niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
85198, 2005 WL 1484025, at *7 (Ohio Ct.App. June 23, 2005) (same). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state an independent claim for breach of contract separate from its claim for default on the Notes. The Amended Complaint reflects that Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is based on the same operative facts as its default claim. Specifically, the pleadings make clear that both causes of action are attempting to enforce the Notes, which are attached to the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff fails to allege facts of any agreement separate from the Notes and the purported extension of their maturity date. Finally, the language of the Notes reflect that they are, or at least purport to be, negotiable instruments within the meaning of Ohio law. Cf. Mohammad, 2012 WL 3132030, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Although a plaintiff is generally able to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract (B) holding that the promissory note was a negotiable instrument as opposed to a contract for the purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations (C) holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes (D) holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met (E) holding that fraudulent collection on promissory note was reasonably related to breach of contract claim
Output: (B)
parties. In Soldal, the police refused to allow the owner of a mobile home to oppose an eviction by the owner of the park where the home was located, even though the police knew the eviction was illegal. The mobile home owner brought a § 1983 action against the park owner and police. The park owner was held by the circuit court to be a state actor based on his conspiracy with the police to illegally evict the mobile home owner. Id. at 58-9, 113 S.Ct. 538. This holding was not disturbed on appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 60 n. 6, 113 S.Ct. 538. Here, there is no evidence that Gage knew that Peng was innocent of robbery. The trial court correctly concluded that a finding of concerted .action could not be found on this record. See Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); accord King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single request that the police perform their peacekeeping responsibilities may be insufficient to create a joint undertaking (B) holding that employees subjective belief that age discrimination occurred is insufficient to create a jury issue (C) holding that private parties may contract to transfer financial responsibilities under cercla (D) holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue (E) holding that the plaintiffs unsupported allegations about the defendants travels to the district were insufficient to create personal jurisdiction
Output: (A)
the representation, and (iii) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made[.] Tex. Disc. Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 1.04©. Failure to follow the rules may result in a quantum meruit fee recovery. Tex. Disc. Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 1.04(g). “Although the Disciplinary Rules do not define standards of civil liability for attorneys, they are persuasive authority outside the context of disciplinary proceedings, and we have applied Rule 1.04 as a rule of decision in disputes concerning attorney’s fees.” Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 561 n. 6 (Tex. 2006) (citations omitted); Sanes v. Clark, 25 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); but see Tex. Disc. Rules of Prof. Conduct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contracts of adhesion are not voidable unless unconscionable (B) holding that contingency fee contract did not cap award of attorneys fees where johnson had so held (C) holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing (D) holding that contingency fee contracts are voidable where attorneys fail to comply with disciplinary rules (E) holding contingency fee cases commenced prior to dissolution are assets of the firm
Output: (D)
pre-estimate may in fact operate as a penalty and become unenforceable is shown by the fact that even though the sum fixed as compensation for each day’s delay ... is held to be a reasonable provision for liquidated damages and to be enforceable, no court will permit it to go on operating forever. 11 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 58:21 at 523. That treatise then observes that there is “some lack of uniformity in the method of determining this time limit.” Id. In general, there are two rules that courts have applied to this predicament. Some courts have held that a liquidated damages clause is inapplicable when a contractor has completely abandoned a project. See, e.g., City of Elmira v. Larry Walter, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 912, 563 N.Y.S.2d 45, 564 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Others have held that, when a contractor has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict (B) holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages (C) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (D) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (E) holding that in the absence of clear and unambiguous language indicating that liquidated damages clause was intended to apply to contractors outright abandonment of the project no such damages should be awarded
Output: (E)
to support a termination for default. Although not cited, we assume that USPS is claiming that Rodeo violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988). In any event, USPS attempts to prove its assertion that Rodeo falsified progress-payment requests by pointing to the notice from IFIC that it had received claims on its payment bond. We conclude that it would be inappropriate to decide this issue by inference, especially when the mandate of J.D. Hedin is that the government justify a default termination with solid evidence. See J.D. Hedin, 187 Ct.Cl. at 57, 408 F.2d at 431. Third, USPS argues that Rodeo abandoned the project by failing to perform any substantial work after June 1988. See Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct.Cl. 206, 215, 537 F.2d 393, 397 (1976) (<HOLDING>). USPS contends that the fact that the estimate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made (B) holding that the government can terminate a contractor for failure to make progress (C) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors (D) holding that the surety was not released to the extent of improper ly paid funds because the contractor had applied the released funds to progress on the contract (E) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate
