niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(Fed.Cir.1985). “Further, as an additional precaution against denying a party its chance to prove a worthy case, any doubt as to the presence or absence of disputed issues of material fact must be resolved in favor of the presence of disputed issues, or in other words in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Lemelson, 760 F.2d at 1261. The onus placed upon a movant for summary judgment on a claim of inequitable conduct is especially heavy, as the claim necessarily involves determinations as to the intent of the party accused of practicing the fraud and the materiality of his alleged misrepresentations or omissions—issues which are typically not appropriate for resolution in a summary fashion. Kangaroos U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1573-74, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). B. Unenforceability Because of Inequitable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument (B) holding the connection is an element (C) holding that by including a knowledge element in two sections of a statute the legislature demonstrated that it knew how to express its intent to require a knowledge element rendering the absence of the element in another statute supportive of the inference that the legislature did not intend for there to be a knowledge element (D) holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry (E) holding that evaluation of the intent element of inequitable conduct is rarely enabled in summary proceedings
Output: (E)
Office Defendants The court also concludes that the Sheriffs Office defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs claims for negligence and wrong ful death. Even if the court assumes that the defendant deputies were somehow negligent in the manner in which they handled Harvey, the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that the deputies were engaged in an essential governmental function involving the exercise of discretion and judgment at all times relevant to the complaint, and thus, that they are immune from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663 (1984) (setting forth the factors considered for sovereign immunity); see also Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 400 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Shaffer v. City of Hampton, 780 F.Supp. 342, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity (B) holding officers involved in investigatory raid entitled to immunity (C) holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity (D) holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity (E) holding that a city police officers negligent actions involved in the pursuit of a speeding automobile were entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity
Output: (E)
charge for each item or items. The Trial Court, however, refused to admit the last page of the bill that contained only a description of miscellaneous and a corresponding charge. Plaintiff had no testimony or other evidence to explain to the jury anything about the charge listed on the last page of the bill. The Trial Court stated such a description would force the jury to speculate regarding what supplies were encompassed within the charge for these miscellaneous items. A jury may not engage in speculation. Stringer v. Cooper, 486 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972) (stating “we understand the holding in those cases and many more like them to be that a jury may not speculate as to cause when one is not shown.... ”); Moon v. Johnston, 47 Tenn.App. 208, 337 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Without any testimony or other evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide (B) holding a jury is not permitted to speculate or guess as to proximate cause (C) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (D) holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury (E) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury
Output: (B)
of demonstrating that the statute “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” Nixon v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 576 Pa. 385, 839 A.2d 277, 286 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the General Assembly may enact laws which impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health, safety, and welfare of society, any restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens. Id. As detailed below, we conclude that SORNA’s registration requirements violate juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing the irrebuttable presumption that all juvenile offenders “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4), because that presumpti 8, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state may not interfere with an unwed fathers custody rights absent proof of unfitness (B) holding unwed father entitled to hearing on his fitness as a parent before children could be taken from him after death of their mother (C) holding unconstitutional a statute providing for children to be declared dependent and removed from their unwed fathers custody based on the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents (D) holding that parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on parental fitness before children are removed from their custody (E) holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent
Output: (C)
