niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
view that these findings do not permit the inference that she could perform full-time sedentary work takes too narrow a view of the evidence. Killen also argues that Reliance Standard unfairly brought forward its strongest evidence — the independent medical examiner’s report — only in the final stage of her appeal, thereby preventing her from engaging in the “meaningful dialogue” contemplated by § 1133. See Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 154 (5th Cir.2009). Circuits that have addressed the issue have generally determined that ERISA does not guarantee claimants an opportunity to rebut an independent medical examination report generated during an appeal prior to a denial of benefits. See Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan (B) holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage (C) holding that the plan administrator did not abuse her discretion by denying benefits when faced with conflicting medical reports (D) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (E) holding that erisa and its implementing regulations do not require a plan administrator to provide a claimant with access to the medical opinion reports of appeallevel reviewers prior to a final decision on appeal
Output: (E)
disciplin ary segregation were isolated from other inmates and only permitted approximately 50 minutes a day to exercise and shower. The Court nevertheless held that “[t]he regime to which [the inmate] was subjected ... was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life.” Id. at 487, 115 S.Ct. at 2302. Even assuming that the additional deprivations of communal religious services and out-of-cell exercise for 15 days caused the level of Arce’s hardship to exceed the hardship at issue in Sandin, any difference is significantly offset by the relative brevity of Aree’s segregation which was 12 days shorter than the 30 day segregation in Sandin. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; see also Frazier, 81 F.3d at 317 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the 15 day duration without 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement (B) holding that placement in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest because it falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence (C) holding that 12 days of prehearing confinement in the shu did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest (D) holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a statecreated liberty interest (E) holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process
Output: (C)
entitlement claims. The VA’s new rule had the effect of reinterpreting § 1318 to prohibit hypothetical entitlement claims. See Tarver, 1373-74. In Rodriguez and Tarver, we applied the three-part test outlined in Princess Cruises to determine that § 3.22 could be applied retroactively to bar § 1318 claims based on a hypothetical entitlement theory. See Rodriguez, 511 F.3d at 1156 (finding that all three Princess Cruises factors weighed in favor of retroactive application of § 3.22, as amended in 2000, to claims for DIC benefits filed by survivors before the amendment took effect); Tarver, 557 F.3d at 1374-77 (finding that retroactive application of § 3.22 was permissible in a case “distinguishable from Rodriguez only . v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Ms. Kernea argues that because § 3.10(f)(3), 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing hixs holding that hypothetical entitlement claims were permitted under  1311a2 (B) holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the fda (C) recognizing hardship where plaintiff alleged it was being deprived of statutory entitlement (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that the husbands failure to argue his entitlement to attorneys fees under a prenuptial agreement at a hearing held on the issue of entitlement to attorneys fees constituted an abandonment of that claim
Output: (A)
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)®. Furthermore, § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of: (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) ] or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security® 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). However, despite the jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(B), we are not precluded from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a properly filed petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1359 (<HOLDING>); see also Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (B) holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond (C) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations (D) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (E) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction
Output: (A)
truthful. Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant’s contention is correct, we nevertheless observe that the trial court found in the four factors noted above ample particularized guarantees of trustworthiness of Bryar’s statements to Trottier and Bollerud, and we conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. See Cook, 135 N.H. at 662, 610 A.2d at 805. For this reason, we hold that the admission of Bryar’s statements incriminating the defendant did not violate the defendant’s right of confrontation under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution. Because part I, article 15 affords this defendant at least as much protection from an unconstitutional admission of hearsay as the sixth amendment, cf. White v. Illinois, — U.S. —, — n.8, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 n.8 (1992) (<HOLDING>), we need not embark on an independent federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception like that for coconspirators under rule 801d2e internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause (C) holding that rule 8034 hearsay exception is firmly rooted for sixth amendment purposes (D) holding codefendants confession incriminating defendant was not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under roberts standard (E) holding that the exception is not firmly rooted
