niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
based on whether KSU had the authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467, 65 S.Ct. 347. We easily resolve this question by examining the enabling legislation, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723. Nothing in the statute itself makes entering into a contract waiving immunity an ultra vires act. Indeed the contrary is true-this legislation explicitly gives KSU, as a state educational institution, expansive, unlimited authority to contract with the DOE so that KSU may participate in student financial assistance programs. Further, unlike in other Kansas statutes, there is no provision in § 76-723 disclaiming a waiver or prohibiting consent to waive. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6116(g) ( ement Co. (In re Estate of Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 244-46 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), amended by 130 F.3d 1138 (5th Cir.1997); cf. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alien tort statute itself is not a waiver of sovereign immunity (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (D) holding attempted statutory waiver of sovereign immunity under  106a unconstitutional and listing similar cases (E) holding that section 106a mandates an automatic waiver of sovereign immunity and thereby impliedly repeals the ftcas exhaustion requirement
Output: (D)
to obtain a certificate from the architect, the court of appeals stated, “We find in this case that the issuance of the architect's certificate was merely another method of assuring final completion.” Id. We find Uhlir distinguishable from the facts of this case because TA’s requirement of an all-bills-paid affidavit was meant to avoid the potential of being subject to double liability, not a part of the contract related to completing the construction. 4 . Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have concluded that where parties contract for literal compliance of the contract, substantial performance does not excuse failure to comply with those express conditions. See, e.g., Hardin, Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 628, 636 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a party has insisted on strict compliance with the contracts terms the doctrine of substantial performance does not apply (B) holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient (C) holding that the substantial compliance doctrine did not apply when a fiduciary failed to issue a timely decision on claimants appeal (D) recognizing that the government generally has the right to insist on performance in strict compliance with the contract specifications (E) holding that strict compliance is not required
Output: (A)
egregious harm from the trial court’s error in submitting the lesser-included-offense charge. V. Conclusion We sustain appellant’s third issue to the extent that it concerns whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the first step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test. Given our disposition, we need not consider the remainder of appellant’s third issue (concerning whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the second step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test) or appellant’s second issue (concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence). We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>) (footnotes omitted); Konchar v. State, 938 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it (B) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (C) holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense (D) holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense (E) recognizing that it is within  our power to direct entry of judgment on a lesser included offense when vacating a greater offense if the commission of the lesser offense can be established from facts that the jury actually found citations omitted
Output: (C)
knowingly and willfully failed to comply with all the requirements of this section, the court may dismiss the case with prejudice. When a trial court finds a petition does not comply with the statute, "it shall be returned together with a copy of [§ 2008.1] and a statement of the reason or reasons for its return." Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to allow the trial court "to return the petition only if it does not comply with the requirements set forth in § 2008.1(B) and (C)," and not for failure to state a claim. Lowe v. Monard, 1997 OK 100, ¶ 4, 942 P.2d 732, 733. 115 The Oklahoma Supreme Court "has often implicitly recognized the right of an imprisoned person to commence a private civil action against a third party." Mehdipour, 2003 OK 3 at ¶ 17, 65 P.3d at 274 (<HOLDING>). According to Mehdip-our, 12 0.8. § 2008.1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff (B) holding that a ttca claim based on an officers allegedly negligent use of his service weapon was a claim for intentional tort not negligence (C) holding that plaintiff may be heard on his nonconstitutionally based tort claim against his former attorneys (D) holding that a title vii retaliation claim was not properly before the court because although the plaintiff had not been fired when he filed his complaint the plaintiff never amended his complaint to include a claim of retaliation based on his termination (E) holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal
Output: (C)
