niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
which began to run on the date the cause of action accrued, not on the date of discovery.” Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. v. Surgical Tech., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 857 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17208). Similarly, under the CLRA, the limitations period begins to run on the date the improper consumer practice was committed. Cal. Civ.Code § 1783. The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations for CLRA claims, however. See Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., 733 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1141 (C.D.Cal.2010); Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Products Inc., No. C 08-00836 CW, 2009 WL 2905960, *3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2009). Florida applies the more straightforward rule that the cause of action accrues on the date of sale. See S. Motor Co. v. Doktorczyk, 957 So.2d 1215, 1218 (Fla. App.2007) (<HOLDING>). New York’s consumer fraud law applies the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale (B) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (C) holding that the payments accrued (D) holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure (E) recognizing the cause of action
Output: (A)
that the Constitution prohibits under the rubric of contemporary conscience shocking substantive due process. State tort law is, instead, a proper source of any remedy. Plaintiffs rely on several cases from other jurisdictions, which they contend support a contrary conclusion. After reviewing those decisions and many others, we are satisfied that they only illustrate that the sheriffs alleged conduct here (with the exception of his physical conduct toward Ms. Springer) does not rise to a “sexual assault” in violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir.1997) (facts showing school superintendent forced teacher to perform fellatio supported substantive due process violation); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forcible rape of a suspect by a police officer may constitute a violation of the substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm (B) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights (C) holding forcible extraction of the contents of defendants stomach shocks the conscience and violates due process (D) recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights (E) recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim
Output: (D)
substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as “whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt
Output: (C)
had been reviewed "extensively and with finality” by the state courts and therefore there was no pending or ongoing state action. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir.2006). Of course, after receiving an unfavorable decision from the state courts on appeal, the Younger doctrine would not bar Plaintiffs from bringing their claims to federal court because there would be no pending state action. Id. 14 . In United Artists, Justice Alito pointed out that the decision to apply the "shocks the conscience” test put the Third Circuit "in line” with other Courts of Appeals that declined to find substantive due process violations in cases involving land-use disputes: See, e.g., Chesterfield Development Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se (B) holding that allegations that the city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and stating in dicta that the decision would be the same even if the city had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith a badfaith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law (C) holding seniorhousing zoning ordinance invalid as applied (D) holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law (E) holding that the city was not estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance when a zoning department employee mistakenly stamped the plaintiffs application for a license to operate a laundromat to indicate compliance with the ordinance
Output: (B)
by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1106(a). Noting that the guardian ad litem had not objected at trial to the sufficiency of service of the summons, nor raised such issue on appeal, this Court held that respondent-mother had failed to demonstrate any prejudice to her “from the alleged failure to properly serve [the juvenile].” Id. at 8, 616 S.E.2d at 269. Additionally, this Court did not question the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on the service of summons and specifically concluded that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. Thus, the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in J.B. was affirmed. See also In re B.D., 174 N.C. App. 234, 620 S.E.2d 911 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 289, 628 S.E.2d 245 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record on appeal includes copies of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that guardian ad litems extensive advice to plaintiffs attorney and daily involvement in case exceeded formal role of guardian ad litem (B) holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 (C) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (D) holding the district court properly allowed guardian ad litem fees to be taxed as costs (E) holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable
Output: (C)
the notice. (Hilsee Supp. Aff. ¶ 6(b), June 8, 2005). Moreover, the notice campaign began in early December, and the deadline to file opt-outs was April 8, 2005. This timeline, spanning a period of four months, is consistent with court-approved best practices for class notice campaigns. Id. at ¶ 6(c)vi. Accordingly, I FIND that there was sufficient notice leading up to the opt-out deadline. Objectors also assert that because the settlement class could have potentially included millions of Class Members, and only 6,524 have “shown their hands” to be included in the class by filing an inventory form, the notice is inadequate. However, many factors contribute to the claims response rate. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prod., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>); 3 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (B) holding that notice apprised class members sufficiently of information that notice was intended under the rule to convey (C) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (D) holding that where defendant engaged in customary and court approved notice procedure the response rate was not determinative of the adequacy of the class notice (E) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice
