niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
chondrolysis, and as such, the manufacturer had a duty to warn of that risk. Id. at 570-71. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, wherein it dismissed the case at the summary judgment stage based on the court’s finding that the risk of chondrolysis was not knowable at the time of plaintiffs surgery. Id. at 577. After analyzing the medical literature plaintiff presented, the Sixth Circuit held: When all is said and done, not one of Rodriguez’s thirteen articles shows that medical experts understood in 2004 that infusing a joint with bupivacaine for two days could cause irreversible cartilage damage. [The manufacturer] had no duty to understand what the relevant medical literature did not. Id. at 572 ; see also, Mack v. Stryker, 893 F.Supp.2d 976, 986-88 (D.Minn.2012) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the Sixth Circuit concluded that none 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the medical community did not draw a connection between pain pumps and chondrolysis or any similar injury suffered until 2005 (B) holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint (C) holding that  666 does not require any connection between the misconduct and federal funds (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
Output: (A)
people who are not government officials (“and other person acting under color of law”) are “government,” and thus proper defendants under RFRA, indicates that individual capacity suits must be permitted because no one who is not a government official has an “official capacity” in which to be sued. Moreover, Congress knows how to specify that a statutory provision applies to government officials only in their “official capacity” when it wants to, and has not done so here. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides, in part, “[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity ... may ... be brought in any judicial district,” and Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The court also reads RFRA to allow for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata  (B) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities (D) holding based in part on this statutory language that  1391e is not applicable to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities (E) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities
Output: (D)
has been convicted of an offense under the Trafficking Act. Id. § 1593(a). But Defendants were not convicted of an offense under the Traffi restitution imposed by the district court exceeded the victims’ actual losses. See United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1243 (10th Cir.2009) (“[A] district court may not order restitution in an amount that exceeds the actual loss caused by the defendant’s conduct, which would amount to an illegal sentence constituting plain error.”); United States v. Austin, 479 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir.2007) (“When a defendant is ordered to pay restitution in an amount greater than the loss caused, the error affects substantial rights as well as the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceeding.”); United States v. Alburay, 415 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no plain error occurred where any hypothetical minor error in calculating total loss would not have affected the ultimate amount of restitution because the court imposed only 30000 of restitution after calculating a total loss of 500000 (B) holding under plain error standard of review that apprendi does not apply to restitution because the statute does not prescribe a maximum amount (C) holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error (D) holding that restitution in the amount of 1750000 constituted plain error because the actual loss was only 1725000 (E) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses 
Output: (D)
disciplinary warning he had issued to Mr. Avila, and he told a group of workers that Mr. Avila should get out of the country if he couldn’t speak English right about the time he fired Mr. Avila. Thus, the record contradicts the district court’s finding that Mr. Keeffe made only one isolated remark about Mr. Avila’s language, which was months before, and unrelated to, the termination decision. We conclude these remarks are circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, and, given that two of the comments were made contemporaneous with Mr. Keeffe’s warning and termination decisions, a reasonable jury could conclude these remarks were related to those warning and termination decisions. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual can be a final policymaker either by operation of state and local positive law or by custom or usage having the force of law (B) holding that use of potentially derogatory term may be evidence of racial animus which could potentially show pretext depending on various factors including context inflection tone of voice local custom and historical usage (C) holding that evidence of pretext may include the use of subjective criteria (D) holding that the employers routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions (E) holding that a supervisors routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions
Output: (B)
a “John Doe” petition involves an unknown defendant, for limitations purposes, it should be treated the same as a petition involving misidentification. Misidentification is distinct from misnomer. Ense in distinction between misnomer and misidentification is whether the correct party received notice of the suit). 3. Policy Reasons Why A “John Doe” Petition Should Not Toll Limitations Unless Authorized By Statute. Finally, statutes of limitations would have little, if any, import if they could easily be circumvented by filing a “John Doe” petition. See Thomas v. Process Equip. Corp., 154 Mich.App. 78, 397 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Mich.Ct.App.1986). Statutes of limitations are designed to compel the assertion of claims within a reasonable time so the opposing party has P.2d 343, 345 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Huggard v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 102 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that allowing john doe complaint to toll limitations where defendant had no notice of suit before limitations expired would impair defendants ability to timely investigate accident scene marshal evidence and locate witnesses (B) holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim (C) holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed (D) holding there is no authority to toll statute of limitations based on mental incompetence (E) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations
Output: (A)
Specifically, the EEOC regulations interpreting the Act provide that, in determining whether a claimant is disabled because he is significantly restricted in his ability to perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes,” a court may consider: The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). In making this determination, the reviewing court must decide whether the plaintiff is restricted in his or her ability to perform ei stems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346, (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). KCC argues on appeal that Burns’s lifting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (B) holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation particularly when compared to an average persons abilities  does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity (C) holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working (D) holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work (E) holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities
Output: (B)
of the contract, the plaintiffs claim will only sound in contract. Id. In operation, the rale restricts contracting parties to contractual remedies for those economic losses associated with the relationship, even when the breach might reasonably be viewed as a consequence of a contracting party’s negligence. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986) (“When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone.”). In other words, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic losses in negligence when the loss is the subject matter of a contract between the parties. Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 285 (T .3d 355, 378 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule JP Morgan’s fifth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract (B) holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims (C) recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule (D) holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement (E) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract
Output: (D)
and purpose of the [FDCPA].” Id. (citing Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir.1998)). Moreover, “[permitting the use of settlement letters may allow resolution of a claim without the ‘needless cost and delay of litigation ... [and] is certainly less coercive and more protective of the interests of the debtor.’” Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 299 (quoting Lewis, 135 F.3d at 399). Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s use of the term “settlement offer” misrepresented the legal status of the debt or implied that litigation is imminent. This argument is unconvincing. See Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 299 (“There is nothing improper about making a settlement offer.”); Kryluk v. Northland Grp., Inc., No. 14-cv-3198, 2014 WL 6676728, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 25, 2014) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere use of the term settlement offer is permissible and indeed desirable in the course of resolving debts (B) holding that purported acceptance letter was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon additional act of resolving medical liens that were not mentioned in offer (C) holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added (D) holding that a trial courts use of the term alimony was not conclusive against a claim that the award was actually a property settlement (E) recognizing the permissible use of hearsay without corroboration
Output: (A)
no reversionary interest in the right-of-way could be affected by the NITU. Id. Therefore, the size of the proposed class “cannot be surmised merely by counting the number of all landowners adjacent to the corridor.” Id. at 7. Moreover, there is no merit to the assertion that the court should defer ruling on the number of individuals with an ownership interest in the right-of-way until some later date. Id. The prerequisites of RCFC 23 require the court to make findings, even if they overlap with issues on the merits. Id. (citing Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP., 368 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed through findings, even if they overlap with issues on the merits.”)); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the Government is not depriving 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court has no authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of an action to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action (B) holding that nothing in eisen which proscribes an inquiry into the merits of a suit to determine if class certification is appropriate prevents the district court from looking beneath the surface of a complaint to conduct the inquiries identified in frcp 23 and exercise the discretion it confers (C) holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class (D) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (E) holding certification is not an occasion for inquiry into the merits
Output: (B)
