niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
on the secured creditor’s position.” Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 49 n. 6 (quoting Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down to Chapter 7, 8 Bankr.Dev.J. 131, 137 (1991)). 11 . Since the debtors have failed to either redeem or reaffirm, the Bank concludes that cause has been shown to modify the automatic stay. As discussed above, however, I am addressing the § 521 issue on its own merits and not in support of a claim for modification under § 362(d)(1). In any event, it is unclear whether a violation of § 521(2) would necessarily constitute cause for modification under § 362(d)(1). See Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 48 ("It is not clear to us that violation of § 521(2) would automatically require a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay.”); Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546 (<HOLDING>); but see Johnson, 89 F.3d at 252 ("If the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry (B) holding that a similar denial was not superseded because the appellant did not seek a stay of the trial courts order (C) holding that noncompliance with  5212 did not warrant relief from the automatic stay so that the creditor could repossess the collateral (D) holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant (E) holding that an appeal was not moot because the amendment to the ordinance at bar did not give the petitioner the relief sought so that the petitioners claim and injury remain viable
Output: (C)
against them. The Tiberts appeal. II [¶ 8] On appeal, the Tiberts argue the trial court erred in finding there was no justiciable controversy because the perpetual easement between Minto and Minto Grain rendered the Tiberts’ issue moot. The Tiberts contend the easement granted by Minto Grain to the City of Minto is not equivalent to an easement held in trust for the public for purposes of a public street. [¶ 9] When a trial court dismisses a case for mootness, we review the factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard set forth in Rule 52(a), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. See Syversen v. Hess, 2003 ND 118, ¶ 9, 665 N.W.2d 23. However, a trial court’s legal conclusion of mootness is reviewed de novo. See Minnesota Humane Soc’y v. Clark, 184 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); State v. Utvick, 2004 ND 36, ¶ 31, 675 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo (B) holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo (C) holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo (D) holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal (E) holding we review a dismissal for mootness de novo 
Output: (E)
right.” Appellant is not seeking to get the property back “as a benefit of survivorship over” his late father and Appellee. This observation, however, raises the possible alternative basis for the trial court’s finding. The court’s order states that Appellant’s quitclaim deed operated to “convey all of his interest” in the townhouse; thus, he is not entitled to any portion of the property that would otherwise pass to him as a beneficiary of his father’s estate. Any right Appellant has to take an interest in the property as a beneficiary did not, however, exist at the time Appellant executed the quitclaim deed. A quitclaim deed conveys only that interest in a property held by the grantor at the time of the conveyance. See, e.g., Blitch v. Sapp, 142 Fla. 166, 194 So. 328, 330 (1940) (<HOLDING>). In other words, “[t]he possibility that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed (B) holding that when a grantor delivered a deed to one of the cograntees therein telling her to keep it in a box and to deliver it to the proper parties at his death the title passed at that time irrespective of the place where the deed was kept (C) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title (D) holding a quitclaim deed yields only such interest in land as the grantor had at the time of the making of such deed (E) holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed
Output: (D)
Spencer’s paternal grandmother, which resulted in denying the minor child the benefits of access and contact with other members of his extended family. In our view, such findings provide adequate support for the trial court’s initial conclusion that defendant had shown that “a substantial change in circumstance [s]” had occurred during the period following the original custody decree and that the change had affected the welfare of the minor child. In addition to noting that a substantial change in circumstances had adversely affected the welfare of the minor child, the order also includes language indicating that the trial court considered changes in circumstances that could positively affect the circumstances of the minor child. See Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 620, 501 S.E.2d at 900 (<HOLDING>). In finding of fact number nine (finding 9), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances (B) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (C) holding interference with visitation of the noncustodial parent   that negatively impacts    the welfare of the child can constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody (D) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (E) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child
Output: (D)
