niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
§ 44-13-100(9). At the same time, the statute serves the purpose of providing creditors a distribution by allowing any additional cash surrender value of the life insurance policy to be included in the bankruptcy estate for distribution. Georgia’s bankruptcy exemptions for life insurance contracts are similar but not identical to the federal bankruptcy exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7) and (8). Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 applies equally to all similarly situated debtors. For a state statute to withstand an equal protection challenge, the statute need not treat bankruptcy debtors and non-bankruptcy debtors the same. Rather, the statute must treat all bankruptcy petitioners alike. See, e.g., Sticka v. Ap-plebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 692-693 (9th Cir. BAP 2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Shumaker, 124 B.R. 820 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that californias bankruptcyonly exemption statute did not violate the equal protection clause even though the exemptions differed from exemptions that california accorded to debtors not in bankruptcy (B) holding that the cap does not violate equal protection (C) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (D) holding that the admission of his juvenile conviction did not violate equal protection (E) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection
Output: (A)
(2012) (punctuation omitted); accord Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319 (2). 8 Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 428 (1) (b) (729 SE2d 559) (2012) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1, 2 (686 SE2d 665) (2009); Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) (507 SE2d 877) (1998). 9 Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1); accord Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (432 SE2d 658) (1993). 10 See Kringle, 301 Ga. App. at 2 (“[I]n order to infer the requisite knowledge!,] there must be at least one incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate the actual incident that caused the injury.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)); Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1) ( ng that there was a jury question regarding whether the dog owne 96 (1) (<HOLDING>); Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 763 (1) (678 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an animal clinic was entitled to summary judgment in a personalinjury action in which the plaintiff was bitten by one of its dogs when it was undisputed that the dog had never bitten or harmed anyone before the relevant incident (B) holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed (C) holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite (D) holding that the owner of a dog who bit the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment when although the dog had previously jumped on the plaintiff in an aggressive manner the dog did not attempt to bite or scratch and the plaintiff conceded that she was unaware of any prior instance when the dog had bitten a person (E) holding that when there was no surprise and no prejudice defendant was entitled to rely on defense of accord and satisfaction in its summary judgment motion even though it was not included in the pleadings
Output: (A)
injury to the debtor's estate which ultimately affect all creditors belong to trustee); Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1094 (2d Cir.1995) (claims predicated upon the distribution of misleading documents to investors are the property of those investors, and may be asserted only by them because cause of action required proof that each individual investor relied on the misleading statement); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 985-87 (11th Cir.1990) (trustee had no standing to assert against third party claims of certain individual creditors who purchased securities through the debtor on its margin account with the third party, which subsequently sold the securities); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701-02 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Steyr-Daimler-Puch of Am. Corp. v. Pappas, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that third party creditor had no standing to pursue alter ego claim against bankrupt subsidiarys parent company alter ego claim could be pursued by bankrupt organization under ohio law and thus alter ego claim belonged to trustee (B) holding that delaware law requires fraud injustice or inequity to be shown before the alter ego doctrine can be used to find personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation (C) holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation (D) holding that a lawsuit against a corporation that purchased assets from a bankrupt is not a claim against the debtor (E) holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party
Output: (A)
any other female subordinate at defendant company. Further, although Parker testified that there was no justification for authorizing a token increase in plaintiff’s pay, he approved an increase for employee Donald Gerding. Mr. Gerding, a white male whose position and experience was comparable to that of the plaintiff, received authorization from Parker for a $1,700.00 per year increase despite Edward Lewis’s statements that Gerding’s major weaknesses included “poor communication, documentation; provides no leadership; poor attitude.” Parker’s conduct, comments, and his demeanor while testifying indicate that his stated reasons for not approving a modest pay increase to the plaintiff in Spring, 1985 were false and therefore pretextual. See Sims v. Cleland, 813 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that his action was a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false (B) holding that temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employers nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee was in fact pretextual (C) holding that even an incorrect belief that an employees performance is inadequate can be a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action (D) recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee (E) holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason
Output: (A)
