niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). 15 . Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-101 to -704 (2003 & Supp.2005). 16 . Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 24, 4 P.3d 795. 17 . Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(3) (2003). 18 . Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795. 19 . Bd. of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d 234. 20 . See 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 22.29-22.30 (6th ed.2002) (discussing the presumption that an amendment was intended to change the prior statute; also discussing other tools of construction applicable to amendments). 21 . Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 24, 4 P.3d 795. 22 . Act of March 5, 1997, ch. 307, §§ 1-5, 1997 Utah Laws 1181, 1181-82. 23 . Id. §§ 3-4, (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-304.5, -305 .2d 83, 92 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 38 . Supra ¶¶ 14-15. 39 . Utah Code Ann. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify (B) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (C) holding no error where the court initially granted 500 for an investigator and defendant made no subsequent request for additional funds (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for additional funds where defendant had not shown exhaustion of the 500 granted (E) recognizing two aspects to assertion of fifth amendment rights 1 a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand request was made for an attorney and 2 the request was for assistance with a custodial interrogation not for subsequent hearings or proceedings
Output: (C)
the circumstances,’ as our cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared to believe that each observation by Stoddard that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to ‘no weight.’ See 232 F.3d, at 1249-1251. Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)], however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis. The officer in Terry observed the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was ‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ we held that, taken together, they ‘warrant ed further investigation.’ 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. See also [United States v.] Sokolow, [490 U.S. 1], at 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581[, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)] (<HOLDING>).” 534 U.S. at 274-75, 122 S.Ct. at 751. Judge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement (B) holding that contradictory or implausible travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity (C) holding that factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion (D) holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion (E) holding that factors which by themselves were quite consistent with innocent travel collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion
Output: (E)
the case, the district court granted the Diocese summary judgment on the basis that the Diocese’s claim against Gallagher was contractual. This time around, the summary judgment burden was on the Diocese, rather than Gallagher. Moreover, the district court considered additional evidence in granting the Diocese summary judgment, evidence that it did not have the opportunity to consider when it erroneously granted Gallagher summary judgment on the same issue. The Diocese even emphasizes this point in its brief: “On remand, the trial court was presented with even stronger evidence than before on the issue of Gallagher’s liability.” This court will not apply the law of the case to factual determinations if there is a different standard of review in the two appeals. See Royal, 3 F.3d at 881 (<HOLDING>). This court has also held that the law of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal (B) holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim (C) holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal (D) holding that because the standard of review for factual determinations on direct appeal is higher than the standard applied during an interlocutory appeal of a preliminary injunction the interlocutory appeal normally will not establish law of the case on factual matters (E) holding that jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal was lacking where defendants arguments rested on factual not legal grounds
Output: (D)
Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings). We affirm the dismissal of Acosta’s complaint against Watts. Acosta’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference against unknown named personnel in the Office of Medical Designation. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005 (<HOLDING>). Acosta alleged that he had a serious medical 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights (B) recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law (C) recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights (D) holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights (E) recognizing an action for damages against unknown federal agents for the violation of constitutional rights
Output: (E)
118 L.Ed.2d 543 (1992). Thus, § 1823(e) and the D’Oench doctrine encourage “banks and their customers [to] include the entire extent of their obligations in the bank’s records.” Id.; see also Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir.) (“The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine ... favors the interests of depositors and creditors of a failed bank, who cannot protect themselves from secret agreements, over the interests of borrowers, who can.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244, 112 L.Ed.2d 203 (1990); In re NEW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F.Supp. 1448, 1461-62 (D.D.C.1992) (describing D’Oench and § 1823(e) as “a regime that places the risk on borrowers if they do not get all of .2d 206 (1994); Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as originally enacted, § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership (B) holding that the doench doctrine extends to claims involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the failed financial institution in receivership (C) holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement (D) holding receipt of cab fare sufficient financial interest (E) holding that the doench doctrine extends broadly to cover any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come within the rtcs control as receiver of a failed financial institution including the financial interest of a whollyowned subsidiary
