niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where  finding  that the defendant initiated the conversation  was  implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion  (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand
Output: (E)
Prema Mathai-Davis, Lewis Pennock, Ruth Quigley, Loius Sklar, Robert Graham, and Mark Williamson — are the trustees of the three nomi nal defendants: AIM Sector Funds, AIM Combination Stock & Bond Funds, and AIM Stock Funds (“Nominal Defendants”). See Document No. 8 ¶¶ 13-16. 4 . It is undisputed that the Funds qualify as registered investment companies under the ICA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(8); 80a-3. 5 . This fiduciary duty is breached when the investment advisor, or an affiliated person, charges "a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir.1982). 6 . See Green, 147 F.Supp.2d at 330 (<HOLDING>); Halligan v. Standard & Poor's/Intercapital, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though attorneys fees were not properly awardable under rule 68 costs excluding fees were mandatory (B) holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required (C) holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed (D) holding that investment advisors officers whose salaries came from fees paid to the investment advisor were not liable under  36b even though they may have indirectly received fees (E) holding that a wife was able to pay her own attorneys fees because she had an investment account of 16000 which could be liquidated to pay the fees
Output: (D)
1999 that she needed surgery. (See PL’s Am. Compl. ¶ 15; PL’s Opp’n at 42, 43.) It is undisputed that, “at various times, [Porter and plaintiff] talked about [their] back problems.” (Walfoort Deck, Ex. 6 at 233). It is also undisputed that Porter “was aware that [plaintiff] periodically had pains” and knew that Amtrak provided her with an oversized chair. (Id. at 233-234.) Yet that is the only evidence — other than her own conclusory statements — that plaintiff advances to demonstrate that Amtrak regarded her as being disabled. She d 1089 (8th Cir.2000) (same); Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir.1998) (same); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir.1996) (same); Simonson v. Trinity Reg’l Health Sys., 336 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employers awareness of an employees impairment without more is insufficient to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as disabled (B) holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled (C) holding that regarded as disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation (D) holding that an employers awareness of plaintiffs past medical problems does not establish that it regarded her as disabled (E) holding that evidence that defendant provided plaintiff with certain accommodations for her condition was insufficient to establish that defendant regarded her as disabled for purposes of ada absent showing that the defendant maintained any misperceptions about her condition
Output: (D)
All Direct Travel and Ann’s Crossroads Travel Center (“Plaintiffs”) brought suit against Delta Airlines (“Delta”) under the Racketee lationship with travel agents if they refuse to pay the debit memos does not amount to extortion because, under the ARC Agreement, Delta has the right to terminate its relationship with any travel agent for any reason or no reason. Therefore, threatening to do so is not a wrongful economic threat. See Rothman, 912 F.2d at 318 (<HOLDING>). “Mail fraud under section 1341 requires the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action (B) holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute (C) holding that the district courts question do you also understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have the right to appeal any sentence that i impose did not comply with rule llbln and failed to properly notify the defendant about the waiver of his appellate rights (D) holding that it is not extortion to threaten economic harm when you have a legal right to engage in the activity you threaten (E) holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous
Output: (D)
to the opposing party or for reasons of ‘undue delay.’” 953 So.2d at 1189. Furthermore, our supreme court explained the meaning of the term “undue delay.” Specifically, it stated: “Undue delay can have two different meanings in a case. First, the trial court has discretion to deny an amendment to a pleading if allowing the amendment would unduly delay the trial. Horton v. Shelby Med. Ctr., 562 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.1989). Second, an unexplained undue delay in filing an amendment when the party has had sufficient opportunity to discover the facts necessary to file the amendment earlier is also sufficient grounds upon which to deny the amendment. Stallings [v. Angelica Uniform Co.], 388 So.2d [942,] 947 [ (Ala.1980) ]; see also Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Burkett [v. American Gen. Fin., Inc.], 607 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint (B) holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts (C) holding that pleadings could not be amended where no evidence offered during trial was outside the issues in the original complaint (D) holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action (E) holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking the amended complaint where the plaintiffs had learned of the facts underlying the new allegations six months before they attempted to amend
Output: (D)
on the foregoing, we conclude that Layman’s and Sparks’ sentences are inappropriate. Like Quiroz, ten years of Layman’s sentence should be suspended to probation and five years of Sparks’ sentence should be suspended to probation. IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Lastly, Sparks argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his felony murder conviction because he did not enter the house. However, Sparks, whose cursory argument is less than a page long, cites no cases in support of his claim. Sparks has therefore waived this issue on appeal. See Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (stating that each argument must be supported by citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on appeal relied on); Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202-03 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned (B) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (C) holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument (D) holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue (E) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority
Output: (E)
