niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
be filed within three years of the time the petitioner’s direct appeal is ruled upon. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015). Here, Lyles’s direct appeal of this conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 19, 2009. See Lyles v. State, 12 So.3d 552, 555 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2009). He filed his PCR motion in February 2013, over three years later. Thus, his PCR motion is time-barred. ¶ 12. Certain statutory exceptions could waive the procedural bar, such as an intervening Mississippi Supreme Court decision like Gowdy, if it applied. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i). However, Gowdy does not apply, because, as the State points out, it cannot be applied retroactively to cases that were final before April 7, 2011, the date Gowdy’s mandate was issued. See Carr, 178 So.3d at 321 (¶ 6) (<HOLDING>). This Court affirmed Lyles’s conviction on May 
 Holding statements: (A) holding miranda decision does not apply retroactively (B) holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely (C) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively (D) holding gowdy does not apply retroactively to habitualoffender convictions that were final when gowdy was issued (E) holding that  523a13 does not apply retroactively
Output: (D)
refer to the defendant’s failure to testify. See State v. Clark, 170 W.Va. 224, 292 S.E.2d 643 (1982); State v. McClure, 163 W.Va. 33, 253 S.E.2d 555 (1979); State v. Simon, 132 W.Va. 322, 52 S.E.2d 725 (1949). However, those cases involved isolated remarks that certain evidence was uneontra-dieted, unlike the argument here which repeatedly emphasized the absence of refutation by the defense. Further, the prosecutor’s statements that no one had denied that appellant sold the drugs amounted to an impermissible comment on the appellant’s failure to testify, since appellant was the only one who could have denied it. 172 W.Va. at 134, 304 S.E.2d at 39; see also U.S. v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, Cotnam v. U.S., 519 U.S. 942, 117 S.Ct. 326, 136 L.Ed.2d 240 (<HOLDING>); Mannarino v. State, 869 So.2d 650 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the states comment that nobody testified he wasnt the guy was an impermissible comment on appellants right to remain silent in a case in which the only individual who could have contradicted the states evidence was the appellant (B) holding that the prosecutors reference to the nonexistence of mitigating evidence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (C) holding that a prosecutor may comment on the absence of evidence so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecutors version of events (D) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (E) holding that prosecutors comment that regarding uncontradieted undenied unrebutted or undisputed evidence is considered violative of fifth amendment rights if only person who could have contradicted denied rebutted or disputed the evidence was the defendant himself
Output: (E)
48 B.R. 916 (Bankr.D.Nev.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58 (B) holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract (C) holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest (D) holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing (E) holding that creditor held a purchase money security interest in household furniture by virtue of assignment of the retail installment contract from the seller
Output: (B)
as cited by the trial court, in Brown v. S. Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co. (1926), 22 Ohio App. 324, 153 N.E. 864, the First District Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he statute provides that persons interested in the estate may file exceptions to the inventory. We are of the opinion that ‘persons interested,’ as used in the statute, does not relate to parties claiming ownership of property inventoried in the estate.” See also Scott v. Mofford (1940), 64 Ohio App. 457, 18 O.O. 197, 28 N.E. 947 (allowing claimed equitable owner of property to assert her title to real estate in a subsequent action, despite failure to file exceptions to the inclusion of the property in the inventory of her father’s estate); Cole v. Ottawa Home & Sav. Assn. (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 1, 47 O.O.2d 1, 246 N.E.2d 542 (<HOLDING>). However, the Brown court further stated that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a noncore proceeding a bankruptcy court may enter final orders with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding (B) holding that the determination by the probate court in the summary proceeding provided for by section 211516 revised code that assets should be included in an estate makes the question of title res judicata as between all parties to the proceeding but the judgment of the probate court may be attacked in a subsequent action by other interested persons who were not parties to the proceeding in probate court (C) holding that a probate court lacked jurisdiction over a proceeding to declare heirship because a court empowered with probate jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters incident to an estate when a probate proceeding related to such matters is already pending in that court emphasis added quoting bailey v cherokee cty appraisal dist 862 sw2d 581 585 tex 1993 (D) holding that texass probate statute does not affect whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to a case (E) holding that a suit for compensatory and punitive damages against various probate judges for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of property during the probate proceedings was not barred by the probate exception or rookerfeldman abstention doctrine
Output: (B)
the burden shifts to the employer to produce a non-discriminatory reason for its action; if the employer meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the proffered reason is pretextual. Id. at 785. Like the district court, we focus our attention on the “similarly situated” prong. A similarly situated employee need not be “identical,” but the plaintiff must show that the other employee “dealt with the same supervisor, [was] subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish [his] conduct or the employer’s treatment of [him].” Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.2008); Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt RR. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The district court found that Am-rhein did 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated (B) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (C) holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions (D) recognizing in a title vii case that for the fourth element of the prima facie case the individuals seeking relief must demonstrate at the least that they are similarly situated to those employees allegedly receiving more favorable treatment in all material respects (E) holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects
Output: (E)
of computer [technology],-” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Thus, claim 1 fails to recite an inventive concept. Accordingly, claim 1 fails to recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 4. Alice Step Two for Remaining Asserted Claims of the ’051 Patent-Evaluation of Abstract Claims for an Inventive Concept Plaintiff has not separately identified an inventive concept for the remaining asserted claims apart from those already discussed above. Thus, the Court need not address whether any of the additional limitations in the remaining claims provide an inventive concept. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 892 (9th Cir. 2008) (litigants waive arguments by failing to raise them in an opposition to a motion to dismiss); accord John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1247 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011).(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, for .the same reasons discussed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is waived where the defendant failed to develop an argument in his appellate brief and cited no authority (B) holding party failed to develop any argument on this front and thus has waived it (C) holding that the appellant waived this argument (D) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (E) holding an argument waived in part because the party failed to develop it in the district court
Output: (B)
and is overruled. Accordingly, we: (1) reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding actual damages (other than funeral expenses) and punitive damages for tortious interference and order that claim dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (2) reverse the judgment to the extent any remaining damages awarded for tortious interference were for funeral expenses and render judgment that Alice take nothing on that claim; and (3) affirm the remainder of the judgment. 1 . Because the seventh issue is largely disposi-tive of the appeal, we address it first. 2 . See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1999 & Supp.2005). 3 . Cathey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 390-91 (Tex.1991). 4 . See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at 391-92 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed (B) holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy (C) holding that an employees claim for wrongful discharge based on the employers desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employees pension fund is preempted by erisa even though the claims are asserted under tort theories not erisa and seek damages only in the form of lost wages mental anguish and punitive damages not benefits under the plan (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate
Output: (C)
“[t]he existence of a ‘public interest in having the legality of the practices settled ... militates against a mootness conclusion.’ ” Id. at 1517 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)). This action is one of those extraordinary cases in which the complained of activity may be repeated and yet evade review. First, the cooperative agreements challenged in this action were of only one year’s duration. It is difficult to obtain judicial review during the duration of a one-year agreement. Second, we find that the Conservation Fund has met its burden of showing a sufficient likelihood that there will continue to be injurious actions relating to the official sanctioning of closed-season hunting. See Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1516 (<HOLDING>). See generally, Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (B) holding that a sentencing decision will be affirmed if challenged factor is permissible and other factors are not challenged (C) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (D) holding that voluntary cessation of the challenged activity is insufficient to render a case moot if the legality of the challenged practices is still disputed because the official is free to return to his old ways  quoting wt grant co 345 us at 362 73 sct at 897 (E) holding that a physical or theoretical possibility that the government actor would repeat challenged actions is insufficient to demonstrate that the challenged action is capable of repetition
Output: (D)
possessed plenary powers of taxation. They could tax the property of their citizens in such manner and to such extent as they saw fit.”); id. at 621 (“The founders anticipated that the expenditures of the States, their counties, cities, and towns, would chiefly be met by direct taxation on accumulated property.”); M’Culloch v. State, 17 US 316, 428, 4 L Ed 579 (1819) (“[T]he power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised * * * to the utmost extent to which the government may chuse to carry it.”); id. (“The people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property.”); see also Curtis v. Dept. of Rev., 17 OTR 414 (2004), aff'd, 338 Or 579, 112 P3d 330 (2005) (<HOLDING>). “Indeed, Oregon has imposed such a tax from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government (B) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (C) holding that the federal constitution does not require states to permit unlimited absentee voting (D) holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution (E) holding that under the federal constitution the states retained unlimited authority in matters of taxation except where trumped by for instance the commerce clause
Output: (E)
