niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
in character, such as determining the content of a school’s curriculum. Id., at 65 (citing cases). Moreover, activities that are so central to the educational mission such that they are “re moved from the ‘business competition’ regulated by the Sherman Act” are not “trade or commerce” within the meaning of that act. Id. at 64. For example, the formation and development of an accreditation policy by a nonprofit educational corporation that functioned as an accrediting agency for schools in a specific geographic area of the country has been held beyond the ambit of the Sherman Act. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S.Ct. 367, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Rather, “an incidental restraint of trade, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability (B) holding accrediting agency did not violate antitrust regulations by requiring nonprofit status as a prerequisite to its accreditation (C) holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it (D) holding that agency is bound by its regulations (E) holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite
Output: (B)
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). In the context of this appeal, that means that we will affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s MJOA unless a rational trier of fact viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state could not have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murders were part of a course of “continuous and uninterrupted conduct that established] at least one offense and [was] so joined in time, place and circumstances that such conduct [was] directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective.” ORS 131.505(4); see also State v. Yashin, 199 Or App 511, 514, 112 P3d 331, rev den, 339 Or 407 (2005) (<HOLDING>). With that in mind, we turn to the facts. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the challenged conduct or statement must be directed at the familial relationship with knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect that relationship internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding in a related context that the legal determination that convictions arose out of separate criminal episodes is based on a factual finding specifically the finding that the acts giving rise to the convictions were not part of continuous and uninterrupted conduct that    is so joined in time place and circumstances that such conduct is directed to the accomplishment of a criminal objective internal quotation marks omitted omission in original (C) holding that the reviewing court must accept the adverse credibility finding so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the petitioners claim of persecution internal quotation marks omitted first alteration in original (D) recognizing that conflict preemption precludes laws that under the circumstances of a particular case stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress omission alteration internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding that qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the officers action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken internal quotation marks and citation omitted
Output: (B)
found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the conspiracy began in 1992. Accordingly, the district court included 1992 and 1993 in its calculation of McGuire’s sentence, adopted the reasoning of the PSR, and set McGuire’s offense level at 28, which put McGuire in a sentencing range of 78 to 97 months. The district court sentenced McGuire to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On October 13, 1999, the court entered final judgment. McGuire argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to change his sentence, asserting that the sentence was “imposed” under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c) when the district co (2d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 869 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (B) holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment (C) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (D) recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry (E) holding that imposition occurs at time of oral pronouncement
Output: (B)
was given for the term “intercepting device.” The trial justice “noted” these objections but refused to issue any curative or additional instruction. In a pretrial de ncorporate the statutory definitions of the terms “intercept” (meaning to “acquire aurally the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device”) and “intercepting device,” the trial justice did not commit reversible error in this case. For the reasons discussed above, the video camera was an “intercepting device” as a matter of law and its use (as revealed in the playback of the videotape to the jury) indisputably “acquire[d] aurally” the surrounding sounds and communications captured on the videotape. See Pascale v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 898 F.Supp. 276, 279 (D.N.J.1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the trial justice read § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment (B) holding question of citys exercise of due care in enforcement of ordinance was question of fact and inappropriate for summary judgment (C) holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law (D) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (E) holding that the question of whether the defendants recording device was an intercepting device was a question of law appropriate for summary judgment
Output: (E)
special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985) (quoting State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. 111, 117, 412 P.2d 405, 408 (1966) (in turn quoting Blevins, 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209)). 27. Other jurisdictions have held that the enactment of a comprehensive motor vehicle code shows a legislative intent to preempt the field. In State v. Davidson, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that with the passage of the motor vehicle code, the legislature “intended to cover the whole field and subject matter of the operation of motor vehicles, including definitions of the several offenses growing out 215 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 28. In addition to the case law from this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay (B) holding that the older more general manslaughter statute is preempted by the vehicular homicide statute (C) holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge (D) holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient (E) holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense
Output: (B)
The court disagrees. All the plaintiffs have done is state a historical fact — that CD & R did not respond to Mail Boxes Etc.’s inquiry — and then assert that CD & R did not respond because they were already in negotiations with the defendants. From that fact and bare assertion, the plaintiffs take the further leap that the defendants intentionally misrepresented the timing of their discussions with CD & R. Compl. 1143; Pis.’ Opp’n at 23 n. 19. “[A] pleading technique that couples a factual statement with a conclusory allegation of fraudulent intent is insufficient to support the inference that the defendants acted recklessly or with fraudulent intent.” Rombach, 355 F.3d at 176 (internal quotations omitted); see also In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs do not any allege any facts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss (C) holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss (D) holding that a conclusory boilerplate assertion of a municipal policy or custom was insufficient to survive motion to dismiss (E) holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra
Output: (E)
S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.”). In an effort to circumvent the issue preservation rule, a fundamental principle of appellate procedure with which Appellants are familiar, we are once again confronted with a subject matter jurisdiction claim. We reject this desperate, eleventh-hour attack on Judge Hughston and the assertion that he lacked jurisdiction to preside over this case. His authority to render judgment is beyond question, and if Appellants desired his recusal, they should have done so in a proper and timely manner. See Parker v. Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 496-97, 531 S.E.2d 546, 566 (Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Lifting of the Automatic Stay On October 10, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review (B) holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court (C) holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review (D) holding that issues must be raised and ruled upon in the trial court to be preserved for appellate review (E) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review
Output: (B)
appealable. See Hudson v. Hous. Auth., 402 Md. 18, 25-26, 935 A.2d 395 (2007). Even if the Order did not qualify as a final order, it would qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order for both the State and Gaumer. By permitting WBAL to copy portions of the audiotape and the DVD, the court conclusively determined the disputed and important issue presented by the Motion for Access. That determination resolved an issue that was completely separate from the merits of the underlying criminal action, i.e., whether Gaumer was guilty of the crime charged and, if so, his punishment. The Order was effectively unreviewable in an appeal from the final judgment in Gaumer’s criminal case. See Mann v. State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, 298 Md. 160, 164-65, 468 A.2d 124 (1983) (<HOLDING>). As WBAL notes, “since the [the Order] was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an order refusing to enforce a settlement agreement is not immediately appealable because it does not prevent a judgment from being rendered in the action and appellant can seek review of the current order in any appeal from final judgment (B) holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal (C) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (D) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order (E) holding that an order granting the media the right to interview a defendant in a capital murder case was unreviewable upon appeal in the criminal trial and therefore immediately appealable as a collateral order because the review on appeal would have been too late to cure any damage to the defendant from what was said in the interview
Output: (E)
and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status .... It was this alteration, officially removing the interest from the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which we found sufficient to invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-11, 96 S.Ct. at 1165 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court also pointed out that other interests are "protected not by virtue of their recognition by the law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which has been 'incorporated' in 2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325, 329 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the foster parent did not possess a liberty interest in her relationship with the foster child (B) recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child (C) holding that the trial court did not err in finding that a trust relationship existed between a foster mother and foster child where it found that the child immediately became attached to the foster mother and was confiding in her when she made statements admitted under the hearsay exception (D) holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child (E) holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship
Output: (A)
that “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.12 . . . specifically states that the expert must be familiar with the standard of care in the same or similar community ‘at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.’ ” Id. at 480, 624 S.E.2d at 385 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.12). Although plaintiff’s expert did not wait four years before gathering information on Wake County, he still failed to comply with the statute insofar as it requires knowledge at the time of the injury. Dr. Frost even testified that the time between the injury and his research on the standard of care in Wake County that he “would expect that there were some ... changes” in the standard. Cf. Roush v. Kennon, 188 N.C. App. 570, 576, -S.E.2d. -, - (No. COA07-209 filed 5 February 2008) (<HOLDING>). I would therefore hold that plaintiff’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care (B) holding that an expert can comply with the timing requirement if an experts research even after his or her deposition revealed that the standard of care in his or her community was the same or similar to the standard of care in the community in which he or she is testifying when the injury occurred (C) holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider (D) holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute (E) holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care
