niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
doubt, however, on whether estoppel may run against the government. For example, in Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990), the Supreme Court held that courts may not use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to award money not authorized by Congress. The Court declined to address, however, “[w]hether there are any extreme circumstances that might support estoppel in a case not involving payment from the Treasury.” Id. at 434, 110 S.Ct. at 2476. In a recent opinion, the Federal Circuit indicated that estoppel may run against the government in certain circumstances and that OPM v. Richmond should not be extended beyond its precise holding. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see Brush v. Office of Personnel Management, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that richmond was limited to estoppel claims involving payment from the public treasury (B) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (C) recognizing that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government as it lies against private litigants and acknowledging merrill as the leading case in the courts modern line of estoppel decisions (D) holding that this court erred in concluding that richmond stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for any monetary claim and remanding for consideration of the facts supporting the estoppel claim (E) holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation
Output: (D)
22 . Gonzalez also argues that the district court erred in evaluating one of the Senate Factors and in concluding that the disparate impact on Latinos was statistically insignificant. Because Gonzalez’s failure to show causation is dispositive, however, we need not reach these issues. 23 . Voters who use an early ballot to vote do not even have to show identification. Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 16-550(A)(for early ballots, elector identity is verified by signature comparison alone). 24 . ITCA’s briefing collapses the Twenty-fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment poll tax claims into a single argument. But these are different claims that arise under different constitutional amendments. The Twenty-fourth Amendment extends only to federal elections, see Harman, 380 U.S. at 540, 85 S.Ct. 1177 (<HOLDING>), while the Fourteenth Amendment also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twentyfourth amendment abolished the poll tax as a requirement for voting in federal elections (B) holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax (C) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge (D) holding texas poll tax unconstitutional (E) holding that ujnder the plain meaning of the voting rights act the state of south dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the attorney general or bring a declaratory judgment action for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties
Output: (A)
have travelled in interstate commerce to commit the murder, thereby making Mandaeina the cause of McGuire’s interstate travel. Second, the evidence listed above also provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that McGuire travelled in interstate commerce with the intent to murder Strada. In view of the evidence, the jury could fairly conclude that McGuire’s intent to commit the murder was formed in January 1990, continued up until the time that he committed the murder on May 16, 1990 and existed at the time that he travelled from Rockford, Illinois to Kansas City, Missouri, on some date betweeh May 12,1990, and May 16,1990. See United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937, 107 S.Ct. 415, 93 L.Ed.2d 366 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Earlywine’s testimony that he was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them (B) recognizing that the government need only prove that crime occurred reasonably near the date stated in the indictment (C) holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce (D) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (E) holding that under a similar statute the government need only show that the defendant had the intent to carry on illegal activity and that the crime occurred in conjunction with interstate travel
Output: (E)
Athletic Ass’n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir.1992). The district court below also acknowledged this interest as a substantial one. TSSAA’s other two justifications, however, are very much in dispute. Brentwood, for example, argues that there is no support in the record for the proposition that student athletes need protection from exploitation. The district court agreed. It concluded that TSSAA offered no proof that exerting undue influence on middle school athletes to recruit them for athletic purposes actually harms those students. Proof of actual harm, however, is not required in order to recognize a state actor’s interest in preventing reasonably anticipated harm. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, 240 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Finally, TSSAA’s newly asserted interest in a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm (B) holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer (C) recognizing  1951 includes fear of economic harm (D) holding that because persecution cannot be based on a fear of psychological harm alone petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal based on the psychological harm she would suffer if her us citizen daughter were to undergo fgm (E) holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm
Output: (A)
