niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
are not made moot by the law of the case doctrine because the later MOA does not encompass the entire project. The law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 443, 32 S.Ct. 739, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912). The doctrine applies not only to issues decided explicitly, but also to everything decided “by necessary implication.” Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1989). We reject this argument for the reasons discussed supra; the second, final MOA is a comprehensive document and supercedes the original. Corrective action by an agency can moot an issue. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 622-23 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 1062, 47 L.Ed.2d 278 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have found that subsequent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address (B) holding that proper service of new notice of deficiency and new notices of levy moots question as to whether prior actions were procedurally defective (C) holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause (D) holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice (E) holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination
Output: (B)
Indiana resident.”). Moreover, Chami’s allegedly defamatory statements on the Website create sufficient minimum contacts. The parties disagree about the relevant standard. Chami focuses on case law regarding commercial internet sites and their relative interactivity. See, e.g., Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 550-51 (7th Cir.2004). However, this case does not deal with injury resulting from the purchase of products or services through a website. See id. Rather, Noble Roman’s asserts Chami committed an intentional tort against it and that Chami’s behavior created minimum contacts with Indiana because the effects of Chami’s intentional tort were felt in Indiana. Thus, this case is more in line with Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Chami used a different medium 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction (B) holding californias courts had personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants from florida because california was the focal point of both the libelous newspaper article written by defendants and the harm suffered by the plaintiff (C) holding that personal jurisdiction in california was appropriate over nonresident journalist where harmful effects of allegedly defamatory article would be exclusively felt in california and california was the state of newspapers greatest circulation (D) holding that nonresident defendants failure to make payments in florida coupled with forum selection clause sufficient for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant (E) holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor
Output: (B)
clearly not well- grounded in the law, given the fact that Mr. Friedman sought the law enforcement files in an ongoing investigation. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 11, 73 S.Ct. 528, 533, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953) (suggesting that failure to pursue . alternative means of obtaining information "might have given the respondents the evidence to make out their case without forcing the showdown of privilege"). 3 . In addition to the law enforcement investigatory files privilege, the CFTC and SEC argued that two other privileges barred production of the documents sought in this case. First, they contended that the governmental privilege for intragovernmental deliberative documents protected the documents from disclosure. See McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1286-87 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege (B) holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute (C) recognizing governmental privilege precluding disclosure of official information that would be injurious to the consultative functions of the government (D) holding that disclosure of predecisional documents would injure the consultative process within the government (E) holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege
Output: (C)
of abuse of discretion, and this Court will indulge every presumption in favor of the correctness of his ruling.’ ” Reynolds v. City of Birmingham, 723 So.2d 822, 824 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (quoting Hall v. State, 348 So.2d 870, 875 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 875 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021, 98 S.Ct. 745, 54 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978)). First, the appellant argues that jurors S.M. and M.L. committed misconduct when they did not respond during voir dire examination to the questions asking whether any members of the venire knew him. However, he did not allege in his motion for a new trial or during the hearing on the motion that S.M. or M.L. knew him. Accordingly, this argument is not properly before this court. See Marshall v. State, 629 So.2d 766 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Second, the appellant argues that jurors S.M. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling motion for new trial on perjury grounds (C) holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure (D) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (E) holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it
Output: (A)
that were favorable to counsel and which established that counsel had performed a valuable public service by taking on extensive litigation with significant risks and had obtained a substantial settlement allowing full payment of every claim that was filed. Fears I, 2005 WL 1041134 at *5-8. Because of these deficiencies in the district court’s explanation, we have no basis to determine whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to adhere to its initial award (as increased to reflect subsequent work) of fees equal to only around 20% of the fund and less than half of counsel’s lodestar, and therefore must remand to the district court for reconsideration of the appropriate award of attorneys’ fees. Cf. In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) overruled on other grounds by Fogerty v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plan administrator abused its discretion when it ignored contrary evidence without explanation (B) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (C) holding that agency abused its discretion by changing statement of purpose to eliminate all but one of the initial range of alternatives (D) holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation (E) holding district court abused discretion by changing characterization of defendants conduct without a reasoned explanation
