niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
employee’s consent to enter the special employment relationship. Those courts have not, however, considered whether the employee must know the corporate identity of the special employer for whom she agreed to work or whether her consent to work for a borrowing entity is tantamount to consent to work for the corporate entity of which the borrower is a part. Rather, the cases have analyzed only whether the employee agreed to work for an entity other than the general employer, an issue that is undisputed in this ease. See Pacenti v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 245 N.J.Super. 188, 584 A.2d 843, 845 (App.Div.1991) (inferring requisite consent from the employee’s reporting to borrower’s place of business and accepting its supervisors’ decisions, policies and training); Murin, 573 A.2d at 991-94 (<HOLDING>); Chickachop v. Manpower, Inc., 84 N.J.Super. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer  or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer (B) holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration (C) holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated  to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name (D) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
Output: (A)
despite the underlying circumstances. See United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that “[ejvery escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do so” and that this characterization applies “to all escapes, whether or not violence was actually involved”) (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994)). C. Sixth Amendment Claim Finally, Mr. Flowers argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to submit the fact of his prior convictions to a jury. This argument is also foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e (B) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (C) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that elements of statute which became  924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged
Output: (A)
the information was filed whether he affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted.”). Accordingly, he contends that the Government failed to meet its burden of proving the convictions. See United States v. Reliant, 568 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir.2009) (listing facts the government must prove). The district court’s error was, however, harmless. “Although § 851 [ (c) ] allows a defendant to attack a prior conviction ... [§ 851(e) ] precludes challenges to convictions ‘which occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction.’ ” Rounsavall, 115 F.3d at 566, quoting 21 U.S.C. § 851(e); United States v. Samuels, 543 F.3d 1013, 1020 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Henderson’s convictions occurred 20 and 16 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel (B) holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final (C) holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence (D) holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points (E) holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state conviction during a federal sentencing proceeding in a different case
Output: (A)
to another, usually his assignor. Such contracts are most frequently found as a reservation in an assignment of a lease. The provision creates in the owner of such royalty an interest in the lease. Edward v. Prince, 221 Mont. 272, 276, 719 P.2d 422, 424 (1986). Because it is carved out of the lessee’s interest, it cannot be of greater duration than the lease. Edward, 221 Mont. at 276, 719 P.2d at 424 (citing Eugene O. Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas, vol. 5, § 63.2 (Anderson Pub. Co. 1991)). We conclude that an overriding royalty applies only to the lease out of which it was created. See Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas at § 63.2. This comports with our general rules governing a grantor’s reservation of an interest. City of Missoula v. Mix, 123 Mont. 365, 369, 214 P.2d 212, 214 (1950) (<HOLDING>); 26A C.J.S. Deeds §279 (2001) (stating “[a] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan (B) holding that the defendant who owned the premises could discharge its duty by either warning the plaintiff or making the premises reasonably safe (C) holding that a retained equity interest is property even if it has no market value (D) holding the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner when the evidence showed no one had been injured by the condition in question and the premises owner had received no complaints about the condition in question during a tenyear period (E) holding that a reservation is some right interest or estate retained by the grantor in the granted premises
Output: (E)
an injunction, and does not require the posting of any type of bond. And, although neither party requested the injunction, neither party appealed from the order. Instead, McKinnon later filed a motion with the trial court, arguing that the injunction should be set aside because it was improperly entered. When the trial judge denied that motion, McKinnon appealed from the later denial order in an improper attempt to belatedly challenge the original injunction order. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Estate of Misdraji, 13 So.3d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (declining to consider issues raised on appeal from denial of successive petition to re-open estate when same issues had been decided in prior orders from which moving party had not appealed); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 921 So.2d 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); M.G. v. State, 711 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that receipt of a large inheritance constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying termination of permanent alimony (B) holding that final order for alimony may be modified by trial court on showing of substantial change in circumstances of either party (C) holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony (D) holding that even if change of circumstances is shown trial court is not required to grant modification of periodic alimony award unless husband had in good faith entered into new occupation at reduced income (E) holding that former husband was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on petition to modify alimony where he failed to demonstrate substantial change in circumstances since entry of a prior order denying modification of alimony from which he did not appeal
