niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
testified that Gollapudi admitted that he prepared and signed the W-2 forms and that they were false. Additionally, although Gollapudi presented evidence that the withholding amounts were true based on his “gross up” method, the District Court found this theory to be without merit based on the testimony of another IRS agent who demonstrated that no withholding was actually made. Moreover, it was established that the alleged withholding was never submitted to the IRS, but rather, was maintained in Gollapudi’s corporate checking account. Furthermore, Gollapudi’s reliance on Reynolds and Borman is misguided. Both of those cases involved § 7206(1) charges for filing the wrong tax form. Reynolds, 919 F.2d at 437 (“Using the wrong form does not violate § 7206(1).”); Borman, 992 F.2d at 126 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in Reynolds, the theory in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient (B) holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement (C) holding that form 4790 is not an administrative rule but is merely incidental to the statute and regulations and therefore false statements on the form can lead to criminal prosecution (D) holding that filing of improper form is not enough to establish false statement for  72061 purposes (E) holding that a false schedule c is an integral part of a tax return and is incorporated therein by reference thus giving rise to liability under  72061
Output: (D)
235, 239 (Fed.Cir.1988). On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board’s determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings. See, e.g., Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant (B) holding that collateral attacks on bankruptcy courts jurisdiction are barred by res judicata (C) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (D) holding that mr baneys challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision (E) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred
Output: (D)
was in control of the premises when and where the accident occurred. McCraney v. Gibson, 952 N.E.2d 284, 288 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Yates v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm’rs, 888 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)), trans. denied. This rule is meant to impose liability upon the party who could have known of any dangers on the land and could have acted to prevent any foreseeable harm. Id. (quoting Beta Steel, 830 N.E.2d at 70). Although duty usually presents a question of law, whether a duty exists in premises liability cases may depend upon resolution of underlying facts by the trier of fact, including questions regarding who controlled the property at the time and place of an accident. Id. (quoting Yates, 888 N.E.2d at 847); see also Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind.2004) (<HOLDING>). Whether there has been possession and control 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim (C) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (D) holding there was genuine issue of material fact to be decided by jury as to who controlled property at time and place of accident for purposes of premises liability duty (E) holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment
Output: (D)
challenged on appeal by the State. Upon entering the room, the officer saw the drugs on the table. Only after Bridges placed appellant under arrest did appellant pick up the two baggies of cocaine and throw them out of the room. Under these facts, Hodari and Perez have no application. All the contraband discovered by the officer was the direct fruit of the initial illegal entry. That Dempsey then picked up the drugs and attempted to throw them out of the room did not amount to an abandonment and most certainly did not turn back time to a point before the Fourth Amendment violation. Because the cocaine was the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation, the trial judge should have granted the suppression motion in its entirety. See Robinson v. State, 615 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); see also U.S. v. Simpson, 944 F.Supp. 1396, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search (B) holding that cocaine trafficking was not a forcible felony so as to preclude the defense of selfdefense when the killing occurred during an attempt to traffic in cocaine (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant (E) holding that where the defendant dropped cocaine during the course of an illegal police search no voluntary abandonment occurred
Output: (E)
(III) (B). 25 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 36 (5) (733 SE2d 72) (2012); see Kidwell v. State, 264 Ga. 427, 432 (10) (444 SE2d 789) (1994) (“Since the grant or denial of a motion to sever is left in the discretion of the trial court, its ruling will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion . . . .”) (punctuation omitted). 26 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); accord McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 615 (3) (791 SE2d 69) (2016). 27 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Kidwell, 264 Ga. at 432 (10) (“The burden is on the defendant requesting the severance to ‘make a clear showing of prejudice_’ ”) (punctuation omitted). 28 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Kidwell, 264 Ga. at 432 (10). 29 See McClendon, 299 Ga. at 615 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because codefendants defenses were not antagonistic (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue trial three months where although trial was complex and records were voluminous court had already granted two prior continuances and continuance of three weeks was sufficient to prepare for trial (E) holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because trial of three defendants would not create confusion
Output: (E)
erning whether an error is harmless include "the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s ■ case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on mate rial points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case”). 78 . Fed.R.Evid. 406. 79 . Jones v. S. Pac. R.R., 962 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Reyes v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir.1979)). 80 . Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 442 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Reyes, 589 F.2d at 794) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mobil Exploration and Prod. U.S., Inc. v. Cajun Constr. Servs., Inc., 45 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 81 . Reyes, 589 F.2d at 795 (quoting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that with respect to a businesss routine practice the plaintiff must show regularity over substantially all occasions or with substantially all other parties with whom the defendant has had similar business transactions (B) holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad (C) recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations (D) holding that an insured has substantially complied with the change of beneficiary provisions of a life insurance policy when he has done all that he could to comply with the provisions (E) holding that a contractor who had substantially complied with the building specifications substantially performed
