niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
between Liberty Mutual and Frankenmuth. See Rodgers Builders, 76 N.C. App. at 29, 331 S.E.2d at 734 (“Although James McQueen was not named as a party to the arbitration, it is clear that he had a strong financial interest in the determination of the issues there because of his ownership interests in McQueen Properties and Parkhill Associates, and that he was an active and controlling participant in the arbitration. He thus is bound by the judgment entered on the arbitration award just as if he were a named party to the proceeding.”); see also Levin-Townsend Computer Corp. v. Holland, 29 A.D.2d 925, 92 lled, participated in, or even had notice of the arbitration proceedings in this case. See Baldwin v. Brooks, 83 A.D.2d 85, 85-90, 443 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, therefore, erred in granting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding arbitration decision disallowing insurers coverage defense binding in subsequent personal injury action where the issue was actually litigated and decided in prior action (B) holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that driver was not bound in subsequent personal injury case by prior arbitration decision that plaintiffs injuries were related to auto accident because driver was not in privity with his insurance carrier and did not participate in arbitration (E) holding that plaintiffs personal injury action against other driver in auto accident was not precluded by arbitration award between insurance carriers regarding damage to plaintiffs car because plaintiff did not participate in or control arbitration was not a party to arbitration agreement did not adopt agreement or attempt to benefit from agreement
Output: (D)
we hold that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim to enforce these covenants as equitable servitudes unless some additional, more precise standards are legally necessary to define and restrict Plaintiffs power of approval. THE DEVELOPER’S POWER OF APPROVAL 16. Defendants contend that the equitable servitudes are unenforceable because the Declaration contains no clear standards for the developer to apply when deciding to approve or disapprove of a particular mobile home. This is an issue of first impression in New Mexico. 17. Some jurisdictions require reasonable parameters in the form of written or de facto guidelines to show that the approving authority is acting reasonably. See Town & Country Estates Ass’n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668, 671 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Prestwick Landowners’ Ass’n v. Underhill, 69 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable (B) holding that property owner who violated restrictive covenant multiple times over several years waived enforcement of same restriction against third parties as matter of law (C) holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans (D) holding that a restrictive covenant requiring approval of building plans by homeowners association which failed to define standard of approval was too vague for enforcement (E) holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable
Output: (D)
witnesses to divulge information and that she regularly "accuse[s] the interviewee" of being involved in a crime to garner information, which escalated an interrogation here. Neither reason required the detective to opine on a witness's veracity, yet both provide context for her interrogation tactics and investigative decisions. 1 31 Finding error, I would address whether permitting admission of the detectives' testimony was harmless. Having reviewed the record, and consistent with our precedent, I am persuaded that it was. As the majority makes clear, although the detectives opined about the veracity of three witnesses, all three testified at trial and were subject to vigorous eross-examination. The jury was free to assess their credibility on its own. See Eppens, 979 P.2d at 18 (<HOLDING>). Although the trial court should have stricken 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse (B) holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement (C) holding mothers drug use during pregnancy and after child was removed from her care in face of random drug testing that placed her relationship with child at risk was legally and factually sufficient evidence that she engaged in course of conduct which endangered her child (D) holding that fundamental error occurred in the prosecution of a mother for aggravated manslaughter of her child when the prosecutor commented on the fact that the mother had contemplated having an abortion during the course of her pregnancy with the child (E) holding that a social workers comment that a child appeared sincere though error was harmless in part because the child was subject to crossexamination and the jury had a full opportunity to judge her eredibility in light of her demeanor
Output: (E)
evidence showing that the defendants used the mark selectively or that they failed to use it pervasively in all their commercial dealings, even if these dealings were low in volume. Furthermore, though the Allard Court granted ownership rights to the defendants based only on oral testimony of various “solicitations” and insubstantial documentary evidence of prior use, the Court noted that there was also good evidence of widespread public recognition of the defendants’ use of the service mark. Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative of a party’s actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning is not required. See id.; see also Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F.Supp. 428, 431 (M.D.Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). Public recognition is probative of a party’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff established a right to a slogan based on evidence of public recognition of its use by the plaintiff (D) holding that a plaintiff had established a primafacie failuretohire case notwithstanding evidence that the position sought by the plaintiff was ultimately filled with a person of the same race as the plaintiff (E) holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic
Output: (C)
Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Trujillo-Teo failed to establish 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion (B) holding that guatemalan guerrillas abducted petitioner on account of imputed political opinion because of her relatives military service (C) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (D) holding that applicant failed to establish imputed political opinion where he presented no evidence that an antigovernmental guerilla group imputed his fathers political beliefs to him (E) holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground
Output: (A)
Court in the intervening years. See Fairfield, 246 S.W.3d at 668 & n. 22 (citing with approval Milligan, Shaffer, Vanderlinden, and Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lichte, 792 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990), writ denied per curiam, 825 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.1991)); see also id. at 683 (Hecht, J., concurring) (identifying Manriques v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 779 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied), a case relied on by Laine, as one of only two courts that “have concluded that punitive damages are damages for bodily injury covered by automobile policies,” a position that “has been uniformly rejected in the context of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage”); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>), overruled by Milligan, 940 S.W.2d 228 (citing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding business automobile policy issued to a corporation did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for owners son (B) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid (C) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured  shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (D) holding that an insurer may  assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not  succeed  to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations (E) holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute
Output: (C)
705 ILCS 405/5 — 815(f) (West 2000). Section 5 — 8—7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) provides the rules for calculating the length of imprisonment for offenders and states that “[t]he offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence *** for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—7(b) (West 2000). Whether an habitual juvenile offender is entitled to credit for predisposition detention is an issue of first impression. Our appellate court districts are divided on the issue of whether a delinquent minor should receive sentence credit for time spent in predisposition detention. Compare In re E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177 (4th Dist. 1998), and In re Jesus R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (4th Dist. 2002) (<HOLDING>), with In re 299 Ill. App. 3d 327 (2d Dist. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a credit issuing bank did not breach a credit agreement when it unilaterally modified the terms (B) holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials (C) holding that juveniles sentenced to indeterminate terms are entitled to predisposition credit (D) holding that when a defendant is sentenced to a term that does not exceed the statutory maximum allowed for an indeterminate amount of the drug involved the jurys determination of drug quantity is practically irrelevant (E) holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals
Output: (C)
provision gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion.” Id. In the instant case, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to grant Lushaj’s motion to reopen because that decision is committed to the discretion of the BIA. See Anin, 188 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, we dismiss Lushaj’s petition with respect to his claim that the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte authority to grant his motion to reopen and deny his petition with respect to his claim that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. 1 . Lushaj does not challenge the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider. Therefore, he has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1382 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Even if we had jurisdiction to review the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned (B) holding that issues not briefed are deemed abandoned (C) holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned (D) holding that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned (E) holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned
Output: (A)
asserted on the petition date even if they were not disclosed in the debtor’s schedules. Goodman v. Phillip R. Curtis Enters., Inc., 809 F.2d 228 (4th Cir.1987). A trustee has the right to rid the estate of property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554. If a trustee neither abandons nor administers a scheduled asset, the asset is deemed to have been abandoned upon the closing of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c). However, property of the estate that is not abandoned and is not administered remains property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554(d). Thus, if property was not properly scheduled by a debtor, it is not abandoned when the bankruptcy case is closed. E.g., Vreugdenhill v. Navistar Int’l Transport Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 525 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Hamlett, 304 B.R. 737, 741 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an undisclosed cause of action which existed at the time of filing remained an asset of the estate and allowing the debtor to reopen the case to formally schedule the cause of action (B) holding property that was technically abandoned under  554c was not brought back into estate by virtue of reopening the case (C) holding that a debtor must formally schedule the property before the close of the case in order for such property to be abandoned pursuant to section 554c (D) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (E) holding that property is not abandoned by operation of law unless the debtor formally scheduled the property before the close of the case
