niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the interests of their future unascertained clients. It would be a short step from the majority’s grant of third-party standing in this case to a holding that lawyers generally have standing to bring in court the claims of future unas-certained clients. In many circumstances a lawyer could demonstrate Article III injury in fact with regard to such claims. For instance, a workers compensation attorney could show that the attorney’s livelihood will be adversely affected by the implementation of a new regulation curtailing workers compensation benefits. An attorney who specializes in medical malpractice plaintiffs’ cases could show that the attorney’s livelihood will be adversely affected by a tort reform statute. An attorney who specializes in Social Security cases could th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). III. The Three Part Test Used in Exceptional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that attorney who knowingly assisted enterprise in execution of fraudulent scheme by providing legal services and advice could not be held liable under  1962c because his role was at all times limited to the provision of legal services and did not extend to operation or management of enterprise (C) holding that negligence on the part of a legal secretary is imputed to the supervising attorney and the statute of limitations for professional services applies to both (D) recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case (E) holding that attorney who simply provided legal services to corporation did not participate in operation or management of enterprise regardless of whether he performed those services well or poorly properly or improperly
Output: (A)
Theft. Defense: Excuse me. I’ll object to that. That’s outside the record. The trial court sustained the objection and further instructed the jury to disregard. In general, to constitute proper argument, counsel’s closing arguments must fall •within the areas of: (1) a summation of the evidence; (2) a reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) an answer to an argument from opposing counsel, or (4) a plea for law enforcement. See Melton v. State, 713 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Here, because the prosecutor’s argument is not reasonably related to one of the enumerated areas, it was improper. Therefore, the trial court correctly sustained appellant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard. See Faulkner v. State, 940 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Mistrials should be granted only when an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard (B) holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction (C) holding that the prejudicial effect of a direct reference to an accuseds failure to testify normally cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard (D) holding that any misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction (E) holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire
Output: (A)
stake.” Lawrence, 357 Mich. at 137-38, 97 N.W.2d at 721. Similarly, the Bacon court, in emphasizing the public policy grounding for the privilege, recognized that the privilege does not exist for the personal benefit of the defendant, but serves to abrogate the rights of the plaintiff only where silence could lead to public harm. Inherent in the balancing of private and public interests is the idea that the alleged defamatory communications be made with the intent of advancing the public interest. Courts have used the term “good faith” to describe the statement-maker’s proper motive. Because the privilege rests on a foundation of public policy, only communications made in good faith, with the legitimate purpose of advancing that policy, are properly entitled to d 83, 85 (6th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). And in Mid-America Food Service, Inc. v. ARA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion (B) holding in a case where a store manager announced to disgruntled employees that the plaintiff a coworker was fired for gambling that in calling in fellow employees of plaintiff and explaining the circumstances of his separation defendant corporation was serving its own particular interest no privilege extended to the communication to them and the trial court properly so held (C) holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement (D) holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case (E) holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees
Output: (B)
were all based on these claims and are now mooted. 53 . Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass'n, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 671 (Alaska 2002). 54 . Thompson's Estate v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 514 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Alaska 1973). 55 . 3 Jamrs Wa Moore, Feperat Practice § 15.14[1] (3d ed.2003). 56 . 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 LEd.2d 222 (1962). 57 . Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1987) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227). 58 . Thompson's Estate, 514 P.2d at 1271. 59 . Betz, 742 P.2d at 1348. 60 . Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 261 Cal.Rptr. 857, 859-60 (1989) (citing Higgins v. Del Faro, 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 176 Cal.Rptr. 704 (1981)); see also Smith v. Costa Lines, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 451, 453 (N.D.Cal.1983) (<HOLDING>); Karn v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife (B) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (C) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay (D) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) holding that it may be held an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave unless there is a demonstrable showing of prejudice to an opposing party
Output: (E)
is] obligated by virtue of a written contract to provide insurance such as is afforded by this policy." According to Deminsky, Federated was thus also Arlington's insurer, and Federated became bound on the Deminsky-Arlington judgment after failing to defend Arlington, given the duties of an insurer under Radke. We conclude, however, that the indemnity provision in the Image-Arlington sales order was not a "contract to provide insurance." The only mention of "insurance" in the Image-Arlington sales order is a provision which required Image to obtain and show proof of its own insurance coverage prior to loading, transporting or otherwise handling the grinding machine on Arlington's premises. See Campion v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 172 Wis. 2d 405, 415-16, 493 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1992) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION ¶ 46. For the reasons discussed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaving the scene and failing to render assistance are separate and distinct offenses (B) holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium is separate and distinct from spouses malpractice claim for purposes of applying insurance policy limitations (C) recognizing that an indemnity provision and an agreement to provide insurance are separate and distinct obligations (D) holding that absent specific language to the contrary benefit funds are separate from union signatories to cbas and that employers obligations to funds are separate from obligations to unions under cbas (E) holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision
Output: (C)
failing to preserve this meritorious issue. He argues that appellate counsel had no reasonable strategy for failing to pursue the issue on direct appeal, and that, had counsel done so, there is a reasonable probability that this Court would have granted him a new trial. The PCRA court rejected this claim, finding that because trial counsel thoroughly investigated Elliott’s prior bad acts, a continuance was not necessary. The Commo t fails to suggest what purported impeachment evidence trial counsel would have discovered had he been afforded additional time to investigate the prior bad act witnesses. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the continuance. See Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305, 1316-17 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial counsel did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance where appellant failed to specify the evidence which might have been revealed if the continuance had been granted and counsel had been afforded the opportunity to investigate further (B) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (C) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant to withdraw his waiver of jury trial where a lengthy continuance already had been granted (D) holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form
Output: (A)
is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m). 2 . See id. 3 . Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir.2001). 4 . See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (reviewing the district court's findings of fact for clear error). 5 . The district court properly excluded as hearsay USF’s evidence of the April 2003 tests purportedly showing that Hughes could not access USF’s software programs from home. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), 802. 6 . See Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136. 7 . Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m). 8 . Id. at § 12940(n). 9 . Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089. 10 . See Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (B) holding that an employer may not merely speculate that the employees suggested accommodation is not feasible but must gather sufficient information  from qualified experts  to determine the accommodations effectiveness (C) holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations (D) holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation (E) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada
Output: (B)
agreed with at least one other person to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and that the defendant and such other person or persons intended at the time the agreement was made that it would be carried out, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. Defense counsel points out that the jury instructions do not specifically name Jimon Dollard as the person with whom defendant conspired; rather, the trial court instructed that the jury could find defendant guilty of the conspiracy offense if it determined that defendant had conspired “with at least one other person to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon . . . .” Defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s instruction. Accordingly, we review the instruction for plain error. “In deciding whether .E.2d 146, 148 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 335 N.C. 241, 439 S.E.2d 158 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty (B) holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy if the jury found the defendant agreed with at least one other person where the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with a single named individual and the evidence tended to show the defendant may have conspired with a number of persons not just the named coconspirator to commit an unlawful act (E) holding the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may find the defendant guilty if the jury found the defendant had conspired with the two coconspirators named in the indictment or both of them or others where evidence tended to show a conspiracy between the defendant and some person other than the named coconspirators
Output: (D)
Trust v. Granite City Storage Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 272, 517 N.E.2d 502 (1988), a Massachusetts state court stopped short of adopting the federal district court’s holding but ruled that “the covenant to pay rent [in a commercial setting] is not necessarily independent.” Id. 517 N.E.2d at 505. It concluded that "there is' great doubt whether ... [the doctrine that covenants are independent] remains a correct statement of Massachusetts law,” because leases are for more than just the land. Id. 4 . The Teodori court concluded that the doctrine of independent covenants rests on outdated property principles rather than on contract principles, which better capture the relationship of parties in many modem leases. Id. (relying upon McDanel v. Mack Realty Co., 315 Pa. 174, 172 A. 97, 98 (1934) (<HOLDING>)). 5 . It should be noted that Kimball was the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that a commercial lessee could retain possession and abate rent in response to a landlords material breach of covenant (D) holding that in the employment context cause of action seeking tort remedies for breach of implied covenant is not permitted recovery for breach of this covenant is limited to contract remedies (E) holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant
Output: (C)
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1051, 115 S.Ct. 654, 130 L.Ed.2d 558 (1994); see United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1069, 114 S.Ct. 1644, 128 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994); see also United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir.1993) (construing warrant and supporting affidavit “fairly” and in “ ‘commonsense’ ” manner) (citation omitted). Courts also recognize that the “conditions governing an anticipatory warrant [should be] ‘explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn’ ” to preserve the magistrate judge’s role in determining probable cause. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12 (quoting Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04); see Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965. The conditions in this case were stated in the affidavit supporting the warrant. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087 (<HOLDING>). I therefore look at the context in which the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (B) holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit (C) holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid (D) holding valid conditions for execution of the warrant which are constitutionally satisfactory stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant and accepted by the issuing magistrate (E) holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant
Output: (D)
