niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the issue of “the full extent of when knowledge possessed by an arm of the State will be imputed to the prosecution.” Id. As the government admits, Pretrial Services has a statutory duty to report any violation of pretrial release conditions to both the court and the United States attorney. See 18 U.S.C. § 3154(5). Further, the Supreme Court has interpreted Brady broadly, in order to provide an incentive for the government to initiate “procedures and regulations” to carry the prosecutor’s “duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1500-04 (D.C.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the governments behalf in the case including the police (B) holding that prosecutions duty to learn of brady material extends to the files of the police departments homicide and internal affairs divisions observing the cases finding a duty to search have involved files maintained by branches of government closely aligned with the prosecution  and in each case the court has found  bureaucratic boundaries too weak to limit the duty (C) holding the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend (D) holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty (E) holding that the court has no duty to search for triable issues
Output: (B)
... may submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation.” This makes a petitioner’s status as an “employee” a prerequisite to having a right of appeal and to Board jurisdiction. Specifically, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513, for purposes of appealing a removal action, a petitioner must be included in one of several possible categories in order to meet the definition of “employee.” As a preference eligible individual in the excepted service who had completed less than one year of current continuous service, Vernon is not covered by any of the categories in § 7511(a)(1). Vernon is, thus, not an “employee” under § 7511 and he has no right to appeal. See Horner v. Lucas, 832 F.2d 596 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The Board correctly concluded that it had no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date (B) holding that an appellant was not entitled to incorporate district court filings into his appellate brief by reference and that his pro se status did not except him from such established rules (C) holding that as an individual with a probationary position in the competitive service the petitioner was not an employee and therefore the board had no jurisdiction at all over her appeal (D) holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the protections of 5 usc  7511a1 and 7513 because under  7511a1a the temporary status of his position in the competitive service prevented him from qualifying as an employee (E) holding that the petitioner in that case could not invoke the protections provided by miranda  including the right to counsel because he was not in custody at the time he stated t think i need a lawyer 
Output: (D)
staying the processing of claims not yet at the Board, which means there is no party before us with any standing to oppose the Secretary’s request — there is no case or controversy with regard to claims potentially affected by Haas but not yet before the Board. Assuming arguendo that the Secretary does not have the authority to stay claims not yet on appeal to the Board, and that is a big assumption, see Ribaudo, 20 Vet.App. at 554 n. 2 (stating that the Court would render clear in its decision the scope of the Secretary’s authority to stay processing of claims, and then holding in that decision only that, absent regulation, the Secretary did not have authority to stay processing of claims at the Board as doing so contravened section 7107); Tobler v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 8,12 (1991) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ithaca Coll. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings (B) holding that such a stay is appropriate where in the absence of a stay the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective (C) holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested (D) holding that it would be reasonable for the board to stay its proceedings in a case that arguably falls within the precedent of another on appeal (E) holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal
Output: (D)
to EDCR 1.48, which permits qualified judges to serve as masters and claims that the local rule does not unconstitutionally expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. I disagree. Through EDCR 1.48, the district court allows a justice of the peace, by virtue of his or her status as a justice of the peace, to perform the duties granted to masters under NRS 3.245. In doing so, the court rule grants justices of the peace jurisdiction in felony cases that the Legislature has expressly denied them. To this extent, EDCR 1.48 expands the justice of the peace’s jurisdiction, and it is unconstitutional. As this court recently held in Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, only the Legislature can expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. 128 Nev. 580, 596, 287 P.3d 305, 316 (2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 8 (“The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal (B) holding that by providing for the participation of justices of the peace in clark countys inquest proceedings  the clark county board of county commissioners has unconstitutionally impinged on the legislatures constitutionally delegated authority (C) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington (D) holding before the apa definition of person was amended to include county that the board of county commission ers of dolores county could not sue the state agency that had ordered reappraisals of real property in dolores county in connection with valuation for ad valorem taxation because the board of county commissioners was not a person under the apa and did not otherwise have authority to sue under statute or constitution (E) holding that notwithstanding language of statute authorizing appointment of a county architect by the board of commissioners of cook county such appointee is not an officer where he has no stated salary but is employed on a commission basis and where his work is generally casual and not continuous even though he is frequently referred to in the records of the county board as an officer
