niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
unless the claims can stand independently. In Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun Inc., the Court held that a Jones Act claim and an unseaworthiness claim did not constitute separate and independent claims because the claims involved an invasion of a single primary right, and therefore the case was not removable. 810 F.2d 533, 539 (5th Cir.1987). In the present case, it is clear that removal is prohibited. Claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law are removable only if the claims are separate and independent. Gonsalves, 733 F.2d 1020. A separate and independent cause of action is one that involves the single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff. Baltimore Steamship Co., 274 U.S. at 321, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); See Gonsalves, 733 F.2d at 1026 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs’ complaint includes 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that a federal cause of action for damages arises upon a federal agents unconstitutional conduct (D) holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action (E) holding that a single cause of action arises out of the same set of facts
Output: (E)
stand against the principal or employer on the basis of vicarious liability or respon-deat superior. See Williams v. Hines, 80 Fla. 690, 86 So. 695, 699 (1920) (where a jury by its verdict exonerates the servant but finds the master guilty, the verdict as to the master is erroneous.); Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (when principal’s liability rests solely on respondeat superior, principal cannot be liable if agent is exonerated); See also, e.g., Rothman, M.D., P.A. v. Hebebrand, 720 So.2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (physician’s professional association, which defaulted, could not be held liable for malpractice, where association’s liability was only vicarious and jury found in favor of physician); Keyes Co. v. Sens, 382 So.2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (<HOLDING>). According to the allegations contained in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rochez did not foreclose respondeat superior liability for brokerdealers for the fraudulent acts of their employees (B) holding that employees defamatory statements made at work about matters relating to work were within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior and recognizing that californias respondeat superior doctrine imposes a broad rule of liability on employers (C) recognizing respondeat superior liability (D) holding that defendant  whose liability for the acts of its employees was vicarious based on respondeat superior  was not subject to a verdict or judgment for compensatory damages in excess of the amount of damage determined and found against its defendantemployees the active tortfeasors (E) holding that employees violation of his employers policy against drinking on the job does not preclude liability under respondeat superior
Output: (D)
The USDA asserts authority to prescribe “restrictions on the use of a product,” including “limits on distribution of the product.” 9 C.F.R § 102.5(d). That regulation is the asserted basis for USDA’s decision to prohibit Creekstone’s “use” of a biological product for private BSE testing. Creekstone contends that USDA’s “use” regulation exceeds its authority to regulate “preparation, sale, barter, exchange, or shipment,” but Creekstone’s reading of the statute is too narrow. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius will not restrict the application of a statute that also contains expansive modifiers such as “as may be necessary to prevent” and “or otherwise to carry out this chapter.” Compare NLRB v. Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, Inc., 174 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>)(emphasis added). See also United States v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing equitable powers necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title (B) holding that 1 usc  1 does not apply except where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute (C) holding that the nlrb has the authority to interpret cbas in the first instance where its interpretation is for the purpose of enforcing a statutory right which congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment (D) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (E) holding that terms of 29 usc  156 authorizing the nlrb to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act grant the nlrb broad rulemaking authority
Output: (E)
1854, 60 L.Ed.2d 435 (1979) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934)). Although condemnation of private property under the Natural Gas Act is a matter of federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) provides that a federal district court must look to and apply the “practice and procedure” followed in similar proceedings in the courts where the property is situated. Generally speaking, state law governs compensation issues in eminent domain proceedings involving private interests. See Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 617 F.2d 1112, 1121 n. 5 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc) (applying state law to questions concerning compensation under the Federal Power Act); Algonquin Gas Transmission Company v. 60 Acres of Land, 855 F.Supp. 449, 453 (D.Mass.1994) (<HOLDING>); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company v. 104 Acres 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is an open question whether drpa is a federal agency governed by the apa or a state agency governed by state administrative law (B) recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony (C) holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law (E) holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily
Output: (D)
