niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
physician-patient privilege statute is highly speculative, see Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 408, 72 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1955), the policies of Schmerber and Oevering are simply inappo-site to the question of medical privilege. 3 . Where exceptions to a statutory privilege are concerned, the court “prefer[s] * * ⅜ to defer a policy determination * * ⅝ to the legislature.” Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d at 420. This court has ultimate authority over eviden-tiary questions including privileges under the Minnesota Constitution, State v. Erickson, 589 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn.1999), but generally defers to statutory evidentiary rules as a matter of comity. See State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Minn.1990). 4 . See, e.g., Indep. Petrochemical v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D. 292, 295 (D.D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>); Anas v. Blecker, 141 F.R.D. 530 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication (B) recognizing that not all correspondence between a lawyer and a client are privileged depending on whether the two have a personal relationship separate and apart from the lawyerclient relationship (C) holding an attorney who carries on representation of an existing case after a law firm dissolves does so on the firms behalf and any income derived from the case belongs to the dissolved firm (D) holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control (E) holding that letters from insureds attorney to accounting firm not privileged under the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the communication and compelling production
Output: (E)
of a billing statement from Mr. Stanley. See id. Mr. Warren’s failure to provide the itemized statement either directly from his former attorney or supported by an affidavit from his former attorney is not necessarily fatal to his application. Amendment to an EAJA application is available where it “ ‘ar[i]se[s] out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth’ in the initial application.” Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 418-19, 124 S.Ct. 1856 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)). This is not a case where the appellant wholly failed to address a statutorily articulated EAJA requirement; here, the appellant submitted a list that was technically deficient in that it is not clear that it is “from any attorney.” See Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). An amended application providing an itemized 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (B) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (C) holding that a mere statement that the appellant is a prevailing party satisfies eligibility requirement for jurisdictional purposes (D) holding that handcuffing satisfies this requirement (E) holding that a remand due to an intervening court decision did not render the appellant a prevailing party for eaja purposes
Output: (C)
not stand for long periods of time. Sears offered to further accommodate Llanes by providing him with a stool or a wheelchair while in the store. Llanes rejected these accommodations as well. In short, Llanes refused to consider any of Sears’ proposed reasonable alternatives and, instead, insisted that he be provided with the accommodation of his choice. The ADA, however, does not give a disabled employee such a right. As previously stated, an employee cannot make his employer provide a specific accommodation if another reasonable accommodation is offered. Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800-02, (6th Cir.1996), citing Ansonia Bd. of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69, 107 S.Ct. 367, 371-72, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see also Kemer v. Johnson, 900 F.Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>), aff'd., 101 F.3d 683 (2d Cir.1996), cert. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ada may obligate employer to reassign disabled employee who can no longer even with reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of her job (B) holding that once a reasonable accommodation is made the employer has fulfilled its obligation under the ada (C) holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation (D) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada (E) holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation
Output: (B)
Welliver was originally entered into by Wellco, Inc. as Welliver’s predecessor. 4 . Ward is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Bloss-burg, Pennsylvania. 5 . A “turn-key” project is one “in which all owner need do is 'turn the key' in the lock to open the building with nothing remaining to be done and all risks lo be assumed by contractor.” Black's Law Dictionary 1055 (6th ed.1991). 6 . Welliver is located in Elmira, New York. 7 . Ward Excavating is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business located in Troy, Pennsylvania. 8 . The phrases "peculiar risk” and "special danger” are used interchangeably. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 comment a (1965); Ortiz v. Ra-El Dev. Corp., 365 Pa.Su per. 48, 528 A.2d 1355, 1357 n. 2 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Nowhere in their Brief in Opposition to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (B) holding corporation that contracted with independent contractor not liable to subcontractors employee plaintiff was unable to establish that peculiar risk or special danger caused injury (C) holding in part that the liability insurance company of the subcontractor which had named the general contractor as an additional insured on the subcontractors policy was liable to reimburse the general contractor for a settlement payment the general contractor had made to the subcontractors employee (D) holding that contract charged primary contractor with a duty of care for all employees on the work site including employees of its subcontractors where contract required primary contractor to comply with applicable state and federal safety statutes and regulations made primary contractor responsible for reviewing safety programs of its subcontractors and primary contractor employed a safety officer to oversee its subcontractors operations (E) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors
Output: (B)