P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (providing that a party seeking to change custody must establish that circumstances have substantially changed since the most recent custodial order, and that any events that took place before the prior proceedings cannot be used to show changed circumstances). Although we will not substantively review the decree’s child custody arrangement because of mootness, we note, in passing, that a district court, faced with evidence that one parent is attempting to disrupt the other parent’s 8 (1993); see also NRS 125.480(1) (providing that the sole consideration in awarding custody of a child is the best interest of the child). 11 84 Nev. 710, 447 P.2d 664 (1968). 12 Id. at 711, 447 P.2d at 665. 13 Cf. Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 1143, 946 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 14 Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 263 (Me. 1984) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that conduct that preceded the prior custody determination cannot be admitted to show a change in circumstances (B) holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child
Output: (A)
determinative, the existence of a Swedish statutory scheme for the Mission’s employees weighs in support of the conclusion that the plaintiffs employment was intertwined with the governmental function of the Mission. See Kato, 360 F.3d at 109; Hijazi, 689 F.Supp.2d at 671. This is true even though the plaintiff may not have been a civil servant under Swedish law because “[o]ther countries are free to structure employment relationships in ways that do not mimic civil service protections now common to the United States and many European states, without thereby sacrificing the immunity conferred by the FSIA, as long as the sovereign, by extending the employment, is engaging in ‘governmental’ rather than ‘commercial’ activity.” Kato, 360 F.3d at 113; cf. El-Hadad, 496 F.3d at 664 & n.2 (<HOLDING>). Under Kato, the plaintiffs employment was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the employment of some noncivil servants can properly be characterized as noncommercial (B) holding that having to report to the police being subject to regular questioning and surveillance and having difficulty finding employment can reasonably be characterized as mere harassment (C) holding that nonconsensual oversecured creditor shall receive the statutory rate of interest unless it can be characterized as a penalty (D) holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes (E) holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense
Output: (A)
benefits for which the employee spouse may name a beneficiary are in the “refund” category. These consist of employee contributions to the plan that have not been paid out in the form of retirement or death benefits “at the date of death of the last beneficiary.” A.R.S. § 38-846(F) (formerly subsection H). Here, Raul was or dered in the original decree to name Guiller-mina as an “irrevocable beneficiary of 50% of any death benefits payable by reason of his former employment with Santa Cruz County.” At some time thereafter, he designated her as a beneficiary of 50% of any refund benefits, which was all that the law allowed him to do. ¶ 21 We believe the wording of the statute deprives an ex-spouse of any right or claim to death benefits under the plan. See, e.g., Arnold, 912 P.2d at 470 (<HOLDING>). At the time of this divorce, there obviously 
 Holding statements: (A) holding railroad retirement benefits are not community property by congressional action (B) holding that home was community property where predecessor residence was initially purchased with separate funds but proceeds from sale of predecessor residence were commingled with community property upon sale and applied to succeeding residences noting there was no evidence of how value should have been apportioned between community and separate property each time the parties sold a residence during the period of the marriage (C) holding that while death benefits have characteristics of community property the washington legislatures designation of the beneficiaries of the statutory death benefit supersedes characterization of the interest under community property principles (D) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (E) holding disability benefits from us civil service are community property
Output: (C)
by a district court judge to conduct a hearing. Unless the district court judge decides to hold a hearing, the appellant asserts at least a somewhat compelling basis for the motion, or some exceptional circumstances require a hearing, the district court is not required to hold one. As the dissent in Harvey stated, “If the attorney, like any other grand jury witness, shows that the materials are privileged, or overcomes the grand jury’s presumption of regularity, then he is entitled to have the subpoena quashed.” 676 F.2d at 1013. Attorneys, like all others, have “the initial task of demonstrating ... some valid objection to compliance.” United States v. R. Enterprises, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 722, 730, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring); see id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 728 (<HOLDING>). The attorneys offered a thirteen-page 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding that because a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable  the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the subpoena recipient who seeks to avoid compliance but recognizing that a court may be justified under some circumstances in requiring the government to reveal the general subject of the grand jurys investigation before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of persuasion (D) holding that the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance (E) holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access