armed. Those are machinations drawn up by the defense attorney.” At that point, Davis’s attorney objected that such a statement attacked Davis over the shoulders of defense counsel, violated his due process rights, and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The trial court overruled Davis’s objection, and the prosecutor continued, “There’s no evidence to suggest that.” Viewing the prosecutor’s statement in the context of the entire argument, the comment was made in rebuttal, specifically in response to Davis’s claim that Latarsha was armed and had attacked Davis. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 256; York v. State, No. PD-1753-06, 2008 WL 2677368, at *5 (Tex.Crim.App. July 2, 2008) (not designated for publication). By saying that the idea that Latarsha was armed was a “machinatio pp.1973) (<HOLDING>); Guy, 160 S.W.3d at 616-17 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prosecutors remarks that defense counsel was a zealot in the courtroom and thank god hes a defense attorney and not part of the government were improper (B) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsel was manufacturing evidence and thus suborning perjury was improper (C) holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper (D) holding prosecutors statement that defendant and defense counsel were lying when they pleaded not guilty was improper (E) holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper
Output: (D)
Celia Morales-Morales v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 418 (7th Cir.2004) is inapplicable to her case. We do not consider Maravilla-Valdez’s contention regarding the District Director’s refusal to apply the humanitarian exception to the automatic revocation of her immediate relative petition, because we already rejected this contention in a prior memorandum disposition. See Maravilla-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 90 Fed.Appx. 242 (9th Cir.2004). We lack jurisdiction to consider Maravilla-Valdez’s contention that she was never granted voluntary departure because only deportation and exclusion proceedings were available in August of 1989 and she was not placed in these proceedings, because she failed to raise this contention on appeal to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 676-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional (B) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (C) holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement (D) holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional (E) holding that the ftcas exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional
Output: (B)
the NCAA is subject to Title IX provided that it receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of section 1681(a). Federal regulations define “recipient” as including any public or private agency, institution or organization, or other entity, or any other person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which operates an edu-cationál program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee or transferee thereof. 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1997) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute and regulation is quite broad and encompasses indirect recipients of federal funds. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564, 104. S.Ct. 1211, 1216, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds (B) holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family (C) holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds (D) holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds (E) holding that kentucky high school athletic association was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it was created by state law its functions were determined by the kentucky board of education and it received dues from member schools who received federal funds
Output: (D)
unnecessary because § 1983 allows for injunctive relief against state officials, and when sued for prospective injunctive relief in his official capacity, a state officer is a “person” for the purposes of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099 and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441. Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in order to seek prospective injunctive relief must demonstrate, inter alia, that “a federal court decision is likely to redress the injury.” Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir.1998), citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the class too imprecise and speculative to be certified (B) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (C) holding that in order to establish standing the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling must not be too speculative (D) holding that defendants claim that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed 75000 was too speculative (E) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
Output: (C)
absence of fault or negligence on the part of defendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law. Hess cannot satisfy these requirements— especially (3) and (4). There was no fraud alleged in this case, and this court has only awarded relief “on the ground of mistake ... where mutual mistake is shown and where the party seeking relief is without fault or negligence in the premises.” Hess was also negligent in failing to pursue his remedies on direct appeal. V For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus is VACATED. Hess’ motions to dismiss his counsel, appoint substitute counsel, appear pro se, and for an out-of-time appeal are all DENIED; and Appellant’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED AS MOOT. 1 . 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir.1998). 3 . Id. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in general aedpa applies only to habeas petitions filed after the statutes effective date of april 24 1996 and noting that aedpas special procedures for 28 usc  2254 petitions in capital cases apply also to petitions pending on april 24 1996 (B) holding that prisoners had one year from the effective date of aedpa april 24 1996 to file their habeas petitions before they could be considered timebarred by the operation of  2244d1 (C) holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996 (D) holding that prisoners whose convictions became final on or before april 24 1996 must file their  2255 motions before april 24 1997 (E) holding that the aedpa applies to those habeas corpus petitions filed after its effective date of april 24 1996
Output: (B)
of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261, et seq. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the summary judgment for Ronson “must be sustained because the FHSA preempts any state law warning requirements other than those imposed by the FHSA and its implementing regulations.” Id. Similar to Comeaux, the Court must inquire whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the theory that Mattel’s warning was inadequate. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621 (explaining that claims based upon a failure-to-warn theory which require a showing that “advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated warnings” different from federal regulatory requirements are preempted); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895, 900 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 739-40 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading (B) holding in a comparable case that statelaw claims premised upon failuretowarn or inadequate warning theories that would result in the imposition of additional or different labeling requirements are nonetheless preempted regardless of the guise under which the claim is presented (C) holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted (D) holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted (E) holding that all claims premised upon a failure to warn after 1969 are preempted