of a co-conspirator’s confession at trial for an impeachment purpose offends the Confrontation Clause. Harvey Street and an accomplice were arrested for burglary and murder. 471 U.S. at 411, 105 S.Ct. 2078. After their arrests, both men confessed to a Sheriff. Id. At trial, Street repudiated his confession and asserted that the Sheriff read him his accomplice’s confession and “directed him to say the same thing.” Id. To rebut Street’s claim that his confession was fabricated, the State had the Sheriff read to the jury the accomplice’s confession, which directly implicated Street. Id. at 411-12, 105 S.Ct. 2078. Before the Sheriff read the accomplice’s statement to the jury, however, “the trial judge twice informed the jury that it was admitted ‘not Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (<HOLDING>); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt (B) holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt (C) holding all evidence be suppressed traceable to the unlawfully seized (D) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (E) holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt
Output: (E)
Judgment on Declaratory Judgment Claim In its final issue, Crimson complains that the trial court erred in entering a take-nothing summary judgment against it on Crimson’s “duty to defend” declaratory judgment claim rather than entering a declaratory summary judgment in Crimson’s favor. Crimson specifically asserts that its claim for a declaratory judgment on its “duty to defend” liability under the indemnity agreement presented an issue beyond that raised in appellees’ claims for which it would have “ongoing exposure under the indemnity portions of the Advisory Agreement” and thus a declaratory judgment on its duty to defend under the agreement would have been proper. See Indian Beach Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Linden, 222 S.W.3d 682, 702 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Declaratory judgments are reviewed under the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title (B) holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed (C) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (D) holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed (E) holding that declaratory judgment counterclaim seeking interpretation of deed restrictions filed in lawsuit regarding breach of deed restrictions was not simply denial of plaintiffs cause of action but affirmative claim for relief and therefore proper subject of declaratory judgment deed restrictions involved ongoing and continuous relationship between parties and declaration would define parties obligations under deed restrictions in future
Output: (E)
who simply in structs a pedestrian to “hold up” does not, without more, commit a seizure of that pedestrian. The instruction “hold up” is a request to stop. By itself, a request to stop, even when issued by a uniformed police officer, would not communicate to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to simply ignore the officer’s request and keep walking. Other states that, like Tennessee, have rejected the Hodari D. standard on state constitutional grounds, have concluded that similar encounters do not constitute a seizure. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 665 N.E.2d 93, 98 (1996) (acknowledging no seizure occurred when officer initially asked defendant to “hold up a minute”); People v. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d 531, 611 N.Y.S.2d 796, 634 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1994) (<HOLDING>). While the language and conduct expressed by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred (B) holding that defendant was not free to leave when officer directed defendant to stay while he conducted a warrants check (C) holding no seizure occurred when after defendant began to walk away officer directed him to stop (D) holding a seizure occurs when a passenger of a car is hit by a bullet that is meant to stop him (E) holding that no seizure occurred where shots were fired at a truck but did not hit the suspect because they failed to produce a stop
Output: (C)
25 N.Y.2d 112, 119, 302 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803, 250 N.E.2d 214 (1969)). The parties' briefs assume that New York law applies to plaintiffs’ state law claims. Such "implied consent ... is sufficient to establish choice of law.” Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 61 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2000)). 131 . E.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, N.V., 68 F.3d 1478, 1483 (2d Cir.1995). 132 . E.g., Manela v. Garantia Banking, 5 F.Supp.2d 165, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.1998). As with Rule 10b-5, knowledge or recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter element for common law fraud. See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 104-05. 133 . E.g., Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 222 A.D. 181, 225 N.Y.S. 488 (1927) (<HOLDING>); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action where plaintiffs allege fraud in inducing not the purchase of the bonds but their retention after purchase (B) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (C) holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing the cause of action
Output: (A)
Judge. The State challenges the trial court’s order dismissing an information against Larry Daniel Jones on the basis of double jeopardy. Because the Florida charge is not barred under the dual sovereign exception to double jeopardy, we reverse. Jones was charged with interference with child cust L.Ed.2d 641 (1985). Jones argues that Booth is inapplicable because it involved a federal-state context instead of a state-to-state situation. We find no basis for this distinction. See State v. McNab, 642 So.2d 41 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). As Jones notes in his brief, a number of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same for malicious prosecution (B) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (C) holding that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for dwi did not bar a subsequent civil proceeding founded on the same facts (D) holding that states nonproseeution agreement did not bar subsequent federal prosecution (E) holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct
Output: (E)
linked’ to the order of removal, it is prohibited by section 1252(a)(5).” Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir.2012). Meanwhile, a § 2241 petition is not subject to § 1252(a)(5)’s jurisdictional bar if it is “independent” of the removal order. See Nnadika v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 626, 632 (3d Cir.2007). Tonfaek claims that his § 2241 petition is independent of his removal order, but we do not agree. Critically, Tonfaek argues not just that the specific Cameroonian travel documents are invalid, but that Cameroon is not a proper country of removal. This issue is encompassed in the removal order — the IJ is obligated to designate a country of removal as part of the removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(d); see also In re I-S- & C-S-24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 433-34 (BIA 2008) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the IJ here may have neglected 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim (B) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (C) holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final (D) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (E) holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal
Output: (E)
when it bought and damaged the railcars, no “accident” occurred. Like the property owner in Meri-wether, Plaintiff may have been mistaken about its property rights, but that mistake, according to the Defendant, does not amount to an “accident” as that term is commonly understood. This Court agrees with the Defendant. Although there is language in Glens Falls that would seem to indicate that a mistake or error in judgment is tantamount to an “accident,” such a reading of the case would bring it into an inherent conflict with that court’s earlier decision in Meriwether. This Court has a duty to avoid interpreting the cases from the Georgia Court of Appeals in a manner that would bring about s.uch a conflict. See e.g. Garrett v. Heisler, 149 Ga.App. 240, 253 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1979) (<HOLDING>). A fair reading of Meriwether leads to the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing usefulness of lower court opinions (B) holding that when mississippi adopted a statute modeled after a georgia enactment decisions of the georgia courts did not bind mississippi courts in interpretation of the statute (C) recognizing the supreme courts holding in ferber (D) recognizing courts duty to reconcile opinions from the georgia supreme court (E) holding unconstitutional the provision in a georgia abortion statute limiting abortions to georgia residents
Output: (D)
is reasonably ascertainable would allow a tortfeasor with knowledge of his or her potential liability to shift this burden to an unwary insurance company. Second, it adds certainty and predictability to a trigger of coverage analysis. Identifying the effects of actual injury is simpler and less involved than tracing injury to its probable cause. Finally, in the event the insurer eventually becomes insolvent, the insured is more likely to obtain coverage as the policy will be triggered at an earlier date, when injury first manifests. Thus, we hold, consistent with the first manifestation rule articulated in DAuria, that coverage is triggered under one of the Penn National policies when either bodily injury or property damage becomes reasonably apparent. See D'Auria, 507 A.2d at 861 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Application of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense (C) holding that tobacco companies statements that they would report on the results of their research into the health effects of cigarettes were not an undertaking to warn customers of those effects (D) holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue (E) holding an occurrence happens when the injurious effects of the negligent act first manifest themselves in a way that would put a reasonable person on notice of injury
Output: (E)
Local Rule 1.3. 33 . Murray, 583 F.3d at 178 (citing Ramey v. District 141, Int'l Assn of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 282-83 (2d Cir.2004)). 34 . National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. L.E. Myers Co. Grp., 937 F.Supp. 276, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y.1996). 35 . Mwray, 583 F.3d at 178 (quoting Lamborn, 873 F.2d at 531) (quotation marks omitted). 36 . Defendants raise only Canon 9 in their Opposition. See Def. Opp. at 8. It is apparent from Defendants’ conflict-of-interest discussion that Rule 1.7 and Canon 5 are also relevant. 37 . Hempstead Video, Inc., 409 F.3d at 132. 38 . New York Code of Prof. Resp., Preliminary Statement, reprinted in N.Y. Jud. Law App. 39 . Board of Ed. of City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 D.2d 487, 597 N.Y.S.2d 34, 34 (1st Dep’t 1993) (<HOLDING>); Hansen v. Brognano, 137 A.D.2d 880, 524 
 Holding statements: (A) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution (B) holding claims against attorney for legal malpractice must be asserted by attorneys actual client absent limited exception (C) holding that attorneys sued for malpractice were entitled to assert thirdparty complaint for contribution and indemnification against subsequent attorney hired by client (D) holding contribution claim against attorney not contrary to illinois public policy (E) holding that the parties purchase agreement did not require a showing of prejudice for plaintiff to assert that defendant waived its claim for indemnification