Output: (B)
ill. A default having previously been entered against Aghion, he proceeded to trial pro se solely on the issue of damages. Aghion now claims he was not present at trial because he was out of the country and never received the notice of trial even though one was sent. He argues that, as he was not present at trial through no fault of his own, he did not have the opportunity of stipulating to a five-member jury or knowingly waiving his right to a six-member jury either when the subject came up during voir dire or at the time of the stipulation between the other defendants. As Aghion did not have the opportunity of exhibiting such a knowing waiver, we must find, based on the case law, that he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages. See Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Fla. Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell, 45 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent (B) recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver (C) holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act (D) holding that the constitutional right to a sixmember jury may be waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver (E) holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary
Output: (D)
case, Plaintiffs statistical evidence is insufficiently tailored to support his individual claims. Plaintiffs statistics compare the promotion rate of employees within the same pay grade who perform similar job functions; however, these statistics generally fail to compare similarly situated individuals, significantly diminishing the probative value of any disparity. For example, Plaintiffs statistics do not account for differences in the type or level of the employees’ applied skills, both of which are highly related to hiring decisions. Plaintiff does not provide statistics comparing employees with equivalent work experience in specific job categories or job progressions, or outcomes for those employees, both black and white, who had actually applied for posted positions Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); cf. James v. Stockholm Valves & Fittings Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position (B) holding reliance on statistical evidence of inexorable zero was sufficient to establish prima facie case notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to reference appropriate workpool (C) holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct (D) holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext (E) holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons
Output: (E)
373 F.Supp.2d at 72 (noting that "[t]he determination that a branch of government has exceeded its constitutional authority does not express lack of respect for it” and that international agreements regarding "property that was expropriated or nationalized by Vietnam” were not related to the herbicide claims). 46 . See Whiteman, 431 F.3d at 70 (political question claims are analyzed on a "case-by-case” basis); Can, 14 F.3d at 163 ("The political question doctrine must be cautiously invoked.”). See also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F.Supp.2d at 65 (noting that experts have observed that the "political question doctrine is in a state of some confusion”) (citations and quotations omitted). 47 . Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000, 100 S.Ct. 533, 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 48 . Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. 49 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (B) holding that the determination of the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is a political question solely within the power prerogative and discretion of the legislature and not subject to judicial review (C) holding state constitution provides senate with authority to judge election returns and qualifications of its members (D) holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates (E) holding that senator goldwaters claim that the constitution required senate agreement to abrogate a treaty raised a political question
Output: (E)
court to interpret the holding in Energy Management I characterizes it as, "the EMC case pertains to a mineral lessee challenging the validity of a Shreveport city ordinance relating to drilling within 1,000 feet of Cross Lake." Holland v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 03-2087, 2006 WL 461127, *3 n. 3 (W.D.La. February, 23, 2006) (emphasis added). 4 . In fact, in order to fully address whether EMC had standing, the Energy Management /panel withdrew its previous opinion in its entirety, Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 03-30677, 2004 WL 2192376 (5th Cir. Oct 15, 2004), and substituted the opinion referred to infra as Energy Management /. 5 . Energy Mgmt. I, 397 F.3d at 303 (citing Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Traver Oil Co., 494 So.2d 1204 (La.Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>)). 6 . Energy Mgmt. I, 397 F.3d at 303 (citing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days (B) holding that broker whose contract called for commission on sale of property was not entitled to commission on transfer of property to partnership in which owner had an interest and that because broker was not entitled to commission under terms of his contract he also could not recover against a third person on theory of tortious interference with that contract (C) holding that contract providing commission was to be paid within 72 hours of closing did not condition the payment of commission on the closing (D) holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious (E) holding that the commission could not restrict drilling within one mile of the new orleans causeway bridge contrary to authorization of loc and corps of engineers
Output: (E)
