niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered, fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The test for when the period, under which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari filed, begins to run anew is “whether the lower court, in its second order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 211-12, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952). We find that the district court did not, by its Rule 70 order, disturb, revise or alter the legal rights or obligations plainly and properly settled in its final judgment. As a result, the time to take an appeal of the underlying judgment in this case does not run anew. See id. (<HOLDING>). We find, therefore, that Baldwin will not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that the solicitor generals ratification of an unauthorized petition for certiorari could not cure a failure to meet the mandatory and jurisdictional 90day deadline to file a petition (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that the judgment at issue did not meet the test for whether the time to file a petition for certiorari ran anew as the judgment at issue simply reiterated without change everything which had been decided previously
Output: (E)
of a majority of the members of the corporation, Dolores Nas-siff (later Mrs. Miller) was purportedly elected corporate president and director and Mr. Miller was purportedly elected corporate treasurer and director. (At the same meeting, Ms. Belavitch was designated corporate secretary and bookkeeper, but not director.) Even if those voting on May 24, 1978, had been authorized to elect directors, the elections were void for failure to observe restrictions imposed by the articles of incorporation which required directors to be members of the corporation. See S & T Anchorage v. Lewis, 575 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (“The Assignment ... and ... subsequent ratification ... are invalid because they ... are ultra vires acts.”); Wolfson v. Cary, 488 So.2d 864, 869 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). Approximately a year later, on May 14, 1979, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that preferred shares were void because invalidly issued and accordingly the common shares into which the preferred had been transferred were void (B) holding that shares of stock in husbands name had not been transmuted (C) holding void shares issued in excess of the amount of common shares authorized in the articles of incorporation (D) holding that rule 11 agreement stating that one party would return shares of stock for a specific amount of money contained essential terms (E) holding preliminary offer tended to prove the lowest possible value of the shares
Output: (C)
the specific issue of his neck or cervical spine injury during the earlier proceedings on his [first review petition], the record evidence clearly establishes that he should have done so.” Id. at 955. 6 . This Court specifically explained in Weney that: The purpose behind the Act "is to provide quick and certain benefits to employees of the Commonwealth who suffer from work-related injuries.” Ramich v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Schatz Elec., Inc.), 564 Pa. 656, 665, 770 A.2d 318, 323 (2001) (emphasis added). We believe that application of the doctrine of technical res judicata here will help to ensure that benefits are provided to injured workers in a "quick and certain” manner. See McCarthy v. Township of McCandless, [7 Pa.Cmwlth. 611,] 300 A.2d 815, 819 (Pa.Cmwlth.1973) (<HOLDING>). Application of the doctrine of technical res 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award (B) recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record (C) recognizing that the doctrines of technical res judicata and collateral estoppel serve as important means of promoting certainty and efficiency (D) holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes (E) holding that collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to quasijudicial agency decisions
Output: (C)
A defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding. See U.S. Const, amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. Therefore, “[a]ny comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant’s failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged.” State v. Marshall, 476 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla.1985); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.250 (prosecuting attorney prohibited from commenting on the defendant’s failure to testify on his or her behalf). The “fairly susceptible” test is a “very liberal rule.” Dessaure v. State, 891 So.2d 455 (Fla.2004). Defense counsel’s failure to object to an improper comment by the prosecution may serve as a basis for a post-conviction claim. Darling v. State, 966 So.2d 366, 385 (Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not deficient for counsel to fail to object to a standard instruction that had not been invalidated by this court (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding the defendant had stated an arguable basis for finding counsel deficient for failing to object to improper prosecutorial comments (D) holding trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to unadjudicated extraneous offenses in a psi report (E) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit
Output: (C)
v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring the defendant to shave); United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir.1978) (same); United States v. Murray, 523 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1975) (requiring the defendant to wear a wig); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir.1973) (requiring the defendant to put on a stocking mask worn during the robbery). If a defendant who is compelled to don clothing before the jury does not “testify” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, it would seem to follow, a fortiori,' that the Self-Incrimination Clause also provides that a defendant who voluntarily dons clothing before the jury may not be required to subject himself to cross-examination. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that a physical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted (B) holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife (C) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal (D) holding that the district court erred in concluding that a defendant was required to take the stand to display his tattoos because the government may compel a defendant to display such physical characteristics (E) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered
Output: (D)
and belief that the party’s actions were not in violation of a bankruptcy stay); Fidelity Mortg. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, [494] U.S. [1030], 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (<HOLDING>); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. [16] at 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing power of bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on parties and counsel who willfully abuse the judicial process but not finding sanctions appropriate against debtor and his attorney for their repeated bankruptcy filings (B) recognizing power of bankruptcy court under  105 of the code and bankruptcy rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay (C) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy (D) holding that  105 authorizes bankruptcy courts to impose sanctions for civil contempt to compel compliance with a court order or compensate parties for losses caused by noncompliance (E) holding that section 105 grants statutory contempt powers in the bankruptcy context that may be used to award monetary and other forms of relief for automatic stay violations to the extent such awards are necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of the bankruptcy code
Output: (B)
the badly injured Rivera to the station house. Once at the station house, Vidal stood by and watched as Rivera was assaulted further. From these facts, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Vidal willfully associated himself with the violation of Rivera’s civil rights and participated in this violation as something he wished to bring about, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 2. Turning to Count Four, Vidal repeats that the evidence showed only that he failed to intervene while other officers beat Rivera. He suggests that mere inaction is insufficient to merit supervisory liability for a violation of § 242, and that it was not apparent that he was acting unlawfully by failing to intervene. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (<HOLDING>). He further argues that his failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction (B) holding that criminal liability for deprivation of a constitutional right under  242 requires that the unlawfulness be apparent under preexisting law (C) holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur (D) holding that liability under  1983 requires a causal link to and direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights (E) holding that a claim for municipal liability under  1983 requires inter alia proof of an underlying constitutional violation
Output: (B)
new trial is granted.” United States v. Grover, 511 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir.2007). “[I]n order to meet the materiality requirement, newly discovered evidence must be ‘more than merely ... impeaching.’ ” United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Dogskin, 265 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir.2001)). The district court properly held Lee had not met his burden of establishing reasonable diligence as to the testimony of Higgins. Due to the evidence adduced at trial connecting Lee to Higgins, Higgins was a prime target to question. But, at the new-trial hearing, Lee’s counsel admitted Lee and he had done nothing to locate Higgins prior to trial. Such inaction does not qualify as reasonable diligence. See United States v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Doyle’s proffer interview would 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted (B) holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant (C) holding that unavailable evidence may constitute newly discovered evidence if the failure to learn of the evidence did not result from the defendants lack of due diligence (D) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (E) holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence
Output: (B)
until they were “in close proximity.” Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *3; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Bayer, 284 F.3d 489, 498 (3d Cir.2002) (according plain meaning to the district court’s choice of language in affirming its “implicit” findings of fact). These findings control because they are not clearly erroneous. Rather, they are suppo a- suspect takes action that clearly indicates that he “does not yield” to the officers’ show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Action— not passivity — has been the touchstone of our an h Cir.2010) (noting that, “for a person who is moving, to ‘yield’ most sensibly means to stop”), or when a suspect makes suspicious motions consistent with reaching for a weapon, see United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the suspects in those cases, Lowe 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded (B) holding that a suspect did not submit to a show of authority when he made continued furtive  gestures including shoving down motions that were suggestive of hiding or retrieving a gun (C) holding that a suspect who continued walking when approached by a police officer did not submit until physically restrained by the officer (D) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept
Output: (B)
he has suffered an injury-in-fact and can be expected to pursue the First Amendment claim vigorously. See id. at 1011 (concluding that the owner of the adult entertainment establishment could “satisfactorily frame the issues in the case” because he “ha[d] a vested interest in having the [licensing] Ordinance overturned”). 2 Although the First Amendment’s applicability in the area of lawyer-client relations is not well-defined, we recognize that — at least as a general matter — the “right to hire and consult an attorney is protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, association and petition.” Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir.2000); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. III. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (<HOLDING>); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members (B) holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted (C) holding that union members had standing to bring rico claims for reduced compensation under collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that a church was entitled to employ only members of its faith (E) holding that a union had a first amendment right to employ a salaried attorney to represent members pursuing workers compensation claims
