niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of his eyes and fired in that direction twice, killing [the victim]. These facts suggest a design to effect the death of [the victim] and therefore do not support a second degree murder instruction.” Taylor v. State, 998 P.2d at 1231. Reviewing the OCCA’s legal conclusions de novo, we concluded that if Mr. Taylor did not aim, but rather the gun was simply flailing around as he testified, such behavior would be imminently dangerous to another person, and it would evince a depraved mind with a disregard of human life, but stands in stark contrast to others in which this court and the OCCA concluded that a lesser-offense instruction was not needed, because in those cases, the evidence did not support the lesser-included offense. See Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1010 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. State, 84 P.3d 731, 750 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (B) holding that firstdegree sexual abuse is a lesserincluded offense of firstdegree sodomy (C) holding that the defendant was not entitled to a lesserincluded firstdegree manslaughter instruction when his attorney was forced to concede at oral argument that no evidence supported the adequate provocation element (D) holding that firstdegree sexual abuse is a lesserincluded offense of firstdegree rape (E) holding that it was error to direct entry of a conviction for a permissive lesserincluded offense based on the fact that it was supported by the evidence because the greater crime was not charged in a manner that encompassed the intent element of the permissive lesserincluded offense and the jury did not make a finding regarding that intent element
Output: (C)
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the dicta in this footnote, contrary to the holding expressed in the main body of the opinion, provided that a person may be convicted of attempted murder if evidence showed that he or she acted knowingly or intentionally. Based on this footnote in Vigil, the trial court and the court of appeals denied Casey's challenges to the jury instructions concerning attempted murder. 3. Other Utah Cases Concerning Attempted Murder 283 In other cases in which we have discussed the level of culpability necessary to convict a defendant of attempted murder, we have consistently required intentional conduct. A month before we decided Maestas, we held that an attempted manslaughter conviction requires intentional conduct. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982) (<HOLDING>). In that case, we reasoned "that one cannot be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one can be convicted of attempted manslaughter under the subsections of section 765205 that require intentional conduct but not under the subsection that only requires the mens rea of recklessness (B) holding that those crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the acca (C) holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea (D) holding that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under section 16 (E) holding that under california law section 28002 requires a reckless mens rea
Output: (A)
reported in a New Jersey opinion those cases must be regarded as authority). The courts of all other jurisdictions agree that a partner execute ing a guaranty in the name of the partnership is engaging in a transaction that is uncommon to the business of the partnership and will be binding on the partnership only if that partner has the express authority of the entire partnership to act. See, e.g., In re 9221 Associates v. Industrial State Bank, No.CIV.A.91-0196-CV-W-1, 1991 WL 405172, at *3 (W.D.Mo. Oct. 7, 1991) (“holding that [wjhere the limited partners have not ratified the transaction, a partnership is not bound by a promissory note or mortgage executed by a general partner acting beyond the scope of his authority.”); Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 207 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>); Jamestown Banking Co. v. Conneaut Lake Dock & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a mechanic working in a garage owned by a partnership is an employee of the partnership not the individual partner (B) holding one partner can not sic maintain an action at law against another partner to recover an amount claimed by him by reason of partnership transactions until there has been a final settlement of the affairs of the partnership (C) holding that a partner who is without actual authority has no power to bind the partnership in a transaction that is not within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business any person dealing with a partner can only rely on the partners acts if they are within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business (D) holding that a partnership agreement that contained prohibitions against the sale or assignment of a partners interest in the partnership without the others consent would be enforced (E) holding that absent an agreement to the contrary any partner can act as an agent of the partnership when apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership 
Output: (C)
by this Court. The documents presented to the Court are not forms as prescribed by the Secretary of which the Debtors have verified under penalty of perjury. Instead, the Debtors submitted affidavits of Charles D. Tobias and documents entitled “Actual and Constructive Notice of Declaration.” In filing bankruptcy, the Debtors have sought this Court’s protection from creditors, including the Internal Revenue Service. However, the Debtors have continued to ig nore this Court’s orders and the Internal Revenue laws in failing to file tax returns. The Court finds that the Debtors’ disregard of this Court’s orders as well as their duty to file tax returns is evidence that the Debtors lacked good faith in filing this bankruptcy case. Matter of Crayton, 169 B.R. 243, 245 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1994) (<HOLDING>). Section 1307(c) of Title 11 provides that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to file correct tax returns constitutes bad faith and makes it difficult for the court to confirm a plan (B) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge (C) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (D) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith (E) holding on an objection to confirmation of plan that the debtors failure to file tax returns before filing the chapter 13 plan and debtors failure for six months to comply with federal law constituted a lack of good faith sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case
