niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
between Marcon Exhibits, Eekstein’s Workshop, and the DSC.” Resp. to Mot., Ex. K at 1. The letter notes that “based on our discussions, it is clear that the parties possess a commonality of interest regarding the representation of AMTC against EPA and the Exhibition and are not adverse with one another or the DSC.” Ibid. Prihod signed the letter on behalf of Eek-stein’s Workshop and DSC, and Robert Gardella signed on behalf of Marcon Eek-stein and himself in his individual capacity. When an organization deals with its officers, directors, or members, Michigan law respects the separate identities of those involved, especially with respect to matching lawyers with clients. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 107 Mich.App. 509, 514, 309 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The ethics rules allow an lawyer to represent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual shareholders of a corporation could disregard the corporate form and assert that a loan made to their corporation was usurious where the lender insisted that the shareholders incorporate an entity to receive the proceedseven though the proceeds were for the individual shareholders benefitsolely to avoid the lower usury rate for individual borrowers (B) holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation (C) holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation (D) holding that a corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders even where the corporation has but one shareholder the general proposition of corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude in accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions that the attorneys client is the corporation and not the shareholders (E) holding that even where no attorneyclient relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney this does not necessarily mean that the law firm had no fiduciary duty to the shareholder and observing that instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small in such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity
Output: (D)
calculated’ to ensure that notice reaches the alien.” Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d 733, 736 & 736 n. 1 (5th Cir.1995)); cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (finding that “notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties”). In this case, the INS simply followed the INA statute and chose a method of notice authorized by the statute — a method Congress itself determined was reasonably calculated to ensure proper notice. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a) (1999); INA § 242B(a)(2), (c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2), (c)(1) (1994). This method of notification does not violate an alien’s due process rights. See Farhoud, 122 F.3d at 796 (<HOLDING>); Wijeratne v. INS, 961 F.2d 1344, 1346 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing (B) holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied (C) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (D) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (E) holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice
Output: (B)
§ 507(a)(7)(E), even though the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no definition of ‘excise,’ ‘tax,’ or ‘excise tax.’ ” Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 220, 116 S.Ct. 2106. Even when the definition appears in a single statute, our sister circuits have also held that definitions limited to one section should not be applied to another section. Thus, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that, where Congress limited the definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer” to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), “[t]o apply the § 2680(h) definition beyond that subsection would make meaningless the limitation that Congress placed on the definition.” Andrews v. United States, 441 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2006); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Amada, 200 F.3d 647, 650-51 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that § 1337 is not designed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 (B) holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract (C) holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa (D) holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in  4b12a (E) holding that where the definition of lottery is expressly limited to 18 usc  1307b the definition cannot be applied to a related civil statute
Output: (E)
his first issue, Samba maintains that the immigration judge placed too little weight on the length of his sentence and the assistance he provided to federal agencies in determining that the offense was a particularly serious crime. We have previously determined that such a claim, “which amount[s] to an argument that the immigration judge ‘abused [his] discretion in weighing the multiple desiderata made relevant by the [BIA’s] definition of a particularly serious crime,’ do[es] not present questions of law and therefore [is] not reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D).” Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296 Fed.Appx. 391, 394 (5th Cir.2008) (third alteration in original) (quoting Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir.2006)); see also Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the first issue challenges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a (B) holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the argument that the immigration judge did not consider all of the relevant factors in determining that his children would not suffer the requisite hardship was not a question of law under  1252a2d (E) holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony
Output: (D)
