niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
defenses listed in Rule 12 because of the absence in Rule 12 of any reference to either a general or special appearance and the express provisions in subdivision (b) to the effect that every defense may be made either in the responsive pleading or by motion, and that no defense or objection is waived by being joined with any other defense or objection in a responsive pleading or a motion. 5A Wright & Miller at 168 (footnotes omitted). The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person may be joined with the other defenses in Rule 12(b) since under the express language of Rule 12(b), “ ‘no defense’ [in Rule 12(b)] is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses in a responsive ... motion.” See Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta, Ga. v. Millwood, 472 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Hence, a jurisdictional defense is not waived 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual notice of lawsuit is no substitute for substantial compliance with frcp 4d1 requiring service on person of defendant on suitable resident at defendants dwelling or on defendants agent a  judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is void and may be set aside at any time pursuant to fedrcivp 60b4 personal jurisdiction is established either by proper service of process or by the defendants waiver of any defect in the service of process (B) holding that a defendant waives the defense of insufficient service of process despite asserting the defense by answer by affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of the district court to obtain partial summary judgment without earlier or simultaneously moving to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of process (C) holding such service satisfies due process (D) holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections (E) holding that a party no longer needs to appear specially to protest the courts jurisdiction or question the sufficiency of process or service of process because under frcp rule 12 all such objections are assertable in an answer or motion to dismiss
Output: (E)
RICO against the Bowlings, it may do so in its affirmative cross-claim. Wfhirl-pool’s belief to the c 46 (2003) (adopting the approach set forth in the Second Restatement defining the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep’t of Educ., 100 Hawai'i 34, 58 P.3d 545, (2002) (relying on Second Restatement for definition of duty set forth in the Second Restatement § 314A); Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Haw., 100 Hawai'i 149, 170, 58 P.3d 1196, 1217 (2002) (adopting Second Restatement § 577 by holding "If the circumstances indicated that communication to a third party is likely, however, a publication may properly be held to have occurred”); and see, McKenzie v. Hawai 'i Permanente Med. Group, 98 Hawai'i 296, 47 P.3d 1209 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 98 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second restatement  302 does not establish per se that a doctor owes a duty to the plaintiff it only describes the manner in which he may be negligent if he owed that duty (B) holding that although violation of rules of professional conduct does not constitute negligence per se such violations may be relevant and admissible in assessing the legal duty of an attorney in a malpractice action and whether that duty was breached (C) holding that in the absence of a product malfunction a plaintiff cannot establish that a defendant breached any duty owed (D) holding defendant owes a duty to disclose where the defendant alone has knowledge of material facts which are not accessible to the plaintiff (E) holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal
Output: (A)
policymaking authority sufficient for imposition of municipal liability); Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 143 F.Supp.2d 94, 125 (D.Mass.2001)(failing to apply Praprotnik and holding that a may- or’s admission that he was the ultimate decision-maker regarding police appointments sufficient to establish final policy-making authority in that area); Martineau v. Kurland, 36 F.Supp.2d 39, 43 (D.Mass.1999) (Keeton, J.) (applying the Praprotnik finality framework and holding that city hospital director lacked final poli- eymaking authority because constrained by city’s formal policy against discrimination or retribution); Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F.Supp. 1018, 1035-36 (D.Mass.1996) (Keeton, J.) rev’d on other grounds by Educadores Puertorriqueños en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Gonsalves v. City of New 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a board of education independently liable despite the intentional nature of the conduct of its employee a school principal (B) holding that the law of the state of incorporation applies (C) holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal (D) holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school (E) recognizing jetts incorporation of specific portions of praprotnik but holding that school committee members have final authority to establish school policy despite fact that state law subjected such authority to standards established by the board of education
Output: (E)
timely and compliant suspension letter). The effect of enforcing the Act’s mandatory procedures as written does not deprive non-compliant claimants of rights they had at common law or that exist outside of the Act; rather, the only effect of failing to fulfill the Act’s statutory prerequisites is that the claimant may not receive the benefits otherwise available under the Act. Cf. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d at 492-96 (declining to construe failure to comply with promptness requirement to bar suit on common law cause of action). And because the right to compensation Blair seeks is created by the Act and did not exist at common law, the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution is not implicated. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 13; see also Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>). 4. Application Blair failed to comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy (B) holding that the right to bring a wellestablished common law cause of action cannot be effectively abrogated by the legislature absent a showing that the legislative basis for the statute outweighs the denial of the constitutionallyguaranteed right of redress (C) holding that the statutes abrogated the common law (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest
Output: (B)
court’s credibility determinations “unless the court credited testimony that was essentially unbelievable as a matter of law,” United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 746 (7th Cir.2002). There is no clear error in the district court’s decision to credit the presentence investigation report and Officer Morrissey’s sworn testimony over the unsworn, hearsay statement of the defendant. See United States v. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.2000) (‘When the sentence rests on testimony under oath ... it is enough that the judge believe the witness — unless the testimony is illogical or contradicted by documents or other physical evidence, making it clearly erroneous to accept the witness’s version of events.”); United States v. Krankel, 164 F.3d 1046, 1054-55 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Campbell directs us to no inconsistencies in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (B) holding that where defendant did not offer any rebuttal evidence to refute presentence report district court  was free to adopt facts in psi without further inquiry (C) holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report (D) holding that bald unsupported assertions by the defendant cannot refute presentence investigation report (E) holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report
Output: (D)
§ 841(a) conviction in light of the vacatur of his § 924(c)(1) conviction. The Government wishes to resentence petitioner on his § 841(a) conviction so that it may request a two-level enhancement pursuant to 2Dl.l(b)(l) and maintain petitioner’s five-year term of supervised release. Petitioner, now released from prison, requests that his supervised release be reduced by 49 months. In the wake of Bailey, district courts across the country have been faced with the situation presented to this court and have been called upon to determine the propriety of adjusting the sentence of a successful § 2255 petitioner to allow for a two-level increase pursuant to 2Dl.l(b)(l). The courts have been fairly evenly split. For example, compare Rodriguez v. United States, 933 F.Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>), and Warner v. United States, 926 F.Supp. 1387 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (B) holding resentencing is not always required (C) holding that resentencing is required (D) holding that constitution and courts jurisdiction allow for twolevel increase on resentencing (E) holding that courts limited jurisdiction precludes twolevel increase on resentencing
Output: (E)
probation officers provided the courts, namely, “providing information in the course of the customer’s daily business operation[,] ... d[id] not relate to court policy or’ overall operational management but to the courts’ day-to-day production process.” Id. Thus, the court determined that the probation officers’ work did not directly relate to the management or general business operations of the employer. A strong argument can be made that the Investigators’ work in this case did not satisfy the directly related element for similar reasons.' It is of course true that while the primary duty of both the probation officers in Bratt and the Investigators before us was to conduct factual investigations and report their results, the information provided by the probation o 764 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), with Shockley, 997 F.2d at 28-29 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding experts experience knowledge and training is considered in determining reliability (B) holding that failure to furnish proper training instruction training manuals and documents to officer who injured plaintiff failure to provide adequate tests for that officer and failure to discipline that officer fell outside ttcas property waiver (C) recognizing an implied warranty in horse training because training introduces new elements to enhance the horses capabilities and personality and extinguishes undesirable traits (D) holding that ems training lieutenants position met criteria because the lieutenants developed coordinated implemented and conducted ems training programs  prepared lesson plans and training aids supervised delivery of training and tests and evaluated new equipment (E) holding that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference in a failuretotrain claim in part because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the training received was inadequate or evidence of any specific additional training that the employees should have received
Output: (D)
Id., 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 324 P.3d at 85. While the dissent recognized that it might be desirable to have the department of revenue participate in decisions involving a determination' of the legality of sales taxes for policy reasons, such participation could be achieved by joining the department as a party to the litigation. Id., 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 324 P.3d at 86. Based 'on the above considerations, we conclude that Iowa Code section 423.47 provides an exclusive remedy for disputes between consumers and retailers over retailers’ representations to consumers about the.tax consequences of transactions. In this tax case, the retailer simply collects the- taxes and holds them in trust for the state. Iowa Code § 423.2(12); see, e.g., Cash v. State, 628 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>); Stoloff, 24 A.3d at 372-73 (explaining that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal (B) holding that a retail seller was an agent of the state in the collection of taxes and thus owed a fiduciary duty toward the state (C) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (D) holding that federal courts will not enjoin the collection of unconstitutional state taxes where the taxpayer has a plain adequate and complete remedy at law (E) holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law
Output: (B)
alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, and denied the writ on the basis that some evidence supported the guilty finding. The question presented to this court is whether there was any evidence to support the prison disciplinary board’s guilty finding. We review this issue of law de novo. See Dyer v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 607, 609 (5th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). As a preliminary matter, we note that the alleged deprivation of Hudson’s accrued good-time credits rises to the level of a constitutional violation only if Hudson can first establish that he has a protected liberty interest in those credits. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates (B) holding that there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration of goodtime credits forfeited for disciplinary infractions under an older statutory scheme (C) holding that a prisoner who challenged prison procedures used to deny him goodtime credits and not actual denial of those credits stated a cognizable claim under  1983 (D) holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process (E) holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process
Output: (D)
filed a motion in the district court that he styled as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. In the motion, Zeedyk sought relief from the district court’s denial of his § 2254 claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the deadly-weapon finding. Zeedyk moves for a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of the purported Rule 60(b) motion. Because Zeedyk’s Rule 60(b) motion challenged the district court’s determination that the deadly-weapon claim in his § 2254 application failed on the merits, the Rule 60(b) motion constituted an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 application. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 & n.4, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal prisoners challenging determination of their future parole eligibility date must bring their suit under habeas corpus theory (B) holding that recent cases have established that habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody but that the writ is available as well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases (C) holding that a writ of habeas corpus is a state prisoners sole federal remedy for challenging the duration of his imprisonment in order to obtain a speedier release in the future (D) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus (E) holding that the district court mischaracterized a state prisoners  1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because the prisoner did not attack his conviction challenge the fact or length of his confinement or seek immediate release from prison
Output: (C)
in every case. We do understand, however, that the government was faced with a difficult situation: a district judge who is not willing to follow the sentencing guidelines, but a defendant who was guilty of a serious and despicable offense and deserves a lengthy term of imprisonment. The judgment of sentence is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings before a different district judge, in accordance with this opinion. 1 . All references to the United States Sentencing Guidelines are to the 2000 version, which were the guidelines in effect when Andrews's criminal conduct took place. 2 . United States v. Milton, 147 F.3d 414, 421 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting Burns, 501 U.S. at 137, 111 S.Ct. 2182). 3 . See, e.g., United States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1341 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The court noted its belief that Andrews 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure (B) holding that intention to consider an upward departure transmitted with six days notice in advance of sentencing by fax was sufficient (C) holding that district courts error was not harmless because the court relied on an improper factor in imposing an upward departure (D) holding that uncharged conduct described in psr and which was discussed by the court at sentencing was sufficient to support an upward departure under  5k221 (E) holding that the requisite notice must specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure
Output: (B)
127 (1988). The act is effective; it is a rare event when a federal court is asked to intervene to stop a state court proceeding. It is even more rare when the federal court accepts the invitation. As cautious as courts may be about reaching out to enjoin a state court from proceeding with litigation, there are circumstances that require such action. One such circumstance is the specter of parties relitigating in state court the same matters that have been decided by the federal court. See 17 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4226 (2d ed. 1988) (“The courts have clearly understood that the third exception [to the Anti-Injunction Act] does allow injunctions to prevent re-litigation.”). See also Midkiff v. Tom, 725 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts must look to the state that rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state would afford the judgment preclusive effect (B) holding that a federal court acting under its federal as opposed to diversity jurisdiction may also give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts would give (C) holding that issuance of injunction was necessary to protect federal court judgment when hawaiian state courts refused to grant it preclusive effect (D) holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court (E) holding that illinois federal court erred in giving preclusive effect to minnesota state courts dismissal of action on statute of limitations grounds based on minnesotas treatment of statutes of limitations as procedural in nature and without preclusive effect
Output: (C)
(2) that she was similarly situated to an employee who was not a member of the protected class; and (3) that she and the similarly situated person were treated disparately”). 6 . McGill cites the testimony of secretary Ida Kingsberry as assertedly supporting her claim that none of the other secretaries who participated in the class were required to compensate for extra time away from their desks. See McGill Br. at 8, 11; Amicus Br. at 44-45. Kingsberry, however, did not testify that she (or any of the others) took off more than the lunch hour. To the contrary, Kingsberry testified that she “d[id] not ... think that Thu McGill was treated less favorably than others” in the department. J.A. at 375. 7 . See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 8 .Cf. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 (noting that one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired (B) holding that plaintiff failed to show she was similarly situated to her comparators without evidence that they shared the similar attributes experience education and qualifications relevant to the position (C) holding that in order for plaintiff to prove that she was similarly situated to three other employees she had to demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other employees (D) holding that because the plaintiff did not allege facts indicating what specific medical information she provided to dps she failed to state a constitutional claim (E) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself
Output: (E)
dismissal. 5 . We emphasize that the district court, although permitting questions as to the appellant’s arrest and the circumstances thereof to show his participation in the drug-trafficking conspiracy and to corroborate the testimony of cooperating witnesses, precluded the government from introducing any evidence that local authorities charged or prosecuted Marrero. 6 . Withal, the court's decision to empanel four alternate jurors entitled the appellant to two additional peremptory challenges that he never received. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c). But the appellant never objected to the number of challenges he was afforded anent the empanelment of the alternates and thus failed to preserve the right to raise this error on appeal. See United States v. Broadus, 7 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 748 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (B) holding that a defendants failure to object to the denial of his right peremptorily to challenge alternates constitutes a waiver of any right to appeal the issue (C) holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver (D) holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error (E) holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal
Output: (B)
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). In her reply brief, Ms. Chediek attempts to defend her right to testify concerning her attorneys’ fees and emotional distress by pointing out that these issues were noted in the magistrate judge’s pretrial order. See United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 315, 81 S.Ct. 13, 5 L.Ed.2d 8 (1960) (“That pretrial order, as authorized by Rule 16, conclusively established the issues of fact and law in the case....”); Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 784 (D.C.Cir.1998); Johnson v. Geffen, 294 F.2d 197, 199-200 (D.C.Cir.1960). Because she made this argument for the first time in her reply brief, it is forfeited. See McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances, the district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not reviewable (B) holding arguments first raised in reply brief are forfeited (C) holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived (D) holding that arguments first raised in appellants reply brief were in answer to those raised in appellees brief and therefore refusing to strike those arguments (E) holding that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief
Output: (B)
are not dispositive); In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir.1993) (concluding that the label attached to an obligation does not control); Adams v. Zentz, 963 F.2d 197, 199 (8th Cir.1992) (determining that state law or the divorce decree characterization of the debt is not binding on bankruptcy courts); In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir.1990) (ruling that bankruptcy courts must look beyond the label attached to settlement agreements to find the debt's true nature); In re Seibert, 914 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir.1990) (ruling that state law does not control the issue of whether an obligation constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support); In re Long, 794 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir.1986) (determining that labels are not controlling); Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir.1982) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive (B) holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court (C) holding that reporting requirements that are afforded immunity under  419 are not predicated on actual or conclusive evidence of abuse or maltreatment (D) holding that the descriptions which parties give obligations in settlements or decrees are not conclusive (E) holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements
Output: (D)
landowner liability despite the fact that it was addressing possessor liability under Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Hale, 116 P.3d at 268 ("Under section 343, if a landowner ‘should expect that [an invitee] will ... fail to protect [himself] against [a dangerous condition],’ the landowner must exercise reasonable care to protect him.”) (citing § 343(b), (c)) (emphases added); compare with Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 343, 343A (addressing dangerous conditions in regard to a "possessor of land”) (emphasis added). The Restatement defines "possessor” as "a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 328E(a); see also Stevens v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3, 5 (1970) (<HOLDING>). In Hale, the possessor was also the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell (B) recognizing the distinction between a landowner and a possessor as defined by  328e of the restatement (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel (E) recognizing this distinction
Output: (B)
have pleaded that the 2007 Agreement was terminated, and the Court is required to accept that fact as true at this stage of the litigation. Therefore the continued use of Plaintiffs’ trademarks by Defendant as alleged would be without the benefit of a license. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the trademark infringement claim is DENIED. C. Breach of Contract Plaintiffs claim that Big Time Toys breached the parties’ contracts when it failed to cure its default on the royalty payments. Am. Compl. ¶ 88. As an initial matter, the continued use of a licensed trademark after termination of a license agreement can be actionable as both breach of contract and trademark infringement. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (B) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (C) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation
Output: (D)
