niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(emphasis added); see also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 66, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962) (“[F]ishing rights are of vital importance to Indians in Alaska.”); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir.1997) (“[F]ishing ... is an integral and time-honored part of native subsistence culture.”); United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir.1991) (“Many Alaska natives who are not fully part of the modern economy rely on fishing for subsistence. If their right to fish is destroyed, so too is their traditional way of life.”). As non-native populations have settled in Alaska’s rural expanses, subsistence fishing has also become a mainstay of Alaska’s non-native rural residents. Cf. Hoonah Indian Ass’n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Given the crucial role that navigable waters 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the terms charges classifications and practices as used in section 152b of the communications act encompass a companys internal accounting and depreciation practices (B) holding that the lottery commission was not a person under the unfair practices act (C) recognizing that hecks favorable termination rule applies to all  1983 plaintiffs not just those in state custody (D) holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix (E) holding that anilca protects subsistence practices of all rural alaskans not just natives
Output: (E)
and systematic,” even when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts. LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). The district court correctly found that it lacked general jurisdiction over Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer has very limited contacts with California. Oppenheimer has shipped unspecified items to the defendant Spectrum Effects, Inc. of California. However, the record gives no indication of the context and significance of these shipments for Oppenheimer’s business. Appellants failed to show that these acts amount to continuous and systematic contacts with California. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Oppenheimer has exhibited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant (B) holding that purchases even if occurring at regular intervals were insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation (C) holding that business visits and purchases within a forum even if occurring at regular intervals are not enough to support general jurisdiction over a defendant (D) holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction (E) holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor
Output: (B)
VI. Remaining Assignments of Error The appellant next argues that his conviction for attempted enticement of a minor was factually insufficient because his conversations with Ms. CG were insufficient to establish a substantial step toward completion of the crime. To the contrary, we conclude that his actions in de-conflicting his own work schedule, discerning when her mother would be absent, ensuring that she was not actually a police officer, discussing specific sexual activity, and asking her what items she might like for him to bring went beyond mere “hot air” and sufficiently demonstrated that the appellant took a substantial step toward enticement of a minor. United States v. Winekelmann, 70 M.J. 403, 407-08 (C.A.A.F.2011); see also United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d at 594 (<HOLDING>). Based on our own de novo review of the record 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (B) holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii (C) holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct (D) holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim (E) recognizing that federal circuits view discussions as a substantial step when they involve arrangements for meetings discussion of sexual acts to be performed during meeting or grooming whereby the defendant exposes the child to sexual material in an effort to lower the childs inhibitions toward later sexual activity
Output: (E)
terms” as existed prepetition meant that the Credit Union would continue to apply the funds received by it pursuant to the automatic deduction to the outstanding balances on both the secured and unsecured loans. In defense of the Credit Union’s policy, it can be argued that a debtor who fails to respond to a creditor’s invitation to terminate automatic loan payments on a prepetition debt has established a willingness to repay such a debt. Because these postpetition payments are (by negative inference) voluntary in nature, the argument goes, they are expressly permitted by § 524(f), and the creditor is therefore not in violation of § 362(a). Arguments to that effect have been consistently rejected by the courts. See In re Hellums, 772 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir.1985) (collecting cases) (<HOLDING>). But since Heliums ruled that a creditor who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors cannot allow postpetition funds to be automatically applied to a prepetition indebtedness absent some positive indication that debtors indeed intend to voluntarily assume their prepetition debts (B) holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable (C) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (D) holding that a prepetition equitable distribution right to equalization relief constitutes a discharged prepetition claim and distinguishing while agreeing with in re marriage of seligman 14 calapp4th 300 18 calrptr2d 209 214215 1993 wherein it was held that a prepetition equitable distribution right to in kind relief does not constitute a prepetition claim (E) holding that debtors could not exempt under  522d1 proceeds from the prepetition sale of their home
Output: (A)
