niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999). If “there are multiple defendants involved, the plaintiff must connect the allegations of fraud to each individual defendant.” Colony at Holbrook, Inc. v. Strata G.C., Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1224, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). For example, in Moore, the court held that a complaint met this heightened pleading standard where it “contained] a chart listing twelve different mailings said to contain fraudulent representations, along with the dates of these mailings and cross-references to the paragraphs of the complaint in which the mailings [were] further discussed.” 189 F.3d at 173; see also ABF Capital Mgmt. v. Askin Capital Mgmt., L.P., 957 F.Supp. 1308, 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in Colony at Holbrook, 928 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that confidential sources need not be named provided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information alleged (B) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (C) holding that complaint met particularity requirement where for each defendant the plaintiffs identified and quoted from specific written materials they alleged were distributed to and relied upon by them and described how these materials were false or failed to disclose material information (D) holding that although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged brady material a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material (E) holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement
Output: (C)
to exercise care’ to avoid the harm.”). Gilmore also presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the Duderstadts overreached and abused their “insider” position as landlords when they increased the rent unilaterally without informing him, after leading Gilmore to believe, through the company’s financial records, that the rent would remain $15,000 per month while Gilmore was striving to make a 10% net profit during the trial period. Gilmore also presented expert testimony that the Duderstadts’ failure to accrue back-due rent on the company’s financial statements had the effect of misrepresenting and overstating Laubo’s net profits by approximately $90,000. Cf. Golden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 113 N.M. 9, 14-15, 820 P.2d 1323, 1328-29 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The jury could reasonably infer the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that misrepresentations about profitability of business made recklessly with intent to deceive supported award of punitive damages (B) holding a court may not award punitive damages (C) holding that the record supported the district courts award of damages (D) holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages (E) holding that an award for punitive damages must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence
Output: (A)
tort liability. On the other hand, there are a number of principles that would lead to the opposite conclusion. First, our courts have held that a statute is to be interpreted as the legislature understood it at the time of enactment. State v. Morrison, 1999 NMCA th. 207, 477 A.2d 36, 39 (1984) (applying state statute to public lands), overruled by Pennsylvania Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Auresto, 511 Pa. 73, 511 A.2d 815, 816-17 (1986). Our courts cited this proposition the very year the legislature passed the RUS, providing some evidence that the legislature would not have understood the word “owner” to include government entities, even if they were subject to tort liability at the time. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. City of Aztec, 77 N.M. 524, 526, 424 P.2d 801, 803 (1967) (<HOLDING>); see also S. Union Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional provision requiring municipalities to pass an ordinance in order to incur debt applied to debt to the state as well as private entities but acknowledging the canon of construction that a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its own statute unless included by the clearest implication (B) holding same as to an easement by implication (C) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or (D) holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor (E) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt
Output: (A)
CURIAM. Anthony McLemore was tried by jury and convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cannabis. We agree with McLemore that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested special instruction that an element of the crime is knowledge by the defendant that the substances possessed were marijuana and cocaine. See Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 746 (Fla.1996). Even though McLemore disavowed any connection whatsoever to the items, we find that the error was not harmless. See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review (B) holdingthat because the evidence of the defendants guilt was overwhelming the courts failure to give a requested charge on impeachment constituted harmless error (C) holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error
Output: (E)
owned water system must charge the same rate to residents and nonresidents. The requirement that a municipality supplying public services to its own residents must act reasonably is stated more explicitly throughout Utah law. Article XI, section 6 of the Utah Constitution mandates that a municipal corporation supply water owned by it to its inhabitants “at reasonable charges.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 authorizes municipalities to construct and operate sewer systems and to “make a reasonable charge for the use thereof.” This court has also held that water and sewer connection fees must be reasonable. Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 901 (Utah 1981); see also Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 n. 1, 1259 (Utah h 530, 15 P.2d 648 (1932) (<HOLDING>). It is significant that Utah courts have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage (B) recognizing that an attorneys fee award does not become final and ripe for review until the amount is set (C) holding amount of fee for municipal inspection of gasoline and oil may be set by citys legislative department within reasonable limits (D) recognizing that the exercise of zoning authority within a home rule citys municipal borders is a matter of local concern (E) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied
