niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event). Yet, the question presented here is whether the crime of involuntary manslaughter is also a crime universally recognized as a “crime involving moral turpitude.” A merely anecdotal survey of court decisions, many of which involve impeachment of witnesses, would suggest that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter is not such a crime, because of the lack of any intent, let alone an “evil intent.” See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y.1929) (involuntary manslaughter does not involve moral turpitude); Carreker v. State, 661 So.2d 784 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Frascinella, 1 Cal.State Bar 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude (B) holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude (C) holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude (D) recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment (E) holding that missouris reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude
Output: (B)
Case Br. 9 (citing Letter from Barbara E. Tillman to Beatrice A. Brickell (Dec. 29, 2003), A.R. Doc. No. 48). Parkdale’s claim that it would not get a satisfactory dumping margin upon review does not merit the court’s consideration because 19 U.S.C. § 1677e contemplates such results. See, e.g., Peer Bearing Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 799, 805-06, 800 F.Supp. 959, 965 (1992) (finding that when resellers choose uncooperative suppliers that are under dumping order, it is irrelevant that such resellers are cooperative in their questionnaire responses). Furthermore, Russel withdrew from the review before its completion and simply does not serve as an example of Parkdale’s “false choice” argument. Cf. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 26 CIT 170, 176, 186 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1339 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, this Court recognizes that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention (B) holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim (C) holding that foreign manufacturer was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before challenging commerces methodology for determining antidumping duty assessment rates because methodology had been previously unsuccessfully challenged at administrative level and additional challenge during review at issue would have been futile (D) holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief (E) holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief
Output: (C)
that Appellant had devoted significant time to criticizing the reliability and methodology of the Commonwealth’s hair comparison evidence, based on Sur-ma’s testimony and that of the state trooper who had collected the hair. See N.T. Trial, 9/6/02, at 54-56, 75-78. The court then observed that the prosecutor’s use of the word “match” in his closing remarks “occurred within the qualifying context of his repeated use of the term ‘similar.’” PCRA Court Opinion at 76. The court determined that the single use of the word “match,” being one fleeting reference within an entire closing argument, did not cause the jury to form a fixed hostility toward Appellant nor prevent the jury from rendering a fair verdict. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 961 A.2d 786, 832 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In accord with the long-standing principle 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a lawyers comments during closing argument may explain away the alleged prejudicial effect of the opposing parties closing argument comments (B) holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made (C) holding that a fleeting reference within the context of an entire closing argument is not prejudicial citing numerous sources of authority (D) holding that to obtain the proper context of a challenged statement made during closing arguments the court must recount in its entirety the portion of the closing argument wherein those statements appear (E) holding that contract providing commission was to be paid within 72 hours of closing did not condition the payment of commission on the closing
Output: (C)
Feb.9, 2005). We need not reach this argument, however, because Outlook has not raised it and has not put forth any defenses that it would be able to assert but for the clause making the agreement “absolute and unconditional.” Instead, Outlook asserts through the affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement and a counterclaim of fraudulent misrepresentation that fraudulent misrepresentations caused it to enter the agreement. This was the only argument made by Outlook both in resistance to summary judgment before the district court and reasserted on appeal. Because this is a defense to contract formation, it may be raised despite the hell-or-high-water clause or a waiver-of-defenses clause. See Colo. Interstate Corp. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 993 F.2d 743, 749 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Uniform Commercial Code § 2A-407, cmt. 5 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted (B) holding hellorhighwater clause enforceable in the absence of fraud or deceit (C) holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit (D) holding rla duty of fair representation claim preempts identical state law claims of fraud and deceit (E) holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract
Output: (B)