Output: (B)
was insufficient). This court was similarly unanimous. See Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i at 385, 219 P.3d at 1172. It was not debatable whether the failure to allege the public-road element (i.e., the definition of "operating”) yields a sufficient charging instrument, because this would have been in derogation of a settled constitutional principle. See State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977) (noting that a charge omitting an element of the offense constitutes a denial of due process). 33 . See also United States v. Rivera-Nevarez, 418 F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir.2005) (''Decisions of statutory interpretation are fully retroactive because they do not change the law, but rather explain what the law has always meant.”); In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 992 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the us supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c in an earlier case was not an expression of a new rule because the court merely interpreted a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction (B) holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other (C) holding that a prior us supreme court decision did not present a new rule of criminal procedure but merely interpreted a statute (D) holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c (E) holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order
Output: (A)
America ... negligently and carelessly treated, transported and cared for the claimant.” 634 F.2d at 1242. 10 . The government argues that even if we hold that Paul Goodman exhausted his administrative remedies, under Maryland common law, only the patient herself can bring a claim for lack of informed consent and Paul Goodman, as surviving spouse, could not properly bring a wrongful death claim based on the decedent’s lack of informed consent. It is well-established under Maryland law that a surviving spouse can bring a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice, but we have not found, nor does any party cite case law regarding, whether a surviving spouse may bring a wrongful death action based on lack of informed consent. See Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 341 A.2d 789 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness (B) holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice (C) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (D) holding that a surviving spouse can bring a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice (E) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death
Output: (D)
consenting to the exploratory laparotomy and the salpin-go oophorectomy. Based on these forms, the only conclusion that reasonable persons could have reached was that Ms. Church consented to these procedures. A patient’s consent may be express or implied. Express consent is permission given directly either by voice or in writing. A party seeking to prove express consent may do so by introducing the writing memorializing the consent. See, e.g., In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Litig., 533 F.Supp. 567, 574-76 (D.Colo.1980). When a patient has signed a written consent form expressly covering a particular procedure, the terms of the consent form will ordinarily control the question of whether the patient consented to the procedure. See Hudson v. Parvin, 582 So.2d 403, 411 (Miss.1991) (<HOLDING>). When a written consent form exists, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied (B) holding that no physicianpatient relationship between doctor who gave informal opinion over telephone at request of treating physician and minor patient whose case was discussed and thus doctor did not owe duty of care to patient (C) holding that the language of an executed consent form took precedence over the alleged prior conversations between the patient and the physician (D) holding that the conversations between a patient and her psychotherapist and the notes taken during their counseling sessions are protected by the privilege (E) holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave
Output: (C)
also Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1100-01; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991)). The rare “third-party standing” exception to this requirement allows federal courts to hear cases in which a plaintiff can “show that (1) it has suffered an injury in fact; (2) it has a close relationship to the third party; and (3) there is some hindrance to the third party’s ability to pro of “the independent action of some third party not before the court,” the plaintiff generally lacks standing to seek its redress. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2013); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Neither is injury caused by market conditions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor (B) holding that a faa certificate was not dispositive as to whether an airline operated on an established line for purposes of the excise tax exemption (C) holding that a retailer lacked standing to challenge a federal excise tax assessed against a thirdparty fuel supplier even where the retailer was required by contract to pay the supplier an amount equal to the excise tax upfront at the time of purchase since the alleged injury  in the form of increased fuel costs was not occasionedby the government (D) holding that constitutional challenge to controlled substance excise tax must pursue administrative routes followed by appeal in tax court (E) holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on distributors not retailers
Output: (C)
