niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
an attorney. With respect to the first explanation, this Court has repeatedly held that while pro se litigants are entitled to special solicitude, “[a]ll litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders.” Valentine, 29 F.3d at 50 (quoting Minotti, 895 F.2d at 103); see also Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302. Houghton failed to seek clarification from the district court of any order he found unclear. In rejecting Houghton’s explanation based on his purported difficulties in retaining an attorney, the district court reasonably took into account Houghton’s termination of two separate attorneys over the course of the litigation and that he fired his last attorney in April 2009 — some 18 months before the scheduled trial date. See S. New England Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at 144 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court is not free to consider the potential for issue reduction when determining whether a putative intervener has a protectable interest in the merits of the action (B) holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness (C) holding that in exercising its discretion in choosing the appropriate sanction the trial court is not limited to considering only the specific violation committed but is entitled to consider other matters which have occurred during the litigation (D) holding that while the nonprevailing partys financial condition is not appropriate to consider in determining whether to award attorneys fees it is appropriate to consider when determining the amount of the attorneys fees (E) holding that the district court is free to consider the full record in the case when selecting the appropriate sanction
Output: (E)
infamous incantation of “financial hardship” so often disavowed by this Court. It is not with a deaf or a totally unsympathetic ear that we listen to the details of the financial disaster which may result____ Nevertheless ... we do not find that this property has been unconstitutionally confiscated. 271 Md. at 664, 319 A.2d 536 (citation omitted). See also Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 365 n. 6, 438 A.2d 1339 (1982) (rejecting the contention that fifte .2d 244 (1973) (“In order to obtain a rezoning on the basis of an unconstitutional confiscation, an applicant must show that he has been deprived of all reasonable use of his property and that it cannot be used for any of the permitted uses in the existing zone.”); Krieger v. Planning Comm’n, 224 Md. 320, 323, 167 A.2d 885 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Greenberg v. State, 66 Md.App. 24, 34-36, 502 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees were nondischargeable as maintenance even though award was in favor of attorneys not spouse because it was rendered in light of the financial resources of the parties (B) holding that restrictions for the public welfare were permissible even though the restrictions resulted in serious financial loss to the owner (C) holding that ordinance conferred unbridled discretion where issuance of permit was subject to broad findings that proposed use will not have a harmful effect upon the health or welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the aesthetic quality of the community or the surrounding land uses (D) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (E) recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters
Output: (B)
(d), which provides: “In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Our Supreme Court ruled that the order mandating the victim to undergo testing was not appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). It observed that, in,the context of trial court orders resolving questions regarding the admissibility of evidence, Pa.R,A.P. 311(d) is applicable only when the order in question suppresses, precludes,, or excludes some evidence that the Commonwealth seeks to introduce at trial. See Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 575 Pa. 411, 836 A.2d 871, 877 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth maintained in Shearer that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pa rap 311d did not accord the commonwealth the right to appeal a pretrial ruling that denied its request that the defense be prevented from presenting certain evidence because in the context of a suppression ruling parap 311d applies only when a pretrial ruling results in the suppression preclusion or exclusion of commonwealth evidence (B) recognizing that we can consider trial evidence in reviewing the denial of a pretrial suppression motion (C) holding that the defendant waived the right to challenge a suppression ruling on appeal (D) holding challenge to suppression ruling not waived under young even though record did not affirmatively indicate that the ruling was part or all of reason for plea (E) holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion
Output: (A)
the allegations do not support an inference that any of the named plaintiffs have been personally injured such as to provide them with the causes of action asserted in Counts III and IV under the laws of California, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee and Vermont, plaintiffs lack standing to bring those claims, and the claims asserted in Counts III and IV as to those jurisdictions will be dismissed. B. Antitrust injury under state antitrust claims States may, but need not, follow the rule of Illinois Brick in enforcing their own state antitrust laws. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105-06, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Several states expressly do not adhere to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim (B) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (C) recognizing that rationales behind illinois brick might not be apply in all cases but standing by illinois brick regardless (D) holding that illinois brick did not preempt state laws that permit suits by plaintiffs with passedon injuries (E) holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims
Output: (D)
