niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit, PER CURIAM: Tracey Lamont Coad pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012), and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to 212 months’ imprisonment. Coad appealed, and this Court affirmed the criminal judgment. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Coad’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this Court’s judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (<HOLDING>). Coad v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness (B) holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process (C) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (D) holding that va code  182603 is not void for vagueness (E) holding c4c factor void for vagueness unless limiting construction was given
Output: (A)
428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Jurors are presumed to answer voir dire questions truthfully. United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 n. 14 (3d Cir.1994) (citation omitted); see also Bolt v. Hickok, 887 F.Supp. 709, 714 (D.Del.1995). In a § 2255 motion — as at trial — the defendant bears the burden to prove actual bias. United States v. Riddick, 15 F.Supp.2d 673, 681 (E.D.Pa.1998) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). “Findings of implied bias are legal determinations dependent on an objective evaluation of the challenged juror’s experiences and their relation to the case being tried.” Powell, 226 F.3d at 1188 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218, 226 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). “[A] finding of implied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california (B) recognizing that it may be appropriate in a particular case to challenge grand juror bias (C) recognizing that implied bias is appropriate in certain situations (D) holding that the exception is applied only in exceptional situations  (E) recognizing implied duty to market
Output: (C)
Supreme Court precedent prohibits states from taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation absent congressional consent. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax. Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973); Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 475-81, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1642-45, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). However, similarly well established Supreme Court precedent permits states to require that Indian retailers on reservations collect and remit sales tax earned on sales made to non-Indians or to Indians who are not members of the tribe governing the reservation. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 481-83, 96 S.Ct. at 1645-46 (<HOLDING>); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a states interest in the integrity of its property tax system lies at the core of the states sovereignty it is impossible to imagine that a state government could continue to exist without the power to tax (B) holding that states have authority to tax sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the tribe (C) holding that montana could require indians who sold cigarettes to nontribal members to add the states tax to the sale price of the cigarettes and thereby aid the states collection and enforcement of the tax (D) holding that registration requirements that aid in the collection of taxes are valid exercise of congress power to tax (E) holding that state could require indian tribe to affix tax stamps purchased from the state to individual packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the tribe and that state has power off the reservation to seize unstamped cigarettes as contraband
Output: (C)
as here, where officers were attempting to handcuff an individual who had been resistant. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir.2002) (finding no excessive force, and noting that an officer need not credit an arrestee’s claims of pain, especially when the arrestee is in the process of being handcuffed); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650-53 (9th Cir.2001) (finding no excessive force where plaintiff suffered a fractured finger after officer pushed plaintiff to the ground for purpose of handcuffing her despite being told of preexisting back and shoulder injuries, and where plaintiff had earlier posed a threat to officers’ safety and ability to control a crowd); Huang v. Harris County, No. 00-20806, 2001 WL 822534, at *10 (5th Cir. June 22, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1288, 1293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that force was reasonable where officer broke resisting arrestees thumb by twisting her wrist in an effort to prevent her from kicking him  and place her in handcuffs (B) holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
Output: (A)
has only raised the spectre that Euler, was aware of the Nature’s Own scheme, but has not produced adequate evidence on which the types of fraud requiring knowledge could be proven. In sum, MBFG has not met its burden to produce evidence on which a reasonable juror could find that Euler knew any of its alleged representations concerning Nature’s Own were false or reckless when-made, that Euler failed to disclose any similar facts from MBFG, or that Euler had actual knowledge that Nature’s Own was engaged.in a fraudulent scheme. Accordingly, MBFG cannot prove an element essential to its claims for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and aiding and abetting a fraud. Euler is therefore entitled to summary judgment on those claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 56c requires summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys ease and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial (B) holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case (C) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case (D) holding that movant is entitled to summary judgment when party with burden of proof fails to establish genuine fact issue (E) holding that rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial
Output: (E)