the trial court erroneously classified property as marital when in fact it was non-marital, the question becomes what relief, if any, this court ought to grant. “The erroneous characterization of property requires reversal of the order dividing marital property if the error materially impacts the overall distribution of the marital property.” Halupa v. Halupa, 943 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo.App. E.D.1997). Here, by our calculation, the difference in the calculation is roughly five thousand dollars. The trial court awarded to each party a percentage of the property based on their respective contributions. The trial court was free to conclude that Wife was entitled to a share of the value of the home due to her significant contributions. Moritz v. Moritz, 844 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo.App. W.D.1992)(<HOLDING>). Because the property was not transmuted, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonowning spouse is entitled to some benefit when marital funds are used to improve nonmarital property (B) holding that a trial court may find that a nonowning spouse is entitled to some benefit by reason of marital funds having been used to pay off debts on the owning spouses nonmarital property (C) holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home (D) holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate (E) holding that one spouse may be entitled to a portion of the equity in home purchased with nonmarital funds
Output: (E)
in state court, Romagosa and Brown filed supplemental proceedings against the P.A., Van Diepen, and OIM pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 56.29. Section 56.29(6)(b) states that “[w]hen any gift, transfer, assignment or other conveyance of personal property has been made or contrived by defendant to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, the court shall order the gift, transfer, assignment or other conveyance to be void-” Fla. Stat. § 56.29(6)(b). The purpose of § 56.29 is to assist judgment creditors in reaching the assets of judgment debtors. Morton v. Cord Realty, Inc., 677 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996). Once the P.A. filed for bankruptcy, Ro-magosa’s supplementary proceeding action was properly stayed by the bankruptcy court. See In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 306 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court ordered the Trustee to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (B) holding rule 11 sanction proceeding was exempt from automatic stay (C) holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a (D) holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay (E) holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a
Output: (E)
and onto her abdomen onee she submarined. He further indicated that Amanda’s pelvic and leg injuries were caused by- her knees impacting the vehicle’s dash panel. Mr. Lewis concluded that had Amanda not submarined and her seat not collapsed, she would not have sustained these injuries. Additional Evidence Amanda also introduced portions of Nissan’s pre-trial discovery responses wherein Nissan admitted to disposing of its developmental test reports including any reports concerning crashworthiness, front passenger seatbelt spool-out, submarining, and the effectiveness of the Pathfinder’s seatbelt systems. Mr. Whitman explained in detail why he believed that Nissan’s record retention policy was a bad of our sister states. E.g., Stone Man v. Green, 263 Ga. 470, 435 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are as a general rule improper where a defendant has adhered to environmental and safety regulations (B) holding tcpa is remedial statute and that statutory damages are not punitive damages (C) holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa (D) holding a court may not award punitive damages (E) holding that punitive damages are not fines
Output: (A)
By holding that the State lacks parens patriae standing because § 1132(a)(3) does not expressly provide for such standing, we do not of course intend to imply that states may only sue in their parens patriae capacity when a statute specifically provides for suits by states. States have frequently been allowed to sue in parens patriae to ... enforce federal statutes that ... do not specifically provide standing for state attorney generals. Id. at 121 (quotations and internal brackets omitted). To underscore the importance of this qualification, the court noted that unlike the carefully circumscribed standing provisions of ERISA, standing provisions in many other statutes implicitly authorized parens patriae standing by using language that permits any “person” who is “a 46 (3d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). Although these authorities do not address the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding title viii standing as broad as is permitted by article iii of the constitution and extends to indirect victims of defendants housing discrimination (B) holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention (C) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (D) holding that title viis term a person claiming to be aggrieved demonstrated congressional intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permitted by article iii (E) holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues
Output: (D)
these arguments is sufficient to override the designation of Shar-key which appears in the record and Pine Tree did not abuse its discretion is so concluding. First, plaintiff contends that Sharkey waived her rights to the death benefits under the pension program when, attendant to the dissolution of her marriage to Decedent, she executed a Voluntary Separation Agreement, which was incorporated into, but not merged in the judgment of divorce. The Separation Agreement contained, inter alia, a mutual release by the Decedent and Sharkey of “any and all rights or interests which [they now have] or may hereafter acquire in the real, personal or other property of the other.” See Defs.’ Ex. 14. This contention founders on the rule of Estate of Altobelli v. IBM, 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Separation Agreement in this case neither 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (B) holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language (C) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (D) holding that the family courts award to exwife of interest in 387 of debtors military pension payable directly from the plan was not subject to discharge because interest in pension plan was not a debt rather it was considered exwifes separate ownership interest (E) holding that exwife had no interest in exhusbands erisa plan because each party clearly intended by the terms of a property settlement to relinquish all interests in the pension plans of the other
Output: (E)
