niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
substance seized from the package and the statement she made following her arrest. The district court denied the suppression motion. Subsequently, Hernandez entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving hér right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. Hernandez timely filed a notice of appeal. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II To determine whether the district court properly concluded that the detention of the mailed package did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we must first identify the nature of the interest an addressee has in a package- delivered to postal authorities. It has long been established that an addressee has both a possessory and a privacy interest in a mailed package. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877) (<HOLDING>); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sealed packages in the mail can not be opened without a warrant (B) holding that there can be no plea agreement without a meeting of the minds (C) holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within (D) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (E) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant
Output: (A)
does not mean that an employee may not sue a union for the union’s independent breach of a collective bargaining agreement unless the employee can establish that the union also breached its duty of fair representation. When the employee alleges that the union itself has breached an obligation to the employee under the collective bargaining agreement, the policy reasons for requiring a violation of the duty of fair representation in the hybrid suits no longer apply. Proof of the contractual violation alone should suffice, without requiring the employee also to establish that the union violated its duty of fair representation with conduct that was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 374, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 1912, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990) (<HOLDING>); IBEW v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 864-65 & n. 7, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that union policy of furnishing only its members with legal counsel in connection with grievances under collective bargaining agreement violated unions duty of fair representation under federal service labormanagement relations statute (B) holding that a union may breach its duty of fair representation by rejecting an employees interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement if the unions interpretation is itself arbitrary or unreasonable (C) holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union (D) holding that union could contractually undertake in collective bargaining agreement other duties towards member employees in addition to statutorilyimposed duty of fair representation (E) holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union
Output: (D)
proceeding against him. 65 . 221 B.R. 49 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998). 66 . Id. at 51. 67 . Bassett, 221 B.R. at 55. 68 . Id. 69 . 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). 70 . Id. at 1322. 71 . Id. 72 .The “mere conduit” exception is “an equitable exception to the literal statutory language of ‘initial transferee,' ... for initial recipients who are ‘mere conduits’ with no control over the fraudulently-transferred funds.” Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir.2010). Because SunTrust was the end recipient of the Transfers, it certainly was not a mere conduit. 73 . 446 B.R. 564 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011). 74 . ATM Financial, 446 B.R. at 566. 75 . Id. 76 . Id. 77 . Id. at 568-71. 78 . Id. at 570-71. 79 . 11 U.S.C. § 101(54); Fla. Stat. § 726.102(12). 80 . See In re Wayne, 237 B.R. 506, 508-09 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) recognizing potential for fraudulent transfer in foreclosure context if debtor enjoyed significant equity in property but received little or no value from the transfer (C) holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review (D) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
Output: (A)
remedy is exclusive”). In other words, Parnar claims are usually raised only in “a ‘narrow class of cases’ where the wrongful discharge action is seen as necessary to effectuate the public policy at stake.” Ross, 76 Hawai'i at 464, 879 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991, 993 (D.Haw.1988) , abrogated on other grounds by Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir.1990)). This necessity usually arises only where a statutory or other policy does not itself provide for a remedy to enforce the policy. An exception to this general rule occurs where the legislative body specifically provides that a common law claim exists even though a statutory remedy is also in place. Ross, 76 Hawai'i at 465, 879 P.2d at 1047 (<HOLDING>). Under the HWPA, the Hawaii legislature 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (B) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent (E) holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent
Output: (A)
the relief provided by Congress under Title VII is equitable in nature, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), and specific procedural limitations are mandated by the Act, such as trial to the bench and expeditious disposition, Congress implicitly intended to deny pendent jurisdiction over state legal claims. To date, only one appellate court has passed on this issue. In Jones v. Intermountain Power Projects, 794 F.2d 546 (10th Cir.1986), the Tenth Circuit held that Congress did not intend to negate the exercise of jurisdiction over non-Title VII claims when it enacted Title VII. The court noted that an examination of the statute “reveals nothing to suggest an intent to negate pendent jurisdiction.” Id. at 552. Cf., Bouchet v. National Urban League, 730 F.2d 799, 805-06 & n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The appellants rely on the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the concerns cited by the district courts supra justify discretionary denial of pendent jurisdiction but not deciding whether such denial is mandated by congress (B) holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself (C) holding that the federal court could not consider under  2254d1 a rationale offered by the state for the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion for selfrepresentation when that rationale would have constituted a discretionary denial of the motion (D) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a denial of adjustment of status as a discretionary matter (E) holding that congress intended for district courts to review only the secretarys denial