and stock options and their underrepresentation in top-level managerial jobs” (Reskin Report ¶¶ 2.1, 2.5). In addition, Dr. Reskin concluded that Allstate’s employment practices fail to check the biases that discretion permits (id. ¶ 2.4). Allstate has filed a motion to strike Dr. Reskin’s report under Daubert (doc. # 207). We need not decide that question because, even assuming that Dr. Reskin’s report passes muster under Daubert, we do not find it persuasive on the issue of commonality. Most of Dr. Reskin’s opinion relies on laboratory studies, “experimental research,” and various historical trends and ideas which lead her to the conclusion that subjective decision-making is inherently flawed: a conclusion that flies in the face of the governing ease law. See Blise, 409 F.3d at 868 (<HOLDING>). Based on this improper assumption, Dr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents (B) holding that a doctors reliance on properly discounted subjective complaints is a specific legitimate reason (C) holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions (D) holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria (E) holding that subjective decisionmaking plays an important and legitimate role in employment decisions
Output: (E)
under chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, as codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014). See Horsley v. State, 160 So,3d 393, 408-09 (Fla. 2015) (<HOLDING>). After the State filed a response, Marshall 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (B) holding that a juvenile whose sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment is entitled to be resentenced under chapter 2014220 laws of florida (C) recognizing that publication in the laws of florida or the florida statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions (D) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range (E) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines
Output: (B)
Right of First Refusal from the Weises to Faulkner is void as a matter of law due to the fact that the legal description of the property conveyed in the document is legally inadequate. On February 18, 1977, more than 20 years before Reiland’s purchase, the Weis-es created a Right of First Refusal in which they granted to Beverly Faulkner, Trustee, her successors or assigns the right of first refusal to purchase the property identified as being 3.0152 acres adjoining on the east side that certain 1.984 acre tract conveyed by Leonard Bythel Weis and wife, Marjorie K Weis to Beverly Faulkner, Trustee on or about February 18,1977. The tract is further identified as being 3.0152 acres in the William Walters Survey, Abstract 851, Harris Count (Tex.App.-Eastland 1987, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). If the descriptions “are insufficient to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disability determinations must be made with reference to corrective measures (B) holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint (C) holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law (D) holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct (E) holding that if property description is to be supplied by writing to which reference is made in deed reference must be adequate to identify writing
Output: (E)
so long. These statements indicate that although formal counseling sessions had ceased, Hess still saiv himself in the role of therapist for both Cindy and her children. Courts unanimously agree that a therapist’s romantic and sexual involvement with a patient is a “harmful act.” See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1986) and cases cited therein. The courts of other jurisdictions have applied statutes regarding social worker privilege. The Massachusetts Supreme Court found statements made to a social worker by a defendant regarding incestuous acts not privileged as communications revealing a crime or harmful act. Massachusetts v. Berrio, 407 Mass. 37, 551 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Mass.1990). See Massachusetts v. Collett, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1228, 387 Mass. 424 (Mass.1982) (<HOLDING>). A New York court has applied the “crime or 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statements made to a social worker that may have bearing on a childs health safety and welfare are not privileged and are subject to compulsory disclosure under the harmful acts exception to social worker privilege (B) holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse (C) holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child (D) holding that statements by a boyfriend to a social worker that he hit an abused mother as well as her child were not privileged (E) holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement
Output: (D)
savoring their natural habitat and not seeing them at all; if there is any difference between the two types of loss, the former would seem more acute. Our own cases have indicated a recognition of people’s interest in seeing animals free from inhumane treatment. In Animal Welfare Institute we expressly noted the plaintiff organizations’ allegation that their members asserted an interest in seeing the seals “alive in their natural habitat under conditions in which the animals are not subject to ... inhumane treatment”, 561 F.2d at 1007, and then identified their aesthetic interests as among those protected, id., presumably thereby embracing the interest in seeing animals free from inhumane treatment. See also Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (D.C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although in both those cases it appears that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the individuals interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters (B) recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters (C) holding that an inmate had no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a more restrictive facility (D) recognizing interest in avoiding exposure to animals killed by hunters (E) recognizing a right to privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
Output: (D)
