niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
that the newspapers and magazines will use the U.S. Mail to send such matter to them subscribers, and therefore, that such Defendant “caused” the use of the mails within the meaning of the mail fraud statute. See, e.g., Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28, 108 S.Ct. 316 (“[U]sing the wires and the mail to print and send the [Wall Street] Journal to its customers” containing the column at issue “was not only anticipated but an essential part of the scheme.”); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co., 886 F.2d 986, 992 (8 Cir.1989) (“[I]t was almost certain that notice of [foreclosure sales] would be mailed to other claimants or that notice would be published in newspapers and copies of the notice distributed through the mails.”); United States v. Bowers, 644 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shepherd, 587 F.2d 943, 944 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an increased sentence may be imposed for harms that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants conduct even where the defendant did not directly cause the specific harm (B) holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable (C) holding that it was reasonably foreseeable that newspapers would be mailed to some subscribers containing the advertisements the defendant placed in the newspaper (D) holding that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the letter he handdelivered to a newspaper in response to an advertisement would be sent by the newspaper to its customer via the us mails (E) holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future
Output: (C)
580, 589, 605 A.2d 1106 (1991), aff'd. o.b., 127 N.J. 394, 605 A.2d 1073 (1992). “The purpose of the principle is to effectuate current policy.” Kruvant v. Mayor & Council of Cedar Grove, 82 N.J. 435, 440, 414 A.2d 9 (1980). A municipality may change its land-use ordinances after an application has been filed, even “in direct response to the application.” Burcam Corp. v. Planning Bd., 168 N.J.Super. 508, 521, 403 A.2d 921 (1979). However, the time-of-decision rule is not automatic. See Lake Shore, supra, 255 N.J.Super. at 589, 605 A.2d 1106. A court must balance the municipality’s zoning interest against the developer’s degree of reliance on the old statute and its entitlements of right. Id. at 590-91, 605 A.2d 1106. See also Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 617, 608 A.2d 895 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In this case, resolution of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either unconstitutional interference with vested rights or manifest injustice (B) holding retroactive application (C) holding no retroactive application (D) recognizing a general principle that retroactive application of rules is permitted absent any manifest injustice (E) holding that retroactive application of amendments will not result in manifest injustice
Output: (A)
I as against the Corporate Defendants. 67 . This definition also contains numerous exceptions not applicable to this case. 68 . The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has observed that "any general definition [of ‘agency’] can be of only limited utility to a court confronted with one of the myriad organizational arrangements for getting the business of government done.” Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C.Cir.1974). Thus, "[t]he unavoidable fact is that each new arrangement mu iew Organization ("PSRO”) at issue in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 449 F.Supp. 937 (D.D.C.1978), none of the Corporate Defendants "has any authority in law to make decisions.” Id. at 941 (<HOLDING>). Finally, unlike the Property Review Board 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state medicaid agency can review the medical necessity of treatment prescribed by a doctor on a casebycase basis (B) holding that the psro was an agency under the apa where in practically all cases medicare or medicaid benefits are not paid unless the psro makes its conclusive affirmative determinations of medical necessity (C) holding that the knowing submission of medicare claims for services that were not covered and payable under the medicare act was an fca violation (D) holding that patient could sue state agency under  1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute (E) holding that knowing submission of medicare claims for services that are not covered and payable under the medicare act is a violation of the fca
Output: (B)
Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judge BOWES files a dissenting opinion.' 1 . The parties appeal from the trial court’s order entered April 18, 2012, disposing of their cross post-trial motions, wherein the trial court also directed the Prothonotary to enter judgment. However, the certified record contains no indication that the prothono-tary complied. We note an appeal generally lies from judgments entered following the disposition of post-trial motions. Mackall v. Fleegle, 801 A.2d 577, 580-581 (Pa.Super.2002). However, in the interests of justice and to promote judicial economy an appellate court may "regard as done that which ought to have been done” and proceed in the matter. See McCormick v. Ne. Bank of Pa., 522 Pa. 251, 561 A.2d 328, 330 n. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Fanning v. Davne, 795 A.2d 388, 392 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a posttrial motion has been deemed denied the only appealable matter is the original order and that any h previously filed notice of appeal must be amended to appeal from the deemeddenied motion (B) holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion by dismissing the defendants appeal as untimely because as relevant here it would be in the interest of judicial economy to avoid a crim p 85c claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (C) holding in summary judgment context that appellate court may consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review and trial court did not rule on in the interest of judicial economy (D) holding that although an order dismissing appellants motion for posttrial relief was not reduced to judgment in the interests of judicial economy the supreme court could regard as done that which ought to have been done and proceed with the appeal (E) holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment
Output: (D)
by rejection of the plain feel doctrine under our state constitution. In assessing the policy considerations, it is analytically important to remember that jurisprudence under both Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution seeks to strike the appropriate balance between preserving the privacy interests of citizens and permitting law enforcement officials to act without hamstringing restraints. See Campbell, 418 Pa.Super. at 399, 614 A.2d at 696. Federal decisions, however, tend to lend greater weight to the interests of law enforcement, while the decisions of our Commonwealth courts more often emphasize the preservation of individual privacy. See White, supra; Melilli, 521 Pa. at 412, 555 A.2d at 1258; see also Matos, supra (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Martin, 534 Pa. 136, 626 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception under state constitution (B) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (C) recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole (D) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (E) holding that definition of seizure under state constitution differs from that under us constitution
Output: (E)
a court-approved $860,000 settlement wherein Continental was released “from the aforesaid arbitration award.” Herman then brought this action for negligent destruction of evidence contending that the arbitration of the personal injury claim was not a bar. Continental’s motion to dismiss, alleging that Herman’s action was precluded by the $860,000 personal injury award, was denied. The case proceeded to trial where the jury was given two presumptions to apply if it found Continental negligent in the destruction of Herman’s wrecked automobile. The jury found by its verdict that Continental was negligent in failing to preserve the Herman vehicle which was a legal cause of loss to the Hermans, and found Herman 65% percent negligent in causing the Allstate, 573 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). In Miller we tracked the origin and 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing breach of contract action for destruction of evidence needed in products liability ease (B) recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach (E) recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law
Output: (A)
to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel by showing that they should have done something more or something different instead of showing that no reasonable attorney would have done what Hart and Downs did given the facts and circumstances of this particular case. At the evidentiary hearing, Taylor’s primary witness was Dr. Drob. The bulk of Drob’s testimony was that, at the time of Taylor’s trial, there was, in his opinion, evidence that he suffered from certain mental illnesses that could have been considered by the jury and the court in mitigation. Though the Court allowed Drob to express his opinion about what he considered to be mitigating, the Court is aware that such testimony would not have been permitted at Taylor’s trial. See, Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d at 1506 (<HOLDING>). Further, Dr. King testified for the State 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge (B) holding that the court is limited in amending a verdict after discharge of the jury and cannot invade the province of the jury (C) holding that the trial court correctly refused to give the jury a peremptory instruction on the f2 mitigating circumstance when an expert testified about inconsistent diagnoses of the defendant thereby making evidence of the defendants mental or emotional disturbance    not uncontroverted (D) holding that a jury does not invade the province of the board when it determines the probability of a capital defendants future dangerousness (E) holding that no mental health expert is competent to express an opinion about whether a particular set of facts constitutes a mitigating circumstance because that would invade the province of the judge and jury
Output: (E)
States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that “[ejvidence that an individual subscribed to child pornography web sites supports the conclusion that he has likely downloaded, kept, and otherwise possessed the material” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (concluding that payment and registration for a subscription to child pornography website supported a probable cause determination); United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “evidence that a person has visited or subscribed to websites containing child pornography supports the conclusion that he has likely downloaded, kept, and otherwise possessed the material”); United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 74-76 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit (B) holding that probable cause existed to search the defendants residence because the warrant affidavit established probable cause that the defendant possessed stolen firearms and because people generally keep firearms at home or on their persons (C) holding affidavit insufficient to support probable cause when one cannot learn from the affidavit when the past activities occurred and when the observations were made (D) holding that officers possession of affidavit at searched premises without leaving a copy with the occupant was insufficient to allow for consideration of the affidavit in evaluating the constitutionality of the warrant (E) holding that affidavit supported probable cause determination when the affidavit stated only that an occupant of defendants home subscribed to child pornography egroup
Output: (E)