Output: (C)
the materials to be held in confidence. However, the parties cannot by agreement overcome the public’s right of access to judicial records. See In re Violation of Rule 28(D), 635 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2011); Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 455 F.Supp.2d 399, 437-438 (D.Md.2006). Instead, the parties must show significant countervailing interests that outweigh the public’s interest in openness. In re Application, 707 F.3d at 292-93. Volvo next contends that the materials at issue contain confidential business information. This would appear to be a sufficient basis in some instances, if it is established and not outweighed by countervailing interests. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306; see also Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 406 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Volvo notes that the materials at issue were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (B) holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to unseal documents containing confidential and proprietary business information (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to award attorneys fees where each element of five part test has been satisfied (E) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony
Output: (C)
factual evidence. The insufficiency of the evidence is fatal to the requisite analysis of the Rule 23 criteria that a trial court must conduct before certifying a class action. See Citicorp, 715 So.2d at 204 (requiring that a trial court conduct a rigorous analysis of the certification criteria). In this case, the insufficiency of the evidence is reflected in the conclusory analysis of the Rule 23(a) typicality and adequacy criteria contained in the trial court’s certification order. The order merely recites the requirement of these criteria and summarily concludes that both of these prerequisites are met. Thus, the St. Clair Circuit Court abused its discretion in certifying the class in the Wallace Action. ' See Ex parte American Bankers Life Assurance Co., 715 So.2d 186 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>). 2. The Rockett Action The Birmingham Water 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions (B) holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court (C) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (D) holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23 (E) holding that the trial court improperly certified a class because it had not conducted a rigorous analysis of the elements of commonality and typicality
Output: (E)
and Paroles, 677 So.2d 1261 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); and Sloan v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, 647 So.2d 85 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). Because the initial decision to grant or deny parole is completely within the discretion of the Board, such a decision should not be reviewable by state comets. See Braxton v. Josey, 567 F.Supp. 1479, 1480 (D.Md.1983) (noting that review was appropriate in federal court because “Maryland does not provide for judicial review of decisions to deny parole”). Compare Quintero v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 329 Or. 319, 986 P.2d 575, 579 (1999) (noting that state statute “provides that ‘any decision relating to a release date’ is not subject to judicial review”). Cf. Esensoy v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 793 So.2d 774, 778 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); Kirk v. State, 536 So.2d 118, 119 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judicial review of the boards denial of a request for remission of a fine or forfeiture is limited to those situations where the board has failed to consider a request that it exercise its discretion or where there is justification for the courts exercising its equitable jurisdiction (B) holding that denial of untimely request was not abuse of discretion (C) holding that third party seeking to be reimbursed for costs incurred in responding to discovery request had standing to appeal because its interests were directly represented by its own counsel in the trial court it was effectively bound by the trial courts final order of dismissal the other party would have had the right to appeal the trial courts ruling if it had granted the request for reimbursement and the third party had no other legal remedy to contest the trial courts denial of its request (D) holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record (E) holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in merely stating that the request could not be granted because there was no transcript at this point
Output: (A)
this duty, Meisel suffered a catastrophic loss to all his belongings, his home and effects, all amounting to damages to be proven at the time of trial. Compl. at ¶¶ 43-45. Defendant argues that Anderson was an agent of Allstate at all times and was acting within the scope of his employment and is not personally liable for his actions. Plaintiff argues that Anderson was not an employee or agent of Allstate and is liable. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “well established that, unless an agent or employee acts as a dual agent (a circumstance not present in this case), she cannot be held liable as a defendant unless she acts for her own personal advantage.” Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir.2003); Lippert v. Bailey, 241 Cal.App.2d, 376, 50 Cal.Rptr. 478 (1966) (<HOLDING>). The court in Mercado stated that an employee 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it (B) holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims (C) holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes (D) holding that statements of a company vice president were admissible against the principal owner of the company under fedrevid 801d2d as an admission made by the partys agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment (E) holding that liability to the insured for acts or contracts of an insurance agent within the scope of his agency with a full disclosure of the principal rests on the company
