niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
at issue.... In order to preserve the requisite reliability of disclosure statements and to provide assurances to creditors regarding the finality of plans which they have voted to approve, we hold that under the facts here present Oneida’s failure to announce this claim against a creditor precludes it from litigating the cause of action at this time. Id.; see also U.S. ex rel. Gebert v. Transport Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 917-18 (8th Cir.2001) (upholding the district court’s finding that employees were judicially estopped from asserting a claim against their former employer because they had represented to the bankruptcy court, through their failure to disclose the claim, that they did not possess the claim); Monroe County Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 75 B.R. 158, 162 (S.D.Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>); USinternetworking, Inc. v. Gen. Growth Mgmt., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations (B) holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims (C) recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings (D) recognizing that the power of disallowance of claims conferred on the bankruptcy courts embraces the rejection of claims in whole or in part according to the equities of the case and emphasizing that a bankruptcy court may therefore limit the amount of claims in view of equitable considerations (E) holding equitable estoppel barred the plaintiffs claims because all of the claims of the amended complaint were in existence during the bankruptcy proceedings yet the plaintiff did not disclose any of the claims in its bankruptcy petitions plans of reorganization or disclosure statements
Output: (E)
yet a third time under the discussion of ‘why.’ 934 S.W.2d at 457 (emphasis added). Finally, the court of appeals properly applied the Kraus factors and explained why the evidence supported the punitive damages award. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals’ factual sufficiency review of the punitive damages award, despite the court’s occasional misleading language, was proper. IY. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD-RECALCULATION Mobil also argues that the court of appeals erred by including, sua sponte, the estate’s actual damages in its punitive damages calculation, thereby adding $91,555.58 to the punitive damages award. We agree. A court of appeals cannot modify a judgment without a point of error asking it to do so. See Texas Nat’l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1986)(<HOLDING>). Here, the jury charge asked the jury to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (C) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (D) holding that oncors request for the trial judge rather than the jury to determine the reasonableness of its attorneys fees and the failure to submit the question of attorneys fees to the jury resulted in a waiver of oncors claim for the recovery of attorneys fees (E) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error
Output: (E)
from the publisher. The United States Supreme Court has held that a New York City correctional facility rule prohibiting the receipt of hardcover books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores is constitutional. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The correctional facility argued the rule was designed to promote security and order at the facility. Id. at 544, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The Supreme Court agreed, stating this “limited restriction is a rational response by prison officials to an obvious security problem.” Id. at 550, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The Court agreed that hardcover books were especially convenient tools for smuggling contraband such as money, drugs, and weapons into a correctional facility and that these books are (<HOLDING>); Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 272 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prison regulations impinging on prisoners constitutional rights are only valid where reasonably related to legitimate penological interests (B) holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest (C) holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population (D) holding a publisheronly rule was constitutional because prison administrators are accorded deference and rule was reasonably related to the penological interest of maintaining internal prison security (E) holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests
Output: (D)
In order to guide the district court in its decision, we now discuss the conduct necessary for a defendant to forfeit the right to counsel. Forfeiture results in the loss of the right to counsel regardless of the defendant’s knowledge of either the consequences of his actions or the dangers of self-representation. Id. at 1100. Forfei ture of the right to counsel “does not require the court to conduct a waiver colloquy with the defendant” and is “usually reserved for severe misconduct, when other efforts to remedy the situation have failed.” Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 505. The district court concluded that ses in which a defendant has threatened the life of his counsel or engaged in a pattern of threatening and abusive behavior. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (<HOLDING>); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct abuse threats and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense (B) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his postadjudication sentence because he did not object at trial or present his motion for new trial (C) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel (D) holding that a habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief from a state courts determination that he had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney and threatening to put a contract on his attorneys life (E) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial
Output: (A)
removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (“[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] removable to federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan  falls directly under  502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court
Output: (E)
— cannot alone support guilty verdicts. There must be some further evidence adduced indicating the defendant’s commission of the charged criminal acts. See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d at 69; United States v. Scheibel, 870 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir.1975). True enough. But these cases do not hold that, if such actus reus evidence is adduced, there is some temporal limit on the jury’s consideration of consciousness-of-guilt evidence to establish mens rea. Indeed, if flight or false exculpatory statements were indicative only of a defendant’s knowledge and intent at the time of those actions, the evidence would be irrelevant to the charged crime and properly excluded. Instead, the law admits consciousness-of-gui 209 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). (4) The Admissions to Goldsmith Still further 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants false exculpatory statements admissible to show consciousness of guilt (B) recognizing that evidence of government knowledge of the defendants conduct could be part of a defendants argument that it did not knowingly submit false claims (C) holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear (D) recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent (E) holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury
Output: (D)
of the franchisee to comply with any lawful provision of the franchise agreement and to cure such failure after being given written notice thereof and a reasonable opportunity, which in no event need be more than 30 days, to cure such failure.” Id. In the instant case, defendants argue that they have “cured” their breaches by “amending the tax returns.” While this may amount to a cure with respect to defendants’ falsification of financial reports, it certainly does not amount to a cure with regard to defendants’ other breaches. Plaintiff certainly had good cause for terminating the franchise agreement due to defendants’ other breaches and these have not yet been cured. See Two Men and a Truck/International Inc. v. Two Men and a Truck/Kalamazoo, Inc., 955 F.Supp. 784 (W.D.Mich.1997) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs request for an order enforcing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that franchisors have a duty to act in good faith and with commercial reasonableness when terminating franchise agreements (B) holding franchisor could not arbitrarily terminate franchise agreement as it would be a disregard of franchisees interests under the agreement (C) holding that under michigan franchise investment law franchisees failure to comply with lawful provisions in franchise agreements by failing to pay royalties and advertising fees and failing to file monthly sales reports constituted good cause for franchisors termination of agreements where franchisor gave notice of termination in writing and franchisees made no effort to cure (D) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (E) holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination
Output: (C)
tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b) are regarded as taxable transfers_” Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3). Clearly, the sentence upon which the Eleventh Circuit and now our Court mistakenly rely is concerned with the $10,000 annual exclusion on gifts and has absolutely nothing to do with pre-Act transfers. There is a definitive difference between a taxable transfer that qualifies for the annual exclusion and on which a gift tax therefore is not imposed, such as an annual $10,000 check to a favorite nephew, and a transfer as to which the gift tax is not even applicable, such as a transfer pursuant to an obligation created in an antenuptial agreement executed in 1931 between a man and woman married later that year. See Commissioner v. Copley’s Estate, 194 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). The creation of the Ordway trust in 1917 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that the act is retroactive (C) holding that transfers made in 1936 and 1944 pursuant to the 1931 agreement were not taxable because to hold as the commissioner would have us do  would require a retroactive application of the gift tax which we think is not permissible see sec 501b of the revenue act of 1932 (D) holding retroactive application (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective
Output: (C)
threatened to use a firearm during the commission of the crime”; (2) where the defendant admitted to use or threatened use; and (3) where the court convened a special proceeding and found use or threatened use of a firearm. Or Laws 1979, ch 779, § 2. The third option, action by the sentencing judge, could only occur if, before sentencing, the judge determined that the “conviction” did not necessarily establish use or threatened use of a firearm. That order of events — “conviction” followed by sentencing — indicates that the legislature intended the term “conviction” in ORS 161.610 to mean the finding of guilt as to the underlying criminal charge, and not that finding of guilt combined with the attendant criminal sentence. Compare State v. Isbell, 178 Or App 523, 527, 38 P3d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and State v. Allison, 143 Or App 241, 246, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because any precedes the list of items a felon is prohibited from possessing double jeopardy precludes more than one conviction for possession of any of the items listed (B) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (C) holding that the term conviction means a finding of guilt and not a judgment where it refers to an event that precedes sentencing (D) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (E) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession
Output: (C)
