niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
are permissible departure factors; (2) whether the departure factors relied upon by the district court remove the defendant from the applicable Guideline heartland thus warranting a departure, (3) whether the record sufficiently supports the factual basis underlying the departure, and (4) whether the degree of departure is reasonable. United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d at 1303. If [a] factor [is] classified as ‘forbidden,’ see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-eco-nomic status); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12 (lack of guidance during youth); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (drug or alcohol dependence); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 (economic hardship), [it] can never provide a basis for departure and its consideration ends at this step. ' ■ United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 759 (<HOLDING>). If the Guidelines classify the factors as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants responsibilities to son and wife both of whom have medical problems are discouraged as a basis for downward departure (B) holding that while  5 g 13 a creates a presumption in favor of a consecutive sentence sentencing judges are free to depart from the guidelines and order a downward departure so long as they comply with the procedures required for downward departure in general outlined in 19 usc  3553c2 (C) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (D) holding that criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial as to the facts on which a court bases an upward departure (E) holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact
Output: (A)
withdrawal of these claims”). Having recognized in our own jurisprudence that voluntary departures are implied agreements that in appropriate circumstances may weigh against granting further relief to aliens, we cannot fault the BIA for doing likewise here, where Medina-Morales bargained for voluntary departure in lieu of full adjudication. III. The Stepparent-Stepchild Relationship This conclusion does not end our analysis, however. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) does not purport to withdraw our jurisdiction to review nondiscretionary aspects of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. For example, we have jurisdiction to review de novo a BIA decision that is contrary to law and will grant an alien’s petition in such a case. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 832, 845-48 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the BIA’s reliance on .the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (B) holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings (C) holding that a legal determination regarding an aliens eligibility for adjustment of status was not barred by the statute (D) holding that the bias denial of a motion to reopen based on the merits of the underlying application for adjustment of status was a discretionary decision under the adjustment of status statute and this court therefore did not have jurisdiction over an appeal of the bias ruling (E) holding that we had jurisdiction and granting aliens petition where the bia unlawfully relied on the nonviability of the aliens marriage in denying her application for adjustment of status
Output: (E)
designs. Moreover, we also note that the similarity of the products need not be identical, as Exmark seems to argue, because the similarity may be defined in terms of the defect and any differences among the products may merely go to the weight of the evidence and not its discoverability or admissibility. See Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1082-88 (5th Cir.1986); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire, 977 S.W.2d at 341; Davidson Oil Country Supply, Inc. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.1990). We note that many other decisions from courts around the nation reject the notion that discovery in a strict product liability case is uniformly limited to the specific product at issue. See, e.g., In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Brownlow v. General Motors Corp., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware (B) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (C) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (D) holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect (E) holding that discovery on other tires was not overbroad where plaintiffs alleged that defendant was aware of tread separation problem
Output: (E)
Cordova’s final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under § 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under § 1981. I consider Defendants’ additional argument concerning the § 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer’s § 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue § 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila 
 Holding statements: (A) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (B) holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex (C) holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination (D) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (E) holding  1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination
Output: (E)
523(a)(4) defalcation prong, as stated by this court in In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 704 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993), aff'd sub nom. Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 189 B.R. 882 (E.D.Pa.), reconsideration denied sub nom. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 198 B.R. 91 (E.D.Pa.1996), that the term “fiduciary capacity” is very narrowly defined. Thus, we stated, at id., that, to give rise to § 523(a)(4) liability, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove only that there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties, but also to prove that there is an express trust held by the fiduciary (debtor) on behalf of the beneficiary (creditor), which did not arise out of the action that created the fiduciary relation ship. See In re Spector, 133 B.R. 733, 739-40 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Shervin, 112 B.R. 724, 730-31 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law defines fiduciary capacity and fraud or defalcation (B) holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 (C) holding that the fraud or defalcation prong of  523a4 requires the showing of an express trust (D) holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 (E) holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4