lower courts are generally in agreement that it is not appropriate to award monetary damages for Title VI violations. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F. 2d 1185 (CA7 1981) (Title IX case), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 937 (1982); Drayden v. Needville Independent School District, 642 F. 2d 129, 133 (CA5 1981); Nabke v. HUD, 520 F. Supp. 5, 10-11 (WD Mich. 1981); Concerned Tenants Assn. v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 526-527 (ND Ill. 1980); Rendon v. Utah State Dept. of Employment Security Job Service, 454 F. Supp. 534 (Utah 1978). See also C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 317 (1980); 2 N. Dorsen, P. Bender, B. Neuborne, & S. Law, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 608 (4th ed. 1979). But cf. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969, 977-979 (CA8 1982) (<HOLDING>); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that post2001 new york was clearly subject to suit under section 504 of the rehabilitation act (B) recognizing there is some confusion among the circuit courts as to the availability of damages under  504 of the rehabilitation act and without expressing an opinion on the matter noting that courts generally agree damages are available for violations of  504 (C) holding that damages may be recovered under  504 of the rehabilitation act of 1973 which was considered to be closely analogous to title vi (D) holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi (E) holding that punitive damages may not be awarded  in suits brought under  202 of the ada and  504 of the rehabilitation act
Output: (C)
rights, so long as it is done so knowingly and voluntarily. Cf. Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So.2d 850, 858-59 (Fla.2007) (allowing homeowners to waive their constitutional rights to homestead exemptions in certain circumstances as long as it is done knowingly and voluntarily); In re Shambow’s Estate, 153 Fla. 762, 15 So.2d 837, 837 (1943) (“It is fundamental that constitutional rights which are personal may be waived.”); Hartwell v. Blasingame, 564 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (allowing homeowners to waive their constitutional right to homestead exemptions). And the Restaurant, as a subsequent lessee, is bound by the prior owners’ waiver of those rights in exchange for the after-the-fact permits. Cf. Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 918 So.2d 988, 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the County argues that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the owners at the time the land was seized are owed compensation rather than the subsequent purchasers (B) holding that subsequent property owners were bound by prior owners agreement to restrict building density and preserve certain portions of land as a condition of the original zoning approval (C) holding that the property owners duty of reasonable care included maintaining the automatic doors into the building and concluding that disputes of material fact remained as to the property owners constructive notice that the automatic doors were closing too quickly (D) holding that a challenge by taxpayers and property owners to the issuance of municipal bonds was barred by a judgment entered in a prior action (E) recognizing that where the location of a deeded right of way is uncertain it may be clarified by the agreement of subsequent owners
Output: (B)
INS 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (1999)) (emphasis in original). This Court has recognized that unwillingness or inability to control persecutors is not demonstrated simply because the police ultimately were unable to solve a crime or arrest the perpetrators, where the asylum applicant failed to provide the police with sufficiently specific information to permit an investigation or an arrest. See, e.g., Truong v. Holder, 613 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir.2010) (declining to conclude that the Italian government was “complicit in or unwilling to stop” the applicants’ persecution, where the police dutifully made reports after each incident and indicated that they would investigate, but where the attackers’ identities were completely speculative); Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, in Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the applicant had not demonstrated the government was unable or unwilling to control the perpetrators where he contended that the police failed to investigate his reports but admitted that he did not give the police the names of any suspects because he did not know any specific names and his wife testified that the police investigated the complaints but were ultimately unable to solve the crimes (B) holding alien failed to show the government was unable or unwilling to control the attackers where police came to aliens location when they were called and no further action was taken which could have been due to a lack of suspects (C) holding that a defendant may plead guilty even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime (D) holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them (E) holding that a suspects statements to the police to the effect that his constitution will protect him that the police have nothing along with his negative response to a police question whether he had anything to say about what he was being arrested for followed by his question who said i did this did not amount to a clear invocation of the right to remain silent under davis
Output: (A)
and that he acted alone in pulling the trigger. The affiants also indicated that there were no heated discussions between Mr. Cool and any other persons prior to the firing of the fatal wound by Mr. Cool. The depositions of Ms. Wilkins and Mr. Coffinbarger also assert that Mr. Cool was acting alone as he pulled the trigger. 2 . The Appellant bases this speculation primarily upon evidence of holes in the kitchen wall behind the seat occupied by the decedent immediately prior to his death. The Appellant submits that such holes indicate a possible struggle of some sort. Christopher Coffinbarger testified during his deposition, however, that he struck the wall with his fists in frustration after the decedent lulled himself. 3 . See Lennon v. Pieper, 411 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). 4 . One night prior to his death, the insured 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intervening act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendants negligence thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury (B) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (C) holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury (D) holding that in negligence actions florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation ie they require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that citys negligence in determining the legal status of plaintiffs property wasnt negligence in the operation of the storm drain that city installed on that property because citys negligence was unrelated to actual operation of storm drain
