niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
plenary determination of jurisdiction over five landlocked canals); Weiszmann v. District Engineers, U.S. Army Corp, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.1976) (same outcome as in Sexton Cove in action brought by landowner); U.S. v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F.Supp. 617 (E.D.La.1984) (plenary trial determining jurisdictional issue); U.S. v. Lambert 589 F.Supp. 366 (M.D.Fla.1984) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland; proof by preponderance of evidence was measure of government’s burden of persuasion); U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.J.1984) (in action for preliminary injunction, court made own determination that property was a wetland); U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, 580 F.Supp. 1036 (D.S.D.1983) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland) rev'd, 747 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corp of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding property not a wetland (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
Output: (B)
limits in which the officer is empowered to act, when a report has previously been made that the vehicle has been stolen or a complaint has been filed and a warrant thereon issued charging that the vehicle has been embezzled.” Reading the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there is a material issue of fact as to whether Officer Faulk possessed the authority to impound the motorcycle based on the stolen vehicle report. A stolen vehicle report was made, which may give Officer Faulk the authority to impound the motorcycle without a warrant. However, Officer Faulk’s declaration shows that he was aware that the allegedly stolen vehicle was part of a contract dispute between private parties. See Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 238 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Officer Faulk knew that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dispute regarding payment of a restaurant bill does not give rise to probable cause to arrest (B) holding that in the absence of a prior indictment probable cause for arrest is determined by the facts in the sworn complaint (C) holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute (D) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (E) holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution
Output: (C)
Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest
Output: (C)
to the State and beneficial to the accused." Nettles, 565 N.E.2d at 1066-1067, 1069. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give his tendered instruction. Id. at 1068. The Indiana Supreme Court found "nothing in [the] record to justify the conclusion that the police engaged in any willful conduct in destroying evidence." Id. at 1069. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that "negligent handling of evidence will not be grounds for reversal unless it can be demonstrated that police acted deliberately" and conelud- ed that the trial court was correct in refusing to give the tendered instruction. Id. Here, the dura from the left side is potentially useful evidence because it had not been tested but could have been subjected to tests. See id. at 1067 (<HOLDING>). Ray does not argue that the State acted in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process (B) holding in securities fraud case that defendants who were the subject of criminal investigation were not bound to predict the likelihood that they would be indicted but were required to disclose material facts that would potentially endanger the companys future financial performance (C) holding the state law claims were not preempted (D) holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination (E) holding that blood samples that were not preserved by the state were potentially useful evidence
Output: (E)
on James’ EEO complaint. James’ EEO complaint was filed on April 2, 1986. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b), James was authorized to file suit in federal district court “[a]fter one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date of filing a complaint with the agency if there has been no decision.” Thus, his original complaint was filed prior to the time of authorization. However, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on March 2,1987. More than 180 days had elapsed by this time. The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim (B) holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling (C) holding that the receipt of a righttosue letter in a title vii claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite (D) holding that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite under the constitution (E) holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite
Output: (C)
toward accomplishing this end.” I believe that the focus in (i)(8) should not be on whether the murder furthered the escape. Whether a murder was committed to further an escape or to avoid an arrest is specifically addressed by Tenn.Code Ann. § 39 — 13—204(i)(6). The focus in (i)(8), however, is on the defendant’s status when the murder was committed. I believe that circumstance (i)(8) was codified to provide protection to society from escaped convicts who are less likely to be deterred by the prospect of further confinement from committing additional crimes. The danger Odom posed to society as a desperate escaped convict needing ase. The third prong encompasses a murder that occurs “during escape from lawful custody or confinement.” See State v. Workman, 667 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Tenn.1984) (<HOLDING>). If this language is construed only to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding i8 applicable when a fleeing defendant killed officer who had arrested and escorted defendant from a wendys restaurant (B) holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation (C) holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested (D) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (E) holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle
Output: (A)