that a licensee is estopped from contesting the validity of its license. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 2007); Sevenr-Up Bottling Co. v. SeveruUp Co., 561 F.2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.1977) (“The establishment of an existing licensor-licensee relationship between Company and [licensee] effectively constitutes an insuperable bar to recovery by [licensee] with regard to its trademark claims.”). “The licensee estoppel rule precludes only licensees from a challenge: other parties, even those closely affiliated with the licensee, are not foreclosed.” 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 18.63 (4th ed. 2011); see also Papercraft Corp. v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 515 F.Supp. 727, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). VantageScore is a limited liability company 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally incapable of conspiring with one another (B) holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control (C) recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary (D) holding parent corporation which controlled litigation on behalf of subsidiary bound by judgment (E) holding that parent corporation was not estopped from challenging mark which licensor had licensed to wholly owned subsidiary which was independent of parent and had separate employees records accounts offices and only one shared officer
Output: (E)
possibilities among various offenders. Felons placed on probation with the first six months to be served in county jail are regarded by the sentencing judge as less serious offenders than those felons sentenced to the penitentiary with no probation. As indicated by the court in Burton, “felons [sentenced to the penitentiary] are in greater need of rehabilitation and need a greater incentive, in the form of good time credits, to get them to conform their behavior to what society will accept.” Burton, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1023. The good-time credit programs are designed to promote prison discipline; therefore, it is reasonable that persons who are subjected to a penitentiary sentence may need more incentives to conform their behavior to prison rules. Burton, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1024 (<HOLDING>). We conclude the legislature’s decision to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that youthful offender could be sentenced in excess of six year cap where probation violation was substantive in that he committed several criminal offenses (B) holding that under goodtime credit rules it was constitutional for a felon sentenced to one year in the illinois department of corrections to be released before a misdemeanant sentenced to six months in a county jail (C) holding that a defendant must be granted credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail (D) holding that jail records can properly be considered in determining jail credit issues raised pursuant to rule 3800a (E) holding that a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offense cannot be sentenced to death
Output: (B)
reduction in sentence under § 3582(c) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir.1996). But we review the district court’s interpretation of the USSG and other legal issues de novo. United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir.1997). We construe Caldwell’s filings liberally as he is proceeding pro se. Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir.2007). Before we consider the merits of Caldwell’s appeal, we must consider whether his appeal is timely. The district court denied Caldwell’s motion on February 9, 2012. His notice of appeal was due within 14 days of this denial, on February 23, 2012, as set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A). See United States v. Espinosa-Talamantes, 319 F.3d 1245, 1246 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Caldwell did not file his notice of appeal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (B) holding rule 4b1a applies to  3582c motions (C) holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions
Output: (B)
346 (1985). A pattern is shown through two or more related acts of racketeering activity that “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402, (8th Cir.1999) (quoting United HealthCare Corp., v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir.1996)). Appellants’ RICO claim was dismissed without prejudice for failure to set forth the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) requires that a party alleging fraud or mistake “state with particularity the circumstances constituting a fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); see Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Srvcs. Co., 48 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir.1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343) (<HOLDING>). Appellants’ amended complaint alleges in very 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that heightened pleading standards of fed rcivp 9b apply to fraud elements of rico claim (B) holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity (C) holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply (D) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (E) holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim
Output: (E)
334 F.3d 528, 538-39 (6th Cir.2003) (also noting that “[t]he wholly irrational standard is described in terms of extreme arbitrariness”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To show “discriminatory” conduct sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation, a plaintiff must present “substantial evidence of ... intentional, severe” discrimination that is “unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Elec. Ry , 457 (2d Cir.1979) (noting that “it was almost inevitable that the union’s drawing of a line would hurt someone” and “although it is unfortunate that ... the ultimate harm fell on appellants, drawing the line elsewhere would ... have caused harm to others”); Forte v. Warehouse Employees Local 169, 2000 WL 377698, *3 (E.D.Pa.) (<HOLDING>); see also Ratkosky, supra, 843 F.2d at 878-79 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sixmonth limitations period established in delcostello applies to a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation brought only against a union (B) holding that sixmonth duty of fair representation statute of limitations applicable to claim alleging breach of union contract (C) holding that union did not breach its duty of fair representation when it accepted a contract that provided severance pay for some active workers but not for laid off workers who were recalled (D) holding that unions interpretation of a contractual provision necessarily favorfing some workers over others did not violate the duty of fair representation (E) holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract
