measures was admissible to show the feasibility of a design change (E) holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility
Output: (A)
v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2001) (ruling that “the Takings Clause does not apply to legislation requiring the payment of money.”). Plaintiff has not shown that it is entitled to damages under a theory independent of the rights accorded Canal Electric under the Standard Contract. Plaintiff’s assertions that the Government’s failure to remove and dispose of nuclear waste required Canal to provide facilities to “store SNF beyond the date when the Government was required to assume such obligations,” and that the Government “forced nuclear utilities, including Canal, to expend their own resources to plan for the disposal of SNF,” are classic breach of contract allegations. See Northern States Power Co. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 759 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff complains of being “deprived of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract (B) holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract (C) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (D) holding that utilities must pursue the remedies provided in the standard contract in the event that doe does not perform its duty to dispose of the snf by january 31 1998 (E) recognizing that a construction contract implicitly imposes a duty on contractors to perform work according to the standard of due care
Output: (D)
23, 2005, which describes Ms. Williams’ psychological limitations. She has also submitted a September 9, 2003 report by Dr. Hammerberg finding “a right long thoracic neuropathy,” and an April 17, 2003 MRI by Dr. Solsberg. At-tachs. to plaintiffs motion to correct omissions. Sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes a district court to remand to the agency when “new and material evidence comes to light, and there is good cause for failing to incorporate such evidence in the earlier proceeding.” Nguyen v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1400, 1403 (10th Cir.1994). A remand is not appropriate in this case because the new evidence does not demonstrate that the findings relate back to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision. Cf. Chambers v. Barnhart, 389 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted). Moreover, Ms. Williams 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new (B) holding that appeals council must consider evidence submitted with a request for review if it is a new b material and c related to the period on or before the date of the aljs decision (C) holding that additional records submitted to the appeals council are part of the administrative record for judicial review (D) holding that court reviews aljs decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole including the new evidence submitted after the determination was made (E) holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding
Output: (B)
which this insurance may apply.” (Def. Mot. Summ. J. App. 70). Plaintiff acknowledges this in its Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum, page 1. 3 . The parties do not dispute that the incident in question occurred within the policy period, within the policy's coverage territory, and without any prior knowledge by any employee of the insured before the policy period. The main argument centers around whether the action was an "occurrence” under the policy. 4 . The Intervenors' Amended Petition incorporates the facts as alleged in the underlying plaintiffs petition; therefore, the Court examines only the Plaintiff’s (D-S-B’s) Original Petition. 5 . But see Southwest Tank and Treater Manufacturing Company v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company, 243 F.Supp.2d 597, 603 (E.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). The district court held that using the word 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in favor of insurer that a steel storage tank on which the insured was working was a selfcontained collective unit which constituted a single item of property when the insured was hired to install heating tubes to be used in the whole tank (B) holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party (C) holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest (D) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (E) holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled
Output: (A)
Grant Mortgage. App. at 82-83. 12 . Section 580.24 provides: If no such redemption be made by the mortgagor, the mortgagor’s personal representatives or assigns, the senior creditor having a lien, legal or equitable, upon the mortgaged premises, or some part thereof, subsequent to the mortgage, may redeem within five days after the expiration of the [debtor's six month] redemption period ...; and each subsequent creditor having a lien in succession, according to priority of liens, within five days after the time allowed the prior lienholder, respectively, may redeem by paying the amount aforesaid and all liens prior to the lienholder’s own held by the person from whom redemption is made; provided that no creditor shall be entitled to redeem unless withi 287 N.W.2d 378 (Minn.1979) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the City has failed to allege that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9 (B) holding that the assignment of rents clause contained in the mortgage was enforceable during the period of redemption for the purpose of securing the 300000 deficiency existing after foreclosure of the mortgage (C) holding that the mortgagee had no right to rents under its assignment of rents during the redemption period because it purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt at its foreclosure sale (D) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (E) holding that an assignment of rents clause in a mortgage is enforceable after foreclosure during the redemption period to secure any deficiency and to pay any expenses associated with maintaining the property
Output: (B)