on the valuation to place upon [the plaintiff’s] remote contributory negligence.”). Based upon our extensive review of this voluminous record, we have determined that the only prejudicial errors in the trial were Judge Wimberly’s improper supplemental instructions encouraging the jury to recalculate the amount of the verdict, and his failure to independently assess the amoun s not against the clear weight of the evidence, it shall enter judgment on the amount determined by the jury. If, however, the trial court does find that the amount of damages is against the clear weight of the evidence, the court should suggest an appropriate additur or remittitur, with the alternative of granting a partial new trial. See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 914-15 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Pomeroy v. III. Cent. R.R., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in civil theft claim once jury sets the amount of actual damages it is a ministerial act for the trial court to triple those damages and enter final judgment in that amount (B) holding that the trial court on remand erred when it adopted a new theory of damages contrary to the order of the court of appeals (C) holding that when a trial court determines that the amount of damages awarded by a jury is excessive the court may either suggest remittitur or grant a new trial on the issue of damages (D) holding that issue of attorneys fees should be retried if damages awarded are reduced on appeal and appellate court can not be reasonably certain that trial court was not influenced by erroneous damages award (E) holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict
Output: (C)
the undisputed facts of this case, that such inability had no effect on his capacity to intend the consequences of his actions. Salter freely admitted that he shot the decedent for the specific purpose of killing him, and the record reveals without dispute that at the time of the shooting he was leading a relatively normal day-to-day life, which included holding a job, maintaining a checking account, keeping his automobiles in working order, paying bills, and raising three children. Under such circumstances, there is no basis whatever for a conclusion that his ability to intend the consequences of the shooting was undermined by his purported inability to appreciate the rightness or wrongness of his conduct. Accord Stein v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 811, 813 (324 SE2d 510) (1984) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we hold that the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evi dence establishing lack of criminal intent does not necessarily demonstrate in a civil case that the act is not intentional (B) holding that mere fact that clerk assigned defendants case a civil docket number did not demonstrate that the district court failed to treat the case as a criminal matter (C) holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action (D) holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm (E) holding that the governments lack of direct evidence as to defendants knowledge does not demonstrate that its case was baseless
Output: (A)
decision not to perform an act or on its failure to make a decision on the performance or nonperformance of an act if the law leaves the performance or nonperformance of the act to the discretion of the governmental unit"); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (Supp.2001) (immunity for discretionary functions); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5601(e)(1) (Supp.2001) (immunity for discretionary functions); see also United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984) (explaining that in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) "Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort" and that therefore, "decisions requir[ing] the agency to est (<HOLDING>); Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 724 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a municipal corporation was forbidden to construct an auditorium in a park as such construction would practically destroy the lot as a park and convert its use into a public square (B) holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards (C) holding that national park services choice not to repair or improve structures adjacent to a road came within discretionary function exception because the need for such repairs existed on nearly all road sections in the park and therefore given its restricted budget the service was forced to determine priorities and repair the more urgent problems first (D) holding a park rangers decision to terminate an arrest falls within the discretionary function exception to the ftca because such decision was the classic example of conduct grounded in policy (E) holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park
Output: (B)
rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state— Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their “maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B § 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather  than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it
Output: (A)
typographical error problem addressed in Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, (2006). In that case, the Court held that a police officer could not testify that the date in the affidavit in support of search warrant was a typographical error—that instead of "4-14-03," it should have been "4-14-04.” The Court reasoned that permitting such testimony would allow the officer to controvert his statement of the date in the affidavit, in “violation of the four corners rule and the purpose for its existence.” Id. at 671, 898 A.2d 961. Here, the words "premise” and "premises” both are used in the application and warrant, and therefore we properly may infer that one word ("premise”) is a mistaken use or spelling of the other word ("premises”). Greenstreet, supra, at 672, 898 A.2d 961 (<HOLDING>). 4 . The McTyre case has been distinguished on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit (B) recognizing cases from other jurisdictions that stand for the proposition that where a factual date in the affidavit material to the probable cause finding is an apparent typographical error because it is contradicted by another factual time or date more likely to be true also contained within the four comers of the affidavit then a reviewing court may infer that a typographical error was made by the affiant and treat it as something other than what was written in the affidavit (C) holding that the presence of the correct address in the sworn affidavit could correct a typographical error in the warrant (D) holding that section 144 requires both a factual affidavit and a separate certificate that the affidavit was made in good faith (E) holding that the court may disregard an affidavit submitted solely for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit is directly contradicted by deposition testimony and the nonmovant does not explain the discrepancies
Output: (B)