Output: (C)
(explaining that Habeas Counsel was “finally ... able to retrieve [the] materials from prior counsel”; that “[t]he boxes were a mess”; and that Habeas Counsel was “on trial for several weeks and could not devote needed attention to this project” (emphases added)).) And after retrieving and reorganizing the materials, Habeas Counsel allowed another forty-seven days to elapse before he sent the Coram Nobis Petition on October 16, 2006-notwithstanding when it was actually stamped filed. Cf. Lee v. Portuondo, No. 02-CV-3990, 2008 WL 22173078, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003) (concluding that the petitioner’s three attempts to obtain files in the one-year limitations period did not constitute a diligent effort); Lewis v. Walsh, No. 03-CV-1932, 2003 WL 21729840, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2003) (<HOLDING>). But even assuming that Petitioner’s and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agency demand letters are not suits (B) holding demand letter written prior to and during litigation absolutely privileged (C) holding that petitioners sending sporadic letters requesting documents written with lengthy delays between each letter was not a sufficiently diligent effort (D) holding that documents did not substantially comply where copies of letter of credit and promissory note were submitted and letter of credit required originals (E) holding defendants were entitled to a decision on the merits on rule 11 sanctions where they substantially complied with rule 11c1a by sending a letter rather than serving a motion
Output: (C)
campus is a limited public forum. Def. Br. 12. The Court agrees with the defendants’ assessment. The Court begins by recognizing that “the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted, “[s]ome portions of a public college’s campus may be a public forum.” Davis v. Stratton, 360 FedAppx. 182, 184 (2d Cir.2010). Significant to the analysis, however, is that these areas may constitute a designated public forum only to the extent they are “intentionally openfed]” to First Amendment activities. Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.2004); see also Ochshom, 645 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>); Hotel Emps., 311 F.3d at 545 (noting that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum
Output: (B)
proceeds recovered if an “alternate action” is pursued. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 7 — 804(f)(2). III. Discussion There is no dispute that, the State and the City did not intervene in Khura-na’s original action or otherwise convert it to a civil enforcement action. Nevertheless, Khurana moves for a relator’s share, arguing that the DPA and SAIC Settlement constitute an “alternate civil remedy” ( o. 8:09-CR-203-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 4431157, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2011) (same); United States v. Lustman, Criminal No. 05-40082-GPM, 2006 WL 1207145, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 4, 2006) (“Surely Congress would have explicitly specified criminal prosecutions as an ‘alternate remedy* if it intended the result urged here.”), with United States v. Bisig, 2005 WL 3532554, at *3-5 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2005) (<HOLDING>). However, even if the DPA and SAIC Settlement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (B) holding that a criminal prosecution and criminal forfeiture proceeding constituted an alternate remedy and permitting award to relator (C) holding that an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded the defendant in any other criminal proceeding (D) recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment (E) holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture
Output: (B)
unambiguous language of the Family Code and under precedent from the Supreme Court of Texas, the answer to this question is “yes.” “A parent of a child has ... the duty to support the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.001(a) (West 2008). In the Family Code, the Texas Legislature expressly states that “a parent who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to a person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is owed.” Id. § 151.001(c). In this provision, the Legislature ha is a sound statutory basis for the holdings in cases in which courts have determined that the trial court in a non-enforcement modification suit has authority to order a parent to pay reasonable attorney’s fees as child support under the “necessaries rule.” See In re J.A.D., 2010 WL 2649961, at *1-4 (<HOLDING>); In re A.J.J., No. 2-04-265-CV, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in paternity proceeding and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children
Output: (A)
lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate’s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the “defect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal’’ and that "having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review”); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted), reh’g denied, trans. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (B) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (C) holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect (D) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (E) holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal
Output: (C)
