niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
minors from the physician-patient privileges established under sections 154C.5 and 228.2. Accordingly, Pini cannot disclose the children’s mental health records unless authorized to do so by law. Susan argues the Code authorizes a parent, as a legal representative of the child, to consent to the release of the child’s mental health records. Id. §§ 154C.5(3), 228.3(1). We agree with her that sections 154C.5(3) and 228.3(1) normally allow a parent to consent to the release of his or her child’s mental health records. Susan then argues section 598.41(l)(e) gives her an absolute right to obtain her children’s records. Susan may even find some support for her position in one of our court of appeals’ decisions. See Leaf v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 460 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. Susan fails to appreciate that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records (B) recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents (C) holding a noncustodial parent has a right to access his childs medical records because section 598411 merely codified existing common law (D) holding that where interference with visitation becomes so pervasive as to harm the childs close relationship with the noncustodial parent there can be a conclusion drawn that the actions of the custodial parent show a disregard for the best interests of the child warranting a change of custody (E) holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records
Output: (C)
federal statutory right. There is no dispute that the officers were acting under color of state law. The dispute in this ease was whether the officers unreasonably searched [Henderson’s] house in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). [1] It is axiomatic that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (concluding that state’s operation of a probation system “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements”); Ca-mara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (<HOLDING>). However, the special needs doctrine applies 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant (B) holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized (C) holding telephonic search warrant as reasonable in certain circumstances (D) holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration (E) holding that in certain circumstances government investigators need not adhere to the usual warrant requirement as long as their searches meet reasonable legislative or administrative standards
Output: (E)
judgment and the trial court held in favor of Building Venture as a matter of law. The time to have presented a meritorious defense was at this time. Bush and Miller’s lawyer received notice of this hearing and appeared on their behalf. This fact alone disproves their claim that they were prevented from presenting a meritorious defense. But even if it did not, the trial in 1990 disposed of the case against a third defendant, Mosby, not Bush and Miller; their rights were not adjudicated at that time, having been adjudicated previously. The only other event Bush and Miller had a right to receive notice of for due process claims was entry of the final judgment signed January 25, 1991. See e.g., Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (<HOLDING>). But neither this appeal nor the bill of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights (B) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (C) holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause (D) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights (E) holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard
Output: (D)
number of animals in an enclosed space made cat A209057 more susceptible to disease and chronic infection. The evidence showed that the bedroom containing approximately 50 cats smelled strongly of urine and feces and that the residence contained only four litter boxes. Many of the cats suffered infections. Cat A209057 suffered an infection so severe that it led to its demise. Although defendant may have believed that she was saving the stray cats from certain death, a reasonable person would understand that her actions caused cat A209057 to exist in an unsanitary environment where the cat became so sick that animal control personnel deemed it necessary to euthanize the animal. Common sense tells us that defendant’s actions were inhumane. See Larson, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 650-51 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we determine that a person of ordinary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding because determination of guilt and whether mercy should be recommended should be made in one proceeding by the same jury petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the burglary charge (B) holding after bairesreyes was decided that  16b is void for vagueness in the context of the ina (C) holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the adea must be made in accordance with common law agency principles (D) holding that in making a determination as to whether a statute is void for vagueness common sense should not be suspended and criminal acts cannot always be defined with absolute precision because of the limits of the english language (E) holding that common knowledge and common sense of one skilled in the art must be considered in determining obviousness
Output: (D)
or threatened to be removed from a religious community sued the responsible state social service employees, claiming religious discrimination in violation of their free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection rights. In response, the employees moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and proffered evidence showing that the children were being mistreated. On appeal of the district court’s denial of that motion, we assumed that the employees were motivated in part by substantial prejudice, but held that they nonetheless were entitled to qualified immunity since their conduct was “objectively reasonable” in light of the doctrines enunciated in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574-76, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)(<HOLDING>); and Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metropolitan 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties (B) holding that state official can act lawfully even when motivated by hostility toward a certain protected class (C) holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances (D) holding that state official can act lawfully even when motivated by a dislike for protected behavior (E) holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court
