niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
because federal law requires federal approval of Indian wills, 25 U.S.C. § 373, and gives BIA probate judges the authority to approve settlement agreements resolving contested Indian probate proceedings, 43 C.F.R. § 30.150. However, this conclusion cannot be squared with controlling precedent. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to recognize any “inherent power” on the part of a federal court to enforce a settlement agreement simply because the agreement resolved a federal proceeding. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377-378, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Rather, enforcement of such a settlement agreement “requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); id. at 951 (“[Wjhere the validity of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general federal regulatory scheme governing indian mineral leases did not establish federal jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement made under such a lease when the plaintiffs claim sounded only in general contract law (B) holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored (C) holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law (D) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
Output: (A)
with conduct of the type alleged by Hopkins in this case, we have consistently affirmed summary judgment dismissing the claims. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir.1989) (affirming directed verdict in Title VII case despite evidence that female police officer was subjected to pornographic material placed in her station mailbox and to fellow officers’ sexually explicit conversations); Harris v. Clyburn, 1995 WL 56634, at *3 (4th Cir.1995) (unpublished) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment for employer where “only specific factual allegation of sexual harassment [was] occasional tickling [by her male superior] in the hallway”); Cobbins v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, Va., No. 90-1754, slip op. at 7-10, 1991 WL 1828 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 1991) (unpublished) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). See also Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430-31 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her (B) holding that homosexual advances by male coworker were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable (C) holding that where male teacher asked female teacher out for a drink asked her to perform tasks she perceived as secretarial and struck her in a fight purported harassment was not genderbased and was not sufficiently severe or pervasive (D) holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment (E) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters
Output: (C)
in making decisions regarding competency, and we uphold those decisions so long as they are “supported by credible evidence and not clearly erroneous.” State v. Bean, 171 Vt. 290, 295, 762 A.2d 1259, 1262 (2000). Here, despite the majority’s conclusions to the contrary, the testimony provided on the record by the two transport officers was credible and, based on this evidence, it was within the trial court’s discretion to rule that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant has therefore failed to show prejudice. ¶ 35. Because defendant has not shown that any prejudice occurred from whatever errors the trial court may have made, any alleged violations of defendant’s due process rights are also harmless. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483, 489-90, 555 A.2d 369, 373-74 (1988) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, I would affirm the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim (B) holding that when the prejudice from a sixth amendment violation is limited to the admission into evidence of the mental health testimony harmless error analysis applies (C) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the doctrine of harmless error applies when a due process violation is alleged and affirming a conviction when defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice (E) holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction
Output: (D)
the “quick intervention” of Dr. Kasozi, “most probably [he] would not be here today.” Id. An IJ’s credibility finding is a finding of fact. Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” We interpret this statute to call for review under the substantial evidence test, under which the IJ’s finding will be upheld if “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the record as a whole.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. To reverse, the evidence must not only support the conclusion that the IJ erred, but compel it. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); accord Batalova, 355 F.3d at 1254 (<HOLDING>). This court has, however, joined “other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that credibility determinations are for the jury (B) holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable (C) holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable (D) holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence (E) holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization
Output: (B)
an argument despite its abandonment on appeal, we ordinarily will not do so ‘unless manifest injustice otherwise would result.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 27 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir.1994))). Here, no “manifest injustice” results from the denial of Seadinovski’s petition, as the relevant regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As the plain language of the regulation provides, failure to comply with the requirement is a ground for denial of the motion. See Zhen Nan Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir.2006); see also Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Because no manifest injustice results, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it (B) holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application (C) holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen
Output: (B)
Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report’s conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way‘that “increases certain poisonous compounds.” On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that “experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify,” as -“[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination.” Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (B) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting  90403 fla stat (C) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice
Output: (B)
