niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
missing. Even McGreal found the purportedly missing reports in the Liquor Commission files. Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks also point out that McGreal filed Judicial Inquiry Board complaint about Judge Sterba without fully investigating the circumstances. McGreal’s letter highlighted the differences between the sentence that Sean Taylor actually received and the one that Lt. Snooks related to McGreal. McGreal then drew the inference that these differences were in response to McGreal’s initial inquiries into the matter, instead of a simple mistake on the part of Lt. Snooks. Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks argue that McGreal’s speech was motivated by personal interests in making these statements, and therefore the First Amendment does not protect the speech. See e.g. Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 844-45 (<HOLDING>). For example, Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks submit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation (B) holding that even though speech was motivated by personal grievances it would still be protected conduct if it dealt with public concerns (C) holding that speech addressing a private interest within a letter containing matters of public interest was protected and noting that we have emphasized that speech of public importance is only transformed into a matter of private concern when it is motivated solely by the speakers personal interests quotations omitted (D) holding that public speech motivated by personal displeasure with policies was not covered by the first amendment (E) recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment
Output: (D)
to further his own goals and sexual gratification; (5) divulged confidences to Linda; and (6) disregarded "all indicia of the transference and countertransference phenomena which normally occurs in the course of psychotherapy.” We note, initially, that each of these allegations is based, in part, on an underlying allegation of fraud. The trial judge has permitted the plaintiff to replead a separate fraud count, the allegations of which essentially duplicate the ones above. Fraud is a distinct cause of action in Illinois. To that extent, we do not believe the allegations of fraud are germane to a count alleging professional negligence, be it that of a psychotherapist or a cleric. Cf. Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic Health Systems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we address the count for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner (B) recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud (C) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (D) holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 (E) holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional
Output: (B)
is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guidelines.” United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir.2002). 5 . This apparent error is further illuminated by the history of § 3B1.1. The Guideline was amended in 1993 to include Note 2 in order to resolve a circuit split over the same interpretation at issue here: whether management of assets warranted an adjustment. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 500; compare, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 893 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir.1990) (requiring a degree of control over other participants), United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir.1990) (same), United States v. Mares-Molina, 913 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.1990) (same), and United States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.1992) (same), with United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 6 . See United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk (B) recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered (C) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (D) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (E) holding that guidelines although advisory and only one factor among others to be considered in arriving at a reasonable sentence are entitled to substantial weight in the sentencing decision
Output: (D)
30, 2014). 12 . U.S. Postal Serv., 339 N.L.R.B. 1175, 1185 n.29 (2003); United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. 317, 317 (1998);, Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 420, 424 (1981); Transcon Lines, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1165; see also Valmont Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 244 F.3d 454, 472 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[E]ntrance areas to plants, where timeclocks, vending machines, and bulletin boards are located, are often mixed use ar- ‘ eas.”). ! 13 . Kaynard, 625 F.2d at 1052 n.6 ("Where, as here, a production area is regularly used by employees as a lunch area with the ‘lull knowledge and approval’ of the employer, the Board's position is that the area ceases, for the duration of the lunch period, to be a ‘work area’ where distribution can be prohibited. "); Rockingham Sleepwear, 188 N.L.R.B. at 701 (<HOLDING>); see also United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employers sewing room a work area ceased to be a work area during lunch because the employer permitted employees to take their lunch in the sewing room and provided no alternate facility (B) holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work (C) holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor (D) holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa (E) holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you  and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work
Output: (A)
of America or any State thereof relating to magnesite or magnesite products brokered by Possehl, and subsequently delivered to Resco during the period from 2000 through the present. Possehl, as Assignor, will make avail- . able for copying at the sole expense of Resco, as Assignee, records documenting the producing seller to Resco of products covered by this Assignment. Id. There is nothing wrong with the abstract legal basis of Resco’s theory of standing. It is well settled in the Third Circuit that “express assignments of antitrust claims from a direct purchaser to an indirect purchaser are permissible and do not run afoul of Illinois Brick’s standing requirements.” In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (<HOLDING>)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in non 17200 case that common law claims duplicative of the flsa are preempted (B) holding that any assignment of antitrust claims as a matter of federal common law must be an express assignment  because an express assignment  entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability (C) holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative (D) holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act (E) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed
Output: (B)
