niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
process of rendering medical treatment.”, D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 172. Mrs. Shea’s claim stems from “the process of rendering medical treatment,” id., and therefore, it would not affect the structure, administration or economics of the ERISA plan. The district court concluded that the negligent misrepresentation claim.of count III was preempted • for the same reason that Mrs. Shea’s claim against Medica, a plan fiduciary, was preempted in Shea I. We respectfully disagree with this analysis. Our opinion in Shea I mandates that ERISA fiduciaries must disclose financial incentives that discourage a treating physician from providing referrals. 107 F.3d at 628-29. The physicians being sued in this case, however, are not ERISA fiduciaries. Cf. Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943(8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1242, 146 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician (B) holding state law malpractice claim against a physician was preempted where the physician acting as the plan administrator denied a thallium stress test as a plan benefit (C) holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted (D) holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary (E) holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa
Output: (B)
the court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (D.I.51). An appropriate order shall issue. ORDER At Wilmington this 11th day of March, 2008, consistent with the memorandum opinion issued this same date; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment (D.I.59) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. 1 .“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or c iff is not entitled to nominal or punitive damages. In addition, defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because he did not violate a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that the threshold inquiry assuming as true the facts alleged by the injured party is whether the officers conduct violated a constitutional right (D) holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right (E) holding officers conduct must violate a constitutional right
Output: (E)
in the face with a bottle. Hogsett, 486 S.W.2d at 731. While denying the employee’s claim because of his willful misconduct, the Court stated as follows: “we are of the opinion the employer has shown the three elements, as deduced from the opinions of this Court, constituting willful misconduct as contemplated by the statute and they are: (1) an intention to do the act, (2) purposeful violation of orders, and (3) an element of perversiveness.” Id. at 733. In formulating the willful misconduct test, the Court drew upon Coleman v. Coker, 321 S.W.2d at 542 (upholding a grant of benefits and observing that willful meant that “regardless of what an employee is told he goes on ‘hellbent for election’ anyhow”), and Brown v. Birmingham Nurseries, 173 Tenn. 343, 117 S.W.2d 739, 740 (1938) (<HOLDING>). In both Coleman and Brown, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding affiants statement that certain conduct constituted intentional or willful misconduct by defendant was conelusory because it stated conclusion and did not provide supporting facts (B) holding that employers policy which required employee to work without pay in violation of federal law was unreasonable and employees refusal to comply was not misconduct (C) holding that an employees purposeful violation of established safety rules despite instruction and warning constituted willful misconduct (D) holding that employees conscious decision to spend the day on the internet instead of doing his job despite being chided more than once constituted simple not gross misconduct (E) holding that employees conviction for possession of a controlled substance constituted gross misconduct
Output: (C)
Apr. 14, 2011). Accord Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissing a retaliation claim whose only causal basis was a letter that plaintiff wrote many weeks before the allegedly retaliatory acts, implicating officers other than named defendants). See also Def. Mem. at 11 ("[A] claim that one defendant took action against the plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint made against a different [officer] [should be] viewed with particular skepticism."). 40 . Def, Mem. at 17. 41 . See id. (citing exclusively to Eighth Amendment cases). 42 .Id. 43 . See Wright, 554 F.3d at 274. 44 . Def. Mem. at 18. 45 . Def. Mem. at 19. 46 . Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. 47 . Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493. 48 . Compare Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 1369, 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12 Civ. 9196, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (B) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case (E) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action
Output: (C)
796 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.1986). Second, “[d]ue process challenges to deportation proceedings require a showing of prejudice to succeed.” Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d at 1226. and replace with We have also held that “[d]ue process challenges to deportation proceedings require a showing of prejudice to succeed.” Rodriguez-Lariz, 282 F.3d at 1226. 2. Op. at 1035 n. 6: Delete footnote in its entirety. 3. Op. at 1035, line 2 of Section III.B: Delete “fell outside the range of professional competence.” and replace with “constituted . 2052). and replace with Counsel’s unreasonable failure to investigate and present the factual and legal basis of Lin’s asylum claim would itself amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), amended on other grounds by 213 F.3d 1221 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (B) holding a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process (C) holding that attorney who was unprepared to argue and unknowledgeable about the facts of an asylum case could not have provided effective assistance of counsel (D) holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel (E) holding that a defendants waiver was invalid where he was required to choose between proceeding with unprepared counsel or no counsel
Output: (C)