Output: (E)
Stacy Danley’s counterclaim is a nullity because he failed to pay the filing fee for it in the State Court. This argument is without merit because an unpaid filing fee in a state court does not nullify a claim in a federal court. Stephanie Danley’s counterclaim is a closer call because she did not claim money damages. If her wrongful foreclosure claim is successful, however, her rights and options regarding the Residence will expand, the Residence itself will re-enter the bankruptcy estate (subject to Liberty Bank’s reinstated mortgage), and Liberty Bank would presumably have a large deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, it is “related to” their bankruptcy case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Cf. Land Ventures for 2, LLC v. Fritz, 551 B.R. 846, 850 (M.D.Ala.2015) (<HOLDING>), appeal docketed, No. 15-15303 (11th Cir. Nov. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawsuit alleging malpractice by an accountant in a bankruptcy case was a core matter within a bankruptcy courts jurisdiction (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the district court had bankruptcy jurisdiction over a professional malpractice action filed by a title 11 debtor against the law firm that represented him in his bankruptcy case under section 1334b because the malpractice claim arose in the bankruptcy case (D) holding that a corporate chapter 7 debt ors malpractice claim against its bankruptcy attorney was related to its bankruptcy case (E) holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case
Output: (D)
ponds started migrating through the soil to underlying groundwater almost immediately after beginning pond operation in 1960.” Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded as a matter of law that property damage occurred upon initial exposure in 1960, and should have concluded as a matter of law that property damage occurred in each policy period from 1961-70. [Id. at 995-96 (citations omittedXemphasis added).] The court rejected the insurers’ argument that the insured had failed to demonstrate “actual injury” during the relevant policy periods and held that “[u]nder the continuous trigger theory, proof of actual injury in the sense of manifestation of injury is not required.” Ibid. See also Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 763 (3d Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. California 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  exposure and manifestation occurred at the time of the damage causing oil spill (B) holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did (C) holding that canadian citizens have standing to intervene in nepa based suit against agency on the basis of citizenss claims that possible oil spill from transalaskan oil pipeline might cause damage to canada (D) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (E) holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed
Output: (A)
to Esparza’s claims for disparate pay, hostile work environment, and retaliation, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting UTEP’s plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly,, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Esparza’s claims for disparate pay, hostile work environment, and retaliation. 1 . 1 Because TCHRA was enacted in part to "provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its subsequent amendments,” we look to relevant federal law for guidance when the relevant provisions of Tide VII are analogous. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001(1); San Antonio Water Sys., 461 S.W.3d at 136-37; Auto-Zone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). 2 . See, e.g., Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 158 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a police officer suffered no adverse employment action where he was temporarily placed on paid administrative leave (B) holding that employee does not suffer adverse employment action when placed on paid administrative leave pending investigation and citing cases (C) holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action (D) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (E) holding that termination is an adverse employment action
Output: (A)
assert a UCL claim, and even if she had standing, her claim fails on its merits. A To assert a UCL claim, a private plaintiff needs to have “suffered injury in fact and ... lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17204. This provision requires Rubio to show that she has lost “money or property” sufficient to consti tute an “injury in fact” under Article III of the Constitution, see Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2009), and also requires a “causal connection” between Capital One’s alleged UCL violation and her injury in fact, Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 4 te standing under the UCL. Aron v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., 143 Cal.App.4th 796, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555, 559 (2006); cf. Birdsong, 590 F.3d at 961 (<HOLDING>). Rubio has also alleged a causal connection 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing will not lie where matters remain conjectural or hypothetical (B) holding that hypothetical injury was insufficient for standing (C) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (D) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (E) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
