niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
have been on notice regarding the ongoing thefts. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that “Paul and Steven Mancuso informed FBI agents of the parking meter thefts between their guilty verdict on or about October 28, 2009 and the date set for sentencing on or about May 24, 2010.” See Dkt. No. 22 at ¶84. The amended complaint further alleges that “[t]he FBI questioned Ronald Mancuso in late November of 2009. On Wednesday, November 25, 2009, Ronald Mancuso confessed to the parking meter theft scheme.” See id. at ¶ 87. This passing reference to these events does not meet the high bar courts have set in order to recognize documents extraneous to the complaint as “incorporated by reference.” See Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Westchester County Health Care 
 Holding statements: (A) holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (C) holding that a complaints reference to a guilty plea does not make the transcript of the plea proffer integral to the complaint (D) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea (E) recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea
Output: (C)
Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190, (1987), quoted in Langenberg v. Sofair, 2006 WL 3518197, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.7, 2006). See also Sofi Classic S.A. de C.V. v. Hurowitz, 444 F.Supp.2d 231, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y.2006), quoting Rocanova v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 83 N.Y.2d 603, 612 N.Y.S.2d 339, 634 N.E.2d 940, 943-44 (1994) (“To recover punitive damages for a tort claim that ‘arises from’ a related contract claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged misconduct was aimed at the public generally and that the misconduct evinced a ‘high degree of moral turpitude’ such as to imply a ‘criminal indifference to civil obligations.’ ”); Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 411, 422 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). Sellers have produced no evidence of any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims (B) recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule (C) holding claimant did not have to segregate fees between fraud and contract claims because both claims were based on the same set of facts and circumstances (D) holding that sovereign immunity also applies to cross claims and third party claims (E) holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims
Output: (E)
property is properly analyzed under takings law, a court must first examine whether the government intended to invade a protected property interest or whether the alleged invasion of a claimant’s property was the direct, natural, or probable result of defendant’s intentional actions. Id. at 1355-56. Next, the court must determine whether the government appropriated a benefit for itself at the property owner’s expense or preempted the owner’s right to enjoy their property for an extended period of time. Id. at 1357-58. In order to meet the second prong of the test, plaintiffs must prove that defendant’s interference with their property “was substantial and frequent enough to rise to the level of a taking.” Id. at 1357; see also Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Wilfong v. United States, 480 F.2d 1326, 1329 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion (B) holding that testimony by the owners expert to the value of trees on appropriated property was properly admitted to rebut or impeach testimony by the appropriating agencys expert that the trees had no value in terms of their effect on the propertys market value (C) holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property (D) holding that a takings claimant must show that the invasion appropriated a benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner at least by preempting the property owners right to enjoy its property for an extended period of time rather than merely by inflicting an injury that reduces the propertys value (E) holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny
Output: (D)
acts. Id. at 963. The Lawson court stated that a "critical distinction” of Pylant from the facts before it in Lawson was that in Pylant, there was "not a factual background of consensual sexual discussion, conduct and relations.” Id. And in Lawson, it was "from that background ... that the issue of [the insured’s] intent ar[ose].” Id. 17 . There is no consensus as the applicable standard, and the Mississippi Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. However, numerous courts have logically concluded that a negligence standard should apply. See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1984) (opining that Texas courts would apply the negligence standard of liability to false light privacy actions by private plaintiffs); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); West v. Media General Convergence, Inc., 53 
 Holding statements: (A) holding when defamatory statement involved issue of public concern that private individual was required to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against media defendant (B) holding that defendant who placed private figure in a false light was not entitled to heightened protection of actual malice standard and could instead be found liable on showing of negligence (C) holding plaintiff failed to present evidence of actual malice because defendants explanation of the mistaken statement shows negligence but no more than that (D) holding under federal law that public figure claiming iied based on defamatory nature of speech must prove actual malice (E) holding failure to investigate before publishing is not sufficient to prove actual malice
Output: (B)
Gilpin, Jr., her grandson. Ms. Thornton then sued for declaratory and other relief. In the summary judgment under review, the trial court found that Mr. Clemons intended the deed to convey a life estate to himself and his wife, as tenants by the entireties, with, upon the death of the survivor of them, the remainder over to Joyce M. Thornton. This construction takes into account the language of the deed as a whole, and is the only plausible reading of the instrument considered in its entirety. See Bronstein v. Bronstein, 83 So.2d 699, 701 (Fla.1955) (“[I]f a contrary intention does appear in the deed then the fee simple character of the title conveyed is limited and controlled by the expressed contrary intention of the grantor.”); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 70 So.2d 364, 366 (Fla.1954) (<HOLDING>); Loveland v. CSX Transp., Inc., 622 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions (B) holding courts may not consider any single provision taken in isolation as controlling but must consider all provisions in context of entire instrument (C) holding that in construing an instrument any apparently conflicting expressions should be reconciled if possible so as to give full effect to all provisions contained in the instrument (D) holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language (E) holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions
Output: (C)
Plaintiff may only seek damages that were incurred prior to that date. See Indiana Michigan, 422 F.3d at 1376-77. Plaintiffs April 20, 2011 Motion For Leave is a motion to supplement the September 4, 2009 Complaint under RCFC 15(d), rather than to amend under RCFC 15(a), because Plaintiff seeks damages that were incurred after the filing of this action. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 (“Plaintiffs’ requested amendment of the complaint is proper under [RCFC 15(a),] although the amendments are not the primary thrust of their motion for leave; su (Fed.Cir.2008) ("SMUD IV") (remanding with instructions to assess damages at the proper rate, and without applying certain offsets claimed by the Government); Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 9 (2009) ("SMUD V") (<HOLDING>). 2 . RCFC 15(d) provides, in relevant part: On 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment (B) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (C) holding that this court has power to direct the entry of summary judgment when it would be just under the circumstances (D) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003 (E) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages
Output: (B)
argument resulted in prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2i is denied on the merits. 1. & m. INTER-CASE AND IN-TRA-CASE PROPORTIONALITY Hamilton asserts defense counsel’s failure to research and demonstrate that the death penalty was excessive based on inter-case and intra-case proportionality, compared to sentences in similar cases and compared to his alleged accomplices, resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. Hamilton does not make any offer of proof or showing which indicates defense counsel’s failure to research this issue resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim is foreclosed by Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The record fairly supports the California 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the jurys finding of a special circumstance with automatic review by the trial judge and the california supreme court sufficiently limits the risk of arbitrariness and capriciousness without comparative proportionality review (B) holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court (C) holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions (D) holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded (E) holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law
Output: (A)
employee welfare benefit programs that reimbursed subscribers who purchased Loestrin 24, but also include three individuals who purchased Loestrin 24 for their' own use. “In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers of goods produced by firms engaged in anticompetitive conduct were too remote from that conduct to be regarded as injured” under federal antitrust law. Nexium I, 968 F.Supp.2d at 409 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-48, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977)). In response to Illinois Brick, “some states have passed laws ... which expressly grant end-payors the right to sue for antitrust violations.” Solodyn, 2015 WL 5458570 at *15; see generally California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Unable to bring claims under federal law, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law (B) holding that a plaintiff may proceed with a claim against the state for breach of contract only where the state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by expressly entering into a valid contract through an agent of the state expressly authorized by law to enter into such contract (C) holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law (D) holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law (E) holding that states may expressly grant indirect purchasers the right to recover under state law
Output: (E)
and medical reports. However, on direct appeal, we held: "Even assuming the statement [was] improperly admitted, reversal is not required.... Douglas was not harmed by its admission." Id. at 13. Douglas cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged error. Finally, Douglas claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, Douglas did not submit his direct appeal record of proceedings to the post-conviction court. Accordingly, neither we nor the post-conviction court can determine that Douglas was prejudiced by trial counsel's actions. Consequently, we cannot say the post-convietion court's denial of Douglas' petition was contrary to law. See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 587-88 (Ind.2001) (<HOLDING>). 7. Delay in Hearing Post-Comviction Petition 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff cannot be denied a new trial for failing to establish sufficient proof to meet a standard which at the time of trial did not exist (B) holding petitioners failure to present any witnesses or submit the trial record into evidence at hearing led to conclusion that petitioner did not meet his burden of proof for postconviction relief (C) holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim (D) holding that the district court properly denied petitioners request for an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling where the petitioner filed several petitions for postconviction relief containing the same arguments presented in his federal habeas petition (E) recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial
Output: (B)
