niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
restraint in doing just that. 4. Excessive Hours Defendant contends that certain hours spent by Plaintiffs counsel were excessive. Specifically, Defendant asserts that nineteen hours in preparat t part of the case that presents a potential alternative to unnecessary litigation. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir.1984) (articulating “[t]he PHRA embodies a discrete, comprehensive administrative procedure, including conciliation and negotiation.”); see also Tlush v. Mfrs. Res. Ctr., Civ. A. No. 02-235, 2002 WL 1748194, *3-5, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13726, at *11-16 (E.D.Pa. July 24, 2002) (discussing importance of administrative remedies for PHRA and ADEA claims). This time (7.6 hours) spent by counsel with his client included the sp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that these tasks were performed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bia error is harmless when it is highly probable that error did not affect cases outcome (B) holding it is not appropriate to allow the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals (C) holding that police officers are not members of highly regulated industry (D) holding that while an informants veracity is highly relevant to the existence of probable cause it is only one part of the larger commonsense determination (E) holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case
Output: (B)
In the instant case, Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 21, 1995, ninety-days after the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir.1999); see Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1999). However, because Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the limitations period did not begin to run until April 24, 1996. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.1998)(allowing one-year grace period to petitioner’s whose convictions became final prior to the enactment of the AEDPA). Applying the one-year limitations period from that date, Petitioner was required to file his Petition by April 24, 1997. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 662-63 (3d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Petitioner did not file the instant Petition 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aedpas oneyear limitations period (B) holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that aedpas oneyear limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court that seeks review of a state courts denial of postconviction relief (E) holding that former federal rule of civil procedure 6a and e applies to federal habeas petitions
Output: (A)
of pain are “well documented” in her treatment records. (Dk. 6, p. 20). The ALJ’s decision does not give the court any reason to think that these treatment records, in particular the consistent prescription of significant pain medications and muscle relaxants, were even considered in regards to the credibility findings. Instead, the ALJ did not even acknowledge the relevance of those records for that purpose: “The undersigned has reviewed the treatment evidence of record, finding no residual functional capacity analyses or opinions therein, and therefore has assigned limited weight to these reports.” (R. 14). The court found ample reports in the record of chronic pain and repeated prescriptions for significant pain medications and muscle relaxants. See Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1221-22 (<HOLDING>). The consultative examination report even 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the established principle that the alj is not required to take the claimants assertions of pain at face value (B) holding that evidence relied on by alj was insufficient to undermine pain allegations where medical records were replete with claimants reports of pain and of prescriptions (C) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (D) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (E) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record
Output: (B)
proceeding”). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, “[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted”). Appellant’s and Sanchez’s after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant’s self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant’s and Sanchez’s affidavits, it was within the trial court’s discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record
Output: (E)
defendants settled with appellees, leaving no issue concerning them for the jury to determine, the trial court erred in allowing the McAdams and Chilcoat third-parties to participate in the trial as adversaries of appellants; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the “reasonably prudent operator standard” is not “reduced” as to appellants because of the fact that appel-lees have other lessors in the same pooled unit and that other lessors should not be considered in deciding whether appellees failed to comply with their duty of good faith to appellants. We first address appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in permitting appellees to join the McAdams and Chil-coat groups as third-party defendants p.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Had appellants prevailed on their claim to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in summary judgment context that appellate court may consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review and trial court did not rule on in the interest of judicial economy (B) holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement to obtain joinder of other royalty owners in a pooled unit on grounds that the presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease (C) holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement on grounds that individuals owning the balance of the working interest were not necessary parties (D) holding that trial court did not err (E) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment
Output: (C)
of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties. The Court found that the precedential effect of judicial opinions derives from the nature of judicial power, and the limitation place thereon by Article III of the United States Constitution. Any attempt to avoid the precedential effect of a prior decision merely because of a decision to not publish same would expand judicial power beyond the bounds envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution. We, therefore, affirm the bankruptcy court’s conclusions in this case because we are bound by the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Wegner. Moreover, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions because we find that secti R. 235, 240 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Flitter, 181 B.R. 938, 941 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who has not sustained any damage as the result of a transfer of property cannot seek to set that transfer aside as fraudulent (B) holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary (C) holding that a debtors technically incorrect exemption in a wrongful death claim based on west virginias homestead exemption stands as claimed because the trustee did not object to the exemption in time (D) holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee (E) holding that even though a transfer of property eg money incidentally benefits another it cannot be said as a matter of law or logic that the transaction was a fraudulent transfer as to the party benefited
Output: (B)
comment g. In addition, “an invitee may anticipate that the premises are reasonably safe for his intended use.” Page, J., THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY, § 4.16, 94 (1976). ■ Our opinions in Tribe, supra, Coburn, supra, and Beach, supra, have evidently failed to clarify our views of the duty problem. We therefore summarize the relevant principles. 1. The question of duty is decided by the court. The question is whether the relationship of the parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff. If the answer is no, the defendant is not liable even though he may have acted negligently in light of the foreseeable risks. Prosser, supra, § 53, at 356-359; see, also, Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In the context of this case, therefore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a business owner owes the duty to his guests to exercise reasonable care to protect them from injury at the hands of a fellow guest (B) holding that a negligent misrepresentation claim brought by an independent third party health care provider was not preempted by erisa (C) holding that a negligent host was under no duty of care to the victim injured by an automobile driven by an intoxicated guest (D) holding that a talk show host did not owe a cognizable duty to protect a guest on the show from the homicidal acts of third parties (E) holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile
Output: (C)
GMAC’s standing to foreclose on their home in the proper venue. However, for the purposes of the RESPA claim we find that GMAC was the appropriate party, but that the McLeans were unable to articulate any specific injury that was caused by GMAC’s failure to respond to their request for information. Further, Ms. McLean was capable of handling her affairs without the aid of a guardian ad litem, especially in light of the fact that Mr. McLean was a party to the suit. Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED. 1 . Although the McLeans asserted other claims below, which the court denied, they do not raise these claims on appeal, and, therefore, have abandoned them. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we are cognizant of the fact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not briefed are deemed abandoned (B) holding that generally arguments not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned or waived (C) holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned (D) holding issues not adequately briefed on appeal are abandoned (E) holding that issues not briefed on appeal even by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned
Output: (E)
summary judgment favoring Defendant eliminated that duty. {13} The question of duty in the present case cannot, however, be resolved simply by reciting the general rules that Plaintiffs assert control. The question is whether the undisputed material facts are sufficient to establish that from the point of Haar’s missed appointments after March 8, 2000, to the point of Haar’s death, Defendant continued to have a duty of care to treat Haar in a manner that would protect against Haar’s suicide. Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that Defendant did have that duty. The district court did not think so. Neither do we. {14} “The general rule is that a person does not have a duty to act affirmatively to protect another person from harm.” Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai'i 154, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (1996) (<HOLDING>); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error (B) holding a psychotherapist had no duty for the suicide of a patient in a noncustodial setting (C) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (D) holding that counselors had no duty to prevent suicides of noncustodial clients (E) holding no legal duty exists to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts
Output: (D)