to understand or determine a fact at issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. And, with that statement, the so-called Daubert hearing was born. Daubert hearings were created for Courts to determine the soundness of an expert’s opinions. A DaubeH hearing was meant to be a manageable evidentiary-hearing where the Trial Judge could outline and evaluate the qualifications of an expert prior to trial. Louis A. Jacobs, Giving Lie to Antiquated Notions About Scientific Evidence, 22 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 507, 537-38 (1999). These hearings were not required in every case and for every expert. Id. at 540. Some Courts, however, erroneously held that Daubert hearings were mandatory for all experts. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 9th Cir., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 n. 10 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Caubarreaux v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding after remand that where the opposing party thus raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence the district court must hold an in limine hearing a socalled daubert hearing to consider the conflicting evidence   (B) holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial (C) holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury (D) holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue (E) holding that the district court need not conduct a separate evidentiary hearing to adjudicate a socalled daubert motion
Output: (A)
the State’s accusations.” 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973). For this reason, the Chambers court held that Mississippi’s strict rules of evidence, which prevented Leon Chambers from cross-examining a witness who had confessed to the same crime and prevented him from entering into evidence other admissions of the witness’s guilt, violated Chambers’s right to due process by effectively denying him a fair trial. Id. at 285, 302. Chambers recognizes the proposition that criminal defendants possess a “due process right to have clearly exculpatory evidence presented to the jury, at least when there is no strong countervailing systemic interest that justifies its exclusion.” United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978). 94, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>), recognize that a major purpose of a criminal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lie by defendant to government regarding his past criminal history was exculpatory material under brady (B) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (C) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (D) holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (E) holding that a defendant cannot present an effective case when the government suppresses material exculpatory evidence
Output: (E)
extending [the] plaintiff every reasonable inference in his favor.” Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir.1992); see also Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 200 (1st Cir.1999). Plaintiffs may not, however, rely upon “unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law.” Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522 (citation omitted). IV. DISCUSSION A. Legislative Immunity Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Speaker Finneran and President Birmingham (the “legislator defendants”) based on the legislators’ absolute immunity from legal claims for their legislative acts. “Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken in the sphere of legislative activity.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs accuse the legislator 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights (B) holding that legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity (C) holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity (D) holding that vulnerability to legislative alteration would seem to depend on the character of the compliance called for (E) holding that legislative immunity is not forfeited simply because the activities if unprotected might violate a plaintiffs first amendment rights
Output: (A)
is no dispute that the facts of this case establish a valid disclaimer by Ms. Gillette. We need not look beyond the plain language of Section 6205 to determine the effect of this disclaimer and the proper result in this case. , The clear meaning of Section 6205(a) is that the status of the parties and the effect of the disclaimer are fixed to the time of the decedent’s death, regardless of when the disclaimer is actually made. See In re Bute’s Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 339, 341 (1946) (“When a devise is renounced the renunciation will relate back to the moment when the gift was made and prevent it from ever taking effect, leaving the devisee without an interest in the property and without liability in connection therewith.”); In re Estate of McCutcheon, 699 A.2d 746 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>). In addition to relating a disclaimer back to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution (B) holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made (C) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (D) holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury (E) holding in case where plaintiff sought damages resulting from the defendants failure to pay the accidental death benefit claims she filed following death of her husband transfer to south carolina was warranted because with the exception of plaintiffs relocation to the state of west virginia following the death of the decedent the cause of action bears virtually no relation to the forum chosen by the plaintiff
Output: (B)
(Ala.1985)). Taken in isolation, the term “personal relationship” does not necessarily carry with it any pejorative connotation. However, Nichols stated that she used that term after receiving information from Spain that led her to believe that Little and Jackson had a dating relationship. Davis placed that phrase “in greater context” in the February 19 story by referring to Little as being unmarried, thereby, at least arguably, implying the relationship was romantic in nature. The February 20 editorial furthered that notion by referring to the audit as “Little’s sweetheart” deal, because that term had no other obvious meaning considering no one had alleged Little had gained any pecuniary advantage from the audit. See Hale v. Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, 28 So.3d 772, 776 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). When coupled with the statements that Little 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (B) holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government (C) holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant (D) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion (E) holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict
Output: (C)
organizations are included as defendants in the complaint; T.R. 75(A)(5). Regardless of whether Franklin County is a preferred venue, its status as such is trumped by Trial Rule 76(A), which states explicitly that a motion requesting a change of venue “shall be granted only upon a ’ showing that the county where suit is pending is a party.” That is clearly the case here. Accordingly, the trial court was required to grant the City’s motion and erred in failing to do so. See Scott v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 833 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“According to the plain reading of Trial Rule 76, a change of venue occurs when the county is a party to the action.”); see also Bd. of Comm’rs of LaPorte Cnty. v. Great Lakes Transfer, LLC, 888 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). [5] The City also claims that the case should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue (C) holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue (D) holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county (E) holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there
Output: (C)
previously discussed Wilson’s subjective complaints, then identified specific discrepancies between those complaints and the medical evidence. He noted that though she claimed back pain since 2000, she continued working till November 2002, when her company merged and she lost her job. He also noted that the record established that she walked with a normal unassisted gait, in contrast with her complaints about her problems walking. Additionally, he indicated that the record showed she had never been hospitalized for any orthopedic reason and had never taken any potent pain medication, though she claimed severely debilitating pain. The ALJ’s credibility finding was fully explained and is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Wilson also contends, given her inability to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (B) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (C) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record (D) holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations (E) holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record
Output: (C)
of appeal” and remanding for the trial court to make factual findings as to its basis for the dismissal); Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1) (vacating a trial court’s dismissal of an appeal and remanding the case when “[t]he trial court simply granted the motion without elaboration and failed to make the necessary findings as to whether the delay was unreasonable, inexcusable, and caused by [the appellant]”); Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal order and remanding the case for the trial court to make factual findings when the order “merely granted the motion to dismiss” without making findings as to the reasonableness and excusability of the delay as well as on the issue of causation). 13 See Mitchell, 285 Ga. at 577 (2) (<HOLDING>); Cooper v. State, 235 Ga. App. 66, 67 (2) (508 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ajlthough ocga  5648 c sets forth the conditions upon which the trial court may dismiss an appeal for delay it does not by its terms require the court to make a formal recitation of those conditions in its order and affirming a trial courts dismissal order which found that the delay was unreasonable but had no express finding that the delay was inexcusable punctuation omitted (B) holding that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support its dismissal of an appeal when the order set forth the circumstances surrounding the appealing partys 16month delay in paying court costs and the appellee had moved to dismiss the appeal based on an inexcusable delay caused by the appellants failure to pay costs (C) holding that a partys explanation that the delay in paying costs was caused by a desire to avoid seeking public assistance in payment did not rebut inference (D) holding that evidence that a partys delay in paying costs was caused by a miscommunication was not sufficient to rebut inference (E) holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal
Output: (B)
Tort Claims Rossi’s action in the district court asserted four state law torts; 1) tortious interference with contractual relations, 2) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, 3) libel and defamation, and 4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any of these claims, each must fail, To establish a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, Rossi must prove “the absence of justification on the defendant’s part ...” Lee v. Aiu, 85 Hawai'i 19, 936 P.2d 655, 668 (1997). Rossi must also establish the absence of justification to prevail on his intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim. See Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 87 Hawai'i 394, 957 P.2d 1076, 1087 n. 15 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The MPAA’s compliance with the notice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an action for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage may not be directed against an individual who is an officer and the sole stockholder of a corporation which is a party to the economic relationship at issue (B) holding that the difference between interference with contract and prospective relations is that second tort requires showing of malice (C) recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations (D) recognizing action for tortious interference with prospective advantage (E) recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage
Output: (E)
