niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). 1. The Notice of Claim Rule The defendants’ contention that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims because the plaintiff failed to subject himself for the Rule 50-h examination is without merit because no such examination is required under the NYSHRL. Section 50-h states that an examination shall only be held “wherever a notice of claim is filed against a ... town-” N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-h(l). However, a notice of claim is not required under section 50-e(l) of the Municipal Law for claims of employment discrimination against a municipality such as the Town. Hamm v. NYC Office of the Comptroller Alan Hevesi, No. 95 Civ. 6367, 1998 WL 92395, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Palmer v. City of New York, 215 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort actions brought against a state actor must be brought in the illinois court of claims and the district courts dismissal of such claims was proper (B) holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement (C) holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act (D) holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 (E) holding that discrimination claims brought pursuant to executive law  296 are not tort actions and are thus not subject to section 50es notice of claim requirement
Output: (E)
prior conviction used to support the enhancement of his sentence. The State is correct that it need not file a return until a probable-cause determination was made. See Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, at 5-6, 461 S.W.3d at 707; see also Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. However, the State’s assertion, and the circuit court’s finding, that Dar-rough made only a bare assertion that failed to establish probable cause is not accurate. Darrotigh made more than a bare assertion in his pleading—he attached the prior California conviction, alleging it was his first and only prior conviction; he nevertheless failed to obtain or attach the record from any part*'of his sentencing hearing, which may have aided him in establishing probable cause. See Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 38, 834 S.W.2d 642 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Even though | ¡¡Darrough presented more than 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that the burden is on the appellant to bring forth a record that demonstrates error (C) holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record (D) holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error (E) holding that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal
Output: (B)
381. The alleged triggering event was a transfer of corporate shares in exchange for shares in another corporation, but there was no transfer of corporate ownership to outsiders. The court concluded that the meaning of “sale” in the agreement was ambiguous because it was uncertain “whether the actual control of the shares must be transferred,” and therefore “remand[ed] for a jury to consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties intended that the shares needed to change control in a real sense before [the plaintiff’s] rights under the agreement would be triggered.” Id. at 382. Other courts have held that a sale or conveyance may require a real change of ownership or control as well as consideration. See, e.g., NSK, Ltd. v. United States, 115 F.3d 965, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Mandell v. Gavin, 816 A.2d 619, 625 (Conn. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both tria  201 and fsia  1610g require plaintiffs to prove some terrorist state ownership in order to attach and execute on property and finding that ownership interest through federal interstitial rule making (B) holding an implied dedication gives rise to a servitude of public use and does not transfer ownership (C) holding that a contract without a minimum quantity term is unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality (D) holding that term sold requires both a transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration (E) holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury
Output: (D)
the only issues to be determined by the reviewing court were whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the order complained of is reasonable and not arbitrarily made. See, In re Proposed Amend. to Title 291, 264 Neb. 298, 646 N.W.2d 650 (2002); In re Application of E. Neb. Non-stock Trucking Coop, 243 Neb. 662, 501 N.W.2d 712 (1993). The district court should have addressed those issues in this case. We do so here. The fact that § 75-110 gives the Commission authority to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations which it “deems necessary to regulate persons within the commission’s jurisdiction” does not require the Commission to exercise such authority in any given instance. See In re Application No. C-1889, 264 Neb. 167, 647 N.W.2d 45 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Under § 84-907.08, the Commission could 
 Holding statements: (A) holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate (B) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure (C) holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement (D) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (E) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence
Output: (C)
v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (quoting Wright et al. § 2810.1). However, entry of judgment in favor of defendant Daniele was manifest error. In its March 13 order, the court granted defendant SBR’s motion to dismiss, but SBR’s motion did not address the claims against Daniele. Therefore, when the court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, it dismissed it as to defendant SBR but not as to defendant Daniele. The entry of judgment in favor of Daniele had no basis and was therefore erroneous. See Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court for Central District of California, 24 F.3d 1545, 1561 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by California Department of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) In 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error (B) holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus (C) holding that the alj did not consider the vocational experts testimony on crossexamination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence which was a basis for remand (D) holding that the failure to articulate the basis for declining jurisdiction may be clear error (E) holding that ajdministrative agencies must articulate a logical basis for their decisions