§ 1102(b)(4)). 45 . Id. (citing ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)). 46 . Id.; Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). 47 . Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148-50, 121 S.Ct. 1322. 48 . Id. at 147, 121 S.Ct. 1322 (citing ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)). 49 . Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 9, 107 S.Ct. 2211; see also Davila, 542 U.S. at 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ("The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”); Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142-45, 111 S.Ct. 478; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). 50 . Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150, 121 S.Ct. 1322; see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (<HOLDING>). 51 . See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:213(A)(14) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans (B) holding employee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation (C) holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted (D) recognizing that it was beyond dispute that a state statute that required all insured benefit plans to submit to an extra layer of review for certain benefit denials had a substantial effect on erisa plans (E) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans
Output: (D)
Cir.1998). Third, expressive activity on Vermont’s vanity plates is subject to numerous restrictions, including limitations on the number of letters that may appear on a vanity plate and on how many numbers may be used in combination with letters. Furthermore, Vt. Stat. ANN. tit. 23, § 304(d) permits the Commissioner to “refuse to honor any request” for a special plate deemed “offensive or confusing to the general public.” At the time of Perry’s application, the DMV exercised its authority to prohibit offensive vanity plates in part through an unwritten policy of denying requests for plates bearing sea- tological terms. Such extensive government regulation of expressive activity does not suggest an intent to designate a public forum. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (<HOLDING>). Fourth, the general public does not have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a charity drive aimed at employees in the federal workplace was a nonpublic forum because inter alia the literature each could distribute was limited to a 30 word statement (B) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent (C) holding that an arbitration agreement was invalid because inter alia the employer could modify the rules at any time without notice (D) holding that inter alia employees criminal conviction for alleged tortious act demonstrated employee was not acting in scope of his employment (E) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted
Output: (A)
raised a material issue of fact regarding the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. See id. at 1169. The inmate must also allege “that a defendant prison official [has] a culpable state of mind, that he or she acts or fails to act with deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety.” Id. at 1168. Mr. Tennyson’s alleged deprivations fall far short of what our cases require for an Eighth Amendment claim. In Gee we dismissed a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim based on the confiscation of his canteen items, a deprivation of hygiene items for approximately 25 hours, and his incarceration in an isolation cell for four weeks as failing to state a plausible claim of a constitutional violation. 627 F.3d at 1192; see also Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1225 n. 17 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted (B) holding that the act of slamming  is objectively sufficiently serious to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that under massachusetts law a mortgagor has standing to challenge  a mortgage assignment as invalid ineffective or void internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding prisoners allegations of limited access to employment education housing assignment religious programming recreation time and equipment telephone and commissary did not demonstrate a deprivation of the minimal measure of lifes necessities as required to state an eighth amendment claim internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (E)
choice to interactively [modify and/or accept],” that, too, appears unnecessary. “Enabling” may mean “allowing,” but the shared definition alone is not a reason to substitute a synonym for a word that was chosen by a patent’s drafters and is easily comprehended by a layperson. Likewise, the claimed invention impliedly involves interactions between a human user and a system, but inserting “interactively” into the claim appears unwarranted. Finally, and on similar grounds, the addition of a purposive statement about “accurate transfer” is unnecessary. Again, a court may not import limitations into the claims that have no basis in the language of the claims themselves, whether those limitations come from the specification or from some other extrinsic source. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (<HOLDING>); see also DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding improper reading into claims a limitation appearing only in the specification (B) holding that limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims (C) holding that claims are not to be interpreted by adding limitations appearing only in the specification (D) holding that courts must not import limitations from the specification into the claim (E) holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite
Output: (D)
