niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Rule 11 sanctions are warranted in this case. As an experiment, I directed one of my legal interns, a third-year law student, to conduct appropriate legal research in order to determine whether or not the challenged § 1983 claims are valid. He needed only seventeen minutes to confirm what every responsible practioner in tMs field already knows: they are not. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....”) (emphasis added); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71,109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (holding that state 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 (B) holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity (C) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity (D) holding state of north carolina and state official sued in their official capacity are immune from  1983 and  1985 actions in federal court (E) holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983
Output: (E)
adjustment for abuse of position of trust or use of special skill, it is not primarily concerned with the defendant’s selection of victims who will suffer greatly from the crime. The vulnerable victim enhancement provides as follows: If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct, increase by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 (1992). The courts appear to have interpreted “susceptible to the criminal conduct” as emphasizing that a particular victim was less likely to thwart the crime, rather than more likely to suffer harm if the crime is successful. See, e.g., United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1603, 1506 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Caterino, 967 F.2d 681, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that the defendant had stalked threatened and assaulted the victim his exgirlfriend was evidence as to the nature of the defendants relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive (B) holding that prisoner who was surrounded by prison officers and then assaulted by one officer was vulnerable victim because he was not in a position to resist (C) holding vulnerable victim factor sufficiently supported by evidence that victim was 82 and physically unable to resist attackers (D) holding a single vulnerable victim is sufficient to support application of the vulnerable victim enhancement (E) holding bank customers affected by embezzlement could be victims for purposes of vulnerable victim enhancement
Output: (B)
that manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class certification, id. at 1173 — a holding consistent with California law as explicated in Hicks and American Honda Motor Co. — it had no occasion to consider whether, in addition to proof of an alleged common defect and defendant’s refusal to honor its warranty to repair that defect, plaintiffs also had to adduce proof — under California law — that it was substantially certain that the alleged defect would cause a malfunction during the future useful life of the class vehicles in order to show predominance. Relying heavily on American Honda, defendants contend that although this question goes to the merits of plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim, it overlaps with the predominance inquiry. Compare Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173 (<HOLDING>). American Honda, however, appears to have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (B) holding that common questions predominated with respect to plaintiffs claims under state consumer protection laws because the merits of the claims did not overlap with the predominance inquiry (C) holding that the circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the merits of plaintiffs claims are inescapably intertwined with a review of the procedures and merits surrounding the faas order (D) holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims (E) holding that state consumer protection laws do not conflict with 47 usc  201 and 202
Output: (B)
But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham
Output: (C)
an arbitration clause, ther s Workers of Am., 422 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1970) (relying on “positive assurance” rule to conclude that employer claims were subject to arbitration). Notably, less than a month before this court heard oral arguments in this case, the Second Circuit again emphasized that although traditional rules of contract interpretation generally apply to these types of cases, they are not always “readily [ ] transposed into the context of national labor law—as though the notion ‘one size fits all’ applies in the law. On the contrary, in labor law there are other policies to con sider, in particular the strong presumption in favor of arbitrability....” Mulvaney Mechanical, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass’n, 288 F.3d 491, 2000 WL 33730559, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr.24, 2002) (<HOLDING>). C. Interpretation of “Article XXIII: 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the grievance representation context an employee must prove that the unions acts tainted the grievance procedure such that the outcome was more than likely affected by the unions breach internal citation and quotation omitted (B) holding that presumption of arbitrability precluded employer from unilaterally repudiating its cba despite unions breach of nostrike clause (C) holding that a cause of action for breach of a purported implied contract would require interpretation of a cba and the totality of the parties contractual relationship (D) holding that proof of unions breach of duty to fairly represent is an essential element of employees hybrid suit (E) holding that no modification of the original employment contract occurred when the employer unilaterally issued a new handbook
Output: (B)
