niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
over sooner. The Jencks Act is clear: it requires production of impeachment material only after a “witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.” 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). Therefore, any materials disclosed prior to trial exceeded the government’s obligations under the Act. The only material Fletcher specifically identifies in his brief as having never been disclosed was material from the proffer sessions of government witness Ben Bashaw. The government claims it could not disclose the alleged statement because a report was not made of the proffer session. The defendant bears the burden of proving that a “statement” for purposes of the Jencks Act exists and is covered by the Act’s disclosure requirements. See United States v. Dark, 597 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); accord United States v. Grecni, 1991 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the court credited defense testimony over prosecution testimony and there was a reasonable basis in the record for the trial court finding that an agreement existed between the defense and the prosecution the decision could not be disturbed on appeal (B) holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an entrapment defense that was legally available and where there was no other viable defense to present (C) holding no liability existed under the circumstances (D) holding that where there is evidence sufficient to sustain finding of trial court that prejudicial error was contained in record there is no basis for stating that trial court abused discretion in granting new trial (E) holding that trial court was under no obligation to examine the file in camera since there was no basis for belief that a jencks act statement existed other than those already furnished defense counsel
Output: (E)
fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory, as long as there is proof of reasonable fees ... and the plaintiff has been awarded damages.” Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir.2002), citing Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 2002). Accord Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 640 (5th Cir.2002) (“[t]he award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is mandatory under § 38.001 if the plaintiff prevails in his or her breach of contract claim and recovers damages”). The only discretion the Fifth Circuit permits is discretion to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award. See id. The availability of a section 38.001 award is not conditioned on a contractual provision for attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Golden v. Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 915 
 Holding statements: (A) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees (B) holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute (C) holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract (D) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (E) holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract
Output: (B)
reasonable expectations of a layperson. Id. at 202, 187 P.3d at 586. 23 . The Court notes that AmerisourceBergen cited Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995), which involved abstention under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and not Younger, for the proposition that "abstention to avoid concur rent, duplicative litigation is available in some very limited circumstances.” AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1151. For the reasons discussed, however, Burlington’s reliance on AmerisourceBergen is unavailing. 24 . To the extent Hawai’i law would allow for reimbursement in the circumstances at bar, such a right to reimbursement would likely be equitable in nature, although still an "at law” claim for monetary damages. See Scottsdale II, 2007 WL 2247795 at *3-8 (<HOLDING>); Porter v. Hu, 116 Hawai'i 42, 56-57, 169 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurer is not required to pay cost of defending action it was never afforded an opportunity to defend (B) holding that an insurer had a duty to defend the insured until it could establish that those claims were not supported by the facts (C) holding that the hawaii supreme court would likely apply equitable principles of quasicontract restitution and unjust enrichment to allow an insurer to be reimbursed for the cost of defending a lawsuit it was determined postsettlement not to have had a duty to defend (D) holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend (E) holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend
Output: (C)
In order to exhaust his claim based on the mandatory minimum, Wardell needed to “properly raisef ]” it in the state courts. Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313 (emphasis added). He did not do so when he made his claim based on the 85% rule. This case is indistinguishable from Kelley v. Secretary for Department of Corrections, where we ruled that a habeas petitioner had not exhausted the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that he attempted to raise on federal habeas where he had not mentioned the same ineffectiveness theory in his Florida Rule 3.850 motion. 377 F.3d 1317, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). This was true even though there was some testimony on that theory at his Rule 3.850 hearing. Id.; see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Because Warden’s claim is now clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a petitioner does not fairly present his claim where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not ordinarily be considered (B) holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief (C) holding where a claim is presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which the merits are not likely to be considered unless there are special and important reasons the petition is not exhausted (D) holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal (E) holding that ordinarily courts are not obligated to review evidence presented for the first time on appeal
Output: (A)
with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range.” Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
Output: (D)