There have been variations in the verbal formulation of what is necessary to show prejudice. See CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1574-75 (Fed.Cir.1983) (finding that to satisfy the minimum requirements for standing to sue, a disappointed bidder must show that “‘there was a substantial chance that [it] would receive an award — that it was within the zone of active consideration’ ”) (quoting Morgan Business Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 223 Ct.Cl. 325, 619 F.2d 892, 896 (1980)); see also TRW Envtl. Safety Sys., Inc., 18 Cl.Ct. at 69 (finding that procurement defects adversely affected plaintiffs chances of selection and therefore that it had established prejudice); TRW Inc., GSBCA No. 11309-P, 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 24,389, at 121,789, 1991 WL 175673 (Aug. 29, 1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Diverco, Inc., B-259734, 95-1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (B) holding a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 if the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure (C) holding that as a matter of law where the procurement decision was rational a reviewing court may not award injunctive relief despite the presence of procedural irregularities in the procurement process (D) holding that governments regulatory violation does not itself necessarily entitle a protester to relief in such situations the board must review the conduct of the procurement with heightened scrutiny to determine if the improper taint had any actual adverse effect on the procurement process (E) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement
Output: (D)
S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex.1996) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, suits against a trust must be brought against the trustee. See Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex.1995); Smith v. Wayman, 148 Tex. 318, 224 S.W.2d 211, 218 (Tex.1949); Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Tex.1945). Relators argue that because James Craig Guetersloh, Trustee of the 1984 Guetersloh Trust, is the actual party to the suit being prosecuted by the Real Parties in Interest, under Rule 7 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure he is authorized to “defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court.” The right of a party to self-representation is not, however, absolute. See, e.g., Kunstoplast of Am. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Steele v. McDonald, 202 S.W.3d 926, 928-29 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte granting a continuance of trial when corporation sent only a nonattorney to represent the corporation at trial and trial court did not allow nonattorney to represent corporation at trial (C) holding that a nonattorney may not appear pro se on behalf of a corporation (D) holding a person who is not a member of the bar of any court  may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in the district court or in this court as counsel for others (E) holding that a nonattorney may not appear pro se in his capacity as independent executor of an estate
Output: (C)
only by his third argument. I District courts have broad discretion to award restitution. State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn.1999). We therefore review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Minn.App.2011). Miller first argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution because the state failed to prove that he is directly responsible for Montplaisir’s injuries. Crime victims are entitled to restitution for losses they incur from the crime. Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012); State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn.App.1999). The district, court “shall consider ... the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; and ... the income, resources .1996) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996), with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding restitution for losses directly attributable to victims murder improper against defendant who helped conceal murder afterwards but otherwise took no part in it (B) holding restitution improper when awarded to homeowner for property damage caused by convicted murderer during random target practice  earlier in day of murder (C) holding that a landowner who lost a strip of property to a highway widening project could not recover losses caused by concurrent placement of a median strip because when less than the entire property is taken compensation for damage to the remainder can be awarded only if such damage is caused by the taking and cjonstruction of the median not the taking caused the alleged damage (D) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (E) holding that restitution for lost income in property cases was improper under the plain language of the statute because restitution for lost income is authorized only for victims of bodily injury
Output: (B)
activity, not objectionable under the prevailing standards of lawful and approved social conduct in the community---- Informed public sentiment is only against unlicensed gambling, which is unsupervised, unregulated by law and which affords no protection to customers and no assurance of fairness or honesty of the operation of the gambling devices.” Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland, 63 N.J. 301, 307, 307 A.2d 85, 88 (1973), stated that “[w]hile New Jersey continues to take a strict view of those forms of gambling that are prohibited, the fact that wagering in various different ways is now authorized demonstrates that our public policy can no longer be said to condemn gambling per se.” See also, Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Texas 1967) (<HOLDING>); In re Smith, 66 B.R. 58 (Bankr.D.Md.1986), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable (B) holding that a contract is not effective until the performance of the conditions precedent and that a condition precedent calls for the happening of some event or the performance of some act after the terms of the contract have been agreed on before the contract shall be binding on the parties (C) holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur (D) holding that the place of performance governs the legality of the contract and because the contract was to be performed in mexico texas public policy against gambling was not implicated (E) holding that place of performance of a life insurance contract was the state where premiums were made payable even if the contract was made in another state
Output: (D)