Division and New York Court of Appeals specifically declined to decide the issue of whether was properly precluded under C.P.L. § 250.10(2), the only court that adjudicated the claim on the merits was the County Court. Time has proven that the trial judge correctly construed C.P.L. § 250.10(2) as applying to lay evidence, such as a defendant’s own testimony, offered in support of an EED defense: Recently, the New York Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative the question it explicitly left open in Smith’s case— “whether a defendant seeking to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense is required to provide notice pursuant to CPL 250.10 if the intent is to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the affirmative defense.” People v. Diaz, 904 N.Y.S.2d 343, 930 N.E.2d at 266 (<HOLDING>). Because the sanction of preclusion bears on a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless (B) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted (C) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel (D) holding that in a seconddegree murder prosecution defendant was required to provide statutory notice of his intent to rely upon the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance eed notwithstanding his stated intention to support that defense with lay testimony only the notice requirements goals of preventing unfair surprise and allowing the prosecution an opportunity to obtain evidence from any source were implicated whether defendant sought to establish mental infirmity through expert or lay testimony (E) holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge
Output: (D)
applies to the bankruptcy court’s severance of these counterclaims. In its motions to sever, Kaiser moved under Bankruptcy Rules 7012, 7013, 7021 and 7042. Bankruptcy Rules 7012 and 7013 do not address the severance of claims or counterclaims. Rule 7012 simply provides for the form and time periods for filing answers and answers to cross-claims and for the admission or denial of the designation of core and non-core matters. Bankruptcy Rule 7013 is similarly unhelpful. While it concerns the filing of counterclaims and cross-claims, the rule does not cover their severance. The rule simply makes Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings, with the exception that a party sued by a debtor in possession or a trustee need not state as a counterclaim any prepetition claim (<HOLDING>). See Bankr.R. 7013 editors’ comment. Kaiser 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court (B) holding that when the claim was duly established as a valid claim against the estate the laws of limitation could no longer apply while the estate was being administered under the probate law (C) holding that a lawsuit by a third party creditor against the estate is a core proceeding (D) holding that bank as coexecutor of estate breached its fiduciary and statutory duties to creditor when it failed to pay creditors claim against estate and instead paid claims of bank and other creditors (E) recognizing that the party can instead file a claim against the estate
Output: (E)
¶ 24. We stated, however, that a home visit has the potential to turn into a search once the officer has reasonable cause to engage in a search. Moody, ¶ 24. ¶10 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, a nonconsensual search violates the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to a validly issued warrant supported by probable cause. The United States Supreme Court has concluded, however, that probation searches do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment when conducted pursuant to state law and supported by reasonable suspicion to believe contraband would be found. Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868, 878, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3171 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A number of the federal circuit courts have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that imposing the traditional warrant and probablecause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the illinois probation system because the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officers ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer and would facilitate the probationers evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct (C) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (D) holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement (E) recognizing the existence of the special relationship
Output: (D)
favorable decision.” Township of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir.1998)). Turchi Qua Guarantor While it is alleged that Turchi was to sign the forbearance agreement, he was to do so as a guarantor. That capacity is not without significance. This lawsuit does not seek enforcement of the guarantee. Indeed, it is the Debtor as the primary borrower who has brought it against the lender, the primary obligee. The Court does not read the complaint to allege that Turchi qua guarantor personally suffered a concrete injury as a result of what the Bank is alleged to have done. See e.g., Borough of Berwick v. Quandel Group, Inc., 440 Pa.Super. 367, 371, 655 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa.Super.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Hufsmith v. Weaver, 285 Ark. 357, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (C) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (D) holding that majority shareholder who guaranteed debt was not a third party beneficiary and thus lack standing to bring action for tortious interference of corporations contract with defendant (E) holding that borough that guaranteed debt owed by municipal sewage authority to engineering firm lacked standing because it was not party to the contract
Output: (E)
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 663, 667 n. 10, 669 (N.D.Ill.1983)). However, in all the cases on this issue, the courts made it clear that the client must have made disclosures to the attorney after manifesting an intent to seek legal advice. Herbes, 180 Ill.App.3d at 698-99, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (finding that counsel for the plaintiff, who was suing a township over its open-space acquisition program, was ineligible to conduct said representation because he had previously engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the township when it interviewed only him for a possible position representing the township in the same program, evidencing the township’s intent to hire him and therefore speak freely regarding the program), Hughes, 565 F.Supp. at 670 (<HOLDING>), Int’l. Paper Co. v. Lloyd Manufacturing Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (C) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them (E) holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one
Output: (B)
against the Debtor have been discharged and that MDE’s pursuit of those claims in the State Court Action constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the Court orders the Respondents to cease any further pursuit of the Debtor in connection with the alleged claims but denies the Debtor’s -request for an award of damages and attorneys’ fees. A separate order will be entered consistent with this ruling. 1 . Unless otherwise noted, all statutory and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1532, and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 2 . In addition to the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the Debtor's case. See Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman), 561 B.R. 79, 83 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Unless otherwise noted, future references 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (B) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings (E) holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket
Output: (A)