such withholding); In re Kuykendall, 957 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.) (concluding that the former ten-year time limitation was on the trial court’s jurisdiction and therefore did not afford the obligor a vest ed right); Wilbanks, 722 S.W.2d at 223-24 (affirming contempt judgment entered within six months after child turned eighteen, when child’s eighteenth birthday had occurred before effective date of statute extending contempt jurisdiction beyond child’s majority); Harrison v. Cox, 524 S.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, wilt ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming arrearage judgment including payments due before effective date of statute authorizing cumulative judgments); cf. In re M.J.Z., 874 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (<HOLDING>); In re C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d 790, 792 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived (B) holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction (C) recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases (D) holding that former section 1441b defined the courts jurisdiction not the personal rights of obligor or obligee (E) holding that section 1406a grants district courts power to transfer cases even where personal jurisdiction is lacking
Output: (D)
a common-law joint tenancy includes a right of survivorship even when no words of survivorship are used in the granting instrument. Peebles v. Peebles, 223 Tenn. 221, 443 S.W.2d 469, 470 (1969) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 185 Tenn. 586, 206 S.W.2d 801, 803 (1947)); Bunch v. Bunch, No. 02A01-9705-CH-00106, 1998 WL 46217, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1998) (citing Jones, 206 S.W.2d at 803); see also Durant v. Hamrick, 409 So.2d 731, 742 (Ala. 1981) (Adams, J., dissenting) (commenting that “to say ‘joint tenancy with right of survivorship’ is redundant”). If, however, the four unities are not present at the time of the conveyance, the conveyance results, in a.tenancy in common, which does not include a right of survivorship. See Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S.W.2d 1016, 1017 (1948) (<HOLDING>). There are important differences among the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (B) holding a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created by express language in the granting instrument (C) holding that when a husband first acquired property and then conveyed it to his wife they could not hold the property as tenants by the entirety or joint tenants because the four unities did not coincide so the deed created a tenancy in common with a right of survivorship (D) holding that where deed purports to create tenancy by entireties between two people who are not husband and wife joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created (E) holding husband and wife may hold life estates as tenants by the entireties
Output: (C)
factual review power; sufficiency of evidence claim based on the law); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution requires record evidence to reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Accordingly, the Court is precluded from considering the claim on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (habeas corpus review is not available where there is simply an alleged error of state law); Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1922) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 263 U.S. 255, 44 S.Ct. 103, 68 L.Ed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority (B) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus (D) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (E) holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence 
Output: (E)
cable companies to provide telephone services”), cert. granted, No. 11SC669, 2012 WL 1940812 (Colo.2012); GTE North, Inc. v. Zaino, 96 Ohio St.3d 9, 770 N.E.2d 65, 69 (2002) (rejecting an ILEC’s constitutional challenge to an Ohio law that provided for a much higher rate of assessment on certain personal property of ILECs and noting that ILECs “enjoy the advantage ... of being the default provider of intraLATA call service for customers who fail to take affirmativ 337, 346-47 (1967) (finding it unconstitutional under Idaho’s uniformity clause to assess certain property at a higher ratio of full cash value), overruled by Simmons v. Idaho St. Tax Comm’n, 111 Idaho 343, 723 P.2d 887, 892-93 (1986); Inter Island Tel. Co., v. San Juan County, 125 Wash.2d 332, 883 P.2d 1380, 1382-83 (1994) (<HOLDING>). These cases are easily distinguishable, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the extension phone exemption applied to situations where a parent records his childs phone conversations from a phone extension within the parents home without any analysis of the recording partys purpose (B) recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property (C) holding vendors right to receive payment under a land sale contract was personal property and a security interest representing that personal property right constituted realty paper and was subject to article 9 (D) holding that the utilities commission has the discretion to use a hypothetical capital structure in setting customer rates particularly where the utility is a whollyowned subsidiary of a holding company (E) holding it unconstitutional to assess a local phone company at a much higher rate than other utilities and personal property taxpayers
Output: (E)
17-18. Little progress has therefore been made in either action. Thus,- this factor weighs against abstention or is neutral at best. Similarly, the seventh factor—“the relative progress of the state and federal proceedings”—does not favor abstention because neither case has progressed into discovery. See R. 7-1 at 24 (noting that the state court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, but not noting that discovery had begun); see also R. 7-2 (state-court record). Randy argues that the fifth factor—“whether the source of governing law is state or federal”—supports abstention because he challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement by raising a contractual defense. R. 7-1 at 24; see First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Federal law, however, provides the rule of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) holding that the essential inquiry in determining whether res judicata principles should apply is whether or not the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the present parties had an opportunity to appear and assert their rights (C) holding that equitable principles apply to child support proceedings (D) holding that when deciding whether parties have agreed to arbitrate claims courts generally  should apply statelaw principles that govern the formation of contracts (E) holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties
Output: (D)
be clear that our assertion that there are some burdens so minor that they do not amount to a violation should not be taken as an invitation to impose a substantial burden test by indirection. But cf. Ford, 352 F.3d at 591 (describing prison officials' argument that denying an inmate one religious feast meal “is not a 'substantial burden'-or, in other words, is a 'de minimis burden’-on [plaintiff's] religious exercise”). 7 .See also, e.g., DeHart, 227 F.3d 47 (finding that Buddhist plaintiff whose request for a vegetarian diet was denied because vegetarianism was not an absolute requirement of Buddhism had stated a free exercise claim, and remanding for further factual findings regarding the existence of countervailing pe-nological interests); Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  relatively shortterm and sporadic  intrusions on an inmates prayer activities did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of his religion (B) holding that prisons policy of supplying orthodox jewish inmates with one frozen kosher dinner supplemented with nonkosher vegetarian or nonpork meals violated prisoners free exercise rights (C) holding that prison officials failure to accommodate inmates meal requirements during ramadan violated his free exercise rights (D) holding that denial of inmates request for bread and peanut butter so that he could prepare his sunday meals in his cell on saturday  thereby avoiding preparing food or benefitting from the preparation of food by others on the sabbath  violated prisoners free exercise rights (E) holding scheduling employee for later shift on sunday so he could attend church did not eliminate conflict with his second religious practice of not working at all on sunday his sabbath
Output: (D)
What he claimed was that it wasn’t property of the estate.” The Court need not reach the issue of whether listing the wrong statute as a basis for an exemption on Schedule “C” is a fatal to the claim. The Debtor was correct that Fed.R.Bank.P. 4003 applies. However, it offers little comfort to him because the Debtor’s counsel waived such defense. Upon filing the Amendment to the Schedules on April 19,2002, the Debt- or’s counsel reopened the issue, at least as to the trust property, and triggered the tolling of a new 30 day period within which the Chapter 7 Trustee was permitted to object. In re Bell, 225 F.3d 203 (2d Cir.2000) cf. Matter of Kazi, 985 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir.1993) [limits application to items actually amended] citing to In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31 (holding that filing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that filing of any amendment does not reopen the time period for asserting an objection trustee could object only to actual amendments to the list (B) holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision (C) holding trustee has waived the right to bring a preference objection (D) holding trustee has not waived the right to bring a preference objection (E) holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal
Output: (A)
not be addressed. Y. Conclusion The trial court did not err in identifying, valuing, or dividing the parties’ property. Those portions of the judgment are affirmed. The record is insufficient for this court to determine whether Wife’s income-producing property is adequate to meet her reasonable needs. Therefore, the maintenance order is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to reconsider the maintenance issue. All concur. 1 . All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000. 2 . Generally, income tax is not owed on an inheritance. In this case, however, the parties’ 1992 joint income tax return designated Wife's inheritance of $685,285 as income from IRA distributions, and income tax was paid on it. 3 . Husband cites Beckham, 41 S.W.3d at 912-14 (<HOLDING>); Cuda v. Cuda, 906 S.W.2d 757, 759 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that home purchased with spouses separate funds prior to marriage was transmuted into marital property because mortgage payments made from joint account home was used as marital residence and both parties devoted resources and energy into home (B) holding that furniture and furnishings for marital residence purchased with separate funds were transmuted into marital property because they were acquired and treated as communal property (C) holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home (D) holding that separate property valued at 45000 was transmuted to marital property when improved by 3800 of marital property (E) holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments
Output: (A)
she failed to file a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days, as required. See D.C.’s Mem. at 12-15. The District is correct. The plaintiffs addendum was filed 718 days after the alleged discrimination, and plaintiffs full EEOC charge was filed 1109 days after the alleged discrimination. These are plainly outside the applicable time limits. Moreover, the plaintiffs subsequent filings cannot be said to “relate back” to the original EEOC charge, as they add an entirely new substantive theory. See, e.g., Marshall, 536 F.Supp.2d at 67 (“[W]here administrative complaints for discrimination based- on sex, race and retaliation do not mention critical facts relevant to an age discrimination claim, the later filed age claims do not relate back.”); Wilson, 767 F.Supp. at 306 (<HOLDING>). The District has met its burden to prove a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc (B) holding that claimant exhausted administrative remedies only as to the complaints made in the original charge and factually related claims that reasonably could be expected to grow out of the administrative investigation of that charge (C) holding eeoc could maintain an action alleging discrimination against women and minority groups although the original charge alleged only discrimination against males (D) holding that because the amendment added a new substantive theory which is fundamentally distinct from the original race discrimination charge it did not relate to or grow out of the plaintiffs original eeoc charge (E) holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number
