niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
treating physician’s opinion does not deserve “controlling weight,” the ALJ “must” consider “certain factors — namely, the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source — in determining what weight to give the opinion.” Id. In other words, “a decision denying benefits ‘must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating [physician’s] medical opinion.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). Generally speaking, if an ALJ’s decision fails to follow these procedural rules, the decision should not be affirmed unless it can be shown that any error was harmless. See, e.g., id. at 547 (<HOLDING>); Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that remand was necessary when the alj failed to adhere to  4041527d2s procedural requirements and noting that a de minimis violation of those procedural requirements may qualify as harmless error (B) holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements (C) holding that court may not impose procedural requirements on agency decisionmaking that go beyond those of the administrative procedure act (D) holding that courts must strictly adhere to title viis procedural requirements and stating that these requirements are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion
Output: (A)
a civilian to fill a position traditionally occupied by a deputy sheriff. Id. at 772. In determining whether the sheriff was justified in retaliating against Fuerst, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the notion that Fuerst spoke as a public employee under Garcetti when he criticized the proposal: Because Fuerst’s comments that precipitated the adverse action taken against him were made in his capacity as a union representative, rather than in the course of his employment as a deputy sheriff — his duties as deputy sheriff did not include commenting on the sheriffs decision to hire a public-relations officer — the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos is inapposite. Id. at 774 (citation omitted); see also Baumann v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 216, 224 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Boone, 786 F.Supp.2d. 328, 335 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech (B) holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen (C) holding that a police officers deposition in a fellow officers  1983 action alleging unlawful retaliation was protected speech (D) holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect (E) holding that police officers criticism of his departments handling of a sniper incident was protected speech because the officer spoke in his capacity as police union president
Output: (E)
rights within the scope of federal copyright.” Thus, Plaintiffs state law claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices is preempted by copyright law, and the court should dismiss this claim. Accord Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F.Supp.2d 630, 637 (M.D.N.C.2004) (finding a claim under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 preempted by copyright law and stating: “While there may be extra elements of fraud or deceit in any given unfair trade practices claim, there are no additional elements required in order to state an unfair trade practices claim than there are required to state a copyright claim. Accordingly, the state law claim is preempted by federal copyright law.”) (emphasis in original); see also Microstrategy, Inc. v. Netsolve, Inc., 368 F.Supp.2d 533, 535 (E.D.Va.2005) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff contends, however, that he alleges 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that copyright offices interpretation of copyright act should ordinarily receive deference (B) holding that declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment claims were preempted notwithstanding that plaintiff did not assert a copyright claim (C) holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement (D) holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession (E) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement
Output: (C)
on the part of the outside directors than the fact that said directors are being ‘controlled’ by defendant.” Id. Third, while well-compensated membership on multiple boards within a fund complex is one factor in the control crucible, most courts have concluded that it is not sufficient evidence by itself to rebut the statutory presumption. See id. at 258-59 (rejecting a control claim where the complaint alleged service by “independent directors” on twenty-one boards with compensation ranging from $140,000 to $160,000); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Management LLC, 77 F.Supp.2d 559, 563 (D.N.J.1999) (rejecting a claim that overlapping service on between 15 and 38 boards with an average compensation of $90,000 constituted control); Langner v. Brown, 913 F.Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Olesh v. Dreyfus Corp., No. CV-94-1664, 1995 
 Holding statements: (A) holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law (B) holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine (C) holding that jjust as the mere receipt of director fees does not constitute a disqualifying interest as a matter of law so too are crossdirectorships insufficient to create interests (D) holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence (E) holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law
Output: (C)
