niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
pursuant to Section 566.226. 2 . All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 cumulative as currently supplemented unless otherwise indicated. 3 .We view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Peal, 393 S.W.3d 621, 623 n. 1 (Mo.App.W.D.2013). 4 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 5 .Olivas was in Cass County's Juvenile Justice Detention Facility from January 7, 2010, until at least February 19, 2010, the date the juvenile court relinquished its jurisdiction over Olivas. 6 . K.R’s body showed no signs of sexual abuse and no semen was found on it. 7 . All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 cumulative as supplemented unless otherwise indicated. 8 . See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offense cannot be sentenced to death (B) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced (C) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (D) holding that a juvenile seventeen years old or younger cannot be sentenced to life without parole in a nonhomicide case (E) holding there was no reasonable suspicion where an officer relied solely on the dispatch that there was a suspicious person at the exxon gas station that the juvenile matched the hispanic male description of the suspicious person that the juvenile was wearing baggy clothes and that the juvenile chose to walk away from the patrol car
Output: (A)
351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). That nexus exists either (1) where the state “has exercised coercive p self is not a government functionary. See, e.g., Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206 (“The NASD is a private actor, not a state actor. It is a private corporation that receives no federal or state funding. Its creation was not mandated by statute, nor does the government appoint its members or serve on any NASD board or committee.”); United States v. Shvarts, 90 F.Supp.2d 219, 222 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (“It is beyond cavil that the NASD is not a government agency; it is a private, not-for-profit corporation. It was not created by statute. None of its directors ... are government officials or appointees. It receives no government funding ..., [and] its actions cannot be i -71 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). To prevail, Cromwell must establish 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding no violation of the fifth amendment where the government relied on testimony compelled in an earlier proceeding before the heavilyregulated new york stock exchange (C) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (D) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (E) holding that a witness who testifies in one proceeding may not be compelled to give further testimony in a different proceeding
Output: (B)
OF THE REVENUES OR EXPENSES IN THE ATTACHED.” 44 F.Supp.2d at 1260. The merger and integration clause in the Franchise Agreement stated that: "It is understood and agreed that neither McDonald's not anyone acting on behalf of McDonald’s has made any representations, inducem tatements had superior knowledge. Predictions or statements that are only promissory in nature or only express what will happen in the future are not actionable as fraud, unless the representing party has exclusive knowledge and should have been aware that the other party would rely heavily on their assertions. See Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir.1979); see also Payne v. McDonald's Corp., 957 F.Supp. 749, 760-61 (D.Md.1997); see Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F.Supp. 1007, 1024 (S.D.Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). Some courts believe that "superior knowledge” 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in texas future predictions and opinions especially those regarding the future profitability of a business cannot as a matter of law form a basis for fraud (B) holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud (C) holding that projections of future profits or business success may constitute fraud if declarant had exclusive or superior knowledge of the facts (D) holding that future predictions and opinions especially those regarding future profitability of business cannot form basis for fraud as matter of law (E) holding that mere statements of opinion or prediction such as future profits or how well a business will do in a particular market may not be a basis for a fraud or misrepresentation action because predictions are not past or present material facts
Output: (C)
the trial court in 2010 to set aside the 2000 judgment based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and this Court dismissed his appeal, specifically stating that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the 2000 judgment, that the judgment was not void, and that the trial court lacked plenary power over the case at the time Akinwamide filed the 2010 motion. See Akinwamide TV, 2012 WL 3861229, at *2. We conclude that the record is replete with evidence that there is no reasonable probability that Akinwamide will prevail in his litigation against Transportation and that, after the litigation was finally determined against Akinwamide, he has repeatedly relitigated or attempted to reliti-gate the validity of the determination in favor of Transportation. See Forist, 141 S.W.3d at 670 (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that the evidence supports 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time (B) holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void (C) holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered (D) holding that plaintiffs bill of review filed after texas supreme court denied her petition for review of direct appeal from final judgment constituted attempts to relitigate cause of action and thus satisfied vexatious litigant criteria (E) holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions
Output: (D)