charge of the crew.” Criminal cabals do not normally have formal organizational charts, and a finding of managerial control can support-ably be premised on how the enterprise operated in practice. See United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). Here, the record is replete with evidence that, either directly or by fair inference,, solidly supports the district court’s conclusion that the appellant was not “out on the street” but, instead, was responsible for overseeing retail sellers and trusted by Cabrera to exert control over other players in the enterprise. No more was exigible to ground the role-in-the-offense- enhancement. See United States v. Cruz-Rodríguez, 541 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 616 (1st Cir. 1993) .(<HOLDING>). Next, the appellant argues that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges (B) recognizing that a defendant need not be the head of a conspiracy in order to warrant managerial roleintheoffense enhancement (C) holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty (D) holding that sentence enhancement for crimes committed against law enforcement officers may be applied when information charges qualifying offense information does not need to recite enhancement statute (E) holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy
Output: (B)
an unlawful battery, or that it would result in bodily harm. Dorn did, however, intentionally apply force to another person, which satisfied the mens rea element of assault-harm, B. Next, We consider whether Dorn’s conduct constituted a battery, and therefore satisfied the actus reus required for assault-harm. The court of appeals determined that Dorn’s conduct constituted a battery because she applied physical force to D.E. Dorn, 875 N.W.2d at 361-63. In Minnesota, the separate crime of battery has been incorporated into the definition of assault. Compare Gallagher v. State, 3 Minn. 270, 271-73, 3 Gil. 185, 187-88 (1859) (discussing the common-law crime of “assault and battery,” which included striking another person), with State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. 1997) (<HOLDING>). At common law, criminal battery was “the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (B) holding that an assault and battery is an unlawful and unjustifiable use of force and violence however slight upon the person of another (C) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (D) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person (E) holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence
Output: (C)
federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board’s proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court’s initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where “the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide”); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court
Output: (B)
results when an extraneous matter is so intertwined with the State’s proof of the charged offense that avoiding reference to it would make the State’s case incomplete or difficult to understand. Id. at 732. The evidence at trial indicated that Appellant pulled the brass knuckles from his pocket as Gary initially approached him in the parking lot. The evidence was relevant to Appellant’s intent and was arguably part of an indivisible criminal transaction. We conclude the evidence was admissible as same transaction contextual evidence because the events are so interwoven that avoiding reference to Appellant’s retrieval of the brass knuckles would make the State’s case incomplete or difficult to understand. See Amaya v. State, 759 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1988, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial courts erroneous instruction on the nonexistent included offense of attempted reckless manslaughter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the jury reached a unanimous guilty verdict as to the charged offense of attempted murder in the second degree (B) holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense (C) holding attempted theft that preceded the charged shooting offense was relevant to the motivation for the ensuing violent confrontation between appellant and the theft victims older brothers because the facts of the two incidents were so interwoven as to necessitate admission of evidence of both for a full contextual evaluation of the indicted offense by the jury (D) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (E) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same
Output: (C)
that includes a right of entry or reentry, education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily available to others resident in the country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. Rather than recite the history of the resettlement doctrine here, we rely on Judge Becker’s opinion in Abdille, which comprehensively examines it. 242 F.3d at 483 & n. 4. The bottom line is that until October 1990, when §§ 208.13(c)(2)(i)(B) and 208.15 created the rule of mandatory denial for a firmly resettled alien seeking-asylum and defined “firm resettlement,” an alien’s resettlement elsewhere was only a factor to be considered by immigration judges, the BIA, and the courts in evaluating an asylum claim as a matter of discretion. See Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 91 S.Ct. 1312, 28 L.Ed.2d 592 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 104, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (B) holding that disbarment was proper where the attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm (C) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (D) holding that despite a statutory change from firm resettlement to flight from persecution in the refugee relief acts of 1957 1960 and 1965 firm resettlement was not irrelevant but was one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a refugee seeks asylum as a consequence of his flight to avoid persecution (E) holding that where the petitioner purported to provide an exhaustive account of the grounds for his claim of asylum that included no reference to his detention and beating this account of persecution was inconsistent with his later testimony before the ij
Output: (D)
N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ind.1999). However, when the landowner is a lessor and the lessee is in operational control of the premises, such duty rarely exists. “[A] landlord under many circumstances has no liability to tenants or others for injuries on the property when the tenant is in full control of the leased premises.” Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 849 N.E.2d 516, 525 (Ind.2006). “[I]n the absence of statute, covenant, fraud or concealment, a landlord who gives a tenant full control and possession of the leased property will not be liable for personal injuries sustained by the tenant or other persons lawfully' upon the leased property.” Olds v. Noel, 857 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted), tram, not' sought; cf. Rossow v. Jones, 404 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>), trans. not sought. Yost v. Wabash College, 3 
