niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature”). Consequently, if the value of forfeited property is within the range of fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is constitutional. The second body that has proportioned crimes to fines is the United States Sentencing Commission. The Commission is a judicial agency that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1994), is authorized to promulgate guidelines for use by federal courts in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. Those guidelines are the product of extensive research, thought, input from commentators, and experience. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch.l, Pt.A (Nov. 1, 1990). They are designed to proportion punishmen 2038 & n. 14 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Howerin was convicted on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 65000 was not excessive where the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 40000 (B) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines (C) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 150000 was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 20000 (D) holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine (E) holding that forfeiture of 357144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 250000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 5000
Output: (E)
regarding the administrative appeal available in 1990 do not amount to a “clear and positive showing of futility,” nor has Plaintiff established to a certainty that her claim would have been denied on appeal. Under the benefit Plan at issue in this case, it is clear that Plaintiff would not be entitled to additional benefits for mental illness. It is not certain, however, that an appeal would have been denied had Plaintiff presented the evidence that she in fact had previously been diagnosed as having MS and continued to seek medical evaluation for a possible physical disability, which she apparently did, and which ultimately led to the rediagnosis of MS. The record establishes that Plaintiff was diagnosed prior to April 12, 1989, as having MS and that she d 869, 874-75 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bomis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 970 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract (B) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations (C) holding that insurance plans thirtynine 39 month contractual limitations period shorter than statute of limitations was reasonable and thus enforceable (D) holding that a reasonable contractedfor limitations period that is not contrary to public policy is generally enforceable (E) holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable
Output: (C)
event of an accident. The Montreal Convention is “an entirely new treaty that unifies and replaces the system of liability which derives from the Warsaw Convention.” Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n. 4 (2d Cir.2004). The Montreal Convention “applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward.” Montreal Convention, art. 1(1), and preempts all federal or state-law claims falling within its scope. Montreal Convention, art. 29 (“In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convent p.2d 361, 369 (S.D.NY.2006) (<HOLDING>); but see Bloom v. Alaska Airlines, 36 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs breach of contract claims fell outside the scope of the montreal convention because the plain language of article 19 of the montreal convention indicates that it governs claims for delay not nonperformance (B) holding the state law claims were not preempted (C) holding plaintiffs claims were not preempted by the montreal convention because they were grounded in a cause of action for nonperformance of a contract and not delay (D) holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan (E) holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention
Output: (C)
to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial court committed reversible error. Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 695, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008). The question of whether a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment is “a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo” on appeal. Id. at 694, 668 S.E.2d at 145. An appellate court independently reviews the trial court’s application of relevant legal principles such as whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause supported a seizure. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 95, 712 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2011) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). In doing so, however, the Court is “bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless those finding (<HOLDING>). Detective Fraser, a trained law enforcement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if an officer has an ulterior motive that does not authorize him to conduct a traffic stop of a particular vehicle he may still lawfully execute the stop if he observes the driver violate a traffic law (B) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation (C) holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring (D) holding that if an officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation he has probable causeand thus also the lesser included reasonable suspicionto stop that driver (E) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver
Output: (D)
visibly impaired, third offense. On September 27, 2011 (four days after trial), the prosecution filed a second amended felony information to increase defendant’s habitual-offender level back to fourth-offense status. Defendant did not object to this amendment, and on December 5, 2011, the trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender. II. ANALYSIS Defendant’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a fourth-offense habitual offender. Defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court; therefore, our review is for plain error. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To avoid issue forfeiture under the plain-error rule, defendant must prove the following: ( 69-470; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 (1997) (<HOLDING>). MCL 769.13 governs the procedure for seeking 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings (B) holding that the closure of a courtroom during jury selection a structural error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings (C) holding that even if a defendant is able to show that there was a plain error that affected his substantial rights a court of appeals is not required to reverse a conviction unless it finds that the error seriously affected the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings (D) holding that plain error will be identified only if 1 there is error 2 that is clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously impugns fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings (E) holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights
Output: (E)
jokingly stated he had heroin at home but not in his vehicle. Before requesting consent, the officer stated Vargas-Miranda that their conversation was consensual. Vargas-Miranda responded, “Go ahead,” but nonetheless pointed out that the officer had “no right” to conduct the search. Deputy Sheriff Brown repeated that their communications were consensual, and stated that he was “just asking” for consent to search the vehicle. The exchange occurred in a public place. Deputy Sh onsent by stating the officer had no right to search the vehicle, this statement cannot be construed as an “unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal,” especially considering the Vargas-Miranda thereafter watched the search and raised no objection. U.S. v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). Lopez-Mendoza argues that even if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent (B) holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent (C) holding that a search exceeded the scope of the initial oral consent and was not validated by a subsequent written consent an allegedly consensual seizure must stand or fall on the basis of the consent preexisting the seizure (D) holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent (E) holding defendants act of watching in silence as the officers examined his truck on a hoist lowered it and prepared to puncture the sheet metal that covered the secret compartment defeated any claim that he withdrew his consent or believed the search exceeded the scope of his consent
Output: (E)
party to file a protest with the contracting agency or to file an action in a district court of the United States or the United States Claims Court.” Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). STANDING The plaintiffs legal standing to appeal the GAO’s decision lies in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.. Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review” thereof. The court finds that the plaintiff, as an unsuccessful bidder, has standing to challenge the agency’s decision to award the contract to a third party. See Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). FINDINGS OF FACT The majority of facts are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the losing bidder has standing to challenge the award of a government procurement contract (B) holding that if the government is obligated to rebid the contract and the unsuccessful bidder could compete for the contract once again and therefore has an economic interest and standing to challenge the award (C) holding that without a valid reason for cancelling the procurement  the government violated its duty to conduct a fair procurement (D) holding that the definition of procurement under the tucker act is broader than the definition of procurement contract in the fgcaa such that an agency can engage in a procurement process for the purposes of the tucker act even though it is using a cooperative agreement instead of a procurement contract to memorialize the parties agreement (E) holding that city had implied contract with bidder to treat bidder fairly
Output: (A)
v. Seldin. h. Item 58: Wording in Legend When 20-20 Design produces a floor plan, it prints out a legend. (Davis Aff. 57.) From left to right, this legend contains a note about dimensions, a logo, an intellectual property claim, and the dates on which the plan was designed and printed. The text of the note about dimensions is taken verbatim from the National Kitchen and Bath Association (“NKBA”) legend. (Real View App. 65.) 20-20 cannot therefore assert copyright protection over that part of the legend, despite accidentally omitting one word of the NKBA version. However, the intellectual property note appears to be original to 20-20, and although basic, may be entitled to copyright protection. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). i. Items 59-61: ProKitchen 2.2’s Help menu 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although notice and comment procedures are not required to trigger chevron deference such procedures are significant  in pointing to chevron authority (B) holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless (C) holding california postdeprivation recovery procedures satisfy due process despite lack of notice to claimant of recovery procedures (D) holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law (E) holding numbers short descriptions and long descriptions in taxonomy classifying dental procedures copyrightable
Output: (E)
hearing. The trial court orally granted appellee's motion to file the affidavit of Thomas Easley. This ruling had an impact on the trial court’s decision to grant at least one of appellee’s motions for partial summary judgment, for in its judgment, the trial court specifically stated that it relied on the affidavit of Thomas Easley. 6 . 1 George D. Braden, et al„ The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 406 (George D. Braden, primary author and ed., 1977). 7 . Other courts interpreting the term "proceeding” in the context of other statutes and rules have also concluded that it requires a broad interpretation. See American Maintenance & Rentals, Inc. v. Estrada, 896 S.W.2d 212 218 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, vacated pursuant to settlement) (<HOLDING>); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that phrase other proceeding as used in rule 801e1a of the texas rules of civil evidence denoted steps and events in the process of litigation besides a trial or hearing because of the word other before the word proceeding (B) holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons (C) holding that the word void is not sufficient (D) holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees (E) holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted
Output: (A)
pre-trial release on April 12, 1985. Although this appeal has received expedited review, a decision has not yet been rendered by the Second Circuit. Thus a total of only fifty-six (56) non-excludable days have elapsed since Leon was arrested and detained (assuming that the filing of Elba Rodriguez’s omnibus motion stopped the clock as to all the co-defendants). DISCUSSION Leon’s first argument is based upon the interpretation of Section 3164(b) itself, which provides that, “[t]he periods of delay enumerated in Section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section.” Leon argues that this sent C.Cir.1976) and United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd. on other grounds, sub nom., United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). According to the House Report accompanying 
 Holding statements: (A) holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases (B) holding that a court examining if a law should be applied retroactively should consider whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment (C) holding that the first amendment definition should be applied by analogy in the franks setting (D) holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk (E) holding that the exclusions should be applied
Output: (E)
Third, the Kimmell court did not actually address whether future projections were actionable, but merely assumed that they were based on the procedural posture of the case and the issues addressed on appeal. Id. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that, “although the Appellate Division in Kimmell [implicitly] found that future prediction/projeetions could qualify as the basis for a negligent misrepresentation claim ..., that finding is contrary to the great weight of authority.” Id. The Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s analysis. The inquiry does not depend on whether the omission itself relates to a past or present fact. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the failure to disclose renders an existing statement of fact false or misleading. Cf. Metropolitan, 532 F.Supp.2d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). If this were not the case, almost any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that an omission claim could not be maintained where plaintiff did not point to previous statements that were misleading without further disclosures (C) holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that a cause of action based on an omission requires the plaintiff to show how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made
Output: (E)
148 (D.D.C.2010) (rejecting “the plaintiffs’ arguments that defendant’s failure to produce any documents until after litigation commenced is evidence of bad faith or an inadequate search”). The court notes that approximately ten months elapsed between when the plaintiff claims to have submitted his amended request to the CIA in March 2008, and when this court ordere rovided sufficient details and facts to support that its search was reasonable under the amended request. See generally Classified Dimaio Deck; see also Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890 (requiring that an agency’s affidavit set forth sufficient information for the court to determine whether a search is reasonable (citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68)); cf. Morley v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 508 F.3d 1108, 1122 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court concludes that the CIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise (B) holding that the sanction the agency imposed was not rationally arrived at on this record and was wholly disproportionate to the error petitioner committed where inter alia the agency did not explain why it had not taken the same position  in similar circumstances in the past (C) holding that an agency declaration was insufficient because it provided only a general explanation of how the agency responds to all foia requests and did not  identify  the terms searched or explain  how the search was conducted  quoting oglesby 920 f2d at 68 (D) holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing (E) holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding
Output: (C)
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 6 . The Supreme Court of Connecticut has already rejected the ¡ex loci delicti rule in workers’ compensation actions in favor of “interest analysis” and the Restatement (Second) “most significant relationship” approach. See Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 29-33, 437 A.2d 828, 831-32 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 181 (1971). 7 . See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-555 (1977) (measure of wrongful death recovery equal to value of decedent’s life and expenses); Marko v. Stop and Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 553, 364 A.2d 217, 219 (1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Halstead II, supra, 535 F.Supp. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (C) recognizing that a violation of the mbta is a strict liability offense (D) recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability (E) recognizing strict product liability actions
Output: (E)
itself.” United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1154, 125 S.Ct. 1293, 161 L.Ed.2d 119 (2005). Wells contends that the evidence does not show that he actually or constructively possessed the Mauser or the Marlin. With respect to the Mauser, Wells argues that his father owned the house and Wells was not aware of any firearms in the house on the day of the decoy deer incident. He also never touched the Mauser that Elsen brought from the house because she placed it in the truck and Reents shot the firearm at the decoy. However, a reasonable jury could find that Wells had dominion and control over the house because Elsen testified that Wells was in charge of it when his father was away. See United States v. Urick, 481 F.3d 300, 303 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Wells also testified that the firearm Elsen 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing theory of constructive possession (B) holding that evidence that the defendant lived in a home where marijuana was being cultivated was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession (C) holding that a defendant had constructive possession over firearms located in a residence where he lived and kept his personal effects (D) holding that proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession citation omitted (E) holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence
Output: (C)
and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reopen so he could apply for asylum based on changed circumstances. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005), and we deny the petition for review. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because the 2004 State Department Country Report he submitted does not demonstrate a material change of circumstances in India with regard to the Indian police’s treatment of suspected terrorists and Sikh separatists. Cf. Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution (B) holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution (C) holding the critical question is  whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a wellfounded fear of future persecution (D) holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable (E) holding that asylum may be denied to an applicant who has otherwise demonstrated a wellfounded fear of future persecution if the evidence shows that internal relocation is a reasonable option in all the circumstances
Output: (C)
and fees, and that the period of time in which appellant was required to make such payments had since expired. Appellant appeals this order of dismissal, as well as the court’s order of September 2 that placed a lien on his inmate trust account. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his mandamus petition because the Clerk’s Certificate enrolling him into a payment plan did not provide him with notice that partial prepayment was required in order for his action to proceed. The Department concedes that this was reversible error by the trial court. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing a lien on appellant’s inmate trust account. We agree. See Jackson v. McDonough, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D2299, - So.2d -, 2006 WL 2527244 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 5, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we (i) reverse the September 2, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a student has a right to counsel in a university disciplinary hearing where there is a pending criminal charge for the same incident but noting that the attorneys role at the disciplinary hearing is limited to safeguarding the students rights at the criminal proceeding and not to affecting the outcome of the disciplinary hearing (B) holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy (C) holding that placing a prisoner in disciplinary confinement clearly effects liberty interest (D) recognizing disciplinary history is an appropriate consideration in imposing sanctions (E) holding that an inmates mandamus petition challenging a disciplinary report imposing 15 days disciplinary confinement was a collateral criminal proceeding because the disciplinary confinement limited petitioners ability to earn gain time
Output: (E)
for ‘non-generic burglary’ does not.” United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir.2010). A “generic” burglary is “any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). A “non-generic” burglary is one that “do[es] not include all of the elements essential to generic burglaries,” including burglaries of boats, automobiles, and other non-buildings. Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1214. The government has a legitimate interest in “prevent[ing] repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” See United States v. Johns, 984 F.2d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court in Taylor determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive due process not violated when licensing decisions are based on scheme rationally related to a governmental interest (B) holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable (C) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest (D) recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history (E) holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest
Output: (E)
to reasonably deduce that criminal activity is afoot. The same is true with regard to the corroboration of an anonymous tip. While the indi-cia used as corroboration needed not be per se criminal, they must still be sufficient to permit one to reasonably deduce that appellant engaged in the misconduct for which he was accused by the tipster. If it does not, then the tip cannot be said to be reliable. Given the record developed below, one cannot reasonably deduce from appellant’s mere use of the driveway of a closed business to turn-around late at night and his failure to then speed away that he had previously drove down the road illegally. Thus, that aspect of the anonymous tip accusing appellant of engaging in misconduct was not sufficiently corroborated, see Stewart v. State, supra (<HOLDING>), and the tip was not shown to be reliable. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court properly suppressed evidence where officer did not possess articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant violated motor vehicle code the officer did not see defendant drive erratically commit a traffic violations or engage in any conduct indicating that he was under the influence of alcohol (B) holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense (C) holding that the state failed to sufficiently corroborate the tip where the officer did not see appellant drive erratically or commit a traffic offense (D) holding that in an arson case there must be other proof that the offense was committed to corroborate a confession by the defendant (E) holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle
Output: (C)