Output: (A)
it was unnecessary to the outcome of the case. Id. at 507 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597. Clarifying its precedent, the Supreme Court stated an ex post facto violation does not rest on an inmate’s lost opportunity to reduce prison time but, rather, only upon a finding that legislation retroactively modified the definition of or increased the penalty for an inmate’s crime: After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ nor ... on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s ‘opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,’ but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the. penalty by which a crime is punishable. Id. See also id. at 514, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Supreme Court has never 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause (B) holding the application of change in law regarding the timetable for being eligible for parole board hearings was not an increase in punishment violative of the ex post facto clause (C) holding change in ultimate parole decisionmaker from board to governor does not violate ex post facto clause (D) holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation (E) holding that a change in parole law violates the ex post facto clause if the change in the law created a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes
Output: (B)
find a scheme to defraud. He also conceded in his brief that either Pastor Holmes or the Greater Hope Baptist Church could be classified as the victims of his fraudulent scheme. He argues that there was insufficient evidence of the victim’s travel and that the district court erred in its instruction on this issue. He also asserts that there was insufficient evidence of inducement. A. Basic to Thomas’s arguments regarding the victim’s travel is an issue inherent in each. Both Thomas and the government agree that to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314, the defendant must induce the victim to travel in interstate commerce. Id. at 164. Thomas argues that Mukes’s travel cannot satisfy the interstate travel requirement of § 2314 because Mukes was not the victim of the fraud. The government th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We agree with our sister circuits that travel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it (B) holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal (C) holding that travel by an agent of defrauded corporation is imputed to the victim (D) holding that  10b applies to fraud on corporation by controlling stockholder and that the fact that creditors of the defrauded corporation may be the ultimate victims does not warrant disregard of the corporate entity (E) holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation
Output: (C)
(11) In any other situations were representation is constitutionally required. (b) The public defender, after being satisfied of the person’s inability to procure sufficient funds to obtain legal counsel to represent him, shall provide such counsel. Every person who requests legal counsel shall sign an affidavit that he is unable to procure sufficient funds to obtain legal counsel to represent him and shall provide, under oath, such other information as may be required by the court, the public defender, or the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 16 P.S. § 9960.6. The Public Defender argued that its appointment as counsel conflicts with this Court’s decision in Dauphin County Public Defender’s Office v. Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, 578 Pa. 59, 849 A.2d 1145 (2004) (<HOLDING>). While acknowledging that it was not directly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal (B) recognizing the transfer of jurisdiction to the commonwealth court of those classes of cases previously heard by the court of common pleas of dauphin county as the court wherein the seat of state government is located (C) recognizing the court of common pleas of dauphin county as the predecessor to the commonwealth court (D) holding in considering a writ of prohibition that the court of common pleas lacked authority to dictate to the county public defenders office criteria for representation of applicants seeking its services (E) holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office
Output: (D)
40 (1983)). The result obtained governs the determination of which party prevailed, and “the fairest test to determine who is the prevailing party is to allow the tria 45-46 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011) (“[Ajppel-lant was entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in the case.... Like Val-carcel, the dismissal in this case was not an adjudication on the merits, since it was a dismissal without prejudice. Under Val-carcel, however, a defendant may ‘prevail’ even where the case is not dismissed on the merits. The fact that the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice was sufficient to trigger appellant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under the rental contract.”); Baratta v. Valley Oak Homeowners’ Ass’n, 891 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Alhambra Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties entitled to attorneys fees for successfully securing a remand of the attorneys fees issue because the ruling was unrelated to the merits of the plaintiffs claim and the issue was not significant nor a benefit the plaintiffs sought in bringing their action (B) holding that a defendant homeowners association was the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees when a plaintiff homeowners action was dismissed for failure to prosecute (C) holding that the defendant became the prevailing party and thus properly claimed attorneys fees when the plaintiffs claim was involuntarily dismissed for failure to prosecute (D) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (E) holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action