goes to voluntariness The Court: Yeah. Crook: As I understand it. Hedgepeth (counsel for State): Well, as I understand it, it does too, but that’s what I want defense counsel to say on the record that he agrees that’s the way our courts ruled that that’s correct and we do not have to have every officer that was involved in everything. ¶ 17. The State submits that these exchanges indicate Sanders’s repeated and absolute waiver of the issue of the volun-tariness of her statement and was strictly based on whether Sanders had requested the presence of a lawyer during questioning. The State responds that Sanders never put on the evidence and expressly declined to attempt to produce evidence sufficient to invoke the Agee evidentiary rule. Hogan v. State, 730 So.2d 94, 98 (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Further, the State submits that once the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agee applies only where defendant has alleged that his confession was induced by threats or promises (B) holding that confession was not induced from an improper promise where competent evidence supports the trial courts finding that the interviewing officer made no promises during the interrogation (C) holding that confession was involuntary where suspect was a few days short of his sixteenth birthday was questioned for at least four hours prior to his first confession and was not accompanied by counsel friends or family where defendants made no showing that petitioner acted coolly or callously during questioning or that he had past experiences with the police and where police made promises of leniency (D) holding that implicit threats or promises did not render a defendants statement involuntary when a review of the circumstances reveals that the defendants independent will was not overcome so as to induce a confession that he was not otherwise disposed to malee internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession
Output: (A)
trial court’s judgment wherein the appellant was sentenced to a loss of liberty”).’ ““““Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (footnote omitted). See also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (‘ “If the accused ... is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.... The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.” ’) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); Weakley v. State, 721 So.2d 235, 236 (Ala.1998) (<HOLDING>).” “““Thus it is the lack of counsel, coupled 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (B) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (C) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal (D) holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel (E) holding that the right to counsel at arraignment is a jurisdictional matter
Output: (E)
Judge. The husband, Theodore C. Rogers, appeals from an order granting the wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees and costs in a dissolution of marriage action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. In March 2001, after approximately nineteen months of marriage, the husband filed for divorce. Shortly thereafter, the wife filed a motion for temporary attorney’s fees and costs. Following an eviden-tiary hearing, the lowe CA 1997)(<HOLDING>); Meighen v. Meighen, 813 So.2d 173, 176 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err in imputing income to wife for purposes of child support based on the continued monthly payment of wifes living expenses by wifes mother (B) holding that trial court did not err (C) holding that it was error to impute income to wife where there was no evidence of regular periodic payments and where assistance from wifes mother was of a temporary nature during the pendency of the divorce proceedings holding that lower court properly imputed income to husband where husbands parents maderegular periodic payments that allowed parties to maintain a high standard of living (D) holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees (E) holding that the wifes testimony outlining the family living expenses constituted evidence from which the trial court could find that  the needs of the children exceed  the maximum support pursuant to the guidelines 
Output: (A)
discrimination on the basis of his disability, in violation of the ADA and NYHRL. Falardo, who was a PBA representative, also claims that after he helped negotiate the contract with the City of New York creating the VSF, the Code was altered from covering police officers who retire “from service” to those who retire “for service,” rendering those electing Disability Retirement ineligible for VSF benefits. Falardo alleges that this change in the statutory language constitutes fraud. B. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS The validity of the VSF statutory scheme (the “Scheme”) and the method by which it distributes funds has been extensively challenged in both state and federal actions under a variety of theories. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 74 (2d Cir.1998) (“Castellano II ”) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 820, 119 S.Ct. 60, 142 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq (C) holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq (D) holding that denial of vsf benefits to disabled retirees does not violate the ada the rehabilitation act 29 usc  791 et seq or the age discrimination in employment act of 1967 29 usc  621 et seq and that plaintiffs due process and first amendment claims were frivolous (E) holding that the age discrimination in employment act adea 29 usc  621 et seq was not a valid abrogation of the states sovereign immunity
Output: (D)
to that fact. A jury could infer that Kudner made the statement with the intent to induce the plaintiffs to sign the agreements and that the plaintiffs relied on the statement: Krupnick’s and Schapiro’s affidavits and testimony indicate that their signing the agreement was contingent on Avecia’s obtaining the registrations. (Exhibit P-6, Krupnick dep., 7/14/00, at 87; Krupnick aff. ¶¶17, 18; Schapiro aff. ¶¶29, 30.) There is evidence that the plaintiffs’ reliance on Kudner’s statements was justified: Kenline testified that it was Avecia’s responsibility to obtain the Reputex registrations and that Avecia had more regulatory experience than the plaintiffs. (Exhibit P-53, Kenline dep., 7/26/00, at 696); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 690 A.2d 914, 916-17 (Del. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Finally, there is evidence of damages: the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact (B) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiffs did not allege actual reliance on defendants misrepresentations  and thus could not rely on  552 of the second restatement  where plaintiffs proffered only fraudonthemarket theory alleging that defendants negligent misrepresentations affected market prices which induced plaintiffs to enter into certain transactions (D) holding it is a question of fact (E) holding that whether a plaintiffs reliance on defendants misrepresentations was justified is a question of fact precluding summary judgment
Output: (E)