Output: (A)
Moreover, even though E.C. was the only eyewitness, her testimony about the assault was cumulative of the testimony of Nurse Bufford and Officer Horace, thus lessening the importance of E.C.’s testimony about the assault. Finally, E.C. gave a statement about the assault to Officer Horace and Nurse Buf-ford immediately after the assault occurred, but before she was arrested. Thus, even if her testimony had been important to the State’s case, her testimony about the assault comports with what she told Nurse Bufford and Officer Horace after the assault but before she was arrested and placed on deferred-adjudication probation; she could have gained no advantage for herself merely by repeating that testimony. See Hall v. State, 663 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellant presented no evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to parse witnesss testimony or to have it replayed in its entirety (B) holding that where no description of witnesss evidence offered and no suggestion made as to how testimony would affect defendants case trial court did not err in refusing to issue certificate ordering witnesss attendance (C) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility (D) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (E) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of witnesss pending indictment when witnesss testimony regarding defendants participation in murder was virtually identical to witnesss written statement which was sworn to on day of murder and prior to offense for which witness was indicted
Output: (E)
in the contract related to judicial scrutiny of a claim denial. Section 10-3-1116(3) eliminates Defendants’ option to minimize scrutiny of benefit denials, and eliminates Defendants’ autonomy to guarantee terms congenial to its own interests. Colorado insureds may no longer agree to a discretionary clause in the absence of de novo judicial review and the right to a jury trial in exchange for a more affordable premium. By requiring de novo judicial review, and thereby removing the benefit of a deferential standard of review from insurers, such litigation may lead to a greater number of claims being paid, thus increasing the benefit of risk pooling for consumers. See Standard Ins., 584 F.3d at 845; see also McClenahan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 621 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1140-42 (D.Colo.2009) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted), aff'd, 416 Fed.Appx. 693, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa does not preempt section 22213b7 (B) holding that erisa does not preempt revstatmo  51343010e because it is entirely consistent with both erisa and the bankruptcy code (C) holding that erisa does not expressly preempt colo rev stat  10311162 as enforcement of the statute would dictate to the insurance company the conditions under which it must pay for the risk that it has assumed (D) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan (E) holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims
Output: (C)
debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).” Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 930, 121 S.Ct. 2552, 150 L.Ed.2d 718 (2001). The state court judgment necessarily included this essential element of § 523(a)(6). The jury found that the Diamonds “intentionally caused injury” to the Kolcums “without just cause.” In order to find fraud, the jury had to determine that there was intentional tortious conduct. Therefore, the issues implicated by § 523(a)(6) were actually litigated in the state court proceeding, and the bankruptcy court was correct to accord the state court judgment preclusive effect with regard to the Kolcums’ § 523(a)(6) claim. Cf. Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 918-20 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 3. Preclusive Effect of a State Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the issues implicated by  523a6 were actually litigated in a california state intentional tort suit and therefore according the judgment collateral estoppel effect under california law (B) holding that california courts assertion of personal jurisdiction over floridabased reporters did not violate due process when allegedly defamatory article that was the basis of the suit focused on the california activities of california residents (C) holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law (D) recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired (E) holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment
Output: (A)
Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 28 P.3d 589, 547 (Okla.2001) (same); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1228-30 (10th Cir.2008) (discussing rationale for American Pipe rule). A claim accruing after the filing of a class action but before denial of class certification is subject to tolling, see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340, 363 (2006), and the statute of limitations remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification has been denied. Rosenthal, 883 P.2d at 531. However, the filing of successive class actions cannot serve to perpetually toll the running of the statute of limitations. See id. (<HOLDING>). In Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case (B) recognizing rule (C) recognizing but not ruling on basis of federal rule prohibiting tolling during a successive class action (D) holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when the prior denial of class certification was based solely on rule 23 deficiencies of the putative representative (E) holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action
Output: (C)
on which she was indicted. On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo’s promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances. See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer’s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite differences in method evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent (B) holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged (C) holding prior drug convictions relevant to show that defendant had knowledge and intent necessary to possess drugs at issue in case (D) holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute (E) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy
Output: (A)