Output: (D)
in the case at bar, because death was not part of the “offense of conviction.” See supra Parts V(A)(2)(a) and (b); see also USSG § 1 B 1.2(a) (defining offense of conviction as “the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment ... of which the defendant was convicted”); United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 157 n. 7 (3d Cir.2001) (examining § 2D1.1 and opining in dicta that “several factors lead us to believe that the phrase includes only the facts underlying the specific criminal offense for which the defendant was convicted” and that “not all acts or omissions committed or willfully caused by a defendant during the commission of the offense of conviction are themselves part of the offense of conviction” (emphasis in original)). Compare Rebmann II, 321 F.3d at 544 (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Shah, 453 F.3d 520, 524 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (B) holding  2dlla2 was inapplicable because death was not part of the offense of conviction (C) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (D) holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction (E) holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense 
Output: (B)
stresses the PCRA court’s conclusion that the report was replete with “ ‘red flags’ of brain damage that indicated the need for neurop[sy]chological evaluations.” Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 45; accord N.T., January 20, 2005, at 185 (testimony of a clinical psychologist confirming that “there were a lot of red flags of brain damage in this case”). Appellee acknowledges the Commonwealth’s position that the record was not provided in response to a subpoena secured by trial counsel; however, he observes that it was otherwise available in court records from the Schuylkill County third-degree murder conviction, which the Commonwealth used to support an aggravating circumstance. See generally Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389-90, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Appellee emphasizes that the PCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior conviction is not final and cannot be used to deny appellant community supervision in the primary offense if appellant still has time to file a motion for new trial in the prior conviction case (B) holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel (C) holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission (D) holding that where the prosecution gives notice that it will rely in aggravation on facts relating to a prior conviction capital defense counsel has an obligation to make a reasonable effort to review the court file pertaining to that conviction (E) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime
Output: (D)
rights, it must be settled in court. The permit may thus be perfectly valid, so far as the conservation laws are concerned, and yet the permittee’s right to drill under it may depend upon his establishing title in a suit at law. Id. at 191. While we noted that the Railroad Commission “should not do the useless thing of granting a permit to one who does not claim the property in good faith,” the Railroad Commission’s determination of the propriety of the permit has no effect on the propriety of the permittee’s potentially tortious actions. Id. Of course, statutory remedies may preempt common law actions or other standards that may set the bar for liability in tort, but a permit is not a get out of tort free card. Cf. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 494, 499 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>). But in this case, the statute authorizing the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state common law claim seeking to require automobile manufacturers to install airbags would frustrate the purposes of the federal safety standard regulations adopted under the federal motor vehicle safety act which did not require manufacturers to do so and therefore was preempted by conflict (B) holding design planning and enforcement of bus safety rules for school bus transportation were not operation of motor vehicle under section 4145 (C) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  (D) holding the federal motor vehicle safety standards do not preempt jury findings that a bus manufacturers buses were defectively designed (E) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling
Output: (D)
affect a conclusion. La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572, n.13 (3d Cir.1967). As the Seventh Circuit stated in Excelsior Foundry, functus officio conceives of arbitrators as “ad hoc judges—judges for a case; and when the case is over, they cease to be judges and go back to being law professors or businessmen or whatever else they are in private life.” 56 F.3d at 847. In the same opinion, the court opined that the functus officio doctrine was motivated primarily by judicial antagonism toward arbitrators and a derogation of the arbitral process—originating “in the bad old days when judges were hostile to arbitration and ingenious in hamstringing it.” Id. at 846; see also Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 702 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). However, after the Supreme Court instructed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that limitations on arbitrators post award authority rested on courts hostility toward arbitration as dispute resolution mechanism (B) holding that arbitrators award will be vacated if    mistaken as to applicable law (C) holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties (D) holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated (E) holding that judicial is review available in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution of a dispute
Output: (A)
