niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and (F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in non-bankruptcy matters. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3); see also In re West End Fin. Advisors, LLC, et al., 2012 WL 25906132012 at *3-4, Bankr.LEXIS 3045 at *8 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), In re Quigley Company, Inc., 500 B.R. 347, 356(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013). The Bankruptcy Code imposes upon the court “a supervisory obligation,” not only to approve the employment of professionals, but also to ensure that the fees sought by those professionals in a bankruptcy case are reasonable, and that the services and expenses were necessarily incurred. In re Fibermark, Inc., 349 B.R. 385, 394 (Bankr.D.Vt.2006) (<HOLDING>). “Even in the absence of an objection, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court has an independent judicial responsibility to evaluate the appropriateness of the fees and expenses requested (B) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (C) holding that jury has responsibility to determine whether repair bills represent necessary and reasonable expenses (D) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (E) holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in awarding opposing counsels attorneys fees and expenses as sanctions without affording the sanctioned party the right to examine question or provide argument against the claimed fees and expenses
Output: (A)
subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena’s validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA’s requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) for the definition of a “consumer reporting agency.”) The Hahns’ claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision
Output: (E)
applying general rules of contract construction to derive their meaning.”); see also In re Guardianship of Hampton, 359 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (explaining that fidelity bonds issued by bonding companies “are now regarded as insurance policies, in substance, and are governed for the most part by insurance law rather than suretyship law”), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 374 N.W.2d 264 (Minn.1985). No Minnesota case precludes application of the concurrent-causation doctrine to financial institution bonds. We find that Minnesota courts would adhere to the general rule of treating financial institution bonds as insurance polices and interpreting those bonds in accordance with the principles of insurance law. See Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 691 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we reject Banclnsure’s argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while not bound to follow the federal rule the minnesota supreme court relies on the principles of title vii when construing the mhra (B) holding that a federal court sitting in diversity must predict how a state court would decide an issue (C) holding that where there are no cases on point we must predict how the supreme court of minnesota would rule (D) holding that uncertainty for pullman abstention means that a federal court cannot predict with any confidence how a states highest court would decide an issue of state law (E) holding that we are required to predict the position which the pennsylvania supreme court would take in resolving this dispute  and in the absence of a clear statement by the pennsylvania supreme court to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in pennsylvania law we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of this court
Output: (C)
Ohio’s Blue Sky Law provides protection for purchasers regardless of who initiates the transaction; intent is irrelevant. See Callahan v. Class One, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 76, 567 N.E.2d 1036 (Ohio 1991) (syllabus). Ohio courts have repeatedly summarized the purpose of the Blue Sky Law in terms like these: The purpose of the Ohio Securities Act, generally referred to as Ohio Blue Sky Law, “is to prevent those persons willing to market worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the purchasing public without first subjecting themselves and their securities to reasonable licensing and registration requirements designed to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility and avariciousness.” Perrysburg T 453, 467, 89 S.Ct. 564, 21 L.Ed.2d 668 (1969) (citing Dasho) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs were using their shares of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding minority shareholders to be forced sellers for the purpose of 10b because corporation forced shareholders to sell their shares for cash or else realize no value from the stock (B) holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation (C) holding that a corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders even where the corporation has but one shareholder the general proposition of corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude in accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions that the attorneys client is the corporation and not the shareholders (D) holding that shareholders had failed to maintain their status as shareholders by selling their shares after they had filed their complaint and therefore had lost standing to maintain a derivative suit (E) holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation
Output: (E)