for well over an hour. Nelson testified at trial that initially she alone questioned defendant, then De-gasser interviewed defendant while Nelson observed through an adjoining room, and finally both officers questioned defendant together. Nelson stated that the time period during which she questioned the defendant alone was approximately fifty minutes. Indeed, defendant claims that the interview lasted several hours. Under either view, we believe the session continued for a lengthy enough period of time to suggest custody. Cf. Mincy 838 P.2d at 653 (refusing to find custody where the questioning lasted only five minutes and was investigatory rather than accusatory in nature). In light of the undisputed evidence of the instant case bearing on the five factor anal , 514 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Farinacci-Garcia, 551 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live (B) holding that the defendants conclusory assertion that he told his counsel he wanted to testify but that counsel failed to call him as witness was insufficient to require a hearing or a response from government but the defendant should have been allowed an opportunity to state his claim with greater specificity (C) holding that defendants prior arrests were insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel even though he told dea officers that he understood his rights (D) holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense (E) holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights
Output: (C)
by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment “what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case” before entering' — usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals
Output: (E)
next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law (B) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (C) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties (D) holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established (E) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper
Output: (B)
error Austin v. State, 603 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) trans. denied. Thus, Miles has waived consideration of any error resulting from admission of the in-court identification evidence by his failure to object at trial. Id. Waiver notwithstanding, Detective Gieselman's pre-trial identification was not impermissibly suggestive so that it tainted his in-court identification. A conviction based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pre-trial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. O'Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ind.2001); see also Swigeart v. State, 749 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ind.2001) (<HOLDING>). Our supreme court has long held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to protect defendants sixth amendment rights a court must determine whether witness identification testimony was tainted by impermissibly suggestive procedures (B) holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person (C) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive (D) holding when the defendant timely objected to an incourt identification by an eyewitness the trial judge should have directed the government to provide an outofcourt lineup or other protective procedure to avoid an impermissibly suggestive incourt identification (E) holding that a spontaneous accidental identification by two law enforcement officials of a suspect in handcuffs upon their return to the police station was not impermissibly suggestive
Output: (C)
record, it appears that at the time the City stopped complying in 1992, it gave no notice to the Court, the lawyers for the plaintiff class, the public and perhaps even the City Council and the Mayor. If true, the City’s action was unacceptable and potentially contumacious. The City should have asked the Court to modify or dissolve the decree if it thought it had achieved compliance. The City’s argument that a Court Order of this magnitude would just dissolve of its own accord, like a divorce decree’s alimony payments, is simply wrong. Not surprisingly, the City has pointed to no cases that support that position; indeed, the authorities are to the contrary. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991) (<HOLDING>); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that good faith compliance with desegregation decree is relevant factor in district courts determination as to whether vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated such that decree should be terminated (B) holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (D) holding that a lower court is bound by the decree of the appellate court and can only enter a judgment or decree in strict compliance with the appellate courts mandate (E) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated
Output: (A)
that restricts the type of retaliatory act that might be visited on an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a complaint.”) Further, it appears that if retaliation does take the form of an employment action, such action need not be as severe as that required to state a discrimination claim. Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 746. In Hermreiter, the Seventh Circuit criticized a number of decisions that stated or assumed that in a retaliation context, an employment action must be as severe as in a discrimination context. The court did not resolve the question of what conduct is necessary to be actionable in a retaliation context, but cited or discussed a number of cases which are instructive on the issue. See, e.g., Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cancellation of a symposium in employees honor was a sufficient act of retaliation (B) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (C) holding that cancellation of benefit to honor plaintiff in retaliation for filing an age discrimination complaint constitutes adverse employment action because of public humiliation involved (D) holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation (E) holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity
Output: (A)