is that the debtor should always be given the opportunity to repay his debts .... S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5787, 5880 (emphasis added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5963, 6336. With regard to this legislative history, at least one court has noted that: [T]he legislative committee's choice of 'absolute' in regard to Section 706(a) is infelicitous to say the least and has spawned an interpretation of the statute couched in hyperbolic terms very much at odds with the equitable considerations of eligibility, good faith and appropriateness which are inherent in a court's review of the facts and circumstances in any request brought on by motion. In re Marcakis, 254 B.R. 77, 79 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute (B) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (C) holding debtor had absolute right to convert under  706a (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion
Output: (A)
CK demonstrated sexual intercourse. Id. This testimony was admitted by the military judge, over defense objection, under Mil. R. Evid. 803(2), as an excited utterance. Record at 113-14. The military judge premised his ruling on a finding that the revelation was made while CK was excited from the startling event of learning her mother was not going to be with her at the upcoming visit with the appellant. Id. The statements by CK were an example of delayed reporting, made more than 1 year after any abusive conduct was alleged to have occurred, and well after CK’s opportunity to privately report the assaults to her mother. To be admissible, an excited utterance must be made while under the excitement of the offense being prosecuted. See generally United States v. Grant, 42 M.J. 340 (1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Arnold, 25 M.J. 129 
 Holding statements: (A) holding 36 to 48 hours between assault and excited report not within mil r evid 8032 hearsay exception (B) holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule (C) holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible (D) recognizing that excited utterance and testimonial hearsay inquiries are separate but related (E) holding that testimonial statements are subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause even if they are otherwise admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances
Output: (A)
Count II, and Police Report No. 07-026265 with respect to Count III. However, without specificity as to the prohibited conduct in the Complaint itself, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i (the State) was not bound at trial to prove all matters listed in the police reports or to adhere to the EOP sections as cited by the police officers in their reports. Hence, the information provided in these corresponding police reports could be subject to varying applications. Corder, in effect, was left without any certitude of what violative conduct he would be prosecuted for at trial. Thus the Complaint, even viewed in the context of the police reports, was not adequate to fairly permit Corder to prepare for trial. See generally State v. Robins, 66 Haw. 312, 316, 660 P.2d 39, 42 (1983) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mitake, 1 Haw.App. 335, 340, 619 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery (B) holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel (C) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery (D) recognizing that in adopting rules which are substantially similar to the federal rules of criminal procedure this court has traditionally given great weight to relevant precedent from federal courts particularly the supreme court of the united states (E) recognizing the fact that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hawaii rules of penal procedure hrpp rule 7a and the fact that other discovery rules given to the defendant are limited might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position
Output: (E)
of an exciting event, and the declarant’s personal perception of it. See McLaughlin v. Vinzant, Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). Assuming that Anderson learned of the shooting by a source, other than first-hand knowledge, the trial court could have reasonably found that Anderson’s statement to Cabbie “related to a startling event,” that event being acquiring knowledge that appellant killed someone, and that Anderson was still under the “emotional stress of the excitement caused by the event or condition.” See Salazar, 38 S.W.3d at 154-55. Anderson’s Source of Knowledge Appellant argues that Anderson’s source of knowledge of the shooting is critical because Anderson may have ding that Anderson was still dominated by the emotions caused by the shooting. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 (<HOLDING>). Cabbie testified that when Anderson arrived 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained (B) holding statement must be made contemporaneously with the excitement or stresscausing event (C) holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant (D) holding that the most critical factor in the analysis of a reasonable fee is the degree of success obtained (E) holding that critical factor is whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions excitement fear or pain of the event
Output: (E)
the Court of Appeals interpreted an assault and battery exclusion in a case stemming from an assault in a nightclub. There, club staff allowed persons previously removed from the club due to an altercation to reenter the club. Id. at 108. The two involved in the previous altercation again confronted one another and patrons “informed [club] security personnel of the ensuing melee, but they failed to take any action.” Id. Interpreting the language of the policy, the Court of Appeals held that the insurer had no duty to defend because the negligence claim by the injured patron fell within the “based on assault and/or battery” exception. Id. at 109, 111. Numerous other cases have similar holdings. See, e.g., Detweiler v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 110 Wn.2d 99, 109, 751 P.2d 282 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Krempl v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 69 Wn. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1109a requires causal connection between breach and loss (B) holding that there must be some causal connection between the accident and the automobile allegedly involved for coverage to exist (C) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint (E) holding that liability arises out of an event so long as there is a causal connection between the event and the liability
Output: (E)