an off-the-record discussion with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the trial court departed downward, explaining that a prison sentence seemed “unreasonable” given the nature of the crime. The trial judge also discussed the need for restitution, but never clearly identified this as a justification for the departure sentence. Although the State made it clear, for the record, that it would not offer a departure sentence as part of a negotiated plea, the State never objected to the court’s imposition of a departure sentence. Rather, the prosecutor told the judge that if she “would like to mitigate, that’s on you, that’s not from the State.” Accordingly, we find that the issue was not preserved for appellate review, and affirm. See State v. Colbert, 968 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. PALMER, LAWSON, and JACOBUS, JJ., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant must object at trial to preserve as applied challenge for appeal (B) holding that claim was preserved for subsequent appeal by objection at original sentencing hearing (C) holding that to successfully challenge a departure sentence on appeal the state must properly preserve the issue by objection during the sentencing hearing (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3800b or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses a defendant from raising the error on direct appeal
Output: (C)
exhaustion of administrative remedies, petition for writ of mandamus may be filed in Leon County, Florida); Stovall v. Cooper, 860 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)(petition for writ of mandamus as to gain time lies against the Department of Corrections in the county wherein which the DOC keeps its headquarters, i.e., Leon County). The record reflects that Borroto was sentenced to nine months in the Dade County jail in case number 01-25640 on July 22, 2002, and to nine months in the Dade County jail in case number 01-26153 on August 9, 2002. In each instance, the trial court ordered and the defendant received all credit for time served. The State concedes that Borroto has satisfied the sentence requirements in both cases, as he was entitled to 332 days for time served in case A 1995)(<HOLDING>). We note that based upon the attachments to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after exhausting administrative remedies if the defendant believes the department of corrections ruling is incorrect he may file a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court for the second judicial circuit leon county florida (B) holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages (C) holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court (D) holding a claim not previously raised or ruled on by the circuit court was waived in an appeal from the denial of a writ of mandamus (E) holding that defendant seeking credit for time served must exhaust administrative remedies within the department of corrections prior to seeking judicial relief
Output: (A)
finds that FMI has failed to satisfy its burden on these issues, it need not address the other criteria. Irreparable Injury Whatever harm FMI may suffer by having its franchise terminated does not constitute irreparable injury. First, the loss of the Audi franchise may result in reduced revenue, but FMI will not go out of business altogether. FMI will still be able to deal in BMW, Mercedes-Benz and Porsche automobiles, and money damages would suffice to compensate for any loss of additional revenue attributable to Audi sales. See C-B Kenworth, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 675 F.Supp. 686, 687-88 (D.C.Me.1987) (finding all alleged injuries from loss of truck franchise to be compen-sable at law); Miller Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 286 F.Supp. 529, 532 (D.Mass.1968) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, given FMI’s poor customer service 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that impossibility but not mere difficulty excuses a partys performance (B) recognizing that courts and commentators have had difficulty determining the meaning of good faith in the definition of fair consideration  (C) recognizing the difficulty of calculating damages but not finding the task impossible (D) recognizing the difficulty of determining a nonspeculative hypotheticallicense damages amount when the infringer is a direct competitor (E) recognizing the difficulty of precisely pleading the effects on interstate commerce before completion of discovery
Output: (C)
stated that he could not remember whether Bailey had reached into Evans’s truck. But the State counters Bailey’s argument by noting that Don-nerson’s statement was entered into evidence at the second trial, and the defense was able to impeach him with the contradictory statement. ¶ 55. Bailey also claims that he was prejudiced by the loss of an audiotape of Pickens’s statement to police. Bailey asserts that the audiotape was important to his defense because Pickens had changed his statement of the events, and the audiotape would corroborate some of his previous statements, as well as Bailey’s statements to police. The State points out that the admission of the audiotape was the reason that the Court of Appeals reversed Bailey’s first conviction. See Bailey, 952 So.2d at 236-38 (<HOLDING>). Also, the State points out that, while the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of the audiotape as substantive evidence of pickenss prior statement was error (B) holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence (C) holding that admission of prior statement constituted error but was harmless when other admissible evidence established the same fact (D) holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial (E) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence
Output: (A)
abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court’s decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the “Stafford Straightaway”), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT’s position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking
Output: (A)
One of the necessary elements of a claim for injunctive relief is proof of itrepara-ble harm. See Uras R. Civ. P. 65A¥(e) (a preliminary "injunction requires a showing that "[the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues"). "Irreparable injury justifying an injunction is that which cannot be adequately compensated in damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money." Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, ¶ 9, 991 P.2d 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). "It is thus well-established that, an injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies." Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 279 (5th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). T73 Several jurisdicti 630 F.Supp.2d 853, 867 (S.D.Ohio 2008) (<HOLDING>), Thus, onee the risk of future disclosure has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act of slamming  is objectively sufficiently serious to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages (C) recognizing that party is not permitted to use the accident of a remand to raise an issue that it could just as well have raised in the first appeal internal quotation marks and alterations omitted (D) holding that the logs of trade secrets is usually considered an irreparable harm that cannot be measured in money damages alterations in original internal quotation marks omitted (E) recognizing that procedural sentencing error is harmless if the resulting sentence is not longer thanthat to which the defendant would otherwise be subject alterations and internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (D)
