niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
for the Court), this Court declared, “[b]y this ruling, we wish to make clear that the Court has relaxed the strict pleading requirements of common law.” Again, just last year, in State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn.1999) (Birch, J., writing for the Court), this Court noted, “[i]n conclusion, we wish to emphasize once again the fact that the Court has moved away from the strict pleading requirements of common law.” Relaxation of the strict pleading requirements of the common law is also apparent from recent decisions of this Court holding that an indictment which references the statute defining the offense is sufficient and satisfies the constitutional and statutory requirements of Hill. See State v. Sledge, 15 S.W.3d 93, 94 (Tenn.2000) (Holder, J., writing for the Court) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an indictment alleging that the defendant did unlawfully kill the victim during the perpetration of aggravated robbery in violation of tca 3913202 sufficient because it contained a specific reference to the statute which was sufficient to place the accused on notice of the charged offense (B) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (C) holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself (D) holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient (E) holding that reference to the appropriate statute was sufficient in felony murder indictments alleging that the defendant did unlawfully kill the victims during the perpetration of aggravated robbery in violation of tca 3913202
Output: (A)
summary judgment of obviousness. However, Perricone did move for summary judgment of nonobviousness in 2001. See Dkt. #216. The issue of obviousness being fully briefed by the parties (see Dkt. # # 417, 419, 421) the Court finds that it is appropriate to consider the issue on summary judgment, rather than conducting a trial in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The Court further finds that Medicis’ motion relies only on prior art otherwise disclosed to Perricone during discovery, and that there is no prejudice to Perricone from the nature of Medicis' discovery responses. Thus, the Court grants leave to file the 2006 motion for summary judgment, and renews the 2001 motions for summary judgment. 8 . See e.g., Monaplastics, Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 378 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>) Further, the Court notes that Perricone has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment of obviousness was appropriately granted despite lack of expert testimony because device would have been obvious to persons having ordinary skill in the plastics molding industry and would even have been obvious to ordinary laymen of modest intelligence (B) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (C) holding that the determination of whether a products dangers are obvious is made from the perspective of an ordinary user of the product rather than an ordinary person who is unfamiliar with the product (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care
Output: (A)
of production. We conclude he did not. Of course, whether a defendant’s use of force was reasonable is a fact question and, like all factual disputes, should be decided by the fact-finder. But when the evidence in the record is undisputed and leads a rational fact-finder to a single conclusion, the issue becomes a question of law. Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 1981); Costilla v. State, 571 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.App.1997) (“[fjacts may be undisputed even though the parties disagree on the inferences or legal conclusions drawn from the facts”), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1998). Here, a reasonable fact-finder could reach only one conclusion, that appellant’s use of force was unjustified and unreasonable. Glowacki II, 630 N.W.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). The uncontroverted testimony establishes 
 Holding statements: (A) holding as matter of law no reasonable juror could find defendants use of force reasonable even assuming defendants version of events was true (B) holding that evidence of misconduct or a deficient work performance record precluded the plaintiff from establishing a genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff (C) holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice (D) holding in affirming denial of judgment as matter of law for defendants that jury was entitled to credit plaintiffs testimony over defendants and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom (E) holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury
Output: (A)
untimely: Abdi presented no evidence as to his entry date other than his own testimony, which was wholly unbelievable. Nothing that the BIA says is irreconcilable with this reasoned conclusion. That Abdi’s counsel may find the IJ’s or BIA’s opinions “confusing” does not make them legally deficient. Abdi’s challenge to the timeliness determination is nothing more than a claim that the IJ and BIA erred in concluding that his testimony regarding his entrance was not believable and that if the agency had believed him, it would have held that Abdi’s application was timely. “Because [Abdi] is arguing a factual error,” we “lack[ ] jurisdiction regarding the timeliness of [his] asylum application.” Diallo, 364 Fed.Appx. at 995; see also Bushati v. Mukasey, 310 Fed.Appx. 883, 885 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we DISMISS Abdi’s petition for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim (B) holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination (C) holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum (D) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the agencys determination that an asylum application was not filed within one year after the last entry into the united states (E) holding that jurisdiction was lacking to review an ijs determination that an asylum application was untimely when that determination was based on the fact that the petitioner offered no evidence other than his own testimony regarding his date of entry