Output: (B)
recognizes that where a legislature has established a ratemaking scheme, the filed rate defines the legal relationship between shipper/customer and carrier/regulated utility. Further, the rights of the ratepayer in regard to the rate it pays are defined by the statutory scheme. See Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1490. Turning to Kentucky’s ratemaking statutes, this Court finds that nothing in them or the cases interpreting them limits the rights ratepayers have against persons or entities who allegedly have harmed their utility. The jurisdiction of the PSC extends to all utilities in Kentucky, and the PSC has “exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of rates and service of utilities.” KRS 278.040(2); see also Smith v. Southern Bell Tel & Tel. Co., 268 Ky. 421, 104 S.W.2d 961, 963 (1937) (<HOLDING>). Utilities must file schedules with the PSC 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that primary jurisdiction and authority to fix rates rested exclusively and primarily in the psc (B) holding that psc had primary jurisdiction to pass upon rates and whether same were reasonable consequently court found it improper to pass upon the reasonableness of the charges complained of by appellant (C) holding that a carrier has a property interest in telecommunication rates and therefore is entitled to due process in the calculation of said rates (D) holding that commissioners broad statutory authority to fix maximum and minimum rates for taxi industry includes power to adopt order reducing fares for elderly and handicapped (E) holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo
Output: (A)
immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant’s probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, supra: We find Spaulding not controlling in the case at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the presen-tence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary. Galvan, at 215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We note also third circuit decisions, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity
Output: (B)
applies only when trade dress somehow explains or describes the function of a product, e.g., the use of a shiny car on the label of a bottle of car wax. Paddington, 996 F.2d at 584. 5 . Kompan also argues that it has shown that its trade dress has acquired secondary meaning. Reply Mem. at 5. Because Kompan has established a likelihood of success on its claim that its trade dress is inherently distinctive, it need not establish secondary meaning. Two Pesos, - U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2761. I note however that by showing U.S. sales revenues of 4.8 mil-' lion dollars for 1994, a U.S. advertising budget of $350,000 for the same year, and evidence that PSI intentionally copied its product line, Kompan has offered some evidence of secondary meaning. Cf. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78 (<HOLDING>). However, Kompan's failure to show evidence of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs proof of increase in defendants sales and a corresponding decrease in plaintiffs sales testimony from a consumer witness that she changed products based on defendants false advertising and survey evidence of consumer confusion was enough to prove a likelihood of competitive injury resulting from the defendants advertising (B) holding that plaintiff inadequately pleaded secondary meaning where it failed to allege facts relating to its advertising expenditures consumer surveys marketing coverage or prior attempts to plagiarize plaintiffs trade dress (C) holding that the likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendants adoption of a trade dress similar to the plaintiffs the touchstone test for a violation of  1125 (D) holding that proof of phenomenal sales success substantial advertising expenditures unsolicited media coverage requests from third parties to license the use of plaintiffs design and defendants deliberate attempt to imitate plaintiffs trade dress sufficed to create serious questions going to the merits even in the absence of consumer surveys (E) holding that the trier of fact must consider the length of time and manner of use of trade dress the nature and extent of its use and efforts made in order to promote a conscious connection in the publics mind between the mark and the particular source of origin
Output: (D)
is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Those appealing the trial court’s judgment must establish that the findings' are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly' erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them de novo. Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citations omitted). II. Natural Parent Presumption [16] In a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party, there is a strong presumption in all cases that the natural parent should have- custody of his or her child. In re L.L., 745 N.E.2d at 230 (<HOLDING>). “[BJefore placing a child in the custody of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding de facto custodian status does not remove the presumption in favor of natural parents obtaining or retaining custody of their children (B) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (C) holding that de facto custodians are still required to overcome the natural parent presumption in order to gain custody (D) holding that a de facto parents rights do not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal parent in a family unit because de facto status can be achieved only through the active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent by affirmatively establishing a family unit with the de facto parent and child or children that accompany the family (E) holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children
Output: (A)
