niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE COUNSEL The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be represented by the retained counsel he prefers. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 158-60, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). An accused is, in fact, entitled to “counsel of his own selection, and as many as he may see proper to employ, to defend him.” Jackson v. State, 55 Tex.Crim. 79, 115 S.W. 262, 264 (1908). This right is not absolute, however, but can be overridden by important considerations relating to the integrity of the judicial process and the fair and orderly administration of justice. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158-60, 108 S.Ct. at 1697; Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). However, the court must indulge a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed (B) holding that the right to choose counsel cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice (C) holding court may raise procedural default sua sponte if doing so will further the interests of judicial efficiency conservation of scarce judicial resources and orderly and prompt administration of justice (D) recognizing the courts inherent sua sponte powers in certain circumstances to allow it to manage its own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases in the furtherance of justice quotation marks omitted (E) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel
Output: (B)
This suggests that McLeodUSA likewise no longer should be considered a significant competitor in the Omaha marketplace. We also note record evidence that Integra, which had been contemplating entry into the Omaha market, abandoned its plans to do so after the Commission issued the Qwest Omaha Forbearance Order. 25 FCC Rcd. at 8640-41, ¶ 34 (footnotes omitted). The Commission acknowledged that “multiple factors” could explain this decline and that it was “beyond the scope of this proceeding to estimate the extent of competition in Omaha today.” Id. at 8640 n. 105, 8641, ¶ 34. However, the Commission was entitled to consider this new data as probative of the soundness (or lack thereof) of its prior conclusions. See George E. Warren Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 626-27 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), amended on other grounds by 164 F.3d 676 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it is not arbitrary and capricious to request additional evidence of continuing disability (B) holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change course when one of its basic assumptions in earlier rulemaking was contradicted by new data (C) holding that any alteration to agency action can be held arbitrary and capricious if the agency does not satisfactorily explain its reason for the alteration (D) holding that the circuit court was not authorized to overturn state agencys decision where the sanction was lawful authorized and within the discretion of the agency and it was not shown to be arbitrary or capricious (E) holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to an express congressional grant of rulemaking authority will be upheld unless they are arbitrary capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute
Output: (B)
the bankruptcy court construed his Motion as a request under §§ 503(b)(2) and 503(b)(1)(A). On appeal, Jones has not mentioned § 503(b)(4) or argued that the bankruptcy court erroneously construed his Motion, except to state that the bankruptcy court failed to consider his request under § 330(a)(1). Manning highlighted that Jones’s appellate brief “appears to substitute § 503(b)(1)(A) for 503(b)(4),” which Manning attributes to Jones realizing that "§ 503(b)(4) simply is not applicable to the present case.” (Appellee’s Second Br. 7, ECF No. 10). Without expressing any opinion on the soundness of Manning’s statement, the Court does not consider any claim under § 503(b)(4) because Jones has waived this point. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The Court notes that page 19 of Jones's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief (B) holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief (C) holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief (D) holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived (E) holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point
Output: (E)
contact” with him throughout the examination, and that nothing he observed during his sexual abuse exam was inconsistent with what P. H. and J. H. had told him. When asked whether P. H. was “consistent with what he was saying” throughout the examination, the pediatrician answered in the affirmative. Finally, with respect to J. H.’s statements to him, the pediatrician testified, “No matter how we asked the questions, it was very consistent all the time.” We decline to find plain error based on the admission of this testimony. As an initial matter, the pediatrician’s testimony concerning the children’s eye contact and the consistency of their statements with the sexual abuse exam did not constitute improper bolstering. See Harris v. State, 279 Ga. App. 570, 572 (1) (631 SE2d 772) (2006) (<HOLDING>) (punctuation and footnote omitted); Morris v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance company could not deny a claim for longterm disability benefits based on a lack of objective medical evidence when the original policy did not refer to the objective medical evidence standard and never defined that term (B) holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness (C) holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence (D) holding that it is not improper bolstering for a witness to express an opinion as to whether medical or other objective evidence in the case is consistent with the victims story (E) holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct
Output: (D)
