niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
to provide Timothy with a FAPE. Members of Timothy’s IEP team, who were professional educators, responsible for the creation of his IEP, observed him in the classroom environment, had adequate background, experience and training to assess his condition and to formulate program to meet his needs. ■ They considered the opinions of Timothy’s medi cal and psychological providers. They opined that a full-time dédicated one-on-one aide would deflect from the goal of promoting independence for Timothy. The IDEIA does not require school districts to consult with outside experts or to adopt their recommendations. The failure to do so does not automatically constitute a serious deficiency in the IEP. Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of the Public Sch. of the City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Under the regulations to the IDEIA, decisions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was deficient for failfing to consult or call an expert on the psychology of child sexual abuse or to educate himself sufficiently on the scientific issues (B) holding that counsel was deficient for failing to consult an expert and present expert testimony about the physiological effect of toxic chemical exposure on defendants brain (C) holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy (D) holding that the failure to recognize every possible legal argument did not render counsels performance constitutionally deficient (E) holding that school districts failure to consult with the plaintiffs expert or to adopt the number of hours she recommended for a particular therapy did not render the iep substantively deficient
Output: (E)
completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided, by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; and (5) the timeliness' of the defendant's assistance. USSG § 5K1.1. 4 . When a statutory minimum sentence is involved in the case, a § 5K1.1 motion is less defendant-friendly than a § 3553(e) motion. A § 3553(e) motion allows the district court to depart below both the statutory minimum sentence and the low-end of the Guideline range. However, a § 5K1.1 motion does not allow the court to depart below the statutory minimum sentence. Cf. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 129-31, 116 S.Ct. 2057, 135 L.Ed.2d 427 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 5 . We note that the government does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure (B) holding that a motion under  5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under  3553e (C) holding 60month mandatory minimum sentence was proper departure point following grant of  3553e motion (D) holding that after granting the governments motion for downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the district court did not err when it determined that the starting point for departing downward was the higher statutorily required minimum sentence and not the lower otherwise applicable guideline range (E) holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress
Output: (B)
As an appellate court, we decline to review a cold transcript and draw our own factual inferences about the tone of voice, volume, and circumstances of Sgt. Norman’s statement. See Lewisohn v. State, 433 A.2d 351, 354 (Me.1981). Because the trial court reasonably could have found that Sgt. Norman’s comment constituted an order, we affirm the suppression order. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 1 . Title 29 M.R.S.A. § 2411(1) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2003, ch. 452 §§ Q-77 to Q-83 (effective July 1, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1-A) (Supp.2004). 2 . Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(1) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2003, ch. 452 §§ Q-84 to Q-85 (effective July 1, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(1-A) (Supp.2004). Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2412-A(3) was am pp.1993) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation (B) holding that because the law in this area is unclear an officer who shot a fleeing motorist was not unreasonable in believing that a potential threat to third parties would justify shooting the motorist (C) holding that the fourth amendment was not implicated when an officer asked for passengers identification to see if he could drive a vehicle because the driver had a suspended license (D) holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle (E) holding that officer did not seize motorist when he tapped on window and asked driver to roll it down
Output: (E)
475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.Bd 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.1993). In reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues; rather, it need rely only on those portions of the submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs its attention. See Dean v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, 1998 WL 826882 (N.D.Tex.); see also Cannizaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F.Supp. 465, 470 (N.D.Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Finally, in those circumstances where the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court has no duty to search for triable issues (B) holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant (C) holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record (D) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (E) holding that the court must consider evidence submitted in support of a crossmotion for summary judgment to determine whether it raises triable issues of fact defeating the opponents motion
Output: (A)
in light of the participation in this litigation of defendant Avendrá (a non-party to the Master and 1999 Agreements).” Thereafter, Marriott appealed the court’s refusal to compel CTF to arbitrate, and CTF cross-appealed the court’s order staying CTF’s breach of contract suit pending resolution of the arbitration between Marriott and HPI. II. JURISDICTION We may review the denial of Marriott’s motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), which provides for jurisdiction over appeals from orders “denying a petition under [9 U.S.C. § 4] to order arbitration to proceed[.]” Marriot order that unreasonably delays a plaintiffs right to have its case heard is appealable. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d at 735; see also Haberern v. Lehigh & New England Ry., 554 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, the District Court decided two 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a stay order of indefinite length which singles out a claim for extended delay while others of a similar nature proceed is appealable (B) holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts to a refusal to hear and decide a case (C) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (D) holding that grant or denial of debtors claim of property exemption is final appealable order (E) holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
