niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, none of the parties to the district-court actions filed an appeal of the June 11, 2012, orders to the trial court to challenge the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the drivers’ appeals. See § 12-12-71, Ala. Code 1975 (“[A]ll appeals from final judgments of the district court shall be to the circuit court for trial de novo.”). Rather, the drivers and the city proceeded in the trial court, apparently under the assumption that the district court could properly transfer the three actions to the trial court. In fact, a district court may transfer an action that it determines is not within its jurisdiction but, rather, is within the jurisdiction of the circuit court: “If a case filed in the circuit p. 2008) (<HOLDING>); cf. Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 767-68 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court (B) holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment (C) holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court (D) holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim (E) holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action
Output: (C)
administrative complaint has expired, and an exhaustion requirement would preclude a civil suit. The primary goal of the exhaustion requirement is to prevent simultaneous proceedings regarding the same claim. The amended regulations resolve this problem, and the Government concedes exhaustion is not necessary. Consequently, the agency no longer supports the requirement. Thus, we hold that the amended regulations eliminate the exhaustion requirement for age discrimination claims and vacate the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand. VACATED and REMANDED. No costs allowed. 1 . We emphasize that our holding is limited to age discrimination claims governed by EEOC regulations. See, e.g., EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention (B) holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim (C) holding claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before litigating discriminatory lay off claim (D) holding that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as to each defendant later sued (E) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts 
Output: (C)
in the murder. See Garafola, 2006 WL 963878, at *3-5. While the petitioner alleges that he is innocent of the murder of Edward Garofalo, as he did in the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this conclusory allegation is insufficient. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (The petitioner’s “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity [and] [t]he subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal.... ”). The facts in the record, including the ir.2009) (same); Ferguson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 580 F.3d 1183, 1218-20 (11th Cir. 2009) (same); Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 460-61 (6th Cir.2001) (same); Wedra v. Lefevre, 988 F.2d 334, 344 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir.1991) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding judicial recusal claim barred because of procedural default (B) holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default (C) holding that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt (D) holding prosecutorial misconduct claim barred by procedural default (E) holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion
Output: (D)
decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer, and ... the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or officer.” R. 2:2-3(a)(2); see also Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 422-23, 895 A.2d 1154 (2006). Our “jurisdiction extends not only to State agency action but also agency inaction.” Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3.1 on R. 2:2-3(a)(2) (2011) (emphasis added); see also N.J. Civil Serv. Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 612, 443 A.2d 1070 (1982). The traditional meaning of an administrative agency is “[a] governmental body with the authority to implement and administer particular legislation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 63 09); Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth, 369 N.J.Super. 175, 187-88, 848 A.2d 793 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 147, 862 A.2d 56 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a determination of a new jersey spill compensation fund arbitrator is reviewable by the appellate division (B) holding that the new jersey statute of limitations applicable to  1983 actions is njsa 2a142 (C) holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending (D) holding that decisions of the new jersey meadowlands commission established in but not of the department of community affairs njsa 13175a are appealable to the appellate division as of right (E) holding that the new jersey sports and exposition authority constituted as a body corporate and politic within the department of community affairs njsa 5104a is a state agency whose decisions are initially reviewable in the appellate division
Output: (E)
to the defense of Poole. 6 . Moreover, not only did Poole's unilateral decision to have the school’s interior remedi-ated violate the terms of the policy, (see ECF No. 1-2 at 19), and impair Nautilus’s ability to protect its interests, which included mounting a litigation strategy to determine fault, see W. Bend Co. v. Chiaphua Indus., Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 816, 824 (E.D.Wis.2000) (explaining that prohibitions against voluntarily assuming obligations “exist to give the insurer — which is being asked to foot the bill — an opportunity to protect its interests”), but the late tender to Nautilus appears to have- deprived it of the opportunity to control the defense of Poole in the state action. See Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 569, 596 (E.D.N.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). To hold, as Westfield urges, that Nautilus 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend (B) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (C) holding that insurer must pay for defense after it declined to provide a defense and coverage was found to exist (D) holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay (E) recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control