Output: (C)
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA’s substantive claim. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United States,’ is merely an element of the United States’ Clean Water Act case under section 301.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a consent decree “is an agreement 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (C) recognizing existence of two tests (D) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (E) holding that one of the essential elements of an abuse of process claim is the existence of an ulterior motive
Output: (D)
tax return. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cement Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund for No. Calif. v. Stone, 197 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1999), and we affirm. The district court properly concluded that because Danoff did not file his claim for a tax refund within statutory three-year period, the refund claim was untimely under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b). The district court therefore correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over DanofPs tax refund action. See Imperial Plan, Inc. v. United States, 95 F.3d 25, 26 (9th Cir.1996) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where taxpayer failed to file a timely administrative tax refund claim under section 6511); Zeier v. United States, 80 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Danoff contends that the IRS should be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  6511b2a is jurisdictional (B) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (C) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional (D) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional
Output: (A)
the district court erred by admitting the balance sheet at all because such evidence is irrelevant to the setting of a punitive damages award. See Fed.R.Evid. 402. But under Nevada law, a defendant’s wealth is relevant to a jury’s determination of punitive damages. In Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 989 P.2d 882 (1999), the Nevada Supreme Court noted its consistent recognition that “[t]he wealth of a defendant is directly relevant to the size of [a punitive damages] award, which is meant to deter the defendant from repeating his misconduct as well as punish him for his past behavior.” Id. at 887 (quoting Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 104 Nev. 587, 763 P.2d 673, 677 (1988)); see also United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 105 Nev. 504, 780 P.2d 193, 199 (1989) (<HOLDING>). To that end, the Nevada pattern jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages (B) recognizing the financial position of the defendant as a factor in assessing a punitive damages award (C) holding a court may not award punitive damages (D) holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages (E) holding that punitive damages award against vicariously liable law firm was not excessive in part because the award is proportionate to the law firms financial position
Output: (B)
Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 852 (10th Cir.2005). 23 . See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 24 . 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-14.11. 25 . See King v. United States, No. 12-CV-616-JED-TLW, 2013 WL 1856472, at *3 (N.D.Okla. May 2, 2013) (recognizing the lack of Tenth Circuit authority on whether compliance with the regulations is part of the exhaustion requirement, but following the majority of circuit courts, which have concluded that the regulations are not part of the jurisdictional presentment requirement). 26 . See id. at *4 (finding, "consistent with the majority position,” that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the regulations did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction). 27 . See, e.g., Tucker v. U.S. Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 960 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice requirements under former rule 40b1 are jurisdictional (B) holding that notice requirements under rule 252b3 are jurisdictional (C) holding service requirements under fedrcivp 4 to be jurisdictional (D) holding that notice requirements of 4206a are jurisdictional (E) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature
Output: (E)