Output: (B)
of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story to the employer.’ ” Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 595 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 494 (6th Cir.1990)). 5 . Other circuits have required something akin to a full evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.2008) ("Because [the plaintiff’s] due process rights were violated, it was not improper for the district court to order a full evidentia ry hearing.... [The plaintiff] was entitled to a full post-termination hearing because there was no way to give [him] the process that he had been due, which was an opportunity to respond before the termination occurred.”); Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1476-77 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a limited pretermination hearing was sufficient where it was followed by a more comprehensive posttermination hearing (B) holding that a pretermination hearing need not be in front of a neutral decisionmaker so long as the state affords plaintiff subsequent to his termination a full adversarial hearing before a neutral adjudicator (C) holding that a nursing home participating in the medicaid program is not entitled to a pretermination hearing (D) holding that due process does not require the state to provide an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing where posttermination remedies are available (E) holding law requires court to consider full record of any evidentiary hearing even if hearing held by different judge
Output: (B)
at 399. In so holding, the majority of the en banc court rejected the argument of the dissenters that these allegations were insufficient as a matter of law to deter an inmate from pursuing a lawsuit. Id. at 403 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting); see also id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In contrast to Bell’s complaints, which presented a close case, the en banc court observed that it “need not pause for long in the case of plaintiff X: his allegations, if true, certainly meet the standard. Harassment, physical threats, and transfer to the area of the prison used to house mentally disturbed inmates, especially combined with the conditions allegedly present there, would likely have a strong deterrent effect.” Id. at 398; 'see also Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the foregoing principles, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (B) holding that there was no basis for adverse inference instruction for failure to produce emails until five days before trial (C) holding that the record did not compel a finding of persecution where an alien was detained for five or six days (D) holding that committing prisoner to administrative segregation for five days was adverse (E) holding that due process requires that a hearing be held within a reasonable time after confinement to administrative segregation and finding that five days plainly satisfied this requirement
Output: (D)
record [to] suggest[ ] that the district court would have imposed the same or a greater sentence.” Id. at 750. What sentence the district court would have imposed had it considered the guidelines advisory, however, is unknown. As the government states in its brief, “the court declined to say how it would have exercised discretion to sentence defendant without guidelines.” Moreover, the comments of the sentencing judge here that “the defendant and his family enjoyed a lavish lifestyle at the expense of many unsuspecting victims” and that “a sentence in the middle range of the Guidelines would sufficiently punish the defendant and deter others from committing like or similar crimes” are insufficient to say with fair assurance that the statutory Booker error was harmless. Id. at 749-50 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum (B) holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines (C) holding that the government could not meet its burden under harmless error analysis because the record indicated that district court would have imposed shorter sentencing under advisory guidelines scheme (D) holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range
Output: (B)
the Government submitted a New York state court document entitled “Sentence and Commitment,” which reflects that De Leon Morillo received a sentence of two to six years for his convictions for the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Government also submitted De Leon Morillo’s Pre-Sentence Investigation report which reflects his convictions. These documents fall squarely within subsection (vi) of Section 1229a(c)(3)(B). In addition, De Leon Morillo admitted he was convicted of the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree at his hearing before the Immigration Judge. Although De Leon Morillo claims his plea was unknowing, a challenge to his conviction is not properly before the Court. See Drakes v. INS, 330 F.3d 600, 605 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will deny the petition for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state conviction during a federal sentencing proceeding in a different case (B) holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel (C) holding that a habeas petitioner cannot collaterally attack the conviction serving as a predicate for a removal order (D) holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision (E) holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed
Output: (C)
