niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the facts or issues involved in the case or even a preconceived, but not fixed, notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is insufficient cause for dismissal. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1284 (3d Cir.1992). Similarly, the mere fact that someone is a member of a certain occupation or organization is not sufficient cause for dismissal, absent a particularized showing of bias. U.S. v. Todman, 117 Fed.Appx. 824, 826 (3d Cir.2004) (non-precedential opinion holding juror’s employment as a legal assistant for an organization representing indigent people was not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for finding implied bias); United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1226 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire (B) holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice (C) holding that the legislature intended the trial court to be more involved in the voir dire procedure in capital felony cases (D) holding that due process clause entitled deathpenaltyeligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime (E) holding that trial court erred in wholesale removal of all members of the national rifle association without individual voir dire questioning
Output: (E)
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances”). Additionally, a party may authenticate an exhibit by any means listed in Federal Rules of Evidence 901(b) and 902. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b) (providing ten approaches to authentication such as voice identification, public records, data compilations, and nonexpert opinions on handwriting); Fed.R.Evid. 902 (self-authenticating evidence such as public documents under seal, certified copies of public records, newspapers, and acknowledged documents). While evidence must be authenticated before the court considers it, it does not have to be authenticated with the motion for which it is being used. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550-51 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Prime’s counsel’s affidavit asserting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission of a statement obtained in violation of miranda v arizona 384 us 436 86 sct 1602 16 led2d 694 1966 resulted in harmless error because the defendant repeated the substance of the statement in a later admissible statement (B) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (C) holding that the district courts improper admission of an unauthenticated registration statement was harmless because the proponent of the registration statement later properly authenticated the statement in a motion to reconsider (D) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent (E) holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial
Output: (C)
of acquittal on the charge of failure to maintain financial responsibility and entering judgment on the jury’s verdict because violation of section 303.025 does not constitute a criminal offense in that the applicable statutes do not provide criminal penalties for violation of section 303.025. The record reveals that defendant failed to raise this issue before, during, or after trial. No reference to this issue appears in his motion for new trial. Although we may review for plain error under Rule 30.20 if manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted from a ruling affecting substantial rights, we decline to do so here because we do not find defendant’s argument to have merit. See sections 303.025 and 303.370.5; cf. State v. Mayo, 915 S.W.2d 758, 762-63 (Mo.banc 1996) (<HOLDING>). Point denied. Judgment affirmed. KATHIANNE 
 Holding statements: (A) holding revocation of appellants medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding (B) holding that suspension of a drivers license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendants constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties (C) holding that age disclosed on a drivers license constituted an admission where the party swore to the truth of the statements made in the license application (D) holding that the suspension or revocation of a drivers license is not a sanction which once imposed precludes the application of criminal sanctions (E) holding that a sanction which constitutes the revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element
Output: (D)
(“In this instance, Cook’s filing of the petition 39 days after the Quitman County Democratic Executive Committee conducted the hearing on September 4, 2003 was not “forthwith” as required by the statute”) (emphasis added). ¶22. In Pearson, this Court deemed “forthwith” a petition filed thirteen days, nine working days, after the committee decision. 541 So.2d at 450. The committee never reached a decision in this case. Parker filed his petition for judicial review on June 22, 2005, fifteen days, eleven working days, after the last committee meeting on June 7, 2005, in which the contest was scheduled to be addressed. Filing within eleven working days is not a significant departure from the nine working days this Court found to be “forthwith” in Pearson. But see Turner, 193 So. at at 632 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the “forthwith” requirement is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of a petition twentysix days after the final executive committee action was stretching forthwith too far (B) holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing (C) holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk (D) holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional (E) holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits
Output: (A)
fundraising service. Id. at 1110-11. The footage of the plaintiff constituted only six seconds of the entire eight minute video. Id. While the court noted the duration of the use was relatively short in relation to the rest of the publication, the court found that the use was “crucial” to the defendant’s advertisement because without it, the video would not have been as attractive to the target audience and because the plaintiffs hole-in-one was not fungible to that of any ot ur-second facial appearance of unidentified and unnamed plaintiff in a street scene, shot from a moving vehicle in low light, during the opening credits of a movie was incidental use because it contributed nothing to the movie’s storyline); Ladany v. William Morrow & Co., 465 F.Supp. 870, 881 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (<HOLDING>). In this case, under the circumstances in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the premise underlying the action was that plaintiff was deceived by the words and actions of an employer the subject of the deception was pension benefits but that was only incidental and not essential to the cause of action (B) holding that incidental use doctrine applied when plaintiff was one of 101 characters in a book discussing in detail the olympic massacre in munich and the book referred to plaintiff only when discussing one out of the many aspects of the tragedy (C) holding the doctrine applied in a case of mistake (D) holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk (E) holding that the ada plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of job when the plaintiffs psychotherapist had told the employer that the plaintiff was unable to work in any position when the plaintiff did not disagree with that point and when the plaintiff in response to a request for admission conceded that she was no longer able to work