Output: (D)
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. 445 U.S. at 589-590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382 (alterations in original). The Fourth Amendment does not differentiate among types of “homes.” The term is of course broader than, for example, a single-family house. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1019, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment protection applies to an apartment, “the equivalent of a single-family house”), citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1634-35, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55, 69 S.Ct. 191, 192-93, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (defendant’s room in a “rooming house” treated as a home); Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The principal protection against unnecessary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contractual conditions printed on cruise ticket were valid even though they were in small type (B) holding that vague on schedule and on track statements were immaterial misrepresentations (C) holding that ontrack dormitory rooms for racetrack employees were homes under the fourth amendment even though they were small temporary located near stables and accessible to track authorities by master keys (D) holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process (E) holding that the juvenile defendants who voluntarily left their homes in the middle of night to ride to the police department in patrol cars and who were told they were not under arrest were not in custody
Output: (C)
Ms. Goren bases her statement of facts on her second amended complaint. That complaint, however, is not before this court. On September 3, 1997, the district court entered a judgment dismissing Ms. Goren’s complaint. Ms. Goren subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend judgment to permit filing of a second amended complaint. Ms. Goren attached her proposed second amended complaint to that motion. On October 23, 1998, the court entered an order denying Ms. Goren’s motion. In her opening brief, Ms. Goren devoted nearly her en tire argument to the district court’s decision dismissing her amended complaint. Indeed, there is no “Issue Presented" or meaningful argument regarding the district court’s denial of Ms. Goren’s 93) (<HOLDING>). 5 . At oral argument, Ms. Goren’s counsel 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance (B) holding that attorney who allegedly prepared false private placement memoranda regarding limited partnership did not conduct affairs of enterprise because he did not direct  the legal entities he represented to engage in particular transactions (C) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial (D) holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them (E) holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures
Output: (B)
the offense is punishable by death if certain proof is introduced at trial. When an accused is charged, as here, with transporting a kidnapped victim across state lines, he is charged and will be tried for an offense which may be punished by death. Although the imposition of that penalty will depend on whether sufficient proof of harm is introduced during the trial, that circumstance does not alter the fact that the offense itself is one which may be punished by death and thus must be prosecuted by indictment.” Id. at 8. (Emphasis original.) The West Virginia Supreme Court has reached the same result in construing a similar state kidnapping statute. Pyles v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 465, 135 S.E. 2d 692, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 864 (1964); but see State v. Sewell, 342 So. 2d 156 (La. 1977) (<HOLDING>). Our determination that G.S. 14-39 creates a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that leaving the scene and failing to render assistance are separate and distinct offenses (B) recognizing similar duties (C) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (D) holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case (E) holding that a statute that created a counselorclient privilege should not be retroactively applied to records created prior to the statute because of the presumption against retroactivity
Output: (C)
father of that child. Given that holding, Longoria’s summary judgment motion in this case was in substance merely a motion to abate, see Carter v. Brady, 423 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the granting of which would merely give Valadez a reasonable opportunity to amend her suit to remove the obstacle to its prosecution. See Texas Highway Dept. v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.1967). See also, M & M Const. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 747 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). A summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment. See Dowler v. Delta Inv. Housing, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1992, no writ). Cf. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>), citing, Texas Department of Corrections v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment (B) holding that protective features of special exception procedure should not be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings where plaintiffs pleadings fail to state a cause of action (C) holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment (D) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (E) holding that pleadings cannot be regarded as summary judgment evidence
Output: (C)
holding that “both the UCC and common law allow defendant to disclaim implied warranties”)). Defendants also argue that there is no privity of contract between the parties, and that Plaintiff failed to identify any affirmation of fact or promise that was the basis of the sale of the Infuse device (Dkt. 51 at 34-35). Again, Plaintiff fatally provides no opposition to Defendants’ arguments. See Notredan, L.L.C. v. Old Republic Exch. Facilitator Co., 531 Fed.Appx. 567 (6th Cir.2013) (recognizing that the plaintiff had waived claim by failing to respond to or refute arguments made by the defendants in the district court); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Global Med. Billing, Inc., 520 Fed.Appx. 409, 412 (6th Cir.2013) (same); Humphrey v. U.S. Att’y Gen.’s Office, 279 Fed.Appx. 328, 331 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Tenn., 878 F.2d 382 (6th Cir.1989) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that the defendant waived any argument on the issue by failing to oppose a motion to dismiss (D) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (E) holding litigant waived issue on appeal by failing to present any argument challenging the decision under review
