niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
alleged prejudice stems from the unavailability of witnesses, the Fourth Circuit explained in Jones what type of evidence is typically required: “[Cjourts have generally required that the defendant identify the witness he would have called; demonstrate, with specificity, the expected content of that witness’ testimony; establish to the court’s satisfaction that he has made serious attempts to locate the witness; and, finally, show that the information the witness would have provided was not available from other sources.” 94 F.3d at 908; see also U.S. v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2nd Cir.1999) (recognizing that actual prejudice “is commonly demonstrated by the loss of documentary evidence or the unavailability of a key witness”); U.S. v. Scoggins, 992 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Sabath, 990 F.Supp. at 1014 (finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (B) holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources (C) holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness (D) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (E) holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary
Output: (B)
same issue in another 3.850 motion that was on appeal in this court at the time. See Hines v. State, 714 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dism., 727 So.2d 906 (1998). This court affirmed the denial of that untimely and successive 3.850 motion. Thurston v. State, 902 So.2d 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). This appeal is at least the third time Thurston has appealed the denial of the same frivolous claim of a violation of Ap-prendi and Blakely in this court. See Thurston v. State, 902 So.2d 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (raising the same claim). The claim is utterly without merit, for neither Apprendi nor Blakely are applied retroactively and neither have any applicability to Thurston’s ease. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005); Figarola v. State, 841 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Thurston has never adequately explained how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding retroactive application (B) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (C) holding that the act is not retroactive (D) holding apprendi is not retroactive (E) holding that the act is retroactive
Output: (D)
in the face of an express warranty stating that no security interest exists. To the contrary, case law supports the proposition that an express “free and clear” warranty precludes a finding of actual knowledge of a security interest. The district court in Black Diamond directly considered this issue in the context of § 9-320. Id. The court wrote that “Black Diamond specifically guaranteed that it ‘had good title’ to the coal, had ‘the right to sell’ the coal to Commodities, and ‘that [the coal] shall he free from all liens, encumbrances and claims.’ Consequently, Commodities acquired the coal without knowledge that its purchases violated CIT Group’s inventory lien.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Victory Nat’l Bank of Nowata v. Stewart, 6 Kan.App.2d 847, 636 P.2d 788, 790 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court in Black Diamond also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding inter alia defendant breached implied warranty of merchantability where an express warranty regarding safety of goods was printed on package and where goods failed to conform to the express warranty (B) holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 (C) holding buyer liable for balance of contract price of accepted goods (D) holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest (E) holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods
Output: (D)
the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse a conviction because of an erroneous instruction unless we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1342-43 (quotation marks omitted). We evaluate the instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 16, 2017) (No. 16-8072). Challenges to jury instructions that are raised for the first time on appeal, however, are reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (C) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment (D) holding that plainerror review applies when a defendant fails to make a specific rule 32i3b objection based on a district courts failure to resolve a factual dispute (E) holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute
Output: (C)
the information provided in the Unplanned Deviation Reports and investigation reports was an accurate depiction of the incidents occurred, and Acevedo has not shown otherwise. Lastly, this Court notes that Ceinos rated Acevedo in 2005 as “Fully Met Expectations,” which evinces a lack of animus towards Acevedo, insofar as he was accorded positive review by Ceinos despite previous performance issues. In essence, Plaintiffs ask us to excuse Acevedo’s performance by replacing Ceinos’ business judgment with his own absent proof that his employer’s findings were inaccurate or misleading, which is an untenable position in light of the applicable case law. Velazquez-Fernandez v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Webber v. Int’l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir.2005)) (<HOLDING>). Ex-Lax’s hiring practices, disciplinary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (B) holding that an employees opinion of the efficacy of an employment decision standing alone cannot supplant the employers business judgment (C) holding that employers have standing to sue (D) holding employer cannot lawfully make the signing of an employment agreement which contains an unenforceable covenant not to compete a condition of continued employment an employers termination of an employee who refuses to sign such an agreement constitutes a wrongful termination in violation of public policy (E) holding that an employers sponsorship of an employees 01 visa does not establish an employment contract for a definite term
Output: (B)
