niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
appeared in court on December 7, 2007, and the court dismissed the cases for failure to prosecute because the State had not filed any charging documents in either case. The court subsequently entered orders dismissing the cases with prejudice, because “[t]he State failed to file the charging documents or take any action to prosecute the case.” [¶ 4] The district court generally has jurisdiction to hear criminal eases under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(1), but in this case the issue is whether the court could dismiss a criminal action under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) when a charging document has not been filed. This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1). See City of Jamestown v. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 5, 586 N.W.2d 494 (<HOLDING>); State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D.1976) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal (B) holding that the value of stolen blank money orders may be established by circumstantial evidence showing the market value for filled in money orders and the fact that the defendants had the necessary equipment to fill in the money orders and to make the completed orders appear valid (C) holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders (D) holding the state may appeal orders of dismissal that have the same effect as orders quashing an information (E) holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291
Output: (D)
As will be discussed below, although (A) the FAA air traffic controllers had a duty to disseminate certain weather related information to Flight 2745, they (B) did not breach this duty as to any CWAs or PIREPs. Furthermore, (C) the controllers did not have a duty to disseminate MISs or the information contained therein. A. Duty to Disseminate Certain Weather Information The existence of a duty in . is not whether the government had a duty to [report weather condition] information, but rather what was the scope of that duty.”). Air traffic controllers are “required to do what a reasonable air traffic controller of their experience and training would have done under the totality of the circumstances.” Kelley v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-31, 2009 WL 1439896 at *5 (E.D.Va. Mar. 26, 2009) (<HOLDING>); see Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 270. Here, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (B) holding that the wright amendment an air traffic regulation restricting air traffic from love field in the dallasforth worth area did not violate the right to travel because any impact on interstate travel  even air travel to and from the dallasfort worth area  is negligible (C) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (D) holding that an air traffic controllers failure to report weather conditions from another faa location to a planes pilot was not negligent (E) holding that during investigatory stop police may transport seized property to another location
Output: (D)
Moreover, under the present law, the Debtor will not receive a discharge unless he completes performance of the Plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5). Thus, if the Debtor were unable to perform the Plan, Osh-untola would suffer little prejudice from its having been confirmed. 4 . The Court does not read 11 U.S.C. § 108 as extending this period. 5 . Oshuntola did not object to confirmation on this ground. However, the Court has an independent duty to confirm a plan only if satisfies the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Great Northwest Recreation Center, Inc., 74 B.R. 846, 852 (Bankr.D.Mont.1987). 6 . Courts differed as to whether an individual debtor could retain exempt property without violating the "absolute priority” rule. See In re Bullard, 358 B.R. 541, 544-45 (Bankr.D.Conn.2007)(<HOLDING>). 7 .The modification concludes with the phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover (C) holding that the mortgaging or conveying of exempt property to a creditor is not against the public policy of the state of michigan and that that the bankrupt had the power to convey to a creditor his existing exemptions resulting in the exempt property not being property of the debtor or the debtors bankruptcy estate (D) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (E) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate
Output: (D)
areas constitute a residence subject to a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Government contends that exigent circumstances warranted the entry into the apartment building. (Id. at 16.) The Government bases this exigency on threats to law enforcement and the general public, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances. (Id.) Aside from these contentions, the Government primarily contends that Defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the common areas of the apartment building. (Id. at 7.) Because it is a threshold issue, this latter contention serves as the focus for the Court’s Fourth Amendment inquiry. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a multiunit apartment building. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment bmldings common entrance (B) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (C) holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship (D) holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the hallway of an apartment building where the building door was unlocked and the hallway was easily accessible to the public (E) holding that defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in common area of residential building
Output: (B)
Bronster, 82 Hawai’i at 40, 919 P.2d at 302. “Such damage means simply that the product has not met the customer’s expectations, or, in other words, that the customer has received ‘insufficient product value.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Under the economic loss rule, “a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.” Leis Family Ltd. P’ship v. Silversword Eng’rg, 126 Hawai’i 532, 538-39, 273 P.3d 1218, 1224-25 (Haw.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Bronster, 82 Hawai’i at 39, 919 P.2d at 301). The rule also applies to negligent design and/or manufacture theory, Bronster, 82 Hawai’i at 40, 919 P.2d at 302, and negligent misrepresentation. City Express, 87 Hawai’i at 470, 959 P.2d at 840 (<HOLDING>). The most recent Hawaii Supreme Court case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims alleging negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose seek economic damages not property damages within insureds policy (B) holding that an architect whose negligent design and supervision of construction render a building unfit for use may be liable in tort to a commercial tenant who suffers economic loss as a result (C) holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional (D) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract (E) holding that the economic loss doctrine barred a negligence claim without regard to whether the parties were in privity of contract
