niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
under a Rule 60(b)(1) analysis. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are clear that a 60(b)(1) motion must be made within one year of judgment. Here, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the Plaintiffs motion was filed 364 days after judgment, within the appropriate timeframe (Docket No. 36 at 2). Although made within the appropriate time, the Magistrate Judge noted that the Plaintiff affirmatively waived any argument of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) at the evidentiary hearing (Docket No. 36 at 3). The Magistrate Judge further noted that Plaintiffs reliance on her former attorney Mr. Watkins’ illness and resulting error or general negligence fails to constitute excusable neglect as intended by Rule 60(b)(1) (Docket No. 36 at 9). See Box 111 Firetower Rd., 920 F.2d at 792 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Ake v. Mini Vacations, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding attorneys failure to object does not warrant rule 60b relief (B) holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief (C) holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief (D) holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies (E) holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees
Output: (C)
Id. The second approach, labeled “immediate offset,” would establish a present value for the options and distribute that value in accordance with each party’s marital proportion. Id. The third approach, which would serve to make the value of the options immaterial, would distribute the options themselves according to the parties’ marital proportions. Id. The court in Fisher found the “deferred distribution” approach to be unavoidable because of the lack of a possible valuation for the unvested options and because the options could not be transferred. Id. at 1170. Here, the trial court imposed a constructive trust upon appellant to keep half of the options for appellee’s benefit, expressly reserving jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the trust. See Callahan, 361 A.2d at 564 (<HOLDING>). Both expert witnesses in this case testified 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a constructive trust is imposed in order to prevent injustice and that such a trust may be imposed when the circumstances show that it would be inequitable for the holder of legal title to retain the property (B) holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust (C) holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute (D) holding that a constructive trust is appropriate in the case where transfer of the options would not be profitable possible or convenient (E) recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy
Output: (D)
whether the Bank was motivated, in whole or in part, by Strate’s association with her disabled newborn child, then summary judgment was improperly granted for the Bank. The evidence establishes that Strate gave birth to her disabled child on April 20, 2001, enrolled the child in the Bank’s group healthcare plan on April 24, 2001, and was notified that her job had been eliminated on July 2, 2001, approximately two months later. It is undisputed that Ziegler knew about the child’s disability when he made the decision to eliminate her job. On rare occasions, a close temporal connection between a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation. See,e.g., Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing cases). It follows that close temporal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation (C) holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases (D) holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation (E) holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action
Output: (B)
underlying action has determined “in fact” that Hanft personally profited. The Court rejects this interpretation of the exclusion. The Diehls cite to several, mostly unpublished, decisions from other jurisdictions in support of their argument (Doc. 64 at 22-23), but contrary to the Diehls’ contention, these cases do not hold that the “in fact” language requires a final adjudication in the underlying action. In each of these cases the court did not require a final adjudication by the underlying factfinder, but rather found that the allegations and evidence presented was not sufficient to support application of the exclusion without further underlying proceedings. See PMI Mortgage Ins. Co. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. C 02-1774, 2006 WL 825266 at *7 (N.D.Cal. Mar.29, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Federal Ins. Co. v. Cintas Corp., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judgment or other final adjudication language of a dishonesty exclusion was satisfied by a criminal conviction (B) holding that the term in fact within the context of the exclusion here should be read to require either a final adjudication including a judicial adjudication or at a minimum at least some evidentiary proof (C) holding that guilty plea to crime of fraud satisfied judgment or final adjudication language of dishonesty exclusion (D) holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits (E) holding that case was justiciable when at least some of the appellants have a sufficient personal stake  in its adjudication
Output: (B)
in the record that the skids contained 177 packages — or any other number except perhaps six — suitable for shipping on their own. Second, the cardboard sleeve enclosing the contents of the skids was more like the cardboard packaging the American & Far Eastern court distinguished than like the shrink-wrapped pallets. And third, the skids were not transparent, and the bill of lading was not ambiguous. American & Far Eastern thus does not support plaintiffs position. Furthermore, there are cases from this circuit in which it was held that where cargo was contained in parcels which in turn were packed in larger parcels, the larger parcels were the COGSA packages. In Nemeth, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that household goods packed in S.S. “Yang Ming”, 672 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (2nd Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff relies especially heavily on Sony, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bill of lading issued as to two containers was binding as to third container which was stolen and as to which no bill of lading issued provided that the bill of lading in evidence was the standard form bill of lading that carrier always used (B) holding that the parties designated the number of packages in the bill of lading when they filled in the numbers 18 103 and 165 under the column heading no of pkgs (C) holding that 30 pallets were the cogsa packages where the bill of lading stated that there were 30 packages (D) holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found (E) holding that where bill of lading indicated 1320 cartons but did not indicate that the cartons were consolidated onto 52 pallets the 1320 cartons were the cogsa packages