human remains as “Native American” if the remains are “of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States.” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). The text of the relevant statutory clause is written in the present tense (“of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous”). Thus the statute unambiguously requires that human remains bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture to be considered Native American. It is axiomatic that, in construing a statute, courts generally give words not defined in a statute their “ordinary or natural meaning.” United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357, 114 S.Ct. 1599, 128 L.Ed.2d 319 (1994); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (B) recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning (C) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (D) holding that  unless otherwise defined words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning  at the time congress enacted a statute and reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statutes enactment to assist in determining its meaning citation omitted (E) holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import
Output: (E)
Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 8 . Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S-Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)). 9 . "The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case [seeking the death penalty] ... shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury. ...” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13. 10 . Marquez, 921 S.W.2d at 220 ("While article 1.13 provides for the method by which a jury may be waived, it does not provide for the undoing of such waiver.”). 11 . Id. at 221. 12 . Id. at 222. 13 . Id. at 223. 14 . Id. (citing Wheatfall v. State, 882 S.W.2d 829, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 15 . Id. See also Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial (C) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing amendments to pleadings because they came too late (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial
Output: (A)
of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the IJ’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We deny the petition for review. Herrera Estrada testified that anti-government guerrillas attempted to recruit her, and pushed her against a wall, where she hit her head, when she refused to join them. Although Herrera Estrada did suffer some harm, she failed to present sufficient evidence to compel a finding that the harm she suffered rose to the level of persecution. See e.g. Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insults harassment death threats and a beating did not compel eligibility for withholding of removal (B) holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution (C) holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution (D) holding that a minor beating even in conjunction with threats did not compel a finding of persecution (E) holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment
Output: (B)
performance is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Boisvert, 632 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is clear that the parties intended such a result. Nelson v. Hansard, 143 Fla. 898, 197 So. 513, 514 (1940). However, due to this harsh result, a court of equity will “always mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without doing violence to the contract of the parties.” Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15, 16-17 (1930) (citing McCaskill v. Union Naval Stores Co., 59 Fla. 571, 52 So. 961, 962 (1910)). A court of equity, though, will not grant relief from a situation traceable to a party’s own neglect, gross negligence, or willful and persistent vio 37, 538 (Fla.1953) (<HOLDING>). Here, the parties intended that a forfeiture 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the equities involved did not lead to an unconscionable result where purchaser planned to use the land for a particular purpose and brought lumber to the site after he defaulted on the agreement (B) holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages (C) holding that a later concession to strike an unconscionable term does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy (D) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (E) holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land
Output: (A)
Bobo, 820 N.W.2d at 516 (describing an evidentiary hearing as “the means for evaluating the credibility of a witness” (emphasis added)). Moreover, even if the dissent’s strict definition of what constitutes a “recanta tion” were correct, the Larrison standard applies broadly to all allegations of false trial testimony, not just to witness recantations, Pippitt, 737 N.W.2d at 227, so the dissent’s metaphysical discussion of recantations is ultimately beside the point. Thus, no matter how we label Caldwell’s allegations-as allegedly false testimony or as recantations — the Larrison standard requires us to examine the substance of the witnesses’ statements, rather than how the witnesses characterize their statements, to determine whether they may have testified falsely at trial. See id. (<HOLDING>). It is the substance of the conflicting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ontherecord evidentiary hearing is necessary when the trial court is asked to rule in limine that a witness cannot be asked questions to show that he is biased prejudiced interested in the outcome of the proceeding or has a motive to testify falsely (B) holding that attorneys testimony was not relevant to any issues contained in the appellants pleadings and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the attorneys testimony could not be gained from any other witness or source (C) holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that not only the employees testimony at the grievance hearing but also the affidavit that he filed and his agreement to be listed as a potential witness were entitled to protection (E) holding following an evidentiary hearing that the first larrison prong was not satisfied when a witness claimed that he had testified falsely at trial but failed to provide any details or otherwise demonstrate which parts of his testimony were false
Output: (E)