prosecutions cannot be considered extreme and outrages or beyond the bounds of decency. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed. To the extent Plaintiffs claim that the alleged withholding of the videotape constitutes a violation of the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), no such claim can be maintained as the Plaintiffs were made aware of the videotape prior to their trial and have made no argument or showing that any delay in its disclosure caused prejudice. United States v. Watson, 76 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir.1996). Finally, since Plaintiffs have not set forth evidence establishing the alleged underlying constitutional violations, their municipal liability claims likewise fail. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). The Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation (B) holding that a claim for municipal liability under  1983 requires inter alia proof of an underlying constitutional violation (C) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom (D) holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers (E) holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983
Output: (B)
relief in all circumstances in which a judgment fails to conform to the statute. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), a court may relieve a party from a judgment that is based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” but only on a motion made within one year of entry of the judgment. In the instant case, as the district court admitted and as seems readily apparent, the error was based on inadvertence. Thus, Rule 60(b)(1), with its one year time limitation, clearly applied. The district court attempted to circumvent the apparent harshness of the one year limitation by reading Rule 60(b)(6) as permitting nd Procedure § 2864 (1973). Therefore, because Rule 60(b)(1) plainly applied, and because the motion for relief came over one year after the entry of judgment h Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we adamantly reject appellees’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty (B) holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise (C) holding that in order for the movant to prevail on a summary judgment motion movant must either factually refute the affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient (D) holding that where interest was supposed to have run from the date of judgment but movant never asked for it and had accepted full payment of the judgment without it movant had forever waived his right to receive it (E) holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law
Output: (D)
(1986) (relying on section 45(1) and comment a). 24 . See e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (“railroad [retirement] benefits are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time”); Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 103 (2nd Cir. 1999) (a claim to vested welfare benefits is contradicted by the ... unambiguous reservation in the plan documents of its right to amend the plan”); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. v. BVR Liquidating Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) (“the inclusion of a ‘reservation of rights’ provision establishes that there was no intent for benefits to vest”); McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed (B) recognizing that generally    with supposed unilateral contracts  if the offeror expressly reserves the power to revoke the offer until the offerees performance is complete then the offer is illusory and cannot give rise to a unilateral contract but noting exceptions (C) holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein (D) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (E) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged
Output: (B)
by Davis do not establish that members of Region 2 were denied election-related privileges enjoyed by UAW members in other regions. Absent discrimination of this kind, Davis may not maintain an action under Title I. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964) (finding that union members were not “discriminated against” for purposes of Title I because they were not denied a “right to vote or nominate which the union has granted to others”). This mismatch between the relief sought by Davis and the protections provided by Title I exists because Title I cannot support a cause of action that seeks to invalidate a previously conducted union election. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 541, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Although Davis purports to rely solely on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exclusivity provision included in  403 of title iv plainly bars title i relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed (B) holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi (C) holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii (D) holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
Output: (A)
discretion” in the absence of explicit standards or procedures. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). Prior restraints on expression in a public forum have generally been subjected to exacting scrutiny. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases). However, “the context in which [a prior restraint] occurs can affect the level of scrutiny applied.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.1999). Prior restraints in a nonpublic forum have been upheld as long as they were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (<HOLDING>); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that school officials could prevent a student from distributing invitations in a public elementary school a nonpublic forum because the restraint was reasonable (B) holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum (C) holding that a federal charity drive a nonpublic forum could limit participation to a number of select charities as long as the restriction was reasonable and viewpointneutral (D) holding that a statesponsored televised election debate was a nonpublic forum and state officials could exercise broad editorial discretion in deciding which candidates to invite as long as the decisions were reasonable and viewpointneutral (E) holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum
Output: (C)
who wore beards as a matter of their religious obligation. See id. at 360-61. This kind of unequal treatment, the Court of Appeals held, “indicates that the [police department] has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity, but that religious motivations are not.” Id. at 366. Subsections (b)(1) and (2) are also rooted in Establishment Clause jurisprudence where the Supreme Court has disapproved of unequal treatment of religious activities measured against secular ones. See Kir-yas Joel Village, 512 U.S. at 704, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (stating that “civil power must be exercised in a manner neutral to religion”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) (<HOLDING>). This bar to unequal treatment is, of course, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (B) holding that no meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who already outside decline to return (C) holding that government may not prefer those who believe in no religion over those who do believe (D) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (E) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony
Output: (C)
