niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
have contributed to Farmland’s damages. This argument is insufficient to withstand Mid-America’s motion to dismiss for a number of reasons. First, neither Farmland’s complaint nor the KCC Order suggests that Mid-America’s violation of a tariff provision forms the basis of Farmland’s negligence per se claim. Additionally, Farmland has not cited any authority or presented any meaningful argument to support the proposition that a tariff violation can satisfy the “statute, ordinance, or regulation” element of a negligence per se claim. And, perhaps most importantly, the record of the KCC proceedings does not reveal that Farmland has exhausted its administrative remedies on this issue. See generally Grindsted Prods., Inc. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 21 Kan.App.2d 435, 901 P.2d 20 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court will grant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal (B) holding plaintiff must move before public interests are involved to bring suit for ejectment but allowing single action for past present and future damages (C) holding the kcc must first interpret a tariff before a plaintiff can bring an action in court seeking damages under  66176 (D) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (E) holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void
Output: (C)
§ 65B.51, subd. 1 (2000). Therefore, we reverse the district court’s grant of the motion for a determination of collateral source benefits and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI § 10. 1 . The Minnesota Court of Appeals has interpreted the phrase "the date of the entry of the verdict” to mean the date of the entry of judgment. Wertish v. Salvhus, 555 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn.App.1997), rev’d on other grounds mem., 558 N.W.2d 258 (Minn.1997). 2 . A nonpublished case issued by this court in 1996 directly addressed the issue we must decide here. See Kissoondath v. Ammerman, No. C0-95-1346, 1995 WL 756840, at *5-*6 (Minn.App. Dec.26, 1995) (<HOLDING>), review granted (Minn. Feb. 12, 1996) and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (B) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act (C) holding that tenday deadline applies to motions for a reduction in a verdict brought under the nofault act (D) holding that  3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies (E) holding  3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies and collecting cases
Output: (C)
Id. (citations omitted). To be sure, in making its analysis under Rule 19(a)(1), a court should consider the interests of “the public in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 advisory committee’s notes. Rule 19(a)(1), however, similarly “stresses the desirability of joining those persons in whose absence the court would be obliged to grant partial or ‘hollow’ rather than complete relief to the parties before the court.” Id. In this case, considering Pennsylvania’s joint and several liability rules which supply the governing substantive law, GRC’s failure to name the absent insurers to its suit plainly will not result in it obtaining “partial” or “hollow” relief if it is successful in its suit. See Janney Montgomery Scott, 11 F.3d at 406 (<HOLDING>). To this end, the advisory committee’s notes 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where liability is joint and several among multiple parties complete relief may be granted with respect to any one of them (B) holding that one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and therefore several conspiracies because the agreement envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one (C) holding that the surety of a joint and several bond has direct liability and may be sued individually or collectively (D) recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several (E) holding that all partners are not indispensible parties defendant where state law provides for partners joint and several liability
Output: (A)
Attorney General, Mary Jo Volkert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daniel M. King, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Ray and Self, JJ., concur. 1 U. S. Const, amend. V; see also Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 3, ¶1 (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., _ U. S. _, _ (II) (A) (1) (135 SCt 2419,192 LE2d388) (2015) (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800 years to the Magna Carta . . . .”). 2 See, e.g., Wood v. B & S Enters., 314 Ga. App. 128, 128 (723 SE2d 443) (2012). 3 See Kellett v. Dep’t of Transp., 174 Ga.App. 214, 21 .App. 622, 624-25 (6) (522 SE2d 661) (1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence
Output: (A)
purpose, we would have some authority to solve taxpayer’s problem. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (noting that, to invoke impossibility rule, party “must dem onstrate why this Court should not construe the statute in its ordinary sense or why the consequences of such construction will cause hardship or constitute impossibility”). But our standard under this prudential rule is very limited and does not ordinarily extend to making choices, among many available, to solve the problem. There is simply no way to construe the statute to allow a transfer that occurred 319 days after an LLC’s articles of organization were filed without reading the words “at the time of formation” out of the statute. See Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 VT 5, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 61, 819 A.2d 727 (<HOLDING>). ¶23. It is true that the Department’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) recognizing that though statute at hand does not fully address the problem legislature intended to address in view of the number of choices available to solve the problem    this is an inappropriate case for the court to fashion the particular remedy appellants seek because to do so would place court in the position of making policy choices best left to legislature (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case (E) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language
Output: (B)
