niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
other than article 42.12, section 5 of the same code. Therein, the legislature stated that matters involving conviction and punishment had to be appealed immediately after the defendant was placed on probation. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 23(b) (Vernon Supp.1999). Once probation is revoked, however, the complainant “may appeal the revocation.” Id. From this it follows that when the legislature said the accused “may appeal the revocation” it meant that he can only appeal matters relating to the revocation itself. See, e.g., Keith v. State, 916 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1996, no pet.) (concluding that the time to appeal the conditions of one’s probation is at the time the complainant is granted probation); Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (<HOLDING>). And, whether one was granted an opportunity 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where party fails to challenge specificity of pleading it waives right to claim that pleading fails to meet legal requirements (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that a defendant who fails to object to trial error forfeits his right to appellate review unless he can establish fundamental error (D) holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court (E) holding that absent fundamental error one who fails to appeal when placed on probation waives his right to review
Output: (E)
United States, 780 F.2d 198, 199 & n. 2 (2d Cir.1985). While civilians were also allowed in the club, this did not vitiate the benefit provided to appellant through the club by virtue of his military service. Appellant was subject to military discipline and control while at the club. As the district court noted, the uncontradict-ed evidence in this case shows that the club is under the operational control of the Fort Riley base commander. The commander has the authority to suspend, ter- mínate or deny privileges of servicemen to participate in such activities if he deems it in the best interests of the activity, the installation, or the Army. Numerous Army regulations govern the establishment and operation of nonappropriated fund instru-mentalities such as the club. See also id. at 199 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that this case more closely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations (B) holding that a conviction for receiving stolen property based on possession must be vacated because it involved the same act constituting theft based on retaining property (C) holding that courts must defer to executive branch regulations implementing statutes so long as agencys regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute (D) holding based on army regulations that club constituting nonappropriated fund instrumentality was under military regulation and control (E) holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended
Output: (D)
regulatory and dictionary definitions of “nominal”). The plaintiff asserts that the Secretary’s approval of the Maine HMP exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority in violation of the APA. See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 59. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Secretary abused his discretion in approving “nominal” copayments that exceed the Secretary’s own regulatory definition of what constitutes a “nominal” copayment. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C); Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 23, 55-58; PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the Secretary to approve the HMP because it includes unlawfully high copayments. See PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28 (quoting Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C.Cir.1983)) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the defendants argue that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language (B) holding that when an agencys interpretation of its own rules flies in the face of the language of the rules themselves it is owed no deference (C) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (E) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference
Output: (B)
and Defendants, therefore, terminated her employment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. A § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process has three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the Due Process Clause protects one’s job only where one has a property right in that job. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee in Alabama’s classified service and, therefore, had a property interest in her position. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1133-35 (Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (B) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment
Output: (E)
the guerillas knocked on the door of the house that Mendez was staying in. He escaped out a back window and ran away. As he ran, they shot him. Fortunately, his wound was a nonfatal one to his left arm. Mendez fled El Salvador for the United States to avoid being killed. 2. Despite concluding that Mendez was credible and had “articulated a social group which is visible within Salvadoran society as affiliation with the army during the civil war period,” the Board concluded that Mendez’s description of these events were “too vague” to establish that he was “individually targeted.” This conclusion is not backed by “substantial evidence,” because no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Mendez was not individually targeted. Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1159-61 (9th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable fact-finder would have to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (B) holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions (C) holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff (D) holding that a similarly situated petitioner was perse cuted when he was repeatedly threatened with death  and hunted down albeit unsuccessfully by men with pistols who were out to harm him (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated
Output: (D)
of the Forfeiture Action The first question presented on this appeal is whether administrative forfeiture actions brought within the 120-day time period sufficiently comply with the letter of the law, as provided in § 924(d)(1), when the judicial proceedings are not brought also within the permissible 120 days. Section 924(d)(1) provides, in part: “Any action or proceeding for the forfeiture of firearms or ammunition shall be commenced within one hundred a 738, 741 (S.D.Tex.1998), aff'd, 54 Fed. Appx. 405, 2002 WL 31688616, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct.28, 2002) (concluding that the statute required “either an administrative forfeiture proceeding or a judicial forfeiture action within 120 days of a seizure”); United States v. Fourteen Various Firearms, 889 F.Supp. 875, 877 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Twelve Miscellaneous 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal (B) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (C) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because both the administrative and the judicial forfeiture actions were not commenced within the 120day timeframe (D) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (E) holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority
Output: (C)
and not to whether one or more conspiracies existed.” Broce, 781 F.2d at 796 (citing Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.1978)). 9 . We emphasize, however, that none of our cases interpreting Menna has been faced with the question of whether, consistent with Menna, a double jeopardy claim may be waived by the kind of deliberate relinquishment of a known right which the Supreme Court first described in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 802 (10th Cir.1986) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that a "deliberate decision to relinquish a legal claim" within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst should constitute a waiver of a double jeopardy claim); Launius, 575 F.2d at 772 (<HOLDING>). For example, we have never been faced with a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (B) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (C) holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargainedfor plea (D) holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver (E) holding that when the court in menna suggested that a double jeopardy claim may be waived it is clear that the court was referring not to waiver conclusively presumed from a guilty plea but to waiver as defined in johnson v zerbst
Output: (E)
commentary to section 4A1.2 defines “prior sentence” as “a sentence imposed pri- or to sentencing on the instant offense, other than a sentence for conduct that is part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.l). Here, Appellant’s state court sentence was imposed in April of 1993, prior to his August 30, 1993, sentencing on the instant offense. Whether his conduct in selling cocaine qualifies as conduct that was part of the instant offense presents an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts of appeal that have considered the issue have decided the appropriate inquiry is whether the “prior sentence” and the instant offense involve conduct that is severable into two distinct offenses. See, e.g., U.S. v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico (B) recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown (C) holding that venue did not he in virginia for money laundering that occurred in florida de spite the fact that the money was embezzled in virginia (D) holding that defendants state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was not part of the instant federal money laundering offense even though the concealed weapon was found at the time of defendants arrest for attempting to carry out money laundering scheme (E) holding that rule 3702d12 does not apply to convictions for possession of firearm and carrying concealed weapon when unrelated to commission of any additional substantive offenses
Output: (D)
pill bottles, and that drug users “usually” buy one piece of crack cocaine, rather than more than one “individual sale-type pieces.” The investigator’s testimony, however, was an insufficient basis upon which to predicate Hicks’s conviction. Storing drugs in a pill bottle for quick disposal, and possessing an unidentified number of sales-size pieces of the drug, without more, equally supports the hypothesis that the person found with the drugs was a user rather than a dealer. See, e.g., Bethea v. State, 220 Ga. App. 800, 801-802 (1) (470 SE2d 328) (1996) (possession of rocks of cocaine, without more, was insufficient to support inference that defendant intended to distribute the cocaine); Anderson v. State, 215 Ga. App. 426, 427-428 (1) (451 SE2d 103) (1994) (physical precedent only) (<HOLDING>). Decided October 6, 2008. Ronald R. Parker, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute (B) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks (C) holding there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute where the defendant dropped a plastic bag containing loose white rocks of cocaine and there was no other indicia of the defendants intent such as the drugs being packaged in smaller baggies (D) holding that defendants collective possession of plastic baggies beepers and scales  in conjunction with other evasive action  was sufficient evidence for jury to find conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine beyond reasonable doubt (E) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine
Output: (C)
