niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
work. By plaintiff’s own testimony, plaintiff was told that he could return to work if he would be willing to work seventy hour weeks: Q: Now, what did you and Mr. [Mauk] talk about? Give me the conversation as best as you can recall it. A: I had told Mr. [Mauk], well, I’m — this is the 59th day. That I’m just calling to see where am I supposed to report to tomorrow and so forth, et cetera. And he said, well, Danny, we don’t have no job for you. Your job has been filled. I said, what do you mean? He says, you couldn’t work the 70 hours a week so we didn’t need you any longer. He said if I could work 70 hours a week, my job would be available. But until then my job had been filled and that there wasn’t a place in Vulcan’s organization for a 50-hour-a-week emplo . 671, 675 (E.D.Pa.1996) (<HOLDING>), aff'd 116 F.3d 469 (3d Cir.1997). At most, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job (B) holding that an employer did not regard an employee with an impaired ankle as disabled where it encouraged her to work in a position that required walking (C) holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled (D) holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project (E) holding that employer did not regard plaintiff as disabled where it repeatedly attempted to return him to work
Output: (B)
Inc., and therefore, had standing. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion for a directed verdict on this ground. VII. Directed Verdict on Negligence Appellants contend the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on negligence. Specifically, they maintain the existence and scope of a duty are legal questions, and no evidence was presented pertaining to duties owed by Appellants to the Association. We find this issue is not preserved for our review. Although Appellants moved for a directed verdict at the close of all testimony, they did not move for a directed verdict on the specific basis that no evidence indicated they owed a duty to the Association. Creech v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t. 328 S.C. 24, 34, 491 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 50(a), SCRCP (“A motion for a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (B) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (C) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (D) holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue (E) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue
Output: (D)
I and II. So ORDERED 1 .Although Barstow names the County as a Defendant in the caption of his complaint, he does not list the County as a party to the action. The Court concludes that no claim is articulated against the County by his complaint. 2 . Barstow failed to submit a Statement of Material Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56. 3 . Not only did Barstow fail to submit his own Statement of Material Facts, he also failed to properly controvert Defendants' Statement of Material Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56. Therefore, Defendants facts are deemed to be admitted, since they are supported by citations to the record. See Local Rule 56(e). Unfortunately for Barstow, his pro se status does not change this outcome. See Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27-28, n. 2 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing D.P.P.R. 311.12); see also Eagle Eye 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court is well within its authority to enter judgment based on the pro se appellants blatant disregard of a local rule of the district court for the district of puerto rico requiring that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to include in her opposition a separate short and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried properly supported by specific reference to the record (B) holding that once motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported opposing party has burden of showing by means of affidavits or other verified evidence that there exists genuine dispute of material fact (C) holding that once motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported opposing party bears burden of showing by means of affidavits or other verified evidence that genuine dispute of material fact exists (D) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (E) holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court
Output: (A)
above, Waters’ claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l) and Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). An appropriate Order shall issue. 1 . Sometime after the filing of his complaint. Waters was apparently transferred to Sussex I State Prison, a VDOC facility. This transfer moots his claims for declaratory and injunc-tive relief. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.1991) (addressing the merits of a prisoner's claim for monetary damages despite transfer to a new facility). It does not moot his claim for monetary damages based on the failure to transfer and hence this aspect of the transfer claim is subject to § 1915A and Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. 2 . See Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 465 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 121, 58 L.Ed.2d 133, (1978) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claim is not cognizable (B) holding that failure to provide adequate sanitary food service facilities establishes a cognizable claim (C) holding claim is cognizable (D) holding that insufficiency of evidence not cognizable in postconviction claim (E) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service
Output: (B)
covered by the subpoena duces tecum issued on November 12, 2008, and there was no evidence showing Respondent was required to have filed his 2008 tax returns by November 25, 2008-the date the subpoena was returnable. Additionally, Respondent told the court at the hearing on August 19, 2009, that his 2008 tax returns had not been filed. 111 . The ABA adopted this comment in 2002. See Ellen J. Bennet et al., Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 326 (ABA Tth ed.2011). Although the Colorado Supreme Court adopted comment 1 on April 12, 2007, effective January 1, 2008, not all jurisdictions have adopted this comment. See id. 112 . Colo. RPC Scope T21. 113 . Colo. RPC 3.3 cmts. 1-2; see also Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Iowa 2013) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Dobbs, 94 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney who committed extrinsic fraud did not violate iowas analogue to colo rpc 33 because he engaged in fraud in his own dissolution proceeding rather than while representing a client (B) holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal (C) holding that although a lawyer who violated the predecessor to colo rpc 18a did not have the conscious objective to deceive his client or to take advantage of her he was aware of the circumstances and the consequences of his conduct his mental state was therefore greater than one of negligence (D) holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit (E) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud
Output: (A)
retailers for them to resell, but to specifically encourage its customers in Tennessee to access its website to -find and purchase Defendant’s products in Tennessee. The Court therefore finds Defendant purposefully availed itself of this forum. B. Arises Out Of Or Relates To “In the ordinary patent infringement suit, the claim asserted by the paten-tee plaintiff is that some act of making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing products or services by the defendant constitutes an infringement of the presumptively valid patent named in suit.” Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). Consequently, for specific jurisdiction purposes, a claim typically arises out of or relates to the infringing activity. See id. (<HOLDING>) In the instant action, Plaintiffs, claim is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (B) holding in an ordinary patent infringement suit the claim both arises out of and relates to the defendants alleged manufacturing using or selling of the claimed invention (C) holding that the computer readable code claimed in claim 6 the product claim was a part or component of that invention (D) holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent (E) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement
Output: (B)
v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000). Anchondo counters with a district court case, which held that net worth includes capital stock and goodwill. See Wisneski v. Nationwide Collections, 227 F.R.D. 259, 261 (E.D.Pa.2004). Neither party has cited a case on this issue from the Tenth Circuit, and I have not found one. The presiding judge will ultimately decide how to calculate net worth and whether any documents produced in response to this request are admissible. For now, it is sufficient that the documents may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Importantly, request 22 does not require ACA to obtain a valuation of goodwill if none exists; it only requires ACA to produce any documents already in existence that include the valuation. Cf Sanders, 209 F.3d at 1003 (<HOLDING>). With this understanding, ACA must produce any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason (B) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (C) holding that one reason for excluding goodwill is to avoid a mini trial on statutory damages because goodwill is difficult to quantify (D) holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial (E) holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages
Output: (C)
see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (providing for transfer of a case where both the original and the requested venue are proper), and presented no evidence showing that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Thus, the firm failed to satisfy its burden of showing that venue was improper in the District of New Jersey, and the District Court erred in dismissing Great Western’s amended complaint on that basis. c Appellees maintain that even if the District Court’s venue determination is erroneous, we should affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Great Western’s amended complaint on alternative grounds, including claim preclusion, arbitral immunity, and failure to state a claim for relief. See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Although these arguments may well be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (B) recognizing that appellate court may affirm result on reasons different from those on which lower court relied (C) recognizing an appellate court may affirm a trial courts decision that reached the right result regardless of the trial courts reasoning (D) holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds (E) holding that we may affirm on an alternative basis supported by the record
Output: (D)
disbursements made by the debtors;. the Fifth Circuit noted that "outside the plan” had greater significance under the pre-Code Bankruptcy Act, because secured creditors whose claims were dealt with by a plan were entitled to vote — therefore, stating that payments to a secured creditor were being made "outside the plan” might eliminate the secured creditor’s right to vote on the plan; the Fifth Circuit held that it is permissible for Chapter 13 debtors to make plan payments directly to a mortgage lender, in connection with curing and maintaining a mortgage, but when they do, it is still considered payments “under the plan ” ). 20 . Kessler, 2015 WL 4726794 at *3 (citing In re Harris, 107 B.R. 204, 208 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989)); see also In re Heinzle, 511 B.R. 69, 78 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2014) (<HOLDING>). 21 . Id. at 78. 22 . 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c). 23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plan provision stating that the summary plan description and summaries of material modifications  are hereby incorporated by reference and constitute a part of the plan acted to incorporate into the plan a limitations provision found only in the summary plan description (B) holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan (C) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (D) holding that although the plan cannot discharge the debt  the claimant may otherwise subject the debt to the provisions of a confirmed plan (E) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions
Output: (B)