Output: (A)
but data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes "discretionary” from "ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim'd in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 18 . As illustrated by the opinion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact (B) holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute (C) holding that genuine factual dispute does not preclude appeal of discrete ruling on pure legal issue (D) recognizing that order denying confirmation of a plan does not resolve a discrete issue (E) recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling
Output: (C)
that the district judge grant the prison officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to paragraphs one through four of Count III; this the district court did by minute order dated August 3, 1999. However, the district court never acted on the recommendation that it construe the screening order as another report and recommendation, nor did it ever enter an order dismissing any counts of the complaint, which it was required to do since the magistrate judge lacks power to enter a dispositive order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. This would ordinarily mean that there is not a final judgment for us to review since there are still claims pending before the district court, and thus, that we would lack appellate jurisdiction. See Chacon v. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, it is clear from the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that once all claims against all parties have been dismissed a prior order will become final for purposes of appeal under 28 usc  1291 (B) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (C) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (D) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants
Output: (B)
the doctrine was extended to include automobiles. See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). In doing so, the court reasoned: The principles of common law do not permit the owner of an instrumentality that is not dangerous per se, but is peculiarly dangerous in its operation, to authorize another to use such instrumentality on the public highways without imposing upon such owner liability for negligent use. The liability grows out of the obligation of the owner to have the vehicle, that is not inherently dangerous per se, but peculiarly dangerous in its use, properly operated when it is by his authority on the public highway. Anderson v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, 978 (1917). Therefore, the doctrine “imposes strict vicariou (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So.2d 107, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trailer is not a dangerous instrumentality notwithstanding the fact that it meets the statutory definition of a motor vehicle (B) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (C) holding that although it does not meet the statutory definition of a motor vehicle a forklift is a dangerous instrumentality (D) holding that a collision with the loading ramp of a trailer was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle (E) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle 
Output: (A)
from “unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.” Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664 (citation omitted). In the present case, however, the plaintiffs seek to enforce the customary law of nations through a jurisdictional vehicle provided under United States law, the ATS, rather than a federal statute that itself details conduct to be regulated or enforced. Thus, any substantive norm enforced through an ATS claim necessarily is recognized by other nations as being actionable. Moreover, this case does not present any potential problems associated with bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the defendants are United States citizens. Cf. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 322-24 (D.Mass.2013) (<HOLDING>). We likewise note that further litigation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims (B) holding state buy american statute unconstitutional because it interfered with federal foreign affairs power emphasizing its effect on foreign commerce (C) holding nlra applied to state bank of indias activities in the united states because most employees are american citizens or american residents and the labor dispute centers on the wages to be paid american residents foreign or natural  (D) holding that coverage arguably existed under an insurance policy for claims against an employer and employees for an alleged assault and battery of bar patrons and that the insurer had a duty to defend (E) holding that kiobel did not bar ats claims against an american citizen in part because this is not a case where a foreign national is being hailed into an unfamiliar court to defend himself
Output: (E)
by a transfer to another position, as opposed to modification of her existing job duties. 30 . It is not obvious to us that a "modification of an existing position" theory would result in CBA interpretation, and Boeing has not cited to us any provision of the CBA that would need to be interpreted if Humble pursues that theory. See Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir.1988) (explaining that under Oregon law, expert opinions and not CBA provisions on job assignments govern whether a disabled employee can satisfactorily perform a job). In the absence of briefing and discussion, we need not resolve whether Washington law on this point is the same as Oregon's. 31 . 66 F.3d at 1526-27. 32 . Id. at 1527. 33 . Id.; see also Miller, 850 F.2d at 548-49 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 34 . Cramer, 255 F.3d at 690-91 (citing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction (B) holding that the need to reference the cbas local assignment and transfer provisions would be minimal under oregon disability discrimination law and did not result in preemption of that claim (C) holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments (D) holding that west virginia disability discrimination law is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence (E) holding disability discrimination claim barred
