niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
friend. Id. at 482. The court concluded that there were no facts on the record to “support a finding of a connection between [the named insured and the ultimate driver of the car].” Id. at 485. The named insured was not found to have known or even spoken with the driver. Id. Further the court found that there was no indication to the insured that her nephew would loan the car to someone else or any evidence that he had ever loaned the car to another on previous occasions when he had used it. Id. Due to these factual findings, the court held that the evidence “was not enough to permit a finding of any permission by [the insured] encompassing [the driver’s] use of her automobile.” Id. See also Motorists Mutual Insurance Cos. v. Great Lakes Laboratories, Inc. 687 F.Supp. 198 (W.D.Pa.1988) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff relies on Cummings, a case similar 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that the driver of a ear owned by his wife who had given him permission to use it had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment (C) holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car (D) holding that driver did not have named insureds implied permission to use car where father gave the son permission to use car and the son lent the ear to someone else (E) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver
Output: (D)
284 So.2d 905, 915-16 (La.1973); see Tesvich v. 3-A’s Towing Co., 547 So.2d 1106, 1111 (La.Ct.App.1989) (“[W]e have concluded on the basis of Lombard that the claim of each plaintiff with respect to his or her leases constitutes a separate occurrence.” (citation omitted)); see also Reynolds v. Transcon. Ins. Co., Civ. A. Nos. 94-1367, 94-1432, 1995 WL 16795, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Jan.17, 1995) (Duval, J.) (discussing and applying Lombard, Tesvich, and Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir.1994)). The property damage in the DuroSeal petitions allegedly arose because of several negligent and fraudulent acts on the part of Jotun and others. Each of these acts does not constitute a separate bes, Inc., 924 So.2d 1131, 1133 (La.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 653 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee (B) holding that property damage occurred when condominium owners received architects report detailing damage not during the four years of construction of the condos (C) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did
Output: (B)
Public Sector Accidental Disability Pensions in New Jersey: The Law of Dramatic Events, 31 Rutgers L.J. 491 (2000). This legislative trend in favor of rendering more difficult the conferring of accidental disability pension benefits militates against the liberal approach forcefully championed by Smith in this matter. If adopted, Smith’s interpretation would expand the class of persons eligible for the significantly greater monetary benefits permitted when an allowance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43 is made, and would have a tendency to place a greater strain on the financial integrity of the fund in question and its future availability for those persons who are truly eligible for such benefits. See Mount v. Trustees of P.E.R.S., 133 N.J.Super. 72, 86, 335 A.2d 559 (App.Div.1975) (<HOLDING>). In rejecting Smith’s argument, we conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries  shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing that the members of the board of trustees are fiduciaries and therefore have a duty to protect the fund and the interests of all beneficiaries thereof which duty must be exercised with due care diligence and skill in administering the trust (C) holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise (D) holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust (E) holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement
Output: (B)
contrast to Paulsen, plaintiffs here seek the direct payment of benefits that they claim they are owed under the plans, and that defendants allegedly have in their possession. Consequently, their claims for tortious interference with contract and inducing breach of contract seek to "duplicate, supplement, or supplant" the remedies provided by ERISA. See Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 269 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir.2001) ("Claimants simply cannot obtain relief by dressing up an ERISA benefits claim in the garb of a state law tort"). Consequently, all of plaintiffs’ state law causes of action are preempted to the extent they seek to recover compensation owed under the top hat plans. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (2002) (<HOLDING>). D. Whether Plaintiff’s Complaint States a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisas preemption of state contract claims in a benefitsdue action is an affirmative defense subject to waiver (B) recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality (C) holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction (D) recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof (E) recognizing that erisas preemption regime is driven by the overpowering federal policy in favor of federal regulation
Output: (E)
Houston [1st Dist.] 1988) (applying the Restatement ’s definition of trade secret). In accordance with common law rights, and where no statute abrogates such rights, the creator of a device has the right to make, use, and sell it. See G. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (Part II), 24 J.P.O.S. 159, 166-68 (1942). The common law does not provide the right to exclude others, see Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35-36, 43 S.Ct. 254, 256-57, 67 L.Ed. 516 (1923), and absent the right to exclude that is granted by the patent statute, an inventor’s recourse to the common law requires that the invention meet the criteria of secrecy as appropriate to the circumstances. See 1 R. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets, § 2.01 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The foundation of trade secret law is 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing difficulty in proving conspiracy (B) recognizing difficulty of formulating concise rules of trade secrecy (C) holding error was structural because of the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error (D) recognizing privilege under federal rules (E) recognizing difficulty of evaluating judges demeanor upon appellate review