in Dow-rick, referring to Restatement, supra, Section 762, said: “The rationale for this rule ‘rests upon fundamental assumptions in free business enterprise. Each business enterprise must be free to select its business relations in its own interest.’ Id., comment a. The Restatement also recognizes that the rule covers a situation involving a lender and borrower. Id., comment d.” Id., 144 Vt. at 512, 481 A.2d at 400-401. The Bank’s privilege to refuse to do business with plaintiffs existed regardless of the motive for its decision. The fact that the Bank may have denied consent because of the earlier lawsuit is immaterial. See Turner Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 98 A.D.2d 88, 469 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1983); see also Posa, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 642 F.Supp. 1198 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Bank was privileged to decide not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that woman has constitutionally protected right to determine for any reason or no reason to terminate her pregnancy (B) holding that there is no right to a setoff against a lawfully imposed condominium charge (C) holding that an atwill employee can be discharged for any reason or no reason unless employee is discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy (D) holding that refusal to maintain trade relations is an inherent right that every person may exercise lawfully for reasons he deems sufficient or for no reason whatever (E) holding that no person can commence or maintain an action in a court of record as agent for another unless he is a regularly licensed attorney
Output: (D)
erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
Output: (A)
the September 5 hearing was insufficient. While the State explained that the crime lab reports were pending based on the analysis of the clothing found at Defendant’s apartment, there was no explanation for the lab’s four-month delay. Officer Campbell also briefly explained the substation was somewhat disorganized because of the “Big I” construction, but he did not elaborate on why this would delay the report. Without providing a record to better explain the delay, the State has failed to meet its burden of persuasion. On balance, we find the State was negligent in failing to provide discovery before mid-September. Therefore, this delay, and the resulting continuance on October 4, 2000, weigh heavily against the State. See Tortolito, 1997-NMCA-128, ¶¶ 12-13, 124 N.M. 368, 950 P.2d 811 (<HOLDING>). {20} On the other hand, the failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding phrase based upon or attributable to is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction (B) holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities (C) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (D) holding unreasonable delays attributable to the states negligence or willfully oppressive conduct in dna testing weigh heavily against the state whereas delays attributable to the labs normal priorities and procedure weigh less heavily against the state (E) holding that comparable provision  502b6 does not literally apply to limit claims of landlord against guarantordebt or and that equities weigh against limiting claim
Output: (D)
according to its terms.” Freelander v. G.&K. Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516 (1970). Thus, Defendant’s liability for breach could not exceed $480 per year, pursuant to the freely-negotiated limitation of liability clause. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore ALLOWED as to Count II. III.Count III: c. 93A Factual questions remain regarding the relationship, if any, between the breach of contract claims and Plaintiffs c. 93A claim. Chapter 93A claims may be grounded in activities more closely akin to either breach of contract or tort actions. A c. 93A claim more closely resembling a traditional breach of contract action is subject to limitation of liability provisions within the contract. See Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 406 Mass. 369, (377) (<HOLDING>). This is because, in purely commercial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a limitation of liability provision in a sales contract was enforceable to bar a breach of warranty claim brought pursuant to glc 93a 11 (B) holding that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in the court of federal claims pursuant to the tucker act (C) holding tenants vacating premises allegedly in breach of a lease was not enough to trigger c 93a liability (D) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (E) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action
Output: (A)
employee status, “summary judgment is appropriate when the remaining factors clearly point to borrowed-employee status.” Billizon, 993 F.2d at 106; Brown, 984 F.2d at 678 n. 5 (“We recognize and reiterate that the terms of a contract and the related factual issues do not automatically prevent summary judgment or direct verdict. If the remaining borrowed employee factors overwhelmingly point to borrowed employee status, a summary judgment or direct verdict is appropriate.”); Alexander v. Chevron, U.S.A, 806 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1986) (“[T]he terms of the contract between the borrowing employer and payroll employer does not ordinarily provide a sufficient basis to deny summary judgment when the remaining Ruiz factors point toward borrowed servant status.”); Gaudet, 562 F.2d at 358-59 (<HOLDING>). Lomeli argues that because Southwest failed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion the court must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law (B) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that this court has power to direct the entry of summary judgment when it would be just under the circumstances (D) holding despite contractual language that sufficient basic factual ingredients are undisputed to warrant the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a circuit courts entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo
Output: (D)