Output: (C)
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (“Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence
Output: (E)
and the weapons charge, for which he was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years’ imprisonment. Jackson appealed to this court. LAW/ANALYSIS I. Exclusion of Evidence Jackson argues the trial court erred in excluding his testimony about his personal knowledge of Felder’s violent history. We disagree. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice. State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2006). Generally, the failure to make a proffer of excluded evidence will preclude review on appeal. State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 163, 634 S.E.2d 23, 29 (Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). Where no proffer of excluded testimony is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection to testimony at trial on grounds that testimony was irrelevant highly prejudicial and below the threshold requirement of admissibility does not preserve appellate challenge that testimony constitutes inadmissi ble victimimpact testimony (B) holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked (C) holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been (D) holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been (E) holding that the trial courts statement it would deny the defendants request to make a bill at this time did not discharge the appellants duty to proffer the excluded testimony for preservation of error
Output: (D)
the trier of fact believes that the presumed fact has been overcome by whatever degree of persuasion is required by the substantive law of the case.” Rebuttable presumptions which shift the burden of proof are “expressions of social policy,” rather than mere procedural devices employed “to facilitate the determination of the particular action.” [This type of] presumption shifts the burden of proof, ensuring that the issue of negligence goes to the jury. This interpretation appears to best implement public policy that adequate operative notes be kept. Id. at 600-601 (quoting Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, 372 So.2d 438, 440 (Fla.1979)). Applying these observations to the present case, we hold that the trial court should have adopted a rebuttable presumption that Providen 1982) (<HOLDING>). 2. Shifting the burden of proof makes it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error (B) holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error (C) holding that any error in trial courts comparative negligence instruction was harmless where the jury found that both defendants were not negligent (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding exclusion was harmless error
Output: (C)
place of dumping the spoil was very material, and could not be made consistently with the terms of the agreement under which Axman undertook to perform the work or be liable....” Id. at 43-44, 34 S.Ct. 736. “[T]he work done under the second contract was not the work which the first contractor had agreed to perform.” Id. at 45, 34 S.Ct. 736. Axman and its progeny have a common thread. The cases in which the courts have barred a damage claim under Axman involved substantial and material changes in the physical nature of the performance, i.e.; the work to be performed or the goods to be delivered, from the original contract to the re-let contract. Consol. Airborne Sys., Inc. v. United States, 172 Ct.Cl. 588, 348 F.2d 941, 947 (1965). See also Cal. Bridge, 245 U.S. at 344-45, 38 S.Ct. 91 (<HOLDING>); Schwartz, 65 F.Supp. at 393 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding original contractor not liable for additional cost of relet contract where significant changes were made to the construction specifications (B) holding that contractor was not precluded from recovering damages against owner for defective specifications stated in contract notwithstanding lumpsum and prebid investigation provisions in contract because owner made positive assurances concerning reliability of said specifications (C) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate (D) holding that a construction contractor is entitled to recover profits upon breach of a partially performed contract but not the same amount as if the contract were completed because that amount must be reduced by the cost of completion (E) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where the governments specifications were impossible to meet government changed the specifications but did not change the price to be paid original contractor refused to perform and new contractor was paid more to meet new specifications
Output: (A)
the evidence presented by the summary judgment record in a light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005)). When both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court considers both sides’ summary judgment evidence and determines all issues presented. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). Where the trial court does not specify the g rv., Inc., 798 S.W.2d 606, 615 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the absence of a causal connection 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract (B) holding that erisa provides relief only for clearly ascertainable damages with the intent to make plaintiffs whole which precludes recovery for speculative future harm (C) holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages (D) holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative (E) holding such damages available where local law silent on issue speculative nature of damages does not preclude recovery