of the contraband. Wagner, 950 So.2d at 513. Where premises are jointly occupied and “contraband is discovered in plain view in the presence of the owner or occupant[,]” the circumstances are “sufficient to support a conviction for constructive possession.” Brown, 428 So.2d at 252. An inference of knowledge and dominion and control may also arise where the contraband located in jointly occupied premises is found in or about other personal property which is shown to be owned or controlled by the defendant. See Holland, 975 So.2d at 598 (stating that discovery of contraband “in close proximity to [defendant’s health insurance] card and other belongings” was “direct evidence connecting [defendant] to the contraband from which a jury could infer actual knowledge”); Wale, 397 So.2d at 740 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Fossett, 119 N.H. 155, 399 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant possessed contraband found in the kitchen of a residence where the defendant was found in the nearby bathroom attempting to dispose of contraband down the toilet (B) holding evidence that marijuana was found in jointly occupied vehicle in open view was insufficient to establish defendants dominion and control by preponderance of evidence (C) holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added (D) holding that if the site where the contraband is found is in joint rather than exclusive possession a defendants knowledge of the contrabands presence and his ability to control it cannot be inferred merely from the defendants proximity to the contraband (E) holding that circumstance that contraband was found in a box bearing defendants name was sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and dominion and control
Output: (E)
favor of the Department of Veterans Affairs in her Title VII action alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant on Brooks’s discrimination and retaliation claims because Brooks did not raise a triable issue of fact concerning pretext. See Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir.2005) (explaining that a plaintiff “must produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.”); see also Moran, 447 F.3d at 759 (<HOLDING>); Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered at summary judgment (B) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial (C) holding that unverified pleadings do not constitute competent summary judgment evidence (D) holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff (E) holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage
Output: (E)
he contends that he alleged that the Department stripped him of the “integral and material responsibilities of a detective.” According to Thompson, he no longer functions as a detective; he has been effectively demoted to the position of an assistant detective. This court has recognized that the mere “loss of some job responsibilities” does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Williams v. U.S. Dept, of Navy, 149 Fed.Appx. 264, 269-70 (5th Cir.2005); Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 532 n. 2 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir.2001) for the proposition that the “loss of some job duties” is not an ultimate employment decision); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511-12 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits similarly agree that “a mere 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer involving no reduction in pay and only a minor change in working conditions does not rise to the level of a material adverse employment action (B) holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case (C) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually (D) holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions (E) holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action
Output: (E)
electronic receipts, that indicate that both Gillette and Mohamed clicked the ‘Yes, I agree” buttons on the Uber application, as depicted in the pictures above. See Colman Decl. Mohamed at ¶ 13-16; Colman Decl. Gillette at ¶ 12. Moreover, it is undisputed that Uber requires drivers to indicate acceptance of the relevant agreements before a driver can continue to use the Uber application, and it is similarly undisputed that both Gillette and Mohamed did, in fact, drive for Uber. Thus, Uber has submitted sufficiently probative evidence that Gillette and Mohamed took some affirmative step to indicate an assent to be bound (i.e., they clicked ‘Yes, I agree” on two separate application screens). See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 2014 WL 2903752, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Jun. 25, 2014) (Koh, J.) (<HOLDING>) (citing Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individuals access to a service or website that requires an indication of assent to contractual terms before access to the service or website will be granted was sufficient evidence that the user clicked i accept  (B) holding that user access codes that facilitated access to a law enforcement database were properly redacted under exemption 7e (C) holding that riminis claim that they had permission from their clients to access oracles  website is irrelevant under the state statutes (D) holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective (E) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service
Output: (A)
penalty would not be administered in an arbitrary or random manner”). Permitting the jury to consider the disparate sentences pursued against equally guilty defendants would also be in keeping with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that capital juries not be precluded from considering, as mitigating factors, any aspects of a defendant’s character or of “the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Although the Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court does not violate Lockett by failing to permit consideration of co-defendant sentences as a mitigating factor, it did so in a case where the defendant facing the death penalty 4 (<HOLDING>). Where the prosecution has conceded that it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer must not be precluded from considering  any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers (B) holding that juries may not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers emphasis in original (C) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (D) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor (E) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded
Output: (B)
the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.”). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment^]” Id. Therefore, there is no issue for the court to adjudicate unless the nonmoving party puts forth evidence sufficient for a jury to return a verdict for that party; but “if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial (B) holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case (C) holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response (D) holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted (E) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case
Output: (B)