hours and hourly rates.... [And fee counsel must supply] the court with specific and detailed evidence from which the court can determine the reasonable hourly rate.” Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988). At a minimum, the party seeking attorney’s fees must produce more than an affidavit from the attorney performing the work. Id. at 1299. Aetna fell short of meeting this burden. However, we have held that “[w]here documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee ... the district court traditionally has had the power to make such an award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 1303; see also Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court should have given 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lower courts application of a some effort standard was an abuse of discretion (B) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (C) holding the district courts conclusion that the attorney should receive no compensation was an abuse of discretion because we are confident that some legitimate time was expended by the attorney (D) holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role (E) holding that under the extraordinary circumstances found by the district court it was not an abuse of discretion to order that defendants be permitted to take depositions of the witnesses in the presence of their attorney and the governments counsel
Output: (C)
are multiple reasons why the hyperlinked “Terms of Membership” page is inadequate to overcome the net impression that OnlineSupplier was a free auction kit. First, the hyperlink is buried at the bottom and is not placed in close proximity to the “Ship My Kit!” button, making it unlikely that consumers would notice or click on the link. There is also no indication that the “Terms of Membership” are specifically in regard to a negative option plan. Second, when the viewer clicks on the hyperlink, the actual terms of membership appear on a separate pop-up page rather than being directly inserted on the landing page. Such separation suggests that the disclosure is inadequate because it appears in a different context than the claims they purport to repudiate. See Gill, 71 F.Supp.2d at 1044 (<HOLDING>). Third, the information about the continuity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a disclaimer in contract consumers eventually signed was inadequate to overcome deceptive representations in defendants advertisements (B) holding that a standard form disclaimer for negligence of thirdparty tour operators which appeared on plaintiffs cruise ticket was valid as a disclaimer (C) holding inconspicuous written disclaimer to be unenforceable absent actual knowledge of the disclaimer (D) holding that representations in a product bulletin created an express warranty inconsistent with disclaimer contained therein which was thereby inoperable (E) holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer
Output: (A)
is signed. Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1). The Bank argues that the Restre-pos’ failure to file their affidavit in the cause number assigned to the severed party within thirty days of the severance deprives this Court of jurisdiction. A court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal when an appellant files an instrument that is “a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction.” City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex.1992) (per curiam); Mu on for new trial filed under old cause number, but seeking new trial as to a severed party, extends the appellate timetable and allows perfection of an appeal as a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction, making the court of appeals’ dismissal improper); Grand Prairie Independent School Dist., 813 S.W.2d at 500 (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION We hereby give notice 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal (B) holding that notice of appeal filed under the wrong docket number is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (D) holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed (E) holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal
Output: (A)
in order to insure the jurors’ lack of knowledge regarding Green’s prior capital murder trial. The court then stated: This comment coming from a medical examiner testifying about the cause of death was a lead into what he was actually talking about, to his actual point. The [c]ourt would have to assume that the jurors know much more than voir dire indicated for this unsolicited phrase to have any effect, therefore, the motion for a mistrial is denied. We agree with the circuit court’s conclusions. Contrary to Green’s assertion, Dr. Abrenio’s reference to his prior testimony did not signal the jury that Green had been previously convicted for the capital murder of Mrs. Vaughan. Thus, Green’s reliance on our decision in Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 375, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985) (<HOLDING>), is misplaced. Although Dr. Abrenio did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a juror did not disclose that she knew someone who had been sexually abused the conviction and sentence must be reversed (B) holding that evidence of the same name the fact that the previous conviction occurred in precinct of defendants residence and that although the defendant testified he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of the previous conviction was sufficient to establish identity (C) holding that a venire person who knew of the defendants prior conviction of the same offense for which he was being retried could not sit as a juror (D) holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction (E) holding that where defense turned on defendants credibility there could be no strategic basis for allowing jury to hear defendant had prior conviction for same offense for which he was being tried and concluding counsel rendered ineffective assistance
Output: (C)
employees and hiring security guards. We conclude that this showing was sufficient to raise triable disputes of fact as to foreseeability and duty. See Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d at 117-18 (construing New York precedent “to indicate that even a few past incidents spaced over a few years may, in appropriate circumstances, be enough to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the relevant criminal activity was foreseeable”); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 519-20, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14, 407 N.E.2d 451 (1980) (concluding that rational jury could find from history of criminal activity in other parts of building that criminal incident in the lobby was “significant, foreseeable possibility”); Stevens v. Kirby, 86 A.D.2d at 394, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (<HOLDING>). 2. Breach “[T]he owner of a public 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot (B) holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties (C) holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer (D) holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs (E) holding that jury could conclude from prior incidents involving breaches of the peace  that the assault in the parking lot was a significant foreseeable possibility which defendant had a duty to guard against