Output: (D)
First Nat. Bank of York v. Critel, 251 Neb. 128, 555 N.W.2d 773 (1996). See, also, Talkington v. Womens Servs., 256 Neb. 2, 588 N.W.2d 790 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. Talkington v. Womens Servs., supra. ANALYSIS Jurisdictional Question. Lee Sapp argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because Merrill Lynch did not file a motion to vacate the default judgment, but “a non-existent motion for an order ‘staying the execution of the judgment ....’” Brief for appellee Lee Sapp at 3. In support of Lee Sapp’s position, it cites Blitzkie v. State, 216 Neb. 105, 342 N.W.2d 5 (1983) (<HOLDING>), and Anderson v. Matthis, 246 Neb. 215, 518 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to dismiss based on a forumselection clause should be treated as a rule 12b3 motion to dismiss for improper venue (B) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (C) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (D) holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment (E) holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion
Output: (C)
See Cal. Crv. Proc. Code § 872.210 (West 2006); see also Forrest v. Elam, 88 Cal.App.3d 164, 151 Cal.Rptr. 591, 594 (Cal.Ct.App.1979) (stating that partition provides a successful resolution where life tenant commits waste). In California, partition of real property is a special statutory proceeding and is available only in limited instances. See § 872.210. Section 872.210 of the California Code of Civil Procedure permits partition of real property where the property is owned in successive estates. § 872.210(a)(2). Under the former version of Section 872.210, partition of such estates was limited to actions by a life tenant against the remainderman. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 752, (repealed 1976). See Akagi v. Ishioka, 47 Cal.App.3d 426, 120 Cal.Rptr. 807, 811 (Cal.Ct.App.1975) (<HOLDING>). The new version expressly removes that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant (B) recognizing that statutory right to partition in kind exists where mineral rights are involved (C) holding that remainderman had no right of action for partition against life tenant in the absence of special statutory authority (D) holding that a judge did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction where he had colorable authority to take the action in question (E) holding that plaintiffs had no right to proceed in rem against vessel under supplemental rule cla when they only possessed a statutory lien ie statutory right of action under  202h
Output: (C)
Red Rock had not shown that it would be offering service to an area that was either unserved or under-served. Second Order, 10 F.C.C.R. at 5991. Contrary to Red Rock’s assertion, the FCC did not state that provision of service to unserved or underserved areas is a prerequisite to a waiver. It merely noted that when an applicant cites “service” as a factor supporting a waiver, “the test ... is whether the proposal will provide service to listeners who currently lack it.” Id. As the FCC points out, every applicant for a new station will provide a new service to listeners within its reach. Therefore, we cannot fault the Commission for discounting the public interest value of a new station that does not reach areas that currently have little or no service. Cf. WAIT Radio, 459 F.2d at 1209 (<HOLDING>). The Commission dismissed KGMN’s failure to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding commission may take into account in considering waiver of clear channel rules whether applicant would offer service to an area lacking it (B) holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe (C) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (D) holding that it may not (E) holding that the governments take it or leave it plea offer including a plea waiver did not violate due process because the defendant had several weeks to consider the offer and this timeframe was not problematic
Output: (A)
by the parties. These considerations are consistent with the principle [sic] legislative purpose behind enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act: to provide and encourage an expedited, efficient, relatively uncomplicated, alternative means of dispute resolution, with limited judicial intervention or participation, and without the primary expense of litigation— attorneys’ fees. Id. at 153-54, 423 S.E.2d at 750. The court concluded that “in arbitration proceedings, both the arbitrator or arbitration panel and the superior courts upon confirmation are limited to applying only [our AR.S. § 12-1510] in determining whether attorneys’ fees should be or were properly awarded.” Id. at 155, 423 S.E. at 751; see also Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 97, 401 N.E.2d 839, 843 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In our view, to permit a trial court to award 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding that attorneys fee statute does not overpower the policy expressed in our ars  121510 against the award of attorneys fees in arbitration proceedings (C) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (D) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (E) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees
Output: (B)
