niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
or similar indicium recognizing the corporation’s controlling position. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 891 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). [¶ 12] In Johnson, the taxpayer was a professional basketball player who had contracted to provide his services to a corporation. Id. at 883-84. The Tax Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the contract gave the corporation a right to control the taxpayer’s services, and thus determined that the first prong was satisfied. Id. at 891-92. The Tax Court, however, concluded that the taxpayer could not meet the second prong of the test because the basketball team he played for “refused to sign any contract or agreement with any person or entity other than [the taxpayer].” Id. at 893; but see Sargent v. Comm’r, 929 F.2d 1252, 1258-61 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 18] In this case, the court applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that professional hockey players personal service corporations were the taxable entities when the players entered into bona fide arms lengths employment agreements with their respective corporations and the team paid the corporations rather than the players (B) holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa (C) holding that the critical issue is not ownership in the first instance but rather the parties respective control over the disposal of hazardous substances (D) holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality (E) holding that the statements by the court went well beyond a mere rejection of the agreements and explanation for it they suggested at the very least the agreements that would be acceptable
Output: (A)
Buck employees by making it appear that their employment would continue uninterrupted at ACS. Second, it made the acquisition of Buck more appealing to ACS, because ACS knew that it could immediately slash costs by eliminating 100 of the employees it had agreed to employ. The existence of such a scheme — seemingly perfectly orchestrated to ensure that MFC would not have to pay, directly or indirectly, the cost of certain promised benefits — • is surely evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could deem relevant to whether MFC’s conflict of interest affected its decision to deny Howley’s claim. Nonetheless, the district court afforded more weight to this evidence than is appropriate when deciding a motion for summary judgment. See Nolan v. Heald Coll., 551 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). It' is uncontested that Buck’s managers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor (B) holding that the nonmoving party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment (C) recognizing that nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence  to defeat summary judgment (D) holding that a court considering evidence outside of the administrative record because of its relevance to a conflict of interest must still construe that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party for the purposes of summary judgment (E) holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true
Output: (D)
that the court applied the correct standard in making its determination, we will not disturb the court's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence for the consent issue to go to the jury. The victim testified that she either told Defendant that "it hurt" and to "stop" or told him, "No." The victim recounted that she held her arms in such a way as to stop Defendant from continuing to touch her inappropriately. The victim testified that she thought she should scream and that in her mind she was seream-ing but no sound came out. Nonetheless, at one point Defendant asked her to be quiet, so as not to disturb other customers in neighboring rooms. "14 Defendant contends that the vie-tim's testimony was inherently unbelievable. See State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 16, 210 P.3d 288 (<HOLDING>). We agree that there were some inconsistencies 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it (B) holding that a court is not bound to accept testimony at face value even when it is uncontroverted if it is improbable unreasonable or questionable internal citation omitted (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (E) holding the tax court not bound to accept taxpayers uncontradicted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable unreasonable or questionable
Output: (A)
winding up its affairs, the right to assert the privilege devolves to the successor. Consistent with that holding, the right to waive the privilege has not been limited to matters arising under the Bankruptcy Code and has even been applied to corporations that have been dissolved by orders of liquidation where there is broad-based power of the liquidator to continue to engage in management-type activity. See, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 129 F.R.D. 188 (M.D.Fla.1989); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Berry, Civ. No. 1-85-62 (E.D.Tenn., June 10, 1985) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Ellis, Civ. No. CD-84-PT-2560-M (M.D.Ala., Dec. 23, 1985); but see, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. McAtee, 124 F.R.D. 662 (D.Kan.1988) (<HOLDING>); and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding weintraub not controlling once a corporation is dissolved (B) holding customs violation of statutory suspension of liquidation not actionable by importer who discovered improper liquidations after protest period had expired (C) holding that a challenge to liquidation instructions falls under  1581i jurisdiction (D) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (E) holding weintraub rational inapplicable to liquidations because corporation ceases to exist after liquidation order
Output: (E)