to questions. Furthermore, Michel manifested overtly accusatory behavior, perhaps best evidenced by Michel’s allegation that the prosecutor was a “mole” who was lying and hiding evidence from the court and the jury. (Docket No. 897 at 48-49.) Numerous other instances illustrated Michel’s penchant for placing the blame on others. Succinctly stated, the record from the evidentiary hearing leads the court to only one finding specifically, that Michel’s testimony is not credible. b. Presumption of propriety in favor of court interpreter However, a more important factor supporting this court’s finding of incredibility emanates from a presumption that a court interpreter translates communications with propriety, accuracy, and integrity. Once again, Michel contends that the Haitian C ir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Larnbey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a pre sumption of effective delivery with respect to regular mail (B) holding that due process requires no irreducible combination of pre and posttermination hearings (C) recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations (D) holding the same with respect to an apartment (E) holding that when attorneys were acting as members of the firm with respect to the case in question section 504b1 applies to allow  fee sharing with any member whether that membership is regular or sporadic
Output: (A)
quotation marks omitted). The defense bears the burden of satisfying the following three-part test: First, the district court must find that the government, through its own overreaching, has forced the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment or, that the government has engaged in discriminatory use of grants of immunity to gain a tactical advantage; second, the witness’ testimony must be material, exculpatory and not cumulative; and third, the defendant has no other source to obtain the evidence. United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 115 (2d Cir.1999). We reject appellant’s claim that the mere fact that many of the government’s witnesses testified under grants of immunity constitutes a “discriminatory use” of the immunity power. See United States v. Todaro, 744 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). We find that the government’s use of its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the number of witnesses immunized by the government without more would not support a finding of discriminatory use (B) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (C) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract (D) holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony (E) holding that the government had established necessity for wiretaps despite its use of three cooperating witnesses because those witnesses were able to give agents only limited information not including the names of all members of the conspiracy
Output: (A)
of the original note because the endorsement on the note in evidence did not match the endorsements on the copy of the note attached to the complaint. As argued by OneWest, the Cummings presented no testimony or evidence to contradict Mr. Den-son’s testimony that the note in evidence was the original note acquired by OneWest in May 2010. Likewise, the Cummings’ argument regarding the validity of the assignment of mortgage from MERS to In-dyMac is not relevant to OneWest’s standing to foreclose. Because the evidence showed that OneWest possessed the original note endorsed in blank at the time it filed the complaint, its standing is established from its status as the note holder regardless of any recorded assignments. See Stone v. BankUnited, 115 So.3d 411, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So.3d 1129, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty (B) holding that the holder of the note must act in a manner that effectively provides notice that the holder has exercised his option (C) holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder (D) holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose (E) holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity
Output: (C)
decision that, generally, cannot and will not “serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance claim.” Indeed, a strategy that “presents alternative defense theories — all of which are better for the defendant than the prosecut 2d 645) (2006); see White, 315 Ga. App. at 63 (7) (noting that it is not enough for the defendant to show that she would have a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial or that the evidence against a co-defendant is stronger, rather the defendant must show clearly that a joint trial prejudiced her defense, resulting in a denial of due process). 33 State v. Austin, 297 Ga. App. 478, 478 (677 SE2d 706) (2009) (punctuation omitted); accord Ham, 303 Ga. App. at 237 (1) (b); see Green ee also Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 614 (5) (724 SE2d 377) (2012) (<HOLDING>); Wheeler v. State, 327 Ga. App. 313, 318 (3) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ocga  17858 b requires an appellate court to revie w for plain error an alleged juryinstruction error to which no objection was raised at trial (B) holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that claims of rule 32h notice error are reviewed for plain error in the absence of an objection (E) holding that omission was not plain error
Output: (A)
also admitted he personally observed that Gretillat had trouble walking long distances. Indeed, Priske excused Gretillat from making rounds of the facility due to Gretillat’s difficulty walking long distances. In April of 2004, Priske admitted that Gretillat’s forced resignation arose out of Gretillat’s problems with standing and “ambulating.” See, e.g., Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir.1999) (finding “ample evidence” that employee alerted employer to the existence of disability where employee told employer about disability, gave employer information about the ADA, requested an unmonitored telephone line to talk with his “support network,” and displayed symptoms of the disability at work); see also Miller, 61 F.3d at 630 (quoting Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934) (<HOLDING>). Because Care Initiatives was apprised of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (B) holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations (C) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (D) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (E) recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability
Output: (E)
the broad power of the Courts of Criminal Appeals to protect an accused. See United States v. Parker, 36 MJ 269, 271 (CMA 1993). We have consistently recognized that the charter of Courts of Criminal Appeals on sentence review is to “do justice.” United States v. Claxton, 32 MJ 159, 162 (CMA 1991); United States v. Healy, 26 MJ 394, 395-96 (CMA 1988). Finally, we have consistently recognized the “broad power” of a Court of Criminal Appeals “to moot claims of prejudice by ‘affirming] only such findings of guilty and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.’” Wheelus, 49 MJ at 288, quoting Art. 66(c); see also United States v. Higbie, 12 USCMA 298, 30 CMR 298 (1961) (<HOLDING>). However, the power of the Courts of Criminal 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing power of board of review to reduce sentence in order to moot issue whether convening authority considered a dismissed charge and specification in his review of the adjudged sentence (B) holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond (C) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (D) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (E) holding that when a sentencing issue centers upon a courts statutory authority to impose a sentence rather than the courts exercise of discretion in fashioning the sentence the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed
Output: (A)
law for a defendant who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense, was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole prior to the effective date of this act, and for whom a resentencing hearing has been ordered.” For that reason, since Defendant is entitled to be resentenced by virtue of Miller and since Defendant was convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of the felony-murder rule, he must be resentenced to life imprisonment with parole in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a). As a result, the trial court’s sentence should be vacated and this case should be remanded to the Wake County Superior Court for the entry of a judgment sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment with parole. State v. Lovette,_N.C. App._,_, 737 S.E.2d 432, 441-42 (2013) (<HOLDING>). in. Conclusion Thus, for the reasons set 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice was obvious where counsels failure to seek acquittal on greater offenses caused defendant to be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole (B) holding that a defendant impermissibly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in violation of miller should be awarded a new sentencing hearing to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of nc gen stat  15a134019b (C) holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing (D) holding that a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole as applied to a threetime offender is constitutional (E) recognizing that before the case was submitted to the jury the trial court charged the jury that if it were unable to reach a unanimous recommendation the court would impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
Output: (B)
because the conclusion is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. As a general matter, a finding of fact or a mixed determination of law and fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Id. at 499, 146 P.3d at 1076 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted); see Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 115 Hawai'i 299, 167 P.3d 292 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Peroutka v. Cronin, 117 Hawai'i 323, 326, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding constitutional questions reviewed de novo under the rightwrong standard (B) holding that where the issues are basically questions of law and the trial court has reviewed them de novo due process is provided (C) holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo (D) holding questions of law related to class certification are reviewed de novo (E) recognizing that mixed questions of fact and law that are essentially factual in nature should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard as opposed to the generally administered de novo standard
Output: (C)
actions or otherwise) to award a share of retired pay.”). Further, the federal regulations implementing the 1990 Amendment confirm Congress’ intent to prohibit dividing military benefits that were not expressly treated in a pre-1981 divorce decree. See 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(c)(7) (1998) (“For court orders issued before June 26, 1981, subsequent amendments [to property division] after that date to provide for a division of retired pay as property are unenforceable under this part.”). Although McDougall may have had a right to part of Havlen’s military retirement pay before the 1990 Amendment, her failure to exercise this right at the time the Act specified has foreclosed her ability to partition Havlen’s retirement benefits now. Accord Delrie v. Harris, 962 F.Supp. 931, 935 (W.D.La.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because McDougall did not assert her right to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce (B) holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits (C) holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits (D) holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits (E) recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree
Output: (D)
