niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
cases holding particular sanctions to constitute non-punitive regulatory measures have served far clearer and more substantial societal interests than the attenuated justifications provided for felon disenfranchisement. For example, in Hendricks, the state civil commitment law held to be non-punitive was intended to protect the public from dangerous mentally ill persons “likely to engage in ‘predatory acts of sexual violence.’ ” 521 U.S. at 350, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Similarly, Alaska’s sexual offender registration requirement, held to be non-punitive in Smith, had the express purpose of “protecting the public from sex offenders” who “pose a high risk of reoffending.” 538 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 1140; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the provision being 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prison litigation reform act requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis  (B) holding that preventative detention under bail reform act justified by the need to prevent danger to the community was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive (C) holding that a prisoners claim was saved by his request for nominal and punitive damages even though he could not recover compensatory damages under the prison litigation reform act (D) holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act (E) holding that a defendants propensity to commit crime generally even if the resulting harm would be not solely physical may constitute sufficient risk of danger to come within contemplation of the bail reform act
Output: (B)
amendment is not futile. Moreover, “the statute of limitations under the New York State Labor Law is six years, posing no hurdle to amendment here.” Hosking v. New World Mortg., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 441, 446 (E.D.N.Y.2009). However, with respect to plaintiff Vanderheydt, the Court finds that it lacks sufficient information to determine whether the proposed amendment would be futile because the Proposed Second Amended Complaint fails to provide the time period in which Vanderheydt contends he was denied minimum wage and overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. Generally, the absence of such information from a complaint is grounds for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See DeSilva v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770 F.Supp.2d 497, 509 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, “the statute of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that flsa which provides an exemption from the acts wage and overtime provisions for fishermen preempts claims under alaskas minimumwage and overtime statute (B) holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours (C) holding that to state a claim for wage violations under the flsa plaintiffs must provide at least some approximation of the overtime hours that defendants required them to work and a time frame for when those hours were worked (D) holding that the flsa does not prohibit changes in wage rates it prohibits the payment of overtime at less than one and onehalf times the regular wage rate (E) holding illinois wage law only applied where at least some work was performed within the state
Output: (C)
it would be unjust for the estate to retain any benefit it might receive, we find no merit to the Crittells’ unjust enrichment claim. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees. 1 . Crittell v. Bingo, 36 P.3d 634, 636-37 (Alaska 2001). 2 . Id. at 637-38. 3 . Id. at 647-52 (appendix containing superior court’s findings). 4 . Id. at 641-42. 5 . Id. at 642. 6 . Id. 7 . Id. at 636, 643. 8 . Id. at 643. 9 . The Crittells make parallel arguments regarding the trial court's award of Rule 79 costs. Because the Crittells neither appealed the cost award in Crittell I nor adequately raised the issue on remand, the Crittells have waived any claim as to costs. See State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Carlson, 65 P.3d 851, 873-74 (Alaska 2003) (<HOLDING>); Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal (B) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived (C) holding issue waived because it was not mentioned in brief but was only raised in notice of appeal (D) holding that the caldwell claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal but was not (E) holding that state had waived argument because it could have been raised in an earlier appeal but was not and because it fell outside the scope of remand
Output: (E)
that there “might” be narcotics. It was entirely conjectural and conclusory. The government presented no evidence regarding the basis for the FBI’s third degree of speculation. For all we know, the FBI’s information was based on an anonymous tip providing the same speculative and unsupported assessment of the house. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, such a tip is insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Florida v. J.L., — U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). Courts will uphold an investigatory stop based on a tip or other secondary information only when the information possesses sufficient indicia of reliability that are independently corroborated by the police. See Florida v. J.L., — U.S. at ---, 120 S.Ct. at 1378-79 (<HOLDING>); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible (B) holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk (C) holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk (D) holding that an anonymous tip supported a terry stop where the informant provided several details but refused to give his name (E) holding stop invalid where anonymous tip provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informants knowledge and credibility
Output: (E)
a section 2 — 622 report and affidavit are filed — any examination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an injured party’s assertion that he did not know his injury was wrongfully caused. I respectfully submit that a section 2 — 622 investigation should not serve as a substitute for making a factual determination whether an injured party reasonably should have known his injury was wrongfully caused. There is nothing magical about a section 2 — 622 investigation. Its validity, accuracy, and comprehensiveness may be affected by numerous factors completely beyond the control of the injured party. Among these factors are (1) the misconduct by defendants delaying the discovery of the wrongful cause of injury or death (see Neade v. Engel, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1005-06, 1009 (1996) (<HOLDING>)); (2) the negligent maintenance or preparation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate (B) holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed (C) holding that the oneyear limit under the act was tolled until the plaintiff learned despite the defendants contrary representations that the defendants storm drain was the cause of damage (D) holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud (E) recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach
Output: (D)
this case was scheduled for a date approximately six months after the permanent injunction had expired. The procedural posture of this case is comparable to that of Madonna, in which the plaintiffs challenged their confinements while awaiting a hearing to determine whether they should be committed to mental institutions. 295 N.W.2d at 358. The plaintiffs filed petitions for habeas corpus during their pre-hearing confinements, which lasted only a matter of weeks, but the petitions were not adjudicated before their pre-hearing confinements ended. Id. at 358-59. Approximately two and one-half years later, the supreme court held that the case was not moot, reasoning that “some method of review must exist.” Id. at 361; see also Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 208 n. 2 (Minn.2001) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 188 n. 1, 210 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired (B) holding that district court may award money due under a statute even though time for disbursement had expired (C) holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement (D) holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations (E) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot
Output: (A)
First, the terms “indecent act” and “indecent purpose” require no further definition because they are terms that are well within the knowledge of the average person. Additionally, to the extent that Wheeler is reasserting his contention that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the full statutory definition of enticing a child for indecent purposes rather than narrowing the definition to match the allegations in the indictment, as we held in Division 3, supra, the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the State was required to prove the offense as charged in the indictment cured any potential problems with the enticing-a-child-for-indecent-purposes charge and did not constitute plain error. Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Miller, J., con (642 SE2d 361) (2007) (<HOLDING>). 8 Daniel, 296 Ga. App. at 522 (6). 9 Smith v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jurors who expressed personal biases but stated they could be fair did not require dismissal (B) holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause (C) holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial (D) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented (E) holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias
Output: (A)
several claims of error are without merit or have been waived, there is no cumulative error. ¶ 25 WE CONCUR: MICHAEL J. WILKINS, Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge. 1 . This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion issued on December 10, 1998, in Case No. 971200-CA. 2 . "Precursor" can be one of several ingredients necessary for the production of methamphetamine. 3 . See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) ("We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement, and. therefore, does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to address the issue.”), cert. denied, Smith v. United States, 510 U.S. 1061, 114 S.Ct. 733, 126 L.Ed.2d 696 (1994); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 104, 88 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  (B) holding that the first amendment protects communicative aspects of video games (C) holding miranda violation does not vitiate voluntary consent (D) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds testimonial silence (E) holding miranda violation does not invalidate consent to search as fifth amendment only protects testimonial and communicative evidence
Output: (E)
in the statute that would limit or guide a prosecution for indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar, or insulting language. Allowing a prosecution where one utters “insulting” language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added) (citations, internal quotations, and omissions removed). The court went on to state that, “[the statute], as currently drafted, impinges on First Amendment freedoms.... [It is] unquestionable that [the statute], as drafted, reaches constitutionally protected speech, and it operates to inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 259. Thus, it is clear that probable cause for Leonard’s arrest is not supported by § 750.337. See Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Michigan’s courts have not commented so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected (B) holding that protected speech cannot serve as the basis for a violation of city ordinances at issue (C) recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected (D) holding that a city could not use past conduct to enjoin future protected speech (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected
Output: (B)
his courtroom constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has stated that “there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses protect.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). However, although Defendant is correct that “judges are not First Amendment orphans,” (Br. of Appellant at 43), Defendant’s hanging of the poster in his courtroom is not the private judicial speech protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech clause. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Defendant presented the identical argument to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it violated the first amendment to prohibit announcement of views on disputed legal and political issues by candidates for judicial election (B) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (C) holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting opprobious language (D) holding political discharges were unconstitutional (E) holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting judges running for election from expressing a view on political issues during campaigns
Output: (E)