De Santamaria v. United States Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1008-10 (11th Cir.2008) (finding persecution where alien received numerous death threats, was dragged by her hair out of her vehicle, and was later kidnapped and beaten); Delgado v. United States Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 859-61 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (finding persecution based on cumulative effect of two beatings, continued threatening phone calls, and two instances of the alien’s car being vandalized with political graffiti); Niftaliev v. United States Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.2007) (finding that the cumulative effect of numerous beatings, arrests, searches, and interrogations, culminating in a fifteen-day, food-deprived detention compelled a finding of past persecution). Notwithstanding the (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution (B) holding that two beatings which were four years apart lasted only a few hours each and did not result in serious injury did not constitute persecution (C) holding that court was not compelled to find past persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution where the petitioner was arrested detained for four hours and experienced some physical mistreatment (D) holding that a chiropractor was not in custody for miranda purposes despite an ensuing interview which lasted nearly seven hours (E) holding that two arrests and repeated beatings constituted persecution
Output: (B)
residents in ICF/MR units to receive “active treatment,” as is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(d)(2) and 42 C.F.R. § 483.440. Moreover, neither the Complaint nor the Consent Decree sought to require STS to consider all residents for community placement. Finally, neither the Complaint nor the Consent Decree sought to enjoin STS from issuing DNR orders. Each of the above remedies is sought by plaintiffs in the instant case. Thus, in the instant case there is manifest evidence that the statutory structure of CRI-PA prevented the Justice Department from pursuing all of the causes of action and types of relief which are available to the plaintiffs. For this reason, plaintiffs’ claims are not barred under res judicata. See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 32 F.3d 654, 658 (2nd Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Absence of Privity Literal privity need 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that res judicata is not applicable to a claim for relief that was unavailable in the earlier action (B) holding that res judicata does not bar those claims that arose after the original pleading is filed in the earlier proceeding (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action (E) holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action
Output: (A)
620, 622 (La.App.1967) (same). Takings of temporary easements are measured differently. A landowner must be compensated for the loss of use of property taken by a temporary easement and any impairment of access to the property during the period of construction. Miczek v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App. Ct. 105, 108, 586 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (1992) (involving temporary slope easement). Some courts have held that the damages are equal to the rental value of the property for the period of occupation. 4 Nichols at § 12E.01. This is commonly measured by the rental value of the property as a whole. See Paddock v. Town of Durham, 110 N.H. 106, 108, 261 A.2d 438, 441 (1970); 4A Nichols at § 14.2462. Cf. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 8, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1439, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (<HOLDING>). E. Miscellaneous Damages are to be measured 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper measure of compensation in a temporary taking is the rental value that probably could have been obtained (B) holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market (C) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (D) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages (E) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed
Output: (A)
are also supported by the evidence. The witness paid elose attention to the burglar. She was not frightened by him, but instead focused upon his face in an attempt to determine who he was. Cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. 214, 220, 385 A.2d 831, 834 (1978) (implying that the fact that the witness was “scared” and acted “like he was in shock” at the time of the robbery would have lessened the degree of attention he paid to the features of the suspect). Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant’s appearance. See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts (B) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (C) holding that the government had established necessity for wiretaps despite its use of three cooperating witnesses because those witnesses were able to give agents only limited information not including the names of all members of the conspiracy (D) holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate despite the fact that they varied in detail (E) holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed
Output: (D)
could be reached was made. A juror responded, “No, sir, we haven’t been able so far. Judge, we stand 11 to 1.” Gidley, supra, at 114, 95 So. 330. With this knowledge the judge proceeded to give a modified “Allen charge” which contained patently coercive language. At one point the judge stated, “The business of the courts cannot be disposed of by mistrials.” Gidley, supra at 114, 95 So. 330. In the case at bar, the court gave no “Allen charge” and did not admonish the jury to reach a verdict. The judge’s inquiry in this case was made for the purpose of determining the practicability of allowing the jury, which had requested a review of some of the testimony, more time for deliberation. We find no reversible error here. See also, Orr v. State, 269 Ala. 176, 111 So.2d 639 (Ala.1959) (<HOLDING>); Ex Parte Morris, 465 So.2d 1180, 1183-84 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party who noted issue and made several broad conclusory statements on appeal waived argument for failure to develop (B) holding that several coercive statements made in combination required reversal (C) holding that a statement that the jurors were not required to reach a verdict but should try to do so was not coercive (D) holding that allen charge given by court was coercive and required a new trial (E) holding that failure to give explanation of allegations required reversal
Output: (B)
