niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
the district court’s instruction to the jury, that New York law as to a gratuitous licensee might have operated as a bar to recovery, was in error, and that the admiralty rule as to damages should have applied. Notably, it stated that prejudicial error would have occurred “if the maritime law imposed upon the shipowner a standard of care higher than” that which existed under New York law. 358 U.S. at 629, 79 S.Ct. at 409. Thus,- state law is not permitted to significantly change the maritime law applicable in such cases. The inferior federal courts in numbers of cases have also refused to apply state laws to actions governed by federal maritime tort law where to do so would alter the rights and liabilities of the parties. See, e.g., Preston v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357, 358 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 31, 129 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that application of connecticut wrongfuldeath law is precluded by general federal maritime wrongfuldeath law (D) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes (E) recognizing products liability concepts as part of general maritime law
Output: (C)
and in response to the jurors’ question specifically asking if they could consider the local dealer. The district court submitted Eighth Circuit model jury instruction 9.01 on entrapment, replacing the clauses “(describe law enforcement officer or agents by name and capacity)” and “(officer or agent)” with the name of the cooperating California source because Kurkowski worked directly with that source, and the source was working with the police. The district court properly excluded the local dealer from consideration because the local dealer did not act on behalf, or at the request, of the police. United States v. Hawk, 276 F.3d 953 (8th Cir.2002) (jury instructions not challenged at trial are reviewed for plain error); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971, 121 S.Ct. 1601, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no derivative entrapment where middleman was induced by a government agent to commit crime responding to pressure takes it upon himself to induce another to participate in crime (B) holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense (C) holding that inducement occurring before the informant was directed or supervised by the government could not support an entrapment defense (D) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (E) holding the defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction when sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment
Output: (B)
for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil procedure. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages. No discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the pleading concerning punitive damages is permitted. Reviewing the sections at issue, we find no clear-cut reason why the two should not be read in harmony. See State ex rel. School Bd. v. Department of Educ., 317 So.2d 68 ( ot to be subjected to financial worth discovery until the court makes an affirmative finding that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for a punitive damages claim. See Potter v. S.A.K. Dev. Corp., 678 So.2d 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, the instant petition is granted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding punitive damages claims must be stricken absent a reasonable evidentiary basis for their award (B) holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages (C) holding a court may not award punitive damages (D) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable (E) holding what section 76872 requires is that a plaintiff who has pleaded punitive damages must offer a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages and obtain an order authorizing the maintenance of the punitive damage claim as a predicate to conducting discovery of a defendants financial worth
Output: (E)
strong protection because it concerns “areas of Art. II duties [in which] the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.” 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). The Nixon Court went on to recognize that, to the extent an executive claim of privilege “relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.” Id. at 711, 94 S.Ct. 3090. Significantly, the Executive’s constitutional authority is at its broadest in the realm of military and foreign affairs. The Court accordingly has indicated that the judiciary’s role as a check on presidential action in foreign affairs is limited. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 1 our decision in timken addressed commerces interpretation of section 167735 and 2 we give commerce substantial deference in its administration of the statute because of the foreign policy implications of a dumping determination (B) holding state buy american statute unconstitutional because it interfered with federal foreign affairs power emphasizing its effect on foreign commerce (C) recognizing strong need for a healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs (D) recognizing judiciarys customary policy of deference to the president in matters of foreign affairs (E) holding that a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to more deference than a foreign plaintiffs
Output: (D)
lot of money, which the defendant was obligated to keep intact or deliver.” Sweeney v. DeLuca, No. 042338, 2006 WL 936688, at *8 (Mass.Super.Ct. Mar. 16, 2006) (citing 53A Am.Jur. 2D Money § 21 (2005) (citing Garras v. Bekiares, 315 Mich. 141, 23 N.W.2d 239, 241 (1946) (allowing claim for conversion where money is identifiable and defendant had obligation to return the specific money with which he was entrusted), U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bass, 619 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir.1980) (stating that “a cause of action may arise from conversion of specific money capable of identification”); and Teledyne Indus. Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F.Supp. 191, 202 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (applying conversion claim to a “special account”))); see also Morrin v. Manning, 205 Mass. 205, 91 N.E. 308, 309 (1910) (<HOLDING>). Where, however, a plaintiffs claim is “not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money (B) holding that plaintiff could recover money mistakenly paid in excess of contract price (C) holding that where constable seized money from plaintiffs cash register the money seized was in excess of the debt constable was authorized to collect under a writ and constable refused to return the excess an action in trover would lie against constable to recover the excess since constable wrongfully took it for his own use and had no right of possession (D) holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence viz the area within his control (E) holding that attorneys could not recover fees in excess of amount billed