variance criteria rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious; and, 5) erred in “taking” appellants’ property without just compensation. The County supports appellants’ contentions except for the last one, with which it disagrees. The County also contends the Board erred in applying the wrong law. The individual appellees, who opposed the variance applications, support the Board’s decision. Discussion 1. Applicable Law A. State Law Before we address the merits of appellants’ contentions, we shall address the County’s contention that the Board applied inapplicable law. The County asserts that the Board incorrectly applied a presumption that the requested use did not conform to the purpose and intent of the Critical Area Program because, while that presumption was added 677 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In 2002, the General Assembly amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that the board did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the entire lot but rather whether denying the variance would have denied reasonable and significant use of the buffer (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it (E) recognizing that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded
Output: (B)
147 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir.1998) (observing that a thorough examination of the evidence "should be particularly true when the Board is determining supervisory status because of the inconsistency in the Board’s application of the statutory definition and of the factors to be used in determining such application”); Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir.1997) (finding the "Board's biased mishandling of cases involving supervisors increasingly has called into question our obeisance to the Board's decisions in this area”); Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir.1992) ("[S]crutiny is particularly appropriate in cases where the Board determines supervisory status.”). But cf. Passavant Retirement & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243, 246 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitrators interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that because of the boards special competence in the field of labor relations its interpretation of the act is accorded special deference and noting that whether a bargaining unit is appropriate involves a large measure of informed discretion vested in the board and is rarely to be disturbed (C) holding that an issue is a matter of substantial public importance where it involves the use of property in a large subdivision and involves the rights of a large number of people (D) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (E) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation
Output: (B)
provisions. Given the defendants’ conduct to date, the court is unpersuaded that CIG-NA/CGLIC should be given another opportunity to retroactively re-consider Ms. Dorris’s ongoing disability status as it existed over the past three years. The defendants have already received the benefit of one remand to reevaluate Ms. Dorris’s claim, and it took them over six months to issue a ruling — surpassing by several months the time period allowed by law to review an entire ERISA appeal, much less a single seven-page SSDI document. See C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. Moreover, the ruling came only after Ms. Dorris filed a motion to reinstate this action with this court. Further remands are not appropriate under these circumstances. Cf. Williams v. Int’l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 715-16 (6th Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>). There is sufficient uncontroverted evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is appropriate to remand to the plan administrator when the administrative record is incomplete (B) holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile (C) holding that plan administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to consider additional medical evidence submitted by plaintiff and that it was appropriate for the court to retroactively grant disability benefits without remanding the case where there are no factual determinations to be made and a remand would be futile (D) holding that retransfer to district court would be futile where district court determined it was without jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claim (E) holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage
Output: (C)
income. As the majority notes, the Internal Revenue Code is not the standard for determining weekly gross income for child support purposes, see op. at ¶ 13 (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b) that the weekly gross income figure may not be the same as gross income for tax purposes). It may be unfair to exclude all of the settlement proceeds where they have inured to the family’s benefit in the past but it may also be unfair to include all of the proceeds where Scott has need of them for his own care. Commentary to Guideline 3(A) urges judges to “be innovative in finding ways to include income that would have benefited the family had it remained intact, but be receptive to deviations where reasons justify them.” Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b); see also Harris, 800 N.E.2d at 940-41 (<HOLDING>). [5] Because the trial court’s decision was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including only the net amount of settlement proceeds from a wrongful termination lawsuit because that is the amount that would have ultimately benefited the children if the family had remained intact (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial
Output: (A)
