niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(1981); W. Page Keeton, Pros-ser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 128, at 972 (5th ed.1984). [¶ 27] Although Brown, 2011 SD 21, ¶ 39, 798 N.W.2d 422, suggests attorney fees through appeal may be appropriate for slander of title under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633(l)(b), we have found no cases, and the parties have cited none, explicitly addressing the propriety of awarding attorney fees on appeal in a quiet title action involving slander of title under a statutory provision comparable to N.D.C.C. § 49-19.1-09. In another context, however, this Court has decided statutory provisions authorizing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party entitle that party to attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal. Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920, 925 (N.D.1987) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 28] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment (B) holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice (C) holding that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants seeking attorney fees are to be treated alike (D) holding a prevailing consumers attorneyfee award under the magnusonmoss act at the trial level should not be dissipated by uncompensated costs expenses and attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal (E) holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party
Output: (D)
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). For citizens who are not in the custody of the slate, however, this right does not include the right to state protection from private violence. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The "state created danger” cases based upon this right to personal security do not recognize a right that is implicated here because they do not involve situations where the risk created is justified by the state’s pursuit of a legitimate public interest. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.1989). 26 . Compare Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1834, 134 L.Ed.2d 938 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 27 . While it is clear that deprivation of a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to  1983 claims (B) holding that state statutes which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular substantive result do not give rise to a statecreated liberty interest (C) holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme (D) recognizing that nevada statutes do  not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore do  not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process (E) holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment
Output: (B)
was accompanied by an actual record that corroborated the summary contained in the certifícate. Under these circumstances, Murphy’s rights secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were not violated. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 1 . Title 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A) (2008) has since been amended. P.L. 2009, ch. 297 § 1 (effective Sept. 12, 2009) (codified at 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-AO-A) (2009)). Title 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A) states in relevant part: 1-A. Offense; penalty. A person commits operating while license suspended or revoked if that person: A. Operates a motor vehicle on a public way or in a parking area when that person's license has been suspended or revoked, and that person: (1) Has received written notice of a suspension or revocati P.3d 990, 996-97 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See United States v. Garcia, 452 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission of a certified document stating that defendants license was suspended was nontestimonial (B) holding that a certified abstract of a defendants driving record was nontestimonial (C) holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant (D) holding that a certified letter verifying that a defendant did not have a valid drivers license was nontestimonial and that washington courts have long recognized the inherent reliability and admissibility of driving records (E) holding that driving records were nontestimonial
Output: (D)
collection industry considers consumer information valuable was insufficient to establish standing where he failed to allege what personal information of his was purportedly collected by a third party and how such collection deprived him of the economic value of his data); In re iPhone Application, 2011 WL 4403963, at *5-6 (plaintiffs’ mere “general allegations” about the mobile device market for apps and about abstract concepts such as “lost opportunity costs” and “value-for-value exchanges” were insufficient to establish a concrete theory of injury); Specific Media, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-6 (plaintiffs’ reference to “academic articles concerning the nature of Internet business models driven by consumers’ willingness to supply data about themselves” was insufficient, on N.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>). While instructive, all of these cases are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendants collection and publication of highly sensitive personal information including credit card numbers social security numbers financial account numbers and information regarding plaintiffs personal issues including sexuality mental illness alcoholism incest rape and domestic violence (B) holding that the amount of loss should include sales tax and shipping costs on computer equipment bought by stolen credit card numbers (C) holding that although the social security number in the information and the social security numbers in the previous convictions did not match the rest of the identifying information  the first and last name and date of birth  did match and was sufficient to establish the defendants identity particularly in light of the fact that the defendant did not claim he was not the individual named in the previous convictions (D) holding that plaintiffs alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data which included their names addresses and social security numbers (E) holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law