test results became so critical to the defense and were so thoroughly discussed that they surely attributed to the verdict. While the jury could have reached the same verdict without the laboratory test results, that evidence surely influenced the verdict in some way. We therefore conclude that the error in admitting this evidence was not harmless and that appellant is entitled to a new trial. II. Given our decision to grant appellant a new trial, we need not discuss in detail the remaining issues raised by appellant. We nevertheless mention the sentencing issue to give some guidance to the district court on retrial. At sentencing, appellant concedes that the district court followed the procedure endorsed by the supreme court in State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 27 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>). Appellant merely challenges the instructions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court possessed the inherent judicial authority to empanel a resentencing jury on remand from  reversal of the respondents enhanced sentence and because the district court erred by failing to recognize that it possessed this inherent judicial authority boehl reversed and remanded for the district courts discretionary determination of whether to exercise that authority (B) holding that district courts have inherent judicial authority to impanel sentencing jury for purposes of departing from presumptive sentence (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) holding that outside of rule 35 there exists no inherent authority for a district court to modify a sentence (E) holding that courts have inherent authority in special circumstances to stay adjudication
Output: (B)
to intervene” as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest — mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer’s unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied
Output: (D)
1946, no writ). 20 . 113 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1938, writ dism’d). 21 . McClung, 430 S.W.2d at 181. 22 . Id. 23 . Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617-18 (Tex.2007) (per curiam). 24 . See Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex.2011). 25 . HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 887; Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 617-18 (public records in a grantor’s chain of title generally create an irrebuttable presumption of notice). 26 . Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. 1962). 27 . See In re Bank of Am., N.A., 278 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex.2009) ("The general rule is that in the absence of a showing of fraud or imposition, a party’s failure to read an instrument before signing it is not a ground for avoiding it.”). 28 . See HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 886 (<HOLDING>). 29 . Id. at 887. 30 . 457 S.W.3d 52, 59 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents (B) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child (C) recognizing virginias interest in protecting defendants from claims and in holding down insurance costs (D) recognizing that mineral interest owners bear some obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in protecting their interests (E) holding that pennsylvanias interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed new yorks interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant
Output: (D)
shall wave “O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave!” As pointed out by the Court, California law requires public elementary schools to “conduc[t] . . . appropriate patriotic exercises” at the beginning of the schoolday, and notes that the “giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.” Cal. Educ. Code Ann. §52720 (West 1989). The School District complies with this requirement by instructing that “[ejach elementary school class recite the [Pjledge of [A]llegiance to the [F]lag once each day.” App. 149-150. Students who object on religious (or other) grounds may abstain from the recitation. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding the voluntary nature of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that students refusal to stand during the pledge of allegiance was constitutionally protected by first amendment (B) holding that the government may not compel school students to recite the pledge (C) holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students (D) holding that school could not compel students to salute american flag (E) holding that a public school cannot compel students to perform the pledge of allegiance
Output: (B)
that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was “[p]ushed out the door.” Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated
Output: (B)
lead levels, from which “a jury could reasonably infer that if [defendant’s property] was not contributing source [of lead exposure,]” plaintiffs blood lead levels would have decreased while living at that property). And, of course, a plaintiff who overcomes summary judgment still bears the burden of proof as to the element of causation at trial, where expert opinion can play a critical role in persuading a jury. The standard for admissibility of expert testimony as to source causation is thus a vital one in lead paint actions. The Majority holds today that an expert who gives an opinion that a defendant’s property caused a plaintiffs harm does not need to show or explain that other reasonably probable sources did not cause the plaintiffs harm. Majority Op. at 250-51, 164 A.3d at 238 (<HOLDING>) The Majority’s removal of the requirement that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (B) holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation (C) holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard (D) holding that it is not the rule that a source causation expert in a lead paint action must exclude other properties before he can testify that the plaintiff was exposed to lead at the subject property (E) recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions
Output: (D)
by citizens of other States, the Supreme Court has long held that the Amendment also bars suits against the State by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir.1998). The Amendment divests federal courts from jurisdiction over private suits against unconsenting states. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Nor may Congress pass a law under its Article I powers to vest federal courts with jurisdiction to hear such suits. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. at 1131-32; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2266, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Eleventh Amendment immunity derives from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that congress did not properly abrogate states eleventh amendment immunity from suits under the patent act (C) holding that states likewise retain immunity from private suit in their own courts which congress may not abrogate by article i legislation (D) holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity (E) holding that congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the patent clause of article i
Output: (C)
