niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
because Sten-nes was no longer free to leave to avoid answering the officer’s questions. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993); Young v. State, 803 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). As the fifth district has written, “positioning a patrol car to obstruct the path of [a] vehicle once it is stopped elevates the encounter to an investigatory stop.” Young, 803 So.2d at 882 (citing Griffin v. State, 800 So.2d 345, 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)) (stating “when [the officers] drove their vehicle behind the appellant’s car, effectively preventing his exit, [the appellant] could not leave. Therefore, the police effected a stop unsupported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”) (citations omitted); see Richardson v. State, 291 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (<HOLDING>); see also L.J.S. v. State, 905 So.2d 222, 225 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle (B) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (C) holding a stop was effected where officers vehicle blocked defendants vehicle from proceeding (D) holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity (E) holding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with a revoked license
Output: (C)
case. Having determined that the court only has subject matter jurisdiction to review the fiscal intermediary’s action in denying the interest expense based on § 413.153(c)(1), the court now reviews that action. However, there is no longer anything for the court to review. The parties have resolved the issue between themselves. The Secretary has conceded that the fiscal intermediary’s action of disallowing the interest expense solely because the loans were from related parties was an error of law. Thus, because it is undisputed that the fiscal intermediary erred, the proper action at this juncture is for the court to remand the case to the Secretary. See South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 806, 96 S.Ct. 1842, 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Federal Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reviewing courts task is to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the administrative agency on the record as a whole to support the agencys conclusions (B) holding that when an administrative agencys decision was a mixed question of fact and law a reviewing court should apply a clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence (D) holding that the function of the reviewing court ends when the administrative agencys error on the legal issue is laid bare (E) holding that the district court is limited to considering the administrative record in reviewing the denial of benefits under an erisa plan
Output: (D)
still pending as of the time plaintiffs filed the § 301 action. The six-month limitations period for challenging a union’s action under § 301 begins running when a union takes an “unequivocal position” that it will not pursue an employee’s claim against the employer. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Local v. A-CMI Mich. Casting Ctr., 191 F.3d 764, 767 (6th Cir.1999). In the present case, the UAW’s GM representative publicly informed Delphi employees on December 1, 2000, that the union did not object to the Delphi spin-off, the Trenton facility closure, or the SAP. As of this date, Zeek reasonably should have known of the union’s unequivocal position regarding the plant closure and SAP. See Chrysler Workers Ass’n v. Chrysler Corp., 834 F.2d 573, 579-81 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs did not file their § 301 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hybrid section 301 action could not be maintained until plaintiff could fairly allege that the union refused to process his grievance (B) holding that timeliness of section 301 hybrid claim against union is measured from the date the internal union appeals procedure is exhausted or broken down (C) holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims (D) holding that a knew or should have known standard applies to triggering of statute of limitations for action against union in hybrid  301 action (E) holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong
Output: (D)
concluded, that the city’s conduct was operational because it failed to implement its plan to reconstruct the water main once it received adequate funding from a grant. But as we have previously discussed, because no development plan for Main Street was in place at the time of the January 2015 leak, there was no definite reconstruction plan that the city failed to implement. And even if there had been a definite plan, the city’s conduct was constrained by economic considerations. Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 234 (“Sometimes the implementation of a policy itself requires policymaking.”). Magnolia next asserts that the city’s conduct was operational because the city delayed infrastructure repairs of a known hazard. See Marlow v. City of Columbia Heights, 284 N.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Minn. 1979) (<HOLDING>). In Marlow, the supreme court held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) holding that a business owner has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for patrons (C) holding that the failure to maintain the facility in a safe condition or to warn of hazards was an  operational failure following the planning decision to operate and maintain the public landing (D) holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment (E) holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage
Output: (C)
of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
Output: (B)
the burden of proving (1) that the defendant was enriched, (2) that such enrichment was at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) “that the circumstances were such that in equity or good conscience [the defendant] should return the money or property to [the plaintiff].” Martin v. Martin, 54 V.I. 379, 394 (V.I. 2010) (citing Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 460, 35 V.I. 356 (D. V.I. 1997)). However, this Court summarily adopted those elements of unjust enrichment by citing a single District Court of the Virgin Islands case, without determining whether that rule represents the sounder rule for the Virgin Islands. See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Connor, 60 V.I. 599, 607 n.1 (V.I. 2014); Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (V.I. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, after this Court issued its Martin 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (B) recognizing that a construction contract implicitly imposes a duty on contractors to perform work according to the standard of due care (C) recognizing wrongful adoption cause of action grounded in fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation (D) recognizing that the legislature implicitly repealed 1 vic  4 through its adoption of 4 vic  21 in 2004 (E) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly
Output: (D)
of peremptory strikes, the holdings of those Supreme Court opinions would be undermined. But we can engage in no comparative juror analysis here, because we do not know what happened during the entirety of the voir dire. Because we hold that, under the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Batson, comparative juror analysis is an important tool that courts should utilize on appeal when assessing a defendant’s plausible Batson claim, we also must conclude that all defendants, including those who are indigent, have a right to have access to the tools which would enable them to develop their plausible Batson claims through comparative juror analysis. “[T]he State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior 94, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the Court has never 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error (B) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (C) holding that appellants waived any claim of error as to the portion of the lower courts ruling that they did not expressly challenge on appeal (D) holding that the lack of evidence that the magistrate judge examined the trial transcript in its sufficiencyoftheevidence analysis left the court no alternative but to reverse the denial of habeas relief and remand for review of the transcript (E) holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court  was reversible error
Output: (A)
statute? [Counsel]: There’s no answer that I can give Your Honor, just wasn’t done, and my argument is that the merits of the statute, the substance, the intent of it has been fulfilled based on the report that has been provided. It is apparent that non-compliance with the statute in this case was due to attorney carelessness. An attorney’s carelessness does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. See Palanque, supra, 327 N.J.Super. at 164, 742 A.2d 1002; see also Burns v. Belafsky, 326 N.J.Super. 462, 471-72, 741 A.2d 649 (App.Div.1999); Hyman Zamft Manard, L.L.C. v. Cornell, 309 N.J.Super. 586, 593, 707 A.2d 1068 (App.Div.1998); cf. Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 619, 695 A.2d 259 (1997) and Wallace v. JFK Hartwyck at Oak Tree, Inc., 149 N.J. 605, 610, 695 A.2d 257 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The order is reversed. The case is remanded 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in both eases that an attorneys mistake cannot give rise to extraordinary circumstances capable of relaxing the thirtyday limitations period for filing a demand for a trial de novo after arbitration (B) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo (C) holding plaintiffs motion for trial de novo of award in counterclaim only but not of damages awarded in main cause of action was not void and remanding for a trial de novo of both the main cause of action and the counterclaim (D) holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard (E) recognizing de novo standard of review
Output: (A)
of a consecutive five-year sentence where a defendant possesses a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence; however, “if the firearm is brandished, [the defendant shall] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). “A defendant may be convicted of a § 924(c) charge on the basis of a coconspirator’s use of a gun if the use was in furtherance of the conspiracy and was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir.1998). Moreover, a defendant may be convicted of a § 924(c) offense on the basis of eoconspirator liability even without a separate conspiracy charge. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.2007); cf. United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Applying these standards, we hold that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious coconspirator liability need not be charged in the indictment (B) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (D) holding that elements of statute which became  924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged (E) holding that apparent authority as a separate theory of vicarious liability should not be considered in ftca claims
Output: (A)
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, ■ in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. H. To sign or circulate any statement, prospectus, or other paper or document required by any provision of this Act or pertaining to any security knowing or having reasonable grounds to know any material representation therein contained to be false or untrue. I. To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly. 815 111. Comp *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (“[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.”). But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Allstate has adequately 
 Holding statements: (A) holding dismissal proper where complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiffs claim (B) holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim (C) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court (D) holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under  121 of the illinois security law (E) holding dollar amount is not an essential element
Output: (D)