Output: (E)
citizens if the wrong decision is made”). In sum, we are aware of no basis for expanding district court jurisdiction beyond the limits se F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”). We are nonetheless persuaded by the contrary view that the word “denial” connotes more than a mere refusal to act. See Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104 (“It may be that [the plaintiff] has not been afforded the ultimate relief for which he applied, but it is simply not the case that his application for relief has been denied by the agency.”); Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354 (<HOLDING>); Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090 (“In the context of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment (B) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (C) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (D) holding that atfs refusal to act on application did not constitute denial (E) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim
Output: (D)
the disposition of appellee’s remaining claims. NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion. CAPPY, J., concurs in the result. 1 . 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 2 . 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 3 . 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3). Appellee struck Officer Eberlein in the nose during the struggle. 4 . 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. 5 . This instruction regarding the jury's obligation to reach an agreement is in complete harmony with the American Bar Association’s approved instruction which this Court specifically recommended in Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 337-38, 275 A.2d 299, 304-05 (1971). 6 . In so doing, the Superior Court found it unnecessary to address other issues raised on appeal. 7 . This Court may raise the issue of waiver sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476 Pa. 83, 89, 381 A.2d 877, 881 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . There are comparable rules requiring 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (B) holding lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is fundamental error that this court may properly raise and recognize sua sponte (C) holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment (D) holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived (E) holding that although the issue of waiver as to the appellants allegation of trial court error had not been addressed by either party this court could raise the issue of waiver sua sponte
Output: (E)
entrapment.” Here also, this decision charts a different course from almost all of the circuits and deviates from the course previously set by our decisions. This circuit, along with every other circuit except the Second, has steadfastly held that there is no defense of private entrapment. See United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 386 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Jones, 950 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1700, 118 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.1986). Even the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168-69 & n. 10 (2d Cir.1980), has been placed in doubt by the subsequent caselaw of that circuit. See United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 126-27 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (B) holding no derivative entrapment where middleman was induced by a government agent to commit crime responding to pressure takes it upon himself to induce another to participate in crime (C) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (D) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (E) holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense
Output: (B)
487, 492 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (concluding that, when a dominant and servient tenant both use an easement, the court may apportion the cost of repairs between them); Bina v. Bina, 213 Iowa 432, 239 N.W. 68, 71 (1931) (allocating specific percentage shares of responsibility among the easement users); Drolsum v. Luzuriaga, 93 Md.App. 1, 611 A.2d 116, 125 (1992) (remanding for the trial court to consider the use and benefit of a relocated easement in effecting an equitable distribution of the burden of relocation); Marvin E. Nieberg Real Estate Co. v. Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc., 867 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (“[T]he general rule is that all users should contribute to maintenance in proportion to their use.”); Cohen v. Banks, 169 Misc.2d 374, 642 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (N.Y.Just.Ct.1996) (<HOLDING>); Lindhorst v. Wright, 616 P.2d 450, 454-55 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dominant tenement a power company rather than the servient tenement had affirmative duties of inspection and repair related to its easement (B) holding that owners of a dominant estate had a duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair to avoid damaging the servient estate through erosion (C) holding that the dominant and servient estates which made common and equal use of the main water line should be equally responsible for the cost of repair (D) holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another (E) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership
Output: (C)
