niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
that the County’s allegations that MERS violated recording statutes by failing to record assignments stated a claim for relief), In re Thomas, 447 B.R. 402, 412 (Bankr.D.Mass.2011) (applying Massachusetts law and holding that “[w]hile the assignment purports to assign both the mortgage and the note, MERS ... was never the holder of the note, and therefore lacked the right to assign it.... MERS is never the owner of the obligation secured by the mortgage for which it is the mortgagee of record”), and In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 404 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2009) (applying Idaho law and holding that MERS is not authorized “either expressly or by implication” to transfer notes as the “nominal beneficiary” of the lender), with Town of Johnston v. MERSCORP, Inc., 950 F.Supp.2d 379, 384 (D.R.I.2013) (<HOLDING>); DeFranceschi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 837 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rhode island law does not require recording of assignments among mers members (B) holding that minnesota law does not require recording of assignments of promissory notes among mers members (C) holding that the mere absence of a tape recording or transcript does not mean that an alien is deprived of his due process rights (D) holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording (E) holding that a letter describing discussions between board members did not support conclusion that the three members whom a jury could find individually acted with racial animus had an understanding among themselves to do so
Output: (A)
until after the interview ended. Defendants therefore contend that we should ignore contrary testimony by Whalen and Connelly. On summary judgment, however, we do not merely accept the plaintiff's contentions as true. Instead, we must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovanfs favor. There is no requirement that inferences favorable to the plaintiff may only be based on evidence that she has submitted to us. Here, the justifiable inference favorable to plaintiff is that a question of fact exists regarding this issue. 6 . The Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Al-bright casts some doubt on whether a plaintiff may state a claim for coercion of a confession under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Albright,-U.S. at-,-,-, -, 114 S.Ct. at 813, 814, 817, 820-21 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has stated that Albright 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim (C) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (D) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding in five separate opinions that  1983 claim based on persons arrest cannot be brought under substantive due process where more specific constitutional provision  fourth amendment  applies
Output: (E)
S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)); see Copening, 506 F.3d at 1248. “An arrest is distinguished” from an investigative Terry stop “by the involuntary, ‘highly intrusive’ nature of the encounter.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115. For example, “the use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques generally exceed the scope of an investigative detention and enter the realm of an arrest.” Id. at 1115-16 (quotation, alterations omitted). Or an investigative deten tion may last too long under the specific circumstances of a given case and on that basis may be transformed into a de facto arrest. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682-88, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (eschewing a bright-line rule); see United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir.2004) (citing cases); see also Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116 (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, Defendants do not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16 (C) holding force used during seizure as well as its duration turned investigative detention into a full custodial arrest (D) holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled (E) holding that plaintiff bears burden of production as well as persuasion
Output: (C)
and managed the other members of the conspiracy following her husband’s arrest. Guerra has not established that the district court clearly erred in imposing the three-level enhancement under § 3Bl.l(b). See id. She also argues that the district court erred when it applied the two-level weapons enhancement pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(l). A district court’s determination that the § 2Dl.l(b)(l) weapons enhancement applies is also a factual finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Zapata-Lara, 615 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir.2010). To support the enhancement, the Government must demonstrate a “temporal and spatial relationship [between] the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” Id.; see also United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 766 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). If the Government satisfies its burden, “the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding intent may be inferred from large amount of marijuana (B) holding in a ease of a reverse sting operation the use of a large amount of drugs did not amount to sentencing factor manipulation (C) holding firearms large sums of cash  and uncharged quantities of illegal drugs are admissible to show a defendant is involved in the distribution of illegal drugs (D) holding that a large amount of drugs increases the likelihood of weapons (E) holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute
Output: (D)
OGA for breach of contract and conversion. The jury found for Hardi 4, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (permitting mother of deceased son to recover mental-anguish damages on her breach-of-contract claim against entity that improperly prepared son’s body for burial); Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex. 1993) (setting forth elements of IIED claim and holding that defendant’s conduct was not outrageous as matter of law because defendant may assert its legal rights in permissible way, even if assertion causes mental anguish). The second is that mental anguish stemming from the birth and rearing of a health^ child is not a compensable injury. See Pressil v. Gibson, 477 S.W.3d 402, 410-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); cf. Delgado v. Methodist Hosp., 936 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages (B) holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested (C) holding that a plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages because he had failed to rebut the defendants prima facie showing that the alleged trespass was not attended by words or acts of insult or contumely (D) holding that plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages in connection with the birth of healthy children (E) holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages
Output: (D)
if “(a) Attendance is outside of the employee’s regular working hours; (b) Attendance is in fact voluntary; (c) The course, lecture, or meeting is not directly related to the employee’s job; and (d) The employee does not perform any productive work during such attendance.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.27; see also Wolman, 2010 WL 5491182, at *3. Here, Wolman and Lundy have asserted facts sufficient to state a claim that the monthly, mandatory staff meetings were compensable. However, the Court finds that Wolman failed to assert facts sufficient to state a claim that the ten hours of respiratory therapy credits were compensable: The FAC does not state where or when these credits were obtained or if they were mandatory. See, e.g., Price v. Tampa Elec. Co., 806 F.2d 1551, 1551-52 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). b. In Excess of W Hours per Week To survive a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that employee would have to be the rainman to be able to retain recall and make use of information contained in documents with which he worked while employed by defendant where he did not take those documents with him when he left (B) holding that meterman was not entitled to compensation for time spent taking a course to advance to a higher paying job classification because his employer did not require him to take the course and he would have remained a meterman with the same responsibilities and credits had he chosen not to take the course (C) holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer (D) holding that the phrase  to  be taken is of course a future tense of the verb take (E) holding that while safety improvements to public golf course were both feasible and highly desirable the citys failure to take such steps did not create a dangerous condition on the golf course for purposes of the cgia
Output: (B)
citations and quotations omitted). Thus, the Court does not view evidence of racial discrimination in hiring practices at Budco as irrelevant to Wilson’s claim that he was discriminated against by being transferred back to DCXOM and by not being hired for a job ultimately given to Page. 5. Many of the black temps within the company quit because they were discouraged with Budco’s hiring practices. Defendants assert that the Court should strike paragraph 5 for lack of personal knowledge. In his supplemental affidavit, Wilson explained that he knew this information because he was told by the employees why they were quitting. Wilson lacks personal knowledge of information that he received from these employees. See Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 495-96 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 526 n. 13 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fourth amendment did not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to government authorities (B) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (C) holding that statements even when made to a third party which are appropriately determined to be threatening can constitute obstruction of justice (D) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (E) holding that plaintiffaffiant did not have personal knowledge of statements made to him by a third party
Output: (E)
his indictment. In his motion, Leverett complained the indictment needed to more specifically describe the gold and jewelry that he had allegedly stolen. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.09 (West 2009) (explaining the amount of detail required in describing personal property in an indictment). Subsequently, the trial court conducted a hearing on Leverett’s motion. During the hearing, the State argued that the indictment was not deficient, but also argued that if it was, the State should be given additional time to satisfy any due process requirements by providing Lever-ett notice by means other than the language in the indictment, allowing the State to provide Leverett with more detail regarding the property at issue. See Kella/r v. State, 108 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Tex.Crim. App.2003) (<HOLDING>). During the hearing, the trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient (B) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (C) holding that verbal notice was sufficient (D) holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the state to amend its indictment because he had more than adequate time to prepare his defense (E) holding that the states itemized list containing dates check numbers and amounts of multiple transactions provided defendant with sufficient notice to prepare a defense
Output: (E)
make the point that an illegitimate purpose can often be achieved without any further act beyond the obtaining of the process. Although our cases are not uniform in this respect, some support this point of view. Without turning on any additional act of misuse, a number of cases find that initiating process alone can at times be so coercive and promoting of ulterior advantage that it supports an abuse of process claim. See Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 210-211 (1913) (allowing an abuse of process claim where an “attachment was made for the ostensible purpose of collecting a commission,” but a jury could find that the real object was to prevent the conveyance of the property to another and to secure it for the party suing for the commission); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass. 345 (1928) (<HOLDING>); Jacoby v. Spector, 292 Mass. 366, 369 (1935) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim (B) recognizing an abuse of process claim for an attachment that a jury could find was intended to coerce a factory owner to settle a claim against her on a debt that the claimant knew was incurred by a different party (C) holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict (D) holding the insurer liable for failing to settle the claim when time was of the essence (E) holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings
Output: (B)