Output: (E)
for odorant before the explosion and fire occurred in Pike County. Certainly the residents of St. Clair County have an interest in ensuring the safety of propane gas stored and odorized in their county. It is also apparent that many of the claims in this case center around the defendants’ alleged acts and omissions occurring at the storage and odorization facility. We, therefore, find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there is a significant connection between St. Clair County and the action. As St. Clair County has a significant connection with the litigation, it also has an interest in providing a forum to resolve the dispute. Wieser, 98 Ill. 2d at 371-72, 456 N.E.2d at 104; cf. Brummett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694 (<HOLDING>). With reference to the court-congestion 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties (B) holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum (C) holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas (D) holding article 1802 claims only survive where the conduct alleged of is based on tortious or negligent conduct different from the conduct covered by other specific labor laws involved (E) recognizing that the court is not the appropriate forum for initial factfinding
Output: (B)
if there is no reasonable excuse offered for a delay in giving notice, the issue may be decided as a matter of law. Id. at 882-83. Here, it is the injured party, by way of a judgment against the insured, that claims a hypothecated interest in proceeds from a policy instead of the insured claiming coverage benefits against the insurer. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we do not find the distinction meaningful, and we hold that these propositions apply to the Hastons. The length of the delay between the Hastons’ default judgment and their motion to reach and apply insurance proceeds was over two years. The Hastons have offered no excuse for the delay, reasonable or otherwise. Therefore, we must conclude that the delay was unreasonable as a matter of law. See Pharr, supra (<HOLDING>); Southern Guaranty, supra, (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (B) holding that a five month delay was unreasonable (C) holding threeyear delay without mitigating circumstances was unreasonable (D) holding that an eightmonth delay without excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (E) holding inability to locate attorney who would prosecute infringement suit inadequate as matter of law to excuse delay
Output: (D)
provide an appropriate basis for the type of declaratory relief sought here. See note 11, supra. 13 . In Voge, 844 F.2d at 780 n. 1, the Federal Circuit recognized that allegations of unlawful discharge due to statutory violations by the military are reviewable under the standard set forth in Sanders. Although plaintiff does not allege that the Air Force violated a statute in discharging him, he does allege that the Air Force unlawfully applied Air Force regulations in discharging him. 14 . The Supreme Court did note that the arguments advanced by the government for a “sweeping rule” that estoppel may never run against the government were " ‘substantial’.” Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 2470, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) 2, 38 L.Ed.2d 7 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314, 81 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa (B) holding on an objection to confirmation of plan that the debtors failure to file tax returns before filing the chapter 13 plan and debtors failure for six months to comply with federal law constituted a lack of good faith sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case (C) holding that neither failure to publicize the rights of naturalization nor the failure to have an authorized naturalization representative available constituted affirmative misconduct sufficient to estop the government from relying on a time bar to filing naturalization petitions (D) holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court  was reversible error (E) holding that neither failure to object to an instruction nor an express statement of no objection to an instruction waive plain error review pursuant to rule 3020
Output: (C)
without a warrant, the search “is presumptively unreasonable, and evidence obtained from such a search is inadmissible, subject only to a few carefully established exceptions.” United States v. Harrison, 639 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.2011). “Voluntary consent to search is one such exception.” Id. “Consent may be obtained from the individual whose property is searched, or in certain instances, from a third party who possesses either actual authority or apparent authority to consent to the search.” United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1124 (10th Cir.2007); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (voluntary consent can be obtained “from a third party who possesses common authority over the premis .2d 634 (2012); Sanchez, 608 F.3d at 689 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 720 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept (B) holding that officers had a reasonable belief that defendants father had authority to consent to the search of his sons room and computer because he owned the home and had access to the room and computer at will (C) holding defendants 15yearold daughter had actual authority to consent because she lived full time in the house and had unrestricted access to it (D) holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there (E) holding that appellants father had authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents room was not locked and defen dants family was not denied access to bedroom
Output: (C)