validity of those prior convictions used to enhance his sentence regardless of when they occurred. Davis’ and Williams’ convictions are AFFIRMED. We VACATE their sentences and REMAND to the district court for re-sentencing. 1 . The parties stipulated that the substance was cocaine base on the second day of trial. 2 . The government argues on appeal that Richardson was not acting as a government agent. But the government cannot make use of an informer and then claim disassociation. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375, 78 S.Ct. 819, 822, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). Where, as here, the informant was clearly acting on behalf of the government before inducing a defendant, the informant is an agent of the government. See id.; United States v. Bushy, 780 F.2d 804, 806-07 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Williams did not contest the court's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inducement occurring before the informant was directed or supervised by the government could not support an entrapment defense (B) holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense (C) holding the defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction when sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment (D) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (E) holding that a request for an instruction on entrapment should be refused even if there is evidence to support the defense if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constituting the crime that is charged
Output: (A)
is limited in applicability to only cases, like this one, in which the total noneconomic damages awarded by the jury were in excess of both of the $250,000 caps and in excess of the $500,000 combined total of both applicable caps; the jury here awarded $1,725,000 in noneconomic damages. 29 . Chesser argues that because a jointly and severally liable defendant possesses a right of contribution, the statutory provisions at issue do not conflict. A right of contribution, however, presupposes that the defendant has actually paid the damages — that is, has already been civilly liable — for noneconomic damages in excess of the $250,000 cap applicable to that defendant, in violation of the express language of section 74.301(b). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.015(a), (b) (West 2008) (<HOLDING>). 30 . Appellees concede that Hospital remains 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a right to contribution (B) recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware (C) recognizing contribution in the appropriate case (D) recognizing in both subsections a right of contribution when a defendant has paid a percentage of damages greater than his percentage of responsibility (E) recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf
Output: (D)
515 N.W.2d at 39 (citing the Rich tripartite test, and noting that since Rich we have adhered to its analysis regarding application of the incidental rule); Ripperger, 514 N.W.2d at 750-51. I think it is apparent that a challenge to the instruction, particularly in a case where the evidence supporting confinement in excess of that incidental to sexual abuse was thin, a challenge to a jury in-, struction as not conforming with Rich and its clear progeny applying the tripartite test was a claim worth raising. See State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1982) (finding nothing would have stopped an attorney from raising an issue if the attorney would have consulted the law in other jurisdictions when none existed in Iowa); see also State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 2014) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that neither failure to object to an instruction nor an express statement of no objection to an instruction waive plain error review pursuant to rule 3020 (B) holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error (C) holding failure to disclose may constitute supplying false information to support negligent misrepresentation claim where such failure breaches a statutory duty (D) holding that a party must submit a proposed instruction to preserve an objection for appeal (E) recognizing failure to preserve error by objecting to an inaccurate jury instruction breaches an attorneys duty
Output: (E)
otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). While the amended third-party complaint alleges a claim involving a federal question against the Chase Defendants, the Circuits are split on whether section 1441(c) permits removal by a third-party defendant. Compare Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir.1991) (‘We do not ... believe § 1441(c) was intended to effect removal of a suit, not otherwise within federal jurisdiction, because of the introduction of a third-party claim.” (internal quotations omitted)) and First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 465 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) with Carl Heck Eng’rs, Inc. v. Lafourche 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (B) holding that removal under section 1441c may only be done by the original defendant (C) holding that  1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent (D) recognizing that  1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature (E) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand
Output: (B)
337, 338 (9th Cir.1986) (“If the district court finds that more than 20 percent of the plaintiffs’ work was not rendered to aid the operation of the vessel as a means of transportation, then plaintiffs were not ‘seamen’ and are entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA.”). And, perhaps most importantly, Alabama Pilot’s argument glosses over the fact that the DOL announced its 20% rule in the context of the seaman exemption back in 1948. Congress has had 59 years to correct any misreading of its intent by the DOL’s implementing regulations. As defendant itself recognizes, Congress has taken full advantage of that opportunity to revise the FLSA in other respects, but has left this aspect of the seaman exemption untouched and undespoiled. See Petroleum Treaters, 876 F.2d at 522 (<HOLDING>). This omission is presumed to be the product 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that in 1961 congress revised the seaman exemption in certain respects but did not change dols interpretive definition as to who qualifies as seamen (B) holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3 (C) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 (D) holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute (E) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute
Output: (A)