242 (Me.1991).) To the contrary, it is difficult to think of a claim that is more intrinsically work-related than sexual harassment alleged to have created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also argues that the injury was not work-related because the “activity causing the injury” was not “implied into the contract of employment.” (Id. at 8 (citing Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242).) Plaintiff characterizes the “activity causing the injury” as “tolerance of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment.” (Id.) However, it is clear from the case law that the “activity” in question in this factor is not tortious conduct of the harasser or the attitude of the victim toward the harassment but the activity that the victim was engaged in when she suffered the injury. See Dorey, 591 A.2d at 242 (<HOLDING>). In this case, there is no indication that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees stress injury solely due to disciplinary proceedings was not compensable under workers compensation (B) holding that an employees visit to the office solely to retrieve medical documents for a workers compensation claim was not an activity implied into the contract of employment (C) holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act (E) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim
Output: (B)
398, 407 (1988) (concluding that the act of inserting an adult’s tongue into a child’s mouth constituted an “immoral, improper, or indecent” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and a “lewd or lascivious” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)); State v. Hammett, 182 N.C. App. 316, 323, 642 S.E.2d 454, 459 (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense punishable pursuant to N.C.G.S. 14-202.1(a)(2)), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 572, 651 S.E.2d 227 (2007); State v. Turman, 52 N.C. App. 376, 377, 278 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1981) (concluding that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(l)); cf. State v. Jones, 172 N.C. App. 308, 314-16, 616 S.E.2d 15, 19-20 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In light of these decisions, at least four 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (B) holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (C) holding that a single act cannot support two convictions under both ncgs  142021al and ncgs  142021a 2 respectively (D) recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes (E) holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial
Output: (C)
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Although the issue was squarely before the court, the district court made no factual finding one way or the other as to whether the parents intended to abandon their habitual residence in the United States in favor of Singapore, or whether they intended to retain their habitual residence while simply residing temporarily in Singapore. As a result, the district court seems to have overlooked an important factor in the habitual-residence analysis. Cf. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that parents did not intend to abandon the family’s habitual residence in favor of Israel where the parents only agreed to move to Israel temporarily for a one-year conditional period); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1018-19 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The father, in an effort to persuade us that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that service of process by international registered mail from germany to the united states satisfied the hague convention and constitutional due process (B) holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states (C) holding that the parties lacked shared intent to abandon their habitual residence in the united states where the family moved to germany for the fathers temporary fouryear military assignment (D) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (E) holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties
Output: (C)
F.2d 474 (11th Cir.) (concluding that the defendant, who was informed of the possible conflict, and who nonetheless indicated that he wanted the attorney to represent him who was also representing his two brothers, consented to joint representation, waiving any ineffectiveness of counsel claim caused by the alleged conflict of interest), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 275, 126 L.Ed.2d 226 (1993); Martinez, 869 P.2d at 524 ("Although ineffective assistance of counsel may be asserted by a defendant when his counsel has been found to have a conflict of interest, it will not be found if the defendant waived his right to conflict-free representation, and if such waiver is made with full knowledge of the actual conflict.”); In re Noday, 125 Cal.App.3d 507, 521, 178 Cal.Rptr. 653, 660 (1981) (<HOLDING>). 2 . But cf. United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant validly waived right to conflictfree representation where the defendant knew a conflict existed its effect on his defense and his right to have other counsel appointed (B) holding that because the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to separate counsel in light of the courts unambiguous advisement that joint representation could present a very substantial conflict so far as his defense is concerned the defendant was precluded from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest that ultimately developed (C) holding that a conflict of interest independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel  constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioners right to pursue his  1 claim (D) holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal (E) holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance due to the alleged conflict of interest because the defendant failed to demonstrate a conflict as nothing was presented to refute the attorneys testimony that his loyalty was to his clients
Output: (B)
acts under respondeat superior. 520 U.S. at 789, 117 S.Ct. 1734; see also Streit, 236 F.3d at 562. Here, however, California law places liability on the county. Cal. Gov.Code § 815.2; Streit, 236 F.3d at 562. Further, California Government Code section 25303 grants the county boards of supervisors broad fiscal and administrative powers for the management of county jails. Streit, 236 F.3d at 561. Under California Government Code section 23013, the counties also “retain the power to transfer control of a county jail from the sheriff to a county-created department of corrections.” Id. The California Code also provides that California sheriffs are elected county officers. Id. at 562 (citing Cal. Gov.Code § 24000(b); Cal. Elec.Code § 314). Sheriffs are 3d 789, 251 Cal.Rptr. 444 (1988) (<HOLDING>)). We rejected the county’s reliance on County 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that control over the local prisons is within the authority of the individual counties (B) holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud (C) recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself (D) holding authority to control limits duty to control (E) recognizing the immunity of counties unless an action is authorized by the legislature