activities so that determining its major purpose requires a very close examination of various activities and statements. Or an organization may be engaging in substantial amounts of both federal and non-federal electoral activity, again requiring a detailed analysis of its various activities. 511 F.Supp.2d at 31. The necessity of a contextual inquiry is supported by judicial decisions applying the major purpose test, which have used the same fact-intensive analysis that the Commission has adopted. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Malenick, 310 F.Supp.2d 230, 234-37 (D.D.C.2004), rev’d in part, No. Civ. A. 02-1237(JR), 2005 WL 588222 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005); Fed. Election Comm’n v. GOPAC, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 851, 859, 864-66 (D.D.C.1996); see also Shays II, 511 F.Supp.2d at 29-31 (<HOLDING>). Real Truth’s argument that the major purpose 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion (B) holding that the commissions choice to regulate  527 groups by determining whether they qualified as political action committees on a casebycase basis was neither arbitrary nor capricious (C) holding that the mere allegation of arbitrary and capricious action on defendants part absent a direct and pointed attack on the evidentiary basis of the agencys action is insufficient to warrant a judicial determination of wrongful agency action (D) holding that evaluations submitted after the committees final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious (E) holding that the classification made by  252242 was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary
Output: (B)
they never would have entered into the Development Agreement. 5 . The merger or integration clause in KFC Corp. v. Darsam Corp. stated that: This agreement supersedes any an all other oral or written agreements between the parties hereto with respect to the outlet which is the subject matter hereof and contains all the covenants and agreements between the said parties with respect to said matter. Franchisee acknowledges that neither KFC not anyone on behalf of KFC has made any representations, inducements, promises or agreements, orally or otherwise, respecting the subject matter of this agreement or respecting any other subject matter, which are not embodies herein. 543 F.Supp. at 224. 6 . See also Vision Graphics, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 41 F.Supp.2d 93, 98 (D.Mass.1999) (<HOLDING>); AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the parol evidence rule presumes finality with respect to the written terms of the agreement only and does not prevent consideration of parol evidence concerning the duration of contract (B) holding that it is unreasonable for plaintiffs to rely on oral representations made before a contract when the contract contained a clause which expressed (C) holding that when a contract is partially parol and partially written parol evidence may prove the parol terms (D) holding that enforcement of alleged oral representations made prior to execution of written contract was barred by the parol evidence rule and the explicit integration clause (E) holding that the parol evidence rule did not bar introduction of evidence of a subsequent oral contract concerning the brokers right to a commission and modifying the written agreement
Output: (D)
goals and policies of the penal institution limits these retained constitutional rights.”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 359, 88 S.Ct. 507 (The Katz Court concluded that where the government electronically listened to and recorded the defendant’s conversations while he used a public telephone, the actions of the government violated the defendant’s privacy, and the constitutional standards of the Fourth Amendment. This case included no evidence that the defendant received notice or any indication that his calls would be monitored or recorded.); In the Matter of An Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 404 S.E.2d at 514 (ruling that an attorney shall not record the conversation of any person without the prior knowledge and consent of all parties to the conversation); Forrester, 541 S.E.2d at 843 (<HOLDING>). In sum, all of the aforementioned cases are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was inadmissible because it was not within the scope of defendants oral preseizure consent to a cursory visual inspection and the seizure was conducted prior to not pursuant to the defendants written consent to conduct a complete search (B) holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept (C) holding that a search exceeded the scope of the initial oral consent and was not validated by a subsequent written consent an allegedly consensual seizure must stand or fall on the basis of the consent preexisting the seizure (D) holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
Output: (D)
Section 30-9-17 (Repl.Pamp.1984) and SCRA 1986, 5-504 (Repl.Pamp.1992). The depositions were taped prior to trial, and Fair-weather was not allowed in the same room with his children, but rather sat in an adja cent room out of the presence of the children during the depositions, viewing their testimony on a monitor. His attorney was present at the depositions and was able to cross-examine the boys. Fairweather was not able to speak with his attorney during the depositions, but was able to have messages handed to him. He was also able to meet with his attorney during recesses. Because the trial court allowed the use of the videotaped depositions, Fairweather claims the boys testified outside of his presence and that he was denied his right to confront his accusers. The Sixth Amend 461 (<HOLDING>). A face-to-face confrontation is not “an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants absence from courtroom during childs testimony to jury instead of presenting videotape of childs testimony to jury with defendant present violated confrontation clause in absence of necessity or defendants consent (B) holding that error in admission of videotape was harmless because it was cumulative of childs properly admitted live testimony (C) holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse warranted reversal where the childs otherwise uncorroborated testimony was the sole basis for conviction and the hearsay augmented the childs testimony with additional detail in certain areas (D) holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses (E) holding that a videotape of the childs testimony could not be submitted to the jury for its unrestricted repeated viewing during deliberations
Output: (A)