to arbitrate is not as broad and expansive as defendants contend. Although I recognize that generally agreements to arbitrate should be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose behind the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., nevertheless, the parties can only be compelled to arbitrate a dispute if in fact they agreed to do so. The necessary inquiry then is whether in fact the parties before the court agreed to arbitrate the dispute contained in this lawsuit. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (“the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so”); State of N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 90 F.3d 58, 62 (2d. Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim was not subject to mandatory arbi tration because the parties specifically excluded it from the general arbitration clause (B) holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court (C) holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract (D) holding that a mandatory arbitration clause does not preclude litigating a federal statutory claim (E) holding that the analogy to arbi tration agreement is not persuasive in part because the principal feature of an arbitration agreement is that the contracting parties agree they will not submit their controversy to a court of law in the first instance
Output: (A)
Apfel, 149 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1998); Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir.1997). Before today, we had not decided whether to adopt either the adjudication or the disability interpretation. See Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir.1999) (electing not to decide between the disability and adjudication interpretations). Today, we adopt the adjudication interpretation. A. Plain Language of Statute The plain language of the Amendments supports the adjudication interpretation. When interpreting congressional statutes, we first look at the plain language of the statute because that is the best way to determine congressional intent. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1245 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The disability interpretation muddles the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language (D) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (E) holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous
Output: (A)
level of 12, under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(7), is based solely on his unlawful possession of firearms, with no weight being given to his trafficking of these, or any related, firearms. “The guideline applied by the court, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 ..., identifies possession alone as a crime.... Thus, the Sentencing Commission recognized that the guideline would be applied to crimes involving mere possession of an illegal weapon, regardless of the circumstances under which it was acquired.” United States v. Dalecke, 29 F.3d 1044, 1047 (6th Cir.1994). Freeman’s base offense level of 12 under § 2K2.1(a)(7) and his four-level enhancement for trafficking pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5) are thus punishing entirely different aspects of his crime. See United States v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hayes, 399 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even without booker constitutional error in the district courts application of the guidelines there could be nonconstitutional error where the court applied the guidelines in a mandatory fashion (B) holding that although the guidelines are not mandatory when applied independently the district court still must adhere to the guidelines insofar as they incorporate the provisions of  3553f (C) holding that the defendants sentence was based on the career offender guidelines despite the fact that the district court calculated an offense level pursuant to the crack guidelines (D) holding that where the defendants sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the district court applies the guidelines as advisory the district court does not err by enhancing the defendants sentence based on facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him (E) holding that no impermissible double counting occurs where each of the guidelines applied by the district court  emphasizes different aspects of defendants conduct
Output: (E)
38 Ill.App.3d 616, 348 N.E.2d 277 (1976) (noting that a co-occupant of premises in which contraband is kept runs a significant risk of facing criminal charges and can, therefore, act in his own interest in the Matlock sense). 27 . Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 28 . Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793; Malone v. State, 163 S.W.3d 785, 797-98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). 29 . Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. Under the Texas Constitution, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that consent was validly given. Id. 30 . State’s Brief on the Merits, at 4. 31 . State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856, n. 22 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 32 . Hubert, 286 S.W.3d at 489. 33 . See Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while a mother could consent to a search of her sons room she did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked footlocker within the room (B) holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom (C) holding that twentyyearold appellants mother had authority to consent to a search of sons bedroom where appellant had agreed to pay 10 per week as rent he had not instructed mother to stay out of his room and mother infrequently entered appellants room to pick up after him (D) holding that although son was eighteen years old and paid rent mother could consent to search of sons bedroom where nothing suggested mother lacked access to room (E) holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will
Output: (C)
have contributed to [Petitioner’s] conviction,” Sawyer, 88 Hawai'i at 329 n. 6, 966 P.2d at 641 n. 6 (emphases added), for attempted murder in the second degree as opposed to attempted EMED manslaughter. The misconstruction of the law and the lack of curative instruction bore directly on Petitioner’s EMED defense. Hence, the reasonable “possibility” that the error “might” have contributed to Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder rather than attempted EMED manslaughter was plainly established. Id. However, because it cannot be said that the prosecutor’s conduct was so egregious that viewed under an objective standpoint, Petitioner was denied his or her right to a fair trial, reprosecution is not barred under the double jeopardy clause. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i at 423, 984 P.2d at 1249 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). XI. Respondent cites to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases (B) holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution (C) holding that appellant was deprived of a fair trial where the jury was instructed in such a way that it was not required to find at least two elements of the offense of capital murder to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that reprosecution is barred where in the face of egregious prosecutorial misconduct it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received a fair trial
