niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Justice BAER files a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice CASTILLE joins. 1 . The three distinct factors that must be considered are as follows: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements will Cmwlth.2003) (concluding that substantial evidence supported indicated report that daycare provider’s son had abused a child so as to support denial of request for expungement). Since its decision Pa.Cmwlth.2005) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The issue presented is a question of law; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a classmates testimony of sexual assault provided substantial evidence to support a students suspension from the university (B) holding moot the plaintiffs challenge to a universitys requirement that foreign students carry health insurance where named plaintiffs were no longer students at the university (C) holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault (D) holding evidence of sexual assault relevant to show defendants motive in kidnapping victim (E) holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct
Output: (A)
or visit the child, and failure to participate in a reunification plan}. 11 . E.J.S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 754 P.2d 749, 751 (Alaska 1988). 12 . Id. (quoting D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973)). 13 . Id. See also Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 439 (Alaska 1983) (indicating that while involuntary incarceration might not suffice to establish abandonment, an eight-month voluntary absence prior to incarceration would) legislatively overruled on other grounds, § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998. 14 . 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998). 15 . Id. at 482. See also E.J.S., 754 P.2d at 751 (affirming finding of abandonment based on father's failure to make reasonable efforts to locate and communicate with his daughter for five years); In re B.J., 530 P.2d 747, 750 (Alaska 1975) (<HOLDING>). 16 . AS 47.10.088(a)(2). 17 . AS 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection n when after release from prison the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents (B) holding that fathers failure to acquire suitable home for his children pay even nominal child support visit or correspond with his children or make efforts to secure permanent employment were sufficient to demonstrate conscious disregard of his parental obligations (C) holding that a parents responsibility to support his children is not suspended upon his incarceration and that imprisonment cannot be used as an excuse to escape parental obligations (D) holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support (E) recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears
Output: (B)
of his insurance window with the Social Security Administration. The ALJ opined that Grogan’s limited ability to function during 1990-91 was due to his illegal drug use, and the ALJ dismissed Grogan’s application for benefits at step two of the five-step process. The Appeals Council affirmed, and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Standard ofRevieiv and Analysis Although the agency’s decision not to reopen a claimant’s application for benefits is discretionary and therefore not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir.1990), once the agency reopens an application for benefits, it assumes the responsibility to adjudicate a claimant’s case properly. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 180-81 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Cash v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo (B) recognizing jurisdiction to review the commissioners procedure after the agency reopens an application for benefits (C) holding that when considering an agency action as to which the statute does not specify the standard of review the courts of appeals must proceed pursuant to the apas general standard of review for agency actions in 5 usc  7062a (D) holding that the bias streamlining procedure does not compromise appellate review because the ijs decision becomes the final agency action subject to direct review by the court of appeals (E) holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review
Output: (B)
that “[a]n affidavit in which the plaintiff merely restates the conclusory allegations of the complaint” is insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment). Second, Defendants argue that the portion of the A. Zaks Affirmation about whether certain comparator sites are similar to the Nike Site is inadmissible as unhelpful lay testimony. (See Defs.’ Opp’n 4 (citing A. Zaks May Aff'n ¶¶ 20-24).) Given, again, that Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument in their Reply, and that Plaintiffs have failed to proffer evidence, or even suggest, that A. Zaks has sufficient expertise to offer an opinion as to the similarity of development sites, the Court will not consider this portion of the A. Zaks Affirmation. See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 911-12 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (same). Third, Defendants argue that certain 
 Holding statements: (A) holding lay opinion inadmissible if it does not help the factfinder to understand the witness testimony or to decide a fact a fact in issue citing fedrevid  701b adams v city of new york 993 fsupp2d 306 324 edny2014 (B) holding it is a question of fact (C) holding that lay witness opinion as to guilt of defendant inadmissible (D) holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion (E) holding that conflicting testimony raised fact issue fact finder was not obliged to accept one experts testimony over the other
Output: (A)