States v. Comparato, 850 F.Supp. 153, 159 (E.D.N.Y.1993), quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 2137, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) (“once it has been determined that state law has created property interests sufficient for federal tax lien[s] to attach, state law ‘is inoperative to prevent the attachment’ of such liens”). The Second Circuit noted that “federal law controlled whether [the taxpayers’] interests were exempt from levy by the United States.” Id., 22 F.3d at 458, citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 2137, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). Because the Second Circuit holding in Comparato governs this case, Mrs. Adler’s renunciation is invalid as against the federal tax lien. But see, Mapes v. United States, 15 F.3d 138 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, any settlement proceeds to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding that a renunciation pursuant to arizonas probate code does determine whether a person has any interest in property for federal tax purposes (C) holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit (D) holding that pursuant to maryland law the government maintains an everpresent interest in property owners land for tax purposes (E) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety
Output: (B)
standard. Fed. R. Crv. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”). Thus, Toombs extended the Rule 9(b) exception to cases with no fraud allegations. Importantly, Toombs provided no reason whatsoever for extending Rule 9(b), and the Court cannot determine that the Ninth Circuit even considered its holding’s impact on notice pleading. The Court must reject those cases which require plaintiffs to plead facts showing compliance with the statute of limitations in every suit brought pursuant to § 111. Rule 8(a) does not require plaintiffs to plead every element that they must ultimately prove simply because plaintiffs carry the burden of proof. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims (B) holding that a pleading may give proper fair notice even where only the title of the theory is pled (C) holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii (D) holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate (E) holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading
Output: (B)
threat, as long as one does so with a corrupt purpose. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir.1998) (sustaining a conviction under § 1512(b) where an employer told an employee not to talk to investigators so that she would not be bothered, finding that a jury could reasonably have inferred that the employer was attempting with improper motive to persuade the employee not to talk to investigators); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.1998) (sustaining defendant’s conviction of witness tampering based on evidence showing defendant had substantial influence over witness because he was her landlord and her employer, and had paid for an attorney to help her prepare her testimony); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life (B) holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury (C) recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent (D) holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose (E) holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury
Output: (E)
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Kiser, 765 F.3d at 607 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). These three elements have been called the “irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing, and the plaintiff, as party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing all three elements. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). While a plaintiff might have standing to seek damages or redress for past injuries, that plaintiff must demonstrate separate standing when seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Barber v. Miller, 809 F.3d 840, 849 (6th Cir. 2015); see Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (<HOLDING>). For pre-enforcement challenges, the standing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15 (D) holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought (E) holding that the court must balance these factors against one another and against the extent of the relief sought and movant bears the burden of proving entitlement to relief
Output: (D)
pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for “anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,” because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for “wil-fully taking away her husband” and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability). But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute (B) holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses (C) recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
Output: (B)
violation is one of federal law, a different result obtains. In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that UCL claims may be based on federal statutes, unless the federal statute completely preempts the action. See Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1042. Defendant does not contend that plaintiffs UCL claim is preempted. Moreover, it has not tendered any evidence that by its amendment of 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c), Congress intended to bar pri vate enforcement for failure to provide a GFE under 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(b)(1). Because Wells Fargo has failed to tender any evidence that it ensured that a GFE was provided to plaintiff, its conduct violated RESPA, which constituted an unlawful business practice under the UCL. See McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471-1472, 49 Cal. Rptr.3d 227 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs motion is therefore granted on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a loan transaction is a business practice under the ucl (B) holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan (C) holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice (D) holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan (E) holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured
Output: (A)
function of determining the validity of a claim from the function of fixing the claim’s monetary value. See In re Devitt, 126 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr.D.Md.1991). Section 502 therefore required the bankruptcy court to “determine[ ] the validity of the claim[s] and the amount allowed.” Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp,, 843 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir.1988). It was then but a short and logical step for the bankruptcy court to enter a money judgment against Porges, on the basis of its section 502 determination, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and Bankruptcy Rule 9021. Rule 58 directs the clerk of the court to enter judgment in favor of a prevai 8 L.Ed.2d 939 (1990); see generally United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1564-65, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The entry of a money judgment also finds 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the time to file an appeal never began to run because the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required by rule 58 (B) holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late (C) holding that in order to prevent uncertainty rule 58 must be mechanically applied (D) holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner (E) holding rule 58 and bankruptcy rule 9021 applied in decision denying proofs of claim following adversary proceeding
