niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
in the majority opinion with one exception. I dissent from the majority’s harmless error analysis of the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) adverse credibility finding with respect to Carmickle. Maj. Op. at 1159-67. A. The Majority Applies an Incorrect Harmless Error Test. An ALJ’s error is harmless if, in light of the record-supported reasons supporting the adverse credibility finding, we can conclude that the ALJ’s error did not “affect! ] the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.2004); see also Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (9th Cir.2006) (describing the harmless error test as whether “the ALJ’s error did not materially impact his decision”); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The majority disagrees. Instead, the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that procedural sentencing error is harmless if the resulting sentence is not longer thanthat to which the defendant would otherwise be subject alterations and internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted (C) holding that an error is harmless if it was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that the petitioner may not turn a clerical error into a windfall of rights it would not otherwise enjoy internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (C)
determination of whether equity exists to support the second lien depends on the valuation of both the first secured claim and the collateral. Fairness and common sense require that both of these valuations be made as of the same date; otherwise, the comparison fails. Accordingly, cases where courts have considered the proper date of valuation for purposes of determining whether equity is available to support a junior lien are relevant to the Court’s consideration of this issue. The Debtors cite four cases in their submission, one of which is inapplicable and two of which actually support the Defendant’s position. One of the cases does not address the proper timing of the valuation of the first lienholder’s claim or of the collateral. In re Dolinak, 497 B.R. 15 (Bankr.D.N.H.2013)(<HOLDING>). Another holds that the proper date for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (B) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (C) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (D) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien (E) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge
Output: (D)
that reimbursement rates for many services are already set below providers' costs. (See, e.g., Yelamanchili Decl. ¶ 10; Coughlin Decl. ¶ 7.) 6 . Plaintiffs seek to vindicate wha er a claim to quality services would be judicially manageable where the issue were other than whether rates have been set in consideration of cost of service. 16 . Whether federal regulations can create rights enforceable under § 1983 is not at all clear. However, there are good reasons to think that they cannot. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 437-38, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting concerns with allowing regulations to create enforceable rights); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 17 . For example, the Health Net of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regulations do not create enforceable rights when they are too far removed from congressional intent (B) holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined (C) holding federal regulations have the force of law and may create enforceable rights (D) recognizing that these two recent supreme court decisions resolve the issue of whether federal regulations alone can create enforceable rights under  1983 (E) holding that because federal regulations have the force of law they may create enforceable rights under  1983
Output: (A)
tenants by the entireties. Because at the time they executed the Release, the Mahans had knowledge of Claim 7 and knew that it would be assigned to them, their execution of the Release released the bankruptcy estate from their right to assert Claim 7. Debtor’s argument that the Ma-hans did not release Claim 7 because they did not own it when they executed the Release is unavailing. “[A] general release which is not restricted by its terms to particular claims or demands ... will ordinarily be regarded as embracing all claims or demands which had [m]atured at the time of its execution.” Sottile v. Gains Constr. Co., 281 So.2d 558, 561 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1973), rev. denied, 289 So.2d 737 (Fla.1974), receded from on other grounds, Brown v. Brown, 432 So.2d 704 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Plumpton v. Continental Acreage Dev., 830 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution (B) holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents included all claims which had matured at the time of its execution (C) holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution (D) holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution (E) holding equitable estoppel barred the plaintiffs claims because all of the claims of the amended complaint were in existence during the bankruptcy proceedings yet the plaintiff did not disclose any of the claims in its bankruptcy petitions plans of reorganization or disclosure statements
Output: (B)