Output: (A)
how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity “ ‘substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ ”). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
Output: (E)
claims because they fall within a policy exclusion if the insurer can demonstrate that “the allegations of the complaint cast the pleadings wholly within that exclusion, that the exclusion is subject to no other reasonable interpretation, and that there is no possible factual or legal basis upon which the insurer may eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured under any policy provision”); Continental Cas. Co., 80 N.Y.2d at 650 (where insurer could not show the insured’s actions were intentional, the insurer “failed to ‘establish as a matter of law that there [was] no possible factual or legal basis on which it might eventually be obligated to indemnify its insured under any policy provision’ ”). Compare W.R. Grace & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 33 Mass.App.Ct. 358, 364 (1992) (<HOLDING>). OneBeacon also argues that Massachusetts and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend (B) holding that a claim against an insurer for vexatious refusal to pay cannot be maintained where the court finds that the insurer has no duty to defend under the policy (C) holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend (D) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (E) holding that under new york law for an insurer to have no duty to defend the court must find as a matter of law that based on the pleadings there was no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured
Output: (E)
Gresh, 311 Fed.Appx. at 771 (noting that “ordinary business relationships” conducted at arm’s length do not rise to the level of a fiduciary relationship); Quadrille Bus. Sys. v. Ky. Cattlemen’s Ass’n, 242 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Ky.Ct.App.2007) (“An ordinary business relationship or an agreement reached through arm’s length transactions cannot be turned into a fiduciary one absent factors of mutual knowledge of confidentiality or the undue exercise of power or influence.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Additionally, while “fiduciary relationships can be informal, [] they must evidence circumstances showing both parties agreed that one party would be acting in the interest of the other.” In re Sallee, 286 F.3d at 893; see also Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Kentucky courts have found 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold (B) holding that because there was no factual dispute between the parties the presumption of correctness is not relevant (C) holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs (D) holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty (E) holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees
Output: (C)
and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. “[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (B) holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment (C) holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded (D) holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc  841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion (E) holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7
Output: (C)
interest” at issue here because “[pjursuant to the Treaty of 1866 and the Thirteenth Amendment, the Cherokee Nation has no authority to treat its Freedmen citizens as anything less than full equals.” Freedmen’s Opp’n to Crittenden’s Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. # 123] at 14. By raising this argument to eviscerate the Nation’s claim of prejudice, the Freedmen are asking the Court to reach the merits of their claims against the Nation. This the Court cannot do. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has squarely rejected a similar argum pelling claim of sovereign immunity” and finds that the Nation’s interests would be prejudiced if the case were to proceed in its absence. Republic of Philippines, 553 U.S. at 869, 128 S.Ct. 2180; see also Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 1001 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Davis, 192 F.3d at 960) (internal 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe (B) recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability (C) holding that there is a strong policy favoring dismissal for nonjoinder due to tribal sovereign immunity but that rule 19b factors must still be considered (D) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (E) recognizing the strong policy favoring dismissal when a court cannot join a tribe because of sovereign immunity
Output: (E)
On July 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Reconsideration (“Pl.Mot.”) of the June 30, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Final Order in United Surety and Indemnity Co. v. United States, 87 Fed.Cl. 580 (2009). For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration is denied. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, PURSUANT TO RCFC 59. A motion for reconsideration must be supported “by a showing of extraordinary circumstances which justify relief.” Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed.Cl. 298, 300 (1999)). The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration lies within the discretion of the court. Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). A movant cannot prevail by “merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the weight accorded to evidence lies largely within the agencys discretion (B) holding that the decision as to the weight to be afforded to documentary evidence  lies largely within the discretion of the ij (C) holding that the decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the trial court (D) holding that the weight accorded to evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency (E) holding that the weight afforded to the evidence lies largely within the agencys discretion
Output: (C)
