niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
court found Seamon’s representation misleading because (1) it did not show accessible curbs when they were near inaccessible ones, and (2) it relied on outdated data. Kirola has not shown that these findings were clearly erroneous either. Finally, the trial record included evidence that the City’s Municipal Transportation Agency provides both public transportation and paratransit services as part of the public right-of-way. Id. at 1205. The paratransit service in particular includes van and taxi service for disabled individuals. Id. The public transportation and para-transit services are the sorts of “other methods” that can satisfy program access even if other particular methods of benefit-ting from the program are inaccessible. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1); see Daubert, 760 F.3d at 988 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we conclude that Kirola has not shown 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (C) holding that the public has an interest in having access to factual data from baseball games (D) holding that high school football games met program access standard where bleachers were inaccessible but other accessible locations provided unobstructed views of the field (E) recognizing that industrial arts teacher with a nineteenyear clean record at the same high school had a property interest protected by the due process clause in his particular assignment to that same high school
Output: (D)
Lee McNair appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil action without prejudice as frivolous and as barred by the terms of a pre-filing injunction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. McNair v. Evan, No. 4:12-cv-00069-FL, 2012 WL 2579338 (E.D.N.C. July 4 & 11, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED. * Generally, orders dismissing complaints without prejudice are interlocutory and not ap-pealable. Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). However, orders dismissing actions or cases 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that a dismissal without prejudice is a final order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiffs case (C) holding that dismissal without prejudice is final appealable order where no amendment to complaint could cure deficiencies identified by district court (D) holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a (E) holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
Output: (A)
Modular obtained a release for Poerio — a party Mr. Smith did not sue and against which Mr. Smith’s statute of limitations had run at the time of trial — preserves Modular’s claim for contribution against Poerio. Although this issue has not'been squarely addressed by this Court, the Parke-Davis Court obliquely noted that, as in West Virginia, states which have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCA-TA”) typically find that a settlement by a joint tortfeasor terminates its right of contribution, “barring a release obtained by the settling tortfeasor that expressly extinguishes any liability against all tortfeasors.” 217 W.Va. at 23, n. 11, 614 S.E.2d at 23, n. 11 (emphasis added); see also Mackey v. Irisan, 191 W.Va. 355, 361 n. 4, 445 S.E.2d 742, 748 n. 4 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Urging the Court to adopt this rule, Modular 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a right to contribution (B) recognizing contribution in the appropriate case (C) recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware (D) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (E) recognizing rule in ucata states that where settling defendant settles only his share contribution does not lie but contribution may be had from defendant whose liability was extinguished by joint tortfeasors settlement
Output: (E)
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 [103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275] (1983) (per curiam) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 [104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317] (1984). Furthermore, this court has held that a restraint on liberty which would constitute a seizure under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), does not necessarily place the seized person in custody for Miranda purposes. Mcllwain v. United States, 568 A.2d 470, 472-73 (D.C.1989); see Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 439-40 [104 S.Ct. 3138], E.A.H., 612 A.2d at 838 (footnote omitted); see also Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1216 (D.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). As we noted in Mcllwain, “[t]he comparatively 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an applicant who had been detained for 36 hours and suffered a beating by the police but without serious injury had not been persecuted (B) holding that even if a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the police station to which morris had been taken for questioning and where he had been for more than four hours and even if morris had thus been detained the restraint was not the equiva lent of a formal arrest and morris was not in custody for miranda purposes when he made an incriminating admission (C) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (D) holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview (E) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
Output: (B)
CURIAM: Robb M. Harksen appeals the district court’s orders dismissing without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2000) his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), for failure to state a claim. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in the district court’s dismissal of Harksen’s due process and access to courts claims. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the district court’s order for the reasons stated by the district court. See Harksen v. Braxton, No. CA-04-242 (W-D.Va. Oct. 28, 2004); see also Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). With regard to Harksen’s Eighth Amendment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a dismissal without prejudice is a final order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiffs case (B) holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order (C) holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was appealable (D) holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that dismissal without prejudice is final appealable order where no amendment to complaint could cure deficiencies identified by district court