out to her mother? ... Which assault came first, Mr. Elliott, the one frontally or the one from behind while holding her neck with an electric cord, as you strangled her to death?”). The court pointed out that trial counsel objected and unsuccessfully sought a mistrial, and that the trial court sustained the objection as to the victim’s dying words. The PCRA court also emphasized that the trial court cautioned the jurors that that they should only consider the evidence proven at trial and that questions and statements of counsel are not evidence. Recognizing that jurors are presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions, the PCRA court denied relief on this claim. PCRA Court Opinion, Oct. 13, 2010, at 23 (citing Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 111 (2004) (<HOLDING>)). Finally, the PCRA court rejected Elliott’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jurors were presumed to follow instructions similar to those in the instant case (B) holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions (C) holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions (D) recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions (E) holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial courts instructions
Output: (B)
a third party sells a minor against her will to the defendant, to be at odds with its plain meaning and the context of 18 U.S.C. § 2251A. “Purchase” does not require the sale of a minor from a third party to the defendant. In the context of child prostitution, the minor herself is turned into an object or commodity, by selling her body to be used by the defendant for a certain purpose. A minor cannot separate her services from herself because she lacks the capacity to do so. Congress used the term “purchase” alone, rather than “purchase from the minor herself,” “purchase a minor’s services,” or “purchase from another,” to encompass situations where money is paid to a third party and where money is paid directly to the minor. See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-30, 113 S.Ct. at 2054-55 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense (B) holding that use of a firearm included the exchange of a gun for drugs and noting that simply because use as a weapon is the first example to come to mind when the phrase uses  a firearm is uttered does not preclude us from recognizing that there are other uses that qualify as well (C) holding that code  182531 criminalizing use or display of a firearm in the commission of a felony included use of an instrument that gives the appearance of being a firearm (D) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used (E) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm
Output: (B)
say this “touching” rose to the level of “deviate sexual intercourse.” However, we do find there was sufficient evidence adduced at the plea hearing that Relator committed child molestation in the first degree in violation of Section 566.067, RSMo 1994, in that he subjected two victims who were less than twelve years of age to “sexual contact” by touching their vaginas with his hand only. See State v. Pnce, 940 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo.App. E.D.1997) (placing hand on victim’s genitals constituted sexual abuse as opposed to deviate sexual' intercourse under amended statutes); State v. Palmer, 976 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Mo.App. E.D.1998) (touching victim’s genitals constituted sexual abuse, not statutory sodomy under amended statutes); State ex rel. Nixon v. Sprick, 59 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Mo. banc 2001) (<HOLDING>). Relator next argues that becadse his offenses 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts exclusion applies to intentional act of child molestation (B) holding that touching anus and touching genitals are separate offenses under penal code section 2211a1 (C) holding that an abuse or molestation exclusion unambiguously covered claim of sexual touching even though terms abuse and molestation were not defined (D) holding that simply exposing ones sexual organs to a child can be sufficient proof of child molestation (E) holding direct touching of victims vagina constituted child molestation under amended statutes
Output: (E)
of fires and explosions and electrical equipment failures, specifically in the causes of electrical fires. Id. He has performed several hundred investigations “involving consumer products, wiring and cabling, medical devices, and residential, commercial, and industrial electrical equipment.” Id. Hamilton Beach objects to the qualification of Wald, asserting that he would be testifying outside of the scope of his expertise because he has never been involved in the manufacture or design of toasters. Hamilton Beach Memo. (Dkt. No. 18) at 10. However, there is no requirement that an expert have manufacturing or design experience with a particular device to qualify as an expert about the design of that device. See, e.g., DaSilva v. Am. Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d 356, 361 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Wald’s education and experience in electrical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience (C) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (D) holding opinion testimony of civil engineer expert that movement of foundation was caused by seasonal moisture not plumbing leak was sufficiently reliable (E) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony
Output: (B)
uncon-scionability.” Woebse, 977 So.2d at 632 (citing Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So.2d 252, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Procedural uncon-scionability necessarily takes into account the manner in which the agreement was made. Id. At the hearing, the Estate argued that the facts are identical, really, to the Woebse case, in that it was a five-minute process where she was told to sign here and here, that she didn’t read the agreement. It wasn’t explained as an arbitration agreement to her. It was not explained that it was a voluntary process. Thus, the Estate sufficiently demonstrated that a disputed issue exists as to the making of the agreement so as to require an evidentiary hearing. See Linden v. Auto Trend, Inc., 923 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court should have held 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue (C) holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) recognizing that a party may demonstrate that a disputed issue exists as to the making of an arbitration agreement through arguments of counsel at a hearing
Output: (E)
attorney’s fees as § 507(a)(2) expenses and General Order 2007-6 details debtors’ attorney’s fees as § 330(a) expenses. BAPCPA amended § 1326(b)(1) by replacing the reference to § 507(a)(1), with § 507(a)(2). [B]y striking out the reference to § 507(a)(1) and replacing it with a reference to § 507(a)(2), the subsection that now governs administrative claims, including attorney’s fees ... [t]he court can only conclude that Congress made the affirmative decision to maintain the pre-BAPCPA treatment of administrative claims in Chapter 13 plans. In re Reid, 2006 WL 2077572, at *2 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2006). Based upon the plain language of § 1326(b)(1), § 507(a)(2) claims must be paid before, or concurrently with, payments to other creditors. See In re Boler, 2008 WL 205579, at *3 (M.D.Ala.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accord In re Brown, 2008 WL 205578, at *3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses (C) holding that quarterly fees are administrative expenses like  503b claims and must be subordinated to chapter 7 administrative expenses (D) holding plain language of  1326b1 requires administrative expenses to be paid before such domestic support obligations (E) holding that the plain language of the regulations requires a claimant to have an intent to file a claim for va benefits