an issue, the federal court must predict how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue by “relying on guidance from analogous decisions in other states and other legal authorities.” Stratford Sch. Dist., S.A.U. Dist. No. 58 v. Emp’rs Reins. Corp., 162 F.3d 718, 720 (1st Cir.1998). There is a split of authority in other jurisdictions as to whether a hospital can be liable for breach of warranty when it supplies a defective medical device to a patient in the course of providing medical services and treatment. 35 Mass. Practice § 6:14 (2d ed. 2009). A number of federal courts have held that a hospital cannot be subject to strict liability because it is not a seller or distributor of medical devices. See, e.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharm. Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 n. 5 (5th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Roell v. Stryker, No. 3:06-cv-443, 2007 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that physicians as agents of the hospital are indistinguishable from the hospital for immunity purposes under the lgaa (B) holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala (C) holding that a hospital cannot be strictly liable under texas law for a defective catheter because a hospital is not a seller engaged in the business of selling the product (D) holding that care of the grounds was part of the business of the hospital (E) holding that because the contract between the hospital and the health insurance company had a hold harmless provision which stated the hospital would not bill or hold insurance subscribers liable for any hospital expenses covered by the subscribers insurance contract and all expenses from the patients treatment for the automobile accident were covered in such contract there was no debt upon which the hospital could assert a lien pursuant to the states hospital lien statute
Output: (C)
agents or brokers concerning the options available to them.” Strube, supra, 277 N.J.Super. at 241, 649 A.2d 624. In a series of decisions responding to those complaints, this Court, and the Appellate Division, held that insurance agents and brokers had a duty to exercise reasonable skill and good faith in advising their customers about UIM coverage and about their coverage selection options. See Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333, 340, 587 A.2d 615 (1991); see also Avery v. Arthur E. Armitage Agency, 242 N.J.Super. 293, 301-02, 576 A.2d 907 (App.Div.1990) (discussing various initiating inquiries by insured that might trigger duty to provide advice concerning availability of additional UIM coverage options); Pinto v. Garretson, 237 N.J.Super. 444, 449-50, 568 A.2d 119 (App.Div.1989) (<HOLDING>); Sobotor v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurance company that sent coverage selection form and buyers guide had no further duty to communicate directly with insured to advise of importance of notice or recommend purchase of additional coverage (B) holding insurance agent has no duty to advise insured of amount of insurance necessary to cover all potential losses (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that insurance agents owe no duty to procure coverage for persons with no written or oral agreement with the agent to procure coverage or who have never contacted the agent about insurance coverage (E) holding that insurance company operating under a reservation of rights had the right and the duty to control the defense until such time as it was determined that it had no liability insurance coverage
Output: (A)
of course, knew that Rios had Patrolman Coggins’ gun, did you not? A. At the time, yes. Further testimony showed that when defendant was captured he was seen to drop the .357 magnum revolver and kick it away. This evidence tends to show defendant first acquired the revolver when he shot Trooper Coggins and had it with him when he was captured. Bray’s testimony provides direct evidence defendant had Coggins’ revolver at the time he entered Mrs. Gillespie’s house. Considering all the evidence, circumstantial and direct, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from which the trial judge could find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time he broke into Mrs. Gillespie’s home. See State v. Thompson, 318 N.C. 395, 348 S.E. 2d 798 (1986) (<HOLDING>); State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 343 S.E. 2d 828 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factors of old age and infirmity (B) holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age (D) recognizing the validity of aggravating factors such as escape from confinement and prior felony conviction (E) holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors
Output: (A)
Cir.1997) (“The text of § 1986 requires the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.”), which in turn requires an allegation of four elements: (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1994). Defendants contend that Ms. Rhyce cannot allege the first element because, under the single entity doctrine, the individual defendants, as employees of the Fire District, cannot be considered individuals sep arate from the Fire District. See id. at 653 (<HOLDING>); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal (B) holding that a school board and its employees constitute a single entity incapable of conspiring with itself for purposes of  19853 (C) holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board (D) holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited (E) holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment
Output: (B)
racketeering income.”). Although a few circuits have adopted a more liberal approach, the Second Circuit has consistently distinguished between injuries alleged to be caused by racketeering activity, and injuries alleged to be caused by investment of racketeering funds. See Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide, § 7 (3d ed. 2010). Under the Second Circuit’s rule, injuries caused by the racketeering activity itself may not form the basis for a Subsection 1962(a) claim. See Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1063 (2d Cir.1996), vacated in part on other grounds by, 525 U.S. 128, 119 S.Ct. 493, 142 L.Ed.2d 510 (1998); Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 82-83 (2d Cir.1990); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F.Supp.2d 345, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, neither can a plaintiff state a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise (B) holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public (C) holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation (D) holding that to state a subsection 1962a claim plaintiffs must allege a use or investment injury that is distinct from any injury resulting from the racketeering predicate acts themselves (E) holding under maryland law that a breach of fiduciary duty claim alleging loss in share value shareholder must allege an injury distinct from an injury to the corporation
