niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
state prosecutors would be able to usurp federal prosecutorial discretion. Nor did the state prosecutor in this case have any authority to bind the federal prosecutor. Under settled precedent, one federal prosecutor cannot bind his or her counterpart in another district unless he or she has been given the authority. See United States v.. D’Apice, 664 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec.1981). If federal prosecutors cannot bind other federal prosecutors with their unauthorized acts, a state prosecutor a fortiori should not be able to do so. Roberson, 872 F.2d at 611. Here, Kozak has not demonstrated that the state actors, Meyer and Moser, with whom her counsel conferred had been granted actual federal authority to negotiate a cooperation agreement. The absence of an agency re Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, because Kozak has failed to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a promise by fbi agents that defendant would serve no time on state charges if he cooperated in the federal investigation was unauthorized (B) holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights (C) holding that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of alleged cooperation agreement entered into with fbi agent who allegedly promised defendant he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in making a statement where there was no evidence establishing that agent was authorized to make promises to obtain defendants cooperation (D) holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges (E) holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony
Output: (A)
Allen asserts the general admissibility of “public records,” but he does not rely on any other specific statutory provision, such as the “public records” exception set forth at section 490.220, RSMo 2000, which provides for admission of office records of other states or the federal government. While public records may be admissible as substantive evidence, that exception is not applicable in this case. “Public records” refers to evidence of “a record kept or prepared by a person whose public duty it is to record the facts stated in the document.” See, e.g., State v. Blakeburn, 859. S.W.2d 170, 177 (Mo.App. W.D.1993). The document in this case does not fit within this definition. The report more closely resembles a handbook or manual than an official government of fice record. See id. (<HOLDING>). Cf. Stuart v. Dir. of Revenue, 761 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records (B) recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents (C) holding that police report containing victim affidavit was not admissible under public records exception (D) holding that an automobiles title history was admissible under the public records exception (E) holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception
Output: (E)
the future because she continues to own and operate Helping Hands and intends to remain in the childcare services profession. Docket No. 17 at ¶ 112. She posits no other basis for establishing her standing to seek prospective relief against the Secretary. Docket No. 26 at 6-9. Her status as the owner and operator of a child-care facility does not provide her with standing to seek the declaratory and injunctive relief that she seeks. Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933-934 (8th Cir.2005) (recognizing that an attorney’s status as a member of the bar does not afford him or her standing to prospectively attack the implementation of the professional disciplinary procedures applicable to attorneys practicing in a particular jurisdiction); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400, n. 5 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Burns does not allege that she has been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness (B) holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change (C) holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence (D) holding that a prisoner cannot establish his or her standing to prospectively challenge the validity of a facilitys disciplinary procedures simply by referring to his or her status as an individual incarcerated in that facility (E) holding that an expert can comply with the timing requirement if an experts research even after his or her deposition revealed that the standard of care in his or her community was the same or similar to the standard of care in the community in which he or she is testifying when the injury occurred
Output: (D)
erred in denying without a hearing his claim that trial counsel were ineffective because they “were under a conflict of interest in this case because counsels’ interest in spending the minimum amount of time on a case for which they were receiving no money conflicted with [Movant’s] desire that his case be fully litigated and investigated.... ” The State counters that the trial court did not clearly err in denying this claim because Movant failed to plead facts not refuted by the record demonstrating an actual conflict. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, a movant must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance. Conger v. State, 356 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Mo.App.E.D. 2011) (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>). “In order to prove a conflict of interest, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea (B) holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case (C) holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims (D) holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty (E) holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial
Output: (E)
Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117 (quoting Landry v. State, 706 S.W.2d 105, 112 (Tex. Crim.App.1985)). A finding of inherent prejudice is reserved for extreme situations. Id. This determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 112. In none of the cases which discuss potential effects that external influences may have on a jury do the courts appear to enumerate which factors might be “impermissible,” or what degree of risk is “unacceptable.” See, e.g., Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117; Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 112. In general, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial if the trial court has instructed the jury to disregard the assault. See Williams v. State, 651 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] ur W. 852, 854 (1923) (<HOLDING>). “We will not lightly assume the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony (B) holding no injury to guse shown by statement from audience member that contradicted guses testimony because statement was irrelevant to defense presented (C) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (D) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party (E) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent
Output: (B)
H 26.22(2) (2d ed. 1969)). Considering that a lack of confidentiality would destroy the “constructive professional criticism” that is “essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients,” the court concluded that “there is an overwhelming public interest in having those staff meetings held on a confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and advice can continue unimpeded.” Id. The “self-critical” privilege has also been recognized in a variety of actions in which confidentiality is “essential to the free flow of information and ... the free flow of information is essential to promote recognized public interests.” Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 Harv.L. Rev. 1083, 1087 (1983). See, e.g., Richards v. Maine Cent. R.R., 21 F.R.D. 590 (D.Me.1957) (<HOLDING>); O’Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211 
 Holding statements: (A) holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation (B) holding that in a personal injury action against a railroad a report containing the conclusions of a hearing examiner of the public utilities commission regarding an alleged hazardous railroad crossing was obvious hearsay (C) holding railroad regulation requiring random drug testing without particularized suspicion to be reasonable in light of connection to public safety (D) recognizing a selfevaluative privilege to railroad companys investigation of an accident in light of the publics stake in the improvement of railroad safety (E) holding that reinstatement of the grievant a railroad employee terminated for drug and alcohol use violated the welldefined and dominant public policy against a railroads employment of individuals whose impaired judgment due to the use of drugs or alcohol could seriously threaten public safety and placed the railroad at risk of violating the federal railroad administration regulations
Output: (D)
law, Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir.2003), but that is not the situation here. 10 . Irrespective of whether Tate both possesses a liberty interest and was denied due process under Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005)— issues that neither the majority nor I address — Tate did not show — before the district court granted summary judgment — any competent evidence of either a liberty interest or a due process violation, let alone sufficient evidence to satisfy his burden to defeat summary judgment. See Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir.2010) ("[Tjhe nonmov-ing party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings.”). 11 . See Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (<HOLDING>). 12 .See Fanning v. Metro. Transit Auth., 141 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed (E) holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment
Output: (E)
judge expressly stated in his sentencing order that he gave “due regard against inappropriate double consideration” and found that this aggravator merged with another aggravator, i.e., that the murders were committed during the course of a burglary, arson, or robbery; therefore, both aggravators were only “considered as one” by the trial court. See Sentencing Order at 4, 10, State v. Looney, No. 97-215 (Fla.2d Cir.Ct. Feb. 18, 2000). Having merged the two, the trial court was correct in setting forth the basis for doing so, as there is ample evidence in the record to prove Looney benefitted financially from these murders. 32 . Moreover, any argument that this Court should unilaterally reject Dempsey's testimony is also without merit. See Brown v. State, 721 So.2d 274, 282 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, the judge and the jury were made aware 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves (B) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony (C) holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine (D) holding that defendants truthfulness and the credibility of and weight to be given expert medical testimony are issues of fact for jury (E) holding that the applicable rule of procedure vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him
Output: (C)
days’ imprisonment. At most, the government’s additional comments were ambiguous. Accordingly, any error was not plain. See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 2. The district court did not commit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant could not show district courts alleged error in considering  3553a2a when imposing a revocation sentence was clear or obvious under plain error review (B) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error (C) holding that plain error will be identified only if 1 there is error 2 that is clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously impugns fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings (D) holding that failure to object at trial should cause this court to review solely for plain error ie error that is clear or obvious and materially prejudicial to an appellants substantial rights (E) holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious
Output: (E)
