niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
an employer based on its status as successor to corporations that had designed and manufactured allegedly defective equipment for their own use. The equipment passed to the successor corporation through a series of mergers. The court held that, but for the merger, plaintiff could have sued the predecessor corporations based on their design and manufacture of the defective equipment. The court concluded that this potential liability survived the merger, “since the obligation upon which [the successor] is being sued arose not out of the employment relation, but rather out of [the] independent business transaction” of the merger itself. Id. at 161, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 885, 412 N.E.2d at 940; see also Schweiner v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 120 Wis.2d 344, 354 N.W.2d 767, 772-73 (1984) (<HOLDING>). A strong dissent in Billy exposed the flaws 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a third party holding legal title to property is a necessary party in an action for equitable distribution (B) holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party (C) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (D) holding that plaintiff could recover royalties only for products manufactured by defendant after disclosure of secret but before issuance of patent (E) holding that but for merger plaintiff could have sued predecessor that manufactured defective equipment as third party but not analyzing basis for such a suit
Output: (E)
See Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.04 (Vernon Supp.2003). Article 21.04 states the following: Any person who solicits an application for life, accident, or health insurance, or property or casualty insurance, shall, in any controversy between the insured or the insured’s beneficiary and the company issuing any policy upon such application or between the insured or the insured’s dependents and that company, be regarded as the agent of the company, and not the agent of the insured.... Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.04. By its own language, article 21.04 applies only to life, accident, health, property, or casualty insurance. Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.04; see generally Guthrie v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 682 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e) (<HOLDING>). In this case, appellant purchased worker’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that good faith exception does not apply because it is inconsistent with text of article 3823 (B) holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9 (C) holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding that a party could not pursue an employment discrimination claim under one article of a labor agreement when the complaint was framed exclusively in terms of another article of the same agreement (E) holding that when the type of insurance procured is not listed in article 2104 the article does not apply
Output: (E)
therefore is not owed Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (“If, under these canons, or other traditional means of determining Congress’s intentions, we are able to determine that Congress spoke clearly ..., then we may not defer to the[agency’s] contrary interpretation.”). Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation conflicts with NAGPRA’s plain language and so is invalid for that reason. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law (B) holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency (C) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (D) holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation (E) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority
Output: (B)
provides that each class must accept the plan or be unimpaired. The plan may still be confirmed over the dissent of one or more classes of impaired creditors if the plan complies with all requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) and the cramdown standard set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). In addition to the considerations of objections raised by parties in interest, this Court has a mandatory independent duty to determine whether the plan has met all of the requirements of confirmation. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1381, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010) (stating that bankruptcy court has obligation to ensure Chapter 13 plan complies with the Code even if the creditor fails to object); Burnett v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 646 F.3d 575, 581 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank (Matter of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that bankruptcy court preconfirmation bears an independent duty to assure compliance with title 11 even if no objection is lodged (B) holding that section 105a facilitates compliance with the bankruptcy code and the bankruptcy courts orders and compliance is one of the central goals of civil contempt sanctions (C) holding that an employer through its employees did not breach an independent duty to power company not to come in contact with power companys transmission lines because such a duty is a general duty not an independent one (D) holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc  105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding (E) holding that all core proceedings necessarily arise under title 11 or arise in a title 11 case
Output: (A)
set forth in the statute are met: the plaintiff must be “(1) an alien, (2) suing for a tort, which was (3) committed in violation of international law.” See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam). However, the explicit statutory requirements are not the only requirements for jurisdiction. Some of the numerous additional jurisdictional predicates include, for example, whether liability on the part of the defendant and the plaintiffs’ theory therefor are cognizable. See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179-80 (2d Cir.2014). Here, such initial prerequisites appear to be satisfied: Plaintiffs are citizens of Colombia bringing a civil suit for the extrajudicial killings of their decedents. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1316 (<HOLDING>). Further, Plaintiffs may pursue their claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it would be difficult to contend that violations of international human rights are in the public interest (B) holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury (C) recognizing the possibility that 28 usc  1331 supplies jurisdiction for violations of international law but not reaching the ultimate merits of the issue (D) recognizing that claims for extrajudicial killings are actionable international law violations under the ats (E) holding that atca establishes cause of action for violations of international law but requiring the district court to perform a traditional choiceoflaw analysis to determine whether international law law of forum state or law of state where events occurred should provide substantive law in such an action