about the cireum-stances surrounding the hiring of Petti-grew to rewrite the airport rules and standards. Thus, their testimony would have been relevant to Turner's claim that the rewritten rules and standards were void because Pettigrew was hired without Ferries' permission. However, as we discussed above, that claim is without merit because the Board possessed independent statutory authority to hire outside attorneys. See supra Part ILA. Consequent ly, Turner could not have prevailed on that claim at trial even if Ferries and Pet-tigrew had testified. Because his claim was without merit, the trial court's exclusion of witnesses to testify about that claim is, at best, harmless error. See Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. S.E. Lab Group, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 615, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Turner also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that remand for explicit findings was not necessary where it was readily apparent that the trial  court accepted one partys testimony and rejected the other partys (B) holding that the trial courts exclusion of evidence about a partys damages was at best harmless error because the partys method of calculating damages contravened indiana law and was without merit (C) holding method of accounting in administering a contract was inadmissible evidence of a partys interpretation (D) holding exclusion was harmless error (E) holding in all cases that where the evidence of guilt was sufficient any error in the exclusion of lastminute evidence and testimony was harmless error
Output: (B)
PA, 265 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (3d Cir.2008) (same; granting summary judgment to defendants under First Amendment); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571 (6th Cir.2005) (confiscation of inmate’s Five Percenter-related mail did not violate his constitutional rights); Cartwright v. Meade, 2008 WL 2944668 (W.D.Va. July 31, 2008) (confiscation of Five Percenter materials from inmate's cell did not violate the First Amendment); Johnson v. Stewart, 2008 WL 828086 (W.D.Mich. March 26, 2008) (confiscation of Five Percenter literature did not violate First Amendment); Talbert v. Jabe, 2007 WL 3339314 (W.D.Va. Nov. 8, 2007) (confiscation of Five Percenter mail did not violate First Amendment); Cooper v. Starling, 2003 WL 23350443, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2003), aff'd, 71 Fed.Appx. 248 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See, e.g., Brown, 265 Fed.Appx. at 110 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute which prohibited polygamy did not violate first amendment (B) holding that a law did not violate the first amendment because it did not burden the exchange of ideas and noting most laws restricting a states initiative process would not implicate the first amendment (C) holding that confiscation of inmates five percenter religious medallion as contraband did not violate the first amendment (D) holding that imposition of government fees did not violate exempt status of religious organization (E) holding that imposition of social security taxes on persons who object to the receipt or payment of public insurance benefits on religious grounds does not violate the first amendment
Output: (C)
Until now, the Sixth Circuit has not settled on a definitive approach to the problem addressed in Sei-bert. Rather, we have been able to avoid the question by finding that the outcomes in the cases before us would be the same under either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s framework. See, e.g., Wooten, 602 Fed.Appx. at 272 (“In addition, this circuit and the First Circuit have avoided ruling on the issue in cases in which the outcome would be the same under either framework ... we conclude that the same resolution is appropriate here.”); United States v. McConer, 530 F.3d 484, 497-98 (6th Cir.2008) (ruling that “neither the plurality nor the concurrence in Seibert supports [defendant’s] Miranda argument”); United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n. 11 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lower court should have suppressed a statement that was obtained to an warrantless arrest made in appellants home (B) holding that regardless of the applicable framework defendants statement must be suppressed (C) holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed (D) holding all evidence be suppressed traceable to the unlawfully seized (E) holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed
Output: (B)
independent advice of her own choosing. In addition, Marilyn and Ball did not inform the brothers of the transfer until after it was completed, thereby depriving Gladys of the brothers’ advice. Proper independent advice in these circumstances means “showing that the donor had the benefit of conferring fully and privately upon the subject of his intended gift with a person who was not only competent to inform him correctly as to its legal effect, but who was furthermore so disassociated from the interests of the do-nee as to be in a position to advise with the donor impartially and confidently as to the consequences to himself of his proposed benefaction.” Merritt, 226 Iowa at 528, 284 N.W. at 404 (citation omitted); see also Luse v. Grenko, 251 Iowa 211, 219, 100 N.W.2d 170, 175 (1959) (<HOLDING>); McGaffee, 244 Iowa at 887, 56 N.W.2d at 39-40 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that additional consideration is a factor in determining whether there is an implied contract of employment (B) recognizing that the acceptance by the grantee of a deed poll signed and sealed by the grantor containing covenants to be performed by the grantee binds the latter to the performance of these covenants as effectually as if he had executed the instrument quotations and citation omitted (C) holding that an interest obtained through an agreement supported by consideration is superior to that of a named beneficiary who has given no consideration (D) holding that independent advice to the transferor is an important consideration where there is a confidential relation between grantor and grantee who is in position of dominance no showing that siblings were made aware of plan to make defendant joint payee of mothers bank account and bonds (E) holding that where the state law has only an indirect effect on the plan and where it is one of general application which pertains to an area of important state concern the court should find there has been no preemption