Output: (E)
doubt about whether Swanson had perpetrated the robbery or whether intimidation was proved. Id. at 1071, 1074. There, we applied Cronic because counsel’s concession concerned the only factual issues in dispute on the only count that was charged. Id. at 1074. The government had also failed to identify any strategy that could justify counsel’s betrayal of his client. Id. at 1075. Unlike Swanson, Thomas was tried on multiple counts, and counsel decided to focus on the charges on which Thomas had a chance. As we recognized in Sioanson, “in some cases a trial attorney may find it advantageous to his client’s interests to concede certain elements of an offense or his guilt of one of several charges.” Id. at 1075-76; see also Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1087-90 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Osband v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder (B) holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill (C) holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense (D) holding that swanson and cronics presumption of prejudice does not apply where trial counsel conceded that defendant murdered the victim but asked the jury to convict him of firstdegree murder rather than felony murder in order to avoid eligibility for the death penalty (E) holding that counsel was not deficient in seeking a conviction for first degree murder rather than felony murder in order to avoid exposing his client to the death penalty and concluding that counsel made a reasonable assessment that the jury would be very unlikely to let anderson off of the hook completely
Output: (D)
OPINION BLACKBURN, District Judge. Currently before the court is the motion of plaintiff Linda N. Lewis to remand. Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the argument of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that plaintiffs motion to remand is due to be granted. This dispute arises out of defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiffs employment. On February 1, 1996, plaintiff filed suit in the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Jefferson County, Alabama, alleging that defendants violated Alabama Code § 25-5-11.1, which prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for claiming workers’ compensation benefits under Alabama law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on March 20, 1996, and 725 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955, 115 S.Ct. 377, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  255111 claim does not arise under alabamas workers compensation laws (B) holding action did not arise under the patent laws (C) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (D) holding that illinois cause of action for retaliation does not arise under its workers compensation laws (E) holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws
Output: (D)
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Amores claims that the government has insufficient evidence to satisfy the “carry” element of the statute. When a motor vehicle is used, the definition of “carry” “takes on a less restrictive meaning than carrying on the person,” and “the government is required to prove only that the defendant transported a firearm in a vehicle and that he had actual or constructive possession of the firearm while doing so.” United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1258-59 (10th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir.1997); see Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Taking the evidence in the light most 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that carries a firearm includes one who knowingly possesses and conveys a firearm in a vehicle (B) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense (C) holding the word carry includes the carrying of a firearm in a vehicle (D) holding that carry includes carrying of weapons directly on the person (E) holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons
Output: (C)
counsel is necessary to warrant the “drastic step of disqualification of counsel.” Id. at 602-03 (citations omitted) (quoting Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145-46 (4th Cir.1992), and citing Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (4th Cir.1978), and Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (4th Cir.1982)). The Court notes that “the lawyer’s duty of loyalty long has precluded the representation of conflicting interests.” Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990); see also Dyntel Corp. v. Ebner, 120 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir.1997) (“[UJnder Virginia law it is clear that a lawyer owes his or her client a fiduciary duty.”); Tessier, 731 F.Supp. at 733 (<HOLDING>). This duty of loyalty is reflected in Rules 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (B) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (C) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (D) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (E) holding that erisas duty of loyalty creates a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries
Output: (D)
(9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>).' Amara’s remaining contentions are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice (B) recognizing that dismissal may be proper where plaintiff concedes the failure to exhaust (C) holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice (D) holding dismissal with prejudice is appropriate remedy for failure to timely file undertaking (E) holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter
Output: (A)