Output: (C)
having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 . We do not reach the question of whether it was proper for a Minnesota peace officer to go outside Minnesota's borders and attempt to compel a blood sample under Minnesota law. In this case, the sample was obtained using Wisconsin's procedure inside Wisconsin's borders and our holding is limited to these facts. 2 . Both parties make arguments regarding Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1978). These cases, due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a dri Tex. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue (B) holding that the michigan usury act mcla  43831 a statute setting forth the legal interest rate in michigan is preempted according to the explicit terms of hola (C) holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication (D) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (E) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under  1983
Output: (C)
Homes, Inc., 518 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (excessive rain); Camacho Enters., Inc. v. Better Constr., Inc., 343 So.2d 1296, 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (heart attack). The court then concluded that the force majeure clause rendered Paradigm’s obligation illusory under the Disclosure Act because the clause excuses delays that would “not qualify under Florida’s impossibility of performance principles.” Neither the district court nor the Steins have explained why the standard of legal impossibility should be the measure of obligation under the § 1702(a)(2) exemption — why any force majeure clause that extends beyond legal impossibility renders a contract non-exempt. This force majeure clause covers events that may or may not happen, but whether they do , 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Nor does the clause make the two-year duty 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the fundamental principle of contract law and florida law that an obligation is illusory when it appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship (D) holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff (E) recognizing that a contractual provision renders an obligation illusory when it allows a party to breach with impunity
Output: (E)
Plaintiff from discovering the causes of action and filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff argues that it is contrary to the public policy of Tennessee to allow Defendants to profit from their own fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs argument, although appealing on its face, is best directed toward the Tennessee legislature. Had the legislature intended to provide equitable exceptions to the statute of repose, it could have done so. Tennessee courts have consistently read all statutes of repose literally, and have declined to read equitable exceptions into them. See Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn.1995) (statute of repose is an “absolute” limit “superimposed upon the existing statute [of limitations]” absent statutory exceptions); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tenn.1978) (<HOLDING>). This Court holds that the Tennessee Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute of repose acts as an outer limit or ceiling within which all suits must be brought (B) holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations (C) recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title (D) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (E) holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose
Output: (A)
documents. Implying such a waiver could tend to inhibit agencies from making any disclosures other than those explicitly required by law because voluntary release of documents exempt from disclosure requirements would expose other documents in the litigation to risk of disclosure. An agency would have an incentive to refuse to release all exempt documents if it wished to retain an exemption for any documents. Although the language of subsection (b) explicitly exempts documents in the covered categories from FOIA disclosure requirements, readily finding waiver of confidentiality for exempt documents would tend to thwart the underlying statutory purpose, which is to implement a policy of broad disclosure of government records. Cf. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 290-94, 99 S.Ct. at 1711-14 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the policy underlying FOIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ajny asserted right by third parties to prohibit disclosure must have a basis independent of the foia (B) holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  (C) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents (D) holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia (E) holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption
Output: (C)
for the purposes of res judicata.”); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (“Plaintiff’s contention that the arbitration’s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.”); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (“[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.” (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep’t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union (B) recognizing that the involvement of supervisory union members in union affairs conflicts with the need to assure the complete devotion of union negotiating teams to employee interests (C) holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union (D) holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted (E) recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members
Output: (A)