the trial, several witnesses testified to the conditions of Kristin’s homes, which included roach and lice problems, animal feces, terrible odors, and general fi Worth 1999, no pet.) (determining that the evidence of neglect and a home smelling like urine was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under section 161.001(1)(D)). In addition to the filthy living conditions, Kristin continued her drug use. Even though she never did drugs around K.M.B., Kristin admitted to still having a drug problem. Therefore, the record also shows more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s finding that Kristin’s continued drug use endangered the physical or emotional well-being of K.M.B. See In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); see also In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 169 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of the childs home supports conclusion that childs surroundings endanger his physical or emotional wellbeing (B) holding that evidence of admitted drug use before the birth of the children missed drug tests after removal of children and a failed drug test between removal and the final hearing established legal sufficiency of evidence to show endangerment under section 1610011e (C) holding that courts may look to parental conduct both before and after childs birth to determine whether termination is appropriate that parents conduct need not be directed at child and that danger to childs wellbeing may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone (D) holding mothers drug use during pregnancy and after child was removed from her care in face of random drug testing that placed her relationship with child at risk was legally and factually sufficient evidence that she engaged in course of conduct which endangered her child (E) holding that evidence of continued drug use after pregnancy may be conduct which endangers a childs wellbeing under section 1610011e
Output: (E)
have done Kim little good since she could not have realistically contested the changed reason, mental health classification,” which caused her removal from the temporary release program. 182 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1999). Similarly, where, as here, the TRC had discretion to make a considered judgment about whether Anderson should continue his participation in the temporary release program, due process requires some opportunity for Anderson to argue that the charges sustained in the Tier III hearing did not warrant revocation of his supervised release. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (“The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, ... that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.”); Friedl, 210 F.3d at 85 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we affirm the district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hall street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in section 10 of the faa (B) holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute (C) holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions (D) holding that requirements similar to those set forth in morrissey would logically apply to revocation of work release (E) holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself
Output: (D)
for the proposition that “a plaintiff is not required to produce evidence of emotional distress beyond his own testimony.” King, 452 F.Supp.2d at 1281. Two other courts faced with the same question since Moore was decided, however, have come out the other way and required more than an FCRA plaintiffs own testimony to support a claim for emotional distress damages. See Sampson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. CV204-187, 2005 WL 2095092, at *5 (S.D.Ga. Aug. 29, 2005) (collecting cases and concluding that an FCRA plaintiff “must produce some form of independent, corroborating evidence of her humiliation and embarrassment at trial to recover compensatory damages for emotional distress”); Jordan v. Trans Union LLC, No. 1:05 CV 305 GET, 2006 WL 1663324, at *7-8 (N.D.Ga. June 12, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Moore provides dubious support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (B) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (C) holding the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the plaintiff could be awarded damages for anxiety mental anguish and loss of consortium for a violation of the kentucky act (D) holding that a complaints bare assertions alone were insufficient for certification (E) holding in a case arising under the fcra that the remainder of plaintiffs complaints such as feeling frustrated and degraded are insufficient standing alone to support damages for mental anguish
Output: (E)
fee award by twenty-five percent to account for these and, as indicated below, other deficiencies in the plaintiffs fee petition. b. Clerical and Other NonProfessional Services The defendants argue that the plaintiffs counsel inappropriately billed for clerical tasks, a type of acti may be reimbursable if they cannot be separated from legal activities. Cf. Lopez, 38 F.Supp.2d at 25 (explaining that charges for “filing” motions were not reimbursable because they were purely clerical, not de minimis). In this case, the defendants declined to reimburse the plaintiff for activities suc he plaintiffs’ counsel’s rate was reasonable because it was below the Laffey Matrix rate for attorneys of her experience); Nesbit v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 01-2429, at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2003) (Order) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, this court has rejected the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may provide evidence to supplement the laffey matrix including fees awarded to attorneys with similar qualifications in comparable cases (B) holding that idea administrative proceedings which require expert testimony regarding whether a student has been denied a fape are sufficiently complex to warrant application of the laffey matrix (C) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (D) holding that a billing rate in accordance with the laffey matrix was reasonable (E) holding that the laffey matrix is the proper formula to determine the prevailing market rate for legal services rendered in connection with idea administrative proceedings
Output: (D)
Moore has to show that an error: (i) was made; (ii) is plain (i.e., clear or obvious); and (iii) affects his substantial rights. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir.2009). Even if we assumed that the district court’s brief explanation constituted an obvious error in violation of Carter, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) requires Moore to also show that the district court’s lack of explanation had a prejudicial effect on the sentence imposed. See Puckett v. United States,-U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433 n. 4, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Having only summarily raised the reasonableness of his 188-month sentence in an Anders brief to this court, Moore has made no such showing. We thus affirm Moore’s within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing presumption (B) recognizing a presumption of reasonableness (C) recognizing that this court applies an appellate presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence (D) recognizing this presumption (E) holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence
Output: (C)