Output: (A)
for municipal securities business by the issuer,” MSRB Rule Book Rule G-37(g)(vi), at 272 (July 1, 2016) (emphasis added); see also MSRB Rule Book Rule G-37(g)(xvi), at 271-72 (Apr. 1, 2017). Compare MSRB Rule Book Rule G-37(b)(i), at 269 (July 1, 2016), ivith MSRB Rule G-37(b)(i)(A), at 266 (Apr. 1, 2017). Therefore, Leather-wood’s affidavit sheds no light upon whether the 2016 Amendments in particular affect McManus. We are thus left with a record that does not identify a single individual whom the 2016 Amendments have prevented from donating to Petitioners or contributing to the Petitioners’ candidates. Without any further basis upon which we could assume that such an individual exists, we decline to hold that Petitioners’ injuries egan, 676 F.2d 715, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 461 U.S. 540, 103 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the standing of an organization whose fundraising efforts would be impaired by an irs taxdeductiblecontribution rule because the organization would be harmed if its contributors ceased giving it money (B) holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury (C) holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury (D) holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did (E) holding that an organization whose members were potential targets of future prosecutions had standing to seek injunctive relief
Output: (A)
(or seven, which carries the same base offense level of 32, see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4) (base offense level 32 applies to quantities of at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine)). But perhaps he is hable for only the one kilogram that was exchanged. Accordingly, as required by § 2255, the District Court should hold “a prompt hearing” to “determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law” on whether there is a reasonable probability that, had he received effective assistance of counsel at his original sentencing, Smack would have established that he was entitled to a shorter sentence. The reasonable probability of any decrease in Smack’s sentence would establish prejudice. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The remedy, in turn, would be to resentence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis (B) holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony (C) holding that it is error to engraft onto the prejudice branch of the strickland test a requirement that any increase in a sentence must meet a standard of significance (D) holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland (E) holding petitioner demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice by proving a claim under strickland
Output: (A)
“at any time before the jury returns a verdict or the court finds the accused guilty or not guilty, provided the amendment does not change the nature or character of the offense charged.” Code § 19.2-231 (emphasis added). Code § 19.2-231 “is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve the laudable purpose of avoiding further unnecessary delay in the criminal justice process by allowing amendment, rather than requiring reindictment by a grand jury.” Powell, 261 Va. at 533, 552 S.E.2d at 356. Nevertheless, “[t]he limitation on amendment to indictments in Code § 19.2-231 to amendments that do not change the nature or character of the offense is clearly intended to protect the defendant from being deprived of notice of the offense charged.” Rawls v. Comm 03, 704 (<HOLDING>). And, conversely, if the amendment changed the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nature or character test set forth in code  192231 applies to both indictments and warrants and that since the amendment at issue in the case did not change the nature or character of the offense charged  the trial court did not err in allowing the trial to proceed on the amended warrant (B) holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue (C) holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment (D) holding that the amendment made to the indictment in this case was not authorized by code  192231 because the amended indictment materially changed the nature of the offense originally charged (E) holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them
Output: (A)
files, in order to prevent the dissemination of personal or confidential information about employees. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir.2003). The court should consider “the totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of the material sought against the burden of providing it,” and taking into account society’s interest in furthering “the truth-seeking function” in the particular case before the court. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). Here, the magistrate judge properly found irrelevant the discovery requests regarding discrimination from supervisors who were not involved with Brunker’s termination. See Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The information Brunker requested about the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (B) holding that evidence of discipline by a supervisor not involved in the adverse employment decision sheds no light on plaintiffs discrimination claim (C) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (D) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (E) holding that a twoweek lapse between the plaintiffs initial complaint to his supervisor and the adverse employment action was sufficient
Output: (B)