the expert Michelle Karshan’s testimony that mentally ill detainees may be singled out for physical abuse because of their bizarre behavior and inability to comply with prison rules, and Dr. Robert Stein’s report stating that, without the necessary treatment for his depression and other medical conditions, and absent humane living conditions in the Haitian prison or detention center, Joseph is likely to “simply curl up in a corner and not say anything at all.” (Pet. Br. at 29.) We conclude that this evidence, although deeply troubling, falls short of demonstrating torture as that term is defined under the law, because it fails to show the requisite specific intent on the part of the Haitian authorities. Pierre, 528 F.3d at 191; cf. Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Joseph also claims that he will be tortured 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the conditions of the mexican mental health system which were created by officials historical gross negligence and misunderstanding of the nature of psychiatric illness do not amount to torture for cat purposes (B) holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling (C) holding that upon applying the doctrine of contra proferentem the insureds organically based illness does not fall within the mental illness limitation as a matter of law (D) holding that attorneys misunderstanding of the period for which a claim remained pending did not warrant equitable tolling (E) holding that a mental illness limitation limiting the maximum payment for care of mental illness or care of nervous conditions of any type or cause is ambiguous because the plan contains no definition or explanation of the term mental illness  and thus construed against the insurance company does not include physically based illnesses
Output: (A)
is “doubtful that the judicial interpretation of advisory Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by an independent commission implicates either of the twin concerns that motivate the rule of lenity.,” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 719 (11th Cir. 2010) (William Pryor, J., concurring). And in any event, the text of the guideline is clear—“ ‘prior sentence’ means a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant Qffense,” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 1. ' Burke’s alternative'ground for appeal— that the district court erred in calculating his sentence because his 1999 Florida conviction for armed robbery is not a “crime of violence” as that term is used in section 2K2.1(4)(A) of the Guidelines—is foreclosed by binding precedent. United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1246 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment (B) holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act (C) holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act (D) holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction (E) holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another
Output: (B)
means through which the ... rights of the person on trial are secured.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). To establish a claim of denial of the right to counsel, a defendant “need only show that counsel was absent during a critical stage of the proceedings in order to establish the constitutional violation.” Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.1987), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987). Trial, sentencing, and direct appeal are all critical stages at which a defendant is entitled to counsel. See Smith v. State, 590 So.2d 1078, 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (treating right to counsel at sentencing as a critical stage); Ford v. State, 575 So.2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (B) holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel on discretionary review (C) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (E) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel
Output: (C)
all the parties request earlier certification. If the Supreme Court grants transfer or review, the Clerk shall not certify any opinion or memorandum decision until final disposition by the Supreme Court. The trial court, Administrative Agency, and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon the opinion or memorandum decision until the opinion or memorandum decision is certified. It has been said that trial courts lack “jurisdiction” to perform any action in a case while an appeal of a final judgment is pending, except Tor. ministerial tasks such as reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing a judgment. In re Paternity of V.A., 10 N.E.3d 65, 67-68, n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). See also Pflederer v. Kesslerwood, Lake Ass’n, Inc., 878 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Hancock v. State, 786 N.E.2d 1142, 1143, n.1 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue of costs and fees to be imposed based on wrongful issuance of injunction was not ripe until appellate decision was certified as final (B) holding trial courts action in resentencing defendant following remand on appeal before appellate decision was certified as final was premature and should be considered as a nullity (C) recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs (D) holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer (E) holding the divesting of jurisdiction by the mailing of a certified copy of the order of remand does not preclude the award of attorneys fees and costs
Output: (A)
the heroin that was seized from the Volkswagen. See United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 609 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Proge does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to lead a rational juror to conclude he was guilty under either a Pinkerton coconspirator liability theory or an aiding-and-abetting theory. See United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990) (Pinkerton theory). Lastly, to establish a money-laundering conspiracy “the government must prove (1) that two or more persons conspired to commit the crime of money laundering, and (2) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Prince, 618 F.3d 551, 553-54 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 212, 125 S.Ct. 687, 160 L.Ed.2d 611 (2005) (<HOLDING>). There was ample proof that a money-laundering 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc  846 do include an overt act requirement (B) holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy (C) holding proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of  846 (D) holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy (E) holding that an 18 usc  1956h conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act
