niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
chance to work out a problem.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2007)); Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LP, 534 F.3d 473, 482 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding employee could not recover because she “assumed the worst and made no effort to allow Wal-Mart the opportunity to remedy the problems she identified”); Barker v. YMCA of Racine, 18 Fed.Appx. 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Employees who quit without giving their employer a reasonable chance to resolve a problem have not been constructively discharged. Here, Ms. Barker did not try to resolve her work problems—she merely walked away from her job without notice .... ” (Citation omitted.)); Yearous v. Niobrara Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1357 (10th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no constructive discharge when plaintiffs only waited brief time before resigning and unreasonably refused to explore any option short of resignation (B) holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute (C) holding claim accrued when employee tendered letter of resignation not when resignation became effective (D) holding that constructive discharge may qualify as a tangible employment action depriving employer of right to assert affirmative defense when a supervisors official act precipitates the constructive discharge (E) recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard
Output: (A)
and only uncontroverted factual allegations are accepted as true.... ” Id. (internal citations omitted). Both the movant and the pleader are permitted to use affidavits and other pleading materials to support and oppose the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000) (citation omitted). “Furthermore, ‘jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.’ ” Gunst v. Seaga, No. 05 Civ. 2626, 2007 WL 1032265, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (quoting Shipping Financial Services Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1998)); see also State Employees Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court can look beyond the face of the pleadings in order to find predicate jurisdictional facts when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that a court may review any evidence such as affidavits and testimony to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction (C) holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction (D) holding that if the resolution of a factual issue is necessary for a ruling on a motionto dismiss the court must go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact (E) holding that in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a court may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings including affidavits
Output: (E)
the [retroactive] amendments ... for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and ... leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1) (emphasis added); see United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 615 (3d Cir.2002) (“only the retroactive amendment is to be considered at a resentencing under § 3582”). Thus, in Barner’s case, the District Court was limited to ascertaining Barner’s Guidelines range had Amendment 706 been in place during his initial sentencing. The District Court lacked authority to reconsider its initial criminal history calculation or any other component of Barner’s initial sentence that was not affected by a retroactive amendment. Cf. United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the District Court did not err 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that application of career offender enhancement falls within exception for prior convictions where facts are undisputed making it unnecessary for district court to engage in further fact finding about prior convictions (B) holding that the district court lacked authority to revisit the application of the career offender enhancement in a  3582 motion because that enhancement was not affected by a retroactive amendment (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding that reduced career offender status was nonetheless based the career offender guidelines (E) holding that the defendants substantial rights were not affected by a sentencing guidelines enhancement even in the absence of a specific finding by the district court because the evidence amply supported the enhancement
Output: (B)
firmness in fear of immediate bodily harm. State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1967) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, based on the underlying factual scenario giving rise to Defendant’s charges, we believe an assault with a deadly weapon was involved in the commission of the crime of resisting an officer. Specifically, Defendant’s actions of stating that he wasn’t going with the officers, running into the bedroom where he stood within arm’s reach of a loaded revolver, and resisting while being handcuffed and removed from the bedroom were an “unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to” the officers. Id.; see also State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. App. 302, 307, 638 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). In sum, the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unloaded gun used in the commission of an aggravated assault is a deadly weapon (B) holding that an obstructionofjustice enhancement was appropriate based on the defendants assault on a witness after trial and rejecting the defendants argument that because the assault occurred after trial it could not impact the prosecution of his case (C) holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer (D) holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates (E) holding that we are not persuaded by defendants contention that an assault did not take place because he never made physical contact with the weapon in light of the evidence showing that the gun was only inches from defendants outstretched hand and that defendant was actively forcefully and to some degree successfully resisting the officers attempt to arrest him we do not believe in light of our states definition of assault that defendants failure to physically touch the weapon precludes the commission of an assault with the firearm