from the trust estate and, in his sole discretion to accumulate such income as a trust asset or to pay such income to the Grantor individually and not in any fiduciary capacity. The Grantor further reserves the power and right during [the] life of the Grantor to mortgage or pledge all or any part of the trust estate as collateral for any loan.” [¶ 26] We agree in part with the district court regarding the trust’s assets at A.G. Edwards. Based upon the plain language of the power of attorney and the trust agreement, Fritz intended for Simon-son and Gifford to each separately have “actual authority” to withdraw trust assets, as Fritz had reserved this power for himself as the grantor. See, e.g., Bank IV, Olathe v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 250 Kan. 541, 828 P.2d 355, 364-65 (1992) (<HOLDING>). The district court therefore did not err in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a healthcare power of attorney conferred by a resident to his wife explicitly limited the powers of the agent to those set out in writing in the document (B) holding that  340c rather than the threeyear statute of limitations in california commercial code  4111 applies to claims by depositors against their bank for payment of forged checks written on the depositors accounts (C) holding that an attorneyinfact acting under a limited power of attorney recorded prior to the mortgage it sought to foreclose did not violate minnstat  58005 (D) holding that even where an attorney exercises broad powers to represent a client in litigation these powers of representation alone do not create a specific authority to receive service (E) holding durable power of attorney conferred broad powers sufficient to authorize savings and loan association to issue checks for depositors funds to an attorneyinfact personally at the attorneyinfacts request
Output: (E)
broadly enough to subsume gateway issues into an arbitral dispute, and there is evidence that both parties agreed to the covenants, then the trial court should compel arbitration and leave issues of validity and enforceability to the arbitrator.” Id. at 382 (emphasis added). Some courts have explicitly determined that the parties must first agree to arbitrate arbitrability, before any gateway issues can be considered by the arbitrator. Accordingly, unless an agreement to arbitrate first comes into existence, the parties have not agreed to submit any issues to the arbitrator, much less contract formation issues. See, e.g., Denar Restaurants, LLC v. King, No. 02-13-00142-CV, 2014 WL 2430854, at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); see also Vallejo v. Garda CL Southwest, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that questions of arbitrability canbe delegated to the arbitrator but concluding that the parties did not agree to submit any issues to the arbitrator because the agreement never came into existence by its terms (B) holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts (C) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (D) holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator (E) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator
Output: (A)
distinguished from Jampole. Here, the appealed court order simply orders “that Plaintiff’s motion to strike designation of Dr. Clifford J. Buckley and Dr. Michael Spebar as experts for Defendants is granted,” and denies plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. The order does not deny the relator the discovery of anything necessary to preserve error, does not prevent the relator from taking the deposition of the doctors involved, and does not prevent the relator from preserving the alleged error for appeal by way of bill of exceptions. In oral argument, the relator conceded that it had not sought, and therefore had not been denied, anything in discovery necessary to preserve error or the taking of the depositions of the doctors. See Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the trial on the merits has not taken 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to have the ability to seek mandamus relief regarding compelling a deposition the trial court had to have explicitly denied the motion to compel the deposition (B) holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read (C) holding that mandamus will not lie in a complaint founded on alleged abuse of discretion of the trial court in denying certain testimony until the trial court has denied a proper request to take the deposition of the witness (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible
Output: (C)
in'the amendment text. See id. at 421. We specifically addressed use of the term “protect” in the ballot title and summary, and rejected the challenger’s analogy to the use of the term “save” that was rejected in Save Our Everglades, noting that the “use of the term ‘protect’ d[id] not constitute impermissible political rhetoric or the adjudication of a fact.” Workplace Smoking, 814 So.2d at 421. We recognized that we had approved prior ballot titles and summaries containing the term “protect,” and stated that we were “unable to discern the logic as to how the application of essentially the same term” could be acceptable in one case and unacceptable in -another. Id.; see also Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880 So.2d 667 (Fla.2004) (<HOLDING>). Our analysis in the Workplace Smoking and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that complaints regarding violation of employer policies unrelated to impermissible discrimination do not fall within the scope of title vii and therefore do not qualify for protection under the statute (B) holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term (C) holding a 1 signature requirement as within the outer boundaries of support the state may require before affording political parties ballot position (D) holding that the use of the term protection in the ballot title did not constitute impermissible political or emotional rhetoric (E) holding that the erroneous use of the term burglary in the beginning of the written jury instructions was not fundamental because any error was cured by the correct use of the term theft in the latter portion of the written instructions
Output: (D)
clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud “relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause.” 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 (“Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.”) (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ argument conflates their tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable
Output: (E)