United States v. Quintero, 937 F.2d 95, 96-97 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 654-55 (3d Cir.1991) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was deprived of the benefit of his bargain by the application of the relevant conduct guideline to a count dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1515, 117 L.Ed.2d 651 (1992); United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 805-06 (4th Cir.1989) (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he was denied the benefit of his bargain); United States v. Rodriguez-Nuez, 919 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (rejecting the contention that it was "fundamentally unfair" to apply § 1B1.3(a)(2) to a count dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain); United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been dismissed with prejudice (B) holding that the notice of appeal filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed (C) holding that application of  1b13a2 to a dismissed count was not inequitable because the plea bargain did not impliedly preclude the district court from considering evidence of the conduct charged in the dismissed count and the defendant could have predicted that the court would aggregate the conduct (D) holding that the trial court should have dismissed the employees breach of contract claim (E) holding where there was no indication in the procedural history that the court had held that the five prior appeals dismissed for failure to prosecute were frivolous that the dismissals did not count as strikes under  1915g
Output: (C)
Her affidavit explains her asset purchases, bank deposits, and credit card activity during the relevant time period. Her affidavit stated her tax records provide an accurate reflection of her income during the relevant times. Her affidavit thus sets forth specific facts disputing her exclusive control of the student activity account and controverting the claim that her personal finances show a $57,759.21 misappropriation. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. C & J Vantage Leasing Co., 784 N.W.2d at 756. We find Van Haaften’s affidavit testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of the theft in excess of the $10,000 conclusively established by her Alford plea. See Wemimont v. Wernimont, 686 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court erred in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a speculative affidavit which contained mere conjecture was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial (B) holding that nonmoving party need not produce evidence unless moving party first brings forth evidence either tending to prove lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging existence of element of cause of action (C) holding that dispute regarding material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship
Output: (E)
of drug trafficking may be predicated, in part, on a cash transaction for a one way ticket and on nervous conduct. Id. n. 7 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (stating that "appearance and conduct" may be factors supporting reasonable suspicion)). Unusual travel plans and inconsistencies in information provided to the officer during a traffic stop may also give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Wood, 106 F.3d at 946-47. Because reasonable suspicion is based on any rational inferences an officer may draw from the totality of the circumstances, a court must examine the combination of all the facts to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Morales, 935 P.2d at 941; Boylan, 854 P.2d at 812 (<HOLDING>). We have held that "there are 'cireumstances 
 Holding statements: (A) holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances (B) holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer (C) holding that while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement (D) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (E) holding that the excluded evidence required a finding of reasonable suspicion
Output: (C)
do not believe that a federal probation officer acts on behalf of the prosecution.”) Investigating a probationer’s alleged noncompliance with the terms of his probation is certainly a regular duty of a probation officer. Therefore, absent evidence that Polk stepped outside his neutral role as a federal probation officer, we question the dissent's assumption that Polk acted as an agent of the police. Second, even assuming that Polk was acting on behalf of the police when he met with Howard, an argument rejected by both the federal magistrate judge, (J.A. at 213), and the district court, (J.A. at 301-02), the1 dissent offers no factual support for its conclusion that Polk "interrogated” Howard. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-89, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In fact, as discussed at n. 2 & n. 10, supra, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial (C) recognizing that not all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation (D) recognizing that police and the courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody (E) holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation
Output: (C)
literal reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) is inconsistent with our ease law. See In re Levy, 951 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.1991) (section 523(a)(2)(A) “limits nondis-ehargeability to the amount of benefit to the debtor or loss to the creditor the act of fraud itself created”). An action for nondischarge-ability under § 523(a)(2)(A) requires only: (1) a representation; (2) falsity; (3) scienter; (4) reliance; and “(5) that the creditor sustained the alleged loss and damage as the proximate result of the representations having been made.” In re Britton, 950 F.2d at 604. Malpractice is a foreseeable result of any medical procedure, id. at 604-05, and the fifth element can be proved if the debtor fraudulently induced the creditor to undergo a procedure that was then negligently performed. Id. at 605 (<HOLDING>). Lee-Benner alleged damage from negligent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding finding of reliability not clearly erroneous despite lack of prior description (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous (E) holding clearly erroneous bankruptcy courts conclusion that mobile home was property of the estate
Output: (D)