Stahl, 792 F.2d at 1440-41 (same); United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1986) (same). Furthermore, the Courts of Appeals have consistently invoked Marshall Field in refusing to conduct other inquiries “into the internal governance of Congress.” Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 571 (9th Cir.1989); see, e.g., United States v. Campbell, No. 06-3418, 221 Fed.Appx. 459, 2007 WL 1028785, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr.3, 2007) (unpublished order) (“Campbell proposes to argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which gives district judges jurisdiction to hear criminal prosecutions, has no legal effect because the House and Senate did not vote on it in the same session of Congress .... The enrolled bill rule prevents looking behind laws in th[at] way .... ”); Mester Mfg., 879 F.2d at 570-71 (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. Anderson, 131 F. 39, 42-43 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury (B) holding it constitutional for congress to allocate jurisdiction question to the judge (C) holding that where congress has directed the agency to issue a rule without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule  congress has amended the law and does not offend the constitution (D) holding that in the absence of express constitutional direction the courts must defer to the reasonable procedures congress has ordained for its internal business where an employer asserted that the immigration reform and control act of 1986 is entirely null and void as unconstitutionally passed  because congress has no constitutional authority to present a bill after adjournment sine die (E) holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect
Output: (D)
pro se motion to withdraw plea, he argued that “the plea offered ... was not the plea [a]greed upon [b]y the State and the Defendant” and that he “signed a plea under false pretenses and [was] led to [b]elieve it [was] the State[’]s offer.” These allegations — if taken alone — were sufficiently refuted by the written plea agreement and the plea colloquy. However, Davis’s counsel also filed a motion to withdraw plea, asserting that Davis told counsel that “he was not properly served by undersigned counsel”; counsel also asserted that “[presumably this ... resulted in an involuntary plea being entered by Defendant.” We are not entirely convinced that such a general allegation was sufficient to warrant a Sheppard hearing. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel (B) holding that counsels motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellants positions had become adverse (C) holding that even if counsel had performed as petitioner alleged counsel should have governments case was still as strong and guilty plea was prudent course (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity (E) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
Output: (B)
UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants’ gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants’ liquid product, the court noted that “treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
Output: (D)
seeking to invoke the exception must establish that they agreed to engage in a joint effort and to keep the shared information confidential from outsiders. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir.1989) (finding valid joint defense privilege where information was “imparted in confidence” between parties “who had agreed upon and undertaken a joint strategy”); United States v. Sawyer, 878 F.Supp. 295, 297 (D.Mass.1995) (despite similar interests between employer and employee, insufficient evidence that communications were made during the course of a joint defense effort; proponent could neither establish time frame of agreement nor acts creating and/or terminating the agreement); United States v. United Tech. Corp., 979 F.Supp. 108, 110, 112 (D.Conn.1997) (<HOLDING>); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 
 Holding statements: (A) holding common interest doctrine shielded information consortium members shared pursuant to collaboration agreement (B) recognizing doctrine (C) recognizing that tribes and states understood that they shared the right to manage the exercise of in common hunting and fishing rights (D) recognizing a subset of the common interest privilege as parents and schools have a corresponding interest in the free flow of information about administrators and faculty members (E) holding that there was no waiver of the work product protection because the business and public relations firm specializing in litigationrelated crisis management shared a common interest
Output: (A)
a bankruptcy case can administer property that is not that of the debtor.” The district court affirmed for essentially the same reasons. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review applied by the district court. Thus, we review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its decisions of law de novo. Devan v. Phoenix Am. Life Ins. Co. (In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc.), 400 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir.2005). II. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the composition of the bankruptcy estate and provides a broad definition of “[pjroperty of the estate.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 2006); see United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205-06, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977, 980 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing broad scope of the reorganization estate (B) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (C) holding that postconfirmation income that isnot necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become part of bankruptcy estate (D) holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become part of the bankruptcy estate (E) holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become pari of bankruptcy estate
Output: (A)
respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Accordingly, stating a claim of discrimination is protected conduct. “To establish that his activity is protected under Title VII, a plaintiff need not prove the merits of his underlying discrimination complaint, but only that he was acting under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed.” Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990). We note that a general complaint of unfair treatment does not translate into a charge of illegal discrimination, and is not protected conduct under Title VII. See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The complaint must specifically mention the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that allegations that employee was yelled at for complaining about his discriminatory treatment and criticized  were not materially adverse actions (B) holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity (C) holding that an employee must do more than make a vague charge of discrimination and that an employee who sent a letter complaining that charges against him were the product of ethnocentrism did not engage in protected activity under title vii (D) holding police department employees opposition to discrimination by police officers against black citizens did not constitute protected activity under title vii (E) holding that the plaintiffs letter to the human resources department complaining of unfair treatment in general and not specifically complaining about age discrimination did not constitute protected activity
