niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
judges, the trial management techniques needed to control these lawyers may seem harsh, even abusive. A rigorous standard that restricts sanctions to instances of clearly abusive behavior will reduce the likelihood that councils will sanction appropriate behavior out of inexperience. And quite apart from the problem of inexperience, even judges can act unfairly — indeed vindictively — towards colleagues. A rigorous standard will reduce, though of course it cannot eliminate, the possibility that judicial discipline will be used to sanction unpopular judges engaged in appropriate behavior. Third, judicial discipline, like civil liability for judicial acts, can chill the proper exercise of judicial discretion. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (<HOLDING>); cf. Williams v. United States, 156 F.3d 86, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that imposing civil liability for acts committed to judicial discretion would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation (B) holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts (C) recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction (D) holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation (E) holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional
Output: (A)
hearing are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). A trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001). In the present case, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact: that on or about July 6, 2004 . . . Officer Henderson, a 27 year veteran of the Burlington Police Dept, had received a call of a suspicious activity at Coy’s Exxon on the comer of Graham-Hopedale Rd. and N. Church St. That location has had numerous calls for shopliftingy fights[,] and other activity. Also there is numerous gang and graffiti act S.E.2d 412, 418 (2004), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The State argues “ [i]t is clear from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support an investigatory stop of a vehicle where the defendant and driver were observed loitering at a closed shopping center shortly before midnight no other vehicles were in the parking lot and the two men abruptly and hurriedly returned to their vehicle which was parked out of general public view (B) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (C) holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity (D) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area (E) holding that a mere parking violation justified the investigatory stop of choudrys vehicle
Output: (A)
health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor’s homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor’s property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign (B) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property (E) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate
Output: (A)
Appellants asserted below. See Harper, 138 Fed.Appx. at 132-33 (dismissing Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims); Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1316 (S.D.Fla.2011) (dismissing a RICO claim under Rooker-Feldman); Distant v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 09-61460-CIV, 2010 WL 1249129, at *3 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 25, 2010) (unpublished)(“AIthough plead as conspiracy claims ..., Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to invalidate the state court action by ruling that the state court foreclosure judgment is somehow void. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, ... this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as Plaintiff seeks a de facto appeal of a previously litigated state court matter.”); Simpson v. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank of Carmel, 20 F.Supp.2d 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Wayne Weinberger, P.C., 994 F.Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party is not entitled to pursue a separate action for deficiency judgment where the foreclosure complaint includes a prayer for a deficiency judgment and the foreclosure court reserves jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment (B) holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final (C) holding that a foreclosure judgment was not subject to federal review under rookerfeldman and noting that the fact that plaintiff alleges that the foreclosure judgment was procured by fraud and conspiracy does not change that result (D) holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale (E) holding that 24 foreclosure was substantial under the facts of that case
Output: (C)
under the TVPA: “[R]esponsibility for torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those acts — anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.” S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 9. Thus, theories of liability under domestic law are available to support TVPA claims by providing a theory of tort liability when the defendant did not personally commit the underlying act. (3) Standards for Aiding and Abetting Liability When considering whether the secondary theories of liability are met, we turn to federal common law for the relevant standards. Our opinion in Cabello, 402 F.3d 1148, forms the basis for aiding and abetting liability in this circuit. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315-16 (<HOLDING>). In Cabello, we addressed whether claims based 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a panel of this court cannot overturn a prior panels decision (B) holding that precedent set by our panels binds all subsequent panels (C) holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels (D) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (E) recognizing that our decision in cabello binds all subsequent panels of this court as to aiding and abetting liability
Output: (E)
his partner Officer Lilly. When the dissent argues that there was no one else at the setting to whom a purse with unknown contents could be given, it ignores the presence of Officer Stewart’s partner, Officer Lilly- ¶ 19 Further, nothing in the actual facts of this ease supports Officer Stewart’s immediate search of the purse before attempting to assess the situation. Thus, when the dissent engages in a worst-case scenario of what might have subsequently transpired had the purse been returned to Appellant before it was searched, it is pure speculation. The officers might have determined there was no danger in returning the purse to Appellant because the situation was never as exigent as the 9-1-1 report suggested. See State v. Gissendaner, 177 Ariz. 81, 83, 865 P.2d 125, 127 (App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Alternately, the officers might have had time 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry where officers were faced with a call reporting burglary in progress (B) holding that police in responding to a domestic violence call were not justified in engaging in a warrantless entry because the assault was over and there was no real danger that the assault was about to resume (C) holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry (D) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry (E) holding that counsel was deficient when he failed to object to error in jury charge referring to aggravated assault when the charge was assault on a public servant