action under the Donnelly Act (General Business Law § 340) because the treble damages remedy provided for in subsection 5 constitutes a ‘penalty’ within the meaning of CPLR 901(b).” Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 290 A.D.2d 206, 737 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y.App.Div.2002). See also Paltre v. Gen. Motors Corp., 26 A.D.3d 481, 483, 810 N.Y.S.2d 496 (N.Y.App.Div. 2006) (“The treble damages provision [in New York’s Donnelly Act] is a penalty within the meaning of § 901(b). The plaintiffs’ Donnelly Act class action may not be maintained because the Donnelly Act does not specifically authorize the recovery of this penalty in a class action[.]”) (citations omitted); Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 26 A.D.3d 488, 489, 810 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y.App.Div.2006), aff'd, 8 N.Y.3d 204, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760, 863 N.E.2d 1012 (2007) (<HOLDING>). As was discussed in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court properly dismissed as barred by res judicata an independent action for rescission of a prior judgment on the basis of fraud where the plaintiff failed to mount a viable direct attack on the earlier judgment (B) holding where plaintiffs stake in controversy disappears before there has been effort to certify class action the action must be dismissed (C) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (D) holding that the court below had properly dismissed the plaintiffs donnelly act class action as barred by cplr  901b (E) holding that district court properly dismissed claims in  2241 petition that had been decided in previous habeas action
Output: (D)
court orders denying motions which Burton filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a) challenging his departure sentence. See Burton v. State, 923 So.2d 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Burton v. State, 889 So.2d 82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). In his direct appeal and in these prior postconviction proceedings Burton never argued that his conviction for attempted second degree murder with a firearm should not have been classified as a first degree felony. Instead, he simply challenged the trial court’s basis fo 2006) (“Blakely ... is not retroactive”). However, the trial judge granted Burton’s third 3.800(a) motion based upon his erroneous view that Burton was entitled to relief because his direct appeal was in the “pipe-fine” when Apprendi was decided in 2000. See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521, 530 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because Burton did not object to the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases state or federal pending on direct review or not yet final with no exception (B) holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal (C) recognizing that the pipeline theory allows a defendant to seek application of a new rule of law if the case is pending on direct review or not yet final and the defendant timely objected at trial (D) holding that tillman applied to cases then pending on direct appeal ie in the pipeline (E) holding that a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final
Output: (C)
as an “animal”). We will not, however, reverse a sentence on the basis of improper prose-cutorial statements unless those statements are prejudicial enough to deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights to a fair penalty phase hearing. At the outset, we reject Allen’s contention that in a capital case there is greater protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for a fair penalty phase hearing than there is for a fair trial. In determining whether Allen has received a fair penalty phase hearing, we therefore adopt the same standard set out by the Supreme Court and this court in determining whether a defendant has received a fair trial under the Constitution despite improper prosecutorial comments during trial. See, e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (<HOLDING>); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1502 (outlining a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant question is whether the prosecutors comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process (B) holding that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a state criminal conviction the relevant question under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that the trial courts order violated due process because it was unclear whether or not the defendant was required to appear on the date in question (D) holding that plain error is the appropriate standard of review when a defendant objects to a prosecutors comments at trial does not move for a mistrial and then on appeal argues that the comments deprived him of a fair trial (E) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error
Output: (A)
countries but noting that the right generally remains less expansive than the Fifth Amendment right in the United States). There is no reason to think the drafters of the Vienna Convention had these uniquely American rights in mind, especially given the fact that even the United States Supreme Court did not require Fifth and Sixth Amendment post-arrest warnings until it decided Miranda in 1966, three years after the treaty was drafted. Judge Thomas’s dissent discusses the longer history of the exclusionary rule for an involuntary confession, but that is not the issue we must decide. Although appellant contends that the exclusionary rule is the usual and, in this instance, only effective way to enforc (4th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that agents violation of irs regulations did not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of violation (B) holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that congress intended exclusion as a remedy (C) holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation (D) holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required (E) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation
Output: (B)
does not violate the Equal Terms Provision if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Other circuits, by contrast, require that a comparator be “similarly situated” to the plaintiff religious assembly or institution with regard to the regulation at issue or to its purpose. For instance, the Third Circuit restricts comparison to “secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated [to the religious assembly] as to the regulatory purpose.” Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir.2007). The Second Circuit compares the plaintiff religious assembly to a nonreligious assembly “similarly situated for all functional intents and purposes of the regulation.” Elijah Grp., Inc. v. C p. 581 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>). Ill Do TOL Christian Schools and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (B) holding that where defendants assertion depends on proof to be offered at trial summary judgment is inappropriate (C) holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof (D) holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient (E) holding summary judgment inappropriate to resolve an essentially procedural conflict