incident. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in determining that no substantial right of the Def WL 1870426, at *6 (Tenn.Crim.App. May 3, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013) (“More[o]ver, any error that may have occurred was cured by the prosecutor’s electing the oral sex in closing argument and the trial court’s recalling the jury and issuing the supplemental instruction.” (emphasis added)); State v. Busby, No. M2004-00925-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 711904, at *6 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar. 29, 2005), perm. app. denied (Aug. 25, 2008) (concluding that “the prosecutor provided such an effective substitute during his closing argument in this case” (emphasis added)); State v. Dearry, No. 03C01-9612-CC-00462, 1998 WL 47946, at *13 (Tenn. CrimApp. Feb. 6, 1998), perm. app. denied (Jan. 19, 1999) (<HOLDING>). Still other decisions from the Court of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors closing argument effectively served as an election of the proof upon which the state wished to proceed (B) holding that the defendants objection was untimely when he waited until the end of the prosecutors closing argument to raise it (C) holding that prosecutors allegedly improper closing arguments regarding burden of proof defendants failure to testify and other allegations did not case serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury verdict or the fairness of the trial (D) recognizing that a lawyers comments during closing argument may explain away the alleged prejudicial effect of the opposing parties closing argument comments (E) holding thatany error made by the state in its election of offenses was cured during the prosecutors closing argument emphasis added
Output: (A)
Although the Providers concede that they have no property interest in remaining part of the state Medicaid program, they assert “a right to due process regarding any submitted claims that are denied by FSSA,” and “[a]t a minimum, this requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (Pis.’ Mot. TRO & Prelim. Inj. 15.) This appears to be a valid distinction between property rights. Compare Grason v. State of Ill. Inspector Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 573, 574 (7th Cir.2014) (“I[t] is doubtful that current Medicaid providers even have a protected interest in continuing in the program.”)(citing Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 953 (9th Cir.2009)); see also Senape v. Constantino, 936 F.2d 687, 690-91 (2d Cir.1991), with Pers. Care Prods., Inc. v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159 & n. 20 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Tekkno Labs., Inc. v. Perales, 933 F.2d 1093, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state police is a state agency (B) holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review (C) holding that when a state agency is investigating a providers past payments for fraud neither federal or texas law gives a provider a property right in reimbursements withheld on claims not within the investigations scope but acknowledging that the agency may only refuse to pay for cause and claims may not be withheld indefinitely quoting yorktown med lab inc v perales 948 f2d 84 89 2d cir1991 (D) holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities (E) holding that court may not accept claims of fraud based on speculation
Output: (C)
2Dl.l(c). U.S.S.G.App. C, Amend. 706 (2007). The effect of Amendment 706 is to provide a two-level reduction in base offense levels for certain crack cocaine offenses. See id. The Commission made this amendment retroactively applicable, effective as of March 3, 2008. See TJ.S.S.G.App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008) (listing Amendment 706 under U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(c) as a retroactively applicable amendment). In United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2008), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 26, 2008) (No. 08-7610), we stated that “[w]here a retroactively applicable guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but does not alter the sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction in sentence.” Id. at 1330 (<HOLDING>). Further, we have affirmed a district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (B) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (C) holding that the district court lacked authority under  3582c2 to grant a sentencing reduction to defendants who were career offenders sentenced under ussg  4b11 because amendment 706 would not ultimately affect their guideline ranges (D) holding that amendment 706 would not affect the guideline ranges for career offenders sentenced under  4b11 (E) holding that a defendant whose sentence is based on his status as a career offender under  4b11 is not entitled to  3582c2 relief because amendments 706 and 713 do not lower the applicable guideline range for a career offender
Output: (D)
Legal Texts § 4 (2012) (“A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”). This result also makes sense in the context of bankruptcy litigation. The lion’s share of damages from violations of automatic stays are typically attorneys’ fees. Most debtors are not in the financial position to afford an action to prosecute damages and, even if they could, limiting fees to those incurred in ending the stay violation would be too small to justify the expensive litigation that may follow. See Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d at 1100. Rather than draining the limited funds in the bankruptcy estate and jeopardizing creditors’ recoveries, the party wrongfully violating the automatic stay and causing the resulting damage 1th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the wpcl an employee who has prevailed on a claim for past wages due is entitled to attorneys fees as a matter of entitlement (B) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal (C) holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs (D) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal (E) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983
Output: (B)
complaint belies this assertion. Paragraph 96 of plaintiffs’ complaint reads, [plaintiff's have alleged the foregoing based upon the investigation of their counsel, which included a review of SGI’s SEC filings, securities analysts reports and advisories about the Company, press releases issued by the Company, media reports about the Company and discussions with consultants, and believe that substantial evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth in ¶¶ 1, 4-15, 19, 27-43, 46, 49-50, 53, 56, 58-70, 72-82, 84, and 87 after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Because the sources set forth in paragraph 96 do not provide plaintiffs with personal knowledge, the complaint must be based on information and belief — that is the only alternative. See Wool, 818 F.2d at 1439 (<HOLDING>). The degree of specificity required by the SRA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that declarations on information and belief are not entitled weight for summary judgment proceedings where the declarant lacks personal knowledge (B) holding that plaintiffs may plead on information and belief if matters are not within their personal knowledge (C) holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore (D) holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge (E) holding that lay testimony is competent if it is limited to matters that the witness has actually observed and is within the realm of the witnesss personal knowledge