Output: (E)
the Bolivarian Circles would pursue and attack him if he returned to Venezuela after a five year absence. Although Lubo argued that the Bolivarian Circles maintained a list with the names of approximately 3.5 million opponents of Chavez on the Internet, Lubo did not demonstrate that assailants targeted people on the list or that they would have a reason to target him specifically. Also, the fact that Lubo’s father remains politically active in Venezuela and has been physically harmed only once in 2005 during an attack that Lubo could not establish was related to political activity, and the fact that Lubo’s sister lives in Venezuela without incident suggest that Lubo’s fear of future persecution is not reasonable. See Ruiz v. United States Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1259 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). B. Withholding of Removal Since we are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that record did not compel finding of asylum on grounds of a future fear of persecution in part because the petitioners child and parents remained in columbia unharmed (B) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable (C) holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412 (D) holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable (E) holding that ability of applicants family to remain unharmed cuts against finding of wellfounded fear
Output: (A)
See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii
Output: (E)
the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case and the matter must be dismissed according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time, either in a pleading or a motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Television Reception Corp. v. Dunbar, 426 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir.1970). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion. Michigan Southern R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass’n., Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir.2002); see also Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir.1990). In most circumstances, the failure to commence an action w s Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Complaints for refunds of taxes and penalties 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (C) holding 30day limit to be mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding that the 30day deadline to file a notice of appeal with the bia was not jurisdictional
Output: (D)
over everything contained anywhere in it.” Leach, 296 Md. at 596, 463 A.2d 872. While executing a valid search warrant, the police found phencyclidine (PCP) in a closed container in a bedroom closet. The Court held that this evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, because “fe]ven though [the defendant] had ready access to the apartment, it cannot be reasonably inferred that he exercised restraining or directing influence over PCP in a closed container on the bedroom dresser or over paraphernalia in the bedroom closet.” Id. (emphasis added) Taylor also discussed several decisions of this Court, but in none of these were the illegal substances out in the open or in the plain view of the accused. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 19 Md.App. 39, 45, 308 A.2d 696 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Barksdale v. State, 15 Md.App. 469, 475, 291 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a visitor to a hotel room for purposes of distributing drugs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room (B) holding evidence insufficient to establish defendant had physical or constructive possession of heroin when no drugs were found on his person and the only drugs discovered on the premises which he shared with the codefendant were secreted out of plain view (C) holding that the defendants allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendants behalf because he had been coerced by the state were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly discovered evidence (D) holding evidence insufficient to establish defendant had physical or constructive pos session when the drugs that were discovered in a hotel room that he shared with a codefendant were secreted and out of plain view (E) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will
Output: (D)
and section 2 of the Act gives effect to the aim of both statutory provisions. It recognizes the legislature’s intent to protect persons involved in the design and construction of buildings from potentially unlimited liability (see La Salle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd., 177 Ill. App. 3d 464, 469 (1988)) while also allowing a reasonable time for a surviving spouse or next of kin to bring an action for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent’s death (Mio, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 825). Nevertheless, in support of her position, plaintiff cites several cases in which courts have applied the construction statute of repose (735 ILCS 5/13 — 214(b) (West 1998)) to wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Herriott v. Allied Signal, Inc., 998 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>); Risch v. Paul J. Krez Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (B) holding 10year statute of repose violated state constitutional right to remedy in personal injury and wrongful death suits (C) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (D) holding 10year statute of repose violates state constitutions guarantee of open courts in case involving defective machine (E) holding wrongful death action barred by 10year construction statute of repose
Output: (E)