on the officer’s compliance with another portion of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 which is not part of the implied consent notice, specifically subsection (f), which requires the officer to follow proper administrative procedures in order to trigger the suspension. We upheld the sufficiency of the implied consent notice and affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that a license suspension “is a true and legitimate consequence of refusing to submit to . . . the test[,]” and that “[t]here is no unlawful coercion where the officer merely informs the arrestee of the permissible range of sanctions that the [S] tate may ultimately be authorized to impose.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. See also Singleterry v. State, 227 Ga. App. 155, 156 (3) (489 SE2d 42) (1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the statute clearly authorizes a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial judge rather than the jury makes the determination of whether the defendant violated the implied consent law (B) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (C) holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply (D) holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test (E) holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671
Output: (E)
cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (emphasis added); see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (acknowledging that “the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.”); cf. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (<HOLDING>). Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the scope of a search under the carroll doctrine is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant (B) holding unconstitutional a search executed on a warrant that failed to list with particularity the items to be seized even where the supporting application contained such a list and the warrant was approved by a magistrate (C) holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within (D) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (E) holding warrant describing items to be seized as a twostory blue house invalid where petitioner did not alert the magistrate to the defect  and the court therefore cannot know whether the magistrate was aware of the scope of the search he was authorizing
Output: (A)
286 (1996). Instead, “[a]pportionment of a fee award between fees incurred on a contract cause of action and those incurred on other causes of action is within the trial court’s discretion.” Id. In this case, appellants do not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Datacom’s tort and contract claims were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, we affirm the attorney’s fee award against Datacom. However, Moore was not a party to the Charter contract, or to Datacom’s causes of action based on contract. As a result, Moore would not have been entitled to fees against Charter had Moore prevailed on his tort claims. We therefore hold Charter is not entitled to fees from Moore by prevailing on contract claims against Datacom. See Abdallah, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1111, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 286 (<HOLDING>); Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal.4th 863, 870, 39 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed (C) holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs (D) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal (E) holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees
Output: (B)
the restitution at the rate of [$50.00] per month.” However, despite Yamamoto’s full compliance with these conditions, the sentencing court in 1992 revoked his probation on the grounds that Yamamoto had inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial condition of his probation, ie., had failed to pay the entire $118,000.00 in restitution during his five-year term of probation. In revoking Yamamoto’s probation, the sentencing court in the instant case erroneously assumed that the order to pay $118,-000.00 in restitution was a condition of his probation. In actuality, the restitution order was an authorized free-standing sanction imposed in combination with Yamamoto’s sentence of probation. See HRS § 706-605(1)(d) (1993); State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 154, 890 P.2d 1167, 1194 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks, internal brackets, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative (B) holding that the suspension or revocation of a drivers license is not a sanction which once imposed precludes the application of criminal sanctions (C) recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions (D) holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
Output: (C)
prong). 57 .667 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D.Fla.1986), aff'd sub nom. Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.1987). 58 . Id. at 1462. 59 . Id. 60 . 853 F.Supp. 1239, 1256 (W.D.Wash.1994) aff'd sub nom. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that the state did not appeal the ballistics issue). 61 . Id. 62 . See id. 63 . Ploof III, 2012 WL 1413483, at *7 (Del.Super. Jan. 30, 2012). 64 . See J.W. Eisele et al., Sites of Suicidal Gunshot Wounds, 26 J. Forensic Sci. 480, 483 (1981) (stating that the study’s findings contradict another author’s statement that a woman who dies from a gunshot should be presumed to be a homicide victim until proven otherwise). 65 .426 F.3d 588, 608 (2d Cir.2005); see also Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 227-28 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1388 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the petitioner had established prejudice when his attorney could have found experts who would testify that the prosecutions evidence was inconsistent with the frequency of abuse the victims alleged (B) holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by letting a video technician who violated the rule testify when the record reflected sufficient evidence on which the jury could have found for appellees (D) holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present (E) holding the experts opinion testimony lacked a proper foundation when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the experts admitted that their conclusions were based solely on the childrens statements that they had been abused
Output: (A)