niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
“[E]ven a ten percent chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear.” Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2001); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). Considering now the State Department Country Reports submitted by Zhou addressing forced sterilization — reports that the IJ did not consider when it found Zhou’s fear of future persecution incredible and that the BIA did not consider on review — that probability of future persecution exists here. Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir.2010) (“The failure of the IJ and BIA to consider evidence of country conditions [consisting of a State Department country report] constitutes reversible error.”); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (B) holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions (C) holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by giving summary consideration to evidence presented in a motion to reopen particularly when dealing with evidence which the bia is asked to repeatedly consider (D) holding that bia did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider an unauthenticated document submitted with a motion to reopen to show changed country conditions (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it
Output: (B)
no interest in the subject matter litigated” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the paradigmatic example of a nominal defendant is “a bank or trustee [that] has only a custodial claim to the property,” Colello, 139 F.3d at 677, the term is broad enough to encompass persons who are in possession of funds to which they have no rightful claim, such as money that has been fraudulently transferred by the defendant in the underlying securities enforcement action. See id. at 675; SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1130-32 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a corporation nominally owned by the defendant’s mother and into which the defendant had channeled proceeds of his securities law violations); SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 838 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Cherif, 933 F.2d at 414. Bustos, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property (B) holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1498b (C) holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding that a district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permissible under the law of the state in which the district court sits (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the assets of a corporation into which the defendant in the underlying enforcement action had tunneled proceeds of his securities law violations
Output: (E)
“is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced- — price, use and qualities considered.” SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 966 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956)). And “[t]he geographic market is the narrowest market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas cannot compete on substantial parity with those included in the market.” Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Together these factors define a real economic market for purposes of antitrust analysis. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). In responding to Campus Villagers motion for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it may be decided as a matter of law (B) holding that although there may be some exceptions as a general matter a conspiracytomonopolize claim requires proof of a real economic market (C) holding that trespass requires only proof of interference with right of possession of real property (D) holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter (E) holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2
Output: (B)
“there may have been—well, I would have ... gotten—and I can’t remember whether it was an e-mail or something from Tim Leitaker saying it was okay for me to do that.” The executive was then asked whether there was something in writing other than the email, .to which he replied, “I don’t remember the exact communication, but, yeah ... I guess I’m positive that it was communicated in writing. If not, it still had to be signed off on every time I turned.a loan in for it.” Even viewing the executive’s testimony about the purported side agreement in favor of the borrowers, there is no evidence from which a jury might conclude that all of the conditions - necessary to overcome section 1823(e) are present. At most, the statements are evidence of communicat d 378, 383-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); FDIC v. Gardner, 606 F.Supp. 1484, 1488 (S.D. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a written form despite outlining the obligations of both parties and existing in the insolvent banks records did not meet section 1823es requirements because it had not been executed by the failed bank (B) holding that a copy of an agreement executed by an insolvent bank found in the draft documents of the banks attorney did not satisfy section 1823es requirements because it was not an official record of the failed bank (C) holding that the fdic may rely on erroneous bank records to determine whether there was an insured deposit at the time of the banks failure (D) holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank (E) holding that courts comments after the parties had reached a definite agreement that had been reduced to writing and executed by the defendant and the government all without any direct involvement by the district judge did not violate rule 11
Output: (A)