held that a prisoners liberty interest is implicated only when government action “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. It was the First Circuit’s view that transfer to more restrictive conditions did not impose an “atypical” hardship: the conditions were “no different from those ordinarily experienced by large numbers of other inmates serving their sentences in customary fashion.” Id. at 1160; see also Lyle v. Sivley, 805 F.Supp. 755, 760 (D.Ariz.1992) (finding that notwithstanding the dictates of § 8624(c), an inmate had no constitutional liberty interest in transfer to a less restrictive environment) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (<HOLDING>)). A prisoner cannot level a due process 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison (B) recognizing the individuals interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters (C) holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation (D) holding that vdocs interstate transfer regulations are routine and create no liberty interest in any transfer (E) holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility
Output: (E)
in the civil context as in a criminal trial. Whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, “[vjoir dire permits a party to establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors,” a relation that “continues throughout the entire trial.” Id., at 413. Exclusion of a juror on the basis of race severs that relation in an invidious way. We believe the only issue that warrants further consideration in this case is whether a civil litigant can demonstrate a sufficient interest in challenging the exclusion of jurors on account of race. In Powers, we held: “The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury, and the defendant has a concrete interest in challenging the practice. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. [255,] 259 [(1986)] (<HOLDING>). This is not because the individual jurors 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation (B) holding that it is in the interest of both parents and children that parents have ultimate authority to make medical decisions for their children unless neutral fact finder determines through due process hearing that parent is not acting in childs best interests (C) recognizing virginias interest in protecting defendants from claims and in holding down insurance costs (D) recognizing a defendants interest in neutral jury selection procedures (E) recognizing the public interest exception
Output: (D)
relief which transgresses the control over PRSI property which is now properly vested in the Florida state court. Count V refers to “equitable subordination,” which is a cause of action recognized in bankruptcy cases under section 510(c). If a claim of a creditor is equitably subordinated, then the claim, although allowed, is reduced in priority and is paid only after other allowed claims'— typically, the claims of general, unsecured creditors — are repaid in full. See In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 277 B.R. 520, 563 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2002). As the disallowance of a claim submitted by a receiver to a bankruptcy court would not violate federal common law, the reduction in its priority is also within my jurisdiction. Cf. In re Continental Financial Resources, Inc., 149 B.R. at 260 (<HOLDING>). In Count V, however, the trustee actually 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 (B) holding that a bank receiver by filing a claim permits challenge to the secured portion of its claim (C) holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim (D) recognizing claim against bank receiver (E) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim
Output: (B)
declared the entire franchise fees assessed by the City to MidAmerican customers for the gas and electric services to be illegal taxes. Accordingly, we must reverse the district court’s order granting Kragnes’s second motion for partial summary judgment. YI. Disposition and Directions. Because under this record a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether all or part of the franchise fees charged by the City on gas and electric services are reasonably related to the City’s administrative expenses in exercising its police power, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case to determine the class certification question and for a trial on the merits. At trial, the district court shall determine what, if any, part of the franchise fees are rel 73 (Iowa 1971) (<HOLDING>). REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement (B) holding an employer may partially enforce a noncompete agreement to the extent it is reasonable under the circumstances (C) holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract (D) holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it (E) holding that court may not refuse to enforce noncompete agreement solely because geographical area is unreasonable but rather must modify unreasonable restriction and enforce agreement as modified
Output: (B)
of a second-tier subcontractor's quantum meruit claim against a general contractor where it alleged that the general contractor had received compensation from the United States pursuant to its contract but had paid neither the subcontractor nor the plaintiff for the services rendered). 20 . In re Virginia Block Co., 16 B.R. 771, 774 (W.D.Va.Bankr.1982) (refusing to impose an implied contract on behalf of third party that contravened insured’s and insurer’s express contract under which dividends were to be paid to insured). 21 . See, e.g., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quality Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 90-2391, 1991 WL 30211, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 1991) (unpublished); Virginia Block Co., 16 B.R. at 774; Rosenbaum v. Price Const. Co., 117 W.Va. 160, 184 S.E. 261, 263-64 (1936) (<HOLDING>). 22 .See, e.g., Raymond, Colesar, 961 F.2d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant (B) holding that putting implied restrictions on an employmentatwill contract would be inconsistent with the express terms of the contract which allowed for termination at any time (C) holding that the plaintiffs express atwill agreement precluded the existence of an implied contract requiring good cause for termination (D) holding that an implied contract may not be found if there is an express contract between the same parties on the same subject matter quoting 42 cjs implied and constructive contracts  34 p 33 (E) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract
Output: (A)