Output: (D)
he'has failed to allege Goodman acted under color of law. As a result, the official capacity claims against Goodman must be dismissed. III. Personal Capacity Claims Against Goodman Acting in his personal capacity, Goodman has moved to dismiss based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction), 12(b)(3) (improper venue), and 12(b)(5) (insufficient service of process). A. Serv d Cir.1980)); Micklus, 632 F.2d at 240 (rejecting the argument that once the defendant was served in his official capacity, he was properly before the court in both his individual and official capacities); Scherer v. United States, 241 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1282 (D.Kan.2003) (same). Knowledge of the lawsuit, alone, is insufficient. See Omni Capital Int’l, 484 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. 404 (<HOLDING>). For example, in Kirkendall v. University of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (B) holding that something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct (C) recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier (D) holding something more than denial of receipt is required (E) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city
Output: (A)
product,” and that Dr. Maddox “rendered his opinion without being prepared to discuss the circumstances of any individual’s exposure”). Betz answered the question with a resounding “No.” However, the Betz question simply is not posed by this case. Substantial exposure to many products does not equate to substantial exposure to one or more of Appellants’ products. But that Dr. DuPont was unable to testify to the relative exposure to each product does not preclude submission of the case to a jury regarding the degree of exposure to Appellants’ products. No Pennsylvania court has held that product identification and the nature of a plaintiffs exposure must be established by expert testimony on peril of dismissal. See Weible v. Allied Signal, Inc., 968 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super.2008) (<HOLDING>); Andaloro v. Armstrong World Indust., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (B) holding that the link between a defendants property and a plaintiffs childhood exposure to lead paint and dust may be established through circumstantial evidence even if expert opinion testimony is not available (C) holding that the nexus between an asbestos product and plaintiff may be established by direct and circumstantial evidence and that testimony by someone with knowledge relating to the plaintiffs workplace exposure to an asbestoscontaining product is admissible (D) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that evidence that would normally be admissible may be excluded if the evidence was a direct or indirect product of an unlawful search
Output: (C)
Defendants contend that the amount awarded was excessive and shocking, such as to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or other improper influence invaded the trial. Defendants initially make this argument on the grounds that the disparity between punitive damages assessed against the “passive wrongdoer” (AGF) is too large in contrast to the amount assessed against the “active wrongdoer” (Risser). We reject this argument for many reasons. First, it assumes that AGF should not have been found liable for negligent retention of an employee. Obviously, the jury disagreed with this assessment. Second, the legal basis for assessing punitive damages on respondeat superior grounds is well-established. Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 665 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent deci sion, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law (B) recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts  909 1977 (C) recognizing that restatement second of torts   416 to 429 are often overlapping (D) recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e (E) recognizing that kansas supreme court would accept the final draft of the restatement second of torts  652e adopted in 1977
Output: (B)
... is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger, and [Reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very prototype of the question a jury must pass upon in particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.” (Citing Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 552-53, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipses in original) (some brackets added)); Janssen v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 34, 731 P.2d 163, 165 (1987) (“[A] defendant owes a duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) (Emphasis added.)); Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 138, 612 P.2d 533, 539 (1980) (<HOLDING>). As discussed more fully infra, these same 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm (B) holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable (C) holding that negligence may be predicated on the foreseeable acts of third persons (D) holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions (E) holding that consequences of serving liquor to intoxicated driver such as further inebriation and injurious conduct were foreseeable intervening acts that would not relieve bar of liability
