niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the NFA Bylaw and Interpretive Notice relied upon by the plaintiffs in this case do not indicate that non-parties have the right to seek private judicial remedies to enforce the agreement. Without such language, the plaintiffs cannot claim third-party beneficiary status. See O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 965 F.2d 893, 902 (10th Cir.1992) (concluding that introducing broker could not enforce arbitration agreement between investor and clearing broker); Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, 748 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir.1984) (suggesting that customer did not have third-party beneficiary rights under membership agreement of New York Mercantile Exchange); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 153 Ill.App.3d 108, 106 Ill.Dec. 323, 325, 505 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, as the plaintiffs may not bring 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agreement between chicago mercantile exchange and its members did not impart direct benefit to nonparty clearing member of exchange (B) holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit (C) holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules (D) holding exchange of information unnecessary due to changes in the agencys requirements and passage of time (E) holding that the witness had accepted immunity in exchange for no prosecution
Output: (A)
The trial court refused to consider the information submitted by the Sanderses because it held their materials to have been untimely filed. The Sanderses argue that the submissions were timely because Rule 6(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., states that in the event a due date falls on a legal holiday, the submitting party has until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Although the trial court specified Monday, February 16, 1999, as the due date for the submission of the materials, that day was a legal holiday, George Washington’s Birthday. The Sanderses were therefore entitled to submit their affidavits and supporting materials on the next day that was not a legal holiday. See In re American Healthcare Management, Inc., 900 F.2d 827, 831 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). It is beyond dispute that the filing was made 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included (B) holding that a claim filed after the last date fixed for the filing of claims was not a covered claim and noting that the requirement in the statute that claims be presented before the filing deadline evidences an intent on the part of the legislature to provide a cutoff date after which the association is no longer obligated to accept claims (C) holding that the plain language of rule 6a of the federal rules of civil procedure which authorizes the extension of a deadline where the deadline expires on a saturday sunday or legal holiday is limited to situations where periods of time must be computed and therefore class settlement optout forms that were postmarked on the first business day after the courtordered saturday deadline were not timely filed (D) holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain (E) holding that the bankruptcy court could not extend a deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 20 day extension period allowed by the bankruptcy rules
Output: (D)
the tax laws accordingly. Forseth v. Comm’r, 845 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir.1988). The economic substance doctrine has been consistently applied by the courts for many years in a variety of tax situations. There is no sound reason to conclude that, in enacting the amendments to. section 108(b), Congress meant to abandon the doctrine. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (court looked at economic substance or reality of sale and leaseback transactions); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 81 S.Ct. 132, 5 L.Ed.2d 128 (1960) (interest expense deductions disallowed because only thing of substance to be realized from transaction was tax deduction); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707, 89 L.Ed. 981 (1945) (<HOLDING>). In essence, the appellants would have this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a transaction disregarded for lack of economic substance  a nonvaluationrelated ground  nevertheless may be subject to a valuation misstatement penalty because a transaction that lacks economic substance generally reflects an arrangement in which the basis of the property was misvalued in the context of the transaction and that congress intended to penalize such transactions (B) holding that the economic substance of a transaction rather than its form determines its tax treatment (C) recognizing that a transaction that lacks economic substance generally reflects an arrangement in which the basis of the property was misvalued in the context of the transaction (D) recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step (E) holding that sale of two obscene magazines to one detective in one transaction and sale of two obscene films to another detective in another transaction could result in only one conviction for each separate transaction
Output: (D)
and wove between lanes on several occasions. Morales’s testimony was more than a scintilla of evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Bell failed to maintain a single lane of traffic and was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Bell was driving while intoxicated or that some activity out of the ordinary was occurring, so as to justify the temporary stop of Bell’s vehicle. See id; see also Texas Dept, of Public Safety v. Seidule, 991 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (finding substantial evidence to support finding of reasonable suspicion based on officer’s statement that driver of vehicle failed to maintain a single marked lane); Texas Dept, of Public Safety v. Nordin, 971 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Bell asserts that the decision in Hernandez 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (B) holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane (C) holding an officer could ask for consent to search the trunk of a car where he had reasonable suspicion that the driver had crossed the border illegally and could be transporting illegal aliens (D) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation (E) holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence
Output: (B)
(citing Mercantile Bank v. Hoyle (In re Hoyle), 183 B.R. 635, 638 (Bankr.D.Kan.1995); Bank One Columbus, N.A. v. McDonald (In re McDonald), 177 B.R. 212, 216-17 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1994); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Weiss (In re Weiss), 139 B.R. 928 (Bankr.D.S.D.1992); Household Card Serv./Visa v. Vermillion (In re Vermillion), 136 B.R. 225, 226-27 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1992)). 50 . Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Hernandez (In re Hernandez), 208 A. 62 . Field v. Mans, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 437, 444, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995). See also Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Walters (In re Walters), 208 B.R. 651, 653 (W.D.La.1997). 63 . Id. 64 . Id. (quoting, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 541, Comment a (1976)). 65 . Id. 66 . Id. (quoting, Restatement (Second) of Tort In re Ward), 857 F.2d 1082, 1085 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Walters (In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at a minimum a credit check must be preformed before a credit card is issued in order to have any resulting debt declared nondischargeable (B) holding the assumption of a credit card debt to be nondischargeable based on a waiver of alimony and a significant disparity of income (C) holding that student debt declared nondischargeable remains subject to the automatic stay (D) holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable (E) recognizing statutory credit
Output: (A)
policy. (Dkt. No. 345, Ex. 1 at APP00005 — 6; Dkt. No. 349, Ex. 42 at APP00961-62, APP00973.) 13 . The plaintiffs also alleged a claim relating to an improper MDL Fund deduction, but later abandoned that claim. 14 . Even assuming that the O’Quinn Firm were entitled to coverage under the 2001 Primary Policy, it is highly doubtful that coverage under the 2001 Excess Policy would ever be triggered because under the terms of the O'Quinn Firm’s settlement with National Union, National Union did not pay, did not admit liability, and was not held liable to pay the full amount of its indemnity under the 2001 Primary Policy. (Dkt. Nos. 380, 381 & 385). The plain language of the 2001 Excess Policy requires otherwise. See Citigroup Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>) 15 . Lexington also argues that “any matter 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage (B) holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insureds deductible which was not covered by the primary insurer (C) holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend (D) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage (E) holding that excess coverage in four policies was not triggered until primary insurer satisfied the requirements necessary to trigger the excess insurers coverage and paid the full amount of its limits
Output: (E)
invites an error may not later challenge that error on appeal. Id. As a result, “[wjhere invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” Id. (quotation omitted). In this case, not only did appellant fail to object to the district court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence, but his attorney agreed with the court that U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) directed the court to impose a consecutive sentence. In short, the invited error doctrine precludes our consideration of the first issue appellant raises. II. A district court commits Booker error if it applies the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir.2005); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (<HOLDING>). While U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) states that any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts use of the sentencing guidelines as a mandatory regime was harmless error because appellant could not receive a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum required by  2251d (B) holding that the mere mandatory application of the guidelines  the district courts belief that it was required to impose a guidelines sentence  constitutes error (C) holding that a district courts treatment of the guidelines as mandatory renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable (D) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed (E) holding that a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court committed no significant procedural error such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range treating the guidelines as mandatory failing to consider the  3553a factors selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence emphasis added
Output: (C)
stopped his car and approached his window. We see no evidence that Byrd targeted Pulliam because he fit a particular profile. Instead, Byrd followed Pul-liam because he saw him make an abrupt lane change that could indicate driving under the influence. And once Byrd saw Pulliam violate § 27-51-302, he was entitled to stop his car. III. Pulliam contends that even if the traffic stop was legal, Byrd violated his Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to detain him after he had finished- investigating the traffic violation. Byrd asked for Pulliam’s license and registration, wrote up a traffic ticket, and questioned Pulliam about his trip while Pulliam was in the back of his squad car. Byrd had a right to do all of these things. See United States v. Ramos, 42 F.Sd 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Byrd next either held on to Pulliam’s license 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers may question motorists about their license registration and travel plans (B) holding that asking a detained motorist whether he would consent to a search of his automobile for contraband even after he had produced a valid drivers license did not necessarily make the traffic stop unreasonable in scope or duration (C) holding that a reasonable investigation of a traffic stop typically includes asking for a license and registration asking the driver to sit in the patrol car and asking about destination and purpose of travel (D) holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition (E) holding that request for license destination and purpose of trip within reasonable scope of detention
Output: (C)