to exempt every alien who seeks to adjust his or her status under § 245(i) after illegally reentering the United States following removal. Where Congress intended § 241(a)(5) not to pose a barrier to adjustment of status for aliens who illegally reentered the United States, it made a special exception to the general rule. Because Lino does not fall within the exception, she is bound by the general rule disqualifying aliens who illegally reentered the country from seeking adjustment of status. Finally, six circuits have held that § 241(a)(5) precludes aliens subject to reinstatement orders from obtaining adjustment of status pursuant to § 245(i). See De Sandoval v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006); Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect (B) holding that petitioners claim is not one to the attorney generals decision or action to execute a removal order either since the facts relevant to their claim  took place well before any decision by the attorney general to execute a removal order (C) holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made (D) holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening (E) holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored
Output: (C)
affected its decision. See Green v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 1042, 1053 (8th Cir.2011) (finding no evidence insurance company’s conflict of interest influenced its denial of benefits when there was no indication company had history of biased claim decisions). Cf. Chronister v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.) 563 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir.2009) (noting that insurance company’s conflict of interest was one of several factors pointing to abuse of discretion; conflict evidenced by company’s recognized history' of biased claims administration, including arbitrary denial of claims and failure to follow own claims-handling procedure). Accordingly, the Court will give MetLife’s conflict some weight when determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion. See Khoury, 615 F.3d at 954 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted); Manning v. Am. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed (B) holding that district court was required to give conflict some weight but the existence of the conflict alone was not determinative when record contained no evidence of claims administration history or of claims administrators efforts to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy (C) recognizing the conflict (D) recognizing conflict (E) holding that there was a valid waiver of defendants right to conflictfree representation despite the courts failure to inform the defendant of the existence of a potential conflict of interest since the defendant was well aware of the factual basis which created the conflict
Output: (B)
rule is limited to questions that seek evidence about the informant’s police sanctioned conduct in apprehending a suspect, then the informant’s claim of privilege under such circumstances would be spurious. In this context he is immune from prosecution. We believe that this is the correct limitation because Norman is premised on a line of cases holding that state agents are not accomplices to illegal conduct of which they are charged to discover. Norman quotes Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) for the proposition that the law is well settled that if an informant is acting as a state agent, then the informant’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment is spurious. Id. at 344. In turn, Turner, supra, is premised upon Woodward v. State, 490 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). See also, Vela v. State, 373 S.W.2d 505 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (B) holding that an undercover agent is not an accomplice as long as the agent does not bring about the crime but merely obtains evidence to be used against those engaged in crime (C) holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant (D) holding that a private citizen acting as undercover agent is not an accomplice witness so long as he does not bring about the crime (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
Output: (B)
in this case do not present such issues. The recording of IP address information and similar routing data, which reveal the existence of connections between communications devices without disclosing the content of the communications, are precisely analogous to the capture of telephone numbers at issue in Smith. That is why the orders here fit comfortably within the language of a statute drafted with the earlier technology in mind. The substitution of electronic methods of communication for telephone calls does not alone create a reasonable expectation of privacy in the identitie s no expectation of privacy in “subscriber information provided to an internet provider,” such as an IP address (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 432 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records (B) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (C) holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider (D) holding that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bulletin board subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person (E) holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email
Output: (D)
with putative class members). Indeed, a district court’s authority under Rule 23(d) is not limited to communications that actually mislead or otherwise threaten to create confusion, but extends to communications that interfere with the proper administration of a class action or those that abuse the rights of members of the class. Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.D.C.2002). “A unilateral communications scheme, moreover, is rife with potential for coercion. If the class and the class opponent are involved in an ongoing business relationship, communications from the class opponent to the class may be coercive.” Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1202 (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted); see also Hampton Hardware v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630, 633-34 (N.D.Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F.Supp. 1474, 1484 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case (B) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification (C) holding evidence of letters discouraging participation in lawsuit an ongoing business relationship between the parties and plaintiffs dependence on defendant for supplies sufficient to prohibit all litigationrelated communication prior to class certification (D) recognizing a defendants connection to dc because the plaintiff had argued and provided correspondence between the parties demonstrating an ongoing relationship between the parties including the defendant giving the plaintiff directions regarding other business projects that the defendant intended to pursue and argued that the contract would have been at least partly performed within dc (E) recognizing correspondence appeared to establish a settlement relationship between the parties given the letters presented an attempt to curb further litigation