was unavailable in the state court.” Id. at 72. HSBC also cites several cases where federal courts have applied res judicata in this context. However, in each of these cases the state court upheld a dismissal of the plaintiffs claim. See, e.g., Day, 656 F.Supp.2d 331; Kremer, 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262. Because the respective state courts granted the plaintiffs no relief, there could be no issue as to the ability of the state court to grant full relief; they are, accordingly, immaterial. 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction HSBC argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for attorney’s fees only. Section 2000e — 5(f)(3), the statutory provision granting subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts over actions bro h Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), Lewis v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., No. 3:97 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because plaintiff no longer has available administrative remedies his action must be dismissed with prejudice (B) recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action (C) holding that state court judgment affirming an administrative decision did not bar a subsequent federal action for additional relief because of national policy that title vii remedies be available to supplement state remedies for employment discrimination (D) holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted (E) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix
Output: (C)
both husband and wife conceded that there was no goodwill to be had and that they simply did not think that the business was worth valuing as a going concern. Nevertheless, at the end of trial, the court assigned $10,000 of goodwill to the trucking business. The trial court issued its opinion letter in March 2000 assigning a goodwill value to the business and issued its judgment in August 2000. Between that time, husband did not object to the trial court’s assignment of goodwill. It is this lack of objection that leads wife to conclude that husband did not preserve his argument. We agree with wife that husband did not properly preserve his objection to the trial court’s decision on goodwill. See McDougal v. Griffith, 156 Or App 83, 86-87, 964 P2d 1135 (1998), rev den, 328 Or 330 (1999) (<HOLDING>). However, we may reach this issue under the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to object at trial customarily means that a party has not preserved the claim on appeal (B) holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review (C) holding that a plaintiff who did not object to the trial courts memorandum opinion giving defendants more on their counterclaim than they had requested had not preserved that issue for appeal (D) holding that a claim was not preserved for review where the defense failed to object on the specific grounds advanced on appeal (E) holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it  
Output: (C)
322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings, but bears the burden to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to [the] case, based on the affidavits or by depositions and admissions on file.” See Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 . The court presumes that plaintiffs’ civil rights claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although the complaint does not specifically say so. The civil rights claims appear to be based on allegations of false arrest and malicious prosecution; thus, the court treats these claims as allegations of a violation of Gatter's rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-74, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment (B) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (C) holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person
Output: (D)
and her poor motivation, undermined her credibility — also is supported by the record. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir.2 easons for giving less weight to the contradicted opinion of treating physician Dr. Nelson where: the opinion was conclusory, see Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113-14 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); the opinion relied in part on Smith’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (B) holding that the weight given to a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (C) holding that the weight given a treating physicians opinion is limited if the opinion consists only of conclusory statements (D) holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence (E) holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim
Output: (A)
decided” by the prior jury. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009). Usually, a special verdict clarifies which issues the jury necessarily decided. But in cases involving general verdicts, such as this one, courts must review the entire record, including “the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue Cir.1993) (“Although the principles of estoppel may apply to the retrial of a ‘hung’ count, ... they apply only when ‘an issue of fact has ... been determined [in the defendant’s favor] by a valid and final judgment.” (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Salamone, 902 F.2d 237, 240-41 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In sum, to successfully meet the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence in first trial concerning firearms in which defendant was acquitted of drug and rico conspiracies could be used in second trial on firearms offenses because evidence was collateral to elements of offenses in second trial (B) holding that the defendant could appeal the district courts order granting a new trial because his right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the second trial has taken place (C) holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them (D) holding that drug offenses and taxevasion offenses were properly joined for trial because the likely source of income for which defendant had evaded taxes was drug distribution (E) holding admissible police officers testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking
Output: (A)
that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator’s decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that “the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application.” See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word “may” rather than “shall” allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan
Output: (C)
(7th Cir.2002). Counsel first considers whether Romero could argue that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Counsel, though, is unable to articulate any conceivable disagreement with the court’s ruling, and nor are we. A defendant convicted of committing a crime of violence or controlled substance offense qualifies as a career offender if he was at least 18 years old at the time and already had two or more felony convictions for such crimes. Id. § 4Bl.l(a); United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2008). Romero is 36, and his felony convictions for threatening to murder a magistrate judge and threatening to harm a corrections supervisor are crimes of violence, see United States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a) (defining 