U.S.C. § 12111(5). 8 . A "qualified individual with a disability” is one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 9 . "The term 'essential functions' means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). "The essential functions are by definition those that the individual who holds the job would have to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, in order to be considered qualified for the position.” 29 C. F.R.App. § 1630.2(o). Here, the parties have not identified what they consider to constitute the "essential functions” of a teacher at 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F.Supp. 303, 309 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact (B) holding that inability to maintain regular and reliable level of attendance defeated plaintiffs qualification for the job (C) holding that attendance can be an essential function of a position and that excessive absenteeism rendered an employee unqualified for such a position (D) holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function (E) holding that attendance is a minimum function of any job
Output: (E)
other non-Virginia cases offer a compelling basis for adopting the per se rule Allied has proposed. In National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App.3d 50, 440 N.E.2d 590, 599 (1981), for instance, the court said: It has long been the law of equity that a person who confers a benefit either directly or indirectly upon another in the course of performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled to compensation ... merely because of the failure of performance by the third party. However, where it appears from all the facts that the conferral of such benefit was the product of fraud, misrepresentation or bad faith by the party accepting and retaining such benefit, equity will imply an obligation to make payment therefor. See Costanzo v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430, 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (<HOLDING>), (emphasis added) (some citations omitted). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a hospital could not be an erisa beneficiary (B) holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply (C) holding that a duty may be owed to a beneficiary of a consensual relationship akin to that of a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract where the professional has actual knowledge that the services being provided are in part for the benefit of such third persons (D) holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit (E) holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms
Output: (D)
exclusively on this Court’s decision in Brooks, which held that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to meet with his capital client personally prior to trial. It emphasizes that Brooks was decided in 2003, nine years after Elliott’s 1994 trial, and created a duty for capital counsel that did not previously exist, thereby constituting a new development in the case law that was unknown to both trial and appellate counsel. Thus, the Commonwealth argues that trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for abdicating a non-existent duty, and appellate counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to challenge trial counsel’s stewardship, which, at the time, was considered to be constitutionally sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Harvey, 571 Pa. 533, 812 A.2d 1190, 1196-97 (2002) (<HOLDING>) (citing Commonwealth v. Bundy, 491 Pa. 607, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is well settled that the amount of time an attorney spends consulting with his client before trial is not by itself a legitimate basis for inferring the total extent of counsels pretrial preparation much less the adequacy of counsels preparation (B) holding that counsels total failure to conduct pretrial discovery constituted ineffective assistance (C) holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsels eligibility and all connections with debtor including counsels retainer agreement (D) holding that the time actually spent by counsel with the accused discussing his case is not necessarily related to and affords no basis for inferring the extent of total trial preparation (E) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client
Output: (A)
defendants point to the fact that the Clients expressed their understanding that the Court’s dismissal of the class claims could be appealed at a later time, and the Clients further stated their intent to proceed with the individual claims and appeal the Court’s decision to strike the class claims at the end of litigation, to support their position. (Sanford Declaration ¶ 8.) But as Capitol Specialty points out that the correct standard is the objective, reasonable attorney one, not whether the lawyer in fact had a subjective belief that a malpractice action was probable. See Ross, 420 B.R. at 49 (“whether the [insured , 649 A.2d 291, 294 (D.C.1994) (finding an attorney “has a duty to pay attention to filing deadlines.... ”); O’Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341-43 (D.C.1982) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court concludes that the acts or 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that allowing the statute of limitations to run on the clients claim is an example of obvious malpractice that does not require expert testimony to establish a standard of care (B) holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care (C) holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation (D) holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered (E) holding expert testimony not required to defeat summary judgment in medical malpractice suit because defendant doctors admissions were sufficient to establish the standard of care
Output: (A)