Output: (E)
could not accurately enforce this portion of the property settlement agreement, despite testimony from both Mr. and Mrs. Prine that they knew exactly which tools Mr. Prine was to receive under the term “small hand tools” as such term was used in the property settlement agreement. Additionally, the chancellor made no finding as to Mr. Prine’s rights with respect to a “Yamaha 250 four wheel ATV” that Mr. Prine was to receive under the terms of the property settlement agreement, an article of personal property which Mrs. Prine gave away for no consideration after Mr. Prine fled the marital home. ¶ 16. Under these facts I must conclude that the chancellor committed manifest error in attempting to modify the terms of an enforceable property settlement agreement. See Mount, 624 So.2d at 1005 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would reverse the chancellor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified (B) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt (C) holding that chancellor committed manifest error when he modified property settlement agreement (D) holding that it was error for the court to enter a modified agreement which materially altered the agreement reached by the parties (E) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement
Output: (C)
defendant’s conversion by wrongful act inconsistent with the property rights of the plaintiff; and (3) damages.” In re Emery, 317 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 704 (1998)). One partner can be liable to another for conversion of partnership property. Oakdale Vill. Grp. v. Fong, 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 546, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (1996), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Apr. 10, 1996). Further, intangible property such as corporate shares and bonds may be the proper subject of a conversion claim. See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1411 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting California cases); see also Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 125, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (2007) (<HOLDING>). However, more abstract intangible property, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (B) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss (C) holding that it is not (D) holding insufficiently definite bonus agreement that did not establish amount or method for determining amount of payment (E) holding that a businesss net operating loss is the proper subject of conversion because it is a definite recordable amount
Output: (E)
appellant’s interpretation of the policy. Section B states that appellees will pay, when due, the benefits required. Section C gives appellees the right to investigate and settle all claims, proceedings, or suits. The actions taken by appellees pursuant to section C will determine if appellees are required to pay the benefits discussed in section B. If appellees exercise their rights under the policy in section C to settle a claim, then payment will be required of appellees under section B. There is .no requirement in the policy that appellees obtain the consent of appellant when settling a claim or investigating the merits of a claim, and we are not permitted to write such a clause into the policy. Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908, 913-14 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Apex Towing Co. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (B) holding that thirdparty indemnity claims are not premature (C) holding that when policy gives absolute right to settle thirdparty claims courts are not permitted to engraft any consent requirement onto the policy (D) holding that injured employee has right to settle with thirdparty tortfeasor claims not covered by minnesota workers compensation act (E) holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle
Output: (C)
In Granato v. City and County of Denver, No. CIV 11-0304 MSK/BNB, 2011 WL 3820730 (D.Colo. Aug. 20, 2011), the Honorable Marcia S. Krieger, now-Chief United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, ruled similarly: At a minimum, a party asserting a Mo-nell claim must plead sufficient facts to identify the unconstitutional custom or policy that was promulgated and the means by which that custom or policy caused the constitutional violation. Here, Ms. Granato’s allegations of an unconstitutional custom or policy maintained by Denver Health are entirely conclusory. She offers only the “formulaic recitation” of a Monell claim, alleging that Mr. Khazanov “act[ed] and/or fail[ed] to act pursuant to City or State policy, custom, decision, ordinance, re d 503, 506-07 (3d Cir.l985)(<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe a pre-determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts are to accept allegations in the complaint as being true including monell policies and writing that a federal court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint has a limited task (B) holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom (C) recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss (D) holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint (E) holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true
Output: (A)