Output: (A)
(4th Cir.1990). Adopting the view that the denial of certio-rari is the relevant state-court decision for our review would mean that, absent exceptional circumstances (as, for example, if the state court were shown to exercise its discretion in an unconstitutional manner), anytime the state’s highest court denied discretionary review, the petitioner would be ineligible for relief in federal court. Thus, if faithfully applied, this interpretation would entirely insulate from review many decisions of the state courts; such a result cannot be correct. Alternatively, one could instead mischar-acterize the state court’s denial of discretionary review as a summary affirmance that adopted and ratified the reasoning of the lower court. See McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691, 704 n. 5 (4th Cir.2004)(<HOLDING>). Such disregard of the state court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state court unreasonably credited the officer when the petitioners attorney provided accurate corroboration of the petitioners version of the postarrest interview (B) holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise iatc claims in initial state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal (C) holding that the state supreme courts summary adjudication of habeas petitioners claims left intact the reasoning of the lower court and that the state is accordingly entitled to the benefit of the more thorough treatment of petitioners strickland claims in that court (D) holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court (E) holding that where the state court denies petitioners requests for discovery investigatory funds and a hearing the court cannot find that petitioner failed adequately to develop the facts of his claims in state court
Output: (C)
as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home  the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
Output: (A)
reasonably be viewed as so affecting the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 933 (Fla.1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Thus, based on Strickland and Maxwell, we find that the record conclusively shows Franqui is not entitled to relief on this claim. Finally, in the penalty phase, the prosecutor made comments that tended to disparage Franqui’s mitigation. The prosecutor argued, “That’s the world of Dr. Toomer [Franqui’s mental mitigation expert], folks. Through the looking glass at Disney World. Make believe. Use your common sense.” This comment, suggesting that the mental mitigation is make-believe or a fantasy, is improper. See, e.g., Brooks, 762 So.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). We have “long recognized that a prosecutor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that a district court can cure the effect of an improper prosecutorial comment with a jury instruction (C) holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred (D) holding that prosecutorial denigration of a defendants mitigation by suggesting it is phantom is improper (E) holding failure to turn over brady material after prosecutorial phase of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity
Output: (D)
note that, contrary to Kooby and EHI’s assertion, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing on this m 2d 814) (1991) (same). 10 Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) (“Although we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, ‘the trial court must make findings on these issues before we may determine whether its discretion was abused.’ ” (quoting Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Patillo, 194 Ga. App. 279, 279 (390 SE2d 431) (1990))); see also Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999) (same); Crenshaw, 202 Ga. App. at 611 (1) (same). 11 See Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1) (“Failure to make [findings of fact] mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case Ga. App. 40, 43 (555 SE2d 508) (2001) (<HOLDING>); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (B) holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal (C) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (D) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (E) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact
Output: (B)
the tickets were just one component of that entire program. Here, in contrast, the TEA just as clearly does not provide any portion of driver education; it merely licenses driver education schools. Second, in the lottery cases, the lottery commissions contracted with the lottery providers, which were paid commissions for acting as agents for the state. Winborne, 677 S.E.2d at 307; Paxton, 451 S.E.2d at 785. Here, there is no such agency or contractual relationship. These cases are therefore unpersuasive. The only other cases that have held a public entity liable for a private actor’s inaccessibility involved similar situations where the private actors had a contractual or agency relationship with the public entity. See, e.g., Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Indep. Hous. Servs. of S.F. v. Fillmore Ctr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state could be liable under ada for inaccessibility of company it contracted with to provide state inmates with jobs (B) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (C) recognizing that under california state law only ceremonial marriages can be contracted (D) holding that a physician under contract with north carolina to provide medical services to prison inmates was a state actor for purposes of  1983 (E) holding that the plain text of title ii of the ada unambiguously extends to state prison inmates
Output: (A)