 Holding statements: (A) holding over (B) holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship (C) holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building (D) holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control (E) holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas
Output: (D)
§ 233(g)(4) (2005). The FSHCAA of 1992 addressed the liability for medical malpractice not only of a health center but also of a health care physician or licensed or certified practitioner recognized as part of the Public Health Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 254b(a)(l) and acting within the scope of their employment. For such liability, the FSHCAA provided that the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff would be against the United States under the FTCA. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g). To be protected by the FTCA from liability for medical malpractice, a health center or an employee of such a center must be “deemed” an employee of the Public Health Service by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. § 233(f), (g)(1); see Allen v. Chris-tenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Under the traditional formulation of the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing an individuals right of privacy in the content of health records and noting that health records are the property of the health care entity maintaining them (B) holding that the term medical as used in the hearsay exception regarding statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment includes emotional and mental health as well as physical health (C) holding that compensatory contempt fines awarded against the secretary of health and human services were barred by sovereign immunity (D) recognizing the 48hour standard as a department of health regulation (E) holding that removal of suit against physicians employed by a federally funded community health center to federal court by the defendants on the ground that they were covered under the public health service act was improper as the department of health and human services had not yet made a determination whether defendants should be deemed to be employees
Output: (E)
of MAJ Stone and CPT Seifert, and the wounding of fourteen other military officers. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for trial defense counsel to forego trying to convince the court-martial panel to the contrary, and to instead focus squarely on trying to persuade the panel members that Appellant’s acts were not premeditated. Accordingly, concessions such as the ones made by trial defense counsel that Appellant “threw those grenades” and “shot and killed Captain Seifert” were not unreasonable because they did not concede Appellant’s guilt to capital murder. Indeed, this type of approach is a well-recognized defense strategy in capital cases. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-91, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004); Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 458-59 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that trial defense 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that concession of elements of seconddegree murder to challenge defendants mens rea for a capitalmurder conviction was not constitutionally deficient where overwhelming evidence pointed to defendant as perpetrator (B) holding that an indictment that omitted the mens rea element was sufficient because it cited the applicable statutes which informed the defendant of the elements of the charged offenses (C) holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder (D) holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea (E) holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea for solicitation to commit murder offense
Output: (A)
under the Due Pro cess Clause. For example, in Casey, the Supreme Court explicitly noted: Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no • doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia. 505 U.S. at 847-48, 112 S.Ct. 2791; see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974) (recognizing that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has also recognized the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the right to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the due process clause (B) holding that private sexual contact between consenting adults is a liberty right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause (D) holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution (E) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state
Output: (A)
purposes of the OTCA, a “tort” is “the breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law, other than a duty arising from contract or quasi-contract, * * * which results in injury to a specific person or persons for which the law provides a civil right of action for damages or for a protective remedy.” ORS 30.260(8) .... [The duty to refrain from unlawful employment practices] is a “legal duty that is imposed by law, other than a duty arising from contract or quasi-contract” within the meaning of ORS 30.260(8).... Accordingly, the unlawful employment practice that was the basis for this action constituted a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA, and plaintiffs action was therefore subject to the provisions of the OTCA. Cf Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, 275 Or. 35, 38, 549 P.2d 657 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Id. The statute at issue here, Or.Rev.Stat. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship (B) holding that a state agencys breach of its statutory duty to assist individuals in reestablishing their business was a tort within the meaning of the otca (C) holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 (D) holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract (E) holding that the word tort is not technically construed and hence a fathers breach of the statutory duty to pay child support for his illegitimate child constitutes a tortious act within the meaning of the statute
Output: (B)