absent the regulation.” Id., citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985). The validity of time, place, or manner regulations does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting “significant government interests” or the degree to which those interests should be promoted. Id. “So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the gov ernment’s interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less ... restrictive alternative.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see also United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931, 103 S.Ct. 2094, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal (C) holding a 12b5 defense is waived if it is not made in a rule 12 motion or if it is not included in a responsive pleading (D) holding that a time place and manner restriction of right of access of the press to observe criminal trials is constitutional if it is reasonable if it promotes significant governmental interests and if it does not unwarrantedly abridge opportunities for communication of thought (E) holding that an award may be in excess of the arbitrators powers if it requires the public employer to perform an act that is prohibited by law or if it does not involve legitimate terms and conditions of employment
Output: (D)
and train staff members, id. at 38; and (10) defendants “conspire against prisoners” who file grievances and complaints, id. Plaintiffs attempt to establish personal involvement based upon the supervisory roles these defendants occupied is inappropriate. See, e.g., Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2009) (vague and conclusory allegations that a supervisor has failed to properly monitor the actions of subordinate employees do not suffice to establish the requisite personal involvement and support a finding of liability); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (plaintiff “must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights”); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract (B) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter (C) holding that a position in a hierarchical chain of command without more is insufficient to support a showing of personal involvement (D) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (E) holding that mere presence at the crime scene without more is insufficient to prove accomplice liability
Output: (C)
to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S, 361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (upholding the United States Sentencing Guidelines). See id. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 647 (pointing out that the federal “sentencing function long has been a peculiarly shared responsibility” rather than “the exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch” and finding no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor’s discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 239-40 (5th Cir.1998), aff'd, 527 U.S. 373, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 895 (4th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty (B) holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation (C) holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable (D) holding that it is improper to categorize certain factors  as simply out of bounds in deciding whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop (E) recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest
Output: (B)
review. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 6101— 6104, 6301-6307. As a result, while the sailors may seek review of the Coast Guard’s actions under other grants of federal jurisdiction, they must do so within the framework of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 702; accord Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 103-07, 97 S.Ct. 980, 983-85, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). The APA permits “non-statutory” judicial review only of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”); see also Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 2191, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (recognizing “strong presumption” that judicial review will be available onl Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Normally, the plaintiff must await resolution 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing doctrine (B) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (C) holding allegation made in enforcement suit does not impose the kind of legal obligation with which the finality doctrine is concerned (D) holding that attorneys fees and costs may not be awarded as child support when they are incurred in a suit to modify the parentchild relationship that does not involve the enforcement of a child support obligation (E) holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death
Output: (C)
7801, 7802, 7803, 7804, or 7805), depending upon the predominant disability. 38 C.F.R. § 4.118, DC 7806. Here, the language of Diagnostic Code 7806 is unambiguous: the diagnostic code explicitly mentions corticosteroids as an example of “systemic therapy” and does not further distinguish between different types of corticosteroid application. Otherwise stated, as used in Diagnostic Code 7806, “constant or near-constant systemic therapy such as corticosteroids .or other immunosuppressive drugs [ ] required during the past 12-month period,” defines systemic therapy as the use of corticosteroids without any limitation of type of use, and it is well settled that the Board is not permitted to add criteria not included in the rating schedule. See Drosky v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 251, 255 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Pernorio v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 625, 628 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the boards imposition of additional requirements other than those specified in the diagnostic code was impermissible (B) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (C) holding that the faa extends to employment cases for employees other than those engaged in transportation of goods (D) holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa (E) holding that the faa extends to employment cases for employees other than those engaged in transportation
Output: (A)
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 773 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied)). 8 . See Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. D’Alessandro, 671 A.2d 1233, 1235 (R.I.1996) (requiring (1) causal connection between injury and insured vehicle, (2) reasonably close geographic proximity to vehicle, (3) vehicle-orientation rather than highway-orientation or sidewalk-orientation, and (4) engagement in transaction essential to use of the vehicle); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinney, 831 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Ky.1992) (same); Utica Mut. Ins. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005, 1009 (1984) (same). 9 . See Butzberger v. Foster, 151 Wash.2d 396, 89 P.3d 689, 696 (2004) (rejecting fourth prong of four-prong test). 10 . See Olsen v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 329, 609 N.W.2d 664, 670 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Joins v. Bonner, 28 Ohio St.3d 398, 504 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (B) holding a car was broken into or entered when defendant reached in through the open window of a car (C) holding passenger was in the process of getting out of vehicle until he reached a position of safety away from the car (D) holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety (E) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous
Output: (C)
existence of the marketing agreement or the fact that the agreement covered revenues recorded and recognized prior to the end of the fiscal year. Complaint, ¶ 53. As a result, defendants’ disclosure of the agreement does not support the conclusion that they intended to dispel the allegedly misleading effect of the financial statements. It also, therefore, does not negate the inference that defendants made the material misstatements with either a specific or reckless intent to defraud. As stated above, the complaint alleges that Chantal’s method of revenue recognition was inconsistent with SFAS 48. Premature accounting recognition of this kind by corporate defendants, where a right of return is clearly capable of exercise, permits an inference of scienter. See Malone, 26 F.3d at 478-480 (<HOLDING>). When considered in light of the other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that misleading newspaper ads and letters which were mailed need not be false or fraudulent on their face and the accused need not misrepresent any fact since it is just as unlawful to speak half truths or to omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which they were made not misleading (B) holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements (C) holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems  that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that jury could make inference that corporate defendants false or misleading statements regarding sales which violated sfas 48 were made with an intent to deceive manipulate or defraud investors based on evidence that defendants were aware of the right of return and approved it
Output: (E)
to foreclosure for mortgagors who are in default before initiating foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the National Housing Act, specifically 12 U.S.C. § 1701-x(c)(5) (effective July 30, 2008), and pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Walkers contend that they were never offered counseling services or any other loss-mitigation services before the foreclosure sale. Although the record does not contain evidence indicating that the Walkers were provided counseling or other loss-mitigation services before foreclosure, this court has determined that any alleged failure to comply with loss-mitigation procedures does not constitute a valid defense to an ejectment action following a nonjudicial foreclosure. See Coleman, 104 So.3d at 206 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the alleged failure to exhaust all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible (B) holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department (C) holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale (D) holding that in the absence of a statute or controlling authority from our supreme court to the contrary we conclude that the failure of a foreclosing entity to comply with department of housing and urban development or department of veterans affairs lossmitigation requirements may not be raised as a defense to an ejectment action following a nonjudicial foreclosure (E) holding nonparty department of mental health had standing to appeal commitment order regarding person found not guilty by reason of insanity because department had direct interest that was affected by commitment order and because employees of the department conceivably could be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order
Output: (D)
was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because “the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.”); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion
Output: (C)
for April Kurzke and her two sons, Brendan and Kyle Kurzke, until December 31, 1998. 2 The order entered included the following language: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall waive any potential statute of limitations defense under the laws of Germany with respect to plaintiffs' claims asserted in this action; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall consent to personal jurisdiction of the Courts of Germany with respect to plaintiffs’ claims asserted in this action and shall not use the fact that they are entities incorporated and located in the United States as a legal objection to defendants being deposed in the German action. 3 E.g., Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, 981 F.2d 1345, 1356 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 255 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T. Moges Shipping 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court has discretion to grant a defendants forum non conveniens motion to transfer before disposing of any other threshold challenges (B) holding that the jones act does not preempt state law in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens and thus state law governs (C) holding that issue concerning forum non conveniens decision was not suitable for interlocutory appeal in part because a forum non conveniens decision is inherently factsensitive (D) holding that a district court may dismiss based on forum non conveniens without first addressing personal jurisdiction (E) holding that the unavailability absent compulsory process of a witness would result in serious injustice thus was a sufficient factor in granting the forum non conveniens motion
Output: (E)
with a total of 8.3 grams of cocaine in them was consistent with both an intent to sell and with personal use. Id. at 631. We noted that the police did not find any money or drug paraphernalia on the defendant and there were “no other facts which would suggest an intent to sell.” Id. The packaging and weight of the drugs in this case is similar to that in Valentin, giving rise to similar conclusions about Alleyne’s intent. The state attempts to distinguish Valentin in two ways. First, there was no money found on Valentin, while Alleyne had $36 in his pocket and another $20 found in the paper bag with the marijuana. However, neither the amount of money found, nor the denominations of it were inconsistent with personal use. See Williams v. State, 569 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the arresting officer in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke (D) holding that evidence consisting of 10 pieces of cocaine marijuana rolling paper 72 and a weapon was not sufficient to prove intent to sell (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks
Output: (D)