Output: (D)
183, 185-87, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). The judge, though immune from private suit, is not immune from criminal prosecution by a state or federal agency. See Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-31, 101 S.Ct. at 186-88. Applying the rule here, the trial judge below — and the court-appointed psychiatrists who proved that they were functioning as an arm of the court — are immune from private prosecution by a private citizen. However, if they violated a criminal law, they are not immune from criminal prosecution by the government. Some cases using the functional approach have held that certain administrative functions of judges are not part of the judicial function and therefore are outside the scope of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (<HOLDING>). However, the case before us today does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination (B) holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him (C) holding judge not able to invoke judicial immunity in  1983 damages action against him for employment decision made in the exercise of his administrative functions (D) holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply (E) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury
Output: (C)
and has not argued that this defendant is a Thimerosal Defendant. Accordingly, the Holders have not shown that the district court e 78 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.2002) (stating that an order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo). 7 . 343 F.3d 765 (5th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 991, 125 S.Ct. 1823, 161 L.Ed.2d 755 (2005). 8 . 408 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.2005). 9 . 381 F.3d 501 (5th Cir.2004). 10 . 385 F.3d at 571. 11 . Id. at 573 (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir.2003)). 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 574. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. at 575; see also Rainwater v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that the Smallwood "common defense” rule only applies if the defense is "dispositive of all claims against all defendants”). 16 . 408 F.3d at 184 (<HOLDING>). 17 . 381 F.3d 501, 503-04 (5th Cir.2004) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city (B) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (C) holding that claims against vaccine manufacturers were subject to the vaccine act but claims against thimerosal manufacturers were not therefore the cause was properly removed based on a fraudulent joinder theory (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and  1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act
Output: (C)
his burden of showing that he has asserted either his factual or legal innocence. The other relevant factors also weigh against Hasson. As for prejudice to the government, it would be required to prepare for an unanticipated trial. In a case such as this, which the court designated as complex under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), the prejudice to the government is more obvious because trial preparation would entail considerable effort. Hasson also delayed the filing of his withdrawal motion until just days before sentencing, having waited almost four months after entering his guilty plea. See Carr, 80 F.3d at 420 (reasoning that a three-month delay in filing a motion to withdraw a plea weighs against the defendant); United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439-40 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The fourth and seventh factors, which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the delay is presumptively prejudicial does not necessarily mean the first factor weighs against the state but requires further consideration of the extent of the delay beyond this period (B) holding that a fivemonth delay did not render information stale (C) recognizing that a fivemonth delay weighs against the defendant (D) holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay (E) holding a fivemonth delay in searching a computer did not invalidate the search because there was no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause that it created prejudice to the defendant or that officers acted in bad faith
Output: (C)
96, 98 (2) (561 SE2d 382) (2002). 12 Id. (punctuation omitted). 13 Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 207 (II) (107 SC 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987); Bruton, 391 U. S. at 135-36. 14 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2); see Bruton, 391 U. S. at 135-36. 15 481 U. S. 200 (107 SC 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987). 16 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Richardson, 481 U. S. at 208. 17 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2); see Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 137-38 (6) (485 SE2d 783) (1997) (“For the admission of a co-defendant’s statements to constitute a Bruton violation the statements standing alone must clearly inculpate the defendant.” (punctuation omitted)); Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 267-68 (1) (a) (601 SE2d 793) (2004). 18 See Moss, 275 Ga. at 99 (2) (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 268 Ga. at 137-38 (6) (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights (B) holding that admission of nontestifying oodefendants statement to police that murder defendant came to his apartment and went in bathroom and stayed there for awhile did not violate bruton rule because statement standing alone did not clearly incriminate defendant but only became incriminating when linked with other evidence (C) recognizing the chance that the jury will credit a nontestifying codefendants incriminating statement and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting defendant as the offender even though he could not crossexamine the declarant (D) holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face (E) holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant
Output: (B)
