niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
conviction by proving the falsity of Defendant’s testimony about the above two emails. 2. Misuse of the Grand Jury Defendant also alleges that the grand jury’s investigation was a mere pretext to lay the groundwork for a perjury indictment. Defendant argues that hailing him before the grand jury to establish the foundation for a perjury conviction was an improper purpose for the grand jury. See United States v. Under Seal, 714 F.2d 347, 349 (4th Cir.1983) (“[Pjractiees which do not aid the grand jury in its quest for information bearing on the decision to indict are forbidden.”). As such, Defendant claims that his testimony was immaterial to a grand jury investigation and cannot form the basis for a false declaration charge. See Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir.1957) (<HOLDING>). Defendant cites several circumstances in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury (B) holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering  only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment (C) holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury (D) holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings (E) holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose
Output: (E)
fears that are chimerical and those that are realistic. The best that we have been able to do is to insist that, in these purlieus, standing requires an “objectively reasonable” fear of prosecution. Id.; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972) (stating that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ [produced by government intelligence-gathering] are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm”). Determining objective reasonableness demands a frank consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the conduct that a particular statute proscribes. See New Hampshire Right to Life, 99 F.3d at 16; cf. Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Association intends to solicit new 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that the qualified immunity determination does not entail an inquiry into the officers subjective intentions merely his knowledge (C) holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances (D) holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances (E) holding that the courts inquiry into the reasonableness of the governments proposed corrective action was proper
Output: (C)
Dubuque’s “irrevocable” decision to relocate was not a vote to categorically refuse Dubuque’s overtures, but a vote to insist on financial disclosure as a prelude to bargaining. The Board’s finding that good-faith bargaining between Dubuque and the UFCW might not have been futile was substantially supported by the record. 3. Retroactivity Finally, Dubuque argues that the Board erred by “retroactively” employing its new test in this case. Again, we disagree. Our formulation of the standard for evaluating challenges to the retroactive application of a ruling from an agency adjudication has varied. Compare Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C.Cir.1972) (applying a five-factor test) with Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted) with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no retroactive application (B) recognizing a general principle that retroactive application of rules is permitted absent any manifest injustice (C) holding retroactive application (D) recognizing principle (E) holding that retroactive application of amendments will not result in manifest injustice
Output: (B)
dominion and control over” the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual “carries” a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of “carry” since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define “carry” broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of “carry.” In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be “carried”); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle
Output: (D)
industry is constitutional.” Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that “the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. § 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS’ powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA’s warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists  the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances
Output: (B)
claim in the third amended complaint, this complaint was not filed until after the summary judgment briefing was filed. Next, Elliott challenges the grant of summary judgment on her supervisory liability claim against Harnett. Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Harnett on the supervisory liability claims for substantially the same reasons as those stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned order. Critically, Elliott failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate that Harnett was personally involved in Glace’s death. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Although Elliott argues that Harnett was 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing conflict between interests of the highest order (B) recognizing conflict (C) recognizing the conflict (D) recognizing possible conflict between the cases (E) recognizing conflict between circuits
Output: (D)
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2002) (failure to exhaust ineffective assistance claim does not create procedural bar in light of CPL § 440.10(3)(c)); Marchese v. Senkowski, No. 97 Civ.2055, 1999 WL 731011, at *6 n. 4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999) (same)); accord Affser v. Murray, No. 04 CV 2715, 2008 WL 2909367, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (“But those claims [of ineffective assistance of trial counsel] are not necessarily defaulted. Petitioner could raise them in yet another motion to vacate, and under § 440.10(3)(c) the state court could, in its discretion, review the claims on their merits despite petitioner’s failure to assert them in his previous motion to vacate.”); see also Reyes v. Phillips, 02 Civ. 7319, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19488, *14-18, 2005 WL 2173812, *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>); but see Caicedo v. Garvin, No. 95 CV 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (B) holding that because section 440103b was discretionary the court was not prepared to hold that petitioner could not return to file a second section 44010 motion (C) holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court