trial be granted on the grounds that the State knowingly used perjured testimony. In making this recommendation, the magistrate judge relied primarily on Prewitt’s testimony that (1) Jones wielded a knife as he approached Fairman before their altercation, and (2) the police coerced him to lie at Fairman’s trial. The magistrate judge found Prewitt’s testimony “wholly credible” in light of his courtroom demeanor and awareness that he risked prosecution for perjury. The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in its entirety, and we will not reverse the district court where the factual predicate at issue is susceptible to two, equally compelling, views. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We pause in conclusion to address several 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies unless judgment is entered on the basis of documentary evidence alone (B) holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence (C) holding that the factfinders choice between two views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous
Output: (C)
or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the employee.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (West 2015). The entity with the "right to control” the employee at the time of an accident is the "employer” for workers’ compensation purposes. See Archem v. Austin Indus., Inc., 804 S,W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The concept of joint control shared by dual or co-employers has been found applicable in workers’ compensation insurance cases. See Port Elevator-Brownsville v. Casados, 358 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tex.2012) (concluding employee of staffing company was covered by both temporary employer's and staffing company's workers’ compensation insurance); Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134, 143 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Aztec Rig Equip., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusiveremedy provision applied to both temporary staffing company and client company (B) holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company (C) holding that trial court erred in granting ex parte temporary injunction prohibiting marketing activities of defendant company because there had been no showing that plaintiff company would likely suffer irreparable harm or lacked an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company (E) holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen
Output: (A)
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the district court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, Player had no right to a jury trial. We reject as without merit Player’s contention that Magistrate Judge Bush and District Judge Lodge should have recused themselves from this case solely because they graduated from the University of Idaho. See United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (B) holding that recusal is not required when judge has minimal alumni contacts with a defendant university (C) holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal (D) holding that recusal was required based on newspaper report of interview with trial judge (E) holding recusal not required
Output: (B)
mental condition at issue in a civil action waives the federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege, and, if so, whether the privilege has been so waived here. We answer both questions in the affirmative. We find that a party waives the privilege by placing her mental condition at issue for several reasons. First, our Court, which recognized a qualified federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege prior to Jaffee, see Mines v. City of Philadelphia, 158 F.R.D. 337 (E.D.Pa.1994); Siegfried v. City of Easton, 146 F.R.D. 98 (E.D.Pa.1992), has previously held that a litigant may waive the privilege in this manner. . See Topol v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D.Pa.1995); see also Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 622 (S.D.Cal.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, the Supreme Court specifically 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege under federal rules (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding privilege was waived only as to matters specifically at issue in court action (D) recognizing application of federal deliberative process privilege to internal state communications (E) recognizing federal common law privilege for psychotherapistpatient communications but holding that litigant waived privilege by raising issue as to her psychological state
Output: (E)
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” and “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” fall within the “core class” of testimony. Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. “Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations” are definitively “testimonial.” Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. As the Crawford Court used the term “interrogation” in the “colloquial” and not “technical legal” sense, statements given in a formal interrogation setting at a police station and witness statements given to an investigating police officer are both considered “testimonial.” Id. at 53 n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (<HOLDING>), at 58 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (characterizing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding testimonial statements to include those involving a declarants knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative environment (B) holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial (C) holding victims statement testimonial where it was elicited in response to structured police questioning pursuant to a police investigation (D) holding antiassignment clause in structured settlement is enforceable (E) holding that postmmmda statement knowingly given in response to structured police questioning was testimonial
Output: (E)