is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent when no evidence indicates that he was aware of a state statute requiring the court to impose a life sentence if the sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. The California statute at issue here provides that “[i]f the trier of fact [at the sentencing stage] is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole.” 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 316, §12. State high courts faced with the issue whether a defendant must be aware of similar capital sentencing provisions have reached differing conclusions. Compare Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339-340, 455 A. 2d 979, 984 (1983) (<HOLDING>), with People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right (C) holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case (D) holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right structural error occurred (E) holding that a court must explain the effect of a jury deadlock for a waiver to be effective
Output: (E)
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (plurality opinion). This court has held that, “to determine whether an actual or intended obstacle is substantial^] the court must determine whether, examining the regulation in its real-world context, the obstacle is more significant than is warranted by the State’s justifications for the regulation.” Strange III, 33 F.Supp.3d at 1330, 1337 (M.D.Ala.2014) (Thompson, J.) (internal ■ citations omitted); see also Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir.2013) (“The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even if slight, to be ‘undue’ in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous.”); Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); but see Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (B) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (C) recognizing burden (D) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (E) holding that the undue burden test is contextspecific and that both the severity of a burden and the strength of the states justification can vary depending on the circumstances
Output: (E)
to determine if it had been stolen. Thus, Offenbacher’s questions were directly related in scope to his reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred. See United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 518 (6th Cir.2003) (“ ‘Questions that hold potential for detecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn reasonable detention into unreasonable detention.’ ” (quoting United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc))). 3. Terry Frisk and Search of the Car Next, Wright claims that the Terry frisk of him was unconstitutional because the articulable and objective facts existing at the time of the frisk could not support a reasonable belief that Wright was armed and dangerous. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, the early-morning stop occurred in an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that a police officer may order an individual out of his car and frisk him for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and dangerous (C) holding that an officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous (D) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible (E) recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure
Output: (B)
shall discharge the prisoner or resentence hi ant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When the conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, within applicable constitutional and statutory limits, if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both the crime and the criminal. United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890, 110 S.Ct. 233, 107 L.Ed.2d 185 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, a court sentencing a defendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that resentencing is required (B) holding that in addition to a remand for clarification another option in these circumstances is to remand for resentencing (C) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated (D) holding that on direct appeal appellate court may remand for resentencing of all counts (E) holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts
Output: (D)
Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del.2012). 133 . Id. at 1239. 134 . In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 766 (Del.Ch.2011) ("The parties agree that the appropriate standard of review is entire fairness.”). 135 . E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.1983) ("The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”). 136 . See, e.g., Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1116 (Del.1988) (noting that statements from Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), must be "read in context”); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del.1985) (<HOLDING>). 137 . See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when determining the adequacy of a jury charge an appellate court should look to the record and the closing arguments to place the words of the judge in context (B) holding that in the context of a rule 10b5 claim when the merger was approved and the exchange of securities occurred the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new security and paid for it by turning in his old one (C) holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under section 1997ea (E) holding that it is necessary to take account of the entire context of weinberger 457 a2d 701 when determining remedies in a cashout merger
Output: (E)
to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a “term of years not less than five years.” While Thomas’ sentences, under court interpretations of § 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum
Output: (E)
Juan Rogelio Barajas-Hernandez appeals his 63-month sentence imposed upon conviction after jury trial for illegal reentry of a previously deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm. Barajas-Hernandez first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, based on his contention that the prosecution did not prove his prior conviction at trial as required by Apprendi v. New 44 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1061, 120 S.Ct. 1572, 146 L.Ed.2d 475 (2000) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony (B) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (C) holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996 (D) holding that  212c applies to all applications for relief filed after november 29 1990 regardless of when conviction occurred for offenses within the original definition of aggravated felony (E) recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively
Output: (A)
question in other jurisdictions have upheld searches of students’ lockers. However, in all these cases there was substantially more evidence justifying the search of the students’ lockers. For example, in S.A. v. Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind.App.1995), there were a number of high school locker break-ins, and it was subsequently discovered that the school’s master locker combination book had been stolen. Id. at 792. School security officials were given information that defendant possessed the combination book which resulted in a warrantless search of defendant’s locker and discovery of the book. Id. The Indiana Court of appeals held that a student had no expectation of privacy in his locker and that the warrantless search of that student’s locker was reasonable b 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992) (<HOLDING>); In the Interest of S.C., 583 So.2d 188 (1991) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though student had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker school officials properly conducted a warrantless search of the students locker because the officials had probable cause to believe that the locker contained marijuana (B) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry (C) holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle (D) holding that the question of whether the police had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo (E) holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper
Output: (A)
obligations is circumscribed by statute and ordinances.” Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Disk No. Re-1J, 464 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir.2006). Such restrictions are incorporated into any contract the government entity makes. Id. Thus, any party contracting with a government entity is charged with constructive knowledge of those restrictions and cannot claim justifiable reliance on statements to the contrary. Id.; see also Keeling v. City of Grand Junction, 689 P.2d 679, 680 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (imparting constructive knowledge that a city council could only act pursuant to the authority granted to it by the city’s charter). We have applied this rule in a case concerning a school district policy requiring school board approval of certain expenditures. See Kirkland, 464 F.3d at 1190-91 (<HOLDING>). Because the Academy’s charter clearly states 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound (B) holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees (C) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver (D) holding that the school district could not be bound by an administrators promise to buyout an employees salary (E) holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset
Output: (D)
conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination by a municipality and its employees, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in  1981 by state governmental units (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution (E) holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
Output: (A)
believe violation of statute had occurred). Sosa has produced relevant evidence of one misstatement and one omission. First, Sosa argues that Hames misstated the location of Accion’s business records because he knew the documents were kept at the business location and not at Sosa’s residence. According to the Affidavit, Sosa told Officer Reyes the business records were being kept at Sosa’s residence. (See Oct. 4, 2004 Aff. for Search Warrant at 2). Although Sosa maintains he did not make any such statements to Officer Reyes, Hames was entitled rely upon statements made to him by another officer in drafting the Affidavit, even if it is ultimately discovered that Officer Reyes misstated the evidence. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statement that the affiant is senior vicepresident and secretary of a corporation asserting a special appearance is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the corporations contacts with texas (B) holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account (C) holding allegation that false affidavit was basis for arrest warrant is sufficient to state  1983 fourth amendment claim against affiant officer (D) holding warrant not undermined and affiant did not act in bad faith where affiant relied upon erroneous statements made by third party (E) holding that a trial court had implicitly found that an affiant lacked credibility even where the affidavit testimony was uncontroverted
Output: (D)
claim was procedurally barred because the state court had rested its decision on an independent and adequate state ground— failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule—and because cause and prejudice were not shown. On appeal, Mercado challenges the district court’s finding. He concedes the procedural default, but asks this Court to find cause and prejudice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (requiring a showing of “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law”). He identifies the court’s interference with his trial counsel’s efforts to make a contemporaneous objection as “cause” for the default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We find no such interference, and no other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusion of defense witness does not violate sixth amendment where defendant failed to comply with discovery rule requiring that witnesses be identified before trial (B) holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice (C) holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules (D) holding that the district court properly allowed the defendant who asserted the disputed defense as a contested issue of law in the joint pretrial order to pursue the defense despite the defendants failure to comply with rule 8c (E) holding that cause exists where some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsels efforts to comply with the states procedural rule