Output: (D)
raiser was litigated) was brought by Guardian Ad Litem, and his fees in doing so were adjudged against Harter. Guardian does not demonstrate how any issue involving those funds also provides a basis for an award of her attorney’s fees. Guardian fails to demonstrate that this case constitutes an unusual type of case, or unusually complicated litigation, in order to qualify under the “very unusual circumstances” exception to the “American Rule.” For that reason alone, it is necessary that we reverse the portion of the judgment awarding Guardian her attorney’s fees. In further support of reversal of the award of Guardian’s attorney’s fees, however, is the fact that such an award is unsupported by substantial evidence. See Estate of Zeppenfeld, 593 S.W.2d 890, 894-95 (Mo.App. E.D.1979) (<HOLDING>). The evidence in this case was heard on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award (C) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (D) holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency (E) holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue
Output: (B)
century context. We hold, therefore, that a plaintiff may not recover for mental anguish for a potential injury to her unborn child that is wholly unsupported by any physical suffering during and after the incident in question and that explicitly has been ruled out by routine medical diagnostics. We are mindful of the fact, however, that pregnancy and childbirth continue to pose great mysteries that escape complete comprehension and control, and that carry risks with them, which, despite the latest advancements in medical research and technology, cannot be fully assessed. This has led some of our sister states to sustain their holdings in cases involving mental anguish suffered by pregnant women in recent decisions. See, e.g., Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 72 P.3d 96 (2003) (<HOLDING>). We emphasize that in an appropriate case this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident (B) holding that a pregnant woman whose baby died just before being born as a direct result of defendantdoctors negligence was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension about the childs wellbeing before death after she learned that the baby was in a transverse position across the upper part of the birth canal and defendant did not undertake any steps to correct the position until after the baby had died (C) holding female supervisors alleged comments that she did not want to add stress to the baby were sufficient direct evidence in a pregnancy discrimination mixed motives case (D) holding woman who claimed she was terminated after giving birth because she became pregnant was part of the protected class (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the victim suffered before she died based on numerous bruises on her forearms that appeared to be defensive wounds and the large amount of blood found at the scene of the crime indicating that many of the wounds were inflicted before the victim died
Output: (B)
defendant claimed that the officer’s “request for permission to ‘look through’ defendant’s automobile was so vague that defendant may not have understood the extent of the search.” Id. In rejecting that argument, the court stated that: Defendant stood beside his car expressing no concern during this thorough and systematic search.... At no time did defendant attempt to retract or narrow his consent. Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the consent. Id. (emphasis added). See also Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d at 425-26 (stating that the defendant was “cooperative during the search” and upholding a search in which police punched a hole in a car’s trunk); Lopez, 777 F.2d at 546-48 (<HOLDING>). B. Because Chaidez gave McMullin permission 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant consented to search of the glove box the trunk and the remainder of his vehicle and stood by without objecting when trooper searched beneath back seat of vehicle it was reasonable to conclude that defendants acquiescence indicated that the search was within the scope of the consent (B) holding conviction for possession was supported by sufficient evidence when a firearm was found under the passenger seat where the defendant had been sitting and the arresting officer observed the defendant trying to place something in the glove compartment which when searched yielded an ammunition clip matching the gun under the seat (C) holding that the presence of a gun in a cars passenger compartment supported the possibility that the cars trunk contained ammunition additional weapons andor other contraband (D) holding that where defendant consented to search of his car and stood by as agent conducted a thorough and systematic search which included removal of vehicles back seat and raising of cars rear quarter panel defendants failure to object to search indicated search was within scope of consent (E) holding that the defendant who stood by and watched as the officers searched the vehicle consented to a search during which officers checked under a cars seat looked in the cars glove compartment and removed a speaker by unscrewing it from a panel
Output: (E)
facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an “integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant’s] crimef.]” The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because    the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal
Output: (C)