at the time in question, we see no useful purpose in pursuing[the first step of Saucier].” The majority’s reasoning is deficient in the context of qualified immunity. The first step of Saucier asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the allegedly injured party, the record establishes a constitutional violation. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Nothing about this inquiry requires this court to resolve factual disputes in the record. In fact, the Supreme Court has clarified that the first step of the Saucier inquiry in no way requires courts to assume a fact-finding capacity; rather, a court generally just adopts the version of the facts set forth by the party challenging immunity. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, contrary to the majority’s reasoning, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (B) holding that the dispositive question in the first step of saucier  whether those facts establish a constitutional violation  is a pure question of law (C) recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion (D) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (E) holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law
Output: (B)
934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir.1991), the authority relied upon in the previous order, subject matter jurisdiction depended upon the discretionary function exception to the FTCA which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). In this matter, jurisdiction depends upon the Feres doctrine, a judicially created exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore, it would be improper for the court to treat the government’s motion as one for summary judgment because jurisdiction is not dependent upon the FTCA; it is dependent upon whether Feres applies. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir.1995) (stating conversion was improper because resolution of the jurisdictional issue did not depend on the FTCA); Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 204 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, the court disposes of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable (B) recognizing proper disposition when feres applies is to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction not grant summary judgment (C) holding that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction in  502e1 is exclusive (D) holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment (E) holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient
Output: (B)
that Rojas was an alien who was deported or removed from the United States and was subsequently found in the United States without authorization. The indictment does not rely on a particular removal for the § 1326(a) charge, and at trial the government introduced and relied on evidence of Rojas’s 1997 removal order as well as the April 2010 removal to prove the elements of the § 1326(a) charge. Because the government relied on removals other than the April 2010 removal to support its case, we reject Rojas’s argument that the court erred in not dismissing the § 1326(a) charge in the indictment. 2 We must still consider, however, whether the district court erred in not dismissing the § 1326(b) charge in the indictment. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 751 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In order to subject a defendant to § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment could not be dismissed based on claim that testimony was hearsay and incompetent (B) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (C) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (D) holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court (E) recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part
Output: (E)
in the amount of oil and gas sold and any price differences were accounted for at the end of the month via the netting agreements, and any debt owed was paid or satisfied in full. The record demonstrates that these transactions were bona-fide transactions where oil and gas was bought and sold and therefore, the Court finds that the transactions created “new value.” The Producers’ third argument is that the cross-product netting agreements were made as security for a money debt. Because there was no antecedent debt at the time of the sale, this argument must also fail. It is well-established that BIOC is determined at the time of the sale and any subsequent action cannot affect a buyer’s status as a BIOC. See, e.g., In re Pearson Indus., Inc., 142 B.R. 831, 843 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1992) (<HOLDING>). The law is equally clear that the “money 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively (B) holding that subsequent acts cannot be applied retroactively to the bioc analysis (C) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (D) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (E) holding that consumer lien avoidance powers of section 522f cannot be applied retroactively
Output: (B)
sufficiency of the amended complaint. Even if we were to conclude that Stillman’s amended complaint failed to allege veil-piercing claims, the district court acted well within its broad discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b)(1) to conform the amended complaint to include a veil-piercing claim in response to defendants’ objection at trial. Defendants cannot plausibly claim they were prejudiced by such an amendment because they were on notice that Stillman intended to pursue a veil-piercing theory from at least July 1, 2009, when Stillman submitted his first request to charge the jury on veil piercing, and they had within their custody and control all documents and witnesses relevant to rebutting Stillman’s veil-piercing claim. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 569 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Further, defendants implicitly consented to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that opponent claiming prejudice from rule 15b amendment must show that a partys failure to plead an issue it later presented must have disadvantaged its opponent in presenting its case internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that in order to warrant equitable tolling alien claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate due diligence in pursuing the case during the period the alien seeks to toll internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that a ruling from a prior decision of this court becomes the law of the case that cannot be challenged in a later proceeding quotation marks omitted
Output: (B)
