niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
would materialize only if Opus West had sufficient general assets to pay such compensation.” As any payout from the benefit plans would only have occurred if Opus West continued to remain solvent, they assert, that contingency defeats any allegation that plaintiffs suffered a “concrete financial loss.” Examining whether plaintiffs suffered “concrete financial injury” begins with the principle enunciated in Diaz that RICO standing must be based on “a harm to a specific business or property interest.” 420 F.3d at 900. By agreeing to receive deferred compensation through Opus West’s top hat plans, plaintiffs made their right to receive the compensation dependent on the company’s ongoing success. The parties agree that the top hat plans provi osp., Inc., 441 B.R. 120, 130 (9th Cir.BAP2010) (<HOLDING>). As a consequence, courts in other contexts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that funds deposited with ing were property of the bankruptcy estate because the ing account was held in the debtor hospitals name and the plan documents plainly provided that compensation deferred under the plan would remain part of the hospitals unrestricted assets and would not be held in trust the plan was unfunded and the hospitals obligations were purely contractual in nature the participation agreement that the doctor executed similarly acknowledged that any contributions to the ing account remained the sole property of the company based on these undisputed facts the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the doctor held no interest in the ing account funds (B) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (C) holding that workers compensation awards remained property of the estate despite confirmation of the debtors plans where the confirmation orders specifically provided that property of the estate did not vest in the debtor until the completion of the plan (D) holding that executives participating in an unfunded top hat plan had no ownership interest in the  funds that could be forfeited the funds remain part of the general assets of the corporation subject to the claims of its general creditors (E) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan
Output: (A)
indicating a desire to appeal. It was then that counsel was appointed, but failed to file anything with the Superior Court. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant has made sufficient allegations that counsel abandoned him for purposes of his first PCRA appeal by failing to file an appellate brief and that Appellant’s relief under subsection (b)(l)(ii) is not controlled by the Gamboa-Taylor line of case law. Thus, as discussed previously, Appellant has made sufficient allegations to invoke subsection (b)(l)(ii). Appellant alleges that he did not receive the review to which he was entitled through no fault of his own. On appeal, Appellant was assigned counsel who could not raise the ineffectiveness claims he wanted to pursue. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 689 A.2d 891 (Pa.1997) (<HOLDING>). Such an infirmity was compounded when counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not (B) holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal (C) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (D) holding that it would be improper for original trial counsel to raise the issue of his own alleged ineffectiveness in a posttrial habeas corpus case (E) holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness
Output: (E)
and that an error qualifies as “plain if the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We further conclude that the error affected Banks’ substantial rights because the district court’s revocation decision was based on the determination that the cocaine sales alleged in the revocation petition had been established by the officer’s testimony. See United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 312 (4th Cir.2013) (noting that the phrase “affecting substantial rights in most cases means that the error was prejudicial” (internal quotation marks, alteration, and ellipsis omitted)), petition for cert. filed, — U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Apr. 29, 2013) (No. 12-9965); United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 334 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we conclude that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings (B) recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings (C) holding that a plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not objected to or brought to the courts attention (D) holding that plain error exists when 1 an error was committed 2 that was plain 3 that affected the defendants substantial rights and 4 the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings (E) recognizing that an error prejudices substantial rights when it affects the outcome of the hearing at issue
Output: (E)
apace notwithstanding an alien’s parole status ‘or possibility of arrest or further imprisonment.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(A)). The court determined that § 1231(a)(4)(A) implicitly endorsed the proposition that “deportation leaves an existing term of parole intact” because “an alien may be deported and later face incarceration for violating his parole.” Id. Therefore, the court held “that, under federal law, deportation does not automatically extinguish an existing term of parole.” Id. Just as in Carrasco-Mateo, the Oregon court in the instant case did not lose authority over Barrera merely because he was deported. Id. This decision is in accord with other circuit courts that have addressed similar issues. See United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 369 F.3d 250, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deportation did not cut short appellants parole term regardless of appellants subjective beliefs (B) holding that deportation does not extinguish term of parole (C) holding that appellants privacy interests under the us and texas constitutions were not invaded when officer walked up appellants driveway to allow drug dog to sniff appellants garage door (D) holding that parole survives deportation (E) holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking
Output: (A)
Frank McLain and Harley McLain appeal pro se the district court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm. Because plaintiffs reside in Montana and North Dakota but did not allege a concrete harm caused by the out-of-state defendants, the district court properly dismissed these claims for lack of standing. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance (B) holding that a borrower lacks standing to challenge transfers of her promissory note to which the borrower is not a party (C) holding that a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge legislation created outside of plaintiffs district absent specific evidence of personal harm (D) holding that a party lacks standing to challenge the validity of a deed issued by a county treasurer in the absence of actual injury to a legally protected interest (E) holding that a claimant without an interest in a particular specific asset lacks standing to initiate ancillary proceeding
Output: (C)
suggests the existence of that claim. Further, although Plaintiff attempts to argue that all of his causes of action “continue to accrue as Defendant continues to recklessly and unlawfully disregard provisions of the Code,” the First Circuit has rejected the “continuous tort” theory in the context of a section 7433 cause of action for unlawful collection ac tivities. Dziura v. U.S., 168 F.3d 581 (1st Cir.1999): “Continuing violation” jurisprudence is drawn from tort law. The doctrine is generally thought to be inapposite when an injury is definite, readily discoverable, and accessible in the sense that nothing impedes the injured party from seeking to redress it. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir.1992); cf. Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 58-59 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent a disability or other impediment 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (B) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (C) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell (D) recognizing the vital distinction between a continuing act and a singular act that brings continuing consequences in its wake (E) recognizing this distinction
Output: (D)
his judgment and sentences for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated fleeing to elude, possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, and felon in possession of a firearm. He raises six points on appeal. We find no merit to his arguments with the exception of those raised in point'six regarding issues Jones preserved in his motion to correct sentencing errors filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). First, Jones correctly argues that the habitual felony offender sentencing statute e rida Statutes (2003), should also be stricken because the trial court did not make a finding on the record of Jones’s ability to pay before imposing the fine. See Gonzalez v. State, 939 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Jones also challenges the $65 cost imposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that the statute in effect at that time ie section 7750832b florida statutes 2003 required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendants ability to pay the fine before imposing it (D) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (E) holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable
Output: (C)
to raise any claim contesting Defendants’ entry into her home or taking of photographs, and she cannot add such a claim at this stage of the litigation. To the extent Plaintiff contends that the photographs are inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the court disagrees — there is no indication of an illegal search in any of Plaintiff's filings. It appears that Plaintiff voluntarily permitted Defendants to enter the home. After entering the home, the officers were entitled to photograph objects in their plain view, and they were also permitted to photograph evidence they viewed from outside the residence, such as the window screens. See Wilson v. Supt., Attica Corr. Facility, No. 00-CV-0767 (NAM)(GLS), 2003 WL 22765351, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (report and recommendation) (<HOLDING>), adopted, Order, 00-CV-0767 (NAM)(GS) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment (B) holding that visible contraband in plain view within the apartment provided probable cause for an arrest of person found therein (C) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where the gun cash and a drug ledger were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different apartment in the same building (D) holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found (E) holding that photographs taken of items outside defendants apartment that were in plain view of the officer were properly admitted
Output: (E)
