niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
cross-motions for evaluations, the trial court entered the order requiring Cranney and Coronado to meet with the parental coordinator. II. Analysis A. Certiorari Review A certiorari petition must pass a three-prong test before an appellate court can grant relief from an erroneous interlocutory order. “A petitioner must establish (1) a departure from the essen- ■ tial requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Barker v. Barker, 909 So.2d 333, 336 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So.2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). The appellate court- must conduct a jurisdictional analysis under the last two prongs before determining the merits of the pet 6) (<HOLDING>). In Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So.2d 650, 652 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding facially unconstitutional provision in 1993 version of section 75201 which provided for visitation where child was living with both natural parents (B) holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child (C) holding section 61132b2c facially unconstitutional (D) holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest (E) holding that without personal jurisdiction over one parent a court could still decide custody of a child living in the state but could not determine support and visitation
Output: (A)
of California has stated that to meet Silicon Graphics, “plaintiffs must couple each separate allegation in the [complaint] with details identifying the sources upon which such beliefs are based.” In re Vantive, 110 F.Supp.2d at 1216 (citing Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 985.) Judge Orrick explained “[t]his requirement is the PSLRA’s single most important weapon against pleading fraud by hindsight because it forces plaintiffs to reveal whether they base their allegations on an inference of earlier knowledge drawn from later disclosures or from contemporaneous documents or other facts.” Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are not required to always name their sources, but rather may, if they provide adequate corroborating details, rely on unnamed sources. In re McKesson, 126 F.Supp.2d at 1271 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, regardless of whether it would 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lumpsum restitution order is valid where it does not specify the source of the restitution or direct liquidation of specific assets and the defendant may have other sources of payment (B) holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference (C) holding that although in some cases it may be proper to require a plaintiff to identify a source by name silicon graphics does not require naming as opposed to identification of sources it is possible to identify sources and provide other corroborating details without disclosing the names of the sources (D) holding that it may not (E) holding that the due process clause does not require courts to abandon their ageold practice of seeking information from outofcourt sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence
Output: (C)
theory, once the police ... [make] a show of authority designed to produce a stop, the Fourth Amendment is implicated. If, in response to unjustified police actions, the suspect thereafter abandons the property he or she is carrying, then the property abandoned, be it illegal drugs, stolen goods, or other evidence, normally cannot be used against the accused. Clancy, The Supreme Court’s Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a “Seizure” of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment? 27 AvlCRIm. L.Rev. 619, 648 (1990). It is undisputed that Johnson denied ownership of the gun when Silvers showed it to him. Tr. at 53, 71. He can thus be fairly said to have exhibited the requisite intent to abandon the gun. See United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding due process is not violated when failure to receive notice is the result of attorneys decision to abandon law practice (B) holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action (C) holding that a demal of ownership indicates intent to abandon (D) holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made (E) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent
Output: (C)
be heard is fundamental, and Rapoport has been denied this right. For the above reasons, I dissent. QUINCE, J., concurs. 6 . See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So.2d 1249, 1254 (Fla.1999) ("Accordingly, because Fredericks was made aware of the conduct alleged by the Bar to be unethical and had the opportunity to be heard as to this conduct, there was no violation of due process.”); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla.1998) ("Prior to being found guilty of the charges at issue here, Rubin was afforded appropriate notice and a full opportunity to be heard during the final hearing before the referee. This was sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (<HOLDING>); In re McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 191 So.2d 1, 5 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to boards recommendation demands of due process were satisfied (B) holding that attorney received due process where circuit court afforded attorney notice and opportunity to be heard before suspending him and later disbarring him (C) holding that due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond before imposition of rule 11 sanctions (D) holding that a mother in a child protection proceeding was afforded due process when she had notice of a hearing was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity to rebut evidence (E) holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause
Output: (A)
May, 886 at 282. To satisfy its burden, the prosecution must show that the police had "specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with the reasonable inferences from these facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion." Boylan, 854 P.2d at 811; Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)(stating that "determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior"). At the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that the police acted without reasonable suspicion. We agree. We determine here that the facts, when taken together, did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic violation. When reviewing a motion to suppres 1997)(<HOLDING>). Officer Miller observed Haley following 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if an officer possesses an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense has been committed the officer may request identifying information from the driver (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot (D) holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation
Output: (A)
the district court’s order denying his February 2003 motion for reconsideration of a sentence imposed in March 2002. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See United States v. Grandison, No. CR-01-126 (E.D.Va. Feb. 18, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED. * To the extent Grandison’s informal brief raises additional claims not directly related to the denial of his motion for reconsideration, this court is without jurisdiction to consider them. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (C) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that period for filing notice of appal is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory
Output: (D)
for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004). Where the attack is facial, the court determines whether the complaint’s allegations are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, accepting all material allegations as true and construing them in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Where the attack is factual, “the .court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute regarding subject matter jurisdiction, a court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id.; McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a court may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings including affidavits (B) recognizing that generally disputes between purchasers of a debtors assets and third parties are not within the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction but recognizing that disputes concerning the sale order itself may be sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction (D) holding that a court may review any evidence such as affidavits and testimony to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction (E) holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard
Output: (D)
in failing to determine Amresco did not have a reasonable turnaround plan. In addition, as the district court stated, general allegations that Deloitte was somehow involved in the Duke & Long loan do not establish Deloitte’s liability, just as the allegations fail to establish liability for the Individual Defendants. D. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that, even if their SAC was properly dismissed, they should have been granted leave to amend (to permit a fourth try). The district court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting another amended complaint. Leave to amend should be freely granted when justice requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). District courts, however, have discretion to manage their docket. Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, although a district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea (B) holding no abuse of discretion after plaintiff had three opportunities to correct any deficiencies in its complaint (C) holding no abuse of discretion where plaintiffs failed multiple times to correct deficiencies in complaint and failed to show couh how they would correct them in a future filing (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint where the plaintiff had already been given opportunities to amend and did not indicate what additional facts he could plead to correct the deficiencies in his complaint (E) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion
Output: (B)
hard at Whirlpool, that is not a mitigating factor. Those are things that we are expected to do, all of us. We are expected to work hard at our jobs. We are expected to be involved in our children’s lives. We are expected to be civil to the people that we work and live around. Those aren’t mitigating factor[s]. Those are what every single human being should do. The Defendant is asking for extra credit because he did it sometimes. Appellant argues that these statements misled the jury because Arkansas neither defines nor limits mitigation by statute. And, in fact, he points to decisions by this court wherein the court has held that there is no requirement that the mitigating circumstances reduce culpability for the offense. See Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He asserts that the prosecutor’s remarks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (B) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (C) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded (D) holding that relevant evidence supporting a defendants theory of defense should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices (E) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor
Output: (C)
and attempt to commit extortion. 1. Because (a) appellants’ ex parte application was a pretrial motion resulting in excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, even though later declared moot; and ( ury concerning the mens rea for extortion and the requisite interstate commerce element. See Rodriguez, 360 F.3d at 957; see also United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir.1998) (upholding jury instructions under the Hobbs Act because “defendants need not have known or intended their actions to affect interstate commerce”) (citation omitted). 5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the spreadsheet or offshore documents as they were probative of intent and motive. See United States v. Whitman, 771 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 6. The district court also 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence (B) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) holding that trial court had discretion to admit relevant photographs in penalty phase
Output: (A)
of the settlement offer within sixty (60) days after the offer is accepted; or (3) the amount of the offer exceeds one and one-third (1 1/3) of the amount of the judgment awarded.” I.C. § 34-4-37-8. Cahoon specifically asserts that while Wife made several offers of settlement to Cahoon and Kohne together, each of the offers failed to comply with the statutory requirement that the terms of the offer must provide for payment of the settlement within sixty days of acceptance of the offer. Our review of the record confirms this omission in each of the offers. As this statutory prerequisite was not met, we conclude that the trial court erroneously awarded Wife prejudgment interest with respect to Dr. Cahoon. See Indiana Dept. of Human Services v. Firth, 590 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. However, for the same reasons, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language (B) recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims (C) holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language (D) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (E) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect
Output: (A)
in some respect. To me, such an approach invites municipal officials to substitute rank speculation and conjectural claptrap for genuine engineering expertise and constitutes an open invitation for local planners to engage in incompetent fear-mongering about perceived or imagined development risks, no matter how unfounded, unlikely, or controllable such risks may be. Such an open-textured standard for upholding the denial of subdivision applications will all too easily be converted into an impermeable cloak to cover confiscatory regulatory takings, official pandering to neighbors’ antidevelopment biases, political shenanigans, and other such local governmental capriciousness of the sort that we recently condemned in L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the mere fact that the municipality 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states (C) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (D) holding that the petitioner property owners had established 42 usc  1983 substantive and procedural dueprocess violations against town officials who arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs request for subdivision approval (E) holding that plaintiffs had claim under 42 usc  1983 against state where state had created an intermediate care facility but placed plaintiffs on waiting list