a “responsible person” under § 6672 in these circumstances. B. Willfulness 1. Standard of Review As with the previous issue, the government asserts that the determination of willfulness under § 6672 is a question of law subject to de novo review, while Bradshaw argues that it is a question of fact on which the district judge’s ruling can not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Some circuits have held that the ultimate issue of willfulness is subject to de novo review. United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d at 320 (noting, however, that this is a difficult question that, in similar contexts, has divided the courts for over a century); Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d at 1505-07. Our prior decisions have, however, treated this as an issue of fact. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033 (reviewing jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings (B) holding that the district court sitting in review of the decision of the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failure to pay over taxes was willful because the bankruptcy court had made no findings on willfulness we remanded for bankruptcy court findings (C) holding that 28 usc  1961a applies to bankruptcy court judgments because a bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court (D) holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority (E) holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding
Output: (B)
(because the grounds specified therein for doing so did not exist in this case) and in remanding the case for a rehearing under § 10-3-13 (because “the time within which the agreement required the award to be made” had expired in this case, and, therefore, the court lacked the ability to direct a rehearing by the arbitrators under § 10-3-13), such errors were harmless because the court nevertheless had the power to seek a clarification of the award under § 10-3-14 without any need for a rehearing and, thus, without regard to the expiration of any applicable period for obtaining a rehearing. Moreover, this Court can affirm a Superior Court judgment for different reasons than those relied upon by the trial justice. Levine v. Bess Eaton Donut Flour Co., 705 A.2d 980, 984 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required (B) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (C) holding that the supreme court can affirm a trial justices decision on grounds other than those stated by the trial justice (D) recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice (E) holding we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even those not relied upon by the district court
Output: (C)
until he received the order in March 2001. While in ordinary circumstances he likely would be faulted for not exercising due diligence to determine the disposition of his motions during the two year period contemplated by the rule, petitioner had no reason to make such an inquiry in this case because he believed that in accordance with the April 1999 order, he had been permitted to withdraw his motions to vacate sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Snell has pled an adequate basis for avoiding the two year time limitation imposed by the rule. We further conclude that he otherwise timely sought relief to the extent his petition seeking belated appeal was filed within two years of his discovery of the existence of September 1998 order. Cf. Adams v. State, 543 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1989)(<HOLDING>). In response to our order to show cause why a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rule 3850 motion based upon new facts or a significant change in the law must be filed within two years of the time such facts become known or such change is announced (B) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (C) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (D) holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms (E) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor
Output: (A)
is not intertwined with the merits of this case. See Davis ex rel. Davis, 343 F.3d at 1295. The substantíve issue in this case, indeed the subject of the Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief, is whether the Plaintiffs are liable for the civil tax penalties assessed under 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a)(2). This preliminary determination does not require the Court to delve into the substantive, non-jurisdictional provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as codified in Title 26 of the United States Code. Put differently, determining whether § 6330(d)(l)’s filing deadlines were adhered to or proper service effectuated pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 bears no relationship to whether the IRS validly assessed § 6702 penalties against the Plaintiffs. Cf. Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of clarity, the Court notes that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (B) holding that determination of timely filing of complaint under ftca was independent of the merits of plaintiffs ftca claim (C) holding an individual who makes a timely challenge to a judicial officer based on the appointments clause is entitled to a determination of the merits of his claim (D) holding that rule 12b1 is inappropriate avenue of dismissal if jurisdictional allegations are intertwined with merits of plaintiffs ftca claims (E) holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations
Output: (B)
IV, V, VI and XIV. See Answee, Docket # 8, Exh. A, pp. 13-14. In order to allow the state courts the opportunity to act on or correct the violations alleged, the Applicant must do more than just invoke the magic words “fair trial,” or “due process,” or make only cursory citation to the appropriate constitutional amendments. He must provide legal theory explaining how the admission of the statements or testimony violated these particular federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (claim on direct appeal that jury instruction was reversible error did not fairly present due process challenge to instruction for habeas exhaustion purposes); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see, also, Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in preaedpa case habeas applicant failed to fairly present federal claim to state court where despite presenting all necessary facts applicant failed to assert specific argument that he later tried to raise in federal court (B) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (C) holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review (D) holding applicants general state court claim was insufficient to exhaust his later more specific federal habeas claim (E) holding that a federal court may deny an unexhausted habeas petition on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim
Output: (A)
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.’ ” (citation omitted)). Under Education’s interpretation, § 1095a operates to improve the efficiency with which defaulted student loans are collected, while the CCPA protects debtors from the hardships resulting from the potential limitless multiple garnishments. See id. Because § 1095a and the CCPA are capable of co-existence and are not in conflict, we conclude that the district court’s finding that § 1095a specifically limited the garnishment of student loans to 10% and superceded the CCPA’s existing general limitation on multiple garnishments of consumer debtors was incorrect. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153-54, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 1992-93, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION The plain language of 20 U.S.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when two statutes are in conflict the more recent and specific statute should prevail so as to repeal the earlier general statute (B) recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern (C) holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict (D) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter (E) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls
Output: (C)
intended to purchase the entire 9.69 acre parcel described in the purchase and sale agreement. These findings have support in the record. Based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably have been persuaded that it was highly probable that the parties operated under a mutual mistake as to the description in the deed. [¶ 18] Roger also argues that the doctrine of merger by deed prohibits reformation. “The doctrine of merger by deed provides that once a ... deed is accepted it becomes the final statement of the agreement between the parties and nullifies all provisions of the purchase-and-sale agreement.” Bryan, 665 A.2d at 1022 (quotation marks omitted). Merger by deed, however, does not prohibit reformation upon proof of a mutual mistake of fact at the time of closing. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). C. Joint Accounts [¶ 19] Roger contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed (B) holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence (C) holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed (D) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title
Output: (C)
to arbitration the question of whether the successor has somehow assumed any of the obligations of the old bargaining agreement.”), with Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 145 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that a "successor [is] not bound by its predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement”), NLRB v. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1991) ("[A] successor is not bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's labor agreement.”), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir.1987) ("[A] successor employer is not automatically re quired to adopt its predecessor’s collectively bargained agreements, see NLRB v. Burns.”). 4 . Compare Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 997, 1001 (2nd Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), and Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (B) holding that the operation of a competitive business enterprise which was expected to provide a financial return that would be of benefit to the municipal corporation was proprietary (C) holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business (D) holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla (E) holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation
Output: (A)
and has provided comprehensive rules prohibiting disclosure except under very limited circumstances. See generally Iowa Code ch. 228 (providing rules of limited disclosure for a patient’s mental health records). These rules, however, do not specifically address the disclosure of mental health information in a criminal proceeding, but the right to privacy derived from our constitution remains a forceful protection against disclosure. I recognize the privilege expressed in section 622.10 does not expressly apply to discovery disputes. Yet, the purpose and rationale of the statute unmistakably applies to pretrial discovery in a criminal case with the same vigor and importance as to the testimonial stage of trial. See Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 844, 89 N.W.2d 349, 354-55 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Discovery of witness records is a predicate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential (B) recognizing federal privilege for confidential therapistpatient communications based in part on the fact that the relationship is protected in all 50 states and the district of columbia (C) recognizing medical records contain the same protected confidential information as a physicians direct testimony about the communications (D) recognizing privacy interest in medical records requested under freedom of information act (E) recognizing qualified privilege for confidential presidential communications
Output: (C)
United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir.1994). B. Sufficiency of the evidence K. Kennedy and Scarborough moved for judgments of acquittal at the close of the government’s proof, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain their convictions. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(a). The district court considered and denied the motions, and neither defendant renewed his or her respective motion at the close of all the evidence, see Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080, or within 14 days after their guilty verdicts,' see Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). They have thus failed to preserve their rights to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. See Swidan, 888 F.2d at 1080; see also United States v. Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir.1984) '(<HOLDING>).' Both K. Kennedy and Scarborough conceded at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to consider an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of justice (B) holding that the defendants insufficientevidence claim was barred by his failure to renew his rule 29 motion at the close of all the evidence because there was no manifest miscarriage of justice (C) holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial (E) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence
Output: (B)
to the rule, ‘it may generally be said that any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2 (1984)); State v. Dixon, 969 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] delay of eight months or longer should be considered presumptively prejudicial.”); City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866, 877 (establishing 200 days as length of delay necessary to trigger further analysis), overruled in part by Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204; Pierce v. State, 921 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App. 1996) (“Most delays of eight months or longer are considered presumptively unreasonable and prejudicial.”). But see United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1185 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no presumptive prejudice for approximately 7month delay on charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and reentry of deported alien (C) holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute (D) holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (E) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine
Output: (B)
and the Cobra Limited have two sets of two twisted pairs, each set having a unique insulation thickness. Moreover, in these cables, each twisted pair has a twist lay that is different from each other pair. Instead, Superior Essex argues that Belden has not demonstrated that the insulation thickness for each group “is consistent with providing a nominal characteristic impedance for each conductor pair of the ... group within desirable limits and an acceptable signal attenuation” as required by the claim language. This eonelusory statement, lacking any citation to the record that would indicate the presence of a dispute in this regard, does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835-36 (Fed. Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, judgment that the aforementioned 
 Holding statements: (A) holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship (B) holding that mere allegations do not create a material issue of fact if the nonmovant cannot point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant (C) holding that a plaintiff cannot create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment through an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony (D) holding that a speculative affidavit which contained mere conjecture was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial (E) recognizing that affidavit cannot create issue of material fact if it conflicts with affiants interrogatory responses but finding no conflict in that particular case
Output: (B)
by the corporation. Pursuant to this type of agreement, undivided partial ownership of the facilities transfers with each installment payment. The school districts use taxes levied for general fund purposes to make the annual installment purchases. These agreements include a non-appropriation clause. In 1988 and 1994, this Court issued decisions holding that lease-purchase agreements and installment-purchase agreements do not constitute general obligation debt. Redmond v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. No. Four, 814 S.C. 431, 445 S.E.2d 441 (1994) (discussing Caddell and finding school board had authority to enter into lease-purchase agreements to build a new school without submitting the matter to voters); Caddell v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 296 S.C. 397, 373 S.E.2d 598 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In 1995, the General Assembly enacted, and in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (B) holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor (C) holding that debt collectors have no obligation to warn a consumer that her debt may increase over time (D) holding that leasepurchase agreements do not constitute general obligation debt under article x  15 of the south carolina constitution (E) holding that definition of seizure under state constitution differs from that under us constitution
Output: (D)
on Fourth Amendment grounds. 2. Standing Conferred by the Statute The government further asserts that the defendants lack standing to challenge the subpoenas because “DOC was the target of the subpoena, not the defendants.” Gov’t’s Reply at 4. The government’s position finds direct support in the decisions of two circuit courts. In United States v. Moffett, 84 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit concluded. that a criminal defendant who was not the direct recipient of a subpoena issued pursuant to § 876 was not “in the zone of interest the statute is meant to protect” and thus had no standing to challenge the subpoena, id. at 1293. Citing Moffett, the Ninth Circuit subsequently came to the same conclusion. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). These out-of-circuit authorities must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government had not produced evidence that the defendant intended to influence an official proceeding because the evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance agency (B) holding the defendant does not possess statutory standing to attack the subpoena  because he has not demonstrated that he was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by  876a (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) holding that as title vi is a remedial statute the zone of interests to be protected  must be construed broadly (E) holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa
Output: (B)