other than delay. The same is true of Mr. Leland’s contention that he was not adequately kept informed by his attorney as the case progressed, that Mr. Largay failed to undertake requested actions, and that he relied too heavily on the prospect of a dramatic change in the legal landscape following Blakely up to Booker. But, there is no factual specificity to any of these arguments. Mr. Leland nowhere suggests what an evidentiary hearing would reveal to justify the relief he has requested. If the § 2255 petitioner wishes an evidentiary hearing, he must at a minimum present a plausible basis to conclude that the evidence would lead to a different result. Here, Mr. Leland has asserted no factual basis for such a conclusion. Cf. Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 61 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on  2255 petitioners mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes (C) holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court (E) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim
Output: (B)
types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a “Specialized Type of Property” ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee
Output: (E)
that Chapter Thirteen plans may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). Defendants concede that plaintiffs’ claims are secured by liens on their principal residences. Therefore, the key issue is whether those hens constitute “security interests” for purposes of the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2). The ich.1992) (finding antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2) inapplicable because creditor’s interest in the principal residence of the debtor was a “hen,” rather than a “security interest,” based on the fact that it arose nonconsensually under state tax act); In re Venable, 48 B.R. 853, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Mitchell, 39 B.R. 696, 700 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence (B) holding that citys tax hen on debtors principal residence was modifiable despite  1322b2 because not consensual and thus not a security interest (C) holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 (D) holding alternatively that rights of undersecured claimant could be modified notwithstanding  1322b2 because mortgagees security interest which attached to appliances machinery furniture and equipment whether fixtures or not was not secured only by a security interest in real property (E) holding modifiable a mechanics hen on debtors principal residence because it was a statutory hen
Output: (B)
we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee’s sexual organ with the child’s female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee’s mouth with the child’s sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child’s sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity
Output: (A)
under the policy where the liability of the insured assumed by the insured under an express contract with the third party is coextensive with the insured’s liability imposed upon him by law____ All the cases are based on the general principle that a contractual exclusion clause contained in an insurance liability policy is not operative in a situation where the insured would have been liable regardless of his contractual promises as an actively negligent wrongdoer to one merely passively negligent, or to one not at all negligent, but by statute or otherwise vicariously liable. Daily Express, Inc. v. Northern Neck Transfer Corporation, 490 F.Supp. 1304 (M.D.Pa.1980) (citing ALR2d 1123 (1959)). See generally The Hertz Corporation v. Smith, 441 Pa.Super. 575, 657 A.2d 1316 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Toombs NJ Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one plaintiff bringing negligence and wantonness claim against car rental company for failing to remove rental car from stolen car list could not recover mental anguish damages because he was never at risk of physical harm but that fact question existed as to whether other plaintiff was at risk of physical harm when police pulled weapon on him (B) holding car lessee specifically contracted with car lessor for liability for any and all loss or damage to rental car thus barring recovery from insurer under exclusion for liability assumed by contract (C) holding that there was probable cause for arrest where officers knew defendants had recently been with suspected drug dealer officers saw defendants car being maneuvered so as to indicate that surveillance had been detected and when officers approached car defendant attempted to place package under car and then pulled the package back inside the car and closed and locked the car door (D) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (E) holding that the factfinder may conclude that recovery is not likely when the car is left on street with keys in the car
Output: (B)
Id. Only if such a re-opening occurred, could the district court have jurisdiction to review the merits of the Secretary’s determination. The McGowen court stressed that in determining whether a claim is in fact the same claim, the Secretary: ... must in fairness look far enough into the proffered factual and legal support to determine whether it is the same claim, and if so, whether it should nevertheless be re-opened as a discretionary matter. Id. at 67. The McGowen court concluded that where the discussion of the merits is followed by a specific conclusion that the claim is denied on res judicata grounds, the decision should not be interpreted as reopening the claim and is therefore not reviewable. Id. at 68. Cf. Taylor for Peck v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). This case is clearly distinguishable from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res judicata inapplicable where previous dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that this line of cases was not on point and that no error was apparent on the face of the record due to lack of reporters record from defaultjudgment hearing because the judgment reflected that it was based only on the pleadings and affidavits that were in the record (C) holding that application of res judicata requires that a prior adjudication include a ruling on the merits (D) holding the trial court is not required to make specific findings of fact on the record for each wham factor if the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the finding of lack of good cause (E) holding the alt reopened the case because of extent of review of evidence and evidentiary hearing and explicitly relying on lack of specific ruling on the basis of res judicata and no specific decimation to reopen the decision in the record