Output: (E)
intent and the public authority defense at a new trial, it should also provide an appropriate instruction articulating that reliance on the apparent authority of a government official is not a viable defense. 7 . In light of our conclusion that the district court properly granted a new trial, we need address only one additional issue on appeal. Michael contends that his indictment was defective because it failed to provide him with proper notice of the three drug-related violations underlying the continuing criminal enterprise count. His argument is without merit, however, because the CCE count in the indictment expressly incorporated by reference the predicate drug violations upon which the jury relied in convicting Michael. See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 863 (4th Cir.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court is permitted to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice (B) holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct (C) holding that an indictment which incorporated by reference the predicate drugrelated violations was sufficient to provide adequate notice for a cce count (D) holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint (E) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense
Output: (C)
law did not authorize the arresting officer to require Turbyne to take a breath test when the blood test was unavailable. Gillett, 629 P.2d at 619 n. 10. Nor do our decisions in Gillett and Riley construe the statute as allowing the police to compel a different test when extraordinary circumstances prevent administration of the driver-selected test. The good cause exception we established in those cases applies to excuse the judicial sanction of dismissal of the charges when the police are prevented in circumstances beyond their control from administering the driver-selected test. As Shinaut and Dike demonstrate, when a driver selected to take the chemical test not initially selected, he or she may have voluntarily consented to the search of his or her person. Shinaut, 940 P.2d at 384 (<HOLDING>). When the controlling facts are undisputed, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation (B) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (C) holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation (D) holding that erroneous accommodation of a citizens request by a police officer does not warrant the sanction of excluding evidence (E) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada
Output: (D)
entitled to relief from the stay under section 362(d)(1). 2. Section 862(d)(2) Colony also contends that it is entitled to relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2) because its collateral is not necessary for an effective reorganization. It argues that it is the only creditor of Mezz II and that a reorganization is not possible without its consent because Mezz II will have no accepting class of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). See also, In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 552, 568 (3d Cir.1994) (finding that the secured creditor’s assertion that it would oppose any proposed plan by debtor was “reason alone” to find that an effective reorganization was not realistically possible); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 87 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 161 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re 6200 Ridge, Inc., 69 B.R. 837, 844 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan (B) holding in the instant case although creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay it failed to object or appeal from the confirmation order accordingly creditor is bound by the confirmation order (C) holding that secured creditor was entitled to relief from the stay because the debtors proposed plan had no reasonable prospect of confirmation as a result of its improper classification scheme (D) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim (E) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case
Output: (C)
in their official capacities to the extent that she sought prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 671. When the district court ultimately dismissed Heike’s initial suit in its May 3, 2010 Order, the court explicitly stated that it was granting summary judgment to CMU’s officials both “in their individual and their official capacities.” Therefore, Heike’s misrepresentations notwithstanding, the district court’s May 3, 2010 Order granting summary judgment was indeed a judgment in favor of CMU’s officials in their official capacities. Moreover, it does not matter for purposes of claim preclusion that the district court granted summary judgment to CMU’s officials in both their official and individual capacities. See Pittman v. Mich. Corrs. Org., 123 Fed.Appx. 637, 640 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Any judgment for individual defendants in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata  (B) holding that a plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed because he could make no showing that the individual defendants acted in their individual capacities when they signed the contract on behalf of the employer housing authority (C) holding that claim preclusion barred a plaintiffs action because the individual defendants who were sued both in their official capacities and as individuals stood in privity with the govern mental entities (D) holding that fca retaliation claim must fail as against defendants sued in their individual capacities because such individuals were not employers (E) holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983
Output: (C)
motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2), for reduction of sentence based on a guideline amendment effective November 1, 2004, concerning drug quantity table 2Dl.l(a). The Government filed a motion to dismiss on October 7, 2005. DISCUSSION Section 3582(c)(2) allows a court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if it was based upon a sentencing range subsequently lowered by an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines and if a reduction is consistent with the policy set forth in the guidelines. In considering a motion for resentencing under § 3582, the court has discretion to determine whether it will elect to impose the newly-calculated sentence under the amended guidelines or to retain the original sentence. See United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 483-84 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This decision should be made in light of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no retroactive application (B) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding that the act is retroactive (E) holding that the act is not retroactive
Output: (B)
consistent with innocent conduct and showed “no indicia of criminal activity.” We find, however, that, taken together as a whole, Alston’s actions after he drove by the patrol car were sufficiently suspicious to provide Hixson with the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Alston from walking away from the scene. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23, 88 S.Ct. at 1880-81 (concluding that defendant’s “series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself,” in combination warranted further investigation by the police). Hixson’s brief detention of Alston was therefore reasonable to allow the officer to confirm or dispel his suspicion and to maintain the status quo during the course of the lawful roadside investigatory stop. See Hatcher, 14 Va.App. at 491-92, 419 S.E.2d at 259 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a police officers brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officers significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation particularly when events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on the passenger (B) holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit (C) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (D) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (E) holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety
Output: (A)
money judgment can be satisfied out of any of the defendant’s assets.” Billman, 915 F.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-03 (7th Cir.1985)). Consequently, after a conviction on a forfeiture count, the district court may order forfeiture of the defendant’s substitute assets. The Billman Court then examined the question of whether substitute assets could be restrained pending trial and ruled in the affirmative. 915 F.2d at 920-21. With an eye to the remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute, the court read the provision allowing for a restraining order in connection with the substitute assets provision as calling for the preservation and restraint of substitute assets pending trial. Id. at 921; see also United States v. Skiles, 715 F.Supp. 1567 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit in Billman relied on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use (B) holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute (C) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (D) holding in the drug trafficking context that the government is allowed to restrain additional assets pretrial to ensure sufficient assets for forfeiture (E) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking
Output: (D)
1 (1977), in which it reversed the Fifth Circuit’s vacation of a district court’s remand order where the district court “had employed erroneous principles in concluding that it was without jurisdiction.” Id. Despite the apparent broad scope of § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review, the Court emphasized in Thermtron that § 1447(d) must be read together with § 1447(c) and “that only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein,” are immune from appellate review under § 1447(d). 423 U.S. at 345-46, 96 S.Ct. at 590. Specifically, the Court held that § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review where a case has been properly removed to the district court and the remand order is issued on grounds not referable to § 1447(c). Id. at 343-45, 96 S.Ct. at 589-90 (<HOLDING>). Following Thermtron, substantial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal (B) holding remand order reviewable because crowded docket not ground for remand under  1447c (C) holding that under 28 usc  1447c and d federal jurisdiction terminates once a section 1447c remand order has been mailed to the state court (D) holding that remand order based on forum selection clause is reviewable on appeal (E) holding remand based on forum selection clause not within  1447c
Output: (B)
a handful of presentations, seminars and lectures. This sort of minimal activity is insufficient to satisfy the “use” element of the test. See Momentum Luggage & Leisure Bags v. Jansport, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 7909(DLC), 2001 WL 830667, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001), aff'd, 45 Fed.Appx. 42 (2d Cir.2002). In Momentum, the court examined the plaintiffs advertising, promotion, and sales and found that the plaintiff in that case never made deliberate and continuous use of its mark despite the plaintiff having exhibited products at an industry trade show, advertised in a magazine, generated approximately $3,000 in sales over two years, and having been mentioned in two trade show journals. Id. at *6; see, e.g., Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1400 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (cited in Momentum, 2001 WL 830667, at *7); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding we reject the appellants contention that a majority may be less than 50 of the citizen votingage population (B) holding that demands for benefits not less than 10 million dollars contributions greater than 50 million dollars and less than 100 million dollars and attorneys fees not less than 150000000 were ambiguous and did not satisfy the sum certain requirement (C) holding that when no statutory exception applies  the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory minimum (D) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (E) holding that gross sales of less than 5000 to fewer than 50 customers were below the minimum threshold for market penetration