or the security for other reasons, no reasonable buyer would base his or her decision on a lack of relevant information. To be sure, and as further discussed in this Order, the omission of data from the 2001 and 2005 Reports was arguably misleading because that data may have cast serious doubt on the projections in the Official Statements. This omission, however, does not give rise to an independent claim based on the disclosure found on page 22 of the Official Statements. (b) The Failure to Reveal the Decision to Forgo a Final ERA Study and S & Y’s Withdrawal Was Not Misleading. To be actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, an alleged omission must render some affirmative public statement misleading. See In re Metropolitan Sec. Litig., 532 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1290 (E.D.Wash.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted). There is no duty to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (B) holding that to state cause of action based on an omission a plaintiff must explain how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made (C) recognizing the cause of action (D) holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading (E) holding that an omission claim could not be maintained where plaintiff did not point to previous statements that were misleading without further disclosures
Output: (B)
defendant’s activities fall outside the FDCPA’s general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, ”[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.”) (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note  by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa
Output: (A)
influences. Rather, one juror was attempting to influence the other jurors’ opinion, although it was done inappropriately before deliberations. Indeed, Mr. Mellow’s declaration states that the juror “... seemed to prey on the weaker jurors and tried to sway them.” Declaration of Mr. Mellow. Nevertheless, the influence here was internal, not from outside sources. Once the verdict was entered, the jurors, including Mr. Mellow, became incompetent to testify regarding any internal discussions or deliberations. Pa.R.E. 606(b); Carter, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s claim fails. Penalty Phase IX. Atkins Appellant raises a claim that he is mentally retarded and that his death sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Appellant did not raise this claim before the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment (B) holding that the eighth amendment to the united states constitution prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals (C) holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment (D) holding that under the eighth amendment to the united states constitution the government may not execute a mentally retarded person (E) holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the eighth amendment to the united states constitution and article i  16 of the tennessee constitution
Output: (B)
S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577. In so doing, the Court recognized that while “an initially inflated purchase price might mean a later loss ... that is far from inevitably so.” Id. at 342, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (emphasis in original). Indeed, “that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price.” Id. at 343, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577. The Supreme Court’s holding in Dura did not represent a break from this Circuit’s approach to loss causation, but rather reaffirmed the analysis we laid out in Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173 (<HOLDING>). In Lentell, we described the two requirements 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the basic elements of section 10b and rule 10b5 claims are 1 a material misrepresentation or omission 2 scienter ie a wrongful state of mind 3 a connection with the purchase or sale of a security 4 reliance often referred to in cases involving public securities markets fraudonthemarket cases as transaction causation 5 economic loss and 6 loss causation ie a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss internal citations omitted (B) holding under the policy language that diminution of market value is not a cause of loss but a measure of a loss caused by something else (C) holding where the defendant knows as well as anyone the value of the assets he concealed the intended loss calculation may properly be based upon the value of the assets concealed (D) holding that defendant must prove when the services were rendered to establish that the new value exception applies (E) holding that to prove loss causation a plaintiff must allege that the misstatement or omission concealed something from the market that when disclosed negatively affected the value of the security
Output: (E)
of TILA;” (2) "The notes and security instruments signed by plaintiff and borrowers for the purchase of mobile homes were extensions of credit subject to TILA;” (3) "The requirement that insurance policies contain provisions covering Green Tree's possible repossession expenses are credit charges as defined by TILA and occur annually when each policy is renewed;” and (4) "No TILA disclosures are given by Green Tree.” (See Am.Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) Green Tree does not rebut these contentions and instead only addresses the merits of the arbitration issue. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, however, the court only addresses the question of whether Plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate her claims, not the merits of the underlying claims themselves. 6 . See. also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (B) holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration (C) holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver (D) holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists (E) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra
Output: (A)
of Law We have already determined that the activity causing Kenneth’s injury and death is significantly related to traditional maritime activity — commercial and/or pleasure boating in navigable waters — and that admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate in the present case. It is well established that maritime law applies in “those cases where the subject matter of the controversy bears the type of significant relationship to traditional maritime activities necessary to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.” Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223, 1231 (5th Cir.1985) (relying upon Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736-38, 81 S.Ct. 886, 890-92, 6 L.Ed.2d 56, (1961)); see Watson on Behalf of Watson v. Massman Const. Co., 850 F.2d 219, 220-21 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). “With admiralty jurisdiction comes the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts (B) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (C) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (D) holding that admiralty jurisdiction applies to a tort dispute if either the in jured party or the alleged tortfeasor is a traditional maritime actor or at least if either of those parties is performing a traditional maritime activity (E) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes
Output: (D)
expressly conferred jurisdiction in district courts for cases with a minimum of $500.00 in controversy. Tex. Const, art. V, § 8 (1876); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art.l906(6) (1925), repealed by Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S. ch 480, § 26(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2048. When article 1906 was codified it no longer included the $500.00 minimum amount and instead provides that district courts have jurisdiction as provided by Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.007 (West 2004). At the time of the codification, Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution provided that a district court’s minimum juris 7947, at *2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Mar. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.), Arteaga v. Jackson, 994 S.W.2d 342, 342 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied)(<HOLDING>), Moore v. TDCJ-CID, No. 13-04-425-CV, 2005 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding after the 1985 constitutional and statutory amendments district courts jurisdiction extends to cases involving more than 20000 (B) holding that the faa extends to employment cases for employees other than those engaged in transportation (C) holding that the faa extends to employment cases for employees other than those engaged in transportation of goods (D) holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts (E) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts
Output: (A)
confidence. See id. (“A debtor-creditor relationship is not by itself a fiduciary relationship although the addition of a relationship of confidence, trust, or superior knowledge or control may indicate that such a relationship exists.” (internal quotations omitted)); Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir.1993) (noting that although no fiduciary duties arise in the ordinary debt- or/creditor relationship, they may arise under the proper circumstances) (quoting Fisher v. Bishop, 108 N.Y. 25, 28, 15 N.E. 331 (1888)); Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at 270-72, 660 N.Y.S.2d 371 (noting that fiduciary duties may arise in the insurance context if the requisite trust and confidence is established); Batas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260, 724 N.Y.S.2d 3, 7 (1st Dep’t 2001) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the complaint alleges that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing fiduciary exception in the erisa context (B) recognizing similar duties (C) recognizing that fiduciary duties may arise in the insurance context where circumstances are appropriate (D) holding that a special relationship may arise from the factual circumstances of a particular case (E) holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract
Output: (C)
post-judgment interest rate, but refutes Ramon’s other arguments. It contends that the district court properly withheld recognition of the Mexican judgment and properly applied Texas law. Additionally, as an alternative ground for upholding the district court’s decision not to recognize the Mexican judgment, Southwest Livestock argues that Ramón failed to serve it with proper service of process, and therefore, the Mexican court lacked personal jurisdiction. II We must determine first whether the district court properly refused to recognize the Mexican judgment. Our jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Hence, we must apply Texas law regarding the recognition of foreign country money-judgments. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (<HOLDING>); Success Motivation Institute of Japan, Ltd. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases (B) holding that a federal district court sitting in diversity must apply its forum states choice of law rules (C) holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state (D) holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law (E) holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state
Output: (C)
the purposes of triggering review of the Bank’s actions under the APA, the Bank is an “agency” of the U.S., we conclude that the establishment of the OSC terms or the Bank’s decision to lend Fidelity advances under those terms was not “state action”. These conclusions are entirely consistent with the main stream of case law which permits such a distinction. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (“[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to [government] regulation does not be itself convert its action into that of the government for constitutional purposes. Id. at 350 [95 S.Ct. at 453] ”); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir.1977). Compare Northrip v. Fed. National Mortgage Ass’n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). If Fidelity cannot establish state action, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rookerfeldman barred a debtors action to rescind a mortgage because it was inextricably intertwined with a state courts foreclosure judgment which was premised on the existence of a valid mortgage (B) holding nonjudicial foreclosure did not involve sufficient state action to trigger iowa constitutions due process clause (C) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (D) holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage (E) holding that foreclosure on mortgage not state action and thus could not trigger due process clause scrutiny
Output: (E)