magistrate judge denied the motion, explaining that Mr. Schueller’s subjective perceptions did not demonstrate judicial bias and his claims were not based on any extrajudicial source to support a bias or partiality challenge. We generally review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. ClearOne Comm’cns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir.2011). For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s order denying recusal, we determine that recusal was not warranted and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent Mr. Schueller now claims that the district judge was biased against him, he did not raise this issue to the district court, so we do not address it. See Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1239 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Wells Fargo’s motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs waived their bias argument on appeal because they failed to timely move for disqualification (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (D) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
Output: (A)
Significantly, however, plaintiff also applied for and received disability benefits milar offsets of FELA awards in cases filed across the United States. Yet, in this case, CSXT failed to request a special verdict form that would reveal the bases for the jury’s calculation of damages and specifically consented to tendering the general verdict form to the jury. See Dist. Ct. Docket No. 82. 7 . CSXT cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions, which it argues support the proposition that a setoff may be appropriate despite a jury's general verdict. Because these cases either offer no rationale for their holdings or involve a factual stipulation of some kind, we do not find them persuasive. See, e.g., Stanislawski v. Upper River Servs., Inc., 6 F.3d 537, 541 n. 8 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), Clark v. Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 448, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested (B) holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded (C) holding that the defendant was entitled to a credit equaling the full amount of the settlement when the plaintiff conceded that the agreement did not indicate whether it covered punitive damages (D) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (E) recognizing that the plaintiff conceded that the jury presumably awarded the full amount of cure he requested
Output: (E)
to trigger the mandatory minimum imprisonment terms. U.S.S.G.App. C, Amend. 750, Reason for Amendment. To account for the statutory changes in crack cocaine sentencing, the Sentencing Commission implemented Amendment 750 to revise the drug quantity table to lower the base offense levels for crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G.App. C, Amend. 750, Reason for Amendment; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7). Under § 3582, dis atutory mandatory minimum, due to the government filing a substantial assistance motion, the district court’s downward departure does not constitute a waiver of the applicability of the mandatory minimum; thus, the sentence remains based upon the mandatory minimum for purposes of § 3582(c)(2). Williams, 549 F.3d at 1340-41; United States v. Mills, 613 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In this case, regardless of which Guideline 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentence below a statutory minimum based on the filing of a substantial assistance motion did not eliminate the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum for purposes of sentence modification under  3582c2 (B) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (C) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (D) holding that where the statutory mandatory minimum sentence is higher than the upper end of the guideline range the court departs from the statutory level ie the lowest offense level that could support the statutory minimum (E) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based
Output: (E)
§ 2520(b)(3). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed with regard to its decision not to award compensatory damages to the plaintiffs, and reversed with regard to its order requiring Benjamin Culbertson to pay a part of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. 1 . Nalley was decided May 17, 1995, after the briefs in this case were filed. 2 . The language of 18 U.S.C. § 2515 is, in pertinent part, "Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence at any trial ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this subchapter." 3 . Accord: Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Plaintiffs contend an unpublished 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (B) holding that evidence seized in violation of a defendants fourth amendment rights was admissible for purposesof impeachment (C) holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible (D) holding on collateral review that miranda rule did not apply to confession because petitioner was tried before miranda decision (E) holding that a confession obtained in violation of miranda was admissible for impeachment
Output: (E)
