niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
1624. As to the second prong of the Lopez test, the Government emphasizes that Courts have determined that Section 2250(a) is a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause, as “[t]he express language of SORNA dictates that violations under SORNA, for failing to register, require either that the person is convicted of a violation of a federal law or, if otherwise required to register under SORNA, travel in interstate or foreign commerce.” Government’s Omnibus Response, Docket No. 35, quoting United States v. Elliott, 2007 WL 4365599 at *3 (S.D.Fla., December 13, 2007); see also, United States v. Thomas, 534 F.Supp.2d 912, 918 (N.D.Iowa 2008)(“See-tion 2250 falls squarely within the second Lopez category.”); United States v. Mason, 510 F.Supp.2d 923, 932 (M.D.Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). As explained by the Court, in United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding if a plaintiffs claim is concerned with rights created within the contractual relationship it falls within the tucker act (B) holding that strict limitations set forth in section 1252e preclude judicial review of any constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying expedited removal order (C) holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself (D) holding that section 2250a is facially constitutional because it falls within the second category set forth in lopez (E) holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute
Output: (D)
was merely a voidable act. They rely on Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.1989), rehearing denied by 888 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir.1989), in which the Fifth Circuit found that the filing of a complaint in violation of the stay was voidable but not void. Id. at 178-79. The court reasoned that provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as section 362(d), by giving courts the power to grant retroactive relief from a stay, indicated Congressional intent that acts in violation of a stay be simply voidable. Id. Spring Meadows, however, urges us to adopt the rule of the Ninth Circuit that any act committed in violation of an automatic stay is void. Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.1993); In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court found such acts void even 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect (B) holding that violations of the automatic stay are void and rejecting the reasoning of sikes (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (E) holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio
Output: (B)
control over an object.” United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 1987, 131 L.Ed.2d 873 (1995). See also United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir.1998). Constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973). The government does not offer any evidence that Curtis and Needum owned or possessed narcotics collectively or that Needum had ever entered Curtis’s apartment to obtain crack. There is also no evidence that Needum had any intent to exercise control over this particular bag of crack. Unlimited access to a particular area, however, is sometimes enough. Cf. Kincaide, 145 F.3d at 782 (<HOLDING>). The fact that Needum frequently sold crack 
 Holding statements: (A) holding when drugs are found on premises exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession (B) holding that constructive possession exists where one knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through others (C) holding that proof of the discovery of illegal drugs in plain view in the presence or two or more joint occupants of the premises is sufficient to support a conviction for constructive possession (D) holding evidence establishing the intent of the defendants to distribute drugs also permits the inference they intended to exercise dominion over them to demonstrate constructive possession (E) holding that proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession citation omitted
Output: (E)
carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the § 924(c) offense. Thus, because § 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while § 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant’s offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his § 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of  924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for  924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a  924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by  924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting  when it applied an  increase under  2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating  924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants  924c conviction
Output: (D)
v. Brehm, 74 Cal. App. 286, 240 R 529, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) (“[T]o acquire title to water by adverse possession .... [i]t is not necessary that a claimant should use the water all the hours of each day, or every day in the year for the prescribed statutory period, in order to establish uninterrupted or continuous use; it is only necessary that he shall have used it continuously during such portions of the day or year as is required for the beneficial use to which it is applied.”). We recognize that the record contains some evidence that Golden Resorts or the prior title owner may have, at various points, simultaneously occupied the land with Ridgway or otherwise regularly used the land. See Fairdealing Apostolic Church, Inc. v. Casinger, 353 S.W.3d 396, 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (<HOLDING>). For instance, in their respective affidavits, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding the exclusivity element is satisfied by showing that others do not jointly possess or use the land (D) holding that a petitioner in a judicial review from the land use board of appeals had constitutional standing because the land use decision would affect her use and enjoyment of a nearby estuary that she used for passive recreation (E) holding land for speculation is a legitimate commercial use grazing on land so classified subject to a special use permit
Output: (C)