that the intent to cause physical injury was an element of the offense of third-degree assault so that he could formulate a defense to that charge. Because the complaint contains all the essential elements of the charge, it is valid. II. Next, the appellant argues that his rights were violated because the record does not reflect that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The State argues that the appellant did not have a right to counsel. Therefore, it argues that no waiver was necessary. The appellant was convicted of third-degree assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See § 13A-6-22, Ala.Code 1975. The right to counsel does not attach in a misdemeanor case if “ ‘ “the de fendant is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. If an uncouns a.Cr.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the appellant had a constitutional 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (B) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (C) holding that culberson who had been sentenced to three suspended terms of imprisonment had a constitutional right to counsel (D) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced (E) holding that a conditionally suspended sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on an indigent in a misdemeanor case who is denied counsel
Output: (C)
of the sale proceeds as disposable income to be distributed under the plan. b. Case Law Case law supports this analysis. Only regular income and substitutes therefor can be counted in the determination of disposable income for the purposes of the chapter 13 test. See, e.g., Hagel, 184 B.R. at 799 (social security disability payments); In re Jackson, 173 B.R. 168, 171 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1994) (workers compensation proceeds); In re Minor, 177 B.R. 576, 582-83 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995) (same). The test is whether the asset in question is an anticipated stream of payments. If it is a stream of payments, the payments must be included in projected income. If the asset is not a stream of payments, it is not included. See, e.g., Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Bicsak, 207 B.R. 657, 661-61 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claimant is required to establish a physical inability to follow any occupation from which he can earn a reasonably substantial income rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood although the income may not be as much as was earned prior to the disability (B) holding that projected disposable income for an abovemedian income debtor would not include a deduction for contractual payments on undersecured debt that the debtor would not actually be required to pay because the plan bifurcated the claim or surrendered the collateral (C) holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of   net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all   fishing sources (D) holding a state cannot impose an income tax on indians whose income is solely from reservation sources (E) holding that withdrawals from individual retirement accounts were not income or income replacements because the debtor was not receiving a regular distribution from the accounts
Output: (E)
at 806-19. Any blanket attempt to apply General Motors Corp. to all non-cash settlements would therefore be in error, and the fact that the settlement does not put cash directly in class members’ pockets is irrelevant. The Texas attorney general has raised the prospect that the additional product benefit may violate Texas law because it provides for a rebate on insurance. Statutes such as these, which often date from the 1800s, are relatively common and typically bar attempts to induce the purchase of additional insurance: “Most states... have laws that prohibit insurance companies, agents, brokers, and others from giving rebates as an inducement to insurance. They generally prohibit only rebates made as an inducement to insurance and that are not set . Rptr. 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (<HOLDING>); Northern Assurance Co. v. Meyer, 160 N.W. 617 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (B) holding that insurance agents purchase of drinks for prospective insureds did not violate antirebate statute (C) holding that an agreement between insurer and insureds whereby insurer reimbursed insureds for costs of providing insurers administrative services did not violate antirebate statutes where agreements were not offered as an inducement to purchase insurance and reimbursements were reasonable in comparison to services rendered (D) holding that payment under settlement agreement between insurer and insureds concerning disputed premium claims was a compromise that did not violate antirebate statute (E) holding that insureds demand to insurer was liquidated when insurer did not point to any evidence at trial in support of its contention that damages were disputed
Output: (C)
does not compel the conclusion that Talamantes Valverde is unable or unwilling to return to Mexico “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1994); see Wang, 569 F.3d at 537. Although Talamantes Valverde asserts that his membership in a family constitutes “a particular social group” for purposes of asylum, the IJ and the BIA implicitly found that the alleged persecution was based on economic disputes over land ownership and therefore was not on account of Talamantes Valverde’s membership in “a particular social group.” See Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 348, 352-53 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Cf. Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien cannot claim asylum based on persecution that is personally motivated (B) holding that alien did not show land ownership dispute was motivated by any protected ground (C) holding that deportable alien status is not a ground for departing downward (D) holding that a police officers words during an assault make clear that he was motivated by a protected ground (E) holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground
Output: (B)
