niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
bad faith breach of contract claim, it is clear that a state law bad faith cause of action against an ERISA provider is expressly preempted. In order to be characterized as a state law regulating insurance, the law must be “specifically directed toward that industry.” Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Stated differently, the state law must “home[] in on the insurance industry.” Ward, 526 U.S. at 368, 119 S.Ct. 1380. The Iowa courts have not confined common law, bad faith causes of action to the insurance industry. Rather, it is a general law, applicable to the entire panoply of contracts. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ common law bad faith cause of action is not saved from preemption by ERISA’s savings clause. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (<HOLDING>), Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1186-87 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (B) holding that improper motive is element of bad faith (C) holding that a state common law of bad faith was not integral to the insurerinsured relationship (D) holding title company liable for bad faith (E) holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint
Output: (C)
in this case. First, it clearly appears on this record that both the Land Department and Waddell relied on the Land Department’s classification of the property as commercial pursuant to the requirements of the Arizona exchange statutes. Waddell admits in his affidavit that he knew at the time of the sale that the property was used as a farm and Arizona law set acreage limitations on the sale of agricultural property. The Land Department assumed the constitutionality of the exchange statutes, which were not declared unconstitutional until Fain, almost five years after the sale. Based on these statutes, the Land Department did not see any need to reclassify the property as commercial subject to an interim, special use as agriculture. See Havasu Heights, 158 Ariz. at 552, 764 P.2d at 37 (<HOLDING>). Because both parties relied on the commercial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff (C) holding land for speculation is a legitimate commercial use grazing on land so classified subject to a special use permit (D) holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land (E) holding that a petitioner in a judicial review from the land use board of appeals had constitutional standing because the land use decision would affect her use and enjoyment of a nearby estuary that she used for passive recreation
Output: (C)
the impact on the employee will depend on factors like the nature of the employer's business and the competitive risk posed by the employee. Wis. Stat. § 103.465 Applies to the NSE Provision ¶ 14. As a preliminary matter, we address Mani-towoc's insistence that its nonsolicitation provision is not subject to Wis. Stat. § 103.465. The statute itself proclaims that it applies to a "covenant. . . not to compete with his or her employer. . . during... or after" one's employment. Id. The provision also calls such covenants a "restraint." Id. Case law has made clear that § 103.465 applies to any covenant between an employer and an employee that "seeks to restrain competition" or operates as a "trade restraint." See Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 112, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15. Manitowoc agrees with this basic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act (B) holding that a nondisclosure provision is subject to  103465 (C) holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision (D) holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter (E) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them
Output: (B)
of not more than 15 years, and it similarly concluded as follows: If a sentence under this paragraph provides for imprisonment, the sentence shall include a special parole term of not less than three years in addition to such term of imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1). The language of §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 960(b)(1) thus squarely contradicts Walberg’s contention, for each stated that the special parole term shall be a minimum of a certain number of “years in addition to [the] term of imprisonment.” Accord United States v. Mack, 509 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir.1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1578, 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975); Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir.1975). Cf. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 388, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the Act and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c (B) holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 usc  846 which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole and emphazing the in addition to language of 21 usc  841b1b (C) holding that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three graduated penalty subsections of 21 usc  841b applies to defendants convicted of a  846 drug conspiracy the jury must be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial (D) holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc  846 do include an overt act requirement (E) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state
Output: (B)
had a legitimate concern that additional undiscovered parties were present and reasonably acted to protect the officers’ safety. Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have thought that she would be free to leave after brief questioning. The appellants contend, however, that the length of the detention transformed an otherwise lawful stop into an arrest. The officers had determined that Ward and Roller were unarmed and that there were no additional suspects within the bank, but the officers did not un-handcuff them until they had verified their story 20 minutes later. Although 20 minutes is not an exceedingly long time, it is certainly long enough to transform a stop into an arrest, see, e.g., United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has refused to adopt a per 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause (C) holding ninety minutes excessive (D) holding that 20 minute detention under the circumstances of the ease was not arrest (E) holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest
Output: (E)