Output: (B)
Nogueira’s own testimony, that, as required under § 3B1.4, Gerald took multiple affirmative acts to involve No-gueira in the crime, such that Nogueira’s involvement was directly foreseeable to Gerald. See id. at 1288 (emphasizing foreseeability). Specifically, Gerald used and directed Nogueira to schedule the meetings at the church, pass out information to the applicants, translate for her during multiple meetings at Bethel Christian Church, complete falsified residency letters (including translated letters), and arrange meetings. Gerald also paid No-gueira $100 to create a flyer that promoted Gerald’s “immigration consulting” services and provided Gerald’s contact information. Nogueira helped Gerald in her scheme and was not merely present during the offense. Taber, 497 F.3d at 1181 (<HOLDING>). Certainly, Nogueira’s actions furthered 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants affirmative acts of driving minor to robbery helping minor enter the building and serving as a lookout for the minor warranted sentencing enhancement (B) holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor (C) holding that reasonable attorneys fees for the benefit of a minor in defending the minor against a criminal charge were necessaries (D) holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing (E) holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor
Output: (A)
in 1995. She claims that though she moved, she kept a post office box in Toledo, Ohio, where the information should have been sent. 5 . Del Rio also argues that Toledo Edison failed to abide by the terms of the LTD plan because the appeals committee did not independently review the medical evidence in the case. Appellant’s Br. at 25. We find this argument to be without merit. First, Del Rio did not offer any medical evidence to the appeals committee to review. Second, assuming arguendo that Toledo Edison failed to abide by the LTD Plan’s procedures, Del Rio would be entitled to only equitable relief, not the compensatory and punitive damages which she is seeking. ERISA § 502(a)(3); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-59 & n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude that Del Rio is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable relief under  502a3 does not include compensatory and punitive damages (B) holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies (C) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (D) holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa (E) holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages
Output: (A)
is fraudulent include but are not limited to the timing of the union, whether the couple intends to live together as husband and wife, and whether the couple entered the marriage in good faith. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (84-5), 111 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir.1985) (stating mere suspicious timing of union does not alone support finding of sham marriage, where individuals had live-in relationship for some time before subpoena was served on one individual to testify against other individual before grand jury). In this context, when enough facts show the marriage was fraudulent, the spousal testimony privilege cannot be invoked; and a court can compel one spouse to testify against the defendant other spouse in a criminal proceeding. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The second approach to the spousal testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify (B) holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied (C) holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was at least somewhat capable of supporting herself where evidence of wifes depression and other mental health problems was uncontested but where other evidence showed that these conditions did not totally bind her to the family home and that wife had been financially successful in the past (D) holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees (E) holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted
Output: (B)
that may be reviewed by this Court for plain error, even sua sponte, whereas an active inducement, acquiescence, or other affirmative act demonstrates an intentional waiver of an issue or right that this Court will not notice even under plain-error review. Williams v. People, 59 V.I. 1024, 1033 (V.I. 2013). And while, in this case, it was Pickering’s counsel — rather than Pickering himself — who affirmatively stated at oral argument that he does not object to a retrial on unauthorized possession or reckless endangerment, defense counsel is authorized to waive a double jeopardy claim on behalf of the defendant on appeal unless doing so would rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355, 364 n.6 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned (B) holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned (C) holding that the decision of what issues to brief on appeal belongs solely to the attorney and not the criminal defendant (D) holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief (E) holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury
Output: (C)
(9th Cir.1954) (concluding that expert opinions did not support jury verdict, in part because "[o]pinion evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based” and record did not support opinions). Here, for the reasons stated, the record demonstrates that the officers' percep tion of an immediate threat — whether correct or not — was clearly reasonable and therefore that their initial use of deadly force was justified. 9 . The situation Appellants faced here — having to determine in a split-second whether a suspect is using his vehicle as a weapon — is analogous to the scenario of an officer forced to make a split-second decision as to whether to use deadly force against a suspect who he believes has a firearm. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-17 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something (B) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (C) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (D) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (E) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station