Output: (C)
to a misrepresentation claim if the company knew the “off-label” use of its ladders was not safe. Thus the distinction between truthful and fraudulent off-label matters also matters when it comes to implied preemption. Mere “off-label” promotion, divorced from any negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations, would likely not run afoul of state tort law. See Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *7; Caplinger, 921 F.Supp.2d at 1219-20. But Schouest’s affirmative misrepresentation claims are based on independent state law duties that Medtronic allegedly violated after the initial PMA process. Because these claims would apply to a seller of a product not subject to any federal regulations who engaged in similar alleged misconduct, they are not impliedly preempted. See Houston, 957 F.Supp.2d at 1179 (<HOLDING>); Eidson, 981 F.Supp.2d at 885, 2013 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state fraudbased claims that include offlabel promotion allegations are not impliedly preempted under buckman because they are moored in traditional state common law that exists independently from the fdca (B) holding that even if such claims are cognizable under state law they are preempted in the case of generic drug manufacturers (C) holding the state law claims were not preempted (D) holding that state law fraud on the fda claims were impliedly preempted by the food drug and cosmetic act (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
Output: (A)
there was no vexatious litigant order entered against Wolfe at the time he filed in district court, there was no state court judgment from which he could have been seeking relief. Instead of seeking relief from prior state court judgments, Wolfe seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the threatened future enforcement of the Vexatious Litigant Statute. He argues that the statute violates the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause; that it constitutes an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder; and that it subjects vexatious litigants to double jeopardy. In his prayer for relief, Wolfe requests “a declaration that California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 391-391.7 .:. are unconstitutional on the nburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We construe Wolfe’s references to the prior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (B) holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute (C) holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative (D) holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative (E) holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then
Output: (B)
may be claimed as exempt in any proceeding brought by any person to recover the whole or part of the purchase price of the property or against the claim or interest of a holder of a security interest, land contract, condominium or homeowners association assessment or maintenance lien or both, mortgage or any consensual or statutory lien. If this statute “prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on property otherwise eligible to be claimed as exempt property” as required under § 522(f)(3)(B), then the monetary cap in § 522(f)(3) applies and the bankruptcy court should have limited the debtors’ lien avoidance to $10,000. Aside from Judge Utschig’s decision in this case and an opinion from the bankruptcy court for the District of Minnesota, In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786 (Bankr.D.Minn.1995) (<HOLDING>), the only other published opinion addressing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  522f3 inapplicable under minnesota exemption law (B) holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes (C) holding that there is no need to consider exemption 6 separately if information was compiled for law enforcement purposes because exemption 7c constitutes broader protection so any information falling under exemption 6 is covered by exemption 7c (D) holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption (E) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3
Output: (A)
and voluntary”), and United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ("[A] trial judge must conduct a waiver hearing to make sure that the accused understands the risks of proceeding pro se and that he 'knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel’ before permitting the accused to proceed personally.” (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525)), with United States v. Keen, 104 F.3d 1111, 1114-45 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that “preferred procedure” is for court to discuss impact of self-representation in open court, but that there are "limited exception[s]” to this practice "when the record as a whole reveals a knowing and intelligent waiver" (quotation marks and citation omitted)), United States v. Bell, 901 F.2d 574, 578-79 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 438 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel (B) holding that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel only after his sic is aware of the nature of the charges against him the possible penalties and the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation (C) holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel even though the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant was inadequate standing alone to inform the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation (D) holding that because the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to separate counsel in light of the courts unambiguous advisement that joint representation could present a very substantial conflict so far as his defense is concerned the defendant was precluded from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest that ultimately developed (E) holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation
Output: (C)
is expressly so despite the statutory authority of any federal agency “to sue and be sued.” See Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 177 (8th Cir. 1978) (12 U.S.C. § 1702); Freeling v. FDIC, 221 F.Supp. 955, 956-57 (W.D.Okla.1962), aff’d on basis of district court’s opinion, 326 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1963). In Bor-Son Building Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1978), this court reasoned that the FTCA is the exclusive remedy if: (1) the suit is against a federal agency; and (2) the suit sounds in tort. 572 F.2d at 177. The instant case meets both requirements. First, it is not disputed that the SBA is a “federal agency” within the meaning of section 2671 of the FTCA. 15 U.S.C. § 633; see also SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 448-50, 81 S.Ct. 191, 194, 5 L.Ed.2d 200 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Second, it should be readily apparent that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sole proprietorship was not a separate legal entity capable of being sued under ohio law (B) holding that a tree is part of a public facility if a public entity incorporates it into a facility in such a manner that it 1 becomes an integral part of the facility and 2 is essential for the intended use of the facility (C) holding sba is an integral part of federal government and is not a separate legal entity (D) holding that a formal report is not required when determining causation is an integral part of treating a patient (E) holding that an unincorporated association is a legal entity and therefore can own property
Output: (C)
. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, to whom this case was referred with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). 3 . Montandon also alleged Title VII claims against Todd and Ehlers in their personal capacities, as well as constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. His wife, Tish Walker Montandon, claimed loss of consortium. The district court dismissed these claims. Because they have not been raised on appeal, they are deemed abandoned. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir.1985). 4 . It remains to be seen whether our holding in Quick will remain the law. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert, granted, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2430, 138 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment (B) holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii (C) holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation (D) holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii (E) holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine
Output: (A)
Supreme Court has held that even though the jurors have the right to determine the law, they do not have the right to disregard it. Walden v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (Ind.2008). Carter argues the prosecutor's discussion regarding a difference of laws between states was inappropriate because there is little difference in state laws regarding theft and robbery. The State argues the prosecutor was ensuring the jury understood their role to follow the law, regardless of their personal feelings We agree with the State, and characterize the dialogue in question to be for the purpose of determining whether the juror would be able to follow the law, regardless of personal feelings. Such an inquiry does not put Carter's right to a fair trial in jeopardy. See Hopkins, 429 N.E.2d at 635 (<HOLDING>). Carter also alleges prosecutorial misconduct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 606b precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one jurors affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other jurors dishonesty during voir dire (B) holding questions meant to expose jurors bias and tendencies permitted during voir dire (C) holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire (D) holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice (E) holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion
Output: (B)
(S.D.N.Y.1972), in which the district court decided that the defendants implicitly conferred authority on their attorney . to receive process. Opp’n to CARCO’s Mot. at 2-3. In Bosur-gi however, the defendants retained their attorneys for the purpose of asserting a right to a fund, the attainment of which “necessarily required the attorneys to resist the claims to the fund asserted by . other parties.” 343 F.Supp. at 818. Consequently, as the Bosurgi court notes, “receipt of process by the attorney 834 F.Supp. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (noting that “[t]his court has specifically stated that an attorney does not become a client’s agent for service of process simply because she represented the client in an earlier action”); McLaughlin v. Fidelity Sec. Life Ins., 667 A.2d 105, 106 (D.C.1995) (<HOLDING>). 3. The Court Directs the Plaintiff to Perfect 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants actual knowledge that an action is pending or that service has been attempted is not the equivalent of service of summons and will not relieve the plaintiff of its burden or vest the court with jurisdiction (B) holding that an attempted service on the partys counsel was insufficient without proof of the counsels actual authority to receive service (C) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (D) recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act (E) holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity
Output: (B)
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Id. Cottrell contends that this case was removed in a timely manner because Cott-rell removed the case within thirty days of receipt of an order in state court dismissing Defendant Cassens & Sons, Inc., on summary judgment; alternatively, Cottrell contends that removal is timely because the case was removed within thirty days from the date Cottrell received a copy of an answer in which Defendant Jeff Cas-sens denied liability to the Younts. Although a few courts have taken the view that removals based on alleged fraudulent joinder are not subject to the thirty-day time limitation on removal set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), see, e.g., Armond v. Shoney’s, Inc., No. 91-0895, 1991 WL 162120, at **6-7 (E.D.La. Aug.9, 1991) (<HOLDING>), this Circuit holds, as does the weight of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand (B) holding that a notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder was procedurally defective because it was filed more than thirty days after defendants could have intelligently ascertained that the action was removable (C) holding that assertions of consent of nonjoined defendants contained in a notice of removal does not constitute proper joinder for removal purposes (D) holding that a removal notice must be filed within a reasonable time after fraudulent joinder becomes evident (E) holding that failure to remove within thirty days after receiving a statecourt complaint from which the removing defendant could have discerned fraudulent joinder of a nondiverse party rendered removal untimely