Output: (E)
at that time to discover facts that would lead to the discovery of the present claim. Through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, Dulude should have discovered the nature of the defamation claim before April 17, 1995. Her claim, therefore, is time-barred. Dulude also maintains that the defamatory statements were repeated to á fellow nurse on their unit and that she could not have discovered such defamatory statements until the nurse’s deposition on May 18,1999. On that date, the nurse testified that she learned of the reason for Dulude’s termination “from what was said on the unit.” We find that such rumors regarding Dulude’s termination are insufficient to establish a claim of defamation against FAHC. See Szot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 596, 607-09 (D. Md. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Elicier v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (B) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter (C) holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict (D) holding that references to the rumor mill created by the plaintiffs former peers sheer speculation as to the grounds for her termination without more is insufficient to establish a claim of defamation against employer (E) holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment
Output: (D)
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues  when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a  1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action 
Output: (C)
written consent unambiguously agreeing to removal. See id. at *2, n. 1 (stating that “a majority of courts,..., have taken a strict approach and have held a representation by one defendant in the notice of removal that all defendants have consented to be insufficient, requiring instead that each defendant independently notify the court of its consent.” (internal citations omitted)). See also Ell v. S.E.T. Landscape Design, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (stating that “unambiguous written evidence of consent” by all defendants is required.) Defendants contend that the court has discretion to keep the case because this is a non-jurisdictional defect and the Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the delay in filing consent. See Gay v. Carlson, 1990 WL 20172 at *2 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>). However, even though a defect in removal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal was proper where the petitioning defendant stated that all parties agreed in its notice of removal and the petition was followed by the supplemental consent signed by each of the parties but filed outside the 30 day period (B) holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal (C) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (D) holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment (E) holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc  1446a and bars removal
Output: (A)
F.3d at 1562. With regard to the reduction in work hours, Belanger had his hours reduced even more than Beal; and thus, even assuming that Beal is correct in stating that she and Belanger were functionally equal in terms of job duties, Belanger was not treated more favorably than Neal. Belanger also is not a valid comparator for Beal’s disparate-discharge claim because he was terminated for unsatisfactory performance, while Beal was terminated for recording customer calls in violation of company policy. Because Beal failed to show the existence of a valid comparator in either her race discrimination or discriminatory discharge claims and does not present other evidence of discrimination, she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job (B) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (C) holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination (D) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (E) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case
Output: (C)
N.W.2d at 799, resolving ambiguities against the Insurers and in favor of Autopia, Nathe Bros., 615 N.W.2d at 344. The Eighth Circuit has determined that “[ljooking at how Congress described unsolicited fax advertisements, it is clear that Congress viewed vi the “right of privacy” under the ordinary meaning of that phrase. The Insurers further contend, however, that even if an invasion of privacy were alleged in the underlying lawsuit, it cannot give rise to coverage because of the type of privacy invasion at issue. The legal concept of privacy encompasses interests in both secrecy and seclusion. E.g., Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1248 (10th Cir.2006) (citations omitted); accord Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn.1998) (<HOLDING>). In the Insurers’ view, unsolicited faxes 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing four different privacy torts under minnesota law appropriation publication of private facts falselight publicity and intrusion upon seclusion (B) recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention (C) recognizing private right of action (D) holding that a plaintiff could not add civil claim based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally  and relate to the conduct of different individuals from facts in administrative charge (E) holding that a states law is materially different from california law if application of the other states law leads to a different result
Output: (A)