the Tenth Circuit held that an unlawful search took place when officers felt the sides of luggage in the overhead racks of a bus without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or consent. See Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 638-39. While it acknowledged that luggage placed in the overhead racks of a commercial bus was subject to some intrusions, the court emphasized that “[t]he degree of intrusion is the determining factor as to whether an officer’s contact with the exterior of luggage constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 639. The court found that the officer’s manipulation went beyond the degree of intrusion that a passenger would reasonably expect his bag to encounter from other passengers. See id. But see United States v. Bond, 167 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), petition, for cert, filed, No. 98-9349 (U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search (B) holding that feel ing and squeezing exterior of luggage in overhead compartment of bus is not a search under the fourth amendment (C) recognizing that permissive search of car compartment incident to arrest is based on the fact that compartment is within reach of the arrestee (D) holding that a dog sniff of the exterior of luggage in a public airport does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment (E) holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not
Output: (B)
for a rational jury to find that Defendant Cloud was a member of the conspiracy for which he was indicted. The evidence demonstrated that Defendant Cloud combined his money together with Hall to purchase large quantities of drugs on repeated occasions. Defendant Hall testified that they would pool their money together and buy an eighth or a quarter of a kilogram of crack cocaine “every day almost.” In addition, Defendant Cloud sold drugs on repeated occasions to Collier, Felix, Wilson, Ralph Jones, Jermaine Jones, and Walker. Notably, Defendant Cloud’s distribution to Jermaine Jones occurred two to three times per week over the period in question. This evidence clearly can establish more than a buyer/seller relationship; it suffices to establish a conspiracy. See Brown, 332 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). 2. Defendant Abdullah The evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a close relationship between alleged conspirators and repeated large volume transactions were sufficient to establish a conspiracy (B) holding that the defendants purchase or sale of a large volume of narcoticsin that case one kilogram of cocainecreates an inference that he is a willful member of the conspiracy (C) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (D) holding that while a simple buy and sell transaction is not sufficient for proof of a conspiracy repeated transactions for large quantities are sufficient to support an inference that the buyer and seller were engaged in a conspiracy (E) holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct
Output: (A)
she made to Mason. Detective Judah referenced the interview and the fact that he watched the interview take place via closed circuit television. He also mentioned that the interview was recorded absent defense objection. Mason likewise testified that the interview was recorded, again without defense objection, and was asked questions based on a transcript of the interview. In light of the repeated reference to the recording of the interview, we discern no manifest injustice resulting from the Commonwealth’s statement to the jury that the recording was excluded because it contained hearsay. We emphasize that the Commonwealth did not reference any of the recording’s content, simply the fact that the interview was recorded. Cf. Parker v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 805, 808-09 (Ky.2007) (<HOLDING>). Even if this reference was absent from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony (B) holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay (C) holding that a later statement was admissible despite illegal detention at home (D) holding error where re cording which was later deemed inadmissible was played during opening statement (E) holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel
Output: (D)
not have acquired any executory obligations towards Brunson because his employment was terminable at will misses the point. Brunson is not suing to enforce an ex-ecutory obligation but to recover compensation for services which he has already fully performed, allegedly in reliance on promises made to him in advance of such performance. Compare Alston v. Brown Transport Corp., 182 Ga. App. 632 (356 SE2d 517) (1987); Murphine v. Hosp. Auth. of Floyd County, 151 Ga. App. 722 (261 SE2d 457) (1979). Brunson would not have been required to give the company “additional” consideration over and above the performance of his job as a sales representative in order to accept the offer created by these alleged promises. Compare Management Search v. Morgan, 136 Ga. App. 651 (222 SE2d 154) (1975) (<HOLDING>). Similarly misplaced is C. B. A.’s reliance on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation (B) holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question (C) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (D) holding that under texas law a contract may be terminable at will and without cause but an employer cannot promise to pay employee a certain wage and then unilaterally decide to pay employee less for work she has already performed (E) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously
Output: (B)
legitimate interests that underlie it. ¶ 26. While this appeal was pending, respondent filed a motion with the Court to amend Canon 5(A)(3) retroactively to comport with the Legislature’s recent enactment of 4 V.S.A. § 278 and to eliminate the finding that he violated the Canon. In pertinent part, the statute provides that: “An assistant judge or a candidate for the office of assistant judge may also seek election to the office of probate judge, and, if otherwise qualified and elected to both offices, may serve both as an assistant judge and as probate judge.” 4 V.S.A. § 278(a). The statute was effective on passage, June 3, 2010, see 2009 (Adj. Sess.), No. 154, §§ 17a, 239(d), and operates prospectively. See Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 156 Vt. 77, 90, 589 A.2d 1205, 1212-13 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In effect, respondent argues that the statute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding new statute applicable only prospectively (B) holding retroactive application (C) holding that statutes operate prospectively unless they contain clear language mandating retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