Output: (B)
of the statute before many petitioners would be able to identify, with reasonable certainty, the nature of the injury. Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed.Cl. 474, 477 (1996), aff'd on other grounds, 240 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir.2001). In Brice, we held that equitable tolling is not available for claims arising under § 300-16(a)(2), reasoning that “the statute of limitations here begins to run upon the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of injury, even if the petitioner reasonably would not have known at that time that the vaccine had caused an injury.” 240 F.3d at 1373; see also Sharpnack v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-983V, 1992 WL 167255, at *2 (Cl.Ct. Special Master June 29, 1992), aff'd, 27 Fed.Cl. 457 (1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1442 (Fed.Cir.1994) (table) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court, in Whitecotton, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted (B) holding substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a eonclusion  (C) holding that in many vaccine program cases the injuries are first manifest ed as subtle signs and seizures of less complicated nature eg seizures lasting less than 30 minutes or seizure activity so subtle as to be unrecognized at their onset (D) holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service (E) holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service
Output: (C)
If the district school board fails to act on the application, an applicant may appeal to the State Board of Education as provided in paragraph (c). If an application is denied, the district school board shall, within 10 calendar days, articulate in writing the specific reasons based upon good cause supporting its denial of the charter application. § 1002.33(6)(b)3, Fla. Stat. (2005)(emphasis added). 3 . To the extent the School Board argues that the Commission’s order is insufficient for failure to include detailed factual findings, the School Board failed to preserve this argument because it failed to raise the insufficiency of the Commission's recommendations before the State Board. See Imhotep-Nguzo Saba Charter School v. Department of Educ., 947 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)(<HOLDING>). GRIFFIN, J., concurring specially. For what 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generally appellate courts will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal (B) holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (C) holding appellate court would not consider issue raised by charter schools for first time on appeal (D) holding that appellate court will not normally address issue raised for the first time on appeal (E) holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal
Output: (C)
finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. Because Officer Gillespie did not comply with KCPD inventory policy and because her testimony demonstrates pretext, we hold that the search cannot be upheld under the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The Government argues that the inventory should be upheld because, as the district court concluded, Officer Gillespie was required to impound the vehicle under KCPD standard policy because she “believed” Taylor’s vehicle had been used in the commission of a crime. The Government’s argument that the inventory was valid because the impoundment was valid conflates two separate issues. The validity of an impoundment is not dispositive of the validity of an inventory search. See Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we have rejected the argument that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inventory search could not be condemned insofar as department policy permitted opening box for the standard purposes of inventory searches (B) holding police officers were justified in impounding and conducting inventory search which extended to the trunk of the vehicle where vehicle was abandoned and believed to contain stolen goods (C) holding warrantless search of defendants automobile four days after impoundment was permissible under requirements of fourth amendment and state constitution where officers had probable cause to search vehicle when it was impounded and that probable cause continued between the time of the impoundment and the search (D) holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit (E) holding that even though an inventory search was invalid the vehicle was properly impounded
Output: (E)
Neither the FLSA nor state wage- and-hour laws provide any such indication. Consequently, the Plaintiffs may pursue then-unjust enrichment claims. Although the Court does not conclusively decide the merits of these claims in this motion, it must examine the claims to “make a meaningful determination of the certification issues,” Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d at 1234, and determine whether the state law claims could support a rule 23 action. Should the Court grant the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, however, the Plaintiffs would only have state law claims before this court, depriving the Court of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Regardless of the resolution of the state law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident (B) holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims (C) holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute (D) holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims (E) holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute
Output: (A)
of the implied covenant in employment contracts. In the insurance cases, the courts look to whether the insurance company, with malice, fraud or oppression, abused its duty to act in good faith. The “bad faith” employment cases maintain a higher standard, in that the courts generally look for a violation of public policy on the part of the employer. See discussion in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1980), 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 12 A.L.R.4th 520, and Annot. 12 A.L.R.4th 544, (1982). Most courts recognizing a cause of action based on a discharge that offends public policy have grounded that action in tort, while only a few have relied on an implied contract theory of recovery. Compare Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980), 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, (<HOLDING>); Nees v. Hocks (1975), 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that liability for the tort of wrongful discharge based on refusal to commit an unlawful act can extend to the corporate officers who authorized or directed the discharge (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (C) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act (D) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge (E) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