Output: (B)
discussed in a footnote at the end of this opinion. 4 .King’s § 2254 petition at best hinted at this claim. It is not separately enumerated. There is only a single sentence, deeply embedded in his Espinosa claim, that "[o]n direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court gave no consideration to the impact of these invalid aggravating factor[s] on the jury’s weighing. An adequate harmless error analysis was not conducted. See Sochor; Espinosa." (R.l-1 ¶ 13, at 23.) Understandably, the district court did not detect or address so well-hidden a claim. Because we hold that the claim was procedurally barred under state law, in any event, we need not decide whether the claim was properly presented in federal court. 5 . Possibly unnecessarily. See Mills v. Singletary, 606 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). 6 . 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). 7 . The court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues (B) holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion (C) holding a failuretoreweigh claim barred in part for failure to present it in rule 3850 motion (D) holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion (E) holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion
Output: (C)
484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 17 MRE 801(c). 18 MRE 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules.”). 19 MRE 803A (emphasis added). 20 This Court first recognized the common-law tender years rule in People v Gage, 62 Mich 271; 28 NW 835 (1886), as a permissible rule to allow hearsay in order to corroborate the testimony of a child complainant. “The rule in this State is that where the victim is of tender years the testimony of the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration of her evidence, if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture; and delay in making the complaint is excusable so far as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstance.” People v Baker, 251 Mich 322, 326; 232 NW 381 (1930) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court held in People v Kreiner, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted (B) holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest (C) holding also that only a childs first statement made is admissible under the exception (D) holding that videotape was admissible under rule 801e1b as prior consistent statement because defense challenged childs credibility (E) holding multiple statements by childvictim and childs mother admissible under residual exception
Output: (C)
to that extent. Reed, supra, at 17, 104 S.Ct. 2901. The holding in Cage represents a degree of novelty sufficient to constitute cause. As such, Mercer has established cause to avoid otherwise procedurally defaulting on his claim challenging the reasonable doubt instruction. Sufficient prejudice to establish federal habeas jurisdiction also exists. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is so intertwined with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury verdict that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction cannot produce a guilty verdict comporting with due process but, rather, requires reversal of a conviction. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-80, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (<HOLDING>). It follows that a claimed Cage violation 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding exclusion was harmless error (C) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding a cage violation could never be held harmless error and thus not amenable to harmless error review but rather required outright reversal
Output: (E)
of waiver of the right to a jury trial is governed by federal, not state, law. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1985). The right to a jury trial may be waived “by prior written agreement” by “the parties to a contract.” Id. at 755. In support of their contention that a contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial must be knowing and voluntary, plaintiffs cite to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in K.M.C. K.M.C. involved a contractual provision in which the plaintiff .agreed to “waive all right to a trial by jury”, and did not involve an arbitration provision or the FAA. Id. at 755. While the Sixth Circuit stated in K.M.C. that the knowing and voluntary standard was, appropriate “in this instance,” it did not base its holding on that standard. Id. at 757 (<HOLDING>). In addition, since its holding in K.M.G., the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (B) holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard (C) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (D) holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard (E) holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss
Output: (C)
concluding “the clarity of the exclusions in question” supported the conclusion “a reasonable person could not have understood coverage would exist”). Goodwin does not identify in his affidavit any way in which he misunderstood the policy exclusion. He merely quotes the insuring clause from the policy and then states that he “expect[ed] that this language means just what it says.” But insurance policy provisions are not interpreted in isolation. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682; Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 1993), called into doubt on other grounds by Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d at 113 n. 1. The insuring clause must be read in conjunction with the policy exclusions. Cf. Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 128 Or.App. 128, 875 P.2d 471, 472-73 (1994) (<HOLDING>). If the policy is not considered as a whole, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (C) holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary (D) holding that a lookout is not using a vehicle entitled to liability coverage under an insurance policy (E) holding that unlicensed driver who was driving vehicle with permission of owners permittee could reasonably believe that permittee had authority to permit him to drive vehicle and thus driv er was entitled to liability coverage notwithstanding auto policy exclusion for any person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that person is entitled to do so driver could have reasonable belief that he was entitled to use vehicle even though he was unlicensed where he was doing so at specific request of permittee and actual owner never instructed driver not to drive vehicle nor instructed permittee not to allow others to drive vehicle