v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129 (Ind.1998), we conclude that the new rule of law announced in Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290 (Ind.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 293, 136 L.Ed.2d 213 (1996), is not retroactive under Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind.1990), and so does not entitle Gary Elvers to post-conviction relief. On July 24, 1992, the Indiana Department of Revenue assessed Gary Elvers (“Elvers”) a Controlled Substance Excise Tax (“CSET”) for possessing marijuana. The State charged Elvers with possession of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, and failure to pay the CSET on July 28, 1992. Elvers pled guilty to the charge of possession on May 24, 1993. On July 3, 1996, Elvers filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on this Court’s decision in Bryant, 660 N.E.2d 290 (<HOLDING>), which the post-conviction court denied. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because cset is punishment the double jeopardy clause bars drug prosecution after cset has been assessed (B) holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required (C) holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction (D) holding that unlike under the federal constitution a civil forfeiture is punishment under the new mexico double jeopardy clause (E) holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause
Output: (A)
had relied on Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (“GAAP”) to value the paintings and the land. G. Levine Test, at 86:8-87:2. Defendants, however, did not show at trial or at the remedies hearing that the assets were correctly valued according to GAAP, or that GAAP was even relevant to the question of the value of the purported interest in the Tennessee land or the Sky Jones paintings. B. The Levines Made the False Statements With Reckless Disregard for Their Veracity 8. By determining that the Levines violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the jury found that the Levine’s fraudulent statements were made at least recklessly as to their falsity, if not knowingly. See Jury Verdict Form [# 169]; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976) (<HOLDING>). II.THE COMMISSION HAS PARTIALLY MET ITS 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  10b and rule 10b5 apply to frauds against brokers (B) holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5 (C) holding that no private cause of action for damages will lie under  10b and rule 10b5 in the absence of any allegation of scienter  intent to deceive manipulate or defraud (D) holding that a private plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an aiding and abetting action under  10b or rule 10b  5 (E) holding that a person violates  10b and rule 10b5 when he misappropriates confidential information  in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information
Output: (C)
the child pornography. This notion is merely ‘unsupported speculation’ and lacks a sufficient nexus to link [J.H.] to the crime charged.” See supra at 991 (setting out entirety of the district court’s order). As noted by Meisel, however, neither the government nor the district court has identified case law holding that alternative perpetrator evidence is admissible only if it conclusively demonstrates the guilt of the alleged alternative perpetrator. Instead, such evidence is admissible if a defendant’s “proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator ..., on its own or in combination with other evidence in-the record, ... show[s] a nexus between the crime charged and the asserted ‘alternative perpetrator.’ ” McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1191; see also Jordan, 485 F.3d at 1222 '(<HOLDING>). Second, the district court indicated “the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding test for admissibility of alternative perpetrator evidence is not as onerous as the standard courts apply in determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction (B) holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction (C) holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction (D) holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies (E) holding that jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence
Output: (A)
should have provided documentation of Dr. Pope’s sloppy collection techniques clearly could not meet the prejudice requirement under Brady. Thus, these two issues were legally insufficient on their face. Claim VII, which alleged that Overton’s counsel was ineffective for the failure to object to the jury instruction on the testimony of expert witnesses, was correctly denied as facially invalid. During the Huff hearing, Overton’s counsel stipulated that this particular jury instruction was the standard expert jury instruction and that this legal issue could be determined without an evidentiary hearing. Failure to object to a standard jury instruction is not ineffective assistance here. See Elledge v. State, 911 So.2d 57, 77 (Fla.2005); Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 665 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). Claim VIII, directed to a lack of effective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction (B) holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance (C) holding that it was not deficient for counsel to fail to object to a standard instruction that had not been invalidated by this court (D) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (E) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel
Output: (C)
State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 42 P.3d 564, 578 (2002)(en banc)(deferring to trial court’s implicit finding of no Batson violation); State v. Shanks, 809 S.W.2d 413, 415-16 (Mo.Ct.App.1991)(noting that, even though the trial court made no express findings, the record was sufficient to evaluate the court’s implicit finding regarding the neutrality of the proffered explanation); State v. Smith, 791 S.W.2d 744, 750 (Mo.Ct.App.1990)(stating that although the trial judge failed to make explicit findings in support of denial of defendant’s Batson’s claim, record is sufficient to support judge's implicit finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie case and would be sufficient for a finding of nonpretextuality); People v. Turner, 294 A.D.2d 192, 743 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (N.Y.App.Div.2002)(<HOLDING>); Broden v. State, 923 S.W.2d 183, 186 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the record supports the trial judges implicit finding of nonpretextuality (B) holding that the absence of legitimate income supports the finding of probable cause in a forfeiture action (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) holding that a likelihood that the suspect will escape supports a finding of exigency (E) holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports
Output: (A)
361 Pa.Super. 491, 495 n. 3, 522 A.2d 1138, 1140 n. 3 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987) (listing state statues and statues that recognize a medical review privilege); IIA Hospital Law Manual (Medical Books) 78-106 (1996) (listing state statues dealing with discovery and admissibility of medical records, and giving a summary of each)); D.C.Code Ann. § 32-505 (1981). Thus, as in Jaffee, the nearly unanimous state legislative recognition of the self-critical analysis privilege in the medical peer review context confirms the appropriateness of recognizing the privilege in this forum. See 518 U.S. at 13,116 S.Ct. 1923. Recognizing the self-critical analysis privilege in this case is also supported by New Mexico’s own statutory privilege. See Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 N.Y.1976) (<HOLDING>). It is true that unlike the psychotherapist 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (B) holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law (C) holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law (D) recognizing a strong policy of comity between state and federal sovereigns impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy (E) holding that a federal court may resort to state law analogies for the development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the federal rule is unsettled
Output: (D)
involved “close to a dozen” individuals, that Walls was “at or near the top of ... the organizational structure” and that Walls “claimed a substantial share of the profits and manipulated those profits.” Id. Regardless of the exact parameters of § 3Bl.l(a) review in light of Buford, it is clear that factual findings made by the district court are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir.2005). With regard to the factual findings of the district judge, there is no evidence in the record to suggest the district court committed clear error. Even under de novo review of the law, given these findings, Walls would satisfy the requirements for imposition of a § 3Bl.l(a) enhancement. See United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 660-61 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Milan, 218 Fed.Appx. at 496-97 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant who supplied another with drugs gave another orders and had a large stake in the profitability of the drug organization is subject to a  3blla enhancement (B) holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute (C) holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice (D) holding that a large amount of drugs increases the likelihood of weapons (E) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal
Output: (A)
in favor of Defendant Pima County under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. We review de novo, Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm. 1. The district court permissibly deemed Defendant’s statement of facts to be true because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b). See Local Rule 56.1(b) (requiring that the non-moving party file a statement of facts that, paragraph by paragraph, states whether it disputes each paragraph of the moving party’s statement of facts). 2. Summary judgment was proper on both the Equal Pay Act claim and the Title VII claim because the work of the proposed comparator, James Casanova, was not substantially equal to Plaintiffs work. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act (B) holding plaintiff must make concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm denying motion to quash subpoena to undercover identity of doe defendants where inter alia plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show it could establish prima facie claim (C) holding that a plaintiff who cannot establish an equal pay act claim likewise cannot establish a paybased title vii claim (D) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (E) holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal
Output: (E)
the final decision regarding his delisting request issued in 2013. Because Zevallos had not previously seen this evidence, he insists he could not adequately contest his ongoing designation. Zevallos forfeited this argument by not raising it in the district court. Potter, 558 F.3d at 549-50. He also points to the questionnaire Treasury asked him to answer in 2009 once the agency realized he still wanted a decision on his delisting request, and complains that Treasury’s 2013 decision did not address any of the topics about which the 2009 questionnaire inquired. This argument is doubly forfeited: Zevallos did not make it to the district court; and on appeal he made it for the first time in his reply brief. See Russell v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 773 F.3d 253, 255 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Zevallos insists that Treasury’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited (B) holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived (C) holding that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not reviewable (D) holding that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief (E) holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived
Output: (A)
the details of the government’s arguments on these grounds. Instead, we hold that Harrison has, by stipulating, waived any right to contest the absence of proof on the stipulated elements. This waiver theory of stipulations has been addressed by a number of our sister circuits, and although the government does not directly advance it in this case, it is necessarily raised by the nature of the appeal. By failing to advance it explicitly, we could perhaps construe the government’s brief as having waived the waiver theory argument, but we will reach the issue because it is squarely presented by this ease and was relied upon by the trial court. See, e.g., United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 445-49, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (<HOLDING>). As the Supreme Court stated in Kamen v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court has discretion not to consider an issue abandoned on appeal (B) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties (C) holding that an appellate court may not consider an issue not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits (D) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (E) holding that an issue first argued in a reply brief is not properly before a court of appeals