Output: (C)
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion that this Court is free to divine its own interpretation of public policy, in fact, Pennsylvania courts generally ascertain public policy “by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest.” Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747, 752 (2002); Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d 1231, 1237 (1998). As Defendant GSK correctly argues, Pennsylvania courts have recognized the societal importance of new and effective prescription drugs, Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 1994). To encourage this process, the courts have also recognized the need not to unduly burden the pharmaceutical industry with unfettered liability. Hahn, 673 A.2d at 890-91 (<HOLDING>); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing strict product liability actions (B) holding that indemnification by excess liability insurer for punitive damages imposed on drug manufacturer contrary to public policy (C) holding joinder of a hospital medical malpractice claim and a drug manufacturer products liability theory was proper in claim alleging injury from administering a drug (D) holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute (E) holding on policy grounds that a strict liability claim should not lie against drug manufacturer
Output: (E)
1st DCA 2003). Because Wife has agreed that her living with a cellmate amounts to cohabitation as that term is defined in the settlement agreement, and because driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is a voluntary act which is known to possibly result in incarceration, we cannot say that on these facts such an interpretation of the agreement leads to an absurd result. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and direct that a judgment terminating alimony be entered upon remand. FARMER, J., concurs. KLEIN, J., dissents with opinion. KLEIN, J., dissenting. The former wife’s position in the trial court was that, even though the word “cohabitation” is not ambiguous, to apply it here would produce an absurd result. James v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 66 So.2d 62, 64 (Fla.1953) (<HOLDING>). Other cases applying the absurd result 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the appellate courts will not rely upon the literal meaning of a statute when such a construction would be absurd unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate (B) holding that all portions of a statute are to be read in concert as to harmonize all provisions and that construction of a statute should avoid unreasonable or absurd results (C) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (D) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (E) holding that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results
Output: (D)
(2d Cir.1981). 11 . E.g., In Re Morris, 914 F.2d at 466. 12 . Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647-48 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1476, 117 L.Ed.2d 620 (1992). 13 . Id. 14 . Rubin, 661 F.2d at 992-94. 15 . Fairchild made three payments after May 31 totaling $114,597.85. The dates and amounts of those payments are as follows: Date Paid Amount 6/05/89 $10,080.37 6/09/89 - 14,517.48 8/01/89 90,000.00 16 . See, TexBus. & Com.Code Ann. § 26.01(a), (b)(2) (Vernon 1987). 17 . E.g., Haas Drilling Co. v. First National Bank, 456 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Tex.1970); Smith d 510, 515 (9th Cir.1992) (stating that such an approach accords the trial court the opportunity to correct any errors). 24 . E.g. Pou v. Dominion Oil Co., 265 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex.1924) (<HOLDING>); Howell v. Bowden, 368 S.W.2d 842, 846 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it (B) holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds (C) holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds (D) holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds (E) holding that full performance takes a contract outof the statute of frauds
Output: (E)
is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the' underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint”). 1. Basic Contributor Rating LMC does not dispute that a basic contributor rating is an adverse employment action and that the action took place after Dr. Chawla’s August 2, 2011 and September 22, 2011 complaints. On September. 29, 2011, Mr. Hooker was notified that he was the subject of an investigation of Dr. Chawla’s complaints. Docket No. 37-2 at 5. However, Dr. Chawla does not contest that Mr. Nichols had a role in assigning the basic contributor rating and identified no specific facts upon which to conclude that Mr. Nichols was aware of Dr. Chawla’s prior complaints of discrimi nation. See Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgm’t Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Chawla also does not attack the stated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to show a causal connection plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that those who decided to fire him had knowledge of his protected activity (B) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (C) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his protected activity (E) holding that in addition to temporal proximity plaintiff must show further evidence supporting a causal connection