Output: (E)
v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 54 S.Ct. 532, 78 L.Ed. 1007 (1934), a case which held that if the FTC elected to challenge a merger, its challenge must be made prior to the consummation of the merger. Arrow-Hart is not on point since it deals with a challenge by the FTC. Arrow-Hart does not hold that private plaintiffs, such as plaintiffs here, lose standing to challenge a merger after it is consummated. Plaintiffs Have Not Demonstrated A Likelihood of Success on the Merits The probability that plaintiffs will succeed on the merits is negligible for several reasons. First, not one of the plaintiffs has established that it will suffer an antitrust injury as a result of the merger. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-110, 107 S.Ct. 484, 488-89, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff seeking injunction under clayton act  16 must allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent  (B) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (C) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit (D) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (E) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing
Output: (D)
an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons’s concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. “We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer’s duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
Output: (E)
(Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief at 12). AFTC has not indicated the precise expense that it believes GFIA should have shouldered, or cited case law on the issue. AFTC’s claim regarding legal fees is unpersuasive. The three A & M companies and GFIA were jointly represented by Greenberg Traurig regarding both the PSA, to which all four entities were signatories, and the PSA Action, in which all four entities were co-plaintiffs. The A & M companies and GFIA each benefited from that joint representation, and AFTC has not disputed that Greenberg Traurig’s rates were reasonable. In such circumstances, parties are not required to divide legal expenses equally; one party may pay all legal fees for joint representation and still receive fair consideration in return. See Frank, 48 F.3d at 639 (<HOLDING>). AFTC has thus failed to establish that the A 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where codefendants conducted a joint defense that provided a benefit to each defendant the joint services represented fair consideration for the payment of reasonable compensation regardless of which defendant paid the bill (B) recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment (C) holding that the rights conferred to a joint account holder by massachusetts statutes and case law in fact give a joint account holder legal title in a joint account (D) holding that childrens book for which plaintiff provided the text and defendant provided the illustrated photographs was a joint work in which each party owned an undivided ownership and thus neither could be held liable to the other for copyright infringement (E) holding in a class action derivative suit that the joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all the parties to the defense except in the situation where one of the joint defendants becomes an adverse party in a litigation
Output: (A)
Analysis ¶ 13 Oklahoma law reflects this State's strong public policy in favor of arbitration. See 12 O.S8. Supp.2006 § 1857(A); see also Towe, Hester & Erwin, Inc. v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 1997 OK CIV APP 58, ¶ 24, 947 P.2d 594, 599. Section 1857(A) of the New Act declares arbitration agreements "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract." This provision reveals "a clear legislative intent that any disputes arising from the interpretation or application" of such agreements "shall have an immediate and speedy resolution by required arbitration." Voss v. City of Oklahoma City, 1980 OK 148, ¶ 8, 618 P.2d 925, 928; see Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship, 2006 OK 90, ¶ 23, 155 P.3d 16, 25 (<HOLDING>). "[Clourts generally look with favor upon 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration in the faa (B) recognizing  1857a is a clear expression of oklahomas policy favoring arbitration agreements (C) recognizing the supreme courts repeated reaffirmation of new mexicos strong public policy favoring resolution of disputes through arbitration (D) recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in waste disposal services (E) recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in electricity sales
Output: (B)
at 1168 (quoting Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982)). The City stresses that it is not trying “to have its cake and eat it-too” because it has scrupulously abided by the terms of injunctions issued here and in state court, and because it urged the Ninth Circuit to reach the merits on appeal. Mot. at 13; see also Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1372 n.6 (noting that it may weigh equitably in favor of vacatur if the party seeking it did not seek to avoid appellate review). The City also observes that both the original and amended ordinance “are now. a dead letter on independent state law.grounds,” making this Court’s constitutional holding unnecessary. Id. at 13-14; see also Coyne et al. v. City and County of San Francisco (dkt. 133-11) at 1 (<HOLDING>); Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 354 (noting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that californias ellis act preempts both ordinances (B) holding that fehba completely preempts (C) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (D) holding that the faa preempts californias broughtoncruz rule which prohibited mandatory arbitration of three particular types of claims if the plaintiff sought a public injunction (E) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims
Output: (A)