Output: (E)
include a detailed description of the evidence that had already been obtained as well as a separate section detailing the aims of and need for continued electronic surveillance. The justifications listed by the government included the facts that the organization under investigation was believed to be an organized crime family that was substantially insulated against infiltration, that additional victims/witnesses would be unlikely to speak to the government out of fear of reprisal, and that attempts to interview these witnesses might compromise the government’s investigation. On these facts, we do not believe that the issuing magistrate judges abused their discretion in granting the government’s extension applications. See United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 480 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). F. Sentencing issues The defendants raise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the objection had been sufficiently timely when the defense waited until the governments rebuttal to object to a statement made during the governments closing statement (B) holding that a title iii warrant was justified where the governments evidence indicated that the defendants belonged to an organized crime family that attempts to infiltrate the organization had failed in the past and were unlikely to succeed in the future and that all of the governments informants had refused to testify because of fear of reprisal (C) holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene (D) holding that district court had ample authority to strike claimants affidavit offered in opposition to governments motion for summary judgment in forfeiture action after claimant invoked fifth amendment and refused to answer governments deposition questions (E) holding that an informant was a government agent when he was placed in the defendants jail cell after he indicated his willingness to testify against the defendant be cause it is not the governments intent or overt acts that are important rather it is the likely result of the governments acts that matters
Output: (B)
Ryan Lockwood’s instruction to Nicholson to “hold up” prior to Nicholson’s flight did not constitute a seizure. The majority further recognizes that the State does not dispute that Nicholson was seized pursuant to Tennessee constitutional standards when the officers pursued him yelling, “Stop, police.” Accordingly, the totality of the events and circumstances leading up to the officers’ pursuit of Nicholson and the directive, “Stop, police,” may be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. Detective Lockwood saw Nicholson in an area in which Detective Lockwood and other detectives in the intelligence division were conducting a previously planned investigation of gang activity. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lawson, 929 S.W.2d 406, 408 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative (B) holding that the hgn test may be considered as a factor in determining probable cause (C) holding that passenger conduct can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion (D) holding that the areas propensity toward criminal activity is one factor to be considered in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion (E) holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion
Output: (D)
2302; Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. McDonald Land & Mining Co., 664 A.2d 190, 193 n. 10 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995). While the statute places a $10,000 ceiling on the amount of fees and expenses recoverable, Energy Pipeline’s application contemplates a recovery of sixty times that amount. Furthermore, the Costs Act strictly limits recovery of fees and expenses to parties who can establish that their net worth does not exceed certain thresholds. Section 2, 71 P.S. § 2032. In sum, the Costs Act has a much narrower applicability than Energy Pipeline believes. Moreover, in deciding eases where the Costs Act did apply, this Court has liberally construed the phrase “initiates an adversarial adjudication” in awarding fees and expenses. See McDonald, 664 A-2d 190 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (<HOLDING>); West v. Western Center, Department of Public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion (B) holding that denial of mining companys bond release and issuance of compliance order constituted adversary adjudications (C) holding issuance of building estimate constituted a denial of claim and triggered the running of the limitations period (D) holding that the application of a statute prohibiting subsurface mining left the coal companys rights to underground minerals worthless and constituted a taking (E) holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement
Output: (B)
a written contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee. S.G. § 12-202 provides that: A claim under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant files suit within 1 year after the later of: (1) the date on which the claim arose; or (2) the completion of the contract that gives rise to the claim. Magnetti does not contest that S.G. § 12-201 applies to the University. Indeed, it is without question that the waiver of sovereign immunity applies and includes the University. In Stem, we held that S.G. § 12-201 was applicab — Stern, 380 Md. at 702, 846 A.2d at 1002 (footnote omitted). See also Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 96, 862 A.2d 941, 957 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Frankel, 361 Md. at 308, 761 A.2d at 329 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that claims over state employment contracts are subject to the oneyear condition precedent set forth in sg  12202 (B) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (C) recognizing that a case becomes removable when nondiverse parties are dismissed subject to the oneyear limitation on removal (D) holding over (E) holding that in the employment context only transportation workers employment contracts are exempted from the faas coverage