and decisions that such a party believed adversely affected his position. Because the premise for seeking removal is presumably a product of a lack of understanding of the process required by the Decree, it is best characterized as baseless. Accordingly, the request for removal will be denied. B. Plaintiffs’ Right to a Jury Trial and the Special Master Process As an initial matter, Paragraph 11(2) of the Stage II Consent Decree provides in relevant part that: This Decree settles in full all class-claims for monetary relief of whatever kind for members of the plaintiff class against Local 542 ... which have been, are, or could have been raised in this litigation. This Decree is not intended, however, to affect, limit or in any way resolve any , 79 F.R.D. 98, 105-06 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (<HOLDING>). The court notes that Local 542 does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (B) holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 (C) holding that consent decree could not preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims that could not have been brought at time consent decree was filed and to which they were legally and procedurally entitled (D) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no  consent decree left to be terminated (E) holding a motion to revise an enrolled divorce decree because of a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the decree filed more than 5 years after entry of the enrolled decree was properly denied
Output: (C)
a drunk driver’s base offense level for involuntary manslaughter. 162 F.3d at 1252. Reasoning that “recklessness” covers a broad spectrum of behavior, the Tenth Circuit concluded that district courts should be free to depart if the facts indicate “a degree of recklessness that falls on the periphery of reckless conduct.” Id. at 1251. Among the factors justifying the upward departure were the defendant’s high blood-alcohol level, a prior conviction for drunk driving that had put her on notice of the dangerousness of her conduct, and several opportunities to avoid the accident on that day, including being refused service at a bar, having her keys taken from her, and narrowly avoiding a collision with another vehicle. Id. at 1252-53; see also Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 2003 WL 21399025, at *4 (<HOLDING>). In both Whiteskunk and Jones, the Tenth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure (B) holding that district courts error was not harmless because the court relied on an improper factor in imposing an upward departure (C) holding that a high bloodalcohol content and prior drunk driving convictions justified an upward departure on extreme recklessness and public safety grounds (D) holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure (E) holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress
Output: (C)
retail installment sales contract for eight vehicles nonexecutory where debtor’s only obligation was payment and creditor’s only obligation concerned limited repair warranty); Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash, D.C. v. Perry (In re Perry), 25 B.R. 817, 819-20 (Bankr.D.Md.1982) (finding installment sales contracts for vehicles not executory within meaning of § 365); Brock v. Am. Sec. Bank (In re Brock), 23 B.R. 998, 1002 n. 8 (Bankr.D.D.C.1982) (noting, without deciding, that installment sales contract for vehicle purchase “would not ordinarily be deemed an executory contract simply because the sole and remaining obligation under the contract is that of the debtor to maintain periodic contractual payments called for in the contract itself’); In re Whatley, 16 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1982) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the nonexe-cutory 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lien cannot be estopped into existence where the borrowers promised to execute a lien in the manner mandated by the constitution and then failed to do so (B) holding the beginning of a creditors action to subject an equitable estate to the payment of a judgment gives a specific lien upon the property which it is sought to reach and this lien continues while the cause is pending (C) holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding creditors obligation to cancel lien not sufficient to make the contract execute ry
Output: (E)
such as the instant case, federal courts must apply the substantive law of the forum state. Id. at 1515 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) and Keller v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 778 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1985)). This principle extends to the forum state’s choice of law rules. LaFarge, 118 F.3d at 1515 (citations omitted). We are thus bound to apply Florida’s choice of law rules in determining which state’s law governs this case. The district court held that Florida’s choice of law rules mandate the application of Florida law to a dispute over a contract to insure real property located within the state. The Sadikis concede, as they must, that the district court’s holding is entirely consistent with two prior opinions of this court. Id. at 1516 (<HOLDING>); Shapiro v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 899 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that by selling approximately eighteen percent of its product to florida importers moving nearly all of its product through the state purchasing equipment and supplies from florida suppliers utilizing storage facilities in florida and establishing essential business relationships in this state all within its ongoing commercial relationship with florida defendant engaged  in substantial and not isolated activity within the state  (B) holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise (C) holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state (D) holding that when an accident occurs outside florida workers compensation benefits are payable only if the contract of employment was made in florida or if the employees employment is principally located in florida (E) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree
Output: (C)
who have not returned their consents 30 days from the date notice is mailed as unnecessary. Plaintiff replies that reminder notice is necessary because potential class members work in remote locations far away from their homes for long periods of time. Plaintiff argues that reminder notice affects the broad remedial purposes of the FLSA and ensures that potential class members receive notice of their rights and potential claims. District courts are split as to whether reminder notices to potential class members are proper in FLSA actions. See Santinac v. Worldwide Labor Support of Illinois, Inc., 107 F.Supp.3d 610, 618-19, 2015 WL 3486971, *6 (S.D.Miss. June 2, 2015) (citing Garcia v. TWC Administration, LLC, Civil Action No. SA: 14-CV-985-DAE, 2015 WL 1737932 (W.D.Tex, April 16, 2015) (<HOLDING>)). Courts that have denied requests for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts (B) recognizing that uniformity has at its heart the equalization of the ratio among all properties in the district (C) holding that a district courts findings under rule 52a are to be liberally construed in support of the district courts judgment (D) recognizing split among district courts (E) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence
Output: (D)
writ denied); see also Attorney General of Tex. v. Redding, 60 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001) (noting that defendant’s right to rely on statute of limitations vests when limitations period expires); Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.1999) (same). Choice-of-law rules are alterable The majority suggests that chapter 149 disrupted Satterfield’s settled expectations in this case. It did not. Satterfield lacked any immediate entitlement or legally enforceable right to impose successor liability on Crown. Her successor-liability remedy depended entirely on the application of New York law through choice-of-law rules and those rules may be altered by statute in the same manner as other Texas law. See Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 574 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings (B) recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest (C) holding that bpps may not engage in legal assistance make inquiries or answer legal questions (D) recognizing that courts may make reasoned adjustments in legal system (E) holding that a municipal sewer system is liable for the acts of a third party that discharged hazardous waste into the system
Output: (D)
training, skill, or experience that may be helpful to the jury in understanding or determining the facts. Crime-scene analysis, which involves the gathering and analysis of physical evidence, is generally recognized as a body of specialized knowledge. See generally 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 417b at 499 (1979); State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129, 115 S.Ct. 2004, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995); United States v. Meeks, 35 M.J. 64 (C.M.A.1992); People v. Nolan, 152 Ill.App.3d 260, 105 Ill.Dec. 336, 504 N.E.2d 205 (1987); and Hill v. State, 647 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.App.1982). Therefore, because crime-scene analysis is not scientific evidence, we conclude that we are not bound by the test enunciated in Frye. Cf. Ex parte Dolvin, 391 So.2d 677 (Ala.1980) (<HOLDING>). The proper standard to determine whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that frye was inapplicable when evidence is in the nature of physical comparisons as opposed to scientific tests or experiments (B) holding that the frye test of general acceptance in the scientific community was superceded by the federal rules (C) holding under the restrictive frye test that pcrstr testing is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community (D) holding use of mtdna analysis to prove identity satisfied frye test for admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence (E) holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant
Output: (A)
deficient as to deprive the public of the ability to respond, when Tri-Valley CAREs itself relied upon that very document to specifically and publicly comment on the 2005 shipping incident? The purpose of an EA is not to compile an exhaustive examination of each and every tangential event that potentially could impact the local environment. Such a task is impossible, and never-ending. The purpose of the EA is simply to create a workable public document that briefly provides evidence and analysis for an agency’s finding regarding an environmental impact. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9; League of Wilderness Defenders Blue Mountains Biodiversity Proje ient manner to put the opposing party on notice are deemed waived. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). c. The 2008 Security Assessment NEPA requires 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that generally arguments not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned or waived (B) holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived (C) holding that claims must put parties on sufficient notice of underlying arguments or arguments are deemed waived (D) holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived (E) holding arguments not raised on appeal waived
Output: (C)
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B). Thus, it is clear that, under some circumstances, injunctions can constitute claims which are dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court must determine whether this case presents such a circumstance. A number of courts have considered whether an injunction prohibiting future breaches of a noncompete agreement can constitute a claim under Section 101(5)(B), reaching conflicting results based on a variety of reasonings. See e.g., In re Oseen, 133 B.R. 527 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1991) (finding that the injunction did not constitute a claim); In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim (B) holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act (E) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified
Output: (A)
literally refer to the possibility for rehabilitation. Finally, the jury instructions unambiguously permitted consideration of any mitigating evidence, unlike the recent situation in Payton, 299 F.3d at 824 (invalidating earlier jury instructions as too vague to guarantee that the jury considered post-conviction rehabilitation). Taken as a whole, there is no “reasonable likelihood” that the jury was prevented from considering constitutionally relevant evidence. Id. at 823 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)). VI Finally, Beardslee argues that the cumulative impact of multiple errors entitles him to relief. The district court did not rule on this claim, though it is cognizable. See Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing possibility of problems but holding there was no rule 403 violation in admitting statistics (B) recognizing that the possibility of a tradeoff between merits relief and attorneys fees is often implicit in class action settlement negotiations (C) holding that apparent eligibility exists where the record raises a reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief (D) recognizing the possibility that a defendant could have been prejudiced by the actual conduct of a codefendants defense (E) recognizing the possibility but denying relief