and woozy, and causes her eyes to blur. (Id. at 33-34, 42). IV. Analysis A. Standard Of Review In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role is a limited one. The Court’s review is limited to determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). A court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir.1986). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir.1991); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether substantial evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appeals boards eonclusion was supported by substantial evidence which left no reasonable doubt as to whether the claim was work connected (B) holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized (C) holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment (D) recognizing that a noevidence summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence (E) holding substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a eonclusion 
Output: (E)
County of Henrico, 10 Va. App. 558, 561, 393 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1990) (citation omitted). “While [two] statutes [may be] related as to [their] subject matter, [one] cannot be utilized to create doubt in [the related and] otherwise clear statute.” Seehorn v. Seehorn, 1 Va. App. 375, 383, 375 S.E.2d 7, 11 (1988). This is especially true where, as here, the later-enacted statute deals with a specific and limited exception. “[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails.” Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979); see also Houtchens v. Lane, 246 Ind. 540, 545, 206 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Compare Code § 19.2-215.7 (addressing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter (B) holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict (C) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls (D) holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one (E) holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision
Output: (A)
runoff “caused” the response costs incurred. While defendants have proffered evidence demonstrating that lead was inherent in the tar-like material, and that the lead that was inherent was alone sufficient to justify the removal effort, this does not preclude a finding that lead that entered the property through the storm drain system might also have provided a basis for remediation. See Boeing, supra, 207 F.3d at 1185. The court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of the causation standard in Boeing — i.e., that there must be a showing that “either polluter’s conduct would have caused the same response cost to be incurred in the same amount, and [that] the[ir] conduct was of substantially equal blameworthiness.” Id. See also Browning-Ferris Industries, supra, 195 F.3d at 958 (<HOLDING>). Seemingly, other courts have not required a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (B) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that a portion of plaintiffs response costs should be allocated to a defendant whose pollution was serious enough  to require that the site be cleaned up (E) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla
Output: (D)
are complete and present within the proscribed state statute of limitations. Id. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Plaintiff argues that because Wallace dealt with a false arrest and not a search and seizure, its analysis is inapplicable. (D.E. 8, Plaintiffs Response). However, the general rule of Wallace soundly applies to a search and seizure scenario, as noted by the Sixth Circuit and several Kentucky district courts. See Harper, 293 Fed. Appx. at 391 n. 1 (“Wallace also clarified that Heck does not delay the accrual of an otherwise complete and present cause of action when judgment in the plaintiffs favor ‘would impugn an anticipated future conviction .... ’ Harper’s claims thus accrued on July 31, 2003, the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure.”); Kenney, 2011 WL 1582125 at *6 (<HOLDING>); Lovins v. Hurt, No. 11-216-JBC, 2011 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure (B) holding that a ruling on preindictment motion that search and seizure were legal collaterally estopped defendant from later moving to suppress evidence claiming that search and seizure were illegal (C) holding that section 1983 action for unlawful search and seizure accrued on dates of seizures rather than date on which state court declared the acts illegal (D) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (E) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale
Output: (A)
the question is whether appellants’ breach of contract claim is “a claim ... for damages arising from the purchase or sale of ... a security [of the debtor].” Id. Claimants concede that the securities that they purchased from Tele-group are common stock. Therefore, if their claims “arise from” the purchase of that stock, then under § 510(b) their claims would have the same priority as common stock, and would be subordinated to the claims of general unsecured creditors. The question of the scope of § 510(b) presents this Court with a matter of first impression. Those courts that have considered the issue appear divided on how broadly the phrase “arising from the purchase or sale of ... a security” should be construed. Compare, e.g., In re Amarex, Inc., 78 B.R. 605, 610 (W.D.Okla.1987) (<HOLDING>), with In re Nal Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (B) holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities for purposes of  510b (C) holding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not arise from the purchase or sale of limited partnership interests where the wrongful conduct occurred after the sale of those interests (D) holding that a claim for breach of a partnership agreement because it is based on conduct that occurred after the issuance and sale of the partnership units does not arise from the purchase or sale of those units (E) holding that under  510b a claim does not arise from the purchase or sale of a security if it is predicated on conduct that occurred after the securitys issuance
Output: (E)