8.01-573, which gives third parties claiming an interest in attached property the right to intervene. Thus, the plaintiff has not taken advantage of § 2410’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Nor is he required to do so, even assuming that the United States is a senior lienholder. The Virginia statute on joining lienholders is permissive: “There may also be made a defendant any person claiming ... a lien upon the property sought to be attached.” Va.Code § 8.01-539 (emphasis added). Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 2410 is not mandatory — it permits but does not require joinder of the United States. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 at 246, 80 S.Ct. 1108 at 1114, 4 L.Ed.2d 1192 compare United States v. Bluhm, 414 F.2d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir.1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 909, 25 L.Ed.2d 91 (<HOLDING>). The government is correct that as a matter of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lien holder who is not served and joined as a party to a tax suit cannot have his lien extinguished by the tax sale (B) holding that sovereign immunity does not bar extinguishment of united states junior lien in proceeding in which united states was not a party (C) holding that when the united states held a senior tax lien it was an indispensable party under the controlling federal tax law (D) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (E) holding that interest received by a foreign corporation on a tax refund from the united states was interest on an interestbearing obligation of a resident of the united states within income tax statute
Output: (C)
that on her return a company manager told Watson in a four-hour meeting in which she cried constantly that she was a poor and incompetent supervisor; that a manager transferred supervisory duties away from her and told her to go home; and that a personnel manager told her that she was considered a bitch and that she could either resign or be demoted to a position in which she would be supervised by her subordinate trainees. We believe that these facts, though covering a shorter period than that in Nolan, could constitute the necessary aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify resigning. See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 924-25, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (B) holding in a fair labor standards act case that a constructive discharge occurred when an employee was physically threatened on one occasion harassed over the next two weeks and not given sufficient work instructions to perform his job (C) holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable (D) holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation (E) holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state
Output: (B)
counts. Again, the motion was denied. The jury convicted appellant on all charges, and the trial court imposed sentence. Preservation Appellant’s motions for judgment of acquittal did not specifically set forth the ground argued on this appeal — namely, that the confinement of three-year-old Victoria Linn did not constitute a kidnapping since it was merely incidental to the robbery. See Reed v. State, 603 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)(explaining that only those grounds raised in a motion for judgment of acquittal are reviewable on appeal). A motion for judgment of acquittal which does no more than generally allege that the State has failed to establish a prima facie case is insufficient to preserve the instant issue for appeal. See Johnson v. State, 478 So.2d 886, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(<HOLDING>); Gibbs v. State, 693 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a general motion for judgment of acquittal which asserted without explanation or argument that the state had failed to prove a prima facie case of the crime charged in the indictment was insufficient to preserve for appeal the specific argument that the state had failed to prove the age of the victim to support a conviction for sexual battery of a child under the age of eleven (B) holding that a defendants general objection that the city of mobile failed to make out a prima facie case was sufficient to preserve for appellate review the issue of the citys failure to prove the ordinance (C) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same (D) holding that trial court erred in denying motion for judgment of acquittal when state failed to prove venue (E) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive
Output: (A)
365, not sold under section 363, pursuant to the Sale Order. Bechtel argues, therefore, that its right of setoff under those Contracts cannot be affected by section 363 and must be determined under section 365. Contrary to Bechtel’s assertions, executory contract rights are a form of “property” that is salable “free and clear” of interests under section 363(f). In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir.2000) (concluding that assignment of leases and executory contracts are subject to sale under section 363, and particularly section 363(m), because “[b]oth exec-utory contracts and unexpired leases ... are included in the definition of ‘property of the estate’ contained in section 541.”); Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In addition to complying with section 363, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable (B) holding that because  363 sale was subject to court approval debtor was not bound to perform until then and could withdraw the application to approve and abandon the contract (C) holding that a judgment lien attaches to a vendors interest in an executory land contract (D) holding that section 363 governs the sales of executory contracts here section 365 provides some limitations and conditions to assignments none of which negates the applicability of section 363 to the sale at auction of an executory contract (E) holding that sale under section 363 eliminates unexercised setoff rights but not recoupment defense