Output: (E)
(order) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. Gamez’s equal protection “class of one” claims were properly dismissed because prison administrators have a rational basis for segregating validated gang associates from the general prison population, and Gamez’s assertion that he was the only prisoner required to debrief in order to be released from the SHU is facially implausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (claim must be “plausible on its face”); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (B) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (C) recognizing class of one equal protection claim where ordinance targeted a single individual on basis that state action was irrational and arbitrary (D) holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim (E) holding that montana constitutions equal protection clause protects against arbitrary and discriminate state action 
Output: (C)
C.J. This appeal is from a Court of Appeals decision affirming the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for welfare fraud. Defendant Sharon Campbell contends that the information charging her was constitutionally insufficient. The sole question before us is whether the dollar amount is an essential element of the crime of unlawfully obtained public assistance (welfare fraud) under RCW 74.08.331. The Court of Appeals is divided on the issue. State v. Bryce, 41 Wn. App. 802, 707 P.2d 694 (1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Campbell, 69 Wn. App. 302, 848 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the connection is an element (B) holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim (C) holding that dollar amount is an essential element of welfare fraud (D) holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established (E) holding that the annual dollar value requirement of enterprise coverage is an element of the claim
Output: (C)
(“The strength of the government’s case against the defendant is probably the most critical factor in determining whether an error affected the verdict.”). II. Sentencing Defendant argues that his case should be remanded for resentencing in compliance with the retroactive application of changes in the Guidelines pertaining to crack cocaine. Defendant’s offense level, however, was set not by U.S.C.G. § 2D1.1, the amended provision, but rather by U.S.C.G. § 4B1.1, because of his status as a career offender. Cf. United States v. Ogman, 535 F.3d 108, 108 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We nevertheless observe, and the Government 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines (B) holding that after united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 a sentencing court cannot vary from advisory sentencing range by substituting its own crack cocainepowder cocaine ratio for the 100tol ratio established by congress (C) holding that sentences imposed under the career offender guideline are not eligible for remand under kimbrough and taylor because a sentence under the career offender guideline raises no kimbrough problem (D) holding that it is not necessary to remand for resentencing under kimbrough v united states  us  128 sct 558 169 led2d 481 2007 when a defendants sentence was not the result of the 100tol powder to crack ratio but rather resulted from his status as a career offender under uscg  4blla (E) holding that the career offender guideline could not directly apply when there was an unsentenced conviction but allowing the district court on remand to consider departing from the guidelines in order to sentence a defendant whose conduct delayed his convictions as if the career offender provision applied
Output: (D)
addressing the covenant not to sue continues with a statement that “this Release” does not prohibit an employee from filing a charge with the EEOC, again intimating that the terms are interchangeable. We can easily see how a participant under this Agreement could construe the statement that “[t]his covenant not to sue does not apply to actions based solely under the [ADEA]” as an exception to the general release, not just an exception to the covenant not to sue. Given the lack of clarity in the Agreement, and IBM’s declination to tell Thomforde what it meant by the language, we hold that the Agreement is not written in a manner calculated to be understood by the intended participants as required by the OWBPA. Cf. Cole v. Gaming Entm’t, L.L.C., 199 F.Supp.2d 208, 214 (D.Del.2002) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Agreement is ineffective as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants waiver was knowing and intelligent even when police withheld information from defendant that his attorney sought to consult with him (B) holding that a trial courts order that defendant not consult with his attorney during an overnight recess during trial violated the sixth amendment (C) recognizing fifth amendment right to be informed of right to remain silent to have questions cease and to consult with an attorney before being subjected to psychiatric examination that may be used against defendant in capital sentencing proceedings (D) holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning (E) holding language reciting that employee acknowledges that heshe has been advised to consult with an attorney prior to executing this agreement was insufficient to meet statutory requirement that employer must advise employee in writing to consult an attorney prior to signing the waiver
Output: (E)
