niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 659 (6th Cir.2007); Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir.2006); Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783-84 (6th Cir.2006)). When applying the Sixth Circuit’s three-part test for the entitlement to qualified immunity, the Court finds that Melendez, Randazzo, nor Dotter satisfy the test. With respect to Defendant Melendez, the Sixth Circuit has specifically noted that “ ‘there undoubtedly is a clearly established legal norm precluding the use of violent physical force against a criminal suspect who already has been subdued and does not present a danger to himself or others.’ ” Meirthew, 417 Fed.Appx. at 499 (quoting Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 367 (6th Cir.2009)); see also Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 302 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104, 123 S.Ct. 866, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force (B) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station (C) holding that a police officers tackling of a handcuffed suspect hitting him in the face twice and banging his head on the floor three times was unconstitutional (D) holding that when plaintiff a suspect was shown officers credentials and ordered into a police car and plaintiff decided to run running after and tackling plaintiff was not constitutionally excessive (E) holding that a showup identification was valid even though the suspect was handcuffed
Output: (C)
accident insurance” as a collateral source. Id. Respondent argues that UIM benefits are akin to payments from the tortfeasor’s liability insurance, which do not constitute collateral sources. Respondent relies on Do, a case in which the supreme court held that “a payment made by a tortfeasor’s automobile insurer is not a collateral source” under section 548.251. 779 N.W.2d at 855. The supreme court observed that the ordinary meaning of “collateral source” refers to a source “wholly independent of’ and unconnected with the tortfeasor, and held that payments made to an injured claimant by the tortfeasor’s liability insurer constitute a direct rather than a collateral source because they derive directly from the tortfeasor’s insurance. See id. at 859-60; see also Dean, 535 N.W.2d at 345 (<HOLDING>). As a result, they do not constitute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violence that does not stem from particularized animosity but rather from a financial incentive does not constitute persecution (B) holding hospital could not enforce ben directly against tortfeasors insurer because patient had no right to directly sue insurer (C) holding that an insurer can be estopped from denying coverage for failure to make payments where that insurer has established a course of conduct of accepting late payments (D) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (E) holding that recovery from the tortfeasors insurer is a condition precedent to a claim for uim benefits
Output: (D)
and found no authority for the proposition that a Hawaii pardon would not allow Plaintiff to purchase firearms in other states because the pardon would only be given effect in Hawaii. In fact, some decisions suggest that a foreign state may give effect to a Hawaii pardon and allow Plaintiff to acquire firearms in that state. See, e.g., Schlenther v. Dep’t of State, Division of Licensing, 743 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (finding that the State of Florida improperly denied plaintiffs application for a concealed-weapons permit because once a sister state has restored a person’s firearms rights, Florida was required to give “full faith and credit” to the restoration of such rights); People v. Van Heck, 252 Mich.App. 207, 208-09, 214 & 217, 651 N.W.2d 174 (Mich.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that michigan must give full effect to a connecticut pardon because connecticut law removes all legal disabilities that flow from the pardoned conviction and therefore a pardoned individual is no longer considered by the law to have been convicted or otherwise adjudicated guilty of the pardoned crime (B) holding that under michigan law evidence of other products to which the plaintiff may have been exposed is relevant to rebut the plaintiffs claim (C) holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed (D) holding that pardon relieves the recipient upon subsequent conviction of another crime of the additional punishment provided by statute for a second offense (E) holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction
Output: (A)
compensable injuries.” Similarly, in Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dep’t of Adoptions, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859, 874-875 (1988), the California Court of Appeal stated that “an adoption agency cannot be made the guarantor of an infant’s future good health and should not be liable for mere negligence in providing information regarding the health of a prospective adoptee.” See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866-867 (1980) (court stated that “no cause of action for negligence should be recognized based on considerations of public policy”); Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 981 (Miss. 1990) (court refused to recognize tort of negligence in adoption context because result not foreseeable). See also Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 211 A.D.2d 446, 447 (N.Y. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Other courts, however, have held that, apart 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (C) recognizing cause of action (D) holding that pecuniary damages are essential to a fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action (E) recognizing wrongful adoption cause of action grounded in fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation
Output: (E)
proceedings that we have come to expect in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, while the separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions is a hallmark of criminal proceedings, due process does not require the strict adherence to separation of functions in civil matters. [Thus], some combination of overlapping of functions in an administrative proceeding is not inconsistent with fundamental fairness. Id. (citations omitted). We also have addressed this issue, albeit tangentially, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In Moncier, we considered whether members of a hearing panel should have recused themselves on the ground of alleged bias due to the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in the Board. As we wrote: When an assertio 4 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process (B) holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required (C) holding that michigans lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process because the functions of investigation prosecution adjudication and review are functionally separate and are handled by different individuals (D) holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause (E) recognizing that individuals are generally not similarly situated when different decision makers are involved in the respective disciplinary action