Output: (C)
at 298; see also 29 U.S.C. 216(b) (“[An employer violating Section 207] shall be liable ... in the amount of ... unpaid overtime compensation ....”) (emphasis added). But, in O’Brien, we specifically declined to reach the issue of the extent to which the town employer may offset contractual overtime payments against its FLSA overtime liability, remanding those determinations to the district court. O’Brien, 350 F.3d at 298. By contrast, Roman dealt with the second issue: whether, as part of the remedy, an offset to FLSA liability is permissible for paid time off. It squarely held that liability for unpaid wages under the FLSA may be offset by the paid time off (or a partial offset if the rate of pay is not at overtime rates). Roman, 147 F.3d at 77; see also D ’Camera, 722 F.Supp. at 803 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in O’Brien is to the contrary. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unemployment compensation should not be deducted from a back pay award under the national labor relations act because failing to deduct unemployment payments does not make the employee more than whole (B) holding that compensatory time used by plaintiff police officers can be deducted from award of back pay (C) holding that compensatory money damages are generally distinct from equitable forms of relief such as injunctions or back pay (D) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (E) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court
Output: (B)
he then asked the trial court questions indicating that he did not understand what was happening. Accordingly, Arseneau’s affirmative answers to the trial court’s limited questions were not sufficient to demons A 2007) (“There is nothing in the portions of the record presented to this Court that would suggest how Appellant’s alleged depression and delusions may have affected his competence to enter a plea. Consequently, an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve this issue.”). Because the record does not conclusively refute Arseneau’s claim that he was incompetent to proceed and that counsel was therefore ineffective for failing to investigate his competency, the postconviction court erred in summarily denying this claim. See Houle v. State, 74 So.3d 143, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel (B) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category (C) holding that record did not conclusively refute postconviction movants allegations that counsel was aware of movants long history of mental illness including the fact that he had been institutionalized multiple times had attempted to commit suicide was diagnosed as bipolar alcoholic and depressive and had a long history of being on and was currently on psychotropic medications (D) holding that waiver of interest was proper where there had been a long delay in the enforcement action (E) holding that the trial counsels performance was constitutionally deficient where counsel made a limited investigation into the petitioners background did not prepare a social history of the petitioner and was not aware that he had been sexually abused and raped as a child
Output: (C)
serve sixty-five percent of the time imposed on those sentences. The trial court acknowledged that counsel’s understanding was erroneous but went on to conclude that counsel’s “conduct and performance met the standard of performance.” Analysis “[I]f a defendant enters a plea in reasonable reliance on his attorney’s advice, which in turn was based on the attorney’s honest mistake or misunderstanding, the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea.” Trenary v. State, 453 So.2d 1132, 1133-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see also State v. Leroux, 689 So.2d 235, 237 (Fla.1996) (citing Trenary and recognizing that “a defendant may be entitled to withdraw a plea entered in reliance upon his attorney’s mistaken advice about sentenc ing”); Shell v. State, 501 So.2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Cornett will serve at least eighty-five 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels mistaken advice that defendants photo would not be placed on the internet established good cause for permitting defendant to withdraw his guilty plea (B) holding that where a defendant is misled and induced to plead by his counsels mistaken advice then he may be allowed to withdraw his plea (C) holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges (D) holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal (E) holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state
Output: (B)
is insufficient to support the contention that Vasquez used forged documents to obtain work ¶34 The Court of Appeals held that since Vasquez might have mentioned to Englund that he had worked in the area, the jury could infer that he possessed forged documents with an intent to injure or defraud a third party. Vasquez, 166 Wn. App. at 53. Such generalized intent to injure or defraud may be shown if “an intent appears to defraud any person, association or body politic or corporate whatsoever,” RCW 10.58.040, and may also be inferred by the facts and circumstances that demonstrate intent as a matter of logical probability, see Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d at 4. However, inferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S. Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable (B) holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (C) holding that triers of fact may draw only reasonable inferences (D) holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (E) holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
Output: (C)
its employee because “purely economic losses are unrecoverable in tort. . . actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Straley, 533 N.E.2d 764, 771 (Ohio 1988) (“We do not find that a duty to an injured employee’s employer exists by virtue of the pronouncements of common law, by legislative enactment, or by operation of law. It would appear that such a duty could only exist based on contract or warranty.”); Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 627 P.2d at 473 (citing the prevailing rule “that a plaintiff may not recover for economic loss resulting from negligent infliction of bodily harm to a third person”); Vogel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (<HOLDING>). {17} This conclusion is consistent with both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no public policy stated where employee and not public at large would benefit from employees whistleblowing actions (B) holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits (C) holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby (D) holding as a matter of public policy that allowing damages to an employer for economic consequences arising from injuries to an employee would enter a field with no sensible stopping point (E) recognizing that a foreign company as a special employer under the lent employee doctrine was subject to arizonas workers compensation statutes for injuries sustained by an employee