121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992), in which the Court held that ERISA preempted a state statute that applied only to employers who provided health insurance coverage, and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), in which the Court held that ERISA preempted a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan). 32 . Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325-28, 117 S.Ct. 832 (refusing to hold that a state statute pertaining to approved apprenticeship programs “referred to” ERISA plans because not all such programs were ERISA plans); see also Corporation Health Ins. v. Tx. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir.2000), op. modified, 314 F.3d 784 (5th Cir.2002). 33 . See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40:2010; cf. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (<HOLDING>). 34 . Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, 117 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted (B) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (C) holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (D) recognizing that it was beyond dispute that a state statute that required all insured benefit plans to submit to an extra layer of review for certain benefit denials had a substantial effect on erisa plans (E) holding that a state law requiring benefit plans to include minimum benefits related to erisa plans
Output: (A)
Patten’s deposition. (Docket 34 at p. 1). Mr. Patten as the Rushmore building custodian is well-suited to describe the general condition of the sidewalk based on his knowledge and observations gained while working there. 6 .Consistent with the court’s oral ruling at trial, the government's objection to the admission of Ms. Clermont’s statement is overruled. See Docket 34 at p. 2. 7 . The Janis Court clarified that " ‘ [t]he duty to keep the properly reasonably safe is, in turn, a subpart of the general duty to exercise reasonable care’ for the benefit of others.” Id. at 501 (quoting Mitchell, 396 N.W.2d at 314) 8 . The accumulation of ice on the sidewalk where Ms. Larmon fell was not a natural accumulation of ice. See Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates, 323 N.W.2d 853, 855 (S.D.1982) (<HOLDING>). The South Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a municipal corporation may be liable for injuries resulting from its failure to keep the shoulder of a highway in repair (B) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (C) holding a landlord liable for injuries sustained by a tenant who slipped on an icy sidewalk (D) recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination (E) holding that an owner or occupant of properly is not liable to pedestrians for injuries resulting from a fall caused by the natural accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk in front of the property 
Output: (E)
agreement. That is not the law. The validity of the settlement agreement in this case is governed by federal law. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 65 F.3d 562, 570-71 (7th Cir.1995). Because of the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship, and consistent with the public policy favoring settlements, federal law presumes that an attorney-of-record who enters into a settlement agreement, purportedly on behalf of a client, has authority to do so. See, e.g., Anderson v. Flexel, 47 F.3d 243, 249 (7th Cir.1995) (“we [] recognize the existence of the longstanding legal presumption that an attorney has the authority to act on behalf of the person he represents.”); Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Paramount Indus., 829 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 390 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rebuttable presumption in favor of the action of an administrative agency and the burden of proof is upon one challenging its action (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding that burden of proof is on party challenging attorneyofrecords authority to settle case (D) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (E) holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca
Output: (C)
person’s lawyer will not suffice.”). Nonetheless, more recent cases in the Second Circuit interpret Rule 45’s personal service requirement liberally where the type of service used “was calculated to provide timely actual notice.” CareCore, 2008 WL 3833238, at *2 (noting that “nothing in the word ‘delivering’ [in Rule 45(b)(1) ] indicates personal service, and a personal service requirement can be unduly restrictive”); see also Cartier v. Geneve Collections, Inc., No. CV 2007-0201, 2008 WL 552855, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.27, 2008) (agreeing that “ ‘delivery’ under Rule 45 means a manner of service reasonably designed to ensure actual receipt of a subpoena by a witness, rather than personal service”); Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld, No. 99 Civ. 3200, 2000 WL 10268, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Aristocrat first sought to serve individual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inhand delivery is not required under rule 45 so long as service is made in a manner that reasonably insures actual receipt of the subpoena (B) holding that because alternative service by means of certified mail reasonably insures actual receipt of the subpoena by the witness the delivery requirement of rule 45 will be met (C) holding that delivery of subpoena via federal express was sufficient because effective service under rule 45 is not limited to personal service (D) holding that service of a subpoena via certified mail is sufficient under rule 45 particularly when defendant does not deny actual receipt (E) holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail
Output: (B)