relevant at all. Petitioner did not demonstrate any connection or nexus between Donorvitch and the subject burglary or grand theft. Nor did he specify the way in which Donorvitch more closely resembled the robber’s description. Petitioner had met Donorvitch in the Pompano Jail, but we have no record indication of whether Donorvitch was in fact in jail at the time of the crime’s commission. We cannot be sure that Donorvitch actually lived in the neighborhood of the crime scene or had looks similar to the description of the robber given to the police, for the sole source of this information was the Petitioner himself and there was no independently reliable corroboration. See Ferreira v. Fair, 732 F.2d 245, 248 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 430, 83 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984) (<HOLDING>)-, cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there to be no due process violation where excluded testimony bore none of the indicia of substantial trustworthiness that were crucial in chambers (B) holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred (C) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (D) holding that due process guarantees were not violated where a defendant was excluded from a witness competency hearing and noting that the hearing did not concern the witnesses substantive testimony (E) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review
Output: (A)
First, a person must be an "individual with a disability" in order to receive the protections provided by the ADA. A "disability" is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [the] individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a). NOCO does not dispute that the plaintiff suffers from epilepsy or that epilepsy constitutes a disability under the ADA, a proposition that is well established. See, e.g., 29 C.F.IR. 1615.103(1)(ii) (including epilepsy in the definition of "physical or mental impairment"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (using epilepsy as an example of a condition that is included in the definition); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (B) holding that epilepsy qualifies as a disability under the ada (C) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (E) holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry
Output: (B)
in the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part. In his pro se complaint, Berge named Estherville Law Enforcement Center (ELEC) Investigator Greg VanLangen, ELEC Sergeant Brett Shatto, ELEC Chief Eric Milburn, and Emmet County Sheriff Larry Lamack. He alleged that VanLangen arrested him based on evidence “that was false and unconstitutionally acquired,” that the evidence was derived from “a non-testimonial identification procedure,” and that VanLangen filed a sworn affidavit which contained false information received from a confidential informant, which led to Berge’s arrest, all in violation of Iowa state laws and the F -12 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 494-95 (8th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) holding allegation that false affidavit was basis for arrest warrant is sufficient to state  1983 fourth amendment claim against affiant officer (C) holding that search warrant which was lacking sufficient description of premises and did not have affidavit attached was not fatally defective when read together with affidavit and when one of officers executing warrant was affiant (D) holding that it was clearly established for  1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim
Output: (B)
294 F.3d at 79 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E)) ("Congress also amended Exemption 7(E) to permit withholding of ‘guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law,' thus giving further indication that the statutory threshold was not limited to records or information addressing only individual violations of the law.”). 4 . We consider today the FBI, an agency with a clear law enforcement mandate. See Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 748. We express no opinion as to the application of Exemption 7 to “mixed” agencies with “both administrative and law enforcement functions.” See id. 5 . The Third Circuit has taken a similar approach. See Frankenberry v. FBI, 567 Fed.Appx. 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2014) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that user access codes that facilitated access to a law enforcement database were properly redacted under exemption 7e (B) holding that requests for metadata and database schema of law enforcement information databases qualify for exemption under 7e (C) holding cia clearance and investigatory processes and related law enforcement techniques and procedures exempt under exemption 7e (D) holding that records concerning polygraph examination procedures and other law enforcement techniques are protected from disclosure under  exemption 7e (E) holding that computer transaction and function codes that reveal how to navigate and retrieve information from a law enforcement database were properly withheld under exemption 7e
Output: (D)
first issue, the Saadats argue that the trial court erred in holding them personally liable for the Sabine Pilot violation. Naifeh argues, and the trial court agreed, that in a corporate setting, individuals can be personally liable for their own torts, including wrongful discharge under Sabine Pilot. We review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex.2002). Texas is an employment at will state, meaning that employment contracts can be terminated at will by either party unless they have bargained otherwise. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex.1993); see also Armijo v. Mazda Int’l, No. 14-03-00365-CV, 2004 WL 1175335, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). The one common-law exception to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employment at will agreement is an enforceable contract until terminated by either party (B) holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated (C) holding that an employment contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at will (D) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (E) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff
Output: (A)
marks and citations omitted). {12} We are unconvinced that application of Texas law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate would violate any fundamental principle, or public policy of New Mexico, nor are we convinced that the outcome of this determination would differ, depending upon whether we applied the law of Texas or New Mexico. Under Texas law, any doubts about whether there is an agreement to arbitrate must be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Dell, Inc. v. Muniz, 163 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex.App.2003). It is not clear that New Mexico has applied the same presumption to this initial determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. See DeArmond, 2003-NMCA-148, ¶ 8, 134 N.M. 630, 81 P.3d 573 (<HOLDING>). {13} Even though the presumption in favor of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) recognizing that a legally enforceable contract is still a prerequisite for arbitration and characterizing the holding in first options of chicago inc v kaplan 514 us 938 94445 115 sct 1920 131 led2d 985 1995 as stating that the presumption in favor of arbitration is reversed when there is a dispute as to the existence of an agreement (D) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