Output: (E)
is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent.”) (quoting United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 2077, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990)). In addition, procedural defects in a judge’s qualifications do not affect the fairness of the proceedings. See Bowen, 283 Cal.Rptr. at 39 (stating that the issue of whether the judge met county residency requirement was “wholly removed from the question of [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence or the fairness of the trial.”). Furthermore, the de facto judge doctrine pro- tects third parties and the public in their dealings with the judicia P.2d 801, 805, 808 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Here, Judge Schulz was appointed as a judge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a judge pro tempore is in actual possession of the office and discharging its duties he or she acts under color of title and is a judge de facto (B) recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge (C) holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal (D) holding that the appointment of a pro tempore judge vests in him or her the powers of a judge of the   court during the period specified in the assignment (E) holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void
Output: (D)
things, employee welfare benefit plans that, ‘through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,’ provide medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). To facilitate that comprehensive regulation, ERISA preempts any state law that “relate[s] to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). It is undisputed that plaintiffs claims under the Kentucky Act “relate to” an employee benefit plan, and therefore fall under ERISA’s express preemption clause. Plaintiff, however, argues that his claims under the Kentucky Act are saved from preemption by virtue of ERISA’s savings clause, which saves from preemptio 2003) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that the Kentucky Act 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claims under the south dakota unfair insurance practices statute were preempted because the south dakota statute provided a state judicial remedy (B) holding that ujnder the plain meaning of the voting rights act the state of south dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the attorney general or bring a declaratory judgment action for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties (C) holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
Output: (A)
consideration is whether the citizen was under a reasonable impression that he was not free to leave the officer’s presence.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citing United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C.Cir.1977)). The test for whether such a reasonable impression existed is what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizen’s shoes. Id. Although nothing in the record suggests that Calmes was a motorist and needed his license to leave the location, nonetheless, upon being asked if he was armed, a reasonable person in Calmes’s position would not feel free simply to terminate the encounter, leave his license with the police, and walk away. See, e.g., United States v. Crump, 62 F.Supp.2d 560, 564 (D.Conn.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 564, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown (B) holding that by the time the officer asked the defendant if he could frisk him the encounter had evolved into a stop (C) holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation (D) holding that once the officer asked the defendant to exit his vehicle the encounter became a stop because the defendant was no longer free to leave (E) holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority
Output: (A)
Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523-26 (6th Cir.2008). Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (B) holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity (C) holding that intervening misconduct can sever the temporal proximity connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment (D) holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases (E) holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection
Output: (A)
in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to the person in the person’s professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable the person to discharge the functions of the person’s office according to the usual course of practice or discipline. Because it impedes the full and free discovery of the truth, the attorney-client privilege is strictly construed. See Chidester v. Needles, 353 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1984). Consequently, we have held that voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged communication constitutes waiver as to all other communications on the same subject. See Iowa Code § 622.10 (privilege does not apply when person, in whose favor prohibition is made, waives the right); State v. Cole, 295 N.W.2d 29, 35 (Iowa 1980) (<HOLDING>); Kantaris v. Kantaris, 169 N.W.2d 824, 830 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing duty by examining physician even absent formal physicianpatient relationship (B) recognizing theory of waiver in physicianpatient relationship (C) recognizing theory of constructive possession (D) recognizing the tort of breach of physicianpatient privilege (E) holding that a physicianpatient relationship gives rise to a duty to avoid emotional harm from failure to provide critical information to patient
Output: (B)