be brought as a class action. In McKesson, the court avoided ruling on this issue, but stated that there was doubt as to whether the class could be certified because the class may lack typicality. We find no reason in this case to prevent the class from bringing this action on behalf of the plan. Defendants do not argue that plaintiffs’ desired relief would be incompatible or that there is somehow a conflict of interest in fifing suit on behalf of the plan as well as individually. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has determined that in similar cases plaintiffs seeking recovery on behalf of a plan must sue as either representatives of the plan in a derivative action or as representatives of the beneficiaries in a class action suit. See Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1080 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). We find no reason that this plaintiff class 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (B) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (C) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (D) holding that an action against nonfiduciaries for a conspiracy with fiduciaries to violate trust obligations must be brought as a derivative suit or class action because it will avoid multiple litigation while providing the beneficiaries with a forum to adjudicate claims against the fund as a whole (E) holding that in rendering judgment following the settlement of a derivative action that did not involve a class action trial court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment that would adjudicate rights and personal claims of individual shareholders who were not parties to derivative action that was being settled
Output: (D)
statute and provides for a specific penalty of a fine of $1250. Id. § 321 J.2(2)(a)(2); see State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he district court may not use the penalty provisions provided in section 903.1(1) if a specific penalty is provided in another statute.”). Because section 903.1 is only applicable “if a specific penalty is not provided fo'd’ and section 321J.2 does provide for a specific penalty, section 903.1 is not applicable as to the fine portion of the sentence. Iowa Code § 903.1(1) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as we noted above, we read general and specific statutes together, but if an irreconcilable conflict exists between the general and specific statutes, then the specific statute prevails. Lutgen, 606 N.W.2d at 314; see Lee, 561 N.W.2d at 354-55 (<HOLDING>); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (same). In this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute (B) holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 (C) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (D) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (E) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls
Output: (B)
the Court finds that the debtors formally had established the Dog Leg Property as their residence by December 2008. In Florida, “[t]he homestead character of a property ‘depends upon an actual intention to reside thereon as a permanent place of residence, coupled with the fact of residence.’ ” In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 789 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2008) (quoting Hillsborough Investment Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448, 452 (1943)). Thus, homeowners seeking to qualify for the homestead exemption must meet both an objective and subjective test. First, they must actually use and occupy the home. Second, they must express an actual intent to live permanently in the home. In re Franzese, 383 B.R. 197, 203 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.2008) (citing In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>). A claim of homestead exemption in Florida is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in interpreting a contract the actual purpose and intent of the parties must be derived (B) holding homestead established by actual use and occupancy coupled with an actual intent to live permanently in a house (C) holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future (D) holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury (E) holding bankruptcy court had abused its discretion by finding the debtor lacked the intent to claim property as a homestead where the debtors occupancy and use of his home and the surrounding acreage were unquestioned
Output: (B)
as corroboration of the testimony of a covert witness; each case must be judged on its own facts. Id. The tends-to-connect standard does not present a high threshold. See id. (citing In re C.M.G., 905 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ)). The corroborating evidence does not, by itself, have to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does have to tend to connect the defendant with the offense. McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 613; Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 711; Torres, 137 S.W.3d at 196. Evidence that merely provides corroboration of “details” of the accomplice's testimony is not sufficient if it does not corroborate a fact that tends to connect the defendant to the offe , at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 27, 2004, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Leal v. State, No. 05-03-00281-CR, 2004 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance (B) holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance (C) holding officers identification of defendants voice on tape recording of phone call setting up controlled buy sufficient to corroborate informants testimony regarding subsequent buy (D) holding that possession of listed chemical with intent to manufacture controlled substance is controlled substance offense (E) holding informants testimony of actual transfer of a controlled substance sufficiently corroborated by testimony of dea agents that informant was given 150 to make controlled buy and by video recording made by informant that showed him buying two 50 rocks from defendant
Output: (E)
