niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA”) agent in Mexico. Id. at 2746. Due to difficulties in extricating the plaintiff from Mexico, the DEA hired a group of Mexican nationals to abduct, the plaintiff and transport him by private plane to the U.S. where he was arrested. Id. He stood trial for his alleged crimes and was acquitted. Id. After returning to Mexico, he instituted a civil action against several Mexican nationals and the DEA. Id. at 2747. 17 . The Court notes that the delayed discovery rule does not apply to § 17200 claims. See Snapp & Associates Ins. Services, Inc. v. Robertson, 96 Cal.App.4th 884, 891, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 331 (2002). 18 . The Court notes that it must take these statements regarding foreign policy at face value. See Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (<HOLDING>); cf. Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 21 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court must accept the statement of foreign policy provided by the executive branch as conclusive of its view of that subject it may not assess whether the policy articulated is wise or unwise or whether it is based on misinformation or faulty reasoning (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) holding that whether a particular document is subject to the work product protection depends on whether the subject matter of the document concerns preparation or strategy or the appraisal of the strengths or weaknesses of the companys case or the activities of the attorneys in preparing their case or is at least primarily concerned with legal assistance and not simply underlying evidence (D) holding that a local government may be held liable for its employees constitutional violation only when the employee is executing the governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy (E) holding that it is not
Output: (A)
her “a bitch and a slut.” He also testified that the next morning, the victim was upset because there were “a lot of hickeys on her neck.” Defendant claimed the marks on the victim’s neck that appeared in the photos introduced by the State were hickeys and not cuts. This testimony indicates that Defendant was arguing that he caused the marks on the victim’s neck either by mistake or with the victim’s consent. In view of Defendant’s testimony, we agree that the testimony of Chavez and Jaramillo was not improper propensity evidence, and we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the testimony was relevant to show, among other things, absence of mistake regarding the victim’s injuries. See State v. Jones, 120 N.M. 185, 187, 899 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION {76} We hold that the victim’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is error for a trial court to admit evidence of prior bad acts without properly conditioning the jurys use of that evidence (B) holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred (C) holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility (D) holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime (E) holding prior bad acts evidence is admissible where there is an articulation or identification of the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other acts is directed
Output: (E)
(quotation omitted). To obtain a conviction under the witness tampering statute, the State had to show that the defendant believed Bryar was a potential witness. Kilgus, 125 N.H. at 742, 484 A.2d at 1211. Indictments underlying the case charged the defendant with conspiracy to purchase drugs, with obscenity for showing an explicit film to a minor, and with prostitution for transporting Bryar to engage in sex for consideration. Testimony that Bryar had stated he received drugs and money in exchange for sex made the defendant’s actual belief of Bryar’s status as a witness more probable. Such testimony also rendered more likely the State’s version of why the defendant promised Bryar cash, a car, and a Canadian address. Cf. State v. Whitney, 125 N.H. 636, 638-39, 484 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1984) (<HOLDING>). On these facts, the trial court could find 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent (B) holding that evidence of prior convictions is proof of motive for witness tampering (C) holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial (D) holding extrinsic evidence of defendants motive to possess gun inadmissible where defendant did not contest the issue of motive (E) holding that when a defendant admits prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing he waives any complaints about the validity of the prior convictions
Output: (B)
for the state, he had on several occasions aided in investigations and acted as an informant on numerous previous occasions. At the evidentiary hearing, Maxwell learned for the first time that Storch had assisted the LAPD’s forgery division in the investigation of multiple forgery cases pri- or to Maxwell’s trial. As this court explained in Benn, “[t]he state argues that this undisclosed evidence about [the informant’s] history was not material; however ... undisclosed evidence that an informant had previously participated in a ... investigation was important impeachment evidence that could have been used to discredit the informant’s trial testimony that he had not previously participated in that type of investigation.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1058; see also Shaffer, 789 F.2d at 688-89 (<HOLDING>). In light of the import of Storch’s testimony, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exclusion of testimony from defendants wife at defendants trial was not required under spousal testimony privilege where both spouses participated in unlawful enterprise of transporting illegal aliens and wifes testimony concerned matters prior to their marriage (B) holding that where defendant sought to exclude evidence prior to trial and again just prior to witnesss testimony at issue it was not necessary for defendant to object to testimony when it was actually put before jury (C) holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit (D) holding that defendants undisclosed prior involvement in a state investigation contradicts his prior testimony and was material (E) holding that where a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to crossexamination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony
Output: (D)