of the admissibility of evidence is based on a purely legal ground, we review de novo. See Khan v. INS, 237 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir.2001). Rosas Robles argues that the certification of her conviction before the IJ failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1008.41(b) or (c) (2003). As an initial matter, § 1003.41(c) applies only to documents “submitted by electronic means to the Service.” As there is no evidence that the certification here was submitted electronically, § 1003.41(c) is inapplicable. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B), a “certified copy” of a k of authentication of that document. At the hearing, she objected “only because [the 1-213] does not have any relevant information on this case” (emphasis added). See Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McGregor, 529 F.2d 928, 929 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (B) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (C) holding that objection on grounds of relevance does not preserve an objection for lack of authentication (D) holding that under rule 103a1 njeither a general objection to the evidence nor a specific objection on other grounds will preserve the issue on review (E) holding that objection by defense counsel that he did not see the relevance of the evidence was not a proper relevancy objection
Output: (C)
property for use as a residence is consistent with valuation at any point during the bankruptcy proceedings. Marsh, 475 B.R. at 896. The court’s analysis thus focuses on the purpose of the valuation. 3 . Section 506(b), of course, allows a senior secured creditor to increase its claim after the petition date by adding interest and fees that are covered by the value of the collateral. In general, however, the augmentation of the senior secured claim will not decrease the amount of the junior secured claim as determined as of the petition date, because "the junior creditor may be entitled to adequate protection of its interest in the collateral” under 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 506.04[5] (16th ed. rev. 2012); see also In re Rupprect, 161 B.R. 48, 49 (Bankr.D.Neb.1993) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, principal payments to the senior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a creditor is oversecured solvency is not required for the creditor to be entitled to postpetition interest and fees and granting contractual default interest to the oversecured creditor of approximately 24 (B) holding that junior creditor entitled to adequate protection from interest accruing on senior claim (C) holding that codebtor relief should be granted to collect accruing unpaid interest (D) recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order (E) recognizing need to balance interests of debt or and creditor in determining nature of protection to be afforded creditor
Output: (B)
adverse treatment that in the circumstances might well dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity. EEOC Enforcement Guidance II B.2. I would also agree with Burlington Northern, the EEOC, and the better reasoned caselaw that the determination of whether a plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to establish a material adverse action is fact specific and will, in most cases, generate a jury question. Of course, petty incidents in isolation do not suffice to show a materially adverse impact, but determining what is so petty that it would not deter a reasonable person from utilizing complaint procedures is usually best decided by a diverse jury with a mix of real world experience rather than by the court. Cf. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603-05 (6th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation (B) holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal (C) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (D) holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment (E) holding unless claimed retaliatory action is truly inconse quential the plaintiffs first amendment claim should go to the jury
Output: (E)
the statute.” 167 F.3d at 992 (citing Haun, 90 F.3d at 1100; United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (3d Cir.1993)). See also United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir.2002) (reaffirming the holding in Cavalier that “the cashing of an illegally obtained check can promote the completion of an underlying unlawful act”). The Federal Express packages at issue in the money laundering counts contained checks fraudulently obtained by IDM. A rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the transfer of the checks from Barbados to New York and the negotiation of those checks promoted the underlying mail fraud scheme, and that by facilitating the negotiation of the checks Bo 88831, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion (B) holding no offense of attempted seconddegree murder where statute allows conviction without proof of intent to kill (C) holding that promotion and concealment are alternative bases for a money laundering conviction proof of intent to accomplish either will suffice (D) holding that it is the fact of concealment and not the intent to conceal that is prohibited under 49 usc  1472f (E) holding that concealment is just one factor to consider and is not a mandatory element
Output: (C)
lacks jurisdiction to review the order denying reconsideration. See Betty B Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 194 F.3d 491, 496 (4th Cir.1999) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction petition seeking review of order “summarily denying] reconsideration”). Turning to the underlying Board order, this court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders of the Board. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c); see Eggers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 11 F.3d 35, 38 (4th Cir.1993) (“The finality requirement contained in § 921 encompasses the same concepts as finality in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [ (2006) ].”)• Because the Board remanded the case for further proceedings, the Board’s order is not a final order. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (B) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order remanding  to an administrative law judge for further findings is not in general immediately appealable under 33 usc  921c (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine
Output: (C)
(citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed.Cir.1995)); see also Hamlet v. United States, 873 F.2d 1414, 1415-16 (Fed.Cir.1989). The Tucker Act assigns jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims over “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This court’s generally applicable jurisdiction under the Tucker Act can be displaced by an explicit jurisdictional grant to another federal court or an express jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g., Texas Peanut Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, codified at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) holding that rule of construction that specific statutory provisions control general ones should not be applied where provisions can be harmonized (C) holding that specific jurisdictional provisions of subsections 506d and 5080 (D) holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional (E) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions
Output: (C)
to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands” and can include transfers under some circumstances. Id. at 157 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has explicitly declined to add other actions to this category. Id. Dixon alleges anti-union threats, harassment, and illegal threats of termination, see Complaint ¶¶ 49-52, but no actions by Defendants that constitute adverse employment actions. See Breaux, 205 F.3d at 157-58 (citing cases holding that, inter alia, accusations, investigations, and false accusations are not adverse employment actions for purposes of § 1983 actions, and concluding that “oral threats or abusive remarks [do] not rise to the level of an adverse employment action”); cf. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932, 118 S.Ct. 336, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of a title vii retaliation claim an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity (B) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding an adverse employment action based on denial or revocation of a security clearance is not actionable under title vii (E) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii
Output: (E)
9-3-71, the medical malpractice statute, because both statutes have a two-year time limitation and under either statute, the Langleys’ claims are time barred. We agree with the Langleys, however, that their complaint can be liberally construed to encompass all three of these asserted allegations of negligence. First, the most obvious cause of action stems from Shannon’s alleged negligence for failure to diagnose the kitten as rabid at the first office visit. Second, the disputed facts indicate that Shannon may have been negligent because she recognized the danger that the kitten may have been exposed to the rabies virus and needed to be either euthanized or quarantined, but failed to communicate the same to the Langleys. Oliver v. Sutton, 246 Ga. App. 436, 438-439 (540 SE2d 645) (2000) (<HOLDING>). Third, the disputed facts indicate that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (B) holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence (C) holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence (D) holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe reglan and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence punctuation omitted (E) holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence
Output: (C)
The purpose of the statute is to give water districts, not the Board, the authority over water fluoridation. Here, the resolution is invalid as applied to Lakewood because it does not allow the water district to decide the issue of whether to fluoridate its water systems as provided for in RCW 57.08.012. No majority vote of the commissioners takes place. No vote of the electors (water users) within the water district takes place. The resolution deprives Lakewood of its specific statutory power and discretion provided under RCW 57.08.012. The resolution is also invalid and ineffective as applied to the private water companies (Parkland Light). A local regulation that conflicts with state law fails in its entirety. See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City 
 Holding statements: (A) holding citizens lacked standing to challenge statute when all citizens affected in the same way (B) holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county (C) holding seniorhousing zoning ordinance invalid as applied (D) holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens (E) holding that a municipal ordinance that contravenes state law as here is invalid for that reason alone
Output: (D)