v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.2000). Hunter bears the burden of “offering evidence that the extent of the limitation” caused by the impairment is substantial. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). She contends, with no evidentiary support, that she has substantial impairments in sleep ing, manual tasks, and her general quality of life, including her ability to garden and care for her grandchildren. These amorphous, unsupported assertions, however, are exactly the kind we have dismissed as insufficient in similar cases. See id. (affirming summary judgment when plaintiff put forth no evidence to support his assertions of disability); see also Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, the district court correctly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled (B) holding plaintiffs who claimed their ability to walk sit stand and sleep was moderately below average were not disabled (C) holding that evidence that plaintiff could walk only four hours a day was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled (D) holding that plaintiffs inability to stand for more than one hour did not render her disabled (E) holding that plaintiffs were no more likely than the average   citizen to be victims of future attacks and so their claimed injury was purely speculative
Output: (B)
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923. The Cheung Tin Wong court concluded that whether the INS investigator’s actions in that case were characterized as “mere questioning” or a “brief stop of a suspicious individual . . .” they should be tested according to the standard of whether he had a reasonable suspicion that the petitioner was an alien' at the time he stopped the taxi. The court found that the investigator’s actions had been justified under that standard. 152 U.S.App.D.C. 70-71, 468 F.2d at 1127-28. See also Au Yi Lau, supra, 144 U.S.App.D.C. at 153—54, 445 F.2d at 223-24 (<HOLDING>). The principles articulated in Au Yi Lau and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass (B) holding that custodial interrogation by police must not occur prior to suspect being informed of his or her right to counsel and against selfincrimination (C) holding defendant was in custody under miranda while being detained under terry (D) holding that defendant was in custody when police questioned him in his bedroom late at night (E) recognizing that one accosted in apparent attempt to avoid being questioned was not clearly detained against his will when he thereafter readily acquiesced in the investigators interrogation
Output: (E)
I). Hunter I provided Mr. Hunter the necessary relief. During the pendency of the appeal in Hunter I, the trial court issued a final order that was substantially the same as the previous non-final order except that the trial court added a finding of contempt against Mr. Hunter. We must again reverse. Because the order on appeal is substantially the same as the order in Hunter I, we will not repeat here the reasons why the trial court erred in entering this second order. Furthermore, Mr. Hunter’s appellate counsel has not briefed as an issue in this appeal the only substantive difference in the two orders — a finding of contempt — and thus has waived any potential error on appeal. See David M. Dresdner, M.D., P.A. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 972 So.2d 275, 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>); accord Kenyon v. Kenyon, 496 So.2d 839, 840 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where appellant omits to address in the initial brief a trial court error raised in the appeal the appellate court will deem such potential issue waived or abandoned (B) holding that an issue is abandoned when not raised in an appellate brief (C) holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned (D) holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned (E) holding that appellate court will not normally address issue raised for the first time on appeal
Output: (A)
rise to the level of the allegations in Harke-ma. While physical abuse obviously endangers a child, Ma Donna’s account of her January 1997 fight with F.G. is not inconsistent with F.G.’s charge (except for the allegation of hair-pulling). An alleged single incident of borderline abuse or neglect has been held not to constitute sufficient endangerment to warrant a custody modification. See Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 227 (insufficient endangerment where child was injured by fallen cuckoo clock and mother allegedly examined clock before child). Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in giving this incident little weight. This court has been inconsistent in categorizing a custodial parent’s efforts to isolate the child from relatives. Compare Westphal, 457 N.W.2d at 229 (<HOLDING>) with Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 227 (stating that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that postadoption visitation of child who was adopted by grandparents on basis of biological parents unconditional consent was required to promote childs best interests (B) holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child (C) holding mothers cutting off contact with grandparents to be best interests consideration but not evidence of endangerment (D) holding that best interests of the child analysis requires consideration of all section 5328a factors (E) holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child where the child actually resided with the grandparents in a stable relationship
Output: (C)
the persecutor attributed a political opinion to the victim, and acted upon the attribution, this imputed view becomes the applicant’s political opinion as required under the [INA].” Id. There is no evidence that suggests the Sendero Luminoso persecuted Cruz on account of an imputed political opinion. Indeed, Cruz fails to link his persecution to anything other than his status as a police officer. During their attack, the guerillas referred to Cruz as a “policeman” and “informer.” Neither of these references implies that the guerillas believed Cruz to hold political beliefs contrary to their own, much less that they attacked him because of such beliefs. While the guerillas may have regarded Cruz as an informant, this is not akin to imputing a political belief to him. See id. at 1489-90 (<HOLDING>). Substantial evidence therefore supports the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that applicant failed to establish imputed political opinion where he presented no evidence that an antigovernmental guerilla group imputed his fathers political beliefs to him (B) holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground (C) holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion (D) holding that persecutors statements indicating that they had chosen her because of her fathers relationship to the philippine government constituted persecution on account of an imputed political opinion (E) holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion
Output: (A)