an exchange did not occur within the meaning of Section 30-36-4. We thus hold that a worthless check is given for something of value if the worthless check is issued as part of a contemporaneous transaction between the parties in which something of value is exchanged for the check, without regard to whether the thing of value is delivered before or after the worthless check is issued. We read Davis as limited to its facts, meaning situations in which something of value has previously been delivered to a person in reliance on that person’s credit, and the check is later tendered as partial payment on the credit account. We note that our interpretation is consistent with other jurisdictions’ interpretations of similar statutes. See Ledford v. State, 184 Ga.App. 556, 362 S.E.2d 133 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Gilley v. State, 182 Ga.App. 681, 356 S.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received (B) holding that direct reliance was not shown where plaintiffs relied on third partys actions which were in turn undertaken in reliance on alleged misrepresentation by defendant (C) holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods (D) holding that delivery of citation is proper when delivered to a party capable of receiving it (E) holding that transaction was contemporaneous where something of value was given in reliance on delivery of check even though check was delivered one day after goods were received
Output: (E)
the defendant’s guideline range. See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1323-24 (11th Cir.2008) (as part of history and characteristics of the defendant, district court could consider defendant’s prior offenses in deciding to impose an upward variance, even though those offenses were already included in the defendant’s criminal history score); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and sidered the 3553(a) factors, “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 127 S.Ct. at 2468; see also Talley, 431 F.3d at 786 (<HOLDING>). Regarding Cooper’s argument that the court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (B) holding that there must be sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate the courts consideration of the relevant section 3553a factors (C) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors (D) recognizing that many of the  3553a factors are already incorporated into any guidelines determination and the  3553a factors can themselves overlap (E) holding that it is sufficient for a court to acknowledge its consideration of the parties arguments and the 3553a factors
Output: (E)
upon several variables, such as: ... are you transferring your GARRETT SECURED BENEFIT ACCOUNT balance to the Retirement Plan? *!* •!* •S' •!* Q. What happens if I have a GARRETT SECURED BENEFIT ACCOUNT? A. You can transfer your GARRETT SECURED BENEFIT ACCOUNT (SBA) to the Retirement Plan, withdraw your SBA balance and invest it in the annuity, or withdraw your SBA balance and spend it. The NORMAL RETIREMENT benefit is calculated on the assumption that you transfer your SBA to the Retirement Plan. If you don’t make this transfer, your NORMAL RETIREMENT benefit will be somewhat reduced. (Dauphine Decl. Exh. A at HW 0000987-989 [Doc. # 60].) This description adequately discloses the Secured Benefit Account offset. See Stahl v. Tony’s Bldg. Materials, 875 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs argue that § 1022 required 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs could not obtain compensation for both lost value and lost profit (B) holding that an spd need only be specific enough to enable ordinary employee to sense when there is a danger that benefits could be lost or diminished (C) holding that such damages could be recovered but only if the plaintiffs were experienced in the business and if the lost profits could be ascertained with some certainty (D) holding that a business owners testimony was insufficient to establish lost profits where he was not able to specify which contracts they lost how many they lost how much profit they would have had from the contracts or who would have awarded them contracts and explaining that the plaintiffs could have supported their lost profits with testimony that they had lost out on specific contracts but failed to do so (E) holding that a summary plan description need only provide information about the general circumstances in which benefits could be lost
Output: (B)
that the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause are not money-mandating and claims based upon these provisions are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. E.g., Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.Cir.1997); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed.Cir. 1995); United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed.Cir.1983). The Court notes that the captioned and titled defendants in Mr. Baker’s complaint (“Transworld Systems, and Max Federal Credit Union,” “Doc Due Little Movies,” and “Max Federal Credit Union and Pentago Federal Credit Union”) are not the United States or any agency thereof. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2001); see also Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States and Federal Express Corp., 264 F.3d 1071 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because the United States or agency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (B) holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency (C) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (D) holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court (E) holding that federal express despite the use of the word federal in its name is not a federal agency and therefore cannot be sued in this court
Output: (E)
or promissory estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment to the state on all claims. Costilla appeals the summary judgment as to her sexual harassment claim and the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. In October 1996, Costilla also brought a separate action against Acosta and the United States Department of Labor. Costilla remains employed at the state. ISSUES I. Does the MHRA recognize non-employee sexual harassment? II. Does the MHRA’s one-year statute of limitation bar Costilla’s claim? III. Did the district court err when it granted the state summary judgment when the state had notice in June 1993 that a non-employee, Acosta, was sexually harassing its employee, Costilla; the state took no corrective action for Supp. 500, 513 (E.D.Va.1992) (<HOLDING>), affirmed 40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir.1994); EEOC v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (B) holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action (C) holding employee had cause of action against city when nonemployee alderman sexually harassed employee (D) holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action (E) holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech
Output: (B)
concerns, the only question under the FFDCA is whether the intended use of the product is to prevent disease, not whether the product actually prevents disease. See United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir.1969) (“Regardless of the actual physical effect of a product, it will be deemed a drug for purposes of the Act where the labeling and promotional claims show intended uses that bring it within the drug definition.”) (footnote omitted); Finished Devices, 714 F.Supp. at 1165 (“[Wjhether a product is a device turns solely on the product’s intended use.”). Accordingly, this court has applied the FFDCA to instruments that do not actually prevent disease. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the physician who included the cost of an intrauterine contraceptive device in the fee for his insertion of the device was a seller under the uniform commercial code (B) holding that no proximate causation existed where a treating physician is well aware of the risks of a medical device independent of any warning by the manufacturer (C) holding that the government is immune from liability for its choice of traffic protection devices (D) holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act (E) holding that a scientology emeter was a device even though the plaintiff admitted that the devices are ineffective for any medical therapeutic purpose
Output: (E)
this is irrelevant to the question of whether a loan was made to Busson-Sokolik in the first place. Finding no clear error on the question of whether the funds were in fact transferred to Busson-Sokolik and no defects in the formation of a valid contract between the parties, we affirm the finding that the sum MSOE transferred to Busson-Sokolik was a loan. 2 . “Abuse of discretion” is the clear standard for evaluating a judge’s decision to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1046 (7th Cir.2000). While the standard for evaluating a judge’s decision not to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case is somewhat less clear, we adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach of using the "abuse of discretion” standard. See In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 . An appeal is frivolous "when the result 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (B) holding that the applicable standard of review for evaluating a bankruptcy courts denial of fed r bankrp 9011 sanctions is abuse of discretion and noting similar approaches taken by the ninth and tenth circuits (C) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit (D) holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits (E) holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review
Output: (B)
as an entity wholly owned by the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Raccoon relies on that portion of § 1603(b) which states that “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” does not include an entity created under the laws of a third country. Raccoon’s argument is without merit. Navoi has presented credible evidence showing that in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Republic of Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence, ownership and control of Navoi passed to the Uzbek Government by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. At all times relevant to the instant litigation, Navoi was an Uzbek entity created by the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers under the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Raccoon challenges Navoi’s prima 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined (B) holding that for purpose of the fsia a foreign entitys status is determined based upon the jurisdictional facts existing at the time the act complained of occurred (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (E) holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final
Output: (B)
fails to state a claim. 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence, disregards any provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a district court of the United States. Defendant does not allege any violation of the tax code or tax regulation. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 the Government has discretion as to those from whom it chooses to collect § 6672 penalties from. United States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 298 (4th Cir.1980); United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the IRS has discretion in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  9613f1 is the exclusive vehicle for responsible parties to obtain contribution from other responsible parties (B) recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties (C) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (D) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (E) recognizing that the government can choose to collect unpaid taxes from corporate employer each responsible person or entirely from one source
Output: (E)
