niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
submitted a proposed order along with the application. Bayouth and Hastings filed an objection, summarily stating that the proposed order “deprives them of due process,” “represents collusion between [Nautilus] and [ reasons. First, Ba-youth and Hastings said nothing about necessary parties when they objected to Nautilus’s proposed order for a declaratory judgment. See Hill v. Kansas Gas Serv. Co., 323 F.3d 858, 866 (10th Cir.2003) (stating that we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal). Second, to the extent that the insurance coverage issue between Nautilus and Banana Joe’s created an actual controversy between Nautilus and Bayouth and Hastings, see Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 274, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941) (<HOLDING>), that controversy was resolved by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured (B) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (C) holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest (D) holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured (E) holding that if counsel retained by an insurer acts as an investigator and not as an attorney then the communications between the insured and insurer are not privileged
Output: (D)
so by the presence of Sherman’s foot in the doorway. For these reasons, it is clear, as the Ohio Court of Appeals found, that Cummings’ “attempt to close the door constituted a termination of the consensual encounter, and communicated his lack of consent to any further intrusion by the officers.” Cummings, supra, 2002 WL 57979 at *4. Defendants contend, as did the State in response to Cummings’ motion to suppress, that when Cummings shut the door on Sherman’s foot, the officers had probable cause to believe that Cummings had committed the crime of assault, and any entry into his home to seize him was justified by exigent circumstances under the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Ohio Court of Appeals that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement (B) recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception (C) recognizing exception (D) recognizing the searchincidenttoarrest exception to the warrant requirement (E) recognizing hot pursuit of a fleeing felon as an exigency exception to the warrant requirement
Output: (E)
two problems with this view. As Judge Lansing pointed out in Gillihan I, the first is that: The opening words of subsection (1) make it clear that it does not apply in cases that are subject to subsection (4), and the opening words of subsection (4) establish that it governs “[i]n actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,-000).” Gillihan I at 696, 99 P.3d at 1086. The two subsections do not govern together in personal injury actions, and to read them as though they do, as Gonzalez points out, is to edit the statutory language of I.C. § 12-120. The plurality’s interpretation is strained, and both parties in this case have agreed ural High School Dist. No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 224, 200 P. 138, 140 (1921) (<HOLDING>); Beker Industries Inc. v. Georgetown Irr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding legislatures removal of language allowing director to approve change in nature of water use prior to bills passage can only be interpreted as intent that director not have that power (B) holding removal of word unanimous from bill prior to passage demonstrates legislative intent to change law from requiring board unanimity to segregate school districts to requiring only majority (C) recognizing that statutes requiring intent are not likely to be invalidated because of vagueness (D) holding change of word shall to may prior to bills passage indicates legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory (E) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law
Output: (B)
resistance, temperature, barorqetric pressure, engine age, associated cylinder compres sion ratio, ambient air conditions, and the like. ’258 Patent 11:6-25. Column 11 is simply a list of input factors with no disclosure on the relationship of any of these factors to glow plug energization. Merely stating that the inputs could be “interactively adapted” fails to inform how any of these inputs relate to one another. Although the listed variables may affect temperature and voltage variables depicted in Chart 1 and Figure 2, the listed variables Plaintiffs cite in Column 11 are not themselves algorithms. The Federal Circuit, has rejected the notion that a list of variables alone without a disclosed relationship could constitute a disclosed algorithm. See Ibor-meith, 732 F.3d at 1381 (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiffs note that the description 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing same factors (B) recognizing that among other factors the location and level of the precedent as well as its age are important factors in a qualified immunity analysis (C) holding that judgment calls on the weight to be given various relevant factors are for the sentencing court not for this court (D) holding that a list of identified factors related to detecting driver drowsiness in a sleep monitoring program does not amount to an algorithm when there is no disclosure of even a single concrete relationship between the various factors that are used to compute an outcome to warn of driver drowsiness (E) holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors
Output: (D)