Output: (B)
a declaratory judgment that GSA’s additional tenant improvements in excess of the Tenant Improvement Allowance of $10,820,800: (1) was a breach of the September 2, 2005 Lease generally; and (2) constituted a cardinal change of the September 2, 2005 Lease that Plaintiff is not obligated to perform. Compl. ¶¶ 55-62. In 1992, the Tucker Act was amended to clarify that the United States Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction extended to “judgment upon any claim by or against ... a contractor arising under section 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, including ... other nonmonetary disputes on which a decision of the contracting officer has been issued under section 6 of [the CDA].” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); see also Garrett v. General Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 750-51 (Fed.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, although the court has 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this amendment provided the united states court of federal claims with jurisdiction over a nonmonetary substitute for monetary relief (B) holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms (C) holding that because it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the united states court of international trade the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over a matter that was protested or protestable (D) holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute (E) holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud
Output: (A)
Talasila, Inc. v. United States, 240 F.3d 1064, 1066 (Fed.Cir.) (“[Plaintiff] must be represented by counsel in order to pursue its claim against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.”), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2001); Finast Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 759, 761 (1987) (“[A] corporate ‘person’ can no more be represented in court by a non-lawyer — even its own president and sole shareholder — than can any individual.”); Affourtit v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 776, 779 (2006) (“A corporation appearing before the United States Court of Federal Claims ... must be represented by an attorney.”). This rule applies despite possible financial hardship imposed on the plaintiffs. See Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 699 F.2d 1366, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Balbach v. United States, 119 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (B) recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice (C) holding that the plaintiffs substantial financial hardship did not waive the rule requiring corporations to be represented by counsel (D) holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel (E) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel
Output: (C)
the Court set out the exception to the rule that an importer has the right to fashion his or her merchandise to obtain the lowest rate of duty “[s]o long as no deception is practised, so long as the goods are truly invoiced and freely and honestly exposed to the officers of customs for their examination, no fraud is committed, no penalty is incurred.” Id. at 704. As discussed above, Plaintiff obtained an advance ruling describing the sugar syrup and its manufacturing process, and a subsequent investigation revealed that Plaintiff was complying with the terms of the advance ruling. Thus, Plaintiffs practice does not fall within the exception annou 416 (1912), the issue was whether pearls, which had been drilled with holes and strung for display, were pr 15 Ct. Cust. App. 198, 201 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Corporacion Argentina de Productores de 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if contract lacks mutuality at time it is made whole or partial performance may render it enforceable (B) holding that an importer could import one large blanket at a lower duty rate even if it later made it into two smaller ones (C) holding that because a lower performance evaluation resulted in a lower bonus amount which is analogous to ones salary or to a benefit of ones employment it was adverse (D) holding that it is not (E) holding that the addition of a enough cereal to dog food to place it in a tariff provision with a lower rate of duty was within the importers right to fashion merchandise to obtain a lower rate of duty
Output: (B)
“knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report... for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured bank upon a loan. 18 U.S.C. § 1014. We have never held that to be liable under § 1014 a defendant must personally submit the false statements to the federally insured bank; rather, use of a third party conduit could suffice. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that a defendant need not know which particular bank his false statements will be presented to or that the institution is federally insured — “it is enough that he knew the false statements were to be presented to a bank.” United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 159 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam); see also United States v. Thompson, 811 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis omitted). Here, there was more than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance (B) holding that the government had not produced evidence that the defendant intended to influence an official proceeding because the evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance agency (C) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (D) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (E) holding that government must merely show that defendant knew that it was a bank that he intended to influence
Output: (E)
distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 641, 644, 646, 790 A.2d 903. That is not to say that a person will not feel some degree of compulsion whenever a police officer makes a request. See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 24, 446 A.2d 1201 (1982); State v. Hickman, 335 N.J.Super. 623, 633, 763 A.2d 330 (App.Div.2000). Surely, during a field inquiry, when a police officer asks a question of a person on the street, although that person is lawfully free to leave, he may feel some compulsion to respond. Nonetheless, we do not mandate that police officers have reasonable suspicion before making an inquiry. See State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. , 934 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Detective Peacock did in this case what 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent (B) holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent (C) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that the mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse consent to search does not supply probable cause to search