manual labor, as well as engaging in such activities as dancing, fighting, and being jailed for public intoxication. We stated that: [an i]njury aggravated or extended in time by the employee’s neglect or disobedience of his physician’s instructions is not com-pensable as to the additional period.... The proposition that one may continue, or even increase, his disability by his willful and unreasonable conduct, and then claim compensation from his employer for his disability so caused, is untenable. Id. at 410, 244 N.W. at 541 (citing Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation, vol.l, § 137, pp. 521, 523). [¶ 11] Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule in Detling, albeit applying their own states’ standards. See Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself (B) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (C) holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions (D) holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later (E) holding that claimants actions in heavy houseeleaning and house painting in contravention of medical restrictions was so unreasonable as to bar compensation for aggravation of her back injury
Output: (E)
statements, if made, may open the nurse and Falkoff to charges of poor taste. They do not, by themselves, leave Falkoff liable for an alleged violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. 4. Morton Hospital, Inc. Is Not Liable Plaintiff alleges that Morton Hospital, Inc. caused her injury by authorizing Falkoff to violate her Fourth Amendment rights through performance of an unconstitutional search. Even if the hospital’s actions can be interpreted as an authorization, however, the hospital is entitled to summary judgment for reasons largely stated above. Plaintiff denies that she is seeking to hold the hospital liable on a theory of respondeat superior. PI. Opp. at 7 (#45). Indeed, it seems unlikely that such a theory is viable under current law. See Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1268 n. 10 (<HOLDING>); DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 723 (same). Plaintiff’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding monell claim fails as a matter of law unless a city employees conduct violates one of the plaintiffs federal rights (B) holding that in order to show municipal liability for an officers actions under monell v dept of soc servs 436 us 658 694 98 sct 2018 56 led2d 611 1978 a plaintiff must demonstrate one of the following 1 (C) recognizing the restrictive holding of butz v economou 438 us 478 98 sct 2894 57 led2d 895 1978 as applicable only to actions amounting to constitutional violations (D) holding that monell v new york city dept of social services 436 us 658 69093 98 sct 2018 203537 56 led2d 611 1978 eliminated respondeat superior liability for private corporations as well as municipalities (E) holding that financial concerns provide rational basis for congress to exclude puerto rican residents from social security system citing califano v torres 435 us 1 5 98 sct 906 55 led2d 65 1978
Output: (D)
because the increased sentence was based on the additional fact-finding that “parole or probation failed to deter defendant from committing further offenses”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Leach, 325 F.Supp.2d 557, 561 (E.D.Pa.2004) (concluding that “Blakely renders [it] impermissible” for the judge to consider the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense). B. The Trial Court Did not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Huber in the Aggravated Range Having concluded that it was proper for the trial court to consider the fact that Huber was on supervision at the time of the offense, we must now consider whether the court abused its discretion in determining that this fact justified aggravation. See Lopez, 113 P.3d at 727 n. 11 (<HOLDING>). Given the proximity in time of the preceding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based (B) holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court (C) holding that a district court has wide discretion to modify an injunction based on changed circumstances or new facts (D) holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case (E) holding that the determination whether relevant facts are extraordinary aggravating circumstances  is a conclusion of law that remains within the discretion of the trial court if it is based on blakelycompliant or blakelyexempt facts
Output: (E)
under the statute and rule would deprive the defendant of the right to due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Goldstein, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 638 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1994) (quoting U.S. Sprint Communications Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 624 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (1994)). Jurisdiction of Ohio courts does not extend fully to the limits of the Due Process Clause. See Goldstein v. Christiansen, 638 N.E.2d at 545 n. 1. Thus, merely finding that jurisdiction comports with federal due process standards is not sufficient in Ohio; rather, both prongs of analysis must be satisfied. See id. The burden of establishing jurisdiction lies generally with the Plaintiff. See American Greetings Corp., 839 F.2d at 1168 (<HOLDING>). The extent of the burden depends upon whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden of proving a violation of the idea lies on the party seeking relief during the administrative process (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding that the burden lies with the plaintiff in a rule 12b motion (D) holding that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the protection of the work product doctrine (E) holding motion to dismiss an indictment pursuant to rule 12b is not a device for a summary trial of the evidence the sole function of this motion is to test the sufficiency of the indictment to charge an offense
Output: (C)
a qualified right of access to criminal trials, see id. at 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, to the examination of jurors during voir dire, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (“Press-Enterprise I”), and to preliminary hearings, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (“Press-Enterprise II”). The circuits, including ours, have concurred in holding that this right applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that “the First Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to civil proceedings”); see also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed (B) holding that the first amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a civil case (C) holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case (D) holding that the rigorous first amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case (E) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed
Output: (D)