standard, but simply noted that the impact on Middletown’s contractual obligations was sufficient adverse effect on a legal interest for purposes of satisfying one of the R.C. 707.09 injunction requirements. McGee also emphasized Ohio’s policy of encouraging annexation and the “heavy burden” on parties seeking an injunction. 39 Ohio St.3d at 285, 530 N.E.2d at 903. And notably, the court distinguished between pleading “standing” under R.C. 709.07(A) and the legal requirements which must be satisfied for an injunction under R.C. 709.07(D). 39 Ohio St.3d at 286, 530 N.E.2d at 904, fn. 1. In a later decision, the Ohio Supreme Court again stressed the legislature’s desire to promote annexation. See In re Petition to Annex 320 Acres to S. Lebanon, 64 Ohio St.3d 585, 596, 597 N.E.2d 463, 470 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in a case decided the same day, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that the remedies are exclusive (D) holding that rc 70907 is the exclusive remedy for challenging annexation approval (E) holding that massachusetts provides an adequate remedy for challenging a real estate tax assessment
Output: (D)
Hook’s unsafe workplace claim was “totally independent from the existence and administration of’ the ERISA plan. 38 F.3d at 784. The claim for negligent misrepresentation was not preempted “because it neither sought benefits under the plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits.” Id. A few months after the decision in Hook, the court again held that an employee’s common law occupational injury claim did not relate to an employer’s ERISA plan. Tex. Health Enters., Inc. v. Reece, 44 F.3d 243, 245 (5th Cir.1994). In Smith v. Texas Children’s Hospital, the court held that preemption did not apply to a plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim because the claim was not necessarily dependent upon the plaintiffs rights under the ERISA plan. 84 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir.1996). The h Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Nunez v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., 771 F.Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed (B) holding that a legal malpractice insurance policy that limited coverage to suits seeking damages and defined damages as excluding sanctions did not provide coverage for a sanctions motion against the insured (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding claim that insurance agent fraudulently induced insured to surrender coverage under existing policy to participate in erisa plan which did not provide promised coverage related to that plan only indirectly (E) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant
Output: (D)
information did not add any new, distinct charges or specify any different time period than was alleged in the original information. Therefore, Bradley has not demonstrated that he was significantly prejudiced by counsel’s failure to seek delay upon receipt of the amended information. ¶ 65 Finally, Bradley argues that trial counsel’s failure to investigate or call witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Bradley offers no evidence that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate or call identified witnesses. In fact, Bradley does not offer any evidence about who these potential witnesses are or what their testimony would entail. Therefore, the record is inadequate to enable us to consider this claim. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 16, 12 P.3d 92 (<HOLDING>). V. Cumulative Error ¶ 66 Finally, Bradley 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a postcollateral proceeding if the defendant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal or if an actual conflict of interest enjoined appellate counsel from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal (B) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record (C) holding that when a defendant raises a claim on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective defendant bears the burden of assuring record is adequate (D) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (E) holding that when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the trial judge must conduct an inquiry into the claim
Output: (C)
See Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 976. However, because we have determined that the police’s initial entry and search were unconstitutional, the government has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence obtained during the parole search was not fatally flawed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). There are two exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine under which the evidence might be admissible: (1) the ‘inevitable discovery’ exception, and (2) the ‘attenuated basis exception.’ See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir.1989)). These exceptions, while distinct, “converge to an extent, 9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Applying the attenuated basis and inevitable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence supported finding of constructive possession of concealed narcotics in part because narcotics paraphernalia was found in residence (B) recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true (C) holding that alleged statements to thirdparties did not substantiate a hostile work environment claim where there was insufficient information as to when the statements were made how knowledge of them was acquired and when the plaintiff was informed of them if she was (D) holding that the defendants unconstitutionally obtained statements to the police telling them that narcotics were located in the hood of his truck did not render the narcotics inadmissible because the police were trained to look under the hoods of vehicles when searching for drugs and therefore would have found them even had the defendant not directed them to look under the hood (E) holding that the defendants sentences were properly enhanced under  3a12b because they assaulted an officer employed by the mississippi bureau of narcotics and during the assault made statements including they are the police lets kill them
Output: (D)
was not clearly erroneous. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Alternatively, Rodriguez alleges that his counsel was ineffective at rearraignment in erroneously advising him to assent to the factual basis despite his disagreements "with portions concerning various people working for him. The district court explicitly stated, however, that it was relying on the proffer, and not on the factual basis, for its finding that Rodriguez was a manager or supervisor; and this court, too, has reached its determination on the enhancement issue without reliance on the factual basis. As a result, Rodriguez was not bound by the factual basis and cannot show any prejudice arising from his attorney’s performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion Finding no clear error in the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense (B) recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance (C) holding that a defendant must show prejudice resulting from counsels deficient performance to prevail on an ineffectiveassistance claim (D) holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim (E) holding petitioner must show prejudice to prevail on due process claim