screen violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches; and (3) the public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine should apply. His arguments are not persuasive. Assuming all of Hice’s allegations as true, the city was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Both the city ordinance adopting the personnel handbook and the handbook itself clearly declare that there is no employment contract and that employment is at will. While the personnel handbook contains provisions describing methods for dismissal under certain circumstances and specifying kinds of conduct that could result in being dismissed, it does not contain provisions that an employee will not be discharged except for cause. See Mertyris v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 310 Ark. 132, 832 S.W.2d 823 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Gladden v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp., 292 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (B) holding that the pam transport manual lists certain conduct that wifi result in termination but nothing in the manual suggests that the fist is intended to be exhaustive thus it would not only be unreasonable but absurd to interpret the manual as implicitly foreclosing termination for criminal acts and wrongful conduct beyond the seven violations listed in the manual (C) holding that a statute cannot be construed in a manner that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result (D) holding that the directors litigating position was not entitled to chevron deference but did warrant skidmore respect on certain issues where the arguments were persuasive and the agencys manual and practice had for some time consistently advanced a reasonable position (E) holding that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in termination cases is generally the same as in criminal proceedings
Output: (B)
habitat are tantamount to a proscribed “taking” under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id. The court contrasted the definition of “take” under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with the definition of “take” under the Endangered Species Act, which defines “take” broadly to include “harass” and “harm,” in addition to the verbs included in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act definition. Id. at 303. The Ninth Circuit .D.Ind.1996) (declining to enjoin a proposed plan that complied with federal law, holding that indirect taking of migratory birds as a result of either habitat destruction or logging during nesting season did not fall within the Migratory Bird Treaty Act implementing regulations’ definition of a “taking”); Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F.Supp. 1502 (D.Or.1991) (<HOLDING>). The District of New Mexico declined to apply 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sale of a cutting of timber from devised real estate was a partial ademption (B) holding that proposed improvements to an rs 2477 route in a national preserve is subject to regulation by the national park service (C) holding a violation of the travel act (D) holding that action challenging united states forest services approval of a timber sale became moot when challenged sale was halted as a result of an administrative appeal (E) holding that diminishment of habitat for the northern spotted owl under a proposed national forest timber sale would not result in a taking in violation of the migratory bird treaty act
Output: (E)
to their rental property; (4) whether the chancellor erred in awarding alimony; (5) whether the chancellor erred in awarding attorneys’ fees; and (6) whether the chancellor erred in requiring him to maintain a $200,000 life insurance policy for Becky’s benefit. We address these issues in turn below. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶'26. “When reviewing a decision of a chancellor, this Court applies a limited abuse of discretion standard of review.” Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So.2d 806, 810 (¶ 14) (Miss.2003). “This Court will not disturb the chancellor’s opinion when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. at 819 (¶ 53); accord Retzer v. Retzer, 578 So.2d 608, 609 (Miss.1990) (<HOLDING>). However, chancellor’s conclusions on pure 
 Holding statements: (A) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous (B) holding that a chancellors finding of fact will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court abuses or exceeds its discretion when 1 its decision rests on an error of law such as application of the wrong legal principle or a clearly erroneous factual finding or 2 its decision  though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding  cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions (D) holding that decisions that lie within the trial courts discretion are to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous (E) holding that the lower court is the factfinding body and that its findings of fact will not be set aside on appellate review unless they are clearly erroneous
Output: (B)
the purpose of NRS 176.055, the statute governing the application of credit for presentence confinement, is ‘ ‘to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendant’s ultimate sentence.” The overwhelming majority of states adhere to the following generally accepted principle when apportioning credit for time served in presentence confinement, as stated by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Tauiliili: [Wjhen concurrent sentences are imposed, presentence credit is applied once. The credit applied once, in effect, is applied against each concurrent sentence. This is done because the longest term of the concurrent sentences determines the total length of the imprisonment. Our holding in Kuykendall coincides with the reasoning in Tauiliili, and we conc P.2d 34, 37 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Nieto v. State, 119 Nev. 229, 231-32, 70 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute (B) holding that the purpose of the credit statute is to provide credit for confinement    where 1 bail has been set for the defendant and 2 the defendant was financially unable to post the bail (C) holding under excessive bail provision of article i section 16 of oregon constitution criminal defendant bears burden of establishing at hearing that amount of bail imposed is excessive (D) recognizing statutory credit (E) holding that the court correctly denied a mistrial when the statement that the witness saw the defendant when the defendant was signing in as a condition of bail was brief and added nothing to the governments case
Output: (B)