Output: (C)
buys than in Smith by equipping the informant with an audio transmitter. See id. Fountain therefore fails to show that Ruffin knowingly or recklessly mischaracterized these operations as controlled buys. Fountain also points out that the description of “the premises” in the affidavit’s preamble includes his apartment’s street address, whereas the street address is missing from the sworn facts section’s description of “the premises.” He argues that this variation blurs the point as to whether Detective Ruffin could actually see the informant buy drugs from Apartment 2. Because we read both descriptions as fairly referring to Apartment 2, we cannot say the variance in descriptions in any way misleads. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (<HOLDING>). %: Omission of Material Fact Fountain’s claim 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officers did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene because they were not present at the time of the shooting (B) recognizing that because affidavits are typically drafted in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation by nonlawyers they must be read with an understanding of that context and accordingly held to a lower standard of scrutiny than that applied to pleadings filed in more formal proceedings (C) holding that investigation was not conducted with sufficient haste when the defendant was detained for over fortyfive minutes (D) holding outofcourt statements relating to reasons for investigation are not admissible where the reasons for the investigation are not at issue (E) holding that affidavits for search warrants must be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion because they are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation
Output: (E)
of records from which the jury could draw their own conclusions. The government argues that only an expert, such as Agent Zimmer, has the ability to interpret VIN numbers to determine the place of manufacture of the vehicles. The government contends that, had Agent Zimmer only been permitted to present records, the jury would have been unable to interpret the VIN numbers to determine the place of manufacture of the victim’s vehicle. The government also notes that the cautionary instruction by the court reduced any possible prejudice to the defendants. Agent Zimmer’s testimony did not usurp the function of the jury; rather, his testimony was permissible as an expert opinion to help the jury determine a fact in issue. Cf. United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 386 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Other courts have held that the government 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law (B) holding an agent from the drug enforcement agency could testify regarding the street value of cocaine where the agent was testifying regarding matters within his personal knowledge and experience as a narcotics officer (C) holding that failure of irs agent to follow irs electronic surveillance regulations before recording conversations between taxpayer and agent did not require suppression of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer accused of bribing irs agent since irs was not required by constitution to adopt its regulations governing electronic surveillance violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions (D) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent (E) holding that expert testimony of irs agent regarding tax liability did not usurp the function of the jury as agent did not give her opinion about the guilt of the defendant
Output: (E)
are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.” Malbrough, 275 Va. at 168, 655 S.E.2d at 3. Moreover, “we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). A law enforcement officer has a legitimate constitutional basis for seizing a person if the officer has either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe, “based on objective facts, that the [person] officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant for the earlier offense of reckless driving, thereby also meeting the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant to investigate that same offense. See United States v. Lopez, 911 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion (B) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (C) holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle (D) holding that probable cause to stop a vehicle was supported by the fact that the defendant had previously been arrested for illegally transporting liquor (E) holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop
Output: (B)
and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 288(L); Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E); Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C. 3101; and Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. 175. S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5861; H.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 360 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6316. The court in Goff then examined two lower court decisions which had considered the legislative history and had reached “diametrically opposite interpretations of the scope of this provision [§ 522(b)(2)(A) ] relative to ERISA-qualified pension plans.” Goff, 706 F.2d at 583. Those cases were Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 B.R. 305 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1982) (<HOLDING>) and Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa (B) holding that it is not within the judicial province to give the words used by congress a narrower meaning than they were manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body (C) holding that erisaqualified pension plans were not intended by congress to be within the statutory exemption (D) holding that the pension plans anticutback language offered more protection than the acts (E) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3
Output: (C)
Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287-88, 289 n. 76 (5th Cir.2005) (enbanc)). 48 . Id. at 223. See also id. at 231 ("Because we interpret Title II and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in pari materia, we hold that § 504 extends to such sidewalks as well.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, Title II does not apply in employment discrimination cases at all. Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir.2015) ("Unlike Title I of the ADA, Title II does not create a cause of action for employment discrimination.” (citations omitted)). 49 . Frame, 657 F.3d at 223'(emphasis added) (citing Kemp, 610 F.3d at 234-35; Pace, 403 F.3d at 287-88, 289 n. 76). 50 . Fleming, 587 F.3d at 944 (emphasis in original) (quoting Schrader, 296 F.3d at 972). But see Soledad, 304 F.3d at 505 (<HOLDING>). 51 . Fleming, 587 F.3d at 944 (emphasis in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rehabilitation act applicable (B) holding  504 of the rehabilitation act does not require equivalent benefits for different disabilities (C) holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable (D) holding that the rehabilitation act does not incorporate title is causation standard (E) holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act
Output: (D)
birth. Tex.Fam.Codb Ann. § 13.42 (Vernon Supp.1990). During oral argument, counsel asserted for the first time that failure to interpret section 13.42 of the Texas Family Code as allowing for child support retroactive to the birth of Mallory creates a constitutional issue because of the specter of allowing child support back to the date of birth when a child’s parents were married at the time of the child’s birth, but not allowing child support retroactive to the date of birth when the child’s parents were not married at the time of the child’s birth. As the concurring opinion rightfully notes, no constitutional question was raised in the trial court, and it is not presented to us by a point of error. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. J.R. Franclen, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). We also recognize that this argument was not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals (B) holding that absent rare fundamental error appellate court should refrain from deciding cases on legal errors not assigned by parties (C) holding that an appellate court may not review errors that have not been assigned by a party or a point of error (D) holding errors which are argued but not assigned will not be considered by appellate court (E) holding an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error
Output: (C)
is analogous to the attorney-client privilege’s underlying purpose, is that “effective and efficient governmental decision making requires a free flow of ideas among government officials and that inhibitions will result if officials know that their communications may be revealed to outsiders.” In re Franklin National Bank, 478 F.Supp. at 581; see also Carl Zeiss Stifung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966) (finding that “government, no less than the citizen, needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is essential to the quality of its functioning”), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952, 88 S.Ct. 334, 19 L.Ed.2d 361 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F.Supp. 939, 946, 141 Ct.Cl. 38 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Thus, it is clear that the deliberative 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disclosure of predecisional documents would injure the consultative process within the government (B) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents (C) recognizing governmental privilege precluding disclosure of official information that would be injurious to the consultative functions of the government (D) holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant (E) holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia
Output: (A)
not indispensably necessary for the disposition of the case”). However, because this Court’s resolution of the statute’s constitutionality is indispensably necessary for the disposition of this case, we proceed with our analysis of the LHMA’s constitutionality. Rhode Island’s Equal Protection Clause, article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution, forms the basis of plaintiffs’ primary claim. Like the corresponding federal guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution provides, in relevant part, that no person shall be “denied equal protection of the laws.” R.I. Const, art. 1, sec. 2; see also Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Manufacturing Co., 716 A.2d 730, 734 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, this protection “does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state and federal equal protection guarantees provide similar protections (B) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (C) holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection (D) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (E) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection
Output: (A)
Knecht Bros. v. Ames Constr., Inc., 404 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.App.1987), in which we held that the clear application of a UCC provision made the appellant’s position frivolous. Id. at 861. Similarly, in Summit House Co. v. Gershman, 502 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.App.1993), this court concluded that the appellant’s claim was frivolous because the appellant’s inter pretation of the law was contrary to existing law. Id. at 425. In the instant case, however, no Minnesota law existed on the issue, and the application of the UCC provision was unclear. We hold that the Bank’s position was not frivolous or taken in bad faith. Although the Bank’s reliance on the WTA provision proved unconvincing, its position was sufficiently grounded in the statute. See Nelson v. Engen, 347 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Minn.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Bank instituted proceedings 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction that omitted elements of crime that defense had conceded was error although not plain error (B) holding that appellants innovative theory based on minnesotas nofault act although in error was not frivolous (C) holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence (D) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (E) holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory
Output: (B)