this extraordinary relief, Harris cited a declaration in which his former lawyer swore that his representation in the first habeas proceeding had been ineffective. We ruled in Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191 (2d Cir.2001), that relief under Rule 60(b) is available with respect to a previous habeas proceeding only when the Rule 60(b) motion attacks the integrity of the habeas proceeding and not the underlying criminal conviction. Harris has cast his Rule 60(b)(6) motion as such an attack on the integrity of his initial habeas proceeding, although the ground cited by Harris for reopening the first habeas proceeding would (if valid) require the habeas court to consider whether the sentencing judge committed reversible error. See Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 534 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Harris’s attack on the integrity of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ineffectivenessofappellatecounsel claim is only valid if the appellate error prejudiced the defendant (B) holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error (C) holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited (D) holding that where the state commits a discovery violation the standard for harmless error is extraordinarily high a defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that the defendants trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred and a states discovery violation is harmless only if the appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced (E) recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings
Output: (A)
case. Between the doctrine’s inapplicability here, coupled by the fact that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure compel the fusion of both issues, this Court holds that Plaintiff did not waive its right to recover on an alleged preferential transfer. Y. Conclusion This Court concludes that § 502(d) does not preclude Plaintiff from bringing a preference action against Morris. Plaintiff was not required by the Bankruptcy Code to object to Morris’s c us. Holdings, Inc.), 2003 WL 1818177 (Bankr.D.Del. Apr. 2, 2003) (same); LaRoche Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. (In re LaRoche), 284 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D.Del. Sept.23, 2002) (same). But see Homeplace of Am., Inc. v. Salton, Inc. (In re Waccamaw’s Homeplace), 325 B.R. 524, 535 (Bankr.D.Del. May 31, 2005) (<HOLDING>); TWA Inc. Post Confirmation Estate v. City & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant to a preference action has a right to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh amendment of the united states constitution but that right can be waived by filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings (B) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (C) holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection (D) holding that party waived an objection to choice of law (E) holding trustee has not waived the right to bring a preference objection
Output: (E)
asserting sovereign immunity under a separate provision of section 24-10-106(1)(e), by which a public entity retains immunity for "an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property" ("the natural condition provision"). The parties subsequently stipulated that the improved campsite was a "public facility" but the trees adjacent to it originated on unimproved property. T8 The trial court determined that the "sole issue" was whether the trees adjacent to Burnett's campsite constituted a "public facility." In granting the State's motion to dismiss, the trial court conducted a two-part analysis to assess whether a pre-existing natural object, such as the tree, could be part of a "public facility." See Rosales v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 89 P.3d 507, 510 (Colo.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). The trial court held that the trees bordering 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver (B) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (C) holding that a tree is part of a public facility if a public entity incorporates it into a facility in such a manner that it 1 becomes an integral part of the facility and 2 is essential for the intended use of the facility (D) holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial (E) holding sba is an integral part of federal government and is not a separate legal entity
Output: (C)
of a memorandum filed by a defendant in anticipation of sentencing in a public-corruption case. See Huntley, 943 F.Supp.2d at 384-85. The letter argued for a lower sentence because of the defendant’s cooperation, and listed the state legislators and other elected officials who were recorded by the defendant as part of her cooperation. Id. In granting the media’s request for access to the letter, the court noted that the privacy interests of the elected officials were at their “lowest,” because these officials were “well-equipped” to “respond to any accusations of wrongdoing.” Id. at 387; see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (noting that “privacy interests are diminished when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public scrutiny”); White, 2004 WL 2399731, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Huntley, however, provides limited support to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case (B) holding that a city cannot be required to enter into collective bargaining sessions with an association of its employees (C) holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning (D) holding that disclosure of grandjury testimony of city employees was proper because they cannot be expected to have any personal privacy interest in their duties as city employees (E) recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
Output: (D)
Law. 11-12 (Nov. 1994) ("The side with the best case almost always wins, and the performance of the lawyers almost never matters. Some of the best lawyering I've ever seen has resulted in spectacular losses. And some of the most bumbling lawyers have had the fortune of attaching themselves to strong, and therefore winning, cases."). 50 . See Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 793 A.2d 515, 531 (2002) (finding that attorney's failure to research whether his client, a criminal defendant, needed to be present at her initial appearance, as well as his failure to have her arrest warrant recalled once he learned of its issuance, provided sufficient evidence that he had violated MRPC 1.1); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 753 A.2d 17, 26-27 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 51 . Stip. Ex. 26 at Beecher00203. 52 . See 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an attorney and his or her client (B) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case (C) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (D) holding that an attorney whose office staff incorrectly instructed a client that he need not appear in court for trial provided incompetent representation (E) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client