subsequent changes in the zoning laws “prohibiting or limiting [a particular] use, the owner must (1) obtain a permit or occupancy certificate where required by applicable ordinance and (2) must proceed under that permit or certificate to exercise it on the land involved so that the neighborhood may be advised that the land is being devoted to that use”) (quoting Richmond Corp. v. Bd. of County Commr’s, 254 Md. 244, 255-56, 255 A.2d 398, 404 (1969)). Although we have not adopted previously the doctrine of zoning estoppel, the principles of equitable estoppel have been considered and applied by both Maryland appellate courts in claims brought against local governments in land use contexts. See Permanent Fin. Corp. v. Montgomery County, 308 Md. 239, 251-53, 518 A.2d 123, 129-130 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. East Prince 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervening change in statutory interpretation did not amount to a change in controlling law under the mandate rule where plaintiffs attempted on remand to rely on a different but related statute which could have been but was not previously raised and the interpretation of which had not changed (B) holding that stare decisis required the court to adhere to a prior statutory interpretation despite the agencys subsequent interpretation of the statute contrary to the settled law (C) holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that where a contractor relied on montgomery countys prior reasonable and debatable interpretation of the statutory phrase nonhabitable structures and constructed its building based on that interpretation and with a valid permit it would be inequitable for the county board of appeals to apply a changed interpretation to require removal of the buildings fourth floor
Output: (E)
of his conviction for the Duncan murder and found that Polk did not "interrogate” Howard. See State v. Howard, 296 S.C. 481, 374 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1988). Again, we do not attempt to decide these issues because they are not necessary to our resolution of the ultimate question of whether Howard's confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins are admissible. We only point out these issues in response to the dissent’s decidedly incomplete discussion of them. 14 . In his Reply Brief, Howard contends for the first time that his rights under Edwards were initially violated by Detective Warren, prior to Howard's meeting with Polk. This assertion is barred by his failure to raise it earlier. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-12, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719-21, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, an examination of Howard’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim but the state court denies such a hearing entitlement to a federal court hearing is analyzed pursuant to preaedpa law rather than the standards set out in  2254e2 (B) holding federal evidentiary hearing not statutorily barred when petitioner had sought to develop factual basis for claim in state court (C) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint (D) holding that federal court cannot review claim procedurally defaulted in state court absent showing of either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice
Output: (E)
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff expressly abandons the claims in his response to defendant's motion. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to defendant on those claims. 2 . Because both the ADA and KAAD define the term “disability” similarly, plaintiff's discrimination claims under the two statutes must meet the identical fate. Nolan v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 753, 757 n. 2 (D.Kan.1996). 3 . In his affidavit, plaintiff articulates a litany of substantial limitations' generated by his surgical scar. The court finds, however, that plaintiffs affidavit is inconsistent with his prior deposition. Accordingly, the court will disregard the affidavit on this issue. See Bohn v. Park City Group, Inc., 94 F.3d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Defendant contends that because plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage (B) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (C) holding that plaintiffs affidavit submitted at summary judgment stage and contradicting earlier deposition testimony should not be considered (D) holding that the court may disregard an affidavit submitted solely for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit is directly contradicted by deposition testimony and the nonmovant does not explain the discrepancies (E) holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial
Output: (C)
(9th Cir.1995). Finally, we dispose of appellees’ argument that Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2004), precludes a RLUIPA claim when the complaint cites only the First Amendment. There, we “expressed] no opinion about whether” the challenged regulation violated RLUIPA because the inmate “brought his claim under the First Amendment, not the RLUI-PA.” Id. at 715 n. 1. Appellees’ reliance on Henderson is misplaced, because at no point did the plaintiff there even assert a RLUIPA claim. See id. at 711-12. Here, Alvarez specifically raised his RLUIPA theory in his post-complaint filings, thereby apprising appellees before summary judgment that he was claiming relief under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292-94 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Appellees had notice of and the opportunity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs could not proceed with different theory of liability after close of discovery when defendant would be prejudiced by inability to develop newly relevant evidence and defenses (B) holding only defenses that would be valid in rendering state can be relied upon by courts of another state (C) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (D) holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations (E) holding that only justification defenses would be recognized
Output: (A)