Output: (B)
§ 2252A and that a conviction for both offenses based on the same conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1374-75 (citations omitted). That said, the Eleventh Circuit found in Bobb that the defendant’s convictions for both receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his convictions were “based on two distinct offenses, occurring on two different dates, and proscribed by two different statutes.” Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375; see also United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 697-98 (9th Cir.2009) (finding that conviction for receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the convictions were based on separate conduct); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158-59 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wendehake, No. 06-14040-CR, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing (D) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated (E) holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy
Output: (A)
subjective, although it is usually proved by inference from the acts of the accused. Thus, intentionally entering or intentionally remaining unlawfully upon the described premises with the intent to commit any crime against a person or property rights constituted burglary, and therefore, it cannot logically be said that specifying the particular crime intended to be committed is, under our statutes, an essential element which must be alleged in order to charge the crime of burglary actual commission of a second underlying offense, in order to sufficiently charge the offense, it is incumbent on the State to allege the essential elements of the underlying offense; identification of the offense by name or statutory reference will not suffice. Cf. Elliott, 77 Hawaii at 312, 884 P.2d at 375 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we adopt the rule set out in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number (B) holding that a charge not taken under oath or affirmation is not a valid charge (C) holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review (D) holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence (E) holding that statutory references in charge did not cure the omission of essential elements in the challenged counts of the charge
Output: (E)
ease provides in part: Court commissioners are quasi-judicial officers of courts of record and have judicial authority as provided by this section and rules of the Judicial Council. It further states: Upon the informed consent of the defendant, the court commissioner may conduct a jury or nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with the law. Upon conviction, the commissioner may impose sentence and enter final judgment. The judgment entered by the commissioner shall be the final judgment of the court for all purposes, including appeal. Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, much like article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution, provides that the judicial power of the state shall be vested in the courts. However, unlike its federal counterpart, the Utah Constit (<HOLDING>); In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 2, 474 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated (B) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (C) holding legislatures intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) recognizing that the general assembly can delegate discretionary functions to administrative bodies and officers and holding that a statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes an intelligible principle to which the administrative body or officer must conform and if it establishes a procedure for effective review
Output: (B)
its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by returning him to his former school in Lake County and changing the timesharing arrangement to have the father assume the primary timesharing responsibilities. See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Holland v. Holland, 140 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing. On remand, the court shall take evidence and use the best interests of the child standard to determine if modification is in the child’s best interests in light of the parties’ inability to agree which school the minor child will attend. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 966 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Once that determination is made, the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that change of circumstances is not prerequisite to additional   3583e2 modification (B) holding that a hearing is required when a modification of parenting time would change the established custodial environment (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a custodial parents move to a foreign state without more is not a substantial change of circumstances that would support a modification of custody (E) holding that parties inability to agree on which private high school child would attend constituted substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting plan
Output: (E)
only when it is shown that the confidence reposed by one person was actually accepted by the other, and merely reposing confidence in another may not, of itself, create the relationship”) (footnotes omitted). Although the courts of Kansas have suggested that a somewhat more protective approach may be used when one party is under a disability or disadvantage, Cor-nett v. Roth, 233 Kan. 936, 941, 666 P.2d 1182, 1186 (1983), Wedman v. Home Nat. Bank of Arkansas City, No. 88-1439-K (D.Kan., Jan. 25, 1990) (WESTLAW, 1990 WL 7501), this more protective approach will ordinarily not be utilized as between two or more business people or business entities who each possess the capacity to protect themselves. See Ritchie Enterprises v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1041, 1054 (D.Kan.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court of Kansas has cautioned 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sellers superior knowledge of a product does not justify imposition of a fiduciary relationship in the absence of a conscious assumption of fiduciary duties (B) holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 (C) holding that under delaware law the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors (D) holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 (E) recognizing that fiduciary liability requires not onlya repose of trust but an assumption of a duty and breach of that duty
Output: (A)