Output: (E)
was inconsistent with his obligations as a debtor-in- possession and merited a finding of mismanagement sufficient to justify the appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee. This Court was unimpressed by the Debtor’s post hoc justification for his violation of his fiduciary obligations and his diversion of estate assets. At the October 15th hearing, the Debtor argued that his purchase of the WSFS Claim resulted in a net benefit to his estate that should inoculate his bad acts. Whether or not his purchase of the WSFS Claim resulted in a net benefit to his estate is irrelevant. See, e.g., In re Free, 466 B.R. 48, 54 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2012) (refusing to credit debtor’s “no harm, no foul” defense to alleged misconduct); In re Johnson, Bky. No. 05-14164, 2009 WL 65246, *13 (Bankr.D.Del. Jan. 9, 2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 271 B.R. 228, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the purpose of the bankruptcy codes avoidance provisions is to prevent a debtor from making transfers that diminish the bankruptcy estate to the detriment of creditors (B) recognizing that noncompliance with bankruptcy codes disclosure requirements may not be excused by a no harm no foul defense (C) holding no irreparable harm and thus no jurisdiction where no existing employeeemployer relationship (D) holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure of informants identity based solely on defense counsels unsworn representations that disclosure would be relevant and helpful to his defense (E) holding that no seizure occurred where officers boarded bus and began questioning passengers gave passengers no reason to believe that they required an answer and tjhere was no application of force no intimidating movement no overwhelming show of force no brandishing of weapons no blocking of exits no threat no command not even an authoritative tone of voice
Output: (B)
established procedures. Failing to follow proper procedures is insufficient to establish an infringement of a liberty interest. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”). Thus, the substantive due process violation claim fails because the failure to follow procedure and provide Grinter with a medical report, question Dunlap and Thomas, and make J. Belt available for questioning does not infringe a liberty interest. Thus, even if Grinter had asserted a procedural due process claim against these defendants, it also would have failed. See Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1165 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). These alleged procedural violations by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (B) holding that due process does not require that parole authorities follow established procedure (C) holding that any reliance by the parole board on inadmissible hearsay did not violate due process (D) holding a plaintiff cannot state a due process claim for defendants failure to follow statutory procedural requirements because a plaintiff cannot have a protect property interest in the procedure itself (E) holding that the bias streamlining procedure does not violate an aliens due process rights
Output: (B)
the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) that the issue has been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) that the determination of the issue in the prior litigation has been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action. Rabo Agrifinance, 583 F.3d at 353. Further, “[t]he parties to the suits need not be completely identical, so long as the party against whom estoppel applies had the full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the previous lawsuit.” Id. Although usually an affirmative defense, collateral estop-pel may be raised sua sponte by the district court, particularly if both actions were brought in courts of the same dis trict, as is the case here. United Home Rentals, Inc. v. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, 716 F.2d 324, 330 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Meador v. McFaddin, 172 F.3d 869, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket (B) recognizing that in the interest of judicial economy res judicata may properly be raised by a district court sua sponte particularly where both actions are brought in the courts of the same district (C) holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment (D) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (E) recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff
Output: (B)
and ethnicity, all of which may be a great deal more sensitive than the electrical consumption records at issue in Maxfield. In addition, DOL records easily reveal the driver’s address, which many people, especially the victims of domestic violence, legitimately desire to keep private to protect their personal safety. The sensitive nature of this personal information supports the legislature’s finding of a privacy interest in the records. The second prong of the article I, section 7 analysis is whether the government intrusion into private affairs was conducted with or without the authority of law. Maxfield, 133 Wn.2d at 342. The State has a legitimate police power interest in allowing the police access to these records in performance of their duties. See Laws of 1990, ch. 232, § 1 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the evidence clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the extraordinary value of the vehicle title and registration records for law enforcement (B) holding that a hearing would serve no purpose because the registration act and notification law subject all sex offenders as defined by the registration act to the registration and notification provisions and law enforcement authorities have no discretion to determine which offenders would be exposed to public dissemination (C) holding that sornas registration requirements and criminal enforcement provision are proper under the commerce clause (D) recognizing the value of leveraging the governments limited enforcement resources (E) holding that the postmark on the registration application was the determining factor when a registration is subsequently approved