Garcia’s argument stumbles at the starting gate because he does not explain how Rule 23 conflicts with the “more lenient” standard he proposes under Massachusetts law. Garcia suggests that Rule 23 might interfere with his substantive right to proceed as a class. But he does not explain how a class certification analysis under Massachusetts law would proceed any differently from a Rule 23 analysis. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”). Nor do the cases cited by Garcia shed any light on what a “more lenient” standard would look like here. See Machado, 989 N.E.2d at 470 (<HOLDING>); Sebago v. Tutunjian, 85 Mass. App.Ct. 1119, 7 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration clauses even when massachusetts law provides for a substantive right to bring a class proceeding (C) holding that the district court did not err by compelling individual rather than class arbitration because the relevant agreements were silent as to class arbitration (D) holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act (E) holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action
Output: (B)
where the statute of limitations has run, the trial court should normally exercise discretion in favor of giving the plaintiff additional time to perfect service. Chaffin v. Jacobson, 793 So.2d 102, 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“[T]he purpose of Rule 1.070(j) is to speed the progress of cases on the civil docket, but not to give defendants a ‘free’ dismissal with prejudice.”) (quoting Skrbic v. QCRC Assocs. Corp., 761 So.2d 349, 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Where the statute of limitations has run, “[discretion in these circumstances must be exercised with the understanding that Florida has a longstanding policy in favor of resolving civil disputes on the merits.” Id. Brown v. Ameri Star, Inc., 884 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>) (citing Chaffin v. Jacobson, 793 So.2d 102, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss (B) recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order (C) holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 (D) recognizing rule (E) recognizing that the intent that of rule 1070j is to serve as a case management tool and not as a severe sanction 
Output: (E)
Frierson must show that (i) Lieman’s performance was deficient, and (ii) this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To satisfy the performance prong, Frierson must show that Lieman’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir.2003). To satisfy the prejudice prong, Frierson must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for [Liema counsel is on notice that important mitigation evidence exists, a failure to uncover and present such evidence at the penalty phase represents ineffective assistance of counsel. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Lieman’s deficient performance is readily 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance must demonstrate that their counsels performance both fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense (B) holding counsels failure to prepare a social history report fell below professional standards where counsel was on notice of severe family dysfunction (C) holding that where counsels decision in leading the court into error falls below the standard of reasonable professional practice we may find that counsel was ineffective (D) holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy (E) holding that the trial counsels performance was constitutionally deficient where counsel made a limited investigation into the petitioners background did not prepare a social history of the petitioner and was not aware that he had been sexually abused and raped as a child
Output: (B)
it is clear that the 2001 Order constitutes a valid order for purposes of § 401(b). To begin with, the 2001 Order is entitled “Memorandum Opinion and Order,” and it notes that “Tribune’s acquisition of the Hartford Courant during the pendency of its earlier-filed request to acquire control of WTXX triggers immediate application of the television/newspaper cross-ownership rule to its proposed purchase. Tribune therefore requests a two-year period ... to achieve compliance with [that rule]” (emphasis added). As that sentence demonstrates, there appeared to be no dispute that Tribune’s acquisition of WTXX violated the cross-ownership rule, and that the FCC was requiring Tribune to come into compliance with that rule. See Mallenbaum v. Adelphia Commun. Corp., 74 F.3d 465, 467 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The 2001 Order further states in paragraph 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agency regulation is not a privately enforceable 401b order unless it requires the defendant to take a particular action (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that a statutory time period is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provisions (D) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (E) recognizing that when an agency promulgates a regulation that is intended to preempt state law the regulation should not be disturbed unless there is evidence that it is contrary to congressional intent
Output: (A)
a sex offender registration order generally must be made at sentencing, if at all. As we noted above, the statute authorizes “the judge who sentences” the defendant to order registration, § 13-3821(C), and it further provides that “the clerk of the superior court ... shall notify the sheriff’ of a discretionary registration order “within ten days after entry of the judgment.” § 13-3821(E). The entry of judgment occurs at sentencing. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.2; Whitman, 684 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7, ¶ 1, 234 Ariz. at —, 324 P.3d at —, 2014 WL 1385396. Thus, the legislature has demonstrated a clear intent that any discretionary order that a person register as a sex offender must occur at the time of sentencing. See State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 594, 667 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1983) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 By requiring such orders to be made at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (B) recognizing conflict between legislative intent and language of ors 309051 and 2 (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) recognizing language of statute as clearest indicator of legislative intent (E) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only
Output: (D)