Output: (C)
Sporio v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Songer Constr.), 553 Pa. 44, 717 A.2d 525, 528 (1998). Prior to the Act’s passage, “[i]t was well accepted in Pennsylvania that a common law cause of action could be asserted for negligence of the employer for injuries to an employee resulting from failure to properly maintain the work place.” Greer, 380 A.2d at 1222. “The rule was true before compensation could be had for diseases, and was true as to diseases not covered by the Act after its adoption.” Id. (citations omitted). Despite the WCA’s scope, the common law duty to provide a safe work environment remains, and, in certain circumstances, an employer can face a common law claim for negligence if that duty is breached. See Lord Corp. v. Pollard, 548 Pa. 124, 695 A.2d 767, 769 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Boniecke v. McGraw-Edison Co., 485 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that decedent employees common law negligence claim against employer was not barred when disease was not compensable under the wca or the occupational disease act (B) holding that clause excluding coverage for temporomandibular joint syndrome without a definition for that disease was not plain and clear (C) holding employees negligence claim against his employer was preempted by the lmra (D) holding that time was not compensable where the employer provided but did not require use of a shuttle (E) holding that an employee could not recover damages and medical monitoring costs under the federal employers liability act unless or until he manifested symptoms of a disease
Output: (A)
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area because the relevant statutes did not affirmatively abrogate either the tribe’s treaty rights or inherent tribal sovereignty. Id. at 700-04, 113 S.Ct. at 2323-24. EXHAUSTION OF TRIBAL REMEDIES Next, National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985) (National Farmers Union), and Iowa Mutual do not establish only a rule of exhaustion requiring tribal courts to determine their jurisdiction in the first instance. The rule of exhaustion established in National Farmers Union is premised upon the Court’s decision that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is not automatically foreclosed by Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (<HOLDING>). National Farmers Union recognized that an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states taxing jurisdiction over nonmember indians is equivalent to states taxing jurisdiction over nonindians (B) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization (C) holding federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to try nonindians for offenses committed in indian country had implicitly preempted tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonindians (D) holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country (E) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws
Output: (C)
rights, flouts the plain language of the felony harassment statute, and risks undermining attempts to achieve the trust necessary to address juvenile mental health issues. It also opens the floodgates to prosecutions for harsh language that the speaker did not intend to be frightening in other areas, like the political context. For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 12 The parties and the majority also cite State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08, 26 P.3d 890 (2001), as the source of our “objective” test for knowing threats (i.e., threats that are constitutionally proscribable and covered by our felony harassment statute). Majority at 893-94. But I note that Williams quoted the objective standard only in dicta because it was not at issue in that case. 144 Wn.2d at 203-11 (<HOLDING>). 13 J.M., 144 Wn.2d at 476-82. 14 Kilburn, 151 
 Holding statements: (A) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (B) holding that felony harassment statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it proscribed threats to harm a persons mental health but did not define that term (C) holding  241 not vague or overbroad (D) holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech (E) holding  3631 not vague or overbroad
Output: (B)
defendants); accord People v. Carrington, 47 Cal.4th 145, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617, 647 (2009) (“An indictment and an information initiate ‘separate proceedings.’ ”); State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 125 (Mo.1981) (“The second indictment began a new and separate criminal proceeding... .”). In fact, the circumstances of this case illustrate the independent nature of the grand jury as a separate charging body. Under Rule 17.01, only a grand jury indictment could have charged Hohenwald with first-degree murder because a conviction for that offense is punishable by life imprisonment. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1 (“An offense punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment.”) (emphasis added); see also State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn.1984) (<HOLDING>). The indictment, therefore, necessarily 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder (B) recognizing that rule 1701 required an indictment to proceed on charges of firstdegree murder (C) holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury (D) holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder (E) holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count
Output: (B)