Output: (E)
of domestic violence. Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I’m going to object to this as introducing extraneous evidence. Trial Court: Sir, the document has been introduced into evidence without objection. She may proceed. Your objection is overruled. Defense Counsel: May I have a running objection as to all the previous objection just made to this evidence? Trial Court: Yes. Appellant concedes he is not challenging the admissibility of the medical records, but rather the harm that resulted when evidence of an extraneous bad act was read to the jury. Appellant cannot object on appeal to statements read from medical records to the jury, when the medical records were previously admitted at trial without objection. Wright v. State, 776 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>)- We overrule appellant’s ninth point of error. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection (B) holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection (C) holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection (D) holding defendant waived error when medical records admitted without objection and contents then read to jury (E) holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection
Output: (D)
added), while § 2702(a)(4) states, "[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon.” IcL., (emphasis added). 8 . A review of the certified record before us reveals appellant failed to file a pretrial motion to quash the information wherein he avers he was charged improperly with § 2702(a)(1) of the Crimes Code. Accordingly, this issue is arguably waived due to appellant's failure to raise the challenge at his first opportunity in a pretrial motion to quash. Compare Pa.R.Crim.P. 578, Omnibus Pretrial Motion for Relief, with Commonwealth v. Parmar, 448 Pa.Super. 470, 672 A.2d 314 (1996), appeal granted, 546 Pa. 640, 683 A.2d 879 (1996), affirmed, 551 Pa. 318, 710 A.2d 1083 (1998) (<HOLDING>). We have elected to address the merit of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the appellants claim on appeal had been abandoned because although his motion for a coa  briefly asserted the claim he did not brief the issue (B) holding that an appellant has no standing to raise a due process issue where he has not shown that the alleged deficiency in the notice had any connection in fact with his own failure to seek review of the denial of his claim (C) holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief (D) holding that while an appellants claim he was charged with the wrong crime may be waived due to his failure to properly preserve the issue by filing a pretrial motion to quash the waiver doctrine will not be applied where the statutes in question do not irreconcilably conflict on their face (E) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court
Output: (D)
states to provide worker compensation protection to maritime workers. See, e.g., Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917). The Act created a worker compensation Scheme that provided coverage to injured employees with out regard to employer liability, see 33 U.S.C. § 904, but that also was apparently intended to be an exclusive remedy, see 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1988) (stating that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive”). But see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530-31, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 2546, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In 1972, Congress substantially amended the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy (B) holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause (C) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (D) holding that under 1972 amendments  904 worker compensation is not exclusive remedy under lhwca where employer also happens to be vesselowner (E) holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer
Output: (D)
fact affirmatively rejected the court’s invitation to consider the instruction’s applicability. Additionally, the State argues, the evidence did not generate a self defense instruction, because appellant’s recorded statement to the police and her trial testimony showed that she understood the spitting to be accidental, and appellant did not produce testimony that she believed that she was in immediate or imminent danger of bodily harm. Analysis We agree with the State that any error on the part of the trial court in failing to give a self defense instruction is not only not preserved for our review, but is affirmatively waived. First, appellant waived her rights on this issue when she did not request a self defense instruction. See Tull v. State, 230 Md. 152, 156, 186 A.2d 205 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. State, 174 Md.App. 510, 520, 922 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction that omitted elements of crime that defense had conceded was error although not plain error (B) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (C) holding that failure to request jury instruction about manner in which evidence was obtained was not error and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance because defendant was not entitled to instruction (D) holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error (E) holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one
Output: (E)