(1st Cir.1983). The next hurdle is the one plaintiffs fail to clear: Does Congress have the power under the United States Constitution to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity? The Supreme Court has recently reiterated that Congress cannot invade Eleventh Amendment immunity except “pursuant to a valid exercise of power” conferred by the Constitution. Seminole Tribe, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1123. In determining the sources of power, the Supreme Court had previously found that Congress possessed the power to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. See id.; see also Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>). However, the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the patent clause of article i (B) recognizing that congress has specifically abrogated the eleventh amendment defense when legislating pursuant to  5 of the fourteenth amendment and its article i  8 plenary power over commerce but refusing to extend authority to abrogate to legislation enacted pursuant to the indian commerce clause the indian gaming regulatory act (C) holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that congress did not properly abrogate states eleventh amendment immunity from suits under the patent act (E) holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause
Output: (E)
of the evidence. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. In interpreting Hicks, supra, the Second Circuit has stated definitively as follows: [Defendant] misreads the Supreme Court’s statement in Hicks that once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant’s actions were intentionally discriminatory. [Defendant] takes this statement as requiring the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence after the defendant’s production — evidence beyond that presented in the plaintiffs prima facie case. Justice Scalia took pains to preclude such an interpretation of the Court’s decision when he observed that, upon rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons for its action , 142 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that former employer met its burden of proof that ubc exception applied (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false (E) recognizing that a plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous
Output: (D)
the Plaintiffs’ Activities Involved Interstate Commerce The final question is whether the plaintiffs’ activities involved interstate commerce. For the purpose of the Motor Carrier Act exemption, “[a] carrier engages in interstate commerce by either actually transporting goods across state lines or transporting within a single state goods that are in the flow of interstate commerce.” Barefoot, 16 F.3d 1216, at *2 (citing Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C., 528 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) (“Highway transportation by motor vehic e intrastate transport of empty bottles destined for a bottling plant outside the state was a part of interstate commerce); Glanville v. Dupar, Inc., No. H-08-2537, 2009 WL 3255292, at *9-10 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 25, 2009) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has specifically 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce (B) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (C) holding that the time appliances were at a distribution center within the state did not break the continuity of interstate movement the subsequent delivery from the distribution center was the last phase in the interstate shipment (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce
Output: (C)
130 (2000). The Court of Appeals also held that Abrams had not preserved its objection to the trial court’s failure to give Abrams’s requested jury instruction containing the complete text of section 222A of the Restatement. Id. at 357. On review, Abrams first argues that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing for abuse of discretion the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. Abrams contends that the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate only when an ex parte communication is between a party and a juror, or between a witness and a juror. According to Abrams, a communication between a lawyer and a juror is analogous to a communication between a judge and a juror, and should be considered error as a matter of law. Huntley v. Reed, 276 Or 591, 594, 556 P2d 122 (1976) (<HOLDING>). However, Abrams asked the Court of Appeals to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judges ex parte communication telling a jury it needed to reach a verdict was reversible error without any discussion of harmlessness (B) holding new trial required after judges ex parte communication with jury in response to jury question during deliberations because there was no way of reaching a conclusion about what transpired other than by adopting the judges recollection (C) holding a new trial required when juror is replaced by an alternate during jury deliberations (D) holding that judges comments to jury during equal pay act trial were harmless error (E) recognizing the hazards of ex parte communication with a deliberating jury
Output: (B)
with the court, that Mr. Peralta has been granted a labor certification pursuant to a subsequent application filed by his employer. He has been awarded all of the relief that he sought, and there is consequently no live controversy concerning the original denial of his application for the same position with the same employer. As to the appellants whose employers have re-filed new certification applications that are currently pending, we do not think their claims are mooted. In contrast to Mr. Peralta, these parties have not yet received the relief originally sought and thus their original claim that the denial of their first certification application was arbitrary remains a live controversy. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Actually, even after a certification is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending (B) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (C) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (D) holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party (E) holding that a previously live case can become moot only if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation
Output: (E)