Output: (E)
to establish eligibility-triggering factors: Though Ia-beled as "sentencing factors,” those factors are more appropriately considered as elements of a capital offense. This logic applies equally to the establishment of any sentencing factors necessary to expose a defendant to a higher maximum penalty in the noncapital context. As discussed supra, Fields’s Confrontation Clause challenge relates only to evidence that the government introduced relevant to the jury's ultimate selection decision. The applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the establishment of eligibility-triggering factors is therefore not a question squarely presented by this case, and we decline to resolve it definitively. 19 .See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment (B) holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing (C) holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment (D) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (E) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment
Output: (B)
and seeking to dismiss the four new claims asserted against them in the amended complaint. Also on January 8, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a supplemental motion to dismiss [26], addressing the new claims against it and renewing its request that all counts be dismissed. II. Discussion The Court must determine whether: (1) Giscombe eliminated the deficiencies of his previous shotgun pleading, and (2) if so, whether the complaint should be dismissed for the other reasons asserted by ABN, Citimortgage, and Wells Fargo in their motions to dismiss. A. Legal Standard The sufficiency of Giscombe’s amended complaint depends on whether it is a shotgun pleading; if so, it will fall short of the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The defining characteristic of a shotgun 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure (B) holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in  1983 litigation (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim (E) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure
Output: (E)
particular occasion, and "clothing the opinion in the garb of an interviewing technique does not help." State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 105 P.3d 1222, 1229 (2005) (quoting State v. Jones, 117 Wash.App. 89, 68 P.3d 1153, 1155 (2003)). 129 More fundamentally, the majority's holding, though framed as an exception to CRE 608, rewrites that rule. CRE 608 controls the admissibility of character evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness. By its terms, CRE 608 does not permit admission of a witness's opinion about whether another witness was telling the truth on a particular oceasion-such as the interrogations at issue here. CRE 608(a); Liggett, 135 P.3d at 731. Until today, our cases have uniformly held as much. See, e.g., People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 18 (Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>); People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1088 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs own testimony and hearsay testimony constituted weak and insubstantial evidence (B) holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses (C) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (D) holding that a social workers testimony that a child was sincere constituted impermissible character testimony (E) holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read
Output: (D)
inequality caused by taxing some property and not taxing other is permitted. The purpose of the proposed exemption, being one properly within the legislature’s discretion in acting for the welfare of the state, furnishes a just reason therefor. Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 490, 491, 178 A. 125, 126 (1935) (quotation and citation omitted). This is precisely the discrimination that violates the commerce clause, as the State has conceded. The limiting power of the United States Constitution over state action in such circumstances, see Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 496, 498-99, 179 A. 409, 410 (1935), renders futile the protectionist effort, but it does not render the effort invalid under the State Constitution. Cf. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the legislative 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the states have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation (B) recognizing that states may establish procedural rules governing litigation in their own courts (C) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (D) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (E) holding that the failure of the appellant to discuss in the opening brief an issue on which the trial court might have relied as a basis for its judgment  results in an affirmance of that judgment
Output: (A)
against a defendant with its own proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings (related to different loans than those at issue here). Since UBS’s recovery on its proof of claim may be offset by RFC’s recovery in this case (or vice versa), this case affects the bankruptcy estate in that regard as well. Therefore, the Court finds that this case will have an effect on the administration of the bankruptcy proceedings, which “is one of the more important factors to consider” for permissive abstention. Allstate, 2012 WL 967582, at *6 (citing In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 285 B.R. 127, 144-45 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2002)). Second, although this action involves only state law claims, none of the issues are particularly complex, so comity does not require abstention. See Refco, 628 F.Supp.2d at 446 (<HOLDING>); WorldCom, 293 B.R. at 332 (“NY-CERS has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the state law claims were not preempted (B) holding that the state law claims are straightforward commonlaw claims that do not involve arcane or idiosyncratic provisions of state law that would warrant abstention based on comity concerns internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (D) holding that state officials cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that qualified immunity applies if either a the defendants action did not violate clearly established law or b it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (B)