Output: (C)
estate in the excess area are subject to the area connection charge if they connect, directly or indirectly, to the water main “to service the real estate situated in the excess area or adjacent to the excess area[.]” (App. 90; Appellee’s Addendum 4) (emphasis added). Thus, the language of Section 4.1, agreed upon by the parties, shows that the intent of the parties was that the area connection charge would be assessed against excess area owners in two specified situations. Because the trial court erroneously interpreted the contract as a matter of law, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Hunt-ertown’s partial summary judgment motion and denial of Carroll Creek’s cross-motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. See, e.g., Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co., 971 N.E.2d at 132-33 (<HOLDING>). See also Singleton, 977 N.E.2d at 968 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at summary judgment hearing trial court erred by considering theory not raised in the pleadings (B) holding that we are not at liberty to rewrite a contract and reversing a trial courts grant of summary judgment where the court erred in interpreting the contract (C) holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient (D) recognizing the general rule which permits judicial notice of a courts prior cases to support a motion for summary judgment but reversing because in his order the trial judge made no specific reference to the basis for his grant of summary judgment (E) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion
Output: (B)
the top of the trailer, where there was a danger that the employee would fall into the trailer. In fact, it appears that the only person to ever see a Cagles employee on the trailer, Hankinson, was assured that an employee should not be on the trailer; he never saw another employee on the trailer. Warren argues that the OSHA citations indicate that the coemployees should have known that, to a substantial certainty, injury or death would result from the top-loading procedure. The citation concerning the failure to guard the openings on the trailer was not a repeat citation, so the coemployees could not have had any advance notice of the likelihood of injury before the issuance of that citation. See Ex parte Martin, 733 So.2d 392, 396 (Ala. 1999). Although some of the citations ari 1991) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that Warren’s evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (B) holding that immunity is not waived for injury or death caused by negligent supervision (C) holding postaccident citation not sufficient to support finding that coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur (D) holding that order finding that injury arose out of and in the course of the employment and awarding medical benefits was interlocutory order that would not support appeal (E) holding that preaccident citation would not support a finding that coemployees were substantially certain that injury or death would occur
Output: (E)
pharmacy problem resulting from what was administered. 6 . We do not feel it is within our realm of expertise, nor is it our duty, to determine if incompatibility existed. St. Joseph maintained that De Anda should have checked for incompatibility and that her failure to do so was the reason for her termination; not whether there was, in fact, an incompatibility. Whether St. Joseph was wrong in its determination that she should have checked is irrelevant, as long as its belief, though erroneous, was the basis for the termination. Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Center, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032. 7 . Such an error might occur if the trial court required that the burden of proof rather than of production of evidence shift to the defendant after the plaintiff had established r. 1980) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, there is a split in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous (C) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (D) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (E) holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
Output: (D)
section 39.6221(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015), requires the circuit court to “[slpecify the frequency and nature of visitation or contact between the child and his or her parents.” Here, the court’s order specifies that K.B. shall have a minimum of one hour per week supervised visitation, with additional visitation at the permanent guardian’s' discretion. The order also gives the guardian discretion to permit unsupervised visitation upon determining that KB. has achieved the sobriety and • stability necessary to keep the child safe. However, it does not leave the frequency and nature of visitation to the guardian’s complete discretion. Therefore, the order comports with section 39.6221(2)(c). Cf. S.W-R. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 64 So.3d 1283, 1284-85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded. NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance requested by telephone when the party requesting same was served with notice of the proceeding less than one hour before the hearing (B) holding an upward departure under ussg  5k22 was not error or an abuse of discretion where the victim suffered permanent and lifethreatening injuries (C) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (D) holding the permanent guardianship order that provided for visitation biweekly for an hour to an hour and a half or at the discretion of the caregiver did not comply with section 3962212c because it placed complete discretion concerning the frequency and duration of visitation with the permanent guardian (E) holding the selection of the person to be appointed guardian is a matter which is committed largely to the discretion of the appointing court and an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of this discretion only in case of a clear abuse
Output: (D)