Output: (C)
the likelihood and probability of infection following treatment. As in Arnold, Kamel’s claims regarding failure to disclose risks and to receive informed consent do not fall within the waiver provision of the TTCA. See id. at 469 (“Failure to receive informed consent [does] not waive immunity under the TTCA.” (citing Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 589)). Likewise, Kamel’s claims of negligent supervision, failure to perform the necessary medical treatment, and failure to use acceptable practices to limit infection are claims for errors in medical judgment or general medical negligence and do not involve the use of tangible property. Therefore, those claims do not fall within the waiver in section 101.021(2). See id.; see also Hall v. Provost, 232 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Kamel contends that the doctors’ use 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that errors in medical judgment do not provide waiver of immunity under ttca (B) holding that general medical malpractice claims do fall with waiver provision of ttca (C) holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court (D) holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa (E) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal
Output: (B)
permitting defendant to evade his negotiated plea by filing a motion to mitigate would discourage the State from entering into future plea bargains with other defendants. See Swett, 772 So.2d at 52. Moreover, the trial court, pursuant to the plea agreement, did not have discretion over defendant’s sentence and, therefore, should have denied defendant’s motion to mitigate. See Arango v. State, 891 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (concluding that denial of a motion for extension of time to file a motion to mitigate was proper because the motion to mitigate would have been futile where the plea agreement imposed upon defendant a specific sentence and did not give the trial court any discretion over the length of the sentence); State v. Brooks, 890 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). We reverse the trial court’s order and remand 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient (B) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (C) holding that a trial court erred in granting a defendants motion to mitigate where the defendants original sentence was imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement (D) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (E) holding that a trial court may rescind an order granting defendants motion for new trial within 75dayperiod allowed for ruling on the defendants motion
Output: (C)
the thirty day Adjustment Period, the parties were obligated to use commercially reasonable efforts for an additional thirty calendar days thereafter the agree upon any adjustment to the Closing Working Capital Statement. If after those thirty days the parties were still unable to agree upon a proposed adjustment, only then were the parties obligated to arbitrate the dispute. (Ex. A § 2.5(d)). In the absence of an Adjustment Request by Ballard, an authorized Closing Working Capital Statement was final and binding under the express terms of § 2.5(d) of the Purchase Agreement. Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the obligation to select a neutral auditor never came about. See e.g., Primavera Labs., Inc. v. Avon Prods., Inc., 297 A.D.2d 505, 747 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17-18 (NY.App.Div.2002) (<HOLDING>). Regardless of whether the January 20, 2006 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process (B) holding enforceable forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements (C) holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms (D) holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced (E) holding that where a collective bargaining agreements terms are clear but the management has engaged in contrary practice for a number of years the words of the agreement must be enforced
Output: (C)
JUSTICE WECHT In 1997, Roderick Johnson was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death. Several years later, Johnson discovered that the Commonwealth had concealed certain documents that would have cast doubt upon the credibility of a key. prosecution witness. The court of common pleas held that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose this evidence violated Johnson’s right to due process of law, in accordance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). The court awarded Johnson a new trial. We 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (B) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment (C) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (D) holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment (E) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment
Output: (B)
the final revised price was $59,398,521. AR Tab 21, at 2888-91. The difference between the prices quoted in STOPSO’s proposals, the FBI Memorandum, and the Source Selection Decision appear to be attributable to differences in accounting resolved through, further discussions. AR Tab 21, at 2888-91, 9 . The LOS Requirement sets aside certain government contracts for small business requiring that “[a]t least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be expended for employees of the concern.” FAR 52.219 — 14(c)(1). 10 . In 2006, RCFC 56.1 "Review of a Decision on the Basis of the Administrative Record” was repealed and replaced with RCFC 52.1, to conform to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1354 (<HOLDING>). See RCFC 52.1, 2006 Rules Committee Notes. 11 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding the trial court is not required to make specific findings of fact on the record for each wham factor if the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the finding of lack of good cause (C) holding section 768201 is exception to general rule that appellate courts uphold  the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings (D) holding that the district court must make findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion about the amount of actual loss (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record
Output: (A)