from the statute’s coverage unincorporated entities that also have the capacity to accumulate wealth “does not undermine its justification for regulating corporations.” Ibid. Moreover, labor unions differ from corporations in that union members who disagree with a union’s political activities need not give up full membership in the organization to avoid supporting its political activities. Although a union and an employer may require that all bargaining unit employees become union members, a union may not compel those employees to support financially “union activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.” Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735, 745 (1988). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977) (<HOLDING>). An employee who objects to a union’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that compelling nonmember employees to contribute to unions political activities infringes employees first amendment rights (B) recognizing that the first amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power (C) holding that probation department employees are not county employees (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of lobbying and other political activities not protected by first amendment (E) holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force
Output: (A)
government. He also contends that, in case of controversy, it is to be expected that speakers and spectators on both sides of an issue will appear and participate. He states that “applause for favored speakers and hoots for the opponents, perhaps even a few angry words, are all considered” de rigueur. Finally, he asserts that the line drawn by the Federal and State Constitutions is at violence and the real threat of violence, not comfort or subjective alarm. Mr. Berrill concludes that because he was not violent and did not threaten violence, his conduct should be protected. In further support of the argument that his right to petition was violated, appellant relies on Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981), overruled, by Harris v. Adkins, 189 W.Va. 465, 432 S.E.2d 549 (1993) (<HOLDING>), and the Noerr-Pen-nington doctrine, which was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to petition does not provide an absolute privilege for intentional and reckless falsehoods (B) holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege (C) holding that absolute privilege applies to proposed but unfiled complaint (D) recognizing privilege (E) recognizing an absolute privilege for police records in a habeas corpus action
Output: (A)
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5653(PAC), 2011 WL 3874821 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011) ("NJ v. DLJ"); NJ Carpenters, 272 F.R.D. 160 (finding Rule 23(a) requirements were met, but not Rule 23(b)(3) requirements). 59 . DI 294, at 30-33. 60 . Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (stating Section 12(a)(2) standing is limited to “persons who have directly purchased the securities from underwriting defendants in the subject public offering(s), and not in the secondary market”); In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., Sec. Litig., 222 F.Supp.2d 216, 244 (E.D.N.Y.2002) ("[P]urchasers in private or secondary market offerings are precluded from bringing actions under Section 12(a)(2).”). 61 . DI 294, at 30; DI 300, at 17. 62 . See IndyMac I, 718 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>). 63 . This of course means that it does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waived the claims she failed to pursue in her merit brief (B) holding that because  544b1 provides only the power of avoidance it does not confer authority on the trustee to pursue state law damage claims but that the trustee could pursue such claims under  544a1 or 2 if the claims could have been asserted by the debtor corporation (C) holding pinter analysis to apply to claims arising under  12a2 (D) holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors (E) holding wyoming only had standing to pursue section 12a2 claims as to indx 2006ar11
Output: (E)
Mont. 200, 936 P.2d 814, 818-20 (1997) (allowing discovery of injuries caused by similar products and discovery about various product models as relevant to whether the design was unreasonably dangerous and whether the defendant was aware of the danger and a viable alternative design); Calo v. Ahearn, 135 A.D.2d 458, 522 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (1987) (“Although the vehicle type of the automobile involved in the accident was the subject of the recall campaign, it is undisputed that the Ahearn vehicle was not among those listed in the recall. However, it was within the legitimate scope of discovery to attempt to determine if the recall campaign erroneously omitted vehicles with the same or similar steering defects.”); Culligan v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 110 F.R.D. 122, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (<HOLDING>). We are especially disinclined to second-guess 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of subsequent measures was admissible to show the feasibility of a design change (B) holding that information about postmanufacture testing was relevant and discoverable in atv rollover case even though it dealt with models other than the atv model at issue in order to show feasibility of alternative designs (C) holding that claim preclusion did not apply even though the legal theory at issue in that case was addressed in a previous case because the case at issue was based on a different set of operative facts (D) holding prior drug convictions relevant to show that defendant had knowledge and intent necessary to possess drugs at issue in case (E) holding prior conclusion properly considered dicta rather than alternative holding because prior ra tionale could not be considered as alternative holding because it could not support the judgment in the case
Output: (B)
that Zhang’s motion to reopen was both based on the country conditions evidence in the record, including the State Department’s 2008 Religious Freedom Report for China. See U.S. Department of State 2008 Religious Freedom Report for China; see also 2007 Annual Report of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Although it did not discuss that evidence in detail, it was not required to do so. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (presuming that the agency has taken into account all evidence presented, unless the record “compellingly suggests otherwise”). This is particularly so because the evidence Zhang submitted was the same the agency is asked to consider “time and again.” See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by giving summary consideration to evidence presented in a motion to reopen particularly when dealing with evidence which the bia is asked to repeatedly consider (D) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it (E) holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider when the motion merely repeats arguments that the bia has previously rejected
