niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
provide: (a) Interference with rights (1) Exercise of rights It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of-or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. (2) Discrimination It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this sub-chapter. Id. § 2615. B. Whether Sievers was eligible for leave under the FMLA. In its motion for summary judgment, Iowa Mutual alleged Sievers failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she was eligible for leave under the FMLA. Although the district court did not base its ruling on this ground, we can address it. See Bensley v. State, 468 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa 1991) (<HOLDING>). One ground of Iowa Mutual’s eligibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court (B) holding that an appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record even if the circuit court did not rely on it (C) holding that this court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on it (D) holding that appellate court can uphold a trial courts ruling on any ground appearing in the record whether urged in the trial court or not (E) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion
Output: (D)
pierce the corporate veil so as to reach individual stockholders” (emphases added)); see also Port Chester Electric Const. Co. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 656-57, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 357 N.E.2d 983 (N.Y.1976) (finding that the owner of a judgment-proof corporation had fraudulently conveyed its assets to other entities that the owner controlled, but declining to pierce the corporate veil on that basis). By the same token, evidence that a controlling party executed a constructively fraudulent transfer with a deceitful or unjust purpose can justify veil-piercing, even absent a successful claim under DCL § 276. See Atateks Foreign Trade Ltd. v. Private Label Sourcing, LLC, No. 07-CV-6665, 2009 WL 1803458, at *15-16, *18 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009) (Baer, J.), aff'd, 402 Fed.Appx. 623 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). E. Burdens of Proof The parties agree — and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporations payment of commissions to one of its owners was constructively fraudulent under dcl  273 and justified piercing the corporate veil because the commissions were inappropriately transferred for the owners personal use without compensation to the corporation apparently as part of a kickback scheme devised by the owner (B) holding that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant when the site of a copyright owners alleged injury is the location of the copyright owner (C) holding that individual owners lacked standing to assert the loss of a business opportunity that belonged to their firm and not to them individually noting that had the corporation declared bankruptcy it is certain that the owners would not be so quick to request that we disregard the corporate form (D) recognizing that the right of redemption is one of the most important rights provided by the states to owners of real property (E) holding that deference to the guidelines depends on the thoroughness of the commissions analysis and the validity of its reasoning
Output: (A)
as “[a] voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant point.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1427 (7th ed. 1999). The agreed order entered into by the parties on September 9, 1997, also constituted a voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning a relevant issue. Respondent also claims that Gibbs conflicts with another case from the Fourth District, In re Marriage of Fox, 191 Ill. App. 3d 514 (1989). We d 4, 618-19 (1993) (concluding that trial court’s authority to modify child support was limited to relief sought in petition); In re J.K., 229 Ill. App. 3d 569, 573-74 (1992) (noting that court is without authority to revoke minor’s probation without having before it a petition requesting such relief); Ottwell v. Ottwell, 167 Ill. App. 3d 901, 908-09 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that respondent’s reliance 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a respondent fails to challenge factual allegations contained in a petition for the writ of mandamus the appellate court accepts as true the factual statements in the petition (B) holding that the trial court erred in unilaterally modifying pastdue and future childsupport payments where the only petition before the court was a petition for citation alleging that the respondent was in arrears in his child support (C) holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted (D) holding that the trial court had not erred in including the cost of health insurance covering both the custodial parent and the parties child in determining the noncustodial parents childsupport obligation (E) holding that before denying petition trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and state specific reasons for denying the petition
Output: (B)
Before the District Court, Transfield alleged that Weaver was at all material times the corporate alter ego of ICI, and sought to attach Weaver’s property even though the underlying charter dispute involved only ICI. We note that because maritime attachments are granted “on the pleadings,” we assume all allegations in the complaint to be true. See Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 438 (2d Cir.2006). On November 19, 2008, garnishee BNP Paribas, acting pursuant to the Attach ment, restrained funds belonging to Weaver pursuant to the Attachment. On March 6, 2009, Weaver moved to vacate the Attachment on the grounds that (1) if Weaver is not the alter ego of ICI, Transfield would not have a valid prima facie maritime claim against Weaver, see id. at 445 (<HOLDING>); or (2) if Weaver is indeed the alter ego of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (B) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (C) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding plaintiff must make concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm denying motion to quash subpoena to undercover identity of doe defendants where inter alia plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show it could establish prima facie claim (E) holding that for a rule b attachment to issue plaintiff must state a valid prima facie admiralty claim against the defendant