Here, Defendants challenge venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Although many federal courts hold that waiver under Rule 12 applies equally to § 1406(a), there appears to be some disagreement on the issue. Compare, e.g., Gardner v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01289, 2010 WL 2595114, at *2 (S.D.W.Va. June 24, 2010) (indicating that Rule 12 waiver guidelines apply to § 1406(a)); Bosse v. Mertoff, No. 05-CV-02170, 2007 WL 484590, at *2 (D.Colo. Feb. 9, 2007) (“[T]here is significant authority for the proposition that, once a defense of improper venue is waived, a defendant is also foreclosed from seeking a transfer under § 1406.”); with, e.g., Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 12 C 5842, 2013 WL 323404, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 25, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, it is clear that a party can 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc  1406a (B) holding that a partys repeated representations that venue was proper in one forum waived its right to bring a subsequent motion under 28 usc  1406a challenging venue (C) holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county (D) recognizing conflicting case law regarding whether waiver  under rule 12b3 extends to a request for a transfer under  1406a given that such a transfer is premised on venue being improper in this district (E) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court
Output: (D)
in defending the action against the insured, unless conflict of interest or other harm is clear and unmistakable. 14 Couch on Ins.3d §§ 202:67-69. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court in Steptore did not expressly address the prejudice requirement, it implicitly recognized that prejudice arises when a conflict of interest exists between an insurer and its insured, reasoning that “waiver principles are applied stringently to uphold the prohibition against conflicts of interest between the insurer and the insured which could potentially affect legal representation in order to reinforce the role of the lawyer as the loyal advocate of the client’s interest.” Steptore, 93-2064 at p. 4, 643 So.2d at 1216; see Parsons v. Continental Nat’l Am. Group, 113 Ariz. 223, 228, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (1976)(<HOLDING>). A prompt reservation of rights letter serves 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a conflict of interest may provide the source of prejudice upon which an insured may rely to estop an insurer from denying coverage (B) holding that if an insurer intended to exclude insured contracts from the provision denying coverage for injuries to employees it could have expressly stated as such (C) holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured (D) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (E) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice
Output: (A)
the sentencing court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Cherry, 572 F.3d 829, 831 (10th Cir.2009). 1. Firearm Enhancement Section 2Dl.l(b)(l) of the Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” The Application Notes explain that “[t]he enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.3; see also United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir.2001). The enhancement applies when a co-defendant possessed a firearm, so long as possession was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See United States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Goddard, 929 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future (B) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession (C) holding that under  1b13a1b and 2d11b1 a defendant may be held accountable for reasonably foreseeable weapons possession by a codefendant (D) holding that under  lb13alb and 2d 11b1 a defendant may be held accountable for reasonably foreseeable weapons possession by a codefendant (E) recognizing that a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for subsequent changes to an otherwise safe product where such alterations are reasonably foreseeable
Output: (D)
to create judicial precedent consistent with the opinions of this Circuit, the federal judiciary generally, and, as this is a matter of international convention, reach a result not entirely devoid of the awareness of the potential for international disparity. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is a paucity of case law dealing with intra-court comity. Courts follow the doctrine to provide a uniform interpretation of the law. See United States v. Anaya, 509 F.Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.Fla.1980), aff'd sub nom United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir.1982). Unlike circuit court panels where one panel will not overrule another, see Julius v. Johnson, 755 F.2d 1403, 1404 (11th Cir.1985), district courts are not held to the same standard. See Anaya, 509 F.Supp. at 293 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). While the decisions of their fellow judges 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an earlier precedential decision is binding precedent on later panels (B) holdings of the court of appeals not specifically reversed by the supreme court retain precedential value (C) recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels (D) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (E) holding onejustice opinion has no precedential value
Output: (D)
in April 2004, after which it denied appellant’s requests for an arrest of judgment or new trial, but granted appellant’s motion for a new penalty hearing. The court concluded that mitigation counsel had rendered ineffective assistance during his closing argument. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s order granting a new penalty phase hearing and appellant likewise filed an appeal in which he challenged the trial court’s denial of relief on all other claims set forth in his post-sentence motions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s orders granting a new penalty hearing and denying all other claims. In all instances in which the death penalty is imposed, this Court begins its review with an inquiry into the sufficiency of .the evidence 88 A.2d 564, 568 (2005) (<HOLDING>). This case is before us on direct appeal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding guilt phase issues shall be resolved by this court even if death sentence has been vacated by trial court on collateral review (B) holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to issues resolved by arbitration where there has been a final determination on the merits notwithstanding a lack of confirmation of the award citations omitted (C) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (D) holding that in some circumstances a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal (E) holding that in a new sentencing proceeding after the original sentence has been vacated by the appellate court the trial court is not precluded from applying a drugtrafficking multiplier that it did not use in formulating the original sentence