his Fourth Amendment protections. See id. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Crowder did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Mustang after he turned it over to the shipper. The doors were left unlocked, the driver of the car carrier was given the keys, and Crowder knew that the driver would enter the Mustang and drive it. We conclude that no one could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a vehicle under those circumstances. Although there is no evidence that Crowder directly authorized the driver to search the vehicle, in light of the circumstances described above it is clear that the driver was “authorized to act in direct contravention to” Crowder’s privacy interest. See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Crowder argues that United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding attorney must have express authority to settle a clients claims (B) holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made to companion while seated in police car (C) holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in utility records under either state or federal constitution (D) holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a package sent via federal express when the defendant signed an air bill that gave federal express the authority to search the package (E) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth
Output: (D)
pumping cases and the body cavity search cases have generally involved searches of prison inmates and searches at the United States border. See id. at 124. In both contexts, the suspect’s expectation of privacy is thought to be less reasonable and the government’s interest thought to be greater. See id. at 125, 144-61 (and cases cited therein); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-40, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381, 388-90 (1985) (“[N]ot only is the expectation of privacy less at the border ... the Fourth Amendment balance between the interest of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the Government at the border.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393, 402-03 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In light of these authorities, Lewis contends 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells (B) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (C) holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records (D) holding under smith that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata (E) holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy
Output: (B)
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir.2014). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Winter’s claim for wrongfulforeclosure because Winter failed to allege facts sufficient to show a lack of default. See id. at 785 (“Nevada law requires that a trustor or mortgagor show a lack of default in order to proceed with a wrongful foreclosure claim.”). Moreover, Winter’s contention that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.’s (“MERS”) involvement rendered the assignment of the deed of trust and note invalid is foreclosed by Nevada law. See Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, — Nev. —, 286 P.3d 249, 259-60 (2012) (<HOLDING>), The district court properly dismissed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee (B) holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan (C) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (D) holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given (E) holding that mers is an ineligible beneficiary within the terms of the washington deed of trust act if it never held the promissory note or other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust and that characterizing mers as the beneficiary has the capacity to deceive and may give rise to an action under the consumer protection act
Output: (B)
to present' concrete plans showing their intent to file those requests. One way for a plaintiff to make this showing -is to “dem upp.2d 233, 262 (D.D.C.2012) (“Recent cases have clarified that, where a FOIA requester challenges an alleged ongoing policy or practice and can demonstrate that it has pending claims that are likely to implicate that policy or practice, future injury is satisfied.”). By the same token, in Citizens for Responsi-bilityand Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Judge Lamberth held that no case or controversy existed in part because “CREW [did] not allege anywhere ... that it has a FOIA request pending with the [agency].” 527 F.Supp.2d 101, 106 (D.D.C.2007); see also Coleman, 134 F.Supp.3d at 306-08, 2015 WL 5730707, at *8-9 (<HOLDING>). If a plaintiff does not have a separate FOIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents (B) holding that only the person or entity whose name appears in the foia request is the real party in interest and thus has standing to bring subsequent foia enforcement action (C) holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing (D) holding that where a foia plaintiff seeks sensitive foreignaffairs information the court should give substantial weight to a government affidavit that the information is exempt from foia but nevertheless consider contrary evidence presented by the plaintiff (E) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents
Output: (C)
include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a).” § 4B1.2 app. n. 1. A shotgun modified so that it “has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length” is a firearm described in § 5845(a). See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). As Lipscomb’s instant offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force as an element and is not an enumerated offense, the issue here is whether Lipscomb’s present offense “otherwise involves conduct presenting a serious risk of injury to another” under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859, 862 & n. 6 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Applicability of the Categorical Approach 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that north carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline (B) holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of  4b12a2 following johnson (C) holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of  4b12a2 (D) holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another (E) holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime
Output: (C)
from the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (requiring the sentencing court to state its reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the Guidelines). As indicated above, Mr. Johnson argues that his sentence is proeedurally unreasonable because: (1) the probation officer’s extrapolation was flawed and should not have been considered in determining the sentence; (2) he did not receive notice of the probation officer’s extrapolation memorandum ; and (3) the district judge did not adequately explain his reasons for imposing the 8 year sentence. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Johnson never raised these arguments in the district court. Therefore, we review them for plain error. See United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard (B) holding that plain error review is used for unpreserved challenges to the method by which the district court arrived at a sentence including arguments that the sentencing court failed to explain adequately the sentence imposed under the statutory factors in  3553a (C) holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable (D) holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum (E) holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of  3553a
Output: (B)