the family court, [appellate courts] review[ ] factual and legal issues de novo.” Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011). “[WJhile retaining the authority to make our own findings of fact, we recognize the superior position of the family court judge in making credibility determinations.” Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011). “Stated differently, de novo review neither relieves an appellant of demonstrating error nor requires us to ignore the findings of the family court.” Id. at 388-89, 709 S.E.2d at 654 (emphasis removed). Further, a finding of contempt rests within the sound discretion of the family court. DiMarco v. DiMarco, 393 S.C. 604, 607, 713 S.E.2d 631, 633 (2011). “Such a finding should not be disturbe .E.2d 620, 623 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Lewis, 392 S.C. at 388-89, 709 S.E.2d at 654 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record (B) holding that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal (C) holding the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating error in the family courts findings of fact (D) holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error (E) holding that the party asserting notice error has the burden of demonstrating prejudice
Output: (C)
an agency should receive for its interpretation of a statute in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If the “intent of the Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. When the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is grounded in a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. In interpreting § 401, the Forest Service is not entitled to any agency deference because the EPA, not the Forest Service, administers the CWA. Baptist Hosp. East. v. Sullivan, 823 F.Supp. 424, 427 (W.D.Ky.1993) (<HOLDING>). An agency that interprets a statute other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding regulations entitled to chevron deference (B) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority (C) holding that a precondition to chevron deference is congressional delegation of administrative authority (D) holding that with respect to domestic bridges the general bridge authority act was clearly intended to end piecemeal congressional supervision of bridge construction by delegation of congressional authority to an expert administrative agency (E) recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys
Output: (C)
Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988). “The rule is generally accepted that appellate courts do not decide cases where no actual controversy exists between the parties at the time of the hearing.” City of W. Univ. Place v. Martin, 132 Tex. 354, 356, 123 S.W.2d 638, 639 (1939). Unless an exception to this general rule exists, it would be proper to dismiss this appeal as moot. 2. Exceptions to the Rule There are exceptions allowing an appellate court to review a case after it becomes moot. Texas courts have recognized three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception; (2) the collateral consequences exception; and (3) the public interest exception. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>); Nat’l Cafe Servs., Ltd. v. Podaras, 148 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing two exceptions to eleventh amendment bar (B) recognizing first two exceptions (C) recognizing constitutionally mandated exceptions to that statutory principle (D) recognizing three exceptions to atwill doctrine (E) recognizing exceptions to immunity
Output: (B)
jury, Appellants’ 1st Br. at 36. They specifically suggest the Northern District of Ohio because that district “is more liberal in interpreting minority cases.” Id. Counsel for the defendants conceded at oral argument that the Smiths’ status as plaintiffs did not preclude them from seeking a change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As this Court explained in Philip Carey Manufacturing Co. v. Taylor, 286 F.2d 782 (6th Cir.1961), “[t]he right to a transfer under [28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ] is available to a plaintiff as well as a defendant. A plaintiff is not bound by his choice of forums, if he later discovers that there are good reasons for transfer.” Id. at 784; accord 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3844 (3d ed.1989) (<HOLDING>). Although the Smiths were not precluded from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reviewing a district courts decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo the decision can be affirmed on any ground that finds support in the record including an alternate ground (B) recognizing that the district courts decision to termi nate parental rights will be upheld by this court if it is supported by substantial evidence (C) recognizing that federal district courts have the authority to grant a remedy if the refusal to file a substantial assistance motion was based on an unconstitutional motive (D) recognizing the very substantial authority including this courts decision in taylor for the proposition that a motion  may be made by the plaintiff (E) holding that plaintiff failed to adequately brief an issue where he failed to cite any legal authority for the proposition
Output: (D)
damage award in this case was fashioned for a compensatory purpose or that it is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the character of Travelers’ bad faith behavior or the award of compensatory damages. We also reject Grossi’s position that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in awarding interest on the $300,000.00 UIM claim, rather than the entire arbitration award. We, however, agree with Travelers that the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding Gros-si’s expert witness fee expenses as recoverable costs under section 8371. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to mold the costs portion of its verdict to reflect an award of $2,729.66. In all other respects the trial court’s verdict and judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in p 002) (<HOLDING>). We do so here. 2 . A loss reserve is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appeal from order denying posttrial motions was proper since prothonotary entered judgment prior to appellate disposition (B) holding that in the interest of judicial economy considering appeal from order denying posttrial motions and ordering entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff even though judgment was not actually entered (C) holding that although an order dismissing appellants motion for posttrial relief was not reduced to judgment in the interests of judicial economy the supreme court could regard as done that which ought to have been done and proceed with the appeal (D) holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered (E) holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment
Output: (B)
rule. Thus, each strand reconstitutes identical DNA molecules. When the cell divides, these two identical chromosomes enter newly-created “daughter” cells. Each new cell has the identical genetic composition as the original cell. All cells contain the same chromosomal composition. No two individuals, except identical twins, have the same nucleotide sequences throughout their DNA. DNA testing conducted on cells from various parts of the same body, whether blood, skin, semen, saliva, or hair will yield the same results. As in this case, DNA analysis can help identify donors of genetic material, such as blood. 2. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism, (RFLP) At present, the most widely accepted DNA test is the RFLP analysis. See, e.g., Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 892 (Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Moore, 268 Mont. 20, 885 P.2d 457, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no private right of action exists (B) holding that no serious dispute exists as to whether the techniques involved in rflp analysis are generally accepted (C) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (D) recognizing that statutory right to partition in kind exists where mineral rights are involved (E) holding that no standing exists to litigate an abstract dispute over the commissions reasoning
Output: (B)
of the offense.” Nothing prevented the jury from considering any circumstances of the offense as mitigation. 4. Victim Impact Statement ¶ 125 The trial court instructed the jury it could consider Gina’s victim impact statement “to the extent that it rebuts mitigation.” Forde asserts that the instruction was erroneous because Gina’s statement did not rebut any mitigation evidence, and the instruction therefore permitted the jury to consider the statement as an improper non-statutory aggravator. Because Forde did not object to this instruction, we review for fundamental error. ¶ 126 Victim impact evidence “rebuts” mitigation by informing the sentencer about the specific harm caused by the defendant. Cf Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction (B) holding that victim impact evidence properly reminds the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family (C) holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing (D) holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized (E) holding statute requiring that murderer be deemed to have predeceased victim thereby entitling victim to all joint tenancy property was not an unconstitutional forfeiture
Output: (B)
420, 112 S.Ct. 773. Note that because the Supreme Court stated that lien stripping would not be permitted in chapter 7 with an “allowed claim,” the implication arises that if the claim becomes disallowed, the lien can be stripped under Section 506(d). 22 . Id. at 418, 112 S.Ct. 773 (stating that the “liens ride through” principle was established before the passage of the 1978 Act, and existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). The Supreme Court acknowledged that liens ride through bankruptcy in several cases. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 6 S.Ct. 917, 29 L.Ed. 1004 (1886). Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991). 23 . In re Shandrew, 210 B.R. 829 (Bankr. E.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>); accord In re Nevería, 194 B.R. 547 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (B) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (C) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge (D) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (E) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien
Output: (D)
revision of testimony creates an issue of fact where none existed before. Otherwise, any party could head off a summary judgment motion by supplanting previous depositions ad hoc with a new affidavit, and no case would ever be appropriate for summary judgment. Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 289 (8th Cir.1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Bass v. City of Sioux Falls, 232 F.3d 615, 618 (8th Cir.1999). The court has considerable experience with this issue: This court has with some frequency considered the question of whether eleventh-horn’ affidavits that contradict deposition testimony can generate a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See Loeckle v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 59 F.Supp.2d 838, 856-58 (N.D.Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Longstreth v. Copple, C97-4100-MWB, slip op. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs deposition testimony was so contradictory of the statements contained in plaintiffs affidavit as to foreclose the affidavits use for summary judgment purposes (B) holding that facts alleged in an employees affidavit were insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the purposes of defeating a summary judgment where the affidavit contradicted the employees earlier deposition statements (C) holding that plaintiffs affidavit submitted at summary judgment stage and contradicting earlier deposition testimony should not be considered (D) holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact (E) holding that plaintiffs affidavit failed to fall within the exception stated in camfield tires inc v michelin tire corp 719 f2d 1361 8th cir1983 that an affidavit contradicting the prior deposition testimony of the affiant but containing an adequate explanation for the disparity may create a genuine issue of fact because plaintiffs deposition testimony was so contradictory from the statements contained in her affidavit
Output: (E)