Output: (C)
drug use. For example, in People v. Conrad, the intermediate appellate court of Michigan concluded that a defendant who used PCP four or five times in the two weeks before committing a murder could invoke a settled insanity defense. 148 Mich.App. 433, 385 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1986). The court held that “a ‘settled condition of insanity caused by drug abuse, even if temporary in nature, may nevertheless be legal insanity if the condition was not limited merely to periods of intoxication.” Id. See also Porreca v. State, 49 Md.App. 522, 433 A.2d 1204, 1208 (1981). In People v. Kelly, 10 Cal.3d 565, 111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875, 876-77 (1973), the Supreme Court of California upheld a similar statement of settled insanity. See also State v. Smith, 260 Or. 349, 490 P.2d 1262, 1264 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Kiley v. State, 860 So.2d 509, 511 n. 3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense (B) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (C) holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate (D) holding that the 1994 amendments changed the burden of proof for the defense of insanity (E) recognizing a settled insanity defense where use of intoxicants were deemed to produce insanity either permanent or intermittent at the time of the offense
Output: (E)
511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of § 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts’ case, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
Output: (B)
advertised and conducted the sale). Moore’s action is not moot. 7 . When consideration is so inadequate that it shocks the conscience of the court, the sale is void and will be set aside. See Hamilton v. Patterson, 236 S.C. 487, 494, 115 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1960) ("It is well settled in this State ‘that inadequacy of price, unless so gross as to shock the conscience of the court or accompanied by circumstances from which fraud may be clearly inferred, will not justify the overthrow of a judicial sale.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hughes v. Wilburn, 156 S.C. 443, 153 S.E. 487 (1930) (ruling a bid one-eightieth of the inventoried value of the property was so grossly inadequate as to be shocking to the court); Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Graham, 291 S.C. 178, 352 S.E.2d 511 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In limited circumstances, however, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale (B) holding sale price of 48100 received for mortgaged property subsequently appraised at 73000 was not so inadequate as to shock the conscience or to give rise to inference of fraud so as to require that judicial sale be set aside (C) holding that the court should in the absence of fraud or improper dealing or clear inadequacy of price as of the time the sale is made or some valid legal objection sustain the trustee and ratify the sale (D) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser (E) holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper
Output: (B)
the application portion of the charge, it did not include them in the abstract portion of the charge setting forth the substantive law of indecency with a child. Moreover, the charge included the required specific intent to arouse or gratify in the application portion, along with the erroneous “intentionally and knowingly” language. The charge also correctly addressed extraneous offense evidence, the indictment, statements of the court and of counsel, the presumption of innocence, the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given their testimony, and the burden of proof. Consequently, within the context of the entire jury charge, the erroneous application paragraph appears less harmful. See id.; see also Fulcher v. State, 274 S.W.3d 713, 718-19 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the state of the evidence, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that charge error that allowed jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense caused egregious harm (B) holding that sentencing error did not affect defendants substantial rights because error did not result in longer term of imprisonment (C) holding that error in omitting requisite mental state from application paragraph of charge did not result in egregious harm (D) holding charge error which authorized jury to convict without finding every requisite element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt was egregious based on the entirety of the charge the contested evidence and the arguments of counsel (E) holding jury charge error consisting of disjunctive submission of three separate sexual assault offenses without unanimity instruction caused egregious harm to defendant
Output: (C)
that she disapproved of what she reasonably believed to be unlawful retaliation. B. Form and Context To the extent that Thomas’ conduct was expressive, the message was communicated to her immediate supervisor, Miller, and other court employees. She did not, however, attempt to inform the general public about the allegedly retaliatory practices. That Thomas chose to convey her views privately rather than publicly is not determinative of whether her expression is entitled to protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979). Because content is the most important factor, we have concluded that speech about a matter of public concern may be protected even when made in a private context. See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>); Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected (B) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged (C) holding that a memorandum given to the employees supervisors was protected speech when the memorandum alleged criminal wrongdo ing (D) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (E) holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court
Output: (C)