the marital home during the minority of the children of the marriage. Section 61.075(l)(h), reads in relevant part: [T]he court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors, including: (h) The desirability of retaining the marital home as a residence for any dependent child of the marriage, or any other party, when it would be equitable to do so, it is in the best interest of the child or that party, and it is financially feasible for the parties to maintain the residence until the child is emancipated or until exclusive possession is otherwise terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction. (emphasis added). See Castillo v. Castillo, 626 So.2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So.2d 522, 524 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home (B) holding an award of possession of the marital home is an incident of support (C) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (D) holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property (E) holding that the objective of maintaining the marital residence for the best interest of the minor children is properly accomplished not by granting exclusive ownership of the home to the wife but by granting the wife exclusive use and possession of the marital residence during the minority of the children
Output: (E)
does not logically support the inference that his decision to direct Collins to fire plaintiff was racially motivated. The evidence showed that Garr believed coworker reports of sexual harassment, warned plaintiff verbally and in writing, and fired him upon determining that McCauley’s complaint was credible. Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant had labeled plaintiff as a troublemaker because of his complaints, or that there was any connection between those complaints and his discharge. Thus, even if the allegations of sexual harassment were false, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it was his race, and not the allegations of sexual harassment, that motivated defendant’s decision to discharge him. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F2d 1466, 1470-71 (11th Cir 1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff’s subjective perception that he was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff has not demonstrated that the employers reason for terminating him was pretextual if the employer reasonably believed the complaint of sexual harassment lodged against the plaintiff and acted on it in good faith (B) holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations (C) holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination (D) holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief (E) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false
Output: (B)
met constitutional requirements. 3. Plaintiffs Claim Challenging Constitutionality of Louisiana Fi Fa Procedures (a) Constitutionality of Procedures Used A close reading of the plaintiffs’ complaint reveals that they are challenging the constitutionality of the Louisiana statutory scheme in so far as it allows creditors to pursue a writ of fi fa before the underlying judgment is final without judicial approval. Due process requires, at a minimum, “that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Although there are no cases directly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (B) holding that notice by mail or other means as certain to insure actual notice is minimum constitutional precondition (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that if persons identity is known under mullane due process requires notice by such means as is certain to ensure actual notice (E) holding that actual notice by mail in conjunction with published notice was best possible notice satisfying rule 23c
Output: (B)
Roscitis cannot recover anything above that amount from ICSOP. This frustrates the Legislature’s purpose in passing § 27-2-2.4, which was to “give an aggrieved and injured party the right to proceed directly against an insurer in those circumstances in which the tortfeasor has sought protection under the applicable provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.” D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1229 (R.I.2005). ICSOP counters, however, by noting that the Rhode Island Legislature limited recovery under § 27-7-2.4 to “insurance coverage available for the tort complained of’ (emphasis added). Thus, ICSOP argues, it was clearly not the Legislature’s intent to expand the scope of coverage available under an insurance policy. Cf. Barber v. Canela, 570 A.2d 670, 671 (R.I. 1990) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Yet IC-SOP contends that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a related direct action statute ri gen laws  2772 is designed only to provide a remedy to the injured party and not to enlarge the liability of the insurer beyond the limits stated in the policy (B) holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer (C) holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue (D) holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer (E) holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits
Output: (A)
is demonstrated by the fact that Judge Marx had previously heard "half a dozen" cases in Box Elder County under color of authority as a temporary justice court judge without objection. See Menzies, 845 P.2d at 226 (requiring "public acquiescence" in acts of de facto official); Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 n. 5 (defining a de facto officer as one who acts "under such cireumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 228 (<HOLDING>); Vance, 671 P.2d at 1831 & n. 6 (noting that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she assumed authority  under col or of a valid appointment and the public acquiesced in her authority (B) holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporters qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict (E) recognizing that a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send the jury back to correct a mistake in its verdict but concluding that jury had been discharged because jury was allowed to return to court on following day and was allowed to deliberate same issue it previously had decided
Output: (D)