the credibility of the defense’s approach to its case. Clark v. State, 878 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.). We cannot conclude that the trial court’s comment was a statement of approval of the State’s argument, disbelief in the defense’s position, or an effort to diminish the credibility of the defense’s approach to the case. Whether the alleged statements were actually made by the police was a question for the jury to resolve. The trial court stated that appellant could testify about “who it was that said it.” The statement that followed, “if it was said,” could have been interpreted as a proper reminder by the trial court to the jury that, it was the jury, not the trial court who would resolve that issue. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Because we cannot determine that the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses (B) holding the resolution of questions regarding credibility and the weight given to testimony is a function of the family court judge who heard the testimony (C) holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine (D) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony (E) holding that defendants truthfulness and the credibility of and weight to be given expert medical testimony are issues of fact for jury
Output: (D)
to foreign sovereign immunity also do not help Bodi. Bodi argues that the differences between tribal immunity and the immunity enjoyed by foreign nations suggest that a tribe waives its immunity by removing to federal court. In refusing to extend Lapides to the tribal immunity context, the Eleventh Circuit in Contour Spa reasoned in part that tribal sovereign immunity is instead “more analogous to foreign sovereign immunity,” and that “[t]he significance of the comparison inheres in the fact that foreign sovereigns do not waive their sovereign immunity by removing a case to federal court.” Id. at 1206 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1047 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001), and Rodriguez v. Transnave Inc., 8 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>)). Bodi asserts that this comparison should cut 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity (B) holding the contract was not authorized by law (C) holding that removal by a foreign sovereign is explicitly authorized by 28 usc 1441d and clearly cannot constitute waiver (D) holding that 28 usc  1361 which provides that district courts shall have original jurisdiction  to compel an officer or employee of the united states  to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that the provisions of title 28 in general and the foreign sovereign immunities act in particular are not laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce as contemplated by 28 usc  157d
Output: (C)
this case. The interplay of paragraphs (a) and (d) in connection with employees who are under the influence of alcohol while driving during working hours has not been considered by this court in a reported decision. Although all paragraphs have some relevance to the employment misconduct determination, we begin our analysis with paragraph (a), which sets forth the basic rule on employment misconduct. Employers have a legitimate interest in having their trucks operated by drivers who are not impaired by the effects of alcohol. See Shell v. Host. Int’l Corp., 513 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Minn.App.1994) (“An employer has the right to expect its employees not to engage in conduct that seriously endangers people’s safety”); Hayes v. Wrico Stamping Griffiths Corp., 490 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Minn.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Risk has not claimed that he lacked the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (B) holding that driving records were nontestimonial (C) holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon (D) holding that statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated applied to defendant driving on a private parking lot (E) holding dangerous driving showed willful disregard of employers interests
Output: (E)
Operating & Production Corp., 30 F.3d 907, 911-12 (7th Cir.1994)). Plaintiffs have alleged substantial circumstantial evidence to show that the financial disclosure statements issued by the Company contained material misstatements or omissions and that those material misstatements were made with scienter. “To the extent that a plaintiff sets forth a primary violation of the Exchange Act, dismissal of § 20(a) claim for derivative liability is inappropriate.” Chalverus v. Pegasystems, Inc., 59 F.Supp.2d 226, 236 (D.Mass.1999). See In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F.Supp. 539, 549 (D.Mass.1997). A motion to dismiss a § 20(a) claim should be denied, moreover, when the defendants themselves made the allegedly false and misleading statements. See Chalverus, 59 F.Supp.2d at 226 (<HOLDING>); In re PLC Sys. Sec. Litig., 41 F.Supp.2d 106, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because defendants made the statements in the press release and signed the sec disclosure forms in light of a preliminary finding of a primary violation it could not dismiss the  20a action (B) holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief (C) holding positive press release was not actionable where plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the historical representations in that press release were false (D) holding that agency could not claim national security disclosure exemption where documents already released to the press (E) holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion
Output: (A)
for applying a broader interpretation of N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(b) than the application of Pukowsky’s test would allow. By the same token, in rejecting the adoption of a test that would exclude all independent contractors, all temporary workers, and all workers who are not permitted the employment benefits mentioned in the Pukowsky test, we recognize that CEPA was not intended to provide protection for all individuals with a working relationship with an employer, but only those vulnerable to retaliation. That is, some workers are contractually positioned in a way that frees them from the fear of termination or other forms of retaliation, and have no critical need for CEPA’s protections. See, e.g., Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 304 N.J.Super. 226, 241-42, 699 A.2d 697 (App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 158 N.J. 333, 730 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division (B) holding that a tenured tax assessor was not entitled to pursue a cepa action because he could only be removed from office by the director of the division of taxation (C) holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity (D) recognizing the transition of the administrative hearing process from the division of motor vehicles to the office of administrative hearings (E) holding that the director of the office of domestic relations was a judicial agency pursuant to the rtkl because the director was administrative staff of the unified judicial system as defined in the judicial code 42 pacs  102
