niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
See Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 950 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 937, 145 L.Ed.2d 815 (2000). Whether that option is available to Green at the present time is questionable, however. If Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) applies to putative class actions before certification of the class, then court approval for the dismissal would be required in any event. See id. 19 . But see Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999) (stating that a district court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may consider materials that are "necessarily embraced by the pleadings.") (citing Piper Jaffray Cos. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 967 F.Supp. 1148, 1152 (D.Minn.1997)); Silver v. H & R Block, Inc., 105 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim (B) holding that court could consider undisputed documents upon which the plaintiff based his action (C) holding that the district court properly dismissed an indictment where the parties argued the applicability of a statute based on a set of undisputed facts (D) holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint (E) holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6
Output: (B)
to support the jury’s verdict. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court to consider the appellant’s remaining point of error. WOMACK, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, J., joined. COCHRAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which JOHNSON and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined. 1 . Nicotinamide is a substance commonly used as a controlled substance additive. 2 . We have held that the State is no longer required to show what amount of a controlled substance and what amount of an adulterant or dilutant make up a mixture for purposes of possession of a controlled substance. Melton v. State, 120 S.W.3d 339, 344 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). 3 . See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Seals v. State, No. 05-03-01105-CR, slip 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged (B) holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (B)
statement during closing argument regarding his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt was improper, but not reversible error). Where it appears that no other verdict could have been properly rendered, prosecutorial misconduct is not reversible error. Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 284, 149 P. 250, 252 (1915). In light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial against the defendant, we conclude that the prosecutor’s improper remark during closing argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 985 (emphasis added); see also Harris, 888 P.2d at 268 (stating that “the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial will be considered on appeal when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct”); Grandbouche v. People, 104 Colo. 175, 185, 89 P.2d 577, 581 (1939) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. People, 70 Colo. 313, 317, 201 P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment (B) holding the rule that the singular includes the plural obviously  is not one to be applied except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (C) holding that 1 usc  1 does not apply except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (D) holding that the rule is that where the guilt of an accused is evident incidental improper action upon the part of the prosecuting officer may be overlooked (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment
Output: (D)
Third, the injury must not be due to the contributory negligence of plaintiff.” Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915, 933 (1990). It is the second element that fails here. “In medical malpractice cases, the doctrine only applies when a layman could find, as a matter of common knowledge, that the patient’s condition was such that would ordinarily not have occurred if due care had been exercised.” Butler ex rel. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan., Inc., 27 Kan.App.2d 403, 6 P.3d 871, 887 (1999). As we have already stated, however, the “common knowledge” exception does not apply to the facts of this case. Expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Esposito’s case, and none is available. For this reason, res ipsa loquitur is unavailable as well. See id. (<HOLDING>). In her appellate briefing, Mrs. Esposito also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in case where both liability and causation had to be established by expert witnesses (B) holding that while a foundation for an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the testimony of an expert witness the experts testimony must establish that the occurrence indicates the probability of negligence (C) holding that permitting jury to find malpractice from blood draw without expert testimony by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur instead of eliciting expert testimony as to the standard of care to be reversible error (D) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (E) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial
Output: (A)
a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” The Tax Injunction Act applies not only to actions to “enjoin, suspend, or restrain” state taxation, but also to declaratory judgment actions such as the instant case. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 2507, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982). Because Congress’s intent in enacting the TIA was to “prevent federal-court interference with the assessment and collection of state taxes,” district courts are without jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments invalidating state taxes unless no “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exists in state courts. Id. at 411, 102 S.Ct. 2498; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1341; Bank of New England Old Colony, N.A. v. Clark, 986 F.2d 600, 602 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff does not claim that remedies under 