Output: (B)
See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C’Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because  once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form  quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous
Output: (C)
to Wil-loughby’s actual distribution of cocaine (taking place miles from where the gun was found) and no evidence indicated that any distribution occurred at the storage facility (packaging drugs for later distribution is not distribution — that is why possession with intent to distribute is such a popular drug charge) and because a hypothetical future distribution is not a legitimate basis for a current conviction, the weapons conviction could only have been based upon a possession-protection theory, a valid ground in this circuit but not when it falls outside the scope of the indictment. Willoughby’s motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. Willoughby, 27 F.3d at 266-67 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, HRS § 708-840 (1993) provides that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial (C) holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury (D) holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it altered an essential element of the crime charged and broadened the language of the indictment by instructing the jury on the general definition of enterprise for rico conspiracy (E) holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted
Output: (D)
agree which documents evince their agreement. Smart Call argues the unsigned service agree ment, which requires any disputes to be submitted to arbitration in Ohio under Ohio law, is the contract. Conceding the document is unsigned and does not name Genio as a party, Smart Call argues the accompanying e-mails constitute written confirmation of its terms sufficient to make the contract enforceable. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 2.201(b) (providing an unsigned contract for goods may be enforceable upon written confirmation of the contract’s terms). Smart Call further argues the forum-selection clause is evidence of Smart Call’s intent to avoid availing itself of the benefits and protections of Texas law. See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 792 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482, 105 S.Ct. 2174) (<HOLDING>). Further, because all of its negotiations with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule of construction that specific statutory provisions control general ones should not be applied where provisions can be harmonized (B) holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions (C) holding that related provisions should be read together (D) holding choiceoflaw provisions should be considered when determining purposeful availment (E) recognizing that totality of circumstances must be considered in determining permissible inferences
Output: (D)
subject to forfeiture, without regard to the location of that property. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). The Williams action, also an in person-am suit, was filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to that court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1332 (2000). The Receiver for NHLIC brought suit against persons and entities, not property, seeking recovery of funds believed to have been stolen from NHLIC. The fact that the court in Williams is exercising control over the proceeds from the sale of the Center Mall property does not transform that suit into an in rem proceeding or alter the basis of the court’s jurisdiction. See United States v. $174,206.00 in United States Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Ill The Government contends that this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment (D) recognizing that the hallmark of an in personam forfeiture proceeding is one where the government proceeds directly against the person (E) holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property
Output: (A)
court would be required to correct its own mistake through the use of its equitable powers granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See id. at 632-33. Isaaeman has been read narrowly by the courts of this circuit which, like the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Ohio, have concluded that Isaaeman carved out one minor exception to the widely-accepted rule that Rule 4007(c)’s Bar Date can be enlarged only pursuant to a motion filed by a party in interest prior to its expiration. This exception has been very narrowly applied, and only in situations where the court itself made an error that resulted in the untimely action of a creditor. In re Gorrell, 260 B.R. 848, 851 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 2001); accord Peerless Ins. Co. v. Miller (In re Miller), 228 B.R. 399, 402 (6th Cir. BAP 1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Lufkin, 256 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sixth circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that of the supreme court in determining what is clearly established federal law (B) recognizing that the sixth amendment is not violated every time the public is excluded from a courtroom an unjustified closure may on its facts be so trivial as not to violate the sixth amendment guarantee (C) holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law (D) holding that the sixth circuit restricted isaaeman to its facts (E) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating
Output: (D)
would, in general, slow down the dispute resolution process.” Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. Moreover, it was rejected as “legally erroneous,” for the “basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms and according to the intentions of the parties.” Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. C. In This Case, The Question Of Arbitrability Is For The Court The second question is whether the power to determine arbitrability resides with the court or the AAA Panel. The answer turns upon what the parties agreed to about that question in the Merger Agreement. First Option 543, 546-547, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, a disagreement about whether an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should decide whether an arbitration agreement survived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation (B) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (E) holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide
Output: (A)