Output: (E)
dissentingXconcluding that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Connecticut’s dispute with New York because New York state was the real party in interest). Defendants also claim that the relief UUtah seeks is retrospective, not prospective, because its effect will be to deprive the state of Massachusetts of its intellectual property. Defendants are correct that such relief would have a financial impact on UMass, as it would lose either a whole or partial interest in the patents, which have been licensed to pharmaceutical companies. Plaintiff argues that such effect is merely an ancillary effect of prospectively correcting inventorship of the patent. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (Ex c., 157 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1164 (D.Or.2001) (<HOLDING>). Unlike disputes over lakes, rivers, and state 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court has broad authority to take jurisdiction over a matter even when that matter is not brought by a real party in interest (B) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive (C) holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over dispute between state of oregon and arizona corporation because it was not the sort of core sovereign interest that warrants the supreme courts original and exclusive jurisdiction  but rather exactly the sort of quarrel over money and technology that the district courts hear frequently when brought by private litigants (E) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts
Output: (D)
contractor’s negligent repair of a leak that caused mold infestation). , However, a structurally deficient building is an economic loss rather than injury to property. In Pender Veterinary Clinic v. Patton, Harris, Rust & Associates, No. 99106, 1990 WL 10039283 (Va.Cir.Ct. Nov. 27, 1990), the court explained this distinction: In effect, [the plaintiffs] claim that the building does not meet the standard of quality they contracted for, that the building injures itself because one of the component parts, the design, was defective. The damages claimed are not injury to property, but instead are complaints as to the quality. According to Sensenbrenner, they are economic damages for which the law of contracts provides the sole redress. Id. at *1. See also Sensenbrenner, 374 S.E.2d at 56-58 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff has not alleged any damages 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it (B) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (C) holding that corrosion caused by contact between soil and foundation of the house is the type of loss the exclusion for deterioration was meant to cover (D) recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house (E) holding that a structurally unsound pool that caused water pipes to break and the foundation of a house to crack only supported a contract claim
Output: (E)
referenda reporting and disclosure requirements. (Id. at 11.) While the Defendants’ asserted interests may be important and, even compelling in the context of regulating contributions in elections for public office, this Court finds that they are not relevant in referenda elections. Regarding the anti-corruption interest, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that such an interest is far diminished in the referendum context: “Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (internal citation omitted); see also Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2840 (<HOLDING>); Citizens Against Ren or an informed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that risk must be measured at the time the lawsuit is filed (B) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (C) holding that a plaintiff has a duty to plead the date of discovery of fraud where the alleged fraud apparently occurred at a remote time (D) recognizing that the risk of fraud or corruption is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting (E) holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate
Output: (D)
allowed agents to question beyond the routine inquiry if “suspicious circumstances” exist. Chavira, 9 F.3d at 889. Federal case law has held that suspicious circumstances do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, and, in determining what constitutes suspicious circumstances, a court examines “the totality of the circumstances.” Massie, 65 F.3d at 848-49. {13} As for moving a vehicle to a secondary area, the court has given Border Patrol agents “ ‘virtually unlimited discretion to refer ears to the secondary inspection area.’ ” Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1991)). Where a routine stop is conducted is “ ‘irrelevant to Fourth Amendment concerns.’ ” Id. (quoting Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d at 753); see also Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1499-1500 (<HOLDING>). The court, however, still requires detentions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of an apartment door from a common area is a permissible nonsearch under the fourth amendment (B) holding the correct fourth amendment inquiry assuming the detention is legitimate is whether the questions extended the time that a driver was detained regardless of the questions content (C) holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions (D) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (E) holding that directing defendant to the secondary inspection area to answer additional questions is permissible under the fourth amendment
Output: (E)