omitted)). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires a finder of fact to consider numerous relevant factors, including “substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.1998). Intent to evade union obligations, though not the keystone to proving alter ego in some other circuits, is the most critical factor in the Seventh Circuit. Compare Trs. of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Centor Contractors, 831 F.2d at 1312), with Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. Dorn Sprinkler Co., 669 F.3d 790, 794 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 1. Ownership, management, operation, and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (B) holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered (C) holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation
Output: (B)
this Court held that the place of business was not a person’s usual place of abode. More recently, in Truss v. Chappell, 4 So.3d 1110 (Ala.2008), this Court held that the default judgment against the defendant was void because service of process was invalid where the evidence, in the form of affidavits, indicated that the defendant was served at his mother’s house. The mother’s affidavit stated that the defendant was in the armed services and that he had been called to service in Iraq and may have been overseas or “stationed” in another state at the time service was attempted. In Truss, there was no evidence before the trial court indicating that the defendant was, at the time of the alleged service, or ever had been, a resident of t 9 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, there is evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action (B) holding that actual receipt of notice is not necessary to satisfy  1607 or due process the government need only make an effort that is  reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that notice of administrative forfeiture sent to prisoner did not require actual notice to the property owner only notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action (E) holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
Output: (A)
entity ....” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2003). 2 . Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24 (2003). 3 . In Count III of the State Complaint, Gomes named his employer, Ever Ready Trucking, Inc., and two of its principals as co-defendants, liable to Gomes for wrongful termination. That Count and those defendants were subsequently dismissed from the State Court action. 4 . Mass. General Laws ch. 152, § 24 acts as a waiver under the Worker's Compensation Act of any covered worker’s common law rights against his/her employer or co-workers for injuries sustained in furtherance of the employer's interests or in the course of employment, so-called compensable injuries. Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 664 N.E.2d 815 (1996); cf. O’Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 690, 511 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Gomes never filed a claim under the Act 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a coworker commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer  the policies behind the act would not be served by immunizing the coemployee (B) recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence (C) holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment (D) holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy (E) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act
Output: (A)
lawful entry. Specifically, the court finds that the mesh wire enabled O’Connell, and as a matter of fact any person, to readily observe the interior of Bin 1138 from a vantage point he had been given free access to by Shugard’s assistant manager. O’Connell used a free-standing ladder to observe the interior and did not interfere with the defendant’s property to secure his observations. Indeed, O’Connell was not trespassing on any property when he saw, with his naked eyes, the contents of Bin 1138. Accordingly, I do not believe that the agents infringed upon the defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy. Taborda 635 F.2d at 139; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 696-97, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989); see also, United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1345 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Based on the circumstances giving rise to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no illegal search within the fourth amendment where a police officer makes a visual observation of contraband from a vantage point he rightfully occupies (B) recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all (C) holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant (D) holding that even an officers testimony concerning appearance and smell of illegal contraband based on experience is sufficient to prove the contraband is illegal (E) holding a visual strip and visual cavity search unreasonable when done beside a police car
Output: (A)
did not expressly note the officers’ purpose in knocking on the defendant’s door, but it is fairly clear from our description of the facts that they intended to arrest him. Although the defendant was standing inside the doorway of his room, we held that the officers lawfully arrested him because he “ ‘voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely opening the door of his motel room to the police.” Id. at 1426 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.1980)). Unlike the officers in Jardines and in this case, the officers in Vaneaton were standing in the common space of a motel when they knocked, rather than in the curtilage of a home. We therefore have no need to overrule Vaneaton. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Whether Vaneaton remains good law after 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (B) holding that a threejudge panel may depart from circuit precedent that has not been expressly overruled when an intervening en banc or supreme court decision has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (C) holding that where the relevant court of last resort has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable then a threejudge panel of this court and district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled (D) holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable (E) holding a threejudge panel may not reexamine normally controlling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening united states supreme court decision unless the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority
Output: (A)
credibility. The court also found that any error was harmless and any prejudice was de minimus. Trial Ct. Op. at 50. Respecting these claims, we are guided predominantly by our standard of review and our understanding that a proper purpose of cross-examination includes attempts to impeach a witness’s credibility. Chmiel, 889 A.2d at 527. It is well-settled that “[w]hatever tends to show the interest or feeling of a witness in a cause is competent by way of cross examination.” Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A.2d 142, 144 (1945) (quoting Commonwealth v. Farrell, 187 Pa. 408, 41 A. 382 (1898)). Of course, the relevant dispute here involves the question of which kinds of facts “show the interest” of a witness. See generally Cooper v. Schoffstall, 588 Pa. 505, 905 A.2d 482, 494 (2006) (<HOLDING>). With regard to an expert witness’s testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing general proposition that pattern of compensation in past cases raises inference that witness may slant testimony to ensure he is hired in future cases (B) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (C) holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant (D) holding and citing cases standing for the proposition that rehabilitation plans may not be based on liquidation (E) recognizing that in exceptional cases the inference may be so strong as to require a directed verdict for plaintiff
Output: (A)
so would not be appropriate in this case. Cf. Def.'s Corrected Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.'s Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R„ ECF No. 41 ("Def.'s Br.”) at 20-23 (arguing that the court should decline to reach the merits of AHSTAC's contention in this regard because AHSTAC failed to make this argument before the agency in the first instance); 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (”[T]he Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) (emphasis added); Blue Field (Sichuan) Food Indus. Co. v. United States, - CIT -, 949 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1321 (2013) (“This court has discretion to determine when it will require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d)); Itochu Bldg. Prods, v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed.Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 17 . Importantly, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review (B) recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action (C) holding that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate where doing so can protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial efficiency (D) holding that courts have consistently required exhaustion of administrative remedies under foia (E) holding that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under section 1997ea
Output: (C)
that he or she possesses all the constitutional and statutory requirements of the office for which the candidate has filed. Subsection (2) clearly requires the petition to be sworn to by the candidate and not less than two registered voters. Subsection (3) requires, by its plain language, the candidate to swear that he meets the requirements for the office. We do not believe the statute should be interpreted as requiring the registered voters to also swear that the candidate meets the requirements of the office. Such interpretation is inconsistent with the language of subsection (3) and does not reflect a liberal interpretation in favor of allowing the candidate (Waterman) to continue on the ballot under these circumstances. See Heleringer v. Brown, Ky., 104 S.W.3d 397 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Rather, we interpret subsection (2) as merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 (B) holding that coas should be construed liberally (C) recognizing the rule of statutory interpretation that laws are to be liberally construed so as to reach a substantially correct result and the court should to every reasonable extent interpret such provisions as directory rather than mandatory (D) holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory (E) holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election
Output: (E)
motions for summary judgments.” Dyes, 611 So.2d at 128. We agree with the legal principle stated, but disagree that it applies to the situation presented here. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966 B sets forth the documentation to be considered on a motion for summary judgment, stating, “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Article 966 B specifically authorizes consideration of depositions. This includes any depositions “on file,” even if simply attached to a memorandum. Aydell v. Sterns, 98-3135 (La.2/26/99), 731 So.2d 189-190 (<HOLDING>). See also Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the trial court proceeded to consider affidavits submitted with motion to reconsider summary judgment the affidavits were properly before the appellate court for purposes of reviewing the propriety of the trial courts grant of summary judgment (B) holding that a claim not pleaded in the petition ie the complaint was not properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs deposition testimony was so contradictory of the statements contained in plaintiffs affidavit as to foreclose the affidavits use for summary judgment purposes (D) holding that information contained in affidavits and depositions submitted as attachments to a memorandum were properly before the trial court and appellate court for purposes of a motion for summary judgment (E) holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court
Output: (D)