hearing. See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 979 (Fla.1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining that the acts of an attorney may be imputed to the client except in circumstances involving fraud or violations of professional ethics). The record does not reflect that there was any evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that private counsel made the statements in reliance on information she received from C.B. Moreover, the limited record before us reflects that these representations were not consistent with or material to the allegations made by C.B. in her initial letter to the court or by regional counsel in the motion to withdraw consent. Under these circumstances, we conclude that relief is warranted. See Howard, 959 So.2d at 313 (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence did not establish that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 that when the papers before the sixth circuit indicate that the plaintiff could submit an amended complaint that would state a claim upon which relief can be granted the proper course is to remand to permit the plaintiff to amend (B) holding that the defendants failed to establish an entitlement to dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint when the alleged fraud was immaterial to any issue that would ultimately be presented to the fact finder (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment (E) holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed
Output: (B)
by § 1983. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-22, 100 S.Ct. at 1472-73; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1995, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). Section 1983 provides that one who under the color of any state law deprives another of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution shall be Hable in an action at law or equity. Id. Our analysis focuses on two questions. First, we must determine whether there is an impUed private right of action for damages against governmental entities for violations of the Texas Constitution. Second, we must decide whether we may look to the Constitution to define the element of duty for a Texas common law cause of action. A. Because Texas has no provision comparable to § 1983, the first question must be answered 652, 459 N.E.2d 453 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass’n v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when there are no other remedies it is appropriate for the courts to imply one under the state constitution (B) holding that because of statutory remedial scheme court would not imply a cause of action arising directly under the state constitution (C) recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution (D) holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available (E) holding that the remedies are exclusive
Output: (A)
final contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in excluding evidence indicating that Wallace did not intend to conceal the stun gun as he boarded the plane. Wallace claims that he sought to introduce evidence at trial that he boarded a plane the day before the arrest with a stun gun and that the security officers inspected the gun and allowed him to board with it. Accordingly, Wallace reasons that he could not have been attempting to conceal the stun gun on the day he was arrested, because he had no reaso raised on appeal, Wallace’s good faith belief that it was not illegal to carry a stun gun onto the aircraft is not an adequate ground for reversal. See United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018, 96 S.Ct. 454, 46 L.Ed.2d 390 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The Government presented a submissible case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that it is the fact of concealment and not the intent to conceal that is prohibited under 49 usc  1472f (D) holding that concealment is just one factor to consider and is not a mandatory element (E) holding it is a question of fact
Output: (C)
exist. The trial court recognized that fact and charged the jury that it could not find both. Defendant argues that by submitting the escape-detection factor, however, the State necessarily affirmed the existence of a motive, thus precluding it from also submitting the depravity factor. In Gerald, supra, the Court stated that [g]iven Bamseur’s intention to include within the reach of the term “depravity’’ only those murders that are entirely without motive, we hold that where, as here, greed, anger, revenge, or other similar motive is present, the depravity aspect of Section (c)(4)(c) [ie., lack of purpose] should not be submitted to the jury. [113 N.J. at 66, 549 A.2d 792.] The Court since has reiterated that part of the Gerald holding in Perry, supra, 124 N.J. at 173-76, 590 A.2d 624 (<HOLDING>), and in State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 567, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial (B) holding that trial court erred in submitting disjunctive charge (C) holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive (D) holding admissible bad acts of defendant evidencing jealousy as motive for killing another (E) holding that trial court erred in submitting depravity factor because evidence pointed to drug dispute as motive for killing
Output: (E)
or offer was made in that case, the automatic suspension remained in place. In In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.1999), the supreme court again recognized the trial court’s discretion to deny suspension of a final “other judgment” and again placed the burden on the appellee to request that the trial court deny suspension of the judgment or to offer to post a bond. In that case, the court first noted the appellant’s exempt status: As a county official sued in his or her official capacity, a district clerk’s notice of appeal operates as a supersedeas bond. As a general rule, a district clerk’s appeal, when perfected, automatically supersedes the trial court’s judgment, and that suspension remains in eff ies for Affordable Util. Rates, 776 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>)).... But [the ap-pellee did not seek denial of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction to review special appearance rulings was not limited solely to interlocutory appeal authorized by section 51014a7 of the civil practice and remedies code (C) holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal (D) holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal (E) holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal
Output: (E)