 Holding statements: (A) holding court of competent jurisdiction includes federal courts (B) holding that the tia does not abrogate states immunity under the eleventh amendment (C) holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed (D) holding that the tia negates federal jurisdiction (E) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court
Output: (D)
Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidence and to procedures at trial.”); Oliver v. State, 329 Ga. App. 377, 381 (765 SE2d 606) (2014) (declining to “construe OCGA §§ 24-4-404 and 24-4-405 as a modification of Georgia’s long-standing requirement that a defendant must first make a prima facie showing of self-defense before requiring a trial court to determine whether evidence pertaining to the victim’s character is admissible”); John D. Hadden, Georgia Law of Evidence § 1:1 (“[Ejven where the federal E2d 80) (1994); accord Brooks v. State, 311 Ga. App. 857, 860 (2) (717 SE2d 490) (2011). 32 Brooks, 311 Ga. App. at 860 (2) (punctuation omitted); accord Freeman, 264 Ga. at 277; see also Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334 (2) (404 SE2d 436) (1991) (<HOLDING>). 33 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; accord Newsome v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (B) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (C) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof (D) holding jury trial waiver valid although district court did not inform defendant of right to unanimous verdict (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge
Output: (A)
(emphasis added) (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720). 27 . Faust, 337 S.W.3d at 335 (emphasis added). 28 . Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.1995). 29 . See Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 218. 30 . Synar v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 12—99— 00428-CV, 2001 WL 1263573, at *6 (Tex.App.-Tyler Oct. 17, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). 31 . See id. 32 . See Tex.R. Evid. 803(18); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. 33 . C 545 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). 55 . See id. 56 . See Tex.R. Evid. 401; Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 387-89. 57 . See Sw. Country Enters., Inc., 991 S.W.2d at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 58 . See Barraza v. Eureka Co., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 59 . See Charter Oak Fire Ins. v. Perez, 446 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture (E) holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment
Output: (D)
Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam), LifeNet did not pursue an attribution theory at trial. LifeCell posits that the non-removal limitation cannot be met until an independent third party, such as a surgeon, actually prepares and uses the accused products, and it is unknown at the time that LifeCell sells a graft if and how that graft will be used for transplantation. LifeNet counters that “the final product that leaves LifeCell’s hands is complete and ... infringes in that condition” without affirmative action by a third party. Response Br. 44. We agree with LifeNet. Functional limitations recited in the negative may describe a capability or structural element. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, the preceding language in each asserted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that allegations of isolated acts of fraud occurring over an eighteenmonth period did not meet the continuity element (B) holding that nonnaturally occurring and not isolated were structural elements defining the source of the claimed material rather than steps for obtaining it (C) recognizing code rather than state law as the  genesis of an oversecured creditors entitlement to interest out of estate assets regardless of the source of the hen  (D) holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor (E) holding that the tax was not direct even though the government imposed it on the estate rather than the recipient
Output: (B)
reasons for his back problems, reasons that Anderson, given his attitude toward work and pain, apparently accepted without question. Considering the evidence as a whole, I conclude that substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that Anderson did know or should have known he had a compensable injury which needed to be reported to Frontier until Drs. Gallagher and Pinto provided reports to Anderson’s attorney in April or May 2009. It was these reports that first established a relationship between Anderson’s injury and his work for Frontier. Therefore, I would hold that the letter sent by Anderson’s attorney on May 13, 2009, constituted timely notice to Frontier under the statute and our case law. 1 . Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 320-22, 101 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A worker may qualify for social security 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (B) recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury (C) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (D) recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought (E) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable
Output: (C)
service on an individual’s lawyer will not suffice. See Khachikian v. BASF Corp., No. 91-CV-573, 1994 WL 86702, at **1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,1994) (quashing subpoena that plaintiff mailed to the defendant corporation’s attorney rather than to the corporation itself, which was the party named in the subpoena); In re Deposition Subpoena Directed to Smith, 126 F.R.D. 461, 462 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (McLaughlin, J.) (denying plaintiffs motion to serve a deposition subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum on a non-party witness by delivering the subpoenas to the witness’s attorney where Rule 45 required service on the person named in the subpoena; noting that Rule 45 should be reevaluated to permit service of subpoenas other than by personal delivery); Harrison v. Prather, 404 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); see also 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that delivery of subpoena via federal express was sufficient because effective service under rule 45 is not limited to personal service (B) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (C) holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity (D) holding that an attempted service on the partys counsel was insufficient without proof of the counsels actual authority to receive service (E) holding that if service is inadequate defendant never submitted to courts jurisdiction and underlying judgment is therefore a nullity