John Patrick McClure, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his medical needs and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 241-42 (9th Cir.1989). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on McClure’s deliberate indifference claim because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the treatment chosen by prison officials was medically unacceptable. See id. at 242 (<HOLDING>). The district court properly granted summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (B) holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs (C) holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference (D) holding that disagreement with a doctors judgment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference (E) holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference
Output: (E)
we affirm. Jim’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims rely on the same inference from Officer Piel’s testimony. Officer Piel testified that he spoke with witnesses at the scene and included their statements in his police report. Jim claims that this testimony indicated: (1) that Officer Piel interviewed witnesses in addition to the four who testified at trial, and (2) that the additional witnesses named Jim as the aggressor in the fight. After carefully reviewing the record, we determine, contrary to Jim’s argument, that Officer Piel made no reference to statements made by any non-testifying witness. Where there is no non-testifying witness, there can be no violation of Jim’s right to confront that witness. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, because the record does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (B) holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings (C) holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay (D) holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements (E) holding that the text of the confrontation clause  applies to witnesses against the accused  in other words those who bear testimony 
Output: (E)
39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute’s second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division’s limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute’s second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods
Output: (B)
915 F.2d at 39 n. 4. Perch’s cancer-related civil claims allege the same types of discrimination (gender and disability), and are based on the same type of conduct (refusal to change shift and grant additional sick time) as her CFS-related administrative charge. While the defendant’s acts regarding Perch’s CFS-related disability and her cancer-related disability are different, the difference is only temporal, not qualitative. The MCAD had ample opportunity to investigate both charges, whether or not it actually did so. Accordingly, I conclude that the cancer-related claims survive under the scope-of-the-investigation rule. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 1 . See Beddall v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Edwin v. Blenwood Assocs., 9 F.Supp.2d 70, 72 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may consider a document submitted by a defendant in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity (B) holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint (C) holding that the failure to attempt to prove the authenticity of a document  is significant particularly when the document in question was apparently obtained for removal proceedings rather than a contemporaneously created record of a past event (D) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (E) holding that when  a complaints factual allegations are expressly linked  and admittedly dependent upon  a document the authenticity of which is not challenged that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under rule 12b 6
Output: (E)
litigated and, on appeal, the Second District held that a sperm donor has no right to visitation and that any agreement granting visitation rights was unenforceable. The court explained: [T]he sperm donor is a nonparent, a statutory stranger to the children. Even though the parties entered into ... stipulations, purportedly to give visitation rights to this nonparent, we conclude that agreement is not enforceable. There are numerous Florida cases holding that nonparents are not entitled to visitation rights. See, e.g., O’Dell v. O’Dell, 629 So.2d 891, 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)(reversing visitation for a divorced man and his stepson, noting that “[t]his court has repeatedly reversed orders giving visitation rights to nonparents”); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So.2d 106, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(<HOLDING>); Meeks v. Garner, 598 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian (B) holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation (C) holding that without personal jurisdiction over one parent a court could still decide custody of a child living in the state but could not determine support and visitation (D) holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights (E) holding that parent has custodial right to prevent visitation with nonparent
Output: (B)
to any genuine issue of material fact, and do not challenge the defendants’ exhibits and affidavits in the manner required by Rule 74.03(e). Their, quarrel is with the trial court’s application of the law. Their sole Point Relied On reads as follows: The trial court erred in summarily finding that defendants could unilaterally alter the character of the road easement from a gravel road to a concrete roadway without the consent of plaintiffs, who were co-owners of the easement, because such alteration was in violation of the road maintenance agreement, a 983) (specifically holding that the owner of a dominant estate was not precluded from subdividing property, even though the volume of traffic might increase substantially); Heigert v. Londell Manor, 834 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Mo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Copanas v. Loehr, 876 S.W.2d 691, 696 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that increase in vehicular traffic arising out of the subdivision of the dominant estate was reasonably foreseeable and so did not restrict the rights of the dominant owner (B) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership (C) holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate (D) recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement (E) holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate
Output: (A)