Output: (B)
decision) (concluding that evidence of intimidation from an Islamist Group without government response was harassment and did not rise to the level of persecution); see also Ujkic v. Ashcroft, 107 Fed.Appx. 560, 562 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished decision). Furthermore, in most instances, neither hostility between competing ethnic groups nor race discrimination constitutes persecution. See Ouda, 324 F.3d at 450; Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390; see also Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring petitioner to show that “mistreatment she suffered was directed personally toward her, and that it was substantially more grievous in kind or degree than the general manifestation of hostility between competing ethnic and religious groups in Fiji”); Ghaly, 58 F.3d at 1431 (<HOLDING>); Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment (B) holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa (C) holding that while widespread violence against a protected group by private individuals and public officials may constitute persecution widespread discrimination that may include persecution of some individuals does not compel such a finding (D) holding that where private discrimination is neither condoned by the state nor the prevailing social norm it does not constitute persecution (E) holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution
Output: (D)
electronic, mechanical, or other device (as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) ]) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States[.] 18 U.S.C. 3504. An aggrieved party’s claim must “appear to have a ‘colorable’ basis before it may function to trigger the government’s obligation to respond under § 3504.” United States v. Pacella, 622 F.2d 640, 643 (2d Cir.1980) (quoting United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 943 (2d Cir.1977)). A respondent can satisfy the requirements of § 3504 by producing affidavits asserting that no evidence to be used in the proceeding was obtained by unlawful surveillance, or by producing a court order showing that the surveillance was lawful. United States v. Kember, 648 F.2d 1354, 1369 (D.C.Cir.1980); In re Millow, 529 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Here, the defendants had no obligation to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (B) holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function (C) holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold (D) holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to determine date employment was to begin (E) holding that the governments submission of a court order authorizing electronic surveillance was a sufficient response to a claim that evidence was a product of illegal wiretaps
Output: (E)
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). At the outset, we consider the effect of TAPAA’s introductory paragraph. Section 1653(c)(1) prescribes that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,” the owner of a vessel carrying trans-Alaska oil and the Fund “shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection....” 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1). Section 1653(c)(1) is the general statement of liability, and as such it introduces the subsequent subsections which contain TAPAA’s operational details. While some courts have found “notwithstanding” phrases to preempt explicitly the application of other laws, see, e.g., Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>), we do not find the phrase dispositive in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking (B) holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act (C) holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit (D) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (E) holding that similar notwithstanding language in the clean water act preempted application of limitation act to limit owners liability for cleanup costs
Output: (E)
that her statement plays no part in this appeal. 2 . The district court also relied on the "inevitable discovery” doctrine, under which unlawfully obtained evidence is admissible if it "ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); see also United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412 (D.C.Cir.1992). The government based its inevitability claim on the testimony of Officer Maradiaga and Sergeant Caldwell, each of whom testified that, but for Maradiaga's mistake about consent, he would have stopped the search and sought a warrant. We are dubious that such conjectural testimony is adequate to support applying the doctrine to this case. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. at 2509 n. 5 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, while the circuits disagree over 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances (B) holding that inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment (C) holding that dismissal for discovery violations was an extreme remedy but warranted under the facts of the case (D) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (E) recognizing inevitable discovery exception under fourth amendment
Output: (B)
of the collateral caused by market forces. Second, Onua argues that various mortgage payments made by him to the banks in furtherance of the scheme, as well as certain other “credits and offsets,” were not properly deducted from the overall amount of restitution. We hold that Onua forfeited this argument, by failing to object to either the District Court’s calculation of restitution at sentencing or to the Government’s proposed Final Order of Restitution, which adopted the District Court’s calculation. Because the District Court’s calculation of restitution did not constitute plain error, see United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.2001), we affirm the District Court’s judgment as to the amount of restitution. See also United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that Onua’s objections 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court (B) holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes (C) holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error (D) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