its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000). A properly filed application is “one submitted ac cording to the state’s procedural requirements, such as the rules governing the time and place of filing.” Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998). As described above, Petitioner initiated several state postconviction proceedings which, if properly filed, could toll the one-year period of limitation. The first of these was a motion for reduction of sentence filed and denied on October 8, 1996. This motion was pending until November 7, 1996, when the thirty-day period for filing a timely appeal expired. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>). The Court finds that the one-year period of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that for purposes of  2255 motions a federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires (B) holding that a postconviction proceeding is pending under  2244d2 until the time to appeal expires (C) holding that time limit for initiating a tax appeal under kansas jurisdictional statute was a limitation  upon the right itself so that when time expires the right to bring such an action is extinguished (D) holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit (E) holding that the other collateral review provision of  2244d2 encompasses federal review
Output: (B)
that a barge that housed workers was a vessel. 133 S.Ct. at 743. Moreover, after issuing its decision in Lozman, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the appellant in Mendez v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, discussed supra, who sought to overturn the Fifth Circuit’s determination that the Red Hawk was not a vessel. — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 979, 184 L.Ed.2d 760 (2013). The denial of the writ does not establish the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the holding in Mendez. Nevertheless, it is worth noting since the Supreme Court, that same day, cited Lozman in vacating a judgment concerning the vessel status of a casino boat. — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 979, 184 L.Ed.2d 760 (2013) (remanding Lemelle v. St. Charles Gaming Company, Inc., 118 So.3d 1, No. 11-255, 2012 WL 130351 (La.Ct.App. Jan. 4, 2012) (<HOLDING>)). The Court therefore finds that the Supreme 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that regulatory ban on drift gillnet fishing was not a taking of fishing vessel and gear (B) holding that floating casino was not a covered situs (C) holding that shoreside quarterboat barge serving as floating hotel was not a vessel (D) holding that riverboat casino was not a vessel (E) holding that a ship with inoperable engines and no ability to selfpropel was a vessel because it had residual navigational capacity
Output: (D)
v. Pingue, No. 96APE11-1598, 1997 WL 578952 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. Sept. 16, 1997) (same); Wiencek v. Atcole Co., Inc., 109 Ohio App.3d 240, 671 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Ohio App. 3 Dist.1996). (“Based upon a reading of Belvedere, the purpose of the theory ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ and Ohio case law prior to and subsequent to Belvedere, we hold that one seeking to disregard the corporate entity may present evidence that the shareholder exercised his control over the corporation in such a manner as to commit a fraud, illegal, or other unjust or inequitable act upon the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity in order to satisfy the second prong of the test enunciated in Belve-dere.”). Contra Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 WL 252725, at *3 (Ohio App. 6 Dist.Apr. 30, 1999). (<HOLDING>). We note that, although many of these cases 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review (B) holding that expansion of belvedere test by other appellate districts was an incorrect interpretation (C) holding that a denial of coverage based on a reasonable interpretation of the policy is not bad faith even if incorrect (D) recognizing that municipal corporations can include under the missouri constitution in addition to cities and towns counties school districts townships under township organization special road districts and drainage districts (E) holding that service was not defeated by an address with an incorrect zip code
Output: (B)
with Mr. Shuck and did not grow or use marijuana. You asked him if he uses marijuana and they asked him if he uses marijuana, and he denied he ever distributed marijuana. I am allowing this testimony [i.e., of Ms. Armbruster]. Id. at 492-93. In other words, the district court expressly admitted Ms. Armbruster’s testimony regarding purchasing marijuana from Mr. Watson, and using it with him, during a period earlier than the charged crimes to impeach Mr. Watson's testimony that he never used or distributed marijuana. 19 . This is not to say that rebuttal-witness testimony is categorically only admissible as impeachment evidence (as opposed to substantive evidence). Indeed, in certain circumstances, rebuttal evidence can constitute substantive evidence. See Harris, 557 F.3d at 942-43 (<HOLDING>). However, in this case, the challenged 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination (B) holding that an ij need not first identify the particular pieces of missing relevant evidence and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant when he or she is not otherwise credible (C) holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants (D) holding that the challenged evidence the government introduced in rebuttal was substantive evidence and not  relevant for impeachment purposes because it was not offered to show that the witness was not a credible person but to show that she was not at the defendants home during the relevant time making her testimony that she did not see any drugrelated activity while at the defendants home irrelevant (E) holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired
Output: (D)
to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state
Output: (C)