dictates how cases against the Engle defendants should proceed. If the Majority mean to suggest that Douglas III instituted an "unorthodox” and "novel notion of res judicata,” Ante at 1183, 1184— 85, our duty as a recognizing court, under Florida law and the U.S. Constitution, would shift to evaluating whether the newly created law “eliminate[s] the basic common law protection against an arbitrary deprivation of property.” Douglas III, 110 So.3d at 431 (citing Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432, 114 S.Ct. at 2339). Does it, for example, allow plaintiffs to preclude the Engle defendants from litigating matters—such as whether their tortious conduct caused an individual plaintiff's injuries— on which they have never had an opportunity to be heard? Douglas III leaves no doubt. See 110 So.3d at 429 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the law to which the Majority hint 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a person commits aggravated dui when his or her driving under the influence was a proximate cause of the injuries  citation not the sole and immediate cause of the victims injuries emphasis omitted (B) holding the plaintiff must show that the defendants departure from such generally recognized practices and procedures was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged injuries and damages (C) holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred as a result of the defendants combative conduct (D) holding that when a plaintiff proves that addiction to the engle defendants cigarettes containing nicotine was a legal cause of the injuries alleged injury as a result of the engle defendants conduct is assumed emphasis added (E) recognizing the phase i trial was conducted for the explicit purpose of determining issues related to the engle defendants conduct which were common to the entire class meaning they had every reason to litigate each potential theory of liability to the fullest extent possible
Output: (D)
Galpin, 40 Minn. 319, 41 N.W. 1054, 1055-56 (1889) ("[W]here the deed or record, in addition to a correct or sufficient description, contains false particulars, the rule is, if there are certain particulars once sufficiently ascertained, which designate the thing intended to be granted, the addition of a circumstance, false or mistaken, will not vitiate the grant.”) (citations omitted). 13 . In re Vondall, 352 B.R. at 198 (citing Howard, McRoberts & Murray v. Starry, 382 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn.Ct.App.1986)). 14 . Id. at 198 (declining to find that a legal description was apparent where the defect in the mortgage — an apparently non-existent lot designation — could also be attributed to incorrect block or plat designation); Bank of Ada v. Gullikson, 64 Minn. 91, 66 N.W. 131, 132 (1896) (<HOLDING>). 15 . See Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 366, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trustee did not have constructive knowledge of an improperly executed mortgage because ohio law provided that an improperly executed mortgage does not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser (B) holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa (C) holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity (D) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (E) holding that a mortgage containing a nonsensical addition designation did not provide constructive notice to subsequent judgment creditors because it was impossible to tell from the face of the mortgage whether the legal description misstated the plat block or addition
Output: (E)
is not practicable. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b). Most courts faced with a request for a hardship discharge have required the presence of catastrophic or compelling circumstances. See, e.g., In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. 836, 838 (1st Cir. BAP 1999) (an unanticipated death precluding payments under a confirmed plan held to be a catastrophic circumstance beyond the debtor’s control to support granting a hardship discharge). These debtors have not faced death or disability. Their reasons for the modification are just chronically poor economics, and they undoubtedly still need the case to help save their home. Therefore, hardship standards do not apply. This court has always looked askance at changes to the playing field this late in the game. See In re Zakowski, 213 B.R. 1003 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the debtors moved to amend their plan 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property (B) holding it would not be fair to secured creditor to require release of its lien just a few months prior to plans completion when due to continuous negotiations throughout the pendency of the plan the bank expected to be paid in full (C) holding that by virtue of section 1325a5 holder of secured claim retains the lien until the underlying debt is paid in full (D) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim (E) holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan
Output: (B)
actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct, and (3) the extent to which the purposes of the limitations period have been satisfied. Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1176 (citing Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir.1981)). Equitable estoppel, then, may come into play “if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time” — a situation that the Seventh Circuit terms “fraudulent concealment.” Id. at 1176-77 (citing Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir.1990)). “Fraudulent concealment necessarily requires active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiffs claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” Id at 1177; accord Boyd, 752 F.2d at 414 (<HOLDING>). B. Johnson’s Failure to Seek Counseling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of equitable estoppel (B) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (C) holding that estoppel was a question of fact (D) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa (E) holding that equitable estoppel did not apply because boyd was not affirmatively misled by a postal service official
Output: (E)