Output: (D)
OCGA § 16-6-11 (5) (“Aperson commits the offense of pimping when he or she... [ajids or abets, counsels, or commands another in the commission of prostitution or aids or assists in prostitution where the proceeds or profits derived therefrom are to he divided on a pro rata basis.”); OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) (“Aperson commits the offense of aggravated child molestation when such person commits an offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy.”); OCGA § 16-6-5 (a) (“A person commits the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes when he or she solicits, entices, or takes any child under the age of 16 years to any pl ate, 276 Ga. 736, 739 (2) (585 SE2d 616) (2003). 8 See Phillips v. State, 289 Ga. App. 281, 282 (1) (656 SE2d 905) (2008) (<HOLDING>). 9 See Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 120 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless (B) holding that any error in admitting results of breath test through admission of breathalyzers certificate of inspection which defendant claimed constituted inadmissible testimonial hearsay was harmless when the jury acquitted defendant of driving under the influence with an unlawful bloodalcohol concentration (C) holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict (D) holding that defendant waived error of admission of hearsay testimony when he elicited it himself (E) holding 1 that administering a breath test is not a critical stage of the proceedings to which a sixth amendment right to counsel attaches and 2 that the results of a breath test are physical evidence  not testimonial  and thus no fifth amendment right to counsel attaches
Output: (B)
in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and the right to confrontation and cross-examination guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, apply in juvenile proceedings in which a juvenile can be imprisoned for a term of years. 1980 Doe, 62 Haw. at 72, 610 P.2d at 511; see also, e.g., In re Doe, 70 Haw. 32, 36-38, 761 P.2d 299, 302-03 (1988) (1988 Doe) (discussing Sixth Amendment right to confrontation) (abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Moore, 82 Hawai'i 202, 220-22, 921 P.2d 122, 140-42 (1996) (re foundation required for excited utterance exception to hearsay rale)); In re Doe, 77 Hawai'i 46, 49, 881 P.2d 533, 536 (1994) (1994 Doe) (<HOLDING>). While HRS § 571-11(1) proceedings need not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel (B) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (C) recognizing minors right to representation by counsel in a law violation proceeding (D) holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation (E) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal
Output: (C)
information and notice “as required” by “this subtitle” and various sections therein. CP 2010 § ll-721(a). Clearly then, if appellant is not “required” to register under MSORA, he cannot be convicted of failing to register under CP 2010 § 11-721. Notably, when the Fourth Circuit reviewed the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), it also concluded that a registration requirement was an element of the failure-to-register offense. See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We acknowledge that the basis for removing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant could not be charged with bail jumping for failing to pay a fine and emphasizing that an essential element of the crime of failure to appear was that the defendants personal appearance was actually required in a criminal proceeding (B) holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court (C) holding that one essential element of the crime of failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offenders change of address is that the defendant is a person required  to register  (D) holding that the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property is an essential element of the crime of larceny (E) holding that failure to identify the defendant in the information is an omission of an essential element because the primary purpose of the charging document is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations brought against him
Output: (C)
be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered -with reference to the whole instrument.” Id. Here, we believe the policy at issue can be given a definite legal meaning and is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning; therefore, we hold the policy is unambiguous as a matter of law. The policy specifies SLIC will provide Wink a defense against claims arising from negligent errors or omissions resulting in civil violation of “[a]ny federal, state or local Truth-in-Lending statute.” We see nothing in the policy’s language that would limit Wink’s coverage to actions based on alleged violations of the federal TILA and its specific state or local counterparts. See Fredericks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Or.App. 269, 915 P.2d 472, 476 (1996) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold the policy’s plain language 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same where the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract provision that incorporated federal law by reference and breach of a new york statute by failing to provide uniform rates allegedly required by federal law (B) holding policy provision promising defense costs for an alleged violation of any federal state or local    truth in lending    law was unambiguous and required a defense whenever a cause alleged facts that could be a violation of any law that has as its purpose the same objectives as the federal truthinlending act tila and its state and local counterparts (C) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (D) holding that the state law contract claim alleged the same conduct as in the erisa claim and was therefore preempted (E) recognizing that plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the law of the land clause in the north carolina constitution because pjlaintiffs were unable to establish a federal due process violation and the constitutional claims state and federal are analyzed the same way