policy, (DE 50, pg. 35), count 6 of the amended complaint is a claim for rescission of the life insurance policies based on “the brokers” fraudulent actions allegedly committed in violation of the brokerage agreements. (DE 50, pg. 33-34). This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Mo tion to Compel Arbitration as to Defendants Richardson and LBEG. See Provident Bank, 141 F.Supp.2d at 313-314 (granting motion to compel arbitration of claims including fraud, breach of fiduciary-duty, negligence, and rescission where arbitration clause provided that all disputes ‘arising out of the agreement were to be settled by arbitration, and because all the claims arose out of alleged breaches of duty imposed by the parties’ loan agreement); Sease, 697 F.Supp. at 1192-1193 (<HOLDING>) (citing Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 671 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   (B) holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement (C) holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause (D) holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation (E) holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract
Output: (A)
on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that whether to hold evidentiary hearing on admissibility of contested evidence “rests in the sound discretion of the district court.’’). 2 . Other Courts of Appeals likewise require a defendant to raise significant factual disputes in order to receive a pretrial evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir.2000) (stating “An eviden-tiary hearing on a motion to suppress need be held only when the moving papers allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested issues of fact exist.”); United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408-1409 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when material facts that affect the resolution of a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search are in conflict the appropriate way to resolve the conflict is by holding an evidentiary hearing after which the district court will be in a position to make findings (B) holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute (C) holding that a defendant must present sufficiently detailed and controverted factual allegations in order to receive an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that defendant bears the burden of showing there are material facts in dispute and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises factual allegations that are sufficiently definite specific detailed and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in issue (E) holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits
Output: (D)
bankruptcy petition was filed. According to the live pleadings, Buffington suffered damages proximately caused by the alleged negligence because, in August 2007, a restraining order was entered forbidding him from entering the premises to his business warehouse or operating his business and an injunction was granted allowing the trustee to take possession of and ultimately sell the business’s assets. Presuming for the sake of argument that Buffington’s claim is a viable one, Sharp alleges that Buffington’s damages occurred only after the bankruptcy petition was filed. See In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 800 (5th Cir.1997) (providing that no damage was suffered until a creditor objected to an exemption after debtor filed for bankruptcy); In re Swift, 198 B.R. 927, 931 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). See also Goggin v. Grimes, 969 S.W.2d 135, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract (B) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale (C) holding that the payments accrued (D) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (E) holding the negligence claim accrued postpetition because the action on which it was based occurred postpetition
Output: (E)
so as to give full meaning and effect to all of its provisions”(alterations, internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added)). A party who has agreed to a particular term in a valid contract cannot later renege on that term or unilaterally declare it to no longer apply simply because the contract could have been formed without it. Contracting parties are bound to perform on the terms that they did agree to, not what they might have agreed to under different circumstances. Reyes counters that because the TCPA is a remedial statute enacted to protect consumers from unwanted telephone calls, any ambiguities in its text must be construed to further that purpose. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987) (<HOLDING>); E.E.O.C. v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (B) holding that when interpreting broad remedial statutes courts should apply a standard of liberal construction in order to accomplish congresss objects citation omitted (C) holding on to objects in the room (D) holding that statutes are to be interpreted in accordance with the legislative intent and in a manner that will not render the statutes application absurd unreasonable or unjust internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding federal courts should apply the aedpas deferential standard of review even when the petitioners claims have been summarily denied by the state courts
Output: (B)
unfair prejudice. See United States v. Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.2002). b.Heroin Sales Evidence The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that Serrano’s involvement in four heroin sales between December 2012 and January 2013 was not being offered to prove propensity but, rather, as direct evidence of the 2012 to July 2013 conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. See United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 47 (2d Cir.2008) (“Where, as here, the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As such, this evidence was highly probative, see United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>), and not unfairly prejudicial so as to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing high probative value of act done in furtherance of conspiracy because it is part of the very act charged (B) holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy (C) recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy (D) holding that venue is proper in any district where any act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place (E) recognizing high probative value of evidence providing conduct that was part of the very act charged
Output: (A)