was under arrest. Id. at 502-03, 103 S.Ct. 1319. Here, too, plaintiffs were removed from the airline concourse to a small, enclosed space for interrogation purposes, but the enclosed space was literally a jail cell, and the location in question was not forty feet away, as in Royer, but between five and fifteen minutes away by car. The transportation and confinement was thus far more intrusive than what the Supreme Court in Royer held to constitute a de facto arrest. Indeed, the Supreme Court has squarely held that “transportation to and investigative detention at [a] station house” is not permissible incident to a Terry stop. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Thus, it has made pellucidly clear that “the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a de facto arrest had occurred where petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found  but rather was taken  to a police car transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room (B) holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes (C) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (D) holding on habeas review that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes and reciting among other facts that defendant was transported to a police station for questioning in an unmarked police car which was not equipped with a shield inside the car (E) holding that the state courts determination that petitioner was not in custody was not unreasonable under aedpa where the petitioner voluntarily went to the police station was interviewed by three police officers and one polygraph examiner was deceitfully told that another man had implicated him in a murder and was questioned for four hours before being advised of his miranda rights
Output: (A)
The administrative record contains no written approval or signature of the Interchange Project as a whole by FHWA in the November / December 2001 time-frame, although it does reflect that FHWA signed off on the ConnDOT requested design exceptions on the same day they were requested, November 9, 2001. File 238 at 17. The Court regrets the lack of clarity on this critical issue of the date of final design approval given how important that date is to the Section 4(f) process. Nonetheless, a presumption of regularity attaches to agency representations and decisions. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419, 91 S.Ct. 814, (“The designation of the Administrative Record ... is entitled to a presumption of administrative regularity.”); Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in view of this presumption of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conditional guilty pleas are valid when entered into in accordance with certain standards (B) holding that statements are admissible in absence of showing that parents were not notified in accordance with statute (C) recognizing that the general rule that a ministerial officer cannot in a judicial proceeding attack the validity of a law imposing duties on him is subject to the exception that such a law may be challenged where it involves the disbursement of public funds (D) recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law (E) holding that the presumption of regularity may be employed to establish that certain ministerial steps were taken in accordance with the requirements of law
Output: (E)
associated with personal injury.” The Court further noted that, “Congress declined to recompense Title VII plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly due them.” Id., — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1873-74 (emphasis added). Burke teaches that back pay awards under Title VII are properly considered restitutionary because they constitute the “wages properly due” to the plaintiff. In addition to the foregoing areas, the courts of appeals have authorized equitable back pay awards in a number of other cases. See, e.g., Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir.1979) (en banc) (equitable back pay remedy available in Pickering cases); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488-90 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (B) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (C) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (D) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable (E) recognizing equitable nature of back pay award under age discrimination in employment act
Output: (E)
in digging a ditch, guiding a barge, or programming a computer. The plaintiffs in this case already are employees of the PCC, and most have worked there since before 1976, -all the while doing work that otherwise would “qualify” for the preference. The PCC has never suggested, let alone shown, that plaintiffs’ job performance has suffered in any way because of their citizenship status. Indeed, the PCC’s own policies make clear that the timing of citizenship is not a work-related qualification. As noted in Part I, from 1984 to 1989 four plaintiffs received the PCC’s equity adjustment package; yet there is no claim that their work was less acceptable than that of employees with earlier citizenship who also received the package during the same time period. See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (<HOLDING>); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the intentional tort exception to employer immunity includes an objective standard to measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to result in injury (B) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (C) holding that a promissory estoppel claim failed where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the employer defendant did not follow the employment manuals requirements (D) holding that it is not (E) holding that fivemonth period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a minimum objective qualification and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it satisfies the bedrock requirements of jobrelatedness
Output: (E)
307 (2d Cir.2003). As a preliminary matter, we reject the government’s contention that Hu failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Hu’s brief to the BIA argued that Hu’s testimony was consistent with the State Department country reports in the record because Hu’s testimony was generally consistent. Hu’s argument that her testimony was generally consistent was sufficient to indicate that Hu was challenging the IJ’s adverse credibility determination as a whole. Further, in Gill v. INS, we noted that “ § 1252(d)(1) does not limit our review to those arguments specifically raised below.” 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir.2005). Although Hu’s brief may not have been clear about which factual findings Hu challenged, the legal nature of her argument was clear. See id. (<HOLDING>). Reviewing the IJ’s adverse credibility 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below (B) holding that   1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below (C) holding that petitioners had abandoned arguments not raised below (D) recognizing general rule that an appellate court cannot address claims that were not raised below (E) holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal
Output: (B)
not domiciled or resident in the foreign country ... has never been recognized in any state in the United States, and has been universally rejected.” Related to these arguments is her contention that COL 35 is wrong. 1.Dominican Decree not entitled to pro forma recognition In COL 35, the family court found: 35. The [Dominican] Decree is recognized by the [family court] under the principle of comity. Metcalf v. Voluntary Employees’ Be 049, 1051 (1985) (stating United States courts will not generally recognize judgment of divorce granted by court of foreign nation unless, by standards of jurisdiction in which recognition is sought, at least one spouse was good-faith domiciliary in foreign nation at time decree was rendered); Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C.App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659, 664 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Basiouny, 445 So.2d at 919 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce (B) holding to the extent that the foreign decree attempts to affect title to property in north carolina it is void (C) holding that dominican court had insufficient jurisdiction to issue divorce decree to two persons domiciled in north carolina and citing to annot 13 alr3d 1419 stating that the great weight of authority in this country is that divorces granted in foreign countries to persons who are domiciliaries of the united states are not valid and enforceable (D) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (E) holding inter alia that a united states court retains jurisdiction over persons arrested on a foreign ship beyond the us navigable waters when said arrest violates a treaty to which the united states and the foreign country are parties
Output: (C)
Thus, even if there was a violation of rule 11 during the plea hearing, appellate courts must continue to inquire into whether there is evidence that the plea was nonetheless knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. 125. Accordingly, if a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and the district court refuses to allow a defendant to withdraw that plea, the federal Due Process Clause and our Plea Withdrawal Statute-not rule 11-would mandate that we reverse the district court's decision. We therefore proceed under the framework provided in Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute. 19 Judges have discretion to grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when "a defendant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered." State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶ 32, 282 P.3d 998 (<HOLDING>); see also Utax Cope § T77-13-6(2)(a) (2007). A 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that military judges enjoy broad discretion on matters of continuance (B) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (C) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (D) holding that prosecution is generally entitled to specific performance or withdrawal of plea following defendants breach but because the government waived its right to withdrawal of plea only the possibility of specific performance remained (E) recognizing that the revised plea withdrawal statute did away with the broad discretion previ ously given to judges on this matter
Output: (E)
that placed Wolfe on the vexatious litigant list and imposed a prefiling order against him. In response, Wolfe states that he referred to these' prior events in his complaint in order to demonstrate his standing to pursue his constitutional challenge. For Wolfe to have standing to challenge the Vexatious Litigant Statute, he must show that he is sufficiently likely to be injured by the operation of the statute that his dispute is ripe. One way — often the best way — for a plaintiff to establish standing in such a case is to demonstrate that he has previously engaged in the sort of activity in which -he now claims' he will engage again if not prohibited by the statute he seeks to challenge. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-92, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) (<HOLDING>). One can also establish standing to sue by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (B) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (C) holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because the case was not ripe for adjudication (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the hatch act because the nature of the political activities they intended to engage in was a matter of speculation
Output: (E)
Court noted: The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. [Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (determining that Confrontation Clause does not compel pre-trial discovery); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause  because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis (B) holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation (C) holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause (D) holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge (E) holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause
Output: (E)
D.H.’s genitals on or about August 20, 2005 (count nine); and (8) indecency with a child for causing D.H. to touch part of his genitals on or about August 20, 2005 (count ten). Hiatt argues “Counts 7 and 8 are lesser included offenses of Counts 1 and 2” and “Counts 9 and 10 are lesser included offenses of Counts 3 and 4.” He thus concludes: “[s]ince there was no proof that separate acts of assault and indecency happened on August 20, 2005 or June 18, 2005, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 all charged [him] with committing the same crime and result in multiple punishment.” Separate charges of indecency with a child and sexual assault of a child are proper when the evidence indicates separate offenses took place. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Bottenfield v. State, 77 S.W.3d 349, 358 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when two penetrations were separated by a short period of time two independent assaults occurred (B) holding that two breaking and entering incidents that were separated by two days of time were not pursuant to a single scheme even though both may have occurred during a continuous drinking binge the court equated single scheme with a temporally integrated episode of continuous activity (C) holding evidence that county employees engaged in unconstitutional assaults on two occasions insufficient to support finding such assaults were pursuant to county policy (D) holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment (E) holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car