made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need b[e] advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.’ ” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala.App. 552, 171 So.2d 462, 469 (1965)). See also Dingier v. State, 408 So.2d 530, 531 (Ala.1981) (same). In the case at hand, Clark entered into a “good behavior” stipulation that the State could prove a prima facie case of guilt. When Clark failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he was adjudicated guilty based on his stipulation. During a hearing on Clark’s motion for a new trial, the prosecutor described a “goo (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Clark was adjudicated guilty based 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (B) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea (C) holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted unaffected by stipulation made by counsel (D) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (E) holding that a defendants strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendants stipulation did not establish guilt
Output: (E)
July 2007, the trial court entered separate orders terminating respondent’s parental rights to B.L.H. and Z.L.H. The only ground found by the trial court for terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor children was under N.C.G.S. § 111 ly to fill procedural gaps where Chapter 7B requires, but does not identify, a specific procedure to be used in termination cases. In re S.D.W. & H.E.W., 187 N.C. App. at 421, 653 S.E.2d at 432; see also In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) (applying the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the contents of a motion .filed to terminate the respondent’s parental rights were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court); In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Article 11 of Chapter 7B expressly states 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred in granting petition for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with case plan when case plan was not filed and approved by the court until seven months after petition for termination was filed (B) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (C) holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim (D) holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights (E) holding the requirements for verification established in chapter 1a rule 11b should determine whether a petition for the termination of a respondents parental rights has been properly verified
Output: (E)
Section 11; Iowa Code § 598.22 (1996 & 1998 Supp.); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 5-6 (1998); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1542; N.J. Child Support Guidelines, Appx. IX-A; Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1996 & 1997 Supp.); Wash. Rev.Code § 26.18.190(2) (1994); W. Va.Code § 48A-1B-9 (1996 & 1997 Supp.). See also State ex rel. Pfister v. Larson, 569 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa Ct.App.1997) (discussing availability of a statutory credit for social security disability dependency benefits received by a child); Herd v. Herd, 307 N.J.Super. 501, 704 A.2d 1340 (App.Div.1998) (reading Appendices IX-A and 1X-B so as to require a credit to the obligor parent for social security disability dependency bene fits received by child); Pasternak v. Pasternak, 310 N.J.Super. 483, 708 A.2d 1235 (Ch.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Briscoe, 134 Wash.2d 344, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing doctrine (B) holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law (C) recognizing statutory credit (D) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence (E) recognizing exception
Output: (C)
Court of Utah, in applying the good-faith exception to a Belton search, recently cautioned: "If the case law had been ambiguous prior to the time the officers conducted a search later definitively declared unconstitutional, the good-faith exception would not apply and the evidence would be excluded.” Utah v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 664 (Utah 2010). 80 . See Belton, supra note 1, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. 81 . Compare Thornton, supra note 59, 541 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (declining to address argument that Belton rule applies only to “recent occupants” of vehicle, while noting that petitioner had conceded "he was in ‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially,’ to his vehicle” when approached by police officer) with Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388-89 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). 82 . See Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest (B) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (C) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (D) holding belton did not extend to search of vehicle incident to arrest of individual who has parked locked and walked fifteen to twenty feet away from an automobile before being stopped and arrested (E) holding that belton permits the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile even when the defendant is arrested outside as long as the officer made initial contact while the defendant was inside the automobile
Output: (D)
medicine] undeniably eliminates whatever may have remained of a plan sponsor’s option to minimize scrutiny of benefit denials, this effect of eliminating an insurer’s autonomy to guarantee terms congenial to its own interests is the stuff of garden variety insurance regulation through the imposition of standard policy terms.... It is therefore hard to imagine a reservation of state power to regulate insurance that would not be meant to cover restrictions of the insurer’s advantage in this kind of way.... To the extent that benefit litigation in some federal courts may have to account for the effects of [the statute], it would be an exaggeration to hold that the objectives of [ERISA’s Savings Clause] are undermined. 536 U.S. at 387, e Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Further, insurance regulation is not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege under federal rules (B) holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure (C) holding that certain rules meet the first prong of the kentucky association test because those rules regulate insurers with respect to their insurance practices (D) holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference (E) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery
Output: (C)