shelter it provides. “A vast majority of state rules regarding qualified privilege include a requirement of ‘good faith.’ ” A.G. Harmon, Defamation in Good Faith: An Argument for Restating the Defense of Qualified Privilege, 16 Barry L.Rev. 27, 30 n. 16 (2011). Modern iterations of the privilege by Michigan appellate courts make clear that a showing of “good faith” is essential to a defendant’s ability to invoke the privilege: “The elements of a qualified privilege are (1) good faith, (2) an interest to be upheld, (3) a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, (4) a proper occasion, and (5) publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.” Prysak, 193 Mich.App. at 14-15, 483 N.W.2d at 636 (emphasis added) (citing Bufalino v. Maxon B . App. 590, 174 N.W.2d 875 (1970) (<HOLDING>); see also Haddad v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 526 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not entitled to any qualified privilege for false accusations of theft given under the guise of employment references despite earlier holdings by michigan courts that had extended the privilege to statements of reference from a prior to a prospective employer (B) holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials (C) holding that the doctrine of commonlaw privilege that grants immunity to witnesses in quasijudicial proceedings does not extend to disciplinary proceedings against a state employee who makes false statements in the course of an official investigation (D) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (E) holding both that a defendants prior disciplinary history was properly precluded because it did not involve an element of deceit or falsification and that defendants earlier allegedly false statements could not be admitted because proving their falsehood would have required the introduction of extrinsic evidence showing the statements made to be false
Output: (A)
whether Lamb unreasonably failed to avail herself of her employer’s remedies against sexual harassment. The City argues that Lamb was unreasonable in tailing to report what she perceived to be Peterson’s harassing remarks until months after they were actually made. The City also contends that Lamb failed to cooperate fully during the City’s investigation following her July 11 grievance. However, Lamb indicated that she did not report Peterson’s behavior immediately because she did not wish to cause trouble when she was relatively new to her job. Lamb Aff., ¶ 6. The Fifth Circuit has clarified that delay in reporting alone is not per se an "unreasonable failure” to take care. Watts, 170 F.3d at 510-11. But see Scrivner v. Socorro Independent School District, 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In addition, while Lamb was perhaps not as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then (B) holding unreasonable plaintiffs failure to complain from the summer of 1995 until march 1996 (C) holding that definition in iowa code chapter 321 1995 was expressly confined to that chapter and did not apply to iowa code section 36412 1995 (D) holding similar allegations supported that the plaintiffs negligence claim did not accrue until plaintiffs loan payments exceeded his ability to pay (E) holding the 1995 amendment to section 5601c removed all rights to appeal from a section 5402 ruling
Output: (B)
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 979 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1999) (ruling that continuing denial of a benefit to which a party is entitled provides a basis for standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative rule). The plaintiffs claim that he would be “directly and immediately better off — in the emphatically concrete sense that ... he would have more money in his pocket sooner — if he could obtain relief through the Notice procedure ... without sacrificing a major portion of his claim,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, is “[n]o reasonable mind could doubt ... a judicially cognizable injury sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact test for Article III standing,” see Ontario Forest Industries Assoc. v. United States, 444 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1323-24 (CIT 2006) (<HOLDING>) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (B) holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence viz the area within his control (C) recognizing that delay of refund deprives plaintiffs of the timevalue of money  and may  deprive plaintiffs of money (D) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (E) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money
Output: (C)
remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed. 1 The statute governs appeals from a judgment of conviction entered for a felony committed on or after November 1, 1989. ORS 138.222(1). 2 The state does not contend that we lack jurisdiction over defendant’s appeal, but it disputes defendant’s contention that we have jurisdiction under ORS 138.050. We agree with the state. See Davis, 265 Or App at 438 (jurisdiction over the defendant’s appeal based on merger argument is under ORS 138.222(7), which allows appeal from a judgment “based on the sentence for a felony”). 3 If the claim is unreviewable under ORS 138.222(2)(a), an appellant cannot rely upon ORS 138.222(4)(a) as an exception to (2)(a) to establish reviewability. See State v. Casiano, 214 Or App 509, 515, 166 P3d 599 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 4 In its answering brief, the state 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing such an exception (B) holding that ors 1382224a is not an exception to ors 1382222a (C) holding that  1983 is not an exception to the state tax injunction act (D) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (E) recognizing exception
Output: (B)
Deveaux court held that “the time of issuance was a technical irregularity which did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. The court explained that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated or disturbed where, inter alia, the officer’s complaint for a search warrant was supported by an affidavit describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized, the defendant made no claim that the warrant lacked probable cause, and the officer executed the search after obtaining the warrant. Id. Finally, in Montana, which has a standalone constitutional provision recognizing the right to individual privacy, the misdating of a search warrant will not necessarily render the warrant invalid. See State v. Steffes, 269 Mont. 214, 887 P.2d 1196, 1210 (1994) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the clerical error in the instant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant (B) holding that where the search warrant was misdated june 19 1991 and was executed on june 18 1991 the misdating was merely technical and did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant (C) holding that if trial courts verdict was based on hearsay statements of victim admitted in violation of the confrontation clause the error clearly would not only affect substantial rights but would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the proceedings (D) holding unconstitutional a search executed on a warrant that failed to list with particularity the items to be seized even where the supporting application contained such a list and the warrant was approved by a magistrate (E) holding that the failure to properly caption and verify a petition did not affect the substantial rights of the parties