its free exercise of its governmental powers, nor could it abdicate its governmental functions, even for a “reasonable time.” Clear Lake, 549 S.W.2d at 391. When discharging its governmental functions, MUD 24, as an agent of the State, is exercising the State’s police power, which is a grant of authority from the people to the government for the protection of the health, safety, comfort, and welfare of the public. Galveston County MUD No. 3 v. League City, 960 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (operation of sewer system by municipality is exercise of governmental function). Therefore, we hold that MUD 24’s functions are governmental functions mandated by Texas law. See Hydrocarbon Prod. Co. v. Valley Acres Water Dist., 204 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir.1953) (<HOLDING>). Because we find that MUD 24’s functions are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding wjhere an appeal is taken the terms of probation do not commence until the mandate of this court is issued and citing former section 8 of article 4212 texas code of criminal procedure (B) holding that refusal to proceed to trial by arbitrarily abating case violates article i section 13 of the texas constitution (C) holding that texas legislature has no police power to violate article i section 16 of the texas constitution because section 29 emphatically and unambiguously excepts this power from the powers of the government of the state of texas (D) holding texass substantive law should apply rather than the law of the state where the accident occurred because texas has a particularly strong interest when the defective product in question was manufactured and placed in the stream of commerce in texas (E) holding that provisions of texas constitution article 16 section 59 are a mandate declaring the texass policy regarding drainage and irrigation
Output: (E)
does not allege that his injuries were the result of a discriminatory policy, see id. 70 . O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 731 ("This court has identified several criteria in determining the sufficiency of a serial continuing violation claim, which we summarize here: (1) is the subject matter of the discriminatory acts sufficiently similar that there is a substantial relationship between the otherwise untimely acts and the timely acts? (2) are the acts isolated and discrete or do they occur with frequency or repetitively or continuously? (3) are the acts of sufficient permanence that they should trigger an awareness of the need to assert one's rights?”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 402 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 71 . See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the most important factor in the preservation hierarchy is whether the relevant issue was raised in the trial court and the least important factor is whether the appellant alerted the trial court to the specific argument raised on appeal (B) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (C) recognizing temporal proximity as important factor (D) recognizing that the supreme court has referred to the policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation as by far the most important colorado river factor (E) recognizing that the most important factor in determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to eleventh amendment immunity is whether a judgment against it would be paid from the state treasury
Output: (B)
and was released around mid-November 2008. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Locator, (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). Furthermore, on September 22, 2008, Mr. Manning sought from this Court a stay of the commencement of his supervised release term, noting that he was "about to be released again to the same probation officer.” No. 08-5057, Doc. 9598259, at 3 (Order of Stay for Supervised Release, dated September 22, 2008). We denied Mr. Manning's request for a stay. If Mr. Manning has in fact been released, as we are inclined to believe under the circumstances outlined above, that portion of his appeal challenging the reasonableness of his sentence is moot. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 54, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ludvigson, 262 Fed. Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of revoking supervised release the applicable guidelines are those in effect at the time of the supervised release violations rather than those in effect at the time of initial offense (B) holding that excess prison time served by a defendant on invalidated criminal convictions cannot be credited to the supervised release period to reduce its length (C) holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release (D) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (E) holding that a former inmates supervised release term may not be credited with undisputed excess time in prison
Output: (B)
on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. Section 217.490. The IAD contains an “anti-shuttling” provision found in Paragraph 5 of Article IV, which provides: If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph 5 of article V of this agreement, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Section 217.490. The rights and protections created by the IAD are statutory rights, not fundamental or constitutional in nature. Kenneth-Smith v. State, 838 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Mo.App. E.D.1992); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir.1979)(<HOLDING>) As such, a defendant’s protections under the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals (B) holding that the protections of the iad are not founded on constitutional rights or the preservation of a fair trial but are designed to facilitate a defendants rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when charges are outstanding against the prisoner in another jurisdiction (C) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (D) holding that since the constitutional and statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives but rather  are designed to facilitate the administration of justice between states the failure to comply with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right and therefore provides no basis for a  1983 claim (E) holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison
Output: (B)