does not emphasize the need for honesty. See id. at 290, 523 S.E.2d at 671. Finally, as in Hinnant, the child’s statements lack inherent reliability because of the nature of Rockwell-Flick’s leading questions. See id. Indeed, almost none of the child’s statements about the defendant were spontaneous, but rather responded to direct questions such as whether anyone had ever touched or kissed her. Second, although the child testified, unlike the minor child in Hinnant, we cannot treat Rockwell-Flick’s testimony as corroborative testimony since the trial court explicitly ruled that it was substantive evidence. Consistent with that ruling, the trial court did not limit the jury’s consideration of her testimony as corroborative. See State v. Quarg, 334 N.C. 92, 101-02, 431 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there was no physical evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court is not required to give limiting instruction when defendant did not object at first opportunity because evidence admitted for all purposes (B) recognizing that upon request the trial court may provide a limiting instruction to the jury (C) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (D) holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party (E) holding that failure to give a properly requested chicone instruction cannot be harmless error
Output: (D)
strength, the majority tells us, “is no less a [constitutional] violation than any other invidious method.” Maj. Op. at 871. But the use of different voting mechanisms has little to do with the type of “invidious discrimination” that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to prevent. That is why I believe that many of the broad statements in the majority opinion, although eloquent, are ultimately hollow. E.g., Maj. Op. at 879-80 (“Violations of the Equal Protection Clause are no less deserving of protection because they are accomplished with a modern machine than with outdated prejudices.”). However unpleasant the prospect, human error remains a part of the democratic process, and no constitutional rule is going to change that fact. See Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). What does have more potential to reduce the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment nor article i  2 of the constitution guarantee against errors in the administration of an election (B) holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution (C) holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court (D) holding that due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment are not confined to protection of citizens rather they apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction (E) holding that the due process clause contained in the colorado constitution encompasses a guarantee of equal protection
Output: (A)
has “jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to ... a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012). A party is an “interested party” with standing to bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) if the party “is an actual or prospective bidder whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract.” Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2013). A bidder has a direct economic interest if the alleged errors in the procurement caused it to suffer a competitive injury or prejudice. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In a post-award bid' protest, the protestor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (B) holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense (C) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim (D) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (E) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice
Output: (A)
of the public record. In 1981, the General Assembly amended the definition of "public records,” to include the following language: "Provided, that compilations, lists, or other aggregations of information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would’ constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, are hereby determined to be confidential and shall not be considered to be ‘public records’ within the terms of this Act, and shall not be supplied to private individuals or organizations.” See Act of Mar. 23, 1981, No. 608, § 3, 1981 Ark. Acts 1345, 1346 (1981). But that language was deleted in 1985. See Act of Mar. 21, 1985, No. 468, § 3, 1985 Ark. Acts 917, 918 (1985). 2 . See, e.g., Office of Lieutenant Governor v. Mohn, 67 A.3d 123, 132 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2013) (<HOLDING>); Governor’s Office of Admin, v. Purcell, 35 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants use of a persons name and social security number without permission constituted the use of a means of identification without lawful authority (B) holding that basic identification data such as name age current address and social security number is not generally subject to miranda (C) holding that although the social security number in the information and the social security numbers in the previous convictions did not match the rest of the identifying information  the first and last name and date of birth  did match and was sufficient to establish the defendants identity particularly in light of the fact that the defendant did not claim he was not the individual named in the previous convictions (D) recognizing the  holy trinity of personal information ie persons name social security number and date of birth that are reasonably likely to result in identity theft and fraud and concluding that sufficient proof had not been presented to add home address to the holy trinity (E) holding a social security number is not private
Output: (D)