against state officials to conform their official conduct in the future to the Constitution or federal law. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268-69, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). Furthermore, such prospective injunctive relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment if the future consequences of the injunction required payment of money from the state’s treasury, so long as the payment has “an ancillary effect on the state treasury.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347. In most cases in which Ex parte Young has applied, the primary relief ordered by the court has been injunctive, requiring future compliance by state officials with the Constitution or federal law. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)(<HOLDING>); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for injunctive relief was merely incidental to a prayer for damages where it was designed to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of any monetary relief the court might award (B) holding that the medicaid act provision allowing reduction of funds to noncompliant states is not a detailed remedial scheme sufficient to show congresss intent to preempt an action under ex parte young (C) holding that title ii ada suits and rehabilitation act suits for prospective injunctive relief may be brought under ex parte young against state officers in their official capacities (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that ex parte young permitted injunctive relief in equal protection challenge to states distribution of public school land funds because the expenditure of state funds that might accompany the injunction did not amount to an award for monetary liability
Output: (E)
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (“There is ... no basis for importing the ‘necessity requirement’ announced in [Craig and Coy ] into the much different context of out-of-court declarations _”). I would hold, therefore, that the Nevada Supreme Court’s failure to insist upon alternative procedures for procuring Autumn’s contemporaneous testimony did not involve an unreasonable application of Roberts, Craig, or Coy. Setting aside Bockting’s assertions of legal error, I must decide whether the Nevada Supreme Court’s unavailability finding “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Under this deferential standard of review, I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clearly erroneous standard of review governs district courts factual findings based on state record documentary evidence and inferences from other facts (B) holding that subsection 2254d2 applies  to situations where petitioner challenges the state courts findings based entirely on the state record (C) holding that the state police is a state agency (D) holding that the law of the state of incorporation applies (E) holding that the trial courts putting its findings on the record at the conclusion of the states case was sufficient to satisfy  152538 because that section does not specifically limit the time within which the court must state the findings
Output: (B)
employed statistical method used in a variety of séttings — that randomly perturbed the lines of an initial districting plan to generate successive new plans. Id. at 13-15. The computer algorithm then eliminated from the 150,000 plan sample all “unreasonable” districting plans — plans with noncontiguous districts, plans with population deviations exceeding 0.1 percent, plans that were not reasonably compact under common statistical measures of compactness, plans that did not minimize the number of county and VTD splits, and plans that did not comply with the' Voting Rights Act — yielding the 24,518-plan ensemble. id. at 15-17. The criteria Dr. Mattingly used to eliminate “unreason able” plans from his sample reflect traditional redistricting criteria, see Harris, 136 S.Ct. at 1306 (<HOLDING>), and nearly all non-partisan criteria adopted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10 falls within the category of minor deviations  from mathematical equality among state legislative districts that are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amendment notwithstanding that the plain language of the constitution references no such statistical threshold (B) holding that bail revocation serves to maintain  the integrity of the judicial process and the authority of the courts and protect  the public from potentially dangerous persons (C) holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16 (D) holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity (E) recognizing compactness contiguity maintaining integrity of political subdivisions and potentially compliance with the voting rights act as legitimate considerations for deviations from population equality in state redistricting plans
Output: (E)
this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”). In 1996, Congress enacted the War Crimes Act, which defined “war crime” in reference to the Geneva Conventions as well as other international agreements. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c). The War Crimes Act provides severe penalties for commission of war crimes, including the death penalty. See § 2441(a). Based on the Geneva Conventions and their incorporation into the War Crimes Act of 1996, the Court holds that there is a customary international law norm against attacks against civilians as war crimes. See In re Agent Orange, at 112-13. See also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43 (<HOLDING>); Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1139-40 (“Courts have 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing attempt and conspiracy as inchoate crimes (B) holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes (C) recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes (D) recognizing an atca claim for war crimes (E) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes
Output: (D)
to a statutory or regulatory violation so long as these objections are in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement”). To possess standing to bring a bid protest, a plaintiff must be an “interested party”—i.e., an actual or prospective bidder (or offeror) who possesses a direct economic interest in the procurement. Sys. Application & Techs., Inc., 691 F.3d at 1382 (citing Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); see also Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). An offeror has a direct economic interest if it suffered a competitive injury or prejudice as a result of an alleged error in the procurement process. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Weeks Marine, Inc., 575 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense (B) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim (C) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (D) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (E) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim
Output: (D)