Output: (C)
land flipping schemes with M.I. and a t rotect what is asserted to be the res of a trust during the pendency of litigation. Gruder v. Gruder, 433 So.2d 23, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (affirming injunction where trustee feared removal of trust’s liquid assets). If the enjoined money remained specifically identifiable in the member-agent’s attorney’s trust account, then the injunction may have been proper. However, because the member-agent transferred the money to M.I.’s bank accounts, commingling the funds, we find the instant injunction improper. Furthermore, the Fund expressly sought damages in its complaint against M.I. for unjust enrichment. Thus, money damages will suffice to compensate any loss incurred by the Fund. See Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So.2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Regardless of the Fund’s allegation that M.I. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that liquidated damages provision did not provide adequate remedy at law or prevent injunctive relief (B) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (E) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment
Output: (D)
State’s modified definition “could have easily affected the jury’s verdict.” But there was substantial evidence that Orsag was intoxicated. Orsag’s fiancé testified that Orsag drank that night, he smelled of alcohol, he pulled over to the wrong side of the road, he exhibited signs of intoxication on all of the field-sobriety tests, and he refused a breath test. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find Orsag was intoxicated, whether it considered either the State’s interpretation of the definition or the definition contained in the charge. Finally, Orsag argues that, by allowing the State to misstate the law, “the only reasonable conclusion the jury could draw was that the prosecutor was stating proper law.” See Kincaid v. State, 534 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). But the trial court instructed the jury to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts failure to sustain objection to prosecutors misstatement of parole law to appellants detriment was harmful error and noting that jury assessed maximum penalty allowed (B) holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge (C) holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury (D) holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law (E) holding that any error in the prosecutors misstatement of the gjrand jjurys function was cured when the judge in effect granted the objection and allowed the attorney to correctly articulate the grand jurys function
Output: (A)
the Title VII limitations period is an affirmative defense; rather, it referred to the filing period as something "like a statute of limitations” which "generally create affirmative defenses.” See Gordon, 675 F.2d at 360. Furthermore, Gordon's discussion came in response to the defendant’s (rejected) claim that the filing period was jurisdictional and did not purport to address, let alone decide, whether compliance with the filing deadline was condition precedent or an affirmative defense. 13 . Plaintiffs have not argued waiver, estoppel, or that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to cure their tardy filings, and based on the facts before us, we see nothing demanding their application. See, e.g., Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Rather, each housekeeper who was told to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be triggered 1 where a plaintiff has actively pursued his judicial remedies by a filing a defective pleading during the statutory period or 2 where a plaintiff was induced or tricked by his adversarys misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass (B) holding that equitable tolling applied where insurance company statements and conduct lulled plaintiff and his attorney into believing that plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was properly filed (C) recognizing equitable tolling in the title vii context where the plaintiff has been deceived lulled into inaction actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights quotations and citations omitted (D) holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights (E) holding title vii subject to equitable tolling
Output: (C)
properties. See Rice, 852 N.E.2d at 602. Instead, the use must be in agreement, accord, or conformity with the district’s character. See Black’s Law Dictionary 722 (7th ed.1999) (defining “harmony”). Although there was evidence that some of the neighboring properties consisted of corporate offices, a residence, and a daycare, the BZA also had before it evidence that the vast majority of the surrounding area was zoned as I-4-S, the IZO’s most intensive industrial zone. Although some of the land uses in the area might not be heavy industrial, evidence that certain individual properties within the district are used for non-industrial purposes is insufficient to support a finding that the use would not be in harmony with the character of the district. See Rice, 852 N.E.2d at 602 (<HOLDING>). 600 Land’s property is bordered on three 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no easement can be created over a section of land in favor of another adjoining parcel when one owner owns both properties (B) holding that the most important factor in the preservation hierarchy is whether the relevant issue was raised in the trial court and the least important factor is whether the appellant alerted the trial court to the specific argument raised on appeal (C) recognizing that while an adjacent neighborhood may be an important factor in analyzing a land uses compatibility with surrounding properties it is improper to turn a blind eye to the fact that the real estate only borders the neighborhood on one side and that there are other properties in the near vicinity that have similar uses (D) recognizing that one cannot have an easement in his own land (E) holding the effect of a commonlaw dedication is to create only such an estate or right in the public as is necessary to enable it to enjoy the uses for which the dedication is made and to reserve the fee to the dedicator