Output: (B)
a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach of duty. E.g., Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 529 S.E.2d 710 (2000). Evidence is relevant and admissible if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rules 401, 402, SCRE. It is well settled that the admission and rejection of testimony is largely within the trial court’s sound discretion, the exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. A.2d 1033, 1034-35 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Stone v. United Eng’g, 197 W.Va. 347, 475 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (B) holding that occupational health and safety administration osha standards were admissible (C) holding that flexibility in park services standards for establishing speed limits did not mean that the standards basic scientific safety specifications may be disregarded (D) holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards (E) holding that when state educational benefits exceed minimum federal standards the state standards are enforceable through the idea
Output: (D)
are not relevant to our analysis. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iv)-(vii) (Supp.2007). 2 . Petitioner also argues, based upon certain language used by the district court, that the increases in alimony were actually intended to be child support for those children who had reached majority, but who were still living with Respondent. It is well settled that a parent's child support obligation terminates when a child reaches majority, and alimony is not a substitute for child support. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-12-102(6), -105(1) (2008). We do not find, however, that the district court intended the increased amount to be child support disguised as alimony, and accordingly do not address Petitioner's argument on this point. 3 . See, eg., Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 722 (<HOLDING>); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a petition to change alimony based upon the husbands imminent retirement was not ripe because the planned retirement was not an actual substantial material change in circumstances 97 quoting utah code ann  30358gi supp2003 (B) holding that former husband was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on petition to modify alimony where he failed to demonstrate substantial change in circumstances since entry of a prior order denying modification of alimony from which he did not appeal (C) holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding that a permanent change in income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction of alimony
Output: (A)
is simply an aggregation of the credit limits of stolen credit card numbers, despite no evidence that Diallo intended to cause that amount of loss; and (2) the District Court incorrectly increased his offense level by four levels based on a finding that there were over fifty victims when only thirty victims had suffered an actual loss. The Government has conceded that the number-of-victims enhancement is improper because the applicable Sentencing Guidelines require that victims must have suffered an actual loss, as compared to subsequent Guidelines which additionally included individuals “whose means of identification [were] used unlawfully or without authority.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 4(E) (effective Nov. 1, 2009); see also United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Corvado, 53 F.3d 620, 622 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that measure of restitution is victims loss not defendants gain (B) holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury (C) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  (D) holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand (E) holding that victims must have suffered an actual pecuniary loss
Output: (E)
1 . In addition to the MDOT "Communication Emergency Incident Report” form, which logged Harvey’s call, an audiotape recording of the MDOT call to the Highway Patrol and the Highway Patrol dispatcher’s subsequent relay of the information to the officer in the field was introduced into evidence at the hearing. 2 . Fernandez also challenges his conviction on two other grounds, which we address in a separate memorandum disposition filed contemporaneously with this opinion. 3 . Even if unreliable, the tip would still be entitled to some weight under the totality of the circumstances test. But, as the Supreme Court recently emphasized' in J.L., an unreliable tip, standing alone, does not give an offi cer reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (<HOLDING>). We note that J.L. is distinguishable from the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a tip to look out for a black person without more does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop anyone (B) holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk (C) holding that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability that an individual is carrying a gun is not enough to justify a terry stop (D) holding that a mere anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun  without any corroborating evidence  does not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying the officers stop and frisk of that person (E) holding that an anonymous callers barebones tip that a young black male wearing a plaid shirt and standing at a particular bus stop was carrying a gun without more was insufficient to justify an officers stop and frisk of the man
Output: (D)