court costs shall not be assessed under certain circumstances in obtaining the return of certain seized or withheld property; and making certain technical correction to the language and style of expressions of certain provisions of the Annotated Code of Maryland.” House of Delegates Bill 902, 1976 regular session of the General Assembly, by the House of Delegates Judicial Proceedings Committee, at 1 (emphasis and alterations in original). This amendment declined to impose court costs on the petitioner if the court "restored” the property "from whom it was taken.” Again, there is no indication that the General Assembly intended to create a private right of action for damages to property resulting from a search and seizure. 5 . Section 306 provided: " 'If, at any time, on a 467 (1991) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding complaint sufficiently pleaded malice where it contained allegations that a police officer unprovoked and without cause while in civilian clothes and without identifying himself threw a rock hitting the side of plaintiffs automobile and that the defendant grabbed mr sawyer and wrestled him to the ground grabbed him by the hair and began hitting him in the face and said that he was going to kill sawyer  (B) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station (C) holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him (D) holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force (E) holding that a police officers tackling of a handcuffed suspect hitting him in the face twice and banging his head on the floor three times was unconstitutional
Output: (A)
SEC under the Investment Advisers Act, and (2) the registration issue was being investig m fails because there was no report within the meaning of the whistle-blower act; thus we need not decide whether the claim involves the violation of a clear mandate of public policy. II. Fiduciary Duties. Rothmeier claims that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that respondents breached their fiduciary duty of good faith (1) by the manner they terminated him from IAI Venture I and IAI Venture II and (2) by converting and reallocating his partnership interests among the remaining partners. Under both Minnesota and Delaware law, all partners owe fiduciary obligations to all other partners. See Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn.App.1998) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 1993); Boxer v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general partners must notify limited partners of partnership opportunity to purchase adjacent property but not addressing whether  9404 requires affirmative consent of partners after such notice (B) holding that the relationship of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity in their dealings (C) holding that partners may not agree to eliminate the fiduciary character of their relationship (D) holding that partners have a fiduciary relationship and are held to high standards of integrity in their dealings with each other (E) holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined
Output: (D)
accordingly consider materials “outside the pleadings” to the extent those materials are necessary to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against the Community Defendants. B. Sovereign Immunity The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is well established. Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir.1995); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing Auth.., 797 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir.1986); see also Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2313, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986) (<HOLDING>). This immunity from suit is based on the view 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity (B) recognizing that the common law sovereign immunity possessed by the tribe is a necessary corollary to indian sovereignty and selfgovernance (C) holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity (D) holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity (E) recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe
Output: (B)
of being performed by the estate representative. See TPS Freight Distribs., Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, 788 S.W.2d 456, 458-59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); see also Solomon v. Greenblatt, 812 S.W.2d 7, 17 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). Thus, to the extent there is a “presumption” regarding survival of a contractual obligation after the death of one of the parties, it is exactly the converse of that advanced by the Estate and adopted by the trial court. Neither the historical treatment of alimony in Texas, nor Texas case law, indicates that the general rules of alimony—i.e., court-ordered spousal support—should apply to contracts for spousal support, particularly the rule that alimony presumptively terminates on the obligor’s death. Cf. Hutchings, 406 S.W.2d at 421 (<HOLDING>). Because Texas law mandates that we apply 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (B) holding that an obligors voluntary unemployment would not affect his child support payments (C) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts (D) recognizing that payments to secured creditors are only required in equal monthly amounts if property to be distributed  is in the form of periodic payments (E) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts and under contract principles payments survive obligors death absent agreement to contrary shown by provisions of contract or surrounding circumstances
Output: (E)
judgment, a party must obtain leave of the court to amend a pleading. Tex.R. Civ. P. 63; Austin v. Countrywide Homes Loans, 261 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (“Once the hearing date for a motion for summary judgment has passed, the mov-ant must secure a written order granting leave in order to file an amended pleading.”). A pleading filed after the summary judgment hearing without leave of court cannot be considered by the trial court. See Taylor v. Sunbelt Mgmt., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (stating “we cannot consider appellants’ pleadings which were admittedly filed after the motion for summary judgment hearing”); W. Tex. Gas, Inc. v. 297 Gas Co., 864 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Because an amendment that is not timely and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition (B) holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding trial court did not err in failing to define manufacture (E) holding trial court did not err by failing to consider amended petition filed after hearing without leave of court