you are going to be a victim, then you better make sure it happens in a crowd,” and “you better make sure it happens for a long time” (emphasis added), had the effect of personalizing the argument by placing the jury members in the victim’s place. Closing argument that personalizes has been repeatedly criticized. Although we do not approve of the argument, it is not reversible error. State v. Norton, 949 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Mo.App.1997). The argument did not have a decisive effect on the verdict. The victim made a positive identification and the defendant was apprehended with the victim’s vehicle two days following the commission of the crime with the victim’s knife on his person. There was substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. State v. Baller, 949 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Mo.App.1997)(<HOLDING>). There is no manifest injustice. Point denied. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the complained of statements may be improper personalizations but plain error does not embrace all errors and defendant has not demonstrated manifest injustice (B) holding that cumulative  effect of multiple errors worked to deprive defendant of fair trial although  some errors standing alone would be subject to plain error review and others might be harmless (C) holding that errors not rising to level of plain error are to be considered in assessing cumulative error (D) recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law (E) holding counsel cannot be ineffective based on errors that the appellate court determined on direct appeal were not errors plain or otherwise
Output: (A)
Plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, he must do so within 30 days of this Order, addressing the deficiencies outlined herein. He is advised that an amended complaint replaces the Complaint currently pending before the Court in its entirety and therefore must include all of his claims and factual allegations against all Defendants against whom he wishes to proceed. The amended complaint must be captioned “ First Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 40). SO ORDERED. 1 . The Court notes that Defendants do not raise the issue of qualified immunity and, as a result, declines to address it at this stage. See Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 784 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); accord Betts v. Shearman, No. 12-CV-3195, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded (B) holding that fair use is an affirmative defense (C) holding that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the official who claims it (D) holding that the plaintiff waived an objection to the defendants failure to plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense (E) holding that affirmative defenses are waived if not pled
Output: (C)
care provider failed to supply adequate information to obtain the informed consent of the injured person, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the treatment, procedure, or surgery was performed in other than an emergency situation and that the medical care provider did not supply the type of information regarding the treatment, procedure, or surgery as would customarily have been given to a patient in the position of the injured person or other persons authorized to give consent for such a patient by other medical care providers with similar training and experience at the time of the treatment, procedure, or surgery in the locality in which the medical care provider practices or in a similar locality.”); Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding expert testimony is generally required to establish proximate cause in medical malpractice cases (B) holding expert testimony was not required where jury is capable of determining existence of duty (C) holding expert testimony is always required for medical negligence cases involving informed consent because physicians duty of disclosure is measured by customary disclosures in practicing community (D) holding that expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish negligence where surgeon left a needle in the patients body but stating that proof of proximate cause requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases (E) holding that no expert reports specifically addressing conduct of professional corporation and professional association were required when plaintiffs alleged only vicarious liability based on medical negligence of entities physicians explaining that the entities conduct is not measured by a medical standard of care but rather their liability was solely vicarious
Output: (C)
824, 827 (4th Cir.2010) (on a.motion to dismiss, the facts as alleged irt the' complaint are assumed to be true). 3 . The Amended Complaint was filed on May 20, 2016, and alleges that plaintiff is a current employee of defendant. See Am Comp. ¶ 1. Yet, the employment agreement between the parties, to which the Amended Complaint refers, has a termination date of June 21, 2016. See D. Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 17), Ex. 2-C, §■7.1. Thus, it appears, from the record that plaintiff’s employment relationship with defendant has terminated since the initiation of this lawsuit. 4 . There are twelve circuit court opinions citing § 7434, and no precedential opinion has dealt with the question presented in this case. See Cuellar-Aguilar v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc., 812 F.3d 614, 620-21 (8th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>); Pitcher v. Waldmam, 591 Fed.Appx. 466, 467 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (B) holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages (C) holding that actual damages under respa included emotional damages (D) holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested (E) holding that even emotional damages could constitute actual damages for purposes of  2605f1a
Output: (A)