five separate allegations: A. From in or about June of 1992, up through approximately October of 1995, and continuing thereafter, the Giacobbe defendants and Schaefer caused monthly statements to be mailed regularly to Bay Bootery, Port Washington, New York, from a NatWest Bank central office, which contained credits to Bay Bootery’s account of substantial sums from deposited checks otherwise payable to or belonging to the Body Shop Partnership which had been endorsed over to Bay Bootery by the Giacobbe defendants. B. On or about May 11, 1994, Michael and Alyssa caused Federal Insurance Company to mail a check in the amount of $7,137.10 payable to Finish Line Collusion jointly with Ford Motor Credit Company. C. On or about March 14, 19 Litig., 663 F.Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>). Paragraphs B and C may be considered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered (B) recognizing that where the relationship to the mailing and the alleged fraudulent scheme is at best highly attenuated a rico claim based thereupon will be dismissed (C) holding that mailing of titleregistration forms satisfied mailing requirement because they contributed to success of the scheme (D) holding that a rico plaintiff must allege at a minimum the time place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied the fraudulent scheme the fraudulent intent of the defendants and the injury resulting from the fraud (E) recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud
Output: (B)
of two dates between Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro in 1988. In its view, the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine with respect to this evidence. The court believed that the evidence was relevant and ought to be before the jury because it had the task of evaluating the overall relationship of Ms. Jonasson and Kingsboro. Evidence that is relevant to the background of the case is admissible for that purpose. At the very least, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court not to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine; the evidence was at least potentially relevant for the purpose the judge identified. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). LCFS did not object during the trial when Ms. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time (B) holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment (C) holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background (D) holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct (E) holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively
Output: (C)
more than sufficient to give Goedhart standing to sue in his own right. The claimed injury to his ground-water supply is neither hypothetical nor conjectural. Indeed, EPA itself acknowledges that “[t]he boundaries of the town [of Amargosa Valley] include all of the area where the highest potential doses from a repository at Yucca Mountain are anticipated.... ” Final Background Information Document at 8-13. Although ra-dionuclides escaping from the Yucca repository may not reach Goedhart’s community for thousands of years, his injury is “actual or imminent,” for he lives adjacent to the land where the Government plans to bury 70,000 metric tons of radioactive waste - a sufficient harm in and of itself. See La. Envtl. Action Network v. United States EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 67-68 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In addition, this harm is “fairly traceable,” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an environmental group established constitutional standing where its members lived near a landfill into which an epa regulation allegedly would permit certain hazardous wastes to be deposited (B) holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did (C) recognizing standing for an environmental group based on the adverse effect of an international commerce commission decision on its members (D) holding that industry groups and various agencies conclusions that certain cyanidecontaining wastes were hazardous provided fair notice to support criminal conviction under rcra despite the defendants claim that the regulation required a specific standardsbased test (E) holding that an organization lacked standing to challenge allegedly lax epa regulations of hazardous waste because its members did not have to follow the lax procedures
Output: (A)
179 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1971) (quoting State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 657, 86 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1955)). Therefore, “the appellate courts ordinarily will not review the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion [regarding jury arguments] unless the impropriety of counsel’s remarks is extreme and is clearly calculated to prejudice the jury in its deliberations.” Johnson, 298 N.C. at 369, 259 S.E.2d at 761; see also Thompson, 278 N.C. at 283, 179 S.E.2d at 319 (stating “[i]t is only in extreme cases of the abuse of privilege by counsel, and when this is not checked by the court, and the jury is not properly cautioned, [the appellate courts] can intervene and grant a new trial.” ). “ 96 S.Ct. 3203, 49 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1976); State v. Jordan, 49 N.C. App. 561, 569, 272 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the existence of overwhelming 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu (B) holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief (C) holding that statements to the jury made by the prosecutor asserting that a defense witness was lying was improper but considering all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record which showed overwhelming evidence against the defendant such statements did not constitute a prejudicial error (D) holding that the prosecutors argument attacking the integrity of defense counsel was of such gross impropriety as to justify ex mero mo tu correction however in light of the strong and convincing case against the defendant we could not hold that the prosecutrixs improper comments were sufficiently prejudicial as to require a new trial (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony
Output: (A)
“there are many ways to show presentment of a motion for new trial to the trial court,” but “merely filing a motion is insufficient.” Id. at 24. Nonetheless, “ ‘[presentment’ must be apparent from the record, and it may be shown by such proof as the judge’s signature or notation on the motion or proposed order, or an entry on the docket sheet showing presentment or setting a hearing date.” Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 305. It is undisputed that there was no ruling on Hiatt’s motions for new trial. The trial judge’s signature does not appear on either Hiatt’s motions for new trial or the proposed orders accompanying them. Additionally, there are no entries on the court’s docket .-Dallas 1992, no pet.), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). As for the anonymous notations and markings 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (B) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (C) holding a certificate of presentation appearing on the last page of appellants motion for new trial did not establish presentment (D) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment (E) holding a certification of service and presentment was insufficient to establish the trial court received actual notice of the defendants motion for new trial