Output: (C)
notwithstanding its concession to the contrary, the Sandpiper Court and Baltimore Avenue warrants were supported by probable cause. Alternatively, the government contends that the seized evidence is admissible under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). The parties differ, as a threshold matter, over whether we can properly consider the first contention in light of the government’s acknowledgment that it conceded lack of probable cause in the district court. We need not resolve such an issue, however, because we agree with the government’s second contention: that, at the very least, the Leon good faith exception applies. See United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In reaching this conclusion, we utilize a de 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the leon exception applicable where the ad dress on the warrant was different from the address in the affidavit (B) recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest (C) recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest (D) recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule (E) recognizing that a reviewing court may proceed to the good faith exception without first deciding whether the warrant was supported by probable cause citing leon 468 us at 925 104 sct 3405
Output: (E)
at 905. The district court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit because the petition “challenged a final order of removal.” Id. at 906. The Court of Appeals consolidated the habeas petition with a preexisting petition for review and agreed with the district court, concluding that “Haider’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus does nothing more than attack the IJ’s removal order.” Id. at 910. After recounting the holding in Haider, the Nnadika Court expressed its approval by explaining that “only challenges that directly implicate the order of removal, such as the challenge to the notice of the removal hearing in Haider, are properly the subject of transfer under the REAL ID Act.” 484 F.3d at 632; see also Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). While this Court has not previously addressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (B) holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final (C) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding that the farr act is expressly limited to claims arising out of a final order of removal and does not confer any legal rights outside of the removal setting (E) holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal
Output: (B)
... clearly does not rise to the level of constitutional error when the failure was correct as a matter of state law.” 593 F.2d at 267. He noted also that “the highest court of Kentucky expressly held that the state trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser included offense instruction.” I do not find any error in this conclusion. Shortly after this court decided Pilón, however, the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds an Alabama law which forbade the jury to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense in a capital case when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). See also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Beck was concerned with imposition of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (B) holding that beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction as a matter of due process in a capital case (C) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (D) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (E) holding that a lesser included offense instruction might be constitutionally required in capital cases because of their unique nature
Output: (B)
facts, testimony regarding those facts must be tested through confrontation. If the government thinks it necessary to prove nonstatutory aggravating factors, then it should be required to do so with the Confrontation Clause in tact. C. The Sixth Amendment’s Text Because Williams is inapplicable and no Supreme Court opinion is directly controlling, I turn to the Constitution’s text. The Confrontation Clause applies in “all criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “If ‘plain meaning’ is the criterion, this is an easy ease. Surely no one would contend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a ‘criminal prosecution.’ ” Wise, 976 F.2d at 407 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Robertson v. United States, 417 F.2d 440, 447 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). This reading of the Sixth Amendment’s text 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the confrontation clause did not apply to proceedings before a draft board because such proceedings are not stages in a criminal prosecution (B) holding that lyness does not apply to residency proceedings before school board (C) holding that the right to counsel applies in all critical stages of state and federal criminal proceedings (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings
Output: (A)
removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director’s term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, “the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....” Drexler, supra, § 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (“At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.”); see also Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). “Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary
Output: (B)
agreements and do not own their software outright under Regime 1. 19 . Though this court reviews orders imposing Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law_" Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 964 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). 20 . The Court extended this reasoning in Business Guides to apply the certification requirement of Rule 11 to represented parties who sign court papers, even where they are not required to do so. 498 U.S. at 543, 546-47, 111 S.Ct. at 930-31. 21 . Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 965; see also Pony Express Courier Corp. of Am. v. Pony Express Delivery Serv., 872 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Southeastern’s argument that Lederman and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction (B) holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability (C) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents
Output: (E)