Output: (C)
in a phone call with his friend Lemons, West-brooks mentioned a “lick,” or a robbery, in Carver City. Also, Westbrooks admitted being with or in control of his car all night, and the State presented evidence that Westbrooks’ car was involved in the incident. There was no other explanation for Westbrooks’ car being in Carver City that night. Cf. Rocker, 122 So.3d at 904 (concluding that Rocker’s actions on the night of the murder were “just as consistent with the theory that he was participating in a drug transaction as [they were] with the theory that he was participating in a robbery”). The State presented evidence of intent and participation that was inconsistent with Westbrooks’ theory that he was not involved in the incident. Cf. Pack v. State, 381 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (<HOLDING>). Because the State presented circumstantial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery (B) holding that circumstantial evidence that defendant drove the car and fled the scene after his brother committed robbery was insufficient to sustain defendants conviction absent other evidence of defendants intent to aid in the robbery (C) holding defendants participation in violent robbery and his fear of codefendants among other facts provided sufficient evidence that murder should have been anticipated as result of robbery (D) holding that the defendants sentence for robbery was not inappropriate (E) holding that evidence showing the defendant after shooting the victim ran from the scene got into a car nearby and drove away was sufficient evidence of flight
Output: (B)
the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 750 (7th Cir.2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (b)(4)). The Act “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: (1) employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; (2) public services, programs and activities, which are the subjects of Title II; and (3) public and private lodging, which is covered by Title III.” Id. (citations omitted). It is now well-settled that prisons and correctional facilities are covered by Title II. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In order to prove a violation of Title II, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety (B) holding that the plain text of title ii of the ada unambiguously extends to state prison inmates (C) holding that prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the constitution (D) holding that state could be liable under ada for inaccessibility of company it contracted with to provide state inmates with jobs (E) holding that error was plain when the district courts ruling was obviously contrary to the text of a federal statute
Output: (B)
v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill.2d 1, 92 Ill.Dec. 501, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985); Veazey v. LaSalle Telecomm. 2d at 517-18 (affirming Illinois trial court’s dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims brought under U.S. Const. amend. XIV and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988) because the claims are covered by the IHRA), cited in Cooper, 265 Ill.Dec. 358, 772 N.E.2d at 399-100; Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees, 339 Ill.App.3d 1074, 274 Ill.Dec. 565, 791 N.E.2d 657 (2003) (expressly holding that Illinois circuit courts do not have original jurisdiction due to the IHRA exclusivity provision to hear claims of discrimination arising under federal statutes) (cert, petition pending); Cahoon v. Alton Packaging Corp., 148 Ill.App.3d 480, 101 Ill.Dec. 934, 499 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Garcia argues that since the greater weight 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the dismissal of a civil action in state court does not preclude a restitution order on the same claim (B) holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence (C) holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions (D) holding the federal and state tests to be the same (E) holding that a federal civil rights claim must be prosecuted under the same procedure applicable to a state civilrights claim
Output: (E)
the reports of the non-examining physicians. See Swindle, 914 F.2d at 226 n. 3 (explaining that the opinion of a non-examining physician “is entitled to little weight and taken alone does not constitute substantial evidence to support an administrative decision.”). Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. This alone requires that the ALJ’s decision be reversed. Furthermore, because Dr. Reddy’s finding is ambiguous as to whether he was referring to all work at any exertional-level or only her past work, the case should be remanded to allow the ALJ to seek clarification from Dr. Reddy to resolve this uncertainty. See Rivers v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-00792-VEH, (Doc. 10 at 10-13), 2013 WL 3992507 (N.D.Ala. Aug. 2, 2013) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Based upon the court’s evaluation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous (B) holding that the case should be remanded so that the alj could resolve an ambiguous statement in the consultative examiners report (C) holding that appellants statement i think i need a lawyer     is just as ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in davis (D) holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings (E) holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue
Output: (B)