Output: (B)
than that they be given such a trial. Its impairment, ipso facto, brings the court, and administrative bodies as well, into public disrepute, and destroys the esteem and confidence which they have enjoyed so generally. Time and experience have demonstrated that the public, as well as litigants, will tolerate the honest mistakes of those who pass judgment, but not the biased acts of those who would deprive litigants of a fair and impartial trial. Foremost among the responsibilities imposed upon a reviewing court, is to make sure that this foundation of our Judicial system be not undermined. Fallon, 441 P.2d 822, 329 (citing Inland Steel Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 109 F.2d 9, 20 (7th Cir.1940)). Devous, 845 P.2d at 417. See also, Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 938 (Wyo.2000) (<HOLDING>). [142] In Ririe we discussed the statutory and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding djue process requires that an agency provide a fair trial without the appearance of bias or prejudice (B) holding that prejudice requires that the difference in sentencing be significant (C) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (D) holding that a petitioner must show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim that he or she was denied a full and fair hearing in violation of due process (E) holding that an indigent defendant cannot have a fair trial without being provided counsel
Output: (A)
State’s proffered alternative ground for affirming the trial court’s ruling. ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE, DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 1 . The State contends that this limitation in the scope of the warrant was merely the result of a technical oversight. 2 . The trial court employed this term in its memorandum decision, and the Court of Appeals generally noted that the trial court had found the warrant to be "invalid." These terms, however, may be somewhat misleading. It does not appear that the trial court found there was an insubstantial basis for issui ah 1984) (refusing to address argument offered on appeal in defense of lower court’s decision where that argument was not raised in pleadings or argued by parties below); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Since deciding Langnes, the United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate court can uphold a trial courts ruling on any ground appearing in the record whether urged in the trial court or not (B) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (C) holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court (D) holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required (E) holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing
Output: (C)
Construction § 44.16, at 529 (4th ed. 1986) (citing cases). “[T]he general federal rule is that courts do not rewrite statutes to create constitutionality.” Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.1991); see generally id. at 1124-25 (canvassing relevant caselaw of the Supreme Court). Though severability may be achieved “by striking out or disregarding words that are in the [challenged] section,” it may not be achieved “by inserting [words] that are not now there.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875). Inserting into a statute words that Congress did not enact “would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one,” which “is no part of our [judicial] duty.” Id.; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 82, 98, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879) (<HOLDING>). Although the Supreme Court cases discussed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims (C) holding that it is not within the judicial province to give the words used by congress a narrower meaning than they were manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body (D) recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims (E) holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import
Output: (C)
In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir.1986); see also In re Schneider, 864 F.2d 683 (10th Cir.1988); In re Boyett, 250 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. S.D.Ga.2000); In re White, No. BRL88-00971C, 1989 WL 146417 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa Oct.27, 1989); In re Kruse, 35 B.R. 958 (Bankr.D.Kan.1983); Conagra, Inc. v. Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich.App. 109, 602 N.W.2d 390 (Mich.App.1999). A Texas bankruptcy case, frequently cited in this connection, explained that, “the disaster payments are merely the substitute proceeds of the crop which logically would have been received had the disaster or low yields not occurred.” In re Nivens, 22 B.R. 287, 291 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1982). Nivens ’s reasoning was adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Sweetwater Prod. Credit Ass’n, v. O’Briant, 764 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.1988)(<HOLDING>). The conclusion of these courts that federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding student loan proceeds did not lose exempt status after excess of proceeds after payment of tuition and fees was deposited in students bank account (B) holding the real estate sale proceeds (C) holding payment in kind contracts are proceeds (D) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (E) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims
Output: (C)