court denied the petition based on its conclusion that Boles had procedurally defaulted his claims by not raising them properly in the state court. Boles contends that appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to preserve his claims for review is cause for his procedural default and resulted in prejudice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). This contention was raised for the first time in Boles’s response to the order to show cause issued by the magistrate judge and was never presented in his habeas petition or in any appeal to the Arizona state courts. Consequently, Boles has not exhausted this claim in state court and the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); Edwards, 429 U.S. at 451, 453 (<HOLDING>). VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default (C) holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective (D) holding that each subcategory of ineffective assistance of counsel is an independent claim that must be sufficiently plead (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion
Output: (E)
software applications, as well as because of the effort involved in learning the new system and transferring files to its format. Findings of Fact ¶ 20. The court also found the Apple system less appealing to consumers because it costs considerably more and supports fewer applications. Id. ¶ 21. Microsoft responds only by saying: “the district court’s market definition is so narrow that it excludes Apple’s Mac OS, which has competed with Windows for years, simply because the Mac OS runs on a different microprocessor.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 84. This general, conclusory statement falls far short of what is required to challenge findings as clearly erroneous. Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102, 106 (D.C.Cir. 1980); see also Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Microsoft neither points to evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims made but not argued in a brief are waived (B) holding issues that are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived (C) holding that issues which are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived
Output: (A)
the activity undertaken by the Financial Services division, and a reasonable investor could not have reasonably understood them to be describing those risks. b The plaintiffs argue that Swiss Re’s portrayal of its risk management strategies and aptitude give rise to a claim for securities fraud, citing assertions that Swiss Re took a "cautious stance" regarding various risks, that it could "manage volatility," and that it engaged in "active management of financial market risk." (SAC ¶¶ 66, 73, 77, 89.) Such statements are "no more than `puffery’ which [do] not give rise to securities violations," because they are "too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them." ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 205-06 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as any of the defendants’ "cautious 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a pro se plaintiff is not an adequate class representative because the competence of a layman is clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that management fees lacked fair consideration because the recipient never ren dered corresponding management services (C) holding that statements such as that the defendant had risk management processes that are highly disciplined and designed to preserve the integrity of its risk management process are too general to be actionable internal quotation omitted (D) holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public (E) holding that statements that employee was doing a good job are more akin to opinions than statements of fact and on this basis are not actionable in fraud and citing a state case as holding that neither opinions nor statement that are general and indefinite are representations of fact giving rise to a misrepresentation claim
Output: (C)
2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (noting that “the failure to allege that the reasons for the dismissal were published dooms” plaintiffs liberty interest claim); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1440 (10th Cir.1988) (“A liberty interest is not violated when one is discharged without public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge.”). Thus, speculative rumors circulating in the community as a result of defendants’ failure to publish do not establish a deprivation of a liberty interest. While the injury to reputation asserted by the plaintiff may be actionable under state tort law , it falls far short of a constitutional violation. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 697-99, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim (B) holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person (C) holding that harassment or discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution under the ina unless it is accompanied by physical punishment infliction of harm or significant deprivation of liberty (D) holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted (E) holding that conduct actionable as state claim for defamation does not rise to level of liberty deprivation simply because government officials are involved
Output: (E)
pet. denied)). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the finding, and we disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. KT., 68 S.W.3d at 890; K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d at 395. If any evidence of probative force exists to support the finding, we will uphold the decision. K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d at 395. In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we review all the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to produce a firm belief or conviction in the minds of the jury of the allegations pleaded. K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 890. To constitute clear and convincing evidence under the Mental Health Code, the evidence must -include expert testimony and “evidence of a recent, overt act or a continuing pattern of behavior that allas 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Johnstone v. State, 961 S.W.2d 385, 387-88 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was pregnant and had sutures in her vagina not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (B) holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed (C) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was in military and that mail carrier was responsible for her welfare not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (D) holding evidence of patients schizophrenia auditory hallucinations paranoia irritability and refusal to take medication not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (E) holding evidence of patients psychotic behavior delusions that she had undergone surgery by satellite and had electronics implanted in her not sufficient to meet required statutory burden