Output: (D)
an insufficient showing of the materiality of Hayes’s anticipated testimony. We agree with defendant. Defendant informed the trial court that a continuance was needed to procure the appearance of Hayes, “an eyewitness to this incident,” and defendant informed the court that Hayes had given a “statement that was favorable to [defendant].” Despite that very “shorthand” description of Hayes’s anticipated testimony, i.e., that it would be “favorable” for defendant, we conclude that it was sufficient information, along with the information that defendant was proceeding on a self-defense theory, for the trial court to understand that, as an eyewitness, Hayes would provide testimony in support of defendant’s self-defense theory. See State v. Morgan, 251 Or App 99, 105-07, 284 P3d 496 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude from its discussion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance (B) holding that a formal offer of proof was not required to challenge an evidentiary ruling because the substance of excluded testimony was apparent from the context (C) holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been (D) holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner relies solely upon conclusory unsworn statements unsupported by any proof or offer or proof
Output: (B)
151, 27 L.Ed. 887 (1883)). Whüe repeals by implication “are not favored,” Congress is not required to make an express statement in order to modify an existing statute via subsequent appropriations legislation. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “positive repugnancy” between the existing statute and the appropriations statute is sufficient to indicate the earlier statute’s suspension or repeal. Id. at 190, 98 S.Ct. 2279 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (repeal is implied when the earlier and later statutes are “irreconcilable”). Congress could not have stated more clearly that the ATF is prohib -16 (E.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>). Since the ATF owes the plaintiff no duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances (B) holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief (C) holding that the only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a denial of relief under  925c (D) holding that congress clearly intended to suspend  925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus (E) holding that a denial of due process warrants mandamus relief
Output: (D)
Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491, 498 (D.Kan. 1997) (stating that "[e]ven if there is a general prospect of litigation, a document is not protected by work product immunity if the document was prepared merely in the regular course of business.” Id.) 56 . See Marten, 1998 WL 13244, at * 11. 57 . Id. 58 . See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., No. 05-2192-JWL, 2008 WL 2548129, at *7 (D. Kan. June 23, 2008) (overruling work-product objection because plaintiff, in its privilege log, relied only on eonclusory assertions that the documents were created in anticipation of litigation and did not provide sufficient information for the court to determine whether the materials were created in the ordinary course of business); Bo-hannon v. Honda Motor Co., 127 F.R.D. 536, 539 (D.Kan. 1989) (<HOLDING>); McCoo, 192 F.R.D. at 683 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because plaintiff could not establish which portions of the tapes had been played in court plaintiff failed to meet his burden (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that plaintiff did not meet his burden to establish workproduct protection because he relied on bare conclusions unsupported by affidavit or other specific explanation (E) holding that a physician who relied only on personal observation without any personal study or experiment to justify his conclusions did not meet the daubert standard
Output: (D)
that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and should not be considered by the Court on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs further contend that in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Merck, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for securities plaintiffs only begins to run once plaintiffs are on notice of the facts constituting each element of the alleged § [10(b) ] violation. Plaintiffs maintain that since scienter is one element of a § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, before limitations could begin to run plaintiffs had to be on notice of specific facts evidencing Defendants’ scienter of the alleged misstatements. They cite City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement System v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit remanded the suit to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under merck a fact is not deemed discovered until a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about that fact to adequately plead it in a complaint ie until he can plead that fact with sufficient detail and particularity to survive a 12b6 motion to dismiss (B) holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract (C) holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case (D) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (E) holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss
Output: (A)
District explained in a unanimous en banc opinion: [T]he more prudent approach is to allow trial judges, in their discretion, to qualify psychologists and neuropsychologists to testify on causation as any other expert would be qualified to testify in his or her area of expertise. A psychologist’s or neuropsychologist’s competency to give an opinion will be subject only to the limitations imposed by 90.702, Florida Statutes. Broward County Sch. Bd. v. Cruz, 761 So.2d 388, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), approved, 800 So.2d 213 (Fla.2001). I agree with Cruz and would adopt this approach. As noted by Cruz, the majority of courts in this country have rejected the bright-line rule used in DeSerio. See, e.g., Huntoon v. T.C.I. Cablevision of Colorado, Inc., 969 P.2d 681, 689 (Colo.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis (B) holding a juveniles request to speak to a probation officer is not a per se invocation of fifth amendment rights (C) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that neuropsychologists are not per se unqualified to speak on the causation of organic brain injury