Output: (D)
of two dollars upon her representation that she was greatly in need of it. She could not defend by denying that she took the money by force and in her brief assume the position that she took it forcibly in the belief that she had a right to satisfy an honest claim in that way. If [appellant] had admitted upon the witness-stand that she took the money by force for the reason [that she had an honest claim to it], the record would have presented the question whether her claim was bona fide and could be the basis of a legal action. 45 Ariz. at 364, 43 P.2d at 205 (emphasis added). A defendant may not claim that he forcibly took property under a claim of right when he testifies that he did not take the property by the use of force. Accord, Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 1559 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, defendant testified that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding qualified immunity defense unavailable to the united states in ftca action (B) holding unclean hands defense unavailable against the government (C) holding that the claim of right defense is unavailable to a defendant who claimed he did not take money by force (D) holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied (E) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded
Output: (C)
its liability for the payment of continuing benefits,” see id. § 725.492(a)(4), and there is no “successor operator” liable for the payment of benefits, see id. § 725.493(a)(2), then the next most recent employer satisfying the definition “shall be considered” the responsible operator, see id. § 725.493(a)(4). “[I]f no responsible operator can be identified, benefits are paid by the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.” Id. § 725.1(d) (2001). And under the regulations applicable to this case, it is the Director’s burden to develop evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that a potentially responsible operator is incapable of assuming liability and consequently does not qualify as the responsible operator. See Director, OWCP v. Trace Fork Coal Co., 67 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 506-07 (stating that “[w]e 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state agency was not an operator solely by conducting inspections and issuing permits (B) holding that partys failure to develop issue in argument section constitutes waiver of issue (C) holding that the applicable regulations give the director not the designated responsible operator the power to develop evidence on the responsible operator issue (D) holding that the trial court must give due consideration to the applicable law and facts (E) holding that a medicare provider was responsible for familiarizing itself with the legal requirements of cost reimbursement and obtaining an agency interpretation of the applicable regulations
Output: (C)
Poindexter interpreted Title VII’s appointment provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a provision “generally viewed as imposing a lesser burden on plaintiffs seeking appointment of counsel, both because of the specificity of Congress’ action ... and because this provision does not require that the plaintiff be a pauper.” Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1182 n. 18. That provision obviously does not apply to FOIA cases, nor do the reasons behind it. Local Civil Rule 83.11, which implements 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), thus controls. The local rule differs only slightly from the Poindexter factors and, to the extent there are differences, it embraces many of the considerations adopted in other circuits for applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See, e.g., Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Cookish, 787 F.2d at 3 (holding that factors 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual factual differences among the individual litigants or groups of litigants will not preclude a finding of commonality (B) holding that a prior administrative decision actually decided ultimate factual issues that are essential to plaintiffs present claims and that issue preclusion therefore bars the relitigation of those issues (C) recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality (D) holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves (E) holding that courts should consider the merits of the litigants claims the nature of the factual issues the litigants ability to present his claims and the complexity of the legal issues
Output: (E)
pauperis on appeal. But we remind him of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full. * After examining the brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . At the outset, Gillings suggests that the district court erred in sua sponte invoking the statute-of-limitations defense. See Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). But here, the district court “issue[dj a show 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived (B) holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional (C) holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations (D) holding that district court improperly dismissed pro se prisoners civil rights complaint by sua sponte raising statute of limitations defense that was neither patently clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts (E) recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff
Output: (D)