so restricted. Rather, ... the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect materials prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself. Id. at 238-39, 95 S.Ct. 2170. Accordingly, federal courts have consistently ruled that the work product doctrine is not inapplicable merely because the material was prepared by or for a party’s insurer or agents of the insurer. See Railroad Salvage of Conn. Inc. v. Japan Freight Consolidators (U.S.A.), Inc., 97 F.R.D. 37, 41 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 779 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1985); Home Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that correspondence between defendant and its liability carriers was protected (B) holding that the prohibition of inmatetoinmate correspondence was not an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners first amendment rights (C) recognizing correspondence appeared to establish a settlement relationship between the parties given the letters presented an attempt to curb further litigation (D) recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence (E) holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor
Output: (A)
an inmate must “complfy] with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). The statute, however, requires an inmate to exhaust only “such administrative remedies as are available” before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Malik v. District of Columbia, 574 F.3d 781, 785 (D.C.Cir.2009). In other words, the PLRA does not bar an inmate from suing before he exhausts an administrative remedy if that remedy is not actually “available” to him. An administrative remedy is actually “available” to an inmate only if it is “present or ready for immediate use,” “accessible,” or “obtainable.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 84 (11th ed.2004); see also Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); accord Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judicial review under the apa is precluded when a remedy is available under a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute citations omitted (B) holding that it is the inefficacy of the remedy not the personal inability to use it that is determinative under  2255 (C) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (D) holding a remedy is available under the plra when it is capable of use at hand  quoting websters ii new riverside univ dictionary 141 1994 (E) holding that a thwarted remedy is not available
Output: (D)
date of the amendment. Jordan v. Dennison, 278 N.J.Super. 306, 311, 650 A.2d 1041 (App.Div.1995). Although the Legislature substantially modified the no-fault laws in 1988, and then again effective March 12, 1990, the provisions of the Fund Law, including N.J.S.A 39:6-70(n), were not changed. The Fund Law has remained constant since enactment and still requires that the threshold of N.J.S A 39:6A-8a be met if the injured party seeks recovery from the fund. Thus, after January 1, 1989, a person would not be entitled to recover noneconomic damages resulting from injury caused by an identified uninsured motorist from the Fund unless her injuries met the “verbal threshold” delineated in one of nine categories of N.J.S A 39:6A-8a. Cf. Rivera, supra, 285 N.J.Super. at 180, 666 A.2d 619 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff contends that the failure to amend 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (B) holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort (C) holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim (D) holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort (E) holding that the tort threshold requirement njsa 39670n is not applicable if the injury to a qualified claimant is caused by a hit and run motorist
Output: (E)
upon which Gibel can “piggyback” her claim. Therefore, Gibel’s motion to intervene was properly denied. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 2 . The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 3 . There is no state or local fair employment practices agency in Arkansas. Therefore, Shem-pert had 180 days, as opposed to 300 days, after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred to file her charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). 4 . The EEOC has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Shempert and submits essentially the same argument on appeal. Therefore, our discussion addresses these arguments simultaneously- 5 . The regulation provides in relevant Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have held that a timely-filed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling (B) holding that an invalid charge can be perfected through equitable tolling (C) holding title vii subject to equitable tolling (D) holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling (E) recognizing that a vested equitable estate can be passed through inheritance
Output: (B)
has sixty days after the judgment to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Although the parties no longer contest the timeliness of this appeal, the timely filing of an appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 387 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, unless the sixty-day rule applies, we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See id. (noting that court “lack[s] jurisdiction over late appeals”). The United States, its officer, or agency is a “party” to a case not only where it is a named party to the appeal, see In re Lloyd, Carr, & Co., 617 F.2d 882, 884 n. 1 (1st Cir.1980), but also where it has actively participated in the proceedings, see id.; cf. In re Serrato, 117 F.3d 427, 429 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). This appeal encompasses challenges to two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that us trustee did not become party merely by his involuntary appearance to quash a summons (B) holding that defendant did not waive his special appearance by filing a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance (C) holding that defendant did not waive special appearance (D) holding that party waived special appearance (E) holding the notice of appearance was not a motion under rule 12b2 4 or 5 and therefore the filing of the notice constituted a voluntary appearance by the defendants in this action which was the equivalent of the service of the summons upon them
Output: (A)
is a liquidated sum for actual harm and/or an incentive for aggrieved parties to act as private attorneys general. Universal Underwriters, 401 F.3d at 881. Also, that Congress elected to make treble damages available — separate from fixed damages — strongly suggests that the fixed statutory damages serve additional goals other than deterrence and punishment. Universal Underwriters, 401 F.3d at 881. Moreover, interpreting the TCPA’s fixed statutory remedy as penal in nature is counter to the clear admonition of Missouri law to interpret insurance contracts liberally in favor of the insured, to furnish, rather than to exclude, coverage. Lou Fusz, 300 F.Supp.2d at 894. The TCPA is a remedial statute intended to address misdeeds suffered by individuals. See Terra Nova, 869 N.E.2d at 575 (<HOLDING>); see also Prime TV, 223 F.Supp.2d at 750 