to a jury trial. At one level, this is a dispute between Nebraska, on the one hand, and Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, represented by the Commission, on the other. The Constitution established two methods for resolving these types of disputes. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 279 n. 5, 79 S.Ct. 785, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959). The first method is the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution. Id. (citing U.S. Const, art. III., § 2). “The other is the compact....” Id. (citation omitted). As for the first method, we know that when the Supreme Court exercises its original jurisdiction there is no jury trial even if money is awarded against a state. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130, 107 S.Ct. 2279, 96 L.Ed.2d 105 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The second method of resolving disputes 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims (B) holding that if the town acted in bad faith in negotiations and litigation which prevented construction then the plaintiffs on remand cannot be deemed to have lost any rights to vest that they would have been able to exercise in the absence of bad faith (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that an insurer acted in bad faith by failing to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations (E) holding that monetary relief could be awarded against new mexico because it acted in bad faith by failing to deliver water called for by a compact
Output: (E)
see Danden Petroleum, Inc. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 615 F.Supp. 1093, 1099 (N.D.Tex.1985) (“Injuries which can be compensated by money damages at a later time are not irreparable and do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of an injunction.”). In analyzing the evidence in this case, the Court revisits Robert Perkins’s testimony that PEI’s reputation would be damaged by-continued display of PEI images in close conjunction with “hard-core pornography.” Although the Court did not find the past harm to have risen to the level of tarnishment required for dilution of trademark under all the circumstances, the evidence is at least probative on the issue of potential harm for which legal remedy is inadequate. See Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1053-56 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Court finds a strong 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury (B) holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm (C) holding potential damage to reputation to constitute irreparable harm (D) holding that the lack of control over ones mark creates the potential for damage to  reputation which constitutes irreparable injury for the purpose of granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark case (E) holding that the potential loss of valuable business may constitute irreparable harm
Output: (C)
David K. Lewis, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that his due process rights were violated in connection with the confiscation of a television set. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment based on the doctrine of issue preclusion because Lewis’s due process claims were previously litigated and decided on the merits in a state habeas proceeding. See In re Lewis, 03W0051B, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal.Super.Ct. March 12, 2004); Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue preclusion bars section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating fourth amendment issue decided in state court criminal proceeding (B) holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court (C) holding that a habeas claim is procedurally barred where it was already raised on direct appeal and decided on the merits by this court (D) holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense (E) holding that a state habeas proceeding decided on the merits precluded a section 1983 action in federal court
Output: (E)
397 So.2d 874, 874-75 (Miss.1981)). However, in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court carved out “a narrow public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that regardless of whether the employment is at-will, (1) an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act as in Laws [v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342 (N.D.Miss.1987) ], shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer; (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else is not barred by the employmen ming Wheeler); Hammons v. Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc., 907 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs have presented no evidence to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties (B) recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc  842c (C) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (D) holding that a judgment that requires the performance of an act is enforceable by civil and criminal contempt penalties emphasis omitted (E) holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act
Output: (A)
that fact, no genuine issue of material fact is created— even if Goodman’s recollection of that fact is hazy or susceptible to some doubt. Thus, for the purposes of deciding these Motions, the Court determines that Goodman’s detention was somewhere between one to two hours long. Although no per se duration exists at which a Terry stop ends and an arrest commences, a 20-minute confinement has been held too lengthy to be appropriately characterized as an investigatory deten tion. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay); see also United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Instances in which a lengthy delay of over 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (B) recognizing that an immigration arrest and detention needs to be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion (C) holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required probable cause (D) holding that a forensic examiner in the employ of the state police could be liable in a claim for continued detention without probable cause (E) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury
Output: (C)