Output: (E)
first contention, it is observed that the Chief Justice’s concern in Cruz had to do with the distribution of literature within a prison, and not with the receipt of food by prisoners. A number of courts have been willing to uphold prisoners’ religiously based dietary claims. See e. g., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); see generally, Note, Free Exercise of Religion in Prisons — The Right to Observe Dietary Laws, 45 Fordham L.Rev. 92 (1976). 6 . Compare St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980) with St. Claire v. Cuyler, 643 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing); see generally Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 812 (1977). See also Alim v. Byrne, 521 F.Supp. 1039, 1045 (D.N.J.1980) (<HOLDING>). 7 . “1 cannot give up my guidance to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise (B) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (C) holding that exclusion of religious groups from universitys open forum policy violated the first amendment (D) holding exempt under ors 307130 which relates to other charitable institutions a building that was used as an office for a religious official and religious court and a printing press for a religious publication (E) holding that limitations placed upon the religious activities of two prison groups found to be religious organizations were reasonable under the circumstances
Output: (E)
Code Ann. §§ 14.003-.004, 14.010 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012). The trial court, though, only granted "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon prosecutorial and absolute immunity.” Because we conclude the trial court’s rulings were correct, it is not necessary for us to determine whether Allen's brief assigns, for appellate review, any error in failing to dismiss based on Charleston's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14. 5 . Under the federal standards for qualified immunity, a prosecutor would be "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 (B) holding that suits under 42 usc  1983 do not override state immunity (C) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (D) recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc  1983 and suits under united states constitution (E) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983
Output: (D)
have somehow defamed him, and that this defamation combined with the removal of his administrative powers constituted a deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law. This claim suffers from two fatal flaws. First, plaintiff has failed to point to any defamatory comments by defendants or to even allege that the actions of defendants were somehow based on a belief by defendants that plaintiff is guilty of some type of wrongdoing. While plaintiff has alleged that the' removal of his powers caused him “to suffer ... loss of reputation in the community and great emotional and mental distress and embarrassment,” the mere removal of his powers without any negative comments by defendants does not rise to the level of defamation. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74, 92 S.Ct. at 2707-08 (<HOLDING>). And second, defamation alone is insufficient 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted (B) holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person (C) holding doma was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty of the person protected by the fifth amendment (D) holding that members of the city council in their official capacity are not immune from a section 1983 suit against the municipality for deprivation of liberty interest in reputation without due process (E) holding that police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for reporting the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being held
Output: (B)
a cognizable claim under § 1983, doc. 20, p. 10, but fails to address whether such harassment, if done in retaliation for an inmate’s having filed a lawsuit, would state a claim. It is well settled in this circuit that “prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising a constitutionally protected right.” Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.1986) (reaffirming the principle that “prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising a constitutionally protected right.”), relying on Bridges v. Russell, 757 F.2d 1155 (11th Cir.1985). See also Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.l997)(reversing the district court’s dismissal of an inmate’s First Amendment claim for retaliation); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916-17 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoners allegations that a corrections officer retaliated against the prisoner for the prisoners report charging the officer with misconduct properly stated a claim for retaliation noting that aji allegation of retaliation should not be ignored simply because the charge was later dismissed  (B) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (C) recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance (D) holding that summary judgment was inappropriate on first amendment claim where prisoner submitted affidavits by other prisoners which inferred that the defendants statements suggested he had filed disciplinary reports against plaintiff in retaliation for eailier litigation (E) holding that appellant had submitted sufficient evidence of racebased retaliation to survive summary judgment on his  1981 claim
Output: (D)
