niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
over the interi- or of the car, including the front passenger seat floorboard, any more than the presence of other occupants in Brown negated the defendant’s control over contraband found in his plain view in common areas of a house he owned and occupied. Brown and its progeny therefore dictate that sufficient evidence existed for the question of the driver’s dominion and control to be submitted to the jury. We acknowledge that a jury issue on a driver’s dominion and control over contraband may not be present under different circumstances. For example, the State may fail to present evidence inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that a passenger had exclusive dominion and control over the contraband. See, e.g., Corker v. State, 31 So.3d 958, 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). But this concern is generally not implicated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant a rear seat passenger of a car for possession of marijuana based on the discovery of two marijuana seeds in the front of the vehicle (B) holding that car passenger had legitimate expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled on the back seat of car (C) holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by three individuals was in constructive possession of marijuana found in white bag directly under the defendants seat (D) holding in a review of probation revocation that a male driver did not have dominion and control over marijuana in a multicolored makeup pouch concealed in the back seat of the car near where the female passenger in question was sitting (E) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke
Output: (D)
appraisal clause under the circumstances here presented when the insurer admits liability for the loss and the remaining issues deal with the extent of loss that falls within the admitted coverage. Florida courts have determined that an appraisal clause is available to resolve disputes over the amount of loss when the insurer admits that the loss is covered. See Kendall Lakes Townhomes Developers, Inc. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 916 So.2d 12, 15 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (noting that, under Florida Supreme Court precedent, “when the insurer admits that there is a covered loss, but there is a disagreement on the amount of loss, it is for the appraisers to arrive at the amount to be paid”). See also Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 828 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Johnson court further stated: “ “Very 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered (B) holding that the vpl requires an insurer to pay the full value of the policy only when a covered peril causes a total loss (C) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (D) holding that causation is a coverage question for the court when an insurer wholly denies that there is a covered loss and an amountofloss question for the appraisal panel when an insurer admits that there is a covered loss the amount of which is disputed (E) holding that the degree of the loss of use of a body part is a question of fact whether the loss is for all practical intents and purposes is a question of law
Output: (D)
the argument, the District Court indicated that in reliance on Judge Lo’s previous ruling, which charged time to the State, it was determining that HRPP Rule 48 has been violated. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, but did not state a reason for its dismissal without prejudice. The District Court entered its judgment dismissing the charge without prejudice on April 30, 2012. III. On February 14, 2012, this court filed an order dismissing Hern’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We ruled that the District Court’s judgment dismissing Hern’s charge without prejudice was not a final appealable judgement because there was no final adjudication on the merits and no sentence imposed against Hern, citing State v. Kilborn, 109 Hawai'i 435, 127 P.3d 95 (App.2005) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (B) holding sanction included in final judgment appealable (C) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (D) holding that even an order that establishes entitlement to a judgment is not final unless it  actually enters or renders a judgment  or includes specific language of finality necessary for a judgment  to be considered final for purposes of an appeal (E) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment
Output: (C)
procedure. Our role is not to search for evidence to defeat the district court’s judgment, but rather, to broadly construe the court’s findings and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment. Johnson, 637 N.W.2d at 177. However, what we do know from the evidence is that the procedure has been used “hundreds” of times by Chrysler in the past without knowledge that it adversely affected the venue rights of litigants. This evidence would support a finding that the chance of invading the protected interest and the number of people likely to be adversely affected is minimal. The final factor in considering reasonableness is the extent of the potential harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 293, at 58; Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1990) (<HOLDING>). In considering this factor, it is important 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations (B) holding that while the nonprevailing partys financial condition is not appropriate to consider in determining whether to award attorneys fees it is appropriate to consider when determining the amount of the attorneys fees (C) holding factor to consider in determining whether employer took reasonable steps to remedy discrimination in the workplace was the gravity of the harm (D) holding that previous sworn statements made by a plaintiff in his request for disability benefits is a material factor for the court to consider in determining whether he is entitled to ada relief (E) holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated
Output: (C)