Output: (D)
under § 1144(a). Moreover, despite the broad language of undivided loyalties in Castonguay, it is not immediately apparent how the alleged fraud, breach of duty, and negligence of the Committee members on behalf of the ESOP here would directly conflict with their fiduciary duties under ERISA. Unlike that case, the state law claims here did not arise from transactions directly relating to plan benefits or administration. The conduct at issue concerned the acquisition of Norcal shares in exchange for restricted notes and a subsequent failure to redeem those notes. As such, the only impact that the state law duties might have had on the plan or its beneficiaries is an indirect economic burden, which we have held to be insufficient for conflict preemption. See Blue Cross, 187 F.3d at 1052 (<HOLDING>). Finally, as in Sommers, the members of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists (B) holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language (C) recognizing limits on the erisa preemption clause (D) holding that a statute relates to erisa plans for the purposes of preemption if it requires the plans to purchase the  benefits specified in the statute when they purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy (E) holding the economic effects that  claims might have on erisa plans are not sufficient for preemption to occur
Output: (E)
CBL claim that if the merger is effected, the public will be harmed because Sparrow Hospital will no longer provide late re at the incipiency and block the merger. This court does not find irreparable injury will result from not enjoining the merger because this court sees a very minimal probability that a divestiture would ever be warranted in the future. For reasons that will be explained infra, this court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. Also, plaintiffs claim that if the merger is not enjoined they may lose standing to challenge it, thereby suffering irreparable harm. This court finds no merit in this contention. In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on the case of Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>). For instance, as described above, GLASCCO and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (B) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (C) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (E) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit
Output: (E)
courts have generally applied a balancing process. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (citing Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv.L.Rev. 427, 432-33 (1991) (court should balance the party’s need for information against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure is compelled)). {16} Some of the documents or evidence which were subject to the trial court’s order of confidentiality were relied upon by the trial court in its decision to grant the Association’s motion for summary judgment. Absent compelling circumstances, a party should not be barred from disclosing evidence which was actually utilized by the trial court in reaching its decision. See State ex rel. Bingaman v. Brennan, 98 N.M. 109, 111, 645 P.2d 982, 984 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also NMSA 1978, § 34-1-1 (1972) (except 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a childabuse report is not a public record and therefore is not subject to public inspection (B) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (C) recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern (D) recognizing presumption in favor of public inspection and copying of matters received into evidence at public session of trial (E) recognizing that some police records must remain secret and free from public inspection as a matter of public policy
Output: (D)
wages. Our Supreme Court has observed that the bond related statutes were enacted for the protection of employees and material suppliers who cannot avail themselves of otherwise available remedies, such as liens. Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 714; Herbert S. Newman & Partners, P.C. v. CFC Construction Ltd. Partnership, 236 Conn. 750, 757, 674 A.2d 1313 (1996); KMK Insulation, Inc. v. A. Prete & Son Construction Co., 49 Conn. App. 522, 527, 715 A.2d 799 (1998). It is undisputed that the subcontractor’s employees themselves would have been entitled to enforce payment on the bond against both the general contractor, as principal, and ICSP, as surety on the bond. See, e.g., American Masons’ Supply Co. v. F.W. Brown Co., supra, 174 Conn. 226-27 (<HOLDING>). The question before us is whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that surety was liable to subcontractor on payment bond because payment bond applied to any claimant who among other things supplied materials that were reasonably required for use in the performance of the subcontract  (B) holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractors recovery under the miller act payment bond because the federal legislation conditions payment of the subcontractor not on payment by the government to the contractor but rather on the passage of time from completion of the work or provision of materials (C) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (D) holding that persons supplying labor or materials to a subcontractor on a public works project may seek reimbursement under a statutory payment bond provided by the general contractor (E) holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable
Output: (D)
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(B). We find that the warrants of deportation in this case consisted of a “routine, objective, cataloging of [ ] unambiguous factual matter[s].” United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, the warrants and the notations on the back pages have “none of the features of the subjective report made by a law enforcement official in an on-the-scene investigation, which investigative reports lack sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness because they are made in an adversary setting and likely to be used in litigation.” United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Agustino-Hernandez, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exception set forth in rule 8038b was inapplicable to warrant of deportation where notation that alien was deported was ministerial objective observation with inherent reliability because of the governments need to keep accurate records of the movement of aliens (B) holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens (C) holding that warrant of deportation is admissible hearsay under fed revid 8038b to prove defendant was deported (D) holding that records referring to defendant as escaped prisoner and escape risk were not admissible because exception for public records rule 8038b specifically excluded them as records of law enforcement personnel further holding that specific exclusion controlled over businessrecord hearsay exception rule 8036 (E) holding that the warrant of removal warning to alien ordered deported and order from the immigration judge were nontestimonial
