niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the essential inquiry is whether the defendant knowingly drove the vehicle in such a manner and under such conditions as was likely to cause death or great bodily harm. D.E. v. State, 904 So.2d 558, 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Although the defendant need not have foreseen the specific circumstances causing the death of the victim, the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the same general type of harm might occur if he knowingly drove his vehicle under circumstances that would likely cause death or great bodily harm to another. Michel v. State, 752 So.2d 6, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). A number of appellate courts in Florida have stated that “speed alone” is insufficient to support a conviction for vehicular homicide. See, e.g., House v. State, 831 So.2d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Hamilton v. State, 439 So.2d 238, 238-39 
 Holding statements: (A) holding 350 per hour reasonable for civil rights federal court litigation (B) recognizing that 90 per hour is a reasonable rate for a paralegal (C) holding that speed alone will not support a conviction but that other factors supported the vehicular homicide conviction where defendant was speeding at 50 to 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour residential area with slowchildren playing sign (D) holding that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone before the collision and a minimum of 50 miles per hour at the time of impact (E) holding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where defendant was driving anywhere from 67 to 90 miles per hour in a residential neighbor hood which alone justified denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal even though the defendant was also playing with his cd driving in rainy conditions and rounding a curve in the road
Output: (D)
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. However, courts faced with this issue have refused to apply this provision to government employees testifying in criminal trials based on the rationale that no individual can bind the sovereign. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir.1979) ("Because the agents of the Government are supposedly disinterested in the outcome of a trial and are traditionally unable to bind the sovereign, their statements seem less the product of the adversary process and hence less appropriately described as admissions of a party.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980); United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durrani, 659 F.Supp. 1183 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (B) holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution (C) holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either (D) holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible (E) holding alford plea admissible in burglary prosecution
Output: (B)
only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370, 379 (Fla.2005) (quoting State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003)). In denying the request here, the trial court specifically found that the requests were not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and were “overly broad and unduly burdensome.” The record fully supports the trial court’s finding with regard to the denial of these overly broad requests. It was reasonable to limit discovery of public records to those pertaining to the investigation of the Maclvor murders, rather than any investigation in which Overton had ever been involved, so such was certainly not an abuse of discretion. See Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 204 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>); Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 253 (Fla.2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence (B) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) recognizing that trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence and party claiming abuse of that discretion bears a heavy burden (D) recognizing that a trial court has the discretion to deny public records requests that are overly broad of questionable relevance and unlikely to lead to discoverable evidence (E) holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award
Output: (D)
that only water which has been put to beneficial use for irrigation purposes is appurtenant to the land. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11. {17} The Bassetts emphasize that in reaching that conclusion, this Court quoted a Utah case, which interpreted a Utah statute to determine that “a vested water right is considered appurtenant to the land conveyed only to the extent that it is used to the land’s benefit at the time of the conveyance.” Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 796 (Utah 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In KRM, this Court did not adopt the Utah rule requiring irrigation at the time of the conveyance. The Utah court established its rule based on established authority in Utah, which New Mexico does not share. See Stephens v. Burton, 546 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1976) (<HOLDING>). Our own case law indicates the opposite 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of water rights appurtenant to the land is the amount that is being used thereon before and at the time of the sale (B) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (C) holding that the appropriation of the land is complete when the amount of damage awarded by the commissioners is paid and possession is taken (D) holding that water stock sold appurtenant to land represents an interest in water which is a real properly right (E) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial
Output: (A)
subsequent actions may help establish mens rea for first-degree murder, "when they reflect a prior state of mind, particularly where they are fairly recent and in some significant way connected with prior material events”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 . Austin, 127 U.S.App.D.C. at 188, 382 F.2d at 137; see also, e.g., Fortson v. United States, 979 A.2d 643, 656 (D.C.2009) ("While a passerby possibly would have characterized the kicking and stomping of Whitfield as 'frenzied,' " evidence allowed a finding that the defendant had "ample time to reflect on his actions and ample time for any initial rage ... to peter out,” and thus had acted with premeditation and deliberation), reh'g granted and op. modified, 987 A.2d 1118 (D.C.2010). 23 . 903 A.2d 818, 830 (D.C.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Our review of appellant's claim is de 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting (B) holding inter alia that conviction of firstdegree premeditated murder on an aiding and abetting theory requires the prosecution to prove that the accomplice acted with premeditation and deliberation and intent to kill (C) holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill (D) holding that in order to convict a defendant of firstdegree murder on a theory of accomplice liability proof of his own premeditation is required (E) recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion
Output: (B)
toll the statute of limitations unless the defendants made representations that they knew or should have known would induce the plaintiff to put off bring ing suit and the plaintiff did, in fact, delay-in reliance on the representations. Olsen, 388 Mass. at 176, 445 N.E.2d 609. The “hypoallergenic” label was not intended to dissuade potential plaintiffs from bringing suit against the glove manufacturer, and there is no evidence that the labeling was fraudulent. Thus, estoppel will not toll the statute of limitations in this case. Other Massachusetts courts have found summary judgment to be appropriate in cases where plaintiffs could be charged with notice of their latex allergies outside of the statutory limitations period. See Zamboni v. Aladan Corp., 304 F.Supp.2d 218 (D.Mass.2004)(<HOLDING>); Starer v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2003 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cause of action for malpractice had accrued before underlying actions dismissal (B) holding that cause of action accrued before formal diagnosis of latex allergy when plaintiff had previously suspected that she might be allergic to latex (C) holding that cause of action against latex glove manufacturers accrued when plaintiff first suspected a latex allergy (D) holding that the payments accrued (E) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale
Output: (C)
from the OSHA inspection after this incident were for repeat offenses, the repeat offense that appears pertinent to this ease was the failure to mark a container of hazardous chemicals so as to identify the chemical. The prior citation for such an offense is not in the record, and we are unable to determine whether the “repeat” aspect of the citation pertains only to the type of citation or to the particular location of the offending container. In any event, our supreme court has not yet held that OSHA citations are evidence that compels the conclusion that a coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur. In fact, in two cases involving OSHA citations, the court has held that such citations would not support that finding. See Ex parte Martin, 733 So.2d at 396 (<HOLDING>), and Harris v. Simmons, 585 So.2d 906, 908 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury (B) holding postaccident citation not sufficient to support finding that coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur (C) holding that preaccident citation would not support a finding that coemployees were substantially certain that injury or death would occur (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (E) holding governments position substantially justified where sufficient support existed in precedent
Output: (B)
warrant was for failure to abide by conditions of release. Defendant was arrested on that warrant; he was not arrested for failure to appear. Defendant argues that there is no provision in the rule for failure to return from a furlough and that failure to appear under Rule 5-604(B)(5) occurs only when a defendant fails to appear before a judicial officer at a scheduled hearing.. {24} The criminal Failure to Appear statute has just such a provision, and Defendant contends that the statute “connects” to the rule. Section 31-3-9 makes it a crime to “willfully fail[ ] to appear before any court or judicial officer” when that person is “released pending any proceeding related to the prosecution or appeal of a criminal offense.” Id.; see Hicks, 2002-NMCA-038, ¶ 15, 132 N.M. 68, 43 P.3d 1078 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, no conviction has been sustained 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt (B) holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena (C) holding that criminal faffing to appear requires not coming to court as directed by a notice subpoena summons or other legal process (D) holding a person who is not a member of the bar of any court  may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in the district court or in this court as counsel for others (E) holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena
Output: (C)
pertinent charge of aggravated assault, to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of release before serving twenty-five years. One element in this mandatory sentence was defendant’s probationary status at the time of the crime. See A.R.S. § 13-604.02 (1989). Defendant argues on appeal that this element was improperly established at trial. After the jury was excused, instead of requiring proof of probationary status, the trial judge stated that he had been the sentencing judge for defendant’s probation violation proceeding, and he took judicial notice that defendant was on probation at the time of his crime. Defense counsel did not object. The defendant now argues on appeal that this was error, relying on State v. Lee, 114 Ariz. 101, 105, 559 P.2d 657, 661 (1976) (<HOLDING>), and State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper procedure to prove prior convictions is to offer a certified copy of the conviction (B) holding that when an agency fails to follow the proper procedure under the illinois administrative procedure act for the adoption of rules the rule is invalid (C) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (D) holding that the mailing of a certified copy of a remand order to a state court divests federal jurisdiction (E) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime
Output: (A)