Output: (D)
the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits that actual innocence applies to a sentencing enhancement. Even assuming it does, courts applying actual innocence for non-capital sentencing have noted that for purposes of the actual innocence exception, “ ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604. Thus, some circuits have held that “for the actual innocence exception to apply in the noncapital sentencing context, a movant must show that he is factually innocent of the conduct or underlying crime that serves as the predicate for the enhanced sentence.” McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1198-99 (11th Cir.2011) (involving career offender guidelines). See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the actual innocence exception applies to a sentencing enhancement in a noncapital sentence (B) holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists (C) holding under acca that the actual innocence of sentence exception applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes (D) holding that as to each predicate act the plaintiff must allege the time place and contents of the misrepresentations (E) holding that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard are constitutionally required in criminal cases
Output: (C)
the garnishee but are still subject to a contingency that has not occurred and thus has not assuredly made the money the debtor’s own.” Id. at 1356 n. 34; see also Cummings Gen, Tire Co. v. Volpe Constr. Co., 230 A.2d 712, 713 (D.C.1967) (“[M]oney payable upon a contingency or condition is not subject to garnishment until the contingency has happened or the condition has been fulfilled”). Accordingly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has long held that future rental payment to be owed by a tenant constitutes a “contingent liability” at the time that a writ of garnishment is levied, and therefore, is not considered a “credit” that may be attached by a judg ment creditor under Section 16-546. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wrenn, 67 App.D.C. 94, 89 F.2d 838, 840-41 (1937) (<HOLDING>); see also Smith, 644 A.2d at 1356 n. 34 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa (B) holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second (C) holding that unearned rent is not a debt  and instead constitutes a contingent liability because rent does not accrue to the lessor as a debt unless the lessee has enjoyed the use of the land (D) holding that future rent is not attachable under statute providing that a debt is not attachable unless it is certain to become due (E) holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or
Output: (C)
1045 (Fla.2004); Fla. Bar v. McAtee, 674 So.2d 734 (Fla.1996). Further, in Florida Bar v. Brown, 635 So.2d 13, 13 (Fla.1994), this Court stated that a “[cjlear violation of any order or disciplinary status that denies an attorney the license to practice law generally is punishable by disbarment.” In this case, the referee’s report and the record do not sufficiently establish that D’Ambrosio clearly violated this Court’s order of suspension by appearing in court. In addition to the inadequacy of factual findings, the referee’s report also fails to conduct an analysis of the facts in light of the case law. Given these deficiencies in the record and the referee’s report, there is an insufficient basis for this Court to disbar D’Ambrosio. See Fla. Bar v. Rayman, 238 So.2d 594 (Fla.1970) (<HOLDING>); see also Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 892 So.2d 1002 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that board erred in requiring admission of guilt and repentance as part of the proof of present good character and rehabilitation (B) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal (C) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment are not grounds for reversal (D) holding that the evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and disbarment (E) holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence
Output: (D)
inference” of scienter. To put it differently, "in those cases where motive and opportunity allegations do not alone create a strong inference of scienter, the allegations will nonetheless be relevant in determining whether the totality of allegations permits a strong inference of fraud.” Angres v. Smallworldwide PLC, 94 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1174 (D.Colo.2000). 45 . See, e.g., Phillips, 190 F.3d at 623; Chill, 101 F.3d at 268; Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.2000); Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir.1994) ("[P]lamtiff's allegation of motive — basically that the defendant and officers were motivated by incentive compensation — -would effectively eliminate the state of mind requirement as to all corporate officers and defendants.”). 46 . Compare Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1491 (<HOLDING>); and Schlagal v. Learning Tree Int’l, No. CV 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 20 of individual defendants holdings raised an inference of scienter (B) holding that sale by one defendant of 11 of holdings in light of absence of any sales by other defendants undermined allegations of scienter (C) holding that total proceeds from insider sales of 106 million raised inference of scienter (D) holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter (E) holding that sales of corporate stock by six individual defendants for a total of approximately 4200000 were sufficient to support inference of scienter against them under prepslra pleading standard
Output: (A)
558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002). DISCUSSION Moody argues the circuit court erred in granting Dairy-land’s motion for summary judgment, asserting Dairyland did not make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage because it failed to offer coverage in amounts less than the statutory minimum limits. We disagree. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 353 S.C. 31, 40, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).. Moreover, “[w]here the terms of the statute are clear, [this Court] must apply those terms according to their literal meaning.” Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see also Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, section 38-73-470 provides 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding when interpreting a statute words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation (D) holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning
Output: (C)
FAA whether an appeal was immediately permitted or only allowed after arbitration. Id. at 440. Numerous other state courts have reached the same conclusion when confronted with an argument that the FAA preempts state procedures of various types. In Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1996), the court held that the recognition of a right to a jury trial in FAA § 4 did not preempt California’s use of a summary procedure to decide a motion to compel arbitration. Quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 137 (1988), the court said, “It is a ‘general and unassailable proposition ... that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation 72, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (1998) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 429 Mass. 1107, 710 N.E.2d 604 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that on appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration a court may only determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration other contractual challenges must be determined by the arbitrator (B) holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court (D) holding that faa  16a3 did not preempt a state statute prohibiting appeal of an order to compel arbitration and reasoning that there is no reason to suppose that the timing of the exercise of the right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration is other than a procedural matter which does not alter the substantive rights of either party (E) holding denial of mandamus challenging arbitration order did not bar appeal of that order after arbitration was completed
Output: (D)
for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement. (C) the magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties. Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, r (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d 168, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party (C) holding that rule 11 sanctions are dispositive and thus subject to de novo review (D) holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions should be promptly made thereby allowing the judge to rule on the matter when it is still fresh in his mind and that the motion should normally be deemed waived if it is not made prior to trial (E) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive
Output: (A)
challenges de novo. Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831 (5th Cir.2003). First, Reyes-Gomez claims that, if removed to the Dominican Republic, he is likely to be injured or killed; and that this would violate his right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. In support, he relies on the state-created danger doctrine, which has never explicitly been adopted by this court. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir.2003). Under this doctrine, due process is violated when state actors: (1) “use[ ] their authority to create a dangerous environment for the plaintiff’; and (2) “act[] with deliberate n the light of INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). That decision, however, did not overrule Cortez. Id. at 324, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (<HOLDING>). Further, post-Sf. Cyr, numerous courts have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens (B) holding in the context of a non  212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance (C) holding that the presumption against retroactivity applies far beyond the confines of the criminal law and the  mere statement that deportation is not punishment for past crimes did not preclude its considering an aliens reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary relief (D) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (E) holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel
Output: (C)
available only to that party; or (2) has such a relationship with one party as to effectively make him unavailable to the opposing party, regardless of actual physical availability. Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 905 (citing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir.1976)). The latter prong is also referred to as “pragmatic unavailability.” See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers’ “strong personal interest in the success of the city’s defense of their conduct ...” rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Garibay was unquestionably 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (B) holding that the same hearing officer as in this case erred in substituting his judgment for that of the pertinent school board in that case (C) holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the united states in building its case as well as his interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant (D) holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction (E) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers
Output: (C)
of the use of the land [were] restricted to a small, select number” of individuals chosen by the foundation for “their own reasons,” the property was not being put to a “public use.” Id. ¶ 12. The same holds true here. Those who seek to benefit from the use of VSC’s property must file an application, and VSC exercises sole discretion in determining who qualifies. The fact that the application process is open “to the entire world” is of no moment. Certainly, the same can be said for the applicants in Vermont Wild Land. What is significant is the existence of VSC’s screening process and the restrictions it imposes on those who can benefit from the primary use of the property. This is the hallmark of a “private” as opposed to a “public” use. See Sigler, 174 Vt. at 134, 807 A.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). VSC’s beneficiaries share a proficiency in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a limited liability company has the citizenship of its membership (B) holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully against the government because the possibility of harm to a private party is often if not always grossly outweighed by the public interest in enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy (C) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (D) recognizing that leased property is exempt from taxation where the lessee uses it for a public purpose (E) recognizing that unlike public uses private uses of property are characterized by the benefits bestowed on a particular and most often limited sector of the public usually distinguishable by certain characteristics or membership