 Holding statements: (A) holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person (B) holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate (C) holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence (D) holding that theft from the person of another under wisconsin law is not a crime of violence as a matter of law and can only qualify as such if there are sufficient facts in the indictment to indicate that a serious threat of violence occurred (E) holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence
Output: (E)
the clergy were more qualified than the civil courts in resolving and interpreting ecclesiastical law and religious faith. Id. The Watson Court, concluding that the local Presbyterian congregation was part of a hierarchical church struc ture, ordered deference to the policies of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. Id. at 726, 738-34. In subsequent rulings, the United States Supreme Court continued to establish limits on judicial determinations of religious congregation disputes. See Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872) (in a congregational church an “expulsion of the majority by the minority [was] a void act”); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (<HOLDING>); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract (B) holding that there was subject matter jurisdiction in dispute relating to archbishops refusal to appoint a candidate to chaplaincy position because he was seeking relief as beneficiary of a trust but further finding that the determination of what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them was an ecclesiastical matter which will be accepted as conclusive in secular courts (C) holding that because the contract dispute between the parties in this case constitutes a justiciable matter that is cognizable in our trial courts our courts had subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act (E) holding that where an objection was made and trial courts ruling was treated as conclusive by state and defense counsel there was no need for further objections when evidence was presented to jury
Output: (B)
an explosive in terms of its primary or common purpose, we hold that the Government need not show that a device is actually able to explode to prove that a defendant knowingly possessed an explosive under § 842(i)(l); it need only prove that the defendant knew he possessed dynamite or other chemical compound, mixture, or device that was primarily designed to function by explosion. Finally, Mr. Markey argues that because he believed in good faith that the dynamite could not explode, he should be exonerated. This contention appears to be one of ignorance of the law — “I thought the law applied differently than it does.” See United States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir.1996). This type of argument is “easily rejected.” See United States v. Reed, 114 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, evidence concerning Mr. Markey’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim (B) holding that a good faith belief that a firearm is inoperable is not a viable defense to 18 usc  922g (C) holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001 (D) holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b (E) holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief
Output: (B)
A. 598 (1935), this Court held that a graduated-rate income tax violated the Uniformity Clause. The statute in that case taxed income below $5,000 at a rate of 2%, income between $5,000 and $10,000 at a rate of 2.5%, and income between $10,000 and $25,000 at a rate of 3%. The Kelley Court explained that the tax was non-uniform because it “resulted] in taxing those whose incomes arise above a stated figure merely for the reason that in the discretion of the Legislature their incomes are sufficiently great to be taxed.” Id. at 602. Relying upon Kelley, we subsequently struck down a city ordinance that taxed “every individual engaged in an occupation ... whose gross earnings would amount to $600 or more during the year.” Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964) (<HOLDING>). More recently, in Amidon, supra, this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the equal protection clause proscribes discrimination against whiteanglos (B) holding that a graduatedrate income tax violates the uniformity clause (C) holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances (D) holding that unlike the uniformity clause the united states constitution does not require equalization across all potential subclassifications of real property (E) holding that the uniformity clause proscribes the unequal treatment of certain individuals based upon their income
Output: (E)
The State Defendants also cite to cases from other circuits refusing to apply Ex Parte Young in suits challenging statutorily-created private rights of action. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 416-24; Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (6th Cir.1996); see also Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1342. Their holdings are unsurprising given that no state officials were charged with enforcing those laws. However, in the case before me, certain state officials are expressly charged with enforcing the law. Indeed, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits distinguished the cases before them from cases challenging penal laws enforceable by state officials, finding the latter suitable for application of Ex Parte Young. See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1337-41 (<HOLDING>); Deters, 92 F.3d at 1416 n. 10 (distinguishing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause (B) holding no error occurred in excluding portion of statement offered by defendant because the rejected portion of the conversation in no manner explains or modifies that portion of the conversation which came into evidence (C) holding that an offender convicted under the bestiality portion of the criminal sodomy statute does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of die portion of the statute that criminalizes homosexual conduct (D) holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate (E) holding that ex parte young applied to plaintiffs claims against the criminal portion of the statute
Output: (E)
If the reliability test is not met and the methods or techniques are deemed unreliable, any expert testimony based upon such techniques is also considered unreliable and therefore inadmissible. See Franklin, 1999 UT 61 at ¶ 18, 987 P.2d 22. ¶ 22 Thus, the question before us is whether canine accelerant detection is novel scientific evidence. Scientific methods or tech- ñiques are not considered novel if they are “of the sort that ha[s] ‘attained general acceptance in ... the relevant scientific community.’ ” Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 16, 977 P.2d 1193 (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted). If scientific testimony is not based on novel scientific principles or techniques, the Rimmasch test is not implicated. See id.; see also State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ¶ 16, 5 P.3d 642 (<HOLDING>). Instead, the testimony must simply comply 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge (B) holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed (C) recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony (E) recognizing that rimmasch is not intended to apply to all expert testimony but only for testimony based on newly discovered principles  quotations and citation omitted