should have asserted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applicable to search warrants in an attempt to salvage this search. Because it failed to assert that legal theory as a basis for upholding this search in the trial court, the State cannot obtain the benefit of that law in this Court. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23(b) permits the admission of evidence obtained by an officer in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas or the United States when “the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(b); McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15, 20-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Had the State argued to the trial court that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (B) holding the search of a computer after the warrant had expired constitutional because despite the delay probable cause for the search continued to exist (C) holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant (D) holding that excluding the unlawfully obtained dogsniff evidence the remaining portion of the search warrant did not establish probable cause and therefore appellate court should consider whether the search should be upheld under the goodfaith exception applicable to search warrants (E) holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant
Output: (D)
Funding, 15 Cl.Ct. at 502. In the case sub judice, the surety assignee declined to file suit against the government as a result of the government’s failure to pay the proper party. 11 . Each of the additional cases plaintiffs rely upon in their Response to Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss involved a surety that filed suit against the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 141-42, 83 S.Ct. 232 (involving a surety that sued the government pursuant to equitable sub-rogation when the surety financed a project to completion after default by the prime contractor); Prairie State, 164 U.S. at 231-32, 17 S.Ct. 142 (determining that a surety was entitled to assert equitable subrogation against the government); Aetna Cas. & Sur., 845 F.2d at 974-76 (<HOLDING>); Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1162-63 (ruling that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that doctrine of impossibility of performance did not apply so as to entitle surety to partial remission of forfeited bond (E) recognizing that the gjovernment as obligee owes no equitable duty to a surety  unless the surety notifies the government that the principal has defaulted under the bond  notice by the surety is essential before any governmental duty exists
Output: (A)
Lamarre challenges a judgment entered by the court ('Warren, J.) denying him post-conviction relief from his conviction of two counts of aggravated trafficking of a schedule W drug within one thousand feet of a school (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E)(1) (2012), and two counts of violating a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2012). Lamarre contends that the court erred in finding that Lamarre’s trial attorney provided effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] The facts from Lamarre’s underlying trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, may no longer be disputed. See State v. Lamarre, Mem-11-16 (Feb. 8, 2011); see also State v. Carey, 2013 ME 88, ¶ 3, 77 A.3d 471; State v. Larrivee, 481 A.2d 782, 783 (Me.1984) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 3] Gina Clark was an opiate addict with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a ruling from a prior decision of this court becomes the law of the case that cannot be challenged in a later proceeding quotation marks omitted (B) holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals (C) holding an unappealed ruling is the law of the case and cannot be later challenged (D) holding that where a ruling on a demurrer to complaint is not appealed from it becomes the law of the case (E) holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case
Output: (A)
RESPA regulation’s exceptions, but Defendant does not proffer any argument on to that point. (See Doc. # 15). Defendant sent Plaintiff a combined notice of service transfer on February 14, 2014, more than fifteen days prior to the transfer’s effective date (and which otherwise complies with RESPA’s notice requirements). (Docs. # 15, 15-1); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b)(3). The provision, not the receipt, of notice is all that RESPA mandates. See U.S.C. §§ 2605. Regardless, Plaintiff has advanced no allegations that demonstrate actual damages caused by any RESPA violations. See Madura v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 593 Fed.Appx. 834, 843 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)); see also Frazile v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 382 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). “To the extent [Plaintiff] raises the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that showing damages caused by the failure to provide notice of transfer is a necessary element of a respa claim (B) recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim (C) holding an allegation of damages is a necessary element of any claim under  2605 (D) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (E) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim
Output: (A)
Eberharter, 361 Pa.Super. 65, 521 A.2d 474 (1987), we defined the doctrine of equitable estoppel: Equitable estoppel arises when a party by acts or representation intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe that certain facts exist and the other justifiably relies and acts upon such belief, so that the latter will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Id. at 479-80 (citation omitted). The concept of paternity by estoppel has been upheld in numerous circumstances where a child or mother seeks child support from a purported father who has held himself out to the child and community as the father, but then attempts to deny paternity when support is sought. See Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 249, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (1997) (<HOLDING>) and citations therein. ¶ 17 In Brinkley, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a paternity action that the selection and change of the childs surname from the name chosen by the mother must be based on the trial courts determination that renaming is in the childs best interests and the record must affirmatively show such a name change is required for the welfare of the minor child (B) holding any person who has supplied necessities to a child may sue and recover from the childs parent for value of the supplies or services furnished to the child (C) holding that the doctrine of estoppel embodies the fiction that regardless of biology and the presumption of paternity the person who has cared for the child is the childs parent (D) recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party (E) holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises
Output: (C)