in its wake that have essentially obliterated the mandatory minimum sentencing framework in our Commonwealth. In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime must be regarded as an element of the offense, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by the fact-finder. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163. After Alleyne, various mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have been held by this Court to be unconstitutional because they contain a non-severable, ‘proof at sentencing1 subsection stating that the “[t]he provisions of [the statute] shall not be an element of the crime[,]” and that “the applicability of [the statute] shall be determined at sentencing ... by a preponderance of the evidence.” See, e.g., Newman, 99 A,3d at 90, 101-102 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, in Hopkins, our Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 pacs  9712 and 9713 are unconstitutional (B) holding that the proof at sentencing1 provision contained in 42 pacs  97121 is unconstitutional in light of alleyne and is not severable from the remainder of the statute (C) holding boards unconstitutional regulations severable from remainder (D) holding that 18 pacs  6317b is unconstitutional (E) holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced
Output: (B)
Byrd was sentenced in September 1992 for an offense committed in March 1992, this amended language governs his sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment, (n.6), (backg’d.) (Nov.1991). Thus, because' the pertinent language relied on by Jones I has been deleted and new language added, Byrd is incorrect that our decision in Jones I controls this appeal. Byrd next contends that the amended language should be interpreted to provide district courts with discretion to entertain constitutional challenges to prior convictions that will be relied upon to enhance a defendant’s sentence. The courts of appeals that have addressed the meaning of the amended Application Note and Background Commentary have taken differing approaches. Compare United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 805 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (B) holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel (C) holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final (D) holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence (E) holding that commission did not intend amended language to provide discretion to district courts to entertain challenges to prior convictions at sentencing
Output: (D)
reason to believe will be seen by others; not to distinguish between an intentional exposure intended to offend the sensibilities of others and an intentional exposure that is not intended to offend the sensibilities of others. All that Peery holds is that intent to be indecent or lewd is an element of indecent exposure, and one does not have this intent where the exposure is accidental. Peery does not hold that exposure intended to be seen by others is not indecent exposure if it is not intended to offend the sensibilities of others. Furthermore, the indecent exposure statute includes only one term referring t penal statute must be strictly construed, that does not justify a court in supplying restrictive language that is not there. See State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn.1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 627-28 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when an interpretation upholding the constitutionality of a statute is available to this court it must adopt that construction (B) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (C) holding that the rule of strict construction does not require the court to assign the narrowest possible interpretation to the statute (D) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (E) holding that if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems
Output: (C)
to eehive before the administrative law judge was permissible and did not violate due process. ¶ 36 Having determined that no notice violations occurred during the Commission proceedings below, we next examine Beehive’s contention that the Commission violated separation of powers principles. 2. Separation of Powers ¶ 37 Beehive appears to argue that the Commission’s general ability as an administrative agency to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers at various stages of these proceedings violates separation of powers and due process principles. We do not address this argument in any great detail because such a combination of functions has long been upheld as consistent with due process. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Pub. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency (B) recognizing the combination of functions within an agency such as prosecutorial and adjudicative without more does not violate due process by virtue of being exercised by the same agency (C) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (D) holding that administrative agency may adjudicate appeals by panels composed of other persons within the same agency who did not participate in investigative or prosecutorial capacities (E) holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process
Output: (B)
sentence, or resentencing. See id. § 9546. Consequently, because the only claim at issue in a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is a convicted individual’s eligibility for such testing under the aforementioned provisions of Section 9543.1, when the trial court enters an order either granting or denying the testing, the litigation under this section is at an end: the sole claim between the parties — the Commonwealth and the movant — has been addressed by the trial court and finally disposed of. Thus, under the plain language of Rule 341(b), because a trial court order granting or denying the motion for DNA testing disposes of all claims raised by all parties to the litigation, it is, therefore, a final order. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 566 Pa. 307, 310-11, 780 A.2d 646, 648 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the instant matter, the Commonwealth, as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonfinal order is immediately appealable where it finally determined claims of right separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the action emphasis added (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that pursuant to parap 341b order of pcra court which fully and finally disposed of all issues before it was final and immediately appealable (D) holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order
Output: (C)
“multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006) (citations omitted). Both requirements are met here. The district court convicted and sentenced Wallace for two distinct crimes committed upon two distinct victims: once for attempting to rape R.L. and once for stabbing and killing Kenneth Williams. And Wallace does not argue, nor have we found any legal basis to conclude, that the multiple sentences imposed by the district court in this case unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, we squarely rejected the precise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts (B) holding that the district court did not err by sentencing a defendant to consecutive prison terms for seconddegree manslaughter and aggravated assault committed against two separate victims because the multiple sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendants conduct (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm (E) holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred
Output: (B)
The evidence was also found by the family court to be sufficient to support an order on January 29, 2008, enjoining Lisa from allowing Byles to be around L.S. “until further order of the court.” I would hold that the trial court erred in finding that Jesus was not immune from liability for defamation for his statements under Family Code section 261.106. I would further hold that the trial court erred in not hearing the jurisdictional facts pertinent to Jesus’s immunity defense before proceeding to trial on the merits of Byles’s defamation suit and entering judgment on Byles’s claim rather than dismissing Byles’s suit for lack of jurisdiction due to Byles’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 223; see also Brown, 13 S.W. at 472-73 (<HOLDING>); Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (B) holding that an individual who is not served cannot be at fault or negligent in allowing a default judgment to be rendered (C) holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981 (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding that it was error to dismiss complaint against individual defendants who had acted as agents of corporate trustee who could be held personally liable
Output: (D)
(“[o]bviously, all of us have very tight compliance programs that we run here”) and an unidentified Sanofi spokesman’s August 8, 2013 statement that Sanofi had “zero tolerance for any unethical conduct.” (CAC ¶¶ 65-66). Plaintiffs further contend that Sanofi’s 2012 and 2013 20-Fs are misleading because they incorporate by reference Sanofi’s Financial Code of Ethics. (CAC ¶¶ 57, 73). They allege that these statements were materially misleading because Sanofi did not actually maintain an effective compliance program and did tolerate unethical conduct in its diabetes group— i.e., Sanofi engaged in an illegal marketing scheme in its US diabetes group — at the time the statements were made. These statements are not actionable under the securities laws, defendants F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), defendants’ statements about Sanofi’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that accurate statements about past performance are not actionable under the securities laws (B) holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws (C) holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided (D) holding that nyseg telling its investors that it would not compromise its financial integrity was not actionable under the securities laws (E) holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange
Output: (D)
and supports a modification without any further proof of a change in cireamstance. "A well-founded custody preference by a child can support modification of custody without proof of any other change of cireumstance." Id. at ¶ 17, 211 P.3d at 927 (citing Hogue v. Hogue, 2008 OK CIV APP 63, ¶ 7, 190 P.3d 1177, 1180; Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 OK CIV APP 6, ¶ 4, 83 P.3d 911, 913; Nazsworth v. Nazworth, 1996 OK CIV APP 134, ¶ 12, 931 P.2d 86, 88). The trial court's decision granting Father's motion to modify custody is affirmed. CONCLUSION ] 23 The trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting Father's motion to modify custody and we affirm. 1 24 AFFIRMED. BARNES, V.C.J., and FISCHER, P.J., concur. 1 . See also Hogue v. Hogue, 2008 OK CIV APP 63, 19, 190 P.3d 1177, 1180 (<HOLDING>) preference to support the modification of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant (D) holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction (E) holding the court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody even though the court did not find father had shown a material change other than the 15 year old childs
Output: (E)
and that the relevant statements were made in furtherance of it.” Id. The Court denies Huber’s argument that Rose’s co-conspirator statements were inadmissable, and the motion for a judgment of acquittal on this basis is denied. E. Evidence of Guilt Huber argues that the finding of guilty was inconsistent with the evidence. As support for this argument, Huber spends a considerable amount of effort attacking the credibility of the government witnesses. Because the determination of witness credibility is within the province of the jury, “[a] trial court has neither the duty nor the authority to grant a motion for acquittal based on the credibility of a witness.” United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir.2001); accord United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Court rejects Huber’s request to enter a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a failure to object to a witnesses testimony while the witness was on the stand justified overruling a motion for a mistrial made several witnesses later (B) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (C) holding that district court had no authority to grant motion for judgment of acquittal based on defendants claim that witnesses had improper interests in testifying gave testimony that conflicted with that of other witnesses or were categorically untrustworthy (D) holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts (E) holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony
Output: (C)