Output: (B)
Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir.1990), the City argues that a state court action for mandamus would provide all the relief that the plaintiffs seek, precluding their procedural due process claim. These cases rest on the principle that when a state officer acts in a “random and unauthorized” way—by unpredictably departing from state law, for example—the state has no opportunity to provide a pre-deprivation hearing and may instead satisfy due process by providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1402 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc). But mandamus would be an incomplete remedy here. Pro’s is asking for more than an injunction compelling the City to issue an unrestricted liquor license. Cf. Schwartz, 330 F.3d at 941 (<HOLDING>). The owners of Pro’s seek damages to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (B) holding that 42 usc  1983 relief is available in some circumstances where state actions interfere with the bargaining process (C) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts
Output: (A)
Plitt v. Stonebraker, 195 F.2d 39, 43 (D.C.Cir.1952) (“The circumstances that a security for such payment [to a holder-transferee] has come into existence after he acquired the obligation is not important.”). The Court agrees with the Government in its interpretation of the receivership statute. The widely agreed upon notion of a shareholder is someone who, first and foremost, holds shares. The shareholder derives certain benefits from the risk of his or her investment, including the right to receive any compensation distributed, including derivatives. The shareholder relinquishes the right to claim a benefit upon the transfer of his or her shares, and is no longer considered to be a shareholder by the term’s definition. See Mendenhall v. Fleming Co., 504 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation (B) holding a shareholders cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes when shareholders and directors of a company asserted a right to stock which was hostile to the plaintiffs claim to the stock (C) holding that a corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders even where the corporation has but one shareholder the general proposition of corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude in accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions that the attorneys client is the corporation and not the shareholders (D) holding that the statute of frauds found in chapter 8 of mississippis ucc applies to the sale of shares of stock in a corporation comprised of only twelve shareholders (E) holding that after the sale of stock former shareholders have no standing to file a claim against the corporation
Output: (E)
that defendant intended to cause pain and actually caused, such pain or that the killing was senseless. Ibid. Thus, if the photo is not relevant to that definition of depravity, it should not be admitted. See Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 638, 562 A.2d 1320 (stating that autopsy photo had only limited relevance to depravity factor). The Court has been much more reluctant to admit graphic photos to prove the felony-murder aggravating factor. In Bey III, supra, it held that autopsy photos were not admissible to prove that the murder had occurred in the course of a rape and a robbery because substantial testimony had been introduced to prove that fact and because the defense had never contested the factor. 129 N.J. at 609, 610 A.2d 814; see also Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 469, 585 A.2d 864 (<HOLDING>). As we have concluded, supra at 387-389, 700 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing (B) holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age (C) holding allegedly gruesome photos relevant to proving aggravating circumstance (D) holding that photos were not needed to prove felonymurder aggravating factor (E) recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor
Output: (D)
purchases of EZ Seed.” (Weir Decl., Doc. #80). This model rests on the assumption that plaintiffs received no benefit whatsoever from purchasing EZ Seed. See, e.g., Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, 2014 WL 2466559, at *15 (noting a full refund model is based on the assumption that consumers received no benefit from the product). This model matches plaintiffs’ first theory of liability—that EZ Seed does not grow grass, and is thus valueless. If plaintiffs prove EZ Seed suffered from a defect that rendered the product completely ineffective, plaintiffs would be entitled to all of their money back. The full compensatory damages model satisfies Comcast because it measures damages properly if EZ Seed is valueless. See, e.g., Allen v. Hyland’s Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 671 (C.D.Cal.2014) (<HOLDING>); Ortega v. Natural Balance, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source (B) holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case (C) holding that plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to instructions consonant with their theory of the case where evidentiary support for the theory exists (D) holding full restitution theory satisfies comcast when plaintiffs theory of liability is that the products are entirely ineffective (E) holding that the plaintiffs misconceived legal theory did not preclude it from obtaining relief under another theory
Output: (D)