provided the convictions occurred, as here, in a single trial.” 236 Va. at 351, 374 S.E.2d at 303. Thus, upon comple tion of the substantive crime, the crime’s actual perpetrator may be convicted and punished at the same trial for both the substantive crime and the underlying conspiracy. Additionally, Code § 18.2-18 provides that “every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree.” The statute’s purpose is to ensure that any person who participates as an accomplice in a substantive crime is equally accountable and subject to the same punishment as the actual perpetrator of the crime. See Charlton v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 47, 52, 526 S.E.2d 289, 292 (2000) (<HOLDING>). It is clear, therefore, from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that before the accessory to a crime can be convicted as such it must be shown that the crime has been committed by the principal (B) holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled (C) holding that code  18218 directs that an accessory before the fact is accountable in all respects as the principal who carries out the intended crime as well as any of its natural probable and incidental crimes (D) holding that an indictment is sufficient as long as it fully and clearly sets out the crime and the elements of the offense even if the evidence consists of proof of other means of committing the same crime (E) holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects
Output: (C)
repeat felony offenders, which reads: "A person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction on which his or her application is based shall not be eligible for probation." Cf. Chism v. People, 80 P.3d 293 (Colo.2003). 4 . Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Sigala agreed that payment of workers' compensation benefits that had been suspended would resume once the suspension was lifted-the analogous question in this case. 184 P.3d at 46; id. at 47 (Eid, J., dissenting). The disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions centered on an issue not presented in this case-that is, whether benefits accrued during a period of suspension to be payable once the suspension lifted. Id. at 46 (<HOLDING>); id. at 47 (Eid, J., dissenting) (finding no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract (B) holding that the payments accrued (C) holding that cause of action for malpractice had accrued before underlying actions dismissal (D) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale (E) holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure
Output: (B)
on self-defense. Despite the trial court’s denial, during closing arguments Davis argued that he had acted in self-defense in an effort to negate the intent element of the offense: “Both people got knifed. Both people are fighting and both people are going for the neck where the carotid artery is, where the jugular vein is, and where someone is going to die if that’s cut.” During its rebuttal to Davis’s closing argument, the State said, “Ladies and gentlemen, if you look at this case and you look at all the facts surrounding this case, there’s no evidence to suggest that Latarsha Hampton wa statement that defense attorneys knew that a defendant accused of cocaine possession lived in a “crack house” was improper); Lopez v. State, 705 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we overrule Davis’s ninth point. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument (B) holding improper counsels argument that plaintiff was entitled to something for manner in which defense was conducted (C) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper (D) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsel was manufacturing evidence and thus suborning perjury was improper (E) holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence
Output: (C)
and Remedies Code places certain procedural requirements on claims against licensed or registered architects, engineers, land surveyors, and landscape architects. See id. §§ 150.001-008 (West 2011). Cases governed by this chapter have involved negligence claims against non-manufacturers based on the design of improvements to real property. See, e.g., Sharp Eng’g. v. Luis, 321 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (concluding section 150.002 was not satisfied with respect to carpenter’s claim against engineers for negligent design of roof that carpenter fell through while performing framing work); Elness Swenson Graham Architects, Inc. v. RLJ II-C Austin Air, LP, No. 03-10-00805-CV, 2011 WL 1562891, at *5 (Tex.App.-Austin Apr. 20, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). Occidental relies on New Texas Auto Auction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an architect whose negligent design and supervision of construction render a building unfit for use may be liable in tort to a commercial tenant who suffers economic loss as a result (B) holding former plant owner liable for its negligent design of conveyor belt (C) holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage (D) holding with respect to class iii device not subject to pma process that negligent marketing and inadequate warning claims were preempted but defective design claim was not preempted because no fda design requirement existed (E) holding former plant owner liable for negligent design of conveyor belt
Output: (C)
or require the information it did. In light of the information possessed by the District as of June 2, 2011, the District’s interference with Rutherford’s right to return began then, and continued until the District ultimately terminated him. Once a technical violation of the FMLA has been established—and here, the undisputed facts show that a violation occurred—the interference inquiry turns to whether the plaintiff experienced prejudice resulting from the violation. Ridings v. Riverside Medical Center, 537 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). The District arg e his fitness to return to work, he had such proof—a note from his doctor stating that he was fit to work—and attempted to present it on June 2, 2011. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Instead of reinstating him, the District kept 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (B) holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours (C) holding that a plaintiff who was unable to return to work before his fmla leave expired did not allege any denial of an fmla right but noting that ragsdale left open the possibility that employees could recover for notice violations on a casebycase basis if there was actual harm resulting from the violations (D) holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave (E) holding that sufficient evidence of prejudice existed where plaintiff would have structured leave differently but employer had not provided notice of fmla right to reinstatement