for this court to certify issues of state law to the Maryland Court of Appeals that the Fourth Circuit specifically declined to certify in that case. 9 . E.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.1980). 10 . E.g., American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.1984). 11 . E.g., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.1982). 12 . E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.Cir.1982). 13 . Some courts adopting the injury-in-fact trigger consider it to be the time when an injury first comes into being, and expert testimony is required to pinpoint this date. See, e.g., Uniroyal v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F.Supp. 1368, 1387-90 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). 14 .The insurer argued that the last policy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a job offer which required a claimant to make a daily round trip commute of 232 miles was unreasonable even though the claimant would be provided with a motel room because this would require the claimant to be away from home at least four nights a week (B) holding that risk is measured at the point when the attorneys time was committed to the case (C) recognizing the same point (D) holding inter alia that the issue of whether a naval yard worker was exposed to a manufacturers product was for the jury (E) holding that coverage was triggered only at that point in time one week after each claimant was exposed to the toxic product
Output: (E)
bodily injury without attempting to cause (or actually causing) serious bodily injury, which would support a conviction for REAP, but not for aggravated assault. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717 (Pa.Super.2014) (affirming REAP conviction of defendant who twice let her horse wander unattended on busy roadway and consciously disregarded substantial risk of injury posed to passing motorists). Additionally, unlike aggravated assault, REAP requires the element of actual danger of death or serious bodily injury. An individual could attempt to cause serious bodily injury to another person without placing that person in actual danger, which would support a conviction for aggravated assault but not REAP. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 439 Pa.Super. 625, 654 A.2d 1150 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Each offense requires proof of an element 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that debt orhusband could exempt his interest in home even though he lived elsewhere and even though the home was a residence only for his children and codebtor wife from whom he was separated (C) holding defendant who discharged firearm into empty residence could be convicted of aggravated assault if he acted with intent to cause serious bodily injury to person he believed was in residence even though that person was elsewhere (D) holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury (E) holding residence means legal residence for will probate
Output: (C)
that strict scrutiny apply. The question is “whether the [government action] imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). We need not ask whether Bronx Household is “substantially burdened” because the government action here, in specifically targeting religious conduct, is not neutral and not generally applicable. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790; Tenafly Eruv Assoc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 (3d Cir.2002) (“[T]here is no substantial burden requirement when government discriminates against religious conduct.”); Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As the district court found, “the unopposed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government (B) holding that requiring plaintiffs to show a substantial burden from nonneutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the first amendment (C) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (D) holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise (E) recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion
Output: (B)
“ ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 798, 50 L.Ed.2d 785 (1977); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, reh’g denied, 405 U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 963, 30 L.Ed.2d 819 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir.1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. Attorney General of United States, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers (B) holding that allegations of pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers (C) holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers (D) holding that the complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers (E) holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys
Output: (E)
P.3d 1154 (“An officer’s warrantless entry into a person’s home is the exact type of intrusion against which the language of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution is directed.”). In this case, the agents had a warrant from Mississippi for Defendant’s arrest, and based upon that warrant, the agents could have entered Defendant’s home in order to arrest him. See State v. Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 10, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d 684 (stating that in light of the evidence showing that the officers had reason to believe the defendant was inside the apartment, the warrant for the defendant’s arrest authorized the officers’ entry into the defendant’s apartment); State v. Krout, 100 N.M. 661, 662, 674 P.2d 1121, 1122 (1984) (<HOLDING>). However, the agents did not need to enter 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that for fourth amendment purposes an arrest warrant supported by probable cause carries with it limited authority to enter a dwelling in which a suspect lives when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within (B) holding that arrest warrant can support entry into suspects residence when there is reason to believe the suspect is within (C) holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed (D) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (E) holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within
Output: (A)