support, we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. This Court has acknowledged that “the importance of first-person observation and preventing disruption to the family setting justifies deference to the trial court.” Id. In relevant part, Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(1) provides that a child support order may be modified only “upon a showing of changed circumstances so substan tial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable[.]” See also Vagenas v. Vagenas, 879 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). The party seeking the modification bears the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (B) holding that postsecondary education support orders are modified pursuant to the statute governing child support modification (C) holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to  current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on  delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support (D) holding that pursuant to prwora and iirira congress had evinced its intention to occupy the field of alien eligibility for postsecondary education and invalidating on federal preemption grounds section 8 of californias proposition 187 which denied public postsecondary education to immigrants not lawfully present (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification because the childs increased need for support and the former husbands ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wifes petition for modification was filed
Output: (B)
1995, writ denied); In re J.F., 888 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1994, no writ); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); D.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ); In re L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ). 40 . In re C.D.B., 94 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet. h.); In re W.C., 56 S.W.3d 863, 867-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Rodriguez v. Tex. De 74 (Ct.App.1988) (basing right on a stat im.App.1996); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 303 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Jackson v. State, 898 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). 103 . See State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1969) (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 596, 90 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (C) holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (E) holding that a jury charge submitting preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof was error that could be raised for the first time on appeal
Output: (E)
Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn.1986)) (emphasis added). Thus: When read together, these [business risk] provisions exclude coverage when there has been no physical injury to tangible property other than the insured’s work. Standard Fire, 972 S.W.2d at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, there is coverage where there has been physical injury to tangible property that is not the insured’s work. As we have pointed out earlier in this opinion, we agree with the district court’s view that Love’s tangible real property is not the insured’s “work,” and that it was physically damaged by having the construction debris from the road-widening project dumped on it. Therefore, this exclusion does not apply. See Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Minn.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn.2002). Cf. Dewitt 
 Holding statements: (A) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (B) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (C) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (D) holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for claim against insured by third party arising out of insureds damage to third partys property (E) holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to subcontractors work because damage did not arise from insureds performing operations on subcontractors work
Output: (D)
(1874), the equitable tolling doctrine provides that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.’ ” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-397 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), quoting from Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. at 348. “This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 396-397, 66 S.Ct. at 585. One court has held that equitable tolling does not apply to § 727(e)(2). See Johnson, 187 B.R. at 986-989 (<HOLDING>). The Court based its holdings on two grounds, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (B) holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose (C) holding that a statute of repose sets absolute parameters of any action (D) holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed (E) holding that  727e is a statute of repose and an essential prerequisite to the proceeding
Output: (E)
issued a press release when this occurred, claiming that “[t]aken as a whole — and not selectively out of context — these documents more than demonstrate that our company responsibly researched, manufactures and markets its products to adult smokers.” Ex. to Def.’s Mem. of Law, Tab F. In May 1998, State v. Philip Morris settled. Incorporated in the consent judgment was a provision permitting the plaintiffs to seek court approval for public disclosure of those documents that were subject to a protective order, over which the defendants had asserted a privilege but for which no privilege was found to exist. The plaintiffs sought said approval, and the court initially granted it. * The defendants opposed the order, and subsequently secured a stay . of Am., 91 F.R.D. 84, 90 (E.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, nothing in New York case law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial because it is settled that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs (B) holding that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the protection of the work product doctrine (C) holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary (D) holding that when a party discloses an item to an adversary even in the context of settlement a waiver of the work product privilege is effected (E) holding declaration or affidavit must support work product claim for documents listed solely as work product on privilege log
Output: (D)
in the context of an election case, even in the absence of a class action, and concluding that the case was not moot); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) (concluding that plaintiffs’ class action challenge to New York’s Election Law was capable of repetition yet evading review, although primary election had passed and the petitioners would be eligible to vote in the next primary); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (in challenge to a provision of Tennessee’s election law, concluding that, although plaintiff would be eligible to vote in the next election, the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We adopt the approach of the former cases, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added (B) holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future (C) holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future (D) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (E) holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected
Output: (E)
that Edmonds waived his objections to the striking of Ashe and Smith by requesting the trial court to reseat only juror Nelson. On the merits, the State does not dispute the trial court’s finding as to Nelson but argues that the trial court implicitly found that Ashe and Smith were struck for race-neutral, non-pretextual reasons, that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and that the trial court appropriately remedied any harm by seating Nelson. III. We turn to the State’s argument that petitioner waived his Batson argument. The State contends that because petitioner asked for one remedy and received the relief he requested—the reseating of Nelson—he cannot now challenge the court’s remedial actions. See Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 545, 735 A.2d 1061, 1070 (1999)(<HOLDING>). We hold that petitioner did not waive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (B) holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury (C) holding there are no grounds to appeal when defendant receives the remedy he requested from the trial court (D) holding there is no right to a specific dollar remedy (E) holding mandamus will lie to prevent trial court from exercising jurisdiction it does not have even if there is adequate remedy by appeal
Output: (C)
55% of United States seafood production and accounts for approximately 40% of Alaska’s international exports. Congress did not relinquish its constitutional authority and confer upon states title to, or exclusive regulatory authority over, fish in navigable waters within state boundaries by enacting the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 130Í-1315. Rather, Congress expressly “retain[ed] all its ... rights in and powers of regulation and control of ... navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce.... ” Id. § 1314(a); see also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127, 88 S.Ct. 265, 19 L.Ed.2d 329 (1967) (concluding that the SLA “left congressional power over commerce ... precisely where it found [it]”); Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 853 n. 3 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The SLA conferred upon states concurrent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters (B) recognizing that navigable waters railroads and highways are channels of commerce which can be regulated under congress commerce powers (C) holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable (D) holding that state ownership of submerged lands remains subject to congress paramount power over navigable waters under the commerce clause (E) holding that sovereign immunity barred suit by indian tribe seeking to compel state officials to turn over ownership and control of disputed lands and waters
Output: (D)
3 . As noted previously, this presumption may be rebutted "where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or disease existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by such service.” 38 U.S.C. § 1111; see Horn, 25 Vet.App. at 235. 4 . Board findings regarding whether a claimant suffered from an injury or disease in service, and whether that in-service disease or injury is related to a current disability or one that preexisted service, are questions of fact to be reviewed by the Court under the "clearly erroneous” standard. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 79, 82 (2006) (Board's finding that a veteran suffered an in-service event, injury, or disease is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard); Coghill v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 342, 345 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (B) holding that boards finding of no relationship between any inservice injury and a current disability was not clearly erroneous (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) holding that when court applies the clearly erroneous standard court may not reverse boards finding of fact if after court reviews the record in its entirety the finding is supported by a plausible basis (E) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous
Output: (B)
and unanimous negative performance reviews from the moment that she began working as a medical resident. The court noted “[e]very doctor to evaluate [the plaintiff] found that her performance as a surgeon was insufficient to allow her to continue in the program. No evidence of bias was alleged regarding most of these doctors, leaving a chorus of negative evaluations unrebutted by a single positive testimonial.” Id. at 318. That is not the case here. While Mr. Ohlmeyer’s performance evaluations were largely negative, he did earn some praise from his supervisors. In addition, |49we note that the U.S. Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed the viability of the Bienkowski rule since Sreeram. See, e.g., Berquist v. Washington Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we find that Mr. Ohl-meyer was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining the propriety of summary judgment credibility determinations may not be made  (B) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (C) holding that credibility determinations are for the jury (D) holding that it is not appropriate for the district court to determine whether subjective criteria are bona fide in effect making dispositive determinations about the employers credibility on summary judgment (E) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if the resolution of material issues depends upon credibility determinations
Output: (D)