Output: (E)
9 (1st Cir.2002), the court did not even consider the possibility that Buckhannon might be limited splely to the contexts of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Instead, the court simply noted that the plaintiff had “relied on the so-called catalyst theory to support this claim [for attorneys’ fees.] The Supreme Court thwarted that initiative when it recently consigned the catalyst theory to the scrap heap.” Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted). Other courts have similarly held Buckhannon applicable to a variety of statutes authorizing attorneys’ fees for “prevailing parties” or for parties who have “substantially prevailed.” See, e.g., Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Department of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea (B) holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (C) holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (D) holding buckhannon applicable to the freedom of information act 5 usc  552 et seq which provides attorneys fees for complainants who have substantially prevailed (E) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal
Output: (D)
§ 991, at 146 (1956). Similarly, another treatise explains: “The personal representative may require a receipt or a release as a condition precedent to payment of a legacy or distributive share, which receipt or release discharges the representative from further liability, in the absence of impeaching circumstances such as fraud or mistake.” 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 656. Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have found that a personal representative is entitled to a release prior to making a distribution. See Ford v. Wilson, 85 A. 1073, 1077 (Del.Ch. 1913) (personal representative had a right to require a release from a distributee prior to making the final settlement of an estate); Sterrett v. Nat’l Safe Deposit, Savings & Trust Co., 10 App.D.C. 131, 139 (1897) (<HOLDING>); First Midwest Bank v. Dempsey, 157 Ill.App.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing  pursuant to   1331 (B) holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary (C) recognizing that the administrator was amply protected if it made a distribution but nonetheless was entitled to exact releases upon payment of distributions (D) recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard (E) holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim
Output: (C)
“orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate.” Id. at *7. Thus, the district court held that the bankruptcy court had “statutory jurisdiction to enforce its own orders ... [and that] Hudson’s injunction motion was a ‘core’ matter under the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. Furthermore, citing the Stem opinion, the district court concluded that Stem’s holding did not disturb the bankruptcy court’s jurisdict rie Retail, Inc.), 304 F.3d 223, 229-30 (2d Cir.2002) (concluding that core jurisdiction exists in a dispute between non-debtors over interpretation of the bankruptcy court’s sale order); In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 266-67 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Motors Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. 467, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bankruptcy court plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders (B) holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc  105a (C) holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court (D) holding that a motion to enforce bankruptcy sale order is a core proceeding and citing 11 usc  105a as the section which gives the bankruptcy court the power and the jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders  (E) holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc  105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding
Output: (D)
e.g., Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 11, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 523-24, 526 N.E.2d 8,14-15 (1988); Krauss v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1019-20 (Utah Ct.App.), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Jurisdictions adopting the specific identity rule conclusively presume that the liability of a party not named or otherwise specifically identified by the terms of the release is not discharged. The specific identity rule compels the settling parties either to name nonsettling tortfeasors, see, e.g., Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889, 893 (Alaska 1969), or to include such terms or descriptions as make the identity of the unnamed beneficiaries or the class thereof reasonably apparent, see, e.g., Aid Ins. Co. v. Davis County, 426 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Iowa 1988) (<HOLDING>); Pakulski v. Garber, 6 Ohio St.3d 252, 452 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable (B) holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release (C) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (D) holding that terms identifying persons in a manner that the parties to the release would know who was to be benefitted sufficient under specific identity rule (E) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release
Output: (D)