Output: (E)
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) stated in Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, the CDA “simply identifies the person to whom the dispute is to be ‘submitted’ for a final decision” and that, “once a claim is made, the parties must ‘commit’ the claim to the contracting officer and ‘yield’ to his authority to make a final decision.” 930 F.2d 872, 880 (Fed.Cir.1991) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc., 60 F.3d at 1579. With these principles in mind, the court addresses whether Kemron submitted a “claim” to the contracting officer such that it satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to asserting a CDA claim for nonmonetary relief. Record Steel & Constr., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed.Cl. 508, 520 (2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Todd Constr., L.P., 85 Fed.Cl. at 42 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added (B) holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added (C) holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added (D) holding that a litigant did not waive a claim because it was the appellee in the intermediate appellate court emphasis added (E) holding that the court possesses jurisdiction to review contractor performance evaluations if the pertinent requirements of the cda are met  emphasis added
Output: (E)
Pa.R.A.P. 3781(a). After the Liquidator issued a notice of determination (NOD) that allowed the claim at priority level (e) for benefits paid under a reinsurance policy, and disallowed the claim for post-judgment interest, AIGA filed an objection in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 3781(c). AIGA asserted that the entire amount, including the post judgment interest, should be allowed and assigned priority level (b). This Court assigned a referee, who opined that, in Pennsylvania, the characterization of the Reliance policy as either direct insurance or reinsurance is governed by the recent decision in CSAC Excess Insurance Authority v. Reliance Insurance Co., (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 1 REL 2007, filed November 8, 2012) (single judge opinion), aff'd, 621 Pa. 424, 78 A.3d 1058 (2013) (per curiam order) (<HOLDING>). The referee rejected as waived AIGA’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested (B) holding that issue in motion for rehearing is waived if original brief is not sufficient to acquaint the court with the issue and does not present an argument that would allow the court to decide the issue (C) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court (D) holding that a policy nearly identical to that at issue in the present case was reinsurance (E) holding that claim preclusion did not apply even though the legal theory at issue in that case was addressed in a previous case because the case at issue was based on a different set of operative facts
Output: (D)
sorts of factors that courts have long charged the Board with balancing. We conclude that the broad legal views outlined in Otis II are reasonably defensible approaches for determining when plant re-locations are mandatory bargaining subjects under the NLRA. IV. Analysis of the Present Case Having determined that Otis II is not fatally flawed on its face, our inquiry is not over. It remains to determine whether the Otis standard, acceptable in its broad outlines, has been properly applied to the particular facts of the case before us. Despite the deference we owe the Board, for reasons that follow, we conclude that its decision in this case falls short of the standards of reasoned decisionmaking that we customarily require in judicial review. A. The Findings of the ALJ 7, 958 (1986) (<HOLDING>); DeSoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 788, 789 (1986) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying inter alia costs for internal copying of documents by prevailing defendants counsel produced for discovery (C) holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim (D) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted (E) holding that a decision to move did not turn upon labor costs but rather was motivated by inter alia a foreclosure action
Output: (E)
if the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary ...”); Douglas by Kelly v. Bd. of Edu., 127 Ill.App.3d 79, 82 Ill.Dec. 211, 468 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1984) (finding that where a school’s window pane fell on plaintiff while she was sitting at her desk, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based on res ipsa loqui-tur); Moore v. Atchison, 28 Ill.App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (finding that directed verdict for the plaintiff was proper where there was no direct evidence as to why two trains collided, even though the defendant showed that the equipment was properly inspected and in excellent working order, because the circumstances made the inference of negligence so strong that reasonable men could not reject it); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (<HOLDING>); Richard Equipment Corp. v. Manhattan Indus. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injured passenger of a cab was entitled to summary judgment against the driver because the prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence is inescapable (B) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (C) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
Output: (A)
official immunity existed only in the cramped sense used by the court of appeals, its qualified promise against personal civil liability to public officers would be hollow indeed. The purpose of the doctrine of official immunity is to protect public officers from civil liability for conduct that would otherwise be actionable. Ministerial acts are those: [ w]here the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discreti .App.—Dallas 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (explaining that officers were not entitled to immunity because “their actions in the pursuit did not involve matters within their discret L.Ed.2d 483 (1988); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 227 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force (B) holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot (C) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible
Output: (A)
susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. “Only knew” clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next — “didn’t know anything about investments.” “Hated helping clients” also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a “pejorative implication” that a reasonable listener would perceive “as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor.” Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement “invested her in all of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (B) holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident (C) holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law (D) holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement (E) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr  3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim  that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service
Output: (D)