the Railroad Retirement Board”; therefore, she “assumed that reporting her earnings to either government agency” satisfied her obligation to report. Id. Most pointedly, she said, “I never thought I would be charged twice for going over the limit and lose all that money I had earned or I would not have worked past the limit.” AR at 45. This court has divided on the question whether, under the governing statutes, Burns could “be charged twice for going over the limit,” thereby “los[ing] all [the] money she had earned.” In light of the division on the court, it is all the more difficult to charge her with fault for her understanding of the advice she received from the Administration and the Board concerning benefit offsets for excess earnings. Cf. Hays v. Finch, supra, 306 F.Supp. at 120 (<HOLDING>). In sum, on the record this case presents, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff not at fault in accepting a lump sum social security benefit a second time observing that the agencys fault finding might be appropriate if plaintiff were an accountant (B) holding that under michigans reformed tortliability scheme the defendant union was not entitled to a setoff for a settlement received by plaintiff and holding that michigans allocation of fault scheme would permit the trier of fact to allocate fault regardless of whether all tortfeasors were parties to the proceeding (C) holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault (D) holding that an eic was neither a social security benefit nor a local public assistance benefit (E) recognizing the benefit of alternative determinations in the social security review process
Output: (A)
to the District Court’s application of AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. The district court determined that petitioner procedurally defaulted the first three of the five claims listed above by failing to properly appeal them to the OCCA. Petitioner raised these claims for the first time in his state application for post-conviction relief. When the trial court denied the application, petitioner attempted to appeal it to the OCCA, but he failed to foll ural default through a showing of cause and prejudice, and the district court concluded that his showing of actual innocence was not sufficient. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321, 115 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (B) holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice (C) holding that fundamental miscarriage of justice standard requires petitioner to make threshold showing of actual innocence (D) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that federal court cannot review claim procedurally defaulted in state court absent showing of either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice
Output: (E)
firms to determine what is reasonable in the relevant community.” Nike, Inc. v. Top Brand Co., No. 00 Civ. 8179, 2006 WL 2946472, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8381, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2006) (citing Miele v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conf. Pens. & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987)). “The relevant community to which the court should look is the district in which the case was brought.” Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 111 F.Supp.2d 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.1987)). Courts in this circuit routinely consider the rates of both the Eastern District of New York as well as the Southern District when undertaking this analysis. See, e.g., New Leadership Committee v. Davidson, 23 F.Supp.2d 301, 305 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). “Overall, hourly rates for attorneys approved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district (B) holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees (C) holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate (D) recognizing the time honored practice of applying new york city rates in calculating attorneys fees throughout the southern district of new york including in counties north of the city (E) holding that judge in southern district of new york could authorize wiretap in maryland
Output: (B)
predecessor to § 183 as including only the “actively responsible vessel” and not other ships or barges attached thereto. As Quinn recognizes, however, this literal reading of vessel has not been uniformly applied through the years. In Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 332, 47 S.Ct. 368, 370-71, 71 L.Ed. 663 (1927), the Court read Liverpool narrowly as applying only in “pure tort” situations where “no contractual obligations [are] involved.” Where the cause of action is for loss of cargo being transported pursuant to a shipping contract, the entire flotilla—in that case a tug and the barge, it was towing—engaged in the act of shipping can be regarded as the “vessel.” Id/, see also Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Ratliff, 715 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). This is what is commonly referred to as the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation (B) holding the limitation fund liability of a defendant shipowner may be increased to include his interest in the value of all vessels engaged in a common enterprise or venture with the vessel aboard which the loss or injury was sustained (C) holding that a party who lends money to be used in the repairs of a vessel or to furnish the vessel with supplies does not have a privilege against the vessel (D) holding that where the real value of an anchoring system design is in the idea not in the physical plans that memorialize it any loss in value of the design represents a loss in the value of the idea which is not a loss of use of tangible property (E) holding a contract clause stating that the yard shall in no case be held responsible for the damages resulting from any loss of use or profit of the vessel to be unambiguous
Output: (B)