purpose of this Memorandum is to explain why the Court declined to do these things. As disclosed by plaintiff in its ex parte motion, the sale of decoding devices like those defendants are claimed to have offered and sold is prohibited by federal criminal statute, see 47 U.S.C. § 553(b), as well as by Illinois criminal statute, see 720 ILCS 5/16-10(a)(4). Under the circumstances, information disclosing defendants’ purchases and sales of the devices, the revenues obtained from those sales, the assets they now have that may have been derived from those sales, and the locations where they keep their records and other descrambling devices is, without question, information that might tend to incriminate the defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (C) holding that abrogating the right to sell endangered eagles feathers did not implicate the fifth amendment (D) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (E) recognizing that preliminary injunction requiring defendant to disclose records might implicate fifth amendment
Output: (E)
certain provisions are met. Fla. Stat. § 624.155 (1999). Before the adoption of section 624.155, Florida courts refused to recognize a cause of action by an insured against his insurer alleging the insurer, in bad faith, refused to settle his claim; i.e., a “first party” bad faith cause of action. Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 263, 265-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987). While “first party” bad faith claims were not permitted, if an insured could allege an independent tort, such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress, he could proceed against the insurer on those claims and receive punitive damages. Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc., 778 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001); see also Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla.1957) (<HOLDING>). GEICO essentially argued during its motion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while punitive damages are normally not recoverable for breach of contract where acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to a cause of action in tort there may be recovery of exemplary damages  however the breach must be attended by some intentional wrong insult abuse or gross negligence which amounts to an independent tort (B) holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship (C) holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract (D) holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract (E) holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach
Output: (A)
court held that these facts demonstrated that Lloyds “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of acting in Tennessee, the cause of action arose from Lloyds’ activities within the state, and the acts had a substantial connection with Tennessee. 1. Purposeful Availment Purposeful availment is essential to a finding of personal jurisdiction. Calphalon, 228 F.3d at 721. Purposeful availment exists where the defendant’s contacts with the forum state “proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). It protects a defendant from being haled into a jurisdiction for random, fortuitous, or attenuated c , 1265-66 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Further, all of Lloyds’ communications were 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio (B) holding personal jurisdiction did not exist over the londonbased international amateur athletic federation iaaf despite the fact that its member organization in the usa had minimum contacts with ohio where the plaintiffs contract claim did not arise out of iaafs contacts with ohio (C) holding that standing alone defendants 4 million in sales in the forum state over a sevenyear period may not have been sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction but that the numerous other contacts with the forum in the case including advertising relationships with dealers and more than 150 visits tipped the balance and led the court to conclude that there were sufficient contacts to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction (D) holding that the defendants contacts with ohio were sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction where defendant consciously reached out from texas to ohio to subscribe to compuserve and sold his software over compuserves ohiobased system (E) holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio
Output: (D)
the crime charged. If the evidence is cumulative, the trial court should more closely scrutinize its prejudicial effect. If the evidence is necessary to prove an element of the charge, the trial judge may have erred in not sustaining the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Moreover, a defendant may have a valid objection, under federal rule 611(b), that the government’s cross-examination exceeds the scope of the direct. These added considerations are necessary not only to limit the impact of rule 404(b) on rule 608(b), but also to limit the prejudicial effect of allowing the government to have the last say through evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct. Smith Grading & Paving, 760 F.2d at 581; see also United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 324-25 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of Rule 608(b) is to prevent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (B) holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper
Output: (D)
prepared prior to that date, completed by Dr. Miller on March 11, 2004, stated plaintiff should not “lift, sit, [or] stand for any length of time,” and described plaintiffs prognosis as “poor to guarded,” (BA 266), that form was completed nine months prior to the FCE and over 16 months prior to the termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits. The September 19, 2005 note from Dr. Miller, received after defendant terminated plaintiffs benefits, (BA 19), provides no information about Dr. Miller’s then current relationship with plaintiff, if any, or the basis for his opinion. A plan administrator need not accord special deference to conclusory medical opinions even if offered by a treating physician. See Jordan, 370 F.3d at 875; see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation (B) holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (C) holding that the weight given a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (D) holding in context of application for social security benefits factfinder need not accept a treating physicians opinion which is brief and conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support its conclusion (E) holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence
Output: (D)
debtor "cannot be viewed as 'the debtor' as that reference appears for the second time in the second sentence in subsection 554.9402(7) (Iowa stats.]." Id. at 27. This reasoning assumes two debtors though factually there is only one. The reasoning is therefore fundamentally flawed. 6 First Agri does not contend that it was actually misled by the debtors' change of name. It cites several ninth circuit cases for the proposition that a conclusion that a financing statement is "seriously misleading" does not require a finding that a creditor had actually been misled. In Re Thomas, Inc., 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972); In Re Pacific Trencher & Equipment, Inc., 735 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1984). Respondents suggest that this is not a ease of a name change, but is rather a change in iden 1970) (<HOLDING>); In Re McCauley's Reprographics, Inc., 638 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motor vehicle to be retained by chapter 13 debtor should be valued at the price the debtor could get for it in a free and open market ie its fair market value (B) recognizing implied duty to market (C) holding brawns super market an insufficient listing where the debtor was wendall p brawn (D) holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product (E) holding that oral listing agreement did not preclude recovery of a commission
Output: (C)
that: a low evidentiary threshold is particularly appropriate in the veterans context because in the early stages of the application process, the veteran is almost always unassisted by legal counsel. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (attorneys and agents prevented from charging for services rendered pri- or to date of final decision from BVA). Since significant if not essential evidence regarding the merits of a claim often resides in the DVA’s files, it would be fundamentally unfair to erect a steep evidentiary hurdle in front of an unassisted veteran before allowing the veteran to receive assistance from the DVA. The low threshold is also appropriate in light of the uniquely pro-claimant nature of the veterans compensation system. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-64 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court (B) recognizing nonadversarial and proclaimant character of veterans benefits adjudication (C) holding that a plantshutdown benefit is not an optional form of benefit (D) recognizing that the veterans benefit system is uniquely proclaimant (E) holding that the interpretation of a veterans filings is a factual inquiry
Output: (D)
Kodak Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (D.Mass.2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002). 123 . See id. at 46-47 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1298, at 625-26 (2d ed.1990)). 124 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228. 125 . See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12651(a)(1) & (2); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201(a)(1) & (2); D.C.Code §§ 2-308-14(a)(1) & (2); Fla. Stat. §§ 68.082(2)(a) & (b); Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 661-21(a)(1) & (2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.175/3(a)(1) & (2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 5B(1) & (2); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 357.040(1)(a) & (b); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 71-5-182(a)(1)(A) & (B); Tex. Hum. Res.Code Ann. § 36.002; Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.01-216.3(A)(1) & (2). 126 . Cf. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>). 127 .Id. at 232. 128 . See id. at 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions (B) holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply (C) holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements (D) holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim (E) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983
Output: (B)
about the safety threat posed by people congregating around the corner. (Tr. at 18) (“On that corner of 174 and University, there is a 24-hour bodega that a lot of people hang out there, so I didn’t want to make the car stop at that location, just for tactics and safety reasons.”) Cf. United States v. Brown, 273 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir.2001) (“A nighttime traffic stop, especially in an area where crime is not a stranger, is more fraught with potential danger to an officer than would be a stop during the light of day.”). Therefore, Officer Fogarty was justifiably concerned that “the weapon’s undetected presence pose[d] a danger to the police or to the public.” Jones, 154 F.Supp.2d at 629; accord United States v. Simmons, No. 02 Cr. 314, 2003 WL 145261, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the inherent danger posed to police 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found (B) holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed defendant as to location of a gun in an apartment even where most of the other adults in the apartment were handcuffed because even assuming the executing officers believed that the residence was secure  the circumstances were still sufficiently dangerous (C) holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view even though appellant was handcuffed and under the control of the officers was lawful because there were other occupants in the house who were not handcuffed and who would have had access to the weapon (D) holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed parolee concerning whereabouts of a gun in an apartment where parole officers had specific information from a third party that a gun was likely present in the apartment (E) holding that the exception applies to statement by handcuffed defendant giving location of a gun in an apartment where officers found loose ammunition iri a closet and other members of the household including children were present