Lexus. 28 . 618 A.2d 176 (D.C.1992). 29 . Id. at 177. ("Appellant replied that he did not own a car, but he was driving one." Id.) 30 . That Scott might not have been driving the Lexus on the day he was arrested does not mean he lacked standing to object to the search of the vehicle. As a permitted co-user of the vehicle, Scott had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if White was using it that particular day. 31 . United States v. Brown, 708 A.2d 637, 639 (D.C.1998); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), at 412 (4th ed.2004) (explaining that to justify a warrant-less search, the government must establish "a sufficient nexus between (1) criminal activity, and (2) the things to be seized, and (3) the place to be searched”). 32 . Cf. Brown, 708 A.2d at 638-39 (<HOLDING>). 33 . Cf. Spinner, 618 A.2d at 179 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that search was proper where a drug dog jumped into the open trunk of a car and keyed on a duffel bag after the suspect opened the trunk (B) holding that defendants suspect activity in the trunk and passenger compartment of his car immediately after he engaged in an apparent drug sale established probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs and drug money (C) holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not (D) holding that an officer clearly had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle without a warrant based on the burning marijuana he smelled as he approached the car (E) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle
Output: (B)
THOMAS, MOORE, and DONALDSON, JJ., concur. 1 . The will contained two codicils, and for the purposes of this opinion, the will and the codicils are referred to collectively as "the will.” 2 . As is explained in later analysis in this opinion, and in notes 3 and 5, infra, we have used the term "personal representative” for ease of reference, but JaNell and David, and, ultimately, Mary Elizabeth, technically sought to be the administrators with the will annexed. 3 .Mary Elizabeth is seeking to be appointed an administrator with the will annexed. An administrator is subject to the residency requirements of § 43-2-22, Ala.Code 1975, but an executor named in a will is not subject to those residency restrictions. See § 43-2-191, Ala.Code 1975, and Ex parte Adams, 168 So.3d 40, 44 (Ala.2014) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Mary Elizabeth did not testify regarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling (B) holding that the specific date restriction set forth in  541a5 controls and that  1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction (C) holding that an executor named in a will is not subject to the nonresident restriction set forth in  43222 (D) holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself (E) holding that plea in bar may be based only on grounds set forth in statute
Output: (C)
particular time charter does not act as a basis for the time charterer’s liability to injured longshoremen. See, e.g., Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 242 n. 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981); Dougherty v. Navigazione San Paolo, S.P.A. Medafrica Line, 622 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (E.D.Pa.1984). The reason most courts have held that a time charterer generally has no such liability is that a time charterer only rents space on a vessel; it exercises no control over vessel and makes no decisions about daily operation. Admittedly, authority exists for the proposition that Clause Eight imposes liability on the time charterer for injuries to persons unloading a ship. See Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294, 74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman (B) holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence (C) holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer (D) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous (E) holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen
Output: (E)
the defective motor. See Tucker v. Aqua Yacht Harbor Corp., 749 F.Supp. 142 (N.D.Miss.1990) (applying Mississippi law) (finding that in a case which was instituted while repairs were being made to piston defect on boat motor, manufacturer should have been allowed to cure and thus could not be held liable for breaches of express and implied warranties). ¶ 15. Also, this case is readily distinguishable from our prior opinions in which we found that the right to cure was not unlimited in the wake of repeated deficiencies and repeated attempts at repair. Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Gentry, 531 So.2d 1202 (Miss.1988) (finding right to cure not unlimited in case where seller made ten attempts to repair a mobile home’s defects in a five-month period); Rester v. Morrow, 491 So.2d 204 (Miss.1988) (<HOLDING>). II. WHETHER MERCURY MARINE’S “REPAIR OR 
 Holding statements: (A) holding employer justified in relying upon plaintiffs physician (B) holding that buyers retention and use of boiler was an act inconsistent with sellers ownership and constituted acceptance precluding rejection (C) holding that performance may be valid acceptance (D) holding likewise in a ease where plaintiffs renault automobile experienced problems with its electrical system air conditioner and oil indicator gauge justified buyers revocation of acceptance (E) holding that although sellers acknowledgment was not valid acceptance of buyers offer under  22071 buyers subsequent acceptance of and payment for goods along with buyers objection to a particular term within counteroffer constituted assent to remaining terms of counteroffer
Output: (D)
or negligent conduct. Although expert opinions are not inadmissible merely because they “embrace” ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, Fed.R.Evid. 704, legal conclusions or statements of advocacy do not assist the factfinder. Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 98 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir.1996). Despite its permissive language, Rule 704 “does not allow an expert to render conclusions of law.” Id. Most of Martin’s report is inadmissible on this basis. To the extent Martin’s report addresses contract interpretation, it is inadmissible. Expert testimony on the proper interpretation of contract terms may be admissible when the meaning depends on trade or industry practice. See, e.g., Kona Tech. Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595, 611 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But such expert testimony is admissible only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the industry norm was established by expert who presented percentages of the industry making late payments (B) holding the district court properly admitted expert testimony on defendants active gang membership (C) holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records (D) holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless (E) holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony to interpret contract provisions having a specialized meaning in the railroad industry
Output: (E)