Output: (C)
therein ...” 392 U.S., at 436, [88 S.Ct., at 2201]. One of the “rights enumerated” in § 1 is “the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens_” 14 Stat. 27. Id. As a result, the Court concluded: Just as in Jones a Negro’s § 1 right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to [him] solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro’s § 1 right to “make and enforce contracts” is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to [him], solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees. Id. 427 U.S. at 170-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2594. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding with little discussion that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination (B) holding that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as nonwhites (C) holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee (D) holding unequivocally that  1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment (E) holding that conduct occurring after the formation of an employment contract could not be racial discrimination under  1981
Output: (A)
Amendment claim because the record demonstrates that there are several disputed issues of material fact. We agree. We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). “We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the releva h Cir.1998) (en banc) (explaining that “we tolerate informalities from civil pro se litigants”). A careful look at Christman’s “Opposition to Summary Judgment” reveals that it served as a statement of controverted facts. In addition, Plaintiffs’ verified complaint constituted an opposing affidavit. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Christman presented 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering successive motions for summary judgment when each of fdics motions reflected material changes in the posture of this litigation and was grounded on meritorious contentions (B) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (C) holding that a declaration signed under penalty of perjury and verifying the allegations set forth in the complaint were true and correct was competent summary judgment evidence (D) holding that where the plaintiff is pro se the court must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of plaintiffs contentions offered in motions and pleadings where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and where plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct (E) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed
Output: (D)
motion for attorneys’ fees based on the proposal for settlement filed by Rebeca Ipox in her individual capacity. In a wrongful death case where there are joint personal representatives, the joint personal representatives are the party plaintiffs. As the party plaintiffs, only the joint personal representatives — acting in that capacity— are entitled to make a valid demand for judgment. The demand for judgment at issue here therefore was invalid. See §§ 768.20, 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2001); Reid, 888 So.2d at 103. Appellees claim that Rebeca Ipox’s act in serving her proposal for settlement should be deemed to be the act of both joint personal representatives. This argument is totally unwarranted. The proposal for settlement expressly stated that it was made by Rebeca Ipox in her 984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, there was no evidence that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where representative plaintiff and other members of class share an interest in prevailing on similar legal claims particular differences in amount of damages claimed or of availability of certain defenses against class representative may not render his or her claims atypical (B) holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries (C) holding that a copersonal representative could not unilaterally file a notice of appeal without concurrence of the other copersonal representative (D) recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim (E) holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class
Output: (C)
those of Legal Defense Fund lawyers. The only material difference is that here employees must choose between the lawsuit and a conciliation offer while in Button there had been no conciliation and offer. The people attending the meetings held by the Legal Defense Fund lawyers in Button, however, did have to choose between initiating a lawsuit and not participating in a lawsuit. The type of choice the people would have to make here and in Button is not so different that the solicitation that could have occurred in this case was outside the scope of activity protected by Button. The characteristics of the solicitation that brought it within constitutional protection in Button are equally present in this case. See also Great Western Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F.Supp. 827 (N.D.I11.1979) (<HOLDING>). The continued vitality of Button was recently 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts findings under rule 52a are to be liberally construed in support of the district courts judgment (B) recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations (C) holding rule similar to district courts order constitutionally inapplicable to nonprofit solicitation (D) holding that the majority of courts to address this issue have decided that the 100mile rule is inapplicable to parties and party officers (E) holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith
Output: (C)