purposes of nonclient standing] is a question of fact.”). Neither party argues that Mark and Marie share some type of legally recognizable confidential relationship, and Marie offered no evidence to the district court that Mark acquired any privileged, confidential information from Marie. In Brown, this court concluded that “disqualification is not warranted absent proof of a reasonable probability that counsel actually acquired privileged, confidential information.” 116 Nev. at 1202, 14 P.3d at 1267 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the context of familial relationships, other courts have declined to disqualify counsel absent proof that counsel actually acquired confidential information from a family member. See, e.g., Addam v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>); DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a marital dissolution action that a sibling relationship between a husbands attorney and a wifes former physician was insufficient to disqualify the attorney and explaining that the attorneys brother presumably possesses confidential information relating to the wife but there is no evidence that he disclosed any such information to his sister (B) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted (C) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (D) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (E) holding that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in shares of his own corporation unless he has first disclosed the material information known to him not because of the relationship between the buyer and seller but because of the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders and the insider who obtained the confidential information by reason of his position with that corporation that relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the need to prevent the insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders
Output: (A)
Id. at 1234. The defendant sought and we granted cer-tiorari from the court of appeals' judgment. We now consider the issue of whether the defendant in this case owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, II. Standard of Review A. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and supporting documents demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Martini v. Smith, 42 P.3d 629, 632 (Colo.2002) (citing Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist Ct., 954 P.2d 608, 611 (Colo.1998)). An appellate court's review of a trial court's order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Vail/Arrowhead, Inc., 954 P.2d at 611; see also Joe Dickerson & Assocs. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo.2001) (<HOLDING>); Feiger, Collison & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when trial courts decision turns on question of law appellate review is de novo (B) recognizing that appellate court reviews questions of law de novo (C) holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo (D) holding that an appellate court reviews a trial courts grant of a summary judgment motion de novo because it is a question of law (E) holding that statutory construction is a question of law which this court reviews de novo
Output: (D)
subject to setoff, the court emphasized the legislative purpose underlying the availability of fees, namely, to encourage the availability of effective legal representation. See id. at 1366. In response to the argument that the provision of the statute mandating the award of fees to the plaintiff (and not to the attorney) vests ownership of the award in the plaintiff, the court indicated that this approach emphasized form over substance; reasoned that reliance upon such allocation to the detriment of attorneys practicing truth-in-lending law would undermine the purpose of the fee-shifting provisions; and determined that “the fee once awarded becomes in effect an asset of the attorney, not the client.” Id.; see also Sullivan v. Crown Paper Board Co., 719 F.2d 667, 669-70 (3d Cir.1983)(<HOLDING>); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that public policy considerations require that the burden be placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of courtawarded attorneys fees in the contingent fee agreement (B) holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law (C) holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees (D) holding that attorneys representing plaintiffs in federal antidiscrimination cases should be permitted to obtain the amount established by their contingent fee agreement or the courtawarded fees whichever is greater citing sargeant v sharp 579 f2d 645 649 1st cir1978 (E) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater
Output: (D)
Ninth Circuit has extended this definition of "physical force” to other generic offense provisions (though not the Section 924(c)(3) force clause), including 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, both of which define “crime of violence” using language that is identical or essentially identical to the language used in the ACCA force clause and the Section 924(c)(3) force clause). The Court finds it appropriate to do the same here. 3 . The text of Section 924(c)(3)(A) does not explicitly require that there be an intentional use of physical force in order for a crime to constitute a "crime of violence.” Still, Wade cites Ninth Circuit authority holding that similar penalty-enhancing statutes implicitly require intent. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>), However, the Supreme Court recently held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that those crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the acca (B) holding that one can be convicted of attempted manslaughter under the subsections of section 765205 that require intentional conduct but not under the subsection that only requires the mens rea of recklessness (C) holding that bank robbery is a crime of violence because a defendants knowledge that his behavior is intimidating satisfies 924cs mens rea requirement (D) holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea (E) holding that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under section 16
Output: (E)
effect at the time Simmons committed his offense, or the 2002 Guidelines, which were in effect on the date of his sentencing. Federal law requires judges presumptively to apply the sentencing Guidelines as they exist at the time of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider ... the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range ... set forth in the guidelines ... that ... are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced-”). The Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, however, prevents the Government from imposing additional penalties for crimes that have already been committed. See U.S. Const, art. I. § 9, cl. 3 (“No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, although courts must 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a change in parole law violates the ex post facto clause if the change in the law created a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes (B) holding that the fact that a retroactive law may have a deleterious effect on an individual does not mean that it is ex post facto punishment (C) holding that one way in which the ex post facto provision of the constitution can be violated is by applying a law that makes more burdensome the punishment of a crime after its commission (D) holding that every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed is an ex post facto law within the words and the intent of the prohibition (E) holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense
Output: (D)