a sovereign or those with whom it deals.” Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 436, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 811, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989)). Thus, a locality may constitutionally impose a use tax on a private citizen or corporation utilizing or possessing government property in connection with the private citizen’s or corporation’s own commercial activities, regardless of whether those commercial activities arise out of a contractual relationship with the government. See New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 733, 102 S.Ct. 1373; City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 493, 78 S.Ct. 458, 2 L.Ed.2d 441 (1958) (“Murray Corp.”); United States v. Township of Muskeg , 462, 97 S.Ct. 699, 50 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Each of these cases, although limiting the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable (B) holding citizens lacked standing to challenge statute when all citizens affected in the same way (C) holding private citizens have no standing to enforce broader state regulations contained in npdes permits (D) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (E) recognizing private right of action
Output: (D)
3553(a) sentencing factors, it did not commit plain error in its application of § 5G1.3(c) when sentencing Hall. C. The District Court’s Enhancement of Hall’s Base Offense Level Hall also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it was enhanced using a Guideline offense level that was not based upon empirical data. United States Sentencing Commission, “Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing,” 47 (2004). Hall cites United States v. Grant, No. 8:07CR242, 2008 WL 2485610, at *4 (D.Neb.2008), for the proposition that, as a result, the offense level for murder in § 2A1.1 is a less reliable appraisal of a fair sentence. A sentencing court is free to reject a Guidelines range based on policy considerations. United States v. Janosko, 355 Fed.Appx. 892, 895 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit has thus noted that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing this principle as a settled rule (B) recognizing this principle in the failure to hire context (C) recognizing this principle in the childpornography context (D) recognizing same principle (E) recognizing principle
Output: (C)
to quantify his expenditures while the children are with him and his future expenditures for the children’s college expenses is speculative and not persuasive. The guidelines “assume that the care given to the child during temporary periods when the child resides with the obligor ... do not substitute for the child support obligation.” N.D.A.C. § 75-02-04.1-02(2). Moreover, the parties’ stipulation requires both Sheldon and Carla to pay half of the children’s reasonable tuition and room and board for up to four years of college. It also requires Sheldon to pay a reasonable share of the children’s expenses incurred by Carla while the children attend college. The stipulation recognizes a shared obligation by Carla and Sheldon for the children’s college expenses. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08 (<HOLDING>). We agree with the trial court that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment (B) recognizing mutual duty of each parent to provide children with support and education suitable to the childrens circumstances (C) recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child (D) holding that evidence of the fathers conduct in stabbing the childrens mother alleged to endanger the childrens physical and emotional wellbeing is pertinent to and entwined in the issue of the childrens best interest (E) recognizing the right of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life
Output: (B)
to take the requested chemical breath test. The record indicates that Allison never answered Trooper Brazas’s question, and instead either remained silent, asked for a moment, exclaimed-that she could not believe the Trooper was doing this to her, complained that her face was itching, or asked for clarification that her license would be revoked if she refused. Approximately four minutes elapsed between Trooper Brazas’s first request that Allison submit to the chemical breath test and when he indicated his intent to deem her refusal to respond a refusal to submit. This evidence, which the trial court was free to believe, constitutes substantial evidénce that Allison refused to submit to the requested chemical breath test. See State v. Caines, 427 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (<HOLDING>); State v. Foster, 959 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Mo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding insufficient officers advisement that defendants license may be suspended if he refused to submit to breath test when statute mandates that license will be suspended for refusal of chemical test (B) holding that a person arrested for dui has the right to consult an attorney before taking a breath test when such consultation would not delay or interfere with the investigation or test taking (C) holding that a driver demonstrated his refusal by giving nonresponsive answers to a request for a breath test ignoring a request for a yesorno answer and never taking the test (D) holding that suppression of stateadministered breath test is necessary where the accused is denied access to a telephone despite his requests to arrange an independent chemical test (E) holding 1 that administering a breath test is not a critical stage of the proceedings to which a sixth amendment right to counsel attaches and 2 that the results of a breath test are physical evidence  not testimonial  and thus no fifth amendment right to counsel attaches
Output: (C)
interest is suitably furthered by differential treatment. Ibid. In the present case we conclude that the classifi cation effected under section 100(b) does not violate the Federal or State constitution. By withholding the right of collective bargaining, section 100(b) is consistent with section 100(a)’s mandate to the Attorney General to “organize the ... division ... as he may determine to be necessary for efficient and effective operation and ... [to] assign to the division such employees in the Department of Law and Public Safety as may be necessar , 94 N.J. 9, 462 A.2d 137 (1983) (ruling that teacher’s claim of reverse discrimination was grievable, though not subject to binding arbitration); Rutgers v. Council of AAUP Chapters, 256 N.J.Super. 104, 606 A.2d 822 (App.Div.1992) (<HOLDING>), affirmed o.b. 131 N.J. 118, 618 A.2d 853 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release (B) recognizing exception to application requirement when employer does not notify employees of available promotion and does not provide formal mechanism for expressing interest in promotion (C) holding that a proposal requiring reasons for rejection of candidate for reappointment or promotion notice of actual vote and permitting candidate to submit additional information were subject to mandatory negotiation (D) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal (E) holding that the right to vote is fundamental