state witnesses regarding their credibility during the course of the trial in chief. Angela Sweat had negotiated with state prosecution involving armed robbery charges, the facts of the plea agreement for impeachment was not permitted by the trial court. This witness was the sole evidence against the petitioner and had the jury known of her motive to lie they would have found me not guilty of the armed robbery charges. This was a denial of my right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the jury would have found me not guilty. Generally, federal courts should not review a state trial judge’s rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence. Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir.1983). Even if the trial court’ h Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Evidentiary rulings are within the broad 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (B) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (C) holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate (D) holding that where the sole defense was insanity excluded testimony was material a crucial critical and highly significant factor (E) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense
Output: (D)
by telling the accused he or she is only a witness, when, in fact, the person is a suspect. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711; see also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Cummings, 27 Md.App, at 379-80, 341 A.2d 294. Police may also exaggerate the evidence they have accumulated against the person being interviewed. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711. A third factor, perhaps most important for this case, is that there is rarely custody when the person questioned leaves the interrogation unencumbered, only to be arrested at a later time. See Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 148-49, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976); Cummings, 27 Md.App. at 378-79, 341 A.2d 294; see also United States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642, 644 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to give his side of the story and then left the station unencumbered (B) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely (C) holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation (D) holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights (E) holding that having the defendant follow an officer to a police station three to four miles away after the officer had asked for and retained the defendants drivers license reg istration and title was not permissible as part of a terry stop and stating that we understand the hayes decision as eliminating the option of forcing the suspect to go to the police station from the alternatives available to the officer during an investigative detention
Output: (B)
give several reasons for their decision to terminate the plaintiff; namely, that he was over-extended, refused to delegate work, failed to share information, had poor people management skills, and treated 010 employees in an abusive manner. As the “proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back,” defendants also point to, and plaintiff concedes, his use of profanities and abusive language during the phone conversation with Clark. (Doc. 41 at 25.) Defendants were concerned that plaintiffs behavior would result in a lawsuit by Clark or potentially lawsuits by other employees. An employee’s inappropriate behavior toward other employees is a legitimate business reason for termination in the context of a close corporation. See Priebe v. O’Malley, 89 Ohio App.3d 8, 12, 623 N.E.2d 573 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The record demonstrates that defendants acted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder (B) holding that shareholder could not prevail on breachoffiduciaryduty claim against other shareholder because alleged mishandling of funds did not result in any injury to the corporation (C) holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees (D) holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets (E) holding that corporate officer and majority shareholder could be held liable for acting in a manner that served his interests at the expense of the other shareholders because his interests and the corporations were not necessarily aligned
Output: (C)
review and authority over all fiduciary actions taken and decisions made by the Administration Committee Defendants.” Defendants’ only arguments that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not confer fiduciary status on Board Defendants are that Board Defendants’ authority is limited to appointing and removing other fiduciaries and that all of Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to duties allocated to and exercised by other fiduciaries. Consider ing Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Board Defendants exercised fiduciary duties beyond the appointment duty by reviewing the Administration Committees’ fiduciary functions. Moreover, as a matter of law, courts in the Fifth Circuit have imposed a duty to monitor appointees on fiduciaries with appointment power. Enron, 284, F.Supp.2d 511, 659 (S.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, although the Court recognizes fact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a public trust that exercised control over the beneficiarys employment did not change the benefit plan into a government plan because the trust did not establish the plan or control it (B) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (C) holding that as a matter of law because enronhas authority and control over appointments of fiduciaries to administer the plan and control its investments it also has a fiduciary duty to monitor its appointees (D) holding authority to control limits duty to control (E) holding it is critical to the trial courts power of control over its own docket and its ability to serve effectively all litigants that it maintain control over progress of cases before it including requests for extensions of time
Output: (C)