Output: (C)
consistent with the respective rights of the parties.” Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 731 (D.C.Cir.1969). Section 8(d) provides, however, that the obligation to bargain in good faith “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Thus, the Act does not require any party “to yield any position fairly maintained; ‘firmness of a bargaining position does not constitute bad faith.’ ” 419 F.2d at 731 (internal citation omitted). The Union argues that the Board’s finding of an impasse should nevertheless be reversed for four reasons. First, the Union alleges the Board did not conduct the sort of intensive factual inquiry it was obliged to make. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) (<HOLDING>), enforced, American Fed’n of Television & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the excusable neglect inquiry is at bottom an equitable one that should be made by considering the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party the length of the delay and its potential impact upon judicial proceedings the reason for the delay including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant and whether the movant acted in good faith  (B) recognizing that the primary issue to be considered in whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class is a determination of whether any antagonism exists between the interests of the plaintiffs and those of the remainder of the class (C) recognizing that the law of the shop includes the understanding of the parties (D) holding that whether impasse exists rests upon factintensive inquiry into the bargaining history the good faith of the negotiating parties the length of negotiations the importance of the issues about which there is disagreement and the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations (E) holding that where the parties contemplate the formal execution of a final agreement there is a strong inference that the parties  do not intend to be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until the final terms are settled 
Output: (D)
The Court held a hearing on the motion on May 19, 2011. Attorney Dennis J. Mitchell represented Whitesell. There was no appearance on behalf of Defendants Smith Jones, Inc. d/b/a Midwest Manufacturing Co. (Smith Jones) or Amtek Auto Limited (Amtek) (collectively, Defendants) at the hearing. The matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition. I. BACKGROUND “If the court determines that the defendant is in default, his liability to the plaintiff is deemed established and the plaintiff is not required to establish his right to recover. The allegations of the complaint except as to the amount of damages are taken as true.” Brown v. Kenron Alum. & Glass Corp., 477 F.2d 526, 531 (8th Cir.1973) (quotation omitted); see also Stephenson v. El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907, 915 n. 9 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). On September 30, 2008, Whitesell provided a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true (B) recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss (C) holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true (D) holding once default was determined the court should have accepted as true all of the factual al legations of the complaint except those relating to damages (E) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint
Output: (C)
1956 can no more be the basis of a conspiracy conviction than the conduct itself can be the basis of a substantive conviction.” 833 F.Supp. at 1158. Based upon this observation, the district court concluded, “[T]he money laundering object of the conspiracy fails to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i).” Accordingly, the district court dismissed the money laundering object of the conspiracy contained in Count One. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction of the dismissal of a portion of an indictment pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 3731. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 n. 23, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2181 n. 23, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Our task is to determine, on plenary review, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order dismissing preliminary objections is interlocutory but an order sustaining them is not (B) holding that an appeal from an order vacating an award while directing a rehearing is an appeal improvidently taken (C) holding appeal from an order dismissing action without prejudice was properly before this court (D) holding there is no statutory barrier to an appeal from an order dismissing only a portion of a count (E) holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
Output: (D)
error, appellant contends the trial court was not an impartial tribunal because of its membership in the Children’s Assessment Center judicial council. In points of error one through three, appellant challenges the trial court’s and the recusal courts’ denials of his motions to recuse and motion for new trial. In points of error four through six, appellant contends the trial court and the recu-sal courts erred by refusing to hear evidence on the motions and allowing the motion for new trial to be overruled by operation of law without a hearing. A.Waiver Initially, the State contends appellant has waived his recusal challenges because he did not comply with the 10-day notice provision of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a. See Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 543, 544-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a. Appellant filed his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 4k2 does apply to admiralty cases (B) holding that 60day time limit for notice of appeal in civil cases not 10day limit in criminal cases applies to  2255 proceedings (C) holding that the rules governing criminal cases apply to  3582c2 proceedings (D) holding that 10day notice provision for motion to recuse in rule 18a explicitly apply to criminal cases (E) holding that action of judge assigned to hear a motion to recuse in signing an order denying the motion was not a proceeding required to be carried out from in the county seat