trial, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. See United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir.1997). Muhammad must therefore prove that the district court erred in admitting Agent Denny’s testimony and that the error was “so egregious as to constitute a miscarriage of justice,” United States v. Beltran, 109 F.3d 365, 370 n. 1 (7th Cir.1997). See United States v. Schaefer, 107 F.3d 1280, 1286 (7th Cir.1997). We find that the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in permitting Agent Denny to testify about Muhammad’s statements and in refusing to order the Government to disclose Agent Gandolfo’s interview notes. First of all, Agent Denny’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay because she used the FBI 302 report merely to re -75 (7th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The district court reviewed Agent Gandolfo’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report (B) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (C) holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report (D) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (E) holding that the defendants right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed
Output: (E)
the damages or otherwise defeat summary judgment. He did not even identify the elements] of the Bank’s breach of contract claim on which his return of the vehicle allegedly raised a fact issue or suggest why it raised a fact issue on any particular element [s]. The requirement that the non-movant “fairly apprise” the trial court of the issues allegedly defeating summary judgment clearly contemplates that the trial court is not required to guess why a non-movant presents certain evidence or consider every possible reason the evidence might defeat summary judgment. In short, Tello’s bare assertion in his affidavit that he returned the vehicle did not “fairly apprise” the trial court what, if anything, he wanted the trial court to do with that information. Cf. Engel, 713 S.W.2d at 771-72 (<HOLDING>). In sum, trial court could not have erred by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding affidavit of attorney filed by nonmovant in response to motion for summary judgment requesting recovery of movants attorneys fees fairly apprised trial court of issue allegedly defeating the motion by stating the fees were excessive and unreasonable (B) recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees (C) holding the trial courts failure to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment after an affidavit was filed in response to the motion was harmless error where the affidavit had no impact on thedecisive statute of frauds issue (D) holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment (E) holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate
Output: (A)
of the deeds executed each year. When the intent of the grantor is clear, as here, neither the trial court nor this court can ignore the rights created by the express grant. See Seastrunk v. Walker, 156 S.W.2d 996, 997 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1941, writ ref’d w.o.m.). He intended the easements to be “[appurtenant] to the lands and premises [therein] described”— i.e., appurtenant to the estates described in the deeds to his children. Thus, interpreting all of the deeds executed in the same year as one instrument, we hold as a matter of law that B.D. Douthitt created by express grant an easement in Donna and Cameron to cross James’ property. The easements are appurtenant to Donna’s and Cameron’s tracts. See Stuart v. Larrabee, 14 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1929, writ ref’d) (<HOLDING>). LOCATION That B.D. Douthitt left the exact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding same as to an implied easement appurtenant (B) holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another (C) holding that an easement appurtenant to a freehold estate of a dowager expired with that estate (D) holding that an appurtenant easement is an incident of the estate granted and passes with it (E) holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement
Output: (D)
leaving the corner and walking away from the officers after making eye contact with them. See United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 494 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual’s flight from uniformed law enforcement officer may be a fact used to support reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity is afoot”); Magda, 547 F.2d at 758-59 (defendant’s companion immediately moved away with a “rapid motion” after looking in direction of observing officer); State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1983) (flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of an officer may be a factor leading to reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 80 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1984). Id., 331 N.C. at 233-34, 415 S.E.2d at 722-23; See also State v. I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 585-86, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134-35 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Crenshaw, 144 N.C. App. 574, 578-79, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to conduct an investigatory detention where a juvenile in a high drug area started walking away upon the approach of a law enforcement officer while keeping his head turned away from the officer and while moving his mouth as if he had something in it (B) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (C) holding fact that appellant immediately turned and started walking in opposite direction when confronted by police officer was factor to be considered in determining existence of probable cause to believe he was attempting to flee after committing offense (D) holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot (E) holding that absent warrant or exigent circumstances an officer had no authority to demand that the juvenile keep the door open to his residence or demand entry into it and thus the juvenile could not be convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer for trying to close door even if the officer had probable cause to believe that the juvenile was sheltering a runaway
Output: (A)
venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.063(1) (“The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county....”); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue
Output: (E)