n. 7, 713 P.2d at 960 n. 7 (1986) (“Counsel has no right to cast upon the court the burden of searching through a voluminous record to find the ground of an objection. It is counsel’s duty to cite accurately the portions of the record supporting counsel’s position.” (Internal citation omitted.)); Hoang, 93 Hawaii at 336, 3 P.3d at 602 (2000) (“Because the factual basis of [appellant’s] alleged point of error is not part of the record on appeal, this court has no basis upon which to rule on the merits of his claim.” (Citation omitted.)) Even if Appellants’ allegations of fraudulent inducement are taken at face value, they fall short of “clear and convincing” evidence of fraudulent inducement. Honolulu Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Murphy, 7 Haw. App. 196, 202, 753 P.2d 807, 812 (1988) (<HOLDING>). At a more fundamental level, they do not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof (B) holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied (C) holding that the standard of proving fraudulent inducement with respect to written contracts is extremely high and a written contract will be cancelled only in a clear ease of fraud supported by clear and convincing evidence citations omitted (D) holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence (E) holding clear and convincing standard to prove fraud or fraudulent intent and preponderance of the evidence to prove other elements under  727
Output: (C)
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the illegal proceeds of wire fraud were thereafter used to promote the carrying on of the illegal scheme as alleged in the money laundering counts of the indictment. The proceeds generated from the underlying wire fraud were, in large part, the income stream that allowed Consortium to continue to maintain the appearance of legitimacy for a number of years. Indeed, the evidence showed that virtually all of the $3.2 million in fees was reinvested into Consortium’s business and expended to maintain the operation. Id. at 928. The Sentencing Guideline 3B1.1, we agree with Ross that using conduct from one group of counts to adjust the offense level of another group of counts without thereafter grouping all the cou 8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 28 usc  2461c authorizes criminal forfeiture of proceeds from general mail fraud via 18 usc  981a1c (B) holding that a count of 18 usc  1957 money laundering should not be grouped with mail fraud counts under either  3d12b or d (C) holding that restitution under the victim and witness protection act need not be limited to  the specific amount alleged in the count of mail fraud to which defendant pled (D) holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 (E) holding that a count of 18 usc  1956 reinvestment money laundering should not be grouped with wire fraud counts under  3d12b
Output: (B)
for new trial. 1 . The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 2 . In early 1994, Watson was detailed into an "Acting Building Management Specialist” position. During-his ninety-day detail, he was responsible for maintaining the environment and overseeing service contracts owned and leased by the IRS. The person ultimately selected for the open position, Milling Canon, replaced Watson in the ninety-day detail position. 3 . The only aspect of the district court's partial summary-judgment order addressed in Watson’s appeal is the court’s ruling on his retaliation claim. Thus, we will only consider this portion of the partial summary-judgment order in our analysis. See In re MidAmerican Energy Co., 286 F.3d 483, 487 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Because Watson offers no argument on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived (B) holding that claims not raised in an appellants initial brief to our court are waived (C) holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned (D) holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived (E) holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived
Output: (B)
v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 937, 950-51 (M.D.Tenn.2000). As other circuits have recognized, the treating physician rule is a standard that was developed in the Social Security context requiring the administrative law judge to give deference to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician when determining the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 833-35 (6th Cir.2002) (applying the “treating physician presumption” in a Black Lungs Benefit case holding that an AL J may place greater weight on the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician than those of non-treating physicians). Several circuits have adopted the treating physician rule in an ERISA context. Regula, 266 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa (B) holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate (C) holding that an erisa plan administrator is not bound by an ssa disability determination when reviewing a claim for benefits (D) holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician (E) holding as a matter of first impression that the treating physician rule is applicable in the context of a disability benefits determination under erisa
Output: (E)
to cause the U.S. government to overpay (i.e. suffer a direct financial loss to the federal fisc) for equipment to be resold to Saudi Arabia). 61 . Moreover, there is no indication in the legislative history that § 3729(c) was intended to expand the scope of FCA liability to demands for payment from money or property merely in the possession of the United States government. Nor does anything in the legislative history indicate an intent to overrule Cohn. Instead, Congress sought to clarify that the FCA extends to false claims made to states and other grantees of federal funds, overturning certain lower court decisions holding to the contrary. See S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 21 (1986); see also United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. (Totten II), 380 F.3d 488, 494-97 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Nowhere does the legislative history suggest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states (B) holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 usc  286  a companion statute to the criminal fca  because his claims were false when submitted even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor (C) holding that congress may even have been unsuccessful in this regard when those false claims are not ultimately presented to the united states (D) holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act (E) recognizing similar problem if fca is applied to claims presented to any federal grantee even if claims are not represented to united states
Output: (C)