1603(b)(2). If either of these arguments holds true, the district court would have removal jurisdiction. Otherwise it would not. EOTT, in its supplemental brief, also argued to the Court that an alternative basis for jurisdiction is diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It was brought to our attention by Appellants that plaintiff EOTT and defendant Lexington Insurance Corporation are both incorporated in Delaware. If that is indeed the case — the record is silent on Lexington’s state of incorporation — there would be no diversity jurisdiction. On remand, the district court should determine whether there was complete diversity at the time removal was sought, or, if not, at the time it entered its final judgment. Harris v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also O’Halloran v. University of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a litigant objects to removal but fails to apply for an interlocutory appeal to preserve an attack on removal jurisdiction the district courts judgment can be upheld if the court would have had original jurisdiction of the case at final judgment (B) holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment (C) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (D) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (E) holding that a motion brought under rule 60b6 two years after the district courts judgment was untimely where the reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original judgment
Output: (A)
information, from the person being interviewed. This line of questioning on redirect was in response to cross-examination by the defendant’s attorney, who elicited the fact that the phone number on the defendant’s FBI 302 interview form was incorrect. The defendant proposes that prosecutors knew that the error on the form was Special Agent Hultz’s because the same phone number (and thus the same error) was written on 302 interview forms from interviews with other defendants. The Defendant’s claim requires this Court to presume that prosecutors knew that the error occurred on two other FBI 302 forms, among the numerous exhibits used in this trial. See United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 240 (5th Cir.1979), citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, any prejudice was minimal as Hultz 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury (B) holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity (C) holding that the prosecutor is prohibited from knowingly presenting or failing to correct false and material evidence against the defendant (D) holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process (E) holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false
Output: (E)
two propositions, and the verdict does not specify upon which the jury acted, there can be no certainty that they found upon one rather than the other” and preclusion is inappropriate. 158 U.S. 216, 222, 15 S.Ct. 816, 818, 39 L.Ed. 956 (1895); see also Fayerweather, 195 U.S. at 302, 25 S.Ct. at 65 (When the basis upon which a judgment is rendered is unclear, it is "tantamount to a finding in favor of the successful party of all facts necessary to sustain the judgment.” (emphasis added)). In Brown II, we observed that Florida courts uphold this common-law protection: [Pjreclusive effect is not given to issues which could have, but may not have, been decided in an earlier lawsuit between the parties. See, e.g., Acadia Parsers, L.P. v. Tompkins, 673 So.2d 487, 488-89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.D.H., Inc., 397 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach (B) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (C) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (D) holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense (E) holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts
Output: (D)
by sheer momentum. This is a danger independent of the materials used in the bike’s construction. To link a failure to warn of the potential of damaged carbon fiber to fail to Miguelez’s choice of bicycle, and, in turn, to an event that might occur to any bicyclist using the equipment as intended, is stretching the concept of proximate legal causation too far. See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla.1984) (“A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant” (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971))); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Mi-guelez failed to prove 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury (B) holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death (C) holding that in negligence actions florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation ie they require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence (E) holding that the intervening act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendants negligence thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury
Output: (C)
punishment to the extent it constitutes an upward departure from the Sentencing Guideline range deemed most applicable by the court. Nothing in this paragraph shall act as a bar to the defendant’s perfecting any legal remedies he may otherwise have on appeal or collateral attack pertaining to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Additionally, should the Court fail to sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of this plea agreement, his right to appeal the court’s sentence is preserved. This court has held that “[a]ny right, even a constitutional right, may be surrendered in a plea agreement if that waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.” Ashe, 47 F.3d at 775-76; see also United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). A reading of the plea proceeding in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a criminal defendant can waive important constitutional rights by entering into a plea bargain (B) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) recognizing that a defendant in a criminal case may waive any right even a constitutional right by means of a plea agreement internal citation omitted (E) holding criminal defendant does not have constitutional right to have guilty plea accepted by court
Output: (D)