terms of the trust hereinafter described concerning the other one-half (50%) of the options to purchase shares as a result of owning the “fair value” options. Randall purchased all of the stock options in November 1998, so he acquired them while he and Ginger were married. Also, none of the stock options were awarded for work done outside of the parties’ marriage. Randall was given the opportunity to purchase the stock options because of his management position with his company. The stock option plan recites that management employees were given this opportunity in order to motivate them to exert their best efforts on behalf of the company. However, because Randall bought the stock options in 1998, they were not something that would be awarded in the fu Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Joiner, 755 S.W.2d 496, 498 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stock plan to which employer and employee spouse both made contributions and whose value was dependent on length of employee spouses employment was a deferred compensation retirement plan (B) holding that stock options that could be purchased but not sold without company consent during marriage were community property even though value of options was dependent upon employee spouses postdivorce employment (C) holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age (D) holding that a debtors interest in an erisaqualified employercontrolled stock bonus and profit sharing retirement trust was excluded from the debtors estate pursuant to 11 usc  541c2 and applicable state spendthrift trust law where the plan involved no active participation by the employee where the plan included a statutorily required antialienation provision and where the plan precluded borrowing and withdrawals by the debtor except on the debtors death termination of employment disability retirement or termination of the plan (E) holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness
Output: (A)
and quotation marks omitted). See also Dees v. Wilson, 796 F.Supp. 474, 475 (D.Kan.1992) (“A motion to reconsider is appropriate if the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position, the facts, or mistakenly has decided issues not presented for determination.”). In addition, “arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsidera issues. Plaintiffs remaining arguments are new arguments or arguments offering supporting facts for which plaintiff has had ample opportunity to argue on prior occasions. These issues are again not properly before the court as they are arguments raised for the first time in plaintiffs motion to reconsider. Thus, the court declines to decide the merits of these arguments. See Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In sum, plaintiff has not presented any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reconsideration pursuant to rule 59 cannot be premised on the same arguments presented in the complaint and motions (B) holding that reconsideration should not be granted where the moving party seeks to introduce additional facts not in the record on the original motion or advances new arguments or issues that could have been raised on the original motion (C) holding that motions for reconsideration are not appropriate if the movant asks the court to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally (D) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (E) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision
Output: (C)
See id. Johnson and the corporation thereafter filed for Chapter 11 protection, and Johnson initiated an adversary proceeding to determine whether § 502(b)(7) limited the allowability of Beck’s claims in his case. See id. The court first held that § 502(b)(7) did limit Beck’s claim against the corporation deriving from the corporation’s breach of the employment contract, but did not limit Beck’s claims against the corporation on his other theories of recovery. See id. at 468. The court then held that § 502(b)(7) did not limit any of Beck’s claims against Johnson. See id. at 469-71. With reference to Beck’s claim against Johnson deriving from Johnson’s alleged tortious interference with Beck’s employment relations, the court stated that “the whole tenor of § 502 Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (<HOLDING>); In re Interco Inc., 137 B.R. 1003, 1007 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  502b7 then called  502b8 does not limit claim of employee against guarantors of employment contract (B) holding landlord was not liable because landlord had relinquished control despite landlords distribution of notices to residents telling them to keep their dogs tied or inside because evidence suggested that the reason for notice was that landlord had received complaints about barking and trash removal and not to protect others (C) holding that  502b6 does limit the claim of landlord against guarantordebtor (D) holding that tenant failed to establish that the landlord breached his duty because tenant offered no evidence that landlord failed to properly maintain second floor balcony or that the landlord was aware of tenants use of deck to move furniture into the second floor or that such a practice was common (E) holding that comparable provision  502b6 does not literally apply to limit claims of landlord against guarantordebt or and that equities weigh against limiting claim
Output: (C)
customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS’s liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase “liabilities covered” in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not “covered,” and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from “liabilities covered.” See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage
Output: (E)
Board’s powers. Id. at 208. In Baker, supra at 207, the defendant expressly repre sented to the public that its computer system would prevent adverse drug interactions. In the present case, by contrast, defendants did not expressly represent to the public or anybody else that there was a one in twenty-two chance of landing on any one of the twenty-two bonus wheel payouts, including the one-thousand-coin payout. Plaintiff alleges that the actual appearance and operation of the slot machines mislead players. Because the MGCB regulates the operation of the slot machines and also determines whether the machines are misleading, defendant’s operation of the slot machines at issue in this case was specifically authorized by the MGCB. C. PLAINTIFF’S COMMON-LAW CLAIMS ARE NW2d 396 (1997) (<HOLDING>). However, notwithstanding traditional notions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq (B) holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq (C) holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (D) holding that denial of vsf benefits to disabled retirees does not violate the ada the rehabilitation act 29 usc  791 et seq or the age discrimination in employment act of 1967 29 usc  621 et seq and that plaintiffs due process and first amendment claims were frivolous (E) holding the state law claims were not preempted
Output: (A)