position. In arguing that a claimant’s submission is not truly “false” if the government knows it to be untrue, the Defendants are actually arguing that when the government remits payment on a claim knowing that a certification contained therein is false, the government waives its right to pursue a cause of action under the civil FCA. We find this position untenable for a number of reasons. Initially, we note that the falsity of a claim is determined at the time of submission. If a claimant has submitted a claim (i.e., a request or demand for money or property) to the government and the claimant knows that he or she is not actually entitled to the funds or property in question, the claimant has asserted a false claim. Fortuities in th y, 82 F.3d 624, 633 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Defendants’ position is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback (B) holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 (C) holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 usc  286  a companion statute to the criminal fca  because his claims were false when submitted even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor (D) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate (E) holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act
Output: (C)
search, Dahl located several items in the trunk that he recognized as commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Those items were located in the same area where the backpack was found. When he found the backpack, Dahl had already located the book on chemicals on the floor in the passenger area where defendant had been sitting, and he had also found contraband in defendant’s fanny pack. When Dahl discovered the contraband visible in the trunk of the car, he contacted the narcotics team to continue the search because of his concern about the hazardous nature of methamphetamine production. He then went into the store to arrest defendant and Johnson. The foregoing facts, taken together, support an inference that Dahl and the other searching officers subjectively b 888 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Of course, probable cause alone is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search (B) holding that officers had objective probable cause to search the pocket of a jacket found on the seat of the defendants truck where the discovery of marijuana in two different locations in the truck combined with the defendants possession of marijuana reasonably led officers to believe that other caches would be found elsewhere in the vehicle (C) holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper (D) recognizing without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant that the discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest the defendant and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched the defendant and discovered the marijuana in his pocket (E) holding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant a rear seat passenger of a car for possession of marijuana based on the discovery of two marijuana seeds in the front of the vehicle
Output: (B)
Inc. v. NNR Global Logistics USA, Inc., No. 09-2202 (JRT/JJK), 2009 WL 4730330, at *4-5 (D.Minn. Dec. 4, 2009); Highland Supply Corp. v. Kurt Weiss Greenhouses, Inc., No. 08-859-GPM, 2009 WL 2365244, at *2 (S.D.Ill. April 28, 2009); TSR Silicon Res., Inc. v. Broadway Com Corp., No. 06 Civ. 9419(NRB), 2007 WL 4457770, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007). As a result, the comments and cases suggest that the answer to the question whether a forum-selection provision materially alters a contract under UCC section 2-207 is that it depends. In some instances, courts have considered the question of material alteration to be one for the jury, including the most recent case involving UCC section 2-207 from the Eighth Circuit. See BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 759 F.3d 869, 872-73 (8th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). A court, however, cannot submit to the jury 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that question of fact for the jury exists on whether warranty disclaimers materially altered the agreement and whether the course of dealing supplemented the agreement (B) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (C) recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists (D) holding that it was error for the court to enter a modified agreement which materially altered the agreement reached by the parties (E) holding that whether a contract has been modified by subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing is a question of fact for the jury
Output: (A)
and Louis Jackson. Id. The district court appointed Marwil as a receiver for CEG, ordering him “to ensure that the Investors are made whole with respect to the funds they invested with [CEG].” Id. at *3-4. Marwil filed suit against Barry Farah, alleging, inter alia, equitable disgorgement on the grounds that the latter negligently misrepresented the value of assets sold to CEG. Marwil, 2003 WL 23095657, at *3-4. The court held that Marwil, as receiver, lacked standing to represent the investors directly. Id. at *1. The court reasoned that notwithstanding the language of the receivership court order that enabled him “to assert Causes of Action on behalf of Noteholders” and ordered him “to ensure that the Investors are made whole C 4296, 2002 WL 1905889, at *1-2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 19, 2002) (<HOLDING>); Scholes v. Tomlinson, Nos. 90 C 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a receiver appointed for the parent corporation of the debtor was not a custodian of the debtorsubsidiary because the receiver was not appointed to take control of the debt ors assets for the benefit of the debtors creditors (B) holding that where the government inter alia retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of a corporation the corporation is part of the government for purposes of the first amendment (C) holding that  10b applies to fraud on corporation by controlling stockholder and that the fact that creditors of the defrauded corporation may be the ultimate victims does not warrant disregard of the corporate entity (D) holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation
Output: (D)