need not even be asked — unless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the crime. The State claims that “the Fifth Circuit’s Penry I jurisprudence is not at issue” in this case. Brief for Respondent 35, n. 21; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. To the contrary, that jurisprudence is directly at issue because the Fifth Circuit denied Tennard relief on the ground that he did not satisfy the requirements imposed by its “constitutional relevance” test. As we have explained, the Fifth Circuit’s screening test has no basis in our precedents and, indeed, is inconsistent with the standard we have adopted for relevance in the capital sentencing context. We therefore hold that the Fifth Circuit assessed Tennard’s Penry claim under an improper legal standard. Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S., at 341 (<HOLDING>). C We turn to the analysis the Fifth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on certiorari review of the denial of a coa that the fifth circuit had applied an incorrect standard by improperly merging the requirements of two statutory sections (B) holding that review by common law certiorari in district courts of appeal is limited to circuit court decisions constituting denial of procedural due process application of incorrect law or miscarriage of justice (C) holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit (D) holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit
Output: (A)
a nuisance per se, but [] it may become a nuisance because of its location or manner in which it is operated.”). 62 . Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 135 F.Supp.2d 675, 689 (D.Md.2001) (citing Burley v. City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 307, 34 A.2d 603 (1946) and Tadjer, 479 A.2d at 1321). 63 . Though Exxon cites two cases which state that a "public nuisance is a criminal offense” neither case holds that a statute criminalizing the activity is a prerequisite to public nuisance. See Exxon Mem. at 4 (citing Hoffman v. United Iron & Metal Co., 108 Md.App. 117, 671 A.2d 55, 64 (1996) (declining to decide whether a scrap metal yard and automobile shredding facility was a public nuisance because the issue was not raised below) and Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180, 190 (1994) (<HOLDING>)). Instead, as noted, Maryland relies on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the fact that an exempt owner who acquired legal title after date when liability for current taxes had accrued was the equitable owner did not make the exemption applicable (B) recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination (C) holding stock dividend payable to actual owner not owner of record (D) holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief (E) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner
Output: (E)
activities are related to the due process complaint that was later filed on December 5, 2008, and to the due process hearing that occurred on February 3, 2009. Id. The defendants contend that these activities should not be allowed because they are too remote in time from the February 2009 administrative proceeding. Defs.’ Opp’n at 17. They therefore assert that 5.65 hours should be disallowed from the plaintiff’s fee petition, reducing the total by $1,208.80. Id. The plaintiff responds that all legal activities for which she was charged are directly related and in close proximity to the administrative proceeding. PL’s Reply at 10. Charges incurred a few months prior to an IDEA due process hearing are not too remote. See Cox v. District of Columbia, 754 F.Supp.2d 66, 77-78 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>); Lax v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 1980264, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that charges for work done less than five months before an idea due process hearing were reasonable (B) holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process (C) holding attorneys must be given reasonable notice of the charges they face before the referees hearing on those charges (D) holding that due process requires that a hearing be held within a reasonable time after confinement to administrative segregation and finding that five days plainly satisfied this requirement (E) holding that continuing to work for five months before deciding to retire and three months thereafter as a matter of law   are not the actions of someone who finds his working conditions so intolerable that he felt compelled to resign
Output: (A)
delivery to these individuals actually occurred. Sanderson asserted numerous causes of action against the defendants including civil rights and tort claims arising out of Sanderson’s divorce action and his March'2003 arrest for felonious restraint. The felonious restraint charge was later dismissed. Sanderson’s complaint in this lawsuit seeks damages for actions by Thomas and Martens while employed by Walsh County and actions by Judge Geiger while employed by the State of North Dakota. [¶ 3] Walsh County, Thomas, and Martens answered Sanderson’s complaint and moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal for lack of proper service of process. Judge Geiger also moved to dismiss, asserting the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over 2001 ND 101, ¶¶ 8-10, 627 N.W.2d 379 (<HOLDING>). [¶8] Sanderson’s complaint asserts a number 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract (B) holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum (C) holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum (D) holding that when a forum selection clause designates  an arbitral forum  the proper remedy is dismissal (E) holding appealable dismissal where application of forum selection clause permanently put plaintiff out of district court
Output: (E)