(9th Cir. 2000)). This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp. Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (“There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.”) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (“Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.”); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (<HOLDING>). “The reason for the rule is simply that where 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employment manuals express disclaimer superseded alleged implied contractual term (B) holding that under georgia law the duty of good faith cannot be breached apart from an express contractual term (C) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract (D) holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant (E) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance
Output: (C)
in connection with the pending motions to dismiss. 8 . Any claim can be transferred pursuant to § 13-101 unless it is (1) a claim for personal injury, (2) founded upon a grant or interest in real property which is void by state statute, or (3) otherwise expressly forbidden by a federal or state statute or contravenes public policy. N.Y. G.O.L. § 13-101. 9 . Plaintiffs do not bring any claims under the Trust Indenture Act or federal securities laws, which, unlike N.Y. G.O.L § 13-107, do not provide for the automatic assumption of a security seller's claims. See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. New Jersey, 85 F.3d 970, 973 (2d Cir.1996) (finding § 13-107 is inapplicable to claims under Trust Indenture Act); In re Saxon Sec. Litig., 644 F.Supp. 465, 474 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Relying on the Affidavit of Laurence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtors securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities (B) holding that rule 10b4 claims were not automatically assigned to purchasers of securities (C) holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable (D) holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5 (E) holding that the securities act authorizes purchasers to maintain a suit in equity to rescind a fraudulent sale and secure restitution of the consideration paid
Output: (B)
violated his substantive due process rights. In so doing, Ahmed has incorrectly “presuppose[d] ... [that he has] a constitutionally protected right to actual discretionary relief from removal or to be eligible for such discretionary relief....” Manzano-Garcia, 413 F.3d at 471. This circuit has repeatedly held that discretionary relief from removal, including an application for an adjustment of status, is not a liberty or property right that requires due process protection. See, e.g., Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.2004) (stating, in a removal context, that due process claims revolving around an alleged failure to receive discretionary relief are not based upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In keeping with the well-established 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that aliens lack of a protected liberty or property interest in the relief he sought  a discretionary waiver of deportation  was a circumstance fatal to his due process claim (B) holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection (C) recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection (D) holding that eligibility for discretionary relief from a removal order is not a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection (E) recognizing that it is well established that where a state provides a discretionary parole regime prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in parole
Output: (D)
and “the failure to provide a child with food, clothing, or shelter necessary to sustain the life or health of the child, excluding failure caused primarily by financial inability unless relief services had been offered and refused.” Id. § 261.001(4)(A), (B)(iii). These definitions are not exhaustive. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.005(13) (Vernon 2005) (stating that term “includes” is term of enlargement and not of exclusive enumeration); C.B., 376 S.W.3d at 249 & n. 10 (citing Government Code section 311.005(13) and concluding enumerated acts and omissions are not exhaustive). In addition, Texas Supreme Court case law, through its definition of child endangerment, is instructive on what constitutes abuse or neglect under Chapters 262 and 161 of the Code. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); see also In re 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (B) holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing (C) holding due process does not require jury unanimity on particular act or omission submitted as alternate means of committing the conduct element of the offense of injury to a child (D) holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury (E) holding that endanger means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a lessthanideal family environment but it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury rather endanger means to expose to loss or injury to jeopardize
Output: (E)
Mac Pherson expressly argued to the state trial court, and subsequently to the Appellate Division, that the Order for Service by Publication was predicated on a misrepresentation of material fact, that sustaining jurisdiction over him based on publication would be a denial of his constitutional right to due process, that procedural due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of an action affecting a person’s property interest, and that the state court should have ordered a hearing to determine whether service by other means was available before ordering service by publication. Accordingly, res judicata applies to preclude Mac Pherson from asserting in federal court the claims he has raised in this action. See Brooks, 84 F.3d at 1463 (<HOLDING>). We have considered all of Mac Pherson’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii (B) holding that the plaintiffs due process claims were completely barred by res judicata because the underlying factual predicate for each of these claims  is substantially identical to the allegations presented in state court (C) holding that when claims regarding the employment relationship arise after the plaintiffs first case is initiated the second case is not barred by res judicata (D) holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action (E) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari
Output: (B)
Id. [33] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind.2012). At the time of his sentencing, the advisory sentence for a Class D felony was one-and-one-half years, with a minimum of six months and a maximum of three years. Here, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence but suspended one year to probation. In arriving at this sentence, the trial court found as mitigating circumstance the fact that Wahl had no criminal history at the time. However, the trial court found the nature of the offense and the fact that the victim was “less than 12 years of age” to be an aggravating circumstance. (Tr. p. 852). See Kile v. State, 729 N.E.2d 211, 214 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). [34] As for the nature of the offense, Wahl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dependent upon the circumstances of the case a defendants deportability could be viewed as either a mitigating or an aggravating factor (B) recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age (E) holding that the trial court did not err in using the particularized factual circumstances of the case namely the victims age  as an aggravating factor