Granting Summary Judgment or in the Alternative a Notice of Appeal”). It is well-setded that courts should construe the requirements of Rule 3(c) liberally where the document is the functional equivalent of a technically proper notice of appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248, 112 S.Ct. 678, 681-82, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992) ("Courts will liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3.”); Torres v. Oakland. Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2408-09, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988) (if a document is "technically at variance with the letter of [Rule 3], a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires”); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1344 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). To the extent plaintiff’s combined document 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that settlement documents were admissible under both section 90408 and federal rule of evidence 408 because the documents were offered not to establish liability but to establish violation of consumer credit laws (B) holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable (C) holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court  we must assume that they were considered (D) holding repeated claims by attorney to client that documents were forthcoming constituted misrepresentations in violation of rule 3284c when the documents were not actually ready (E) holding that documents technically at variance with rule 3c were nevertheless valid because they were the functional equivalent of a proper notice of appeal
Output: (E)
concludes the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) is the only authority cited by the Plaintiff which could provide jurisdiction. See R. 31, PagelD#: 566. The Administrative Procedure Act provides, in relevant part: Agency action made renewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA does not apply when “statutes preclude judicial review” or when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Magistrate Judge correctly observes that “Jama does not identify any statute that expressly makes the USCIS’s actions he challenges reviewable in District Court,” and as such, this Court does not have j nho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 202 (3rd Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Judicial review of orders of removal is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding agency action is final where there are no deportation proceedings pending in which the decision might be reopened or challenged (B) holding that section 1429 does not divest district court of jurisdiction when deportation proceedings are pending (C) holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action (D) holding that district courts lack jurisdiction to review denied applications when deportation proceedings are pending (E) holding that apa  702s waiver of sovereign immunity applies regardless of whether the challenged agency action constitutes final agency action 
Output: (A)
relief. We vacate the court’s decision: on remand the issue of the availability and scope of injunc-tive relief must be referred to arbitration. V. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the superior court’s order staying court proceedings and submitting the dispute to arbitration, but we REVERSE and VACATE the superior court’s ruling that the arbitrator can order statewide injunctive relief, and we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . In both cases Citibank (South Dakota) NA issued the cards, but in Stewart's case Midland Funding LLC purchased the account from Citibank. 2 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(1), (b)(4). 3 . For convenience, the parties will be referred to collectively as “Citibank'1 and "Hudson.” 4 . Compare Airoulofski v. State, 922 P.2d 889, 894 n.5 (Alaska 1996) (<HOLDING>), with Blood v. Kenneth Murray Ins. Co., 68 
 Holding statements: (A) holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo (B) holding that when the facts of a robbery are undisputed the imposition of the enhancement is a question of the application of the guidelines to be reviewed de novo (C) recognizing that this court reviews de novo the trial courts interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts (D) holding the ultimate question of probable cause should be reviewed de novo (E) holding that waiver should be reviewed de novo when decided without trial on undisputed facts
Output: (E)
the referee believed it was irrelevant, the referee made no inquiries about the son’s special needs or how the presence of Claimant’s domestic partner in Florida would alleviate them. 6 .For example, the majority relies on a portion of Claimant’s testimony to find that the domestic partner's main reason for leaving her job was stress. (Majority op. at 266.) While giving credence and weight to that testimony, the majority gives no credence or weight to Claimant's testimony that job stress had an adverse effect on her domestic partner’s health. (N.T. at 10.) Of course, only the UCBR can determine the credibility and weight of evidence. 7 . This court recognizes unmarried, heterosexual, single-parent families for other purposes in determining necessitous and compelling cause. See Beachem (<HOLDING>). 8 . I note that an individual may legally 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police chiefs son who alleged that he was denied an interview for a position because his father had criticized the local officials did not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of his father (B) holding that son had no homestead interest in property even though he resided upon it with his fathers consent because son had neither title nor a present right to possess land nor right to demand partition from father who was his cotenant (C) holding that a plenary hearing was necessary based upon mothers certification and school social workers report of childs behavioral problems (D) holding that a single father who relocated to care for an elevenyearold son with emotional and behavioral problems had a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving his employment (E) holding that transfer of insurance agency by father to his son was not a gift because sons agreement to continue fathers employment with agency was consideration for transfer
Output: (D)