Output: (D)
strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied
Output: (B)
its scope to reach the facts before us, particularly since doing so would read a key element out of the text of Rule 19(a)(2)®. Visa also relies on several cases that recite the general proposition that a party who claims title to a piece of property that is the subject of an action has sufficient interest in the action to justify compulsory joinder, and urges us to follow that reasoning here. Visa attempts to characterize this case as if it were a proceeding to determine the rightful owner of a piece of property to which MasterCard and Visa have competing claims. While we have held in cases involving this factual scenario that all claimants to the property at issue are necessary parties to the action, see, e.g., Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 117-19 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 736 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land (B) holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff (C) holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties (D) holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages (E) recognizing general proposition that if land is artificially submerged for the statutory period necessary to change ownership of the land title to the submerged land is passed to the state in trust for the public
Output: (B)
defective. If anything, his testimony suggests the battery in the ICD device was working too well; the ICD activated at times when he believed his heart rate was normal. At one point, Melton testified that the battery powering the ICD “never malfunctioned between the date that it was implanted and the date it was explanted.” Further, to the extent the ICD was “defective” in the sense that it was prone to over-activation, Melton also failed to present evidence that Dr. Feldman or Columbia Heart Clinic knew this at the time Dr. Feldman implanted the ICD. Accordingly, Melton failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Feldman’s implantation of the ICD, in and of itself, constituted malpractice. 3. Improper Corp., 324 S.C. 359, 365, 478 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Melton failed to present 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (B) holding expert testimony is generally required to establish proximate cause in medical malpractice cases (C) holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care (D) holding that expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish negligence where surgeon left a needle in the patients body but stating that proof of proximate cause requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases (E) holding expert testimony not required to defeat summary judgment in medical malpractice suit because defendant doctors admissions were sufficient to establish the standard of care
Output: (B)
tolling of the [EEOC] filing is inappropriate ... notwithstanding the plaintiffs allegations that she was given incorrect information by both an EEOC employee and her own counsel.” See Crossman v. Crosson, 905 F.Supp. 90, 95 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also South v. Saab Cars USA Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1994) (“[L]ack of due d ]” delay as grounds alone for applying the equitable tolling doctrine. (PI. Mem. 10.) No principle of law supports the proposition that the applicability of equitable tolling is measured by time alone. Rather, the relevant inquiry centers of the factual circumstances leading to the delay; equitable tolling does not excuse ordinary neglect. See Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Toolan v. Bd. of Educ. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period (B) holding the 90 day period begins to run the date the eeoc right to sue letter is delivered to plaintiffs counsel (C) holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included (D) holding in the context of the 90day period during which a plaintiff must bring suit after receiving a right to sue letter that in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day (E) holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action 
Output: (D)
in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the “first-served rule,” defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant’s service must join in the removal petition. The “failure to do so renders the petition defective.” Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena
Output: (D)
1. Defendant argues that the district court erred in not granting him a mistrial after it allowed the government to question Jose Colon-Maldonado (Colon) about the charged conspiracy. The court gave a curative instruction after the evidence was wrongfully admitted, and the fact that the jury acquitted Defendant of Counts One and Two indicates that the jury followed the instruction. See United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1206 (9th Cir.2004). 2. After the rebuttal witnesses testified, the trial court gave a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the testimony. There is no evidence in the record that the curative instruction failed to alleviate any prejudice to the Defendant. See United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 3. The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law (B) holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire (C) holding that prosecutorial blunder did not prejudice the defendant as the blunder was effectively cured by the instruction to the jury to disregard it (D) holding that the prejudicial effect of a direct reference to an accuseds failure to testify normally cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard (E) holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard
Output: (C)
the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator. See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator “when deficiencies in the arbitrator’s process call into question the arbitrator’s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition”); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen’s Ass’n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (B) holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union (C) holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator (D) holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy (E) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator
Output: (C)