plan administrator seeking recovery of plan benefits). Similarly, those cases in which the state law claim involves “some aspect of the distribution, processing or entitlement of benefits or administration of claims or funds under a[n] [ERISA] plan[,]” typically are determined to be preempted by federal law. Hollingsworth Paving, 929 F.Supp. at 1101; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 129 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied sub nom. Pressley v. Pressley, 520 U.S. 1263, 117 S.Ct. 2431, 138 L.Ed.2d 193 (1997) (commenting that state laws relating to designation of beneficiaries are preempted when an ERISA plan is involved); Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183, 115 S.Ct. 1175, 130 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1995) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the nature of the claim, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted (B) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (C) holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy (D) holding that erisa preempted state law claim brought by employer against insurance company for wrongful claims processing (E) holding the state law claims were not preempted
Output: (D)
203, 216, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (“The Board’s power [to order remedies] is a broad discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review.”); McKinney ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Southern Bakeries, LLC, 786 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting the NLRB’s broad remedial powers to remedy employer violations in the shape of unfair labor practices); Medallion Kitchens, Inc. v. NLRB, 811 F.2d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 1987) (observing that the NLRA affords “the Board broad .latitude in fashioning remedies for unfair labor practices”). To illustrate further, should an employer commit misconduct while she is at the bargaining table, so to speak, the NLRB may mandate the employer to reimburse the corresponding labor organization for bargaining expenses. See HTH Corp., 361 NLRB No. 65 (2014) (<HOLDING>). With respect to labor schedules and other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable (B) recognizing nlrbs power to order reinstatement front pay back pay wideranging ceaseanddesist orders furnishing the union with relevant information and noticereading requirement among other remedies (C) holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment (D) holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court (E) holding in an adea case that when after acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing cut off accrual of back pay reinstatement or the award of front pay was inappropriate
Output: (B)
16(b)(2) would not preclude its discovery, for we understand this provision only to state the limits of discovery under the authority of Rule 16, not the limits of the court’s potential discovery powers. See Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 116-20 (D.C.1979) (noting that while "any venture beyond the[ ] limited principles [of the Jencks Act and Rule 16 discovery] must be subjected to close scrutiny,” more extensive disclosure may be sustained ”[i]n proper circumstances” under the court’s “‘inherent powers' over the discovery process"). Furthermore, to the extent that our ruling here authorizes discovery during trial, Rule 16 is irrelevant, for it applies only to pretrial discovery. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234-35, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2168-69, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Waldron v. United States, 370 A.2d 1372, 1373 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted (B) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (C) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (D) holding that fedrcrimp 16 does not control courts discovery power once trial has begun (E) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it
Output: (D)
convictions. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a court does not violate the Sixth Amendment when it elevates a sentence based on the fact of prior convictions. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738. This rule has been applied with equal force in the federal courts since the Booker decision. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491 n. 1 (1st Cir.2005) (stating that the rationale of Ap-prendi and Blakely “simply does not affect sentence-enhancement provisions premised upon a defendant’s prior criminal eonvic- tions”); United States v. Barrero, 425 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that a court does not violate the Sixth Amendment by basing a sentence on its finding of a prior conv (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 24] Given the court’s articulation of its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing court may determine the nature of a prior conviction without violating the sixth amendment (B) holding that the defendants argument that the sixth amendment requires that a jury not a judge must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in  2l12b1avii was without merit (C) holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing (D) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating (E) holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment
Output: (A)
farmer-brewer, importer or wholesaler. If the legislature intended the obligation to run with the product, it would have said it.” Heublein, 434 Mass. at 698 (approving Commission declaration to this effect) (citations and quotations omitted). It is thus the general rule that “a supplier is not obligated under Section 25E to continue to make sales to those wholesalers with whom an unaffiliated predecessor did business.” Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 499. This principle has been applied consistently in the few reported decisions by Massachusetts courts, confirming that purchasers of liquor businesses are not ordinarily saddled with the Section 25E restrictions of either their sellers or those through whom their sellers distributed product. See, e.g., Heublein, 434 Mass. at 701-02 (<HOLDING>); Pastene Wine & Spirits, 401 Mass. at 619 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that supplier who acquired all assets and operations related to manufacture and sale of prod uct in armslength transaction did not succeed to predecessor suppliers section 25e obligations a former suppliers obligations under section 25e to continue to sell its product to its wholesalers is not imputed to a successor supplier who obtains ownership of the product through an arms length asset acquisition (B) holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury (C) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (D) holding that section 388 of the restatement does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers even though the supplier is aware of those means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not (E) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury
Output: (A)
Court. See State v. Perez, 2002-NMCA-040, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 84, 44 P.3d 530. Nor does Gabriel request this Court to review his plea agreement for fundamental error, another exception to preservation. See State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 111, 957 P.2d 1145 (declining to apply the preservation exceptions when they were not argued on appeal). Under these circumstances, we do not reach the issue of Gabriel’s plea agreement. {26} Gabriel next contends that there are no facts in the record indicating he “helped, aided, or encouraged” the setting of the fire. See UJI 14-2822 NMRA 2004 (listing elements of accessory to a crime). Having been raised for the first time on appeal, the issue is not preserved. See Cockrell v. Cockrell, 117 N.M. 321, 323-24, 871 P.2d 977, 979-80 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Gabriel does not argue that the question is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed (B) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court (C) holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone (D) holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing (E) holding that the defendants failure to call the insufficiency of the evidence to the trial courts attention rendered the issue not preserved
Output: (E)
§ 2242, Pub.L. No. 105-277, Div. G, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-761 (Oct. 21, 1998), provides that a signatory nation will not "expel, return!,] or extradite” an alien to another country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” See Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.2000). 2 . Because the IJ found Ornelas-Chavez’s testimony credible and the BIA did not make a contrary finding, we accept the facts given by Ornelas-Chavez and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them as true. See Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1189 n. 4 (9th Cir.2003). 3 . Whether Ornelas-Chavez belongs to a protected social group is not at issue in this appeal. See generally Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 4 . BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (8th Ed.2004) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government material witnesses do not constitute a particular social group (B) recognizing as a distinct social group gay men with female sexual identities in mexico (C) recognizing women as a distinct group (D) holding that government informants are not members of a particular social group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
Output: (B)
“limited, supervised discretion under explicitly neutral guidelines” did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 220, 494 S.E.2d at 147. Therefore, roadblock jurisprudence does not prohibit all discretion by the field officer but only “unbridled” discretion. “Unbridled” means “completely at liberty: unrestrained, ungoverned, unchecked.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2484 (1993). See also Crouch, 26 Va.App. at 219 n. 2, 494 S.E.2d at 147 n. 2 (“We reject appellant’s argument that [the officer’s] ability to choose which direction of traffic to stop gave him excessive discretion. The designation of a specific pre-approved site for the detail was sufficient guidance with respect to location.”); Wesley v. Commonwealth, 37 Va.App. 128, 134, 554 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The fact that on the day of the roadblock in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (B) holding that leaving the duration of the roadblock up to a twohour maximum to the officers discretion was not unbridled discretion that would render the checkpoint unconstitutional (C) holding creditors can reach assets of trust to the same extent as the maximum amount that would be payable to the beneficiary in the trustees discretion (D) holding that the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude dna evidence if errors in the laboratory procedures render it so unreliable that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact but that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence (E) holding that the lack of statutory limitations does not give the trial court unbridled discretion as the trial court has a special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection
Output: (B)
to survive. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, 9-10 citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) general notice pleadings standard remains intact after Twombly) Because this question goes to the very heart of the matter, it must be addressed first. To recapitulate, this Court’s April 2007 Opinion weighed the sufficiency of the “enterprise” allegations in accordance with the Third Circuit’s ruling in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984). See 365 B.R. at 548. Seville stated that nothing more than general notice pleading was required for pleading a RICO enterprise. Seville relied, implicitly, on the long-standing rule regarding notice pleading first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>) But two months after this Court’s April 2007 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (B) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (E) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief
Output: (D)
support this interpretation. Nevada attorneys must notify their clients in writing of any interest the attorney has that is adverse to a client. RPC 1.8(a); In re Singer, 109 Nev. 1117, 1118, 865 P.2d 315, 315 (1993). Other courts have found that charging liens constitute adverse interests and applied a similar written notice rule. See Fletc rm waived its right to assert its charging lien when it waited several months after the property was distributed to assert its charging lien). See also Anderson v. Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass’n, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 989, 992 (D. Neb. 1995) (quashing the attorney charging lien because notice of the lien was untimely, made after the property had been transferred to the opposing party); Libner v. Maine Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n, 845 A.2d 570, 573 (Me. 2004) (<HOLDING>). It would be unreasonable and unfair to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorneys charging lien may be asserted and enforced in the civil action which gave rise to the lien claim or in an independent action (B) holding the beginning of a creditors action to subject an equitable estate to the payment of a judgment gives a specific lien upon the property which it is sought to reach and this lien continues while the cause is pending (C) holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien (D) holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond (E) holding that no lien may be imposed without direct and specific notice to the fund of an opposing party or its carriers that a lien is asserted before the proceeds are disbursed