Output: (E)
730. The Court determines that the movants are making a factual challenge to Carlson’s Complaint; therefore, the Court will consider matters outside the pleadings, Carlson does not benefit from the safeguards of 12(b)(6), and Carlson has the burden of proving that this Court has jurisdiction over its claims against the movants. B. Reinsurers are not Liable to the Insured Minnesota law concerning reinsurance is clear. A reinsurance contract is a contract of indemnity between the reinsurer and the insurer—it operates solely for the benefit of the insurer. Schunk v. Hotchkiss, 231 Minn. 219, 224, 43 N.W.2d 104, 108 (1950). “There is no privity of contract between the insured and the insurer’s reinsurer.” Id.; see also Barnes v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 38, 40, 57 N.W. 314, 314 (1893) (<HOLDING>). “In such a contract the policy holders have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reinsurance is a mere contract of indemnity (B) holding that a party that settled but failed to immediately notify a third party of indemnity claims did not waive indemnity claims (C) holding that indemnity language on front of onepage contract was conspicuous (D) holding that an indemnity provision need not be valid and enforceable to trigger obligations under the contract so long as the parties agreed to indemnity (E) holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity
Output: (A)
CSI loan. A bank can exercise its common-law right of setoff when: (1) there is mutuality of obligation between the bank and its customer; (2) the funds against which a setoff is exercised belong to the customer; (3) the money to be set off has been deposited into a general — as opposed to a special, reserve, or trust— account; and (4) the debt owed by the customer to the bank is mature. E.g., Firstar Eagan Bank, N.A. v. Marquette Bank Minneapolis, N.A., 466 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). Here, there was mutuality of obligation because the bank owed Brier the money attributable to the CD and Brier had guaranteed the CSI loan personally — a loan that was in default when the bank set off the CD against the balance due on the loan. See In re Foutz, 271 F.Supp. 847, 849-50 (W.D.Va.1967) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Brier indisputably owned the CD, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor (B) holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation (C) holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank (D) holding that debt from debtor to bank in the form of chargebacks to the debtors account for credit card transaction rescissions was prepetition debt even though customers rescinded transactions postpetition and the bank therefore chargedback postpetition because a customers right to rescind and thereby the banks right to chargeback accrued at the time the customer made a purchase even though such customer exercised his right to rescind postpetition (E) recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check
Output: (A)
the above-listed cases and two additional cases not listed in his motion to correct illegal sentences, case numbers 89-4346 and 89-12881. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, Merrell was sentenced to forty-year sentences on each first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment and each life felony, fifteen years on each second degree felony, and five years on the sole third degree felony. The sentence imposed on each count and each case was ordered to run concurrent with the other sentences imposed. Merrell claims that the habitual offender designations imposed for the life felonies were error. While we agree that in 1990, when the sentences were imposed in the instant cases, a habitual offender sentence was not authorized for life felonies, see Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>), the forty-year sentences imposed in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony (B) holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence (C) holding that the habitual offender act as it existed in 1989 did not apply to those who were convicted of life felonies (D) holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender
Output: (C)
of this exception and concluded that Apprendi does not impart a fundamental procedural right that is a necessary component of a fair trial. Id.; see also United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir.2002) (“Sending the drug quantity determination to the jury cannot be fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding if the judge is allowed to make such findings in some circumstances.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 939, 123 S.Ct. 48, 154 L.Ed.2d 243 (2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.) (noting that Apprendi is “clearly not on the same level as a truly landmark decision such as Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ].”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 961, 123 S.Ct. 388, 154 L.Ed.2d 315 (2002); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1258 (<HOLDING>); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (same). Just 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida in postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively (D) holding apprendi does not satisfy second exception in teague (E) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review