was not. Corporal Smith’s testimony, on the other hand, was admitted entirely without objection. While we agree with the trial court’s ultimate determination that the BAC results lacked sufficient foundation due to noncompliance with the fifteen-minute observation period, the court had already admitted Corporal Smith’s testimony on the subject without any objection. Consequently, this evidence could not later be excluded. See Riley v. Dir. of Revenue, 378 S.W.3d 432, 442-43 (Mo.App. W.D.2012) (“The failure to follow the foundational procedural requirements of sections 577.020 to 577.041 does not render the BAC toxicology report incompetent. It merely renders the test inadmissible upon proper objection.”); see also Reinert v. Dir. of Revenue, 894 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. banc 1995) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by White v. Dir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (B) holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection (C) holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection (D) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (E) holding that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence is received without objection
Output: (B)
1999, she did receive that review in November, after Compuware took measures to correct the lapse. Although the review noted several performance deficiencies, Compuware nonetheless awarded Ms. Thomas a 4% increase, made retroactive to September when the salary review should have been completed. And, although Ms. Thomas complains that the amount of the salary increase was less than other employees received, she has presented no evidence that the increase was outside the range for which she was eligible. Neither a late but retroactive pay raise, nor a pay raise within the applicable range but less than the employee subjectively believes she deserved, constitutes a “materially adverse employment action.” See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We note, for the record, that in White v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lateral transfer without a loss in benefits does not constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (C) holding that a materially adverse action is of the magnitude of a termination of employment or a decrease in salary or a material loss in benefits (D) holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation (E) holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action
Output: (C)
of the APA, substantive rules are rules that create law. These rules usually implement existing law, im posing general, extrastatutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress. Interpretative rules merely clarify or explain existing law or regulations and go “ ‘to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means.’ ” Id. at 783 (citations omitted). See also New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.1987) (ruling that Secretary of Agriculture’s determination that restaurant allowance for food stamp recipients was income was an interpretive rule exempt from the notice and comment requirement of the APA); Chula Vista City School Dist. v. Bennett, 824 F.2d 1573 (Fed.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 774, 98 L.Ed.2d 861 (1988) (<HOLDING>). FNBL suggests that the proper method for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (B) holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited (C) holding that a 50 rule used by the secretary of education to evaluate applications for impact aid by local school districts was not subject to the notice and comment procedures of the apa because it was an interpretive rule describing the agencys view of the meaning of a statute (D) holding that exhaustion was not required under a federal education statute where the gravamen of the complaint was not that the plaintiff had been denied the type of education the statute guarantees and hence the relief sought was not available through the statutory appeals process (E) holding that the postal service was not required to follow notice and comment rulemaking procedures
Output: (C)
significant change.in benefits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Lucas, citing Annett v. University of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1239 (10th Cir. 2004), argues that “[a]cts that carry a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects may be considered adverse actions,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 27. He claims, without evidentiary support, that the corrective action subjected him to potential humiliation as a sexual predator. But his argument rests on a flawed legal premise: Annett defined an “adverse employment action” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, which is broader than the definition of an “adverse employment action” for a Title VII discrimination claim. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 61-65, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (<HOLDING>); see also Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1203 (explaining 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a collective bargaining agreement violated the antiretaliation provision of the age discrimination in employment act because on its face it unambiguously denied an employee his contractual right to file an inhouse grievance once he elected to file an age discrimination charge (B) holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian (C) holding that title viis antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action that might dissuade  a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge and thus covers a broader range of employer conduct than its substantive discrimination provision (D) holding that in retaliation case the requisite adverse action is one which well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination (E) holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc
Output: (C)