Output: (B)
tool and the ability to detain a person for a brief Terry-type investigation when that person runs at the sight of the police. If the police gain no additional information which would lead to probable cause, then the person should be free to go. Second, the Third District opined that the police had no reasonable suspicion that D.T.B. was engaged in any criminal activity. In fact, the police said just the opposite. Thus, the district court found that the officers were not executing any legal duty at the time the juvenile D.T.B. fled. Additionally, the Third District cited a number of other district court cases, decided prior to Wardlow, which held that flight alone was insufficient to demonstrate resisting/obstruction. See, e.g., DM. v. State, 681 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); S.G.K. v. State, 657 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car (B) holding that passenger of stopped car who fled from police was not guilty of obstruction without violence (C) holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety
Output: (B)
case in a court of law. The court of law would then have to decide whether the entire contract is valid simply in order to determine whether the arbitration clause is valid such that the case may be submitted to arbitration. Obviously, however, at this point res judicata would render any action taken by an arbitrator superfluous and irrelevant, and thus defeat the entire purpose of the arbitration clause, since the court of law would have already decided the larger substantive issue of contractual validity. The law under the FAA and Buckeye, therefore, mandates a different result. In the wake of Buckeye, courts have ruled that challenges to the entire contract, such as this one, are subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.3d 98, 102-03 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Community State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (B) holding that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider an issue which was not included in the written notice of arbitration and was added on the first day of the arbitration hearing (C) holding if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself  an issue that goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate  the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it otherwise claims involving the contract generally should be decided by the arbitrator (D) holding that the issue of whether contract which contained arbitration agreement was illegal should be properly decided by arbitrator not court (E) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement
Output: (D)
held that the MVFRL mandated that the driver be covered, up to the MVFRL limits, by the owner’s policy issued to Metro Ford from Universal. Id. at 283. Hargrave and Rader teach that the insured exclusion in NCC’s owner’s policy is invalid to the extent it would deny coverage, up to the MVFRL limits, for Bough’s permissive use of the Cougar. See § 303.190.7; Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992). Therefore, the NCC policy provides Bough with the mandatory MVFRL liability insurance coverage of $25,000 per person. The insured exclusion in the NCC policy, however, is enforceable to bar any additional liability insurance coverage for Bough beyond that mandated by the MVFRL. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zumwalt, 825 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s first point is granted. Point III 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a household exclusion in the policy was void insofar as it denied coverage in the amount required by  3031902 but it was valid as to any coverage exceeding that amount (B) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (C) holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage (D) holding that a hospital may not assert a statutory lien in an amount exceeding the amount it agreed to accept from the patients insurer (E) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage
Output: (A)
jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to treat the matter before it as a petition for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In light of the far reaching consequences of the issues presented, we are confident the district court would have exercised that discretion for the same reasons we have exercised our discretion to review the instant original petition. 3 Nev. Const, art. 6, § 8. 4 NRS 4.370(3). 5 State of Nevada v. Justice Court, 112 Nev 803, 919 P.2d 401 (1996). 6 See generally NCJC Canon 2. 7 Nev. Const, art. 6, § 8; NRS 4.370(3). 8 NRS 189.120; State v. Shade, 110 Nev. 57, 867 P.2d 393 (1994). 9 See Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 937, n.8, 10 P.3d 836, 841-42 n.8 (2000). 10 40 Nev. 228, 161 P. 737 (1916) (<HOLDING>). 11 106 Nev. 203, 789 P.2d 584 (1990) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters (B) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (C) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines
Output: (D)