taxes. However, we conclude that the “erroneous nonrebate refund” case law does not control this case for two reasons: first, the 1995 refund was not “erroneous”; and second, the rationale for treating erroneous nonrebate refunds as nontax liabilities does not apply to the 1995 refund. First, we do not believe that the 1995 refund was “erroneous.” Court-ordered refunds, even if unmerited, are not “erroneous” for the purposes of tax law. Deeming such refunds to be “erroneous” would allow the IRS to circumvent the court’s order: after making the refund, the IRS could immediately recover it by suing the taxpayer under IRC § 7405, which creates a cause of action for the recovery of erroneous refunds. See United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir.1965) (Friendly, J.) (<HOLDING>). This is consistent with the case law, which 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a refund is not erroneous and therefore not recoverable by a  7405 suit when it was deliberately made by the irs to satisfy a court order regardless of the merits of that order (B) holding the order of the circuit court did not involve the merits of the action and was therefore interlocutory and not reviewable by the supreme court for lack of finality (C) holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits (D) holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order (E) holding the collateral order exception does not apply to a pretrial order denying class certification because the order is subject to revision prior to a decision on the merits
Output: (A)
since on their face the benefit of the Amendments inure to the state and not the consumer), but also a political statement of condemnation on the designated countries, particularly the Republic of Cuba. See Faculty Senate of Florida International University, 574 F.Supp.2d at 1848 (finding that the fact the Act restricts the use of “non-state” funds, as well as state funds used to administer non-state funds, demonstrates the law is more than just a state spending decision, but a political statement); Miami Light Project, 97 F.Supp.2d at 1180 (stating that because the “stated purpose of [a county ordinance was] to protest and condemn Cuba’s totalitarian regime,” it was outside the scope of the county’s power); see also Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1879-80 (D.N.M.1980) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Sponsor of the Travel Act 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied (B) holding that a university regulation entitled the substitute motion which denied admission or readmission iranian students to new mexico state university was unconstitutional because the true purpose in enacting the substitute motion was to make a political statement (C) holding that the university was not a political subdivision of the state because it had no power to tax or cause taxes to be levied (D) holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended (E) holding state university is not a person under  1983
Output: (B)
denying recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiffs were not physically present, cited with approval Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). Dillon directs the courts to look at various factors to- determine who can recover for the tort of negligent infliction of mental distress including whether the plaintiff and victim are “closely related.” Cases in California since Dillon have expressly held that a plaintiff must be closely related to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal.3d 267, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582 (1988) (plaintiff living together with victim in de facto marriage not “closely related”); Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (1989), (<HOLDING>). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that related provisions should be read together (B) holding that all related matters must be arbitrated (C) holding that plaintiff must present such evidence (D) recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud (E) holding plaintiff must be closely related to victim
Output: (E)
constituting a breach of that duty. The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888, 904, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 443, 51 P.3d 297, 306 (2002) (citations omitted). A party may bring only one cause of action to vindicate a primary right. Id. at 897, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d at 438, 51 P.3d at 302. Claims not raised in this single cause of action may not be raised at a later date. Id. MHC’s claims in federal and state court all involve a single primary right: the right to receive a fair return on its investment at Westwinds. They all stem from a single injury MHC claims to suffer. See Takahashi v. Bd. of Trs., 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). MHC’s claims all relate to a single Ordinance 
 Holding statements: (A) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (B) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (C) holding the plaintiffs statutory mandamus proceeding in state court barred the plaintiffs constitutional claims in federal court because both actions stemmed from a single primary right the contractual right to employment (D) holding that district court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims that his constitutional rights were violated in state divorce proceeding (E) holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court
Output: (C)
Financial was ever an unincorporated division of Dow Electronics. In fact, Dow has provided affidavit which plainly explains this. 6 . Plaintiff has cited no authority in support of her position in this regard, and for their part, defendants have not even acknowledged her assertion of this argument and have not bothered to provide the court with any argument or authority on this issue. In fact, defendants assert that "[p]laintiff has not and cannot plausibly argue that this case is not at least ‘related to' Dow’s bankruptcy.” 7 . None of the parties actually provided any authority or even much in the way of argument in support of their position on that issue, and the cases touching this subject are not altogether consistent. See Back v. LTV Corp., 213 B.R. 633, 639 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Poplar Run Five Ltd. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that postconfirmation claims against the debtors themselves have a conceivable effect on their estates (B) holding that res judicata did not bar debtors objection to creditors proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert postconfirmation objections to claims (C) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (D) holding that the debtors had standing to challenge the settlement of the estates right to sue various entities because the outcome of this litigation could potentially have a huge effect on the liabilities of the debtors and could give them a substantial surplus upon emerging from bankruptcy (E) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith
Output: (A)
at 536, 280 A.2d at 376 (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not established a constitutional right to retain their jobs, notwithstanding their allegations that they were being fired solely on the grounds of political sponsorship or affiliation. Id. at 377-78. See also Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151, 166 A.2d 278 (1960); Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 13 Pa.Cmwlth. 243, 320 A.2d 459 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975). Using hindsight, it is possible to reconstruct a foreshadowing of the Elrod holding in the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928, 943, 93 S.Ct. 1364, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973) (<HOLDING>) and Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (B) holding a political rally for instance (C) holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting judges running for election from expressing a view on political issues during campaigns (D) holding political discharges were unconstitutional (E) holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion
Output: (D)
Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574. 19 . Although the parties did not fully brief this issue, we must consider it as it goes to whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See McDonal, 408 F.3d at 182-83 (if court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, case must be remanded to state court). 20 . Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 575. 21 . Id. at 574. 22 . McDonal, 408 F.3d at 184 (quoting Rainwater v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir.2004) (per curiam)). 23 . See Rainwater, 391 F.3d at 638. 24 . Ameen concedes that she has no cause of action against the individual defendants on her retaliation claim. 25 . WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). 26 . See Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.002. 28 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (B) holding that appellants failed to raise material issue of fact when they relied on their belief that appellee or his employees had spoken disparagingly about them (C) holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim (D) holding that the nonmovant failed to raise a fact issue on mitigation by not raising a fact issue as to the amount of damages that could have been avoided had the movantproperly mitigated his damages (E) holding that defendants failed to raise triable issue of material fact where they did not establish that the type size of the copy they submitted in opposition to summary judgment motion was identical to that of the original contract
Output: (B)
(Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (B) holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal (C) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (D) holding supervisors removal of safety switch did not amount to crime of culpable negligence (E) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct
Output: (D)
process.” Final Rule Establishing an Administrative Appeal Process for the Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16488. Additionally, the preamble notes that, because physical circum stances can change over time, "JDs are not necessarily 'final' even as an administrative matter.” Id. Based on the foregoing, it seems rather doubtful that the Corps’ decision to certify Dr. Booth’s delineation constituted a final determination entitled to preclusive effect. See Zurcher v. Bilton, 379 S.C. 132, 135, 666 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2008) (issue preclusion applies when an issue has been "actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment”) (emphasis added). 10 . See Chasm Hydro, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 58 A.D.3d 1100, 872 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 107 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding local regulation of hazardous waste disposal facilities preempted by comprehensive and detailed state regulatory scheme (B) holding that federal power act and cwa largely preempted the field of regulating hydroelectric facilities (C) holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance (D) holding that subsequent congressional statute regulating registration of aliens retroactively preempted state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
Output: (B)
set to work corroborating” his story, id., and found substantial corroborating evidence in methamphetamine ingredient purchase logs, police records, and “silent observer” tips. Id. at 385. Similarly, in Williams, not only was the informant named; officers “corroborated the information [the informant] provided through multiple sources, including [two cooperating witnesses], who correctly identified [defendant’s] block.” 544 F.3d at 690. Also, the investigating officer’s “own observations outside [defendant’s] residence substantiated [the informant’s] statements.” Id. Indeed, all our named informant cases share this common thread — affidavits containing an informant’s name plus other indicia of reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 938 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that informants identity should not be revealed where informant witnessed unrelated crime and reported it to the police who then only used the information to create probable cause for a search warrant (B) holding corroborating evidence sufficient that officer drove informant to defendants house saw defendant admit informant and saw informant come out with drugs and defendants voice was identified on audio tape of transaction (C) holding that dea agents may enter moments after or at the same time as the informant exited because they were immediately summoned by the informant (D) holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant (E) holding probable cause existed based on informants credibility as a named informant along with her decidedly intimate relationship with the suspect as revealed in a textmessage log provided by the informant emphasis added
Output: (E)