8 . See, e.g., Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir.2012); Pacific Dunlop Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir.1993); Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir.1988); Penturelli, 779 F.2d 160 at 166; Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir.1970); Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 883 (D.C.1967); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F.Supp. 1314, 1346 (S.D.N.Y.1982). 9 . Interpreting the same language, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois observed that Congress intended “to specifically include as securities 'only that form of splitting up of mineral interests which had been most utilized for speculative purposes.’ ” Fearneyhough v. McElvain, 598 F.Supp. 905, 907 (C.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). 1 The Lenau [Appellants] signed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged (B) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (C) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (D) holding that the sale of the entire leasehold interest in the oil and gas rights in plaintiffs land does not constitute the sale of a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 acts notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs retained an overriding oneeighth 18 royalty interest (E) holding that the amount of water rights appurtenant to the land is the amount that is being used thereon before and at the time of the sale
Output: (D)
the interpretation of the statute has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the agency’s discretion. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (l). If the agency has been clearly vested with interpretive authority, we generally defer to the agency’s interpretation, and may grant relief only if the agency’s interpretation is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(i). If the agency has not been clearly vested with discretion to interpret the statute, “we are free to substitute our judgment de novo for the agency’s interpretation and determine if the interpretation is erroneous.” Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(e)). The legislature has delegated broad authority to 643 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Section 147.76 clearly'vests the board of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding board cannot ignore the rules it adopts under the delegation of authority to prescribe rules for its governance and the governance of the university because such rules have the force and effect of statute (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that director of police department does not have final policymaking authority in miamidade county despite having some discretionary authority (D) holding statute providing the director shall have the power and authority to prescribe all rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter necessary and advisable for its detailed administration and to effectuate its purposes vested authority in the department of revenue and finance to interpret section 4224520 (E) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute
Output: (D)
reference to service of process, a diverse defendant could effectively create federal jurisdiction by removing prior to service on a nondiverse co-defendant. Thus, rejection of the notion that service is determinative of diversity "avoids any potential expansion of the court's jurisdiction beyond the clear mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Id. 3 . See also In re Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., 184 F.Supp.2d 826, 828 (S.D.Ind.2002) (in case where complete diversity clearly existed, court held that "[sjection 1441(b) would have precluded removal ..only if [resident of forum state] had been properly served, and [since] it had not been served at the time Ford filed the removal petition,” case was removable); Maple Leaf Bakery v. Raychem Corp., No. 99 C 6948, 1999 WL 1101326, at *1 (N.D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>); Recognition Communications, Inc. v. American 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (D) holding that the plain language of section 1441b indicates that an action may be removed unless a properly joined and served defendant is a resident of the state in which the action was initiated and reiterating that the plain language of  1441b particularly in light of the 1948 amendment inserting the language and served precludes removal on the basis of the presence of resident defendants only when those defendants were properly joined and served at the time of removal (E) holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc  1446a and bars removal
Output: (D)
Act (VUFA), section 6105, and for the duration of [Appellant’s] probation and/or parole period, [Appellant] is subject to random searches of his/her residence. The search will be limited to the space occupied by [Appellant]. The searches will be conducted by the agents of the Gun Violence Task Force. Sentencing Order 3/18/08. ¶ 6 First, we note that the trial court did not sentence Appellant to probation; thus, there can be no probation conditions. Secondly, because the court sentenced Appellant to a maximum term of incarceration of two or more years, Appellant’s parole would be under the exclusive supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) and not the Court of Common Pleas. 61 P.S. § 331.17, and see Commonwealth v. Camps, 772 A.2d 70, 74 (Pa.Super.2001) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, any condition the sentencing court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania (B) holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole (C) recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole (D) holding that it is well settled that the pennsylvania board of probation and parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years (E) holding that a defendant at federal sentencing who is on state parole where no parole revocation has occurred is not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment thus ussg  5g13 is inapplicable
Output: (D)