Output: (E)
to recall the mandate discussed in Calderon, by comparison, seek the adjudication of constitutional claims; they do not constitute collateral attacks on the integrity of the court of appeals’s judgment. Hence, they differ from true Rule 60(b) motions and must be denied. D. Having distinguished between SSHPs and Rule 60(b) motions, I nonetheless share the majority’s general concern that petitioners will disguise the former as the latter to avoid AEDPA’s restrictions. We must craft a holding that curtails this abuse. We do not write on a blank slate here, as virtually all of our sister circuits have addressed this issue. Some circuits have held that all Rule 60(b) motions are SSHPs, regardless of the nature of the claims presented. See Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gee v. Shillinger, 1998 WL 43155, *1-*2, 1998 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in failing to recharacterize a rule 60b motion as an sshp and reversing with the instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived (C) holding without specifying exceptions that rule 60b motions are sshps under aedpa (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding without extended discussion that the peti tioners rule 60b motion was an sshp under aedpa
Output: (E)
medical treatment. See Rollins v. Miller, No. 1:12-cv-298-RJC, 2012 WL 4974966, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 2012) (unpublished); Sherman v. Jones, 258 F.Supp.2d 440, 442-43 (E.D.Va.2003); Adams v. Drew, 906 F.Supp. 1050, 1054-58 (E.D.Va.1995). Rather, the Supreme Court has recognized that “imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Even for detainees, loss of privacy is an “inherent incident[] of confinement.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Moreover, even though plaintiffs have alleged a Fifth Amendment violation, the “deliberate indifference” standard applies to this claim. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38, 114 S. Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs have failed to plausibly 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that deliberately indifferent disclosure of hivpositive inmates medical status could violate inmates constitutional right to medical privacy when made to corrections officer escorts and by loud announcement (B) recognizing that federal inmates filed 39000 lawsuits in 1994 excluding only habeas corpus petitions or other cases challenging the inmates conviction or sentence (C) recognizing that gratuitous disclosure of inmates status as a transsexual as humor or gossip and in the presence of other inmates and staff members violates inmatess constitutional right to medical privacy (D) holding that an inmate has a privacy interest in guarding against disclosure of sensitive medical information from other inmates subject to legitimate penological interests (E) holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records
Output: (C)
“reason ably infer” with respect to justifiable reliance, such an argument “cannot substitute for evidence of ‘justifiable reliance.’ ” Taylor, supra, 776 A.2d at 1220 (emphasis added). Here, appellants have not shown justifiable reliance in order to establish a special relationship. Despite their conclu-sory allegations to the contrary, appellants have failed to show that Allen acted or failed to act in any way, because of the presence of EMTs, PAT monitors, or any other safety personnel at the test. Indeed, a conclusion that there was a special relationship between Allen and the District, relying overwhelmingly on the fact that EMTs were present at the PAT, would be the impetus toward perverse incentives such as the avoidance of safety precautions. Cf. Varner, supra, 891 A.2d at 272 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Allen’s decision to sign the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that operational manuals do not establish standard of care because to hold otherwise would create the perverse incentive  to write manuals in such a manner as to impose minimal duties  in order to limit civil liability internal quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted (C) holding that trial court retains wide latitude and considerable discretion to limit crossexamination internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that the petitioner may not turn a clerical error into a windfall of rights it would not otherwise enjoy internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (A)
and Franchise Agreements has repeated itself again and again, so that each merger and integration clause has eliminated any misrepresentation that preceded it. The Court disagrees with Defendants that the merger and integration clauses in each Franchise Agreement do not come into play with the course of misrepresentations about the continuous development of franchises. The Court will give contractual effect to the repeated expression by these two sophisticated parties. C. The Court finds another convincing leg 73, 576 (7th Cir.1994); Barrington Press, Inc. v. Morey, 752 F.2d 307 (7th Cir.1985); Fruit Industries Research-Foundation v. National Cash Register Co., 406 F.2d 546 (9th Cir.1969); Haque Travel Agency, Inc. v. Travel Agents Intern., Inc., 808 F.Supp. 569 (E.D.Mich.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hengel, Inc. v. Hot ‘N Now, Inc., 825 F.Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the elevated class c felony penalty for the offense of criminal recklessness by shooting a firearm from a vehicle into a place where people are likely to gather did not shock public sentiment or violate the judgment of reasonable people because among other things the use of a vehicle would make it less likely that the person would be identified which in turn would make it more likely that the offense would be committed (B) holding agencys letter to plaintiff repudiated licensing agreement by stating agency would refuse to make payments and that requests for reconsideration would be denied (C) holding that an eleventhhour amendment that would require extensive additional discovery would be prejudicial to the defendants (D) holding that when plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to a law it must be established that there are no set of circumstances under which the law would be valid (E) holding that statements of franchisor that total investment of capital necessary would be about 85000 that agency would turn around within 12 to 18 months that agencys gross profit once business was established would be approximately 300000 and that franchisor would play substantial role in operation of franchise were not fraudulent under michigan law