Output: (A)
al., No. 05-3662-ag In this case, amicus counsel correctly argues that, prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review an order of removal where, as is the case here, that order was entered against an alien by reason of his conviction for an aggravated felony where the convicted alien did not challenge that categorization of his crime. See INA § 242(a)(2)(c) (as amended by Pub.L. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996)). Accordingly, prior to May 11, 2005, the date of the enactment of the REAL ID Act, Williamson had no reason to file a petition for review. However, Williamson failed to file his § 2241 petition within 30 days of the enactment of the REAL ID Act and therefore cannot benefit from the grace period we have allowed. Wang, 484 F.3d at 616, 617-18 (<HOLDING>). As such, we conclude that we have no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons (B) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (C) holding that because the real id act created a remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition the act is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus (D) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction (E) holding that  1252a4 of the real id act precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the petitioners habeas petition
Output: (D)
EPA approved NR § 216.21(4)(a). However, we need not decide whether the EPA approved this specific provision of Wisconsin’s WPDES scheme because, even if Flambeau’s permit were legally invalid, we cannot, consistent with the requirements of due process, impose a penalty on Flambeau for complying with what Wisconsin deemed a valid WPDES permit. Informed by basic principles of due process, it is “a cardinal rule of administrative law” that a regulated party must be given “fair warning” of what conduct is prohibited or required of it. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ), Inc. v. United States EPA 937 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C.Cir.1991) (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455, 458-59 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that epa rule relating to repair of cars not in compliance with clean air act was interpretative not legislative rule and thus not subject to apa notice and comment procedures (B) holding that defendant could not be sanctioned and found to have violated the clean air act when it complied with regu lations as codified despite having knowledge that the epa requested amendment of the regulations to prohibit defendants conduct (C) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (D) holding the epa could regulate air pollutants under the clean air act solely on the basis of the pollutants risk to human health (E) holding in a case involving the clean air act asbestos workpractice standards that knowingly violates does not require knowledge of the illegality of ones conduct
Output: (B)
of the Civil Rights Act for guidance in interpreting the employment discrimination provisions of ORS 659A. See, e.g., Portland State Univ. Chapter of Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Portland State Univ., 352 Or. 697, 711, 291 P.3d 658, 666 (2012); Briede v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA Inc., No. 10-cv-649-HA, 2010 WL 4236929, at *3 (D.Or. Oct. 21, 2010); Conley v. City of Lincoln City, No. 02-cv-216-AS, 2004 WL 948427, at *13 (D.Or. Apr. 20, 2004) (collecting cases). Under Title VII, former employees can bring post-employment retaliation claims against their former employer if the action is related to or arises out of the employment relationship. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir.1997); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court finds that Hoy can 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii (B) holding that postemployment retaliation against a former employee for filing an equal employment complaint is actionable under title vii (C) holding an adverse employment action based on denial or revocation of a security clearance is not actionable under title vii (D) recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii (E) holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii
Output: (B)
included only cognitive and achievement tests. Doc. No. 85 at 5. Based on deficiencies identified in the 1998 BCH evaluation, the parents believe that Tingley also should have evaluated J.B.’s motor skills, speech/language skills, social/emotional skills, pragmatic skills, visual abilities, vocational/life skills, and adaptive behavior. Id. at 9. The [¶] appears to have rejected the parents’ argument as time-barred. A.R. 1 at 14. This conclusion was based on the fact that the allegedly improper evaluation occurred in May 2002, more than two years before the parents requested a due process hearing. See Conn. GemStat. § 10-76h(a)(3) (2002) (current version at Conn. Gen-Stat. § 10-76h(a)(4) (2007)) (setting a two-year statute of limitations for IDEA claims); M.D., 334 F.3d at 221-222 (<HOLDING>). The HO’s conclusion was correct. Without 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea (B) holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period (C) holding that the threeyear statute of limitations applicable to  1983 actions in arkansas governed idea claims (D) holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea (E) holding that in an idea case state law sets the relevant limitations period
Output: (E)