was originally approved). The only authority cited by the Secretary — Rouse—does not support his point of view. He asserts that Rouse drew a distinction between orders issued prior to the enactment of the PLRA and those issued subsequent thereto. That is incorrect. Rouse drew a distinction between “existing federal court orders” and those “not yet obtained.” 129 F.3d at 654. That distinction contradicts the position that the Secretary advocates in this appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the procedure limned in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) applies to any existing prospective relief, regardless of when that relief was first ordered. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 333, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (stating that section 3626(b) applies to “existing injunctions”); Harvey v. Schoen, 245 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Rouse, 129 F.3d at 654 (suggesting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought (B) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (C) holding that prospective relief made in the absence of the required findings is immediately terminable regardless of when ordered (D) holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures (E) holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings
Output: (C)
misconduct “that has affected the grand jury’s charging decision and is brought to the attention of the trial court before the commencement of trial”). The defendant suggests that Benjamin should not be applied retroactively to bar her claim. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively). We sympathize with the defendant’s belief that retroactive application of Benjamin to preclude any appeal would “pro duce substantial inequitable results.” Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1968)); cf. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a shortened statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively as to bar otherwise valid civil claims (B) holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void (C) holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case (D) holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired (E) holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases
Output: (A)
applies the law to New York residents who violate the law outside the state. Id. § 298-a(2). That isn’t this case either. Here, Schuler alleges that a New York company has committed a discriminatory act in New York, namely adopting, maintaining, and implementing a retirement and promotion policy that disadvantages a class of employees on the basis of age. Thus, nothing in the statute’s plain text removes Schuler’s charge from the NYHRL’s reach or the NYSDHR’s jurisdiction. PwC nonetheless urges us to set the plain terms of the statute aside and follow a string of New York federal district court eases construing the NYHRL to include an in-state impact requirement. See, e.g., Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1535(KMW), 2007 WL 707068, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.6, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Lucas v. Pathfinder’s Personnel, Inc., No. 01 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york law applies to this matter (B) recognizing the rule and surveying new york law (C) recognizing the time honored practice of applying new york city rates in calculating attorneys fees throughout the southern district of new york including in counties north of the city (D) recognizing a split of authority regarding whether the nyhrl like the new york city human rights law includes an instate impact requirement and holding that it does (E) holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued
Output: (D)
and hiring. H.R.Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630 (emphasis added). The fact that the Committee listed “discharge” along with “retaliation” shows that Congress intended to make not only retaliatory discharge but also retaliation in general actionable under § 1981. In particular, the Committee Report indicates that Congress clearly intended § 1981(b) to encompass retaliation against an employee for filing EEOC charges: In cutting back the scope of the rights to “make” and “enforce” contracts[,] Patterson also has been interpreted to eliminate retaliation claims that the courts had previously recognized under section 1981. See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 5 WL 311911, at *5 (E.D.La. May 18, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. City of Chicago, 865 F.Supp. 445, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 (B) holding claim is not cognizable (C) holding claim is cognizable (D) holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc  1981 (E) holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under  1981
Output: (A)
in this state, and must therefore comply with the terms of M.C.L.A. 500.3606. The fact that the terms of the policy were negotiated in another state, or that the policy was executed by the parties to the policy in another state, does not vitiate this result. The Court acknowledges New England Mutual’s argument that it is burdensome to require an insurer to submit its policies for approval to the administrative agencies of the states in which every beneficiary of the policy is located. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Michigan has a sufficient interest in the application of its law for the protection of its residents in such a case as this to require that the hardship must be borne by insurers. Cf. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 293 Md. 629, 446 A.2d 1140 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The question then arises, if New England 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that maryland law controls the operation of a group health insurance policy that covers employees who live and work in maryland notwithstanding the fact that the policy was executed in rhode island and contained a provision that the law of rhode island would control the operation and effect of the policy (B) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (C) holding fact that prototype group disability policy submitted to insurance department for approval contained blanks and that therefore policy actually issued with blanks filled in may have been unapproved in violation of insurance statutes did not warrant voiding of nonduplication of benefits clause in group disability policy (D) recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing (E) holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy
Output: (A)
(stating in dicta that “the granting of credit for pretrial confinement is not necessarily limited to the situations discussed in Anglin'’). 2 See generally NRS 176.055(1) (“whenever a sentence of imprisonment ... is imposed, the court may order that credit be allowed against the duration of the sentence ... for the amount of time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before conviction”). 3 See NRS 34.724(2)(c); NRS 176.555. 4 See Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 877 P.2d 1058 (1994) (claims appropriate for direct appeal, including a challenge to the sentence imposed, must be pursued on direct appeal or will be considered waived), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999); see also Parrish v. State, 116 Nev. 982, 12 P.3d 953 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 5 111 Nev. 1172, 1176, 901 P.2d 639, 642 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (B) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (C) holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crimes will be charged and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion (D) holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court (E) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion
Output: (D)
supervisors or the Calhoun County jail of the injury or to follow the city’s policy of reporting all officer-caused injuries. Instead of believing Watkins’s lies, then, Mrs. Watkins argues that the officers determined to punish Watkins by making him suffer for them. There are thus two closely related factual disputes regarding what the officers did after they had made the crucial inference of a substantial risk to Watkins’s health: (1) whether the officers actually believed Watkins’s lies or instead disbelieved them and intended to punish Watkins for lying to them, and (2) whether the officers acted reasonably after having perceived that there was a risk to Watkins’s health. These disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment. Cf. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 508 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, I believe that the district court erred 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (B) holding that the reasonableness of a defendants efforts in discharging a duty of care is a question for the trier of fact when the record does not permit summary judgment (C) holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review (D) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (E) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them
Output: (A)
proceeding arid concerns of undue burden or intrusiveness ... in determining whether to grant a section 1782 application.” In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 685 F.3d at 998 n. 7. Any requests that are “unduly intrusive or burdensome ... may be rejected or trimmed.” 542 U.S. at 265, 124 S.Ct. 2466. For instance, “[a] person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.” 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The Court finds, contrary to NextEra’s assertions, that most of Mesa Power’s discovery requests materially comply with the requirement that the discovery be “relevant to the foreign proceeding.” In re Dr. Braga, 789 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1304 (S.D.Fla.2011); compare In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 685 F.3d at 999 (<HOLDING>), with Kang v. Noro-Moseley Partners, 246 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the discovery relating to  the rates charged  to conocel or the procedure or methodology for applying the rates to be charged  are plainly relevant to the foreign proceedings as they formed the basis of conocels defense (B) holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense (C) holding that fedrevid 404b does not restrict evidence of crimes that arose out of the same series of transactions as the charged offense or that are necessary to complete the story of the charged crime (D) holding but offering no authority for the position that the defense counsel could neither argue nor receive an instruction distinguishing the crime charged from a lesserunincluded offense not charged (E) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (A)
court of appeals to address the issue was quick to point out that no statute required seat-belt use and no Texas authority supported a common-law duty to use seat belts. See Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). And in lieu of forging a new path, some courts of appeals were able to dispose of the issue on the ground that defendants had no evidence the failure to use seat belts caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. See United Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ dism’d); Nieman, 418 S.W.2d at 341. Others grappled with the evidentiary difficulties of admitting seat-belt evidence. See Red Top Taxi Co. v. Snow, 452 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1970, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Sonnier v. Ramsey, 424 S.W.2d 684, 689 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of nonuse of seat belts irrelevant to the liability issues involving the plaintiffs alleged contributory negligence (B) holding that contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence is not a defense in strict liability cases (C) recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims (D) holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence (E) recognizing nonuse of seat belt may constitute such negligence as will permit apportionment of damages under comparative negligence
Output: (A)