Output: (A)
605 (2010) ("We do not decide whether 'manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street [ ] as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”). 6 . On one hand, the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that manifest disregard survives Hall Street as a valid ground for vacatur, because arbitrators who exhibit manifest disregard for the law have "exceeded their powers” under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Comedy Club Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir.2009); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-95 (2d Cir.2008), overruled on other grounds,-U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010); see also Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed.Áppx. 415, 418-19 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the Fifth and Eleventh 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions may be persuasive (B) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (C) holding in an unpublished opinion that manifest disregard survives hall street as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur (D) holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground (E) recognizing the dol opinion letter as the source of the nonstatutory factor
Output: (C)
in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, “ ‘and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’ ” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be “unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
Output: (D)
account of the events at issue.” Id. “And the Sixth Amendment may be implicated when a defendant establishes that the victim engaged in a similar pattern of sexual acts.” Id. Consequently, to determine whether Oatts’s rights were violated, we move beyond a pure rape shield act analysis to consider whether evidence to show the child’s pre-existing sexual knowledge is admissible. See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis.2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325, 331 (1990) (“Despite the virtue of the general rule that such evidence is inadmissible, however, in the circumstances of a particular case evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and probative that the defendant’s right to present it is constitutionally protected. [Wisconsin’s rape shield law], as app 333, 1337 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). Oatts argues that the trial court erred by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the line of questioning was not relevant to the credibility of the witness and sought information about which the witness had no knowledge it was not a constitutional violation to sustain the objection (B) holding that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to sustain the states objection where questions to a witness go to his understanding of the law concerning parole and call for the legal knowledge of a lay witness (C) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (D) holding that error is preserved regarding a defendants right to confront a witness if the defendant identifies for the trial court the subject matter about which he or she desired to examine the witness and the subject had a tendency to affect the witness credibility (E) holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness
Output: (A)
Re- ’ ” Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83, 102 S.Ct. 851, 859, 70 L.Ed.2d 833 (1982) (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959)); Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 484 U.S. 539, 108 S.Ct. 830, 832 n. 4, 98 L.Ed.2d 936 (1988). Yet, when there is an independent federal remedy that is consistent with the NLRA, then a plaintiff may have a choice of federal remedies, Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 636 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1830, 1841 n. 17, 44 L.Ed.2d 418 (1975), and may be able to proceed in federal court. See, e.g., Hospital Employees’ Div. of Local 79 v. Mercy-Memorial Hospital, Corp., 862 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs claim that in this case they are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding employees negligence claim against his employer was preempted by the lmra (B) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (C) holding employees negligence claim not preempted by lmra (D) holding that  302 of the lmra is not preempted by nlrbs exclusive jurisdiction to hear  7 or  8 nlra cases (E) holding plaintiffs state law claims of inter alia tortious interference with contract are preempted by section 301 of lmra
Output: (D)
with Avery Coleman. The District Court admitted this evidence not to permit the prosecution to show Coleman’s propensity to possess a firearm or narcotics, but instead ‘as proof of ... knowledge’ of their presence in the apartment, a permissible purpose pursuant Rule 404(b).”); United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 793 (D.C.Cir.2002) (noting, in the context of a felon in possession case, that “[w]e have previously held that ‘in cases where a defendant is charged with unlawful possession of something, evidence that he possessed the same or similar things at other times is often quite relevant to his knowledge and intent with regard to the crime charged’ ” (quoting United States v. King, 254 F.3d 1098, 1100 (D.C.Cir.2001))); United States v. Moorehead, 57 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible (B) holding alford plea admissible in prosecution for felon in possession of firearm (C) holding that actual knowledge of a coconspirator possessing a firearm qualifies as foreseeability (D) holding that prior possession of a firearm is admissible to show knowledge in a prosecution for knowingly possessing a similar weapon (E) holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime
Output: (D)