Output: (A)
efforts as well as this court’s jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the court is not persuaded that Bank of America has satisfied the requirements for a stay pending appeal. SO ORDERED. 1 . The court herein incorporates by reference the findings and reasoning set forth in the Stay Order. See In re Brier Creek Corp. Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 2013 WL 144082, 2013 Bankr.LEXIS 143 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2013). 2 . See also Piccinin, 788 F.2d at 1002-03 (“The court will have ample power [under Section 105] to enjoin actions excepted from the automatic stay which might interfere in the rehabilitative process whether in a liquidation or in a reorganization case.”); Apollo Molded Prods., Inc. v. Kleinman (In re Apollo Molded Prods., Inc.), 83 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr.D.Mass.1988) (<HOLDING>) (citing Piccinin); Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin federal administrative proceedings when they threaten the debtors estate (B) holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc  105a (C) holding debtors are entitled to establish and recover their compensatory damages under 11 usc  105a for violations of the discharge injunction (D) holding bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue injunction of state court litigation against debtors principal stating this power under 11 usc  105a  includes the authority to enjoin litigants from pursuing actions in other courts that threaten the integrity of the debtors estate (E) holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtors principal residence from modification under 11 usc  1322b
Output: (D)
26C et al, 226 Or 263, 278, 360 P2d 282 (1961). In that historical context, it is clear that a plaintiffs remedies against a public body created by the state to perform functions on behalf of the state would have been understood by the drafters to have been entirely dependent on the will of the legislature. That is, in 1857, a plaintiff would not have had any absolute rights against such a body; rather, the legislature would have had the ability, when creating a public body to operate as an instrumentality of the state, to determine the scope of the public body’s liability. See Hale, 308 Or at 518 (at the time of statehood, instrumentalities of the state government, performing state government functions, partook “fully of the state’s immunity from suit”) (citing Vendrell, 226 Or 263 (<HOLDING>), and Templeton v. Linn County, 22 Or 313, 29 P 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth (B) recognizing the districts duty of care for the protection of school children in its schools (C) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (D) recognizing that school districts may not enter agreements which are inconsistent with state law (E) recognizing that municipal corporations can include under the missouri constitution in addition to cities and towns counties school districts townships under township organization special road districts and drainage districts
Output: (C)
the original form of the authorizing statute would nonetheless be saved under the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, which provides: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. This provision reversed the common-law rule, under which the repeal of a criminal law “preclude[d] punishment for acts antedating the repeal.” Landgraf 511 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 1483; see also Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281, 283, 3 L.Ed. 101 (1809) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, “unless [a] repealing statute 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision increases the punishment for being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce and it does not affect the punishment previously meted out to the defendant for the  crimes he committed prior to the effective date of the statute (B) holding that a statute may be facially challenged only  by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep  (C) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   (D) holding that an executive order authorized by statute and intended to implement or supplement that statute has the force of law (E) holding that when a criminal statute expires or is repealed no penalty can be enforced nor punishment inflicted for violations of the law committed while it was in force unless some special provision be made for that purpose by statute
Output: (E)
is (1) its alter ego, (2) a mere department of it, or (3) its agent. See Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp., 943 F.Supp. 559, 562-63 (E.D.Pa.1996) (reciting the three tests under which a subsidiary’s contacts can be imputed to the parent); see also Arch, 984 F.Supp. at 837 (suggesting comprehensive approach whereby “all relevant factors” contained in the three tests are considered at once). Jurisdiction based on agency is proper where “the subsidiary is necessarily performing activities that the parent would otherwise have to perform in the absence of the subsidiaryf.]” In re Latex Gloves Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1148, 2001 WL 964105, at *3 n. 10 (E.D.Pa. Aug.22, 2001) (quoting Arch, 984 F.Supp. at 837). See also Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., 781 F.Supp. 1079, 1084-86 (E.D.Pa.1992) (<HOLDING>). This is in contrast to a nonresident holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent corporations contacts may not be imputed to its subsidiary (B) holding that parent corporation could not be held liable for any acts of whollyowned subsidiary although boards of directors of the two corporations overlapped in all other respects corporation had not disregarded subsidiarys corporate separateness had not involved itself directly in management of subsidiary and had not otherwise dominated or controlled subsidiary (C) recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations (D) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (E) holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself 
Output: (E)