types of turbines studied at distances greater than 300 m[et-ers].” Id. The BLM then concluded that the resulting LFN and infrasound that would be produced by the OWEF Project would be unlikely to cause health problems for the nearby residents because “the dos- est turbine is 804.67 m[eters] ... from the nearest home.” Id. We find the BLM conducted a full analysis of the potential consequences of LFN and infrasound that would be produced by the Project and, based on the studies it found reliable, the BLM determined that the health effects would be minimal. Thus, the BLM took the requisite “hard look” at LFN and infrasound, and we will defer to the agency’s position on this technical issue. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, and finally, Appellants argue that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we show  deference to an agencys conclusions in the area of its expertise (B) recognizing that courts accord significant deference to an agency decision where agency expertise is involved (C) holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that when there are conflicting expert reports an agencys determination is due deferenceespecially in areas of agency expertise (E) holding that conflicting expert evidence regarding function establishes material issue of fact
Output: (D)
when she testified that defendant had approached the boys in response to their taunting him — a fact not mentioned by Mr. Bissell, who was outside, and presumably better positioned to observe the encounter. On the other hand, the testimonies of Mr. Cole’s two friends, present alongside him at the time of the confrontation, were entirely consistent with that of the complaining witness-both saw defendant strike Mr. Cole in the manner he originally described. The hearing justice’s decision to credit the testimony of the state’s witnesses, and thus find that defendant had struck Mr. Cole, rightly led to the conclusion that defendant “failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior,” thus violating the terms of his probation. See State v. House, 889 A.2d 231, 232 (R.I.2006) (mem.) (<HOLDING>). B The Sentence Imposed The defendant’s second 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony (B) holding that a defendants aggressive conduct and shoving of another individual violated the terms of his probation (C) holding that probation is not a sentence (D) holding that the state must establish by the greater weight of the evidence that a defendant violated a term of his probation (E) holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel
Output: (B)
S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). When plaintiffs assert a claim based on threatened or future injury, however, they must show that the injury is so imminent as to be “certainly impending.” Pub. Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 122 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 155-58, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). Here, the challenged Ordinance itself is not the injury Plaintiffs complain of, but, by allowing development on that parcel of land, the Ordinance increases the risk that Plaintiffs aesthetic and recreational interests will be harmed. Numerous courts have held that increased risk of future injury is sufficient to establish imminency of injury for purposes of standing. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In a case involving increased risk of harm, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff meets the injuryinfact requirement for standing if he faces a credible threat of harm and that harm is both real and immediate not conjectural or hypothetical (B) recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements (C) recognizing that standing is an essential component of our appellate jurisdiction and permitting party to appeal only after determining that they had met the requirements of article iii standing (D) holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements (E) holding that plaintiff had standing based on increased risk of contracting an illness and citing the followingfriends of the earth inc v gaston copper recycling corp 204 f3d 149 160 4th cir2000 en banc concluding that tjhreats or increased risk constitutes cognizable harm sufficient to meet the injuryinfact requirement central delta water agency v united states 306 f3d 938 94748 9th cir2002 holding that the possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs and concluding that plaintiffs could proceed with their suit where they raised a material question of fact  as to whether they will suffer a substantial risk of harm as a result of the governments policies johnson v allsteel inc 259 f3d 885 888 7th cir2001 holding that the increased risk that a plan participant faces as a result of an erisa plan administrators increase in discretionary authority satisfies article iii injuryinfact requirements walters v edgar 163 f3d 430 434 7th cir1998 reasoning that a probabilistic harm if nontrivial can support standing cert denied 526 us 1146 119 sct 2022 143 led2d 1033 1999 mountain states legal found v glickman 92 f3d 1228 123435 dccir1996 recognizing that an incremental increase in the risk of forest fires caused by the forest services action satisfied article iii standing requirements
Output: (E)
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If the deficient performance occurred during sentencing that resulted in the imposition of the death penalty, a petitioner must show that “absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. Because the Supreme Court of Virginia applied Strickland in rejecting Powell’s ineffectiveness claim, its decision was not “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Thus, review here is limited to whether the Supreme Court of Virginia applied Strickland unreasonably or made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See § 2254(d)(1) & (2); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Powell first alleges that a more thorough 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff must show that a statute  could never be applied in a valid manner  to prevail in a facial attack on its validity (B) holding petitioner must show prejudice to prevail on due process claim (C) holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test (D) holding that to prevail under  2254 a petitioner must show that the state court applied strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner (E) holding that a plaintiff must show his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented
Output: (D)
does not directly address the question of an intervenor's standing to appeal because the United States brought the original action and the defendant city raised the federal government's standing as a ground to dismiss the action. See City of Tacoma, 332 F.3d at 578. 23 . See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1991). 24 . See State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 130 Ohio St.3d 30, 955 N.E.2d 935 (2011). 25 . See SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 448, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. 1293 (1940) (permitting the SEC to intervene in and appeal bankruptcy proceedings because it is "specially charged by various statutes with the protection of the interests of the investing public"); Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 149 Cal.App.3d 308, 196 Cal.Rptr. 871, 875 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Conn., Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that board had standing to collaterally attack gag order based on its interest in fulfilling its statutory obligations to supervise and regulate the practice of medicine in this state and to investigate allegations of physician misconduct (B) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (C) holding that the press lacks standing to assert the free speech rights of another when the person subject to the gag order has not challenged it (D) holding that appraisal district had standing based on its interest in the validity of the statute that it is charged with implementing (E) holding that under section 25303 the board of supervisors has a statutory duty to supervise the conduct of all county officers
Output: (A)
To prevail, plaintiffs must also show that, under clearly established law, exigent circumstances did not exist such as to justify the officers’ forcible entry into Bubenhofer’s apartment, and that Sizemore reasonably should have known this. Plaintiffs fail to cite a single case indicating that an officer’s attempt to rescue what that officer believes to be a suicidal person does not constitute exigent circumstances, nor are we aware of such precedent. Although the fact that Sizemore may have violated established police procedure certainly makes our task more difficult, the Supreme Court has indicated that the violation of established procedure alone is insufficient to overcome a qualified immunity claim. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, therefore, that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that absolute immunity is immunity from charges of either constitutional or statutory violations (B) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (C) holding that there is an exception to eleventh amendment immunity for actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law (D) holding that officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose qualified immunity simply because their actions violate statutory or administrative procedure (E) recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law
Output: (D)
to say that WQBELs are necessary to ensure that water quality standards are met, while specific enforcement of such WQBELs is unnecessary. More importantly, this lack of enforcement violates the CWA regulations, which mandate that no permit may be issued “[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d). Accordingly, EPA’s failure to include monitoring for compliance with WQBELs was inconsistent with regulations and thus arbitrary and capricious. C. Remand Accordingly, we remand this matter to EPA for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The 2013 VGP is to remain in place until EPA issues a new VGP. See Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when an agency promulgates a regulation that is intended to preempt state law the regulation should not be disturbed unless there is evidence that it is contrary to congressional intent (B) holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation (C) holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended (D) holding that verbal requirement of need not contained in hunting regulation was addition of substance and thus regulation under apa (E) holding that ojrdinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the apa the regulation is invalid however when equity demands the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures citation omitted
Output: (E)
as provided in Rule 74.01(b). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss father’s appeal. GRIMM, P.J., and PUDLOWSKI, J., concur. 1 . The docket sheets reflect service of process was issued on Lay on March 4, 1997, though the record does not indicate service of process was ever obtained. However, "[fjailure to have served process on [certain defendants] by any given time, without any action or disposition as to such defendants by the trial court, would not eliminate them as parties to this action at this time. A party to an action is a person whose name is designated on the record as plaintiff or defendant.” Cooper v. Barr, 413 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo.1967) (bracketed language in original; citation omitted); see State ex rel. Schweitzer v. Greene, 438 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Mo.banc 1969) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party loses its right to contest default final judgment on grounds of defective service of process by entering general appearance unless it also contests service of process or raises issue of personal jurisdiction (B) holding trial courts judgment dismissing petition as to one of two defendants not final despite lack of service or entry of appearance of second defendant (C) holding that one of the effects of submitting to the courts jurisdiction by making a general appearance is that a party waives any objection to service of process (D) holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment (E) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