64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980). We are faced with precisely such circumstances here. In their July 30 telephone conversation, Garcia negotiated with Papo for the purchase of heroin. He also instructed Papo to deliver the heroin to DeJe-sus, a direction that Papo clearly intended to carry out. Garcia’s instructions to Papo and Papo’s evident assent are independently admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Under that rule, hearsay statements reflecting a declarant’s intentions or future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts. Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note. Accordingly, the July 30 Garcia-Papo conversation is admissible to prove that Papo and Garcia intended to carry out a narcotics transaction in which DeJesus would serve as a middleman. See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d at 104 (<HOLDING>). The July 30 conversation also is arguably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding coconspirators hearsay statements independently admissible under fedrevid 8033 to show declarants intent to engage in illicit drug transaction (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (D) holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators (E) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy
Output: (A)
(2003), this court considered this very issue. In Collins, after a jury verdict was awarded against it, IGT made timely motions for JNOV, new trial, and new trial nisi remittitur. Id. at 560, 579 S.E.2d at 524. All of these motions were denied by the trial judge and IGT was served with a copy of the order on September 5, 2001. Id. IGT served a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, on September 12, 2001, which merely restated the arguments made in the post-trial motions. Id. at 561, 579 S.E.2d at 524. IGT received written notice of the entry of the order denying its motion to alter or amend on November 5, 2001, and thereafter served its notice of appeal on November 21, 2001. Id. Relying on Coward Hund Constr. Co. v. Ball Corp., 336 S.C. 1, 518 S.E.2d 56 (Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>) and Quality Trailer Products, Inc. v. CSL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues are not waived for failing to file posttrial motions from a remand proceeding where no evidence was presented because no posttrial motions were required under those circumstances (B) holding argument based on economic loss rule waived when raised for first time in posttrial motions (C) holding that successive new trial or jnov motions do not toll the time for serving the notice of appeal (D) holding that successive rule 59e motions unlike timely filed ones do not toll the time for appealing (E) holding that successive posttrial motions do not toll the time for appeal
Output: (E)
MEDINA delivered the opinion of the Court. The Texas Anti-Retaliation Law, found in Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code, prohibits a person from discharging or discriminating against an employee, who in good faith files a workers’ compensation claim. See Tex. Lab.Code § 451.001(1). This law applies to private employers. We have also held it to apply to the state’s political subdivisions through Chapter 504 of the Labor Code. See City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 298-99 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this interlocutory appeal, a political 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 504 waives the governmental immunity of political subdivisions for retaliatory discharge claims under chapter 451 (B) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (E) recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20 
Output: (A)
on the merits. As the post-conviction court recognized, the trial court never formally accepted appellant’s plea. Because there was no formal acceptance, and sentence had not yet been pronounced, appellant had a right to withdraw his plea without any justification for doing so. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g); see also Campbell, at 739. He attempted to assert this right, both independently and through his attorney, to no avail. Counsel was deficient in failing to adopt and present appellant’s motions to withdraw the plea because, under these circumstances, appellant had an affirmative right to withdraw the plea, and counsel’s failure to correctly advise or advocate appellant’s desire in this instance constitutes deficient performance. See Puglisi v. State, 112 So.3d 1196, 1205 (Fla.2013) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the prejudice prong of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (B) holding that written jury waivers alone cannot validly waive a defendants right to a jury trial (C) holding that the standard for determining competency to plead guilty is whether the defendant has a rational understanding of the proceedings (D) holding that decisions on whether to plead guilty or waive the right to a jury trial reside solely with the defendant (E) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial
Output: (D)
to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any individual or other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner.”); United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1983) (concluding that a “policy [that] is merely an internal guideline for exercise of prosecutorial discretion [is] not subject to judicial review,” and emphasizing that the policy “is not a statute or regulation; nor is it constitutionally mandated”); see also United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir.1990) (“[T]he internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not mandated by statute or the constitution, do not confer substantive rights on any party.”); cf. Firstland Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 377 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding moot appeal from revocation of visa petition where immigrant subsequently obtained lpr status (B) holding that the beneficiary of a form 1130 visa petition did not have standing to challenge a denied petition (C) holding no abuse of discretion where ij denied aliens request for continuance because alien had no immigrant visa available and it was unlikely attorney general would exercise discretion to permit excludable alien to stay (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available (E) holding that the ins was deprived of any discretion to revoke approval of an immigrant visa petition when it failed to follow statutorilymandated notice requirement
Output: (E)