Even so, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of “whether the evidentiary framework of [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)] ... is appropriate in the ADEA context.” Gross, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 n. 2. We have used the analytical framework from McDonnell Douglas in ADEA cases where a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence to prove a claim of discrimination. Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 n. 6 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that “[a]l-though the McDonnell Douglas framework originally applied to Title VII cases, it is now widely accepted that the framework applies to claims of discrimination under the ADEA as well”). Sinc ., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a 56year old employee was replaced by a 40year old employee this qualified as someone substantially younger for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case (B) holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination (C) holding that the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two individuals  one who was four years younger than plaintiff and the other who was ten years younger (D) holding that replacement by someone outside the protected group is required to make a prima facie age discrimination case (E) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive
Output: (B)
person’s conduct is motivated by a desire to protect his economic interest, or whether it is motivated by spite, malice, or some other improper objective. Id. at 31. In our view, this rule applies to this case. Although the defendant in Bendix was a corporation which forced its subsidiary to breach a contract with the plaintiff, we recognized that another economic interest which would support a claim of privilege was the interest which a lessor had “in his property to interfere in a sublease.” Id. (citing Bergfeld v. Stork, 1 Ill.App.3d 486, 288 N.E.2d 15 (1972)). A number of other cases have recognized that a landlord has a sufficient interest to interfere with a prospective or actual lease assignment. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. NBD Trust Co. of Illinois, 904 F.2d 1172, 1178 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Walner v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 514 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege where lessor wished to maintain control over appearance and character of shopping center (B) recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself (C) recognizing privilege (D) recognizing that knowledge and dominion and control are separate elements and stating that it is conceivable that an accused might be well aware of the presence of the substance but have no ability to maintain control over it (E) holding it is critical to the trial courts power of control over its own docket and its ability to serve effectively all litigants that it maintain control over progress of cases before it including requests for extensions of time
Output: (A)
and whether the Tribe’s immunity, if intact, protects the Health Board and the Health Board’s Chairperson. If the tribal immunity defense is not dispositive as to all Defendants, the district court also should address on its merits Defendants’ separate defense that the FMLA is not applicable to the dispute at hand. REVERSED and REMANDED. 1 . The district court decided Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the waiver-by-removal issue based solely on the pleadings, and we therefore "take as true the allegations of the com ancheria Band of Pomo Indians of Cal., No. C-01-4125 VRW, 2002 WL 34727095, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2002) (same), with State Eng’r of the State of Nev. v. S. Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev., 66 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1173 (D. Nev. 1999) (<HOLDING>), vacated on reconsideration on other grounds, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tribes voluntary participation in administrative proceedings is not the express and unequivocal waiver of tribal immunity that we require in this circuit (B) holding that the tribal defendants removal of the case amounted to a clear and unequivocal waiver of immunity in federal court (C) holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity (D) holding that wjaiver of the right to remove must be clear and unequivocal  and that standard was not met by an agreement in which defendants consented to filing of suit in state court but which did not address removal (E) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
Output: (B)
in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States” as a result of the officers’ alleged conspiracy. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir.2006). As discussed previously, Mills suffered no injury to his constitutional rights. See Part II.A-B, supra. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on Mills’s claims under § 1985(3). D. Finally, Mills seeks reversal of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on his several pendent state law claims. Because Mills’s arrest was supported by probable cause, however, his claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution cannot survive under Pennsylvania law. See Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an arrest based on probable cause cannot be the basis of a claim for false arrestimprisonment (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause (D) holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause (E) holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest
Output: (A)
1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that “[b]y the statute’s own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers”); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that “a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee’s strong arm transfer avoidance powers.”); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13
Output: (C)