grievances with any individual or employee organization other than the Union with respect to terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit members in the [ASEA]. When individuals or organizations other than the Union request negotiations or seek to represent bargaining unit members in grievances or to otherwise represent bargaining unit members in Employer/employee matters, the Employer shall advise them that the Union is the exclusive representative for such matters. Similarly, the Union will so advise individuals or organizations making such requests. 2 . Christensen v. NCH Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 473 (Alaska 1998). 2 3 . Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 735 (Alaska 1990). 4 . See, e.g., Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 622-26 (Alaska 1986) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) recognizing privilege under federal rules (D) recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor (E) recognizing in the context of discussing executive privilege that law enforcement documents disclosing investigative techniques or sources should be minimized
Output: (D)
immunity defense ordinarily fails, since “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” See id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Thus, the aldermen are entitled to qualified immunity only if Belk’s right to free speech was not clearly established at the time of her discharge. See id. Belk was discharged in 1995. As early as 1985, the Supreme Court had found a clear First Amendment protection for public employees. “It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382, 107 S.Ct. 2891. Our own precedent evidences this principle as well. See Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Casey, 12 F.3d at 804 (“No right is more 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment (B) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (C) holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable (D) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (E) holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation
Output: (E)
amended its order to disqualify Camenisch on March 27, 1998. 6 . Attorney Camenisch represents Mrs. Wagner on appeal because, he explained at oral argument, the trial court’s disqualification order did not extend to this court — a question we decline to address. 7 . The Wagners contend that there is a question of fact as to when Sellinger was terminated, suggesting it was later than July 21. That contention has no merit. Mrs. Wagner stated in her second amended complaint that she terminated the relationship "on or about July 21, 1994.” She retained Mr. Camenisch on July 31, 1994. Despite Sellinger’s failure to withdraw his appearance, the record makes clear that he did not continue to serve as Mrs. Wagner’s counsel after July 21, 1994. 8 . This July 25, 1994 motion was , 1219-20 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Fabricating, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation (B) recognizing that the statute of limitations for a survival action began to run on the date of the decedents injury as though he was bringing his own lawsuit (C) holding that limitations period began to run when flooding occurred not when plaintiffs learned city had been on notice of flooding potential and had fraudulent motive (D) holding statute of limitations began to run when plaintiffclient learned attorney negligently drafted contract not later when plaintiff lost on merits defending contract in lawsuit (E) holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run
Output: (D)
Forrest, 839 So.2d 839, 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So.2d 389, 393 n. 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)). Fourth, Ocean World asserts that Columbia submitted itself to Florida jurisdiction by filing lawsuits in Florida, thereby availing itself “of the benefits offered by the Florida judicial system.” However, Columbia’s participation in other lawsuits in Florida concerning subject matters separate and distinct from this lawsuit does not create personal jurisdict , 701 So.2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (finding "continuous systematic business contacts” where the defendant sold 50,000 office chairs for approximately $1,000,000.00 per year over several years to a Miami distributor); Garris v. Thomasville-Thomas County Humane Soc’y, Inc., 941 So.2d 540, 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Banco Inversion, S.A. v. Celtic Fin. Corp., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that texasbased organization was subject to general jurisdiction in florida because it solicited contributions from florida residents using internet websites (B) holding that texasbased organization was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in florida even though it did not maintain office or have any employees or agents in florida on a regular basis personal jurisdiction was ultimately exerted because organization solicited contributions from florida residents using local television stations and internet websites (C) holding defendant had requisite contacts under section 481932 florida statutes where it solicited consulting and other services from a florida corporation in which a substantial amount of the services sought by defendant were performed in florida (D) holding that general jurisdiction existed where defendant directed significant advertisement towards residents of florida targeting the populous florida market  solicited donations from floridians and had ongoing relationship with several florida animal aid organization including arrangements under which it regularly transferred animals to them for adoption in florida (E) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree
Output: (D)
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective’s statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, “ ‘initiated’ further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word.” Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant’s statement was not the product of “police-initiated interrogation” where it followed an inquiry that “amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney.” See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation
Output: (B)