Output: (D)
or inferences ... based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701(c). In other words, lay testimony must "result[] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life” and not “from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.” Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted). "Testimony based solely on a person’s special training or experience is properly classified as expert testimony, and therefore it is not admissible under Rule 701.” Compania Administradora v. Titan Intern’l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.2008). This includes testimony about an opinion reached during a parole officer’s investigation. See U.S. v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Cue’s testimony here does not ”result[] from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (B) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (C) holding that a law enforcement agent may not testify about an opinion reached during his investigation if the agents reasoning process depended in whole or in part on his specialized training and experience (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying an expert witness in the area of gang identity and investigation based on his training and experience (E) holding an agent from the drug enforcement agency could testify regarding the street value of cocaine where the agent was testifying regarding matters within his personal knowledge and experience as a narcotics officer
Output: (C)
the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in requiring production of the document covered by item (2) because the document is not privileged. The only document covered by item (2) is the employment agreement between Jenney and Airdata. Jenney cannot seriously contend that the employment agreement is protected by the attorney-client privilege be- ■ cause both he and Airdata had copies of the agreement before Jenney retained his former attorney to negotiate the retirement agreement. The fact that Jenney may have given a copy of the employment agreement to the attorney negotiating the retirement agreement does not convert the nonprivileged employment agreement into a privileged document. See Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So.2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); cf. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So.2d 263, 266 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment debtors trust fund records are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege because djocuments which are not privileged in the hands of the client cannot be shielded by transferring them to the attorney (B) holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice (C) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (D) holding that discussions between management personnel concerning legal advice given by attorney is privileged even when attorney is not physically present (E) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client
Output: (E)
however, had received the full procedural due process to which he was entitled for the 1996 events to which the court was referring. The events, in fact, culminated in a decision and order of the Lincoln County Appeal Board calling for Pratt’s reinstatement. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to a summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, because the LCPO has been dissolved, the issue of Pratt’s employment status, particularly after he was reinstated, is now moot. B. Constitutionally Protectable Property Interest Neither Exists In Pratt’s Job Duties Nor In Pratt’s Suspension When Such Suspension Is With Pay. [¶ 19] Pratt argues the defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity because the defendants obstructed the reinstatement order of the Appeal Board -42 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property (B) holding inmates possess a constitutionally cognizable property interest in the interest earned on money held in their prison accounts (C) holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest (D) holding that constitutionally protected property interest in employment does not extend to right to possess and retain particular job or to perform particular services (E) holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest
Output: (D)
stacking claim arises from the same certified order Continental appeals. Yet, the claim “appears to be a ‘cross-petition’ within the compass of Rule 5, which must be timely filed.” Id. The Munroes’ failure to timely file their cross petition does not preclude review of the stacking issue. The Munroes cross-appeal the same certified order Continental appeals. See Tristani, 652 F.3d at 366 (finding that a grant of appellant’s leave to appeal pursuant to § 1292(b) gives the court jurisdiction over the entire certified order of the district court, “including any portions that were decided in the appellant’s favor” even though appel-lees failed to properly cross-appeal). Rule 5(b)(2) is not jurisdictional. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (<HOLDING>). • This court granted the petition to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction (B) holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only congress may determine a federal courts subjectmatter jurisdiction (C) holding that judicial analysis of the preemption under  1144 cannot help a federal court determine whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction (D) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case (E) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction
Output: (B)
methodology for establishing causation, then that places a burden on the expert to explain his choice of methodologies.” Meridia, 328 F.Supp.2d at 800 (citing Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F.Supp. 972, 1025-26 (S.D.Ohio 1992)). Plaintiffs argue that it would be medically and scientifically unethical to attempt a control-group epidemiological experiment of the effects of OSCS in human beings. To do so would require administering OSCS to patients and exposing them to the possibility of injury. Nevertheless, plaintiffs must still demonstrate that the reasoning or methodology on which their experts base their opinions is scientifically valid and properly applied to the facts in issue. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (<HOLDING>). To this end, when relying on animal, in vivo 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that animal studies can be a proper foundation for an experts opinion but that those opinions must be sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purport to rely (B) holding that an rld manufacturer was unlikely to succeed on its challenge to the fdas reliance on animal studies to establish the bioequivalency of a proposed generic because courts are bound to show deference to the agencys factfinding in this area of its technical expertise (C) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an opinion relying in part on extrapolation from highdose animal studies to lowdose human disease scenarios where there was no attempt to explain how the animal subjects and humans have similar physiological makeup and rate of chemical absorption (D) holding that a reliable differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion even when no epidemiological studies peerreviewed published studies animal studies or laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion (E) holding that alj properly rejected opinions based on invalid objective studies