Output: (C)
here certainly is covered by state tort law, the other examples the majority posits that may violate the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution but may not be covered by tort law are inapposite. In any event, I am not convinced that any of these acts— denying a prisoner access to a toilet and thus exposing the prisoner to human waste for thirty-six hours, depriving a prisoner of basic necessities, completely depriving a prisoner of outdoor exercise for a period of years, and exposing a prisoner to other unhygienic conditions— would not be covered by tort law. Rather, each act involves a clear breach of the duty of reasonable care and would unreasonably jeopardize a prisoner’s health. See Irabor v. Perry County Corr. Ctr., No. 06-0483-BH-C, 2008 WL 1929965, at *2-3 (S.D.Ala. Apr.30, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Owsley, 422 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo.1967) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available (B) holding that as a matter of equal protection the state must provide indigent defendants with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools are available for a price to other defendants (C) holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted (D) holding that a plaintiff had adequate state tort remedies available to redress the denial of basic necessities such as socks toilet paper and soap (E) holding that defendant had adequate alternatives in judicial and administrative remedies to the course he took
Output: (D)
were capable of signing the applications, as demonstrated by their signing of the affidavits attached to the ballots. Thus, I need not address the issue of physical incapacity to sign an application. 6 .The 1996 amendment of § 17-10-7, Act No. 96-885, 1996 Ala. Acts, p. 1699, reinforced that section’s two-witnesses-or-notarization requirement without adding similar reinforcing language to § 17-10-4 regarding applications for absentee ballots. Justice Cook interprets this amendment to mean that, notwithstanding the plain language of § 17-10-4, the Legislature intended for applications not to be manually signed by the applicant. This interpretation ignores the history that gave rise to the amendment of § 17-10-7. See Roe v. Mobile County Appt. Bd., 676 So.2d 1206, 1226 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>). In my view, far from approving this Court's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan did not comply (B) holding that a threepage memorandum opinion  order containing the district courts reasoning and case citations failed to comply with the separate document requirement (C) holding defendants could not be guilty as parties when the state failed to show they knew the criminality of the conduct they assisted (D) holding that absentee ballots could be counted even if they failed to comply with the twowitnessesornotarization requirement of  17107 (E) holding that habeas relief would be proper if the state failed to comply with the statutory requirement that all members of the multidisciplinary team sign the report supporting the commitment petition
Output: (D)
(2005). 7 .For a Petitioner to prevail under the Vaccine Act, "a petitioner must prove either a 'Table' injury or that a vaccine listed on the Table was the cause in fact of an injury (and of an 'Off Table’ injury).” Dec. 2. GBS is not a Table injury. 8 . As proof for the proposition that Dr. Pike’s theory was “probative,” Petitioner cites to or discusses medical and other literature that was never submitted in the case before the Chief Special Master. Vaccine Rule 8(f) states that "any fact or argument not raised specifically in the record before the special master will be considered waived and cannot be raised by either party in proceedings on review of a special master's decision.” RCFC App. B, Vaccine Rule 8(f); see also Jay v. Sec’y of HHS, 998 Fed. 979, 983 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Court, therefore, will strike these 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below (B) holding that petitioners had abandoned arguments not raised below (C) holding that   1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below (D) holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal (E) holding that arguments not briefed are abandoned
Output: (B)
(en banc) (further quotation omitted). This seizure implicates a passenger’s Fourth Amendment interests to the same degree as the driver’s. Erwin, 875 F.2d at 270 (“[W]e reject any notion that a vehicular stop detains for Fourth Amendment purposes only the driver simply because the passenger may be free to depart.”). We assess the reasonableness of a routine traffic stop under the principles laid out for investigative detentions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), considering “ “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868); see also id. at 1230 (<HOLDING>). We must examine “both the length of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (B) holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring (C) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred (D) holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion (E) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop
Output: (D)
to a district court’s evidentiary rulings,- an appellant is required to denote with “speeific ity with record references” the allegedly erroneous ruling and the improperly excluded evidence. United States v. Cates, 251 F.3d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir.2001). Watson, however, failed to cite to the district court’s ruling in the record, and as is our praetice-without any arguments or citations to the record that would assist us in judging the merits of his claim of error-we decline to address it. United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1517 n. 3 (8th Cir.1995) With regard to the objectionable evidentiary rulings at Watson’s trial, we will only address those sufficiently identified and discussed in Watson’s brief. See, e.g., Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We review evidentiary rulings made at trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (B) holding that an issue is abandoned when not raised in an appellate brief (C) holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue (D) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (E) holding that failure to discuss an issue in an appellate brief constitutes abandonment of that issue