of the damages incurred by the insured. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-209(a)(3) (Repl. 1999). In Clampit v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Ark. 107, 828 S.W.2d 593 (1992), this court stated that underinsured coverage applies when the tortfeasor has at least the amount of insurance required by law, but not enough to fully compensate the victim. Furthermore, the Underinsured motorist coverage statute estabhshes the public policy of the State of Arkansas with regard to UIM coverage. Majors v. American Premier Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 628, 977 S.W.2d 897 (1998). Although Underinsured motorist coverage is statutorily prescribed, this court has upheld prior exclusions under the current and prior versions of the statute. Chamberlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Clampit v. State Farm, supra. Where an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds (B) holding nearly identical exclusion did not violate public policy noting there is no clear legislative pronouncement of public policy requiring umuim coverage for a named driver exclusion (C) holding exhaustion clauses to be void as against hawaiis public policy (D) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (E) holding that state farms unambiguous ownedbutnotinsured exclusion was valid and not void as against public policy
Output: (E)
omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen proceedings based on his failure to abide by the time limitations for such motions. Lin filed his motion in April 2006, more than one year after the BIA’s issuance of its final decision in March 2005, and long after the ninety-day deadline for the filing of motions to reopen had passed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Lin argues in his brief to this Court that the arrest warrant he submitted to the BIA constituted evidence of changed country conditions, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this issue in light of the Government’s argument that he failed to administratively exhaust it before the BIA. Cf. Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 101 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). It is possible that the warrant provided new 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue exhaustion is not jurisdictional and thus waived if not raised by the government (B) recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement (C) holding that under 8 usc  1252d1 issue exhaustion while mandatory is not a jurisdictional requirement and consequently a failure to exhaust may be waived by the government (D) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement
Output: (C)
the payment of professional fees from a bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether an objection has been filed. See In re Metro Transportation Co., 78 B.R. 416, 420 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); In re Pettibone Corp., 74 B.R. 293 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1987). 5. “In determining whether a particular expense is chargeable to the debtor’s estate, the court must distinguish between ‘overhead’ expenses, which are not reimbursable, and ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses, which are. In re Thacker, 48 B.R. 161, 164 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985). Overhead expenses are those day-to-day operating costs which are incurred regardless of whom the law firm represents.- Id. ... Out of pocket expenses are those expenses which can clearly be traced to a particular client....” In re Island Helicopter Corp., 53 B.R. 71 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>). Counsel’s justification for charging the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (B) holding that taxi cab did not park for an appreciable length of time when it merely stopped to let out passengers (C) holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges (D) holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges (E) holding that out of pocket expenses reimbursable to creditors committee counsel include photocopy charges but not costs of meals secretarial overtime and cab fare where the necessity for them was not established
Output: (E)
without authority to grant JNOV judgments). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s grant of a JNOV in this case was improper. Nevertheless, trial courts do maintain the authority to order new trials for eviden-tiary insufficiency in criminal cases; a power which is the functional equivalent of granting a JNOV in a civil case. Therefore, when a jury returns a guilty verdict and the trial court grants the defendant’s motion for new trial based upon insufficiency of the evidence under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(b)(9), double jeopardy prevents the trial court from entering any other judgment than an acquittal. Tex.R.App. P. 30(b)(9); Moore v. State, 749 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a trial court’s JNOV ruling after 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction (B) holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met (C) holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial (D) holding that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the commonwealth intentionally undertakes to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial (E) holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence
Output: (A)
Detecting no reaso ent of sentence and we remand, leaving the trial court to reconsider its entire sentencing plan. Justice Dougherty joins the opinion. Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Donohue join the opinion with respect to Parts I, II, and 111(B) except with respect to footnote 29. Justice Baer joins the opinion with respect to Part II(C). Justice Todd joins • the opinion with respect to Parts I, II, and III(B). Justice Baer files a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Donohue files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Saylor joins and in which Justice Todd joins with respect to Part II. 1 . See 65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a) (conflict of interest), deemed unconstitutional in part by Shaulis v. Penna. State Ethics Comm'n, 574 Pa. 680, 833 A.2d 123 (2003) (<HOLDING>); see also 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102 (defining 