he would have requested, and the trial court would have granted, a mistrial. In this situation, then, “the denial of a significant procedural right ... is sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.” Ramsey, 323 F.Supp.2d at 39. Because the trial court has already made the requisite findings entitling Middleton to relief, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial. DAVIS, J., concurs, and THOMAS, J., concurs with opinion. THOMAS, J., concurring. I concur in the majority opinion, but write to explain that while we cannot determine whether Appellant will again be tried for first-degree murder, the possibility is not foreclosed by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. If Appellant is tried for first-degree murder, he wil , 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court noted in State v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder (B) holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty (C) holding on habeas corpus that claims regarding sentencing phase jury charges in a death penalty case are never barred by procedural default (D) holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error (E) holding that the defendants due process rights to notice were violated when a judge imposed a capital sentence even though the state took the position that it would not seek the death penalty
Output: (B)
at 513, and we certainly do not find it helpful to the decision at hand. Nor are we persuaded by the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson v. Family Services Division, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). In Wilson, the Utah court held that a grandmother who had nothing more than a biological relationship with her grandchild was nonetheless entitled to a hearing on her adoption petition. Id. at 230-31; see also State v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Ut.1977) (similar). Although it is not clear whether the Utah Court based its decision on the federal or state constitution, we think its conclusion flowed from a sense that a grandparent’s wish to adopt her grandchild was an aspiration worthy of protection by the courts. But cf. Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 308-09 (Ind.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Although we do not dispute that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody (B) recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection (C) holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child (D) holding that juvenile court that determined child was not dependent had no jurisdiction to thereafter determine custody of child (E) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody
Output: (C)
by Plaintiff. Plaintiff relies instead on a statistical analysis of a company-wide data pool and makes no attempt to narrow the data pool to the locations in which he worked or the positions which he challenges. As this Court noted in the order denying class certification, the probative value of Plaintiffs statistical evidence is therefore highly questionable, in significant part due to the treatment of factors such as experience, education and specific promotion processes. Cooper v. Southern Company, 205 F.R.D. 596, 613-14 (N.D.Ga.2001). The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment. See Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext (B) holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position (C) holding reliance on statistical evidence of inexorable zero was sufficient to establish prima facie case notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to reference appropriate workpool (D) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (E) holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons
Output: (A)
summary judgments de novo. Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Products, L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569, 571 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied); Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non movant, crediting evidence favorable to the non movant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the non movant unless reasonable jurors could not. Cunningham v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 352 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. filed). When a trial court does not specify the grounds on which the judgment is based, we will affirm the judgment if it is correct on any legal theory expressly placed at issue and supported by the evidence. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001) (per curiam)(<HOLDING>). As Appellee asserted alternative grounds for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (B) holding that we may affirm a district court if its holding was right for any reason (C) holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious (D) holding we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even those not relied upon by the district court (E) holding that when the grounds for the ruling are not specified we affirm if any of the theories advanced are meritorious
Output: (E)
giving weight to or rejecting the statements of a treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Whether the ALJ gives great or small weight to the opinions of treating physicians, the ALJ must give good reasons for giving the opinions that weight. Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 720 (8th Cir.2001). “The ALJ may discount or disregard such an opinion if other medical assessments are supported by superior medical evidence, or if the treating physician has offered inconsistent opinions.” Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir.2001). Moreover, a treating physician’s opinion does not deserve controlling weight when it is nothing more than a conclusory statement. Piepgras v. Chater, 76 F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir.1996). See also Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 1. Dr. Millea’s May, 22, 2005, Opinion Letter 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (B) holding that the weight given a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (C) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (D) holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations (E) holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence
Output: (B)