Output: (E)
I would, in sum, wholly affirm the judgment of the district court on the basis of its summary judgment decision, which I commend unreservedly. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F.Supp.3d 768 (D.Md.2014). I. A. Let’s be real: The assault weapons banned by Maryland’s FSA are exceptionally lethal weapons of war. In fact, the most popular of the prohibited semiautomatic rifles, the AR-15, functions almost identically to the military’s fully automatic M16. Significantly, the Supreme Court in its seminal Heller decision singled out “M-16 rifles and the like,” i.e., arms “that are most useful in military service,” as being “dangerous and unusual weapons” not even protected by the Second Amendment. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624-25, 627, 128 S.Ct. 2788, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Similar to the district court — and unlike 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (B) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (C) recognizing that the second amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes such as shortbarreled shotguns and machineguns (D) holding first amendment does not protect nonexpressive conduct (E) holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president
Output: (C)
question as it relates to court-awarded attorney fees. Thus, State Personnel Board is not controlling here. A division of this court has held that an award granting attorney fees, but not determining the amount, is not a final judgment. Axtell v. Park School District R-3, 962 P.2d 319 (Colo.App.1998). This holding is consistent with well-settled law that a judgment assessing liability without determining damages is not a final order. Har ding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo.1982); Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 119 Colo. 121, 201 P.2d 380 (1948); Ball Corp. v. Loran, 42 Colo.App. 501, 596 P.2d 412 (1979). Axtell is also supported by considerations of judicial economy, because its holding prevents piecemeal appeals See Feiger, Collison & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P2d 1244 (Colo.1996)(<HOLDING>). Both parties urge us to consider the order 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal (B) holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders (C) holding that orders denying summary judgment are not appealable based in part on the avoidance of piecemeal appeals (D) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable
Output: (C)
In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today’s majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter’s far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs
Output: (B)
SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir.2001). To the extent that the Underwriters knew or should have known of facts tending to undermine the Official Statements, they had a duty to disclose those facts. (e) Kutak & Stinson Plaintiffs have pled facts indicating that Kutak and Stinson may also be responsible for the alleged omissions — at least to the extent these law firms knowingly failed to disclose facts that tended to undermine the affirmative impressions created by the Official Statements. In preparing the Official Statements, Kutak, as bond counsel, represented the Issuer and Stinson represented the Underwriters. Thus, they had a fiduciary duty to the Authority and to Baird, Stern, and Jones, not to the Bondholders. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (<HOLDING>). The lack of a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers (B) holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law (C) holding that a  10b claim premised on an omission cannot lie absent a duty to speak (D) holding that upon choosing to speak one has a duty to be both accurate and complete  (E) holding that silence can constitute misrepresentation when there is duty to speak
Output: (C)
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of a proceeding and may be recognized by an appellate court on its own motion or raised by a party for the first time on appeal). 26 . See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445-46; Trojacek, 2009 WL 909591, at *3; Somers, 295 S.W.3d at 8, 10, 13. 27 . See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 21.562; Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Assoc. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex.2008); In re Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 2013 WL 5470089, at *6; Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 839; Pate v. Elloway, No. 01-03-00187-CV, 2003 WL 22682422, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 13, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 28 . See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 21.562; Arkoma Basin Exploration Co., 249 S.W.3d at 387 (<HOLDING>); In re Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix (B) recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings (C) holding texas law governs procedural matters (D) holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues (E) holding state law governs disputed ownership of lands
Output: (D)
is no evidence that the immigration authorities have unreasonably prolonged [Young’s] removal proceedings and consequent detention.” Debel, 2014 WL 1689042, at *6; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 532-33, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing the lack of evidence of “an unreasonable delay by the [Government] in pursuing or completing deportation proceedings”); cf. Ly, 351 F.3d at 272 (noting that the petitioner’s detention was lengthened due to “the INS drag[ging] its heels indefinitely in making a decision”). Nor is there any “indication that [Young’s] continued detention ... will last indefinitely,” or — as discussed above — that his ultimate removal is unlikely. Orsino, 942 F.Supp.2d at 410; accord Debel, 2014 WL 1689042, at *6; cf. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (<HOLDING>); Monestime v. Reilly, 704 F.Supp.2d 453, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future (B) holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force (C) holding that it is not known legally that an offense has been committed until there is a conviction (D) recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal (E) holding that the ins lacks authority under  1231a6 to detain a resident alien for more than a reasonable time beyond the removal period if there is no reasonable likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