of purely legal questions, such as whether a given set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs would demonstrate a constitutional violation. 4 . We note that the record contains no indication that the OSHP employs explicit racial criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making. If such a showing could be made, the plaintiffs would not need to establish the existence of a similarly situated class that was not investigated. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) ("[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 44, 151 L.Ed.2d 16 (2001); cf. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). "In its more recent pronouncements on laws 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is unnecessary for criminal defendant to establish threeprong test for discrimination in grand jury selection where there is direct evidence of exclusion based upon race (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea   forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (C) holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant
Output: (A)
The parole officer testified that his job was to supervise convicted felons and that Mr. Prieto was one of his supervisees. And during her testimony, Ms. Prieto stated twice that her son was a convicted felon. This testimony did not violate Old Chief or Rule 404(b)(1). Old Chief does not preclude reference to the fact that the defendant has a prior felony conviction; instead, it precludes any discussion of the nature and substance of the felony: “In dealing with the specific problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and its prior-conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S.Ct. 644; see also United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, there was no Old Chief violation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (C) holding that to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice the parties should make use of a redacted record stipulation affidavit or other similar technique whereby the jury is informed only of the fact of a prior felony conviction but not the nature or substance of the conviction (D) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense (E) holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded
Output: (C)
it is not counsel’s decision.” Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir.2004), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 1664, 161 L.Ed.2d 491 (2005). A trial court has no duty to explain to the defendant, however, that he has a right to testify or to verify that a defendant who is not testifying has waived the right. See United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 & 1069 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1996) (collecting cases); cf. United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir.1983). To ensure his constitutional rights, “a defendant must alert the trial court that he desires to testify or that there is a disagreement with defense counsel regarding whether he should take the stand.” United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted); Janoe, 720 F.2d at 1161 n. 9 (<HOLDING>). ‘When a defendant does not alert the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding violation of right to testify could not be harmless (B) holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify (C) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (D) recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify (E) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right
Output: (B)
against a physician or health care provider that are not founded upon a breach of an accepted standard of care. Id. The court pointed out that claims that are “health care liability claims” may not be “recast” as other causes of action in order to avoid requirements of the Act. Id. at 242. The underlying nature of the claim determines whether it is truly a health care liability claim, and thus governed by the Act. Id. As one court has noted, “[i]f the cause of action is based on the physician’s breach of the accepted standard of medical care, the cause of action is nothing more than a health care liability claim, no matter how the plaintiff labels it.” Wright v. Folder, 991 S.W.2d 343, 352 (TexApp.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 892-93 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). Just as a health care liability claim may not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years (B) holding that since the court could disentangle the inadequately pleaded fraud claims from the plaintiffs dtpa causes of action the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs dtpa claims for failure to meet rule 9b pleading requirements (C) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (D) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (E) holding that plaintiffs dtpa causes of action were actually negligence claims because they all complained of earles failure to hold to the applicable standard of care
Output: (E)
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, VACATED, in part, and Remanded.for further proceedings consistent with this order. 1 . Defendants express some doubts as to whether Type II agreements exist in New York law, or are merely a “creature of the federal courts.” Simone v. N.V. Floresta, 1999 WL 429504, at *9 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1999), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9578, at *27 n. 3. However, New York courts have cited with approval Tribune and Adjustrite, and appear to recognize the possibility of “Type II” preliminary agreements. See, e.g., SNC, Ltd. v. Kamine Eng. and Mech. Contracting Co., Inc., 238 A.D.2d 146, 655 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (1997); River Glen Assoc., Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 295 A.D.2d 274, 743 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Defendants argue on appeal that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement (B) holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract (C) holding that agreement did not constitute a binding preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith a mortgage contract (D) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (E) holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment
Output: (C)