of the state. Our interpretation today is consistent with previous decisions construing the same phrase. In determining the state departments and agencies that are entitled to sovereign immunity, this Court has never restricted the defense or its waiver to entities with the words “department” or “agency” in their title. Instead, we have held that the terms apply to state political subdivisions and governmental entities, including the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and counties. Likewise, we have held that the phrase in the 1991 amendment does not apply to municipalities or local hospital authorities because they are neither the state nor a department or agency of the state. Based on the language and legislative history of the 19 217 Ga. 712 (124 SE2d 733) (1962) (<HOLDING>); State Ports Auth. v. Arnall, 201 Ga. 713 (41 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act (B) holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government (C) holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act (D) holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board (E) holding that two entities were a single employer and therefore that their gross receipts could be totaled together to establish jurisdiction under the national labor relations act
Output: (D)
time may have some parallels in a different jurisdictional doctrine. 28 . See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (noting that the presumption "guards against our courts triggering [the] serious foreign policy consequences” that could be raised if "other nations, also applying the law of nations, could hale our citizens into their courts for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere else in the world”); Al Shimon, 758 F.3d at 530 (concluding that the case did "not present any potential problems associated with bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the defendants are United States citizens”); accord Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 322-24 (D.Mass.2013) (<HOLDING>). 29 . For further discussion of authorities 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims (B) holding state buy american statute unconstitutional because it interfered with federal foreign affairs power emphasizing its effect on foreign commerce (C) holding that kiobel did not bar ats claims against an american citizen in part because this is not a case where a foreign national is being hailed sic into an unfamiliar court to defend himself (D) holding that coverage arguably existed under an insurance policy for claims against an employer and employees for an alleged assault and battery of bar patrons and that the insurer had a duty to defend (E) holding nlra applied to state bank of indias activities in the united states because most employees are american citizens or american residents and the labor dispute centers on the wages to be paid american residents foreign or natural 
Output: (C)
was allegedly violated on each date, despite the fact that the EOP contained several different provisions referring to various types of acts. Be cause the Counts in the Complaint merely alleged that Corder “did intentionally or knowingly violate the [EOP] issued in FC-DA No. 05-1-1551 on August 2, 2006[,]” without designating which conduct and sections within the EOP were violated, “the nature and cause of the accusation [could not] be understood by a person of common understanding from a reading of the Complaint itself.” Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 71, 890 P.2d at 308 (internal quotations marks omitted). The Complaint did reference in its caption (as opposed to in the charges) Police Report No. 07-016631 with respect to Count I, Police Report No. 07-021001 with respect t 1078, 1081 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Complaint was defective. II. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the hrpp does not permit a broad and freeranging discovery in criminal cases (B) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position (E) recognizing the fact that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hawaii rules of penal procedure hrpp rule 7a and the fact that other discovery rules given to the defendant are limited might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position
Output: (A)
evidence that appellant was sometimes delusional, spat on the floor, was angry and irritable toward the hospital staff, had disorganized thought patterns, exhibited rap id mood swings, and that, on the day after she was admitted, appellant wore wet clothes and attempted to disrobe in a common area of the hospital. We have previously held that an expert diagnosis of mental illness, standing alone, is not sufficient to confine a patient for treatment. K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 892; Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). Additionally, evidence that merely reflects a patient’s mental illness and need for hospitalization is not sufficient to meet the State’s burden under section 574.034 of the Mental Health Code. See, e.g., K.T., 68 S.W.3d at 892 (<HOLDING>); D.J. v. State, 59 S.W.3d 352, 357 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was in military and that mail carrier was responsible for her welfare not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (B) holding evidence of patients psychotic behavior delusions that she had undergone surgery by satellite and had electronics implanted in her not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (C) holding evidence of patients schizophrenia auditory hallucinations paranoia irritability and refusal to take medication not sufficient to meet required statutory burden (D) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (E) holding evidence of patients delusion that she was pregnant and had sutures in her vagina not sufficient to meet required statutory burden
Output: (E)