Output: (A)
and to seek collateral relief (except for ineffective assistance of counsel),” United States v. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted), but only in judicial districts that participate in a[n] "early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States attorney for the district in which the court resides.” U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. This court has rejected Bravo’s argument that the “fast track” program creates a sentencing disparity, and we are bound by decisions of prior panels until overruled by this court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Anaya Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (11th Cir.2006) (addressing fast-track programs); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . This court has rejected the government's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a multipanel circuit prior panel decisions generally are binding upon newlyconstituted panels (B) holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels (C) holding that decisions by prior panels are binding (D) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (E) holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels
Output: (C)
automobiles are likewise per se reasonable given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution”). The Court cannot allow law enforcement to emasculate well settled constitutional protections in order to cure their own mistake. 9 . The Court notes that the Supreme Court has implied that exigent circumstances are never necessary to justify a warrantless search, but has never expressly stated such a conclusion without first noting that the vehicle in question was somehow readily mobile. See Search And Seizure, supra at 477-81, 91 S.Ct. 2022. As a result, lower courts have split when interpreting its meaning. See United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that among the circumstances accepted as providing exigent circumstances for a warrantless search are those where a true emergency exists (B) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (C) holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest (D) holding that camey notwithstanding the fact that a car is moveable alone is not sufficiently exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search (E) holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee
Output: (D)
to adverse use.” Feldstein, 198 Md. at 295, 81 A.2d at 615; accord Banks, 393 Md. at 709, 904 A.2d at 460 (noting that “[r]espondent’s use of the farm lane was permissive when he was a minor and there was no affirmative evidence that it ever ceased to be permissive .... ”). The case of Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 199 A.2d 209 (1964), although addressing adversity in the context of adverse possession, has been considered instructive on the requirement of adverse use in prescriptive easement cases. See Banks, 393 Md. at 709-10, 904 A.2d at 461. We said in Hungerford: It has long been held by this Court that where the original entry and subsequent occupancy of land was under a contract, or -with the consent or permission of the owner, the possession .E.2d 1073, 1085 (2008) (<HOLDING>). It is clear under the facts of this case that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (B) holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware (C) holding that ors 164015 the theft statute consolidated the various forms of unlawful property deprivation into a single offense of theft that does not depend on the relationship between the thief and the owner the type of property or the manner of deprivation (D) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (E) holding that various acts on the beachfront were not examples from which it could be presumed that the owner knew that the actors were using the property under a claim of right
Output: (E)
onto § 1981. I also agree that Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974), does not save the Kamehameha policy. Mancan involved a federal employment preference for persons of tribal ancestry that the Court upheld against a Fifth Amendment challenge because tribes, which are federally-recognized, are a political, rather than a racial, classification. 417 U.S. at 553-55, 94 S.Ct. 2474. However, the Court has since declined to extend Mancan to an Hawaii statutory scheme that restricted voting for certain state officials to those of Native Hawaiian ancestry. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-23, 120 S.Ct. 1044. As no other basis appears for affirming, I would reverse. 1 . See also Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Neither party discusses whether the right 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff could not assert a  1981 claim based on gender discrimination (B) holding unequivocally that  1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment (C) holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee (D) holding that  1981 protects against discrimination based on ancestry (E) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination
Output: (D)
“Under the FAA, absent unmistakable evidence that the parties intended the contrary, it is the courts rather than arbitrators that must decide ‘gateway matters’ such as ... [w]hether an arbitration agreement is binding on a nonparty....” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex.2005) (orig.proceeding). We do not believe the cited provisions constitute “unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended for an arbitrator to decide whether nonparties are bound by the arbitration agreement, particularly in light of established Texas law placing the initial burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and claims within the scope of that agreement on the party seeking to compel arbitration. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement (B) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (C) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (D) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (E) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement
Output: (A)
version of those events, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting testimony pertaining to the March 3rd incident because any error would be harmless. Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators (B) holding that past instances of physical contact between parties in sexual assault case admissible to show relationship intent opportunity and defendants attraction to alleged victim (C) holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim (D) holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible to show the nature of the parties relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse (E) holding that prior uncharged sexual conduct between the defendant and the victim is admissible to show their state of intimacy as well as to explain the circumstances surrounding the offense
Output: (D)
which remains in effect. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS Bermudez asserts that the Tribe, although not a party to the tort lawsuit when the case was tried and the first judgment entered, may be added as a party and held liable to pay the damages awarded against Billie and Bert because the Tribe funded and guided Billie and Bert’s defense. Bermudez relies upon three lines of authority in making this argument. The first line of authority relied upon by Bermudez involves issue preclusion. Ber-mudez notes that several cases from outside Florida have held that a person who funded and guided litigation, although not a party, may be estopped from attempting to re-litigate the issues decided in the litigation. See Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315, 265 N.E.2d 739 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Theller v. Hershey, 89 F. 575, 576-77 
 Holding statements: (A) holding without discussion of gilberg that res judicata applies to facts determined in new york traffic court proceeding (B) holding an executor of will in new york was bound by a decision of a french court as res judicata where the executor had hired counsel and controlled in part the defense in the french court (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary (E) holding that while a decision of the court will not be disturbed because it is law of the case under res judicata the court is not bound by a conclusion stated as obiter dictum
Output: (B)
fines to community service, we next must address the trial court’s conversion of Lamb’s court costs to community service. As noted above, the trial court ordered Lamb incarcerated for ten days in each case for his failure to perform community service to satisfy his fines and his court costs. {¶ 9} In Swift, we recognized that “a court cannot incarcerate a person for nonpayment of court costs.” Swift, supra, at ¶ 21, citing Strattman v. Studt (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 95, 103, 49 O.O.2d 428, 253 N.E.2d 749. Indeed, “[a] judgment for costs in a criminal traffic case is a civil, not a criminal obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments.” Id.; see, also, State v. Self, Montgomery App. No. 20370, 2005-Ohio-1120, 2005 WL 589887, at ¶ 64 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 10} In the present case, of course, the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts may not confine defendants to work off court costs in order to satisfy the governments contractual interest (B) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (C) recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered (D) recognizing virginias interest in protecting defendants from claims and in holding down insurance costs (E) recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the governments actions
Output: (A)
with "the public policy of the forum,” and allowed the maintenance of the causes of action only after finding that Oregon statutes were "virtually identical” to Idaho’s. Id. at 1279-80. Thus, plaintiffs are mistaken in suggesting that Houston presents an instance in which the existence of a statutory cause of action precluded a court from conducting a choice-of-law analysis. 30 To be clear, plaintiffs did not assert a defamation claim nor complained in this appeal that their allegations should have been interpreted as if they had sought damages based on a claim of defamation. Nevertheless, their disparagement claims may — for these purposes — be viewed similarly due to their theoretical kinship. Cf. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 104 N.J. 125, 133, 516 A.2d 220 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 31 We have appended to this opinion a graph 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the torts of product disparagement and defamation sometimes overlap (B) recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (C) recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts  652e (D) recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention (E) recognizing that restatement second of torts  323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law
Output: (A)
made these statements with reckless disregard for the truth.” Whether an accused established by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit was deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth are questions of fact for the military judge to resolve; thus, a military judge’s findings on this issue “are binding unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402, 408 (C.A.A.F.2000). To prove reckless disregard for the truth under Franks, the accused “must prove that the affiant ‘in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth’ of the allegations.” United States v. Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir.1984)) (agreeing with United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>)). There is no evidence that Det. Krause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning (B) holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity (C) holding that where the definition of lottery is expressly limited to 18 usc  1307b the definition cannot be applied to a related civil statute (D) holding that the first amendment definition should be applied by analogy in the franks setting (E) holding that the exclusions should be applied
Output: (D)