was safe to operate, afforded discretion to the FAA to “make its own findings” whether the submitted documentation satisfied that requirement. Id. Likewise, as the district court noted, 49 C.F.R. § 385.17(f) is not a “check list.” J.A. at 105. It leaves it to the FMCSA to determine whether a carrier’s submission provides evidence that corrective action has been taken, and whether the agency has the resources to reach a final decision within 45 days. Such decisions, which relate to a regulatory agency’s “implementation of a mechanism for compliance review” and necessarily require “balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding,” constitute discretionary functions themselves. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (<HOLDING>). Discretion thus suffuses 49 C.F.R. § 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (B) holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception (C) holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755 (D) holding that the faas application of a spotcheck system to a particular aircraft was a discretionary function (E) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 
Output: (D)
385 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). 34 . Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). 35 . Id. at 741, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (emphasis added). 19 . See id. V 5. 20 . See Opp. Mem. at 3. 21 . Omegle.com Privacy Poli meno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). 50 . Probation Order at 2 ¶ U. 51 . Opp. Mem. at 11. 52 . United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (emphasis added). 53 . See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57, 88 S.Ct. 507. 54 . Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577. 55 . Opp. Mem. at 11. 56 . Id. 57 . DiTomasso’s Reply Memorandum ("Rep. Mem.”), at 5. 58 . Opp. Mem. at 13. 59 . Id. at 12. 60 . Id. at 13. 61 . Id. at 12. 62 .See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>), vacated en hanc on other grounds, 532 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email (B) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (C) holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party (D) holding that users have reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages despite advance warning that the messages could be read (E) holding appellant failed to show any expectation of privacy in files stored on the computer system in his office was one that society accepts as objectively reasonable
Output: (A)
court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that the inventory search was permissible. Further, there is no evidence that the search was a ruse to discover incriminating evidence; searching the locked trunk and backpack furthered the purpose of allowing inventory searches. “[I]nventory procedures serve to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). The opening and inventory of easily-accessible containers serves both to protect the owner’s property and to insure against false claims. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (<HOLDING>). We overrule appellant’s sixth issue. We 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag (B) holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents (C) holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone (D) holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment (E) holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole
Output: (E)
States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th Cir.1996). Although Bellamy is correct to note that the Sentencing Commission expressed its intent that the Chapter 7 policy statements would only be the first step in a process that would ultimately lead to the promulgation of binding revocation guidelines, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(a) (2002), the Commission has not yet moved beyond this first step. Thus, absent any official action by the Commission, we are left with the policy statements and our law interpreting them. Applying our existing view of Chapter 7 to t f appeals have applied this reasoning in reaching the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 323 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920, 922-23 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range (B) holding that no notice is necessary when a court exceeds a range recommended by chapter 7 (C) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (D) holding that only general rather than specific reasons must be stated when a court strays from the chapter 7 range (E) holding that the district court did not err by failing to specify a final adjusted sentencing range because we apply a presumption of reasonableness only to sentences falling within the initial sentencing range recommended under the guidelines and there is  no intrinsic need to specify an adjusted sentencing range to aid our appellate review
Output: (B)
248 F.3d 110, 124 (3d Cir.2001) (concluding that “the sale of an executory contract triggers the protections afforded sales of bankruptcy estate property but also requires satisfaction of the requirements for assuming and/or assigning the same execu-tory contract.”); In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 47 (Bankr.D.Del.1999) (concluding that a “debtor cannot avoid the requirements of section 365 by saying it is ‘selling’ a lease or executory contract, rather than assuming and assigning it.”). Shaw argues that Bechtel’s purported offset rights were extinguished pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code by paragraphs 7 and 11 of the Sale Order, which transferred the Debtors’ “Assets” to Shaw “f c. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 275 B.R. 712, 718 (Bankr.D.Del.2002) (<HOLDING>). Bechtel argues that the Sale did not result 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sale of accounts receivable under section 363 was not free and clear of defenses such as recoupment but was free and clear of setoff rights unless the setoff was actually taken prepetition (B) holding that section 363 governs the sales of executory contracts here section 365 provides some limitations and conditions to assignments none of which negates the applicability of section 363 to the sale at auction of an executory contract (C) holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable (D) holding that the secured partys contract and quasicontract claims fail as a matter of law because they are subject to the buyers ucc defenses and its right to recoupment and setoff under the agreements between the buyer and the debtor (E) holding that sale under section 363 eliminates unexercised setoff rights but not recoupment defense
Output: (E)