of Governors, exercising its power pursuant to article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution, and, therefore, are not subject to challenge under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. We agree. Article IX, section 7(d), states that the Board of Governors “shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Appellees argue that such a broad grant of authority clearly includes control over admissions policies which are essential to the management and operation of the university system. We conclude that such a construction is consistent with the provision’s explicit language and the intent of the framers and voters. See Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So.2d 492, 501 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Appellees argue, further, that, with the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interpretation of a constitutional provision begins with examination of the provisions explicit language and that a court must endeavor to construe the provision in a manner consistent with the intent of the framers and voters (B) holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them (C) holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision (D) holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent (E) holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence
Output: (A)
paragraph borrows from passages in his work, The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 221, 268-72 (1995). 7 . "[T]he validity of a limitation is ... to be determined under the circumstances then existing, and the certainty that it will vest within the permitted period, if at all, must be discernible at that date.” 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities § 16. 8 . The deed also grants the option to Otis’ immediately related heirs and assignees without temporal limitation. This offensive aspect of the optionee class as well is remedied by the holdings of this Opinion. 9 . Pathmark Stores, Del.Ch., 663 A.2d at 1191—92. 10 . Smith Deed at 11. 11 . Del.Ch., C.A. No. 1096-S, mem. op. at 15, Allen, C., 1988 WL 34528 (Apr. 13, 1988). 12 . Id. at 15-18. 13 . Id. at 18-19 (<HOLDING>). Another way of looking at it is to say that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding right of first refusal only applied to a voluntary sale and taking of property by condemnation is involuntary therefore right of first refusal not triggered (B) holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the  property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the  purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the  property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the  property burdened by the right of first refusal (C) holding this type of agreement fixedprice right of first refusal at least in this type of market threatens to act as a complete impediment to the free alienability of land that our law has for centuries sought to encourage (D) recognizing the significance of territorial jurisdiction and concluding that a more stringent approach needs to be followed in order to confer this type of authority (E) holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion
Output: (C)
allege no physical harm resulting from Wells Fargo’s voluntary undertaking of services. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.2000) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965))) (emphasis added); see also Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *6 (Tex.Ct.App. Jun. 6, 2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because that tort requires proof of physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another and plaintiffs had alleged only economic harm (B) holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself (C) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort
Output: (A)
entire record “and consider the probable effect that the prosecution’s comments had on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.” Turk, 870 F.2d at 1308 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)); see also United States v. O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1428 (8th Cir.1988) (explaining that prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in context of the entire trial record). Any comments that the prosecutor made about defendant’s lawyer injecting the issue of “consciousness of wrongdoing” into the case, when reviewed in the context of the record as a whole, “did not substantially influence the jury decision or infect the trial with unfairness. The error, if any, was harmless.” Turk, 870 F.2d at 1309; see also O’Connell, 841 F.2d at 1428-29 (<HOLDING>). Finally, defendant argues that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any harm resulting from personal attacks that the prosecutor made on defense counsel was fully outweighed by the properly admitted evidence which provided ample and convincing proof of defendants guilt (B) holding that any prejudice resulting from misstatements of law made by the prosecutor during closing was cured by the trial courts proper instruction on the applicable law (C) holding that the trial courts actions in sustaining the defendants objections were sufficient to remedy any possible harm resulting from the mere asking of the three questions by the prosecutor (D) holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law (E) holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence
Output: (A)
OPINION PATRICK M. FLATLEY, Bankr 1996) (<HOLDING>); Chisholm v. Cendant Mortgage Corporation, No. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (B) holding that the debtor is entitled to cure the arrearage until entry of an order confirming the foreclosure sale completes the foreclosure process under oklahoma law (C) holding that a foreclosure sale was not complete under north carolina law until after the tenday statutory period of redemption had expired (D) holding that the debtors could cure their arrearage until the expiration of the 10day upset bid period which would render the foreclosure sale complete under north carolina law (E) holding that the debtors were entitled to cure the mortgage arrearage through their chapter 13 plan because the creditors failure to record the sale deed prior to the bankruptcy filing rendered the sale incomplete under state law
Output: (D)