Output: (C)
a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment.” O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111, 854 A.2d at 1196 (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001)). In other words, a material fact is a fact “necessary to resolve the controversy as a matter of law[.]” Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974). If it is determined that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, “we review the trial court’s ruling on the law, considering the same material from the record and deciding the same legal issues as the circuit court.” Messing, 373 Md. at 684, 821 A.2d at 28 (citation omitted); Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 560, 571, 948 A.2d 11, 18 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In conducting our review of a grant of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact (B) holding that if no material facts are placed in dispute this court must determine whether the circuit court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law citations omitted (C) holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute (D) holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine (E) holding that this court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on it
Output: (B)
should be drawn from the defendant's failure to call his accomplices to testify. The prosecutor remarked only that Mitchell had the power to subpoena witnesses, and that the defense could do so "if they thought it would contradict something [the State! presented.” In light of defense counsel’s earlier statements that "clearly you have a situation where a misidentification could take place,” and that the jury should be able to see Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson in the courtroom, the prosecutor's remarks did not relate to the substance of those witnesses’ potential testimonies. Had the prosecutor inferred that Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson would have testified unfavorably to the defense, that inference might well have conflicted with Christensen, 274 Md. at 140-41, 333 A.2d at 49 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime (B) holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely (C) holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that witness was not an accomplice in distributing marijuana to himself (E) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify
Output: (C)
board’s determination that former lawyers for the board were not disqualified from representing a property owner regarding a piece of property before the board, when the lawyers had dealt with issues relating to that same property while they were working for the board. The facts and rationale of Brown II are quite different from the facts of the instant case. In Brown II, the zoning board did not oppose its former lawyers’ representation of the property owner about matters that the board considered to be unrelated to the lawyers’ former work for the board — whereas, in the instant ease, the BZA’s position is that Mr. Cassell is working on the same matter about which he advised and represented the BZA. In State ex rel. Keenan v. Hatcher, 210 W.Va. 307, 313, 557 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2001) (<HOLDING>), this Court identified a core principle that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prosecutor was disqualified from bringing a recidivist proceeding even though the prior offenses in which the prosecutor served as defense counsel were public matters (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants timely motion for the substitution of the participating prosecutor in order to permit the defense to call the prosecutor as a witness (C) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant (D) holding counsel must examine public information like prior conviction records prosecutor is likely to use (E) holding parttime prosecutor barred from acting as defense counsel
Output: (A)
he alleged. Given the plain language of the statute and the Secretary’s regulation, our task should have been: where a claimant’s allegations of pain were not corroborated by medical evidence, we would conclude from the record as a whole that there was substantial evidence justifying the Secretary’s finding that the claimant was not disabled. Despite this clear statutory and regulatory language, however, this circuit’s pre-Re-form Act decisions regarding subjective pain testimony were at best unclear and possibly inconsistent. Compare Gonzalez v. Harris, 631 F.2d 143, 145-46 (9th Cir.1980) (Gonzalez) (despite claimant’s testimony regarding her pain she failed to prove disability because of a lack of supporting medical evidence), with Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>), and Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits (B) holding that a medical impairment is deemed  severe  when alone or in combination with other medically determinable physical or mental impairments it significantly limits an individuals physical or mental ability to do basic work activities (C) holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability (D) recognizing the basic statutory mandate that disability benefits  are to be awarded only in cases of disability by reason of any some medically determinable physical or mental impairment  but then concluding that the ad must determine the truthfulness of allegations of subjective pain (E) holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability
Output: (D)