National Bank of Richmond, 223 Va. 519, 290 S.E.2d 863 (1982), held that exempt funds deposited into a general account and commingled with non-exempt funds lose their exempt status. Accordingly, because these funds have been commingled with non-exempt funds in a general bank account, which has been used by both parties to pay individual and joint bills, the social security benefits are no longer exempt. While the court is aware that several federal courts have questioned the holding of Bernardini, the court will adhere to this binding precedent. See NCNB Financial Services v. Shumate, 829 F. Supp. 178, 180-81 (W.D. Va. 1993), aff’d sub nom. NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Shumate, 45 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. den. 515 U.S. 1161, 132 L. Ed. 2d 859, 115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The Bernardini court distinguished Philpott 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a social security number is not private (B) holding that the express language of  407a and the clear intent of congress that social security benefits not be attachable (C) holding that under 42 usc  407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income (D) holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation (E) holding that  407a imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits
Output: (C)
bad faith may certainly compel an adverse infer ence, the absence of bad faith may not necessarily preclude one. “Destruction of potentially relevant evidence obviously occurs along a continuum of fault—ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality.” Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir.1988). Within the bounds of its discretion, the circuit court has the flexibility to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the facts of the case. In the present case, the missing evidence was the very object that plaintiffs alleged caused Stender’s injuries. Thus, although the circuit court found no bad faith or intentional misconduct on the plaintiffs’ part, we cannot say that it abused its discretion by giving the adverse infer 6, 79-80 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The instant case, however, raised complex 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs did not need to identify the specific defective lawn mower to sustain their claim of a design defect (B) recognizing that because plaintiff alleged a design defect the need for immediate access to the particular saw involved in the accident was greatly diminished (C) holding that complaint alleging design defect likely to cause damage failed to state a claim (D) holding that where the defendants expert described the product design using superlatives namely the safest design you could possibly put on the machine the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiffs accident (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion
Output: (B)
majority appears to rely on the fact that the text of Section 30(A) defines the minimum reimbursement rates solely by reference to the health needs of recipients. 5 . To be sure, attorney’s fees are available to a successful § 1983 plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs....”). Awards of attorney’s fees may be inadequate to induce attorneys to represent Medicaid recipients in Section 30(A) cases, however, since such attorneys would assume the risk of earning no fees if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) (<HOLDING>). RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (B) holding that section 721312 florida statutes provides for an award of appellate attorneys fees where the issue was the reasonableness of the fee awarded by the trial court (C) holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed (D) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied (E) holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required
Output: (C)
& Health Review Comm’n, 649 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. Unit B July 9, 1981)). As for the knowledge element (the one at issue in this case), the Secretary can prove employer knowledge of the violation in one of two ways. First, where the Secretary shows that a supervisor had either actual or constructive knowledge of the violation, such knowledge is generally-imputed to the employer. See Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 321 (5th Cir.1979); New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 88 F.3d at 105; see also Secretary of Labor v. Access Equip. Sys., Inc., 18 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1718, at *9 (1999). An example of actual knowledge is where a supervisor directly sees a subordinate’s misconduct. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1202, at *3 (1977) (<HOLDING>). An example of constructive knowledge is where 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the supervisor directly saw the violative conduct without stating any objection his knowledge and approval of the work methods employed will be imputed to respondent (B) holding that the use of the word or in a statute indicates that any of the listed alternative methods will suffice (C) holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection (D) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (E) holding that constructive knowledge was shown where the supervisor who had just walked into the work area was 10 feet away from the violative conduct
Output: (A)
motion to vacate pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1). Y. For the foregoing reasons, the State’s motion to dismiss F & D’s entire Verified Petition pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In addition, 10 Del. C. § 5703(b) provides: Subject to subsection (c) of this section, a party who has not participated in the arbitration and who has not been made or served with an application to compel arbitration may file its complaint with the Court seeking to enjoin arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with or that the claim sought to be arbitrated is barred by limitation of § 5702(c). 2 . 10 Del. C. § 5703(b) and (c). 3 . See Weymouth v. State of Delaware, 1983 WL 17987, at *4 (Del.Ch. July 18, 1983) (<HOLDING>). 4 . 10 Del. C. § 5703(c). 5 . Emphasis added. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys failure to follow the unequivocal mandate of 10 del c  5703c precludes that party from attempting to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to enjoin the arbitration (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act (D) holding that a party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement (E) holding that failure to follow mandatory provision of statute renders the act void whereas failure to follow directory provision does not
Output: (A)