Output: (A)
with the same deficiency — the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.”). We are not, however, convinced that the instant case was one with respect to which a dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, a complaint — so long as it is minimally sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the claims against him — will not fail for mere surplusage. See United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.2003) (“Surplusage can and should be ignored. Instead of insisting that the parties perfect their pleadings, a judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case.”); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We have recognized that “[pleading facts not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (B) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (C) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (D) holding that it is an abuse of discretion  to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter (E) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds
Output: (D)
Dec. 20, 2001) (Fed. R. Civ.P. 27); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04 — CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *2 (Cal.Super.Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (California discovery statute). 4 . See 4 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 982-83, 5 . See Tex.R. Civ. P. 270 (allowing court discretion to permit "additional evidence” to be offered); TexR. Civ. P. 286 (stating that ”[a]d-ditional argument may be allowed in the discretion of the court” in event jury receives further instructions after having retired); Tex.R. Evid. 611(a) (giving court "reasonable control” over interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence); Tex. Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Loesch, 538 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). The trial court’s authority to dismiss for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in overruling defendants objection on same ground as asserted here to trial courts voir dire hypothetical that was similarly worded to states hypothetical here (B) holding failure to take action may have some bearing on good faith (C) holding that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error (D) holding that court may place some limits on voir dire examination (E) holding that no manifest injustice resulted although the prosecutor did misstate the law at one point because the correct standard of proof was restated multiple other times during voir dire and in argument and the jury was properly instructed
Output: (D)
individualized suspicion that each child was in possession of tobacco products or a lighter,” affirmance is merited because such individualized suspicion to search Child and his backpack was nevertheless present. In support of its argument, the State acknowledges that Child’s mere presence at the smoker’s corner prior to stepping onto the school campus does not provide the requisite individualized suspicion. See generally State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (noting that New Mexico has not dispensed with the need for individualized suspicion and affirming the lower court’s determination that the actions of the defendant’s companion could not be used to justify the defendant’s detention); State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 3, 11, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (<HOLDING>). However, the State argues that individualized 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests (B) holding that the childs proximity to the initial reported disturbance the childs dress in gangattire and the childs gangwhistle and the fact that another juvenile in the area had been found carrying a concealed weapon did not provide the necessary individualized suspicion to justify the search of the child in the school parking lot (C) holding that the improper admission of hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse warranted reversal where the childs otherwise uncorroborated testimony was the sole basis for conviction and the hearsay augmented the childs testimony with additional detail in certain areas (D) holding that trial court improperly awarded custody of child to the childs stepmother and grandparents where no pleading in the case was directed at such relief and the childs mother had no notice that the issue would be considered (E) holding in a paternity action that the selection and change of the childs surname from the name chosen by the mother must be based on the trial courts determination that renaming is in the childs best interests and the record must affirmatively show such a name change is required for the welfare of the minor child
Output: (B)
United States v. Reyes, 603 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.1979)). In contrast, other circuits have concluded strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 23(a) is necessary to waive a jury trial. E.g., United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1012 (5th Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). Mindful of Rule 23(a)’s writing requirement and the reasons for it, we conclude requiring strict compliance with Rule 23(a) is not justified. In those circumstances where the record clearly reflects a defendant’s waiver of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, we see no practical justification for finding a waiver invalid simply because Rule 23(a)’s writing requirement has not been met. Cf. United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The Constitution requires only that a waiver 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that technical violations of fedrcrimp 41 d require suppression if there was a deliberate disregard of the rule or if the defendant was prejudiced (B) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant (C) holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue (D) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (E) holding that collateral review of the validity of a jury waiver in the absence of a rule 23a writing is not available absent any indication the defendant was prejudiced by the technical error
Output: (E)