of disposal which would limit its meaning to “active human conduct.” United States v. Waste Ind., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir.1984). In Waste Industries, the court held that Congress intended the 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) definition of disposal “to have a range of meanings,” including not only active conduct, but also the reposing of hazardous waste and its subsequent movement through the environment. Id. at 164. Id. at 845. The Fourth Circuit concluded “that § 9607(a)(2) imposes liability not only for active involvement in the ‘dumping’ or ‘placing’ of hazardous waste at the facility, but for ownership of the facility at a time that hazardous waste was ‘spilling’ or ‘leaking.’ ” Id. at 846; accord Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Four years later, in CDMG Realty, the Third 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disposal under  9607a2 includes a partys movement and spreading of contaminated soil to uncontaminated portions of property and that congress did not limit disposal to the initial introduction of hazardous material onto property (B) holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the acca as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court (C) holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff (D) recognizing the increased breadth of the definition of property damage introduced in the more recent form of policy (E) holding that given the breadth of the statutory definition of disposal the district court must be able to conclude that the buried drums did not leak when the defendants owned or operated the facility to make a finding that they were not liable under  9607a2
Output: (E)
v. Arambular-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.1993) (evaluating admissibility under Rule 404(b) for materiality, similarity, sufficiency, and proximity of the prior act evidence to the offense now charged). Evidence that sheds light on Dhingra’s purpose in contacting the victim is material, as his intent in communicating with a minor is an essential element of criminal liability under § 2422(b). Further, the testimony of a single witness, as present in this case, satisfies the low-threshold test of sufficient evidence for the purposes of Rule 404(b). See United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir.1994). Also, the testimony, which recalled events that occurred three years prior, was sufficiently close in time. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, the evidence described 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirteen years since a prior bad act was not too remote in time (B) holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction (C) holding that a local commission had not failed to act on an application within time limit set by state law and consequently had not failed to act within a reasonable time under telecommunications act (D) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (E) holding that bad faith handling of an insureds claim fell within the act
Output: (A)
assault conviction. See Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.39(B). Further, Plaintiffs understanding of the nature of the choice he was required to make is demonstrated by the fact that he discussed the choices with his union representatives' — the President and Vice President of his local union and the President of the Central Ohio union — and discussed the choice with a teacher at Ft. Hayes High School. See Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86385, at *20 (finding that the plaintiff “fully understood the options as he testified that he discussed them with his wife and union steward”). Also, Plaintiff was given a reasonable amount of time to choose between termination and resignation as he was given approximately twenty-four hours in which to decide. See Rhoads, 103 Fed.Appx. at 895 (<HOLDING>); Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force (B) holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference (C) holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours (D) holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice (E) holding that delay of several hours after the vehicle was seized was reasonable
Output: (D)
96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976): [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. That is not to say that there are no guides whatever to striking that balance. There are. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, as explained below, the provisions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that organizations designated by the secretary of state as terrorist organizations must have the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner and must have the opportunity to present at least in written form such evidence as those entities may be able to produce to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations (B) holding plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (C) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (D) holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
Output: (A)
verdict form that Alleyne had ‘[u]sed or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,’ but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was ‘[bjrandished.’ ” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2156. The trial court, however, applied the mandatory minimum based on its own finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had brandished the weapon. Id. Thus, the error in Alleyne was confined to sentencing, where the district court made a finding on an aggravating element that was presented to and rejected by the jury. In essence, the trial judge sentenced Alleyne for “a separate, aggravated offense,” id. at 2162, that the jury had itself decided not to find beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328-29, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense (B) holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense (C) holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers (D) holding that when the jury acquitted the defendant on the greater offense but deadlocked on the lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lessers (E) holding double jeopardy prohibition not applicable where jury unable to agree on greater charge but convicts on lesserincluded offense because no implied acquittal occurred on greater offense