Output: (D)
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550, 63 S.Ct. 727, 87 L.Ed. 959 (1943); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 39, 44 (2d Cir.1979); Matter of Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir.1977). Indeed, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has referred to the decision to reject or assume an executory contract as within the “discretion” of the trustee. Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257, 260 (1st Cir.1963). It is to be noted that Collazo dealt with the rejection of an agreement for the sale of real estate. Although Collazo was decided prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has given no indication that the “business judgment test” should not continue to apply under the present Code. In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 107 B.R. 435, 440 (Bankr.D.Mass.1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in confronting the question of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable (B) holding that the business judgment test applies to the determination of whether a trustee should be allowed to reject an executory contract for the sale of real estate under  365 (C) holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made (D) holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute (E) holding the real estate sale proceeds
Output: (B)
the County acknowledges that Barrett involved litigation costs rather than attorney’s fees, it contends that this is a distinction without a difference and that it would not make sense to permit reimbursement of one and not the other given that both have their foundation in Section 440. Moreover, the County argues that It would be inequitable to force it to bear the costs of attorney’s fees where it had'a reásonable basis for its contest, and that Parker’s counsel will be unjustly enriched if the erroneously awarded fees are not disgorged. In this regard, the County observes that courts have frequently utilized equitable principles when interpreting provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Kiebler v. WCAB (Specialty Tire of America), 738 A.2d 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Roadway Express Inc. v. WCAB (Alien), 152 Pa. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant (B) holding claimant was not entitled to agencys mistaken application of statutory provision (C) holding that the equitable principle of unjust enrichment allowed an employer to recapture a mistaken overpayment made to the claimant (D) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (E) holding that where employer paid benefits under group disability policy to employee under mistaken belief that his condition resulted from illness rather than injury arising out of and in course of employment employees acceptance of such benefits did not bar him from benefits to which he was entitled under workers compensation law and employer was properly allowed credit for payments made under disability policy
Output: (C)
engage in any conduct subsequent to speaking with Cohen that could be construed as a waiver of the privilege: once Cohen advised him to invoke the Fifth Amendment, Fornes apparently stopped telling others about the murder. The fact that Fornes has died does not alter the privileged nature of the conversation, as the privilege survives his death. Nonetheless, under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, I conclude that Fornes’s statements to Cohen are admissible. As the Supreme Court held in Chambers, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible under the state’s rules of evidence, a defendant in a criminal case may nonetheless be entitled to introduce the evidence if its exclusion would render his trial fundamentally unfair. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (<HOLDING>); see also Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding declarations against penal interest admissible where certain conditions are met (B) holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted (C) holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest (D) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay (E) holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made
Output: (D)
facie case of retaliation. Upon review of the record, we find that the University satisfied its burden by producing evidence indicating that its actions were taken because of changes in Khazzaka’s conduct. See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 1, Passon Affidavit at ¶¶ 9-14, 18-21, 81-83; id., Exh. 2, Adams Affidavit at ¶¶ 9-22; id., Exh. 3, Wiley Affidavit at ¶¶ 28-54. Although Khazzaka disputes some of this evidence, see Plaintiffs Response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts, he has not presented any evidence from which a fact-finder could disbelieve the University’s as serted reasons and/or believe that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating cause for the actions. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis omitted). Consequently, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying on conclusory statements (B) recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence  to defeat summary judgment (C) holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question (D) holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment (E) holding that the nonmoving party may not defeat a summary judgment motion by standing on the bare allegations in the pleadings
Output: (B)
CURIAM: Michael Disch appeals his convictions for mailing threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and making false statements to an FBI agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Disch argues that the district court judge was required to recuse himself sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 455(b). Ordinarily, we review a judge’s decision not to recuse himself under § 455(a) and § 455(b) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir.1999); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). However, when a defendant fails to seek 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (B) holding that a  455b violation is subject to harmless error review (C) holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error (D) holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review (E) holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis
Output: (B)