Output: (C)
presence of the vast majority of original, relevant documents in Europe, the district court did not err when it found this factor slightly favors dismissal. Similarly, the district court did not err when determining the public interest factors tipped toward dismissal. The district court correctly observed that “any local interest in this case ... is slight and does not exceed or even come close to the interest other [European] forums ... have in the adjudication of this controversy.” The burden on local courts and juries unconnected to the case and the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to the forum also favor dismissal. Finally, the district court concluded its lack of familiarity with foreign law counseled in favor of dismissal. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 260 & n. 29, 102 S.Ct. 252 (<HOLDING>). The district court found that the balance of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  109g2 does not apply when there was no unresolved motion pending at the time when the debtor sought dismissal (B) holding that a party relying on foreign law must plead and prove it and partys failure to do so entitles court to assume that foreign law is the same as forum law (C) holding that while the need to apply foreign law does not warrant dismissal in itself it is a factor favoring dismissal (D) holding that it is not (E) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum
Output: (C)
Assembly amended the statute in 2015. See Ga. L. 2015, pp. 1050, 1051, § 1. 24 Haas v. State, 146 Ga. App. 729, 732 (5) (247 SE2d 507) (1978) (citation omitted). 25 See Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 348 (3) (751 SE2d 408) (2013). 26 Marryott v. State, 263 Ga.App. 65, 69 (5) (587 SE2d 217) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted). 27 See Marryott, 263 Ga. App. at 69 (5) (a jury charge must be adjusted to the evidence presented). 28 See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214-215 (1) (790 SE2d 66) (2016) (The Court affirmed the grant of a new trial based on plain error in the court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction on the defendant’s sole defense, justification, which was supported by evidence at trial.). 29 See Brown v. State, 289 Ga. 259, 260-261 (2) (710 SE2d 751) (2011) (<HOLDING>). 30 Notably, Reid does not contend that any 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt (B) holding that any error in admission of demonstrative aid was harmless because evidence of defendants guilt was overwhelming (C) holdingthat because the evidence of the defendants guilt was overwhelming the courts failure to give a requested charge on impeachment constituted harmless error (D) holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt (E) holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt
Output: (C)
the Court has intimated that tolling based on mental incapacity is allowed. More recently, it decided Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002), a bankruptcy case that involved whether 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)’s lookback period could be tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. The Court noted that equitable tolling has been widely permitted in the two situations acknowledged in Irwin, supra, and its progeny. Young, 535 U.S. at 50, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Significantly, and of critical importance to the outcome of Young, the Supreme Court said, “We have acknowledged, however, that tolling might be appropriate in other cases, and this, we believe is one.” Id. (citations omitted). Equitable tolling of federal statutes of limi (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 26 usc  6511 may not be equitably tolled but that mental incapacity is a grounds for tolling when available (B) holding that 42 usc  405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment (C) holding that 5 usc  7703b2 can be tolled due to mental incapacity (D) holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling (E) holding that  2401b of the ftca can be equitably tolled
Output: (A)
of the deceased or another would result?” 4 . Tucker, 115 F.3d at 282; Lackey, 28 F.3d at 489; James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir.1993); Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d at 170. 5 . The second special issue reads: "Is there a probability that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that will constitute a continuing threat to society?” 6 . The third special issue poses the question: "Was the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any by the deceased?” 7 . See Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Brown v. State, 554 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). 8 . See Washington, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Mann v. Scott, 41 F.3d 968, 983-84 (5th Cir.1994). 9 . See Duhamel, 955 F.2d at 966 (<HOLDING>). 10 . See, e.g., Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (B) recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant (C) holding that the omission of evidence that the defendant was moderately mentally retarded with an iq of 56 did not result in prejudice (D) holding that miscitation or omission of a statutory provision is not a basis for reversal unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice (E) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause
Output: (C)