Output: (D)
opinion issued on April 6, 2005, and issue the following clarified opinion in its place. Maurice Harris appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm the order denying postconviction relief because he never appealed his resen-tence, and the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), is not retroactive. Harris was charged with attempted first degree murder with a firearm (Count I) and armed robbery with a- firearm (Count II). He was 15 years old at the time that the alleged crimes were committed. A jury trial found him guilty as charged. On direct appeal, in Harris v. State, 674 So.2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), this Court vacated the conviction on Count I under the authority of State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>), and remanded the case with instructions to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida (B) holding that attempted felony murder was abolished (C) holding that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in florida (D) holding that attempted felony murder is a logical impossibility (E) holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist
Output: (B)
this distinction, Justice Stevens emphasized that the rale in that case “expressly and unambiguously applie[d] not only to claims based on New York law but also to claims based on federal law or the law of any other State.” Id. at 432, 130 S.Ct. 1431. Here, the prohibition on class-action litigation only applies to claims brought under the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act, and it appears within the same statutory provision that creates the private cause of action. KRS § 337.385(2). Thus, as three district courts have concluded, we assume without deciding that the Kentucky statute’s purported prohibition against class-action litigation is substantive for the purposes of the Rules Enabling Act. See Williams, 199 F.Supp.3d at-, 2016 WL 4184026, at *6-7, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104001, at *19-22 (<HOLDING>); Green, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171647, at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment (B) holding that rules allowing multiple claims to be litigated together  including rule 23  are categorically valid under the rules enabling act (C) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative (D) holding that federal court sitting in diversity should apply fed r crv p 4 rather than conflicting state rule because federal rule was consistent with rules enabling act (E) holding that krs  3373852 prevents class certification under rule 23 in federal court because of the rules enabling act
Output: (E)
676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982); Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 38 V.I. 213 (D.V.I. 1997). In contrast, a fine is a criminal contempt sanction if the amount of the fine is fixed and imposed unconditionally as a punishment for past disobedience. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33 (“An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character.” (citations and quotations omitted)); see also Latrobe Steel Co., 545 F.2d at 1343 (“[T]he penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount . . . .”). Criminal fines are retroactive, and may not be avoided by purging the contemptuous conduct. See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117 (1947) (<HOLDING>). Here, the June 13, 2006, order was phrased in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance (D) holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial (E) holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine
Output: (C)
acts of sexual harassment by the plaintiffs co-workers, about which defendants’ supervisors neither knew nor should have known, does not give rise to a cognizable sexual harassment claim and will not revive an otherwise stale sexual harassment claim. See Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) (“[Because no harassment event occurring during the violation period was ever brought to the attention of [the employer] while [the plaintiff] was still employed, there is no violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct.”). Additionally, the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violations doctrine, because there is no nexus between the conduct of the coworkers in 1994 and the earlier incidents going back to 1992. See Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there being no dispute as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur (B) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself (C) holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between alleged touching incidents by a supervisor and the later conduct of fellow employees (D) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the  entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (E) holding that plaintiff cook at a nursing home had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where she alleged she was fired for expressing concerns that a fellow employee was contaminating the area where she was preparing food
Output: (C)