is entertained, his failure to object to the drug weights for which he was held responsible renders any Collins error harmless. See United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 700-01 (4th Cir.2000) (“[I]f the element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, the harmless error inquiry ends, and we must find the error harmless.”). Moreover, we find that even if we were to vacate Williams’ sentence on his conspiracy charge, Williams would still be subject to a 360-month sentence for his cocaine distribution conviction. Thus, even if the Collins claim was properly before this court and found to be meritorious, it would still afford Williams no relief as the district court’s sentence on remand would have been the same. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 231 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations and quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error (C) holding that a nonconstitutional error is harmless where an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict (D) recognizing that an error will be deemed harmless if a reviewing court is able to say with fair assurance after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error (E) holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction
Output: (D)
that her supervisor had treated her unfairly and yelled at her on numerous occasions, ADC presented evidence that (1) Coleman had made frequent and excessive errors shortly after she began working, and did not improve after the errors were brought to her attention and she was counseled; (2) Coleman was given additional duties and on-the-job training, but made frequent mistakes in performing those duties as well; and (3) Coleman’s initial assignment was that given to all new Records employees. We conclude Coleman’s evidence was insufficient to show constructive discharge, a hostile work environment, or any adverse employment action; rather, the evidence showed her treatment by supervisors was due to her poor performance. See Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391, 395-96 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (B) holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing (C) holding that denial of the opportunity to work overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to make out a prima facie case under title vii (D) holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo (E) holding prima facie case for hostile work environment includes showing of severe conduct that affected term condition or privilege of employment
Output: (E)
to recognize a mere breach of contract that has an incidental effect on the plaintiffs business relations with third parties as a wrongful act under a claim of tortious interference. See Volcjak, 124 Md.App. at 512-13, 723 A.2d at 479; K & K Management, Inc., 316 Md. at 162-63, 557 A.2d at 978. Here, Mates bases her claim on the grounds that her removal from the board and subsequent termination was in violation of NAVI’s corporate by-laws. See First Am.Compl. ¶ 29. Assuming arguendo that the corporate bylaws acted as a contract between the board and the corporation, Mates’ claim of tor-tious interference would be based on nothing more than a breach of contract, which Maryland courts have refused to recognize as a basis for this tort. See Volcjak, 124 Md.App. at 513, 723 A.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Mates has failed to a state a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lmra preempted plaintiffemployees claim under michigan law for tortious interference with contractual relations breach of contract is an essential element of a tortious interference claim and resolution of such claim would require the court to interpret collective bargaining agreement to determine if that agreement had been breached (B) holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference (C) holding that where no wrongful conduct by the defendant was alleged ie a breach accompanied by violence intimidation defamation fraud or other tortious conduct other than the breach of its contractual obligation under its bylaws no claim for tortious interference can lie (D) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (E) holding that where both defamation and tortious interference claims are pled and are based on same facts minnesota law requires the application of the actual malice standard to tortious interference claims
Output: (C)
we find that the district court erred by commencing its evaluation of the assignment by applying a presumption of collusion against Ambrosia. Hi. While other Circuits have reasoned that a presumption of collusion is appropriate when certain closely-related entities assign claims amongst themselves, there is no such binding precedent in this Circuit. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has held that in cases where diversity jurisdiction is premised on the assignment of claims from a subsidiary to a parent corporation, a presumption of collusion is triggered. However, both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have opined on the general topic of parties collusively obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction. As discusse dy Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). However, in Kramer, the Court explicitly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the county was an indispensable party to an action between two private parties in which the public status of a roadway was in question (B) holding that jurisdiction was collusively obtained when the plaintiff made a private side agreement that promised a portion of the litigation proceeds to potential plaintiffs so long as they did not intervene and destroy diversity between the parties (C) recognizing that a narrow reading of missouri would suggest that the state is the real party in interest for diversity purposes only when the relief sought inures to the benefit of the state alone but noting that cases have only required a real interest pecuniary or otherwise in the outcome of the litigation (D) holding diversity jurisdiction was collusively obtained because the transferor retained a onehalf interest in the outcome of the litigation and was an indispensable party but for the assignment (E) holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable
Output: (D)