primary custody in which it failed to address each section 5328(a) factor. Instead, it “based its decision almost exclusively on the fact that Child is breastfeeding and the parties’ difficulty commu nicating with each other” and made no mention of the preponderance of the section 5328(a) factors. J.R.M. 33 A.3d at 652. By failing to address each section 5328(a) factor in its opinion, we concluded that “the trial court failed to properly consider the statutorily mandated factors in arriving at its custody determination!)]” Id. We held that the trial court must expressly consider all of the section 5328(a) factors when entering a custody order in order to comply with the Custody Act’s requirements, and that failure to do so amounts to an error of law. Id.; see also M.P., 54 A.3d at 956 (<HOLDING>). While the Custody Act requires a trial court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court is required to make a determination on impairment of access prior to trial (B) holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal (C) recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal (D) holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board (E) holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure
Output: (B)
7 . 502 U.S. 478, 482-83, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). 8 . See Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Jukic has failed to demonstrate that he will be persecuted by either people based on his political opinion or social group, ‘rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.' ”). 9 . See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812. Petitioners must provide "some evidence of ... [motive], direct or circumstantial.” Id. 10 . See also Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994) (Under the substantial evidence standard, "the alien must show that the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it”). 11 . Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812. 12 . Id. at 480, 112 S.Ct. 812. 13 . See id. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (<HOLDING>). 14 . Petitioners argued in their appeal to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition (B) holding that since the statute makes motive critical a petitioner must provide some evidence of it direct or circumstantial (C) holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent (D) holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution (E) holding that the applicant must provide some evidence direct or circumstantial that the persecutor was or would be motivated to persecute him because of a protected ground
Output: (B)
The “phrases ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major life activities’ must be strictly interpreted ‘to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.’ ” Rolland, 492 F.3d at 47 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002)) (emphasis in original). In order to qualify, “an individual must have a permanent or long term impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.” Id. at 47-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of disability is made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 48. McDonough argues that she actually has an impairment — back an th Cir.2002) (“The nu . of Lafayette Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, though McDonough claims that she 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs hernia condition was not sufficient to render her disabled under the ada (B) holding that plaintiffs inability to stand for more than one hour did not render her disabled (C) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (D) holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled (E) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand
Output: (B)
(1989), Detroit Edison Co v Detroit, 208 Mich App 26; 527 NW2d 9 (1994), and City of Taylor, 263 Mich App 551. This long line of cases discussing reasonable control under Const 1963, art 7, § 29 is supported by the common law. And the control exercised by Taylor here is also in accord with the common law. Under the traditional common-law rule, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. 12 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 34.74a (3d ed. 1970); 4A J. Sackman, Nichols’ Law of Eminent Domain § 15.22 (rev. 3d ed. 1981). This rule was recognized and approved by this Court as long ago as New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905) (<HOLDING>). [Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth v 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual standing not available where inter alia there is no claim that plaintiff sustained a loss disproportionate to that sustained by the corporation (B) holding that feca is the sole remedy for the back injury sustained on the job by a us postal service employee (C) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (D) holding that the injury sustained by the utility is damnum absque injuria (E) holding that a claim for loss of consortium  cannot stand because there is no evidence of bodily injury sustained
Output: (D)
and its finding that probationer officers must be able to conduct warrant-less searches in order to properly supervise their probationers, we conclude that the statute provides the necessary notice _” (footnote omitted)); Soca, 673 So.2d at 28 (“Florida’s statutes contain no scheme expressly authorizing or regulating the authority of probation officers or supervisors to conduct a probationary search.... Rather, a probation officer’s right to search is based on our holding in Grubbs....”); see also State v. Yule, 905 So.2d 251, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[T]he authority of the probation officers to monitor and control the probationer ... provided a sufficient basis for them to enter her residence and conduct a warrantless search.”); Ayoub v. State, 901 So.2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Extending the same general authority to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion (B) holding that all special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced at sentencing (C) holding condition of probation requiring probationer to consent at any time to a warrantless search by a law enforcement officer was unconstitutional (D) recognizing that condition requiring submission to search by probation officer need not be orally pronounced because warrantless searches are necessary for proper supervision of probationers citing brown 697 so2d at 929 (E) holding a warrantless probation search condition that is reasonably related to a probationers rehabilitation is a valid limitation to a defendants fourth amendment rights
Output: (D)