of the crime. Id. at 982-84, 512 N.W.2d at 261. Again, Evans is readily distinguishable from our case because there the government was seeking money expended in the course of a criminal investigation. Evans, like Schmaling, does not contradict our holding that the plain meaning of "victim" under § 973.20(lr), Stats., encompasses political entities. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by imposing restitution to the United States government. By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 We note that Howard-Hastings appeals a sentence imposed by the court, not a condition of probation. A sentencing court has broader authority to impose restitution as a condition of probation. Compare State v. Connelly, 143 Wis. 2d 500, 505-06, 421 N.W.2d 859, 861 (Ct. App. 1988) (<HOLDING>), with State v. Evans, 181 Wis. 2d 978, 982-84, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation (B) holding that defendant could be required to reimburse state for buy money in drug case as a condition of probation (C) recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged (D) holding that the requirement that a defendant pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which must be pronounced at sentencing (E) holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation
Output: (B)
as to taint the director’s judgment. See, e.g., Khanna v. McMinn, C.A. No. 20545-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, 2006 WL 1388744, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006) (finding no lack of independence where Complaint alleged that director also sat on the board of a software vendor that received over $2.2 million in revenue from the subject corporation, as plaintiffs failed to allege that $2.2 million was material to the vendor or that the transaction might otherwise have influenced the director’s decisions); White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 366 (Del.Ch.2000) (rejecting claim of director’s lack of independence where the plaintiff did not allege particular facts indicating that $33,440 allegedly paid to director or his firm was so material as to taint the director’s judgment); Disney, 731 A.2d at 360 (<HOLDING>). Here, the Court cannot ascertain whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the director of the office of workers compensation programs in the us dept of labor lacked standing to challenge a decision by the benefits review board and finding that when an agency in its governmental capacity is meant to have standing congress says so emphasis in original (B) holding that the attempt to remove  a director by written consent of the board is invalid (C) recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing (D) holding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that a defendant director was not disinterested on account of his business relationship with the company whose board he sat on because he was a man of comparatively modest means (E) holding that allegation that company paid a director 50000 in consulting fees was not enough to demonstrate that the director lacked independence as plaintiffs had failed to allege that 50000 was material to the director
Output: (E)
on the basis of an otherwise constitutional statutory aggravator. ¶ 32 Even if we assume Graham supplies the proper analysis for challenging an aggravator, such a challenge fails here. Under Graham, a court “considers ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). In the past decade, the Supreme Court has used this approach in three death penalty eases. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (concluding the death penalty cannot be imposed for rape); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime (B) holding that the execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed capital crimes violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution (C) recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved (D) holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment (E) holding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed
Output: (E)
for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants. DISCUSSION Appellants argue that the Forest Service lacked the authority to restrict the use of the ditches to maintain instream flow levels for the protection of fish under the ESA. We agree with the district court that the placement of restrictions in the right-of-way permits was within the authority of the Forest Service. Whatever questions exist as to the standing of the various appellants, they are represented by the same counsel and make the same arguments, and the Early Winters Ditch Company as a permit holder indisputably has standing. We accordingly proceed to the merits. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 & n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (<HOLDING>). At bottom, appellants argue that the Forest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual standing issue waived (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that where one plaintiff has standing we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit (D) holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they may not rely on the expense of credit monitoring and other preventative measures for standing (E) recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements
Output: (C)
(5th Cir.1994). The Court may not look beyond the pleadings. See Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 935 (5th Cir.1988). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is not favored by the law. Id. at 926. A Plaintiffs complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”); Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 735 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). However, “there are times when a court should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may dismiss a claim under 12b6 only if it appears to a certainty that no relief can be granted under any set of facts provable in support of its allegations or if the allegations accepted as true do not present a claim upon which relief legally can be obtained (B) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (D) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (E) holding that rule 12b6 dismissal is proper where it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations
Output: (A)
909, 435 P.2d 248, 249 (1967). The plain language of I.R.E. 201(d) requires specificity in identifying what documents or items the district court is requested take notice of. See, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835, 243 P.3d 642, 651 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court held that where a party is requesting that a court take judicial notice of a document or items, that party must state with particularity what he or she is asking the court to take notice of. Id. at 835, 243 P.3d at 652. Where a party does not meet this requirement, it is improper for a court to take judicial notice under I.R.E, 201(d). Taylor, 149 Idaho at 835, 243 P.3d at 652. If a party fails to specify which material from the underlying case he or she is requesting, judicial notice is not mandatory. See id. (<HOLDING>). Fortin argues that Taylor is not controlling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice (B) holding that a notice to produce personal papers was unconstitutional and void and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice when produced in obedience to said notice and its admission in evidence by the court were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings (C) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (D) holding that where it was erroneous for the district court to take judicial notice it certainly cannot be said that such notice was mandatory and therefore ire 201d is inapplicable (E) holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice
Output: (D)
also initially sued the prosecuting attorney and the sheriff of Wise County. Those defendants have been previously dismissed. 4 . Horner filed an earlier Motion for Summary Judgment, also asserting that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted, but Senior District Judge Glen M. Williams disagreed, and denied the motion. (Opinion and Order, Jan. 10, 2010.) The case was thereafter reassigned to me and after discovery, the present motion was filed. The earlier decision does not preclude revisiting this issue, particularly since additional evidence has been presented that calls into question the basis for the earlier denial of summary judgment. See Tang v. State of R.I., Dep’t of Elderly Affairs, 163 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 5 . In his deposition in June of 2010, Horner 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling (B) holding if an appellant conceded trial courts ruling was not prejudicial he could not assert on appeal the ruling denied him a fair trial (C) recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge (D) recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling (E) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion
Output: (D)
terms, as Justice Holmes put it, a “conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.” United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910). Because most conspiracies are “clandestine in nature,” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 12.2(a), at 266 (2d ed.2003), by “the very nature of the offense, it often may be established only by indirect and circumstantial evidence,” Wright, 224 Va. at 505, 297 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 580, 249 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1978)). It is a rare case where any “formal agreement among alleged conspirators” can be established. Wilder Enter, v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1141 (4th Cir.1980); see also Combs v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 802, 810, 520 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1999) (<HOLDING>). As often as not, conspirators play different 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required (B) holding that a theory of recovery pleaded but not submitted to the jury by explicit agreement need not be considered on appeal (C) holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement (D) holding that expert proof was not required for an asserted claim of ordinary negligence (E) holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy
Output: (A)
Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.2000). This decision strongly suggests that, in pertinent circumstances, conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is, as Home Products suggests, “automatic.” However, it also suggests that the proper procedure is for the district court expressly to “convert” a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id. (concluding that the district court had not followed the proper procedure, because it had not converted the motion). However, the decision also suggests that whether or not application of summary judgment standards is appropriate ultimately depends upon whether the parties were provided with adequate opportunity to address the merits of the motion according to summary judgment standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). A slightly earlier decision of the Eighth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (B) holding that appellate review under summary judgment standards was appropriate where the district court despite its procedural error provided the parties with a full opportunity to present all pertinent materials outside the pleadings regarding the issue of response costs and the parties created a complete record on the issue (C) holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court (D) recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review (E) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties
Output: (B)
in their Constitution, or from the Congress that the Constitution had empowered. We made a similar point in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 416, where we considered a suit against a State in another State’s courts: “This [traditional] explanation [of sovereign immunity] adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign’s courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity.” Cf. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892) (<HOLDING>). Subjecting States to federal jurisdiction in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state (B) holding a states regulation of wyoming national guard was insufficient to implicate a special sovereignty interest because of the dual federal and state nature of national guard service (C) recognizing that a suit by the national government against a state does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty (D) holding the governors emergency powers to take private property for the public benefit was a special sovereignty interest but the relief requested was not so much of a divestiture of the states sovereignty to render the suit as one against the state itself (E) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state
Output: (C)
at 123. Dr. Mittal agreed that the fact that the knife had been left in the wound in the victim’s back did not alter his medical conclusion. Id. at 128. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s argument to the jury was . based upon reasonable inferences from the evidence. Further, we agree with the Commonwealth that, contrary to Appellant’s contention, the prosecutor’s use of the word “speculation” did not urge the jury to base its verdict on conjecture, but rather was a colloquial way of saying that the prosecutor was not in the room at the time the fatal stabbing was committed. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comments were not improper, and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to lodge a meritless objection. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d at 278 (<HOLDING>). VII. Appellate Counsel Ineffectiveness In his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim (B) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advance novel and unaccepted theories (C) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to present cumulative evidence (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection
Output: (A)
Union, Local 535, Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944, 949 (9th Cir.1979). The Court considers Defendants’ arguments with respect to Edwards and her counsel separately. a. The Adequacy of Edwards as Named Plaintiff Defendants’ argument that Edwards is inadequate is primarily based on Edwards’s testimony in an unrelated bankruptcy proceeding. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). This requirement ensures that the named plaintiff and his or her counsel will pursue each class member’s claim with sufficient “vigor.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir.1998); see also Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). As previously stated by this Court, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (B) holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim (C) holding that ajdequate representation depends on the qualifications of counsel for the representatives an absence of antagonism a sharing of interests between representatives and absentees and the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive (D) recognizing that the number of class representatives is not significant under rule 23a (E) holding that awards of 2500 to majority of representatives and 5000 to deposed representatives were inappropriate where representatives had borne little risk by participating in litigation and provided services that could have been provided by any other class member
Output: (C)
in the earlier proceeding commensurate with those in the subsequent proceeding, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Messina, 874 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Colo.1994), but also that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted have had the same incentive to vigorously defend itself in the previous action, Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 782 P.2d at 1166-67; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(c) & emt. j (1982). A party necessarily lacks the same incentive to defend where its exposure to liability is substantially less at the earlier proceeding. Salida, 732 P.2d at 1166-67. In addition to the amount of potential money awards, significant variations in exposure may arise from differences in the finality or permanence of judgments, see In re C.M., 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1137-38 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Frederick, 405 Mass. 1, 537 N.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consortium is not a part of the parentchild relationship (B) recognizing that parents incentive to defend in a child in need of supervision proceeding where resulting order is temporary in nature and entitles parent and child to government services is dramatically different from incentive to vigorously litigate same issues in parentaltermination proceeding where the result is permanent and completely severs parentchild relationship (C) holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that attorneys fees and costs may not be awarded as child support when they are incurred in a suit to modify the parentchild relationship that does not involve the enforcement of a child support obligation
Output: (B)
to build and repair the furnaces as promised under the warranty. This is precisely what Spectro claims in Counts 2, 6, and 10. There are cases in which a party may plead separate breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. See, e.g., Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. BASF Corp., No. 3:97-CV-1480-L, 2001 WL 1388872, *6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16807, *13-20 (N.D.Tex.2001) (“delivery of inferior goods or services equate to a warranty claim while delivery of nothing equates to a contract claim” and plaintiff “failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether its breach of contract claim is distinct from its breach of warranty claims”); see also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 758 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir.1985) (discussed at length in Alcan) (<HOLDING>); and see Rhode v. E & T Invs., Inc., 29 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that warranty claim accrued at tender where 180 day warranty on computer not a warranty for future performance as it involved a remedy only (B) holding that an agreement in which one party promised to make monthly payments to the other partys attorney as part of an asset sale contract was for the direct benefit of the attorney (C) holding that a warranty claim survived alongside a contract claim where a service was promised in addition to the sale of a good (D) holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed (E) holding that the state law contract claim alleged the same conduct as in the erisa claim and was therefore preempted
Output: (C)
F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir.2012). Thus, Plasencia’s claim is not proeedurally barred because the state court did not “clearly and expressly [state] that its judgment rests on a procedural bar.” See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173. Furthermore, Plasencia exhausted his state court remedies because he presented his claim to the state’s highest court in his motion for rehearing on direct appeal, and in his Rule 3.850 motion, which was affirmed per curiam by the Second District Court of Appeal. See Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.2010) (stating to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must have presented the issues raised in the federal habeas petition to the state’s highest court,' either on direct appeal or collateral review); see also Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). II. BLAKELY ERROR Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts (B) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree (C) holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court (D) holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise (E) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction
Output: (C)