Output: (A)
as C8 is currently on Plaintiffs land due to air emissions, such deposits cannot be remediated under RCRA’s ISE provision. Defendant argues, first, that air emissions of C8 do not constitute “solid waste” under RCRA’s definition. The portion of the definition of “solid waste” under RCRA that applies to Defendant’s air emissions of C8 is that it is a “discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial ... operations.” § 6908(27). Defendant argues that since C8 was released into the air via stacks, it is not included in the definition of solid waste because it was an “uncontained” gaseous material, not a “contained” gaseous material as required by RCRA. See United States v. Sims Bros. Const., 277 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The court in Sims Bros Const., however, dealt 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for gaseous material to be solid waste it must be contained (B) holding that a violation of the act founded upon a material omission must be deliberate (C) holding that prejudice cannot merely be alleged it must be affirmatively proved (D) holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for (E) holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved
Output: (A)
Linda Giles, and Gina Arias. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff acknowledges that he received individualized training from these individuals, but claims it only lasted one to one- and-a-half weeks. (PI. Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 142^43.) Throughout this later training period, Plaintiff admitted he remained disinterested in the DCD training because of his purported imminent transfer to Piping, and his primary concern was distribution—delivering mail. (PL Dep., Doc. No. 12, Ex. B, 123; Ex A., ¶9.) In deciding motions for summary judgment, a Court may not make credibility determinations. Plaintiff has admitted that he subsequently received individualized training, although its length is disputed. A jury, however, could still conclude that Plaintiffs initial lac 8 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff identifies three employees who were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (B) holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects (C) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated (D) holding that where one employee involved in fight was more harshly disciplined than the other plaintiff was not similarly situated because he had been more aggressive than the other employee (E) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured
Output: (D)
parent’s right to visitation is the best interest of the child. Under Article 136, the parent seeking to restrict or deny access or visitation of the other parent to the child has the burden of proving that visitation would not be in best interest of the child. Since Ms. Mire was the party that sought to terminate visitation, she had the burden of proof on this issue. Absent conclusive evidence that visitation would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, a noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So.2d 375 (La.1983); see Smith v. Smith, 41,871 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07), 948 So.2d 386, writ not considered, 07-0621 (La.4/20/07), 954 So.2d 149, reconsideration denied, 07-0621 (La.6/22/07), 959 So.2d 485 (<HOLDING>); see also La. C.C. art. 137 (denying 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the presumption of legitimacy shifts the burden of persuasion to the putative father to establish that he did not father the child (B) holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity (C) holding that plaintiff had cared for his father who suffered severe depression after murder of his daughter within meaning of fmla interim regulation because inter alia he discussed with his father grief associated with murder and provided reassuring physical presence to his father (D) holding that fiveyearold child was not required to visit in prison the father who was convicted of murder (E) holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child
Output: (D)
he omitted information that he had been imprisoned and mistreated. The asylum officer who conducted the English-language interview did not testify at the hearing, and the record does not contain a transcript of the interview or the asylum officer’s notes. Substantial evi- dence therefore does not support the BIA’s reliance on this omission to find Ghebremedhin incredible, because the record does not support the agency’s rejection of Ghebremedhin’s explanation for the omission. See Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1087-91 (9th Cir.2005) (stating that without officer testimony or detailed notes from the asylum interview, an Assessment to Refer provides insufficient evidence to support an adverse credibility determination); see also Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Because the BIA relied on its credibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bia must address in a reasoned manner the explanations that a petitioner offers for perceived inconsistencies (B) holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding (C) holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so (D) holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so (E) holding that an agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistencies in the record unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so
Output: (A)
absence of ... (3) a “special relationship” existing between the parties ... recovery of purely economic loss is foreclosed.”).) He asserts he has such a special relationship with Maserati because Maserati had “reason to know or expect the particular purposes for which the vehicle was purchased by Plaintiffs [sic] (i.e., transportation of Plaintiff and his family).” (Dkt. 22 at 15.) Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular “circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.” Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh’g (May 20, 2014) (<HOLDING>); see also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal (B) holding there is no continuing duty to repair or recall (C) holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company (D) holding that a manufacturer is under a duty to instruct a distributor (E) holding that rv repair company which repaired rv for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components
Output: (E)