Output: (D)
property to a third party for $8,500. The original owner then attempted to redeem the property and argued that the redemption amount was based on $8,500 paid at the subsequent sale, not the $380,000 paid at the foreclosure sale. This Court, while noting that the sale price should be reduced by the amount of the insurance proceeds the bank received when the house on the property was destroyed, concluded that § 6-5-253(a) referred to the sale price at the foreclosure sale, not at the subsequent sale. We stated that “both the plain meaning and the existing precedent governing this statute lead us to conclude that Pitts must pay Gangi the purchase price paid by Bank One at the foreclosure sale.” Pitts, 896 So.2d at 436. See also Dicie v. Morris, 285 Ala. 650, 653, 235 So.2d 796, 798 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the LLC argues that the word 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mortgagee had no right to rents under its assignment of rents during the redemption period because it purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt at its foreclosure sale (B) holding that debtor not bank paid the propertytax redemption amount even though debtor paid this amount using proceeds of loan from the bank (C) holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing (D) holding that a foreclosure action becomes final only when the order confirming sale establishes who gets the property at what price and what deficiency judgment if any will be entered against the mortgagor (E) holding that the redemption price was based on the amount bid at foreclosure  and not  what the subsequent purchaser paid  for the property
Output: (E)
the conduct was sufficiently extreme to result in liability.” Taking all of Taing’s evidence as true, Farrens’ conduct is not in the ballpark of Washington’s standard for outrageousness, and the summary judgment evidence does not support the more extreme characterization of events contained in Taing’s pleadings and briefs. Evidence that Farrens might have yelled at Taing once, combined with continued lecturing when Taing asked her to stop so her blood “won’t go up and up,” simply are not the types of behavior that Washington law recognizes as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. There is no evidence that Farrens continued her lecturing after Taing began to manifest symptoms of illness or an anxiety attack, nor was there evidence that Tain 2d 536, 539 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Boeing relies on Saridakis v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 (B) holding claim not preempted where court is required to read and apply cba provisions that are neither uncertain nor ambiguous (C) holding that a claim based on a supervisors circulation of a suspension letter accusing the plaintiff of cocaine use was not preempted despite cba provisions authorizing employee discipline (D) holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was owed wages following his discharge was preempted because this right was created by a cba provision stating that an employee who is discharged shall be paid immediately (E) holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense
Output: (C)
of Federal, State, or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the environment. 6 . The Lead Agencies and Longhorn have argued that requiring the preparation of an EIS here would be a waste of time and resources, given the fact that the EA prepared here contains all the functional elements of an EIS. We find this argument persuasive. In Vieux Carre Property Owners Residents and Assoc's, Inc. v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1282 (5th Cir. 1983), this court upheld the decision of an agency not to conduct an EIS where the “objectives reflected in the [fjinal [EA] and the procedures followed in its preparation were extremely thorough and resulted in a document much akin to a detailed environmental impact statement.” But see State of Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Like the EA in Vieux Carre, the EA here- has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding eis must be prepared where monitoring and mitigation measures were uncertain (B) holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required (C) holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action (D) holding that an ea prepared by an agency in that case was not the functional equivalent of an eis (E) holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial
Output: (D)
and the consistency analysis found in section 163.3177(10)(a). He focused upon whether the plan, as adopted by the Commissioners and when considered as a whole, is compatible with, furthers or takes action in the direction of realizing, the goals and policies of rule 9J-5.005(8) and section 163.3174 and the public participation ordinance referenced therein. We hold that the Department of Community Affairs did not abuse its discretion in approving this analysis or in concluding that the Town’s determination that its plan is in compliance is fairly debatable. In our view, the planning board members’ actions at the January 10, 1989 meeting demonstrate that body’s de facto recommendation of the plan to the Commissioners. Cf. Leon County v. Parker, 566 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>) Given the planning board’s active role in the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing informal assumptions (B) holding that kentucky does not recognize any inherent right to local government (C) recognizing that informal discovery methods can support adequate appreciation of the merits (D) holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca (E) recognizing that local government bodies often proceed in an informal freeform manner