Output: (E)
to give such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accord with the law and practice of such Court. [I]n any suit instituted against the Rein-surer under this Agreement the Reinsurer will abide by the final decision of such Court or of any reviewing Court. The district court held that, as a matter of contract interpretation, the service-of-suit clause waived the underwriters’ right to remove. Id. at 6. The district court interpreted the clause to provide that, by consenting to submit to any court of competent jurisdiction at the request of the reinsured, the underwriters agreed to go to, and stay in, the forum chosen by the receivership, which was the state court. Id. at 7, citing Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1217 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 302, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court (B) holding that the defendant waived the right to challenge a suppression ruling on appeal (C) holding that a similar serviceofsuit clause waived the defendants right to remove (D) recognizing similar duties (E) holding that later served defendants each have thirty days to remove to federal court
Output: (C)
90 F.3d at 692. Particularly persuasive was the following exchange between Senator Bentsen, then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Senator Rockefeller, a principal architect of the legislation: Mr. BENTSEN: That definition of [business activity] has alternative tests: a company is considered to be in business if it either conducts a business activity or “derives revenue from” a business activity. As is apparent from the existence of the two tests, the intention of the legislation is to define the term “in business” broadly. Even in eases where a company is not considered to conduct a business of its own, if the company has leased any of its property in return for the right to receive royalties based on the use of the property in a 9 F.Supp.2d 539, 553 (N.D.W.Va.2002) (<HOLDING>). As previously stated, the parties do not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a company that generated revenue from the sale of its assets remained in business (B) holding that where subchapter s corporations revenue was generated from professional accounting services of its sole shareholder or from personal services performed under him funds generated by the business which shareholder withdrew to pay personal expenses although not denominated wages for purposes of bookkeeping could be considered wages for purposes of calculating preinjury wage (C) holding that the separate earlier sale of the defunct business tangible assets rendered the later sale of the trademark invalid (D) holding that a company that derived revenue from leasing its property was in business for purposes for the coal act (E) holding that where a company pays plan beneficiaries from its own assets its perpetual conflict with its profitmaking role as a business must shape  the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard
Output: (A)
appeals from the district court’s order denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion for reconsideration challenging the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. Henderson contends that the district abused its discretion by denying his motion, which we construe as a motion for relief from final judgment based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.1989). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Henderson’s motion because his almost two-year delay before filing the motion was not reasonable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.... ”); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to find an unexcused twoyear delay unreasonable (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable
Output: (B)
that Crabtree was visibly intoxicated at the time he was served the glass of wine would require a jury to speculate. [¶ 29] The contact at the accident scene between Sparda and Crabtree was brief. There is no evidence to link Crabtree’s post-collision appearance and behavior to intoxication before he was served the wine or to Crabtree’s conduct and appearance at the time of service. Other explanations for Crabtree’s conduct after the collision, such as a collision-caused head injury or physical disability, are as consistent with the facts in evidence and also suggest nothing about Crabtree’s appearance when he was served. See, e.g., Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 190 F.Supp.2d 69, 71-72 (D.Me.2002) (plaintiff’s physical disability mimicked intoxication); see also Green, 673 A.2d at 219 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 30] Furthermore, because the specific time 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to instructions consonant with their theory of the case where evidentiary support for the theory exists (B) holding that the plaintiffs misconceived legal theory did not preclude it from obtaining relief under another theory (C) holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source (D) holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case (E) holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory
Output: (D)