they had him restrained on the ground. See also Hemet Chief of Police, "Use of Force," Gen. Order No. U-102 (discussing "professional presence," "compliance techniques," and other "intermediate force" less likely to cause death or serious injury). A rational jury could rely upon such evidence in assessing whether the officers' use of force was unreasonable. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 635(9th Cir.1991) (as amended) (finding that testimony of "an expert on proper police procedures and policies" was relevant and admissible); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 148 994) (same). In sum, Smith has submitted a substantial amount of evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the force used against him was excessive. C. Deadly Force Smit 1168 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914-15 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm (B) holding that an officer did not employ excessive force in shooting a suspect who turned out to be unarmed because at the time of the shooting the officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a threat and was armed (C) holding that deadly force was reasonable where a suspect who had been behaving erratically swung a knife at an officer (D) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (E) recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat
Output: (C)
and the order denying reconsideration are both properly before this court, as both were filed within 30 days of the trial court’s original nonfinal order. Otherwise, the order denying the Partnership’s motion for reconsideration of an appealable nonfinal order is not in itself, alone, an appealable order. Agere, 931 So.2d at 245. Furthermore, while “a legally insufficient motion to vacate a default cannot be corrected as a matter of right by a motion for reconsideration or hearing, a trial court does have the inherent discretionary power to reconsider any order entered prior to the rendition of final judgment in the cause.” City of Hollywood v. Cordasco, 575 So.2d 301, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (emphasis in original); Monte Campbell Crane Co., Inc., 510 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>); see generally, James H. Wyman, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider (B) holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal (C) holding that unauthorized motion for rehearing to set aside default heard by trial court will be considered as motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment (E) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing
Output: (C)
a parent has a duty to support his or her l Assembly have taken several steps to ensure that non-supporting parents honor their obligations. For example, the State Constitution provides that a person may be imprisoned for nonpayment of child or spousal support obligations. See Md. Const, art. Ill, § 38 (stating that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for a debt, but a valid decree of a court of competent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support of a spouse or dependent children, or for alimony ... shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.”); Md. Rule 15-207(e) (providing procedures for imprisonment upon non-payment of child or spousal support obligation); Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 639, 620 A.2d 1363, 1369 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The General Assembly authorized the Child 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (B) holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 (C) holding that since a parents child support obligation is not a debt within the prohibition of  38 the obligation of the defaulting parent may be enforced by means of the courts contempt power including imprisonment pending the purging of the default (D) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (E) holding that the trial court had not erred in including the cost of health insurance covering both the custodial parent and the parties child in determining the noncustodial parents childsupport obligation
Output: (C)
is not fully equated with a private law firm, in that a former agency lawyer is not considered to have been associated with all other lawyers in the agency. I might say we started out by equating the two and, as we went along the committee decided that that really was taking too hard a line because to say that all lawyers in the Justice Department or the FCC or any other agency are to be considered in the same way that you would consider the lawyers in a private law firm, that was too sweeping a disqualification and there was no good reason for it.... Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm, on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1971-73); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1585, 89 L.Ed.2d at 832 (<HOLDING>). Professor Thode added that a judge who had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that the conditions delineated in canon 3c1a alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the due process clause (C) holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process (D) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (E) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause
Output: (B)
limit, modify, or eliminate altogether. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. 905 (“Congress has always been.at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it.”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384, 16 S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896) (“Indian tribes are subject to the dominant authority of congress.”). Thus, suits such as' this one are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, unless the plaintiff shows either a clear waiver of that immunity by the tribe, or an express abrogation of the doctrine by Congress. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 509, 111 S.Ct, 905 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence that the Poarch Band 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity (B) holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him (C) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (D) holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted    the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration (E) holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity
Output: (E)
UC Hastings Mot. at 5-8), and courts in their home forums have addressed related arguments in the past. See, e.g., Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 275 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming the district court’s holding that the University of Iowa and its Board of Regents were immune, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suit on plaintiffs § 1983 claims); Scherer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 49 Fed.Appx. 658, 658 (8th Cir.2002) (affirming the district court’s holding that the University of Missouri and its Curators were immune, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suit on plaintiffs ADA claim) (citing Sherman v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 871 F.Supp. 344, 348 (W.D.Mo.1994)); Gallagher v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law, No. C011277PJH, 2001 WL 1006809, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Because the relevant circuit and district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under  1983 (B) holding that uc hastings was immune under the eleventh amendment from suit on plaintiffs  1983 claims and granting motion to dismiss (C) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 (D) holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment
Output: (B)
prolonged; and (4) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Alpert, 816 F.2d at 964, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). DiGiovanni’s continued investigation after issuing the warning was entirely reasonable in light of these factors. First, any detention incident to that investigation was of limited duration. The encounter between Rodriguez and law enforcement personnel, from the moment he was pulled over until the currency’s discovery, lasted approximately forty minutes. Under these circumstances, even if Rodriguez’s detention occupied that entire time interval, it might not suggest a Terry Stop of unreasonable scope. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1194 (4th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the alleged detention here only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest (B) holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest (C) holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest (D) holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion (E) holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck
Output: (A)
indicated a willingness to consider additional factors. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). In Osborne, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Ohio could ban the possession of child pornography. Id. at 108, 110 S.Ct. 1691. In finding it could, the Court relied not only on the harm caused to the children who are used in its production (i.e., Ferber), but also on the harm that children suffer when child pornography is used to seduce or coerce them into sexual activity. Id. at 111, 110 S.Ct. 1691. Thus, in Osborne, the Court indicated that protecting children who are not actually pictured in the pornographic image is a legitimate and compelling state interest. See Id. See also United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 115, — 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that competing interests of parents children and the state requires additional analysis (B) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (C) holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents (D) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (E) recognizing the supreme courts subtle yet crucial extension of valid state interests to include protecting children not actually depicted
Output: (E)
original). Here, the claim is based on Chase’s failure to pay flood insurance premiums from the escrow account. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached a duty that was owed to her specifically, not a general duty owed to the public. See Harrison v. Gore, 27,254 (La.App. 2 Cir.8/23/95); 660 So.2d 563, 568 (“The classical distinction between ‘damages ex contractu’ and ‘damages ex delicto’ is that the former flow from the breach of a special obligation contractually assumed by the obligor, whereas the latter flow from the violation of a general duty owed to all persons.”). The Court, therefore, finds that plaintiffs detrimental reliance claim sounds in contract and is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. See Stokes v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 894 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of a non  212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance (B) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (C) holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance (D) holding detrimental reliance claim was subject to tenyear prescriptive period (E) holding that each class member was not required to prove justifiable reliance when an inference of reliance arises if a materially false representation was made to persons whose acts thereafter were consistent with reliance upon the representations
Output: (D)
under § 3730(e)(4)(A). Finally, we consider whether the GAO report was a “public disclosure” under § 3730(e)(4)(A). The GAO report disclosed generally that some contractors performing the 254 ESPCs granted between 1999 and 2003 had engaged in the activity Relators allege is fraudulent, but the report did not disclose the names of any contractors or specify any locations where an ESPC may have involved fraud. Because of the large number of ESPCs granted and the GAO report’s lack of specificity, the report did not contain sufficient information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against Honeywell. Accordingly, the GAO report was not a “public disclosure” under § 3730(e)(4)(A). See United States v. Alcan Elec. and Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Because neither the AAA reports nor the GAO 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca (B) holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  (C) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant (D) holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia (E) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege
Output: (C)
effect on the procreation and child-rearing practices of opposite-sex married (or unmarried) couples. See Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1088, 2012 WL 372713, at *21 (“There is no rational reason to think that taking away the designation of ‘marriage’ from same-sex couples would advance the goal of encouraging ... opposite-sex couples to procreate more responsibly.”) To the extent some people may have a bias in favor of preferring biological parents over other couples, there is no such recognition of this distinction under federal or state law. See id. There has been no showing that DOMA alters any state or federal law governing childbearing, procreation or family structure. Given the state of the law, the rationale of promoting responsible child-rearing finds no “ ‘footing in t 85, 186 (1971) (<HOLDING>)). Again, the argument that the definition of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a case involving not intraunion politics but rather a matter of an employer requiring the union to carry out the penalty provision of a collective bargaining agreement that the statutory term otherwise disciplined is narrowly confined to regulatory actions that affect a union members rights or status as a member of the union that the sanctions imposed were employmentrelated rather than internal union related and that the safeguards in  411a5 were not available for such action (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) holding that a vermont civil union is not the equivalent of a marriage (D) holding that as long as alleged breach of a continuing duty occurred within six years of the filing of the lawsuit the claim is timely (E) holding that the institution of marriage as a union of man and woman uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family is as old as the book of genesis
Output: (E)