of discretion a district court’s decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1238. We construe liberally pleadings filed by pro se litigants. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Amendment 706 lowered the base offense level for drug offenses involving crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2007); U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). When, as here, a “motion for sentence reduction is not a direct appeal or a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the viability of [the court erred by not considering his exemplary postconviction conduct, we first note that he did not raise this claim in the district court. Consequently, we do not consider it. See United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 837 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because the district court did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report (B) holding defendant waived alleged factual inaccuracies in presentence report by failing to raise them in district court (C) holding that the district court committed plain error in relying solely on the factual description in the presentence report (D) holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court (E) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient
Output: (B)
by the Motor Carrier Act”). I. Allegations in Complaint The court notes initially that in the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]t all times relevant TBC was not a ‘motor carrier’ as that term is used in the ’Motor Carrier’ exemption of the FLSA.” (Compl. Par. 11). Plaintiffs further allege that “[a]t all times relevant, the armored truck messengers were not covered by the Motor Carrier exemption of the FLSA.” (Compl. Par. 11). Such allegations in the complaint are legal arguments and legal conclusions rather than factual allegations. Thus, even if this court were to proceed under the motion to dismiss legal standard, such assertions by Plaintiffs in the complaint would not be controlling at this juncture. See Cty. of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Hickey v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged (B) holding that at the motion to dismiss stage a court is not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions (C) holding that a court is not bound to accept as a true legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation and should disregard mere conclusory statements (D) holding prior to twombly that courts were not required to accept the truth of legal conclusions contained in a plaintiffs complaint (E) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences
Output: (B)
could be made. The psychologist also acknowledged that appellant’s recent good grades could be an attempt “to por tray a very favorable impression” in light of his pending charges. The record also is replete with evidence that appellant’s defiant and uncooperative behavior continued during his detention and the investigation of this matter by providing different and conflicting versions of his involvement in the offense and his involvement in the gang to police officers and certification 4, 711 (Minn.2008) (stating that consideration of pre-offense voluntary programming and “defiant and uncooperative behavior during [defendant’s] detention” relative to the “programming history” factor was not an abuse of discretion); In re Welfare of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). The majority is correct that section 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering juveniles failure to participate in school programs and affiliation with gangs under the programming history factor (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (C) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion when considering the reactive nature of the federal claim (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action (E) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court
Output: (A)
64 F.3d at 122. The court further noted that the attorney was not an imposter, in that he had graduated from an accredited law school, was originally certified by California as competent to practice law, had practiced law for a decade, and had been tested and found knowledgeable about Pennsylvania law. It also noted that his breaches of conduct were unrelated to his representation of the client. See, also, Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 960, 113 S. Ct. 1383, 122 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1993) (declining to find per se ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney represented client while disciplinary proceedings were pending against him and was then suspended following trial due to health concerns); Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (B) holding representation at a suppression hearing by lawyer disbarred on final day of hearing not per se ineffective (C) holding appellant waived argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing (D) holding representation by attorney who met all requirements for obtaining license but failed to take oath for admission not per se ineffective distinguishing circumstance from representation by someone impersonating lawyer (E) holding objection need not occur at suppression hearing
Output: (B)
show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant’s employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination.” Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997); see Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811, 124 S.Ct. 53, 157 L.Ed.2d 24 (2003) (“[T]he question [on summary judgment'is] ... whether the evidence, taken as a whole, supports a sufficient rational inference of discrimination. To get to the jury, it is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must also believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). “Though the plaintiffs ultimate burden- may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification (B) holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith (C) holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor (D) holding summary judgment in favor of defendant was appropriate where plaintiff failed to present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that age was a determinative factor in adverse employment action (E) holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege
Output: (D)