 Holding statements: (A) holding subsection 1103g unconstitutional to the extent that it regulates the conduct of former government employees who are also attorneys (B) holding that interests of plaintiffs former employees of defendant company in combating discriminatory policies were coextensive with the interest of all former and present employees subjected to the discriminatory policy (C) holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted (D) holding that where an spa does not mention former employees but only current employees and a complaint only alleges that former employees were solicited there is no breach of a nonsolicitation clause (E) holding section 742031 unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited attorneys fees to a father in a paternity action
Output: (A)
of a fiduciary relationship.”). As for whether the breach must be material to the transaction, we need not address this argument because the case at hand satisfied any such requirement. The very reason bribes were paid to the adjusters was to obtain favorable results in settlements. The insurance companies, acting as reasonable entities, were bound to have considered the fact that their employees had a financial interest in settling cases to be important information with respect to those settlements. See United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 280 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming jury instruction charging that a representation was material if “a reasonable person might have considered [it] important in making a decision”); see also United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Appellants next contend that the government 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the appellant needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her husbands death fell within the terms of the insurance policy (B) holding that unless the collision resulted in a total loss the measure of recovery is the difference between the fair market value of the vehicle in the condition in which it was immediately prior to the collision and its value thereafter (C) recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself (D) holding in a case involving falsified insurance claims that the government needed to prove only that defendant employed a deceptive scheme intending to prevent the insurer from determining for itself a fair value of recovery (E) holding in the context of the criminal false claims act that to prove falsity the government only had to prove that the statement was known to be untrue at the time the defendant made it
Output: (D)
¶ 11 The measure of delay extends from the defendant’s date of conviction or entry of a guilty plea on the new charges to the date the court holds the revocation hearing. Commonwealth v. explanation for the delay, the court should not attribute the delay to the defendant; instead, the court should analyze whether the delay prejudiced the defendant. Woods, supra. ¶ 13 To demonstrate a violation of his right to a speedy probation revocation hearing, a defendant must allege and prove the delay in holding the revocation hearing prejudiced him. Woods, supra at 1229; Clark, supra at 125; Bischof, supra at 9. There is no per se rule of prejudice for technical violations of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Commonwealth v. Marchesano, 519 Pa. 1, 7-8, 544 A.2d 1333, 1336-37 (1988) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he controlling consideration at a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum (B) holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked (D) holding that revocation of probation is merely an extension of a sentencing proceeding (E) holding defendant cannot establish prejudice merely by alleging court held probation revocation hearing after defendants period of probation expired
Output: (E)
that the district court’s mention of having considered the “entire lengthy record” indicates that the court, in concluding that amendment would be both untimely and futile, relied in part upon the overall history of the dispute, including the ease CBS had previously initiated in Florida. Whether the court meant to encompass that history within the reason for its decision is not clear,- however; the “lengthy record” in question may well refer only to the present litigation, which alone had been going on for more than three years at the time. In either event, the district court erred; the prolonged nature of a case does not itself affect whether the plaintiff may amend its complaint. See, e.g., Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kevin Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the opposing partys case for prejudice is stated  only in the most conclusory of terms and no particular witnesses or documents are identified to support the argument that a delay would prejudice a party (B) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (C) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar (D) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay (E) holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months
Output: (D)
Communications Co., 971 F.Supp. 302, 305-06 (W.D.Tenn.1997). Plaintiffs rebanee on these cases is misplaced for several reasons. None of these cases analyzed whether a court could ignore a federal consumer-protection regulation simply because a tariff was filed with the FCC. The MCI case dealt with whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear billing-dispute cases arising out of long-distance contracts where the long-distance provider had filed tariffs with the FCC. The issue was one of jurisdiction and the case did not at all address the applicability of federal regulations. In Wegoland, the issue was whether plaintiffs could attack long-distance rates on the theory that the providers had engaged in fraud. Although the Second Circuit broadly reaffirmed the “filed tariff’ doctrine (<HOLDING>), the court did not discuss whether federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the respondents statelaw claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine (B) holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine (C) holding that suits against longdistance companies for unreasonable rates were barred if the defendant had filed a rate tariff with the fcc (D) holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud (E) holding that filed rate doctrine did not apply because pharmaceutical companies do not file rates with any agency
Output: (C)