Output: (B)
by pointing to several places in the NEPA documents which address and discuss the Clancy-Unionville project. Plaintiffs also contend the Telegraph Project was inadequately addressed in the Project’s cumulative effects analysis, but it is undisputed that the Telegraph Project was considered at some level and Defendants point to several places in the NEPA documents where the Telegraph Project is addressed and analyzed. Plaintiffs also fail to persuade that an unnamed, potential project, the size and specifics of which are apparently unknown, was required to be included in the cumulative effects analysis. This unnamed project had not yet been proposed when the Project was authorized. See Environmental Protection Information Center v. U.S. Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Without addressing each and every one of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ea prepared by an agency in that case was not the functional equivalent of an eis (B) holding environmental assessment ea inadequate where ea contained virtually no reference to any material in support of or in opposition to its conclusions deficiency not cured by support contained in administrative record (C) holding that nsf must comply with procedural requirements of nepa when considering incineration of food waste in antarctica because 1 the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because nepa is designed to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the united states 2 the united states exercises legislative control over antarctica 3 any concerns about nepa interference with foreign policy were overstated because when foreign policy interests outweighed benefits of nepa compliance nepas requirements must yield and 4 broad language of the statute supports broad application of nepa requirements (D) holding that materiality analysis turns on the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence not an itembyitem analysis (E) holding that usfs did not violate nepa by failing to include project in cumulative effects analysis when parameters of the   project were unknown at the time of the ea
Output: (E)
showing that a defendant knew or had reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement. b. Analysis The evidence adduced at trial demonstrates eBay had general knoivledge of infringement by sellers using its website. Such general knowledge, however, does not require eBay to take action to discontinue supplying its service to all those who might be engaged in counterfeiting. Having concluded that, as a matter of law, general knowledge of infringement is insufficient, the Court proceeds to consider whether the generalized assertions of infringement made by Tiffany are sufficiently specific to impute to eBay k ., 180 F.Supp.2d 678, 690-91 (D.Md.2001) (finding that demand letter notifying defendant of plaintiffs position is insufficient); Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F.Supp. at 964 (<HOLDING>); Coca-Cola, 64 F.Supp. at 987 (holding general 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trademark owners mere assertion that its domain name is infringed is insufficient to impute knowledge of infringement and a demand letter is also insufficient (B) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (C) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (D) holding that trademark owners demand letter is insufficient to resolve  uncertainty of infringement (E) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract
Output: (D)
calculated by summing Keszen-heimer’s regular monthly salary and a 24-month average of both his offshore per diem and the taxable automobile allowance. 5 . Facility Ins. Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 357 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir.2004). 6 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 7 . Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Ramming v. Nat'l Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir.2004). 8 . Wegner v. Standard Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 814, 818 (5th Cir.1997) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989)). 9 . Id. 10 . Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 . Id. 12 . Id. (<HOLDING>). Because the plain meaning of the policy terms 
 Holding statements: (A) holding terms overtime or any other extra compensation to be unambiguous and assuming salary was also commonly understood (B) holding that the words amount and compensation in the regulation referred to cash or salary rather than to all forms of compensation (C) holding where terms are unambiguous any facts about the parties intent are immaterial (D) recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms (E) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous
Output: (A)
and Cotton, we find that the purported error here does not satisfy Olano’s fourth prong. In Johnson and Cotton, the Supreme Court found that violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not overcome the “threat ... to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings” that would result from reversing convictions supported by overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence. Id. (internal citations omitted). Any error in this case derives not from a constitutional violation, but from a statutory transgression. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) (“[M]ost matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.”); Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In light of Johnson and Cotton’s refusal to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bias analysis insufficient to support its decisions (B) holding that a challenge for cause for actual bias  essentially requires a determination  of credibility (C) holding that the recusal statute should not be construed so broadly as to become effectively presumptive or to require recusal based on unsubstantiated suggestions of personal bias or prejudice (D) recognizing that statutes mandating recusal for actual bias have constitutional bases unlike those that require recusal for a mere appearance of bias or prejudice (E) holding that prejudgment constitutes cause for recusal