in the sanction proceedings, the court's prior factual findings in this matter require the court to impose an additional sanction against the Esso Defendants and their former counsel. Having canvassed the literature, both commentary and case law, concerning sanctions, the court has identified few alternatives to the routine monetary sanction of fee shifting. Nevertheless, the court is undeterred from its mission of fashioning an appropriate sanction and is willing to adopt a novel, innovative approach. See, Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45. Pursuant to its inherent powers, the court has considered both the imposition of a fine on the Esso Defend al Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 40 L. Ed. 2d 703, 94 S. Ct. 2157 (1974) (same); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Titus, 695 F.2d at 749 n. 6 (recognizing the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (B) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process (C) recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties (D) recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions to the lawyers firm or employer (E) recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants
Output: (D)
(8th Cir.2007)). “Continuances are generally disfavored and are not granted without a compelling reason.” Id. We have held the FSA is not retroactive. See United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir.2011) (concluding “the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, requires us to apply the penalties in place at the time the crime was committed”) (quoting United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909-10 n. 7 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McBride, — Fed.Appx. -,-, No. 10-2689, 2011 WL 2206725, at *2 (8th Cir.June 8, 2011) (unpub. per curiam). But even if we assume Woods can show prejudice, Woods fails to provide any support for his contention the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. See id. at-, 2011 WL 2206725, at *3 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 414 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second continuance until congress acted on the fsa and assuming error no prejudice exists because the fsa is not retroactive (B) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (C) holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
Output: (A)
court to apply the enhancement. United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63-64 (11th Cir.1995) (per curiam). Evidence that a defendant used or could have used a firearm to protect his criminal activity is sufficient to show a connection between the firearm and the offense, and will thus satisfy the government’s burden under § 2Dl.l(b)(l). See United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 91-92, 94-95 (11th Cir.2013) (“While other facts, such as whether the firearm is loaded, or inside a locked container, might be relevant to negate a connection, there is a strong presumption that a defendant aware of the weapon’s presence will think of using it if his illegal activities are threatened. The firearm’s 'potential use is critical.”); United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709, 715-16 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). With respect to whether a defendant has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (B) holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations (C) holding that defendants personal items and sworn declaration and police officers testimony that the defendant had stayed in a house the night before are insufficient to establish defendants expectation of privacy (D) holding that government met its burden with evidence that agents found a firearm and other drugrelated items in the defendants house where defendant engaged in conspiratorial conversations (E) holding that the fortress theory applied where a firearm and marijuana were found on a night stand and cocaine was found in the same room as defendant had easy access to the firearm
Output: (D)
Initiatives was aware of Gretillat's kneeling, crouching and squatting limitations because, after Gretillat’s fitness-for-duty exam, Paca reported to Care Initiatives that Gretillat stated “that given her right total knee replacement it is contraindicated for her to kneel, crouch or squat and she admits to me that ... she cannot do this today.” Such an argument would fail for two reasons: (1) Paca’s report does not indicate that Gretillat had a permanent or long-term limitation, see Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 ("The impairment’s impact must ... be permanent or long term.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001)), and (2) Care Initiatives was entitled to rely on Dr. Fehrle's correspondence, which indicated no such problems, see, e.g., Alexander, 321 F.3d at 727 (<HOLDING>). It is also unclear whether squatting, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding employer justified in relying upon plaintiffs physician (B) holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician (C) holding employer was entitled to rely and act upon the written advice from the employees physician (D) recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician (E) holding physician entitled to recover attorneys fees actually paid by malpractice insurer because physician was personally liable in the first instance
Output: (A)
in Bartley-Williams, “[a] bankruptcy trustee occupies a different position than the bankrupt” because under the bankruptcy rules, property not abandoned or administered remains property of the estate. Id. at 101; accord 11 U.S.C. § 554(d). The Bartley-Williams court reasoned that prohibiting a bankruptcy trustee from “pursuing [a] claim on behalf of the estate” ignored the role of the trustee in bankruptcy proceedings and could “create a windfall for the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel at the expense of the bankruptcy creditors.” 134 Wn. App. at 102. The Bartley-Williams court held that the “correct solution” was to allow the trustee to “ ‘determine whether to deal with the cause of action for the benefit of the estate.’ ” Id. at 102 (quoting Cheng 70, 774 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:04CV01527, 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (B) holding that a bankruptcy trustee is barred from pursuing claims for injuries particularized to certain creditors (C) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (D) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (E) holding that a plantshutdown benefit is not an optional form of benefit
Output: (D)