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, § 1487 (1990 & Supp.1997); here the district court never intimated a concern either with bad faith or with prejudice. Alternatively, C&W might be arguing that the district court’s reference to the “entire lengthy record” is an allusion to our suggestion in Firestone, following Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, that a plaintiffs failure to cure a defect in its complaint after repeated amendments is at some point sufficient to warrant denying it leave to amend yet again. But we Ml not infer such an acute point from such an oblique reference— if it is a reference at all — particularly in light of the policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits. See, e.g., Poloron Prods., Inc. v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 72 F.R.D. 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (<HOLDING>); Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 194 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs five previous attempts to state cognizable claim did not preclude amendment because federal rules suggest artless drafting of a complaint should not allow for the artful dodging of a claim (B) holding claim is cognizable (C) holding that plaintiffs complaint did not invoke federal courts arising under jurisdiction because it put forth alternate state and federal policies to support its state law claim (D) holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act (E) holding claim is not cognizable
Output: (A)
sexual assault victims.” Id. at 1026. Conversely, in People v. Spicola, the New York Court of Appeals recently held “the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he allowed the expert to testify about CSAAS [Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome] to rehabilitate the boy’s credibility.” 16 N.Y.3d 441, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (2011). Significantly, here, the State offered the challenged expert testimony in its case in chief against Dudley, not in rebuttal. Spi-cola is therefore distinguishable. But, the observation of the Spicola dissent (concluding that allowing an expert to connect general characteristics to a specific complainant is equivalent to bolstering the victim’s credibility and is therefore inadmissible); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1130 (La.1993) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. La-Caprucia, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse (B) holding that an expert testifying to child sexual abuse symptoms must limit the testimony to general characteristics that cannot directly concern the particular victims (C) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (D) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
Output: (B)
by Otay Mesa to date. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (cautioning that “the government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.”). After the first appeal in this case, the only remaining issue before this Court was to determine the amount Otay Mesa should recover in just compensation, with interest, for the Government’s taking of a permanent easement over Otay Mesa’s property. Given the Government’s stipulation, Otay Mesa is entitled to reimbursement for its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in securing just compensation for the Government’s taking, Cloverport Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 121, 127 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Government stipulated to the taking of an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the government stipulated to liability for a taking the uniform relocation act applied at that point and mandated the award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses even though there was limited success on the merits and certainly not the results reached that the plaintiff had contemplated (B) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error (C) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (D) holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action (E) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal
Output: (A)
that Perez purchased $75,000 in counterfeit currency and (2) a calculated Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months that was based, in part, on this finding. Second, although the court did not explicitly engage in a Guidelines calculation at sentencing, it did refer to the proposed Guidelines range at the start of sentencing and confirm that Perez agreed with this range. Third, the court’s statement of reasons set forth its calculation of the Guidelines range, which matched the calculation in the presentence report. We therefore identify no error in the court’s Guidelines calculation or its adoption of the presentence report’s findings, and we decline to vacate the sentence on these grounds. See Aldeen, 792 F.3d at 251 (requiring calculation of Guidelines range); Molina, 356 F.3d at 275 (<HOLDING>). B. Section § 3553(a) Factors and Explanation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report (B) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (C) holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings (D) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (E) holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report
Output: (B)
for a mistrial. See Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 2-3 (426 SE2d 360) (1993) (noting that the decision over “what trial motions should be made[ ] and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, the ultimate decision over whether to move for a mistrial is a strategic one made by the lawyer, not the client. See id.; Fortson v. State, 240 Ga. 5 (1) (239 SE2d 335) (1977); Berry v. State, 262 Ga. App. 375, 377 (2) (c) (585 SE2d 679) (2003) (noting that “counsel’s decision whether to move for a mistrial generally falls within the ambit of trial strategy”) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Burke, 257 F3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). And, the fact that defense counsel and his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision whether to seek a mistrial is a tactical decision entrusted to defense counsel binding the defendant even when the defendant expressed a contrary wish to his lawyer (B) holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision (C) holding that there is an inference from the existence of a blank for the name of defendants lawyer and from the absence of any evidence to the contrary that defendant was not represented by counsel (D) holding that defense counsel gathered sufficient evidence to make a reasonable tactical decision not to conduct further investigations into his clients mental health when psychiatric experts interviewed the defendant for more than twenty hours and informed defense counsel that they could not find any basis for a mental defense (E) holding that defense counsels decision not to call defendant to the stand despite defendants repeatedly expressed desire to testify on his own behalf was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel not to subject defendant to all of the risk attendant on crossexamination
Output: (A)