Output: (B)
at night a few days after a homicide occurred in the area, the driver slumping down in his seat either before or after spotting law enforcement, driving in a peculiar, although entirely legal, manner, and the fact that defendant’s car was not registered to an address in the immediate area. 408 Md. 490, 970 A.2d 894 (2009). The Court reasoned that the combination of factors, viewed in their totality, are no more indicative of criminal activity than any one factor assessed individually. [The officer] testified only that he considered what he observed to be suspicious; he did not illuminate how his training and experience caused him to believe that what he observed revealed possible criminal activity. Id. at 511, 970 A.2d 894. See also Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 816 A.2d 901 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Crosby and Ransome, in Graham v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (B) holding that an officer stopped the defendant when he ordered the defendant to take his hand out of his pocket (C) holding that the defendant was not seized when two officers approached the defendant on a public street and asked him questions (D) holding that a generalized suspicion of those questioned in highcrime area was insufficient to justify terry frisk (E) holding that law enforcement did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to either stop or frisk the defendant when the defendant was in a highcrime area had a large bulge in his pants pocket and acted nervously when approached by officers
Output: (E)
was misrepresented as a tax, I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The trial court noted that there were various methods used by South Lubes to inform customers that the fee was not a tax, including menu boards, verbal explanations, and a letter and fee explanation notices. Moreover, the invoices showing the fee separately showed taxes charged. The trial court reasoned that it would be necessary to make a number of individual inquiries to determine which potential class members had actual knowledge that the fee was not a tax. Because of these individual inquires, I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification. See The St. Joe Co. v. Leslie, 912 So.2d 21, 24-26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that the trial court erred 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that common issues of fact did not predominate because it was necessary to make an individualized inquiry into equitable circumstances (B) holding that individualized factual determinations precluded finding that common issues predominate reversing the class certification order (C) holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification (D) holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class action when claims were so individualized that certification was improper
Output: (B)
of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a “watershed rule,” falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
Output: (A)
or disapproval of development plans. ¶ 53. Allowing the circuit court to balance the equities when an injunction is requested under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) will not render "meaningless the entire line of case law regarding the standard of unnecessary hardship which must be met in order for a variance applicant to be properly granted a variance." State's brief at 7. Instead, the circuit court, sitting in equity, should weigh heavily the factors considered by boards of adjustment in determining unnecessary hardship, see Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c), as well as traditional equitable considerations. Equitable defenses, such as laches, estoppel, or unclean hands should also be weighed in appropriate cases. See, e.g., Ramaker v. Cities Service Oil Co., 27 Wis. 2d 143, 153, 133 N.W.2d 789 (1965) (<HOLDING>). See, also, Hargreaves v. Skrbina, 662 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  he who seeks equity must do equity  (B) recognizing that a court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would interfere with the rights of those who are not parties to the action (C) holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law (D) recognizing that there may be situations where laches or estoppel would justify a court of equity in denying an injunction at the suit of private parties (E) recognizing that an injunction cannot bind parties who are not before this court
Output: (D)
544 U.S. 336, 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172). Accord Emer e.g., In re Nortel Networks, 238 F.Supp.2d at 629. 115 . Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167. 116 . See id. 117 . Compl. ¶ 15. 118 . See id. 119 . See, e.g., ¶¶ 80, 86, 99. 120 . Id. ¶¶ 82, 84, 88, 90. 121 . In re Par Pharm., 733 F.Supp. at 675. 122 . Compl. ¶ 58. 123 . See id. ¶ 59. 124 . See id. ¶¶ 44-45, 52-56. 125 . See id. ¶ 105. 126 . See id. ¶ 80. 127 . Id. 128 . See id. ¶ 81. 129 . See id. 130 . See In re Vivendi Universal, 381 F.Supp.2d at 182. 131 . Compl. ¶¶ 65-66. 132 . See id. ¶ 68. 133 . See id. ¶ 71. 134 . See id. 135 . Id. ¶ 101. 136 . Id. ¶ 69. 137 . See id. ¶ 72. 138 . See id. ¶ 70. 139 . See id. ¶¶ 73, 80-81, 101. 140 . See id. ¶¶ 73-74. 141 . See Pu o Instruments, 235 F.R.D. at 232 (<HOLDING>). 160 . In re Scottish Re Group, 524 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that scienter requirement was met where gaap violations led to restatement and individual defendants were aware of weak internal controls (B) holding that the failure to maintain the facility in a safe condition or to warn of hazards was an  operational failure following the planning decision to operate and maintain the public landing (C) holding that a failure to maintain sufficient internal controls to avoid fraud is  indicative of scienter (D) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (E) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter
Output: (C)
sale of assets necessary to fund a plan. There is a split of authority whether “under a plan confirmed” limits § 1146(c) to post-confirmation transfers. I find the text to be ambiguous because it can reasonably support two different outcomes. From one perspective, “under a plan confirmed” requires plan confirmation as a precondition to eligibility for the exemption. See NVR Homes, 189 F.3d at 456-57. Alternatively, it can be read as merely describing a type of eligible transfer, i.e., one that is an integral part of the plan process for a plan later confirmed or pursuant to a confirmed plan, as opposed to, for example, a transfer incidental to a debtor’s business operations. See, e.g., City of New York v. Smoss Enter. Corp. (In re Smoss Enter. Corp.), 54 B.R. 950, 951 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Lopez Dev., Inc., 154 B.R. 607, 609 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding preconfirmation transfer essential to fund plan is exempt under  1146c (B) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (C) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan (D) holding that where a governmental entity purchases a benefit plan on behalf of government employees and dele gates the administration to a private insurer the plan is a government plan exempt from erisa (E) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions
Output: (A)
“the evidence in the record compels a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the [BIA’s] decision is incorrect.” Id. Purely legal questions, including jurisdictional questions, are reviewed de novo. See Taslimi v. Holder, 590 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.2010). III. ASYLUM To qualify for asylum, an applicant must file her application within one year after arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The limitations period will be tolled if the applicant can establish changed circumstances that materially affect her eligibility for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i). Contrary to the government’s argument, we have jurisdiction to review an agency’s changed circumstances determination. See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Petitioners argue that Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 
 Holding statements: (A) holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo (B) recognizing that this court reviews de novo the trial courts interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts (C) recognizing the issue may be decided as a question of law if the facts are undisputed and support only one inference (D) holding that when the facts of a robbery are undisputed the imposition of the enhancement is a question of the application of the guidelines to be reviewed de novo (E) holding that the real id act restored jurisdiction over the changed circumstances question because this question involved the application of a statutory standard to undisputed facts
Output: (E)
1, 6 (1st Cir. BAP 2006) (discussing shifting burdens); Mountain Dairies, Inc., 372 B.R. at 633 (“the petitioning creditor must first establish a prima facie case that no bona fide dispute exists”); In re Mylotte, David & Fitzpatrick, Bky. No. 07-11861, 2007 WL 2033812, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. Jul. 12, 2007) (same); In re Graber, 319 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2004) (“The initial burden lies with the petitioner to establish a prima facie case that there is no bona fide dispute.”). The Petitioning Creditor alleges that her Claim is derived from the Proposed Debtor’s failure to repay a loan in the amount of $850,000. To provide prima facie evidence of her Claim, the Petitioning Creditor must provide evidence of the alleged loan. In re VitaminSpice, 472 B.R. 282, 291 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Taub, 439 B.R. 261, 274-75 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that loan documents introduced by petitioning creditors were sufficient to establish prima facie validity of claims (B) recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language (C) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (D) holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation (E) holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease
Output: (A)
Thus, in the absence of injury to persons or damage to property, economic losses cannot be recovered in tort. Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 609, 653 N.E.2d 661, 667 (1995). In Ohio, however, the applicability of this economic loss rule depends on the complexity of the parties and the type tort claim at issue. See, e.g., HDM Flugservice GmbH v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 332 F.3d 1025, 1030-32 (6th Cir.2003). Although Ohio courts do distinguish between commercial entities and individual consumers, the foundational doctrinal distinction in the economic loss rule jurisprudence is whether the parties are in privity of contract. In cases of contractual privity, courts apply a strong version of the economic loss rule. See, e.g., Chemtrol, 537 N.E.2d at 631 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, when the parties are not in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contract between parties not law of negligence gave rise to duty and accordingly provided exclusive source of remedy (B) holding that when chapter 95 applies it is the plaintiffs exclusive remedy and precludes common law negligence liability (C) holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise (D) holding that where the contract affirmatively shows the parties intent to charge one party with a duty of care actionable negligence may be predicated upon that contractual duty (E) holding that it was a question of breach not duty whether an agents failure to advise a client about additional insurance gave rise to liability