Output: (C)
wills. R. at 150. The affidavits from Messrs. Almazan and Pacquing, alleging that Carlos Pacquing died during World War II and thus could not have placed the veteran with the BC, are likewise not material given that the veteran admitted under oath to having served in the BC. R. at 110. See Blackburn, Villaruz, and Cox, all supra. The other evidence added to the record is similarly not new and material. The .service records submitted address the veteran’s dates of active and inactive duty with the Navy; most are duplicates of documents already of record, and are not material because they do not shed light on his activities with the BC between 1942 and 1944. Compare R. at 15, 17, 19, 28, 41, 44-45, 47 with R. at 160-61, 185, 195, 201, 203; see Rightly v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 200, 205 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Colvin, supra. The appellant asserts that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (B) holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal (C) holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative (D) holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence (E) holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new
Output: (E)
vehicle cases under the [Policitical Subdivisions Tort Claim] Act has been the involvement of the motor vehicles as motor vehicles in accidents. In no cited case has a waiver to immunity been found where the plaintiff has alleged the sole involvement of the governmental motor vehicle lay in carrying a passenger to an area for discharge that the governmental agency knew or should have known was unsafe. The Complaint alleges the bus driver did nothing wrong other than allowing [appellant] to leave the bus in a certain place. The Comp ne whether Paula Jo Lehman continued to be an “occupant” of the bus after she had alighted from the bus and was crossing the street behind the bus to get to her school. See Walker v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 323 Pa.Super. 427, 470 A.2d 993 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that she was no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding port authority required to provide basic loss benefits under section 204a4 of nofault act regardless of whether passenger continued to be occupant as bus was involved in an accident when passenger struck by passing vehicle after alighting from bus (B) holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle (C) holding that ttcas motorvehicle waiver did not apply to claim whose gravamen was that bus drivers failure to supervise the public  by for example failing to supervise tortfeasor passenger and failing to return to pick up victim passenger  allowed tortfeasor who had threatened victim on bus to assault victim after both had exited (D) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (E) holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit
Output: (A)
to Guatemala to hold meetings with job applicants. Defendants also do not dispute that Eller has the authority to fire any individual employed by Eller and Sons Trees, although he normally delegates this duty to others. It is further e and hour matters at Eller and Sons Trees. In this regard, it is undisputed that Eller set up the pay structure for tree planters at Eller and Sons Trees. Eller has attended AWPA and FLSA compliance seminars on behalf of Eller and Sons Trees and has been the officer in charge of certifying the company’s compliance with the provisions of those laws. Such facts have been considered significant by other courts in examining the issue of employer status. See Stout v. Smolar, Civil Action No. 1:05-CV- 1202-JOF, 2007 WL 2765519, at *5 (N.D.Ga. Sept.18, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Donohue v. Francis Servs., No. Civ.A. 04-170, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime (B) holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements (C) holding individual defendant liable where he among other things made inquiries into the business obligations under the flsa (D) holding it error to admit testimony where among other things there was no evidence that defendants appearance had changed since the time of the robbery (E) holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract
Output: (C)
their motion for summary judgment. We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir.1995). Ortiz v. Jordan, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 884, 889, 178 L.Ed.2d 703 (2011), precludes our consideration of most of the issues defendants raise with respect to their motions for summary judgment and to dismiss. But because Ortiz leaves open the possibility that cases “involving] ... [only] disputes about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law” may still be considered, Id. at 892, we briefly consider two legal arguments for summary judgment on the state law claims. See also Owatonna Clinic-Mayo Health Sys. v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 639 F.3d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits (B) recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue (C) holding the denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue which is later submitted to the jury is not reviewable (D) holding that we will not review under any standard the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits (E) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity
Output: (B)
on direct appeal when the district court did not entertain the claim or develop a factual record. United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.2002). “If the record is sufficiently developed, however, [we] wdl consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.” Id. We review such a claim de novo. Id. We wdl not consider Wdliams’s first claim on direct appeal. However, given our earlier holding that there was no constructive amendment of the indictment where the district court instructed the jury to determine whether and to what extent Williams possessed with intent to distribute crystal methamphetamine, we reject Wdliams’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for fading to object on this ground. See Lucas v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 373, 375 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing, Wdliams’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction (B) holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed (C) holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury (D) holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected (E) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
Output: (A)