1069 (5th Cir.1981). In Sessions, the Fifth Circuit barred a plaintiffs Section 1981 employment discrimination action against a state hospital. The court ruled that the hospital was an arm of the state, and that Section 1981 did not abrogate the state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: “[u]nlike Title VII, Section 1981 contains no congressional waiver of the state’s eleventh amendment immunity.” Id. The facts in the instant case do not present a distinguishable situation. The Office of the Attorney General is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity. See Tex. Const, art. IV, § 22. Therefore, the court is without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs Section 1981 claim against the state of Texas. See also Loya v. Tex. Dep’t of Corrections, 878 F.2d 860, 861-862 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). While conceding that Defendant is immune from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 (B) holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation (C) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment (D) recognizing that claims against a state under  1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that section 1981 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment
Output: (A)
claimant’s claim for hearing aids is barred by the statute of limitations. Arkansas Code Annotated § ll-9-702(a)(l) (1987)', provides, “A claim for compensation for disability on account of injury, other than an occupational disease and occupational infection, shall be barred unless filed with the Commission within two (2) years from the date of injury.” The Commission determined that Rollon’s 1.9% permanent hearing impairment had developed and become apparent to Rollon more than two years prior to the date he filed his claim for benefits on March 3, 1993, and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations, a finding not appealed to this court. However, the Commission recognized that although Rollon’s permanent impairment remained the same under the AMA Guides, he W.2d 193 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, in the present case, we hold that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction (B) holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that the liberal construction of workers compensation laws did not relieve a claimant of the burden of showing a causal relation between his injury and the employment (E) holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence
Output: (E)
would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’ willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576-77, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Second, § 301 completely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law (B) holding a state court tort action for retaliatory discharge removable because it arose under  301 of the labor management relations act rather than illinois state law (C) holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that any suit filed in state court alleging violations of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under  301 and be resolved by federal law (E) holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law
Output: (A)
from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Id. Defendants argue that the Supervisory Defendants (Blasnek, Cruz, McGrattan, Onhemus, and Washington) cannot be liable for their subordinates’ alleged use of excessive force under § 52.1 pursuant to § 820.8. However, each of the Supervisory Defendants was found liable for her own actions under § 52.1, including witnessing and directing their subordinates to violate Plaintiffs’ rights. {See Docket Nos. 592-601 (verdict forms).) Therefore immunity under § 820.8 does not apply. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir.1978) (“California law expressly imposes liability on a public employee for his own act or omission”); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 F.Supp.2d 971, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights (B) holding that a superior can be held liable in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights (C) holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur (D) holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity (E) holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity
Output: (B)
amount and terms of the deductions ...” In case of any failure to pay wages due to an employee as required by Section 41-10-40 or 41-10-50 the employee may recover in a civil action an amount equal to three times the full amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as the court may allow. § 41-10-80(C). The South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this treble damages provision to mean that the decision to award the penalty of treble damages is discretionary, and the penalty should not be imposed “if there is a good faith dispute over wages allegedly due.” Rice, 456 S.E.2d at 383. Fruehauf asks us to extend the requirement that there be a bona fide, good faith wage dispute to require that Wall show that Fruehauf willf 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (<HOLDING>); O’Neal v. Intermedical Hospital of South 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer (C) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (D) holding that an employee who breaches the duty of loyalty to his employer forfeits his right to compensation and creates a good faith dispute over the payment of his wages by virtue of his bad behavior (E) holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act
Output: (D)
described the manner of the attack), adopted by 2012 WL 1014821 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2012). In alleging that his face and hand were “smashed” by Defendants Yega and Gibson, (see Compl. § II), the Complaint puts forth more than a de minimis use of force that parallels the degree of force found by other courts to be sufficiently serious under the objective prong. See, e.g., Santiago v. Westchester Cty., No. 13-CV-1886, 2014 WL 2048201, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014) (finding allegations that a prison official “threw [the] [p]laintiff to the ground, twisted his arm, [and] picked him up off the ground while squeezing his throat ... lead to a plausible inference that the force inflicted was malicious and wanton”); Taylor v. Wilde, No. 11-CV-3608, 2012 WL 2860999, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2012) (<HOLDING>); Phelan v. Hersh, No. 10-CV-11, 2011 