91 Hawai'i 81, 86, 979 P.2d 1107, 1112 (1999). In Stewart v. Budget Rentr-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970), this court first articulated the rule of strict products liability, to the effect that one who sells or leases a defective product which is dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the defective product to the ult cases alleging design, as opposed to manufacturing, defects “since obviously the design of the product does not change from the date of its original manufacture, absent some modification in design.” Rix v. General Motors Corp., 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195, 199 (1986) (citation omitted). See also Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo.App. 99, 517 P.2d 406, 413 (1973) (<HOLDING>). As explained in L. Frumer & M. Freeman, 1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that acts of improper maintenance were insufficient to defeat plaintiffs defective design claim (B) holding with respect to class iii device not subject to pma process that negligent marketing and inadequate warning claims were preempted but defective design claim was not preempted because no fda design requirement existed (C) holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn (D) holding that plaintiffs negligence defective manufacturing defective design breach of warranty and failure to warn claims were preempted by the mda and fdca defined below (E) holding that plaintiffs did not need to identify the specific defective lawn mower to sustain their claim of a design defect
Output: (A)
matter is before us on a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we cannot look beyond McCormick’s complaint. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236 (“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is ... to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” (quotation omitted)). McCormick has never filed an amended complaint containing a factual allegation that the final shift change occurred on January 24, nor has he filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint. In th was aware of the alleged typographical error when he filed his brief in opposition to appellants’ motions to dismiss. At that point in the proceedings, he could have amended his complaint without the permission of the district court. See Glenn, 868 F.2d at 370 (<HOLDING>). McCormick had a reasonable opportunity to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (B) holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss (C) holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion (D) holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision (E) recognizing that they could be amended anyway
Output: (D)
we cannot say that this record conclusively shows that appellant is entitled to no relief, sufficient to deny the motion without a hearing. See, e.g., Ventura, 820 So.2d at 1026 (Appellant affirmed at plea hearing that he personally understood the terms of his plea agreement and was informed of the consequences of his plea; the appellant was nonetheless entitled to a hearing on the merits of his motion to withdraw based on allegations of trial counsel misadvice and coercion.); Kemner v. State, 770 So.2d 276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Transcript of hearing did not conclusively rebut appellant’s allegation that his plea was induced by his counsel’s misadvice that he would receive a life sentence if he went to trial and was convicted.); Holmes v. State, 726 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>); Stott v. State, 701 So.2d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant was entitled to evidentiary hearing based on allegation his trial counsel told him he would most likely face a life sentence if he went to trial when the maximum sentence for the charge he plead guilty to was eleven years (B) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence (E) holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty
Output: (A)
Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrines. Although this court declines to decide whether the state-action doctrine applies to state antitrust claims, it seems clear that it does apply, contrary to the district court’s holding. Aplt.App. 3942-43. Oklahoma’s antitrust law is to “be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal antitrust law ... and the case law applicable thereto.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79, § 212; see also Teleco, Inc. 587 P.2d at 1362; Oakridge Investments, Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 719 P.2d 848, 850 (Okla.Ct. App.1986). Nothing suggests that Oklahoma would reject the state-action doctrine which we have applied to federal antitrust claims in similar circumstances. See Trigen Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1225-1226 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); S. Disposal, Inc. v. Tex. Waste Mgmt., 161 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference (B) recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in electricity sales (C) recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in waste disposal services (D) holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation (E) recognizing  1857a is a clear expression of oklahomas policy favoring arbitration agreements
Output: (B)
to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transportation Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Ci 2d 719 (2003). In any event, this Court fully discussed the merits of Concepcion’s Apprendi claim and concluded that any sente lakely is applicable to the federal sentencing guidelines. Even if held to be applicable, the Supreme Court has not determined that Blakely applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Therefore, the rule in Blakely is of no aid to Concepcion in the resolution of this motion. See Simpson v. United States, 376 F.3d 679, 681-682 (7th Cir.2004) (finding that, even if Blakely announced a new constitutional rule, “the Supreme Court has not made the Blakely rule applicable to cases on collateral review”); In re: Dean, 375 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Garcia, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (noting that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review (B) holding that blakely does not apply retroactively to  2255 motions (C) holding that the blakely rule does not apply retroactively on collateral review and cannot authorize a successive habeas petition (D) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (E) holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely
Output: (C)
readily ascertainable.” (internal citation omitted)). Because Minnesota’s waiver rule was neither firmly established nor regularly applied in the courtroom closure context when it was applied to Crawford, I respectfully dissent. 6 . It should be noted unpublished appellate decisions in Minnesota are not precedential. See Minn.Stat. § 480A.08. 7 . Since Crawford, the Minnesota’ Court of Appeals has continued to apply the waiver rule as it was articulated in Bashire. See State v. Delacruz, No. A03-129, 2004 WL 193058, at *4 (Minn.Ct.App. Feb. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (finding no waiver where the defendant failed to object to a courtroom closure but did not explicitly agree to the closure); State v. Campbell, No. A06-539, 2007 WL 1121284, at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. April 17, 2007) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). These cases are irrelevant to our inquiry, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial (B) holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial (C) holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure (D) holding the defendant waived his courtroom closure challenge because he both failed to object to the limited closure and agreed to the closure through his attorney (E) holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial
Output: (D)
P.G. Hospital argues that there is an implied private cause of action under the Medicaid statute for health care providers against MCOs for nonpayment, citing Mallo v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, Florida, 88 F.Supp.2d 1376 (S.D.Fla.2000), Wilder, 496 U.S. at 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, and Ohio Hospital Ass’n v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 62 Ohio St.3d 97, 579 N.E.2d 695 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 1483, 117 L.Ed.2d 625 (1992). However, in each of those cases, the question was whether the Medicaid statute created a federal right enforceable against a State or i tient did not have a private right of action under the Medicaid statute against an MCO to enforce Medicaid guidelines and waiver provisions); Stewart v. Bernstein, 769 F.2d 1088, 1093-94 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Brogdon v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 103 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing private right of action (B) holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility (C) holding that nursing home patients did not have a property interest in receiving care at a particular facility (D) holding that the medicaid statute as amended by the federal nursing home reform amendments did not create a private cause of action for nursing home residents against nursing homes (E) holding that a medicaid recipient who was involuntarily removed from private nursing did not have a private right of action under the medicaid statute against a nursing home
Output: (E)
As to Defendant’s Shifrin’s Motion for Summary Judgment, in which he raises the same or similar arguments as those made in his earlier motion but attaches extraneous information and discusses material derived through discovery, the Court reviews that motion under the standard regarding entry of summary judgment. When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true the well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Shaw v. Valdez, 819 F.2d 965, 968 (10th Cir.1987). The Court considers whether the Complaint contains allegations that support a plausible legal claim for relief. Alvarado, 493 F.3d at 1215 n. 2; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment is proper when the record 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face (B) recognizing that to survive dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that a complaint must contain only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face (D) holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim (E) holding that while the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations it must contain more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim and must state a claim that is plausible on its face
Output: (C)
The question here is not whether he intended to defeat jurisdiction but whether he filed in conscious disregard of proper jurisdiction. Those are different propositions. Although these arguments bear some real similarity, they do not intersect. The Frenches’ counsel’s affidavit also stated that he had believed that the federal court might have been able to retain jurisdiction over the entirety had it chosen to do so. That was a mistake in an understanding of the law, not a mistake of fact. As pointed out by the Eastland court in Parker, the issue focused on the question of whether the record showed that claimant had made “a good faith mistake” by initially filing in a (federal) court without jurisdiction over the claim. The court found that the claimant had not acted in good faith (<HOLDING>) and that it was not necessary for the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss (B) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (C) recognizing that the partys factual complaint if taken as true affirmatively established that the other tribunal had no jurisdiction (D) holding that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction only precludes the relitigation of the issue of whether the first tribunal had jurisdiction (E) recognizing that when considering pretrial motions attacking the sufficiency of an indictment or information the factual allegations in the states pleadings are taken as true
Output: (C)