contractual obligation where ordinance provided for payment of health premiums, stating that “Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the 1966 ordinance would impose future liability upon the City by requiring subsequent councils to annually appropriate the fun 2d 1160, 1161 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (discontinuation of college incentive pay program upheld even though employees allegedly worked in reliance on the program); Beckham v. City of Bowling Green, 743 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Ky.App.1987) (disallowing police officers’ attempt to parlay probable cause statutory provisions regarding reduction of salary into prohibitions against city’s “right and duty to fix the compensation of its employees based on the resources available to it.”); Watkins v. Josephine County, 243 Or.App. 52, 259 P.3d 79, 85-86 (2011) (<HOLDING>): Alston v. City of Camden, 322 S.C. 38, 471 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the murder and robbery occurred in one county but the plan was hatched in another county and the body was subsequently returned to that other county both counties had jurisdiction to try the appellant (B) holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest (C) recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  (D) holding that no contractual obligation was created and county was not required to refrain from amending personnel benefits resolution stating that county never promised the permanence of the disputed benefits  (E) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county
Output: (D)
to the government, i.e., the king. That concept, through escheat statutes and conditions of early grants, persisted in colonial days. The Takings Clause was thus considered to be a liberalization of property rights adverse to the conservative interests of the preconstitutional colonial governments. The right to private property was then perceived to be one of the incidents, privileges and immunities constituting individual rights that should be free from governmental interference. Maryland was one of only three states that had a Takings Clause in its first constitution. Id. at 698, n. 15 (citing 3 F. Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies, N Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct. 511, 59 L.Ed. 900 (1915) (<HOLDING>); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ordinance passed for the health and comfort of the community that prohibited brickmaking in a designated area was a valid exercise of police power (B) holding general statutes  1466 a requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing valid exercise of police power (C) holding that limiting to two the number of dogs kept per residential unit was not an unreasonable exercise of police power (D) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (E) holding that the exercise of police power was valid where an owner was prohibited from operating a liveiy stable business that was not a nuisance per se
Output: (E)
been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.” Ruddick Corp. v. United States, 226 Ct.Cl. 426, 643 F.2d 747, 750 (1981) (quoting Treas.Reg. § 1.482-l(c)) (emphasis omitted). Even if plaintiff inadvertently treated its parent in a non-arm’s length manner, section 482 applies. Section 482 in the Internal Revenue Code is the specific provision that may be used to adjust the prices at which goods and services are transferred between entities owned or controlled by the same interests. It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that a specific provision controls when the same subject matter is addressed by a more general provision. See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758, 81 S.Ct. 864, 867-68, 6 L.Ed.2d 72 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a proceeding to recover taxes from a nonbankrupt taxpayer the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his taxes complied with the internal revenue code (B) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision (C) recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional (D) holding that interest accruing on an overpayment of taxes attributable to an unused excess profits credit carryback was governed by a specific provision of the internal revenue code rather than by a general provision (E) holding that general obligation to pay money under a disputed provision of the tax code was not a taking
Output: (D)
the eminent-domain takings are government actions that occupy (or today, regulate) private property. Plaintiffs posit that the former are subject to sovereign immunity doctrines, the latter are not. Sovereign immunity is the immunity that, by the accident of English history that underlies American law, shields the government, absent consent to be sued, from legal liability for all sorts of wrongs, including torts and contract wrongs. Based on the distinction between common-law takings and eminent-domain takings, plaintiffs conclude that the bar of the statute of limitations properly applies only to cases involving the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the common-law takings cases. It is true that sovereign immunity does not protect the government from a Fifth Amendment Ta 996) (<HOLDING>); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law (B) holding that a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking (C) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action (D) holding that overflights can constitute a taking (E) holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs
Output: (D)
Predicate of Discrimination The majority apparently concludes that “vestiges” of past discrimination do not constitute a sufficient predicate for affirmative action — that there must be some kind of “smoking gun” evidence of present discrimination before a predicate can be found. The majority is, of course, wrong. The Supreme Court has stated time and again, in both Title VII and equal protection contexts, that affirmative action may be used to eradicate continuing effects (i.e., “vestiges”) of discrimination that occurred in the past. See, e.g., Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1847; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484, 100 S.Ct. at 2777; id. at 496, 100 S.Ct. at 2783 (Powell, J., concurring); Weber, 443 U.S. at 197, 99 S.Ct. at 2724; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-308, 98 S.Ct. .2d 557, 562-63 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The majority states that there must always be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria (B) holding that statistical disparity plus other indicia of past discrimination constitute sufficient remedial predicate (C) holding in the discrimination context that a plaintiff may challenge incidents which occurred outside the statute of limitations period if the various acts of discrimination constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination (D) holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk (E) holding that a thirtyone month delay could be outweighed by other indicia of reliability
Output: (B)