focused their attention on the word “corruptly” as the key to what may or may not lawfully be done in the situation presented here. Section 1512(b) punishes not just “corruptly persuading]” another, but “knowingly . . . corruptly persuading]” another. (Emphasis added.) The Government suggests that “knowingly” does not modify “corruptly per suades,” but that is not how the statute most naturally reads. It provides the mens rea — “knowingly”—and then a list of acts — “uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades.” We have recognized with regard to similar statutory language that the mens rea at least applies to the acts that immediately follow, if not to other elements down the statutory chain. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the term knowingly under  2252a applies to both the nature of the material and the age of the children depicted (B) recognizing that the most natural grammatical reading of 18 u s c  2252a1 and 2 suggests that the term knowingly modifies only the surrounding verbs transports ships receives distributes or reproduces (C) holding that the offense defined by sections 2201a1 and b2b has three parts two of which include culpable mental states and that intentionally knowingly or recklessly in the third part modifies impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person (D) holding that unless otherwise directed by the statute the term knowingly merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense (E) holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession
Output: (B)
the question of competency of counsel. Balanced against this is the possibility, in most instances quite l’emote, that an experienced member of the public defender’s staff might labor under a conflict of interest because another member of the staff was so burdened. People v. Robinson, 79 Ill.2d 147, 37 Ill.Dec. 267, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979). These two considerations outweigh any possible chilling effect on attorney client relationships at OPD. See also, Bolin v. State, 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.2006) (stating that, although conflicts involving associates at a private firm are imputed to entire firm, public defenders office “warrants slightly different treatment[,]” and adopting a ease by case analysis); cf. People v. Daniels, 52 Cal.3d 815, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906, 915 (1990) (<HOLDING>); People v. Banks, 121 Ill.2d 36, 117 Ill.Dec. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (B) holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice (C) holding designated counsel acting on behalf of the office of public defender in law guardian program to be public employees for purpose of the new jersey tort claims act njsa 5911 to 123 and therefore entitled to indemnification by the state (D) holding that public defender did not face conflict requiring withdrawal when bringing collateral attack of a defendants conviction public defender was required to attack competence of previous public defender and stating that automatic disqualification  would hamper the ability of public defenders offices to represent indigents in criminal cases (E) holding a federal public defender is not a federal officer for purposes of a bivenstype action
Output: (D)
fall within the range of 216 to 240 months. The 240-month sentence is the statutory maximum for first-degree aggravated robbery, and the 216-month sentence is equivalent to a double departure of the 108-month presumptive sentence for the kidnapping. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 1 . This statute went into effect August 1, 1998, before Neal was sentenced, but after the date of his offense. The previous dangerous-offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 2, was repealed August 1, 1998. See Act effective August 1, 1998, ch. 367, art. 6, § 7, 1998 Minn. Laws 731, 735. The district court erred in using the 1998 dangerous-offender statute because it went into effect after the date of Neal's offense, July 14, 1998. See State v. Murray, 495 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Minn. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the criteria for sentencing a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (C) holding that some of the sex offender conditions imposed on defendant as part of his sentence for possessing a firearm were unreasonable where defendants sole sex offense was over a decade old at the time of sentencing (D) holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective (E) holding that while a defendant is not entitled to be sentenced as a youthful offender on any new offense he or she may have committed the trial court cannot revoke a defendants youthful offender status on offenses for which that defendant has already been sentenced citation omitted
Output: (D)
the area of Professional Responsibilities, which assessed whether “[t]he appraisee has performed building responsibilities.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Birchette Dep., Ex. 11. Thus, if it is accurate that director Birchette’s basis for terminating Ms. Smith was her poor attendance and her failure to attend planning meetings, it seems odd that this did not affect the ratings she awarded Ms. Smith on her evaluation form and that she did not indicate a problem with these areas on plaintiffs CLDF form. The Court concludes that director Birchette’s varying, and what a jury could find inconsistent justifications for terminating Ms. Smith, raises a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. See, e.g., Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 285 (3rd Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Starks v. George Court Co., 937 F.2d 311, 315 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim (B) holding that there were genuine issues of material fact and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment because in part the everchanging nature of the proffered reasons given for plaintiffs termination could be viewed as evidence tending to show pretext   (C) holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate
Output: (B)