Output: (B)
the majority’s opinion that court costs are likewise not awardable. Utah Code' Ann. § 13 — 7—4(d) (1992) states: Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprises regulated by the state charged with maintaining a public nuisance in violation of this act, which is determined or found not to be in violation of this act, may be awarded all actual and necessary expenses incurred in defending such action, as determined and approved by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. Thus, under the plain language of this section, the decision to award expenses rests with the discretion of the trial court. Expenses related to defending a cause of action clearly include court costs. See, e.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1098 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, International 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (B) holding that deposition expenses are an allowable cost (C) holding that personal grooming expenses are not deductible (D) holding that deposition expenses are not an allowable cost (E) holding that expenses includes costs
Output: (E)
terms, “pending” refers to the status of an action before a final decision on the merits. Beetham v. Georgia-Pacific, 87 Or App 592, 743 P2d 755 (1987); see also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1669 (unabridged ed 1993) (pending means “not yet decided”). Although that meaning is useful in determining whether an action remains pending, it does not fully resolve the problem before us, which is to determine when an action becomes pending. The solution to that problem, however, is readily apparent from relevant contextual sources. ORCP 3 provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint rather than by service of summons. An action becomes pending when it is commenced. See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Corbett, 66 Or App 668, 672, 675 P2d 1097, rev den 297 Or 340 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, after a complaint is filed, an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that under orcp 3 lis pendens attaches upon the filing of a complaint because the action is pending (D) holding that action of filing a complaint and notice of lis pendens based on a contract without simultaneously requesting a stay and an order compelling arbitration waives that partys contractual right to arbitrate (E) holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing
Output: (C)
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). To determine whether Kaplan is a “qualified individual” we must resolve two issues: (1) whether Kaplan was able to perform the essential functions of the peace officer position at the time of his termination without an accommodation, and (2) whether Kaplan was entitled to reasonable accommodation to help him perform the essential job functions of a peace officer. A. We first address whether Kaplan could perform the essential job functions of a deputy marshal without accommodation at the time of his termination. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that he could not. As a part of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements plaintiff made to obtain disability insurance were binding admissions that he could not perform the essential functions of his job (B) holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination (C) holding that ada may obligate employer to reassign disabled employee who can no longer even with reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of her job (D) holding that employee who frequently missed work was not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a reasonable accommodation as required to support disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the rehabilitation act (E) holding that a must be cured or 100 healed policy is a per se violation of the ada because the policy does not allow a casebycase assessment of an individuals ability to perform essential functions of the individuals job with or without accommodation
Output: (B)
55(c) motion on or before August 22, 2012, the 90th day after it was filed, that motion was denied by operation of law on that date, which denial terminated the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Lenoir, 5 So.3d 1282, 1283 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“The trial court loses jurisdiction to consider [a postjudgment] motion after the expiration of the 90-day period.”). Because its jurisdiction terminated on August 22, 2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16, 2012, order purporting to set aside the default judgment against Thurmond; the March 16, 2013, order purporting to deny Thurmond’s summary-judgment motion; and the April 16, 2013, order purporting to enter a summary judgment in favor of Parrish. See Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So.3d 191, 193 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). A judgment entered by a trial court lacking 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void (B) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (C) holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction (D) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (E) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief
Output: (D)
rule may be outdated, we have also recognized that “it is uniquely a province of the legislature to change it.” Reiter v. Yellowstone County (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 845, 849, 38 St.Rep. 686, 690. In Reiter, we noted that because of the operation of section 39-2-503, MCA, the at-will employee was not employed on a “discharge for cause only” basis. We stated, “assuming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad faith because its conduct was statutorily permissible.” 627 P.2d at 849-850, 38 St.Rep. at 690. In other words, under section 39-2-503, MCA, an employer or employee could terminate employment for any or all reasons, provided the reasons or manner of termination did not 7), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (<HOLDING>); and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974), 114 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions (B) holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions (C) recognizing contract action and limiting damages to those for breach of contract when employee terminated for refusal to date foreman (D) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (E) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act