Output: (E)
of decision, and this is how the INS has consistently understood these terms.”); Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000) (“[Sjubject to possible limitation, we think that the requirement of ‘legal custody’ in section 1432 should be taken presumptively to mean legal custody under the law of the state in question.”). Our decision to look to state law is consistent with our practice in other areas of federal law generally, and immigration law specifically. For example, entitlement to federal social security benefits often hinges on marital status as defined by state law. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-53 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Purganan v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 269, 270-71 (9th Cir.1982); see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in the immigration context, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment (B) holding that statute does not provide for the adjudication by the alj of a state law breach of contract action for damages that is independent of the aljs determination of entitlement to benefits under the terms of the applicable agreement (C) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest
Output: (D)
benefit doctrine in the context of derivative actions brought under rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54,¶ 7 n. 2, 53 P.3d 947 (“Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are ‘substantially similar’ to the federal rules.” (citations omitted)); Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 n. 5 (Utah 1994) (“This court recognizes the persuasiveness of federal interpretations when the state and federal rules are similar and few Utah eases deal with the rule in question.”). ¶ 22 Federal courts have applied the substantial benefit doctrine as a way of awarding attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs in derivative Wal-Mart Stores, 54 F.3d 69, 71-72 (<HOLDING>). However, a substantial benefit must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in suit brought by shareholders against corporation under federal securities laws that the promotion of corporate suffrage regarding a significant policy issue confers a substantial benefit regardless of the percentage of votes cast for or against the proposal at issue (B) holding in suit brought by shareholders against corporation under federal securities laws that plaintiffs conferred substantial benefit upon corporation by vindicating statutory policy stressing the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage (C) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (D) holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation (E) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action
Output: (A)
statute is not clear, there is a risk of arbitrary criminal enforcement, and a potential for violating the separation of powers doctrine by extending criminal liability beyond that which the legislature contemplated. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d at 586-87. The potential for ambiguous enforcement in light of the majority’s position affects crimes committed by affirmative acts. Every bill taken from a gas station’s cash register could give rise to an individu al charge of theft. Every threat of violence spoken in a conversation paves the way for a slew of assault charges. Each footstep on another’s land could constitute an independent incident of trespass. The implications of the majority’s approach are equally disproportional regarding crimes of omissions or negative acts. See Iowa Code § 702.2 (<HOLDING>). For example, every minute, every hour, or 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim (B) holding that the term diligent prosecution requires thatthe government action is both capable of requiring compliance with the act and calculated to do so internal quotationmarks omitted (C) holding that the term indecent act required no further definition (D) recognizing the term act includes a failure to do any act which the law requires one to perform (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective
Output: (D)
delisted sections of those water bodies, Cantwell says that the mercury problem is not being resolved by Florida or the federal government, further diminishing her enjoyment of the wa ters. The harm that these individuals claim to have suffered — the pollution of waterbod-ies that they use and whose integrity the Clean Water Act is intended to protect — -is of a type the courts have recognized as an “injury in fact.” See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984-986 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding plaintiffs had standing under Clean Water Act to challenge the EPA’s failure to establish maximum pollutant levels for waterbodies in the state of Alaska); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Amer. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Biodiversity Legal Found, v. Badgley, 309 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests (B) holding that plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury in fact in that their members whalewatching and studying would be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting and this type of injury was within zone of interests protected by statute (C) holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation (D) holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public (E) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
Output: (B)
from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.... The civil confinement here at issue is not limited, but potentially permanent. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (citations omitted). The Court continued that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.” Id. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Following this rationale, no less of a problem arises if indefinite detention were caused by the inability to pay a bond. Indeed, the language of Zadvydas compels the conclusion that the bond must be low enough that the immigrant is able to meet it. See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he alien’s release [post-removal-order] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeiture of 357144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 250000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 5000 (B) holding that state may not revoke probation for nonpayment of fine where probationer is unable to pay through no fault of his own (C) holding that state may not imprison indigent defendant solely for inability to pay fine (D) holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum (E) holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine
Output: (E)