v. Green, 944 So.2d 208 (Fla.2006), Barrios-Cruz’s motions are still untimely. Affirmed. KHOUZAM and MORRIS, JJ., Concur. 1 . Courts that have concluded that Padilla should be applied retroactively include: People v. Bennett, 28 Misc.3d 575, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2010); Marroquin v. United States, 2011 WL 488985 (S.D.Tex. Feb.4, 2011); United States v. Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625 (E.D.Cal. Jul.l, 2010); United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Ill.2010); Martin v. U.S., 2010 WL 3463949 (C.D.Ill. Aug.25, 2010); and Al Kokabani v. United States, 2010 WL 3941836 (E.D.N.C. Jul.30, 2010). Courts that have reached the opposite conclusion include: People v. Kabre, 29 Misc.3d 307, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2010); United States v. Macedo, 2010 WL 5174342 (N.D.Fla. Dec.15, 2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hough, 2010 WL 5250996 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cage has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding simply that padilla was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review without further analysis (C) holding the supreme court has not held in a case or a combination of cases that the rule in johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review and therefore it has not made johnson retroactive (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that padilla does not announce a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and listing in footnotes three eases finding that padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure and seven cases finding that padilla is simply the application of an old rule
Output: (B)
participation a controverted issue — • one that the jury resolved against him — he never controverted drug quantity, either at trial or during sentencing. Thus, we conclude that the Apprendi error claimed by Carrington “did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings” because the evidence that the conspiracy— indeed Carrington’s personal involvement in the conspiracy — involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was “overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted.” Cotton, — U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1786. “Surely the ... jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.” Cotton, — U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1786; see also Strickland, 245 F.3d at 379 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we note, as did the Court in Cotton, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding factual finding authorizing death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that there was no error at all much less plain error in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal (D) holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction (E) holding that on plain error review the defendants must  demonstrate that the jury would not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants conspired to traffic in at least  50 grams of crack
Output: (E)
this approach have found the refusal to admit wrongdoing a willful and substantial violation because upon becoming aware of the admission requirement, the offender should have made a motion to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment. Staples, 161 So.3d at 562; Mills, 840 So.2d at 466-67; Archer, 604 So.2d at 563. Having done neither, the offender can have his or her probation revoked by the trial court, regardless of whether the offender was made aware of the requirement prior to the entry of the plea. Staples, 161 So.3d at 562; Mills, 840 So.2d at 466-67; Archer, 604 So.2d at 563. On the other hand, the conflict cases consider the program requirement of admitting wrongdoing to be a new, additional condition of probation, not imposed by the trial court. Bennett, 684 So.2d at 243 (<HOLDING>); Bell, 643 So.2d at 675 (“The probation order 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no willful or deliberate violation of probation where probationer was absent from meeting of sex offender program due to inept and negligent conduct (B) recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing (C) holding trial court not required to provide a complete list of each and every term and condition of probation (D) holding defendant was placed in classic penalty situation when he was required as condition of probation to participate in treatment program that required participants to disclose their offense history (E) recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged
Output: (E)
and had played inside another partially constructed house a short time earlier. A jury could infer from this evidence that the partially completed house was attractive to the children. Where differing inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts, summary judgment is inappropriate. See American Motorists, 463 N.E.2d at 1146. The fourth element is whether the owner knows that children do or are likely to trespass upon his property and be injured or whether the facts alleged are such as to charge the owner with constructive knowledge. We have previously held that summary judgment is inappropriate where the question remains whether the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. See Golba v. Kohl’s Dept. Store, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 14, 16 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, trans. denied. The Carrolls 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition a wet floor in the second floor hallway because snow and sleet regularly accumulated there in periods of inclement weather (B) holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time (C) holding plaintiff can prove foreseeability by showing the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the assailants violent nature (D) recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge (E) holding that in the absence of undisputed evidence the issues of whether a store in a slipandfall case had actual or constructive knowledge of an item on the floor is a question reserved for the jury
Output: (E)