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act of slamming  is objectively sufficiently serious to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing that party is not permitted to use the accident of a remand to raise an issue that it could just as well have raised in the first appeal internal quotation marks and alterations omitted (C) recognizing that procedural sentencing error is harmless if the resulting sentence is not longer thanthat to which the defendant would otherwise be subject alterations and internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that independent review is not de novo review of the constitutional issue but only a means to determine whether the state court decision is objectively unreasonable internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that the agency did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a continuance where the petitioner was only at the first step in a long and discretionary process and relief was speculative at best alterations and internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (A)
889 F.2d at 672. In 1990 the EPA revised the standard for determining whether cleanup costs will be considered “consistent with the NCP.” County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514-15 (10th Cir.1991). In doing so, it reduced the standard for compliance from “strict” to “substantial compliance.” Id. “A private party response action will be considered ‘consistent with the NCP’ if the action, when evaluated as a whole, is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements ... and results in a CERC-LA-quality cleanup.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i). Viewing the facts favorably to Aviall, this court’s task is to decide whether Aviall has complied with this standard. See, e.g., La.-Pac. Corp. , 89 F.3d 835, 1996 WL 338624, at *5 (6th Cir.1996) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>) and SherwinWilliams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that on summary judgment a court may not disregard evidence merely because it serves the interests of the party introducing it citations omitted (B) holding that it may not (C) holding that the act is constitutional because it restricts who may control the images but not what the defendant may introduce at trial (D) holding that it may be decided as a matter of law (E) holding that it is not
Output: (B)
that Congress intended federal courts to be bound further by state administrative decisions than by decisions of the EEOC. Since it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded preclusive effect in a state’s own courts. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1891 n. 7. The Court thus drew a sharp distinction between state court judgments, which are entitled to deference under the res judicata principles of section 1738, and unreviewed state administrative determinations which are not. See also id. at 487, 102 S.Ct. at 1900 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (<HOLDING>); id. at 508-09, 102 S.Ct. at 1911-12 (Stevens, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) recognizing the majority rule (C) recognizing majority rule and collecting cases (D) recognizing the boggs distinction (E) recognizing distinction made by majority
Output: (E)
of which are local and some out of State.” Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 585-86, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997). Thus, as the Court stated, “[f]or purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any categorical distinction between the activities of profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit entities is ... wholly illusory.” Id. at 586, 117 S.Ct. 1590. Similarly, government institutions not only can affect interstate commerce but also can be direct participants in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions the impact that certain federal, state, and local government institutions can have on interstate commerce. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537, 547-48, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Governments in general, and individual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce (B) holding that the inability to proceed as a class does not deprive plaintiffs of substantive rights under the fair labor standards act flsa (C) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (D) holding that a religious foundation is an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the fair labor standards act (E) holding that application of fair labor standards act flsa to transportation employees employed by local government does not contravene the commerce clause because labor conditions of those employees affect interstate commerce
Output: (E)
improperly held in favor of Hanover on independent equitable grounds, which are not recognized as a defense to an avoidance action in bankruptcy. We address each argument in turn. A Earmarking The earmarking defense in bankruptcy is a judicially created exception to the statutory power of the bankruptcy trustee under § 547 to avoid or set aside an otherwise preferential transfer of assets. See McCuskey v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir.1988). The earmarking defense applies “[w]hen a third person makes a loan to a debtor specifically to enable that debtor to satisfy the claim of a designated creditor.” 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 547.03[2][a] (16th ed. 2011); see Va. Nat’l Bank v. Woodson (In re Decker), 329 F.2d 836, 839 (4th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). The proceeds of such an “earmarked” loan 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that specific jurisdiction requires at least butfor causation (B) holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose (C) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (D) holding that a transfer was not an avoidable preference when it was made for the specific purpose of paying at least a portion of a particular debt (E) holding that it was within family courts discretion to assign all debt to one party when court found that party to be at fault for debt
Output: (D)