coercion ... with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California].” Cal. Gov’t -Code § 52.1. To prevail on a § 52.1 claim, a plaintiff must therefore prove (1) a violation of a constitutional or statutory right (2) by intimidation, threats or coercion. Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1242, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 750 (2007). Defendants take the position that a California Civil Code § 52.1 claim can only survive if the plaintiff proves “threats, intimidation, or coercion” separate and apart from whatever constitutional violation is at issue in the case. See Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 819 F.Supp.2d 937, 953 (E.D.Cal.2011) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable (B) holding that an officers use of force against a plaintiff was objectively reasonable considering the force the plaintiff herself exercised in resisting police custody (C) holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force (D) holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied (E) holding that plaintiff could not pursue section 521 claim on the basis of allegations that defendants used force to interfere with his right to be free from bodily restraint or harm
Output: (D)
under Section 1692g(a)(5), the request had to be in writing. As Welker argues, the Ninth Circuit in Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc. observed that the FDCPA “assigns lesser rights to debtors who orally dispute a debt and greater rights to debtors who dispute it in writing.” 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.2005). “The plain meaning of § 1692g is that debtors can trigger the rights under subsection (a)(3) by either an oral or written ‘dispute,’ while debtors can trigger the rights under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) only through written dispute.” Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit in Camacho, however, was only faced with the question of whether adding the “in writing” requirement to where it was not statutorily required violated the FDCPA. Id. The court concluded that it did. Id. (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, by extension, Camacho’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collection notice was potentially misleading because least sophisticated consumer could conclude that total amount stated as due was due at any time when in fact it was increasing (B) holding that the defendants collection notice violated  1692g insofar as it stated that disputes under subsection a3 had to be in writing (C) holding that a debt collectors violation of the overshadowing rule was a circumvention of  1692g (D) holding therefore that although defendants failure to provide plaintiff with sufficient notice of termination and a pretermination hearing violated his right to procedural due process defendants motion for summary judgment should be granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from recovering more than a nominal amount (E) holding that if congress had intended to obligate every subsequent debt collector beyond the first to provide validation notice it would have explicitly called for it in 15 usc section 1692g
Output: (B)
504 N.W.2d 838, 841 (N.D. 1993). [¶ 6] Objections to jury instructions in criminal proceedings are governed by N.D.R.Crim.P. 30. A party must object to an instruction, or the failure to give an instruction, on the record. N.D.R.Crim.P. 30; State v. Jennewein, 2015 ND 192, ¶ 9, 867 N.W.2d 665; State v. Johnson, 2009 ND 76, ¶ 10, 764 N.W.2d 696; State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 9, 575 N.W.2d 658. Mayland not only failed to object to the jury instructions excluding a jury determination on whether Mayland had previous convictions under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01, he requested and stipulated to the exclusion. In light of the stipulation, it would have been reversible error to provide an instruction requiring a jury determination on prior convictions. State v. Saul, 434 N.W.2d 572, 575 (N.D. 1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Mayland failed to preserve the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant could stipulate to prior dwi convictions (B) holding that when a defendant admits prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing he waives any complaints about the validity of the prior convictions (C) holding that when a defendant stipulates to prior convictions in prosecutions for aggravated offenses under ndcc  390801 submission of prior convictions to a jury constitutes reversible error (D) holding that application of career offender enhancement falls within exception for prior convictions where facts are undisputed making it unnecessary for district court to engage in further fact finding about prior convictions (E) holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate
Output: (C)
statement when asked whether he prayed to God for the shooting. Petitioner only asserted that his answer during the interrogation was involuntary because it was obtained after three hours of questioning during which time Petitioner remained largely silent. The sole issue presented was whether Petitioner invoked his right to remain silent based on the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. An evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resolve that issue. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 05-70188, 2011 WL 835927 at *2 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 8, 2011). Thus, even if the procedural argument is not a new “claim,” the contention that it relates to was not raised before the district court on the original habeas petition and therefore was waived. Cf. Lancaster v. Metrish, 683 F.3d 740, 753 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). We affirm the district court’s judgment and, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief (B) holding that a party waives an objection by failing to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence before the district court (C) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (D) holding that a defendant waived an argument under section 2  610b by failing to raise it in the trial court (E) holding that appellant waived argument by failing to raise argument before workers compensation board and failing to list or brief issue in administrative appeal to superior court
Output: (C)