and his supervisor never returned his calls, and never advised him that his extended absence would require him to apply for a leave of absence. According to Plaintiff, a simple investigation into these facts would have revealed a failure to accommodate or grant a leave of absence on the part of Federal Mogul. It is generally accepted that a failure to accommodate is not like or reasonably related to an allegation of termination. Stuart, 217 F.3d at 630 (stating an allegation of discipline is not like or related to an allegation of termination); see Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir.1997) (finding a complaint of failure to accommodate and termination are separate things not like or reasonably related); Jones v. Sumser Ret. Vill., 209 F.3d 851, 853-54 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, construing the complaint’s allegation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that default termination is government claim (B) holding that although the plaintiff has suffered no adverse employment action she may still raise a claim of discrimination based on the alleged failure reasonably to accommodate her disability (C) holding that the employers willingness to accommodate the employee undercut the employees claim of constructive discharge (D) holding a termination claim is far different from a failure to accommodate claim (E) holding that a failure to accommodate claim is separate and distinct from a claim of discriminatory treatment under the ada and pointing out that a failure to accommodate claim and a claim of discriminatory treatment under the ada are not like or reasonably related to one another and one cannot expect a failure to accommodate claim to develop from an investigation into a claim that an employee was terminated because of a disability
Output: (D)
days of that date. She further argues that prejudgment interest should be assessed on her punitive damage award. Id. at 4. She observes that the case relied upon by EMMC for the proposition that the Court has declined to assess prejudgment interest on punitive damages did not deal with Maine’s prejudgment interest statute. Id. She cites two cases in which she says the Maine Law Court upheld trial courts’ assessments of prejudgment interest on punitive damage awards. Id. at 5. II. DISCUSSION A. Timeliness Ms. Morin’s motion for prejudgment interest is timely. Ms. Morin brought her motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to Rule 59(e), the proper vehicle for such a motion. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e); Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 176, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 90-93 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any motion made within ten days of entry of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will be considered a rule 59e motion which suspends the finality of the judgment and tolls the time to appeal (B) holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider (C) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (D) holding that a motion filed as a rule 59e was not a motion to alter or amend the judgment and did not toll the time to file an appeal because the motion for costs was wholly collateral to thejudgment on the merits (E) holding that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest involves the kind of reconsideration of matters encompassed within the merits of a judgment to which rule 59e was intended to apply
Output: (E)
(2001); 7 DCMR §§ 312.2,312.8 (2011). 10 . Capitol Entm't Servs., 25 A.3d at 22; see also D.C.Code § 51-110(b)(l)-(2). 16 A.3d 130, 135 (D.C.2011) (" '[I]mplicit in [the] definition of 'misconduct' is that the employee intentionally disregarded the employer’s expectations for performance.'") (quoting Washington Times v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 724 A.2d 1212, 1217-18 (D.C.1999)); Chase v. D.C. Dep't of Emp’t Servs., 804 A.2d 1119, 1124 n. 12 (D.C.2002) (noting that a finding that the employee's misconduct was intentional "may be required even for a finding of simple misconduct”). 21 . Odeniran, 985 A.2d at 428. 22 . Id. at 426. 23 . Id. at 428. 24 . Doyle v. NAI Pers., Inc., 991 A.2d 1181, 1183 (D.C.2010). 25 . See Badawi v. Hawk One Sec., Inc., 21 A.3d 607, 615 (D.C.2011) (<HOLDING>). 26 . See Hegwood v. Chinatown CVS, Inc., 954 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (B) holding that this court could not affirm the aljs finding of gross misconduct because the alj failed to make findings on every material contested issue of fact (C) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (D) holding that where adequately supported credibility findings are for the alj to make (E) holding remand proper on circuit courts own motion in a workers compensation case where the commission failed to make essential findings of fact because to hold otherwise would in such cases make the determination of the rights of the parties turn upon the neglect of the commission to make essential findings of fact or require the appellate court to make the omitted findings of fact which our statute forbids
Output: (B)
administrative remedies as are available. (2) the exhaustion of administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may not be required unless the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section or are otherwise fair or effective. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994) (amended 1996). 11 . Webster’s International Dictionary 180 (3d ed.1993). 12 . Oxford English Dictionary Vol. I, 812 (2d ed.1989). 13 . Id. 14 . Roget’s International Thesaurus 1171 (4th ed.1977). 15 . Random House Dictionary Of The English Language 1213 (Unabridged ed.1981). 16 . Oxford English Dictionary Vol. XIII, 584 (2d ed.1989). 17 . See, e.g. Lacey, 990 F.Supp. at 1205 (<HOLDING>); Whitley, 158 F.3d at 886-87 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statement failure to pay will leave our client with no choice but to consider legal action did not violate  1692e5 by threatening legal action because at most the language  threatened that the creditor will have to consider legal action and therefore no action of any kind is threatened by defendant collection agency (B) holding that ignorance of the law or legal procedure is no excuse for filing a frivolous action (C) holding that judicial review of final agency action under the administrative procedure act  provides the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of an eis (D) holding that when the administrative procedure is not empowered to achieve the end sought in the legal action the procedure is unavailable because it cannot accomplish the purpose of the legal action (E) holding that when an agency fails to follow the proper procedure under the illinois administrative procedure act for the adoption of rules the rule is invalid