Restatement was not error. Plaintiffs rely on Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., for the contention that incidental transfer of a product does not relieve an entity from strict products liability. Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Mo.App.1994). This case is distinguishable however, because in Bell there was no question that the implant placed into petitioner’s body was done so in the course of the business of respondent. Id. The issue was whether respondent was a “seller” within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. In this case, the issue is whether Corrigan sold the manlift in the course of its business. This is apparently a question of first impression in Missouri. Corrigan characterizes the issue 713 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The case of Abbott v. U.S.I. Clearing Corp., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for a transaction to constitute a sale and trigger a first right of refusal it must involve an armslength transaction resulting in an actual change in control of the burdened property rather than simply moving it from the individual owners to an entity controlled by them (B) holding that net lease provisions in agreement together with other factors establish that the transaction is a sale (C) holding that an auction sale by an unlicensed auctioneer did not invalidate the sale (D) holding that the onetime sale of an industrial saw by a sawmill was an isolated transaction that did not come within the provisions of section 402a (E) holding that an isolated derogatory remark did not create an inference of discrimination
Output: (D)
I, who sought an injunction against any federal or state court proceedings in conflict with the ruling in Canady I pursuant to the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (enabling federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions”). The judgment protected by the injunction is the judgment in Canady I, which was properly issued in federal court, as it is undisputed that appellants properly filed their original class action complaint in federal court. As long as the original lawsuit was properly brought in federal court, the federal court retains subject matter jurisdiction to remove any subsequent state law action to federal court for purposes of applying the All Writs Act. See Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F.3d 424, 426-27 (8th Cir.1999) (Xiong) (<HOLDING>); see also NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 144 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act (B) holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc  1651a (C) holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act (D) recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody (E) holding that the all writs act does not provide an independent basis for supplemental federal jurisdiction in situations where federal jurisdiction is otherwise wholly lacking
Output: (A)
unconditional, in that Defendants were expressly informed that their purchase of components from Intel did not grant them a license to infringe LGE’s patents by combining those components with other non-Intel parts. LGE is correct that the patent exhaustion doctrine requires an unconditional sale. B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“[It is] an unconditional sale of a patented device [or its essential components that] exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter.”). Further, LGE is correct that it is entitled to impose conditions on the sale of its patented products or the essential components of its patented products, if it chooses. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706-08 (Fed.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor is there any support in the case law for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale (B) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (C) holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine is only applicable if there is an unconditional sale and that private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale (D) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (E) holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale
Output: (C)
Id. at 153, 121 S.Ct. 2079; see also United States v. Parker, No. WDQ-09-0360, 2011 WL 4682177, at *2 (D.Md. Oct. 3, 2011) (“Article IV(e)’s dismissal is strictly interpreted; there are no exceptions for de minimis, technical, or harmless errors.”); United States v. Gezelman, 522 F.Supp.2d 344, 347 (D.Mass.2007) (interpreting Bozeman as rejecting the view that a prisoner must be involved in rehabilitative programs for the IAD to apply and holding that the IAD must be strictly applied). Because the interpretation of the IAD is a question of federal law, we must follow the Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Bozeman. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438, 101 S.Ct. 703; In re All Assessments, 67 S.W.3d 805, 818-19 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (“[O]nly the decisions of the United Stat t.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 882 P.2d 472, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the iad inapplicable to a prisoner at a temporary holding facility and noting that while there may be an occasional case in which a prisoner awaiting transfer is involved in rehabilitative programs offered at the local facility such rehabilitation efforts themselves ultimately would be disrupted by that prisoners transfer to his permanent correctional residence (B) holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served (C) holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility (D) holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution (E) holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility
Output: (A)
asserts that the real reason for his termination was UPS’s failure to reasonably accommodate his disability. “Whether summary judgment is appropriate ... depends on numerous factors, including the strength of the employee’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered.” Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir.2002). We conclude that Cooper has not produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Cooper was discharged as retaliation for filing claims of discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of UPS on Cooper’s retaliatory discharge claims is appropriate. Cf. McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562 (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action (B) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action (C) holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiff attempted to prove pretext simply by showing that the defendant knew of her complaints and took an adverse employment action shortly thereafter and did not offer reasons as to why the legitimate reasons proffered for her discharge were pretextual (D) holding that posthoc reasons for an adverse employment decision constitute evidence of pretext (E) holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim
Output: (C)
was first introduced prior to his taking the stand, Valentine took the stand and presented testimony that he was silent when told he was under arrest for murder. Because Valentine testified to his own silence, neither Doyle nor Fletcher clearly applies to these facts. We conclude that the state court decision is not contrary to Supreme Court law, and consider whether the state court’s application of clearly established law was objectively unreasonable. Circuit court precedent is relevant only to the extent that it “illuminates the application of clearly established law.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir.2004). In this case, circuit court precedent reveals a divergence of opinion in cases addressing this issue. Compare United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 638 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence (B) holding that the admission of a defendants postarrest premiranda silence in the prosecutions caseinchief violates the fifth amendment because the defendant was in custody (C) holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment (D) holding that introduction of defendants premiranda custodial silence is violation of fifth amendment (E) holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation
Output: (D)
the view before and after the trees were cut down after the accident. They could easily be compared to other photographs depicting the trees present at the intersection the night Haley approached the intersection. Any error in the admission of testimony is rendered harmless if the objecting party subsequently permits the same or similar evi dence to be introduced without objection. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 896 (Tex.1989); Dalworth Trucking Co. v. Bulen, 924 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.). Thus, the error in admitting other evidence of the subsequent remedial measures was rendered harmless. We overrule this contention of error. We affirm the judgment. 1 . But see Sipes v. City of Grapevine, 146 S.W.3d 273, 285 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 2 . See Jezek v. City of Midland, 605 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (B) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (C) holding that the district courts order refusing to exercise jurisdiction and remanding to the magistrate court for trial was sufficiently final for purposes of appeal and then determining that the remand was in error (D) holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages (E) holding there was some evidence that city had negligently implemented discretionary act involving stop light and remanding for trial
Output: (E)
District Attorney’s Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant’s hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), any PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
Output: (C)
because they would no longer be moot. There was no Open Meetings Act violation; DNR simply listened to public complaints about loose horses. Any information gathered by DNR as a result of those investigations was not conclusive on any issue in dispute before the hearing o hat agency directive to use certain standard in awarding contracts was not regulation when agency had repeatedly required that standard and when standard was consistent with existing regulation). 13 . See Messerli v. Department of Natural Resources, 768 P.2d 1112, 1117-18 (Alaska 1989) (concluding that policy manual was not regulation because definitibns in manual merely conditioned already existing right), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. State, Dep't of Natural Resources, 799 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Alaska 1990) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See Op. at 143-144. 15 . See Op. at 139. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the standard of review under rule 60 is abuse of discretion (B) holding that rational basis test used in messerli was incorrect and employing abuse of discretion standard of review for discretionary acts not requiring formal procedures to allow agencies latitude to act commensurate with their discretion (C) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (D) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (E) holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard
Output: (B)
own participation in the speech of others. Where public property is a traditional or designated public forum, the government is limited as to what restrictions it can impose, despite the fact that the government is, in effect, subsidizing the speech and participating in it by giving speakers use of the public property. Further, as Forbes makes clear, at least in the context of broadcast political debates, where the government offers its resources to third parties for transmission of those parties’ communica tions “with minimal intrusion” by the government, the government may not engage in viewpoint discrimination even in a private forum. See id. at 1640; see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 834, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (<HOLDING>) In these types of cases, however, the essence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an identity of interest existed between the university and one of its doctors because the university took steps to provide counsel for the doctor and required that all communications concerning the plaintiffs claim be sent to the universitys risk management attorney or to the doctors counsel (B) recognizing private right of action (C) holding that speech addressing a private interest within a letter containing matters of public interest was protected and noting that we have emphasized that speech of public importance is only transformed into a matter of private concern when it is motivated solely by the speakers personal interests quotations omitted (D) holding that if university expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers then universitys right to control its own speech not at issue (E) holding student activity fees not to be state funds when they were segregated from university funds and the state treasury
Output: (D)