Output: (E)
¶¶ 52-54. Pandora argues that Plaintiffs MCPA claim should be dismissed on the grounds that Pandora is exempt from liability under the MCPA’s safe harbor provision, and that Plaintiff cannot maintain a class action under the MCPA absent a showing of actual damages. The Court discusses each contention in turn. 1. Safe Harbor Section 445.904 of the MCPA provides that “this act does not apply to ... a transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” MCL § 445.904 (emphasis added). The focus of this exemption is on the “general transaction at issue,” as opposed to the specific misconduct alleged. See Molosky v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 664 F.3d 109, 117-118 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>) (citing Liss v. Lewiston-Richards, Inc., 478 
 Holding statements: (A) holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate (B) holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license (C) holding that granteepurchasers who acquired real estate subject to an existing mortgage while not personally lia ble did take real estate charged with the payment of the debt and such property became the primary fund out of which said mortgage must be paid (D) holding the real estate sale proceeds (E) holding that general authorization to service real estate loans included claims regarding fees for prepayment of mortgage loans
Output: (E)
not apply, and Holland was required to object in order to preserve the double-jeopardy issue. 2 . Holland has also argued, in vain, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should fall within a Wicks exception. We have rejected a similar argument before. See Rackley v. State, 371 Ark. 438, 441, 267 S.W.3d 578, 581 (2007) ("Our research has not revealed a single case where this court has considered an ineffective-assistance, conflict-of-interest argument on direct appeal in the absence of a proper objection in the trial court.”). And as far as we can tell, there is nothing that will prevent Holland from raising this issue, and developing a much more complete record, during Rule 37 proceedings. 3 . See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire (B) holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence (C) holding that it was permissible to ask whether a juror would consider death sentence if juror determined aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances (D) holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause (E) holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated
Output: (D)
Woodmancy v. Colvin, No. 5:12-CV-991 GLS, 2013 WL 5567553, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013), we conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency determination that Woodmancy did not carry her burden of demonstrating that these conditions were severe impairments. Nor are we persuaded that there is any unwarranted inconsistency between the ALJ’s determination that these conditions did not cause serious impairment while substance abuse did. While these conditions may all have required ongoing treatment, substantial record evidence indicated that Wood-mancy either failed to pursue or to benefit from treatment for substance abuse but did benefit from treatment for the other conditions in ways that minimized their impairing effect. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). 2. Residual Functional Capacity Woodmancy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that receiving advice or treatment during the exclusionary period for a condition which proves to be the same condition the claimant seeks benefits for qualifies as a preexisting condition regardless of whether there was an accurate diagnosis (B) holding that once one severe impairment is found the combined effect of all impairments must be considered even if other impairments would not be severe (C) holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities (D) holding condition was not severe impairment where it improved from treatment (E) holding that torture is something more severe than the kind of treatment that would suffice to prove persecution
Output: (D)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 2 . The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey intervened because Amana raised a Commerce Clause challenge to the extraterritorial application of the NJFPA. We have since held that the NJFPA does not violate the Commerce Clause. See Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp. 35 F.3d 813 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1176, 130 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1995). 3 . Amana does not argue that the termination of its business relationship with Cooper was for "good cause,” a concept that is “limited to failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise.” N.J.S.A. § 56:10-5; see also Westfield Centre Service, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 86 N.J. 453, 432 A.2d 48, 55 (1981) (<HOLDING>). . 4 . Because Amana’s briefs do not raise or 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that franchisors have a duty to act in good faith and with commercial reasonableness when terminating franchise agreements (B) holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created (C) holding that a restrictive covenant will be upheld where a franchisor has a protectable interest in the sale of his franchise (D) holding that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are enforceable to protect the basic product which the franchisor has to sell namely the franchise itself   (E) holding that a franchisor who in good faith and for bona fide reasons terminates a franchise for any reason other than substantial nonperformance has violated the act
Output: (E)
counterclaim sought a determination that CDB had breached the agreements. See Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (defining counterclaim as “a claim, which, if established will defeat or in some way qualify a judgment to which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled. It embraces both setoff and recoupment, and also comprehends recon-vention as well as all adversary actions by the defendant in a case.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 315 (5th ed.1979) (defining counterclaim as a “claim presented by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the plaintiffs claim”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling CDB’s motion for JNOV. See generally Hobbs Trailers v. J.T. Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) -(<HOLDING>); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach (B) holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action (C) holding that if appellees breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim article 5539c the predecessor to section 16069 would have applied (D) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (E) recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach
Output: (C)
418, 421 (Colo.2001) (concluding, after determining that the URA did not apply, that public entity could enforce a 30-day termination provision in a lease because the entity “possessed the same rights ... which any other market buyer would have”); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Frankford 5206 Bar, Inc., 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 209, 587 A.2d 855, 857, 860 (1991) (concluding that when public entity acquired property and informed tenant that it would not renew tenant’s lease at the end of current lease term, tenant was not a “‘displaced person’ since the termination of its occupancy here resulted from the natural expiration of its then current lease term and not from [the public entity’s] acquisition of the [property]”); Hindsley v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 25 Pa.Cmwlth. 455, 360 A.2d 297, 298-99 (1976) (<HOLDING>). These cases are not persuasive in light of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease (B) holding that after township acquired property entered into lease with tenant that was renewable absent notice of termination and terminated lease tenant was not displaced person because tenant will be moving not as a result of the acquisition  of such real property but rather because township having already acquired the property has merely declined to renew the lease quotation omitted (C) holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property (D) recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election (E) holding that when notice to vacate was insufficient to comply with the terms of the lease lease was not properly terminated before commencement of summary ejectment action
Output: (B)
by any of the Defendants who participated in the disciplinary hearing process, and thus, their bald assertion that Appellees Paul Zuckerman and Jonathan Raskin were not impartial is insufficient to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007))). To the extent the Plaintiffs assert that the disciplinary committee deviated from the proper regulations, their conclusory allegations fail to support a plausible inference that the proceedings were unfair. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that physical assaults did not rise to the level of persecution where they did not requirfe medical attention (B) holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims (C) holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands (D) holding that universitys deviations from procedural guidelines did not rise to constitutional proportions particularly where they were minor deviations and did not affect the fundamental fairness of the hearing (E) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed
Output: (D)
the sufficiency of the evidence,” we “must affirm the verdict ‘if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218, 117 S.Ct. 1709, 137 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997)). hi. A. The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting the text messages obtained from Govan’s cell phone. First, Govan argues that the district court erred by applying the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Govan argues that for the good-faith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required (B) holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search (C) holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant (D) holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule (E) holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid
Output: (D)
Therefore, the inquiry into whether a court may hear a qui tam relator’s claim can be divided into three parts: (1) Have the allegations made by the plaintiff been “publicly disclosed”? (2) If so, is the lawsuit “based upon” that publicly disclosed information? (3) If so, is the plaintiff an “original source” of the information? See United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir.1999); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 564 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994). The threshold inquiry is whether there has been a public disclosure. Id. Whether the plaintiff is an “original source” of the information is immaterial unless there has been such public disclosure. See United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 524 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1415 (“Where there has been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (B) holding that in the absence of public disclosure the court need not address whether relator was original source of the information (C) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant (D) holding by federal district court that before a court orders disclosure of educational records the party seeking disclosure is required to demonstrate a genuine need for the information that outweighs the privacy interest of the students (E) recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca
Output: (B)
constitutionally obstruct despite the provision of counsel. Indeed, in Benjamin v. Fraser, when considering impediments to pre-trial detainees’ ability to visit with counsel, we recognized that a state could not “ ‘unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts.’ ” Benjamin 264 F.3d at 187, 188 (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) and determining that “both the due process right of access to the courts and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are implicated,” and that there was no error in measures ordered to remedy undue delays associated with attorney visits). See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Nor can I agree with the majority’s holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same for writ of error coram nobis (B) holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis (C) holding that the state could not deny an indigent criminal appellant a transcript to appeal pro se from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis or permit that the appellant at the will of the public defender be entirely cut off from any appeal at all (D) holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner (E) holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial
Output: (C)