it to sue purely as a representative of its members — in other words, to act as a “private attorney general.” See National Ass’n of Realtors, 894 F.2d at 940-41. Therefore, because NAS-FA is suing only on behalf of its members, and not to adjudicate any of its own rights, NASFA’s members are the real parties in interest to this controversy, and it is their citizenship that should control for diversity jurisdiction purposes. This conclusion accords with the “well settled” general principle, in this circuit and elsewhere, that divers upp. 267, 270-71 (D.Md. 1995) (finding that corporate franchisees who had property interests at stake were not nominal or formal parties who could be ignored for diversity purposes); Workman v. Nat’l Supaflu Sys., Inc., 676 F.Supp. 690, 693 (D.S.C.1987) (<HOLDING>). But cf. Turnamics, Inc., v. Advanced 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the question of diversity jurisdiction is distinct from that of immunity the analysis of citizenship determinations for eleventh amendment immunity and diversity jurisdiction are the same (B) holding that for diversity purposes the citizenship of a llc is determined by the citizenship of all of its members (C) holding that corporation that may be liable under state law was not a nominal party and thus its citizenship in same state as plaintiff destroyed diversity jurisdiction (D) holding that lawyer who acted as mere depository for funds was nominal party whose citizenship should not be considered for diversity purposes (E) holding that defective allegations of citizenship may be amended to establish diversity jurisdiction
Output: (C)
such child and his natural parents .. ■. shall cease and ... [s]uch child shall thereafter be deemed and held, to be,for every purpose the child of his parent or parents by adoption[.]” Section 453.090. Accordingly, in an adoption proceeding, unlike in a proceeding awarding custody to a parent or a third;.party, the legal rights of a natural parent are completely abrogated. Id. This “statutory abrogation extends to grandparents — parents of the natural parent whose rights were taken away” as well. In re Marriage of A.S.A., 931 S.W.2d 218, 225 (Mo.App. S.D.1996). Therefore, Section 452.375.5 does not give a grandparent a statutory right to visitation in an adoption proceeding commenced under Chapter 453. Id. at 830-31 (Mo.App. S.D.2007); See also In re E.N.C., 458 S.W.3d at 400-05 (<HOLDING>); In Matter of' Adoption of C.T.P., 452 S.W.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 4523755 provides that a third party may intervene in a case in which custody is at issue only in a dissolution of marriage action or a modification of a dissolution proceeding and reversing the circuit courts order permitting a grandmother to intervene in an adoption proceeding for the purposes of obtaining visitation (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under  1292a1 (C) recognizing that court may intervene in arbitration proceeding by invoking equitable powers (D) holding attorney negligence did not result in damage until dissolution order in divorce proceeding became final (E) holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order
Output: (A)
rules or orders.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.113(a). The legislature imposed only the two restrictions previously mentioned: an ordinance must be consistent with the Act and the commission’s rules and orders and may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the Act or the commission’s rules or orders. Id. § 382.113(b). If the ordinance violates one of these restrictions, however, then its preemption is implied with unmistakable clarity. We therefore turn next to the first of these restrictions and address the question of whether the Act and the ordinance are consistent. 3. The Clean Air Act and the tent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (B) holding state and federal actions not parallel for colorado river purposes because the remedies were different  one was equitable and the other compensatory  and the sources of law came from different states (C) holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted (D) holding that completing sixth grade and a limited ability to read were not inconsistent with a valid iq score of 68 (E) holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade a raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes
Output: (E)
not rape or murder the victim. He points out that the rules barring the admission of involuntary confessions at trial are grounded in an individual’s guarantee of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the accuracy of the facts contained in the statements is irrelevant to the question of admissibility. See Appellant’s Brief at 19 (citing, inter alia, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). Appellant notes it is this dichotomy between 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (C) holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that even though a statement given by an individual in the grip of schizophrenic hallucinations may be proved to be unreliable unless the statement was the product of police coercion it cannot be deemed involuntary and thus the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit the statements admission into evidence (E) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent
Output: (D)
803(3). A statement that the declarant is afraid or testimony demonstrating that the declarant was afraid when he made the statement qualifies under Rule 803(3). See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (allowing declarant’s statement that she was afraid of man with same first name as appellant); Williams v. State, 798 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, no pet.) (admitting testimony describing declarant’s disturbed emotional state because it demonstrated her fear of defendant when she said defendant was going to kill her and her children). In contrast, a statement from which the de-clarant’s fear can only be reached by inference is an inadmissible statement of belief. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 24 S.W.3d 921, 928 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Barnum v. State, 7 S.W.3d 782, 790-91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (B) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that declarants statement that if anything strange happened to her like car crash it meant that defendant had killed her is one of belief (E) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine
Output: (D)