Upon “cause to suspect,” the WPBPD would be required to conduct an investigation. Logic would suggest it would consider the findings contained in the Final Order in reaching its conclusion as to whether Wills had failed to maintain “good moral character.” If the investigation concludes he did not maintain good moral character, Wills is subject to imposition of any of the penalties discussed above. Clearly, the modified findings contained in the FEC’s Final Order would provide a basis for future disciplinary proceedings against Wills. Consequently, although the Final Order dismissed the charges against him, he is adversely affected by the FEC’s modified findings, and has standing to institute this appeal. See Rabren v. Dep’t of Prof'l Reg., 568 So.2d 1283, 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); c.f., Bodenstab v. Dep’t of Prof'l Reg., Bd. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding pilot had standing to appeal final order even though charges were dismissed agencys statements in conclusions of law would be used against him as precedent in later proceeding or as evidence of incipient policy (B) holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt (C) holding that the notice of appeal filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed (D) holding that a plaintiff may bring a  1983 action alleging a violation of fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from police coercion in pursuit of a confession even though statements were not used against him at trial (E) holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted
Output: (A)
trial court wide latitude in sentencing...." State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. "Generally, we review sentencing decisions to determine whether the court exceeded its permitted range of discretion, and we will reverse only if we determine that the trial court has failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 108, 1 12, 182 P.3d 708 (quotations and citations omitted). ANALYSIS I. Admissibility of Evidence T9 Defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed two witnesses to testify as to the children's credibility in violation of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), and rule 608(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rim-masch, TIS P.2d at 392 (<HOLDING>); see also Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(1) ("The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 608a1 bars admission of an experts testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion (B) holding rule applicable to witness (C) holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial (D) holding that even if an experts testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue such testimony is permissible as long as the experts testimony assists rather than supplants the jurys judgment (E) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
Output: (A)
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 840 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 888, 109 S.Ct. 219, 102 L.Ed.2d 88 (5th Cir.1991). 57 . Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir.1994). 58 . See United States v. Bloom, 112 F.3d at 205 n. 17; Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir.1997); Liquid Drill, Inc. v. U.S. Turnkey Exploration, Inc., 48 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir.1995); Exxon Corporation v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1474, 1487 (5th Cir.1995); King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d at 346; Wichita Falls Office Assoc, v. Banc One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 910, 113 S.Ct 2340, 124 L.Ed.2d 251 (1993); Cormier v. Pennzoil, 969 F.2d at 1561; International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1267, (<HOLDING>); McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d at 1088; 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence  to defeat summary judgment (B) holding that under rule 56f nonmoving party seeking additional discovery must demonstrate precisely how additional discovery will lead to a genuine issue of material fact (C) holding that the nonmoving parly must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question (D) holding that when the nonmoving party requests a delay in ruling on a summary judgment motion until further discovery may be completed the party must demonstrate the likelihood that further discovery will uncover additional relevant evidence (E) holding that the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial
Output: (C)
hold that the transactions were part of a single conspiracy entered into by the same parties for the same purpose. III. Motion for Appropriate Relief Defendant has submitted a motion for appropriate relief, seeking to overturn his habitual felon conviction. The motion for appropriate relief is properly before this Court because “appellate courts may rule on such a motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1418 ... when the defendant has.... an appeal of right.” State v. Jamerson, 161 N.C. App. 527, 530, 588 S.E.2d 545, 547 (2003). Defendant’s arguments are premised upon this Court’s holdings in State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60, 588 S.E.2d 5, stay granted, 357 N.C. 660, 589 S.E.2d 882 (2003) and State v. Sneed, 161 N.C. App. 331, 588 S.E.2d 74, stay granted, 357 N.C. 661, 589 S.E.2d 883 (2003) (<HOLDING>). In reviewing Jones and Sneed, our Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana are admissible to impeach defendant (B) holding a habitual felon indictment cannot be predicated upon misdemeanor cocaine possession convictions (C) holding the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment was not excessive for conviction of possession of cocaine where defendant was adjudged to be a fourth felony offender with prior convictions for manslaughter two prior convictions for possession of cocaine and numerous arrests for drug offenses possession of a firearm by a felon aggravated battery and armed robbery (D) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (E) holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy
Output: (B)