Output: (D)
review of a denial of “Special Agriculture Worker” (“SAW”) status except in the context of a deportation order. The statute states: “There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e) (as amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986). The Court held that this bar did not preclude review of “general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications.” McNary, 111 S.Ct. at 896. Rather, it only barred review of individual denials of SAW status. Id. The statute in McNary resembles the CERCLA provision at issue here in two r S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that we have jurisdiction 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute (B) holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more (C) holding that courts should exercise judicial restraint and decide asapplied challenges before facial challenges (D) holding that where the appellants listed challenges in the statement of issues but failed to brief them the challenges were waived (E) holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional
Output: (A)
is a careless afterthought of the appellant and amici. The conclusion that section 6 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not embrace congressional enforcement of the copyright and Lanham acts is consistent with the trend of post -Seminole decisions. Thus far, only federal statutes that enforce the Equal Protection Clause have been held to permit suits against unconsenting states. See, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir.1997) (Title IX); Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir.1997) (Equal Pay Act). Statutes that enforce the Commerce and Bankruptcy Clauses, on the other hand, have not been found to represent exercises of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment remedial power. See In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.1997) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment (B) holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (D) holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (E) holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
Output: (E)
a result, he had assented to the Estate’s producing the letters. Despite their lack of objection prior to producing the documents, the Opposing Parties contend the Estate “inadvertently” produced the documents and, further, that the stipulated protective order in this ease (the “Protective Order”) requires KFI to return the documents. KFI argues the Estate voluntarily produced the documents. As detailed herein, this court finds the documents were not inadvertently disclosed. When parties stipulate to a protective order requiring the return of inadvertently produced documents, the agreement is enforceable if the proponent actually produced the document(s) inadvertently and otherwise complies with the terms of the order. See VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 11-12 (D.Mass.2000) (<HOLDING>). Absent an agreement, courts have applied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in agency adjudications in which the government has not claimed privilege written reports made at the time of an event must be produced when the credibility of the witness on matters discussed in the report is in question (B) holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully against the government because the possibility of harm to a private party is often if not always grossly outweighed by the public interest in enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue (E) holding stipulated protective order mandated return of two documents inadvertently produced with approximately 25000 intentionally produced pages proponents established that the production of the materials at issue was not a considered or grossly negligent decision but the result of inattention ie inadvertence
Output: (E)
In addition, he filed, in this Court, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted. Liddy v. Lamone, 395 Md. 420, 910 A.2d 1061 (2006). The appellees and Gansler subsequently filed a Joint Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Oral argument was heard on November 2, 2006, and, on that same day, the Court issued its Order vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanding the case to that court with directions to dismiss it on the ground of laches. We now set forth the reasons for that Order. B. Laches is one of the affirmative defenses recognized and expressly listed in M d. Rule 2-323. Generally, it must be pled, but it can be invoked by a court on its own initiative. See, e.g., Ipes v. Board of Fire Comm’rs of Baltimore, 224 Md. 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Baltimore County v. Glendale Corp., 219 Md. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is itself generally a matter of discretion (B) holding that a court of appeals may transfer petitions for writ of mandamus to the court of proper jurisdiction pursuant to  1631 (C) holding public standing doctrine permitted action for emergency writ of mandamus (D) recognizing that laches is a proper ground for refusing to issue a writ of mandamus (E) holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances
Output: (D)