limit on their civil liability for noneconomic damages is inclusive of prejudgment interest on past noneconomic damages. As authority for their position, Appellees cite section 74.002 of the civil practice and remedies code and Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex.2011). Section 74.002 states that, and Molinet stands for the proposition that, in the event of a conflict between a provision of chapter 74 of the civil practice and remedies code and any other statute, rule of procedure, or rule of evidence, chapter 74 trumps. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.002(a) (“In the event of a conflict between this chapter and another law, including a rule of procedure or evidence, or court rule, this chapter controls to the extent of the conflict.”); Molinet, 356 S.W.3d at 412-14 (<HOLDING>). Appellees claim that section 74.301’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 311034 does not make section 890041 jurisdictional (B) holding that both section 122 and rule 10b5 claims are timebarred by section 13 (C) holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines (D) recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations (E) holding that the limitations provisions of section 74251a and section 33004e conflict and that section 74251a prevails
Output: (E)
Again, the trial judge’s findings were supported by competent evidence and worked no injury to Needleman. Whistler Sportswear, supra. Needleman urges that the court erred in awarding damages in an assumpsit action in excess of the plaintiffs prayer for relief. In support of this proposition, Needleman cites House of Pasta v. Mayo, 303 Pa.Super. 298, 449 A.2d 697 (1982). Needleman’s rebanee on House of Pasta is misplaced. House of Pasta discusses the trial judge’s discretion to mold a jury verdict to conform to the jury’s intent. In the present case, Needle-man was put on notice that the claim could exceed the stated amount by Bernhardt’s prayer for “whatever other relief this court deems just and proper.” See, e.g., Donlin v. J.J. Newberry Co., 319 Pa.Super. 310, 466 A.2d 174 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Needleman’s argument on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for injunctive relief was merely incidental to a prayer for damages where it was designed to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of any monetary relief the court might award (B) holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees (C) holding that loss of earnings was sufficiently encompassed by general prayer for relief (D) holding that in determining capacity in which defendant was sued it is appropriate to consider course of proceedings and allegations in complaint including caption section identifying parties claim for relief and prayer for relief (E) holding prayer for general relief does not support award of commonlaw prejudgment interest as element of damages
Output: (C)
no recovery is possible” Id. Jones reasserts her claim that Nationwide’s practice of reimbursing the insured’s deductible from the insurer’s subrogation only on a pro rata basis calculated upon the percent of the insurer’s recovery from a third party violates the common law made whole doctrine. Relying on Superior Court and federal court cases applying Pennsylvania law, Jones asserts, “Pennsylvania law provides that an insurance company cannot exercise its right of subrogation until the insured has been fully compensated or ‘made whole.’ ” Brief at 6 (citing inter alia, Gallop v. Rose, 420 Pa.Super. 388, 616 A.2d 1027, 1031 (1992); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DiTomo, 330 Pa.Super. 117, 478 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1984); Walls v. City of Pittsburgh, 292 Pa.Super. 18, 436 A.2d 698, 701 (1981) (<HOLDING>)). She observes that in Valora v. Pa. Employees 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees (B) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend (C) holding that a jury question as to an insurers bad faith arises when facts permit differing inferences as to the reasonableness of the insurers conduct (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured
Output: (D)
the unambiguous language of Texas Government Code section 25.00255, a party may appeal an order denying a motion to recuse on appeal from the probate court’s final judgment, but this statute does not provide an interlocutory appeal from such an order. See id. In the only part of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 30.016 that addresses appeals, the Legislature provides that “the denial of a tertiary recu-sal motion is only reviewable on appeal from final judgment.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 30.016(d) (West 2012). Under the unambiguous language of section 30.016(d), a party may appeal an order denying a tertiary recusal motion only on appeal from final judgment. See id.; In re Joyner, 357 S.W.3d 844, 845 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 24, 2012, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Judge Spencer’s order was rendered on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petitioner cannot circumvent time requirements for seeking certiorari review of an order denying a motion for a protective order by filing a successive motion seeking the same relief and seeking certiorari review that is timely only with respect to the order denying the second motion (B) holding that under section 30016d a party may not seek review of order denying tertiary recusal motion by mandamus (C) holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration (D) holding that pursuant to rule 2a2 a party may appeal an order denying a motion for permissive intervention (E) holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable
Output: (B)
review of the record and having considered the submissions and arguments of the parties; and for the reasons set forth in the Court’s accompanying Opinion of even date; IT IS ORDERED: THAT the Territorial Court’s Order dated February 22, 1993 is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Territorial Court with instructions to conduct further proceedings consistent with this Court’s Opinion. 1 . At that time, the Trial Division of this Court had jurisdiction over such petitions to review the actions of Virgin Islands agencies. See infra note 2. 2 . See V.I. Code Ann tit. 4, § 76(a) (1994 Supp) (shifting original jurisdiction from the District Court to the Territorial Court in all civil actions); Dawson v. Government Employees Service Commission, VI BBS 92CI010.DT1 (D.V.I. May 19, 1994) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Waialua Agricultural Co. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act (B) holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc  1651a (C) holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act (D) holding that district courts have power to issue writs of prohibition to administrative agencies to prevent them from exceeding their jurisdiction (E) holding that the shift divested the district court of original jurisdiction pertaining to petitions for writs of review filed pursuant to vi code ann tit 5  1423