Output: (A)
See New Cingular Wireless Servs., 232 F.R.D. at 300 (rejecting an argument that a class representative was inadequate because he could not show that he “recall[ed] the terms of a settlement for a case he was previously involved in, or that he was aware that his attorneys had filed certain motions in the current case”). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Murray’s involvement in the litigation weighs in favor of finding him an adequate class representative. E*Trade also argues that Murray lacks sufficient understanding of the issues involved in his FCRA suit. A class representative, however, is not required to understand the intricacies of the suit. See Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F.Supp.1150, 1154 (C.D.Ill.1991); New Cingular Wireless Servs., 232 F.R.D. at 300 (<HOLDING>); Cavin, 236 F.R.D. at 394 (same). It is enough 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification (B) holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se (C) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (D) holding that awards of 2500 to majority of representatives and 5000 to deposed representatives were inappropriate where representatives had borne little risk by participating in litigation and provided services that could have been provided by any other class member (E) recognizing that the number of class representatives is not significant under rule 23a
Output: (C)
that the cited driver will not appear in court or is under the influence, the officer is statutorily empowered with discretion to arrest or cite the driver. 16 The case before us is distinguishable from Collins v. State, 113 Nev. 1177, 946 P.2d 1055 (1997), and Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 953 P.2d 18 (1998), which were decided based on the mandatory provision of NRS 484.795. 17 Black’s Law Dictionary 419 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). 18 Id. (emphasis added). 19 Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 325-26, 44 P.3d 523, 525 (2002); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (explaining states may restrict police power under state law to a greater degree than the Supreme Court holds is necessary under the Federal Constitution); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 20 Zale-Las Vegas v. Bulova Watch, 80 Nev. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the idaho constitution provides no greater protection from double jeopardy than does the federal constitution (B) holding that our federal constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the states power to control the selection of ones spouse (C) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (D) holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in  1983 litigation (E) holding that individual states may    construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the federal constitution
Output: (E)
It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state’s business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute “arms of the state.” Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under § 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of “arms of the state” and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a “person” under § 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity
Output: (E)
CMI customers pay up to $15,000 to attend “trust academies” run by TES. (Aldridge Trial Tr. at 1287-88, 1295; T. Galley Dep. at 28; S. Galley Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). At these trust academies, customers set up a collection of trusts for the purposes of holding title to customers’ assets and paying their expenses, thereby allowing customers to deduct most of their personal expenses. (RFA 18, 22). CMI and defendant represent that these trusts will allow conversion of up to 97% of income to a tax shelter with “full disclosure to the IRS.” (S. Galley Decl. ¶¶ 14, 22; RFA 16; Fields Dep. at 41-42). The IRS may disregard an entity for tax purposes where such entity lacks economic substance. Richardson, 509 F.3d at 741; see also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether a trust has sufficient 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the economicsubstance doctrine is a judicial tool for effectuating the underlying congressional purpose that despite literal compliance with the statute tax benefits not be afforded based on transactions lacking in economic substance (B) holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law (C) recognizing that an issuer has the primary obligation to pay on letter of credit such that literal compliance with the letter of credits terms for payment is all that is required (D) holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity (E) recognizing that the purpose of the setoff doctrine is to prevent circuity of judicial actions
Output: (A)
a showing. Thus, to the extent that Endsley raises issues that fall outside the scope of the COA, we will not consider them here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); 9th Cir. R. 22-1. The California Court of Appeal determined on direct appeal that the circumstances surrounding Ward’s statements provided the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause’s “residual trustworthiness test.” See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 138, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). Upon review of the record, we conclude that the California Court of Appeal’s resolution of this case was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also United States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent to Endsley’s conviction becoming 
 Holding statements: (A) holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause (B) holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue (C) holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts (D) holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights (E) holding that the admission of a statement against penal interest made by an accomplice to a close friend in a private setting under circumstances suggesting residual trustworthiness did not violate the confrontation clause
Output: (E)