and that the error was not fundamental. In Cagle v. State, 821 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), in which the State conceded error on appeal, this court clearly stated: A trial court may conduct probation revocation proceedings in an informal manner and it may question witnesses, but it may not assume the role of the prosecutor. Edwards v. State, 807 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Doing so deprives the defendant of the fair and impartial tribunal which is the cornerstone of due process. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Such conduct amounts to fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Sparks v. State, 740 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Id. at 444; see also Lyles v. State, 742 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the trial court assumed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment (B) holding lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is fundamental error that this court may properly raise and recognize sua sponte (C) holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error (D) holding that trial court committed fundamental error where it gave the appearance of partiality by taking sua sponte action which benefitted the state ie reopening the probation revocation hearing and ordering the probationer to submit to fingerprinting (E) holding that a claim is considered exhausted by arizonas fundamental error review if it was explicitly noted in the briefs presented to the state appellate court or the state court mentions it is considering the claim sua sponte
Output: (D)
on a peer-to-peer file sharing network” and “knowingly allowed others access to his Ares Shared Folder.” Viewing the instructions as a whole, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury Meisel’s proposed identification instruction. Although it is certainly possible Meisel’s proposed theory-of-defense instruction could have given the jury a “clearer understanding of the issues,” the district coui’t’s jury instructions were not erroneous or inadequate as given. See Bowling, 619 F.3d at 1183-84. And although this'court, if it were deciding the issue in the first instance, might well have instructed the jury consistent with Meisel’s theory-of-defense instruction, the governing standard of review is a deferential one; See Jordan, 485 F.3d at 1218 (<HOLDING>). The , district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment (B) holding that under the abuseofdiscretion standard this court will reverse only if the district courts decision is arbitrary capricious or whimsical or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment quotation omitted (C) holding court of appeals should review district courts determination regarding punitive damages under abuseofdiscretion standard (D) holding that under chevron step two courts may not disturb an agency rule unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance or manifestly contrary to the statute internal quotations omitted (E) holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable
Output: (B)
court that the fact [a prisoner] is barred by the one-year limitation period from asserting his claims pursuant to § 2255 does not establish that the remedy in § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’ ”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). Mr. Jones’s reliance on Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 2001) is equally unavailing. First, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Reyes-Requena does not suggest that a claim of actual innocence, standing alone, is sufficient to satisfy § 2255(e)’s savings clause. While Reyes-Requena establishes that the Fifth Circuit’s § 2255(e)’s savings clause test includes an “actual innocence prong,” it also indicates a petitioner must show more than actual innocence in order to proceed under § 2241. 243 F.3d at 904 (<HOLDING>). Second, and more importantly, “this court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under  2255 whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal (B) holding  2255es savings clause applies to a claim i that is based on a retroactively applicable supreme court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and ii that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioners trial appeal or first  2255 motion (C) holding that  2255 is not available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on appeal quotation omitted (D) holding that a claim including a constitutional claim must have been asserted to the trial court to be raised on appeal (E) holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal
Output: (B)
had to inquire into each deposit compared with the relatively simple procedure a customer could follow — by depositing the funds into a separate account, with proper notice to the bank, and keeping the funds segregated — to ensure that the funds remain exempt. Id. That portion of Bemardini holding that funds in a bank account lost their special status when commingled with a debtor’s general funds has been followed by the Fourth Circuit. Alexander & Jones v. Sovran Bank, N.A. (In re Nat Warren Contracting Co.), 905 F.2d 716, 718-19 (4th Cir.1990). But see NCNB Financial Servs., Inc. v. Shumate, 829 F.Supp. 178, 180-81 (W.D.Va.1993), aff'd sub nom. Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Shumate, 45 F.3d 427 (4th Cir.1994), cert. den. 515 U.S. 1161, 115 S.Ct. 2616, 132 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Woolard, 23 Collier Bankr.Cas. 59 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  407a imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits (B) holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation (C) holding that under 42 usc  407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income on a firstin firstout basis (D) holding a social security number is not private (E) holding that the express language of  407a and the clear intent of congress that social security benefits not be attachable
Output: (C)
self-incrimination because the prosecutor might have moved to set aside Harley’s plea on the basis of false testimony and to file charges against him fo crime apart from perjury Harley might reasonably be charged with in a future prosecution. The State refers only to capital murder, which in this case would be precluded by the prior conviction for the lesser included offense of first degree murder. As to the risk of prosecution for perjury, we are likewise skeptical. A witness may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent himself from imminent commission of peijury. Although the reverse is possible, i.e., a witness may claim the privilege to prevent himself from revealing a previous peijury, see, e.g., United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), the State fails to detail such circumstances 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege (B) holding that where a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to crossexamination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony (C) recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury (D) recognizing that a witness may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding (E) holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case
Output: (D)