1983). VI CONCLUSION To sum up, the Act of 1871 was a response to a profound breakdown in state government. Congress guaranteed by Section 1 of the Act that every person should have a federal remedy for failure of any state actor to afford a person the rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Among the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is that no state shall deprive a person of property without due process of law, nor deny to that person the equal protection of the laws. In the setting of municipal land use controversies, our State has well established procedures, including judicial review of municipal governance, to assure government under law. See Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 645 A.2d 89 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We are satisfied that the principles of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that municipal government may not exercise unguided developmental powers but must incorporate standards of decision in dulyenacted ordinances (B) holding that a policy for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an officials single decision (C) recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government  (D) holding that municipal pension boards may not be sued (E) holding a court of criminal appeals may not exercise its sentence approval powers to criticize a state court conviction
Output: (A)
Plaintiff provided Defendant timely notice of his claim with regard to the Schering suit. State Sec. Ins., 145 Ill.2d at 431, 583 N.E.2d at 551, 164 Ill.Dec. at 635. Plaintiff argues that he did provide timely notice to Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that he immediately contacted Defendant’s agent, James Markwell, upon learning that Scher-ing had filed a petition for a rule to show cause with Judge Hart. Moreover, based upon his prior dealings with Markwell, Plaintiff claims that he did not believe that a written notice of his claim was necessary. However, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff timely notified Defendant of the “occurrence.” First, it is highly questionable whether Markwell was Defendant’s agent, .App.3d 232, 237, 456 N.E.2d 348, 352, 74 Ill.Dec. 846, 850 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Illinois Valley Minerals Corp. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a one month delay is acceptable (B) holding that a six month delay was unreasonable (C) holding that a 14 month delay was unreasonable (D) holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable (E) holding that a five month delay was unreasonable
Output: (E)
that possession of the following depictions violates § 1466A(b)(1): Prosecution Exhibits 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 40, 54, 55, 77, 90, 106, 120, 121, 122, 123, 132, 143, 149, 154, 156, 157, 183, 184, 206, 277, 285, 316, 319, 326, and 335. 4 . Contrary to the military judge's special findings of Specification 3 of The Charge, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that possession of the depiction in Prosecution Exhibit 13 violates § 1466A(b)(1). 5 . Appellant does not contend that § 1466A(b)(1) is facially unconstitutional. This subsection is neither vague nor overbroad because it explicitly requires the offending material meet the Miller definition of constitutionally unprotected obscenity. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293, 297, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaring statute facially unconstitutional deprives trial court of subjectmatter jurisdiction (B) holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application (C) holding texas flagdesecration statute facially unconstitutional (D) holding section 61132b2c facially unconstitutional (E) holding that a statute whose definitions precisely track the material held constitutionally proscribable in ferber and miller was not facially unconstitutional
Output: (E)
“no additional proof of discrimination is required.” Thus, [plaintiff] did not fail to offer sufficient evidence of discrimination by not presenting more evidence after [defendant] endeavored to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for his actions. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 385 (2d Cir.) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749) (emphasis and alterations to Hicks quotation in original), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 205, 130 L.Ed.2d 135 (1994). Moreover, the trier of fact can decide not only that the reasons proffered by defendant are pretextual but can also “generally infer discrimination when it finds that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir.1995). See also, Ethan Allen, 44 F.3d at 120 (<HOLDING>); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination (B) holding that a finding of pretextuality allows a juror to reject a defendants proffered reasons for a challenged employment action and thus permits the ultimate inference of discrimination (C) holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons (D) holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim (E) holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination
Output: (B)
tools,” some of which are traditionally employed to decide causation questions and some of which are employed to decide standing questions. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311 (“Here we use ‘proximate cause’ to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts. At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and convenient.”) (quotation omitted); see Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532-33, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) (“Congress simply assumed' that antitrust damages litigation would be subject to constraints comparable to well-accepted common-law rules applied in co Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rico plaintiff alleging destruction of the value of his stock lacks standing because his injury is derivative of the corporations injury (B) holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury (C) holding that health care trust funds that paid medical claims could not sue tobacco companies under rico because their injury was derivative of smokers injury and stating a direct relationship between the injury and the alleged wrongdoing although not the sole requirement of rico  proximate causation has been one of its central elements citations omitted (D) holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
Output: (B)
“a certain transcript of a book Brenner was writing, including handwritten notes,” entitled “Unleash the Warrior Goddess Within.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108-12.) In their post-trial submissions, however, Plaintiffs further allege a cause of action for conversion of Pure Power’s confidential business documents, including its client list. To state a claim for conversion under New York law, a plaintiff must show that “someone, intentionally and without authority, assume[d] or exercise[d] control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person’s right of possession.” Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49-50, 827 N.Y.S.2d 96, 100, 860 N.E.2d 713 (2006); accord Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 403-04 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). A plaintiff must show: (1) a “possessory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information (B) holding that where plaintiff did not allege that it was deprived of or excluded from use of its own customer lists it could not establish conversion (C) holding that where defendant retained possession of and deprived plaintiff access to business records a claim for conversion was properly stated (D) holding that electronic records may be subject to a claim for conversion (E) holding complaint was not based on a conversion claim but was a declaratory judgment action thus not governed by conversion statute of limitations