in a 3-2 decision does not settle the intent issue, because Honkanen did not consider the difference between intent to injure or inflict pain and intent to correct. Additionally, Honkanen’s rationale may be outdated in light of the 2001 amendments to NRS 48.061, which expand the use of bad-act evidence in domestic violence cases, 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 360, § 1, at 169; see NRS 33.018(1)(a) (defining “domestic violence” to include battery on an accused’s minor child), and Bigpond, which recognizes that character evidence can be admissible so long as it has a credible, non- propensity purpose, such as explaining the relationship dynamics between a domestic-violence victim and the accused. 128 Nev. at 111, 270 P.3d at 1246; see also Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Cherry, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (B) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (C) recognizing that the holding in harvey v state 604 p2d 586 590 alaska 1979 a case similar to honkanen had been abrogated by the amendment of alaskas rule 404b to allow admission of prior incidents of domestic violence as an exception to the general rule against admitting such evidence (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing this as the general rule
Output: (C)
awarding bridge-the-gap, rather than permanent alimony. “Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established during the marriage of the parties.” Rosecan v. Springer, 845 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In determining whether a party is entitled to permanent alimony, the trial court must consider the duration of the parties’ marriage. See Martinez v. Martinez, 761 So.2d 433, 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222, 1234 (Fla.2005). Here, the parties were married for nineteen years. It is well settled, and the trial court properly found, that a nineteen-year marriage qualifies as a long-term marriage. See Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage (D) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (E) recognizing seventeenyear marriage as long term
Output: (E)
Alabama, 843 F.Supp. 1427, 1434 (M.D.Ala.1994) (a statute affecting not only the insurance industry, but also other non-insured health care plans and agreements failed the common sense test). The Court finds that the Any Willing Provider Statute fails the common sense test because it is not specifically directed towards the insurance industry, but, rather, it expressly applies to entities outside the insurance industry, such as employers and Taft-Hartley trusts. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40:2202(3)(a)-(b) (West 1987); Hayden, 843 F.Supp. at 1434 (“[although [the statute at issue there] may have a substantial effect on the insurance industry, the law affects other health care plans and agreements even though they are not a part of an insurance contract”); cf. Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 504 (<HOLDING>). Because Louisiana’s Any Willing Provider 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analytically analogous statute failed the commonsense view where although the statute may have a substantial effect on the insurance industry the law affects other healthcare plans and agreements even though they are not part of an insurance agreement (B) holding that a probate courts jurisdiction is limited to that expressly conferred or which is necessarily implied from those expressly conferred (C) holding that section 624155 is not a statute which regulates the insurance industry because the statute does not meet the three prong test enunciated in union labor life ins co v pireno 458 us 119 129 102 sct 3002 73 led2d 647 1982 in so holding the court reasoned that although section 624155 is directed toward the insurance industry and applies only to the insurance industry the statute transfers or spreads no policyholder risk and the statute is not an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured see also american intl group inc v siemens bldg techs inc 881 so2d 7 12 fladistctapp2004 holding that section 624155 is not a law  regulating insurance to which mccarranferguson might apply citing anschultz 850 f2d 1467 (D) holding that a federal statute 12 usc  92 which expressly permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns is a statute which specifically relates to the business of insurance and preempts a state statute which prohibits banks from selling insurance (E) holding that virginias statute was expressly limited to entities within the insurance industry
Output: (E)
to resolve identification issues sufficiently supported the reliability of his application to the facts in this case, and his express observations and reasoning on the record reinforce this conclusion. Interestingly enough, the reliability of Detective Caffey’s methodology finds further support in the fact that Pierce’s own expert, Taylor-Austin, relied on similar experience-based credentials and the same gang-membership identifiers in assessing the conduct of the Appellants. Indeed, Taylor-Austin confirmed that clothing in a specific color, Philadelphia Phillies memo rabilia, and terminology such as “Pira” were factors suggestive of Blood gang membership, and reached a conclusion regarding the evidence in this case based, in part, on these facts. See id. at 151, 119 S.Ct. at 1176 (<HOLDING>). The only cognizable difference between the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that expert testimony may be admissible even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community provided that it qualifies in some other way as reliable under federal rule of evidence 702 (B) holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community (C) recognizing that it may be appropriate to ask an expert relying on experience whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable and whether his  method is generally accepted in the relevant  community (D) holding that whether the witnesss area of expertise was technical scientific or more generally experiencebased the court in its gatekeeping function must make certain that an expert whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field (E) recognizing that an expert may rely on an article because it is the expert who determines based on study and experience whether the article is reliable
Output: (C)
he was able to identify petitioner at trial because of the photographic array is meritless. In fact, Rodriguez testified that petitioner’s face was “burned” into his mind at the time of the incident because he was so angry about being robbed, not as petitioner contends, that he memorized petitioner’s face from the photo array. Accordingly, this argument is rejected. As already discussed, Rodriguez had an unobstructed, well-illuminated view of petitioner during the robbery that lasted for approximately 15 seconds. This view allowed Rodriguez to provide officers with a detailed, mostly accurate description of petitioner, to identify the defendant with a high degree of certainty; and the two month lag between the incident and initial confrontation is not fatal. See Wong, 40 F.3d at 1360 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Appellate Division’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a five month delay was unreasonable (B) holding that a five month delay is unreasonable (C) holding that a thirtyone month delay was sufficient to trigger the barker test (D) holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable (E) holding that a thirtyone month delay could be outweighed by other indicia of reliability