Output: (A)
complaint nor any facts relating to VBCJ’s General Order support an argument that Waters received less procedural due process than what is constitutionally required in the circumstances. Therefore, VBCJ’s fee program does not violate Waters’ right to procedural due process. C. Legitimate Penological Interest Finally, Waters’ complaint, broadly construed, alleges that Virginia’s one dollar per day room and board fee is not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. This claim also plainly fails, as there are several conceivable rationales to support the finding that VBCJ’s fee program is “ ‘reasonably related’ to promoting a legitimate penological interest.” Sample v. Angelone, 173 F.3d 425 (Table), 1999 WL 52347, *1 (4th Cir. Feb.5 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Section 53.1-131.3 provides as follows: 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person (B) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (C) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that deliberate indifference standard for imposing supervisory liability based on an eighth amendment violation is consistent with iqbal and collecting cases (E) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation
Output: (E)
563 U.S. 421, 438, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Nonetheless, the District Court and the Plan have cited to the language in the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) as the language of the Plan. We, too, adopt this approach. See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 133 S.Ct. 1537, 1543 n.1, 185 L.Ed.2d 654 (2013) ("Because everyone in this case has treated the language from the summary description as though it came from the plan, we do so as well.”). Moreover, insofar as McLaughlin and J.J.M. now contend that the SPD was not "designated a plan document” and so cannot control here, McLaughlin Reply Br. 1, we deem this argument forfeited because it is raised solely in the reply brief. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . We have considered McLaughlin's and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an argument not raised in opening brief is waived (B) holding that a party waives an argument that it raises in the background section of its brief but not in the argument section (C) holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief (D) holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived (E) holding that an argument is not preserved unless a party raises it in its opening brief
Output: (E)
engagement of experts[,]” McDonald, 191 at 786, 663 S.E.2d at 465, the additional days to prepare after receiving notice of the nature and extent of defendant’s entrapment defense should have been sufficient to remedy any prejudice to the State. In any event, the State would not have been prejudiced had the trial court imposed a less severe sanction such as a continuance or a recess. After considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on'the entrapment defense was not a proper sanction for any failure by defendant to provide sufficiently specific notice of his intent to assert the. defense of entrapment. The trial court’s ruling, therefore, constituted an abuse of discretion. See Dorman, _ N.C. App. at _, 737 S.E.2d at 470 (<HOLDING>). Conclusion We hold that defendant presented 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony on inmate code of silence to show witness bias and help explain why the government failed to call certain witnesses (B) holding trial courts pretrial order suppressing certain witnesses testimony from use in future proceedings based on states initial failure to disclose various documented conversations was in error when defendant was in possession of the relevant information well before trial and trial court failed to detail specific and continuing prejudice defendant suffered as a result of initial nondisclosure and failed to explain how suppression of witnesses testimony remedied nondisclosure (C) holding that the trial courts failure to have each bench conference and ruling properly transcribed was not reversible error when the defendant failed to show that he was prevented from presenting any relevant evidence and failed to establish that any prejudice resulted from the absence in the record (D) holding that review by certiorari was available to remedy a trial court order that improperly struck two of the states witnesses as a sanction for the states failure to disclose the address of one of the witnesses in discovery (E) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial
Output: (B)
not have jurisdiction to enter a money judgment predicated on that liability. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or other federal law supports such a construction. The basis of the bankruptcy court’s authority to issue a money judgment rests on section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 502(a) provides that “[a] claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). Section 502(b) then provides that, except in certain circumstances not relevant here, “if such [an] objection to a clai wers to enter judgment is particularly appropriate where the court’s decision would have preclusive effect in any subsequent proceedings. See Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 343 F.Supp. 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted), aff'd without opinion, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that only property administered or listed in the bankruptcy proceedings reverts to the bankrupt (B) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (C) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (D) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (E) holding that bankruptcy courts decision with respect to a creditors claim for money or for property is a final judgment and should be given the same effect as any other judgment of a competent court in a subsequent suit against the bankrupt or anyone in privity with him