Output: (A)
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (quotation omitted). In this case, however, the enforcement of the arbitration agreement would require Morrison to forego her substantive rights to the full panoply of remedies under Title VII and would thereby contravene Congress’s intent to utilize certain damages as a tool for compensating victims of discrimination and for deterring employment discrimination more broadly. The critical question is not whether a claimant may obtain some amount of the entire range of remedies under Title VII, but whether the limitation on remedies at issue undermines the rights protected by the statute. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27, 111 S.Ct. 1647. See also McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 285 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages which was available to the plaintiff under title vii (B) holding that arbitration agreement that did not provide for award of attorney fees to successful title vii claimant was unenforceable because the right to attorneys fees  is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from violations of title vii (C) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (D) holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (E) holding that   19853 may not be invoked to redress violations of title vii
Output: (B)
of any immunity provision found in the Act. Instead, the Fifth District found the existence of a duty under the common-law doctrine of public immunity. Long, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 532 N.E.2d at 921. Long is not only legally distinguishable from Havens and Bainter but also factually distinguishable. Unlike the situations in Havens and Bainter, the trees in Long were so overgrown they were physically encroaching the street. In fact, the plaintiff in Long testified that the brush physically struck the side of her car and tore her blouse. Clearly, courts have held that public entities can be held liable for injuries incurred as a result of objects being located on a public road. See O’Connell v. Chicago & North Western R.R. Co., 305 Ill. App. 430, 442, 27 N.E.2d 644, 650 (1940) (<HOLDING>). The duty to remove known encroachments 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning (B) holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city (E) holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight
Output: (A)
1 . Section 42.15(b)(3) (2006) defined “vending” as "[t]o sell, offer for sale, expose for sale, solicit offers to purchase, or ... to require someone to pay a fee or to set, negotiate, or establish a fee before providing goods or services. Requests for donations in exchange for food, goods, merchandise or services also constitute vending.” 2 . While s 4-55 (9th Cir.2004) (invalidating a statute requiring physicians to treat patients "with consid eration, respect, and full recognition of the patient’s dignity and individuality” as void for vagueness because it "subjected physicians to sanctions based not on their own objective behavior, but on the subjective viewpoint of others”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Given this conclusion, we decline to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (B) holding postrelease condition prohibiting the possession of sexually explicit materials to be unconstitutionally vague (C) holding that statements that merely convey an impression or understanding of a fact do not constitute a promise (D) holding that defendants relatively minor participation in the crime is a mitigating factor that sentencer must consider (E) holding a provision that criminalized sexually explicit images that appear to be a minor or convey the impression that a minor is depicted unconstitutionally vague because it was unclear whose perspective defines the appearance of a minor or whose impression that a minor is involved leads to criminal prosecution
Output: (E)
of the Licenses; revocation is made explicit in a filing before the bankruptcy court (which filing is not itself an order) and is implicit in the Public Notice announcing the re-auction of the Licenses previously held by NextWave. Nevertheless, as this Court's prior opinion makes clear, we think that the FCC action in question is unmistakably regulatory in nature. But even if the FCC’s acts do not amount to "decisions” or "orders” of the Commission, subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, that would not expose the FCC's acts to review in the bankruptcy court. A regulatory action short of a decision or order is an exercise of regulatory discretion that is not subject to review. See Bethesda-Chevy Chase Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 967, 968 (D.C.Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Telecommunications Research & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding allegation made in enforcement suit does not impose the kind of legal obligation with which the finality doctrine is concerned (B) holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy (C) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (D) holding that a regulatory action that did not impose an obligation deny a right or fix a legal relationship was not reviewable (E) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right
Output: (D)
Appraiser to correct the assessment of their property. We agree with the trial court that the fundamental nature of the appellant’s lawsuit is a challenge of an assessment and, thus, it is governed by the sixty day non-claim statute. See § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). As the court explained in Department of Revenue v. Stafford, 646 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), regardless of how the complaint is couched, when a taxpayer is challenging the assessment on grounds that it was “unjust, capricious, arbitrary and illegal,” the action is cognizable only under the strictures of section 194.171, which allows a suit to be filed only within 60 days from the date the assessment roll is certified for collection. See also Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814 (Fla.1988)(<HOLDING>); State, Dept. of Revenue v. Gerald Sohn, P.A., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the 60day claim period applicable to a constitutional challenge of an assessment and of the statute authorizing the assessment (B) holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied (C) holding that a notification letter dated 10 days before the expiration of the 60day period was timely  and ignoring the date of receipt (D) holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day (E) holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