Output: (D)
efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver — the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is “considered an integral part of any sentence,” Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (B) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation
Output: (B)
the trial ...." Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2006). This rule does not authorize a supplementation that attempts to establish that defense counsel objected to an action of the trial court, when such an objection is not documented in the official record of the case-particularly when the trial transcript indicates that defense counsel stated that he "agreed with" the trial court's action, and particularly when no one suggests that the transcript is inaccurate. This Court sees no reason to "supplement the record" with the proffered recollection of counsel. Hence Roy's SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT AND APPLICATION FOR EVIDENTIA-RY HEARING, tendered for filing on January 19, 2006, is hereby DENIED. 21 . 2006 OK CR 6, 130 P.3d 273 (<HOLDING>). 22 . Roy's trial was completed on June 15, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that jurors should be instructed regarding the 85 rule contained within 21 02001  121  131 for crimes falling within this rule (B) recognizing this texas rule (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing this rule (E) recognizing this as the general rule
Output: (A)
at the behest of the state. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1438. This he cannot do. It is true that the El Dorado County prosecutor in charge of the state criminal action against Price subsequently pursued the federal forfeiture action as a “Special Assistant United States Attorney,” while still on the county payroll. But this fact, without more, is not sufficient to allege a “sham” prosecution. Close coordination between state and federal authorities, including “the employment of agents of one sovereign to help the other sovereign in its prosecution,” does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1098, 112 S.Ct. 1181, 117 L.Ed.2d 424 (1992); accord United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924, 111 S.Ct. 1319, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that investigation was insufficient prior to prosecution for forgery of check (B) holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  (C) holding that the fact that an indiana prosecutor was later designated a special deputy united states attorney for purposes of the federal prosecution was insufficient to establish a sham prosecution (D) holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct (E) holding that prosecution of defendant in the united states for hostage taking based on acts committed outside the united states did not violate due process
Output: (C)
fraud. See Grageda v. U.S. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.1993); Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 647. However, we have included in this category acts “of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards,” Grageda, 12 F.3d at 921 (quotation omitted), such as spousal abuse, child abuse, and statutory rape which involve moral turpitude “by their very nature.” See id. at 922 (spousal abuse); Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (9th Cir.1969) (child abuse); Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir.1927) (statutory rape). Incest also involves an act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards, and we hold that it too is a “crime involving moral turpitude.” See also II American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 230.2 cmt. 2(d), 406-07 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Gonzalez-Alvarado, 39 F.3d at 246. Taking a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although a state may be free to develop its own laws of search and seizure to meet law enforcement needs such laws may not authorize police conduct which trenches upon fourth amendment rights regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct (B) recognizing general rule (C) holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws (D) recognizing that laws against incest reinforce a community norm of general and intense hostility toward such conduct (E) recognizing this as the general rule
Output: (D)
and therefore [the medical conditions] cannot be causally related to asbestos exposure sufficient to sustain a compensable injury.” Tr. Ct. Slip Op. at 4; “Neither of the plaintiffs can currently meet his burden of demonstrating that asbestos exposure created impairment or disability beyond the severe breathing problems he has from smoking and other ailments.” Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 886 A.2d at 246-47 (OISA). As noted, supra Part II, “summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 1221-22 (2002). Equally clea 07 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414, 419 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Finney v. G.C. Murphy, Co., 406 Pa. 555, 178 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct (B) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (C) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (D) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide (E) holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury
Output: (D)
have entered the plea.”); see also Hernandez, 124 So.3d at 763 (recognizing that a plea colloquy is not meaningless); Smith v. State, 21 So.3d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“It is well-settled that when a court determines whether an allegation is conclusively refuted by the record, it may rely on the sworn testimony the defendant has given in a plea colloquy. Any allegations that contradict those answers should not be entertained.”) (internal citation omitted). In other words, St. Louis’s admission under oath that he would enter the plea even if it subjected him to deportation demonstrates that he cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. 1 . Because St. Louis admitted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial (B) holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial (C) holding that where defendant seeks to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel the prejudice prong of the strickland test is satisfied by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial alteration in original quoting hill v lockhart 474 us 52 58 106 sct 366 88 led2d 203 1985 (D) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (E) holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different