Output: (D)
WL 687033, at *1 (D.Md. Feb. 29, 2008) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Courts in the Fourth Circuit deny leave to amend a complaint past the deadline established by a scheduling order where the moving party has been careless in developing his claims or where he has failed to satisfactorily account for his failure to do so. Compare Whichard v. Specialty Restaurants Corp., 220 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.Md.2004) (denying plaintiffs motion to join an additional defendant five months after the court imposed deadline because plaintiff had ample notice before the deadline that the original defendant might not be the right party) with Long v. Blair, No. 2:09-CV-00349, 2010 WL 1930220 (S.D.W.Va. May 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>). After a movant satisfies the good cause 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint (B) holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed (C) holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline (E) holding that good cause existed where the plaintiff did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to support new claims until after the deadline for amending his complaint and moved to amend immediately after the new evidence came to light
Output: (E)
2011, this court granted the government’s Emergency Motion to stay the criminal trial and the setting of further pretrial proceedings in the district court, pending the resolution of this appeal. This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3731. DISCUSSION 1. We first consider whether the district court erred in suppressing the evidence obtained from the government’s wiretaps. This court reviews the issuing court’s wiretap order for clear error, see United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1376 (5th Cir.1995), but reviews de novo the district court’s conclusion that “necessity,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c), was not met. See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 619 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Smith, 273 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Two district judges separately authorized the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing ruling on motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo on appeal (B) holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo (C) holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo (D) holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo (E) holding that legal issues presented by rule 12b1 motion are reviewed de novo
Output: (B)
implicit in all indictments for substantive offenses); United States v. Clark, 980 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir.1992) (“It is well established that a defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting even though he was not charged in that capacity. Aiding and abetting is an alternative charge in every count, whether implicit or explicit.”) (citatio . 257, 765 P.2d 419, 433 n. 12 (1989) (“[I]n California the definition of a principal has historically included those who aid and abet ... and notice as a principal is sufficient to support a conviction as an aider or abettor.”); Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ind.1982) (“One can be charged as a principal and convicted on proof that he aided or abetted another in committing the crime.”); State v. Satetn, 516 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa 1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Pennington, 254 Kan. 757, 869 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no error in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting when defendant was not charged with aiding and abetting because ajiders and abettors  are chargeable directly as principals (B) recognizing aiding and abetting conversion (C) holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting (D) recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion (E) recognizing aiding and abetting trespass
Output: (C)
being fired, for failing to comply with a work requirement that conflicts with his religious practice. See, e.g., Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1379 n.1 (6th Cir. 1994). We do hot have to rule definitively on that issue, however, because in any event, Kellogg cannot now retract its concession in the. district court that, for purposes pf the summary-judgment motions, Tabura made a prima facie, claim. 6 . The EEOC also points to its' own compliance manual, which "states that an ’[ejmployer violates Title VII if it offers only a partial accommodation where full accommodation would not pose an undue hardship.’ ” (EEOC Br, 11 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 12 (R v. Universal Mfg. Corp,, 914 F.2d 71, 73-74 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See Porter v. City of Chi., 700 F.3d 944, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding employer did not reasonably accommodate employees reli gious practices where employer accommodated employees request to attend religious festival during scheduled work shift but did not address employees second religious practice of refraining from work during the week of the festival (B) holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work (C) holding that the cba preempted an intentional infliction claim that was based on a failure to change an employees work schedule so he could attend friday religious services (D) holding that employer is not vicariously hable for employees negligence while driving to work where such driving conferred no special benefit upon employer other than to make employees services available (E) holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor
Output: (A)
the public interest and ‘[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system’ require that the district court defer to local government administrators.” Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where “decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all” the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree — as well as the fact that the “local government administrators” in this case appear to favor vacating the decree — the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes
Output: (D)
Rainer’s Rule 37 petition on ground one, which was an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus that was the claim before the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal. Although Rain-er acknowledges in his Reply on this appeal, his “ineffective assistance and due process claims are separate but intertwined,” Reply 1, Rainer faults the Arkansas Supreme Court for considering this intertwined argument as it was presented on appeal. Whether or not Rainer maintained a due process claim entirely independent of his ineffective assistance claim, Rainer did not rebut the presumption that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision adjudicated his due process claim on the merits, and the decision is therefore entitled to deference. See § 2254(d)-(e); Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). We further hold that the district court, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review (B) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (C) holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard (D) recognizing that the interaction of general constitutional rules governing pretrial identification procedures and the deferential standard of habeas review affords significant discretion to the state court (E) recognizing the deferential aedpa standard noting this court will take only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions  quoting worthington v roper 631 f3d 487 495 8th cir 2011
Output: (E)
well-being, and failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary to obtain the children’s return. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O) (West Supp. 2016). The jury also found that clear and convincing evidence showed that termination of S.J.’s and B.P.T.’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Both appellants’ court-appointed appellate attorneys have filed motions to withdraw and Anders briefs, in support of those motions, stating that after diligently reviewing the record, they believe that an appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776-77 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The briefs meet the requirements of Anders by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel (B) recognizing that the statutory right to counsel in parental termination cases requires that the appointed counsel provide effective assistance (C) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (D) holding that anders procedures apply in parental termination cases (E) recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure
Output: (D)
by “ ‘(1) the peculiar dignity and protection to which the law cloaks the human person, as contrasted with articles of commerce; (2) the inequality of the bargaining positions and relative intelligence of the contracting parties; (3) the amount of consideration received; (4) the likelihood of inadequate knowledge concerning future consequences of present injury to the human body and brain; and (5) the haste, or lack thereof, with which release was obtained.’ ” Finch, 84 Wn.2d at 146 (quoting Finch v. Carlton, 10 Wn. App. 32, 39, 516 P.2d 212 (1973) (McInturff, J., dissenting)). 2 A few cases have imposed an affirmative duty to explain contracts when the defendants know the signer is illiterate or speaks another language. See Scott v. Bodnar, 52 N.J. Super. 439, 145 A.2d 643 (1958) (<HOLDING>); S. Pac. Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 P. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding failure to explain consequence of signature to illiterate plaintiff could be grounds for avoiding release (B) holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal (C) holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum (D) holding that 24 hours is sufficient time for a plaintiff to review release (E) holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record
Output: (A)
the mootness doctrine as it pertains to land use challenges. For this reason, I decline to adopt CME's reasoning. CONCLUSION 34 CME's claims are now moot because CME does not have a right that will be affected if the district court were to declare Tocele County's decisions unenforceable. CME does not have any potentially affected property rights because CME does not own, nor does CME at this time lease, any property in the vicinity of the corridor. Further, the mootness doctrine prohibits land use challenges from continuing after all of the litigant's relevant property rights have been transferred. For these reasons, I would dismiss this appeal. 4 35 Justice WILKINS concurs in Associate Chief Justice DURRANTS dissenting opinion. 1 . Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 720 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>). 2 . McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appeal became moot when the party sold the real estate that formed the basis of the claims (B) holding unenforceable a contract for real estate commissions formed by an unlicensed corporation (C) holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner (D) holding appeal moot on this basis (E) holding that trustee may bring assigned creditor claims where estate is the real party in interest
Output: (A)