Output: (E)
... to certify the goods or services of any person who meets the standards and conditions which the mark certifies.” In re University of Mississippi, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1909, 1911, 1987 WL 123808 (T.T.A.B.1987). That the owner of a certification mark “cannot refuse to license the mark to anyone on any ground other than the standards it has set,” 3 McCarthy at § 19.96, is an important distinction between the policies embodied in trademarks and certification marks. It is true that certification marks are designed to facilitate consumer expectations of a standardized product, much like trademarks are designed to ensure that a consumer is not confused by the marks on a product. See, e.g. Institut Nat’l Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1889-90 (T.T.A.B.1998) (<HOLDING>). But the certification mark regime protects a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that same likelihood of confusion test applied in the context of trademarks also applies to certification marks (B) holding that the likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendants adoption of a trade dress similar to the plaintiffs the touchstone test for a violation of  1125 (C) holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of  349 claim premised on likelihood of confusion between marks (D) holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion (E) holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion
Output: (A)
To stay a person’s release and trigger a hearing on civil commitment, the IDRA requires only that the warden certify that “suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available.” The warden here certified as follows: “[W]e believe that suitable arrangements for state custody and care over inmate Wigren are not currently available.” The certificate was sufficient on its face, and facial sufficiency is all the statute requires. Cf. United States v. Belknap, 26 Fed.Appx. 600, 601 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam). The IDRA does not provide for judicial review of the certification, or establish standards by which a court could determine whether “suitable arrangements for State custody” are available. Cf. United States v. Vanci er, 515 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Wigren also contends that the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that post conviction hearing act is not available to juvenile proceeding since the child is not convicted of a crime (B) holding that court leave under  6322 is not available to a federal employee summoned to appear in juvenile court in her capacity as the juveniles parent as a party to the proceedings (C) holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available (D) holding that judicial review is not available of the governments certification under 18 usc  5032  as required to initiate a juvenile delinquency proceeding that inter alia an appropriate court of a state  does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles (E) holding juvenile court under statutes then in effect could not acquire jurisdiction in delinquency proceeding in the absence of a delinquency petition filed by the probation officer under an order of the court authorizing the same
Output: (D)
F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir.1983) (noting duress defense “raises broad philosophical issues concerning the nature of voluntary action for purposes of criminal responsibility and the appropriate conditions for holding a person morally blameworthy”; further noting disagreement among state jurisdictions regarding the relation of mens rea and duress). We consider this exposition of the defense compelling and one that we will adopt in this appeal. {13} We also note that we have not uncovered any extrajurisdictional support for Lucero or the State’s argument in this appeal. Even State v 107 (1983) (necessity is a defense to DWI); State v. Olson, 79 Or.App. 302, 719 P.2d 55, 57 (1986) (choice of evils defense available to DUI defendant); State v. Riedl, 15 Kan.App.2d 326, 807 P.2d 697, 699 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Also, see generally Michael J. Yaworsky, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that compulsion is a defense to absolute liability traffic offenses (B) holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability (C) recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim (D) holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence (E) recognizing that miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of routine traffic offenses
Output: (A)
the murder of Captain Azote. It is perhaps true that Adekpe’s story might be more plausible if the letters had confirmed details of these events. (On the other hand, as Adekpe observes, it might be suspicious for a letter to without solicitation recount stories that are several years old and with which the recipient is more familiar than the writer.) But while the IJ was correct to conclude that the letters did not “specifically corroborate” Adekpe’s testimony in that way, she ignored a way in which the letters might make Adekpe’s story more plausible without specifically corroborating its details: by revealing that the situation in Togo after his departure is consistent with the situation he says existed prior to his departure. See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 507 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Togo frequently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel (B) holding that a class of all high school female athletes could not be certified  even if the alleged conduct of the defendant school system was discriminatory  when some female athletes did not share the same goals or interests as the named female plaintiffs because those unnamed female athletes were satisfied with andor benefitted from the alleged discriminatory treatment (C) holding that a letter from an aliens mother stating that elders were asking when the alien would return to undergo female genital mutila tion corroborated the aliens story that she had been pressured to undergo female genital mutilation (D) holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum based on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation because her fear of  being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is wellfounded (E) holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation
Output: (C)