but indeed compels it”) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmation of the immigration judge’s decision; the record evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion. Lin also argues the immigration judge erred in failing to find a nexus between his Falun Gong activities and the confiscation of his gaming equipment, and in failing to properly review the State Department Human Rights Report on China. However, these claims have not been administratively exhausted because Lin did not present them in his brief for his BIA appeal. This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been administratively exhausted. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Lin also argues this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding only claims properly presented to the bia and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this court in an immigration appeal (B) holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte (C) holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal (D) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (E) holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court
Output: (A)
84 (3d Cir.1999) ("[W]hen parents unilaterally withdraw their children from public school, absent mitigating circumstances, they are not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition until they request review proceedings.”) (citing Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 156-58 & n. 14 (3d Cir.1994)); Marissa F. v. The William Penn Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 2304738, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 20, 2005) (barring plaintiffs from receiving reimbursement for any time student was in private school before their request for due process). 16 . Although not clear, to the extent the State is arguing that Loveland was inappropriate because it did not meet the IDEA’S requirements, the argument fails. See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Warren G., 190 F.3d at 84 (rejecting argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 12a2 did not apply to a private placement memorandum which was subject to a section 42 exemption (B) recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board but concluding that the ideas mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parents choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate (C) holding that when a private placement of securities purported to be exempt under rule 506 rjegardless of whether the private placement actually complied with the substantive requirements of regulation d or rule 506 the securities sold to plaintiffs are federal covered securities because they were sold pursuant to those rules (D) holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement (E) holding that a private alternative placement need not meet the criteria of a fape
Output: (E)
— THE COURT: You just need to answer the question. JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. On appeal, Moton argues that Juror Five’s initial response to the trial court indicates that the verdict was not unanimous and, therefore, that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to continue its deliberations. But while not entirely clear, the most logical interpretation of Juror Five’s response to the court’s first question shows that she may not h a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. . . .”). 10 Freeman v. State, 328 Ga. App. 756, 762 (5) (760 SE2d 708) (2014) (punctuation omitted); accord Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127, 127 (739 SE2d 423) (2013). 11 Freeman, 328 Ga. App. at 762 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Graydon v. State, 313 Ga. App. 580, 582 (722 SE2d 173) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 12 McCullough v. State, 317 Ga. App. 853, 853 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel (B) holding that there is no indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying the discoverysanction motion (C) holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony (D) holding that trial court erred in denying defendants request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial (E) holding that trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendants request for firstoffender treatment when there was no indication that trial court refused to consider request or erroneously believed that such was not permitted
Output: (E)
recognized the “exceptional” nature of deific-command delusions, 200 N.J. at 249-50, 979 A.2d 312, and cited a few examples. See Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1272 (10th Cir.2007) (observing that a defendant could be found legally insane if “mental illness caused him to believe that he had a warrant from the President or a command from God to kill the victim”), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1079, 128 S.Ct. 2875, 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo.1992) (determining that the insanity defense may be estab lished where “the defendant’s cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the act has been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has decreed the act”); State v. Cameron, 100 Was A.2d 520, 674 F.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In considering the deific-command situation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal (B) holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court (C) recognizing the need for amplification beyond the right and wrong instruction where the defendant claimed to have killed under the command of god (D) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence (E) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present
Output: (C)
money on him. He then equipped the confidential informant with an audio recording device to record the conversation. Sergeant Brawner and the confidential informant planned a signal for the confidential informant to give if he saw the money. The confidential informant drove to the meeting location. On his way there, the informant talked to Renteria on his cell phone. Renteria told the informant that a police patrol car was in the parking lot. They agreed to meet at a nearby Burger King. The informant notified Sergeant Brawner of the change in location. At the Burger King, the confidential informant went inside with Renteria, Appellan weigh the significance that the meeting place changed, due to a police patrol car being at the original planned location. See Matthews, 431 S.W.3d at 603 (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s other ground for suppressing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a trial courts bestinterest determination is a subjective assessment based on the totality of circumstances (B) holding foreseeability is based on the totality of the circumstances not on a mechanical prior similar incidents rule (C) holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances (D) recognizing that district courts finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances is ordinarily accorded deference (E) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable
Output: (C)
March 23, 2005, the court held a hearing and, by order bearing the same date, denied the motion, based on the Board’s untimeliness. Discussion Appellant, asserting the interests of the Director and the Animal Services Division, the latter a party to the administrative proceeding and a part of County government, contends the circuit court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration without applying the usual standard of review applicable to decisions of administrative agencies. Appellee has not filed a brief on appeal. The standard for judicial review of administrative decisions is well settled. As summarized by the Court of Appeals in Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 729 A.2d 376 (1999). A court’s role i 5, 406, 880 A.2d 1118 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Dep’t of Labor v. Boardley, 164 Md. App. 404, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reviewing a gaming commission decision the court will examine the record to determine if there is any evidence to support the commissions order (B) holding that a reviewing courts task is to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the administrative agency on the record as a whole to support the agencys conclusions (C) holding that a courts role in reviewing an administrative agency decision is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agencys findings and conclusions and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law (D) holding that under the substantial evidence standard the reviewing court must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the agencys conclusion (E) holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact 
Output: (B)
295 Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814 (1982) (same); Hunter v. Board of Educ., Md.Ct.App., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982) (same); Swidryk v. Saint Michael’s Med. Ctr., N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div., 20l N.J.Super. 601, 493 A.2d 641 (1985) (same); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., N.Y.Ct.App., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1979) (same); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., N.Y.Ct.App., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (1979) (often-cited case refusing to recognize educational malpractice tort based on claim that school failed to adequately educate student); Poe v. Hamilton, Ohio Ct.App., 56 Ohio App.3d 137, 565 N.E.2d 887 (1990) (stating public policy precludes cause of action for educational malpractice); see also Ross v. Creighton Univ., 7th Cir., 957 F.2d 410 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Moore, the Iowa Supreme Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that illinois supreme court would refuse to recognize the tort of educational malpractice (B) holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court (C) recognizing that only the illinois supreme court could finally resolve the issue of implicit repeal explaining the state must resolve this conflict internally (D) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction (E) holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence
Output: (A)
supports the general proposition that consent to a search can be prospectively given pursuant to a contract. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628-29, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 1279, 90 L.Ed. 1477, 1482 (1946), judgment vacated by 330 U.S. 800, 67 S.Ct. 857, 91. L.Ed. 1259 (1947). In other words, a person can contract away the constitutional right to be free from unconstitutional searches. See id. In Zap, an aeronautical engineer entered into a contract with the Department of the Navy to perform experimental work involving test flights of airplanes. Id. at 626, 66 S.Ct. at 1278, 90 L.Ed. at 1480. Under one of the terms of the contract, the engineer specifically agreed to permit the government to search the account and billing records of his business during the term of the contr p.1996) (<HOLDING>); People v. Hellenthal, 186 Mich.App. 484, 465 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (B) holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches (C) holding defendant contractually agreed to intensive probation to avoid prison (D) holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation (E) holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation
Output: (D)
the district court’s ruling are considered abandoned on appeal and not reviewable by this Court). Pending for review is the district court’s disposition of Hopson’s disparate treatment claims regarding the above five employment actions, brought pursuant to Title VII and Michigan’s EUiott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. A. Direct Evidencé of Discrimination Under both Title VII and Michigan law, a plaintiff may set forth a prima facie case of employment discrimination by presenting direct evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion)); Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp., 225 Mich.App. 601, 572 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Mich.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). “[DJirect evidence is that evidence which, if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (B) holding that when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination federal law provides appropriate guidance for analyzing claims brought under the michigan civil rights act (C) holding that when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination price waterhouse applies rather than mcdonnell douglas (D) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (E) holding the court may look to state law for guidance where federal law is not fully developed
Output: (B)