Output: (E)
of a contract, legally authorized to enforce the contract, cannot -be held liable for tortious interference since he is not a stranger to the contract.”); Atlanta Market Center Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 503 S.E.2d 278 (1998) ("[I]n order for a defendant to be liable- for tortious interference with contractual relations, the defendant must be a stranger to both the contract and the business relationship giving rise and underpinning the contract.”). 21 . The Couri need not address DIRECTV’s second argument that claim 2 must fail because Plaintiffs cannot show that DIRECTV acted unlawfully. 22 . A violation of "court-made” law is, for example, a violation of a prior court order. See, e.g., Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski. Corp., 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 533-35, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 23 . Here, this would be the alleged breach 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injunction was proper after state court entered a temporary restraining order against defendants many of whom were also defendants in a federal multidistrict action because the restraining order would interfere with the multidistrict courts ability to dispose of the action before it (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding temporary restraining order void because court waived bond (D) holding that violations of a courts temporary restraining order can be redressed as an unlawful act claim under the ucl (E) holding temporary restraining order void for lack of requirement of separate bond
Output: (D)
Covenant Media of South Carolina, LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir.2007) (city regulation was revised during the litigation to include a time limit for reviewing permits; however the court still found standing because Covenant had suffered an injury by the City’s application of the original unconstitutional ordinance that is redressable at least by nominal damages); Boulder Sign Co. v. City of Boulder City, Nevada, 281 Fed.Appx. 701 (9th Cir.2008) (City passed an ordinance banning all billboards while sign company was challenging size restrictions of the original ordinance; court found no standing because sign company’s alleged injury cannot be redressed by a favorable decision.); Coral Springs St. Sys. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Granite State Outdoor Adven, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the zoning code of a homerule city is a legislative enactment (B) recognizing that code is speech (C) recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue (D) holding that the challenge to the sign code is moot because the original code was repealed and superseded and there was no reasonable likelihood the city would reenact the old code (E) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law
Output: (D)
is therefore unpersuasive. But the Agency’s statement to this Court that the records withheld pursuant to exemption 1 are less than twenty-five years old is, as to some documents, plainly incorrect. For example, portions of several documents dating from 1962 are withheld on the basis of exemption 1. DiMaio Decl. Ex. 2, Part 3, at 26-30 (“2008 Vaughn Index”). Executive Order 12,-958 calls for the automatic declassification of records “more than 25 years old” with “permanent historical value.” E.O. 12,958 §§ 3.4(a). The Order exempts from this requirement nine categories of information. Id. § 3.4(b). The records at issue here may well fall into one or more of these categories, but the CIA has not made such an assertion. Cf. Schoenman v. FBI, 2009 WL 763065, at *21 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). The CIA should address this issue in its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cia complied with the requirements of eo 12958 where a declaration regarding a foia request stated that the declarant had rereviewed each of the documents described in the cias vaughn index during the current litigation process and determined that the relevant documents each contain information  warranting their continued classification despite their age (B) holding that the district court properly considered documents attached to a motion to dismiss that described the terms of plaintiffs group health insurance plan where plaintiff alleged membership in the plan his claims depended on the conditions described in the documents and plaintiff never disputed their authenticity (C) holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents (D) holding that the fdas voluntary release of documents that may have been caused by the courts order to submit a revised vaughn index cannot constitute court ordered relief (E) holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia
Output: (A)
performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708. A showing of prejudice from any such adverse effect is not required. See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.1980). An “actual conflict” results when counsel “actively represented conflicting interests.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted). An actual conflict need not be a direct conflict, and it need not be established separately from adverse effect. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Instead, an actual conflict “is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance.” Id. Successive representation is sufficient to establish a conflict, see Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1118 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted sub nom. Ornaski v. Belmontes, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the most significant relationship test as espoused in the restatement of conflicts governs conflicts cases sounding in tort in case where automobile collision occurred in mexico (B) holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation (C) holding that conflicts of constitutional magnitude can arise from cases of successive representation (D) recognizing adequacy of notice as a matter of obvious constitutional magnitude (E) holding that the failure to optout precluded challenge to adequate representation based upon purported conflicts of interest between subclasses