a wrongdoer is nevertheless responsible for its own attorney’s fees. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fedders Air Conditioning, USA Inc., 821 F.Supp. 50, 56 (D.Mass.1993). Haley’s position has a modicum of support to the extent that depriving it of indemnification elevates formality above substance because the same claim brought under a different procedural posture might be indemnifiable. For instance, had Haley been impleaded not as a direct defendant but rather as a third-party defendant in a claim brought by defendant Tnemec, alleging, for example, that Haley made negligent misrepresentations to Tnemec which then caused it to provide improper materials to Caldwell, Haley would arguably be entitled to indemnification. Cf. O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1090 (2d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). That theoretical possibility is, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party which would have been indemnified if sued as a crossclaimant should be indemnified when brought into the case as a thirdparty defendant (B) holding that a subrogation claim required the parties to try the case as a casewithinacase to determine if the insured would have been liable to thirdparty plaintiff (C) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication (D) holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition (E) holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees
Output: (A)
Esparaza, in both her individual and official capacities, is entitled to summary judgment on Count Three because Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that she took any adverse action against him. The remaining Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three because the Arbitrator’s 1998 decision included factual findings which eliminated all support for Plaintiffs claim pursuant to the Michigan Constitution. For the reasons discussed below, the Court does not agree. The Court has serious doubts that the arbitration proceeding, or the Arbitrator’s findings, are capable of precluding a claim brought pursuant to the Michigan Constitution on a retaliation theory. See Arslanian v. Oakwood United Hospitals et al., 2000 WL 461585 (Mich.App. April 21, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, even if the Arbitrator’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award (C) holding that the claim accrued after the employer denied a request for arbitration as untimely under the collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreement is not res judicata and cannot collaterally estop a civil rights claim (E) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights
Output: (D)
15.7(a)’s general grant of authority, skirts the more stringent requirements of the contempt remedy authorized by Rule 15.7(a)(3). ¶ 51 Neither can the majority’s holding be explained as an exercise of its inherent authority apart from Rule 15.7. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the continuing vitality of the “American Rule” that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority except in the following exceptional circumstances: (1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys a court order; or (3) a party acts in bad faith. See also Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). ¶ 52 Similarly, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent explicit congressional authorization the factual prerequisites of bad faith misconduct or willful disobedience laid out in alyeska must be met (B) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (C) holding that remedial scheme afforded by federal tort claims act was not exclusive absent explicit congressional declaration that it was (D) holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard (E) holding that a bad faith claim arises out of contract for attorney fee statute
Output: (A)
only for the payment of deferred compensation only from the company’s general assets. Under the plans, plaintiffs assume the risk that if Opus West suffered financial setbacks or became insolvent, their deferred compensation would be significantly reduced or eliminated. Plaintiffs identify no cognizable property interest in the company’s general assets that would confer RICO standing. While under the terms of the deferred compensation agreements, plaintiffs are unsecured creditors of Opus West to the extent of the deferred compensation benefits they claim, this does not give them a property interest in the company’s general assets. The most it does is convey a general interest in the company’s estate. See In re The Colonial BancGroup, Inc., 436 B.R. 695, 707 n. 17 (Bankr.M.D.Ala.2010) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Downey Regional Medical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment (B) holding that executives participating in an unfunded top hat plan had no ownership interest in the  funds that could be forfeited the funds remain part of the general assets of the corporation subject to the claims of its general creditors (C) holding that funds deposited with ing were property of the bankruptcy estate because the ing account was held in the debtor hospitals name and the plan documents plainly provided that compensation deferred under the plan would remain part of the hospitals unrestricted assets and would not be held in trust the plan was unfunded and the hospitals obligations were purely contractual in nature the participation agreement that the doctor executed similarly acknowledged that any contributions to the ing account remained the sole property of the company based on these undisputed facts the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the doctor held no interest in the ing account funds (D) holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation (E) holding that the funds in the privatelyheld corporations account belonged to the corporation not to the individuals who owned the corporation and expressly stating that directors officers and shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to claim an ownership interest in corporate property in their individual capacities they must state a claim in the corporate name