that the burglary occur in a dwelling.” Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973. Taylor sets forth a categorical approach, which “generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Using that approach, Rodriguez’s California first degree burglary conviction does not constitute generic burglary because California Penal Code Sections 459 and 460 do not require “unlawful or unprivileged entry” for a burglary conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (“A few States’ burglary statutes, however, define burglary more broadly, e.g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful.”); see also People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the state burglary statute is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent (B) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim (C) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary (D) holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcategorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry (E) holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary
Output: (A)
Affirmed. WEBSTER, J., concurs. BENTON, J., dissents with opinion. BENTON, J., dissenting. Because the order on appeal fails to afford the opinion of the expert medical advisor the presumption of correctness to which it is entitled, I respectfully dissent. Absent clear and convincing evidence of adequate grounds for rejecting it, the opinion of the expert medical advisor binds the judge of compensation claims. See Palm Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Cabrera, 698 So.2d 1352, 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The opinion of the expert medical advis- or is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as determined by the judge of compensation claims. § 440.13(9)(c), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). See Walgreen Co. v. Carver, 770 So.2d 172, 174-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Jacaranda Manor v. Randolph, 755 So.2d 781, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings (B) holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error (C) recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome (D) holding that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness owed to the trial courts findings (E) holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness
Output: (E)
a noninvasive procedure which posed little risk of harm. He had done similar tests many times on, in his view, similarly rusty boilers without cooling them down first. And nothing in his observations or discussions with Mr. Nelson suggested that this particular boiler posed a heightened risk of danger. Mr. Reimer’s version of events will, of course, be subject to challenge by defendants, but, at this stage, these facts create a genuine issue as to Mr. Reimer’s actual knowledge of the risk in this case. See Kraft, 136 F.3d at 586 (reversing summary judgment to defendant and finding significant to appreciation of risk element that plaintiff “had placed her hands and feet into this gap before without incident.”); Piotrowski v. Southworbh Prods. Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. S. Minn. Mach. Sales, Inc., 442 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk (B) holding that plaintiff who was injured in fall from table did not have actual knowledge of a known risk and he did not make the choice to chance the risk rather than avoid it where he and other employees had similarly stood or stomped on the lift table without incident for seven months (C) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (D) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it (E) holding that the government must prove actual subjective knowledge and that a defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known
Output: (B)
or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). B. ANALYSIS Equitable tolling is generally available in two types of situations: (1) “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period,” or (2) “where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 45 98) (en bane) (<HOLDING>). In Jaquay, a veteran executed a motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling (B) holding that equitable estoppel and equitable tolling cannot apply to extend the 120day noa filing period set forth in 38 usc  7266a (C) holding that in light of irwin previous statements that equitable tolling is unavailable against 38 usc  7266 are overruled (D) holding that issue of whether the 120day judicialappeal period prescribed by 38 usc  7266a for seeking judicial review of a board decision is subject to equitable tolling is a legal question (E) holding that irwin overruled all prior ninth circuit cases that denied equitable tolling under statutes and regulations relating to federal employee discrimination suits including one which had denied tolling under  7703b2
Output: (C)
had reached age 55, in order to make them eligible for benefits (Katz Aff. Ex. 45), establishes that Pan Am in fact interpreted its Plan as requiring employees to have reached the age of 55 to receive subsidized benefits, regardless of how their employment ended. If the Plan provided the subsidized benefit to employees involuntarily terminated before age 55, there would have been no need to re-hire laid-off employees after that age to qualify them for benefits. Pan Am’s generosity in accommodating laid-off employees to allow them to receive higher benefits was completely gratuitous, and could not have resulted in an obligation on Pan Am’s part to employ this practice with every employee, or in a modification of the Plan’s terms. See Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215, 224-25 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, PBGC’s interpretation of the Plan’s 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that pension plan administrators have the ability to fashion their own plan formulas (B) holding that employer may not orally modify a pension plan and citing 29 usc  1102a1 which provides that all plan terms must be in writing (C) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (D) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (E) holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan
Output: (B)