Output: (C)
preventing employee from "working in any geographic space in which [employer] operates” where employer had interest in confidential information); Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Hewes, No. 061995B, 2006 WL 3292810, at *1-2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2006) (lack of geographic scope restriction in non-compete not fatal to enforcement of restrictive covenant when employer was national company). 17 . See Miller Mech., Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So.2d 11, 12-13 (Fla.1974) (citing Kenco Chem. and Manufacturing Co. v. Railey, 286 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 732 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Balasco v. Gulf Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Health Care Financial Enterprises, Inc. v. Levy, 715 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 18 .Under Florida law, courts are required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (B) holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it (C) recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope (D) holding that court may not refuse to enforce noncompete agreement solely because geographical area is unreasonable but rather must modify unreasonable restriction and enforce agreement as modified (E) holding an employer may partially enforce a noncompete agreement to the extent it is reasonable under the circumstances
Output: (D)
such generalized allegations are irrelevant —that they are inferentially barren — or that other factual allegations cannot strengthen the inference of scien-ter to be drawn from them. But, in order to satisfy their pleading burden by pleading motive alone, securities fraud plaintiffs must plead additional facts going to motive that sufficiently strengthen any inferences of scien-ter and weaken other inferences of a noncul-pable state of mind. Even if the motive allegations in a complaint fail in themselves to meet the pleading burden, however, they may still be considered along with other allegations of direct or circumstantial facts in the ultimate determination of whether the totality of the circumstances raise a " 6384, 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 20306, at *49 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 29, 1998) (<HOLDING>); and In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that total proceeds from insider sales of 106 million raised inference of scienter (B) holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  (C) holding that sales of corporate stock by six individual defendants for a total of approximately 4200000 were sufficient to support inference of scienter against them under prepslra pleading standard (D) holding that 20 of individual defendants holdings raised an inference of scienter (E) holding that where a defendant sold no stock at all this suggested that there was no insider information from which to benefit and there was not a strong inference of scienter
Output: (A)
the same test is used with respect to appellate counsel.”). In other words, Petitioner “must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable” in failing to raise the issue on appeal, and then “must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure [to raise the issue], he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 285-86, 120 S.Ct. 746. Under the first prong, “it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent” for “fail[ing] to raise a particular claim” because “appellate counsel ... need not (and should not) raise every non-frivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746; see also Jones, 463 U.S. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (<HOLDING>); Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 95 (“Counsel is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (B) holding that appellate counsel is not required to raise meritless issues on appeal (C) holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction (D) recognizing that appellate counsel is under no duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by a client (E) recognizing that every theory of relief must raise federal issue for claim to arise under federal law
Output: (D)
we overrule appellant’s first point of error. B. Finger-Counting and Hand-Clapping Tests In appellant’s second point of error, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting Trooper Pickett’s testimony concerning the manner in which appellant performed two other field sobriety tests, the “finger-counting” and “hand-clapping” tests. Appellant argues his performance of these tests constituted testimonial acts done prior to receiving his Miranda warning, which rendered testimony concerning appellant’s performance inadmissible. Appellant bases his argument upon the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), as followed in Texas by Vickers v. State, 878 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by admitting a doctors testimony that a child victims description of a sexual crime was very believable (B) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (C) holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence (D) holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child (E) holding that trial court erred by admitting a video showing suspect taking sobriety tests consisting of the recitation of the alphabet from f to w and counting backwards from 90 to 75
Output: (E)