 Holding statements: (A) holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages (B) holding that treble damages awarded under the civil theft statute are remedial not punitive (C) holding a court may not award punitive damages (D) holding that punitive damages are not fines (E) holding that plaintiff could recover both treble damages under state racketeering statute and punitive damages under fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims because the statute provided that actions brought under it are remedial and not punitive and that civil remedies provided under it are supplemental and not mutually exclusive
Output: (A)
hospitals. 13 . Even assuming for the moment that decedent was in state custody at the time of his death, the complaint’s failure to allege private violence — a failure about which we will have more to say subsequently — would render the special relationship exception inapposite. In that case, the questions simply would be those posed by the complaint's first claim for relief, namely, whether Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to decedent’s serious medi cal needs and whether that indifference caused a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-199 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 998 (suggesting deliberate indifference is necessary to establish a substantive due process violation in a custodial setting); Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 666 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) recognizing a state doctor may violate a detainees right to substantive due process by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner
Output: (C)
owed to each. Because of like evidentiary voids we do not know whether reliance by the purchasers is provable, as some purchasers may have known, as a result of their knowledge and experience, that the representations were false or misleading. Even more fundamentally, no purchaser or representative of a class was joined as a party to the proceeding, and for this reason alone restitution was not an available remedy. More precisely, the court was without the power to enter a judgment ordering an offer of restitution or, correspondingly, reconveyances. Compare, United states v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956); see also, Kugler, supra(by reason of a price unconscionability common to all transactions, all of the sales contracts were held invalid and unenforceable); Jayhill, supra (<HOLDING>). Although Nevada is a “notice pleading” state, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (B) holding that the request for restitution in a consumer protection action is only ancillary to the primary remedies sought for the benefit of the public (C) holding that even if indirect purchasers are barred from seeking damages relief they may still obtain injunctive relief (D) holding that as a form of ancillary relief to the attorney general suit a court may award restitution to all purchasers shown to have been defrauded (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court
Output: (D)
a habeas petition, and since his administrative remedies are now exhausted, this claim can proceed. B. Fox’s Notification Challenge is Properly Before The Court The second half of Fox’s claim relating to the notification requirement of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(2), is properly brought by him as a petition for a declaratory judgment. Notification claims do not relate to the fact or duration of confinement, therefore challenge to a notification requirement is not properly brought as a habeas petition. See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The notification scheme [under 18 U.S.C § 4042(b) governing violent offender notification] in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement.”); Henrikson v. Guzik, 249 F.3d 395, 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that because henrikson is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement subject matter jurisdiction is not present under 28 us  2241 (C) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (D) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608 (E) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc  2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes
Output: (B)
weight' given in the lookout. 3 . The government moved for admission of the report after Officer Garner confirmed that it bore the same identification number as the heat-sealed envelope in which she placed the two ziplocks given to her by Officer McClinton 4 . The chemist’s report is commonly referred to the “DEA-7,” but to be precise, it is only the Report of Drug Property Collected, Purchased or Seized that is the Drug Enforcement Administration Form 7, or DEA-7. 5 . jn the chemist's absence, Officer Garner misunderstood the report and testified that the net weight of the cocaine base was .15 grams. This answer was mistaken because .15 grams was the reported net weight of the white rocky substance in its entirety. 6 . See Giles v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 48, 53-54 (D.C.1988) (<HOLDING>); accord, Ellis v. United States, 834 A.2d 858, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances (B) holding that a chemists report is admissible under dccode  4890506 without need for a testimonial foundation if four requirements are met 1 the analysis of a controlled substance must be performed by a chemist charged with an official duty to perform such analysis 2 an official report of chain of custody and of analysis of the controlled substance must be attested to by that chemist 3 the chemists official report must be attested to  by the officer having legal custody of the report and 4 the official report must be accompanied by a certificate under seal that the officer has legal custody  (C) holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court (D) holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty (E) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error
Output: (B)