944, 565 N.E.2d 215, 218-19 (1990). As the Court already has discussed, none of Cottrell’s diverse co-Defendants in this case have been fraudulently joined to defeat diversity. To the extent there is any question about the citizenship of the Allen Cassens Trust, the Albert Cassens Trust, Albert Cassens, Mark Shashek, Marysville Releasing, Inc., Bankhead Transportation Equipment Company, and Bankhead Enterprises, Inc., for diversity purposes, it would have been apparent to Cottrell upon service of the Younts’ operative complaint that those Defendants were due to be dismissed from the case under the “seller’s exception” to 735 ILCS 5/2-621, at least with respect to the Younts’ products liability claims. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F.Supp.2d 659, 684-85 (N.D.Ill.2005) (<HOLDING>); Link v. Venture Stores, Inc., 286 Ill.App.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 2621 does not apply to claims for breach of warranty (B) holding that warranty claim accrued at tender where 180 day warranty on computer not a warranty for future performance as it involved a remedy only (C) holding that fifra preempts breach of warranty claims based on labeling (D) holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage (E) holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty
Output: (A)
“insurer” technically is considered part of the “business of insurance” is not material. Barnett Bank, at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1111 (“The word 'relates’ is highly general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other pre-emption contexts.”). Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Service is not part of the “business of insurance,” and yet we have held that a Treasury Regulation, which resulted in a tax on insurance companies, rendered the MeCarran-Ferguson Act “inapplicable by its own terms.” See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1211, 1219 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979); see also Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1414-15 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1932, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore we conclude that Congress expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period (B) holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule (C) holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act (D) holding that the longshore and harbor workers compensation act specifically relates to business of insurance (E) holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act
Output: (D)
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and learned that the federal license "will not change upon renewal." 4 . The position statement included an Administrator's Memorandum, dated June 19, 1986, indicating how regional offices should handle approval of permits for hydropower purposes. The memorandum indicates that when dealing with a hydropower application coming within FERC jurisdiction, departmental staff need to be aware of FERC licensing conditions for the facility in question. An attachment to the memorandum shows standard conditions of approval for a state water rights permit and the language of one of such conditions is that which was incorporated into the license at issue in this case. The memorandum notes that an applicant "can request Department action on 0-41 (1969) (<HOLDING>). 7 . It was also after the enactment of I.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use (D) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (E) recognizing the right to use water to generate power
Output: (D)
8117 (one year); Ga.Code.Ann. § 9-2-61 (six months); 735 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/13-217 (one year); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.19 (one year); Tenn.Code.Ann. § 28-1-105 (one year); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 205(a) (McKinney 1990) (six months); W.Va.Code § 55-2-18 (one year). A plaintiff should not be permitted to extend the re-filing period beyond the limitations period fixed by section 16.064 by filing one or more discretionary appeals which are later dismissed. Therefore, if presented with the facts of this case, it is likely that the Texas Court of Appeals would hold that a dismissal becomes “final” after it is affirmed on appeal, not after discretionary appeals, such as petitions for rehearing or a writ of certiorari, are denied. Cf. Click v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 397 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); Lehman Bros. v. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that filing of petition for writ of certiorari did not prevent judgment from becoming final for purposes of limitations period of missouri savings statute which provided that plaintiff who suffers nonsuit in wrongful death action may commence new action within one year thereafter (B) holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a  1983 action is three years (C) holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted (D) recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review (E) holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired
Output: (A)
“[t]he inquiry [whether a duty of care exists] involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). We have also made clear that, [i]n most eases, the justice of imposing such a duty [of care] is so clear that the cause of action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor’s creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. In fact, however, more is needed, “more” being the value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy, that the actor owed the injured party a duty of reasonable care. [Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied) (<HOLDING>).] It is beyond question that “[a] cause of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provisions in a subcontract incorporating a prime contract for a limited purpose are limited only to those that are applicable (B) holding that the tort threshold requirement njsa 39670n is not applicable if the injury to a qualified claimant is caused by a hit and run motorist (C) holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration (D) holding limited by njsa 2a1557 (E) holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers
Output: (D)
of his mental illness. Both the ADA and the appellant’s counsel spent considerable time discussing insanity and mental illness. During voir dire, the ADA admitted the appellant was mentally ill. The record reflects that the appellant’s only-defense to the State’s murder allegation was the insanity defense. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to question the veni-re on how they might give effect to mitigating evidence of insanity, mental illness, mental defect, and other elements of the anticipated defense. See Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The appellant should have been allowed to question the prospective jurors about their feelings on punishment and whether they could consider probation. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). Although the majority acknowledges that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case (B) holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question seeking to determine bias or prejudice in favor of the victim because she was a nun (C) holding trial judge was at the very limit of his discretion in refusing to remove prospective jurors for cause (D) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child (E) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion
Output: (A)
6 . 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b). 7 . 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003) (defining elements required to satisfy the clause). 8 . Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 875-76 (9th Cir.2004). We review the district court’s choice of the standard of review de novo. Id. To the extent the plaintiffs question the district court’s ability to renew Reliance’s summary judgment motion, we note that the plaintiffs faced the complete dismissal of their complaint when Reliance first made its motion and briefed all relevant issues. In these circumstances, renewal of the motion was not inappropriate. 9 . See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Sandy v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement may provide elements of a plan by setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to care (B) holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement (C) holding that the proceeds of a pension plan could be garnished after they had been paid out to the beneficiaries (D) holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith (E) recognizing that there may be multiple beneficiaries of federal programs
Output: (A)
Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court’s actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with § 1125’s solicitation requirements “is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization.” In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2)(B)(vi), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process
Output: (E)
his failure to appear personally at the hearing. This distinguishes this case from cases where a party never appears in an action, and a default judgment is granted at trial. See, e.g., Ladson v. BPM Corp., 2004 S.D. 74, ¶¶ 22-25, 681 N.W.2d 863, 869 (upholding a default judgment granted to the plaintiff at trial where the defendant corporation never answered the complaint or otherwise appeared in the action by counsel as required by law and as repeatedly instructed by the circuit court). 6 . Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412, 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite failure to appear for trial default could not be entered without notice to defendant (B) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (C) holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered (D) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment (E) holding 1 that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial a plaintiffs only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial 2 that entry of default is not authorized and 3 that the hearing held under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguished from a default hearing 1 quoting warden v lamb 98 calapp 738 277 p 867 868 1929
Output: (E)
its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both. The 1993 version did not contain subsection (2), which was part of the statute in effect in 1996 at the time of petitioner's crime. See Note 1, supra. To the extent that the Connecticut Supreme Court found the 1993 version of § 53-21 to have two distinct purposes, that finding would be even more pronounced under the 1996 version, which added the second subsection involving contact with the intimate parts of a child under the age of sixteen. 15 . See also State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 163, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In State v. Smith, 73 Conn.App. 809, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force (B) holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen (C) holding that where defendant charged with wilfully or unlawfully committing certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child contrary to general statutes  5321    specific intent is not an element of the crime defined (D) holding that the deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner was conduct proscribed by the second prong of subsection 1 (E) holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child
Output: (B)
the litigation in the form cast or in the plaintiffs chosen forum”). [¶ 9] If this Court were to retain jurisdiction only over those claims which arguably are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations and dismiss the remaining causes of action, this would force Sander-son to proceed in a manner akin to an improper splitting of his cause of action. See Freed v. Unruh, 1998 ND 34, ¶ 10, 575 N.W.2d 433 (allowing plaintiff to proceed with lawsuit would be analogous to an improper splitting of cause of action); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429, 434 (N.D.1953) (stating when there is a single cause of action, although there may be different kinds of damages, only one suit can be brought); Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 73 N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 442 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Choice Fin. Group v. Schellpfeffer, 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent (B) holding a person who has availed himself of part of single claim or obligation in action or defense is thereafter estopped from enforcing the remainder of it (C) holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party (D) holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class (E) holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action