entitles a defendant to a life sentence. Crawford, Cheney, and Perry are examples of cases in which this Court found the state did not prove its case for the death penalty, a finding that constitutes an acquittal of murder plus aggravating circumstances and legally entitled those defendants to life sentences. Contrary to the dissent’s claim, these cases do not stand for the proposition that this Court rejected Poland in any manner for almost ten years or found that the jury’s failure to find a particular aggravator constitutes an acquittal. This point is further supported by the fact that this Court cited Poland approvingly in Romano v. State, 1995 OK CR 74, ¶ 66-68, 909 P.2d 92, 117-18, a case decided eleven days after Cheney. 22 . 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 23 . 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the existence of any fact increases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant that fact constitutes an element that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that any fact that increases mandatory minimum is element that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than that of a prior conviction that increases criminal penalties above the statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and found by a jury (D) holding that any fact other than fact of prior convictions which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that any fact that increases a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury
Output: (A)
chapter 7 petition are inconsistent with the established purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. After reviewing the three lines of cases, this Court concluded that if a debt- or, by way of the filing of a chapter 7 proceeding, was willing to surrender his or her non-exempt assets, regardless of the motive for the filing, the debtor nonetheless would be entitled to Chapter 7 protection. In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R. 848, 852 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2003), citing In re Padilla, at 1193. The Court is aware that there are numerous cases that have since been published on this issue in almost every Circuit. It appears that the Circuits continue to be split on the issue of bad faith and whether it constitutes cause to dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy. Compare U.S. v. Pedigo, 329 B.R. 47 (S.D.Ind.2005) (<HOLDING>) and In re Linehan, 326 B.R. 474 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (B) holding that lack of good faith is a valid basis to dismiss a chapter 7 case for cause under section 707a (C) holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing (D) holding title company liable for bad faith (E) holding that the list contained in 11usc  707a is not exhaustive such that bad faith may constitute cause for dismissal in a chapter 7 bankruptcy
Output: (E)
other violent acts reflects society’s concern for protection against criminal behavior. Ordinarily, the public relies on law-enforcement officers to prevent such behavior. Consequently, those officers are entrusted with powers not possessed by the general public, such as the power to arrest and interrogate. When exercising those powers, however, law-enforcement officers are circumscribed by cherished constitutional rights of every citizen. Those rights include freedom from arrest or seizure without probable cause, U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, § 7; the right to counsel, U.S. Const, amends. V & VI; N.J Const, of 1947 art. I, § 10; and the right to remain silent when accused of a crime, U.S. Const, amend. V; cf. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 281, 511 A.2d 80 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Police may not arrest someone on a mere whim 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination (B) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (C) recognizing claim against bank receiver (D) recognizing puerto rico law creates substantive claim against liability insurer distinct from claim against insured (E) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states
Output: (A)
also have not obtained approval from any federal, state, or local government agency, which is a prerequisite for doing business in the heavily regulated alcohol industry. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 356 (10th Cir.1993) (citing 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-11); Fedway Assocs., Inc. v. United States Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1418 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing same); Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers, Inc. v. Ayers, 504 A.2d 1077, 1078-80 (Del.1986) (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 4, § 101 et seq. (1984)). In the face of these multiple contingencies, the court cannot conclude that this case is ripe for decision. See Kiser v. Johnson, 404 F.Supp. 879, 886 (M.D.Pa.1975); cf. Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 934 F.Supp. 925, 938 (N.D.Ill.1995) (<HOLDING>). To paraphrase the Polaroid court, if this 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although the fourth circuit has not yet addressed the issue partial discharge may be granted to the extent that it would be an undue hardship for the debtor to have to pay that portion of the loan that is to be discharged (B) recognizing that even if approval by the food and drug administration could be obtained within three months this approval had yet to be granted at the time of the courts decision and there was no guarantee that the  approval would be forthcoming on any particular date in the future (C) holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later (D) holding that decision of this court unless or until overturned by this court en banc the  federal circuit or the supreme court is a decision of the court on the date it is issued any rulings interpretations or conclusions of law contained in such a decision are authoritative and binding as of the date the decision is issued and are to be considered and when applicable are to be followed by va agencies of original jurisdiction the board and the secretary in adjudicating and resolving claims (E) holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself
Output: (B)
Cir.2005). The undisputed evidence in this case reveals that neither Arbaney, Lakey, nor Couch was similarly situated to Ramon. Ramon was younger and not as close to being eligible for retirement as were Arbaney and Lakey, and there is no evidence that Continental uncovered any wrongdoing by Couch. These differences between Ramon’s situation and that of her comparators justified the differential treatment, and Ramon cannot demonstrate that she was “similarly situated” to them. See Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins.. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir.2000) (affirming summary judgment where “the striking differences between the two men’s situations more than account for the different treatment they received”); see also Nelson v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2 Fed. Appx. 425 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Hilts, No. 224690, 2002 WL 234757, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (B) holding that a similarly situated employee is one who is comparable to plaintiff in all material respects (C) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated (D) holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions (E) holding that younger employee not similarly situated to older employee who committed similar infraction and was allowed to remain on job for a few extra months and obtain retirement eligibility