Output: (B)
require a common scheme or plan. See Pollock, 117 N.M. at 191, 870 P.2d at 153. A common scheme or plan may imply use restrictions, and that common scheme or plan may place purchasers on inquiry notice when the land has a uniform appearance and the property demonstrates a general plan or common scheme of development. Id. at 192, 870 P.2d at 154; Walters, 107 N.M. at 416, 759 P.2d at 208. However, in Defendants’ case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had actual, personal notice of the restrictions before they bought lot 224, and therefore the appearance of other lots in the subdivision was immaterial to the question of notice. When a party has actual notice, there is no legal need to imply notice from the existence of a common scheme or plan. io App.2d 45, 429 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 18. Most jurisdictions, however, recognize 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (B) holding that a statute relates to erisa plans for the purposes of preemption if it requires the plans to purchase the  benefits specified in the statute when they purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy (C) holding that when guidelines contradict the plans requirements denial of benefits pursuant to guidelines was arbitrary and capricious (D) holding that absent written or de facto guidelines to give notice to lot owners as to the kind of fence that would qualify for consent a statement that plans were not pleasing enough was insufficient ground to sustain an injunction (E) holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice
Output: (D)
motion or for any other calendar setting, shall promptly give no tice advising all other parties who have appeared in the action so that cross motions may, insofar as possible, be heard on a single hearing date. (Emphasis added.) Application of this rule would appear to require that appellant move for a hearing. Additionally, in State v. Due, which also involved the forfeiture of a bail bond, this court noted that no evidentiary hearing was requested, which implied that the appellant was not automatically entitled to a hearing. 427 N.W.2d 276, 277 (Minn.App.1988), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28,1988). Moreover, the phrase “shall be heard” does not necessarily mean that a party is entitled to an oral hearing. See, e.g., Sweet v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 702 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). And the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (B) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard (C) holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard (D) holding that counselors opportunity to submit his written case to the commissioner along with any supporting documents satisfied his right to be heard (E) holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause
Output: (D)
commerce are only incidental,” and where the burden imposed on interstate commerce is not “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). “[T]he practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.” Healy, 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491. Finally, there exist unique aspects of commerce that demand national treatment. See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244 (1886) (<HOLDING>). SB 6251 likely violates the dormant commerce 
 Holding statements: (A) holding railroad regulation requiring random drug testing without particularized suspicion to be reasonable in light of connection to public safety (B) holding that a railroad operated and owned by the federal government was immune from antitrust liability (C) holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation (D) recognizing a selfevaluative privilege to railroad companys investigation of an accident in light of the publics stake in the improvement of railroad safety (E) holding negligence per se not applicable to violation of railroad commission regulation
Output: (C)
S.B. 6933. This interpretation of ER 404(b) is consistent with a majority of federal and state courts. 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence §§ 29-31 (1998). 73 State v. Ferguson, 100 Wn.2d 131, 133-34, 667 P.2d 68 (1983) (“This court has often invoked an exception in similar cases to permit evidence of collateral sexual misconduct when it shows a lustful disposition directed toward the offended female. ‘Such evidence is admitted for the purpose of showing the lustful inclination of the defendant toward the offended female, which in turn makes it more probable that the defendant committed the offense charged.’ ” (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Thorne, 43 Wn.2d 47, 60-61, 260 P.2d 331 (1953))). 74 State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d 11, 21, 74 P.3d 119 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 75 See, e.g., State v. Herzog, 73 Wn. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the common scheme or plan exception is generally applied in cases involving sexual crimes where evidence of acts prior and subsequent to the act charged in the indictment is held admissible as tending to show continued illicit intercourse between the same parties (B) holding that a prior conviction may be a bad act for purposes of rule 404b if substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant committed both acts and the probative value is not limited solely to tending to establish the defendants propensity to commit a crime such as the crime charged (C) holding that the high level of similarity between the charged crime and prior bad acts necessary to prove common scheme or plan does not require evidence of common features to show a unique method of committing the crime (D) holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime (E) holding that despite some differences between the charged offense and the collateral crime similarities between the two were striking enough to establish a unique crime pattern