because of [the dealer’s] precarious financial condition .... ... [W]e decline to hold BMW/NA negligent and liable for damages since it could not reasonably have anticipated the crimes committed by [the dealer’s] principal, Eichler. Although BMW/NA may have been aware of [the dealer’s] shaky financial condition, that knowledge alone gave BMW/NA no cause reasonably to anticipate that Eichler would either engage in any criminal activity or that he would abscond with customer funds. In fact, no amount of supervision by BMW/NA would have enabled it to foresee Eichler’s thievery. Id. In other cases involving the franchisors of automobile dealerships, the courts have reached similar results. See Colson v. Maghami, No. CV 08-2150-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 2744682, at *9-10 (D.Ariz. July 9, 2010) (<HOLDING>); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (B) holding that a franchisor had no duty to supervise its automobile dealership or to warn a customer of the dealership who paid a substantial deposit for a limited edition lamborghini reventon and who did not receive either the car or the return of his deposit (C) holding that an automobile dealership had no duty to prevent the misconduct of the executives of another company who misappropriated company funds to make the purchase of several automobiles from the dealership (D) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 (E) holding that a car dealership could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee who shot out the tires of the plaintiffs truck during a repossession attempt
Output: (B)
to do it. The Bankruptcy Court provided counsel for Debtor with the opportunity at the October 3, 2013 status conference to address IndyMac’s argument that conversion was appropriate “based on the record that’s before the Court today” due to “lack of compliance with [the Bankruptcy Court’s] status conference order,” including the untimely filing of the status report and the “monthly operating reports [which] are missing” or “chronically late throughout the entire case.” (Suppl. Notice of Lodgment Supp. Mot. Stay, Ex. 7 at 5-6, 8, ECF No. 20-8). The Scheduling Order and the October 3, 2013 hearing provided Debtor with sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard to meet due process requirements. See In re Bijelonic, No. CV 11-08077-JVS, 2012 WL 2263289, at *5 (C.D.Cal. June 15, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Debtor contends that, prior to the October 3, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts initial scheduling order provided sufficient notice and opportunity to present evidence to meet due process requirements when the bankruptcy court sua sponte converted a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 because a debtor failed to comply with an initial scheduling order by not submitting a status report prior to the second status con ference and failing to appear at the second status conference (B) recognizing the distinction between the reorganized debtor and the converted debtor and holding an asset which was not property of the original chapter 11 estate does not become property of the converted chapter 7 estate (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession
Output: (A)
leave because the claim was not yet barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, this claim could also have been re-filed without affecting the rights of the parties. In both cases, the amended complaint was considered filed because leave would have been granted had it been sought and no party would have been prejudiced if the formal requirements of requesting leave were bypassed. But that is not the situation here because HealthSouth would have been prejudiced if the court did not follow the formal requirements of Rule 15(a). Although it is true that upon re-filing leave would have been granted (as it was a week later), the loss of the affirmative defense of prescription would prejudicially affect HealthSouth. See Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>); Phillips v. III. Central Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense (B) holding that the loss of a statute of limitations defense constitutes clear legal prejudice (C) holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only (D) holding that the statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional and defendant expressly waived it observing in dicta that a statute of limitations defense should be raised no later than the trial (E) holding that the loss of a statute of limitations defense prejudices a defendant
Output: (E)
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If, however, the petitioner’s federal constitutional claim was raised in the state courts but remained unresolved, we apply a de novo standard. Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir.2006). Under this standard, Williams’ petition should be granted if he can demonstrate that the erroneously admitted evidence so infused the proceeding with inflammatory prejudice that it rendered a fair trial impossible. Petrillo v. O’Neill, 428 F.3d 41, 44 n. 2 (1st Cir.2005). The Commonwealth contends that Williams’ federal claim was effectively adjudicated by the state court because the Massachusetts Appeals Court applied prejudicial error analysis, a standard that was at least as favorable to Williams as the federal standard. McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Appeals Court found that admission of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (B) holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum (C) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (D) holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard (E) recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard
Output: (A)
discretion. Commonwealth v. Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (2008). As noted, discovery in death penalty collateral proceedings is permissible only upon leave of court, and only for good cause shown. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). “ ‘A showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence.’ ” Collins, 957 A.2d at 272 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 750 (2004)). We agree with the Commonwealth that Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying Elliott’s request for additional discovery. Elliott has not identified any document that was withheld from him that would have been exculpatory, and his claims to the contrary constitute mere speculation. See Hanible, 30 A.3d at 484 (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d at 261 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (C) holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation (D) holding that speculation that production of requested documents might reveal exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish good cause for discovery (E) holding that conjecture that opportunity to review homicide file might yield exculpatory evidence is inadequate to demonstrate good cause for discovery
Output: (E)