(D.Mass.1999) ( “[Defendant] asserts that ... the reasoning behind Central Bank forbids holding [it] liable under status-based [agent] liability principles. I anticipate that the First Circuit, when and if it addresses this issue, will not reach the outcomes proposed by [defendant].... ”). Some district courts — including a judge in .this district — have held the contrary. See, e.g., In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F.Supp. 539, 544 (D.Mass.1997) (“To hold [defendant mutual fund] hable under Rule 10b-5 on a theory of respondeat superior would -impose liability without any showing that the market relied on statements or actions directly or indirectly attributable to [it] in evaluating Micron shares.”); Converse, Inc. v. Norwood Venture Corp., 1997 WL 742534, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state or agency is not a person subject to qui tam liability under the false claims act (B) holding that sovereign immunity did not protect state agency from liability based on failure to pay assignee of contractual account receivable (C) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (D) holding that no substantial right is affected when a plaintiffs claims based on derivative liability are litigated separately from the claims that the plaintiff has asserted based on a direct liability theory because no possibility of inconsistent verdicts exists (E) holding claims based on agency liability nonviable after central bank
Output: (E)
guardianship is supported by the evidence, we need not consider whether reunification efforts would be futile because of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(b) (2011). Although we have held that a court may order the cessation of reunification efforts if it makes sufficient findings under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(d), the court must still make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b). See In re Dula, 143 N.C. App. 16, 19, 544 S.E.2d 591, 593 (“The department of social services can also be relieved of the obligation of making reasonable efforts if a child has been in placement outside the home for the period of time and under the conditions referenced in section 7B-907(d).”), aff’d, 354 N.C. 356, 554 S.E.2d 336 (2001); In re M.R.D.C., 166 N.C. App. 693, 702, 603 S.E.2d 890, 895 (2004) (<HOLDING>), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 321, 611 S.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding that the prior conviction was valid for calculation of the defendants criminal history because his waiver of the right to counsel was valid (C) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (D) holding that without a valid permanency planning order the trial court was necessarily unable to malm a valid gs  7b907dl finding regarding the nature of the permanent plan emphasis omitted (E) holding that performance may be valid acceptance
Output: (D)
for a search warrant before a more thorough search was conducted. ¶ 19. Hutto made no objection to the admission of the pistol seized during the protective sweep, and we find no issue with the pistol’s admissibility. The pistol was in plain view. And “[i]t has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.” Godbold v. State, 731 So.2d 1184, 1190 (¶ 24) (Miss.1999) (quoting Hams v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)). ¶ 20. Because the pistol’s seizure did not violate Hutto’s Fourth Amendment rights, we find no error in the admission of the pistol at trial. But see Marshall v. State, 584 So.2d 437, 438 (Miss.1991) (<HOLDING>). C. Refusal of Insanity-Defense Jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review (B) holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review (C) holding that harris v united states 536 us 545 122 sct 2406 153 led2d 524 2002 does not overrule mendozapaz (D) holding that tangible materials seized during an unlawful search are inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree quoting murray v united states 487 us 533 536 108 sct 2529101 led2d 472 1988 (E) holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review
Output: (D)
evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 346-47 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865). Sgt. Lubelan testified that he saw an officer exposed through the hatch of the LAV before he fired at Rohm, and that he fired at Rohm in order to prevent Rohm from firing at the LAV. Even assuming that Rohm was not aiming his rifle at the LAV when he was shot, we nonetheless conclude that Sgt. Lubelan had probable cause to believe that Rohm posed a serious threat to the officers in the LAV — particularly Sgt. Homrich — due to his proximity to the LAV while armed with a rifle, his prior violent behavior, and his continued refusal to surrender and face arrest. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (<HOLDING>). Because Livermore has not shown that Sgt. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat (B) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (C) holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm (D) holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others (E) holding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny a police officer the ability to neutralize the threat of physical harm if he has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous
Output: (D)
Commission, and appellants, yet the County Commissioners did not require any of them to face cross-examination before submitting those documents. Appellants maintain that all of this documentary evidence should have been placed before the County Commissioners by sworn witnesses who faced cross-examination, and, therefore, it should not have been considered by them. We disagree. “A zoning board, along with other administrative agencies, is generally not bound by the technical rules of evidence although it must observe fundamental fairness in dealing with the parties who appear before it.” Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 236, 403 A.2d 858, cert. denied, sub nom. Engel v. Farley, 286 Md. 747 (1979). See also Entzian v. Prince George’s County, 32 Md.App. 256, 262, 360 A.2d 6 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The documents properly could be considered by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (B) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (C) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (D) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (E) recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence
Output: (E)