29, 2010 hearing on BP’s motion for continuance, Donato Ramos Jr., one of BP’s attorneys, told the court that Zaffirini and Jones were “plaintiffs in addition to being counsel.” Ramos Jr. also told the court that “[tjhere was a Favored[-]Nations Clause in Mr. Zaffirini’s clients[’] oil and gas lease.” Ramos Jr. heard Jones complain to the court about BP’s planned depositions “especially when a bunch of our clients didn’t even go to any of the negotiations.” BP first moved to disqualify Zaffirini and Jones on June 27, 2011, three days before the summary-judgment hearing, and almost seven months after the hearing in which BP’s counsel stated that Zaffirini was representing clients and heard that Jones was likewise representing others in the suit. See Vaughan, 875 S.W.2d at 690-91 (<HOLDING>); In re Davila, 04-99-00571-CV, 1999 WL 735164, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint (B) holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation (C) holding that even a potential conflict can justify disqualification (D) holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation (E) holding that party waived disqualification complaint by filing her motion six and onehalf months after learning of the potential conflict
Output: (E)
of limitations have been held as not capable of waiver or subject to an estoppel, whether pled or not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissenting opinion cites several re-, cent Supreme Court decisions in support of the proposition that the statute of limitations set forth at section 2501 is not jurisdictional, including Day v. McDonough, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), Eberhart v. United States, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam), Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004), and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). None of the foregoing decisions address section 2501. Day, 126 S.Ct. at 1681 (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1245 (addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights (E) holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions
Output: (A)
antitrust immunity is not absolute. Accordingly, the party asserting state action doctrine immunity must demonstrate that the state legislature intended that the statute or regulation at issue supplant competition as a matter of “ ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.’ ” Second, that the policy must be “ ‘actively supervised’ ” by the state. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. 937 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978)). A private party, like Waste Management— Washington, may claim “state action” immunity but only if both parts of the Midcal test are satisfied. See Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636, 112 S.Ct. 2169, 119 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Private conduct cannot be immunized by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stateaction immunity issues immunity from federal statutes not intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state  are immediately appealable under cohen and mitchell (B) holding that these tests are directed at ensuring that particular anticompetitive mechanisms operate because of a deliberate and intended state policy (C) holding that only deliberate clear and unambiguous statements are judicial admissions (D) recognizing that motions for directed verdicts are not normally directed to bits and pieces of an action (E) holding that epa need not incorporate particular tests when evaluating applications if relevant statutory language does not explicitly require such tests
Output: (B)
“A person can be convicted for conspiring with unknown persons, if the indictment charges conspiracy with unknown persons and the evidence supports their existence and their complicity in the conspiracy.” United States v. Dukes, 139 F.3d 469, 475 (5th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Villasenor, 894 F.2d 1422, 1428 (5th Cir.1990). For example, in Dukes we held that the evidence was sufficient to prove a conspiracy with an unidentified drug supplier who twice brought drugs for sale to a confidential informant in the defendant’s presence and who paid the defendant a portion of the proceeds from one sale that was successfully completed. Dukes, 139 F.3d at 472, 475. Here, the indictment charged that Boyd conspired with unknown persons, and Evelyn French tes x. 383, 387 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In short, it cannot be inferred whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold (B) holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence (C) holding extraneous evidence that defendant was using drugs admissible under rule 404b because evidence not offered to show that defendant was drug user and was using drugs at the time of the offense but to rebut the defense of consensual sex (D) holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offense of supplying contraband to a jail because the defendant was not in possession of the drugs when he was taken to jail where the arresting officer entered the jail with the drugs (E) holding that evidence that the defendant and a witness sold drugs together was relevant to prove how the witness knew the defendant
Output: (A)
procedures and requirements pertaining to nondiscriminatory employment practices.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council In Support of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 2. The EEAC has on many occasions prior to this one participated in cases as amicus in several federal appellate courts, and in the Supreme Court, advocating the interests of employers on various issues. 9 . This issue has been considered by other courts of appeals as well. See, e.g., Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir.1983) (deciding that disparate impact theory is inapplicable), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952, 104 S.Ct. 2155, 80 L.Ed.2d 541 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.1982) (same); cf. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, 813 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir.1987); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea (B) holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack (C) holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity (D) holding that disparate impact analysis is inapplicable to suit challenging hiring practice that based employee compensation on market rates rather than comparable worth despite demonstrable disparate result and concluding that that analysis is confined to cases that challenge specific clearly delineated employment practice at a single point in the job selection process (E) holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions
Output: (D)