that the situation had changed for the worse. See Zheng Zhong Chen v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir.2006). For example, the 2006 Country Report that Palaj submitted states that arrest and pretrial detention conditions “continued to be an area of great concern,” that police corruption and impunity “continued” to be a problem, and that the country “continued to experience high levels of societal killings” and “remained” a source for trafficking of women and children. Further, the BIA properly found unpersuasive Palaj’s and her husband’s affidavits attesting that Palaj’s brother had experienced recent difficulties in Albania, where neither Palaj or her husband had personal knowledge of these incidents. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Palaj moved to reopen based on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight afforded to the applicants evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the ij (B) holding that the weight afforded to the evidence lies largely within the agencys discretion (C) holding that the weight accorded to documentary evidence lies largely within the ijs discretion (D) holding that the decision as to the weight to be afforded to documentary evidence  lies largely within the discretion of the ij (E) holding that the weight afforded to the applicants evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency
Output: (D)
CURIAM 1(Writ Granted. For reasons more fully discussed in Judge Ledet’s dissent, State v. Pitts, 16-1068 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/29/16) (unpub’d) (Ledet, J., dissenting), the court of appeal majority erred by reversing the district court and by granting the motion to suppress evidence, the defendant’s statement, and the identification. See State v. Washington, 12-2203, p. 4 (La. 11/16/12), 104 So.3d 401, 404 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court of appeal’s ruling is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to property leading up to and including the threshold of a residence therefore police officers were well within their authority to proceed on the open walkway to the front door where they saw evidence in plain view (B) holding that the judge issuing the search warrant plainly had a substantial basis for determining that there was probable cause to issue the warrant for the search of a residence when inter alia a reliable cl went to the residence knocked on the door entered and then made a controlled purchase of what appeared to be heroin (C) holding that abandonment was not caused by police misconduct where defendant left bags in open view before officers had knocked on door to gain admission because officers had not yet done anything illegal (D) holding it was not unreasonable for police officers to push the door open further to better ascertain whether the residence had been again burglarized or what the security situation may be (E) holding that absent warrant or exigent circumstances an officer had no authority to demand that the juvenile keep the door open to his residence or demand entry into it and thus the juvenile could not be convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer for trying to close door even if the officer had probable cause to believe that the juvenile was sheltering a runaway
Output: (D)
the defendants conceded that, as a general rule, homogenous precinct analysis may be more reliable than ecological regression, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in accepting Mag-giotto's numbers and treating the election as arguably split-preference. 5 . The defendants also argue that, even if there is a statutory violation, Section 2 should not be enforced because it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, principles of federalism, and' the "congruence and proportionality” test established by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). We need not address this argument in light of our holding that Section 2 has not been violated. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record (B) holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record (C) holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses but can resolve such issues  upon evidence which is not materially in conflict (D) holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court (E) recognizing that courts should not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of
Output: (E)
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537. Butler argues that his “Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the court used drug amounts and U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(d) to enhance his sentence.” He also takes issue with the application of the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which is based on his prior convictions. However, as explained supra, the jury specifically found the drug amounts beyond a reasonable doubt, and prior convictions need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under the Apprendi line of cases, even if they increase the minimum sentence applicable to a defendant. See Book er, 125 S.Ct. at 756; Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537. Moreover, Butler admitted his previous drug felony convictions at trial. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Regardless, Butler’s Sixth Amendment argument 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if sentence does not exceed maximum authorized by facts admitted by defendant or found by jury there is no sixth amendment violation (B) holding that an upward departure based on judges finding of deliberate cruelty violated the sixth amendment when the facts supporting that finding were neither admitted by defendant nor found by a jury (C) holding that sixth amendment not violated when sentence enhanced based on prior convictions that were not charged in indictment or admitted by defendant (D) holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the acca even though convictions were neither charged in indictment nor admitted (E) holding that this court reviews a booker issue de novo where the defendant objected in the district court to sentence enhancements based on facts not found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant
Output: (B)
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. The statute invalidated therein, the Court determined, violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and to a jury trial, which, collectively, entitle the accused to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, 490. ¶9 The Court has since applied the rule set forth in Apprendi to invalidate various sentencing schemes, in each case determining that the facts authorizing the imposition of a sentence greater than that authorized by a jury verdict or guilty plea were required to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. Ct. 856, 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing court violated the sixth amendment when it elevated a sentence based on evidence of failed attempts to rehabilitate and a history of alcohol and drug abuse (B) holding that californias indeterminate sentencing law which authorized the trial court judge to find facts exposing a defendant to an elevated upper term sentence violated the right to a jury trial (C) holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the sixth amendments guarantee of the right to trial by jury (D) holding that the trial judge rather than the jury makes the determination of whether the defendant violated the implied consent law (E) holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury
Output: (B)
a modification but rather as an explanation of why the court was signing a protective order that appeared to contradict its own findings in the custody case. But when it placed its oral decision of the custody issues on the record in March 2016, the court explained that its intent was to modify and not ''reinstate' the protective order's domestic violence findings. We therefore review it as a substantive modification rather thaq an explanatory comment. 7 . Crystal writes in her brief that she “does not challenge th[e] trial court’s jurisdiction and ability to independently decide whether she established by a preponderance of the evidence that Charles committed two or more crimes of domestic violence against her for custody purposes.” See Morris v. Horn, 219 P.3d 198, 208 (Alaska 2009) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See AS 22.15.100(9)(A) (giving 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that children are often physically assaulted or witness violence against one of their parents and may suffer deep and lasting emotional harm from victimization and from exposure to family violence consequently a family law judge should take domestic violence into account when making an award of temporary eustodyt based upon a recognition that it is clear that where domestic violence is present it should be considered when determining parental fitness (B) holding that previous domestic violence finding did not have res judicata effect in proceeding to modify visitation because domestic violence and visitation modification proceedings are different causes of action (C) holding south carolina crime of criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature was categorically a crime of violence under ussg  4b121 because its lesserincluded offense criminal domestic violence fell entirely within  4b12ls force clause (D) holding as relevant in a murder case a history of domestic violence involving defendant and his victim (E) holding that plaintiff was precluded under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel from relitigating in proceedings under prevention of domestic violence act allegations which had been decided adversely to her in earlier hearing
Output: (B)
77, 111 S.Ct. at 1704. Thus, in diversity cases, whether a state-law cause of action exists at all is a jurisdictional issue insofar as it relates to standing and injury-in-fact, not an issue of whether a claim for relief has been stated. 74 .Despite this unambiguous holding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has allowed plaintiffs to recover medical monitoring costs for exposure to asbestos. See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 239-40. The court stated that such costs were properly awarded for meritorious exposure-only cases but that damages for increased risk a , 192 (Ky.1994) (requiring manifestation of asbestos-caused injuiy before recognizing existence of cause of action for negligence based on exposure to asbestos); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 399 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing in a latent disease case that an injured persons cause of action accrues either 1 (B) holding that cause of action for asbestosis accrues upon discovery of disease not at time of exposure to asbestos (C) recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach (D) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach (E) holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs
Output: (B)
an intention that suits for pension benefits by disappointed applicants are equitable.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); see also Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (2d Cir.1996); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir.985); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 106 S.Ct. 800, 88 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986); In re Vorpahl, 695 F,2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir.1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980). Some district courts have suggested that Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), calls these holdings into doubt. See, e.g., Hulcher v. United Behavioral Sys., 919 F.Supp. 879, 885 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); Vaughn v. Owen Steel Co., 871 F.Supp. 247, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate (B) holding plaintiff had no claim under  1132a3 because his grievance that benefits were denied is specifically addressed in  1132a1b (C) holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances (D) holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan (E) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b
Output: (E)