to suppress, even though it is not admissible at trial. People v. Lesure, 271 Ill. App. 3d 679, 680 (1995). Moreover, federal law supports defendant’s argument. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides, in relevant part, “Preliminary questions concerning *** the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court ***. In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.” (Emphasis added.) Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). The Supreme Court has explained that no automatic rule precludes the admission of hearsay when a trial court is determining the admissibility of evidence. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 252, 94 S. Ct. 988, 995 (1974); see also United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1975) (<HOLDING>). After reviewing the cases cited by defendant, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (B) holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo (C) holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant (D) holding that hearsay is admissible in an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence citing lara (E) holding that even though a hearing to suppress allegedly illegally seized evidence occurred under a superseded indictment the defendant may not relitigate the motion to suppress after reindictment
Output: (A)
under this section occurs during a single criminal episode, it shall be considered a single offense.” Hence, the amendment provides that a first-time offender who commi ppears to be misleading because it could be read to mean that legislative implementation would be required before the amendment would become effective. The amendment itself, however, actually provides for the amendment’s effective date in subsection (f). Only in subsection (g) are voters made aware that the Legislature is involved with this amendment because it “shall enact such laws as necessary to implement this section.” Thus, the term “legislative implementation” does not accurately describe the proposed amendment’s implementation as set forth in the amendment’s text. See Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d at 1841 (<HOLDING>). Third, the title and summary are also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the summary was too misleading because the phrase to help to pay gave readers the impression that entities other than the sugarcane industry would be sharing in the expense of cleanup but the amendments text called for the levying of a fee on sugarcane processors exclusively (B) holding that the possibility of a mistaken understanding of the phrase preponderance of the evidence on the part of the jury is too remote to constitute plain error when counsel gave the jury an accurate explanation of the legal meaning of the phrase in his closing argument and that meaning is consistent with the common understanding of the words in the phrase (C) holding that if presented with this situation as a matter of first impression the court would not extend the doctrine where the new lender is not a guarantor because in that case the earmarking doctrine does not help either the new creditor nor the debtor (D) holding that virginias statute was expressly limited to entities within the insurance industry (E) holding that the defendants could not be held in contempt for failure to pay more than the fee cap amount because the court cannot order the djefendants to violate an act of congress to pay the total award
Output: (A)
The trial court sustained defendant’s objections to this testimony based on the state of the law as it existed at that time, which was that a psychologist, who is not a medical doctor, is not qualified to render an opinion as to the cause of brain damage. Executive Car & Truck Leasing, Inc. v. DeSerio, 468 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Tomlian, 782 So.2d at 906. The district court reversed the jury verdict for defendants and remanded the case for a new trial, noting that in Broward County School Board v. Cruz, 761 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA), approved, other grounds, 800 So.2d 213 (Fla.2001), the Fourth District had receded from its prior holding in DeSerio, which it now considered to be contrary to the greater weight of authority. See Cruz, 761 So.2d at 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court also rejected the argument 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that publication in the laws of florida or the florida statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions (B) holding that psychologists are not precluded from testifying as to the cause of brain injury based in part upon the district courts acknowledgment that after deserio the florida legislature had broadly defined the practice of psychology in section 4900034 florida statutes 1997 (C) recognizing that the florida legislature had after deserio broadly defined the practice of psychology in section 4900034 florida statutes 1997 and that the decision in deserio was contrary to the current weight of authority (D) holding defendant had requisite contacts under section 481932 florida statutes where it solicited consulting and other services from a florida corporation in which a substantial amount of the services sought by defendant were performed in florida (E) holding that defendants bank account and open line of credit in florida utilized to transfer money in international commerce was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under section 481932 florida statutes where defendant operated its business in honduras had no employees or agents in florida and did not advertise or solicit business in florida
Output: (B)