that the "automobile must, in some manner, be involved in the accident”); Lebroke v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 146 N.H. 249, 769 A.2d 392, 394 (2001) (citing Peck with approval for the proposition that an auto accident requires, at the very least, the involvement of the automobile); Schweitzer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 306 Pa.Super. 300, 452 A.2d 735 (1982) ("[T]here must be some connection, more than mere chance or happenstance, between the injuries sustained and the insured vehicle.”); Schulz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 930 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (explaining that mere fact that vehicle was involved is not sufficient; rather, claimant must show that injuries resulted from a motor vehicle accident); Tyrrell, 994 P.2d at 838 (<HOLDING>); 8 Russ & Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (B) holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle (C) holding a motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon by the manner of its use (D) holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a (E) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling
Output: (A)
to distinguish the Fisher and Sweetman holdings by relying upon the importance that SDCL 31-2-34 played in their outcome. City claims that these holdings only apply to those instances where a subcontractor is suing the State, not to instances where a subcontractor is suing a municipality. This reliance is misplaced. The jurisdictional implications of SDCL 31-2-34 merely played a role in these holdings because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article III, Section 27 of the South Dakota Constitution, prohibit lawsuits against the State in the absence of an express abrogation of its sovereign immunity. The South Dakota Legislature has provided express abrogation of immunity for municipalities in this context. See SDCL 9-12-1 2d 915, 917-18 (S.D.1988) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 17.] City also attempts to argue that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding section 101065 is exception to waiver of governmental immunity (B) holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability (C) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional (D) holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary (E) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit
Output: (B)
on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors’ assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion
Output: (A)
including, wages, salaries or commissions for services rendered.” Section 503(b)(2) authorizes administrative expense priority payments to professi 9 (3rd Cir.1988). Accord In re Imperial Corporation of America, 181 B.R. 501, 506, n. 2 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1995) (attorney barred from compensation under 327(e) may not “end run” the section by seeking compensation under 503(b)(1)); In re Office Products of America, Inc., 136 B.R. 675, 688 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992) (denying quantum meruit compensation for unapproved professional); In re Southern Diversified Properties, Inc., 110 B.R. 992, 996 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1990) (rejecting doctrine of quantum meruit as justifiable basis for compensating professional who did not qualify under 327(a)). The rationale is clear. To apply Section 503 nkr.S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper use of a mixedmotive instruction in a butfor case shifted the burden of persuasion on a central issue in the case and therefore the error cannot be harmless (B) holding that a professional is one who plays a central role in a debtors case (C) holding that defendant is liable for entire quantity of drugs attributable to conspiracy in circumstances where defendant is one of conspiracys central figures (D) holding that a third partys history of violence at least insofar as it was known to the defendant plays an important role in determining whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable (E) recognizing that in any criminal trial the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is central
Output: (B)
the dismissal would be without prejudice). See also Dunham v. Fullerton, 258 P.3d 701, 704 (Wyo. 2011) (affirming Rule 25 dismissal for untimely substitution: “dismissal without prejudice was proper—it was not an adjudication on the merits, and the statute of limitations has not run”). Still other courts have reasoned that a trial judge dismissing an action per Rule 25 is invested with the same level of discretion as one acting pursuant to Rule 41. Therefore, a court may properly dismiss claims without prejudice under Rule 25 if it finds that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff has not acted with extreme dereliction and the defendant has not suffered acute prejudice by reason of the delay. See, e.g., Keating v. Levitan Mfg. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6839 at n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Bessent v. Nat’l Housing Partnership, 2008 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the circumstances presented viz plaintiffs failure to prosecute for months following suggestion of death but with no discernible prejudice to defendant dismissal without prejudice was appropriate sanction (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice (C) holding that de facto dismissal without prejudice was appropriate where a plaintiffs certificate failed to state with specificity that a defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice (E) holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice
Output: (A)