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers.”); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination “protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness”); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no selfincrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege (B) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (C) holding that there is no unitary business in part because there is no flow of international business (D) holding that district court has no jurisdiction to take further action where there was no remand order (E) holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required
Output: (A)
to dedicate all of their disposable income to their plan. The Trustee’s supplemental objection raised, for the first time, whether Section 1325(a)(5) bars a debtor from confirming a plan that strips off a wholly unsecured lien where the debtor has received a discharge in a prior bankruptcy case within the proscribed period set forth in Section 1328(f). Although TD Bank had previously argued that the Debtors’ ability to strip off its lien was contingent upon the entry of a discharge order, TD Bank did not rely on Section 1325(a)(5). IV. Discussion A. Jurisdiction and Venue The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and discharge in a bankruptcy case filed within four years of filing an earlier Chapter 7 petition 253 F.3d 778, 781-83 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, there is no prohibition against lien 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien can be avoided under nobelman (B) holding that a socalled chapter 20 debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien (C) holding that an allowed wholly unsecured consensual junior lien may not be stripped off in a chapter 7 case (D) holding that a wholly unsecured junior mortgage on chapter 13 debtors residence could not be stripped down into an unsecured claim by debtors plan (E) holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge
Output: (C)
right to additional BLM permits or approvals. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1971); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.1984). They hold no more than an expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 451, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C.Cir.1977). Their absence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the preliminary injunction. Compare Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). C. Exhaustion Mountain States asserts that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (B) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated (E) holding that contract with construction company rendered inequitable a preliminary injunction restraining the contractors from performing the contractual obligations
Output: (E)
court’s conclusion that the Jarvisons had a traditional ceremonial marriage under the Navajo Code. Moreover, because the Jarvi-sons had not completed the procedure under Navajo law to validate a traditional or common law marriage, the government argues that their marriage was invalid. In evaluating the government’s contentions, we observe that the district court could have produced a more robust order detailing its findings of fact and evidentia-ry basis similar to the detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 679 (D.N.M.2003). Nonetheless, on our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence in the record is sufficient to establish a valid marriage between the Jarvisons. See United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Esther testified to having 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law (B) holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required (C) holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely (D) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (E) holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact
Output: (A)
“[a] member of a limited liability company ... does not have an interest in any specific property of the company.” Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 101.106(b) (Vernon 2012). If further provides, “[ejxcept as and to the extent the company agreement specifically provides otherwise, a member or manager is not liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of a limited liability company, including a debt, obligation, or liability under ajudg ment, decree, or order of a court.” Id. § 101.114 (Vernon 2012). Thus, absent a showing that the LLC agreement provides otherwise (which has not been made here), no liability for the underlying judgment is imposed on BJVSD by virtue of its role as a member of Triton 2000. Furthermore, the relationship between BJVSD and the judg pp.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>) (citing Redman v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing spoliation as an independent cause of action for negligence where a party is unable to prove its case due to the loss or destruction of key evidence (B) recognizing that when the corporations management or its shareholders are deadlocked with respect to a particular issue courts have realigned such corporations as party plaintiffs (C) holding that a corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders even where the corporation has but one shareholder the general proposition of corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude in accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions that the attorneys client is the corporation and not the shareholders (D) holding under pennsylvania law that where fraud mismanagement or other wrong damages a corporations assets a shareholder does not have a direct cause of action however a corporation can suffer an injury unto itself and any claim it asserts to recover for that injury is independent and separate from the claims of shareholders creditors and others (E) holding that cause of action for injury to corporations property or for impairment or destruction of its business is vested in corporation as distinguished from its shareholders
Output: (E)
of a firearm, in the absence of any aggravating circumstances charged in the indictment, does not constitute a per se ‘crime of violence’ .... ” Johnson, 953 F.2d at 115. The court reasoned that “[t]he danger inherent in the mere possession of a firearm is, in many cases, too highly attenuated to qualify the offense as a per se ‘crime of violence.’ ” Id. “While a felon in possession of a firearm may pose a statistical danger to society,” the offense in and of itself cannot be categorically considered a crime of violence. Id. While I recognize that, strictly speaking, the holding of Johnson applies only in the context of the Sentencing Guidelines, I can discern no basis to decline to apply its reasoning here. But cf. Fonner v. Thompson, 955 F.Supp. 638, 640-641 (N.D.W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>). This is especially true in light of the very 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo (B) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (C) holding that bop interpretation of  922g1 as a crime of violence is permissible construction of  3621e2b and limiting the holding of johnson to the interpretation of sentencing guidelines (D) holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation (E) holding that in reviewing a claim construction decided under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