set forth in the Clean Air Act for designation of “attainment” and “nonattainment” areas did not, without more, justify departure from ordinary APA procedures, because “under the facts of this case, the Administrator could have reconciled the commands of the two acts by publishing the designations ... as proposed rules.” Id. at 1047. Similarly, in Air Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Department of Transportation, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C.Cir.1990), vacated for mootness, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C.Cir.1991), we characterized New Jersey as holding that a “statutory deadline did not constitute good cause to forgo notice and comment absent ‘any express indication’ by Congress to this effect.” Id. at 378-79 (quoting New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1043). Cf. Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1200-02 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). However, none of those decisions involved 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule (B) holding that extraordinary factors justified invocation of the good cause exception under  553 (C) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (D) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (E) recognizing exception
Output: (B)
Clause. Id. at 530. As Hill recognizes, “[t]his holding appears to foreclose much of the defendant’s arguments.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) Consistent with our precedent, United States v. Speakman, 330 F.3d 1080, 1082 n. 6 (8th Cir.2003), we hold that the enactment of § 922(g)(1) was not beyond the scope of congressional authority- Hill’s claim that the indictment was defective because it did not allege a substantial affect on interstate commerce also fails. The statute in question requires proof that Hill, a felon, possessed a gun “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The indictment tracks this language, and we fail to see how an indictment under § 922(g)(1) that tracks the statutory elements is defective. See United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264-65 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We thus affirm Hill’s conviction for being a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance (B) holding that an indictment under  922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient (C) holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely (D) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (E) holding that an indictment phrased in the statutory language was sufficient to satisfy ors 1325507
Output: (B)
include reasonable attorney’s fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney’s fees as necessaries is based upon a parent’s duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children
Output: (A)
been substantial in gross,” we reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded for a factual determination of whether the alleged “campaign reached the threshold of actionability under section 1983.” Id. at 625. We reiterated this point in DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir.1995), by explaining that “even minor forms of retaliation” such as “diminished responsibilities” or “false accusations” can be actionable under the First Amendment if sufficiently adverse to chill employee speech on matters of public concern. Since then, we have consistently applied this standard. E.g., Fairley v. Femaint, 482 F.3d 897, 903 (7th Cir.2007) (“Suppose the white guards at a prison mercilessly harass the black guards and make their lives miserabl r.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, even the Fourth Circuit case cited by 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that outside of the employment context speech that would chill a person of ordinary firmness is actionable (B) holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable (C) recognizing that code is speech (D) holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable (E) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine
Output: (A)
12-4) (“Cantor Aff.”); (9) Samsung's Reply Brief (Docket No. 16) ("Def. Reply”); (10) Byung Jik Cha’s second affidavit (Docket No. 16) (“Cha II Aff.”) and (11) the letter from Dr. Edward Michna (Docket No. 18) (“Michna Letter”). 2 . This information comes from Samsung’s website and refers to Samsung's business in 2008. (Cantor Aff. at Ex. A). 3 . The First Circuit has clarified that "the term ‘oppressiveness and vexation’ neither created an independent standard nor raised the bar for dismissal in forum non conveniens cases." Iragorri v. Int’l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.2000). 4 . This concession may be insufficient as defendant has not proffered any evidence that a defendant has the ability to waive a statute of limitations defense in Korea. See Mercier I, 935 F.2d at 426 (<HOLDING>). However, even assuming that the statute of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional (B) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (C) holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel (D) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment (E) holding that despite defendants willingness to abandon statute of limitations defenses the plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to address the question of whether foreign courts would accept such a waiver
Output: (E)
See Fla. R. App, P. 9.030(b)(1)(A); Office of the Public Defender v. Lakicevic, 215 So.3d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (treating an order denying the public defender’s motion for a protective order from a third-party subpoena duces tecum for deposition as a final order reviewable on appeal, rather than via a petition for writ of certiora-ri). We consolidated Wadsworth's appeal with the two' petitions, and, because we are quashing the subject order, we dismiss, as moot, Wadsworth’s appeal in case number '3D17-1527. We need not, and therefore do not, reach the perplexing issue of whether it is a better practice for a non-party to seek appellate, father than certiorari, review of a final discovery order, 7 .. see Marlin v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 761 So.2d 380, 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured (B) holding that if counsel retained by an insurer acts as an investigator and not as an attorney then the communications between the insured and insurer are not privileged (C) holding in the context of an attorney malpractice suit an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney it selects to defend the insured while the insurer selected the attorney to defend the insureds and controlled the ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy there is nothing in the record to indicate the insurer had any control over the details of the litigation as it was being conducted by the the attorney (D) holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured (E) holding that an insurance policy providing that the insurance company would pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at our request emphasis omitted did not establish an agreement that the insurer would cover attorney fees and costs to the insured in a declaratory action