to correct error are proper only after the entry of final judgment; any such motion filed pri- or to the entry of final judgment must be viewed as a motion to reconsider. See Citizens Indus. Group v. Heartland Gas Pipeline, LLC, 856 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind. Ct.App.2006) (explaining that “a party can only file a motion to reconsider with the court if the action remains in fieri ” and “[i]f the trial court has issued a final judgment, the party must file a motion to correct errors rather than a motion to reconsider”), trans. denied; Stephens v. Irvin, 730 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (treating a motion labeled a “Motion to Correct Error” filed before the entry of final judgment as a motion to reconsider), trans. denied; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). This distinction is important because unlike 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to reconsider a section 2255 ruling is available and that it is to be treated asa rule 59e motion if filed within 10 days of entry of the challenged order (B) holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider (C) holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted (D) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (E) holding that a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error
Output: (E)
This Court has recognized that “courts will not hold conduct to constitute a nuisance where authority therefor exists by virtue of legislative enactment.” Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 436 F.Supp. 151, 154 (E.D.Tenn.1977); accord N.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309-10 (4th Cir.2010) (operation of TVA power plants under permits required by Congress and the EPA cannot be deemed a public nuisance). Here, the TVA Act authorizes TVA to acquire and construct transmission lines and distribute electric power, and affords TVA those powers that may be necessary or appropriate to exercise that right. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 831c(g)-(j), 831d(i); see also 16 U.S.C. § 831k, 831x. Thus, the conduct complained of in the complaint cannot constitute a public nuisance. Accord id. (<HOLDING>); Morris v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 345 F.Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is the legislative authority of the union that must  make an act a crime (B) holding ordinary and necessary concomitants to operating railroad terminal authorized by specific grant of legislative franchise not nuisance (C) holding that to negate coverage under an exclusion insurer must show that its construction is the only construction that could fairly be placed thereon (D) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only (E) holding that the construction of a hydroelectric generating facility could not constitute a nuisance because it was being constructed under legislative authority
Output: (E)
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled “An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions” (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill’s sponsors also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
Output: (E)
plea for law enforcement. Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Sanders v. State, 787 S.W.2d 435, 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd). The State’s comments did not go outside the record, nor was it an improper plea for law enforcement. The appellant had been convicted of violently stabbing his father six times in the chest. The appellant’s sister Cheryl testified to threats the appellant had made to her before the murder, and on several occasions he lunged toward her in anger, making her believe he would hit her. Asking the jury what the appellant might do next if he was not sent to prison for a considerable time was not outside the bounds of permissible jury argument. See Murray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 47, 55 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). We overrule point of error four. We affirm 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea (B) holding that under the circumstances of that case an argument made for the first time in a motion for rehearing was waived (C) holding that the good faith requirement of the whistleblower statute was not met where the purpose of the employee at the time of the making of reports was not to protect the public but to protect the jobs of himself and his coworkers (D) holding the states argument that the best way to protect the community was to give the defendant substantial time in prison was a proper plea for law enforcement (E) holding states argument was proper deduction from evidence
Output: (D)
before the IJ took place in 1993 and 1994. While the 2011 decision found that what “[t]he evidence indicates” is insufficient to meet the burden of showing changed circumstances, it is unclear whether the BIA considered all of the evidence before it or only that evidence which it viewed as timely submitted under the incorrect legal standard. In light of the foregoing, we are unable to determine whether the BIA abused its discretion. See Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.2011) (reviewing the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion). The BIA’s decisions must allow us to “ ‘discern its reasons for declining to afford relief.’ ” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006)). Compare id. at 268-71 (<HOLDING>), ivith Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148-50 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bias analysis insufficient to support its decisions (B) holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict (C) holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca (D) holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract (E) holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions
Output: (A)
were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, ■ expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the “[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico (E) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico
Output: (C)