Output: (A)
at DFW International Airport, where hundreds of people work. This construction is inconsistent with the stated purposes of the TCHRA, as well as with the legislature’s prior actions that broadened the reach of the TCHRA by broadly defining “state agency.” Our statutory construction analysis compels the conclusion that the legislature intended to include organizations like the DFW Board within the scope of the term “state instrumentality.” Other courts, including this court in Tarrant County Hospital District v. Henry, have likewise held that an entity created pursuant to Texas statutory authority, and whose purpose includes the performance of public and governmental functions are a state instrumentality. See, e.g., 52 S.W.3d 434, 445-48 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Purdin, 143 S.W.3d at 301 (holding economic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an entity majorityowned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is itself an agency or instrumentality of that foreign state under the fsia (B) holding economic development corporation to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under the tchra and explaining that the employment discrimination prohibitions in chapter 21 are to be generally applied (C) holding hospital district to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under tchra (D) holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act (E) holding school district  in claim made pri or to amendment defining state agency to be state instrumentality subject to claims made under tchra
Output: (C)
is in Arteria H.’s best interest. Instead, Father asserts that his parental rights should not be terminated because DCS did not make reasonable efforts to place Arteria H. with a relative and because of ineffective assistance of counsel in the Juvenile Court proceeding. After reviewing his brief, it is clear to this Court that all of Father’s allegations of error involve the alleged lack of reasonable efforts on the part of DCS or errors which occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding. However, the two grounds upon which Father’s parental rights were terminated, do not require reasonable efforts on the part of DCS or require a previous finding of dependency and neglect. See e.g., In re C.A.H., No. M2009-00769-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 5064953, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 22, 2009)(<HOLDING>); In re G.L.T., No. M2008-00582-COA-R3-PT, 2008 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing majoritys failure to address impact of mothers incarceration upon circuit courts decision to terminate her parental rights (B) holding that dcs did not have to provide reasonable efforts when petitioning to terminate parental rights based upon the ground of abandonment (C) holding in a termination of parental rights case that as a question of law the trial courts ruling that the facts of this case sufficiently support the termination ground of willful abandonment are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness (D) recognizing the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in his or her child and concluding that the state must provide a parent with fundamentally fair procedures including a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when seeking to terminate parental rights (E) holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death
Output: (B)
for it address a matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Tang, 163 F.3d at 12. In Coyne v. City of Somerville, the court examined prior media coverage as one factor in the overall context in which the speech was made to help determine whether the speaker’s interest was merely personal. Coyne, 770 F.Supp. at 752. The court did not announce a rule that testimony regarding matters which have received extensive press coverage fall outside the realm of public concern. See id. It can hardly be argued that media coverage of the Kelleher incident transform lear that speech like Putnam’s report and testimony relating to the possible corruption of public officials addresses a matter of public concern. Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Guilloty Perez v. Pierluisi, 339 F.3d 43, 53 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law enforcement agents speech which raised the possibility of corruption in a public agency is protected under the first amendment (B) recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment (C) holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation (D) holding that first amendment principles preclude recovery under state law for damages caused by speech or other protected conduct (E) holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern
Output: (A)
privilege objections and to produce certain documents that are protected by these privileges. There is no adequate remedy by appeal for this error. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992). Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion by compelling Fairway to produce documents that are not within its possession, custody, or control. We therefore conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus as follows. We direct the trial court to: (1) to vacate his Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel signed on October 12, 2016, and (2) issue a new Order that only requires Celanese to produce the documents bookmarked as Nos. 7, 11, 13, 19, 22, 22.1, 41, 69, 107, 116, and 124 V, 2014 WL 3745447, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 30, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); In re Weeks Marine, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 389, 391 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion (B) holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion (C) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering temporary alimony that exceeded the husbands ability to pay (D) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (E) holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering production of investigative report prepared by hospital after a slip and fall incident because such report is protected work product