Output: (D)
face,” id. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, it held that the exception for any portrayal that “does not tend to discredit [the] armed force[s]” impermissibly restricted expression on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Here, as in Schacht, defendants may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform. But it does not follow from this premise that defendants have the seemingly lesser included authority to ban only some organizations from marching in uniform. Under Schacht, and under other Supreme Court cases involving selective prohibitions on expression, defendants’ selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (B) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (C) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property (D) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (E) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted
Output: (A)
that they were not. See Oates, 698 P.2d at 816 (government-installed beeper in a 110 Ib. drum of phenyl-acetic acid purchased from a chemical company was a search under Colorado Constitution); Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 139-40 (governmental installation of a pen register is a search under Colorado Constitution); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 98-99, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1980)(governmental seizure of bank ree-ords violated the Colorado Constitution). Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution applies to the case before us. We therefore distinguish Place, and our recent ruling in People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 2001 Colo. LEXIS 783 (Colo.2001), both of which were decided under the Fourth Amendment and did not involve a prolonged traffic stop without reasonable suspicion (<HOLDING>); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 377-78 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search (B) holding that a dog sniff search of a safe taken by a burglar from the defendants home was a search (C) holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest (D) holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search (E) holding that dog sniff of dryer vent of house was not a search
Output: (A)
refers to tangible property. If an item of property is located somewhere, it has a physical form. Black’s defines “tangible” as: Having or possessing physical form. Capable of being touched and seen; perceptible to the touch; tactile; palpable; capable of being possessed or realized; readily apprehensible by the mind; real; substantial. Black’s Law Dictionary 1456 (6th ed.1990). A right to receive payments under a covenant not to compete has no physical form; it cannot be seen or touched. Thus, such a right is intangible. This interpretation follows the definition in Black’s for intangibles: Property that is a “right” such as a patent, copyright, trademark, etc, or one which is lacking physical existence; such as goodwill. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990). W ankr.D.Mass.1991) (<HOLDING>); Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Cory., 64 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that covenants prohibition on the employeedoctor from practicing health care of every nature and kind was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology (B) holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings (C) holdingthat the language of an arbitration clause applying to all claims demands disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise  concerning the vehicle was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue (D) holding that validity of sale would be affected where settlement was approved and the debtors assets were transferred free and clear of all liens (E) holding description all of the debtors properties assets and rights of every kind and nature wherever located sufficient to cover equipment
Output: (E)
the evidence was more than ample to convict him of both conspiracies had they been separately charged. In his brief, Herrera essentially concedes this point. And, under either or both conspiracies Herrera could have been convicted of the same offenses, since the conspiracies with both Nye and Jimenez separately involved combined weights over 50 grams of methamphetamine. Herrera’s argument is actually one of variance, in that the evidence presented at trial proved that he was a part of two conspiracies, rather than the one conspiracy with which he was charged. A variance “warrants reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the parties.” Id. at 1081 (internal quotations omitted); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-83, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 135, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conviction should be affirmed despite the existence of two conspiracies where the indictment charged only one because this variance did not prejudice the defendant (B) holding that the conviction should be upheld because there was no prejudice to the defendant even though the defendant had been charged with one conspiracy and the proof at trial showed two separate conspiracies (C) holding that the jury would have no problem separating the actions of the individual defendants where there were only four defendants and two separate conspiracies (D) holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial (E) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication
Output: (B)