and verse in the Bible where the Lord’s Prayer appears; how many chapters are in the Bible; the content of Psalm 23) constituted "an impermissible governmental inquiry into religious dogma and practice.” Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 727-29 (9th Cir.1997) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 4 . The Government argues that Golkar should have corroborated his account of his conversion, but absent a legitimate reason to doubt Golkar’s "direct and specific” testimony about his conversion, corroborating evidence is not required. Kaur, 379 F.3d at 889-90. RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my view, we are not compelled to find that the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility determination was erroneous. See Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). If even one of the bases supporting the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies (B) holding that where the ij finds the petitioner to be credible his testimony must be accepted (C) holding that contrary determination must be compelled to reverse the ij (D) holding that the ij must make clean determinations of credibility (E) holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice
Output: (C)
omitted). The rationale for the exception is that there are certain matters for which Congress so strongly intended [for there to be] an exclusive federal cause of action that what a plaintiff calls a state-law claim is to be recharacterized as a federal claim. Id. at 45. The United States Supreme Court has described complete preemption as a “narrow exception” to the general rule that an anticipated federal defense cannot support removal to federal court. Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 5, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). The Court finds that the instant action does not satisfy the second criteria for complete preemption because the FDCA expressly states that it does not provide a private federal cause of action. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a); see, e.g., Fayard, 533 F.3d at 48 (<HOLDING>); Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was not complete preemption because the applicable federal statute did not provide a private right of action to redress the same kind of injury alleged in the plaintiffs statelaw claims (B) recognizing private right of action (C) holding that there was no federal question removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule (D) holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court (E) holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive
Output: (A)
is inconsistent with asserting a defense of property. Section 9.41 of the Penal Code allows [a] person unlawfully dispossessed of ... tangible, moveable property by another [to use] force against the other when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to ... recover the property if the actor uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession and ... reasonably believes the other had no claim of light when he dispossessed the actor[.] Tex. Penal Code § 9.41(b)(1). Defense of property, therefore, involves an intentional use of force to recover one’s property, whereas counsel’s argument that appellant accidentally pushed his girlfriend centers on a lack of intent. See Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 133-34 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Appellant has not established that his trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one (B) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (C) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (D) holding trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request instruction on self defense when his strategy was to argue the complainant was accidentally injured (E) holding that counsels failure to object or request a limiting instruction for evidence of defendants incarceration was sound trial strategy
Output: (D)
in prison as a condition of his probation; however, the written sentence re n in Florida State Prison as a condition of probation. As a result, the sentence is illegal and should be corrected. Although the written sentence imposed on count three is a nullity because it differs from the oral pronouncement, we also note the following. Possession of al-prazolam is a third-degree felony. The maximum permissible sentence for a third-degree felony is five years. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). The written sentence imposed two years in prison followed by five years’ probation resulting in a total sentence of seven years. Because the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for a third-degree felony, it is an illegal sentence. See Netkerly v. State, 804 So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 584 So.2d 154, 154 (Fla. 2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences need only be below the statutory maximum (B) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (C) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (D) holding that santoss concern regarding the evisceration of congresss choice of a low statutory maximum penalty for an underlying offense did not apply where the underlying offenses carried maximum sentences of twenty years and the money laundering offense carried a lower maximum sentence of ten years (E) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious
Output: (C)
abuse of a minor, the trial court may apply the statutory presumption that Junior and Saul are at substantial risk of being sexually abused. And if the trial court again finds that Rowan sexually abused Agnes, it can conclude that Junior and Saul are at substantial risk of being sexually abused. v. CONCLUSION We REMAND this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is RETAINED. 1 . We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the parties. 2 . The record does not show that Rowan attempted to obtain the information any other way, such as by scheduling a deposition, before making his motion. 3 . AS 40.25.100-295. AST relied on AS 40.25.120(a)(2), records pertaining to juveniles, and (a)(6), law enforcement records. 4 . 533 P.2d 13, 16 (Alaska 1975) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Rhodes v. Erion, 189 P.3d 1051, 1053 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knew that prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk (B) holding that mere knowledge of a defect is not sufficient to amount to an eighth amendment claim defendant must also draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm exists (C) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (D) holding that fathers sexual abuse of daughter demonstrated serious disregard of parental responsibilities and lack of social and moral values that posed substantial risk of harm to sons (E) holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative
Output: (D)