"Shortened Arbitration Rules,” which meant that arbitration would proceed based on documents alone. Transatlantic further states that this limitation would be to Amergent’s advantage. 2 . In contrast, cases granting motions to compel arbitration have involved a clear refusal on the part of one party to arbitrate. See, e.g., Crystal Pool AS v. Trefin Tankers Ltd., No. 12 CIV. 9417 RA, 2014 WL 1883506, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014) (“Trefin Tankers twice failed to respond to Crystal Pool’s requests that it appoint an arbitrator, and it also has failed to appear in or respond to the proceedings in this Court, Trefín Tankers has thus unambiguously manifested a refusal to arbitrate.”); Telesat Canada v. Planetsky, Ltd., No. 12 CIV. 3743 JMF, 2013 WL 592668, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Severstal U.S. Holdings, LLC v. RG Steel, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand (B) holding respondent refused to arbitrate where it neither opposed nor responded to petitioners arbitration demand letter (C) holding that when plaintiff sought arbitration and neither the award nor the arbitration agreement mentioned interest the plaintiff was not entitled to preaward interest (D) holding that an action to compel arbitration accrues only when the respondent unequivocally refuses to arbitrate either by failing to comply with an arbitration demand or by otherwise unambiguously manifesting an intention not to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute (E) holding that purpose of stay pending arbitration is twofold it relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the district courts order to arbitrate
Output: (B)
by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quotation omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). Plaintiff argues that (1) the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored medical evidence of her disability; (2) the ALJ failed to analyze plaintiffs pain properly under Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162-64 (10th Cir.19 95) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, plaintiff has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion (B) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion (C) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review (D) holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects (E) holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships
Output: (A)
of attorney-client privilege, nor could they. There was thus no error in admitting the bill. J. The Apportionment of Damages Defendants Ashton and Short contend that the Court erred in refusing to apportion damages among the Defendants. This issue as such was first raised in Defendants’ Amended Motion and would not need to be considered by the Court. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra. Prior to the charge of the Court, the parties were advised of the charge and Ash-ton and Short vaguely objected because of the potential for joint and several liability; however they did not propose any points for charge with respect to the apportionment of damages. See Frankel v. Burke’s Excavating, Inc., 269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff’d 397 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1968) (<HOLDING>). In any event, under Section 433(b), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court (B) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (C) holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement (D) holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim (E) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect
Output: (A)
indifference or bad motive. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pennsylvania, 413 Pa.Super. 128, 604 A.2d 1053, 1061 (1992); see also Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (1984) (Restatement (2d) of Torts § 908(2) regarding imposition of punitive damages adopted in Pennsylvania). Three factors can be considered when awarding punitive damages: (1) the character of the act; (2) the nature and extent of the harm caused; and (3) the wealth of the defendant. Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 555 A.2d 800, 803 (1989). The bankruptcy court found that the Don-aldsons’ actions constituted outrageous conduct above and beyond the breach of fiduciary duty which justified the compensatory damages. See Smith v. Renaut, 387 Pa.Super. 299, 564 A.2d 188, 193-94 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The court first found that the Donaldsons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court may not award punitive damages (B) holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies (C) holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages (D) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (E) holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages
Output: (C)
decision, when the parties agreed to transition Z.S. back to public school with a plan approved by all parties and supported with a transition plan from CCCD. Contrary to Carmel’s assertions, the IHO decision declaring the 2007-2008 IEP inadequate effected a material change between the parties in connection with the subsequent negotiations. Our Court recognizes a distinction between claims for tuition reimbursement pursuant to the pendency provision and claims for tuition reimbursement pursuant to an administrative determination that a school district has failed to provide a FAPE. See Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 160-61, supplemented sub nom. Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 112 Fed.Appx. 89 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Carmel claims that the IHO decision did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that either a fouryear or a twoyear limitations period applies to claims under the idea in ohio for tuition reimbursement either way the claims were timebarred (B) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (C) holding that the unilateral placement of a student by the parents in an unapproved school is not by itself a bar to tuition reimbursement but public schools may not place students in unapproved schools (D) holding that though the school districts plan was adequate the parents were still entitled to tuition reimbursement under the pendency provision (E) holding that court may order reimbursement of private school expenses incurred by parents of handicapped child in successful challenge to iep brought under eha predecessor to idea stating that it is beyond cavil that appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school official to develop and implement at public expense an iep placing the child in a private school and affirming reimbursement award against petitioner local school district 