Output: (E)
Cal. Civ.Code § 2924c(e). 9 .Debtors’ original chapter 13 plan proposed paying 0% to the unsecured creditors (not including Advanta and Household). The Debtors then amended their plan to provide 100% to the general unsecured creditors (not including Advanta and Household). After the Court’s ruling at the hearing on the issue presented herein, the Debtors amended their plan to provide 8% to the general unsecured creditors, including Advanta and Household. 10 . Kathleen P. March and Jennifer Hilde-brandt, Lien Stripping: When You Can and When You Can't — The Law Now and What the Future May Hold, 24 Cal. Bankr.J. 317 (1998). 11 . See supra, footnote 5. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. 14 . 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(1), (2). See also, Cennamo v. United States (In re Cennamo), 147 B.R. 540 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>); accord In re Isom, 901 F.2d 744 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtors belated filing was not a reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the tax law relying significantly on the debtors delinquency in failing to file his tax returns until after the irs assessment thus defeating the main purpose of the selfreporting requirement of our tax system (B) holding that operates as a charge of debtors in personam tax liability not debtors in rem tax liability (C) holding that discharged debtor is protected only from in personam liability not in rem liability on lien given as security for mortgage loan (D) recognizing certificates of assessment as adequate evidence of tax liability (E) holding that a binding settlement on a tax liability must follow the requirements of the tax code which include the execution of a closing agreement
Output: (B)
small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is “whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect that public’s right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands”). Plaintiffs’ taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
Output: (B)
may be held personally liable for his or her tortious acts, even if committed within the scope of the agent’s employment with the principal, an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract of which his or her principal is a party.”) (citations omitted); Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“For the interference to be unjustified, the defendant must be a third party, external to the business relationship” or an agent who “acts solely with ulterior purposes, without an honest belief that his actions would benefit the employer, and the employee’s conduct concerning the contract or business relationship is not in the employer’s best interest.”); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (<HOLDING>). This principle is fatal to Crossland’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation (B) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (C) holding that employee of one familyowned corporation who was assigned to terminate a contract of another corporation owned by the same family could not as a matter of law be held liable for tortious interference with the contract (D) holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity (E) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed
Output: (C)
suggests that one of the Structure Owners authorized carnival companies to operate on the lots during the decades before Overflow Owner’s arrival. The evidence is silent on whether all of the most recent carnivals were authorized only by Overflow Owner or possibly, at times, by other premises owners. On this mixed evidence, Structure Owners’ role in permitting recurring carnival operations cannot be described as mere acquiescence or failure to enforce restrictions being violated by others. There is at least some evidence that some or all Structure Owners violated the applicable restriction through their own affirmative conduct in authorizing carnival operations on the premises before Overflow Owner held any ownership interest in the property. Cf. Friedman, 2013 WL 6175318, at *4-5 (<HOLDING>). Because one’s own violation of a restriction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties (B) holding that property owner who violated restrictive covenant multiple times over several years waived enforcement of same restriction against third parties as matter of law (C) holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable (D) holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable (E) recognizing the courts right to modify the parties obligations under a restrictive covenant in light of current developments and the parties initial expectations
Output: (B)
The Second Circuit has observed that “[a]n explanation for a particular challenge need not necessarily be pigeon-holed as wholly acceptable or wholly unacceptable.” Alvarado II, 923 F.2d at 256. Where the acceptability of the explanation is doubtful, the Batson inquiry is not at an end. United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Alvarado III ”). In deciding the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent, the judicial officer is entitled to assess each explanation in light of all the other evidence relevant to prosecutorial intent. The officer may think a dubious explanation undermines the bona fides of other explanations or may think that the sound explanations dispel the doubt raised by a questionable one. Id. See also, Howard v. Senkowski 986 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Alvarado II, 923 F.2d at 256. As discussed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis (B) holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis (C) holding evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that batson challenges are subject to dualmotivation analysis (E) holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional
Output: (D)