not have occurred. Any negligence on the part of these third parties may not be imputed to the Greene County defendants. Therefore, even if the Greene County defendants were negligent in allowing the horses to compete in the pull, they may not be held liable for any harm caused when the horses escaped from the control of third parties. Herman, 535 A.2d at 1255 (emphasis added). In short, this precedent establishes that the animal exception to governmental immunity does not apply except where the animal is in the direct control of the governmental agency. Further, this Court has explained the meaning of “control” in the context of other exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the Judicial Code. See Walters v. Department of Transportation, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 478, 474 A.2d 66, 67 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Giovannitti v. Department of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding motorist entitled to hearing before taking his license under statute that required loss of license if uninsured driver involved in an accident (B) holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer (C) holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity (D) holding that officers may question motorists about their license registration and travel plans (E) holding that department of transportation did not have control over an uninsured motorists vehicle as intended by the personal property exception to sovereign immunity where it failed to physically obtain custody of motorists drivers license and allowed him to possess a license plate
Output: (E)
” Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). “ ‘[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.’ ” Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person
Output: (A)
White arrived on the scene to when he arrived with the appellant at the Travis County Jail.” However; in light of M'cNeely, we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Schmerber. Here, although Roop was involved in á traffic accident, nothing in‘the record suggests that this fact significantly ■ delayed the collection of Roop’s blood. Officer White testified that he came into contact with Roop at about- 4:00 a.m., placed Roop under arrest at 4:25, and ordered her blood to be drawn at 5:09. The stop for Roop to use the restroom took just a few minutes, and the drive to the jail took only seven to eight minutes. We are not persuaded that'the mere existence of-a traffic accident constitutes a per se exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw. - See Evans, 2015 WL 545702, at *6 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “[ajlthough the findings of fact 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (B) holding that the threat of imminent destruction of evidence of criminal activity created an exigent circumstance (C) recognizing exigent circumstance exception to warrant requirement (D) holding that accident investigation by itself is not exigent circumstance (E) holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense
Output: (D)
or “plain error” exists. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). In the present case, or in any similar case, the only way that a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of section 78 — 3—31(6)(a) would be first to consent to a hearing by a commissioner and then to challenge the validity of that very consent. Such a procedure would likely be futile inasmuch as it would invariably result in the withdrawal of the consent, either by the defendant or by court order. Indeed, absent the approach taken by Ohms, it is unlikely that section 78-3-31(6)(a) would ever be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is precisely the sort of exceptional circu Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). For example, a legislator cannot appoint 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that utah const art vi  1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that the contact clause reaches every form in which the legislative power of a state is exerted whether it be a constitution a constitutional amendment an enactment of the legislature a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated
Output: (D)
F.3d 518, 527 (2d Cir.2005). Although Patterson argues that it “was certainly possible” for his California conduct not to have been fraudulent, Appellant’s Br. at 25, that possibility, which appears remote, did not foreclose the district court’s conclusion of probable relevant criminality. See United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 190. Finally, the district court’s observation that it “must give [the Guidelines] some heavy weight,” Sentencing Tr. at 30 (Jan. 3, 2007), when reviewed in the context of the full sentencing transcript, raises no concern as to the district court’s proper understanding of its obligation to make an “individualized assessment” of the appropriate sentence consistent with the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97 (<HOLDING>). The district court explicitly acknowledged 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines (B) holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that district court may not presume reasonableness of guidelines sentencing range in particular case (E) holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines
Output: (D)
Paulekas, 633 So.2d at 1113. The coverage determination was not binding on the injured claimants who were not parties in the earlier suit. Id. Unlike Bethel, Conde, and Paule-kas, Alexandra’s absence from Citizens’ suit for declaratory relief does not subject Citizens to the threat of future litigation by a potential claimant. Alexandra assigned to Haim any and all rights to benefits under the policy, and she is not and cannot be a potential claimant under the policy. In short, while Alexandra may remain obligated to perform the post-loss duties imposed by the language of the policy, she need not be a party to any coverage decision. See Conde, 595 So.2d at 1008 n. 6; cf. Reinstein v. Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology & Nutrition of Fla., P.A., 25 So.3d 54, 58-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Publix Mkt, Inc., 198 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders even where the corporation has but one shareholder the general proposition of corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude in accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions that the attorneys client is the corporation and not the shareholders (B) holding that resident shareholder of s corporation is eligible for tax credit for taxes paid by corporation in another state and noting that this conclusion is consistent with the internal revenue code which provides that shareholders of an s corporation are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income tax paid by an s corporation (C) holding that after the sale of stock former shareholders have no standing to file a claim against the corporation (D) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (E) holding that doctorshareholder was improperly dismissed from action by corporation seeking to enforce noncompete agreements against former shareholder where underlying agreements allowed for nonexclusive enforcement by corporation or doctorshareholder and both corporation and doetorshareholder therefore must be joined in action to ensure both of former shareholders potential adversaries are bound by judgment