Output: (E)
incorporated organizations, on the other," noting that its holding "concerns only schools that have no legal identity separate from a church." Id. at 782 & n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2142. 124 In contrast, a separate legal entity that is not operated "primarily for religious purposes" is not subject to the exemption, despite affiliations it may have with religious organizations. Rather, as in Samaritan Institute, where courts have found that an organization is an entirely separate legal entity engaging in activities that are not religious per se, they have generally distinguished S6 Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church and held the exemption from unemployment compensation taxes inapplicable. See, e.g., Bethania Ass'n v. Jackson, 262 Ill.App.3d 773, 200 IIl.Dec. 332, 635 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1994) (<HOLDING>); accord Concordia Ass'n v. Ward, 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a faa certificate was not dispositive as to whether an airline operated on an established line for purposes of the excise tax exemption (B) holding that cemetery owned and operated by association of churches was not entitled to unemployment compensation tax exemption because services it provided were the same as those of secular cemeteries and therefore its primary purpose was not religious (C) holding that a charitable organizations religious purposes will not remove it from the purview of a property tax exemption (D) holding that the statutes establishing the national motto and directing its reproduction on us currency clearly have a secular purpose and that the mottos primary effect is not to advance religion instead it is a form of ceremonial deism  and therefore the statutes do not violate the establishment clause (E) holding american association of cereal chemists and american phytopathological society was not entitled to realestate tax exemption as seminaries of learning even though their primary purpose was educational because the offerings were restricted to the limited area the organizations promote
Output: (B)
changes to M.R.E.s 103(a)(2), 404(a), 701-702, and 803(6) that have already taken effect through operation of M.R.E. 1102. 3 . The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits follow rules similar to the Ninth Circuit’s formulation in Cox. See, e.g., United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. White, 569 F.2d 263, 267 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 268 (7th Cir.1976); DeLoach v. United States, 307 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C.Cir.1962) (pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case); see also United States v. Coleman, 284 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir.2002) (upholding police officer's testimony interpreting defendant’s "drug jargon”); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640-42 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Sixth Circuit, however, maintains that a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although early interpretations of the act were narrow subsequent interpretations demonstrate that the act reaches a wide variety of deceptive commercial practices (B) holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony (C) holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights (D) holding that the plaintiffs ftca claims failed because the fbi agents were privileged to use reasonable force under texas law (E) holding that fbi agents interpretations of codefendants conversations were inadmissible under fedrevid 701
Output: (E)
to California to attend to her mother’s affairs. The debtor’s affairs are neglected in the process. Although the debtor neglects her own affairs, she intends months before to transfer funds from a stock to an annuity. Yet she waits until being sued and after consulting with a bankruptcy attorney to make the transfer. The transfer occurs one day prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. Upon filing bankruptcy, the hypothetical debtor lists the annuity as an exempt asset and discloses the untimely transfer. In fact, at the meeting of creditors she volunteers the information, including all records, names, and dates surrounding the transfer. Based on these facts, it is difficult to conclude that any court would find fraudulent intent. See In re Schwingler, 15 B.R. 291, 294-95 (W.D.Wis.1981) (<HOLDING>). Although part of her motivation when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an emergency petition by an insurance commissioner in her capacity as liquidator of an insurance company that was whollyowned by the debtor holding company was not an exercise of police and regulatory powers because it sought to take control of the debtors assets to allow certain policyholders and creditors to gain a pecuniary advantage over other creditors of the debtors estate (B) holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel (C) holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings (D) holding that at least a part of the debtors motivation was to keep assets away from the creditors (E) holding that a bankruptcy courts jurisdiction does not diminish post confirmation if the debtor pursuant to a liquidating plan seeks to commence litigation to collect the debtors assets for the benefit of its creditors
Output: (D)
cannot now plead ignorance of those terms, regardless of the apparent conflict of interest in Mr. Pulliam’s conduct as a negotiator. Finally, we must point out one additional difference between the situation at bar and the line of cases, on which the Funds hope to rely, holding that collective bargaining agreements are exceptions to the rule of construction regarding promisors’ defenses against third-party beneficiaries. Those cases all involve some type of language or arrangement between the union and the employer that is unknown to the fund or trustees. In Schneider Moving, the employees sought to invoke an ADR clause that referred only to union and employer; an analogous situation is found in Local Union 597 v. Mosbeck Indus. Equipment, Inc., 856 F.2d 837, 841-842 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the court in Gerber Truck refused 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union (B) holding that the present controversy concerns the plaintiffs rights under state and federal statutes which exist independently of the collective bargaining agreement and do not require interpretation of that agreement (C) holding that a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate is binding upon individual employees even when dispute involves federal cause of action (D) holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement (E) holding the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement did not manifest an intent to require trustees to arbitrate contribution claims