53 S.W.3d 368, 52 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (recognizing that “[t]he measure of damages to [personal] property that is totally destroyed [by another’s negligence] is its reasonable market value when destroyed”); Shaw Tank Cleaning Co. v. Tex. Pipeline Co., 442 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Civ.App.-AmariIlo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding replacement damages awarded by jury for destruction of crude oil storage tank by fire negligently caused by defendant). When the damaged property “has neither a market value nor a real value, but it is shown what it would cost to replace or reproduce the article, then such cost is the measure of recovery.” Int'l-Great N. R.R. Co., 46 S.W.2d at 670; Pringle v. Nowlin, 629 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). It is the plaintiffs burden to show which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because plaintiffs speech occurred in the reception area of the judge executives office it was only the nature of that limited area and not the general public nature of fiscal court budding within which the office was located that was determinative of the forum (B) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (C) holding plaintiff entitled to replace ment value of gold leaf professional sign located in the window of his leased law office when defendants intentionally destroyed it (D) holding that a plaintiff who did not replace a destroyed tractortrailer due to lack of funds and failure to find a suitable replacement could recover for loss of use of the vehicle limited to a reasonable time (E) holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire
Output: (C)
was unable to meet its burden of showing that remedy under § 1581(c) was manifestly inadequate. Id. at 964. Having found that the plaintiff-appellant could not establish standing under either § 1581(c), nor § 1581(i), the Miller court dismissed the Complaint. Id. Here, NuFarm is seeking to have its potential class members assert jurisdiction under § 1581(i), while NuFarm itself has already established jurisdiction under § 1581(a) for identical claims. See Plaintiffs Motion at 20 (stating “it appears that the great majority of the members of the class have jurisdiction for their claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). . . .”) Under Miller, the scope of § 1581(i) jurisdiction is “strictly limited.” Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F. 2d 356, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals in Thomson examined a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the remedy under another subsection of  1581 is not manifestly inadequate because  1581s builtin safeguards and limitations    are not to be dismissed because they are inconvenient (B) holding that decisions that lie within the trial courts discretion are to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous (C) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (D) holding that surveys are admissible only if they are conducted with proper safeguards to insure accuracy and reliability (E) holding that legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute
Output: (A)
defendant was not present at the scene of the crime, and we made clear that “a defendant who is present but unarmed during the commission of a crime may ([ ] by the division of labor) make it easier for another to carry a firearm and therefore aid and abet that act.” Id. at 47. Here, the evidence showed that Santana actively facilitated Torres’s use of the firearm by “division of labor.” Santana entered the apartment with Torres, helped to subdue Flores, and then Santana guarded Flores while Torres stole untaxed cigarettes, marijuana, jewelry, and electronics. Santana’s role exceeded the type of assistance to a gunman in a robbery that we have previously found sufficient for an aiding and abetting conviction under § 924(c). See United States v. Gomez, 580 F.3d 94, 102-03 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The evidence was also sufficient to establish 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a comment made by a person who played no role in the employment decision was a stray remark that lacked any probative value as a matter of law (B) holding that escape driver with no prior knowledge that robbery would be armed is aider and abettor of aimed bank robbery if he knowingly and willfully joins in the escape phase of an armed bank robbery knowing that an accomplice has a gun (C) holding that a downgrade for a juvenile who pled guilty to firstdegree robbery was not warranted because although the defendant acted as the lookout while his confederate committed the robbery we see no basis for characterizing defendants role as only secondary  and no evidence of the kind of psychological impairment that would be relevant to this determination (D) holding that there was sufficient evidence to convict an accomplice who was  present as a lookout at the scene and who played a critical supportive role in the armed robbery by acting as a driver of a secondary vehicle (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation when the defendant previously planned to commit the robbery armed himself with a shotgun and shot the victim during the robbery
Output: (D)
to her knowledge and lack of mistake. So that goes specifically to the case-the State's ability to enter this in its case in chief. ... [T}he prejudice just simply is not extensive at all. The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed an ... unlawful controlled substance. 13 We hold that the trial court did not exceed its broad discretion in admitting the evidence for three reasons. First, the evidence at issue is not the type of evidence that Utah courts "have previously deemed highly prejudicial." See State v. Johnso (Utah 1998) ("[Gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse will unfairly prejudice and inflame the jury and therefore require the proponent to show that they have unusual probative value."), and State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence at issue is "not the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (B) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that the gruesome portion of the videotapeshowing closeup shots of the victims stab wounds in her chest her slit throat and her beaten face as well as her bloodcovered neck shoulders and blouseshould have been excluded under rule 408 (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