Parker, we vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing. Nearly a month before trial, Parker opted to waive his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. At that time, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry and allowed Parker to represent himself throughout the trial. However, when the jury returned with the guilty verdict, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing without renewing the offer of counsel. In doing so, the trial court erred. “Once a defendant waives the right to counsel in a criminal case, the court must renew the offer of counsel at each subsequent critical stage of the proceedings, one of which is sentencing.” Serrano v. State, 113 So.3d 895, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ingraham v. State, 32 So.3d 761, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, vacate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (B) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (C) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (D) recognizing that brooks protects against denial of counsel at a critical stage of his trial (E) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver
Output: (C)
positions, the defendants did not, and have not, filed a motion to withdraw the reference. Accordingly, this court finds that any right to a jury trial is waived. Stainer v. Latimer (In re Latimer), 918 F.2d 136 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 863, 112 S.Ct. 186, 116 L.Ed.2d 147 (1991) (court finding a defendant’s request for a jury trial was properly denied where defendants never requested withdrawal of the reference); See In re Chemetco, Inc., 308 B.R. 339 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.2004) (distinguishing Latimer because in Latimer no motion was ever filed, but in Chemetco, the court had discretion on timeliness issue when motion to withdraw reference was filed only seven days after the jury demand); Consolidated Industries Corp. v. Welbilt Holding Co., 254 B.R. 237, 241 (N.D.Ind.2000) (<HOLDING>). 28 U.S.C. § 157 requires that a party file a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (B) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant to withdraw his waiver of jury trial where a lengthy continuance already had been granted (C) holding that a trial courts refusal to withdraw a jury waiver ordinarily does not implicate the federal constitutional right to a jury trial (D) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (E) holding with or without a local rule so requiring failure to file motion to withdraw the reference when jury demanded was a waiver of right to jury trial
Output: (E)
a “financial institution” and a “financial participant.” JPMC unquestionably fits the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “financial institution.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (defining “financial institution” to include a “commercial bank”). JPMC also is a “financial participant” because it is a party to outstanding safe harbor contracts totaling at least $1 billion in gross notional or principal dollar amount. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A) (defining “financial participant”). That JPMC fits the applicable definitions for safe harbor protection is not in dispute, and the Amended Complaint concedes this point. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 10 (identifying JPMC as a “financial institution”); ¶ 76 (identifying JPMC as a “national banking association chartered under the laws of the United States”); ¶¶ 66-67 (<HOLDING>). B. The Clearance Agreement, the August 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (B) recognizing that although walt disney world wdw was a corporate entity separate from disney companys other subsidiaries sufficient promotion of wdws business by the other subsidiaries could support jurisdiction and remanding for a hearing on the extent to which the subsidiaries furthered wdws enterprises (C) recognizing the extent of jpmcs derivatives obligations to lbhi and its subsidiaries (D) recognizing that the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private (E) holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea that section 24 fifth preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts
Output: (C)
who agreed to purchase the property “as is” and assumed the risk of properly determining the property’s value); Isaacs v. Bishop, 249 S.W.3d 100, 110 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (suggesting the appellee was negligent for failing to read a promissory note, but still upholding rescission based on fraud by the appellant). Contrary to the Commission’s argument, the proportional responsibility of the parties to investigate does not negate a finding of misrepresentation. See Pleasant v. Bradford, 260 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied) (concluding that “[t]he opportunity to conduct an independent investigation of a representation, without more,” does not negate a finding of fraud); Barber v. Keeling, 204 S.W. 139, 140 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion On the record before us, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding majority shareholder liable when he used his control of the board for the malicious purpose of  preventing dividends and otherwise lowering the value  of the stock of the minority shareholders (B) holding that the director of a bank and friend of the appellee was liable for misrepresentations about the value of stock despite evidence tending to show that appellee could by an investigation have ascertained the falsity of the representations (C) holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date (D) holding when defendant raised affirmative defense of total failure of consideration that even assuming the acquired stock became worthless the worthlessness of the stock did not constitute a failure of consideration when in exchange for note defendant received 2500 shares of stock   as well as all the rights privileges and benefits of a shareholder director and officer emphasis supplied punctuation omitted (E) holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale
Output: (B)