as the targets of his violence. The evidence in this case consisted primarily of the testimony of eyewitnesses and Ellis himself. In prior cases where the evidence consists of witness or victim testimony and the testimony of the accused, this court has steadfastly held that the accused’s credibility is critical and, therefore, prior convictions are highly probative. See Smith v. State, 2009 Ark. 453, 343 S.W.3d 319; Benson, 357 Ark. 43, 160 S.W.3d 341; Turner, 325 Ark. 237, 926 S.W.2d 843; Schalski, 322 Ark. 63, 907 S.W.2d 693. The admissibility of prior crimes for impeachment purposes is determined on a case-by-case basis. See Turner, 325 Ark. at 242, 926 S.W.2d at 846. Inquiry into those crimes is not unlimited. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 342, 347, 645 S.W.2d 690, 693 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, however, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession (B) holding that the probative value of prior felony convictions varies with their nature and number (C) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (D) holding that when the accused takes the stand the jury can be made aware of the number and nature of prior convictions within the restrictions of rule 609 but that some impermissible details must remain undisclosed (E) holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection
Output: (D)
a threat to water quality because they do not introduce any invasive species from outside the Great Lakes. EPA has properly rejected this argument, noting that Lakers can spread or more rapidly distribute invasive species already present, in the Great Lakes. Id. at 501. 16 . Federal regulation permits such limits to be expressed narratively if the calculation of numeric limits is "infeasible.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(3). 17 . EPA also claims general prohibitions can be BMPs, citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, but does not offer an example of something as general as the WQBEL standard being found to be a BMP. As discussed herein, the EPA’s charac-terizationis inconsistent with regulations that require WQBELs to "ensure compliance.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). 18 . EPA’s response is that petitioners’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (B) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (C) holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (E) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
Output: (A)
outline two methods for dealing with thirdparty liability: “cost avoidance” and “pay and recover later.” 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(a)(2) (2005). When the probable liability of a third party is established at the time a claim is filed, the state Medicaid agency is required to practice cost avoidance by rejecting the claim and returning it to the provider for a determination of the amount of third-party liability. See 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(b) (2005). When, on the other hand, probable thirdparty liability is established or other benefits become available after the claim is filed, the state Medicaid agency is required to use the pay and recover later method, see 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(c) (2005), also known as “pay and chase,” Atlanticare Med. Center v. Com’r of Div., 785 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Mass. 2003) (<HOLDING>). When a state Medicaid agency is obligated to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (B) holding that the court does not examine legislative history when the statutes text and context are not subject to more than one plausible reading (C) holding that 42 usc  1396aa13a which requires states to make reasonable reimbursement to providers was enforceable by the providers pursuant to section 1983 (D) holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action (E) holding that natural reading of 42 usc  1396a25b and legislative history demonstrate congressional intent that state medicaid agencies seek reimbursement from liable third parties rather than providers
Output: (E)
in Bowman were appointed by the court to make educational decisions for children who were wards of the district, so that the advocates effectively acted as “parents” under the IDEA. See id. Accordingly, even though they were licensed attorneys, they could not recover fees as educational advocates because they were not acting in an attorney-client capacity. See id. Pressley distinguishes from this scenario because she was employed by the Chris Anwah Law Firm, instead of being appointed by the court as an advocate. See Adewusi Deck ¶ 1. Furthermore, Pressley’s work on this matter was similar to that performed by the billing attorneys. See PL’s Mot., Ex. B. Yet because she is not a member of the D.C. Bar, Pressley is not entitled to attorney rates. See Dickens, 724 F.Supp.2d at 120 (<HOLDING>); Agapito v. District of Columbia, 477 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (B) holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees (C) holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees (D) holding that attorneys not admitted to the dc bar are not entitled to reimbursement but awarding fees at paralegal rates as equitable relief (E) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees
Output: (D)
admitted in evidence that contained a "department of corrections social and criminal history [ evaluation of the defendant] prepared by an unnamed department employee." Grey v. Texas, 299 S.W.3d 902, 906, 910 (Tex.App.2009). The court concluded that the "criminal history summary, not having been made in anticipation of prosecutorial use, was not testimonial.” Id. at 910. 8 . See generally , 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 190, 193 (2005) (concluding that proof of service of a domestic relations restraining order was nontestimonial); Colorado v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060-61 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (determining that documentary evidence showing prior convictions and affidavits used to establish chain of custody for certain documents were nontestimonial); Iowa v. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d 228, 237-38 (Iowa 2008) (<HOLDING>); Kansas v. Dukes, 38 Kan.App.2d 958, 174 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a certified letter verifying that a defendant did not have a valid drivers license was nontestimonial and that washington courts have long recognized the inherent reliability and admissibility of driving records (B) holding that driving records were nontestimonial (C) holding that a certified abstract of a defendants driving record was nontestimonial (D) holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant (E) holding that the admission of a certified document stating that defendants license was suspended was nontestimonial
Output: (C)