of constructive notice. Defendant’s second argument requires more discussion. District of Columbia cases show a tendency to merge claims for implied warranty of merchantability with strict liability. That is the second basis for Defendant’s argument to dismiss this count. In Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 808 (D.C.1970), the court characterized the doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability in tort as “but two labels for the same right and remedy, as the governing principles are the same.” The reason why implied warranty merges with the strict liability claim is that both are based on the sale of a product alleged to be defective. (M.D. at 13.) Precedent supports the merging of these two claims: Bowler v. Stewart-Wamer Corp., 563 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (<HOLDING>); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F.Supp. 417, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective (B) holding the learned intermediary doctrine as adopted by georgia courts insulated a defendant from liability for negligence strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims (C) recognizing strict product liability actions (D) holding that a commercial buyer of defective goods cannot maintain a strict liability or negligence suit for economic loss to the product as the remedy is a breach of warranty suit under the ucc (E) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control
Output: (A)
jurisdiction] has not been met: (1) the complaint did not specify an amount of damages, and it was not otherwise facially apparent that the damages sought or incurred were likely above [$75,000.00]; (2) the defendants offered only a conelusory statement in their notice of removal that was not based on direct knowledge about the plaintiffs claims; and (3) the plaintiffs timely contested with a sworn, unrebutted affidavit indicating that the requisite amount in controversy was not present.”) (emphasis added). The presence of a binding affidavit submitted by the plaintiff that limits her ability to recover more than the jurisdictional amount would, if offered, place this case squarely within Dow Química’s holding. See also Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liability 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a state statute provides for the award of attorneys fees those fees can be considered as part of the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal diversity jurisdiction (B) holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy (C) holding that it is a wellestablished rule that a district courts subject matter jurisdiction once established is unaffected by postremoval reductions in the amount in controversy internal citations omitted (D) holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal (E) holding that postremoval affidavits can be considered in determining the amount in controversy if jurisdiction is ambiguous at the time of removal
Output: (E)
to review them before entry. The record shows that,- as of the date of his restricted appeal, Bazan had not complied with the trial court’s order to submit an order to memorialize the judgment. II. Error on the Face of the Record A. The Trial Court’s Inherent Power to Dismiss A trial court has the inherent power to dismiss a case. Veterans’ Land Bd. v. Williams, 543 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex.1976) (per curiam); Burton v. Hoffman, 959 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). In the context of the record before us, dismissal for want of prosecution for failure to comply with a trial court’s order is not an abuse of discretion. See id. passim; Koslow’s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.1990); Kutch v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506, 509-10 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Public Util. Comm’n v. Cofer, 754 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (B) holding that trial courts have the power to sanction parties for bad faith abuse of the judicial process not covered by rule or statute (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees (E) holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing
Output: (B)
operations within [the] state [are] thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. at 159. If the court determines that there are sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to support general jurisdiction over the defendant, the court still must determine whether the assertion of such jurisdiction is reasonable under the circumstances of the case. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir.1996) (“[Reasonableness inquiry is applicable to all questions of personal jurisdiction, general or specific.”). See also Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Propet USA, Inc., 62 Fed.Appx. 322, 337 (Fed. Cir.2003) (unpub. op.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore,-even where the defendant conducts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law (B) holding that a similar motion to strike under california state law applies in federal court (C) holding that federal circuit would henceforth apply its own law rather than regional circuit law to questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal and state law rights (D) holding that substantive admiralty law applies though suit was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction (E) holding title vii analysis applies in ada case
Output: (A)
the Golf Course.” However, because the study was conducted without notice to the Board or community, the observation points upon which its conclusion was based were limited to locations accessible to the public— mostly public roads — and no observations were made from the residents’ backyards, much less from their second story windows. Moreover, the study suffered from the further defect that it failed to consider the tower’s visibility in winter, when deciduous trees are bare. Accordingly, the study did not foreclose a finding that the tower would be widely visible. Second, the Board was not bound to accept Omnipoint’s expert testimony simply because (as Omnipoint contends) it was insufficiently contested by properly credentialed expert testim Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, some of the residents’ comments 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se (C) holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight (D) holding that an employment contract between an outgoing city council and the city manager was void on public policy grounds because it attempted to take away the governmental or legislative power of the incoming council to appoint and remove public officers (E) holding that neighbors aesthetic concerns could constitute compelling evidence for a city council
Output: (E)