to file on time was not due to willful neglect. See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1). On the face of the matter, these determinations would seem to apply equally to the remainder of the penalty (which was calculated according to the same statutory algorithm and imposed for precisely the same late filing). The Commissioner has pointed to no basis for treating one portion of this unitary penalty differently from the other, and the record suggests no such distinction. The whole is but the sum of its parts, and logically, the two portions of the late-filing penalty should stand or fall together. There may be special circumstances that would justify splitting the baby, but the Commissioner has the burden of identifying those circumstances. Cf. Estate of Abraham v. Comm’r, 408 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Absent a plausible explanation, the only 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination (B) holding that a party is not entitled to pursue a separate action for deficiency judgment where the foreclosure complaint includes a prayer for a deficiency judgment and the foreclosure court reserves jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment (C) holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice (D) holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension because it found deficiency even though it was not same deficiency complained of by appellant in his motion to dismiss (E) holding that former sec 272f does not require that the commissioner wait until the period for filing a petition as to a deficiency notice expires before issuing another deficiency notice as to the same taxable year
Output: (A)
protections in the context of their revocation hearings. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (stating that a parolee is entitled to confront adverse witnesses in a revocation hearing unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing such confrontation); Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 32.1(a)(2)(D) (providing that a person accused of violating probation or supervised release is entitled to a revocation hearing and an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses). In United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 642-43 (8th Cir.1986), we held that the trial court in a revocation proceeding must “balance the [defendant’s] right to confront a witness against the grounds asserted by the government for not requiring confrontation.” Id. (<HOLDING>). The need to apply this balancing test is well 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsel was defective for failing to understand the laboratory tests performed and the inferences that one could logically draw from the results when challenging the states expert (B) holding that the trial court had properly granted prices motion for new trial because while the state properly introduced identification testimony from a police officer who was not a witness to the offense it improperly elicited testimony that the witness was in fact a police officer who knew the defendant from working in his neighborhood (C) holding that it was not error to allow the government to introduce urinalysis laboratory results from a california laboratory through a probation officer who had not prepared the report and without live testimony from the laboratory technicians because the hearsay was reliable and the proposed testimony was of little value (D) holding that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine laboratory discovered in a bedroom she shared with a renter (E) holding that the admission of a report was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth but to impeach the veracity of the witnesss direct testimony
Output: (C)
L.Ed.2d 554 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The Associations claim that serving as an official proponent is protected by the Free Speech Clause, and thus that they have a right to associate for the purpose of serving as official proponents. Thus, if serving as an official proponent is not an aspect of free speech, the condition imposed by the elector requirement does not violate the associational rights of the First Amendment. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (“To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the group engages in ‘expressive association.’”); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Because the Associations’ claim regarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity (B) holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president (C) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (D) holding first amendment does not protect nonexpressive conduct (E) holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports
Output: (A)
actions in terminating the contract. Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1566 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324). He has clearly alleged an injury caused by Defendants. Accordingly, Mr. Umbehr has standing. We turn now to the merits of his claim that his First Amendment rights have been violated. Mr. Umbehr was indisputably an independent contractor. As the district court acknowledged, there is conflicting ease law on whether those who independently contract with the government share the same degree of First Amendment protection for their speech as government employees. A number of courts have held that governments may award or terminate public contracts on the basis of political affiliation or support. See Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 129, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract in retaliation for petition was not protected by first amendment (B) holding that independent contractors whose contracts were terminated following a change in administration were not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that independent contractor claiming loss of and denial of contracts because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of lobbying and other political activities not protected by first amendment (E) holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment
Output: (C)
a matter of fact that the wind generated by the storm created pressure higher than 40 PSF. Defendant also contends that Mr. Abruzzo’s testimony should be dismissed out of hand because he testified as to the hangar specification requirements, but studied only the schematics related to the fuel dock. Although Mr. Abruzzo testified that the hangar pressure panel specifications were also incorrect, defendant points out that the hangar did not have pressure relief panels. Defendant therefore urges rejection of Mr. Abruzzo’s opinion testimony based on Supreme Court precedent in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The Daubert requirements are derived primarily from Fed.R.Evid. 702. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (<HOLDING>). The Federal Circuit recently held that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial (B) holding that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony (C) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law (D) holding that trial courts are gatekeepers in determining fitness of scientific expert testimony for admissibility at trial (E) recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony
Output: (D)