Output: (A)
background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
Output: (D)
intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions “could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited.” Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) (“We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse’s liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void.”). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years
Output: (B)
omitted). Even if we were to do so, it would not change the outcome, since we see no error in the district court’s ruling regardless of whether the robbery and drug conspiracy were related. 3 . This course of action is permissible, though "we have repeatedly mentioned 'our strong preference for James proceedings.' ” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.1995)). 4 . The conspiracy supporting the introduction of the out-of-court statement need not be the same as the conspiracy charged in the indictment, so long as the statement was in furtherance of the uncharged conspiracy. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d. Cir.1999); see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 675 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 5 .Burnett testified at one point that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy (B) holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme (C) holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error (D) holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error (E) holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial
Output: (A)
a particularized need. 4. Seriousness of the Litigation and Issues Holmes maintains that the gravity of her allegations — namely, that IPRA “concealed] its widespread efforts to cover-up unlawful shootings by police officers,” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 — warrants disclosing the draft summary reports. In other words, Holmes asserts that the privilege is overcome because IPRA’s deliberative process, which includes the back-and-forth exchange of draft summary reports between supervisors and investigators, is “part of the code of silence.” Id. Where a plaintiff directly challenges a government agency’s deliberative process, courts routinely find that there is a particularized need for disclosure. See, e.g., Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2013 WL 2588709, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 430-31 (finding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (B) holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional (C) holding that public employees working for the office of cook county assessor and receiving their compensation from cook county had no vested right in the expectation of the continuance of this compensation (D) holding that plaintiffs had a particularized need for cook county jail prebudget documents after observing that the plaintiffs theory is that the county allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the jail accordingly  the countys deliberative process is directly at issue in this case (E) holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations
Output: (D)
rise to the application of a subjective test.” Swanson, 135 F.3d at 701. Such a system is one in which case-by-case inquiries are routinely made, such that there is an “individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct” that “invite[s] considerations of the particular circumstances” involved in the particular case. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Perhaps the best example of such a system, and indeed the one in which this exception originated, is a system of unemployment benefits which requires claimants to show “good cause” as to why they are unable to find work. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), a Seventh Day Ad . But see Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364-66 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). While of course it takes some degree of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  522 permits states only to adopt uniform exemptions (B) holding that a regulation prohibiting excavations below groundwater level was not a taking because the regulation only limited some forms of development but did not decrease market value (C) holding that because a police department regulation prohibiting beards allowed for medical exemptions but not religious exemptions it was not generally applicable under smith (D) holding that dol regulations related to flsa exemptions are enforceable (E) holding that the districts facial hair regulation was discriminatory as applied to the firefighter although the department was not precluded from promulgating a reasonable grooming regulation equally applied to all requiring beards to be neatly trimmed
Output: (C)
for separate crimes occurring on different days, involving different victims, to different terms of imprisonment. Therefore, we conclude that the sentences were not “consolidated” under the Sentencing Guidelines. III. As the evidence on the record strongly indicates that the cases are not related for the purposes of section 4A1.2, we must reluctantly conclude that the Defendant is properly characterized as a “career offender” under section 4B1.1 of the Guidelines. DONE AND ORDERED. 1 . We note that the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned a separate holding in Jones that bank tellers are particularly susceptible to offenses of larceny and thus are vulnerable victims under section 3A1.1 of the Guidelines. United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The portions that we are concerned with in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (B) holding that bank tellers as a class are not vulnerable victims under  3a11 (C) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (D) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification (E) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members
Output: (B)