that Bartholdi’s claims of privilege were not properly raised before the Commission. Section 405 of the Communications Act provides that the Commission must be afforded an “opportunity to pass” on an issue as a condition precedent to judicial review. 47 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2). In this case, Bartholdi raised its privilege claims, if at all, only before the WTB. Bartholdi’s application for review to the Commission made no mention of either the attorney-client or work-product privilege. Under the plain language of Section 405, an issue cannot be preserved for judicial review simply by raising it before a Bureau of the FCC. It is “the Commission” itself that must be afforded the opportunity to pass on the issue. Id.; cf. Parsippany Hotel Management Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Bartholdi contends that it preserved the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue raised before alj but not nlrb was not preserved (B) holding that despite the merits of the argument the appellant raised on appeal the issue was not preserved for judicial review because it was not raised before the administrative agency (C) holding issues not raised before the district court are not preserved for appeal (D) holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed (E) holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review
Output: (A)
247 Fed.Appx. 730, 734 (6th Cir.2007). Instead, he merely argued that the Cl “was the person that formed the facts for the issuance of the search warrant,” and so “[i]n order to present any viable defense,” the requested information was necessary. (Mot. for Discovery, R. 40, PagelD 164). Further, on appeal, Ray has not demonstrated to this Court how disclosure would have assisted him at trial; he only asserts that the Cl could have testified at trial about the details of the alleged purchase during the controlled buy, even though Ray was never charged for that alleged sale. The only record evidence of the role played by the Cl in this case -is that the Cl supplied the information to law enforcement that ultimately led to a fruitful search. See Beals, 698 F.3d 248, 270 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Similar to Beals, in this case, Ray was not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that information from confidential informant was reliable and credible where affidavit referred to previous instances in which informant provided correct information to police affiants own investigation and controlled buy of contraband confirmed information and second informant supplied same information to police (B) holding that trial court improperly dismissed charges pretrial because the state did not disclose the identity of a confidential informant (C) holding that because the defendants offer of proof failed to show that the affiant was untruthful the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order disclosure of the informant (D) holding that the district court was within its discretion not to order disclosure of the governments confidential informant where the informant only helped orchestrate the search that led to discovery of incriminating evidence not the crimes themselves and could not testify to any relevant fact (E) holding corroborating evidence sufficient that officer drove informant to defendants house saw defendant admit informant and saw informant come out with drugs and defendants voice was identified on audio tape of transaction
Output: (D)
that Cook County was justified in discharging Bodenstab because “[i]t would have been too risky to chance returning [Bodenstab] to his previous position as a Doctor of Anesthesiology at Stroger Hospital in view of the recommendations and observations made by PRC Staff.” Thus, the Hearing Officer’s decision does not support Bodenstab’s claim of pretext. Bodenstab also claims that he presented sufficient evidence of pretext, as well as circumstantial evidence of discrimination, by showing that Cook County failed to follow its own internal policies and by pointing to inconsistencies in various witnesses’ testimony. Bodenstab, however, did not develop these arguments until his reply brief and thus has waived any such argument. See United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the evidence Bodenstab 
 Holding statements: (A) holding arguments not appropriately developed in brief are waived (B) holding arguments first raised in reply brief are forfeited (C) holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited (D) holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived (E) holding that arguments not fully developed until a reply brief are waived
Output: (E)
of leaving the license at home.” Id. It also considered the scant risk of erroneous conviction, remarking that: “We find it nearly impossible to believe that [the accused] had such a license but withheld it, subjecting himself to the risk of a mandatory term of imprisonment” — “ ‘[s]uch an absurd game.does not contribute to a search for truth....’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970)). In the end, the Jones court found “no unfairness in [its] traditional rule.” Id. Given that the section 10 firearms offense remains a general prohibition crime in the Commonwealth, it comes as no surprise to us that the SJC in Powell’s direct appeal decided to abide by the due process analysis in Jones. Cf. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 91-93, 54 S.Ct. 281 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, between the time of Jones and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence (B) holding the standard of review in juvenile adjudication is whether after viewing evidence in light most favorable to the state any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that state courts determination that the petitioner was competent to waive his right to pursue further postconviction review of his claims was a factual one and therefore presumed correct under the federal habeas corpus statute (D) holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that the state crime under review was not one of general prohibition before considering whether the evidence had any sinister significance in relation to the presumed culpability component
Output: (E)
it was given voluntarily. If these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then, without being advised of the court’s decision, the jury shall be instructed that they should decide whether in view of all the same circumstances the defendant’s confession is true. If they find that it is not true, then they must treat it as inadmissible and disregard it for purposes of discharging them function as fact finders on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. [Id. at 272, 294 A.2d 23.] See also State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 366, 387 A.2d 1187 (1978) (reaffirming Hampton principle that trial court is sole arbiter of voluntariness of defendant’s statements and rejecting defendant’s invitation to overrule decision); State v. Bowman, 165 N.J.Super. 531, 537-39, 398 A.2d 908 (App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Rules of Evidence codified the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors statement to jury on summation that trial court had previously found defendants two confessions voluntary constituted reversible error even though trial court gave hampton charge because it failed to instruct jury to disregard prosecutors statement (B) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (C) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (D) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (E) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error