exercise of religion. Indeed, specifically concerning the Red Cross, we explicitly rejected the argument that the meaning of “instrumentality” for intergovernmental tax immunity purposes could be equated to the meaning of a government “instrumentality” in other contexts. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d at 88. We termed this a “serious logical and semantic error ----based on the fallacy that a word which has a meaning in one context must have the selfsame meaning when transplanted into an entirely different context.” Id. Government-created corporations are often held to be tax-immune government instrumentalities, but courts have also frequently found them not to be subject to constitutional treatment as government actors. Compare United States v. Michigan, 851 F.2d 803, 805 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) with Jesinger v. Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state immune from suit involving a federal question (B) holding that a railroad owned and operated by the federal government was immune from antitrust action under the governmental immunity doctrine which protects the federal government its agencies and instrumentalities from the reaches of antitrust law (C) holding that federal credit unions are governmental units within the meaning  523a8 (D) holding federal credit unions to be government instrumentalities immune from state taxation (E) holding state immune from suit brought in state court
Output: (D)
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84 (1940). Cf. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n. 2, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967). 103 . 380 U.S. at 208-209, 85 S.Ct. at 829, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) where the Supreme Court intimated that rebuttal testimony that the clerk selected names on the basis of “good moral character” and those “qualified to serve as jurors” would be unavailing when a prima facie case was based on a 31 percent disparity between Negro population and the jury box composition in Vance County. 104 . 380 U.S. at 227, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed. 759. 105 . For cases involving the less educated, see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prima facie case met by evidence that 836 of jury pools had high school diplomas while only 432 of population over 25 did and proof that 181 of pool had college degrees as compared with 5 of population (B) holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case (C) holding plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof can be met by combining proof submitted in its prima facie case with evidence that defendants proffered reasons for its acts were false (D) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that the mathematical disparity between 197 of africanamericans in the population and 47 of africanamericans on grand jury lists was adequate for a prima facie case under an equal protection analysis
Output: (A)
viability which is more workable.” See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (finding unconstitutional Florida’s procedures for determining sanity for purposes of execution, and setting forth guidelines for states to follow to ensure constitutionally adequate safeguards in future litigation); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (per curiam) (finding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, and suggesting that death sentences could be constitutionally imposed if states limit the class of murderers to which the death penalty may be applied); Brooks v. Hobbie, 631 So.2d 883, 889-90 (Ala.1993) (<HOLDING>); Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a redistricting case the legislature has the initial responsibility to act but in the event the legislature fails to act the responsibility shifts to the state judiciary (B) holding that the movant has the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion (C) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature (D) holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted (E) holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances
Output: (A)
choice of law applies to the tort claims, the one year limitations period is unenforceable under Oklahoma law pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 15 § 216. In response, Parametric claims Okla. Stat. tit. 35 § 216 does not apply to tort claims, citing McDonald v. Amtel, Inc., 633 P.2d 743 (Okla.1981). Parametric also asserts that the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code, which allows contractual limitations on commencement of a lawsuit, applies to the Licensing Agreement, and thus such provisions do not violate Oklahoma public policy, citing Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Univac Division, Sperry Corp., 824 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.1987) (implying that the Uniform Commercial Code applied to leases of computer equipment); Colonial Life Ins. v. Electronic Data Systems, 817 F.Supp. 235 (D.N.H.1993) (<HOLDING>). A. NMP’s Breach of Contract Claim The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that licensing agreement controlled the scope of the users rights in the software (B) holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement (C) holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties under the uniform commercial code where there was allocation of commercial risks in a socially or economically unreasonable manner (D) recognizing the purpose of a uniform statewide building code (E) holding that a memorandum referring to the allocation of stock ownership did not satisfy  8319 of the uniform commercial code
Output: (B)
Substantial compliance with the requirements for immigrant status as a conditional permanent resident, even if true, cannot excuse plaintiffs failure to maintain a full course of study pursuant to his student status. The intent for status as a conditional permanent resident and as a non-immigrant student are mutually exclusive; the former encompasses a desire to permanently remain in the United States while the latter does not. Moreover, the two sets of requirements are separate and independent. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 245 with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f). Compliance with the requirements for being a conditional permanent resident does not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements for being a non-immigrant student. See, e.g., Ghajar v. I.N.S., 652 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiff violated specific regulations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial compliance with the requirements for maintaining nonimmigrant student status under 8 cfr  2142f does not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements for obtaining an extension of stay under 8 cfr  2141c (B) recognizing that when the employer had failed to comply with the reporting requirements of 29 cfr  5162 an order requiring prospective compliance was proper but that additional sanctions for the past violation were not necessary (C) holding that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of sdcl 3212 and 3 (D) holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient (E) holding that substantial compliance with the requirements for exempting a lessors personal property from a lien is not enough
Output: (A)