tow-truck operators intended by Congress. On the other hand, some federal and state courts that have considered the towing industry, and in particular the preservation or storage of a vehicle after it has been towed, have held that state causes of action relating to storage and disposition of towed vehicles are not preempted by the Act. See, e.g., Rhode Island Public Towing Ass’n, Inc. v. State, (No. CV-96-454 ML, Feb. 28, 1997) (D.R.I.1997) (not published in F.Supp.) (concluding “that the regulation of storage rates is not sufficiently related to a price, route, or service of a tow truck” and therefore the state regulation of those rates was not preempted by § 14501(c) (emphasis added)); CPF Agency Corp. v. Sevel’s 24. Hour Towing Serv., 132 Cal.App.4th 1034, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 (2005) (<HOLDING>). See also Ware v. Tow Pro Custom Towing & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision (B) holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel (C) holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss (D) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations (E) holding that state statute imposing limitations on liensalepreparation fees had only a remote relationship to towing companys price route or service and thus did not come within the purview of the preemption provision of  14501c
Output: (E)
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have likewise recognized that inmates possess a First Amendment petition right to be free from retaliation for filing grievances. Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing claim where inmate alleged that prison officials “impermissibly retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to file grievances and petition the courts for redress”); Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing claim where inmate alleged he was retaliated against for “filing grievances against the prison” and noting “[s]uch retaliation violates a prisoner’s right, founded on the First Amendment, to petition government for the redress of grievances”); Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379, 379 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1266, 1269-72 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the inmates filing of a grievance and stating that such conduct strikes at the heart of an inmates constitutional right to seek redress of grievances (B) recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance (C) holding that inmates allegation that guards destroyed his legal materials in retaliation for his filing of suits and grievances stated a cognizable first amendment claim (D) recognizing right to petition for redress of grievances under established prison grievance system (E) recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances
Output: (A)
private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation .... The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it .will be recognized as a taking. 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160. The seminal case regarding the constitutionality of zoning ordinances is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). The Supreme Court first noted that zoning ordinances were, at that time, of recent vintage predating the case by approximately twenty-five years. 272 U.S. at 386, 47 S.Ct. at 117. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915). The Euclid 60 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>); Kasdon v. G.W. Zierden Landscaping, Inc., 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cases claiming that government action requires just compensation must be determined on an ad hoc  basis (B) holding that whether an exchange is substantially contemporaneous must be determined on a casebycase basis (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding that detailed exhaustion scheme of the civil rights of institutionalized persons act cripa is inconsistent with discretion to impose on an ad hoc basis a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases (E) holding that to constitute an enterprise under rico the enterprises structure must provide some mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an ongoing rather than an ad hoc basis
Output: (A)
that presently exists or has existed in the past. A promise relating to future events without a present intent not to fulfill the promise is not actionable.") (citation omitted). 31 . See Mer also testified that his debt to Cook was not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding and he is continuing to repay that debt. 42 . See ABA Standards, Definitions, § 1.1 (defining "knowledge" as "the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result"); People v. Foreman, 966 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Colo.1998) ("Ignorance of the requirements of a Rule of Professional Conduct does not transform knowing conduct into conduct that is merely negligent."); People v. Potter, 966 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Colo.1998) (<HOLDING>). 43 . Although a client's deprivation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that although a lawyer who violated the predecessor to colo rpc 18a did not have the conscious objective to deceive his client or to take advantage of her he was aware of the circumstances and the consequences of his conduct his mental state was therefore greater than one of negligence (C) holding that an attorney who committed extrinsic fraud did not violate iowas analogue to colo rpc 33 because he engaged in fraud in his own dissolution proceeding rather than while representing a client (D) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (E) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation
Output: (B)