agreed contract provides a clear and specific right of subrogation.” Id. at 651. As we indicated in Fortis Benefits, equitable doctrines conform to contractual and statutory mandates, not vice versa. Id. at 648. We further clarified that “contract-based sub-rogation rights should be governed by the parties’ express agreement and not invalidated by equitable considerations that might control by default in the absence of an agreement.” Id. at 650. Fortis Benefits eliminated the basis for the trial court’s judgment in this case, as Ortiz dealt with equitable subrogation, not, as here, contractual subrogation. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, appearing to rely in part on the “made whole” doctrine but without expressly claiming to. 315 S.W.3d at 70 (<HOLDING>). Under Fortis Benefits, the “made whole” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife (C) holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees (D) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in setting aside inheritance exclusively to wife where it was kept in wifes name separate from husband and husband did nothing to contribute to the accumulation of the funds which were not treated as marital property or commingled with other marital assets (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion since there were not enough settlement funds to compensate sigmundiks wife and sons and thus in the words of sigmundiks wife there is nothing left for the estate alteration in original
Output: (E)
by stating that any change in operations by NPS introduced by implementing actions under the CSP or Housing Plan will be subject to negotiation. Additionally, the level of contribution to the CIF would also be subject to negotiation. The evaluation panel wrote: YRT’s ‘assumption’ that plan implementations and contributions be renegotiated for any change in operations occasioned by implementation of each component of the Concession Services Plan or the Housing Plan is not an acceptable condition. We conclude that the present value of the proposer’s contribution to the CIF would be approximately $65.7 million over the life of the contract. This translates to an average percentage of 6.1% of the present value of gross receipts. Considering only the first four years of the contract (<HOLDING>), the proposer’s offer was $7.0 million. This 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that shall will and must are all mandatory terms (B) recognizing the equitable maxim that once equity has jurisdiction it will grant complete relief (C) holding that an action construing a will creating a trust is equitable in nature (D) recognizing exception (E) recognizing that nps will renegotiate the cif percentage
Output: (E)
U.S. Fire tacitly acknowledged in its 2007 papers (and also before us now) that some portion of the ENSR bills relating to the 2004 site work constitutes recoverable defense costs. Yet, as with the legal fees, U.S. Fire made no attempt to pay a single cent, nor is there any record evidence that it made any effort to resolve the sizable remuneration issue. U.S. Fire’s apathy stands in sharp contrast to the Museum’s multiple requests for some measure of contractual defense benefits in 2004 and 2005; its request for clarification in August 2005 of what “defense expenditures [its insurer may have paid] to date [and] on what terms”; and its express reminder about the ENSR bills in its November 2006 correspondence. Cf. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maguire, 662 F.3d 51, 56-58 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). We also reject U.S. Fire’s attempt to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend (B) holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees (C) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (D) holdingas a matter of law that the insurers diligent investigation efforts and readiness to comply negated allegations of breach especially when compared to the insureds lackadaisical conduct (E) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action
Output: (D)
(1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved[.]”); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S.-, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2809, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (“[T]he classic ease for weighing reliance heavily in favor of fobowing the earber rule occurs in the commercial contextf.]”). Upsetting what may very web be the legitimate expectations of one or more of the parties under the rubric of “treating similarly situated parties the same” may simply be unjustified. A similar concern for the rebanee interests of state and local governments imposing taxes motivated the plurahty’s opinion in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182-83, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2333, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In the tort context, however, a party’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that previous decision invalidating highway use equalization tax should not be appbed retroactively because of inequity of unsettling actions taken in rebanee on overruled precedents (B) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc  4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc  4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc  4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc  4061a 4218a (E) holding contractor not responsible for use tax where tax exempt entity purchased the materials used
Output: (A)
that it is significant that he is a participant or beneficiary of a plan, while the Menhom plaintiff was not. This distinction does nothing to limit the effect of Menhom. Menhom’& holding is unambiguous: unless the critical acts occurred after January 1, 1975, a district court may not take jurisdiction over an ERISA action. Plaintiff’s status as a participant or beneficiary is relevant only when the plaintiff has cleared this initial hurdle. We also reject plaintiff's contention that the critical acts occurred after January 1, 1975. Under Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1501-03, the critical acts have occurred when it becomes inevitable that the plaintiff will be denied benefits. Cf. Freeman v. Jacques Orthopaedic and Joint Implant Surgery Medical Group, Inc., 721 F.2d 654, 656 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Lee makes much out of the revision of the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (B) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa  514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (C) recognizing cause of action (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) holding that events surrounding cause of action for fraud in erisa case had occurred before january 1 1975 despite continuing effects
Output: (E)