price. Moreover, as a practical matter, there is no “interim” between the placement of the customer’s bid and its acceptance or rejection during which the customer could exert control over Priceline. The electronic transaction is nearly instantaneous. In effecting that transaction, Priceline’s actions are akin to those of an intermediary or middleman rifling through its inventory of discounted hotel rooms until it locates an item for which the customer has stated a willingness to pay a specified price. The fact that only Priceline has access to both its algorithm and its particular inventory of discounted hotel rooms does not create a fiduciary relationship with a customer where none otherwise exists. See Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 42, 761 A.2d 1268 (2000) (<HOLDING>). No different conclusion regarding agency is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that technical expertise or sjuperior skill and knowledge alone do not create a fiduciary duty among parties involved in a business transaction (B) holding that a fiduciary who receives consideration in connection with a transaction involving plan assets violated section 406b and a nonfiduciary who facilitated that transaction could be liable (C) holding that parties intent to create or extend agency relationship may be inferred from their conduct viewed in light of all circumstances surrounding transaction (D) recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step (E) holding that a sellers superior knowledge of a product does not justify imposition of a fiduciary relationship in the absence of a conscious assumption of fiduciary duties
Output: (A)
business is a disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. State Auto disputes Appellants’ arguments and also posits in the alternative that, even if Kraus was an “insured” at the time he committed the acts in question, Appellants’ false imprisonment claims were subsumed by their sexual assault claims. As discussed below, we conclude that the district court correctly found that the determination of whether Kraus was an “insured” under the policy is a question of law where the pertinent facts are undisputed, that the policy is not ambiguous, and that Kraus’s acts fall within the Criminal-Acts Exclusion. Because we affirm the district court on those grounds, we do not reach State Auto’s alternative argument in support 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707 (Wis.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Michelet v. Scheuring Sec. Servs. Inc., 680 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question (B) holding that the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the employers business for purposes of insurance coverage were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment particularly since there was a question regarding the employees intent in performing the act in question (C) holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred (D) holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury (E) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact
Output: (B)
to regulate ... every public utility.... The exercise of such powers, rights, functions, and jurisdiction is prescribed as a duty of the commission.”). Whether exigent circumstances exist within the context of utility interim rate setting therefore “necessarily requires application of the [Commission’s] technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented.” Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn.2002) (“A determination whether significant environmental effects result from this project is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agency’s technical knowledge and expertise.”); see also In re Review of 2005 Annual Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Minn.2009) (<HOLDING>). The dissent contends that the determination 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that statutes are to be interpreted in accordance with the legislative intent and in a manner that will not render the statutes application absurd unreasonable or unjust internal quotation marks and citation omitted (C) recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted (D) holding that we show  deference to an agencys conclusions in the area of its expertise (E) holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law
Output: (A)
“isolated location” and “absence of other hospitals” revealed Congress’ intent to incorporate a broad range of criteria previously considered in some regions of the country. Plaintiff contends that the SCH regulation contained in 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 narrowed, rather than broadened, the range of factors to be considered in SCH designations by eliminating the consideration of admitting practices of area physicians, the actual use of alternative facilities, and the availability of public transportation. Plaintiff therefore argues that this was a change in policy and that when an agency changes its policy it must provide a reasoned analysis for the change. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Defendant disputes plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the national highway traffic safety commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking a motor vehicle safety standard without supplying a reasoned analysis (B) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (C) holding that the plaintiffs state commonlaw tort claims were preempted by the national motor vehicle safety act 15 usc 1381 et seq (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that traffic safety is a substantial government goal
Output: (A)
portions of Cavnar. Sisters of Charity v. Dunsmoor, 832 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, writ denied). However, the amendment adding section 6 was not effective until September 2, 1987. Any action commenced before this date is governed by the applicable law in effect before the effective date of the amendment. Tex. Rev.Civ.StatANN. art. 5069-1.05 historical note (Vernon Supp.1993) [Act of Sept. 2, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3, § 1, 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws. 51, 52], The law in effect prior to the effective date of section 6 was Cavnar, and since appellants filed this suit on April 9, 1987, prior to the effective date of the amendment, Cavnar is controlling on the issue of prejudgment interest. See Granite Const. Co. v. Mendoza, 816 S.W.2d 756, 766 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>); O’Reilly v. Grafham, 797 S.W.2d 399, 401 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provision in wrongful death act that allowed parents to recover exemplary damages was invalid under art 16  26 since legislature could not enlarge on exemplary damages (B) holding that prejudgment interest in suit filed before september 2 1987 not governed by article 5069105 section 6 (C) holding plaintiff could not recover prejudgment interest on exemplary damages because suit was filed on april 161987 and thus governed by cavnar and not article 5069105 (D) holding the eighth amendment inapplicable to an award of exemplary damages (E) holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award
Output: (C)