Output: (E)
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 5. As noted, Mr. Amores pled guilty to two counts, but went to trial on the other three counts in the indictment. At the sentencing, the district judge denied a downward departure because Mr. Amores “required the government to go to trial on three counts, disputing the government’s factual basis for a conviction.” Ill R. at 14. Adjustments are not proper where a defendant “puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 2. Although there are “rare situations” where a defendant may exercise his right to proceed to trial and still be found to have demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, this is not such a case. Id.; see Gauvin, 173 F.3d at 806 (<HOLDING>). The district court’s determination was not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply (B) recognizing that such adjustments are rare (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing change (E) holding that such provisions are valid
Output: (B)
in original) (quoting Capital City Press, 4 So.3d at 821). It is noted that none of these cases concerned significant privacy interests. 13 .The laws of several states specifically provide that police personnel files are not subject to disclosure under state freedom of information acts. See Cal.Penal Code § 832.7 (providing police personnel records are confidential except for investigations or proceedings conducted by a grand jury, a district attorney's office, or the Attorney General's office); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 9200(c)(12) (providing that all records compiled as a result of an investigation of a law- enforcement officer “shall be and remain confidential and shall not be released to the public”); Union Leader Corp. v, Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 620 A.2d 1039, 1041 (N.H.1993) (<HOLDING>); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50-a (providing that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that records of personal phone calls made by staff employees of the house of representatives fall outside the current definition of public records and were properly redacted (B) holding that documents generated by the cia at the specific request of congress were exempt from disclosure as congressional records (C) holding that personnel records or conduct investigative records regarding police officers are exempt from disclosure under virginias freedom of information act which exempts personnel records from disclosure (D) holding defendant charged with making harassing phone call to sheriffs department did not meet burden of showing impartiality even though case was tried to a judge to whom defendant also made aggravating calls (E) holding that documents compiled during internal investigation of police lieutenant accused of making harassing phone calls were records pertaining to internal personnel practices within the meaning of new hampshires righttoinow law and thus were exempt from disclosure
Output: (E)
558 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996). The administrative expense priority only applies to those claims for costs “that were actually and necessarily incurred in preserving the estate for the benefit of its creditors.” Id. In order for an expense to qualify as “actual” and “necessary,” the claim must benefit the estate as a whole. Id. at 559 (citing Montrose Ctr. v. Northeast Consumer Tech. Store, Inc. (In re Appliance Store, Inc.), 148 B.R. 234, 243 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1992)). Further, the claimant seeking an administrative expense award has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor’s estate benefit-ted from the applicant’s services to the extent of the claim allowed. In re Molnar Bros., 200 B.R. at 559. In re Interstate Grocery Distributions Sys., Inc., 267 B.R. at 913 (<HOLDING>). To sustain its burden and thus qualify for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a claimant must prove entitlement to benefits by the preponderance of the evidence which is not sustained by mere surmise or conjecture (B) holding that burden is upon employer to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence that claimant committed act in question (C) holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings (D) holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to an administrative claim
Output: (E)
that the type of storm-water utility assessments at issue in this case are fees rather than taxes. See McLeod v. Columbia Cnty., 278 Ga. 242, 599 S.E.2d 152, 154-55 (2004). That decision does not affect the outcome here: “Where a federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization given to a state tax by state courts or Legislatures, or relieved by it from the duty of considering the real nature of the tax and its effect upon the federal right asserted.” Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367-68, 50 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed. 478 (1930). Indeed, the state court addressed the issue only because a federal district court had remanded the ease after determining that the charges were taxes under federal law. See McLeod v. Columbia Cnty., 254 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1344-49 (S.D.Ga.2003) (<HOLDING>). For the same reason, the court is not bound 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a countys stormwater management charges were taxes for purposes of the tax injunction act 28 usc  1341 2006 (B) holding that  1988 attorneys fees should not be awarded when the tax injunction act 28 usc  1341 bars the plaintiff from obtaining  1983 relief (C) holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc  1391 (D) holding that  1983 is not an exception to the state tax injunction act (E) holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391
Output: (A)