Output: (D)
act sufficient to satisfy the state-created danger test. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence on which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that an SCPD policymaker announced a policy or deliberately acquiesced to a custom of delegating law enforcement power to liquor licensee personnel. The Plaintiffs have presented evidence of a series of events in which SCPD officers, upon arriving at the scene of a confrontation between individuals and liquor licensee personnel, handcuffed the individuals while taking no direct action against the bar employees. Even if this course of conduct could be taken to establish an affirmative act, we are skeptical that it could satisfy either the causation or mens rea elements of the state-created danger test. See id. at 281 (<HOLDING>). The District Court properly dismissed the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 (B) holding that amtrak was a state actor (C) holding that state action occurs when inter alia the party charged with the deprivation is a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor (D) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (E) holding that the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct and that a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience
Output: (E)
harm. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373; see United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining “threat” as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). The Edwards court specifically held that RCW 9.61.160 does not require proof of a true threat. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 12. Rather, the court indicated that the statute prohibited fighting words. In its analysis, the court noted that RCW 9.61.160 proscribes some protected speech, stating that threats are protected by the First Amendment “unless they are likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace.” Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 17. But the court concluded, without elaboration, that the majority of threats proscribed under RCW 9.61.160 are likely t 276 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (D) holding that it is not (E) holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances
Output: (A)
and he did not “knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Edüd 271 (1986). So denial of immunity cannot rest on those grounds. In my view, the majority’s reversal of the trial judge’s grant of immunity undercuts the interests protected by the immunity doctrine. The purposes of granting qualified immunity include: avoiding “excessive disruption of government,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); giving “a fairly wide zone of protection in close cases,” Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir.1994); allowing officers “reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages,” Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 13 r.2002) (<HOLDING>); Clue v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 57, 60, 61-62 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity on first prong of test despite jury verdict because evidence at trial did not establish unreasonableness of seizures under the fourth amendment (D) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search (E) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity despite their ignoring the arrestees complaints that the handcuffs were too tight
Output: (C)
INA, the predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1) is not of an “aggravated felony,” nor even a “felony.” Instead, the predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1) is of any “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Further, such conviction may be in “any court,” and what “constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Case law interpreting Lope 798, at *4 (W.D.La. Sept.11, 2007) (“Further, since the resolution of petitioner’s predicament does not turn on an interpretation of the ‘aggravated felony’ provisions of the INA, the holding of Lopez, supra, does not apply.”); Maxwell v. Warden, No. 4:06 CV 2844, 2007 WL 546366, at *3 (ND.Ohio Feb.16, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I conclude Lopez does not apply 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the apprendi rule does not apply retroactively in the context of a  2241 petition (B) holding lopez did not apply to csa crimes outside of the ina context (C) holding that the attachment statute which did not expressly reach property beyond territorial limits of state would not be construed to apply to property outside state (D) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (E) holding for crimes committed on or after october 1 1988 the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences
Output: (B)
D.I.B. questioned whether the trial court’s statement of the law regarding probation was accurate. While D.I.B.’s objections were not as specific as they might have been, the objections were adequate to call the issue to the trial court’s attention and to give the trial court an opportunity to cure the error. The error was thus preserved for appeal. IV The court of appeals did not discuss whether the trial court’s misstatement of its power to grant probation was harmful error. A harm analysis should have been undertaken, but a review of the record reflects that harm was adequately demonstrated. Counsel for D.I.B. informed the juvenile court that he would recommend to his client disposition by the court rather than by a jury if the court had the authority to gra Antonio 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>); W.J.M.A. v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399-400 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to give explanation of allegations required reversal (B) holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record (C) holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences was fundamental error that required reversal even though the juvenile had not raised this in his brief (D) holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review (E) holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal
Output: (C)
de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.” Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his ‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.’ ” (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (E) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant
Output: (D)
protected by the Order Amending Protective Order in the Dairyland litigation, sanctions are also appropriate pursuant to the court’s inherent power to enforce its own orders. C. Appropriate Remedies or Sanctions 1. Defendant’s Requests for a Return of All Documents and Bar Against Their Future Use Defendant has asked that the court impose three remedies or sanctions: 1) to require counsel for PG & E to return or certify the destruction of all protected documents, 2) to bar PG & E from using any of the protected documents in future proceedings in this case, and 3) to award recovery of all costs, including attorneys’ fees, incurred due to PG & E’s violation. Def.’s Br. 3-4. As authority for its first request, defendant cites Kramer v. Boeing Co., 134 F.R.D. 256, 258-59 (D.Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>), and for its second request defendant cites 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has the right to an order permitting him to inspect his own written or recorded statements absent a basis for a protective order (B) holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure (C) holding that production of documents without seeking a protective order waives the right to such an order unless there is a showing of good cause for the delay (D) holding for the purposes of the california public records act that a city disclosed all documents in a reasonably timely manner when records that had not been in the citys possession or could not be found were promptly disclosed when they were found or became available (E) holding that counsel for kramer must return or destroy all documents disclosed under a protective order
Output: (E)
have determined, the abstraction-filtration-comparison (“AFC”) test is either unnecessary or simply does not apply in cases of literal copying. See Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1555-56 n. 16 (11th Cir.1996) (explaining that the AFC test “was designed to help assess nonliteral copying of a nonliteral element, not nonliteral copying of computer code (a literal element)”); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir.1995) (“While the [AFC] test may provide a useful framework for assessing the alleged nonliteral copying of computer code, we find it to be of little help in assessing whether the literal copying of a menu command hierarchy constitutes copyright infringement.”); ILOG, Inc. v. Bell Logic, LLC, 181 F.Supp.2d 3, 7 (D.Mass.2002) (<HOLDING>); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that priority of liens whether by mortgage or judgment is governed by the date of acquisition (B) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law (C) holding that if the identical function is not performed literal infringement is not possible (D) holding that literal copying is not governed by the afc test (E) recognizing that it is an open question whether drpa is a federal agency governed by the apa or a state agency governed by state administrative law
Output: (D)
party criminals would not have poisoned tablets or caplets instead). Plaintiffs claim, “[a]l-though masquerading as a claim for ‘better protection against tampering,’ [] is, in reality, a claim for tamper-proof packaging;” yet no such packaging exists. Id. at 162. Therefore, as a matter of law, Am-gen’s packaging of the Epogen could not be found defective in its packaging design. See, e.g. Id. at 162 (rejecting as a matter of law the plaintiffs contention that the packaging of the Tylenol was defective). Moreover, generally, a manufacturer does not have a duty to anticipate and prevent criminal conduct by third parties, or to design its product in such a way as to anticipate and frustrate criminal tampering. See, Elsroth, 700 F.Supp. at 163, 164; see also Cacciola, 127 F.Supp.2d at 190 (<HOLDING>). Further, contrary to plaintiffs contention, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under new york law a manufacturer is not obligated to design a product that is impossible to abuse (B) holding that a divorce granted at a foreign consulate in new york was not valid for immigration purposes because it did not comply with new york law (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that new york law applies to this matter (E) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership
Output: (A)
to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program. See O’Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 (“The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer’s discretion in administering the plan.”); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring “case-by-case, discretionary application” of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer’s obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (<HOLDING>). As such, this factor relates to both the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding benefit program that entailed a purely mechanical determination of eligibility and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an erisa plan (B) holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage (C) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan (D) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (E) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant
Output: (A)
that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2000). Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to move beyond the pleadings and to designate evidence which demonstrates the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial. See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir.2013) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” be considered when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1314 (10th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion (B) holding that hearsay ev idence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion (C) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (D) holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion (E) holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion
Output: (D)
indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.” Id. (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994)). Following Iqbal, courts in this district have held that a defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983 unless that defendant took an action that deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. See, e.g., Joseph v. Fischer, 2009 WL 3321011, at *15, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96952, at *42-43 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2009) (“[pjlaintiffs claim, based on [a supervisor’s] failure to take corrective measures, is precisely the type of claim Iqbal eliminated.”); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54141, at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 26, 2009) (<HOLDING>); Newton v. City of New York, 640 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that iqbal eliminated supervisory liability previously permitted by colon in situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a constitutional violation committed by a subordinate (B) holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983 (C) holding that deliberate indifference standard for imposing supervisory liability based on an eighth amendment violation is consistent with iqbal and collecting cases (D) holding that supervisory liability under  1983 requires a showing that the supervisory official at least implicitly authorized or approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate (E) holding colon standard is unaffected by iqbal in deliberate indifference case because iqbal involved discriminatory intent
Output: (A)
[a] grievance ... opened him up to assault from his fellow inmates”); Carl v. Griffin, No. 08 Civ. 4981, 2011 WL 723553, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2011) (“Defendants’ alleged ‘threats’ and/or ‘harassment’ of Plaintiff were also insufficiently direct or specific to deter an ordinary inmate from exercising his first amendment rights.”); Mateo, 682 F.Supp.2d at 434 (dismissing retaliation claim based on threats that plaintiff “should ‘wait till he put his hands on me,’ and that ‘one day he and I will party’ ”) (internal citation omitted). In fact, this Court has granted summary judgment with respect to a retaliation claim based on a threat nearly identical to Titka’s alleged threat to “get” Barrington. See Bartley v. Collins, 2006 WL 1289256, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2006) (Holwell, J.) (<HOLDING>). Accord Bilal v. New York State Dept. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute (B) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (C) holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action (D) holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous (E) holding that the district courts question do you also understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have the right to appeal any sentence that i impose did not comply with rule llbln and failed to properly notify the defendant about the waiver of his appellate rights
Output: (C)
8 without an apartment would be tantamount to no relief at all. Similarly, a change in NYCHA’s Section 8 termination policies and practices would mean little to plaintiffs who have already lost their apartments. Preliminary injunctive relief thus is essential to aid this Court’s ability to decide the claims and accord the appropriate relief. Id. at 256. Central to the court’s rationale was that the NYCHA was not, and could not become, a party to the state court eviction proceedings, which were between the private landlords and the plaintiffs. Thus, if the eviction proceedings were not enjoined, the court would be “unable to accord meaningful relief to the parties”. Id.; see also Lattimore v. Northwest Coop. Homes Ass’n, No. 90-CV-49, 1990 WL 10521534, at *4 (D.D.C. March 26, 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding (B) holding that the longer appeal period from a judgment controlled over the shorter appeal period in a certiorari proceeding when the two proceedings were consolidated in the district court and the certiorari proceeding was not an independent proceeding (C) holding that the court was not barred from enjoining the eviction proceeding based on the second exception to the antiinjunction act because the plaintiff could not raise her claims as a defense in the eviction proceeding (D) holding that misleading testimony regarding the purpose of a proceeding did not warrant inquiry into the result of the proceeding (E) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding
Output: (C)
CURIAM. Appellant, John Mark Vaughan, Jr., filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines could have been imposed under the valid 1994 guidelines. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to attach the relevant portions of the record to support this finding, which ordinarily would require reversal. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 741 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). However, appellant failed to allege that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a movant successfully challenges an illegal prr sentence in a rule 3800a motion at resentencing the movant is entitled to be present at sentencing represented by counsel with an opportunity to present mitigating evidence (B) holding that burden is on trial court denying a facially sufficient rule 3800a motion to attach record establishing movant is not entitled to relief (C) holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient
Output: (B)
that a “civil cause of action in chancery court” includes the right to a jury trial on issues of fact. Tennessee Code Annotated section 21 — 1— 103 provides: Either paHy to a suit in chancery is entitled, upon application, to a jury to try and determine any material fact in dispute, save in cases involving complicated accounting, as to such accounting, and those elsewhere excepted by law or by provisions of this Code, and all the issues of fact in any proper cases shall be submitted to one (1) jury. Tenn.Code Ann. § 21-1-103 (2009) (emphasis added). This statute has long been understood as affording a broad right to trial by jury in chancery court, even when the statute creating the cause of action does not otherwise expressly provide such a right. See Anderson, 676 S.W.2d at 336-37 (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Wolfenbarger v. Moore, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (B) holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict (C) holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act (D) holding that section 211103 grants a party to an action under the open meetings act the right to trial by jury (E) holding that section 211103 grants plaintiffs in an ouster suit the right to trial by jury