Simply put, a causal connection between the Mr. Black’s DDOT disciplinary proceedings and his whistleblowing complaint is temporally impossible because Mr. Black did not make a formal whistleblow-ing complaint until months after his DDOT disciplinary proceedings started. Thus, Mr. Black has failed to state a plausible retaliation claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Mr. Black concedes that his defamation claim fails because he did not comply with D.C. Code § 12-309 prior to filing this lawsuit. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.’s Mem. Opp."), Docket No. 15 at 20. See, e.g. Clark v. Flach, 604 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). 2 . On February 12, 2013, Mr. Black filed a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation (B) holding that the purpose of  12309 is to allow the district to conduct a prompt investigation of the injured persons claim (C) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (D) holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation (E) holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation
Output: (B)
the Constitution and laws of this state .... Any home rule charter proposed as herein provided, may provide for such county officers as may be deemed necessary to carry out and perform all county functions as provided by charter or by general law .... The terms of all elective officers ... who are in office at the time of the adoption of a Home Rule Charter shall terminate as provided in the charter. ¶22 It is well established that a home rule charter county has “the right to conduct their purely local affairs without supervision by the state, so long as they abided by the provisions of the constitution and did not run counter to considerations of public policy of broad concern, expressed in general laws.” State ex rel. Carroll v. King County, 78 Wn.2d 452, 457-58, 474 P.2d 877 (1970) (<HOLDING>). However, because the CRC and Proposition 1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a home rule charter county could hold elections at a different time than specified by state statute (B) holding that a charter county may assess a fee pursuant to florida statute section 3374013 and is not expressly or impliedly preempted by federal or state law (C) recognizing that a board of elections is not a political subdivision and its members are not county officers (D) holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax (E) holding that the lehigh county sheriff is a county officer rather than a state officer
Output: (A)
were adjudicated with the debts established in a foreclosure decree. Cf. Malooly, 119 N.M. at 747-50, 895 P.2d at 269-72 (deciding not to decide the issue of whether a mortgagee who is the purchaser at a foreclosure sale can redeem from herself). Further, as suggested by Justice Minzner in Malooly, we are not foreclosed from considering what the practicing bar has recognized or assumed as to a particular redemption practice. Id. at 747, 895 P.2d at 269. That practice, we think, is exemplified in Springer Corp., in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage and was held to have a right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage. See 80 N.M. at 210, 458 P.2d at 3, 154 A. 537, 539 (1931) (<HOLDING>); cf. W. Bank v. Fluid Assets Dev. Corp., 111 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt (B) holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser (C) holding that the redemption price was based on the amount bid at foreclosure  and not  what the subsequent purchaser paid  for the property (D) holding that the sale vested in the purchaser a legal right to the property free of incumbrances imposed upon it subsequent to the mortgage foreclosed provided that the holders of such incumbrances are made parties to the foreclosure (E) holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable
Output: (D)
of ordinary care of the risk or hazard about which he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless [the] manufacturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the public. Although this ground of recovery is sometimes referred to as strict liability, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability described as the sale of a product in a defective condition.... W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 99, at 697 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). We have embraced this view, see Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir.1991), and, more importantly, so has Vermont. See Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 308, 479 A.2d 126, 1 s, Inc., 679 F.2d 1204, 1205-06 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The first and second prongs are easily 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim (B) holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment (C) holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element (D) holding that loss causation is a necessary element of a rule 10b5 claim (E) holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established
Output: (A)
at 422) (alteration in original). But even then, the equation of legal and factual non-consent mixes considerations of physical disparity (“smaller” or “weaker”) with considerations of mental or emotional disparities (“less experienced,” “authority figures”). While this assumption may be valid where the minor is a younger child, see, e.g., Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379, it does not hold true where the victim is an older adolescent, who is able to engage in sexual intercourse voluntarily, despite being legally incapable of consent. See United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir.2004) (distinguishing factual and legal consent for purposes of determining whether statutory rape is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2); Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 51-52 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while we agree that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding dwi intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle in a public place is clearly not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16b (B) holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence (C) holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime (D) holding that unlawful imprisonment of a minor or incompetent adult is not a crime of violence under  16b because the crime can be accomplished with the victims acquiescence (E) holding a crime committed under a nebraska statute criminalizing sexual contact between an adult and a minor a felony crime of violence for sentencing purposes
Output: (D)