”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Applying this standard, the Court found that Nurriddin pled viable factual allegations of Title VII discrimination that should not be dismissed pre-discovery. Now, however, the parties have completed discovery and submitted motions for summary judgment, which are evaluated under an entirely different standard. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In conducting this evaluation, the Court finds it appropriate to use the expanded record in determining whether there are any genuine disputes of material fact, including whether Nurriddin meets his burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F.Supp.2d 4, 9 n. 7 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metro. Police 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession (B) holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived (C) holding that plaintiffs lawofthecase argument fails because the arguments presented in defendants motion for summary judgment were based at least in part on an expanded record (D) holding that a litigant who fails to raise an argument in opposition to a properly raised motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to raise that same argument later either in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal (E) holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived
Output: (C)
employees to determine who has authority to accept service, service is proper when, objectively viewed, it is calculated to give notice to the corporation. See id. at 273, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 406 N.E.2d 747 (“[W]hen the corporation is regularly doing business in the State, it generally cannot be heard to complain that the summons was delivered to the wrong person when the process server has gone to its offices, made proper inquiry of the defendant’s own employees, and delivered the summons according to their directions.”). Thus, service may be sustained where the employee accepting service has apparent authority to do so. Courts within the Second Circuit have adopted this broadening approach. See, e.g., Melkaz Int’l Inc. v. Flavor Innovation Inc., 167 F.R.D. 634, 642-43 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.R.D. 407, 414 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date (C) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (D) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously (E) holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation
Output: (B)
acceptance of the lessee’s surrender of the premises. See, e.g., First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. L. Weimann Co., 93 Wis.2d 258, 286 N.W.M 360 (1980). However, in recent years, New Jersey and other jurisdictions have shown an increasing tendency to analogize landlord-tenant law to conventional doctrines of contract law. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (implied warranty of habitability and covenant to pay rent construed as mutually dependent); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (landlord’s implied covenant to make repairs and tenant’s covenant to pay rent construed as mutually dependent; landlord’s breach of covenant entitles tenant to repair and offset cost against rent); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) (<HOLDING>). In view of that tendency, we think it is more 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule of caveat emptor would no longer be applicable to the sale of a newly constructed house and recognizing an implied warranty of fitness and habitability with regard to such sales (B) holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california (C) recognizing implied warranty against latent defects and of fitness of premises for lease purposes (D) holding implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose cannot lie where goods were subject of gift rather than sale (E) holding that where claimant complained of a problem and showed defendant a rusty part the requirement of notice was satisfied for a claim of breach of the warranty of fitness
Output: (C)
we will address it here. The purpose of Rule 3.7 is to prevent an attorney from being in the awkward position of acting as both a witness and an advocate at trial, which could create some of the following problems: the possibility that, in addressing the jury, the lawyer will appear to vouch for his own credibility; . . . the unfair and difficult situation which arises when an opposing counsel has to cross-examine a lawyer-adversary and seek to impeach his credibility; and ... the appearance of impropriety created, i.e., the likely implication that the testifying lawyer may well be distorting the truth for the sake of his client. (Citations omitted.) Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F2d 94, 99-100 (II) (1st Cir. 1988). Further, there is great po S. Dist. LEXIS 15672 (<HOLDING>); cf. World Youth Day v. Famous Artists 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawyers willful absence from his clients trial is contemptuous (B) holding that loss of contingency fees that lawyers might have earned from other clients was not foreseeable and directly traceable to clients failure to pay amounts due under contract (C) holding that lawyers who were necessary witnesses in the case under rule 37 were not prohibited from representing their clients in all pretrial matters including discovery (D) holding that the defendants discovery requests were untimely because they were not served in time for the responses to be due before the discovery deadline (E) holding that rule 37 does not prohibit a lawyer who will testify at trial from acting as counsel in pretrial discovery
Output: (C)
De La Garza, 690 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, Burke testified to the financial hardship caused by his injury, but his testimony was limited to the hardship caused by his reduced earning capacity. The following exchange occurred at trial: [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Now, Ronnie, after all of this, how much do you make now working with Bennett? [Burke:] About twenty, about 20,000 and glad to have it. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Ronnie, you haven’t filed your taxes, have you? [Burke:] No, we haven’t. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] We don’t have your taxes for last year yet. But my point ny that plaintiff did not receive paychecks was not inconsistent with receipt of insurance benefits and did not open the door to collateral source evidence); Mundy, 783 S.W.2d at 745 (<HOLDING>). The trial court therefore did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing collateral source testimony when plaintiff testified generally about financial hardship caused by injury (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce direct evidence of the controlling nature of defendants relationship with the victim (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits
Output: (B)
relevant inquiry is “fact specific,” Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 311 (11th Cir.1994), and the plaintiff must point to a controlling case, decided before the events at issue, that establishes a constitutional violation on “materially similar” facts. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994); see also Cofield v. Randolph County Comm’n, 90 F.3d 468, 470 (11th Cir.1996). As emphasized in Lassiter, “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what de fendant is doing violated federal law in the circumstances.” Id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)(<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has warned that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of the second question the right must have been clearly established in a particularized sense such that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (B) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry  is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (C) holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity (D) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right (E) holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right
Output: (D)
188 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio E.D.1981); In re Davis, 16 B.R. 473 (D.Kan.1981). Or after a judgment has been entered: In re Young, 22 B.R. 620 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.E.D.1982); In re Breuer, 4 B.R. 499, 6 B.C.D. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1980). (5)Courts that hold that a debtor may cure a default where a foreclosure sale has been held provided that the debtor’s right of redemption under state law has not expired: In re Johnson, 29 B.R. 104 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Chambers, 27 B.R. 687 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Taylor, 21 B.R. 179 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1982); In re Thompson, 17 B.R. 748 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich.1982). 32 B.R. at 790. To the fourth group we add the following recent opinions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.1984) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank (D) holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
Output: (D)
] and corporation! ] organized exclusively for religious. . .purposes.” II. Quantum of Use N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 provides: The following property shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter ... all buildings actually and exclusively used for ... religious worship ... all buildings actually and exclusively used in the work of associations or corporations organized exclusively for religious ... purposes ... the land whereon any of the buildings hereinbefore mentioned are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, and which is devoted to the purposes above mentioned and to no other purpose and does not exceed five acres in extent____The foregoing exemption shall apply only where the association, corporation Equalization, 226 Neb. 510, 412 N.W. 2d 459 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Welch Ave. Freewill Baptist Church v. Kinney, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit the united states from prosecuting a claim of contribution (B) holding that first amendment does not prohibit state require ment that religious organization comply with states reasonable procedures for obtaining property tax exemption (C) holding that tax exemption for church property does not violate establishment clause (D) holding that although exemption from use tax granted to religious publications violated first amendment exemption was severable from statute and thus taxpayer was still responsible for use tax on real estate advertising publication (E) holding that a charitable organizations religious purposes will not remove it from the purview of a property tax exemption
Output: (B)
district court create a non-statutory category of private-school students and thereby err in awarding temporary services? The following is the section of the opinion in which the district court allegedly created a new category for reimbursement: Therefore, a student, like Kelsey, who was enrolled in the Winston School for her senior year as a result of a settlement agreement and IEP, developed by a local school district, should at a minimum receive the rights provided to students who were unilaterally placed in private school by her parent. 34 C.F.R. § 300.132, 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(a). Under IDEA, Kelsey should be given greater rights than a parentally placed student in private school Sam K. [ex rel. Diane C. v. State of Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 788 F.3d 1033, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2015) ] (<HOLDING>). Therefore, at a minimum, DISD was obligated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours (B) holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials (C) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (D) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver (E) holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea
Output: (C)
albeit not the one urged by the State. The statute expressly states that the court may not grant a further reduction in excess of “one-half of the remaining mandatory minimum sentence.” Iowa Code § 901.10(2). If, as the State suggests, it is the prosecutor who decides the maximum level of the reduction, it seems more logical that any limitations on the extent of the reduction would be placed on the prosecutor, not the court. Moreover, the fact that the legislature expressly limited the court’s discretion indicates that it gave consideration to the breadth of the court’s power. The legislature could also have expressly limited any reduction by the court to an amount that did not exceed the prosecutor’s request, but it did not do so. See State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Adams, 554 N.W.2d at 689 (“legislative intent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the guidelines did not strip the sentencing court of its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence (B) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (C) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (D) holding it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to have determined that sentencing by the court was preferable to sentencing by a jury (E) holding that sentencing court had discretion under sentencing statute noting that the legislature has demonstrated its ability to use restrictive language when it desires to do so