of status, positing that we need not address this question because the BIA, in the alternative, considered and denied Petitioner’s second application on the merits. However, because we must ensure that we review the correct BIA opinion, which turns on which adjustment application the IJ had jurisdiction to adjudicate, see Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014), we i pause to clarify the IJ's jurisdiction. We have held that when the BIA does not expressly retain jurisdiction over a petitioner’s case and issues a remand order unlimited in scope and purpose, an IJ has jurisdiction to consider any matters pertinent to that case under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in exercising its discretion in choosing the appropriate sanction the trial court is not limited to considering only the specific violation committed but is entitled to consider other matters which have occurred during the litigation (B) holding that a remand unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all matters that the ij deems appropriate (C) holding that unless remand from the bia is qualified or limited to a specific purpose an ij may consider any and all matters he  deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations (D) holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate (E) holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence
Output: (C)
at 377; Haight v. Savoy Apartments, 814 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Also, under the “no evidence” motion, after an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The trial court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. The response need only “point out evidence” that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a cmt (i) to 1997 change; see also Macias v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment (B) holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant (C) recognizing that a noevidence summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence (D) holding courts review motion for summary judgment in light most favorable to nonmovant (E) holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff
Output: (C)
(2005). On September 13, 2006, the District Court held a resentencing hearing and imposed the same sentence as before. Section 1326(b)(2) increases the authorized prison sentence from a maximum of two years to a maximum of twenty years if the person’s deportation followed conviction for an aggravated felony. JimenezCohenete argues that, because his prior felony convictions increased the statutory maximum penalty for his reentry offense, those offenses should have been charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that the Government’s failure to do so violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Put another way, Jimenez-Cohenete challenges the vitality of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (<HOLDING>), in light of subsequent Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that factors increasing a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum of the crime charged with the exception of prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that any fact  that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment submitted to a jury and proven beyond reasonable doubt
Output: (A)
the Second Circuit has emphasized that “[although evidence of one stray comment by itself is usually not sufficient proof to show age discrimination, that stray comment may ‘bear a more ominous significance’ when considered within the totality of the evidence.” Carlton, 202 F.3d at 136 (quoting Danzer, 151 F.3d at 56); see also Schreiber, 324 F.Supp.2d at 522-23. “Even ‘stray remarks in the workplace by persons who are' not involved in the pertinent decision making process ... may suffice to present a prima facie case,’ provided those remarks evidence invidious discrimination.” Belgrave v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 1507, 1999 WL 692034, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999) (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182); see also Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements made by nondecisionmakers were properly received because they showed the pervasive corporate hostility towards plaintiff and supported her claim that she did not receive a promotion due to her employers retaliatory animus (B) holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination (C) holding that a plaintiff could not proceed on her procedural due process claim brought under  1983 because she did not show that she had exhausted her state law remedies or alleged that those remedies were inadequate (D) holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent (E) holding that plaintiff failed to establish that her transfer to another department was retaliatory as opposed to her employers attempt to diffuse a personality conflict
Output: (A)
return to work. Without establishing this prima facie case, Rincones’s claim fails as a matter of law. “Employees are similarly situated if their circumstances are comparable in all material respects, including similar standards, supervisors, and conduct.” Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). “The situations and conduct of the employees in question must be ‘nearly identical.’ ” Reyes, 272 S.W.3d at 594 (citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 145 Fed.Appx. 946, 948 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (noting that as to the similarly situated requirement, circumstances surrounding the compared employees must be “nearly identical”); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores (No. 471), 891 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). “Employees with different responsibilities, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct (B) holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct (C) holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination (D) holding that in order for plaintiff to prove that she was similarly situated to three other employees she had to demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other employees (E) holding plaintiffs burden was to show that the misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a male employee whom her employer retained internal quotation omitted
Output: (E)