718, 725 (8th Cir.2001) (employer’s statement that “[t]wenty years is too long. You should have moved five years ago[,]” was not direct evidence of age discrimination absent showing that length of tenure was being used as a proxy to accomplish age discrimination). Rather, for the Board’s 2010 discussion to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, Dunn would need to show that the Board used the term “retire” as a proxy for age to articulate a discriminatory attitude. Scott, 182 Fed.Appx. at 526; Erickson, 271 F.3d at 725. Dunn has made no such showing, but is asking for this Court to speculate and thereby to infer the existence of direct evidence based on the term “retire.” The Board’s discussion does not directly reflect a discriminatory attitude. Erickson, 271 F.3d at 725 (<HOLDING>). Even if the Board had expressed a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference (B) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent (C) holding that employers statement was not direct evidence where accepting statement as evidence of age animus depended on an inference (D) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence (E) holding that the statement at your age i dont believe you could pass the test is not direct evidence of age discrimination
Output: (C)
that Section 31.03 primarily addresses the person getting the goods, and Section 31.16 targets the schemer. Additionally, the State raises a waiver contention, arguing that the pari materia argument was never made before the referee or the district court below. With this contention we must agree. To preserve error, a party must make a timely and specific objection. TEX.R.APP.P. 33.1(a); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The complaining party must also obtain an adverse ruling on the objection. Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Specifically with reference to the pari materia issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals has focused on the adequacy and timing of the objection made at trial. Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2008)(<HOLDING>). The same is true for a number of court of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely (B) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (C) holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (D) holding that a party must have made a directed verdict motion at trial on the specific issue which is the basis of the jnov (E) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage
Output: (A)
courts, noted that stock options are a form of deferred compensation that has been earned by the employee. 564 Pa. 586, 769 A.2d 1165, 1168 (2001). In Fisher, the husband received several stock options from his employer during the marriage. Id. at 1167. These options would terminate even upon the husband’s death or disablement. Id. The court in Fisher reasoned that un-vested stock options are similar to pension benefits, in that both are awarded to the employee to induce that employee to remain in his or her present employment; otherwise, an employee’s compensation would arguably be higher. Id. The court, also relying upon the majority of other states, concluded that unvested stock options that were earned prior to the divorce must be considered marital a Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husbands unvested stock options as marital property (C) holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect (D) holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust
Output: (B)
felt compelled, at the very least, to guess why the prosecutor behaved as he did. But the Batson framework was designed to avoid such “needless and imperfect speculation,” by asking prosecutors to perform the “simple” task of placing race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes on the record. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172, 125 S.Ct. 2410. As a result, this Court must conclude that the Appellate Division applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner. The Court appreciates the gravity of this holding, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that AEDPA creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388. Even in the Batson context, however, AEDPA deference has its limits. See, e.g., Jones, 555 F.3d at 101 (<HOLDING>). Enforcing those limits is the only way to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york courts unreasonably applied batson (B) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (C) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (D) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (E) holding that new york law applies to this matter
Output: (A)
contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int’l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an “occurrence,” and are intended “to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority — that there is no ‘occurrence’ if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract — has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.”) (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident
Output: (E)
to those aggrieved employees if we did not discuss it. We have held that an EEOC civil suit may allege any discrimination “stated in the charge itself or discovered in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge, provided such additional discrimination was included in the EEOC ‘reasonable cause’ determination and was followed by compliance with the conciliation procedures I of the Act.” EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir.1976). Similarly, in EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994), we held that the EEOC could assert an employee’s discriminatory layoff claim as it was “like and reasonably related to” her charge which alleged discriminatory failure to recall and rehire. See also Vasquez v. Cty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We “consider [a] plaintiffs civil claims to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual employee may assert unexhausted retaliation claim if the later claim is reasonably related to the allegations in the employees timely filed charge (B) holding sexual harassment claim was not like or related to retaliation allegations and therefore was outside the scope of the administrative charge (C) recognizing that a claim is administratively exhausted if it is specifically stated in grows out of or is reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in an administrative charge or complaint (D) holding that regarded as claim is reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability alleged in eeoc charge (E) holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim
Output: (A)
Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 45 P.3d 1198, 1206 n. 22 (Alaska 2002) ("Mental illness, absent related conduct, cannot be a basis for termination of parental rights."). 21 . A finding that a child is in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(11) requires a showing that "the parent, guardian, or custodian has a mental illness, serious emotional disturbance, or mental deficiency of a nature and duration that places the child at substantial risk of physical harm or mental injury." 22 . 165 P.3d 605, 618-19 (Alaska 2007). 23 . Id. at 619. 24 . Compare CINA Rule 15(c) (requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence in an adjudication) with CINA Rule 18(c) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence in a termination proceeding). 25 . See Rick P. v. State, OCS, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005) (<HOLDING>); D.M. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and convincing standard must apply in terminating the parentchild relationship after the children have been adjudicated dependent or neglected (B) recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights (C) holding that termination of benefits under the aid to families with dependent children program must be preceded by a hearing (D) holding that where parents have previously stipulated that the children should be adjudicated as being in need of aid ocs still has the burden of proving in the subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid (E) holding that a superior court properly considered the childrens need for permanency a crucial need for young children in evaluating the best interests of the child in a termination proceeding
Output: (D)
S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975).” Peters v. Narick, 165 W.Va. 622, 628 n. 13, 270 S.E.2d 760, 768 n. 13 (1980). This Court has determined repeatedly that the West Virginia Constitution may be more protective of individual rights than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Bonham, 173 W.Va. 416, 317 S.E.2d 5 Daley, 174 W.Va. 299, 324 S.E.2d 713 (1984) (state constitution compels striking limitation on soliciting after sunset even if federal constitution does not); Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospital, 173 W.Va. 604, 611, 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (1984) (Article III, § 1 "more stringent in its limitation on waiver [of fundamental rights] than is the federal constitution”); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners, 164 W.Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 707, 255 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (B) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (C) recognizing exception under state constitution (D) holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately (E) holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution
Output: (B)
this Opinion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s Claim of exemption in her Toledo, Ohio house, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), be, and is hereby, SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the Debtor’s claim of exemption in past due rents, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), be, and is hereby, DISMISSED without prejudice. 1 . As a resident of Michigan, the Debtor along with her bankruptcy petition also filed a contemporaneous motion for a change of venue to the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, which this Court granted. 2 . Pursuant to § 522(b), a debtor's right to claim an exemption in bankruptcy is determined by the state in which the debtor is domiciled. See In re Vaughan, 188 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr.E.D.K.y.1995) (<HOLDING>). Some states like Michigan permit their 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that the terms residence and domicile are not the same thing but that a debtor may only claim an exemption in property where he is domiciled (C) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (D) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (E) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other
Output: (B)
account of the legislative history, the BAP rightly concluded that on the facts of this case a proof of claim need not necessarily be filed to trigger the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in section 106(a). This result effectuates Congress’s desire to prohibit the government from participating in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate without relinquishing part of its sovereign immunity. See supra, H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 317, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6274, (“The governmental unit cannot receive distribution from the estate without subjecting itself to any liability it has to the estate within the confines of a compulsory counterclaim rule. Any other result would be one-sided.”); see also In re OPM Leasing Servs., 21 B.R. 993, 1001-02 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Davis, 20 B.R. 519, 520-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtors adversary proceeding against the university of virginia to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a suit for eleventh amendment purposes (B) holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added (C) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding (D) holding that a claim that sovereign immunity has been waived is itself waived if not argued on appeal (E) holding that west virginia waived sovereign immunity by initiating adversary proceeding even though it had not filed a proof of claim
Output: (E)
Examiner” was included on the form that was approved by the New York State Insurance Department. Inasmuch as the differences between the form of medical questionnaire that was submitted to and approved by the New York State Insurance Department and the form that defendant signed are non-substantive, this Court finds that plaintiffs technical failure to submit for approval to the New York State Insurance Department the medical questionnaire form, entitled “Declarations to Paramedical Examiner” neither operates to void the insurance application form and policy nor relieves defendant of her duty to provide truthful information on her disability income insurance application. See, e.g., McDaniels v. American Bankers Insur. Co., 643 N.Y.S.2d 846, 846-47, 227 A.D.2d 951, 952 (4th Dep’t 1996) (<HOLDING>); National Union Fire Insur. Co. v. Ambassador 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers technical noncompliance with insurance laws requirement to place question on policy application in tenpoint type did not preclude it from disclaiming coverage based upon insureds alleged misrepresentations nor relieve insured of duty to provide truthful data on her application (B) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend (C) recognizing an insurers right to rescind an insurance contract where the insured has made fraudulent or material misrepresentation in insurance application (D) holding insureds general assertion that it expected a liability policy to cover such negligent acts as insured was alleged to have committed would not support application of reasonable expectations doctrine (E) holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed
Output: (A)
the cause in fact and legal cause of the damage.” Glover, 968 So.2d at 1277 (¶ 31) (citing Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 180, at 443 (2000)) (emphasis added). And a defendant’s negligence is the legal cause of the damage only when the “damage is the type, or within the classification, of damage the negligent actor should reasonably expect (or foresee) to result from the negligent act.” Id. at 1277 (¶ 33). ¶ 19. The circuit court held Faul offered no proof to show Perlman knew or should have known of Adkins’s propensities to commit the sexual assaults or that Perlman had any knowledge that the crimes were being committed. The circuit court applied the foreseeability test for premises owners from Simpson, which looks for actual or constructive knowledge. Simpson, 880 So.2d at 1051 (¶ 14) (<HOLDING>). We note California’s foreseeability test for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual knowledge of a coconspirator possessing a firearm qualifies as foreseeability (B) holding that the plaintiff must prove that management level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually  hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action (C) holding that the innocent owner defense hinges upon the claimants actual not constructive knowledge (D) recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge (E) holding plaintiff can prove foreseeability by showing the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the assailants violent nature
Output: (E)
then no bills until March 2004, within the ninety days prior to the April 13, 2004 letter. In March, doctors’ notes indicate that Bur-ress sought to find work that could accommodate him, but that his employer would not let him go back to work while he was using a cane. A doctor’s note from April 8, 2004, states that Burress was “obviously a little bit discouraged” because he learned the day before from another physician that his brucellosis was “a life-threatening situation and he was going to require a major surgical procedure.” Also, the April letter explained that while Burress had recently been diagnosed with brucellosis, he had “only more recently” been informed of the connection to his work at IBP. See Holmquist v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516, 523 (Iowa Ct.App.1977) (<HOLDING>). Because we have no factual findings by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding letter that came into evidence without objection may be used to establish any material fact (B) holding that a statute providing for confidentiality of medical records may not be used to shield relevant and material evidence from legal process (C) holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination (D) holding that ijnadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence (E) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact
Output: (A)
Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.1994))). 17 . See Executone, 26 F.3d at 1320 ("We must sustain an arbitration award even if we disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision 'draws its essence' from the contract.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18 . See also Parsons & Whittemore, 744 F.2d at 1483-84 (recounting that the arbitration panel awarded postjudgment interest at state statutory rate). 19 . We construe the parties’ intentions "generously” to determine whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular issue. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). 20 . Cf. Newmont, 615 F.3d at 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>). 21 . Riebesell, 586 F.3d at 794; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate (B) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator (C) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular issue any doubt about who should decide the consolidation issue was resolved in favor of the arbitrator (D) holding that companys contention that union repudiated the agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute was a matter for the arbitrator and not the court to decide (E) holding that agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of contract authorized arbitrator to decide postjudgment interest issues
Output: (E)
is the shortest limitations period applicable to the case. 32 . The Brokers did not assert this ground in their motion for partial summary judgment. Although the Brokers did raise this argument in their reply, the trial court stated that it did not consider the limitations arguments set forth in the reply brief, and the Brokers do not assert that the trial court erred in refusing to consider these arguments. 33 .In support of this contention, the Insureds cite Don Chapman Motor Sales, Inc. v. National Savings Insurance Co., 626 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Tex.App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 34 . See Guthrie v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 682 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 35 . See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). 36 . See No. 01-03-00637-CV, 2004 WL 2823147, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (B) holding that an attorney for a debtor owes a general fiduciary duty to preserve the bankruptcy estate (C) holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal (D) holding that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to persons though not strictly clients who he knows or should know rely on him in his professional capacity (E) holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes
Output: (C)
7261. The Court reviews the Secretary’s interpretation of law de novo. See Hatch, supra. After reviewing the Secretary’s analysis of the rating schedule with regard to tinnitus, the Court concludes that he failed to take account of a basic canon of construction, specifically, to look to the plain text of the regulation. “The basic principles that apply to construing statutes apply equally to construing regulations. ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language.’ ” Otero-Castro, supra (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Secretary’s interpre tation cannot stand because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the regulation. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet.App 202, 207 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (citing Combee v. Principi, 4 Vet.App 78, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute (B) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (C) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (D) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (E) holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference
Output: (E)
personal involvement in the case.” 798 F.3d at 381. Additionally, the court found that “few of the challenged statements could be characterized as (1) arguing the government’s case or (2) offering interpretations of plain English language.” Id. For these reasons,' the testimony was admissible. Id.; see also United States v. Williamson, 656 Fed.Appx. 175, 187 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Although [the agent] testified that he had listened to ‘over thousands of phone calls’ and often .used the pronoun ‘we’ when discussing the investigation, he made clear his active role in the surveillance.... He had the firsthand knowledge necessary to give lay opinion testimony.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1119, 197 L.Ed.2d 185 (2017); United States v. Smith, 609 Fed.Appx. 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). More recently, this court held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted (B) holding that when a law enforcement officer testifies using technical terms but based on his personal knowledge of a relevant investigation the officer testifies as a lay witness (C) holding that agent who interpreted the conversations based on personal knowledge as opposed to his general involvement in the investigation gave permissible lay witness testimony (D) holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge (E) holding that lay testimony is competent if it is limited to matters that the witness has actually observed and is within the realm of the witnesss personal knowledge
Output: (C)
may be convicted even if the principal is not charged, is acquitted, or is not yet prosecuted. See Massey, 267 S.C. at 444, 229 S.E.2d at 338 (noting “the conviction of the principal is no longer a condition precedent to the conviction of an accessory”). An exception to these modern notions of criminal liability applies to an accessory after the fact. While an accessory before the fact may be treated like a principal upon proper proof, an accessory after the fact is not generally treated like a principal of the crime. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-55 (2003) (outlining lower classifications of punishment for persons convicted of the offense of accessory after the fact to a felony as compared to punishment for the principal felon); State v. Good, 315 S.C. 135, 139, 432 S.E.2d 463, 466 (1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fuller, 346 S.C. 477, 481, 552 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no abuse of discretion for denying the motion to change venue because although there had been some publicity surrounding the murder an independent review of the record demonstrates that there was no difficulty in seating the jury (B) holding that there is no error in instructing the jury on alternative theories if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed firstdegree murder (C) holding that where there is no essential conflict as to the facts and the evidence the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the theory of strict liability to the jury (D) holding that there could be no risk of spillover evidence where there was significant proof that both defendants participated in all the transactions (E) holding there was no error in refusing to charge accessory after the fact because there is no exclusionary situation which eliminates one defendant or the other from having participated in the murder as a principal
Output: (E)
State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 146-47 (Me.1985); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss.1979); State v. Shankle, 58 Or.App. 134, 137-38, 647 P.2d 959, 961-62 (1982). Furthermore, the arrest rates for the Taylor roadblock indicate that it was sufficiently productive of the licensing and registration interest. Sergeant Canty testified that forty-two cars were stopped at the Taylor roadblock over the ninety minute period, and two arrests were made for unauthorized use of an automobile (namely, appellant Taylor and his passenger), meaning that arrests occurred involving approximately 2.4 percent of the stopped vehicles. This would appear to satisfy the requirement that there be something more than “a complete absence of data” indicating effectiveness. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2487 (<HOLDING>); Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sobriety checkpoints at which approximately 15 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested were sufficiently productive (B) holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession (C) holding that the seizure of motorists who were stopped at a sobriety checkpoint at which all vehicles were stopped was reasonable without individualized suspicion in light of the magnitude of the drunkdriving problem and the determination of law enforcement officials that such checkpoints were necessary to apprehend such individuals before tragedy strikes (D) holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them (E) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers
Output: (A)
Id. Professor Larson notes that in addition to an employee’s failure to recognize the nature of his condition, a failure to recognize the seriousness of a condition is a second reason that may justify a delay in giving timely notice. Larson states that the “claimant must have had reason to be aware of the seriousness of the trouble. This feature is a salutary requirement, since any other rule would force employees to rush in with claims for every minor ache, pain, or symptom.” 7 Larson & Larson, supra, § 126.05[5] see also Rebiski v. Pioneer Tel. Co., 262 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn.1978) (noting evidence supported finding that employee reasonably believed that fall from telephone pole would not result in disability); Barcel v. Barrel Finish, 304 Minn. 536, 537-38, 232 N.W.2d 13, 15 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The third reason cited by Professor Larson 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employees injury while on college grounds to report for first day of work before he reached either the administration building where he was to complete payroll forms or the athletic field house where he was to do the work was an injury suffered in the course of the employment (B) holding that where symptoms of numbness in employees right hand and forearm were at first intermittent and did not interfere with his work the trivial injury rule applied to toll the statutory period for notice of injury to employer (C) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (D) holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor (E) holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury
Output: (B)
representative. The complaint asserted causes of action for (1) an accounting of trust funds, (2) conversion by Petitioner and Martin Woolin of trust funds, and (3) a constructive trust of assets, including the subject property, acquired by Petitioner and Martin Woolin with misappropriated trust funds. On August 6, 2002, Respondents also filed and recorded a notice of lis pendens relating to the subject property. Petitioner filed an emergency motion to remove the lis pendens from the subject property. Prior to a hearing on the motion, Respondents filed the affidavit of Tony Argiz, a forensic accountant, in an effort to demonstrate the fair nexus necessary to maintain the lis pendens against the subject property. See, e.g., Conseco Servs., LLC. v. Cuneo, 904 So.2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)(<HOLDING>). On September 19, 2002, a hearing was held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proponent of a lis pendens must show a fair nexus between the alleged fraudulent transfer and the real property encumbered by the lis pendens (B) holding that suit arose from alleged fraudulent transfer of real property located in texas even though the allegedly fraudulent assignment occurred in california (C) holding that a nexus between the corporate officers or directors official activity and the matter for which indemnification is sought must be shown though no more than a nexus whether a nexus exists is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court considering all the circumstances surrounding the proposed indemnification (D) holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary (E) holding that appellants failed to state a claim regarding real property therefore the lis pendens was improperly granted and could be canceled notwithstanding appeal
Output: (A)
that he had been discriminated against when he was not selected for and promoted to a specialist position. Id. at 46. The plaintiff first attempted to lay venue in the District of Columbia as the location where the unlawful employment practice was alleged to have been committed. To support this argument he argued that “discriminatory activities, retaliation, and reprisal” had occurred at the District of Columbia location where he worked. Id. at 46 n. 3. However, the court determined that the plaintiff could not rely on this first statutory basis for venue. Because the plaintiff was complaining about his failure to be promoted, the court determined that under the first statutory basis for venue, Virginia was where “[t]he selections for the positions that plaintiff sought were made.” Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, McLaughlin made the selection decisions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (B) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia (D) holding however that venue was proper under the third statutory basis because it was likely that had plaintiff received one of the positions he sought he would have been assigned to work in the district of columbia at some point (E) holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia
Output: (D)
in their pension payments would only be temporary, rather than receiving any express representations regarding that fact. See Grossman Decl. Ex. D at 141-42 (Avitabile); id. Ex. E at 119 (Keelin). Further, as previously noted, it is undisputed that all five plaintiffs received clear and unambiguous written information that accurately described the Level Income Option and indicated that the reduced payments would continue “until death.” These (and other) accurate written communications rendered any inconsistent oral representations (assuming, arguendo, that there were any) entirely immaterial, because plaintiffs had full notice of their benefit rights and could not reasonably have been misled by anything to the contrary. Adams v. Tetley USA, Inc., 363 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Ballone, 109 F.3d at 126; Adams, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud a plaintiff must have justifiably relied to his detriment on the defendants material misrepresentations (B) holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage (C) holding that class actions may be reasonably litigated through use of legitimate inferences based on the nature of the alleged misrepresentations at issue (D) holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation (E) holding that plan beneficiaries could not have reasonably relied on any alleged oral misrepresentations in light of a signed severance agreement containing information to the contrary
Output: (E)
officers and the public in danger.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 14). The Court finds such speech to be of significant concern to the general public, as it is analogous to “speech on crime rates, police staffing, equipment shortages and related budgetary matters” that “quite plainly involve matters of public concern.” Morris, 196 F.3d at 111; see White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1060 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that “a state police corps’ performance of its duties is a matter of public concern”). Indeed, there is little doubt that the public has great interest in acquiring information about the proper functioning of its police force — particularly where the information purports to directly relate to their own safety. See Cahill v. O’Donnell, 7 F.Supp.2d 341, 349 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). That certain of Plaintiffs statements concern 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern (B) holding that investigations into purported police misconduct where civilians were or could have been harmed is a matter of public concern (C) holding that an officers report of misconduct by fellow officer is a matter of public concern (D) holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern (E) holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern
Output: (B)