import of excluding those particular services in relation to the client’s particular circumstance. While not required under the ethical rules, the court agrees with the ABA that the consent should be in writing. ABA Handbook 71; Nev. Rule of Prof’l Conduct 1.5 (2011) (“The scope of the representation ... shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing....”). Attorneys protect themselves by putting the agreements in writing. In the absence of an explicit written agreement, a lawyer and client may be left in a “he said, she said” dilemma if there is a dispute about the nature of the unbundling agreement. See ABA Model Rule 1.5 cmt. 2; Struffolino, supra note 17, at 234 (citing Smith v. Statewide Grievance Comm., CV94-053-98-40, 1995 WL 231108, at *1, *4 (Conn.Super.Ct.1995) (<HOLDING>)); see Cal. Ethios PRIMER 4 (malpractice 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an attorneys right to conduct the clients case with a certain degree of privacy (B) holding that attorneys and not clients choose the arguments to present (C) holding that attorneyclient privilege did not protect attorneys summaries of clients business transactions (D) holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent (E) holding that the clients did not consent to limited scope representation in a telephone conversation despite the attorneys testimony otherwise
Output: (E)
Finally, the court notes that this court has strong interest in adjudicating the claims before it. The lawsuit was initiated by an American company (Microsoft) against another American company (Motorola). Central to the lawsuit are the October 21 and October 29 Letters — sent by Motorola from its Libertyville, Illinois office to Microsoft at its Redmond, Washington office — which Microsoft alleges breached Motorola’s commitments to the IEEE and ITU to grant licenses for all of its patents, both domestic and foreign, on RAND terms to all applicants on a worldwide basis. Accordingly, this court is fully capable of adjudicating the issues before it. To the contrary, the lawsuit lacks international issues and foreign government involvement. Applied Med. Distribution, 587 F.3d at 921 (<HOLDING>) (international quotations omitted). Thus, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would interfere with the rights of those who are not parties to the action (B) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived (C) holding that where there is no public international issue raised a foreign government is not involved in the litigation and the litigation involves private parties concerning disputes arising out of a contract not only would an antisuit injunction not have an intolerable impact on comity but allowing foreign suits to proceed in such circumstances would seriously harm international comity (D) holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement (E) holding that comity concerns are implicated where plaintiffs ask the district court to contradict the conclusions of the hong kong courts and to overlook the respect that a foreign sovereign is due
Output: (C)
The savings clause states that “[compliance with an order [under the MDA] shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 360h(d). While the savings clause almost certainly prohibits a holding that the MDA preempts all state law liability, our interpretation of § 360k(a) does not preclude all liability. Further, nothing in the savings clause suggests that some tort liability, as opposed to other types of liability, must be preserved. Interpreting the savings clause to preserve non-tort liability, such as contract liability, is not only permissible, but also comports with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a savings clause in a recent preemption case. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 817, 826, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, where the preemptive intent of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs (B) holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable (C) holding that the airline deregulation act preempts claims under the illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act but does not preempt state breach of contract actions (D) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (E) holding that cjlaims for unfair competition and deceptive business practices involving trade names brought under illinois statutes are to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the lanham act and noting that illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims
Output: (C)
that the carefully prepared processing table contained no folder or photograph for her, the reasonableness of her continued detention diminished. Nevertheless, the police could have hypothesized that her folder had been misplaced, and it was not objectively unreasonable to delay releasing her from custody pending final verification of her status. See Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir.1997). There remains the approximately thirty minutes during which the police completed routine paperwork and awaited a cuff cutter after they had reached the inescapable conclusion that there had never been a warrant for Wilson’s arrest. Although the issue is close, we conclude that Dunford continued to enjoy qualified immunity during this final thirty minutes of detention. Cf. id. at 456-57 (<HOLDING>). After confirming Wilson’s identity and her 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (B) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (C) holding that police did not enjoy qualified immunity for a period where they acknowledged that plaintiff had to be released but nevertheless kept him handcuffed (D) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
Output: (C)
§ 952(a) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. 2 . Compare United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir.1990) (excluding from speedy trial clock all time from district court’s grant of stay to obtain permission to file an interlocutory appeal through the date “the [appellate court's] mandate was received by the district court”) and Tyler, 878 F.2d at 759 (excluding from speedy trial clock "the 140 days that elapsed between the filing of the mandamus petition and the notification to the district court of the disposition of that petition”) and Speedy Trial Guidelines, infra pp. 1231-1232 (providing that delays due to extraordinary writs are excluded until the ”[d]ate the mandate of the court of appeals is filed in the district court”) with United States v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 198 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We do not comment on whether the time 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due (B) holding that the excludable period for an interlocutory appeal ends upon the date of issuance of the appellate courts mandate and expressly rejecting extending the exclusion until the date the district court receives the mandate (C) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (D) holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment (E) holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations
Output: (B)
faith, and the district court provided them an opportunity to respond on the merits. See Richey, 632 F.3d at 565 & 565 n. 1. AFFIRMED. *** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . For the first time on appeal, the parties raise the competency and reliability of certain declarations submitted in the district court. Because neither party raised these evidentiary objections in the district court, we deem them waived. See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.1990) (explaining that to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection to evidentiary issues before the trial court); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The Soongs do not argue that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives an objection by failing to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence before the district court (B) holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection (C) holding that failure to file a postjudgment motion on alleged error of law relating to ruling on exception to the statute of frauds that was committed for first time in the judgment waives any objection to that ruling and that in the absence of any other formal objection the issue is not preserved for appellate review (D) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (E) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court
Output: (A)
the district court would have been de facto granting a continuance by declaring a mistrial and summoning new jurors. We decline here to find that the district court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial when the defendant’s own misconduct caused the alleged impartiality of the jurors and the court took reasonable steps to ensure the jurors could serve impartially. Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 723-24 (9th Cir.2002) (“The Sixth Amendment affords no relief when the defendant’s own misconduct caused the alleged juror partiality and the trial judge employed reasonable means under the circumstances to preserve the trial’s fairness”) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1116-18 (9th Cir.1991)). See also United States v. Harris, 2 F.3d 1452, 1456 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court afforded the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding that a bank officer who obtained for his own benefit a profit participation in a real estate venture in exchange for loaning bank money misappropriated a corporate asset (C) holding that a defendant should not profit from his own outburst (D) recognizing in context of fraudulent nondisclosure cases that a defendant may reasonably expect the plaintiff to make his own investigation draw his own conclusions and protect himself (E) holding that outofstate plaintiff had procured his own absence at trial of his case where record contained no intimation that his absence resulted from any reason other than his own volition
Output: (C)
to the “enforcement” of the reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order allowing IMC an administrative expense. It would also be considered a core proceeding since it follows directly from a core proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Basic principles of restitution and appellate procedure which dictate that a lower court always has the jurisdiction to order the restitution of an award overturned on appeal, even without a remand from the appellate court, also support our conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to rule on the Debtor’s Motion. See Caldwell v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship and Training Trust, 824 F.2d 765, 766-67 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. U.S., 279 U.S. 781, 786, 49 S.Ct. 492, 493, 73 L.Ed. 954 (1929)) (<HOLDING>). “The right to recover what one has lost by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (B) holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court (C) holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal (D) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court
Output: (E)
and tortious activities into Virginia. In this regard, AAMG points to DNX’s acceptance of $2,400 worth of jewelry from a donor in Virginia in December, 2003. According to Caswell’s affidavit, however, the content of which AAMG does not contest, the jewelry donor contacted DNX. (Caswell Aff. ¶ 10.) Even when coupled with the harmful effects in Virginia of DNX’s alleged conduct, the one-time unilateral act of a single third-party contacting DNX, even if that contact was facilitated by DNX’s website or other national advertising, is simply “too attenuated and insubstantial to provide a constitutionally sufficient basis” for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over DNX. See ESAB, 126 F.3d at 626; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Based on the record before the court and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that california courts assertion of personal jurisdiction over floridabased reporters did not violate due process when allegedly defamatory article that was the basis of the suit focused on the california activities of california residents (B) recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired (C) holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law (D) recognizing that california has a valid interest in protecting a california company from copyright infringement (E) holding that personal jurisdiction in california was appropriate over nonresident journalist where harmful effects of allegedly defamatory article would be exclusively felt in california and california was the state of newspapers greatest circulation
Output: (E)