Output: (E)
v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 328 (Iowa 2010) (concluding Commerce Clause is not offended based on Iowa income tax on royalties earned by allowing use of intangibles within the State of Iowa); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 17, 899 N.E.2d 87, 92 (2009) (applying substantial nexus test and rejecting Commerce Clause challenge based on income earned through use of intangible property in state); Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 379 N.J.Super. 562, 879 A.2d 1234, 1242 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2005) (finding physical presence of Delaware holding company was not mandatory to impose income tax associated with licensing fees attributable to intellectual property targeting New Jersey consumers); Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d at 18-19 (<HOLDING>); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 167 N.C.App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by licensing intangibles for use in south carolina holding company had substantial nexus such that taxing royalties from intellectual property would not violate the dormant commerce clause (B) holding that state restrictions on electronic license plates might constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce so the claim fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant commerce clause (C) holding that the dormant commerce clause applies to the notforprofit sector of the economy (D) holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant commerce clause (E) holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce
Output: (A)
are differences between sanctions under Rule 37(a) and substitution of counsel conditioned on payment of fees, the parallel considerations convince us that the Cunningham rationale applies here. Like Rule 37(a) sanctions, the present situation invokes concerns regarding finality, avoiding piecemeal appeals, and availability of effective appellate review.” Id. Cases from the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits further support interpreting Cunningham as applying more broadly than to Rule 37(a) sanctions alone. The First Circuit recognized in Empresas Omajede, Inc. v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000), that Cunningham affirmed its precedents denying interlocutory appeals in the sanctions area. See, e.g., United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Appeal of Licht & Semonoff 796 F.2d 564, 573 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable (B) holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable (C) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding an order of rule 37a sanctions against an attorney is immediately appealable under  1291
Output: (C)
Court procedures or under G.L.1956 §§ 16-19-1 and 16-19-6 as to the number of absences from school that were necessary to incur possible liability as a truant. However, the administrative order specifies a threshold number of ten days of absence before a child may be referred either to the Diversion Program or to the formal juvenile calendar. Indeed, administrative order 2010-2 states that “[t]he Intake Department may refer cases to the Truancy calendar if the petition: * * * [h]as at least 10 days of absences and/or states that a student is habitually late or absent from school.” We are confident that a person of average intelligence need neither guess nor speculate about the number of absences that will result in a referral to the Truancy Diversion Program. See Moreau, 15 A.3d at 583 (<HOLDING>). Administrative order 2010-2 also details how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute defining drug paraphernalia and  564403cl were not unconstitutionally vague for want of certainty and definiteness because they give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden (B) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (C) holding that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly (D) holding flag contempt statute unconstitutionally vague (E) holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague
Output: (C)
whether Appellant possessed a specific intent to kill the victim. Again, although not controlling, the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions offer a nearly identical instruction concerning the use of facts to infer a specific intent to kill. Pennsyl vania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, § 15.2502(A)(5). Appellant’s argument that our judicial system condemns the use of inferences for evaluating the degree of homicide is incorrect. Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s impression, we find nothing in the instruction of the trial court that the jurors could have interpreted as requiring them to draw an inference. See Commonwealth v. Karenbauer, 552 Pa. 420, 715 A.2d 1086, 1098 (1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1258, 143 L.Ed.2d 354 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The trial court did not tell the jury that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction (B) holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable (C) holding that instruction on inference of specific intent to kill did not usurp jurys role as fact finder (D) holding good faith jury instruction unnecessary when court gave adequate specific intent instruction (E) holding that there was no error where one instruction did not inform the jury that in order to convict defendant of attempted murder the evidence must show that defendant had a specific intent to commit murder but where subsequent instruction did inform jury of this requirement and concluding that the instructions when read as a whole adequately informed the jury of the requirement of specific intent to kill
Output: (C)
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). 36 . Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir.2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20(2)). 37 . Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). 38 . See id. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139. 39 . Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1152, 115 S.Ct. 1104, 130 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1995) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added)). 40 . Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 904 (10th Cir.1997), aff'd 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). 41 . See Eckholt v. American Business Information, Inc., 873 F.Supp. 526, 534 (D.Kan.1994) (<HOLDING>). 42 . Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied (B) holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them (C) holding that plaintiff conceded the merits of an issue when he did not respond in any way to defendants argument on that issue in his opposition before the district court (D) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed (E) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed
Output: (B)
keep that information confidential, (b) not compete with their employer by using that information, and (c) return the information upon termination. InnoSys then alleges that it disclosed confidential information to Ms. Mercer under the protection of a signed NDA (thereby giving rise to the fiduciary duty) and that Ms. Mercer subsequently breached that duty by disclosing the confidential information during the DWS hearing. But as shown above, InnoSys must utilize these same facts to substantiate its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Therefore, InnoSys's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is preempted by the UTSA, and its dismissal was proper for this additional reason. 1 . See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Ssangyong Cement Indus. Co., 107 F.3d 30, 1997 WL 59360, at "7-8 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Firetrace USA, LLC v. Jesclard, 800 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the amount of damages was the primary issue in dispute the plaintiffs claim for damages was not liquidated until the date the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest under ksa  16 201 (B) holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim (C) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (D) holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation (E) holding that californias codification of the utsa requires plaintiffs to show damages in one of the three listed categories
Output: (E)
statement “is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Id. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court departed from its ruling in Roberts and established a new standard for determining when hearsay statements of an unavailable witness may be admitted as evidence against a criminal defendant consistently with the Confrontation Clause. The standard set forth- in Crawford actually expanded defendants’ confrontation rights beyond what was contemplated in Roberts. Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-55, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (requiring unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination to admit testimonial hearsay statements of witnesses not appearing at trial), with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (<HOLDING>). Prior to the decision in Crawford, this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witness hearsay statements may be admitted whenever they bear sufficient indicia of reliability even without crossexamination (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements (C) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (D) holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing (E) holding that it would have been proper to admit party opponent admissions although they were based on multiple levels of hearsay and test their reliability on crossexamination but upholding the district courts exclusion of the statements where the hearsay statements lacked any factual content and lacked any indicia of trustworthiness
Output: (A)
to two judicially cognizable interests. Id. at 560. First, the partisan-elections regime makes the process of getting on the general-election ballot more costly and time consuming. As Nix argues, courts have recognized that “[s]uch ballot-access requirements impose an ‘injury-in-faet,’ not only because non-compliance prevents ‘candidates’ from ‘appearing] on the ... ballot,’ but also because even compliance requires ‘significant amounts of time, money, personnel, and energy,’ which are limited ‘campaign resources’ that could have been ‘allocate[d]’ elsewhere.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 19-20 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Second, Nix alleges that Kinston’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance (C) holding that candidates had ample standing to challenge ballotaccess requirements (D) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (E) holding that candidates had standing to challenge requirements for appearing on the generalelection ballot as independents even though they could have chosen to run in a party primary
Output: (C)
call, a reasonable police officer would have been especially cautious in obtaining clear consent from an individual with impaired speech who makes a nonsensical, non-responsive statement in answer to the officer’s request. Cf. United States v. Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 685-88 (8th Cir.2004) (finding voluntary consent in spite of a language barrier and the defen-, dant’s varying answers to whether police could search his truck in part because the English-speaking police officer asked the Spanish-speaking defendant repeatedly until he was satisfied that the defendant had consented). In this unique situation, Swierk or Mitchell clearly should have confirmed their belief that Antone had consented to the entry of his home. Cf. United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 847-49 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained a detailed description of the nature of the offense the premises to be searched the items for which they were searching and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment (B) holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council (C) holding that the pittsburgh police department did not illegally terminate an officers hla benefits and that the police department was entitled to a subrogation interest against the officers thirdparty settlement (D) recognizing without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant that the discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest the defendant and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched the defendant and discovered the marijuana in his pocket (E) holding in the context of thirdparty consent that the lack of an expressed interest in the items searched in conjunction with the purpose of the police officers presence created an ambiguous situation and that under rodriguez the officer should have inquired further
Output: (E)