Output: (D)
provisions which would allow the holder, under certain specified conditions, to buy an acquirer s stock and Unison’s stock at a substantial discount (respectively, at a 50% discount and for $.001 per right per share of $1.00 par value). These rights would become exercisable in the event the “acquiring person” acquired, agreed to acquire, or commenced or announced a tender or exchange offer of more than 20% of the target’s stock without the approval of the Unison board. Plaintiffs do not challenge the general authority of the Unison board to adopt the Rights Plan under Kansas law. While that issue has never been decided by this court, most states have followed the lead of Delaware in recognizing such rights plans. See Moran v. Household Intern., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1985) (<HOLDING>). Compare K.S.A. 17-6407 and 17-6301 with Del. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs (B) recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege (C) recognizing authority of directors to adopt rights plan citing del code ann tit 8  157 for a corporations power to issue rights to purchase shares and del code ann tit 8  141 for a boards authority to manage the corporations business and affairs (D) recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition (E) recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court
Output: (C)
Ungar elected not to contest the majority of Islamov’s testimony. Regarding the court’s jurisdiction to enter a judgment against Ungar after making its determination of non-discharge-ability, our review is de novo. We agree with the determinations of the other circuits that have addressed this issue and unanimously concluded a “bankruptcy court, in addition to declaring a debt non-dischargeable, has jurisdiction to liquidate the debt and enter a monetary judgment against the debtor.” Morrison v. W. Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir.2009); see also Johnson v. Riebesell (In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 793 (10th Cir.2009) (collecting cases from the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1279 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Ungar’s argument appears to go further than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding creditor willfully violated the automatic stay in refusing after notified of debtors bankruptcy filing to turn over debtors funds in his possession (B) holding that a debtors  522d1 exemption was invalid when the debtor exempted proceeds from the prepetition sale of the debtors marital home which were paid to a judgment creditor with an attachment on the debtors interest in the home (C) holding that a lender who held a deed of trust had priority over a debtors subsequent judgment creditor (D) holding a bankruptcy court possessed relatedto jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust on a debtors home and enter a monetary judgment against the debtors wife where the wife had colluded in perpetrating a fraud on the creditor (E) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons
Output: (D)
and his access to the records of the other allotments in the area, [Native American # 1] was given an allotment that obviously conflicted with a prior land claim. No matter how much [Native American # 1] or his survivors might have wished to cultivate this land [as required by statute], it would have been virtually impossible because of this conflict. Id. at 1166. For this reason, the court concluded that it would protect the plaintiff’s interests by holding that the plaintiff’s predecessors complied with the statutory requirements necessary to acquire a vested interest in the allotted land. Id. at 1167. Here, a finding in favor of Cabrera is even more compelling because there is evidence that he did, in fact, comply with the requirements of his permit. 54 Cf. Antoine, 710 F.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). 55 N.M.I. Const, art. Xm, §§ 1-2 (the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the statute of frauds a description will be insufficient as a matter of law if it is indefinite to the degree that no particular tract of land is identified nevertheless a description which is vague will be sufficient if its precise location may be determined upon competent parol evidence (B) holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land (C) holding that if subsequent to the taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of  itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable probability of an imminent change (D) holding that governments conduct constituted a taking where the government erroneously confirmed native american ls selection pursuant to treaty of a tract of land that was previously selected by native american  2 whose possession of the tract prevented native american  1 from complying with statutory requirements for issuance of a patent (E) holding that where both tract to which predecessor had record title and disputed tract were enclosed by single fence even though deed from predecessor to plaintiffs described only tract of record and possession of both tracts was delivered by predecessor to plaintiffs who continued to adversely possess disputed tract there was privity of estate between predecessor and plaintiffs who were entitled to tack their period of adverse possession onto that of predecessor to get full statutory tenyear period
Output: (D)