Output: (E)
such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege. Jane, quoting People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443 (1968), notes that “ ‘[f]aced with a confusing variety of rules concerning the existence and scope of his privileges, a witness should not be required to make these choices unaided by his lawyer.’ ” See also People v. Smays, 156 Mise.2d 621, 594 N.Y.S.2d 101, 105 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1993) (discussing Ianniello). Jane argues confidentiality concerns regarding the presence of her counsel during her testimony are misplaced. Jane asserts her counsel will be bound by the same confidentiality requirements as others who attend the hearing. See Op. of the Justices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 915, 371 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Jane also notes her counsel would be bound by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that usual rule 6e secrecy protecting identity of witnesses did not apply to the president because it was already widely known that he had testified in front of the grand jury (B) holding that governments weak interest in preserving grand jury secrecy did not warrant in camera submission where party seeking access to submission would learn of submission contents as soon as he was called as a grand jury witness (C) holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy (D) recognizing the importance of grand jury secrecy (E) holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury
Output: (C)
For example, courts have allowed individuals judicially to enforce treaties that govern the rights of foreign nationals to inherit property, despite the absence of explicit treaty wording providing for such individual enforcement, most likely because the right-granting wording in those treaties makes sense only if it is read to confer an individually enforceable right. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 US 503, 507-08, 67 S Ct 1431, 91 L Ed 1633 (1947) (dealing with such a treaty). On the other hand, an individual right of judicial enforcement will not be Inferred from the mere fact that a treaty sets out substantive rules of conduct that, if honored, would benefit individuals. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 US 428, 442, 109 S Ct 683, 102 L Ed 2d 818 (1989) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that united states admiralty jurisdiction extended not only to the high seas but also to american vessels in foreign waters (B) holding that a purchase agreement for a foreign corporations stock is not subject to section 10b even if the closing occurred in the united states (C) holding inter alia that a united states court retains jurisdiction over persons arrested on a foreign ship beyond the us navigable waters when said arrest violates a treaty to which the united states and the foreign country are parties (D) holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages (E) holding that geneva convention on the high seas which provides that illegally boarded merchant ship shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained does not create private right of action for foreign corporations to recover compensation in united states courts
Output: (E)
a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and “the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). 1. Equal protection “Unless a classification ... is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” statutory distinctions are presumed constitutional, and will survive a challenge if the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Although not every non-suspect legislative classification passes muster under rational basis review, see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (<HOLDING>), “the judiciary may not sit as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (B) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (C) holding that a preferential state tax rate for domestic businesses violated the equal protection clause because the states justifications  that the tax promoted domestic industry and encouraged investment in domestic assets  were not legitimate government interests since if they were any discriminatory tax would be valid if the state could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business (D) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (E) holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax
Output: (C)
should only be dismissed if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims, the district court was correct in not dismissing his complaint at this stage in the proceedings. See Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir.1998); see also Morley, 175 F.3d at 759. AFFIRMED. 1 . This appeal is from a denial of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Therefore, we recite facts as alleged in Mishler’s second amended complaint and assume them to be true for the purposes of our decision. However, the facts have not yet been proved. See Metro Display Adver. Inc. v. City of Victorville, 143 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir.1998). 2 . See Mishler v. Nevada Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 896 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) ("Mishler I ”); Mishler v. Nevada Bd. of Med. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint (B) holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate (C) holding that mishler could amend his complaint because the board had been put on notice that the integrity of its administrative proceedings was at issue and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment for the board members because no reasonable state official could reasonably believe that malicious deprivation of license verification was lawful (D) holding that board members would not be entitled to qualified immunity for their failure to respond to the ohio board inquiry because it was a ministerial act and reversing the district courts dismissal of mishlers complaint (E) holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest
Output: (A)