Output: (B)
that he was on S.L.’s property, and he admitted that he took cigarettes and a lighter from the patio table. According to the recorded statement that Andrus gave to Detective Le-wállen, after' entering S.L.’s garage, An-drus changed his mind about being on S.L.’s property and decided to leave. The evidence at trial shows that Andrus did not have permission to be on the property or in S.L.’s garage or breezeway. Given the circumstances proven by the evidence admitted during Andrus’s trial, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Andrus, when entering the garage or breezeway, intended to commit theft under a standard of beyond reasonable doubt even if he later changed his mind - about committing a crime. See Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Solis v. State, 589 S.W.2d 444, 446 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants plea to indictment alleging 8000 theft was not an admission to the theft amount (B) holding that against her will in the rape statute means without her consent and that the fact that the victim was under the age of consent was sufficient to establish that element (C) holding that the defendants entry into the building having been made in the nighttime without the consent of the owner is sufficient to show an intent to commit theft (D) holding that the plaintiff must show felonious intent to commit theft in order to establish a violation of section 8120141 (E) holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile
Output: (C)
before he filed suit. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s order granting summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . Jones v. Comm’r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.2003). 2 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 3 . Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (West Supp.2011). 4 . Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . Haussecker v. Childs, 935 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996), aff'd, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.1998). 6 . Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1996). 7 . See, e.g., id. at 457 (<HOLDING>). 8 . Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Norwood, 58 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings (B) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (C) holding that the discovery rule categorically does not apply to misappropriationoftradesecrets claims because in most cases trade secret misappropriation generally is capable of detection within the time allotted (D) holding that the discovery rule does not apply to  bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments (E) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law
Output: (C)
of the defendant, because ... confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary, are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the prosecutor’s case, a confession may be shown to be “insufficiently corroborated or otherwise ... unworthy of belief.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (quoting Lego, 404 U.S. at 485-86, 92 S.Ct. 619). Whatever doubts the jury could have entertained about Brisbon’s videotaped confession — or any taint from its erroneous admission — would have been outweighed by Brisbon’s subsequent and independent confessions to Route and to the prosecutor that were removed in time and circumstance from the videotaped confession. Cf. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 299, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (White, J., dissenting in part) (<HOLDING>). On this record, where the jurors were 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended (B) holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations (C) recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute (D) recognizing that in some cases two confessions delivered on different occasions to different listeners might be viewed as being independent of each other (E) recognizing different factual situations may dictate application of a different valuation ie other than fair market value of the damage to the property
Output: (D)
of discrete parcels of land counsels towards transfer to the judicial district where that land is located. See, e.g., Intrepid Potash-New Mexico, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 669 F.Supp.2d 88, 99 (D.D.C.2009) (stressing that “land commonly has been considered a local interest” due to its direct effects on local citizens). Set against this local interest in land is the plaintiffs’ argument that Utah’s natural beauty should concern the nation at large. Pis.’ Opp’n at 18. While there can be no debate about the objective natural beauty of these locations, this fact alone does not suffice to create a national interest that outweighs Utah’s strong local interest in having local controversies decided within its borders. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 437 F.Supp.2d 42, 49-50 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>); Norton, 315 F.Supp.2d at 88-89 (concluding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the everglades location in florida outweighed the national interest in the natural beauty of the area (B) holding that defendants interest in preventing the impairment of its performance outweighed plaintiffs interest in disseminating racist materials anonymously through the mail (C) holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area (D) recognizing the need for natural gas supply as a substantial public interest (E) holding that bargaining unit employees have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their home addresses under the freedom of information act and concluding that that interest substantially outweighed the virtually nonexistent public interest in disclosure under foia and the privacy act not the nlra
Output: (A)
reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts.” Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker’s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police