constitute neither a gift of public money nor property nor a loan of state credit. In reaching these conclusions, the court noted that, "[t]he State parts with nothing in allowing its tax exempt status to be used ..." and that, "[n]o money comes from the public treasury." Higher Educ. Facilities Auth., 103 Wn.2d at 844, 848. Although the court also mentioned other factors, the absence of any actual public expenditure was clearly an important consideration. Therefore, unless the State must actually return money to the affected Taxpayers, this reasoning implies that a retroactive tax repeal will not contravene Const, art. 8, §§ 5 or 7; see also Marysville v. State, 101 Wn.2d 50, 52-53, 676 P.2d 989 (1984); State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wn.2d 491, 494-95, 671 P.2d 247 (1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn.2d 255, 267, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judgments for prospective relief that have an ancillary effect on the state treasury do not offend the eleventh amendment (B) holding that the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case (C) holding that the inquiry under these sections focusefs primarily on the risk that the state program poses to the public treasury    (D) holding that doc is entitled to sovereign immunity under  14 because a judgment against it would be paid from the treasury of the state (E) holding that an alien must be released unless the government demonstrates at a bond hearing that the alien poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the community
Output: (C)
to do so caused Appellant egregious harm. (2) Overly Broad Definition of Reckless Because' the applicable mental state of a result-oriented offense relates to the “result of the conduct” rather than the “nature of the conduct,” a charge containing the full statutory definition of the applicable mens rea is erroneous. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 491; Anaya, 381 S.W.3d at 664. Here, Appellant contends felony-murder is a “result-oriented offense,” and therefore, the full statutory definition of “reckless” given by the trial court was inapplicable. Citing Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)- (finding a “trial court errs when it fails to limit the language in regard to the applicable culpable mental states to the appropriate conduct element”) and Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 491 (<HOLDING>), she concludes the trial'court erred by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense (B) holding that trial court was not required to include all statutory definitions in its instructions but rather should refer only to those definitions having a rational basis in the evidence adduced at trial and not otherwise excludable (C) holding that trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise the issue of the defendants mental health at trial (D) holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence   of his conduct (E) holding that statutory appeal bonds relate to the jurisdiction of the court
Output: (A)
or older “determined by the court to be in need of partial or full supervision, protection and assistance by reason of mental illness, physical illness or injury, developmental disability or other mental or physical incapacity.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 34-1-101(7). Persons do not attain the office of conservator by contract or family relationship. They are appointed to act in the best interests of the disabled adult person for whom they are partially or fully responsible in the discretion of the court. Although there is a statutory order of priority of persons the court is to consider when selecting a conservator, the order of priority is subject to the court’s determination of “what is in the best interests of the disabled person.” See In re Rockwell, 673 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). A conservator occupies a fiduciary position 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding the selection of the person to be appointed guardian is a matter which is committed largely to the discretion of the appointing court and an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of this discretion only in case of a clear abuse (C) holding that questions concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and this court will not interfere in the absence of abuse appearing on the face of the record (D) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (E) holding that the faas action in this case was  analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion  and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law
Output: (B)
to the Knoedlers’ claims. In fact, despite a review of the record, this Court is unable to find any further reference to the Blinco counterclaim subsequent to the Knoedlers’ answer. The trial court’s summary-judgment orders left pending the Blincos’ counterclaim, and there is no Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification that the judgments are final. Consequently, the summary-judgment orders are nonfinal judgments, which will not support an appeal. See Bon Harbor, LLC v. United Bank, supra (dismissing appeal on grounds that trial court’s summary-judgment order, which left pending defendants’ counterclaims, was, at best, an order entering a partial summary judgment and not a “final, ap-pealable judgment”); Hill v. Huntsville West Ltd. Partnership, 847 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). APPEAL DISMISSED. COBB, C.J., and WOODALL, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment (E) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
Output: (C)
id. We hold that Graves fails to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . T.N. testified that they bought the camera "around October of 2000,” but he was not sure of the exact day. During an earlier videotaped interview, however, he could not remember the month or year. 2 . The Jensen court held that the error was harmless because the child’s live testimony did not differ substantially from the facts revealed in the videotape. Jensen v. State, 66 S.W.3d at 535-36 (noting the well-established rule that "the improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible error if other properly admitted evidence proves the same facts”); see also Matz v. State, 21 S.W.3d 911, 912-13 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Dowthitt was a capital murder case, not a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if cumulative (B) holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless (C) holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record (D) holding that error in admission of videotape was harmless because it was cumulative of childs properly admitted live testimony (E) holding that when evidence was erroneously admitted such error was harmless when the evidence was insignificant and cumulative
Output: (D)
underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant’s nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted. Id. (citation omitted). Upon a review of these factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The first factor weighs against Taylor. Six months elapsed between the entry of his guilty plea and his motion to withdraw. As the district court noted, the Sixth Circuit has affirmed denials of motions to withdraw in cases involving delays far shorter than the delay in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 912-13 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durham, 178 F.3d 796, 798-99 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a 75day delay justified the denial of a motion to withdraw (B) holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights (C) holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay (D) recognizing the late date of a motion to withdraw filed three weeks before trial (E) holding that the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal when the granting of an attorneys motion to withdraw had left the petitioner entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal
Output: (A)