of G.D.’s older sibling, C.D., based on the abuse of G.D. The court may not terminate parental rights based on the abuse of a sibling without a finding of a nexus between the abuse and the prospective abuse. O.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re G.C.A.), 863 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing R.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000)); see also C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re C.M.), 844 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Children who have not been abused may be adjudicated dependent based on abuse inflicted upon their siblings; however, the evidence must demonstrate a nexus between the abuse and any prospective abuse to another sibling.”). But see T.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 860 So.2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). “Generally, this nexus is established when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parental rights may be terminated based on the egregious abuse of a sibling without a showing of a nexus but providing that the parent should be afforded the opportunity to show a lack of a nexus (B) holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness (C) holding the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings (D) recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated (E) recognizing petitioners must be afforded the opportunity to show good cause for filing a longer petition
Output: (A)
of fraud on the court. In this regard, the district court recognized that under binding Tenth Circuit precedent “[ijntent to defraud is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of fraud on the court.” Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir.1996). The district court then proceeded to set out at length its reasoning for concluding that McVeigh had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that given additional time he could present a viable claim of fraud on the court. Second, McVeigh is simply wrong in trying to compartmentalize the questions of fraud on the court and Brady materiality. If the evidence in question was not material, a fundamental requirement for fraud on the court would be absent. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the fact that only non-material 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted (C) holding that while a district court lacks jurisdiction to deny a 60b motion while an appeal is pending it can certify that it will grant a 60b motion if the court of appeals remands the case for that purpose (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice
Output: (E)
rather than a PTO interference proceeding, we similarly have applied the person of ordinary skill standard in interferences when assessing priority under § 120, see Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2006), and see no reason to depart from that standard here. Moreover, § 120 requires that the disclosure actually appear within the specification, Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571-72 (“It is the disclosures of the applications that count. Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed. ), and amendments in later applications cannot cure an otherwise defective application in the priority chain, see Encyc. Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The incorporation by reference analysis, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (B) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (C) holding that ijlater applications cannot amend an application and restore its entitlement to priority (D) holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so (E) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court
Output: (C)
163 U.S. at 658, 16 S.Ct. 1127. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are cases in which an error may seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings even “independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770. One such case is Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 82 S.Ct. 1287, 8 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (per curiam), in which the Court considered whether to notice a defect in an indictment. In its short per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the defect in the indictment constituted reversible plain error even though the error was not raised in either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Silber, 370 U.S. at 717, 82 S.Ct. 1287; see also United States v. Brown, 995 F.2d 1493, 1504 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Clark, 412 F.2d 885, 887-88 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to prove an essential element of an offense does not constitute fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal (B) holding that in the absence of a government crossappeal an appellate court may not sua sponte correct a district court error if the correction would be to the defendants detriment (C) holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming (D) holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error (E) holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error
Output: (E)
contract (as the jury did here) unless instructed that they must decide who committed the first material breach.” Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. 2004) (second emphasis added). The supreme court explained in Mustang Pipeline Co. that charge problems in these breach-of-contract cases may be avoided by a disjunctive submission of the breach-of-contract question (whether plaintiff or defendant failed to comply with the parties’ agreement) accompanied by a conditional instruction (that applies if the jury determines both parties breached), directing the jury to decide who (plaintiff or defendant) committed the first material breach. Id.; see also Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Business PJC 101.2 (2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Berg v. Wilson, 353 S.W.3d 166, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this method of submission (B) holding it is within the trial courts discretion to choose on a casebycase basis the method although expressly rejecting the reserved jurisdiction method (C) recognizing this rule (D) recognizing this presumption (E) recognizing offset method
Output: (A)