Output: (C)
Abreu’s App. at 1878.) The defendants do not challenge now, nor did they contest at trial, the accuracy of these statements as related to the bank statements. The declaration that the bank statements were kept in the ordinary course of the banks’ businesses did not add to the Government’s case against the defendants for submitting false loan applications. It was the information contained in the bank statements themselves, which is not contested on appeal, that the Government relied upon to make its case. The authenticity of the bank statements has never been challenged, and the admission of the statements contained in the Rule 902(11) Certifications as related to the bank statements simply had no effect on the verdict. Cf. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous admission of evidence not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the only other evidence against defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness of questionable credibility (B) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (C) holding the admission of plea allocutions of codefendants to be harmless against a crawford challenge where the government did not emphasize the allocutions which were used only as corroboration for other evidence showing the existence of an enterprise in a rico case (D) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (E) holding that trial courts error in failing to sua sponte give instruction was harmless because state did not emphasize this evidence in closing argument and evidence of appellants guilt was otherwise overwhelming
Output: (C)
willingness to consider impermissible factors such as ... age ... while engaging in one set of presumably neutral employment decisions ... might tend to support an inference that such impermissible considerations may have entered into another area of ostensibly neutral employment decisions — here, an employee’s termination.” Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597-98 (1st Cir.1987). However, we agree with the district court that, standing alone, it is too remote in time to be linked with the decision to terminate Mulero. See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir.1994) (finding that discriminatory comment made over two years prior to discharge was not evidence of age discrimination); Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1026 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861, 114 S.Ct. 175, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding (B) holding that statements that a company was recessionresistant and that it would maintain a high level of growth were too vague to constitute material statements of fact (C) holding that statement made eight months before employee was dismissed and one made at least ten months before were not too remote from the dismissal and thus properly admitted at trial as evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere where he who made the first statement may have participated in the decision to fire her and the other refused to block her termination (D) holding that statements made almost a year before layoff were too far removed to have influenced decision (E) holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement
Output: (D)
judgment to consider, as part of the sentence on the prior felony, a term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation. Id. at 515. We held that because such a term of imprisonment is indeed part of the punishment for the prior felony conviction, the district court properly counted such prison term in determining the length of the “sentence imposed” on the prior conviction. Id. In reaching that conclusion, we reasoned that “[ujnder both federal and state law a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation is treated as a sentence on the original underlying offense. Such a sentence is not considered a sanction for the new conduct which constituted a probation violation.” Id. at 516 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2nd Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Weaver, 880 S.W.2d 855, 857 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction (B) holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that a condition of probation requiring the defendant to spend up to one year in a halfway house at the discretion of the probation officer was lawfully imposed under as 1255100a5 because it was imposed as part of the original sentence (D) holding that prison term following revocation of probation is a modification and part of the actual sentence imposed for the original offense (E) holding that probation is not a sentence
Output: (D)
damages. In re TMI Litig. Personal Injury Claims, No. 79-0906 (M.D.Pa. order entered Dec. 30, 1982); App. at 162. While these and companion TMI cases were being litigated in state and district court, the Supreme Court decided Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), which held in part that states are precluded from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy but that states still had authority under the Act to control nonregulatory aspects of nuclear facilities. Id. at 240-41, 256, 104 S.Ct. at 617-18, 625-26. Following the decision in Silkwood, the district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment that had been filed following a Rule 16 confer ence. See In re Three Mile Island Litig., 605 F.Supp. 778, 784 (M.D.Pa.1985) (<HOLDING>) [referred to herein as “TMI I ”]. Shortly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda (B) holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the flsa (C) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 (D) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b (E) holding that punitive damages are recoverable under the priceanderson act to the extent that damages assessed under the act would not be paid from federal monies
Output: (E)