was made available to the Court by way of the opposition brief submitted by counsel on behalf of Hawkins, pp. 1-2, as well as defense counsel’s contentions at oral argument on December 21, 1998. 8 . Hawkins does not contest the preclusive effect of the judgment debt or the amount of the judgment, $750,152.16. Thus, this Court will recognize the state court’s finding as to that amount. 9 . Mattson’s legal argument centers on the pre-clusive effect of the default judgment entered by the Superior Court of New Jersey. If, however, there is no preclusive effect, then the Court would have to determine whether there is a material issue of fact which would require the Court to deny Mattson’s motion for summary judgment. See In re Rubitschung, 103 B.R. 1010, 1011-12 (Bankr.C.D.111.1988) (<HOLDING>). The parties would then have to proceed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the circumstances which caused a fight between the plaintiffcreditor and the defendantdebtor pre1 eluded plaintiffcreditors motion for summary judgment as to the  523a6 nondischargeability of his state court default judgment (B) holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact (C) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (D) holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment (E) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity
Output: (A)
the creation of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). 4 . "We review the denial of a suppression motion for clear error as to the underlying facts, and exercise[ ] plenary review as to the legality of the denial in the light of properly found facts.” United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200, 211 n. 9 (3d Cir.2008). 5 . The taking of DNA samples following a lawful arrest constitutes a lawful search. Maryland v. King, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1980, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). Accordingly, if the arrest was lawful, so too was the collection of Clarke's DNA. 6 . In the alternative, it would not have been plain error for the Superior Court to conclude the arresting officers were faced with an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless arrest. See Myers, 308 F.3d at 265 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrantless entry by police into an apartment based on an uncorroborated anonymous 911 report of a mentally ill man  acting crazy and possibly in possession of a gun violated the fourth amendment (B) holding that 911 call reporting domestic dispute and child telling officer that a man with a gun was inside fighting with her mom constituted exigent circumstances that justified warrantless entry into home (C) holding that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry where it seemed apparent that a burglary was in progress (D) holding that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry where officers were faced with a call reporting burglary in progress (E) holding that officers warrantless entry was justified to assure safety of person who called 911
Output: (B)
the relevant unit for evaluating the infringement or fair use of musical works. See Berkman Center Br. at 38 (document # 177-3). The Supreme Court took exactly this view in Campbell, when it measured the substantiality of 2 Live Crew’s parody against Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman,” rather than the album on which that song appeared. See 510 U.S. 569, 114 S.Ct. 1164; see also BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir.2005) (considering fair use of individually downloaded songs); Szabo v. Errisson, 68 F.3d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir.1995) (finding each song on a registered album an individual copyrightable work). Likewise, the copying of even extremely small portions of protected works may not be fair use. See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y.1924) (L.Hand, J.) (<HOLDING>). That is especially so where the portion 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that copyright offices interpretation of copyright act should ordinarily receive deference (B) recognizing that the trial court enjoys wide discretion in setting the amount of damages for each work infringed under section 504c of the copyright act (C) holding that eightnote ostinato infringed copyright in song (D) holding that licensees use of photograph after license expired infringed licensors copyright (E) holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession
Output: (C)
§ 30-16-3 (1971). {27} In New Mexico, “a separately secured area of a building otherwise open to the public is a ‘structure’ within the meaning of the burglary statute.” State v. Gregory, 117 N.M. 104, 104-05, 869 P.2d 292, 292-93 (Ct.App.1993); see also State v. Sanchez, 105 N.M. 619, 621-22, 735 P.2d 536, 538-39 (Ct.App.1987); State v. Harris, 101 N.M. 12, 19, 677 P.2d 625, 632 (Ct.App.1984); State v. Ortega, 86 N.M. 350, 351, 524 P.2d 522, 523 (Ct.App.1974). Although it is true that, at the time of the burglary, the repair shop was not open to the public, it is also true that the possession of burglary tools statute does not require that a defendant be convicted of burglary to be held liable for possession. See State v. Everitt, 80 N.M. 41, 47, 450 P.2d 927, 933 (Ct.App.1969) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the evidence must only show that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary (B) holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary (C) holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes (D) holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary (E) holding that burglary is violent felony
Output: (D)
We distinguished Peck from Al-Hellou, noting that in Peck, the school hired the teacher specifically to work with young people, the teacher’s contact with the victim occurred on work premises, and the contact occurred precisely because “both the employee and the victim were required to be on the work premises.” Id. at 149-50 (citing Peck, 65 Wn. App. at 287). ¶49 We determined that, unlike the employer in Peck, Al-Hellou’s employer was not liable for the employee’s misconduct because (1) the employer did not hire Al-Hellou to work with people; (2) the rape did not occur on the work premises; and (3) “the job duties did not facilitate or enable Al-Hellou to commit the rape” when the victim, who did not live at the apartment building, happened to meet Al-Hellou there. Id. at 149-50 (<HOLDING>). In reaching this conclusion, we noted that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer owes a duty to foreseeable victims to prevent the tasks premises or instrumentalities entrusted to an employee from endangering others (B) holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable (C) holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons (D) holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal (E) holding that the employer remains liable with respect to the duty regardless of the acts or omissions of the person entrusted to perform it