Output: (C)
to renegotiate the terms of that document. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Schuttler, 697 F.Supp. 1195, 1203 (N.D.Ga.1988) (“Plaintiffs were not precluded from reading the releases; they understood that they were releasing their claims and exercised that option rather than gambling on the legal outcome of [their action].”). 9 . Plaintiffs allege that the money was spent in an effort to contain the damages caused by DuPont's product. 10 . The court notes that plaintiffs may not now seek to tender the money received in settlement. Georgia law requires that rescission be timely. Plaintiffs learned of the alleged fraud in 1994, nearly two years prior to commencing these actions. This delay is, as a matter of law, determinative. See, e.g., Orion Capital Partners, 223 Ga.App. 539, 478 S.E.2d at 385 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sevenmonth delay is too late as a matter of law to constitute an effective rescission or reasonable offer to rescind the agreement (B) holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement (C) holding that seventeenmonth delay in abandoning premises is not within a reasonable time as a matter of law (D) holding that a fiftyday delay to conduct an investigation was reasonable as a matter of law (E) holding that after learning the information justifying rescission an insurers four month delay in seeking it was unreasonable as a matter of law
Output: (A)
be invalid where used to enter a private residence. Further, there are a host of “retake” state statutes and at least one federal statute authorizing the Attorney General to issue arrest warrants (arrest warrants for aliens pending deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) that authorize nonjudicial arrest warrants. Thus, despite my position the search of Lucas’s primary residence was conducted pursuant to an invalid administrative warrant, I conclude it was objectively reasonable for officers, in arresting Lucas in his primary residence, to rely on the statute that authorized the issuance of the arrest warrant. As a result, I disagree with Judge Beam’s view that the good-faith exception was inapplicable in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 893 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), opinion withdrawn in part on other grounds, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (B) holding that the vehicle of a recent occupant may be searched incident to arrest as an exception to the warrant requirement where it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest (C) holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception (D) holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant (E) holding the leon goodfaith excep tion applied to save evidence seized as part of the execution of an arrest warrant issued by the oregon department of corrections pursuant to its authority under an oregon statute and citing the krull decision in support
Output: (E)
the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes. Colo. Const. Art. 16, § 6 (emphasis added). As Vidler held, the constitution guarantees a right to appropriate and not to speculate. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 568; Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 408, 276 P.2d 992, 1009 (1954). The Colorado Constitution and its implementing statutes focus on an applicant’s ability to put the water to some beneficial use and not on the availability of that water. See, e.g., Southeastern Water Conservancy Dist. v. Rich, 625 P.2d 977 (Colo.1981) (<HOLDING>). Vidler correctly warned that to do otherwise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (B) holding that a new appropriator will be allowed if no injury will occur to senior users on an over appropriated river (C) holding that a constructive trust will be imposed where the evidence is clear and convincing that one party will be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the entire property (D) holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal (E) holding that in the federal noncriminal law context a judicial decision can be applied nonretroactively if it established a new principle of law if such a limitation will avoid substantial inequitable results and if retrospective application will not retard the purpose and effect of the new rule
Output: (B)
sentence of life imprisonment that Hanson was told he could receive. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974 (7th Cir.2002). Although the court did not tell Hanson that he had the right to plead not guilty, see Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3), this error was harmless because Hanson was aware of his right to plead not guilty; he originally had pleaded not guilty to both counts of the indictment and then changed his plea to guilty, see Knox, 287 F.3d at 670. Counsel also states that the court did not inform Hanson that he was giving up the right to confront witnesses against him at trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3). Because the court informed Hanson that “at a trial [he] would have the right to cross-examine witnesses against” him, we agree with counsel that this again would be har r.2002) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, there is no time period 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that burglary is violent felony (B) holding that all escapes qualify as violent felonies (C) holding that  2255 movant claiming his prior conviction for assault was not a violent felony did not qualify for actual innocence exception (D) holding that when an inmate escapes from a guarded facility he acts with purposeful violent and aggressive behavior and creates a substantial risk of violent confrontation (E) holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes
Output: (B)