Output: (E)
very well continue indefinitely. 34 . If that were the question, no petitioner would ever be entitled to habeas relief. This court has no doubt that the state court judges in Oklahoma, Colorado, Kan OCCA's unanimous concerns about Miller's and Macy's misconduct were "overwrought.” Dissenting Op. at 765. The irony of the dissent’s assessment speaks for itself. The dissent further asserts that our reading of the prosecutors' statements is "selective.” Dissenting Op. at 759-60. It is the dissent, however, that in trying to rehabilitate the prosecutors' clearly improper comments on jury unanimity and nullification adopts a selective and stilted view of the record. Miller’s and Macy’s improper remarks about jury unanimity and nullification certainly do not stand alone. Hooks, 19 P.3d at 315 (<HOLDING>); id. (holding prosecutors erroneously argued 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors misstated the law as applied to oklahomas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstances and additionally encouraged the jurors to decide the question on the basis or sympathy for the victims (B) holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime (C) holding that the unconstitutionality of the especially heinous atrocious or cruel instruction was compelled by godfrey (D) holding that the trial court did not err in using the particularized factual circumstances of the case namely the victims age  as an aggravating factor (E) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide
Output: (A)
its holding in Engle III that “individualized issues such as legal causation” would be litigated, rather than presumed, in progeny trials. Engle III, 945 So.2d at 1268. Next, the Florida Supreme Court examined whether the defendants were given an opportunity to be heard. The Court answered that question with a resounding “yes”—with respect to conduct: As illustrated by hundreds of witnesses, thousands of documents and exhibits, and tens of thousands of pages of testimony, the Engle defendants had notice and the opportunity to defend against all theories of liability for each of the class’s claims in the year-long Phase I trial. And, as we held in Engle, the Phase I jury’s verdict fully settled all arguments regarding the Engle defendants’ conduct. See Waggoner, 835 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74 (<HOLDING>). Douglas III, 110 So.3d at 431. The Court also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession (B) holding that putative class representatives had standing to represent the class even when they owned stock for only part of lengthy class period because they alleged a common course of conduct to defraud over that entire period including the period during which they owned stock (C) recognizing the phase i trial was conducted for the explicit purpose of determining issues related to the engle defendants conduct which were common to the entire class meaning they had every reason to litigate each potential theory of liability to the fullest extent possible (D) recognizing that in determining numerosity courts must consider the geographical dispersion of the class the ease with which class members may be identified the nature of the action and the size of each plaintiffs claim (E) holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions
Output: (C)
that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.’ ” Altman, 48 F.3d at 102-03 (quoting Per-eira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954)) (alteration in original). We hold that this requirement was easily satisfied here given that the settlement checks issued by the insurance companies (i.e., the fruition of the scheme) were sent by mail. In addition, several of the bribes were invoiced and paid by mad. Finally, the appellants’ mandatory filings with the New York State Office of Court Administration, which were adulterated to help conceal the fraud, were sent by mail. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Appellants argue that their prosecution under 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that proof of a business system of preparing and mailing letters and compliance with such a custom in the particular instance is sufficient to establish proof of mailing (B) recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud (C) holding that mailing of titleregistration forms satisfied mailing requirement because they contributed to success of the scheme (D) holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing (E) holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered
Output: (C)
the district judge reviewed the record, he did so with the understanding that “[n]o objections have been filed to this Recommendation.” Therefore, we need not consider Hall’s “objection-by-ratification” argument because it is inapplicable. Second, Hall asserts his case is particularly compelling because the Government has not identified any prejudice it would endure should we address his claims. This rationale is rooted in the notice the Government received when Hall made these arguments to the magistrate judge. But Hall ignores the other side of the coin: The arguments Hall made to the magistrate judge are conclusive proof of Hall’s actual prior knowledge of the claims he now raises on appeal, which sets the stage for waiver to apply. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 415 F.3d at 730-31 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if the government is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived this argument (B) holding that ruling on motion to suppress is interlocutory and may be reconsidered (C) holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence (D) holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial (E) holding that not filing a motion to suppress constitutes mere neglectful failure to pursue an argument  not intentional relinquishment which may be excused if appellant could show cause
Output: (E)