Output: (E)
Defendant Jose Abraham Estrada-Lugo appeals from his sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with a sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 1. We have jurisdiction because the district court’s oral statements conflict with the plea agreement’s waiver of the right to appeal the sole issue here, which is whether Defendant’s conviction for negligent homicide is, or is not, an aggravated felony. See United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). When the court asked Defendant whether he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract (B) holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant (C) holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls (D) holding that when a courts statements from the bench conflict with its written order the order controls (E) holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control
Output: (E)
as such, did not create a security interest); In re Murray, 191 B.R. 309 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1996) (concluding that vehicle lease was a true lease and not an installment purchase agreement with a security interest), aff'd, 201 B.R. 381 (E.D.Pa.1996). Because the Lease is a true lease, it must be treated as so in the Debtor’s Plan. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7), a debtor may provide for the assumption of an unexpired lease in his or her Chapter 13 plan. Howeve .2003) (ruling that § 1322(b)(2) precluded the debtor from modifying the rights of her motor vehicle lessor, including its right to be paid a lump sum payment for the vehicle’s purchase price upon the debtor’s exercise of the purchase option under their motor vehicle lease); In re Winston, 181 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Weske, 203 B.R. 694 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since motor vehicle contract between the debtor and fifth third bank was a lease and not a security agreement the debtor was required to treat fifth third banks claim in his chapter 13 plan as a lease and not as a secured debt which meant that the debtor could not obligate fifth third bank to finance the purchase of his vehicle (B) holding that the debtor could not treat a lessor as a secured creditor by paying the present value of the purchase option price of the lease through her chapter 13 plan (C) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim (D) holding plan properly vacated with respect to chapter 13 creditor who received actual notice of proceedings but did not receive adequate notice that court would value secured claim at the confirmation hearing (E) recognizing that a lessees holding over without giving the prescribed notice of renewal gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended
Output: (B)
to alter this standard. The Commonwealth Court held appellant did not satisfy the HUP test, and our grant of allocatur was limited to its continued viability in light of Act 55. As such, we will not review the Commonwealth Court’s application thereof, nor the relevance or constitutionality of Act 55. The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Justices BAER, TODD and McCAFFERY join the opinion. Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justice ORIE MELVIN join. 1 . This is not the precise measure, as a charity can relieve the government of some of its burden, even if the beneficiaries are not in the jurisdiction from which it seeks a tax exemption. See West Indies Mission Appeal, 387 Pa. 534, 128 A.2d 773, 781 (1957) (<HOLDING>). However, this issue is outside the scope of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated (B) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (C) recognizing that application of the seaman exemption is a factintensive question that can be answered in many cases only after a trial (D) holding charity can be entitled to exemption when its beneficiaries are outside pennsylvania (E) holding that statements even when made to a third party which are appropriately determined to be threatening can constitute obstruction of justice
Output: (D)
Buckley v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re DVI, Inc.), 2008 WL 4239120, 2008 Bankr.LEXIS 2338 (Bankr.D.Del. Sept. 16, 2008) ("Rule 8(a) requires a showing rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only fair notice, but also the grounds on which the claim rests.” (citations omitted)). 19 . Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. 20 . Id. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“It is the con-clusory nature of [plaintiff’s] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth."). 21 . Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. 22 . Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (<HOLDING>); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court must take the complaints allegations as true no matter how incredulous the court may be (B) holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints (C) holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true (D) recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss (E) holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true
Output: (A)
was to obtain injunctive relief, not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail or the possible size of the damage award. See id. at 1234-35. The Court concludes that under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, Plaintiff has failed to show that her primary goal in bringing this action was to obtain injunc-tive relief. Although the prayer for relief in the Complaint “prays that Defendant be permanently enjoined from marketing Pantene Pro-V as products able to strengthen hair,” the prayer for relief also repeatedly requests damages, including punitive damages. (Compl. at 13-14.) The facts of this case are wholly unlike the facts of cases in which certification under Rule 23(b)(2) has been permitted despite the fact that damages were also sought. Cf. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1235 (<HOLDING>); Molski, 318 F.3d at 950 (concluding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint (B) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification (C) holding that logic supports the conclusion that the suit by current and former employees seeking to end employers practice of gender discrimination would be primarily motivated by the desire to protect those class members that are suffering as they once did (D) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (E) holding that defining the class to include anyone who received such a call without prior express consent means that only those potential members who would prevail on this liability issue would be members of the class
Output: (C)