Output: (B)
of the alleged wrongful conduct by defendants as of May 18, 1999, the South Carolina claims should have been filed by May 18,2002. f. Tennessee Tennessee applies its general three year statute of limitations to claims under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act (Tenn.Code § 47-25-101 et seq.). See Tenn.Code § 28-3-105 (“The following actions shall be commenced within three (3) years from the accruing of the cause of action ... (3) Civil actions based upon the alleged violation of any federal or state statute creating monetary liability for personal services rendered, or liquidated damages or other recovery therefore, when no other time of limitation is fixed by the statute creating such liability.”); see also Leech v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1980 WL 4696, at *3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Sept. 25,1980) (<HOLDING>). Under Tennessee law, the cause of action 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations (B) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (C) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit (D) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (E) holding that a private antitrust action for injury sounds in tort and is subject to a three year statute of limitations
Output: (E)
stepped into a “sticky,” “slimy” substance on the floor behind her seat. She also saw other drippings and debris on the floor and that upon being helped up her hands, knees and dress were dirty. The court noted that “an inference arises that a dangerous condition existed.” Bozza, supra 42 N.J. at 358, 200 A.2d 777. Accordingly, the Court found that even without an inference of constructive notice, and “[alb-sent an explanation by defendants, a jury could find from the condition of the premises and the nature of the business that defendants did not exercise due care in operating the cafeteria ...” Bozza, supra 42 N.J. at 359, 200 A.2d 777, See Torda v. Grand Union Co., 59 N.J.Super. 41, 157 A.2d 133 (App.Div.1959); Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 221 A.2d 513 (1966)(<HOLDING>); Craggan v. IKEA USA, 332 N.J.Super. 53, 752 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (B) holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction (C) holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that in the absence of an injunction irreparable injury is likely and not merely a possibility (D) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (E) holding that an operator must do what is reasonably necessary to protect the customer from the risk of injury a particular mode of operation is likely to generate
Output: (E)
first, that under New Jersey law a plaintiff assumes the risk of voluntarily participating in a sporting activities, citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) and Pona v. Blvd. Arena, 35 N.J.Super. 148, 113 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1955), and that Buglioli voluntarily participated in a “cat and mouse game.” These cases provide no defense. First, the court knows of no decision after New Jersey adopted its comparative negligence statute interposing “assumption of risk” as a complete defense in a negligence action. To the contrary, a recent case arising from a contact sport accident formulated an appropriate rule by adjusting the standard of care, not by finding “assumption of risk.” See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 257 N.J.Super. 374, 608 A.2d 465 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Second, the court finds no New Jersey case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety (B) holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied (C) holding that an unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter and that criminal liability is imposed in the latter instance because although the defendants acts are not inherently wrong the defendant has acted or failed to act with awareness of the risk to safety and in wilful disregard of the safety of others (D) holding in actions arising from a contact sport accident plaintiff must show defendant acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others or intentionally (E) holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others
Output: (D)
district court judges were responsible for appointing magistrate judges, removing them from office, and maintaining plenary authority over what matters were delegated to the magistrate judges once they were appointed. Id. at 937-39, 111 S.Ct. 2661. The Supreme Court held that because the entire process of magistrate ad judication “takes place under the district court’s total control and jurisdiction,” there was no danger that the structural protections of Article III would be violated. Id. at 937, 111 S.Ct. 2661. Prior to Peretz, the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning to uphold the constitutionality of the Magistrates Act in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc., 725 F.2d at 540. See also Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). When the structural protections under Article 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act (B) holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation (C) holding that the supreme courts holding in stem did not extend to magistrate judges when fifth circuit precedent which was not overruled concluded that the magistrate act was constitutional (D) holding that a threejudge panel may depart from circuit precedent that has not been expressly overruled when an intervening en banc or supreme court decision has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (E) holding that an intervening supreme court case can overturn circuit precedent
Output: (C)