Output: (A)
problem. The state laws at issue in Takaha-shi and Graham were found to interfere with the federal government’s regulation of immigration despite the fact that, as here, neither law resulted in the removal or inadmissibility of any aliens. 16 . 66 Stat 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 17 . Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 18 . It is clear, therefore, that PRWORA does not consider mere admission or attendance at a public post-secondary institution to he a public benefit. Otherwise, Virginia would be required to deny admission to illegal aliens, unless the state affirmatively enacted a law allowing for their admission into public colleges and universities. 19 . But see League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.Supp. 1244, 1256 (C.D.Cal.1997) ("LULAC II”) (<HOLDING>). LULAC II is neither controlling nor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pursuant to prwora and iirira congress had evinced its intention to occupy the field of alien eligibility for postsecondary education and invalidating on federal preemption grounds section 8 of californias proposition 187 which denied public postsecondary education to immigrants not lawfully present (B) holding that exhaustion was not required under a federal education statute where the gravamen of the complaint was not that the plaintiff had been denied the type of education the statute guarantees and hence the relief sought was not available through the statutory appeals process (C) holding that sc const art xi  3 which requires the general assembly to provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public education guarantees only a minimally adequate education and does not call for this court to dictate what programs are to be used in this states public schools (D) holding that it is impermissible to dismiss a teacher for openly criticizing the board of education on its allocation of school funds between athletics and education and its methods of informing taxpayers about the need for additional revenue (E) holding that postsecondary education support orders are modified pursuant to the statute governing child support modification
Output: (A)
States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir.2003) (“The general rule within the Seventh Circuit is that if a party fails to file an objection with the district court, he or she ‘waives the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal.’ ” (quoting United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1503 (7th Cir. 1996))). Even more, Ervin did not request an evidentiary hearing on his motion, and further accepted the government’s representations regarding Arreola’s misconduct and the government’s lack of knowledge of the misconduct. Similarly, the district court granted Zambrana’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and at that hearing he was allowed to present nine witnesses in support of his motion. The district court never attempted to limit the scope of the hear (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1225-26 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any error the district court may have committed at evidentiary hearing addressing ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claim was harmless because defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by counsels alleged shortcomings (B) holding defendant did not show prejudice to support ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because any evidentiary error was harmless (C) recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense (D) holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay (E) holding that the defendant did not show prejudice to support ineffective assistance of counsel because any evidentiary error was harmless
Output: (A)
dismissed Ms. Goren’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) for failure to plead fraud with particularity and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the court held that, with respect to the RICO complaints against the Boreykos, Direct and October, the amended complaint failed to allege with particularity two predicate acts of fraud committed by those defendants. In addition, the court held that the amended complaint failed to adequately allege RICO claims against Dr. Wallaeh, Direct and October because that complaint did not allege that those defendants played some role in the direction of the New Vision enterprise. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 607 U.S. 170, 177-78, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (<HOLDING>). II DISCUSSION We review de novo the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant who was associated with the enterprise and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when he repeatedly violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws was not liable under  1962c because he had no part in directing the enterprises affairs (B) holding that in order to plead adequate rico complaint plaintiff must allege that defendant had some part in the direction of the alleged enterprises affairs (C) holding that complaint must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged (D) holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government (E) holding that to constitute an enterprise under rico the enterprises structure must provide some mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an ongoing rather than an ad hoc basis
Output: (B)