Output: (E)
In deciding whether to adopt a rule of [market share] liability, courts have considered the following factors: (1) the generic nature of the product; (2) the long latency period of the harm; (3) the inability of plaintiffs to discover which defendant’s product caused plaintiff's harm, even after exhaustive discovery; (4) the clarity of the causal connection between the defective product and harm suffered by plaintiffs; (5) the absence of other medical or environmental factors that could have caused or materially contributed to the harm; and (6) the availability of sufficient 'market share’ data to support a reasonable apportionment of liability. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 15 cmt. c (1998). 41 .See In re "Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.Supp. at 819-20 (<HOLDING>). See also Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512-13, 541 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (B) holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain (C) holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage (D) holding that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if but only if said plaintiff 1 is closely related to the injury victim 2 is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and 3 as a result suffers serious emotional distress (E) holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim
Output: (C)
of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” Id.; accord Snow v. State, 697 S.W.2d 663, 666-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), pet. dism’d, 794 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). A “single egregious error” may constitute ineffective assistance. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Frequently, it has. Texas Cases Reversing Without Evidence of Trial Strategy In at least 22 cases decided after the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Jackson v. State, Texas courts have reversed even though no evidence of trial counsel’s reasoning was presented. See Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833, 835-38 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. filed); Mares v. State, 52 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd); Jaubert v. State, 65 S.W.3d 73 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. granted) (designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Robison v. State, 35 S.W.3d 257, 265 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) recognizing a limited exception to the eightcorners rule for a pure coverage question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying thirdparty claim and the extrinsic evidence goes strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the thirdparty claimants pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim (C) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court (D) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (E) recognizing the rule in robinson and reviewing the merits of ineffectiveness claim without evidence of trial counsels strategy
Output: (E)
a home was not raised below, it nevertheless decides the issue. Because I disagree with the majority’s disposition, I dissent from the conclusion that police are not required to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity in a home before seeking a consent search. Similar to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. “A warr 866 (2005) (finding legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records under State Constitution in contrast to Federal Constitution); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 215, 642 A.2d 947 (1994) (invalidating warrantless vehicular search based on arrest for motor vehicle offense); State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 166-70, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 195-215, 576 
 Holding statements: (A) holding new jersey constitution prohibits search of auto incident to arrest where occupant removed from vehicle and secured elsewhere (B) holding that in contrast with fourth amendment new jersey constitution prohibits police from stopping defendant solely because of flight upon seeing police (C) holding new jersey law prohibits appropriation of a celebritys nickname (D) recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey (E) holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest
Output: (B)
notes, records, omitting nothing.” Doc. 8, Attachments 1^4, 7 (emphasis added). Such subpoenas could lead to the production of medical information, social security numbers, payroll information, income tax information, information about family members, and other documents completely extraneous to this litigation, and the Court finds it difficult to conceive of subpoenas which could be more expansively written than these. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (noting, where the subpoenas at issue requested “any and all personnel documents pertaining to the named plaintiff,” that “it [was] difficult to conceive of subpoenas which could be more expansively written than those at issue”); see also Cook, 2012 WL 3634451, at *6 (“While the Appellants assert that these materi 647, at *4 (<HOLDING>); see also Lewin v. Nackard Bottling Co., No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subpoenas seeking the complete employment file of plaintiff including employment application payroll records medical records evaluations correspondence and all other records omitting nothing  were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone (B) holding that subpoenas seeking any and all documents files and records reflecting or relating to the employment of each plaintiff were overly broad on their face (C) holding that a restriction on any unrelated adult was overly broad and unsupported by the evidence (D) recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents (E) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records
Output: (B)
when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application. (Citations omitted.) The Sixth Circuit also follows the “functional approach” in deciding whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. For example, in Cady v. Arenac County, 574 F.3d 334 (6th Cir.2009), plaintiff alleged that a county prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by conditioning a plea on plaintiffs agreement not to bring a civil action against the people who plaintiff was charged with assaulting. While the condition was questionable, and perhaps a First Amendment violation, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint on grounds of absolute immunity: “[Pjrosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct ... insofar as that conduct is intimatel 86) (<HOLDING>); Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prosecutors alleged use of perjured testimony the nondisclosure of exculpatory information  conflict of interest problems and  spy allegations are all related to the acts of an advocate and thus come within the area of prosecutorial immunity (B) holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion (C) holding that absolute immunity applies to claims of perjured testimony (D) holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity (E) holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information