not provide to the employees in The Gas Service Company. B. We turn now to the other issues raised by the parties. As previously discussed, Gaylord’s sole argument in its cross-petition is that, following the transfer to Tuscaloosa, it no longer had the duty to bargain with the USW. It does not contest the factual bases underlying the other unfair labor practices related to bargaining. Specifically, it does not dispute that, on August 31, September 23, and October 19, 2010, Flippo requested that Gaylord provide the USW information related to the terms and conditions of its Tuscaloosa employees. It also does not dispute that failure to provide this information violated the NLRA if it had a duty to bargain with the USW. See NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 888 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Gaylord does not contest that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that an error is harmless if it was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that the maximum possible sentence provided by law for conviction of the offense charged is the most important consequence of the plea internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding a pro se plaintiff is not an adequate class representative because the competence of a layman is clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that an employer violates the nlra when it fails to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (E)
N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir.2010). a. Malpractice Claim An action for professional malpractice requires proof of damages actually and proximately caused by the malpractice. Kaminsky v. Herrick, Feinstein LLP, 59 A.D.3d 1, 9, 870 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5-6 .(1st Dep’t 2008). Here, Solin’s claim for malpractice damages fails because it falls within New York’s proscription on the recovery of tax liability. See Gertler v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 283, 835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007) (“[Tjaxes ... are not recoverable under New York law.”). Indeed, New York applies this rule even when the tax liability is allegedly attributable to the defendant’s mistaken advice. See Fownes Bros. & Co. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 92 A.D.3d 582, 583, 939 N.Y.S.2d 367, 367 (1 st Dep’t 2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Gaslow v. KPMG LLP, 19 A.D.3d 264, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consequential damages are not to be considered (B) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it (C) holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract (D) holding that operates as a charge of debtors in personam tax liability not debtors in rem tax liability (E) holding where plaintiffs transfer between employee benefit plans generated tax liability that fact that plaintiffs may have performed the transfer pursuant to advice from defendants does not convert plaintiffs tax liability into consequential damages
Output: (E)
in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Under the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, however, “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support the issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). The “sliding scale” approach allows “district courts to preserve the status quo where difficult legal questions require more deliberate investigation.” Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 15-00048 JSW, 2015 WL 3945996, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015); see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). IY. Analysis . As a threshold matter, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted (B) holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success (C) holding that success on a motion to sever requires a strong showing of prejudice (D) holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success (E) holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury
Output: (D)
Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1988); and Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.1988). 169 . See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d at 245-46; Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d at 392; and Benavides v. County of Wilson, 955 F.2d at 972-73. 170 . Id. 171 . See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 916 F.2d at 286. 172 . See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 118 F.3d 1047, 1051 n. 1 (5th Cir.1997); and Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir.1991). 173 . See DSC Communications v. Next Level Communications, 107 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir.1997); and Wallace v. Texas Tech University, 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 3 (5th Cir.1996), (<HOLDING>). 174 . See Wallace v. Texas Tech University, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment precludes an award of injunctive or declaratory relief that is not prospective in nature (B) holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief (C) holding that eleventh amendment does not bar federal suit against state official for prospective injunctive relief (D) holding that a class of juveniles had standing to seek injunctive relief in federal court against future interrogations by a police squad because of the strong likelihood that the challenged interrogation methods would be used again (E) holding that prospective injunctive relief is appropriate in a federal civil rights action only if a reasonable likelihood exists the plaintiff will again be subjected to the unconstitutional actions
Output: (E)
unit’s claim arose. (b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate. (c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity— (1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity”, or "governmental unit” applies to governmental units; and (2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such provision binds governmental units. 3 . The Court notes that the order dismissing the case had no effect, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 349 or any other section of the Bankruptcy Code, on the confirmation order which remains in full force and effect. See In re Depew, 115 B.R. 965 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1989) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Court notes that the fact that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith (B) holding after comprehensive analysis that the postconfirmation dismissal of a chapter 11 case does not vacate the order of confirmation or revoke the debtors discharge (C) holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions (D) holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered (E) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge
Output: (B)