Output: (A)
to argue on appeal his waiver and sua sponte dismissal issues, we should then reject the petitioner’s arguments on the merits. In my judgment, the district court acted in conformity not only with AEDPA but also with the caselaw construing AED-PA. Congress intended AEDPA to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (stating that “there is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doctrines [comity, finality, and federalism]”). Consistent with such purpose, Congress created a one-year limitations period that was meant to streamline the habeas review process and to lend finality to state court convictions. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2128, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (<HOLDING>); see also H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statute serves as only effective deterrent of such violations (B) recognizing as well that such uninhibited communication serves the public interest by facilitating the administration of appropriate treatment (C) recognizing that the 1 year limitation period of  2244d1 quite plainly serves the wellrecognized interest in the finality of state court judgments (D) holding that appellate court may raise issues of default sua sponte where necessary to protect inter alia the finality of federal criminal judgments (E) holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest or failed to file a claim with the state within a twenty year period
Output: (C)
for the Florida Supreme Court to review the imposition of the death sentence with “rationality and consistency,” Proffitt, supra, 428 U.S. at 259, 96 S.Ct. at 2969, defendants and their counsel must be aware of all the material under consideration by the court. Not only is the defendant’s right to counsel implicated, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), but so is the right of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). The receipt of psychiatric and psychological reports from the Department of Corrections also implicates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). By considering nonrecord information without 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent (B) recognizing fifth amendment right to be informed of right to remain silent to have questions cease and to consult with an attorney before being subjected to psychiatric examination that may be used against defendant in capital sentencing proceedings (C) holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease (D) holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed (E) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer
Output: (B)
“others” are not enough to plead the requisite pattern of fraud. In Emery v. American General Finance, Inc. (“Emery I”), 71 F.3d 1343 (7th Cir.1995), we encountered facts substantially similar to those in the case at hand: The plaintiff pleaded with adequate particularity the fraud directed against her, but with regard to other customers of American General Finance alleged merely that the company did the same thing to them. There are no names or dates or other details of transactions involving any other customers besides Emery. These details ... are necessary to identify a violation of RICO, which requires ... more than one fraud and only one is alleged to have been perpetrated against Emery herself. Id. at 1348; see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant who was associated with the enterprise and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when he repeatedly violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws was not liable under  1962c because he had no part in directing the enterprises affairs (B) holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (C) holding that wire and mail fraud statutes are construed identically (D) holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes (E) holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant engaged in multiple instances of mail and wire fraud did not allege pattern of racketeering activity with sufficient particularity
Output: (E)
the evidence of Robertson’s alleged prior threat to his ex-wife as Williams rule evidence, the State cannot rely on the law of impeachment to introduce the same evidence through the back door by asking an impermissible question regarding an alleged prior crime. Finally, we address whether the admission of this collateral-crime evidence constitutes reversible error. This Court has held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence “is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demon strated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)); accord Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, given the highly inflammatory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (C) holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify  (D) holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful (E) holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime
Output: (D)
she sought treatment with, at least, seven (7) different doctors, and none gave her a written recommendation indicating that her impairments required a change in territory. See Findings of Fact, Section I, infra, ¶ 37. That is, although Plaintiff categorizes this transfer as a “reasonable accommodation,” she never explains how this change in territory actually amounted to an accommodation that was both reasonable and would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her job, or provided any medical evidence in support of her contention. “All that [plainitff] can present in support of her reasonable accommodation claim is her own self-serving testimony, and in this case, that is just not sufficient....” McPhaul v. Board of Com’rs of Madison County, 226 F.3d 558 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, McPhaul v. Board of Com’rs of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act (B) holding that the appellant failed to establish that she was entitled to an accommodation under the ada because there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that she could not perform the functions and activities of daily life or that her impairment and symptoms substantially limited her functions and activities (C) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada (D) holding that ada may obligate employer to reassign disabled employee who can no longer even with reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of her job (E) holding that employee allegedly suffering from fibromyalgia was not qualified individual and thus could not maintain ada claim challenging transfer and termination inasmuch as she was unable to perform essential functions of those positions with or without accommodation employee did not dispute supervisors evaluations documenting her performance deficiencies and provided no medical evidence that requested accommodation would have improved her performance
Output: (E)