was denied the opportunity of securing, minimally, his $756,800.00 mortgage at the prevailing interest rate being offered at the time. Despite the fact that BMW Financial Services was the party that initiated the repossession proceedings and allegedly reported its actions to various credit agencies, the trial judge determined that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that Rovmain was “responsible for starting the ball rolling that resulted in his [Mr. Reuschel’s] credit rating being adversely affected by BMW and Land Rover Financial Services...to the tune of...$25,330.51.” [N.T. 4/9/07, at 207] The credibility of the parties and witnesses in this case presumably weighs heavily in the fact-finder’s decision-making process. See In Re Lokuta at 255, 11 A.3d at 446 (<HOLDING>). Given the trial judge’s verdict, one might 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (B) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact (C) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (D) holding that an appellate court will not disturb atrial courts credibility findings (E) holding that generally appellate courts will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal
Output: (D)
104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In this case, plaintiff was formally placed under arrest after she was tackled and brought back to her car. Plaintiff was later found guilty in municipal court for disorderly conduct, battery on a law enforcement officer, and fleeing arrest. Plaintiff appealed her convictions, and the conviction of battery on a law enforcement officer was affirmed. Plaintiffs convictions for disorderly conduct, battery on a law enforcement officer, and fleeing arrest conclusively establish the existence of probable cause for her arrest. Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, 184 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir.1999). This remains true notwithstanding that plaintiff was found not guilty for disorderly conduct and fleeing arrest on appeal. Mason v. Stock, 955 F.Supp. 1293, 1307 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, plaintiffs conviction precludes her 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probable cause existed to search the defendants residence because the warrant affidavit established probable cause that the defendant possessed stolen firearms and because people generally keep firearms at home or on their persons (B) holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself (C) holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits (D) holding arrest was valid because there was probable cause of cdw even though officer incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of ppw (E) holding that municipal court conviction established that there existed probable cause even though defendant was found not guilty on appeal to the district court
Output: (E)
violation of the Act would be substantially reduced if the time that the motions to suppress were under advisement was entirely excludable. Instead of 30 days being excludable, 60 days would have been excludable, thereby reducing the violation of the Act from 59 days to 29 days. In this connection I note that under the Nebraska equivalent of the Act any period of delay involving “the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence” is excluded in computing the 6-month Nebraska speedy trial statutory requirement. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1985). Under Nebraska law it appears that the entire time a motion is under submission is excludable, not merely 30 days. State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 335 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, there is at least a plausible reason to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties (C) holding among other things that there should be excluded from computing the time for trial a period from the filing of a motion on september 18 until finai disposition of the motion by the trial court on its own motion on december 28 that is 102 days (D) holding that the exclusion in rule 48c1 hrpp of periods of delay should be taken from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on or other prompt disposition of the motion citation omitted (E) holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment
Output: (C)
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967), stated that section 2(d) shows that the legislature contemplated multiplicity of actions and provides a court with two options: stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration, or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be granted with respect to that issue only. 710 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 1994). The Galt court explained: “In enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, the [Illinois] Legislature has not eradicated a chancellor’s inherent powers, but the legislature has determined in Section 2 that it is no longer equitable to enjoin arbitration to prevent multiplicity of actions.” Galt, 376 F.2d at 716. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 782, 103 S. Ct. 927, 939 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Accord Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed
Output: (C)
because it was made by physicians and nursing home administrators who are private parties. The Supreme Court explained its rationale: “Those decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State.” Id. at 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2777. The Court distinguished situations where the state “affirmatively command[ed]” the discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients, id. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2777, or where medical judgments were made by utilization review committees mandated by federal regulation. See id. at 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2777. A key inquiry under Blum and its progeny is which entity made the decision being challenged. See id. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2777; see also Kraemer v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 214, 220 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 117 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision (B) holding  2254d authorizes federal court to review state courts decision only and not explanation of decision (C) holding that state courts failure to discuss or even to be aware of federal precedent does not in itself render the decision contrary to federal law (D) holding that a party losing in state court may not seek what would amount to appellate review of that decision in federal court based on the claim that the decision violates the losers federal rights (E) holding that the decision of a utilization review committee may well constitute state action where the decisionmaking process itself appears to be governed largely by federal guidelines
Output: (E)