Output: (A)
paradigm” and finding that Section 2113(a) bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation” qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3(A)). Wade has therefore failed to demonstrate a “realistic probability” that the accidental use of force would meet the elements of Hobbs Act robbery. See Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. Wade’s argument is particularly unpersuasive given that the Ninth Circuit has already determined that the federal bank robbery statute to which Wade refers, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1), which uses a definition of “crime of violence” that is nearly identical to the “crime of violence” definition provided in Section 924(c)(3)(A). See United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION Wade’s claim is procedurally 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924 (B) holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing (C) holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence (D) holding that a bank robbery conviction under  2113a by force and violence or by intimidation qualifies as a crime of violence under the  924c3a useofforce clause (E) holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16
Output: (C)
$585,000 compensation for both the value of the condemned property and damage to the remainder. Northborough filed an objection to the commissioner’s decision asserting it had not received just compensation. The State filed an objection claiming the award was excessive. On April 19, 1991, the award was deposited with the clerk of the trial court. Northborough filed a motion to withdraw the $585,000, which the trial court granted on May 2, 1991. The State subsequently took possession of the condemned property and commenced construction on I-45. Prior to the commencement of the jury trial, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether there was a material and substantial impairment of access to the remainder. See State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>). The trial court found the improvements to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made (B) holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal (C) holding the trial court is required to make a determination on impairment of access prior to trial (D) holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds (E) holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case
Output: (C)
the postcard. As a factual matter, whether Mitchell proves that Hood made defamatory statements in the postcard does not govern Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan. Hood’s claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan for putting Hood’s name on the postcard may succeed or fail in a scenario where Mitchell’s claims against Hood succeed or a scenario where Mitchell’s claims against Hood fail. Judge Anderson-Trahan is no more or less liable to Hood based upon Hood’s liability to Mitchell. Furthermore, Hood has not asserted that his claims against Judge Anderson-Trahan are derivative of Mitchell’s claims against Hood. Hood does not seek damages from Judge Anderson-Trahan contingent upon his liability on Mitchell’s claims. In fact, Hood specifically alleges that he has been harmed by Jud 0) (<HOLDING>) (alteration in original). Because we decide 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment (B) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (C) holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court (D) holding that maines antislapp statute could be applied in the district court because federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56 are not so broad as to attempt  to answer the same question as the statute (E) holding that the district of columbias antislapp law could not be applied in federal court in a diversity case because it conflicted with federal rules of civil procedure 12 and 56
Output: (D)
Defendant relies on Ronald Mancuso’s confession to the thefts, in which he admits that the thefts continued through “September of 2004,” when “the City of Syracuse began to change out the single space parking meters with the ‘pay stations.’ ” See Dkt. No. 31-9 at 4. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, however, these documents do not render Plaintiffs breach of contract claim implausible. Even if the Court were to agree that a non-party’s confession in the criminal matter that led to the present action and a letter from Ronald Mancuso’s brother, who did not have personal knowledge of the events that allegedly transpired, should be considered documents upon which the pleading relied or facts of which the Court may take judicial notice, they d igeria, 265 F.R.D. 106, 124 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Finally, Defendant relies 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint (B) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (C) recognizing that a court is permitted to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (E) holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct
Output: (A)
notwithstanding the approval of the [visa] petition. Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 657. Although Garcia created an exception to the general rule that deportation proceedings need not be continued for resolution of a pending visa application, we do not believe that the IJ abused its discretion in declining to continue Onyeme’s deportation proceedings, notwithstanding the presumption announced in Garcia. First, as set forth above, Garcia did not create an inflexible rule, requiring an IJ to continue deportation proceedings, regardless of the merits of the pending visa petition. Rather, under Garcia, the IJ retains the discretion to deny a request for a continuance where the adjustment of status application would be denied on statutory grounds. See id.; see also Hassan, 110 F.3d at 493 (<HOLDING>); Oluyemi v. INS, 902 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bia did not err in affirming the ijs denial of a continuance request where there was no prima facie approvable visa petition pending and alien had not applied for status adjustment (B) holding that continuance of deportation proceedings was not merited where alien had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude such that his visa petition and adjustment of status application were not prima facie approvable (C) holding the district court did not have jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment of status where removal proceedings are pending (D) holding that the bias denial of a motion to reopen based on the merits of the underlying application for adjustment of status was a discretionary decision under the adjustment of status statute and this court therefore did not have jurisdiction over an appeal of the bias ruling (E) holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings
Output: (B)
it was minor and that Zhang only had five years of education. The IJ reasonably found these explanations insufficient. Zhang also testified inconsistently regarding whether he was fired from his job after authorities arrested him in 2010, or simply did not return to work. Zhang argues that this inconsistency was “nonexistent” because there was more than one reason why he did not return to work. Zhang does not explain, however, why he did not state that he was terminated when he was first asked why he did not- return to work. The agency reasonably found that Zhang’s failure to mention his termination until prompted by the IJ undermined his credibility, and that his explanation that he “did not listen clearly” was unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the agency reasonably found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (B) holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence (E) holding that ij need not accept plausible explanation for inconsistency unless reasonable factfinder would be compelled to do so
Output: (E)
not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that § 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 (“Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities.”). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that  14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted
Output: (C)
from taking a position that is “contrary to a position previously taken in the same or earlier proceeding.” Ergo Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir.1996). Because the S.E.C. representations were neither made by Surety Bank nor made in judicial proceedings, they cannot serve as the basis for estopping the Bank. III. The district court did not err in refusing to give full faith and credit to the Tennessee judgment. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. 2 . See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”). 3 . See also In re Maddron, 1991 WL 135467, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 1991)(<HOLDING>). 4 . In his reply brief, the Receiver points 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (B) holding that a foreign judgment for alimony and child support arrearages was not subject to attack in wyoming except on grounds that would permit attack upon any other money judgment such as want of jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to vest jurisdiction over the defendant (C) recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act (D) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (E) holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment
Output: (D)
satisfies the “actually litigated” requirement for the application of collateral estoppel. Lake, 202 B.R. at 757 & n. 6; Green, 198 B.R. at 566 (citing Four Star Elec., Inc. v. F & H Constr., 7 Cal.App.4th 1375, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 (1992)). 2. Extrinsic Fraud Debtors contend in their opening brief that the bankruptcy court should not have given preclusive effect to the default judgment because Debtors’ failure to appear was due to opposing counsel’s “fraud” and misrepresentations to them. A state court judgment is subject to collateral attack if the judgment was procured by extrinsic fraud. Lake, 202 B.R. at 758. Extrinsic fraud is an exception to the application of the full faith and credit doctrine such that a judgment procured by fraud may be disregarded by the bankruptcy court. Id. (<HOLDING>); In re Naemi 128 B.R. 273, 279 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petitioners collateral attack under  1331 (B) recognizing collateral attack on void order (C) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (D) recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack (E) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts
Output: (D)
marriage, the wife is still young and able to find suitable employment. The relatively equal distribution of the couple’s limited assets does not create a circumstance requiring permanent alimony.” [C.O.] 580 So.2d at 813-14. Similarly, in Childers v. Childers, 640 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), we held an award of permanent alimony is inappropriate where the spouse is young, educated, and comparatively healthy. The duration of marriage being less than 10-years makes this a short term marriage. See Iribar v. Iribar, 510 So.2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (10 year marriage is short term). In short term marriages where the partners are still young and able, the presumption is for rehabilitative alimony rather than permanent. Reeves v. Reeves, 821 So.2d 333, 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Green v. Green, 672 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption (B) recognizing presumption (C) recognizing that  1132g1 creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party but characterizing that presumption as modest and rebuttable (D) recognizing a rebuttable presumption of reliance in rule 10b5 (E) holding that in case of a short term marriage a presumption against awarding permanent alimony arises but such presumption is rebuttable
Output: (E)