but execution of the sentence was stayed until August 6, 1996, then again until September 16, 1996, in order to afford Appellant the opportunity to pay the $360 purge amount. Appellant failed to purge herself of contempt and ultimately served thirty days in jail. No appeal was taken from that order. Appellant was again held in civil contempt on May 20, 1997, for failing to make any payments towards the court-ordered restitution. This second contempt proceeding is the subject of- the instant appeal. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty days in jail with a purge provision in the amount of $320, but failed to make a finding that Appellant had the present ability to pay the purge amount. This, as the State concedes, was error. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla.1985)(<HOLDING>). Although the record supports the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt (B) holding that father being held in jail based on presumption of ability to comply could not have been incarcerated for civil contempt of child support order after failing to appear at contempt hearing without affirmative finding based on evidence that he had present ability to pay purge amount (C) holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive (D) recognizing that no warning to a contemnor is necessary when contempt is flagrant the aoc also argues that williamss use of the term bullshit justifies a separate contempt finding particularly in light of the warning provided by the initial contempt citation17 assuming without deciding that certain forms of contempt are so selfevident that they excuse a court from complying with the plain terms of the statute we disagree that the record before us presents such circumstances regarding the trial courts initial contempt finding we decline the aocs invitation to speculate that williamss inaudible comment to the court was contemptuous on its face williamss comment may have been a patent obscenity or an innocuous comment taken out of context by the court or anything in between further the trial courts failure to make findings deprives us of any other relevant cireumstances not apparent in the bare transcript such circumstances might include williamss body language gestures or even a general air of defiance while these circumstances when combined with williamss actual comment may well have supported a contempt citation we cannot uphold the contempt finding based on mere conjecture therefore we conclude that the first finding of contempt is insupportable on the facts present in the recordt18 whether williamss use of the term bullshit independently supports a contempt finding presents a closer question the record reveals that williams used that term to describe either the sentence the trial court had just imposed or the trial courts initial contempt citation more troubling however than the language itself is the apparent challenge to the courts authority and decorum see utah code ann  783211 defining contempt as inter alia dlisorderly contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding see also haton v tulsa 415 us 697 698 94 sct 1228 39 led2d 693 1974 a single isolated usage of street vernacular not directed at the judge or any officer of the court cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt emphasis added (E) holding that because civil contempt is only to obtain compliance it must be used only where the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the court order and the trial court specifically finds that the contemnor has that ability
Output: (A)