the peremptory strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In this case, we cannot say that the Florida state court’s judgment was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, specifically the Supreme Court’s holding in Bat-son. As for the State’s strike of the first black prospective juror, the interaction between the parties and the state court (where, upon being challenged, the State revealed that it wished to strike this juror because two prosecutors had seen her sleeping during the jury selection process, and the trial court then moved onto the next juror) was adequate under Batson, so trial counsel was not ineffective in that respect. See Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n. 9 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even assuming that Sneed’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly (B) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (C) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp  a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful  but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge  must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (D) holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence (E) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors
Output: (B)
41(a) after it has sought and received a TRO or a preliminary injunction can constitute a final adjudication on the merits that “the injunction should not have issued in the first instance.” Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1054. The determination of whether such a dismissal should be treated as a final adjudication on the merits for such purposes, however, “must be made on a case by case basis” in light of the totality of the circumstances. Belfer, 2008 WL 163615, at *2. A key factor in this analysis is whether, as here, the plaintiffs dismissal follows vacatur of the TRO or injunction on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. See Middlewest, 433 F.2d at 243; Belfer, 2008 WL 163615, at *2; cf. Rocky Mountain Timber Corp., 502 F.Supp. at 434-35 (<HOLDING>). In such circumstances, a court may “presume 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that dissolution of a tro after the plaintiff failed to carry its burden at the preliminary injunction hearing constituted a final decisions on the merits for purposes of the bond (C) holding that the dissolution of a tro constitutes a final judgment on the merits allowing recovery against the tro bond (D) holding in camera hearing was needed to determine whether the incourt identification was of independent origin or was the tainted product of the circumstances surrounding a bond hearing where a witness saw a suspect at a bond hearing prior to his incourt identification of the suspect and the witness may have gotten a fix on the suspect at the bond hearing (E) holding that committee failed to carry its ultimate burden
Output: (B)
a compelling state interest which justified a routine, administrative inventory search of the personal property on, or in the possession of, the arrestee at the station house following a lawful arrest. Pastos, 887 P.2d at 202. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the application of the strict scrutiny test is a question of law. Woodland v. City of Houston (5th Cir. 1991), 940 F.2d 134, 138. In Woodland, the circuit court stated that the question of whether the city police department’s interest in pre-employment polygraph testing outweighed the applicant’s privacy interest was a question of law and should not have been submitted to the jury. Woodland, 940 F.2d at 138; see also Evans v. Romer (Co. 1993), 854 P.2d 1270, cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993) (<HOLDING>)(citing Lafferty v. Cook (10th Cir. 1991), 949 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it is a question of fact (B) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (C) holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law (D) holding that the jurisdictional reach under section 955a is strictly a question of law (E) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts
Output: (C)
is frivolous because the Court has yet to resolve the question of immunity in the first instance. See, e.g., Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339 (“a notice of appeal may be so baseless that it does not invoke appellate jurisdiction ... [where] the district judge has not finally resolved the question of immunity”). B. Limited Jurisdictional Discovery Does Not Infringe on Sovereign Immunity The Country of Curacao and the Kingdom of the Netherlands contend that any discovery, including limited jurisdictional discovery, infringes on their presumptive sovereign immunity. (DE # 216, at 3). Generally, sovereign immunity shields defendants not only from judgment, but from the litigation process, including discovery. See, e.g., Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The instant situation, however, is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order permitting general asset discovery prior to ruling on alleged exception to the fsia infringed on sovereign immunity (B) holding that licensing the exploitation of natural resources is a sovereign activity under the fsia (C) recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia (D) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (E) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable
Output: (A)
and feed herself. (Id.). Since leaving her position with Defendant, she has performed in jobs requiring her to move files and has assisted in moving a corporate division to another location. (Id. at 25, 28-29). The Eleventh Circuit has not squarely addressed whether an individual with a lifting restriction is disabled. See Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir.2000). Most recently, the Court has stated that it “doubt[s] that a lifting limitation states a per se ADA disability.” Carr v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 170 Fed.Appx. 57, 60 n. 3 (11 th Cir.2006). A number of the Circuit courts have held that lifting restrictions on the same scale as Plaintiffs restriction do not constitute an ADA disability. See Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539-40 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restriction limiting continuous lifting of containers weighing fortyfour to fiftysix pounds does not substantially limit any major life activity (B) holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (C) holding as a matter of law that a permanent twentyfive pound lifting restriction does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity (D) holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities (E) holding that a permanent lifting restriction of no more than twentyfive pounds on a continuous basis is not substantially limiting
Output: (E)