services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir.1987). The district court also failed to discuss any of the Kerr factors in determining whether to adjust the lodestar amount. See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.1975). Although a district court is not required to analyze every Kerr factor, “the need for meaningful review requires remand where, as here, the record on appeal fails to indicate which, if any, of the Kerr guidelines were considered.” Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 838-39 (9th Cir.1982). The district court should have addressed, at a minimum, the “extent of success” factor. See McGinnis v. Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., 51 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Defendants apparently sought $1.3 million at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to present a federal question a right or immunity created by the constitution or laws of the united states must be an element and an essential one of the plaintiffs cause of action quoting franchise tax bd v constr laborers vacation trust 463 us 1 1011 103 sct 2841 77 led2d 420 1983 (B) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances (C) holding that a court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply in order to chastise what the court views as prosecutorial overreaching  quoting united states v hasting 461 us 499 507 103 sct 1974 76 led2d 96 1983 (D) holding that an attorneys fee award must be reasonable in relation to the success achieved quoting hensley v eckerhart 461 us 424 436 103 sct 1933 76 led2d 40 1983 (E) holding that hensley v eckerhart applies to a fee award for seeking fees
Output: (D)
defense, or a development in the controlling law that foreclosed the claim. The record here betrays no significant change in circumstances prior to trial that reasonably should have caused the plaintiffs to conclude that their claims were no longer viable. In fact, the most notable development in the case prior to trial sent a contrary signal: the court denied the Mayor’s post-discovery summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs’ central political discrimination claim. While the fact that a claim has survived summary judgment is not, on its own, “entitled to decretory significance,” Foster, 943 F.2d at 144, it has some value in determining whether a claim was or became unreasonable or without foundation. See id.; Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815, 818 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court abused its discretion in finding suit unreasonable and groundless where inter alia the court had denied two prior summary judgment motions (B) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (C) holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on summary judgment motion where inter alia plaintiff had been given repeated notices court intended to rule on motion and it was plaintiffs burden to rebut defendants evidence
Output: (A)
are non-public records; (2) applying the capital collateral litigation work product exemption retroactively to a public records request that predated the October 1, 1995, effective date of the 1995 amendment to section 119.07(3)(£); (3) dismissing his Brady claims; and (4) finding that the clemency materials are exempt from disclosure. We agree with the circuit court that the first category of withheld documents are either not public records or are exempt from disclosure under the work product exemption in section 119.07(3)(i). Even though this particular provision did not take effect until October 1, 1995, the legislative history indicates that the statute is remedial in nature and thus can be applied retroactively. See City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So.2d 1027 (Fla.1986) (<HOLDING>). Roberts also argues that the amended statute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale (B) holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date (C) holding that a chapter 7 debtor who claimed an invalid exemption in a cause of action had standing to pursue that litigation because the cause of action was excluded from the bankruptcy estate after no party in interest objected timely to the exemption (D) holding aedpa applicable to petition filed on or after aedpas effective date (E) holding that statutory work product exemption in chapter 119 was remedial in nature and thus applicable to cause of action that accrued prior to its effective date
Output: (E)
with SPAWAR’s legal department. The record also shows that, whenever Advantor conducts training seminars, it requires attendees to sign a sheet acknowledging that [t]he information provided in this training class ... is considered Proprietary and Confidential to Advantor. These instructional materials also contain trade secret information of Advantor. This information may be used only for its intended purpose and - may not be disclosed without ... consent. One of the Air Force officers who provided DRS with the Manuals had received and signed this notice. Under Florida law, a factfinder could conclude that this set of precautions (which DRS does not dispute) likely constitutes “reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.” Fla. Stat. § 688.002(4)(b). See, e.g., Premier Lab, 10 So.3d at 206 (<HOLDING>). Cf. 55 Fla. Jur. 2d Trademarks & Unfair 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work (B) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (C) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer (D) holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation (E) holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate
Output: (C)
and Application Note 11, which deal with revocation sentences, and neither of which were affected by 2007 amendments to § 4A1.2. The court noted a split in the circuits over how to interpret the second paragraph of Application Note 11, which states: “Where a revocation applies to multiple sentences, and such sentences are counted separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2), add the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation to the sentence that will result in the greatest increase in criminal history points.” Compare United States v. Streat, 22 F.3d 109, 111-12 (6th Cir.1994) (treating revocation as single action applied to all prior suspended sentences), and United States v. Flores, 93 F.3d 587, 591-92 (9th Cir.1996) (same), with United States v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1278, 1285-88 (10th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). The court followed Norris and determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where state court imposed multiple sentences on revocation of probation to be served either consecutively or concurrently note 11 is inapplicable and criminal history is calculated solely under  4a12 k (B) holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence (C) holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution (D) holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum (E) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category
Output: (A)