Output: (A)
person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a first offense or second offense may have the sentence suspended and probation granted, and is eligible for parole, supervised furlough, community supervision, work release, work credits, education credits, and good conduct credits.” 2010 Act No. 273, § 38 (emphases added). Similar language was added to subsection (A) of section 44-53-375 and various provisions in section 44-53-370 covering controlled substances. The legislature’s use of the phrase “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” in the amendments to sections 44-53-375 and -370 expresses its intent to repeal section 24-13-100 to the extent it conflicts with amended sections 44-53-375 and -370. See Stone v. State, 313 S.C. 533, 535, 443 S.E.2d 544, 545 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hair v. State, 305 S.C. 77, 79, 406 S.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls (B) holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict (C) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter (D) holding that an earlier specific statute trumps a later more general one (E) holding that when two statutes are in conflict the more recent and specific statute should prevail so as to repeal the earlier general statute
Output: (E)
Henry Dana, Jr., ed., 8th ed. 1866) (distinguishing between a vessel’s “ostensible nationality,” which is indicated by its flag and documents, and its “actual nationality, which depends on the domicile of the owner and other facts”). Under international law, “[a] vessel may be considered as possessing the nationality of a State even though she is unregistered, possesses no documents evidencing that nationality, nor even flies the flag of that State.” N.P. Ready, Ship Registration 3 (3d ed.1998); see also McDorman, supra, at 533 (“Determining vessel nationality ... is not just a question of documentation of the vessel!,] and a vessel literally without a flag, not being a vessel registered in a country, is not necessarily stateless or without nationality.”); Rosero, 42 F.3d at 172-73 (<HOLDING>). Even pirate ships possessing no documents and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant (B) holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could find constructive notice from evidence that the defendants knew of a recurring dangerous condition (C) holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme (D) holding that it was error to instruct the jury that it could find a vessel genuinely stateless based on an unstructured weighing of the totality of the evidence including various indicators of nationality (E) holding that there was no error at all much less plain error in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (D)
delayed investigating her claim. Ms. Williams asserts that Owners should have begun its investigation in 2009 upon being informed of the probability of a UIM claim, not in 2012 when it received her demand for payment. To carry her burden to show that Owners acted unreasonably in violation of industry standards, Ms. Williams relies on excerpts from the deposition of her expert witness, Bradley Levin. Mr. Levin testified that Owners’ request for additional documentation to support the wage loss claim was not unreasonable, but Owners should have requested additional information from Ms. Williams about her wage loss claim in January, 2012. He did not say Owners should have made the request in 2009. See Sanderson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 251 P.3d 1213, 1220 (Colo.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Levin did not testify that his opinion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs uim claims did not accrue until his lawsuit against the underinsured driver was resolved where insurance policy provided for uim coverage only after liability policies had been exhausted (B) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy (C) holding that because plaintiff released the tortfeasor plaintiff may not assert a claim against the uim carrier because of the derivative nature of the uim carriers liability (D) holding that prospective buyer of used car could not recover under dealers uim endorsement because uim insurance is not for protection of vehicles but of persons (E) holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement
Output: (A)
he or she was not legally entitled.” The term INSURED is defined in the Policy as the NAMED INSURED, and NAMED INSURED is further defined as “the person or entity listed in the Declarations.” The entity listed in the declarations section of this policy is “Brown & LaCounte, L.L.P.” Thus, the most natural and reasonable interpretation of the personal profit exclusion is that the entity of Brown & LaCounte, L.L.P. is included within the meaning of “any INSURED.” Additionally, other courts interpreting similar insurance policies, albeit without the “he or she” language, have held that the phrase “personal profit” in a policy exclusion should not be read as limiting the exclusion to only natural persons. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Auto Europe, L.L.C., 2002 WL 314380 *4 (N.D.Ill.2002) (<HOLDING>). See also Plainview Milk Products Coop. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exclusion inapplicable because under the facts alleged in the underlying suit the insured could receive personal profits and be legally entitled to retain them and distinguishing cases where there was sufficient evidence in the underlying complaint to show the profits received were illegal or undeserved within the meaning of the exclusion (B) holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled (C) holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party (D) holding that an ownedproperty exclusion did not apply with respect to property that the insured bought only after the policy periods for which the insured sought coverage (E) holding that business use exclusion precluded coverage when insured was operating a taxicab whose purpose was to carry passengers for hire even though at the time of the accident insured did not have a passenger
Output: (B)