provided substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case that the primary significance of the applicant’s composite mark is geographic, namely that the mark primarily signifies Venice, Italy. In response to the examiner’s prima facie case, the applicant argues that the strongest part of the proposed mark is its previously registered and incontestable service mark, “SAVE VENICE.” Accordingly, Save Venice contends that consumers would associate the proposed mark with the fundraising activities of Save Venice, rather than with the city of Venice as a geographical origin for the goods. We disagree. A registered mark is incontestable only in the form registered and for the goods or services claimed. See In re Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1568, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1141 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 873, 227 USPQ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding incontestable mark durango for cigars insufficient to establish distinctiveness of durango for chewing tobacco (B) holding that a failure to update sexoffender registration should not be considered a minor or technical offense when committed as part of a more general course of conduct that demonstrates a deliberate general unwillingness to comply with the sex offender registration requirements (C) holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement (D) holding applicants incontestable registration of a service mark for cash management account did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of that mark for broader financial services (E) holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment
Output: (D)
surrounding the Javits Center takeover and focused single-mindedly on finding a reason to deny the claim, it would not disturb the conclusion that FM’s refusal to pay the claim was supported by “reasonable justification,” and that its basis for refusal, namely, interpretation of the contract, did not require any investigation into circumstances at the Javits Center. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In this case, even if discovery would have furnished ample evidence in support of Pen-ton’s theory, Penton’s bad faith claim would still not be meritorious, and FM would still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 542 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the grant of summary judgment to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under rule 56f nonmoving party seeking additional discovery must demonstrate precisely how additional discovery will lead to a genuine issue of material fact (B) holding that general allegations of a need for additional discovery will not suffice the person presenting such a claim must show what discovery has been obtained why it is inadequate and the what additional information he expects to obtain from additional discovery (C) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (D) holding that rejection of the appellants rule 56f request for additional discovery was proper where the information as to which he sought discovery was immaterial to the question of whether he is liable (E) recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery
Output: (D)
the order or judgment using a common-law writ of certiorari. In addition to this statutory requirement, persons seeking judicial review of a board of zoning appeals decision must have been parties to the proceeding before the board. Levy v. Board of Zoning App., No. M1999-00126-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1141351, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept.27, 2001) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed). Both TenmCode Ann. § 13-7-206(b) and Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-9-101 authorize persons who are “aggrieved” to appeal, first to the Board and then to the courts. Extending the authority to appeal and to seek judicial review to all persons who are “aggrieved” reflects an intention to ease the strict application of the customary standing principles. Federal Election Com’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19, 118 S.Ct. at 1783 (<HOLDING>). It is desirable that land use matters be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title viis term a person claiming to be aggrieved demonstrated congressional intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permitted by article iii (B) holding that congress may dispense with prudential standing requirements (C) holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing (D) recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions (E) holding that hfistory associates the word aggrieved with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly  beyond the commonlaw interests and substantive statutory rights upon which prudential standing traditionally rested
Output: (E)
that he does not explain how his experience or training, which they claim is overwhelmingly in the field of forensic psychology, provides him the necessary training or experience with the omissions alleged here: involving the diagnosis, care, and treatment of an adult diagnosed with ADD and prescribed Adderall, Adderall addiction, or Adderall psychosis. However, the Clinic and Dr. Davisson fail to read the report and Dr. Helge’s curriculum vitae as a whole. Dr. Helge’s curriculum vitae shows that he is a practicing psychologist and that he has treated patients who are taking Adderall prescribed by a doctor. As such, he meets the requirements of section 74.402 as to the Clinic’s principal, Dr. Davisson, at least. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.402; see Barber, 303 S.W.3d at 793-94 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Helge’s Articulation of Standard of Care 
 Holding statements: (A) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (B) holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension even though appellants argued expert report was so woefully deficient on necessary elements so as to constitute no report and report was missing experts curriculum vitae (C) holding courts may not consider any single provision taken in isolation as controlling but must consider all provisions in context of entire instrument (D) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (E) holding that court must not view any one part of expert report or curriculum vitae in isolation
Output: (E)
any meaning at all, I do not think that [the defendant’s statement that he had a .357 magnum and that no one would get hurt if she put the money in the bag] can reasonably be said to constitute an ‘express threat of death,’ U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). What was conveyed here was, at most, an implicit threat of serious bodily injury or death.”). We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, and views of Judges Easterbrook and Arnold that to satisfy the qualifier “express,” a defendant’s statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or otherwise cause the death of the victim. Because four of the five examples in Application Note 6 do not, they are not controlling. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, reliance on the commentary’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets (B) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative (C) holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself (D) holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative (E) holding that where the commentary to a guideline is at odds with another provision of the guidelines the guideline prevails