Appellant's App. at 70. An "x" is handwritten into the blank next to "written," followed by a second "x" to indicate that Brooks had shown a "disregard for safety." Id. These lines are followed by the narrative recitation of the facts surrounding this safety violation. Id. Above the signature line, the form states that the signer had "received a full explanation of my failure to perform to the expected standards of the company" and that "further failure on my part will be due cause for disciplinary action." Id. As an initial stage in the disciplinary process, the corrective form is a subsequent remedial measure that may not be used to prove Strack's negligence or culpability in connection with Carter's injury. See Dukett v. Mausness, 546 N.E.2d 1292 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), trans. denied (<HOLDING>). Our analysis does not end here, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake (B) holding that evidence of subsequent measures was admissible to show the feasibility of a design change (C) holding that evidence of other crimes though generally inadmissible to show character is admissible to show for instance proof of motive or plan (D) holding that postevent disciplinary measures are not admissible to show negligence or culpability (E) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action
Output: (D)
not be supported by any evidence”) (emphasis added). Daniel’s point is denied, and the full-order of protection is affirmed. GARYW. LYNCH, J. — CONCURS WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J.— CONCURS 1 . Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer to them by their given names to avoid confusion. In doing so, we do not intend any disrespect or familiarity. 2 . Two additional brothers have become enmeshed in these quarrels — one on the "side" of Steven and the other on the side of Daniel. 3 . All statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2013. 4 . Daniel concedes in his brief that, absent a defense of justification, "his actions constitute an act of abuse [as defined] under [s]ection 455.010[ (1),]” and he relies on McAlister v. Strohmeyer, 395 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) (<HOLDING>). Steven claims in his brief that Daniel waived 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus (B) holding that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the appointment of the defendants requested expert as there was no undue prejudice to the defendant because the defendants claim on the predicted effect of the experts testimony was purely speculative (C) holding that no error was committed where issue of whether the defendant had committed another crime was injected into the trial by the codefendant but was immediately followed by the trial courts instructions to the jury that only the counts listed on the indictment be considered (D) holding no error was committed in denying an order of protection when the trial court found the respondents actions justified under the law (E) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial
Output: (D)
damages and liability may be indivisible”); N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n v. Citizens to Make Mayor-Council Gov’t Work, 107 N.J. 380, 388, 526 A.2d 1069 (1987) (explaining that, “[i]n choosing between [retroactivity/prospective application] options, the court must weigh considerations of fairness to the litigants as well as the dictates of sound public policy”); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 227, 294 A.2d 7 (1972) (stating class action rules “should be applied liberally ... if it is possible to do so with fairness to the litigants”); State v. McCann, 391 N.J.Super. 542, 553, 919 A.2d 136 (App.Div.2007) (stating that judicial disqualification implicates, among other concerns, fairness to litigants); Arenas v. Gari, 309 N.J.Super. 1, 19, 706 A.2d 736 (App.Div.1998) (<HOLDING>); Klajman v. Fair Lawn Estates, 292 N.J.Super. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented (C) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (D) holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat (E) holding that jurors must not only be fair and impartial they also must appear so in order to maintain the litigants confidence in the basic fairness of the trial
Output: (E)
the district court’s choice and application of the standard of review to the Plan’s decision. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review- the Plan’s decision denying Barnes and other “Lump Sum” class members additional retirement benefits for an abuse of discretion with scepticism. See Burke v. Pitney Bowes Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 544 F.3d 1016, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2008). Where, as here, a plan unambiguously grants an administrator discretionary authority, the court reviews the administrator’s decision for abuse of discretion. Id. In determining the standard of review, we take into account the existence of a structural conflict of interest. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 965 (<HOLDING>); Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan administrator that was also insurer operated under conflict of interest (B) holding that when the insurer is also the plan administrator we have recognized something akin to a rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest (C) holding the district court erred by finding an automatic conflict of interest merely because insurer and administrator were the same (D) holding that it is wrong to assume a financial conflict of interest from the fact that the plan administrator is also the insurer (E) holding that a structural conflict of interest exists when an insurer acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source
Output: (E)
Note-holders’ claims. 3. Contract Terms An indenture trustee has a fiduciary duty to the noteholders and is required to act with the same care as if it owned the investment. See, e.g., Flight Transp. Corp., 874 F.2d at 578 (citing Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-ooo(c)). The Indenture in this case incorporates this standard by mandating that WTC’s services be performed with “the same degree of care and skill in their exercise as a prudent Person would exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.” (See Indenture at § 7.1(a).) If the indenture trustee fulfills its duties, it is entitled to reimbursement of its expenses, including attorneys’ fees, in accordance with the terms of the indenture. See, e.g., Flight Transp. Corp., 874 F.2d at 583 (<HOLDING>); In re W.T. Grant Co., 119 B.R. 898, 900 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in awarding opposing counsels attorneys fees and expenses as sanctions without affording the sanctioned party the right to examine question or provide argument against the claimed fees and expenses (C) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee (D) holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party (E) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders
Output: (A)