Ins. Co. (Mo. Ct. App.), 724 S.W.2d 307; Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co. (N.M. 1995), 907 P.2d 994; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts (N.C. 1964), 134 S.E.2d 654; Celina Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Saylor (Ohio Misc. 1973), 301 N.E.2d 721; Stucky v. Long (Okla. Ct. App. 1989), 783 P.2d 500; Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Or. 1973), 507 P.2d 9; Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier (R.I. 1990), 574 A.2d 1240; Stepp v. Hill (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), 1993 WL 181984; Whitehead v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), 952 S.W.2d 79. But see McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Minn. 1992), 488 N.W.2d 476, 479 (under UM coverage, “accident” is to be viewed from the perspective of the tortfeasor); Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. (N. J. 1994), 649 A.2d 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident 
 Holding statements: (A) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (B) holding that sciascia v american ins co nj super 1982 443 a2d 1118 which held that for purposes of um coverage accident must be viewed from the insured victims perspective was no longer respectable authority (C) holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement (D) holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage (E) holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver
Output: (B)
said he did ‘not admit [the challenged statement], and [would] not consider it relevant to ... issues” other than to establish a recent complaint of rape (emphasis added)). Further, and contrary to the position taken by the majority in footnote 4, I do not believe the trial court’s partial articulation of the reason for its decision in this case sufficiently rebutted the Cole/Craddock presumption that the court improperly considered the admitted evidence of Pierce’s perjury conviction in determining her guilt. The trial court commented that, before defense witness Kisha LeBray testified, this was a “close” case on the issue of possession with intent to distribute. Its statement that “the testimony of Miss LeBray makes it pretty clear that this defendant was at least a c d.2d at 826 (<HOLDING>). Here and in Craddock, unlike in Cole, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if other evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is insignificant by comparison (B) holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if cumulative (C) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (D) holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt (E) holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt
Output: (A)
could extend its more protective overtime pay laws to maritime workers on the high seas. We relied on the principle that FLSA sets a floor rather than a ceiling on protective legislation, holding that FLSA does not “preempt states from according more generous protection to maritime employees on the high seas off a state’s coastal waters.” Id. at 1425. In Williamson v. General Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1152-53 (9th Cir.2000), we held that a common law fraud claim, which addressed conduct not within the scope of FLSA, was not preempted by FLSA. Our decision in Williamson contained somewhat contradictory statements. On the one hand, we suggested in dicta that “[c]laims that are directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and retaliation d L 24216269 (C.D.Cal. Dec.9, 2003) (<HOLDING>). A California Court of Appeal has also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in non  17200 case that the exclusive remedy for violations of the state and federal wage and hour laws is flsa (B) holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs wage and invasionofprivacy claims (C) holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (D) holding in non 17200 case that common law claims duplicative of the flsa are preempted (E) holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates
Output: (A)
had simply taken the first step in the ultimate disposition of the dispute between the parties. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Beaumont v. Callaway, 597 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd); see also Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 150. Because an interlocutory order may only be appealed when authorized by statute and because there is no such authority for the appeal of an order compelling arbitration, we must follow the holdings of this and other courts in concluding that an order compelling arbitration is an unappealable interlocutory order. See Elm Creek, 940 S.W.2d at 150 (concluding court of appeals had no jurisdiction over interlocutory order compelling arbitration); Gathe v. Cigna Healthplan of Texas, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Bethke v. Polyco, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 431, 434 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision (B) holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court (D) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (E) holding order compelling arbitration is unappealable
Output: (E)
136-87; see also Ontell v. Capitol Hill E.W. Ltd., 527 A.2d 1292, 1295-96 (D.C.1987) (upholding notice as adequate despite failure technically to comply with § 45-1406). In the Frank Emmet Real Estate case, a tenant informed his landlord that he was temporarily relocating to Colorado, gave him the address there, and indicated the tenant’s intent to return to live in his rented property in Washington. While the tenant was in Colorado, the landlord attempted eviction by posting a summons on the door of the Washington property and mailing a copy of the notice to the Washington address. In this way, the landlord comported with the express statutory requirements for service of summons. The court reasoned, however, that the landlord’s strict adherence to the statute was of a “woode D.C.1981) (<HOLDING>). This court suggested in Gantt that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient (B) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (C) holding that because the requirement of strict compliance with the statute obviates some of the practical difficulties of proving delivery notice to quit served by slipping under door was insufficient despite actual receipt of notice (D) holding that upon receipt of the important notice a conclusive presumption of notice was established (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice
Output: (C)