Output: (D)
was approved by the family court; nevertheless, paragraph seventeen originated as “a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration” within the meaning of the statute. The family court’s approval and merger of the agreement into an order does not insulate the arbitration provision from compliance with section 15-48-10(a). Given the strict construction of section 15-48-10 mandated by the supreme court, we conclude the arbitration clause contained in paragraph seventeen of the agreement had to comply with section 15-48-10(a) to be enforceable. See Ebert v. Ebert, 320 S.C. 331, 338, 465 S.E.2d 121, 125 (Ct.App. 1995) (contract principles should be applied to a separation agreement approved by the family court); Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142, 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, it was error for the family 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement (B) holding that an unapproved settlement agreement is binding on the parties even though not yet approved by the court (C) holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis (D) holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established (E) holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship
Output: (C)
770) (2006) (declaratory judgment could not be used to compel ex-husband to provide additional funds to ex-wife). The trial court erred by dismissing Appellants’ request for declaratory judgment on the basis that it impermissibly asked the trial court to interpret a criminal statute and that it imprope injunctive relief — enjoining the arrest or prosecution of Appellants — squarely implicates the administration of criminal law and, thus, is improper. See Mohwish v. Franklin, 291 Ga. 179, 179-180 (728 SE2d 240) (2012) (injunction not available where sought to interfere with an ongoing prosecution); Holmes v. Bd. of Commrs., 271 Ga. 206 (517 SE2d 788) (1999) (injunction not available to restrain trespass prosecution); City of East Point v. Minton, 207 Ga. 495, 499 (62 SE2d 911) (1951) (<HOLDING>). Decided May 9, 2016. John R. Monroe, for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal prosecution is not complete until a sentence has been imposed (B) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (C) holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  (D) recognizing that  ejquity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution solely to prevent such a prosecution  (E) holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct
Output: (D)
court of competent jurisdiction to command the performance of a specified official duty issued by law. See Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 92, 185 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1971). The writ may therefore still be issued by our courts, “and the substantive grounds for granting the remedy as developed under our former practice still control.” Fleming, 23 N.C. App. at 420, 209 S.E.2d at 368. The purpose of a writ of mandamus remains, however, a limited and extraordinary remedy to provide a swift enforcement of a party’s already established legal rights. “Mandamus will not lie unless the party seeking the writ has a clea o damages on any grounds since the repeal of the statutory authority for the writ. As our own Rules of Appellate Procedure indicate, mandamus is intended as a swift remedy, “file 917) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under  33420a (B) holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter (C) holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined (D) holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages (E) holding that absent a false return no damages could be recovered in an action for mandamus
Output: (E)
(quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)). Because we affirmed the denial of qualified immunity in Martinez-Aguero and allowed the case to proceed to trial, the availability of a Bivens remedy was necessary to the decision and is binding Fifth Circuit law. 3 . See, e.g., Escobar v. Gaines, No. 3-11-0994, 2014 WL 4384389, at *4 (M.D.Tenn. Sept. 4, 2014) (“The Court does not have to 'imply' a damages remedy [for undocumented immigrants challenging a raid by immigration officials] — one already exists under Bivens for damages against federal officers who violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.”); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F.Supp.2d 19, 30-34 (D.R.I.2014) (same); Vazquez-Mentado v. Buitron, 995 F.Supp.2d 93, 97-102 (N.D.N.Y.2014) (<HOLDING>); Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F.Supp.2d 106, 111, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied fourth amendment action for damages (B) holding that a mexican national who alleged that she had been illegally arrested and beaten by a border patrol agent may bring a bivens claim for unlawful arrest and the excessive use of force under the fourth amendment (C) recognizing aliens bivens claim for damages under the fourth amendment against the chief border patrol agent arising from the us border patrol buffalo sectors policy which rewarded usbp buffalo sec tor agents with cash vacation time and gift cards for high arrest numbers but not for the legality of arrests (D) recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights (E) recognizing an action for damages against unknown federal agents for the violation of constitutional rights
Output: (C)
253 F.3d 443 (9th Cir.2001) (interpreting whether a delay was “reasonably necessary”); Hondras, 296 F.3d at 602 (stating that there is no dispute that the violation warrant complied with the Warrant Clause). “In construing a statute as a matter of first impression, we first must look to the statutory language:’The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’ ” Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)). Vargas contends that the plain meaning of the term “warrant” means a document that is based upon probable cause and supported by sworn facts. See United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We agree. It is a well-established canon of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning (C) holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning (D) holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning (E) holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts
Output: (D)