authority. 9 As is evident from the majority's discussion of the standard of review, the majority does not address whether the circuit court's decision to grant Henley a new trial was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. Majority op., ¶¶ 28-29. Since I would hold the circuit court has the authority to grant a new trial here, I would review that decision under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard. Totsky, 233 Wis. 2d 371, ¶ 46; Pulaski, 23 Wis. 2d at 142 ("A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and for a trial, as we deem the defendant's motions to be ... is a motion directed to the discretion of the court in the interest of justice which the court has the inherent power to hear."); Lee, 88 Wis. 2d at 246 (quoting Pulaski for this proposition); Schill, 93 Wis. 2d at 378 (<HOLDING>); Behning, 57 Wis. 2d at 186 ("An order for a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unless discovery is granted as a matter of statute court rule or the constitution discovery is within the discretion of the trial court whose ruling will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted (C) holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not bedisturbed absent an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion (E) holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion
Output: (E)
record prior to judgment, it is clear that district courts have the discretion to grant such a motion: such an application to reopen the record is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331-32, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77, reh’g denied, 401 U.S. 1015, 91 S.Ct. 1247, 28 L.Ed.2d 552 (1971); Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 679 (2d Cir.1998) (“A district court’s decision to reopen the proof to allow a party to submit additional evidence is subject to its sound discretion”); Dow Chem. Pac., Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1986) (same); See also Caracci v. Brother Int’l Sewing Mach. Corp., 222 F.Supp. 769, 771 (E.D.La.1968) aff'd., 341 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); 12 James Wm. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court may properly look with more favor upon a motion to reopen made after submission but before any indication by it as to its decision (B) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it (C) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (D) recognizing laches as an equitable defense to a motion to reopen (E) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it
Output: (A)
action by the State to recover the costs of legal assistance. Therefore, the entry of this judgment was a “stage” of the criminal proceeding for which Dudley was entitled to counsel. Our characterization of the cost judgment in Sluyter as a civil liability does not alter our conclusion. See Sluyter, 763 N.W.2d at 582 (stating cost judgment entered against acquitted defendant creates a civil liability). As previously noted, the legislature has injected this matter, which would ordinarily be civil, in a criminal action and provided for counsel throughout the criminal prosecution, ending with judgment on behalf of the State. We think it proper to focus on the legislative intent evidenced by these statutes, rather than on the label attached to the final judgment. See Jones, 964 P.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). Because the criminal case did not end, by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postacquittal proceedings were part of criminal case notwithstanding that they resulted in a reimbursement award that was civil in nature stating legislative intent was more important than labels (B) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only (E) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings
Output: (A)
with her own report disclosing missing data at five loci. Counsel was also armed with enough information to disclose Ms. Houtz’s involvement in the initial testing and in the chain of custody underlying the DNA analysis. In any event, our resolution of the issue again turns on Appellant’s inability to establish prejudice in light of the compelling other evidence establishing his identity as the robber and killer and the fact of a rape, and the absence of any plausible alternative theory to discount that Appellant was also the rapist. C. Cumulative Effect of Alleged Napue and Brady Violations Appellant next characterizes the assertedly false testimony and alleged concealment of evidence as violations of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (<HOLDING>), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights (B) holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury (C) holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false (D) holding that an ijs failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel from a pro se petitioner is a due process violation (E) holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process
Output: (E)
that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 536, 571 S.E.2d at 59. Defendant first argues that N.C.G.S. § 20-38.6(a) infringes on the right of a person charged with an implied-consent offense in district court to exercise his or her fundamental right to a fair trial, since it requires that such defendants move to suppress evidence' or dismiss charges pretrial without the benefit of any statutory right to pretrial discovery. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the fundamental right to a fair trial is “the most fundamental of all freedoms.” See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 549, reh’g denied, 382 U.S. 875, 15 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1965); see also State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 616, 419 S.E.2d 557, 564 (1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 136 L. Ed. 2d 229 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a fundamental right to marry (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (D) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (E) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental
Output: (E)
to support a conclusion .’ ” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)). “As long as the agency’s methodology and procedures are reasonable means of effectuating the statutory purpose, and there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the agency’s conclusions, the court will not impose its own views as to the sufficiency of the agency’s investigation or question the agency’s methodology.” Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 404-5 (1986), aff’d, 810 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir., 1984); see also Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States, 12 CIT 1074, 1076-77 (1988) (<HOLDING>). However, “[t]he court will find a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where judgment was not entered the appeals period neither triggered nor expired (B) holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 (C) holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment (D) holding that the court neither weighs the evidence nor substitutes its own judgment for that of the agency (E) holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency
Output: (D)
to this liability scheme is “in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey.” Id. Thus, the key issue is whether United qualifies as a contracting carrier under the Montreal Convention. First, as a threshold matter, because the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs, any theory of agency liability concerping airlines involved in the underlying ticket transaction or accident must arise from a provision of the Convention itself. See Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed.Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Conventions preempt all state law claims within their scope.”); see also, Asiedu-Ofei v. South African Airlines, 2016 WL 8229875, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2016) (<HOLDING>); Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs claims were not preempted by the montreal convention because they were grounded in a cause of action for nonperformance of a contract and not delay (B) holding plaintiffs breach of contract claims fell outside the scope of the montreal convention because the plain language of article 19 of the montreal convention indicates that it governs claims for delay not nonperformance (C) holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention (D) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (E) holding the state law claims were not preempted
Output: (C)
for kidnapping, and to a concurrent twenty-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault into which it merged the remaining convictions. During the course of trial on Indictment I, defendant was arrested at the courthouse for the Lakewood rape on charges that would form the basis of Ocean County Indictment Number 90-04-0519 (Indictment II). He was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and two counts of criminal sexual contact on Indictment II in 1993 and sentenced to another discretionary extended term of life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility on the kidnapping count consecutive to the sentence he was then serving arising out of Indictment I. In 2011, following our decision in State v. Pennington, 418 N.J.Super. 548, 557-58, 14 A.3d 790 (App.Div.2011) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 595 (2012), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed (B) holding that an additional term did not materially alter the contract because the plaintiff cannot profess to be surprised by an additional term in an invoice when the price quotation contained the identical term (C) holding that district judge was laboring under the misapprehension that in his words a term of supervised release can be reduced but cant be extended thats wrong it can be extended (D) holding that a second extended term cannot be imposed on an offense occurring before the imposition of the first extended term under njsa 2c445b1 (E) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract
Output: (D)
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and may be invalid if it was induced by threats or misrepresentations, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). A defendant’s statements at the Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 hearing are presumed to be true. Black-ledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Unsupported allegations on appeal are insufficient to overcome representations at the Rule 11 hearing. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir.1991) (stating that defendant’s statement at Rule 11 hearing that he was neither coerced nor threatened was “strong evidence of the voluntariness of his plea”); Via v. Superintendent, Powhatan Corr. Ctr., 643 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Here, McMillan indicated at the Rule 11 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements (B) holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent (C) holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive (D) holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea (E) holding that statements at plea hearing that facially demonstrate pleas validity are conclusive absent compelling reason why they should not be
Output: (E)
in any case,” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This unambiguous statutory language necessarily excludes the complaint that gives birth to the proceedings, as it is not possible to multiply proceedings until after those proceedings have begun. To the extent that the Seventh Circuit held otherwise in In re TCI, Ltd,., 769 F.2d at 448, we find the court’s reasoning questionable. There, the Seventh Circuit looked beyond § 1927’s language to (1) a failed amendment that would have required a warning prior to sanctions; and (2) the “new” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. which, the court observed, “requires the attorney to take care before filing a complaint.” Id. We see no reason to look past § 1927’s clear language. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 388 (2004) (<HOLDING>). [14] Because Gage acquiesced in Winn’s first 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text (B) holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear (C) recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous (D) holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text (E) holding that unless a statute is ambiguous on the point at issue a court should not resort to legislative history in interpreting it
Output: (A)
There is no clearly established Supreme Court law holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to an instruction on a lesser included offense. Cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Ruiz’s state court conviction thus has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (B) holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime (C) holding that a lesser included offense instruction might be constitutionally required in capital cases because of their unique nature (D) holding that beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction as a matter of due process in a capital case (E) holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense
Output: (C)