is such that it is generally out of the public view .... [and] visibility is limited to those informants who are discovered.” 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. The BIA has continued to apply social visibility analysis in later cases, determining that “no particular social group” exists for individuals seeking protection as “affluent Guatemalans,” In re A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 75-76, or for Salvadoran youths who had rejected or resisted criminal gang recruitment efforts, In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dee. 579 (BIA 2008), or for young Hondurans resistant to gang membership, In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2007). A number of our sister circuits have adopted the BIA’s use of social visibility as a relevant criterion. See, e.g., Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 945 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the applicant must show social visibility and particularity (B) holding that status as competing family business owners did not give petitioners sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society (C) holding a court need not find the harassment to be psychologically injurious so long as the environment would reasonably be perceived and is perceived as hostile or abusive (D) holding that the proposed social group of affluent guatemalans depends on no disadvantage other than purported visibility to criminals so that the scales are tipped away from considering those people a particular social group  (E) holding that government informants are not members of a particular social group
Output: (B)
California, there was an insufficient basis for a California court to exercise in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 112-13. Four other Justices held that Asahi’s awareness that the ultimate product would be marketed in California did establish sufficient minimum contacts with California. Id. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Even if mere awareness that a product will ultimately end up in Virginia coul e stream of commerce is not, by itself, sufficient to allow a federal district court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers, in the absence of evidence that manufacturers “purposefully availed” themselves of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state. Id. at 658-660; see also Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Marketing and advertising within the forum 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state (B) holding that a defendants agreement that a substantial performance of contractual duties take place in the forum state is dispositive on whether defendant purposefully availed itself of that forum (C) holding that the defendant must have created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state (D) holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts (E) recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties
Output: (C)
F.2d at 453 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This Court held similarly in Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, That no plant in a given industry has adopted a pollution control device which could be installed does not mean that that device is not “available.” Congress did not intend to permit continuance of pollution by industries which have failed to cope with and attempt to solve the problem of polluted water. 537 F.2d 620, 636 (2d Cir.1976); see also Cal. & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 286 (2d Cir.1977) (technology used “ ‘in other industries with similar raw waste characteristics’ ” was “available” (quoting Liquid and Crystalline Cane Sugar Refining Subcategory, 39 Fed.Reg. 10,522, 10,522 (1974))); Am. Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 264-65 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). For a technology in one industry to be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing mackey is not consistent with our decision in wood v national basketball assn (B) holding that a determination of residual functional capacity must include a discussion of why reported daily activity restrictions are or are not reasonably consistent with the medical evidence  quoting avery 797 f2d at 29 (C) holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent (D) holding that a process can be deemed available even if it is not in use at all because such an outcome is consistent with congress intent to push pollution control technology  quoting assn of pac fisheries v epa 615 f2d 794 816 9th cir1980 weyerhaeuser co v costle 590 f2d 1011 1061 dccir1978 (E) holding that it is not
Output: (D)
itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” Id. at 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Huber argues that this language forbids the use of a prior conviction unless the conviction was the result of a jury verdict. This argument misapprehends the rationale behind the prior-conviction exception. Apprendi and Blakely set limits on judicial factfinding. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”) (em 80 (App.2005) (upholding sentencing enhancement based on prior misdemeanor conviction); Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 461 (Ind.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that some courts and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court (B) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion lacked specificity (C) holding that trial judge properly considered defendants misdemeanor convictions (D) holding when defendant waived objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary hearing granted and judge considered claim defendants waiver was effectively waived by judge (E) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith
Output: (C)
Id. Oriedo objected that this was an undisclosed expert opinion, so the government withdrew the question and rephrased to ask whether the agent was “personally concerned” about the presence of two vehicles. Id. The agent responded in the affirmative because “more than one vehicle ... raises concerns about being countersurveillance [sic].” Id. (omission and bracketed text in original). We concluded that this was lay testimony under Rule 701 because, although the agent’s “specialized knowledge informed his mental state, he was not called upon to testify generally about narcotics counter-surveillance practices or to offer an explicit opinion that what he observed was counter-surveillance.” Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Agent Labno’s experience with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (B) holding that agent could testify as to his impressions of intercepted telephone conversations under rule 701 because he was explaining coded  words and phrases that were unique such that his understanding came only as result of things he had perceived not from specialized knowledge (C) holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals cordless telephone conversations as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations (D) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live (E) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue
Output: (B)