Output: (C)
claims. Case Nos. 75958 and 75961 represent appeals by the plaintiffs from the latter ruling, while Case Nos. 75959, 75960, 75962, and 75963 represent separate cross-appeals by the defendants from the former rul ing. Held: 1. The validity of a renewal action filed pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) is contingent upon compliance with OCGA § 9-11-41 (d), which provides as follows: “Cost of previously dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the plaintiff shall first pay the court costs of the action previously dismissed.” (Textual emphasis supplied.) See Little v. Walker, 250 Ga. 854 (301 SE2d 639) (1983). See also Tucker v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. 545 (314 SE2d 896) (1984) (<HOLDING>). In reliance on such recent decisions as Hiley 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that laches is an affirmative defense (B) holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived (C) holding that fair use is an affirmative defense (D) holding that payment of costs in a dismissed action is not an affirmative defense but a jurisdictional matter which may never be waived (E) holding that exhaustion requirement in bj997ea is an affirmative defense that may be waived or forfeited
Output: (D)
system created or recognized by the law of the State, which either directly or by delegated authority assigns to the incumbent thereof the continuous performance of certain permanent public duties. *** An employment differs from both an office and a position in that its duties, which are non-governmental, are neither certain nor permanent.” People v. Coffin (1918), 282 Ill. 599, 606-07. Although the designation of one by the law as an officer is of some significance (67 C.J.S. Officers § 8 (1978)), we recognize that such a designation is not conclusive as to the official or unofficial character of the person. Further, the nomenclature in a statute designating a person holding a position as an officer or employee is not controlling. (See Hall v. County of Cook (1935), 359 111. 528 (<HOLDING>).) We, therefore, consider whether the sheriff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notwithstanding language of statute authorizing appointment of a county architect by the board of commissioners of cook county such appointee is not an officer where he has no stated salary but is employed on a commission basis and where his work is generally casual and not continuous even though he is frequently referred to in the records of the county board as an officer (B) holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited (C) holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county (D) holding before the apa definition of person was amended to include county that the board of county commission ers of dolores county could not sue the state agency that had ordered reappraisals of real property in dolores county in connection with valuation for ad valorem taxation because the board of county commissioners was not a person under the apa and did not otherwise have authority to sue under statute or constitution (E) holding that the lehigh county sheriff is a county officer rather than a state officer
Output: (A)
all cases involving the conclusiveness of a judgment. It may be said that such privity involves a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. See 30 Am.Jur. 954, Judgments § 227. In Indiana a privity is one who after rendition of the judgment has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment. T.R. v. A.W., 470 N.E.2d 95 (Ind.App.1984). 4 . The Trustee’s action arises under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and his power as a hypothetical lien creditor and the representative of the estate. If the prior litigation has been brought in Federal Court, the Federal rule of res judicata would apply. See In the Matter of Energy Cooperative, Inc., 814 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir.1987). Compare Thibodeau v. Foremost Ins. Co., 605 F.Supp. 653 (N.D.Ind.1985) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that state law controls applicability of res judicata or collateral estoppel in nondiversity action where prior judgment involved issues of state law (B) holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes (C) holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law (D) holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award (E) holding that federal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine preclusive effect of prior federal ftca judgments even though liability is based on state law
Output: (A)
F.Supp. 1424, 1426 & 1427 n. 3 (S.D.Fla.1993). The district court correctly determined that “the statute of limitations was tolled on Rothmeier’s whistleblower claim while the age discrimination claim was pending in federal court.” B. Prima facie case. Rothmeier failed to establish the first element of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because the record contains no evidence that he engaged in statutorily protected conduct. See Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 444. Whether a plaintiff made a report in “good faith” is a question of fact. McDonald v. Stonebraker, 255 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Minn.1977). Nevertheless, this court may determine as a matter of law that certain conduct does not constitute a “report.” See Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn.App.1991) (<HOLDING>), ajfd, 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn.1992). Rothmeier 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (B) holding that an appellant waived a claim where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his appellate brief (C) holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities (D) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension (E) holding that appellant failed to state a claim of retaliatory discharge where the record showed he merely gave his supervisor feedback and did not report alleged violations to any outside authority
Output: (E)