Output: (E)
of “sexual abuse of a minor” “encompassed statutory rape crimes only,” and recognized that a residual category of “sexual abuse of a minor” exists that encompasses statutes where (1) “the conduct proscribed ... is sexual;” (2) “the statute protects a minor;” and (3) “the statute requires abuse.” Id. at 513-14. In turn, we defined the term “abuse” as “physical or psychological harm in light of the age of the victim in question.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have noted that sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen is categorically “abuse,” see United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2006), but we have never held that such a per se rule applies to consensual sex with persons fourteen and older, see Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107 & n. 2 (<HOLDING>); Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1015-16 (rejecting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee (B) recognizing that estradaespinoza and medinavilla set out two different generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor  and looking to both definitions to determine whether conviction under calpenal code  2615d qualifies as generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor under categorical approach (C) recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years (D) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (E) holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague
Output: (C)
Peaslee simultaneously moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction; his attorney submitted an affidavit asserting that Peaslee was not domiciled in New York and had not transacted any business in New York either on his own account or on behalf of the Yagi entities or Euro Brokers. The Yagi defendants filed similar motions on February 3,1995. On February 6, 1995, plaintiffs moved to remand to the state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that diversity was incomplete because Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. was a limited partnership at least one partner of which was a citizen of the United States domiciled abroad, citing Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68-69 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1222, 112 S.Ct. 3036, 120 L.Ed.2d 905 (1992) (<HOLDING>). At a status conference on February 10, 1995, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general partners must notify limited partners of partnership opportunity to purchase adjacent property but not addressing whether  9404 requires affirmative consent of partners after such notice (B) holding that alien on student visa could not lawfully possess intent to be domiciled in the united states (C) holding that under the texas uniform partnership act the government was entitled to collect the  tax liability indisputably a partnership debt from any one of the general partners (D) holding that a diversity suit cannot be maintained against a partnership one of the partners of which is a united states citizen domiciled abroad (E) holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency
Output: (D)
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation and with knowledge of the consequences. The language of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b) is almost identical to the above rule. 2 . New Hampshire Rule of Prof. Conduct Rule 1.8(b) provides: A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless*the client consents after consultation and with knowledge of the consequences. See, e.g., Bourdon’s Case, 132 N.H. 365, 565 A.2d 1052, 1056 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(b) provides: "A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (B) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (C) holding that rule 18b is violated if attorney uses information of a divorce clients vulnerability to pursue a sexual relationship with the client (D) holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
Output: (C)
who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac’s motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted
Output: (D)
Garay v. BRK Electronics, 755 F.Supp. 1010 (M.D.Fla.1991). This question, in turn, depends on whether Dole is subject to jurisdiction in California, whether venue is appropriate in the Central District, and whether Dole is amenable to service of process in California. See Jewelmasters, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 840 F.Supp. 893, 894 (S.D.Fla.1993) (finding that action could have been brought in Central District of California where venue, process, and personal jurisdiction existed in that district). The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not enough to satisfy the “might have been brought requirement” that the defendant waives or consents to jurisdiction in the proposed transferee court. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1090, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the plaintiff must have had the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the customs court lacked jurisdiction when plaintiff failed to comply with all terms of consent by the united states mandated by 28 usc  1582 1976 the predecessor to 28 usc  1581a 2000 (B) holding district lacking personal jurisdiction over defendant not one in which suit might have been brought under section 1404a (C) holding that under 28 usc  1404a might have been brought requirement was not satisfied by defendants consent to jurisdiction (D) holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391 (E) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction   depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc  1330a and proper service under 28 usc  1608
Output: (C)