Output: (A)
and depression are examples of Mr. Comer’s compulsions. (Id. at 88-92.) He concludes Ms diagnosis of SHU syndrome with the assessment that “[Mr. Comer] has his own idiosyncratic ways of coping, which accentuates certain symptoms.” (Id. at 92.) The Court finds it undisputed that Mr. Comer was subjected to some physical brutality and abuse while incarcerated that no human being should be made to endure for any length of time. The Court has no difficulty concluding that this abuse would shock even a person with hardened sensibilities; and that even a cold-eyed critic of any disapproval of prison administration would agree that these forms of corporal punishment run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2245, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)(<HOLDING>); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable (B) holding the eighth amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions it provides excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted  (C) holding that excessive fines clause of eighth amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards between private parties (D) recognizing culpability as important criteria for eighth amendment excessive fines claim (E) holding that forfeitures may violate the eighth amendment excessive fines clause
Output: (B)
proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 848, as opposed to the civil forfeiture proceeding at issue in this case. See Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 896. Furthermore, Oberlin recognized this distinction, noting that the defendant’s criminal conviction and the criminal forfeiture were intended as a penalty, and thus abated. Id. Potter also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminates the distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings such that those labels can no longer be the basis for distinguishing civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Thus, she contends, Shaffer calls into question the validity of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-79, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2088-90, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Shaffer is distinguishable from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process (B) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (C) holding that the defendants property interest requires a preseizure hearing (D) holding a puerto rican forfeiture statute modeled after  881a which did not provide for preseizure notice and hearing did not deny appellant due process (E) recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process
Output: (D)
that on separate occasions several years before, each had personally observed that appellant possessed, in his residence, nude photographs of young boys with whom he had had sexual relations. In addition, Broder-ick reported that he knew of at least 10 other young boys that appellant had sexually abused in his home. Moreover, as recently as five to six months prior to the execution of the search warrant, appellant had shown Broderick a photograph from his wallet of a nude 15-year-old boy. Because we read the affidavit, signed in early January 2009, in a commonsensical and realistic manner, drawing all reasonable inferences, we conclude that the magistrate could have reasonably concluded that appellant continued to be in possession of child pornography. See Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 703 (<HOLDING>); McKissick, 209 S.W.3d at 215 (magistrate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk (B) holding anonymous tip regarding narcotic activity on unspecified date was sufficient when considering all circumstances (C) holding an anonymous tip insufficient to support reasonable suspicion based on the fact that defendant was suspected of drug activity in his community failed to corroborate he currently was engaged in drug related activity and surveillance failed to uncover any independent information that defendant was engaged in any criminal activity (D) holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk (E) holding anonymous tip that someone at the residence was dealing drugs did not amount to anything the tip was never substantiated and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing
Output: (B)
employment records of eligible beneficiaries. See 26 U.S.C. § 9706(c). 13 . With respect to Hribar and Stewart, Appellants also argue that the SSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not following its prior practice of reversing assignments when the Combined Fund informs the SSA that the work at issue "was not covered earnings.” (Appellants’ Br. 36 n.5.) Appellants, however, have provided no legal authority to support their argument, nor have they elaborated upon the prior instances in which the SSA reversed an assignment based upon the Combined Fund’s lack of records showing a beneficiary's employment with an operator. (Id.) We will not address this perfunctory and underdeveloped argument. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. Fulton County, Ga., 242 F.3d 976, 987 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1576 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument (B) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority (C) holding party must support argument with legal authority (D) holding that a party waives an argument that it raises in the background section of its brief but not in the argument section (E) recognizing that where a party fails to provide any authority for an argument we will presume that none exists
Output: (A)