Output: (B)
the magistrate may not have had the authority to enter the order under Ind.Code § 33-24-5-8, Father does not argue on appeal that the order was defective because it contained the signature of the magistrate only and the record does not indicate that either party argued below that die order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication the order was approved by the trial court. Accordingly, the parties have waived any challenge to the validity of the appealed order by failing to make any objection or call the court’s attention to the issue. See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his c ; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Father cites to “Ind.Code § 35-16-15-7.” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of hearing by failing to object (B) holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court (C) holding appellant waived argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing (D) holding that appellant by failing to object to commissioners authority before or at the administrative hearing waived any challenge (E) holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial
Output: (D)
applied in employment discrimination cases, although the burden of production shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff makes out a pri-ma facie case, the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact ... remains at all times with the plaintiff”). 21 . Cf. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Ont. (Human Rights Comm’n), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321, ¶ 119 (Can.) (referring to "the rule of evidence that the burden of proof should lie on the person most likely to be in possession of the relevant facts”); McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, ¶ 30 (Can.) ("The burden of proof should fall on the party who is in the best position to obtain the facts.”). 22 . See Schaible Elec. Ltd. v. Melloul-Blamey Constr., Inc., [2004] 35 C.L.R. (3d) 141, ¶¶ 105-26 (Ont.) (standing merely for R. 653, 655-56 (Ont.) (<HOLDING>). 23 . In oral argument before this Court, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that seller was entitled to recover contract price of goods where buyer failed to make effective rejection under the ucc (B) holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue (C) holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 (D) holding that title revested in seller under california law when buyer revoked his acceptance of goods (E) holding merely that to the extent a breaching buyer wishes to invoke the presumption that a nonbreaching seller will resell the contractedfor goods in the open market it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for those goods
Output: (E)
to the County. 2. Plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge also fails. When, as here, plaintiffs “rely on substantive due process to challenge governmental action that does not impinge on fundamental rights,” courts “merely look to see whether the government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.” Halverson, 42 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted). The County has put forward a rational justification for the retroactive nature of the Ordinance—ensuring compliance with Clark County Code § 8.04.040(B)(3)’s requirement that the gambling permitted by Class A Slot Machine Licenses remains merely “incidental” to the licensee’s primary business purpose. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 3. The Ordinance does not violate the Equal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is retroactive (B) holding retroactive application (C) holding that retroactive aspects of legislation must satisfy due process a burden met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation
Output: (C)
Gagnon made it more difficult for her to sell financial products and thereby “altered the terms and conditions of her employment.” Yet the record suggests that these frustrations were shared by many, if not all, of the other agents in the office. Moreover, this type of “sporadic” inconvenience is not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to meet the demanding test to establish a hostile environment claim. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (explaining the justification for the “demanding” requirements placed on hostile environment claims); Nicole v. Grafton School, 181 F.Supp.2d 475, 484 (D.Md.2002) (granting motion to dismiss Title VII hostile environment claim in part because alleged racial slur was not sufficiently “continuous and prolonged”); Jackson, 171 F.Supp.2d at 532 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a jury reasonably could find based on an employees complaints to a superior that the employee perceived her environment as hostile (B) holding that ajlthough a continuing pattern of hostile or abusive behavior is ordinarily required to establish a hostile environment a single instance can suffice when it is sufficiently egregious and holding that the plaintiff established that she suffered a sexually hostile working environment where she alleged she was raped by a male coworker (C) holding that plaintiffs allegation that her professor gave her a brief bear hug was insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment (D) holding that plaintiffs allegations of loosely related actions that she perceived to be hostile to her based on her race are insufficient to meet the heavy burden required to prove hostile environment (E) holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence
Output: (D)