§ 1983. The Court explained in McMillian, however, that whether a sheriff is a state or county policymaker depends on the local government laws of the particular state. See id. at 1741-42. In contrast to the Alabama Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly states that sheriffs are county officers. See Pa. Const. Art. IX, § 4 (“County officers shall consist of ... sheriffs”). Furthermore, in his deposition, Sheriff Erling testified that he was elected in municipal elections, see Erling Dep. at 6, and is paid by Chester County. See id. The Sheriffs budget comes from Chester County. See id. at 8-9. Accordingly, we reject defendants’ contention that Sheriff Erling is a state policymaker. See Morgan v. Rossi, Civ. No. 96-1536, 1998 WL 175604 at * 12 (E.D.Pa. Apr.15, 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Reid v. Hamby, Civ. No. 95-7142, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lehigh county sheriff is a county officer rather than a state officer (B) holding county liable along with sheriff thomas for an attorneys fee award even though the county was not named in the suit and was denied an opportunity to intervene because sheriff thomass actions under article 6869 represented county policy (C) holding that the sheriff when investigating crimes acts as a county officer (D) holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county (E) recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions 
Output: (A)
possession” instruction. Moreover, the trial court’s instructions defining “knowingly” and “possession” adequately and accurately explained the level of conscious control over the firearm and the ammunition required under the law. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury regarding a “temporary innocent possession” defense to the possession of a firearm. B. Conduct of Trial Judge We review a district judge’s conduct during trial for an abuse of discretion as well. See United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Cox, uld not apply to the cases that have been presented to them, based on the facts as developed at trial. See United States v. Williams, 389 F.3d 402, 405 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 872 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession (B) holding that possession was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits (C) holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory (D) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
Output: (A)
test, and given that the issue has been forfeited, there is no reason to partially overrule Helzer in the case before us. II. CONCLUSION I concur with the majority that the order granting defendant a new trial should be vacated and that defendant’s conviction should be reinstated, although I reach this result on the ground that defendant forfeited his right to separately empaneled juries. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to partially overrule Helzer, which has served as precedent for more than 30 years in this state, because it is unnecessary to reach the issue whether Helzer was correctly decided. 1 MCL 750.335a (indecent exposure); MCL 767.61a (sexual delinquency). 2 See also Spencer v Texas, 385 US 554, 567-569; 87 S Ct 648; 17 L Ed 2d 606 (1967) (<HOLDING>). 3 Helzer, 404 Mich at 424. 4 People v 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no federal constitutional right to a bifurcated criminal trial (B) holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal (C) holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right (D) holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction (E) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right
Output: (A)
“intentionally self-inflicted injuries” applies. The policy defines accidental bodily injury, which is covered under the policy, as “bodily harm caused solely by external, violent and accidental means which is sustained directly and independently of all other causes.” (Stipulated Facts, Ex. 1 at 11.) The death in this case was not solely caused by external and accidental means, nor was it sustained independently of all other causes. The death certificate reported that the spinal fracture was due to a motor accident, which itself was due to alcohol intoxication. As a matter of common sense and reasonableness, there can be no question that but for the intoxication, the mishap might well not have happened. See Smith v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 872 F.Supp. 482, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1994) (<HOLDING>). The parties have devoted a large portion of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that decedents voluntary consumption of alcohol resulting in a level of 23 was at least a partial cause of vehicular collision precluding accidental benefits (B) holding that rule 58 allows inclusion of at least one citation to legal authority and at least a onesentence explanation of the courts reasoning (C) holding that rule 23 applied even when the new york statute providing the cause of action prohibited class relief (D) holding misrepresentation must at least be partial cause of plaintiffs injury (E) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
Output: (A)
attorney-client relationship. In its order, the circuit court stated: “By statute, [Wingate] owed no duty or obligation to [Wife] with respect to the congressional life insurance policy or the manner in which it was paid.” Because the issue of Wingate’s prior representation of Wife was the only argument made by Wife in support of her claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and because the circuit court ruled on this issue, a Rule 59(e) motion was unnecessary. See Elam v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, 361 S.C. 9. 25, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) (“Civil procedure and appellate rules should not be written or interpreted to create a trap for the unwary lawyer or party”); Hardaway Concrete Co. Inc. v. Hall Contracting Corp., 374 S.C. 216, 225, 647 S.E.2d 488, 493 (Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). On the merits, I would hold that a genuine 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review (B) holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal (C) holding a rule 59e motion unnecessary to preserve an argument for appeal where the issue was raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court (D) holding that an argument not made to the circuit court cannot be raised on appeal (E) holding issues must be raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court to be preserved for appellate review
Output: (C)
partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs’ arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court’s order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants’ arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
Output: (C)