debtors each with two copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel and vacated and remanded the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that rescission may not be conditioned upon tender by debtors. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Jaaskelainen, 407 B.R. 449, 463 (D.Mass.2009). While not relevant here, this Court has expressed a different view as to the latter issue. See Giza I at 273-276. 21 . The Court noted the "split over whether a borrower’s testimony of non-receipt [by itself] is enough to rebut the presumption of delivery in TILA.” In re Sousa, at *6. Compare CUNA Mut. Ins. Group v. Williams, 185 B.R. 598, 599 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) ("The law in this circuit is that denial of receipt does not rebut the presumption.”); Rhoades v. Credithrift, Inc. (In re Rhoades), 80 B.R. 938, 941 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1987) (<HOLDING>); McCarthy v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 362 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct (B) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (C) holding something more than denial of receipt is required (D) holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing (E) holding that probable cause is something more than mere suspicion
Output: (C)
that the first question had not been filled out and subsequently explained that the jury had been unable to reach a unanimous answer to the first question, but had unanimously answered “no” to the second question. Based on the jury’s unanimous answer to the second question and on instruction 28, the trial judge accepted the verdict for Dr. Vigil and denied the Do-marais’ motion for a new trial. II. Jury Verdict The Domanns now appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for a new trial, arguing that the jury .verdict was inconsistent and incomplete. We review a district court’s refusal to grant a new trial based on a finding that the jury verdict is not inconsistent for abuse of discretion. Harvey ex rel. Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court has broad discretion in granting denying dissolving or modifying injunctions and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated appellate courts will not disturb the trial courts decision (B) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (C) holding that we will not overturn a denial of a rule 59 motion absent an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the trial courts denial of a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence is reviewable only for abuse of discretion (E) holding that when plaintiffs argue an inconsistent jury verdict this court will not disturb the trial courts denial of a motion for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion
Output: (E)
” Larson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Meeropol v. Meese, 252 U.S.App. D.C. 381, 790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C.Cir.1986) (emphasis added)). The CIA was “not obliged to look beyond the four corners of the request for leads to the location of responsive documents.” Kowalczyk v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C.Cir.1996); but cf. Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C.Cir.1998) (requiring that an agency expand the scope of its search if during the search the agency discovers information suggesting the existence of documents elsewhere). The CIA’s failure, moreover, to produce a particular document does not necessarily undermine the adequacy of a search. Lasko v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2010 WL 3521595, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Sept. 3, 2010) (<HOLDING>). Here, the CIA construed the plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents (B) holding that the failure to produce particular documents does not undermine the adequacy of a search citing wilbur v cent intelligence agency 355 f3d 675 678 dccir2004 (C) holding that an agency may only tier to documents subject to nepa review and citing cases (D) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (E) holding that it was fanciful to think that the court had revised its jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction
Output: (B)
at 73. The BIA’s finding that Dong was not credible is supported by substantial evidence. There is at least one material inconsistency between Dong’s and his wife’s account of his family’s persecution at the hands of the family planning officials. Dong testified on direct examination that he did not witness he family planning officials taking his wife from their home for a forced abortion. In a letter to the IJ, Dong’s wife stated that her husband had been home and had been beaten by the family planning officials. This inconsistency is directly related to Dong’s claim of persecution, and therefore is a “specific, cogent” reason that bears a “legitimate nexus” to the BIA’s conclusion that Dong was not credible in his description of his family’s persecution. See Zhang, 386 F.3d at 77-78 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Dong failed to carry his burden 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any alleged inconsistencies in dates that reveal nothing about a petitioners credibility cannot form the basis of an adverse credibility finding (B) holding the bias decision upholding the ijs finding of removability  was the final order (C) holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization (D) holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination (E) holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable
Output: (C)
(ruling that ordinance requiring developer of subdivision to “dedicate seven percent of the land area of the proposed subdivision to the public use” or pay equivalent in cash be reasonable); Mantua Town v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1978) (“[A court] will not intervene [in the administration of municipal services] unless the administrative action is capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable....”); Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285, 287 (1946) (mandamus will not lie to compel town officials to extend water line to plaintiffs residence unless refusal is unreasonable). Furthermore, courts of this state have not hesitated to enforce reasonableness in myriad other situations involving other services. See, e.g., Crawford v. City of Manti, 18 Utah 2d 79, 415 P.2d 665 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Oil Co., 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that territorial jurisdiction must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ordinance regulating cityowned cemetery must be reasonable (C) holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident (D) holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable (E) holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary
Output: (B)