Training Stables, Inc., 719 P.2d at 533. Accordingly, the court dismisses Defendants’ CPA claim concerning Cornhusker’s alleged violation of WAC 284-30-330(2). Hi. Compelling a first party claimant to initiate or submit to litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in such action This claim fails in light of the court’s foregoing rulings. Because Defendants have failed to create a genuine dispute with respect to coverage, see supra Part III.B.l.b., they cannot show that Corn-husker compelled SQI to submit to litigation by offering substantially less in settlement than the amount ultimately recovered on the Policy in this litigation. See WAC 284- 2JLR, 2013 WL 1562032, at *3 (W.D.Wash. Apr. 12, 2013) (<HOLDING>))); but see Seaway Props., LLC v. Fireman’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unreasonably low settlement offer amounts to a denial of benefits under ifca (B) holding that the trial courts denial of appellants motion to enforce settlement agreement constituted an important issue (C) holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits (D) holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (E) holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits
Output: (A)
neither cause nor prejudice). Although a court "must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim” when the government challenges the retroactive application of a decision, Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994), a disposition based on the appellant’s procedural default does not require us to decide the merits of the underlying Apprendi claim. See United States v. Lafayette, 337 F.3d 1043, 1048 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.2003). 10 . See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604 ("It is important to note ... that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”). 11 . See Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice 0, 766, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 17 . See Frady, 456 U.S. at 172, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (<HOLDING>); Dale, 140 F.3d at 1054 (finding no prejudice 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff bears burden of proving malice to defeat qualified privilege once defendant shows privilege applies (B) holding in a murder case that the strong uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record coupled with the defendants utter failure to come forward with a colorable claim that he acted without malice disposes of his contention that he suffered  actual prejudice from an instructional error that relieved the government of the burden of proving that element (C) holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances (D) holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury (E) holding a school principal seeking recovery for defamation has the burden of showing actual malice
Output: (B)
McCaffery. The issue in this discretionary appeal is whether a police officer violates the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (“Wiretap Act” or “Act”), 18 Pa.C.S. § 5701, et seq., when he communicates directly with a suspect via cell phone text messages while pretending to be the suspect’s accomplice. Because an officer who directly communicates with another person by text-messaging is not eavesdropping or listening in on a conversation, but is himself engaging in the communication, and because for purposes of the Wiretap Act, it is irrelevant that an officer intentionally misrepresents his identity to the person with whom he communicates, we hold that no violation of the Wiretap Act occurred here pursuant to Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa.Super.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Superior Court in the case sub judice 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule announced excluding the results of a wiretap because of improper minimization should not be applied retroactively because to reopen cases even on a limited basis for detailed hearings on the reasonableness of the interception of each phone call during each wiretap would overwhelm the courts (B) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation (C) holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal (D) holding that where an officer posing as an underage female communicates with a suspected sexual offender in a chat room on the internet no violation of the wiretap act occurs because the officer is a direct party to the communication and thus there has been no interception of a communication (E) holding that if an officer smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing the crime of possession of marijuana and thus has authority to arrest him without a warrant in a public place
Output: (D)
guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
Output: (A)
applies to both GMR and its attorneys, who “stand on the same legal footing” as their clients. See Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 313 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1991). Carlson also relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). Like Lugar, Doehr concerned a state statute that authorized prejudgment attachment without prior notice or hearing. Id. at 4, 111 S.Ct. 2105. The Court did not, however, consider whether the private party was a state actor. Doehr offers no guidance here. The district court correctly applied this court’s § 1983 case law when rejecting Carlson’s claim. Finding private parties liable as state actors, this court has required joint action or conspiracy with state authorities. See Wickersham, 481 F.3d at 595, 599 (<HOLDING>); DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state police is a state agency (B) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (C) holding that a private air show is a state actor when its president is the final arbiter of what constituted unwanted protest and directs whom police arrest (D) holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for  1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor (E) holding that amtrak was a state actor
Output: (C)
(<HOLDING>); United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify (B) holding that the fact that parallel proceedings force a defendant to make a difficult choice as to whether to testify does not of itself violate the constitution (C) holding that parallel importation of genuine goods does not violate lanham act (D) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (E) holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable
Output: (B)