578 (finding purposeful availment because of foreign corporation’s “additional conduct through which it aimed to get extensive business in or from this state”). Indeed, specific jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers is often premised on sales by independent distributors. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 483-84 (6th Cir.2003) (finding specific jurisdiction under “additional conduct” standard based in part on nationwide distribution agreement with independent distributor); Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 458 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that “[t]he actions of an independent distributor may not insulate a foreign company from specific jurisdiction”); Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 533-34 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident auto distributor whose only connection to the forum resulted from a customers decision to drive there failed to provide the defendant with clear notice that it would be subject to suit in the forum state and thus an opportunity to alleviate the risk of burden some litigation there (B) holding that personal jurisdiction over defendant car manufacturer was inappropriate when defendants only contacts with the forum resulted from plaintiffs unilateral activity of driving defendants product into another state (C) holding that foreign drag manufacturer who marketed its product in kentucky through independent distributor was nonetheless subject to personal jurisdiction in forum under asahis additional conduct standard (D) holding defendant a foreign manufacturer was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of a wyoming court because the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship between the defendant and its us distributor (E) holding consumers unilateral act of taking product to forum state insufficient to subject manufacturer to jurisdiction there
Output: (C)
“incomplete, anonymous personal opinions.... lack[ing] any context,” ruling them “inadmissible, anonymous hearsay and speculation .”. The Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v. Premier Health Partners, 2014 WL 7739356, at *4 (S.D.Ohio Oct. 20, 2014). To the contrary, many of the statements were attributable to a particular person. But, whether a specific identity is given or not, it was error to exclude these statements as they are admissions of a party-opponent, admissible under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). An anonymous statement may be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) in certain circumstances that demonstrate sufficient indicia of reliability as to the authenticity of the statement. Davis v. Mobil Oil Expl. & Prod. Se., Inc., 864 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The ’ statements fall within the hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in deeming admitted the facts in the movants local rule 561 statement where the party opposing failed to include a separate statement responding to the numbered paragraphs in the moving partys statement (B) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party (C) holding that nurses statement made during the course of treating the plaintiff was admissible under rule 801d2d when offered against the government in ftca case (D) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent (E) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence
Output: (B)
while Deputy Sizemore had his driver’s license, appellant would have violated Code § 46.2-104, which prohibits a vehicle operator from driving without a license. See Brown, 17 Va.App. at 697, 440 S.E.2d at 621 (under circumstances where police observed the defendant operating a motor vehicle, when an officer asked the defendant for his operator’s license, the defendant “was no longer free to leave”). For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss appellant’s conviction. Reversed and dismissed. 1 . Police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching an individual in a public place and asking questions. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)(<HOLDING>); Richards v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 612, 615, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment was not implicated when an officer asked for passengers identification to see if he could drive a vehicle because the driver had a suspended license (B) holding that the defendant was not seized when two officers approached the defendant on a public street and asked him questions (C) holding that the defendant had been subjected to an illegal arrest when after detectives requested and did not return his airline ticket and drivers license he was asked to come with the officers from the concourse into an interrogation room approximately 40 feet away where his suitcases were searched (D) holding fourth amendment not implicated when police officers approached defendant who was standing outside of an airport terminal and asked to see his airline ticket and identification (E) holding fourth amendment not implicated when police officers asked defendant to see his airline ticket asked for identification and requested consent to search him
Output: (E)
it from weighing the evidence objectively and rendering a fair verdict. The prosecutor’s references were brief, and, as noted, did not reveal explicitly the nature of Richard’s death. By sustaining Appellant’s objection, the trial court cut off any further suggestion regarding the cause of Richard’s death, and refocused the prosecutor’s remaining remarks on threats Appellant had made to Tanesha. Additionally, the trial court cautioned the jury that the prosecutor’s statements did not constitute evidence and that evidence of Appellant’s prior offenses should be considered only for the limited purpose of establishing that he acted pursuant to a common scheme, plan, or design. We presume the jury followed this instruction. Commonwealth v. Brown, 567 Pa. 272, 786 A.2d 961, 971 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Because Appellant has failed to demonstrate 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court presumes that juries follow district courts instructions (B) holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error (C) holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions (D) holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions (E) holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions
Output: (E)