of CBS’s. As the district court recognized, one company’s minority ownership interest in another company is not sufficient by itself to make the owner a competitor, for purposes of the antitrust laws, of the subsidiary’s rivals. To be a competitor at the level of the subsidiary, the parent must have substantial control over the affairs and policies of the subsidiary. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir.1978) (finding no violation of § 8 of Clayton Act where interlocked parent corporations had competing subsidiaries, but reserving issue whether statute would cover “parent corporation that closely controls and dictates the policies of its subsidiary”); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 1061, 1084-85 (D.Del.1987) (<HOLDING>); J.E. Rhoads & Sons, Inc. v. Ammeraal, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (B) holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary (C) holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control (D) recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary (E) recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations
Output: (C)
(“Given the crowded state of this Court’s calendars, the case would not be tried prior to 1997. [opinion dated May 11, 1995] It is not unrealistic to predict that, if fully litigated, the present class action would not be concluded before the end of this decade ....”); In re Warner Communications Securities Litigation, 618 F.Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (“Although much discovery has been conducted, much would remain if the parties were to go to trial.”). 155. In contrast to trying the case, the Proposed Settlement permits a prompt and efficient solution to plaintiffs’ claims against Prudential; the Proposed Settlement would af 8-19 (3d Cir.1990) (finding only twenty-nine objectors from 281-member class “strongly favors settlement”); Weiss v. Mercedes-Benz, 899 F.Supp. at 1301 (<HOLDING>). 157. The Court recognizes that courts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification (B) holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action (C) holding that substantial silent consent weighs in favor of certification where approximately 100 out of 30000 class members objected or opted out of class (D) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (E) holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification
Output: (C)
concerning, the merit system principles contained in section 2301.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(ll). For most federal employees, section 2302(b)(ll) would give the OSC jurisdiction over complaints concerning specified personnel actions taken in violation of the rules and/or regulations promulgated under the CSRA. As members of the excepted service, however, FBI employees may not employ the remedial scheme available to most other federal employees. That Congress deliberately excluded FBI employees from the provisions establishing administrative and judicial review for personnel actions involving violations of CSRA implementing regulations suggests that Congress meant to preclude judicial review for such actions. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Borrell v. United States Int’l 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court (B) holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief (C) holding that defendant had adequate alternatives in judicial and administrative remedies to the course he took (D) holding that the csra in failing to provide explicitly for administrative or judicial remedies for certain decisions affecting nonpreference excepted service employees implicitly bars judicial remedies under 5 usc  5596 back pay act (E) holding that the remedies are exclusive
Output: (D)
some fact.’ ” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting 1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). Thus, “formal statements] to government officers” are generally testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. So is “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used proseeutorially.” Id. Similarly, “extrajudicial statements ... ement given by victim to an investigating police officer in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), as testimonial); see also United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 903-04 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Admission of non-testimonial hearsay against 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident (B) holding that rule of completeness did not apply where statements made at the scene and the statement made at the police station were  distinct and not part of one confession (C) holding declarants statements to 911 operator were not testimonial when defendant was still present during phone call (D) holding that accusers 911 call initial statement to police upon their arrival at the crime scene and statements made to police a short time later were testimonial (E) holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial
Output: (D)
of section 440.13, Florida Statutes, controls. See Butler v. Bay Center/Chubb Ins. Co., 947 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (procedural changes apply without regard to the date of accident). Section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), allows a claimant to make one change in his treating physician during the course of treatment for an accident. The carrier is to authorize an alternative physician who is not professionally affiliated with the prior treating physician. However, “[ujnder the 2005 version of the workers’ compensation law, the employer/carrier is no longer statutorily required to provide a claimant with the choice of three physicians.” Butler, 947 So.2d at 573. To be entitled to a change in physician, claimant must first avail himself of the treatment authorized. Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, claimant was not entitled to a onetime 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician (B) holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition (C) holding testimony about plaintiffs mental and physical state before treatment by physician was relevant (D) holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician (E) holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434043 when the claimant did not return to the authorized physician for treatment
Output: (D)
victim’s undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-viólating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of § 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret § 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc
Output: (C)