as true.” See United States v. Young, 694 F.Supp.2d 25, 27 (D.Me.2010) (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n. 16, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952)). The Court must consider whether the allegations in the indictment are sufficient to inform a jury as to the charged offense. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76, 83 S.Ct. 173, 9 L.Ed.2d 136 (1962); United States v. Barker Steel Co., Inc., 985 F.2d 1123, 1125 (1st Cir.1993). “[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. U 0 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Teleguz court upheld section 922(k) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime (B) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce (C) holding that the commerce clause does not provide congress with authority to enact a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivat ed violence because the crime was noneconomic contained no jurisdictional element and the aggregate impact of such crime was based on an attenuated effect upon interstate commerce (D) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (E) holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act
Output: (C)
this conclusion, we are mindful of decisions in other jurisdictions rejecting the argument that changes to the juvenile justice system have altered its parens patriae character. See Valdez v. State, 33 Ark. App. 94, 801 S.W.2d 659 (1991); In re Myresheia W., 61 Cal. App. 4th 734, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1998); In re L.C., 273 Ga. 886, 548 S.E.2d 335 (2001); State, ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002) (dissenting justice concluded changes to system required a jury trial); State v. G 971) (upholding statute that required juvenile trials to be heard by the court; concurring justice acknowledged that if juvenile code became only a punitive tool, then a juiy trial might be justified under state constitution); State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 887, 889-90, 919, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998) (<HOLDING>). While there is wide variability in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals (B) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (C) holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials (D) holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights (E) holding juveniles do not have right to jury trial because it is a civil proceeding under states parens patriae authority four justices dissented
Output: (A)
and Recommendation (“Report”) suggesting denying Dickey-Williams’ motion and granting the Commissioner for Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) motion. Report, ECF No. 13. Dickey-Williams filed three timely objections to the Report. She argues the Report improperly dismissed the ALJ’s failure to apply the treating physician rule to the opinions of Dr. Clague; the Report did not properly consider the opinions of psychologist Ross Thayer; and the report overlooked the ALJ’s failure to discuss whether Dickey-Williams’ migraines affected her residual function capacity. Objection at 2-7, ECF No. 14. Civil Rule 72 does not require the Court to hold a hearing when reviewing a magistrate judge’s findings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Estate of Wyatt v. WAMU/JP Morgan 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised (B) recognizing de novo standard of review (C) holding 28 usc  636 did not require a hearing for de novo review of a magistrates findings (D) holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo (E) holding that the error caused by the magistrate judges unauthorized postjudgment order was cured by the district courts later de novo review of the magistrates findings and conclusions
Output: (C)
in fact, consumers will not necessarily get less tar” due to “such behavior as compensatory smoking.” Ibid. This history shows that, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances prevented misleading representations of Cambridge Filter Method test results. The FTC’s failure to require petitioners to correct their allegedly misleading use of “light” descriptors is not evidence to the contrary; agency nonenforcement of a fed eral statute is not the same as a policy of approval. Cf. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51 (2002) (<HOLDING>). More telling are the FTC’s recent statements 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that private security guards unsolicited call to police did not establish agency (B) holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims (C) holding that the safety act and fmvss 208 did not expressly or impliedly preempt a tort claim based on the manufacturers failure to install lap belts (D) holding that the safety act and fmvss 108 did not impliedly preempt commonlaw conspicuity tort based on inadequate lighting and reflectors on truck trailer (E) holding that the coast guards decision not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly preempt petitioners tort claims
Output: (E)
limitations will not commence to run until the contract has been finished.” In the instant case, Freberg was never allowed to deliver a finished product or service to Dr. Robert Thomason. Consequently, up to the date of July 25,1973, the day after Dr. Elizabeth died, Freberg’s cause of action against the Thomasons had not accrued, or in other words, limitations had not begun to run. Indeed, Freberg’s limitations did not begin to run until after he was first prevented from continuing his tasks. See Scott v. Walker, supra. To hold that Freberg’s cause of action accrued after each day’s work would unduly fragment the time of accrual for each of these indivisible tasks. Compare Jones v. Lewis, 11 Tex. 359 (1854); Caldwell v. Jones, 63 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1933, writ ref’d) (<HOLDING>); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 251, 253 (1965). 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case (B) holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf (C) holding that defendant must prove when the services were rendered to establish that the new value exception applies (D) holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed (E) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001
Output: (D)