insurer provides a notice of disclaimer ‘as soon as is reasonably possible after it first learns of the accident or of grounds for disclaimer of liability.’” Adams v. Perry’s Place, 168 A.D.2d 932, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (4th Dep’t 1990) (internal citation omitted); see also Zappone v. Home Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 131, 135-36, 447 N.Y.S.2d 911, 432 N.E.2d 783 (1982) (noting that Insurance Law § 3420(d) “was enacted to avoid prejudice to the insured, [and] the injured claimant ... [who] could be harmed by delay in learning of the carrier’s position” (internal citation omitted)). If an insurer breaches its duty to disclaim coverage in a timely manner, it may not rely upon exclusions to deny coverage. Worcester Ins. Co. v. Bettenhauser, 95 N.Y.2d 185, 189, 712 N.Y.S.2d 433, 734 N.E.2d 745 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Notably, however, an insurer has no duty to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (B) holding that a denial of coverage based on a reasonable interpretation of the policy is not bad faith even if incorrect (C) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (D) holding that a disclaimer of liability is required when denial of coverage is based upon an exclusion set forth in a policy without which the claim would be covered citing zappone 55 ny2d at 134 138 447 nys2d 911 432 ne2d 783 (E) holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage
Output: (D)
candidate for nomination shall file a petition for nomination.... The petition shall be sworn to before an officer authorized to administer an oath by the candidate and by not less than two (2) registered voters from the district or circuit from which he seeks nomination. Subsection (3) states in part: The petition for nomination shall be in the form prescribed by the State Board of Elections. The petition shall include a declaration sworn to by the equiring the voters to swear that they are registered voters in that circuit and interpret subsection (3) as requiring only the candidate to swear that he meets the requirements of the office. Additionally, we view subsection (2) as containing both mandatory and directory provisions. See Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337, 98 S.W.2d 884 (1936) (<HOLDING>). We believe the legislature clearly intended 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to follow mandatory provision of statute renders the act void whereas failure to follow directory provision does not (B) holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment (C) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter (D) holding that the failure to follow rule 252b3a was jurisdictional (E) holding that a tortfeasor seeking contribution and indemnification is required to follow the 120day notice provision in the cda and not the 60day notice provision
Output: (A)
reputation as protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 3-4. The court addressed the juveniles’ assertion that SORNA infringed upon their fundamental right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution pursuant to both a substantive due process analysis and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, finding these claims interrelated. Id. at 11. Like the York County Court, the Monroe County Court concluded that SORNA unconstitutionally utilized an irrebuttable presumption. It observed that, while the adjudication of delinquency involves a hearing on the facts of the crime, no proceeding addresses the juvenile’s likelihood of reoffense, upon which registration is based. B.B. at 32-36 (relying upon Clayton and D.C. v. School District of Philadelphia, 879 A.2d 408 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) (<HOLDING>)). The court opined that the limited provision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (B) holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented (C) holding district court lacked authority to order placement at a school not approved by the state (D) holding that an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption existed where school district automatically excluded from regular classrooms students returning from juvenile delinquency placement or criminal conviction (E) holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students
Output: (D)
with NASD’s Motion to Dismiss Lugosch definitively reinforced Amodeo II’s ruling that documents submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment are judicial documents for presumption-of-access purposes, 435 F.3d at 123, a principle that district courts have faithfully applied. See, e.g., Prescient, 487 F.Supp.2d at 374; Allen v. City of New York, 420 F.Supp.2d 295, 302 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Other courts in this Circuit have found the presumption applicable in other contexts, as well. See, e.g., In re San Francisco Chronicle, 07-00256-MISC (TCP), 2007 WL 2713859, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2007) (noting that presumption applies to “search warrant materials after an investigation is over”) (citing In re Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1990)); Sattar, 471 F.Supp.2d at 386 (<HOLDING>). It appears, however, that the post-Lugosch 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (B) holding that letter and report filed in conjunction with defendants sentencing submission are judicial because they supported her argument at sentencing (C) holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal (D) holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular (E) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing
Output: (B)
reasonably necessary. We affirm. Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. ít.App. P. 4(b). Background In the underlying criminal matter, defendant was indicted on August 22, 1995, on one count of possession of materials involving the sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The indictment was based on three sexually explicit photographs, found in defendant’s home, which he had taken of his twelve-year-old stepdaughter. Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty. On appeal, this court vacated the conviction based upon an evidentiary issue. United States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d 577 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On remand, defendant pled guilty. On January 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district courts admission of evidence that defendant had sexually molested his stepdaughter was improper because it showed propensity and was not probative of his knowing possession of the photographs (B) holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice (C) recognizing trial courts discretion in weighing the allegedlyimproper prejudicial aspects of photographs of victims against the photographs probative value (D) holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with (E) holding that district courts findings were not clearly erroneous where there was  sufficient evidence  that the defendants waiver of his rights was knowing and intelligent
Output: (A)