Output: (E)
Anderson claims that the trial court findings do not justify the decision to “increase” his child support on August 1, 1987. In other words, appellant construes the trial court’s 1987 decision as a modification downward to $250 followed by a modification upward to $400. This is a misconstruction of the trial court’s order. As the majority opinion indicates, the court did not make an upward modification. It does not follow, however, that the trial court could act without making findings on appellant’s ability to pay child support. Without findings on appellant’s ability to pay, or another indication that the trial court considered the facts as to appellant’s ability to pay, the law commands us to remand the case rather than to affirm. Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 864-65 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). The dictates of Moylan should be applied. The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending (B) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (C) holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy (D) holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant (E) holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors
Output: (E)
making of competent parents.” (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000))). We have further held that it is the party opposing termination of the guardianship who bears the burden of proving that the petitioning parent is currently unfit to regain custody of the child. Guardianship of David C., 2010 ME 136, ¶¶ 4, 7, 10 A.3d 684. [¶ 12] Although the Legislature has established the standard of a preponderance of the evidence for addressing the best interest of the child.in a proceeding to terminate a guardianship, neither we nor the Legislature has made clear what specific standard of proof the existing guardian must meet in proving the petitionin 174-75 (2010) (same); In re Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 682 N.W.2d 238, 243-46 (2004) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 13] We need not decide the applicable 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party (B) holding that the guardianship must terminate unless the guardian proves by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioning parent is either unfit or has forfeited the right to custody (C) holding custody and guardianship of child whose natural parent is adjudicated unfit mandatorily vests with social services (D) holding that on a parents petition the guardianship must terminate unless the guardian proves by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the guardianship would result in physical or emotional harm to the child (E) recognizing the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in his or her child and concluding that the state must provide a parent with fundamentally fair procedures including a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when seeking to terminate parental rights
Output: (B)
sole contribution of [Lamar] and that [Lamar] was the only party at risk on the purchase of the condominium.” Elizabeth contends that this ruling was in error. This court reviews division of marital property cases de novo. Copeland v. Copeland, 84 Ark. App. 303, 139 S.W.3d 145 (2003). In reviewing a trial court’s decision on whether an item is marital property, we will not reverse unless the court’s ruling is clearly erroneous. See Nicholson v. Nicholson, 11 Ark. App. 299, 669 S.W.2d 514 (1984). We first consider whether Lamar’s execution of the real-estate purchase contract created a property interest. We believe that it did. In executing the contract, Lamar acquired the right to enforce the sale of the condominium. See generally Bharodia v. Pledger, 340 Ark. 547, 11 S.W.3d 540 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Lamb, 210 Ark. 1, 194 S.W.2d 5 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that persons not parties to a contract did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment on contracts validity (B) holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions (C) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (D) holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court (E) recognizing that the supreme court has allowed both the buyers and the sellers of land to seek specific performance on realestate contracts
Output: (E)
by law, the head of an agency may ... grant ... danger pay allowance ... to an employee of his/her agency and require an accounting therefor, subject to the provisions of these regulations and the availability of funds”); DSSR § 031.2. (stating that “danger pay allowance prescribed in Chapter 650 ... may be granted to employees defined in Section 040i”). In fact, the DSSR specifically contemplates that agency heads may decide not to grant danger pay allowances that are authorized by the DSSR, stating that “[wjith-in the scope of these regulations, the head of an agency may issue such further implementing regulations as he/she may deem necessary for the guidance of his/her agency with regard to the granting of and accounting for these payments.” DSSR § 013. See Roberts, 745 F.3d at 1165 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs’ claim that pursuant to the DSSR, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dssr provisions concerning living quarters allowances are only moneyauthorizing and are not moneymandating because section 013 contemplates that agencies may promulgate further regulations as he or she deems appropriate with regard to the granting of allowances (B) holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies (C) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding that unless remand from the bia is qualified or limited to a specific purpose an ij may consider any and all matters he  deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations
Output: (A)