limit Section 74.351(a) imposes on a health liability claimant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial with respect to dismissal of her claims. We overrule Awoniyi’s second point of error. Attorney’s-Fee AwaRD to the Hospital In her third point of error, Awoniyi contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the hospital because she timely served her expert report on the hospital. As discussed above, Awoniyi’s expert report was not served timely. Where an expert report is not served timely, Section 74.351 imposes a duty on the trial court, upon a health care provider’s motion, to dismiss the claims and to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the health care provider. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>). The trial court thus did not err in awarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous (B) holding that attorneys fee statute using shall language is not discretionary (C) holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication (D) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (E) holding provision in attorneys fee contract requiring client that terminated contract to immediately pay attorney fee equal to present value of attorneys interest in case was inconsistent with public policy and unconscionable
Output: (B)
850, 853 (Tenn.1985). Therefore, we conclude that, under AR.S. § 12-1514, the trial court may make an award for attorney’s fees incurred in the confirmation proceedings themselves. As the attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court in this case included fees for both the arbitration and the confirmation proceedings, the judgment must be modified to exclude fees attributable to the arbitration itself. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION W.E.S. requests attorney’s fees incurred for the appeal. W.E.S. was only partially successful in the appeal. The arbitration award was confirmed, but W.E.S. lost on the lion’s share of attorney’s fees, which has been the core issue in this case for some time. Cf. Coldwell Banker v. Camelback Office Park, 156 Ariz. 214, 223-24, 751 P.2d 530, 539-40 (App.1987) (<HOLDING>), vacated in part on other grounds, 156 Ariz. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is possible to have no successful party when one prevails on the complaint and the other prevails on the counterclaim (B) holding that where complaint seeks greater damages than counterclaim and court denied relief to both parties there is no successful party (C) holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages (D) holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation (E) holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered
Output: (A)
grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. Id. (emphasis added). A defendant must also “file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Id. § 1446(d). The removal statutes are construed narrowly. Pritchett v. Off its, including the District of Kansas, have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039 n. 9 (D.Minn.2008) (stating that “a failure to comply with the requirements of [Section 1446(a) ] ordinarily is not grounds to deny removal”); Riggs v. Fling Irrigation, Inc., 535 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (W.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1215; In re Methyl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under alabama law the law of the forum applies to procedural matters and that in most instances the statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule (B) recognizing that the procedural defect could be corrected through a reinstatement of the termination proceedings (C) holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this (D) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (E) holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured
Output: (E)
that she has never seen Nathan Smith. Rather, the Smiths state in their Response that they do not dispute any of these facts, but that the facts are not relevant to this motion. See Response ¶¶ 35-39, at 5. The Tenth Circuit has held: “Without a specific reference, [the court] will not search the record in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant evidence which might require submission of the case to a jury.” Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 839 (10th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). Accord Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir.1992) (explaining that searching the appel late record for “dormant evidence ... would not be fair to either the movant or the district court”); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found (B) holding that while a district court has discretion to consider other materials in the record it has no obligation to do so where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found (C) holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing (D) holding that a district court need not comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment particularly where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found (E) holding that the district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact where the evidenceis not set forth in the moving papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found
Output: (B)
proof of the charges against each of the defendants is based on the same evidence and acts. Rarely, if ever, will it be improper for co-conspirators to be tried together.” United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 880 (8th Cir. 1996). The first basis for Defendant’s motion is his contention that he and his co-defendants have antagonistic defenses. The United State Supreme Court has addressed this argument in Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). The Court recognized many of the Courts of Appeals have expressed the view that “mutually antagonistic” or “irreconcilable” defenses may be so prejudicial in some instances so as to mandate severance. Id., 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. at 937. See e.g. United States v. Shivers, 66 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Court recognized, however, that in most 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that affirmative defenses are waived if not pled (B) recognizing the existence of antagonistic defenses does not require severance unless defenses are actually irreconcilable (C) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment (D) holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court (E) holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion
Output: (B)