Defendant's conspiracy conviction, a second recidivist information was filed against him based upon the felonies set forth in the first recidivist information. Defendant ultimately entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to acknowledge his three prior felony convictions and also waived the recidivist trial, as provided for in W.Va.Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl.Vol.2005). He was given a second life recidivist sentence, which was ordered to run consecutively to the first. Defendant later challenged the second life recidivist sentence in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which he filed with this Court on or about July 3, 1991. Defendant's request for habeas relief was denied in Gibson v. Legursky, 187 W.Va. 51, 415 S.E.2d 457 (1992). See Id., at syl. pt. 2, 415 S.E.2d 457 (<HOLDING>) 14 . On August 21, 2000, Defendant, by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  djouble jeopardy principles are not offended merely because earlier convictions used to establish a recidivist conviction are subsequently utilized to prove a second recidivist conviction  (B) holding that a defendants denial of a conviction may be contradicted by introducing public records which prove such a conviction (C) holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial (D) holding that the proper procedure to prove prior convictions is to offer a certified copy of the conviction (E) holding that rule 35a can be used to challenge sentences that are not authorized by the judgment of conviction
Output: (A)
collection of payment for those sales less likely. According to the plaintiff, Buxton’s awareness or reckless disregard of the accounting treatment of these sales is shown by, among other things, her presence at a meeting where concerns about distributor sales were discussed and by the fact that reports were sent to her showing the rapidly increasing receivables and loosened terms. One confidential witness also alleges that the loosened terms were “shared with top management.” SAC ¶ 76. The defendants contend that the reference to “top management” is too vague to support an inference of scienter with respect to any individual defendant. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 719 Pension Trust Fund v. Conseco Inc., No. 09cv6966, 2011 WL 1198712, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (<HOLDING>). However, unlike in Conseco, the allegation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter (B) holding vague allegations of bias insufficient (C) holding that vague allegations against unnamed executives and senior  employees do not raise a strong inference of scienter (D) holding that recounting of analysts opinions did not prove underlying factual support necessary to create a strong inference of scienter (E) holding that collective sales of 10 insufficient to raise strong inference of conscious fraud
Output: (C)
command and going to physical therapy at the Naval Hospital. As such, his statements related directly to his availability to perform his duties and his precise location on base. The statements were made to individuals whose duties included being responsible for appellant including knowing his whereabouts and duty status. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant’s statements were clearly “official” and were made to individuals with a “duty to account” for the accused. See generally United States v. Davenport, 9 MJ 364 (CMA 1980). Unpub. op. at 1. A false official statement includes all statements made in the line of military duty. The determination of whether a military duty existed in a particular case is based on the evidence of record. See United States v. Jackson, supra (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if there is no independent duty to account a servicemember who lies in an oral statement to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation as part of his duties has violated article 107 (B) holding that a law enforcement agent may not testify about an opinion reached during his investigation if the agents reasoning process depended in whole or in part on his specialized training and experience (C) holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances (D) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party (E) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify
Output: (A)
mere showing that there is a discriminatory effect to a particular action or policy is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 2049; see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-64, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir.1977); see also Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of South Bend, 617 F.Supp. 1330, 1348 (N.D.Ind.1985), aff'd, 801 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.1986) (noting in equal protection challenge to promotion policy in police department that official action will generally not be held unconstitutional solely because which it results in racially disproportionate impact); Betts v. McCaughtry, 827 F.Supp. 1400, 1404 (W.D.Wis.1993) (<HOLDING>). Whether discriminatory purpose was a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an inmate has no right to any particular prison job but prison officials cannot discriminate against him on the basis of his race in work assignments (B) holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms (C) holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury (D) holding that the fact that nearly all music cassettes censored by prison authorities was afrieanamerican rap music failed to demonstrate that the purpose of the ban was to discriminate against africanamerican inmates (E) holding that music and loud talking broadcast over prison intercom throughout 24hour period did not offend contemporary standards of deeency
Output: (D)
and (3) resulting injury of the other party. See In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A, 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex.2001). Fraud and fraudulent inducement are separate causes of action that share the same elements. See id.; see also Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex.2001). Hoagland alleged in his live petition, in relevant part, that each appellee “made written and oral misrepresentations of material fact to [Hoagland] ... in Harris County, Texas ... via email and telephone conversations and in-person meetings ... with the intention that [Hoagland] would rely upon such misrepresentations and take action or refrain from taking certain actions within Harris County, Texas.” (Emphasis added.) Hoagland Holding, LLC, 324 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Hoagland pleaded allegations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas (B) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute (C) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation (D) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (E) holding plaintiff was required to allege defendants committed fraudulent acts in texas to satisfy his initial burden of pleading jurisdictional facts