Output: (D)
with the federal sex offender registration and disclosure requirements created by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) for juvenile delinquents who were fourteen years or older at the time of the offense, and that the later enacted SORNA controlled for these older juveniles, but that "[f]or all other juvenile delinquents, the FJDA's confidentiality provisions remain in force"). 4 . Among other places, if J.D.T. were to move to Montana, he would be subject to lifelong registration as a sexual offender; state law also makes the name and address of registered sexual offenders publicly available. See Mont.Code Ann. §§ 45-5-502(3); 46-23-502(9)(b),(10); 46-23-506(1); 46-23-508(l)(a); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 360 Mont. 317, 255 P.3d 110, 112-15 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, if he went to school in Illinois 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a juvenile adjudicated as delinquent in federal court for violation of  2241c had a duty under state law to register as a sexual offender when present in montana (B) holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court (C) holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state (D) holding that court leave under  6322 is not available to a federal employee summoned to appear in juvenile court in her capacity as the juveniles parent as a party to the proceedings (E) holding that the uniform act and mca  259303 are alternative methods for filing a judgment of a montana federal court in montana state court
Output: (A)
appellant claims there is no evidence that he had reason to believe Levy was a violent person or would n, appellant admitted that he knew Levy had a .45 caliber silver gun. The evidence further demonstrates that appellant knew Levy had the gun with him, at the latest, when Levy used it to strike Vasquez — which was before appellant and his companions robbed Vasquez of his money. “Evidence that a defendant knew his co-conspirators might use guns in the course of the robbery can be sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant should have anticipated the possibility of murder occurring during the course of the robbery.” Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447, 453 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd); see also Nava v. State, 379 S.W.3d 396, 406-09 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 415 S.W.3d 289 (Tex.Crim.App. Dec.18, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence showed appellant knew gun was brought when coconspirator removed something wrapped in white towel from truck during criminal transaction (B) holding evidence sufficient that appellant should have anticipated murder when he knew coconspirator had a gun and appellant stated he first saw the gun on the night of the offense when coconspirator showed it to victim (C) holding that the defendant knew of his accomplices gun and benefitted from its presence for protection (D) holding evidence sufficient to support jurys verdict when physical evidence including evidence gun was fired from a distance greater than appellant told police was inconsistent with accidental discharge during a struggle (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept
Output: (A)
951, 953 (5th Cir.1967) (distinguishing nexus between tenant and landlord from absence of nexus between tenants in same building); Thompson v. Butler, 214 Iowa 1123, 243 N.W. 164, 167 (1932) (noting service on servant may be valid due to relationship of confidence or personal interest); Plushner v. Mills, 429 A.2d 444, 446 (R.I.1981) (concluding service on defendant’s daughter was valid because she was trusted member of household and had substantial nexus with defendant). In addition, the duration of an individual’s presence, the frequency of the presence, or the intent to return may also establish nexus between the individual and defendant. See Sangmeister v. McElnea, 278 So.2d 675, 676-77 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973) (stating one who resides or visits home o 42, 235 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Plushner, 429 A.2d at 446 (concluding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding tenday visitor not residing therein (B) holding babysitter was not residing therein (C) holding housekeeper did not reside therein (D) holding that a tenday visitor was not residing therein (E) holding fourmonth visitor was residing therein
Output: (B)
her claims. In support of its argument, CSX relies on evidence outside of the pleadings, including documents filed and transcripts made in connection with Lawrence v. CSX Corp., a nearly identical case filed in Baltimore County Circuit Court by Alice Lawrence, sister of plaintiff and decedent. As the Court will consider this evidence outside the pleadings, CSX’s motion will be treated as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Under the D.C. Survival Act, a right of action survives to a decedent’s “legal representative” where the right of action accrued to the decedent prior to his death. D.C.Code § 12-101. If the decedent left heirs at law, then the decedent’s legal representative should be an heir at law. Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F.Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>) (citing to Strother v. Dist. of Columbia, 372 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring securities claims relating to funds that plaintiffs did not own (C) holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity (D) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring survival act suit because decedent left heirs at law but plaintiffs were not among them (E) holding that where one plaintiff has standing we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit
Output: (D)