that a debtor contribute disposable earnings. Therefore, according to Price, equating “ability to pay” with substantial abuse is an impermissible exercise of the court’s equitable powers in violation of the statutory scheme. As neither of these arguments were made to the bankruptcy court, we need not consider them. See Parker v. Comty. First Bank (In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc.), 123 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir.1997). In any event, Price’s argument that the Kelly court assumed individual debtors not engaged in business could not file under chapter 11 assumes the Kelly court would have followed Wamsganz. However, at the time Kelly was decided, authority in this circuit was to the contrary: see Warner v. Universal Guardian Corp. (In re Warner), 30 B.R. 528, 529 (9th Cir. BAP 1983) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073, 1074 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 (B) holding that individual debtors may use chapter 11 to save the family home from foreclosure (C) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (D) holding consumer debtors may be eligible for chapter 11 under certain circumstances (E) holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home
Output: (B)
(1993). This privilege has been given an “expansive reach” by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the “plaintiff’ to “plead around” this “absolute barrier.” See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A “communication[ ] preparatory to or in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege
Output: (A)
in this sense, inasmuch as he has alleged an imminent violation of his statutory right to personal privacy within the trial court’s power to enjoin. “Standing” can also refer to various judicially-created limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). It is not, however, standing in this so-called prudential sense with wh out the phrase, in Rector v. City of Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1979) (<HOLDING>). The question thig case presents is who, aside 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonindustrial property owners did not have standing under the asserted statute to challenge an annexation (B) holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change (C) holding that petitioners who asserted neither a property interest nor a possessory interest in property searched or seized were not entitled to assert a constitutional challenge to the search (D) holding annexation ordinance void (E) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract
Output: (A)
within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact____” The purpose of Rule 36 requests for admissions “is to allow for the narrowing of issues, to permit facilitation in presenting cases to the factfin-der and, at a minimum, to provide notification as to those facts, or opinions, that remain in dispute.” Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 457-58 (D.Minn.1997). As such, requests for admissions are similar to stipulations in the pretrial order. See Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp. v. Estee Lauder Co., No. 00CIV.5960(RMB), 2001 WL 521832 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001); O’Neill v. Medad, 166 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.Mich.1996). Rule 36, strictly speaking, may not (W.D.Tenn.1989) (<HOLDING>). A substantial number of other courts, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 36 requests for admissions are not included within the parameters of a general cutoff for discovery in a scheduling order (B) holding trial courts general charge concerning requests for admissions was a correct statement of law (C) holding that any general deadline for completion of discovery facially applies to requests for admissions (D) holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates
Output: (A)
than English, “also has in his or her immediate possession a valid international driving permit.” Appellant does not claim that he has a valid license from any state or country or that he was otherwise exempt from the licensing requirement when he was cited. 5 Although Appellant stipulated that he has been living in this state for over ten years, he is not a Georgia “resident” for purposes of the drivers’ licenses chapter of the Georgia Code. See OCGA §§ 40-1-1 (35) (“ ‘Nonresident’ means every person who is not a resident of this state.”), 40-5-1 (15) (“[N]o person shall he considered a resident for purposes of this chapter unless such person is either a United States citizen or an alien with legal authorization____”). See also Diaz v. State, 245 Ga.App. 380, 383 (537 SE2d 784) (2000) (<HOLDING>); John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dept. of Public Safety, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 (B) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (C) holding that an illegal immigrants status as a nonresident does not create an exemption allowing him to drive without a valid georgia license (D) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (E) holding that an slc members status as a defendant does not create a lack of independence
Output: (C)
power to determine whether claimants to a share of decedent’s stock in a Native American Corporation are adopted children. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 57-58 (Alaska 1977). The Alaska court also, in Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938, 98 S.Ct. 426, 54 L.Ed.2d 297 (1977), held state courts were without jurisdiction to determine whether claimants to oil royalties were members of a Native Village. In Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 192, 525 P.2d 217 (1974), the court held that jurisdiction under Public Law 280 existed to terminate the parental rights of reservation Indians. See also In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); Duluth Lumber and Plywood Co. v. Delta Development, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1979) (<HOLDING>). Voorhees v. Spencer, 89 Nev. 1, 504 P.2d 1321 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the wisconsin supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that public law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction to the state of wisconsin to commit burgess an enrolled member of an indian tribe as a sexually violent person (B) holding that state failed to assume even partial jurisdiction in compliance with public law 280 (C) holding that pursuant to amended public law 280 a tribe must consent to state court civil jurisdiction over actions arising against member indians in indian country (D) holding the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to hear a dispute by a materials supplier against a contractor in an indian housing agency under the authority of public law 280 (E) holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation
Output: (D)