class members did appeal. First they appealed the district court’s order to this court, and this court affirmed (over a dissent). See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 294. Then they sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, securing amicus support from the Attorneys General of seventeen states in the process. See Brief of the Attorneys General of Ala. & Ariz. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Blackman v. Gascho, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1065, 197 L.Ed,2d 176 (2017) (No. 16-364), 2016 WL 6213015. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Blackman, 137 S.Ct. 1065; Zik, 137 S.Ct. 1065. And on March 21, 2017, after the time to request a rehearing expired, the Supreme Court’s decision became final. Only then did the court’s order become definite. Until the order w (6th Cir. 1958) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 361 U.S. 398, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contempt order labeled by the district court as civil was actually a criminal contempt because the order was retroactive seeking to penalize previous violations and was punitive serving no compensatory purpose (B) holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements (C) holding that an order which purports to become final upon the happening of an event specified in the order is not a final order and the happening of the event does not operate to render the order final (D) holding that an order under which the amount owed was contingent on a future event was not sufficiently definite and mandatory to serve as the basis for contempt proceedings (E) holding it was within the chancellors  discretion to find that though the husband was in contempt the contempt was not willful
Output: (D)
highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit.” Id. Similarly, the court stated that, where a client communicates to the accountant at the direction of the lawyer, the attorney-client privilege applies. Id. (stating that the attorney- client privilege attaches “where the client in the first instance consults a lawyer who retains an accountant as a listening post, or consults the lawyer with his own accountant present” but not “where the client communicates first to his own accountant ( ... even though he later consults Ms lawyer on the same matter)”). 17 . This approach dovetails with the case law addressing this topic. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, 244 F.R.D. 412, 420 (N.D.I11.2006) (<HOLDING>); see U.S. v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the duty has been applied to accountants (B) holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption (C) holding that accountants worksheets did not contain privileged communications (D) holding that the attorneyclient privilege applied to communications with accountants where defendants  demonstrated the necessity of the accountants services by showing that the accountants provided services that were beyond  counsels resources and abilities but were uniquely within the accountants qualifications (E) holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary
Output: (D)
when there is reason to believe that the individual subject to the gag order is willing to speak and is being-restrained from doing so. E.g., In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 607 (determining whether the recipients have standing required the court first to examine “[wjhether the [plaintiff] news agencies, are actually potential receivers of otherwise restrained speech”); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 787 n. 12 (1st Cir.1988) (emphasizing that the third party had standing to challenge a protective order because “far from agreeing to the protee-five order, the plaintiffs to this action have opposed the pi'oteetive order at every stage” and the speech, therefore, would be available); Radio & Television News Ass’n v. District Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Id. 75 F.3d at 838-39. On March 27,1998, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal (B) holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association (C) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (D) holding that the press lacks standing to assert the free speech rights of another when the person subject to the gag order has not challenged it (E) holding that claim under connecticut law for employer discrimination based upon the employees exercise of privacy and free speech rights not preempted
Output: (D)
catalogs in Florida, the activity at issue here. Although Sharper Image made all of the arrangements concerning the mailing of the catalogs from its California headquarters, Sharper Image nevertheless supplied the addresses for the catalogs and directed that those catalogs be placed in the United States mail. See Sharper Image Corp. v. Miller, 42 Conn.App. 310, 678 A.2d 977, 980 (1996) (“The plaintiff’s control was the direction; relinquishing the right to withdraw or redirect does not for purposes of ‘ownership’ relinquish control.... By directing the shipping of the catalogs, Sharper Image retained ownership, even though it relinquished physical possession to the postal service.”), aff'd, 240 Conn. 531, 692 A.2d 774 (1997); Talbots, Inc. v. Schwartzberg, 928 P.2d 822 (Colo.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Sharper Image thus caused its catalogs to be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters (C) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision (D) holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city (E) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract
Output: (C)
rights. See U.S. Const, amend. VI. “The Sixth Amendment rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered through the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence.” State v. Gillian, 360 S.C. 433, 449-450, 602 S.E.2d 62, 71 (Ct.App.2004); accord State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 330, 563 S.E.2d 315, 317 (2002); State v. Graham, 314 S.C. 383, 385, 444 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1994); Schmidt, 288 S.C. at 303, 342 S.E.2d at 402. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures these rights are extended to criminal defendants in state courts. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Mizzell, 349 S.C. at 330, 563 S.E.2d at 317 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment (C) holding second amendment right is incorporated against the states through fourteenth amendment (D) holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel (E) holding that the confrontation clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
Output: (A)
tended to prove “that these people had the propensity ... of getting into a fight that night.” Because evidence of pxior bad acts for this pxxrpose is subject to exclusion under Rule 11-404(B), the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. {44} Garcia attempts to show erx*or by contending that the evidence in question was admissible under Rule 11-404(B) as pi'obative of motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, and/or context. By this argument, we understand Garcia to suggest that the prior incident had some bearing on the issue of self-defense, as tending to establish that Victim was the first aggressor. However, evidence of the prior altercation was not admissible to show that Victim was the first aggressor. See Baca, 115 N.M. at 540, 854 P.2d at 367 (<HOLDING>). {45} Finally, even though the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that specific incidents of a victims conduct are not admissible to show that the victim was the first aggxessor (B) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (C) holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony (D) holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind (E) holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment
Output: (A)