Output: (C)
certain procedural , advantages in attempting to present and develop direct-service-connection claims does not mean that any of those claims necessarily have merit. That is what the claims-development process under § 3.311 is designed to determine, just as is the duty to assist that attaches under section 5107(a) as to well-grounded claims, regarding which the Court has emphasized:“The amount of evidence sufficient to make a claim well grounded differs from the amount sufficient for an award of service connection”, Meyer v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 425, 432 (1996); “to be well grounded a claim need not be supported by evidence sufficient for the claim to be granted. Rather, the law establishes only a 'preliminary threshold of plausibility”. Robinette, 8 Vet.App. at 76; see also Alemany, supra (<HOLDING>). It must be remembered that the § 3.311 
 Holding statements: (A) holding service requirements under fedrcivp 4 to be jurisdictional (B) holding that no federal nexus is required (C) holding medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as possible suffices for that aspect of wellgroundedclaim requirements (D) holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service (E) holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as very well might have been although not conclusive suffices to well ground claim
Output: (C)
do not have enough information before us to determine whether the informant had a sufficient basis of knowledge for concluding that the occupants of the car were "smoking drugs." Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the informant's tip, by itself, supported a reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination. See id. Thus, we turn our attention to whether the observations of the investigating officer were sufficient to support reasonable suspicion and probable cause. B. Detection of "Cat Urine" Odor ¶18 Our courts have recognized that probable cause and, by extension, reasonable suspicion "may arise from an officer's sense of smell." Wright, 1999 UT App 86, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 505 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, when an officer detects the h Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Minnick v. United States, 607 A.2d 519, 525 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer clearly had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle without a warrant based on the burning marijuana he smelled as he approached the car (B) holding that an officer had probable cause to search bags in the trunk of the car when he opened the trunk and smelled a strong odor of methamphetamine (C) holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not (D) holding that search was proper where a drug dog jumped into the open trunk of a car and keyed on a duffel bag after the suspect opened the trunk (E) holding that sniff test of automobile trunk not a search requiring probable cause
Output: (B)
to defendant] by the trial judge submitting to the jury, with or without the presence of ... counsel, correct excerpts of limited trial testimony.” Id. at 617. Similarly, other circuits courts of appeal have found that even court staffs ex parte actions regarding the substantive law of the case may be harmless error. Notably, in United States v. Patterson, 644 F.2d 890 (1st Cir.1981), the First Circuit held that a court clerk’s unilateral action to deny the jury’s request to make transcripts of witnesses available to them was not prejudicial because only one witness’ testimony had been transcribed at that time, and it was “improbable” that the judge would have furnished that one transcript anyway. Id. at 897-98. See also United States v. Fulcher, 626 F.2d 985, 989 (D.C.Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). At the outset, given the controlling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sales puffery cannot constitute mail fraud to support rico claim (B) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud (C) holding that the prosecution may establish the intent element of mail fraud by proving that the defendant was reckless (D) holding direct misrepresentations were not required for mail fraud conviction (E) holding clerks action in giving requested mail fraud and contract documents to jury without consulting counsel or judge was error but defendant was not prejudiced because virtually all exhibits were either contract or mail fraud documents
Output: (E)
Committee recognizes that the fishing industry is compelled to deal with the vicissitudes of fish stocks, abundance, changes in consumer choice, and economic conditions which makes for a great deal of uncertainty. There is, however, a need to protect all concerned parties by discouraging persons from deliberately and knowingly providing the Councils with false information. The Committee has thus attempted to clarify these issues. See House Comm, on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H. Rep. No. 99-165 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6249, 6254-55. This language, the only legislative history related to 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), simply indicates the rationale for that provision. It in no way suggests that Congress intended to preempt 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Cf. Anderez, 661 F.2d at 407 & n. 7 (<HOLDING>). Having determined that appellants’ preemption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative history of the misdemeanor provisions of the currency and foreign transactions reporting act 31 usc  1058 1101 indicated only that the provisions would be of tremendous help and did not suggest congresss intent to preempt 18 usc  1001 (B) holding that 18 usc  1920 the misdemeanor false statement provision of the federal employees compensation act feca preempted 18 usc  1001 because  41 of feca expressly repealed all inconsistent statutes (C) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (D) holding that because the bank had no duty to report defendants structured transactions these transactions did not constitute material facts within the meaning of 18 usc  1001 consequently defendant may not be held criminally liable under 18 usc  2b for causing the bank to fail to disclose a material fact (E) holding that a wide application was required given the legislative intent for the remedial provisions of the act
Output: (A)
many of which were communicated before the assumed suggestive procedures. It bolsters the reliability of the identifications. See, e.g., Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 383; Goodman, 797 F.2d at 470. Lemon evidently gave detective Mook a description of the driver about one week after the offense, but that description is not in the trial record. Our inability to ascertain the accuracy of this prior description obviously prevents this fact from weighing in favor of the reliability of Lemon’s identification. However, it is also important to note that since it is an omission rather than an affirmative inaccuracy it does not cast doubt on other evidence supporting the reliability of the identification. Cf. United States ex rel. Hudson v. Brierton, 699 F.2d 917, 925 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as the district court cogently noted, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in accepting  expert testimony  on the issue of reliability and rank order scoring that happened to include a component reliability estimate (B) holding finding of reliability not clearly erroneous despite lack of prior description (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous (E) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record
Output: (B)
Court and also is denied as moot. Discussion Motion To Exclude This case arises under the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq. Review under the APA is limited to the administrative record that was before the decision-making agency and may not include a new record constructed by the reviewing court. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). “If a court is to review an agency’s action fairly, it should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision.” Walter O. Boswell Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C.Cir.1984); see also Doraiswamy v. Secretary of Labor, 555 F.2d 832, 839-40 (D.C.Cir.1976); Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001, 94 S.Ct. 356, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo (B) holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo (C) holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo (D) recognizing de novo standard of review (E) recognizing that a district courts review is limited to the agency record submitted and that no de novo evidentiary hearing is permitted
Output: (E)
56(c)). “A ‘genuine’ issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and a ‘material fact’ is one that has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “The moving party ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ” DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>). “Once the moving party has pointed to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the movant cannot demonstrate conclusively that the nonmovant cannot prevail summary judgment is precluded (B) holding that in order for the movant to prevail on a summary judgment motion movant must either factually refute the affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient (C) holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances (D) holding that in summary judgment proceeding movant may prevail by averring that nonmoving party cannot establish an element essential to her case (E) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case
Output: (D)
§ 42-217. If, based on the proof submitted by the applicant and the field examination, the Department “is satisfied that the law has been fully complied with and that the water is being used at the place claimed and for the purpose for which it was originally intended, the [Department shall issue to such user or users a license confirming such use.” I.C. § 42-219(1). On the other hand, “[i]n the event that the [Department shall find that the applicant has not fully complied with the law and the conditions of permit, it may issue a license f ls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 (2005) (finding that “a party is not entitled to vested rights in a water right by virtue of filing a permit application”); Hardy v. Higginson, 123 Idaho 485, 491, 849 P.2d 946, 952 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has never considered the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (B) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (C) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (D) holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use (E) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use
Output: (D)
Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1996); Oliven, 849 F.2d at 745. Although the testimony of a damages expert should be excluded as unduly speculative if it is based on "assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictoiy as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison," "other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.” Boucher, 73 F.3d at 22 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Projections of future earnings are admissible where, as here, they are supported by evidence such as wage scales or contracts, and where the juiy is charged with determining the likelihood of the plaintiff’s progress and is given sufficient information to enable it to do so. Oliveri, 849 F.2d at 745 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Court instructed the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked (D) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (E) holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by admitting expert testimony on future compensation rates for marine engineer positions where it was based on a meba union officials testimony regarding promotion the jury was given information to assess the plaintiffs chances of promotion and the juiy was clearly instructed that the testimony was only relevant if they found that the plaintiff would have been promoted
Output: (E)
the voters’ intent in approving the measure. Id. Where the language of the initiative is clear and unambiguous, a court may not look beyond the text of the measure; however, if the initiative is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, a court may determine the voters’ intent by applying canons of statutory construction or by “examining] the statements in the voters pamphlet.” Id. at 205-06. a. The Single Subject of 1-776 The first step in the article II, section 19 analysis is to determine whether Pierce County has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that 1-776 violates the single-subject requirement. An initiative embraces a single subject if its parts are rationally related to one another. Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wn.2d 392, 404, 418 P.2d 443 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 290, 517 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire (B) holding where the defendants conduct in setting a fire was a proximate cause of a fire fighters death the death occurred in course of and in furtherance of the arson (C) holding that the land contract vendor was entitled to fire insurance benefits when the fire occurred after a judgment for possession was obtained by the vendor pursuant to summary forfeiture proceedings (D) holding that petition failed to allege fire hydrants were physically defective where fire hydrants did not work and plaintiffs decedent was killed in fire (E) holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable
Output: (E)
request with a statement that counsel has examined these issues and found them to be without merit. Specifically, Coleman asserts that: (1) the Government violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2000), by presenting the testimony of witnesses who were presumably testifying in the hopes of obtaining a sentence reduction; (2) the district court erred at sentencing in converting the value of a half of a kilogram of cocaine powder into crack; and (3) his attorney provided ineffective assistance. Our review of these issues leads us to agree with counsel’s determination on issues (1) and (2). As to issue (3), a direct appeal is not the proper forum in this instance, because ineffective assistance is not clear on the face of the record. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In light of the above determinations, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal (B) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (C) holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced (D) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate (E) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
Output: (B)
87 (2000). Roberts now cites to the Cloird opinion for the proposition that it is the circuit court, not this court, who considers the diligence issue in the first instance. While it is true that we have directed circuit courts to examine the issue of diligence, we have done so only in those cases where we have granted the petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the circuit court. This court has itself examined the diligence requirement and denied petitions where it was evident that a petitioner failed to proceed diligently. See, e.g., Echols, 354 Ark. 414, 125 S.W.3d 153. Even though it was a death-penalty case, this court denied his petition for coram nobis relief where we determined that he had not acted diligently. See also Scott v. State, 2010 Ark. 363, 2010 WL 3796227 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we will address the issue of whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner (B) holding that a coram nobis petition remained pending until  the court of appeals denied petitioners application for leave to appeal the appellate divisions denial of his petition (C) holding same for writ of error coram nobis (D) holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial (E) recognizing that under the common law applications for writs of error coram nobis were civil in character
Output: (D)
Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 03 Civ. 8258 (SAS), 2004 WL 868211, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.21, 2004). In order to establish a prima facie claim of negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show reliance upon a false statement or material misrepresentation or omission made by the defendant to the plaintiff. See, Prohaska, 138 F.Supp.2d at 447; Sita, 43 F.Supp.2d at 260. Assuming that there existed a special relationship and corresponding duty on the part of CVS ProCare to provide plaintiff with correct information regarding the prescription drug it was providing him, “an issue generally not susceptible to resolution at the pleadings stage,” Century Pacific, 2004 WL 868211, at * 8 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Bombardier Capital, 2003 WL 22137989, at * 4 (<HOLDING>), plaintiff cannot establish the second element 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that whether a plaintiffs reliance on defendants misrepresentations was justified is a question of fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding it is a question of fact (C) holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
Output: (C)