Output: (B)
as such without a toner cartridge. Hence, the cartridges function as an integral part under Willoughby Camera. It is also undisputed that the toner cartridges were dedicated solely for use with Mita photocopiers. Thus, the toner cartridges also meet the Pompeo standard. Therefore, the Court concludes that under the standards set forth in Bauerhin Tech., the toner cartridges are properly considered parts under the HTSUS. See also Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Cust. Ct. 75, 82 n. 5, 287 F.Supp. 999, 1004 n. 5 (1968) (“[I]t is of course obvious that if an item is dedicated solely for use on a particular article and is essential to the functioning of that article, it is a fortiori a ‘part’ of that article.”); Bruce Duncan Co. v. United States, 63 Cust. Ct. 412, 1969 WL 13830 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, lexicographic and scientific 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that engine parts later used to make engines were properly classified as parts (B) holding that apprendi was not triggered because the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were within the maximum penalties for the rico offenses that they were found guilty of committing (C) holding that a variable annuity is properly classified as a security (D) holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis incomplete merchandise as imported does not have the essential character of the complete or finished article  the ability to strain salt from water and thus cannot be classified as straining cloth (E) holding that imported butane cartridges were properly classified as parts of cigarette lighters because these speciallydesigned cartridges were necessary for the operation of the lighter
Output: (E)
to offenses generally" suggests that the General Assembly intended it to apply broadly. See Carrillo, 120 (interpreting the word "offense" in a statute to suggest broad application); of. Black's Law Dictionary 1186 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "offense" as a "violation of the law"). 23 Portions of the legislative history also support the interpretation that the section was intended to apply to all types of crimes where criminality depends on a victim's age. During a 2001 committee hearing, one House sponsor said that the purpose of moving the provision was to "go[ | along" with recent court precedent holding that the affirmative defense now found in section 18-1-508.5(1) applied to an offense in a different part of the Criminal Code. See Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo.2000) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, one of the witnesses testified 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same standard applies to claims of discrimination based upon gender and age (B) holding that the former section 18150351 applies when the criminality of conduct depends upon a child being a certain age (C) holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen (D) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (E) holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor
Output: (B)
harmed by the duplicity of Count II of the indictment. C. Remedy Having found the threat of prejudice to the defendant due to the duplicity of Count II of the indictment, the next question is whether the entire judgment must be vacated. Duplicity does not necessarily require dismissal of an indictment. See United States v. Goodman, 285 F.2d 378 (5th Cir.1960) (“The entire count should not be dismissed when a less drastic ruling will suffice.”); 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Mill tates, 395 U.S. 6, 53 n. 116, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), or by a jury instruction that ensures that the jury is unanimous as to the conduct underlying the conviction, see, e.g., Murray, 618 F.2d at 898; cf. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 664-65, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, a defendant has already been 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that guilty verdict rendered on duplicitous indictment did not preclude on double jeopardy grounds the court of appeals from ordering a retrial based on evidentiary error courts instruction to jury that it had to unanimously find all elements of both crimes charged in count eliminated possibility that jury had acquitted defendant of one of those crimes (B) holding that when the jury acquitted the defendant on the greater offense but deadlocked on the lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lessers (C) holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers (D) holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds (E) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted
Output: (A)
an expression that equates with a clear mandate of public policy and if they can show that they were discharged in violation of that public policy. Id. at 72-73, 417 A.2d 505. Sources of public policy include the United States and New Jersey Constitutions; federal and state laws and administrative rules, regulations, and decisions; the common law and specific judicial decisions; and in certain cases, professional .codes of ethics. Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 92-93, 94-95, 609 A.2d 11 (1992); Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d 505. A basic requirement of the wrongful discharge cause of action is that the mandate of public policy be clearly identified and firmly grounded. See, e.g., Potter v. Village Bank, 225 N.J.Super. 547, 558-60, 543 A.2d 80 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 352, 550 A.2d 462 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby (B) recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge (C) holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement (D) holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy (E) holding that discharge of bank president for reporting suspected illegal money laundering by bank directors violated clear mandate of public policy few people would cooperate with law enforcement officials if the price they must pay is retaliatory discharge from employment
Output: (E)