intend to allow him to build his own ramp sometime during the early 1990s, when ODOT is alleged to have repeatedly refused to grant Barack permission to build his own ramp, whether through an outright denial of permission or inaction on his requests. Even giving plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, Barack was certainly on notice that there would be no new ramp in 1998, when ODOT was prepared to stand by and allow the bridge to be razed following the Coast Guard’s demolition order. Consequently, the plaintiffs had reason to know of their injury in the early 1990s, and in 1998 at the latest, and the statute of limitations therefore accrued much longer than two years before plaintiffs commenced suit in 2005. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239-41, 250, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims (B) holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims (C) holding that statute of limitations governing the most closely analogous state substantive claim controls rather than the forum states borrowing statute (D) holding that  1522 is the most analogous limitations period for  1983 actions (E) holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada
Output: (A)
adjudication.” We read this representation as a request by the Petitioners to withdraw the instant petition, and we dismiss the petition on that basis. We do not address at this time whether this court otherwise lacks jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. DISMISSED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . See In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir.1993) ("We may review a remand order on petition for writ of mandamus ... provided that it was entered on grounds not authorized by [28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c).”). But see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-15, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ("An order remanding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding remand orders not subsumed under statute barring review of remand orders based on defect in removal or on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be appealed pursuant to 28 usc  1291 (B) holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders (C) holding that the rule 21 severance rendered the district court verdict a final and appealable judgment under 28 usc  1291 (D) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders
Output: (D)
filed, is the verdict, and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself.” (punctuation omitted)). 19 See former OCGA § 17-9-41 (“The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict.”); Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 65 (16 SE 260) (1892) (syllabus by the court) (“According to repeated rulings of this court, the affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach, their verdict.”); see also former OCGA § 9-10-9 (providing the same rule in civil procedure). 20 See generally OCGA § 24-1-2 (e) (“Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded b tate, 323 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (747 SE2d 99) (2013). 34 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; see Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 107-08 (6) (401 SE2d 701) (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (E) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof
Output: (D)
applied to law enforcement officers.” 1992-NMCA-033, ¶ 17. We also noted that holding persons in custody is a minor incident of probation and parole officers’ jobs and that probationers and parolees are not persons “accused” of crimes because they have already been convicted. Id. {14} Plaintiff asserts that Vigil’s interpretation of the words “custody” and “accused” is unduly narrow. However, we see no legal basis for reinterpreting those terms more broadly. Indeed, we have limited the definition of law enforcement officers in this category to detention center employees whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody persons accused of a crime while awaiting trial. See, e.g., Davis v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Doña Ana Cnty., 1999-NMCA-110, ¶¶ 35, 39, 127 N.M. 785, 987 P.2d 1172 (<HOLDING>); Abalos v. Bernalillo Cnty. Dist. Atty’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the director of the new mexico m otor v ehicle department who has statutory authority to make arrests was not a law enforcement officer because the vast majority of his time and effort are involved in administrative matters internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the director of the new mexico motor v ehicle department who has statutory authority to make arrests was not a law enforcement officer because the vast majority of his time and effort are involved in administrative matters internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that the director captain and assistant director of a detention center are law enforcement officers (D) holding corrections officers are not law enforcement officers under  41412 (E) holding that director of the police department is not a final policymaking official because his decisions are constrained by the county manager the board and administrative order and polices
Output: (C)
the District’s sexual harassment policy, and how to handle sexual harassment complaints; and (2) the adequacy of the defendants’ response to plaintiffs complaints of sexual harassment. Accordingly, summary judgment of plaintiffs negligent training and supervision claim must be denied. 2. Vicarious liability “The doctrine of respondeat superi- or renders an employer vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of the employment.” Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932, 933, 715 N.E.2d 95, 96, 693 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (1999); Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 302, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1281, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1979). School districts may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee. Murray v. Water Y.S.2d 347, 348 (3d Dep’t 1994)(<HOLDING>). Further, for respondeat superior to attach, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment (B) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver (C) holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials (D) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours (E) holding that intraconspiracy doctrine applied to plaintiffs claims against school board teacher school principal and district superintendent
Output: (D)