by other inmates to say that Bishop, who had solicited the murder, did not know the murder had occurred until after it happened. The district court denied Bishop’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explaining that the evidence that Bishop alleged should have been presented at sentencing, did not bear on two of three aggravating factors, each of which was independently relied on by the state sentencing court, and that Bishop failed to show that the omitted evidence would have affected the state sentencing court’s departure analysis. Thus the district court declined to disturb the decision of the state post-conviction court, which had denied relief on the basis that Bishop failed to show prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (B) holding that the ninth circuit improperly granted habeas relief because the state courts decision that it was not inherently prejudicial when court spectators wore buttons depicting the murder victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (C) holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states (D) holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution (E) holding that state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25yearstolife sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
Output: (C)
if necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). We lack jurisdiction to review either of the district court’s orders because they are not final judgments for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; they are not among the type of orders listed in § 1292(a); they were not certified by the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to be final appealable orders; and they do not fall within a jurisprudential exception, such as the collateral-order doctrine, that would render them final, appealable orders. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957-59 (5th Cir. 1988); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981); see also In re Macon Uplands Venture, 624 F.2d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>); Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding an order allowing a motion under rule 60b is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
Output: (A)
under an exception to the statute was either waived or resolved in the workers’ compensation case. Neither of these circumstances apply in the instant case. a. Compensability is not an issue. Vallejos elected his remedy by filing a petition for benefits, receiving payments, and negotiating a settlement. All of the following cases that Vallejos cites can be distinguished because they deal with workers’ compensation claims where the compensability of the claim or the status of the employee at the time of the injury was contested: Vasquez v. Sorrells Grove Care, Inc., 962 So.2d 411, 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that the carrier contested the compensability of the claim and whether Vasquez was an employee); Hernandez v. United Contractors Corp., 766 So.2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Lowry v. Logan, 650 So.2d 653, 658 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that cue may be based on a showing that there was no evidence before the adjudicator that could have supported a denial of the claim on the merits that is that all of the evidence militated in support of the claim (B) holding that because the carrier contested the compensability of the claim and took the position that there was no evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course and scope of hernandezs employment there was no conclusion on the merits (C) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (D) holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment
Output: (B)
scared” and “[s]ome of those questions were too hard.” J.A. at 108-25 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 299-816). Spies listened to the recording of Vaughn’s interrogation of Harris as soon as she arrived at the police station and before she ordered Harris’s arrest. J.A. at 559-60 (Urban Dep. at 586-40). Accordingly, she should have known that Harris’s confession was suspect and inherently untrustworthy because it was- extracted from a twelve-year-old child with no previous law-enforcement experience, outside the presence of his mother, through the use of intensive interrogation techniques. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the confession provided support for Spies’s finding of probable cause for the arrest. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) (<HOLDING>). After the elimination of Harris’s confession 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed (B) holding that a probable cause determination should consider the facts and circumstances known to the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information (C) holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant (D) holding that whether an arrest is supported by probable cause turns upon whether at the moment of the arrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting officials knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense emphasis added (E) holding that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense in situations where the arresting officer has not observed the operation of the vehicle such facts and circumstances would necessarily have to include a relationship between the time there was evidence to show the influence of intoxicants and the time of operation of the vehicle internal citations omitted
Output: (D)
meets the statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the appellate court.” State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn.App.2011) (quotation omitted). A victim may request restitution if the defendant is convicted of a crime. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). When considering restitution requests, courts look at, among other factors, “the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) (2012). This court has interpreted the statute to require that the claimed loss be “directly caused by the conduct, for which the defendant was convicted.” State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn.App.1999) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Olson, 381 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Willis does not dispute that P.H. should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (D) holding that restitution is proper under  2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (E) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction
Output: (B)
Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (B.I.A.1992) (“[T]he Board ordinarily will not consider a discretionary grant of a motion to remand unless the moving party meets a ‘heavy burden’ and presents evidence of such a nature that the Board is satisfied that if proceedings before the immigration judge were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.”)). Accordingly, the BIA did not commit legal error, and we lack jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the BIA’s conclusion that the § 212(c) factors did not warrant a grant of discretionary relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i);De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 144, 146-47 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship (B) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (C) holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations (D) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of removal and that sjection 106 of the real id act does not override the jurisdictiondenying provision of 8 usc  1252a2b unless the petitioner raises a constitutional claim   or question  of law within the meaning of 8 usc  1252a2d (E) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations
Output: (D)
OF THE COURT GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. I. JURISDICTION Thomas J. Capano appeals from an order entered in the district court on June 27,1997, holding that he waived the attorney work product privilege with respect to certain documents he created which the United States seized from a third party pursuant to a subpoena. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction to review the order of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cf. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1073-77 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In July 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena (B) holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena (C) holding that denial of motion to vacate discovery order and to quash subpoena issued pursuant to 28 usc  1782 constitutes final appealable decision (D) holding that a denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not final and therefore not appealable (E) holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable
Output: (A)
regarding lack of consent of the owner, there was no evidence as to who was authorized to give consent to use the vehicle because the identity of the owner was never conclusively established, as there was no connection established between the car appellant was driving and the car that was stolen from Ms. Hautala. The government argues that lack of consent may be established by circumstantial evidence, and contends that appellant’s flight, the testimony of Ms. Hautala, the broken window and the different VINs on the car and registration card provided ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that the car belonged to someone else and that appellant did not have permission to operate it. See Powell v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 258, 418 F.2d 470, 474 (1969) (<HOLDING>). While the government is correct that lack of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that lack of consent may be established by adequate circumstantial evidence (B) holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent (C) holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination (D) holding that conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence (E) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence
Output: (A)
does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.” Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 165. Moreover, a witness’s "general and hopeful expectation of leniency is not enough to create an agreement or an understanding that [he] would, in fact, receive leniency in exchange for [his] testimony.” Id. at 163 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . Respondent advises that Deyo’s CPL § 440.10 motion was denied following a hearing. R. Mem. at 28, n. 7. 10 . As respondent notes, Deyo’s affidavit in support of his own § 440.10 motion also was not part of the record on appeal in petitioner’s direct appeal. R. Mem. at 32. 11 . Citation is to the pagination provided by CM/ECF. 12 . Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029; see Richardson v. Greene, 497 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir.2007) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (B) holding when a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim a coa may issue only when the petitioner shows that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether 1 the claim is a valid assertion of the denial of a constitutional right and 2 the district courts procedural ruling was correct (C) holding that if the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason would find debatable two issues 1 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling and 2 that the applicant has established a valid constitutional violation emphasis in original (D) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct (E) holding that when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds a petitioner is entitled to a coa only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would conclude it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable whether the district courts procedural ruling was correct
Output: (C)
pursuant to a lawful warrant that the police obtained in the interim with information that was unrelated to the war-rantless entry. The Court refused to suppress the evidence, not because of a lack of causal relationship to the conduct of the search, but because the search was lawful in every respect. The search was conducted pursuant to what the Court determined to be a lawful warrant and was conducted in a lawful manner. See id. at 813-14, 104 S.Ct. 3380. The attenuation applied only to the 19-hour-old initial entry. Here, of course, the entire point is that the search that produced the seized evidence was con ducted with excessive force and was, accordingly, unlawful. Third, United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2007), does not compel the majority’s holding. Id. at 1154-55 (<HOLDING>). If officers violate their obligation to serve 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant (B) holding that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for officers failure to serve a warrant to the defendant before during or immediately after the search (C) holding that violation of knockandannounce rule during execution of valid search warrant warranted suppression of evidence seized in search following violation (D) holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression (E) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation
Output: (B)