did wrong, and when. The target is not required to play a guessing game in that respect.”). Once Defendants cured the specific problems identified in Plaintiffs’ Notice, if Plaintiffs believed that Defendants remained in violation and wanted to motivate Defendants to change their conduct with the possibility of a citizen suit, Plaintiffs needed to provide Defendants’ with another notice, one with sufficient information to address the problems that would eventually be the subject of a federal lawsuit. The Court rejects the idea it is foisting an impossible burden on Plaintiffs by requiring that this suit be supported by a notice containing details not available at the time of the first (and only) Notice. That Notice was good, but just not for the claims Plaint 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). B. State Law Claims (Counts II-IV). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that some of the claims raised in the plaintiffs complaint were not properly raised in its 60day citizen suit notice thus the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims (B) holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims (C) holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine (D) holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute (E) holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims
Output: (A)
for the spectacled eider and the Steller’s eider should be dismissed with prejudice as moot. Defendants further argue that FWS is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining part of Count VIII alleging that BLM and FWS consultations on the proposed leasing program and decision to proceed were inadequate because they failed to consider the impacts on critical habitat. The parties agree that plaintiffs’ claim that FWS violated the ESA by failing to designate critical habitat for the spectacled eider and the Steller’s eider is moot. The parties disagree as to whether that claim should be dismissed with or without prejudice. A dismissal on mootness grounds is without prejudice to future suits on the merits of the same claim. See Payne v. Panama Canal Co., 607 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); DiGiore v. Ryan, 172 F.3d 454, 466 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits (B) holding that a partial adjudication on the merits followed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims is not a final judgment that gives rise to appellate jurisdiction (C) holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata (D) holding that the dismissal without prejudice of the prior actions on grounds of mootness does not serve as a final adjudication on the merits so as to bar this action (E) holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits
Output: (D)
9 .The judge made no specific finding with respect to two issues that might have been of some importance, namely, whether Henson had access to other housing, as he had earlier told Prue that he would have, and whether he suffered pain and distress as a result of not being able to use his medication. The judge also cut off Henson's attorney somewhat abruptly when he requested an opportunity to argue on the issue of damages, but Henson has not raised this or any other procedural issue on appeal. 10 . It appears that Prue's premises may have been in the nature of a rooming house, and Henson may have been a roomer rather than a tenant. If he was, then the prohibition against self-help evictions may not have been applicable. Cf. Harkins v. Win Corp., 771 A.2d 1025, 1029 (D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>). No party has raised this issue, however, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse (B) holding that a provider of transientaccommodations may use selfhelp to evict a nonpaying lodger (C) holding that continued possession and unrestricted use constitutes regular use (D) holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under  2l12bla (E) holding that it may not
Output: (B)
representative. Id. at B-2. The DOL also stated that the designation of an authorized representative can limit the representative’s authority to particular types of claims. Id. at B-3. Defendants have provided examples of benefit plans that require particular procedures to designate authorized representatives. See Defs.’ Joint Resp., Exs. 49 (plan stating that participant can identify authorized representative in writing to plan), 51 (plan stating there is a process to appoint authorized representative), 58 (plan requiring participant to fill out form obtained from plan to designate authorized representative), 59 (same), 65 (plan requiring designation of authorized representative in writing), 111 (plan requiring completion of form or provision of the information in it), 115 at 5361 (<HOLDING>). The questions of compliance with these 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where representative plaintiff and other members of class share an interest in prevailing on similar legal claims particular differences in amount of damages claimed or of availability of certain defenses against class representative may not render his or her claims atypical (B) recognizing general rule (C) recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law (D) recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim (E) holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class
Output: (D)
not admissible ... [because it is] not subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. Therefore, such statements are appropriately [ jadmissible ... to prove only that the defendant earlier spoke consistently with his present testimony, the credibility of which is being challenged.” “A defendant may introduce his or her own prior consistent statements [in limited circumstances:] when the prosecution suggests that the defendant has a motive to falsify, alleges that the defendant’s testimony is a recent fabrication, or attempts to impeach the defendant with a prior inconsistent statement. [Where] the defendant [does] not testify at trial[,] ... none of these exceptions applie[s].” (citations omitted)); cf. also Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 468, 374 S.E.2d 303, 316 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Numerous federal and state courts, applying 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (B) holding that admitting evidence of a defendants prior statement to an investigator proffered by the commonwealth did not violate the defendants fifth amendment rights by forcing him to testify to dispute it (C) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (D) holding district court did not violate sixth amendment by admitting defendants outofcourt statement (E) recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify
Output: (B)
of the Lemmon Avenue Terminal gates, they are entitled to partial summary judgment: “The [WARAj’s mandate that Dallas demolish the passenger gates deprives [Love Terminal Partners] of its pre-existing property right to exclude others (including Dallas) from invading these gates to destroy them. The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs’] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking.” Pls.’ Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court’s interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (<HOLDING>); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment on appeal constitutes the law of the case as to particular issues decided and is applicable throughout subsequent stages of the case (B) holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds (C) holding that it may be decided as a matter of law (D) holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator (E) recognizing in a takings case that issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment
Output: (E)