Output: (A)
there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed. Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1989) (en banc) (citation omitted). Little argued that Windermere discharged her because she made a complaint about sexual harassment. The Washington Supreme Court held recently that Revised Code of Washington sections 49.12.200 and 49.60.010 embody a clearly articulated public policy condemning sex discrimination in employment. See Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 69, 993 P.2d 901, 907 (2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Relatedly, discharging an employee because of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project (B) holding that the supervisors failure to give employee new assignments once she announced that she was pregnant and that her maternity leave would occur during the two months prior to the employers busiest time did not constitute evidence of discrimination (C) holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave (D) holding that discharging an employee because she was on maternity leave would violate that poli cy (E) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave
Output: (D)
legal scholars in Maryland, as well as in other jurisdictions, have endorsed the use of an approved pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence to ensure that a criminal defendant’s due process rights are protected and to create uniformity in criminal jury trials. See Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 30, 843 A.2d 803, 819 (2004) (stating that the concurring opinion in Wills “wisely suggested that trial judges ‘closely adhere’ to Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:02 when attempting to define ‘reasonable doubt’ ”); Wills v. State, supra, 329 Md. at 388-392, 620 A.2d at 304-305 (concurring opinion); Himple v. State, 101 Md.App. 579, 584-585, 647 A.2d 1240, 1243 (1994). See also Arizona v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (Ariz.1995) (<HOLDING>); Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though the reasonable doubt instruction given in the case was not the preferred instruction it was not a misstatement of the law and therefore was legally appropriate (B) holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case (C) holding that in every criminal case trial courts shall give the reasonable doubt instruction set forth by the court (D) holding that no person shall suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof  defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense (E) holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution
Output: (C)
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). We must therefore decide whether Mothershed’s claims fall within the Rook-er-Feldmandoctrine’s narrowed scope. A Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (<HOLDING>); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar (B) holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision (C) holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case (D) holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review  of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions (E) holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case
Output: (B)
keep their promise at the time it was made. 1. Fraud with Particularity Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), “all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” This rule requires the plaintiff to allege such circumstances so the defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir.1973). The plaintiff should include the time, place and content of the alleged misrepresentations. Decker v. GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994). A plaintiff should set forth reasons why the statements were false. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff should, where possible, identify who made the representations. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff has a duty to plead the date of discovery of fraud where the alleged fraud apparently occurred at a remote time (B) recognizing that rule 9b is largely designed to give each opponent notice of his purported role in the alleged fraud (C) holding that a plaintiff is required to identify specific acts of individual defendants  for his claim to survive (D) holding that plaintiff should identify when possible the role of individual defendants in the alleged fraud (E) holding that where a plaintiff is unaware of the identity of alleged defendants plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds
Output: (D)
Eighth Circuit and a pair of nonprece-dential decisions from this court, all of which assume that lying to a supervising probation officer is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), a felony. See United States v. Wagner, 573 Fed.Appx. 598, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quillman, 409 Fed.Appx. 18, 21 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1995). But Grimes was decided before Congress amended § 1001 to exempt from its coverage any false statement made to a “judge or magistrate” by a party in a “judicial proceeding,” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b), and we haven’t yet considered whether, or to what extent, that exemption covers lies made to a probation officer by a person under supervision, compare United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Vreeland, 684 F.3d 653, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation is not a sentence (B) holding that defendants lies to probation officer preparing presentence report fall within  1001b exception if probation officer must include particular statement in report (C) holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report (D) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (E) holding that the defendants statements to the probation officer were insufficient to satisfy the safety valves fifth requirement the probation officer is for purposes of  5c12 not the government
Output: (B)