Output: (C)
like the defendants here, failed to attach process to its notice of removal. Id. at 1214. In denying remand, the court stated that the failure to attach process was inadvertent and trivial and “did not unduly burden the court or reflect the complete failure to follow the removal procedure that typically leads to remand orders.... Important, also, is the fact that plaintiff has suffered absolutely no prejudice whatsoever from the defect and this defect can be promptly and easily remedied by allowing the defendant to file its proposed amended notice of removal.” Id. Plaintiff argues that this court must remand the case back to state court because defendant failed to attach process. To support this proposition, plaintiff cites Albonetti v. GAF Corp.-Chemical Gp., 520 F.Supp. 8 .Ala.2004) (<HOLDING>); Emp’rs-Shopmens Local 516 Pension Trust v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (B) holding that 28 usc  1446as requirement of attached process is jurisdictional and defendants failure to attach process precluded removal (C) holding that a defendants failure to attach process to its notice of removal was not fatal and did not require remand (D) holding that failure to include all state court pleadings and process with the notice of removal is procedurally incorrect but is not a jurisdictional defect (E) holding that 28 usc  2401 is a jurisdictional statute of limitations
Output: (B)
charges for work related to preparation of the discovery requests that were served on Awoniyi on September 11, 2006. Nor, however, does she state that the requested fee does not include such charges. Work related to the discovery requests could constitute “defense of th[e] case,” which the hospital’s attorney testified constitutes a basis for the incurred fee. Further, the affidavit testimony is dated October 17, 2006, more than a month after service of the discovery requests on Awoniyi. Under these circumstances, we cannot exclude the possibility that preparation of the discovery requests forms the basis for some portion of the awarded fee. Evidence of unsegregated fees constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence of segregated attorney’s fees. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 12 (<HOLDING>). Where a fee award is erroneously based on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law (B) holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award (C) holding that unsegregated attorneys fees must be remanded (D) holding that where plaintiff sought recovery of fees against multiple defendants evidence of unsegregated fees was more than a scintilla of evidence to support fee award what a reasonable attorneys fee would be for the entire case indicates what the segregated amount  should be (E) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees
Output: (D)
then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum “[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case.” Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a), the predecessor to § 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
Output: (B)
However, we find it difficult to draw that inference here. The key to our view of the facts is that the police knew all along that they were surveilling Ms. Lewis’ apartment. Hawes testified that he had been advised that Ms. Lewis resided there, and the officers had no reason to assume that she was not there on the day they arrested Colbert. In fact, it is altogether incredible that an officer would be surprised by the fact that a resident of a home would come out of his or her house upon seeing a large group of undercover police officers arresting an individual who just left that resident’s apartment. In addition, there is no indication that Ms. Lewis herself posed any kind of a threat to the officers, indeed she wasn’t searched or taken into custody at all. See United S 6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this justification threatens to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest (B) holding that the officers awareness that the defendant could be dangerous and that he had a previous weapons conviction was not enough to justify the sweep because once the defendant was in custody he no longer posed a threat to the police (C) holding that search of appellants suitcase found on the floor next to the couch on which he was sleeping was an unconstitutional search of his person and was not authorized by a search of the residence (D) holding unconstitutional a sweep of the second floor of a house after arrest occurred on first floor where officers could point to no specific basis for believing anyone posed a threat from the second floor (E) holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene
Output: (D)
area in determining that the proposed sale includes no old growth forest. AR Tab 59, pp. 13, 44. Using a different definition of old growth forest, the Virginia Department of Conservation Resources identified ten acres of the sale as old growth. The Forest Service argues that the state agency’s definition of old growth is more simplistic and produces less representative stand ages because it uses a single age cutoff for all. species, focuses on the older trees in a stand, and considers no factors other than age. The court need not concern itself with the merits of the competing methodologies, however, because the Forest Service is entitled to substantial deference on scientific questions within its area of technical expertise. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 621 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference (B) holding the agency is entitled to use its own methodology unless it is irrational (C) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (D) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (E) holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor
Output: (B)