Output: (E)
and Plummer brought the present lawsuit asserting various federal and state constitutional claims. In due course, Quinn filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part, but denied as to Plummer’s First Amendment claim and with regards to qualified immunity. It is that denial of qualified immunity that we address in this appeal. “Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This inquiry normally proceeds in two steps. See Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. —, —, 129 S.Ct. 808, 813, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we first decide whether the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sequence of the saucier inquiry is not mandatory (B) holding that recklessness even for fiduciaries is no longer sufficient (C) holding that sauciers twostep sequence is not mandatory (D) holding that twostep sequence is no longer an inflexible requirement (E) holding the lilly analysis is not a sequential twostep process but rather one broad inquiry
Output: (D)
from Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 552, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3075, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989) (Black-mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The purported new rule finds a duty never before articulated by any other court. Added to that is that the purported duty, in many cases, may be almost impossible with which to comply. Who will agree that a four- or five-year-old child can be strapped in a seat belt for a three-to-five hour trip across country on a family vacation? Children are so full of energy that is impossible that they sit strapped to a seat for any substantial period of time. And what of the fifteen year old who unbuckles his seat belt 40 miles from any city or town? Does the parent beat him 89-193 and -195, published July 20, 1992) (Mills II) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State of Wyoming Hearing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act (B) holding that the coemployee immunity provision in workers compensation law was constitutional (C) holding that a contractors employees were not within the scope and course of their employment when they deviated from their work to shoot at squirrels (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding unconstitutional a workers compensation statute which granted immunity from suits by coemployees to employees who acted within the scope of their employment
Output: (E)
Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-19, 102 S.Ct. 2452); Redman, 942 F.2d at 1439. This interest encompasses a right to protection from psychological as well as physical abuse. See K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir.1990) (“Youngberg v. Romeo made clear ... that the Constitution requires the responsible state officials to take steps to prevent children in state institutions from deteriorating physically or psychologically.”). The record indicates that the conditions at HYCF are both physically and psychologically unsafe for the plaintiffs, such that the conditions amount to punishment. The plaintiffs do not complain of a few isolated incidents of name-calling or verbal harassment. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 & n. 3 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 138 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that loss of visitation and commissary privileges inter alia did not deprive the prisoner of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest (B) holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process (C) holding that a verbal assault although tortious does not deprive a plaintiff of a protected interest (D) holding that sjtanding alone simple verbal harassment does not  deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest but noting that racially derogatory language  can be quite important evidence of a constitutional violation (E) holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest
Output: (D)
27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.Cir.1994) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 856 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C.Cir.1988)); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (stating that summary judgment is not appropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). B. The Court Treats Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts as Admitted The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmoving party must do more that simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts (B) holding that the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial (C) holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question (D) holding that the nonmoving parly must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question (E) holding that the nonmovant may not carry its burden by simply showing that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts
Output: (A)
arguments from § 3553 “for a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed,” the party sufficiently “preserves its claim.” Id. at 578. However, we review unpreserved non-structural sentencing errors for plain error. Id. at 576-77. If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.2009). Because Lackard requested a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed by the district court, we review his sentence for abuse of discretion. King, 673 F.3d at 283. Lackard’s arguments to the contrary, we discern no procedural sentencing error by the district court. Although Lackard asserts that the district court erred when it denied his r Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Although Lackard also asserts that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis (B) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (C) holding that this court laeks the authority to review a sentencing courts denial of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so (D) holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure (E) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable
Output: (C)