in Rules 3007 or 7001 appear to require an adversary proceeding simply because a claim of fraud or malpractice is made, absent a claim for affirmative relief. 2. Lack of Standing to Assert Claims In the three circuit court cases, the party raising the malpractice claim had standing to r 234 B.R. 8, 11 (D.Conn.1997) (explaining that 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) expressly provides that any interest in property acquired by the estate after commencement of the bankruptcy, including a cause of action, is considered to be part of the estate). After conversion of a case to chapter 7, the decision to pursue, or not to pursue, a claim belongs to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 323; Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino County Superior Court Case Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Bezanson, 402 F.3d at 265. Costa, not the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code (B) holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court (C) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (D) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (E) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code
Output: (C)
jurisdictional rule is ciarity.”). By making all actions for the charges on transportation-services contracts subject to the TCA’s three-year filing period, common carriers doing business with the government need not specplate about (among other things) the jurisdictional time frame in which they must file a complaint in federal court. Carriers in Inter-Coastal’s shoes, for example, will know that the ICA’s three-year filing period applies, no.t the filing period governed by the CDA. Our holding today thus has the benefit of establishing the bright-line rule that the Court of Federal Claims itself had established before dicta in Dalton may have cast some uncertainty upon it. See Northeastern Penn., 32 Fed.Cl. at 74-75 & n. 8; see also Scott v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 829, 831 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Stapp Towing Co., Inc., 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,293, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract (B) holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc  2244d is subject to equitable tolling (C) holding that the ica threeyear limitations period governs and unequivocally  supersedes the six year limitations period in 28 usc  2501 in cases involving claims for transportation charges (D) holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 (E) holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983
Output: (C)
the information to the “best of its ability.” Def. Br. 25. Alternatively, Commerce claims that this argument is beyond the scope of this proceeding since it is not an issue raised by the Plaintiff. “[IJntervenor is limited to the field of litigation open to the original parties, and cannot enlarge the issues tendered by or arising out of plaintiffs bill.” Torrington Co. v. United States, 14 CIT 56, 57, 731 F.Supp. 1073, 1075 (1990) (citing Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, 296 U.S. 53, 56, 56 S.Ct. 6, 80 L.Ed. 39 (1935)) (granting plaintiffs motion to strike defendant-intervenor’s affirmative defenses because they raised issue of standing not contested by plaintiff and defendant); see also Grupo Indus. Camesa v. United States, 18 CIT 107, 108 (1994) (not reported in F.Supp.) (<HOLDING>). Russel’s claim that Commerce failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed (B) holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity (C) holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint (D) holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing (E) holding that plaintiffintervenors argument was separate from plaintiffs claim because plaintiff did not challenge pertinent statute as unconstitutional even though complaint alleged that itcs determination was not in accordance with law in a number of respects including the following
Output: (E)
The specific roles played by each corporate Defendant are also adequately delineated; for example, Transmarketing is alleged to have been a conduit to move funds from Bingham and Tetra to Procida. To borrow from a recent case: Here, the circumstances constituting the fraud — the relationships giving rise to the fiduciary duties owed by [the defendants], the details of the alleged embezzlement, and the concealment — generally are stated with particularity. The complaint alleges, among other things, specific diversions of funds, giving in most eases the approximate dates, amounts and purposes. Thus, Rule 9(b) is satisfied as to the core of the complaint.... Spiro, 876 F.Supp. at 559 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Smith, 576 F.Supp. 1061, 1070-71 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. Carr v. Equistar Offshore, Ltd., No. 94 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant waived complaint (B) holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing (C) holding that the firsttofile rule did not bar complaint involving same defendants where firstfiled complaint did not put government on notice of a separate fraudulent scheme (D) holding that failure to identify specific dates and contents of mailings was not fatal to complaint where complaint offered detailed description of defendants overall rico scheme (E) holding that a defendants failure to attach process to its notice of removal was not fatal and did not require remand
Output: (D)
opinion notes that the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts granted Finch a hearing before issuing its order denying him the right to take the examination for licensure prescribed in Section 334.040, supra. At this hearing, Finch introduced evidence of his rehabilitation commensurate with that outlined in the majority opinion. Finch’s previous conviction was never disputed and he was fully aware that it was the “roadblock” to his licensure by the board. In my opinion, the Board afforded procedural due process to Finch, particularly so when measured by the standard expressed by Mr. Justice Goldberg (joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart) in his concurring opinion in Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (<HOLDING>) wherein at pp. 107, 108, at p. 1182 of 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amenability hearings must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment (B) holding that the facts did not measure up to the standard expressed for determining procedural due process (C) holding that the defendant was denied due process because the procedural rule was not followed in any respect by the trial court (D) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (E) holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard
Output: (B)
106 S.Ct. at 2553. And if plaintiff cannot support each essential element of his claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The Court reviews defendants’ motion for summary judgment in light of the forgoing standard. DISCUSSION There is no question in this case of Brod-nicki’s innocence. But, because “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), Brodnieki’s innocence is irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause for his arrest. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The issue before the Court is whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (B) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed (C) holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality (D) holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause (E) holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest
Output: (E)
Seminatore, we find these references incidental to the propositions of law for which these cases stand. In reaching this conclusion, we take into consideration that the word “pending” is used once in the Seminatore opinion and, although “pending” is used four times in the Wilke opinion, it is not used at all in the court’s discussion of legal expenses under R.C. 305.14. Notably, neither case involved the reliance on assurances of reimbursement that we must consider here. {¶ 50} It is inconsistent for respondents to stand in the way of proper procedural performance under R.C. 305.14(A) while arguing that relators’ writ of mandamus must fail because the particulars of R.C. 305.14(A) were not followed. See Barrett v. Picker Internatl., Inc. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 820, 826, 589 N.E.2d 1372 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 51} Thus, in conclusion, we hold that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs status as thirdparty beneficiaries cannot be used as both a sword to reap the benefits    and a shield to protect them (B) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status (C) holding that a firearm could be used both to protect the defendants spouse and to facilitate the defendants drug trafficking crimes (D) holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them (E) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract
Output: (A)
68 L.Ed.2d 238 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 2654, 41 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed.2d 257 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 237, 3 L.Ed.2d 231 (1958). The California Supreme Court has held that the state constitution enshrines a correlative protection. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at 274, 208 Cal.Rptr. at 155, 690 P.2d at 628. The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of compelled disclosure of media sources in the context of non-grand jury-criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Farr v. Pritchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 3200, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In so doing, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit (B) holding that pennsylvanias interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed new yorks interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant (C) holding accuseds right to fair trial outweighed newsmans interest in protecting sources and privilege must yield (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental (E) recognizing academic privilege but holding plaintiffs need for information outweighed colleges interest in confidentiality
Output: (C)
claim first be classified as “an allowed secured claim” within the meaning of Section 1325(a)(5). Under Nobelman and Zimmer, as discussed above, when a creditor is wholly unsecured after application of Section 506(a), the creditor has only an unsecured claim for purposes of Section 1322(b)(2). The creditor is not the holder of a secured claim, and as such, Section 1325(a)(5), which, by its language applies only to secured claims, does not apply to the wholly unsecured creditor. Hill, when considering this issue, reached this very conclusion. After considering many of the same decisions that this court has considered, and after the same analysis of the statutory text that this court has engaged in, the court found that Section 1325(a)(5) “has no applicability to unsecured claims, whi ) (<HOLDING>); In re Frazier, — B.R. -, 2011 WL 1206198, *6 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim (B) holding that the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506a does not determine the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506d (C) holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 (D) holding that if claim is not an allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506a by its terms section 1325a5b is inapplicable (E) holding that where there was no value in the collateral to secure the claim after application of section 506a creditor did not hold a secured claim and therefore lacked basis for asserting rights under 11 usc  1325a5
Output: (D)
Trust has $72,741 that may be used to fund this litigation, because the money in the Residence Trust to which the Revocable Trust’s beneficiaries are entitled, however much that may ultimately be, will be added to the Revocable Trust; (3) Mr. Alvord has provided no evidence other than his own representation to show that the beneficiaries are incapable of financing the litigation on their own, nor has he made a credible showing that the Revocable Trust funds are insufficient to fully litigate this matter; and (4) should the funds in the Revocable Trust be exhausted, Mr. Alvord can seek to have the injunction modified. We agree with the trial court’s analysis with respect to the balance of harm and find no error. Cf. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden however will be on the defendant to satisfy the court that he can secure the services of an attorney only if assets subject to the freeze order are released (B) holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (E) holding forfeited theories will be reversed on appeal only if the appellant can satisfy the plain error standard
Output: (A)