Output: (A)
influence the selection of issues — is the sort of event to which [amended § 2255] would ‘attach new legal consequences.’ ” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc), cert. granted in part, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 726, 136 L.Ed.2d 643 (1997). Accordingly, because § 2255 movants must be afforded both notice as well as a reasonable opportunity to secure review of important legal interests, this Court holds that petitioners have one year within which to file a motion to vacate from the later of the effective date of the Act, the date upon which conviction becomes final, the date upon which a novel (and retroactive) rule of law is announced by the Supreme Court, or the date upon which other grounds for relief become or should have been known. See Simmonds, 111 F.3d at 746 (<HOLDING>); Lindh, 96 F.3d at 866 (“reliance interests 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners whose convictions became final on or before april 24 1996 must file their  2255 motions before april 24 1997 (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final (C) holding that  2254 petitions of prisoners whose convictions became final before the passage of the aedpa are timely if filed within one year from the aedpas effective date (D) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional (E) holding that  2255s one year limitations period is also a reasonable time for prisoners to bring  2255 motions whose convictions became final before the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act took effect
Output: (E)
has not determined that the State or Tribe has authority over the site of the proposed Lake Andes landfill. The EPA Region VIII developed an alternative mechanism to allow the District to seek the waiver directly from the Region. The waiver was received on October 6,1995. The EPA has reviewed the District’s application and has made a tentative decision to approve their waiver. (Admin.Ree. at 1160.) The agency intended to, and did create, a new right in the District under these circumstances to petition the agency directly, and thus, the agency’s “alternative mechanism” is properly considered to be a legislative rule subject to the APA’s notice and comment procedures rather than an interpretative rule. Cf General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074, 105 S.Ct. 2153, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that epa rule relating to repair of cars not in compliance with clean air act was interpretative not legislative rule and thus not subject to apa notice and comment procedures (B) holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed (C) holding the epa could regulate air pollutants under the clean air act solely on the basis of the pollutants risk to human health (D) holding that defendant could not be sanctioned and found to have violated the clean air act when it complied with regu lations as codified despite having knowledge that the epa requested amendment of the regulations to prohibit defendants conduct (E) holding for a citizen suit brought under a substantially identical provision of the clean air act that whether plaintiffs have established a nondiscretionary duty to act by the epa is a merits question under rule 12b6 rather than a subjectmatter jurisdiction question under rule 12b1
Output: (A)
State, 918 S.W.2d 511, 518 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Baird, J., concurring), urged that McFarland should be overruled, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not done so. I would hold that we are not bound by the interpretation of the federal rule by the United States Supreme Court, based on the substantial differences in the respective evi-dentiary rules regarding statements against penal interest. Indeed, the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Williamson was to evaluate each statement within a confession as a separate statement for purposes of admissibility under the federal hearsay exception. Id. at 2434-35 This is antithetical to the general approach Texas has taken in evaluating admissibility of statements. See, e.g., Marini v. State, 593 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (<HOLDING>). The federal interpretation would lead to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that question is whether defendants will was overborne by police at the time of the confession (C) holding that rule of completeness did not apply where statements made at the scene and the statement made at the police station were  distinct and not part of one confession (D) holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given (E) holding that later declarations during defendants confession leading officers to evidence of the crime constituted part of one continuous confession that began at the police station
Output: (E)
vague standard. See, e.g., id. (describing the "reasonable belief” standard as one that "appears to be roughly comparable to the reasonable ‘ar-ticulable suspicion’ standard applied by the Supreme Court” in “stop and frisk” cases, and directing that "doubtful cases [should] be resolved in the defendant’s favor_”) (emphasis added). 12 . See, e.g., Test, supra, 420 U.S. at 30, 95 S.Ct. 749 (recognizing that without discovery, "a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge."); United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1025 (1st Cir.1996) (‘‘[A] litigant need only allege that he is preparing a motion to challenge the jury selection process.”). 13 . See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed (B) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (C) holding death qualification of jury prior to guilt phase of bifurcated capital trial did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to impartial jury representative of fair crosssection of the community (D) holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury (E) holding that defendant had unqualified right to the jury list but not the jury qualification questionnaires without some demonstration of necessity
Output: (E)