of the statute did not recognize mere statements to a supervisor as a protected activity. Id.; see also Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir.1993) (“The plain language of this provision limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.”) (citations omitted). Other courts have found oral complaints to be protected activity, but it is difficult to draw guidance from these decisions be cause many of them do not specifically state whether the complaint in question was written or purely verbal, and none discusses the statute’s use of the verb “to file” and whether it requires a writing. See EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of the verbalwritten distinction that employees voicing of concern was protected activity (B) holding without discussion of the verbalwritten distinction that plaintiffs apparently oral complaints to supervisors were protected activity (C) holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity (D) holding that written but not oral internal complaints are protected based on the inclusion of the verb filed (E) holding without discussion of the verbalwritten distinction that defendants mistaken belief that plaintiff had made apparently oral complaints to supervisors was grounds for suit
Output: (B)
transfer, and everything else about the transaction was local to St. Thomas, to wit: Franklin Martinez, the lender and president of Transcaribbean, is a St. Thomas resident and has substantial business interests in the Virgin Islands. Those interests include that Martinez is an officer and part-owner of Colombian Emeralds, Inc. and its subsidiaries, and a part-owner of Sea Wind Food Distributors, Inc., Clark asserts that federal jurisdiction is inappo-site because the transaction occurred between Martinez and Peter Clark — both local businessmen — and involved a loan to fund a local real-estate development. This argument fails because the Court may assume jurisdiction on the basis of a single interstate wire communication. See United States v. Pecora, 693 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, facts alleged by Clark about the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (B) holding that the jurys guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery under federal law confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted the defendant of honest services fraud if the courts definition had been limited to the bribery basis that skilling expressly approved (C) holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored (D) holding that a federal court can assume jurisdiction over a local bribery ease involving only local residents on the basis of a single interstate telephone call (E) holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed
Output: (D)
until her date last insured, nor did it mention how frequently Claimant’s MS symptoms arise. (Id.) The fact that the ALJ indicated it was “difficult to determine the exact period of time covered by Dr. Russell’s opinion” reveals the presence of an ambiguity that the ALJ was required to resolve. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1) (2010). The time-frame the letter covers is especially important, as the record shows Claimant suffered a serious, five week long MS flare-up from February to March 2006 — mere weeks before her insured status lapsed. (R. at 14, 18); SSR 96-2p. Likewise, the ALJ made no effort to recontact Dr. TothRussell to explain the ambiguity surrounding the frequency and severity of Claimant’s MS flare-ups. (R. at 20); see Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Had the ALJ done so, Dr. Toth-Russell could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to more deference than a foreign plaintiffs (B) holding that because the alj did not have the plaintiffs entire prior record he could not have constructively reopened the prior applications (C) holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim (D) holding that plaintiffs are not required  to have asked for the precise form of relief that the district court may ultimately grant (E) holding that the alj should have contacted the plaintiffs doctor and asked for more detail regarding the fre quency of plaintiffs seizures
Output: (E)
the district court’s Rule 10(e) factual findings in the Settling Order were appropriate, the Defendants have not made the requisite showing of an affirmative courtroom closure for a non-trivial duration. See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, “exclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee”); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Settling Order reveals that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the sixth amendment right to a public trial (B) recognizing that the sixth amendment is not violated every time the public is excluded from a courtroom an unjustified closure may on its facts be so trivial as not to violate the sixth amendment guarantee (C) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (E) holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial
Output: (A)
State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444, 221 A.2d 521 (1966))); Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). Our construction of N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) is thus consonant with established principles of statutory construction. | IV. Applying statutes that are identical or very similar to the statute before the Court, courts of other states have reached varying conclusions. Several decisions have construed analogous statutes to describe two offenses, as this Court construes N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b). See People v. Butler, 81 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 856, 857 (Cal.Ct.App.1978) (construing Cal. Veh.Code § 21658 to state “two affirmative duties placed upon the operator of a motor vehicle”); People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that plain language of 625 ill comp stat ann 511709 establishes two separate requirements for lane usage (C) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (D) holding that in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders (E) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms
Output: (B)
CURIAM. Carl Headley Chambers appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Chambers v. Brooks, No. CA-01-1389-AM (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 11, 2001; entered Oct. 12, 2001); see also United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201-02 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 937, 121 S.Ct. 1393, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi does not apply to a judges exercise of sentencing discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute (B) holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 (C) holding that apprendi does not apply to judges exercise of sentencing discretion within statutory range so long as defendants sentence is not set beyond maximum term specified in substantive statute (D) holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 does not apply to a judges exercise of discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute (E) holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum
Output: (D)