Output: (E)
to disbelieve what a person who is accused of a crime might testify to in his defense solely because he is the defendant? In addition, if the testimony given by a law enforcement agent conflièts with the defendant's testimony, would you be inclined to believe the former and disbelieve the latter solely because the former is a police officer? 2 . A previous Eleventh Circuit panel has noted that Jackson and Gassaway govern our review of a district court’s decision not to question prospective jurors regarding their attitudes towards law enforcement officers’ testimony. See United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082, 103 S.Ct. 1771, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983). See generally Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The court below, in fact, went further in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing circuit split (B) holding in an appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in not ruling on his motion to subpoena a transcript of his guilty plea proceedings was not preserved for review because the circuit court never ruled on the motion and the appellant never objected to the circuit courts failure to rule on the motion (C) recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law (D) holding that all fifth circuit cases decided before the close of business on september 30 1981 are binding on the eleventh circuit (E) recognizing a split in the circuit as to whether objections to prudential standing can be waived and listing circuit cases
Output: (D)
the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Applying the above°factors to the instant case, no evidence exists to support the exercise of jurisdiction to comport with fair play and substantial justice. First, the burden on Killebrew seems unduly great when we consider the extent and circumstances of the contact. Second, although Texas retains an interest in protecting its residents from tort actions, Kil-lebrew’s activity is far too remote to address this consideration. Cf. Memorial Hosp. System v. Fisher Ins., 835 S.W.2d 645, 652 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.)(<HOLDING>). Third, albeit inconvenient for Greeno, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the same rule in texas courts (B) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (C) recognizing this texas rule (D) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied (E) holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas
Output: (B)
definition was first approved by the Supreme Court in 1907, Victor, supra, at 9, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.Ed. 722 (1907), and widely adopted by state courts, although it later met with criticism in various states. Id. at 9, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing) People v. Brigham, 25 Cal.3d 283, 157 Cal.Rptr. 905, 599 P.2d 100, 106-121 (1979)). Nevertheless, the jury instruction at issue in Cage represents a clear break from the past insofar as the Court criticized one form of jury instruction in which “reasonable doubt” was defined, in part, as “moral certainty,” Cage, supra, at 41, and is retroactively appl ies the prejudice requirement for establishing federal habeas jurisdiction. Cf. Restrepo v. Kelly, 178 F.3d 634, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). As such, Mercer has satisfied both the cause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in context of sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel based on asserted failure of counsel to file appeal established prejudice per se for purpose of establishing habeas review jurisdiction as if proven such failure constitutes denial of a fundamental constitutional right (B) holding that failure to file brief on appeal to bia constitutes ineffective assistance but affirming the denial of habeas because petitioner could not show prejudice (C) holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se (D) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (E) holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape
Output: (A)
Kay’s authorization and knowledge. However, the Damalls were still entitled, under these findings, to enforce the note according to its “original tenor.” Id. The “original tenor” of the note at issue, considering the trial court’s findings, was one with no interest rates stated, only blank spaces. The 18-percent default rate becomes ineffective for any purpose. Accordingly, the trial court’s factual findings render the usury defense based on that 18-percent interest rate inapplicable as a matter of law. The trial court erred in applying usury to defeat the Damalls’ claim for interest. Because of this, we need not address the parties’ arguments on whether the 18-percent interest was usurious under the circumstances of this case. See Kelly v. Kelly, 246 Neb. 55, 516 N.W.2d 612 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The remaining issues are whether any interest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive (B) holding that an appellate court need not address all remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive (C) holding appellate court need not address issues unnecessary to its decision (D) holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of a prior issue is dispositive (E) holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive
Output: (C)