the defendant Boston church as well as the plaintiff Massachusetts Association of . the New Jerusalem. 4 As the Appeals Court concluded, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit a civil court from exercising jurisdiction over property disputes involving a church so long as the court does not intrude upon issues of church doctrine, polity, discipline, and internal operation. See General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S.A., Inc. v. MacKenzie, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 839-840 (2006), citing Callahan v. First Congregational Church, 441 Mass. 699, 708 (2004), and Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). 5 General Laws c. 180, § 11 A, provides as follows: 6 See, e.g., Central Coast Baptist Ass’n v. First Baptist Church, 154 Cal. App. 4th 586, 592 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Wisconsin Conference Bd. of Trustees of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a church was entitled to employ only members of its faith (B) holding the federal unemployment tax act section exempting service performed in employ of church after which florida molded its unemployment law was meant to apply to schools that have no separate legal existence from the church and therefore employees working within such schools are in employ of the church (C) holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing breach of fiduciary duty claim against priest church official and church (D) holding that members of a church congregation lacked sufficient interest to support intervention in an action by the church itself challenging the designation of the church as a landmark (E) holding that disaffiliated church had de facto dissolved when last vote of its full membership was to dissolve and to transfer assets to mother church
Output: (E)
omitted) ]. Thus, the Debtor is collaterally estopped from arguing that the Probate Judgment is dischargeable because it does not give rise to a right of recoupment. Attorney’s Fees The Trust Plaintiffs also argue that the obligations represented by the Fee Judgment and the Appellate Fee Judgment are nondischargeable. Attorney’s fees and costs constitute a debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523 when they “result from” the debtor’s conduct underlying the debt. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998). Therefore, when a debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), the attorney’s fees and costs associated with that debt are likewise nondischargeable. See, e.g., K & K Ins. Group, Inc. v. Houston (In re Houston), 305 B.R. 111, 116 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>); USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Auffant (In re 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a state court judgment was found not to be dischargeable under 11 usc  523a6 the associated attorneys fees were also not dischargeable (B) holding that state university violated 11 usc  362 and 525 by withholding debtors transcript where debt was dischargeable (C) holding  525 applies only where debt dischargeable (D) holding that if both willful and malicious are not met the debt is dischargeable (E) holding that fees should not be awarded where plaintiff also argued a claim under  523a6
Output: (A)
constituted the criminally negligent exercise of nondeadly force. Consequently, it was error for the district court to refuse to instruct the jury on this theory of involuntary manslaughter. B Alternatively, defendant argues the jury could have found that, although his actions resulted in the death of Russell John, they did not constitute a felony. We reject this claim. Assault resulting in serious bodily injury is a felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6); it is also a general intent crime. It is not necessary that defendant have assaulted the victim with the intent to do serious bodily harm — the resulting serious bodily injury coupled with the general intent to assault is sufficient to satisfy the elements of the felony. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 882 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim (B) holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury (C) holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16 (D) holding purposely inflicts  serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other (E) holding that assault resulting in bodily injury under  111b is a crime of violence
Output: (B)
has been specifically pled in the complaint, the defendant may still overcome a motion for remand by showing through a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory requisite. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1993). Removal “cannot be based simply upon conclusory allegations.” Felton v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 324 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335). As the underlying complaint in this case does not request a specific amount of damages, that pleading must be further examined to determine if it is otherwise “facially apparent” that the requisite amount in controversy has been met. This analysis focuses on the nature of the damages alleged; See Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193 F.3d 848, 851 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). But see Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing loss of consortium claims (B) holding that damages comprising an injured shoulder bruises abrasions unidentified medical expenses and a loss of consortium did not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement (C) holding that loss of consortium damages are not recoverable when the nonderivative claim did not result in physical injury (D) recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium (E) holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse
Output: (B)
of what we determined USF & G’s coverage to be. CU’s concession cements our conclusion that the SIR is nothing more than a deductible contracted between Payless and USF & G. Because the SIR contained in the USF & G policy is not “other insurance” within the meaning of CU’s “other insurance” clause, CU’s policy provides the only insurance coverage for the first $200,000 of Payless’s liability (subject of course to the $10,000 SIR in CU’s own policy). See Cargill, Inc., 889 F.2d at 180 (applying Minnesota law and holding that, up to the higher deductible contained in one of two applicable insurance policies, only one insurance policy provided coverage so that its “other insurance” clause was not triggered); cf. Wallace v. TriState Ins. Co. of Minn., 302 N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). The district court determined that CU was not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits (B) holding that excess coverage in four policies was not triggered until primary insurer satisfied the requirements necessary to trigger the excess insurers coverage and paid the full amount of its limits (C) holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insureds deductible which was not covered by the primary insurer (D) holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend (E) holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies
Output: (C)