CURIAM: Darren Lamont Dennis pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). Dennis appeals his sentence, arguing that his sentence violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because the fact that his predicate prior convictions were committed on different occasions was not charged in the indictment or admitted by him. We affirm. As Dennis acknowledges, the issue he raises is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 285-87 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1463, 164 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because of its civil nature section 881 does not require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal violation occurred (B) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that the nature and occasion of prior offenses are facts inherent in the convictions which government is not required to allege in the indictment or prove beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that nature and occasion of offenses are facts inherent in convictions and those facts need not be alleged in indictment or submitted to jury (E) holding that failure of trial court to instruct jury that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt killing was not committed in heat of passion required reversal of murder conviction even though there was general charge that state was required to prove each element of offenses beyond reasonable doubt
Output: (C)
F.2d at 890. The more recent case of Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999), also discusses the requirements of these types of agreements. There, the court stated: “A settled-but-not-paid requirement, finally, also accords with the long-established rule that a contractor need not pay its sub before making a claim on its behalf. See George Leary Constr. Co. v. United States, 63 Ct.Cl. 206, 223, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (Tt is easy to forecast the financial ruin of a Government contractor if the rule is to be established that he may not receive amounts due from the Government under his contract until he establishes . . . that he has paid his subcontractor all he owes him.’); see also Severin v. United States, 99 Ct.Cl. 435, 443, 1943 WL 4198 (1943) (<HOLDING>).” 175 F.3d at 1250. The Morrison court went on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy trustee for contractor could not avoid prepetition payment of funds from contractor to subcontractors (B) holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor (C) holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate (D) holding that if contractor is hable to sub that liability though not yet satisfied by payment might well constitute actual damages to the contractor and sustain their suit under rule that contractor may only sue to recover its own damages (E) holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor
Output: (D)
court’s decision did not address it. [¶ 12] In Matter of Boschee, 347 N.W.2d 331, 334-35, we said in appeals from administrative agency decisions, courts may consider only those grounds identified in specifications of error under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-15, and the grounds specified must come within the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-32-19. See Dodds v. North Dakota State Highway Comm’r, 354 N.W.2d 165, 169 n. 4 (N.D.1984); Cf., Application of Otter Tail Power Co., 354 N.W.2d 701, 702-04 (N.D.1984) (stating under certain circumstances constitutional issue may be raised for the first time on appeal of administrative agency decision). Clyde did not raise this issue in his specifications of error to the district court. Vetter v. NoHh Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 451, 453-54 (N.D.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, he has not postured his argument in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power (B) holding that because the scope of review of agency matters is confined to the administrative record discovery in the form of depositions from agency officials was improper and irrelevant (C) holding that a party who had demonstrated an injury sufficient to confer standing to appeal from an agency decision could raise  any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the agency (D) holding specifications of error in appeal from administrative agency decision must be reasonably specific and calculated to identify the matters truly at issue sufficient to fairly apprise the agency other parties and the court of the particular issues claimed (E) holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise
Output: (D)
termination of parental rights and temporary commitment of the child to an agency or to a person deemed competent by the court, including petitioners, will be for the welfare of the child, the court may order the child to be so committed and may terminate the parental rights of the parents and declare the child a ward of the court or, if it is not so proved, the court may enter such other order as it shall deem necessary and advisable.” 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(d) (West 2006). Clearly, the Adoption Act, when read as a whole, supports the conclusion that a trial court, as part of an adoption proceeding, may determine whether the natural parent is unfit and may terminate a natural parent’s parental rights. But compare Johnson v. Burnett, 182 Ill. App. 3d 574, 579, 538 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with In re Petition of Filippelli, 207 Ill. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a single partial payment of 36 within the oneyear period prior to the filing of the adoption petition qualified as support and maintenance requiring natural parents consent as prerequisite to adoption (B) holding that single partial payment of 20 within the oneyear period prior to the filing of the adoption petition was de minimis and did not make natural parents consent necessary for the adoption (C) holding that parties not related to the child could not file an adoption petition and later prove the unfitness of the natural parents because the child was not available for adoption as defined in the adoption act parents had to be found unfit before petition could be filed (D) holding that natural parents consent for an adoption is required so long as the parent complies with the duty to support for any period during the oneyear preceding the filing of the adoption petition (E) holding prior to adoption of child support guidelines that a credit was discretionary
Output: (C)
by [the motorist].” Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that “it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow.” 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas’s argument, this court observed that “procedural due process requires that a person have an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action
Output: (A)