niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
negligence placed the plaintiff....” Brown v. Philadelphia Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 674 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1996). Russell’s actions were intentional, not negligent. The impact rule, which depends upon the negligence of a defendant, is therefore inapposite to this case. 7 . Because DiSalvio’s federal cause of action survives Russell's Motion to Dismiss, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over DiSalvio’s remaining state law claims. 9 . Unlike the School District Defendants, Russell has not argued that this tort is unavailable to plaintiffs in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 10 . The Court similarly rejects Russell’s argument that DiSalvio cannot recover punitive damages from him under her § 1983 claim. See Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 11 . DiSalvio suggests that Magill should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda (B) holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee (C) holding that punitive damages may be awarded under  1983 when the defendants conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others (D) holding that a supervisor with no personal involvement may be liable for the constitutional violation of a subordinate for culpable action or inaction in the training supervision or control of his subordinates acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation  or reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others (E) holding that since the complaint set out a deliberate indifference claim it follows logically that reckless or callous indifference has been noticed
Output: (C)
fundamental error analysis. 4 . During this hearing the court allowed Dr. Bail-on to testily telephonically from the hospital at which the patient was located. 5 . Alternatively, an appellate court could remand the matter to the superior court for evidentiary hearings and findings on the effectiveness of appointed counsel. See In re Condry's Estate, 117 Ariz. 566, 568, 574 P.2d 54, 56 (App.1977). In In re Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-4942, 142 Ariz. 240, 242, 689 P.2d 183, 185 (App. 1984), we reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parent had received adequate notice of the hearings against him and whether the parent had received effective assistance of counsel. 142 Ariz. at , 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. 301, 304, 645 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (B) holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant (C) holding if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing  the adversary process itself is presumptively unreliable (D) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (E) holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith
Output: (C)
law and fact. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). Because these mixed questions are primarily questions of law, we exercise free review. Id.; Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1997). Estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental capacity. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200-01, 207 P.3d 169, 176-77 (2009); State ex rel. Williams v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 419 (1965); Buell v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 265, 254 P.3d 1253, 1261, (Ct.App.2011). Cf. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591, 599 (2000) n of Nez Perce County, 138 Idaho 82, 87, 57 P.3d 793, 798 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Willig v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that based upon the facts presented the arbitration provisions restricting or banning class actions are substantively unconscionable (B) holding quasiestoppel did not apply when boards actions were not unconscionable without discussing whether the case presented extraordinary circumstance (C) holding quasiestoppel did not apply when department did not take an inconsistent position without discussing whether the case presented extraordinary circumstances (D) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (E) holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants
Output: (B)
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; (B) there is a factual basis for the plea. ...; (5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the mini-reum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered. Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)(2), (4)-(5). 3 . Because our decision that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 by accepting Mora's guilty plea without informing him that the State had the burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is dispositive, we need not address Mora's other arguments. See, e.g., State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Prior to the creation of the strict 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants other arguments (B) holding that appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive (C) holding that this court need not address the merits of an argument raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that where a party does not adequately brief an argument we need not address it on appeal (E) holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive
Output: (A)
essential element of an elevated breath alcohol level. Consequently, he contends that the judge’s ruling was essentially a determination that the exclusion of the BAT results left the State without sufficient proof to convict Defendant of the DWI charge, and that this constituted an adjudication of his innocence. Defendant also asserts that the judge’s oral comments that he had “reasonable doubt” and that he found Defendant “not guilty” further indicate that the judge deliberated on the merits of the case and acquitted Defendant of the DWI charge. Defendant does not, however, argue that the judge expressly ruled that Defendant was acquitted of the charges, nor would the record support such an assertion. See County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 741, 790 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1990) (<HOLDING>). {20} The State concedes that jeopardy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists (B) recognizing that an actual express judgment of acquittal precludes retrial regardless of any defects in the process leading to the judgment (C) holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections (D) holding on summary judgment that an attorney who failed to timely file an answer leading to a default judgment was on notice that a malpractice claim might be filed against him (E) recognizing that an appeal from a final judgment permits an attack against any nonfinal order or ruling leading up to it
Output: (B)
properly consider the Handbook as it was incorporated by reference in the complaint and attached as an exhibit to the first amended complaint. III. Analysis In the District of Columbia, all employment is at-will “unless a contrary contractual intent is clearly expressed!.]” Turner v. Fed. Express Corp., 539 F.Supp.2d 404, 410 (D.D.C.2008), citing Green v. Bowne of N.Y., LLC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2002) (internal citations omitted). Even if the employer has provided its employees with an employee handbook, the handbook is not enforceable as an employment contract if it disclaims the establishment of contractual obligations and explicitly provides that employment may be terminated at-will. Futrell v. Dep’t of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 806 (D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); Boulton v. Inst. of Int’l Educ., 808 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment (B) holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will (C) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law (D) holding that a disclaimer setting forth policies for general guidance only which stated that it did not create a binding contract and that the employee could be terminated without notice and at will at any time for any reason unambiguously provided that employment was atwill (E) holding that employee guidebook did not create an implied employment contract as it contained a clearlystated boldfaced disclaimer and statement that employment was atwill
Output: (E)
again, and KEB confirmed that it had, in fact, conveyed KLI’s notice to Morgan, but that Morgan had stated that it would not execute KLI’s demand to unwind. Kim called Morgan, and Morgan stated that it would not execute KLI’s demand because KEB did not want the transaction to be unwound. Morgan does not dispute these facts, and must concede, therefore, that it knew, by reason of both KLI’s written and oral notices, that KLI wanted its baht position unwound, and that it was Morgan’s decision not to comply with the demand. Clearly, Morgan had actual knowledge, and therefore is deemed to have notice that KLI made demand pursuant to the unwind provision, section 2(e) of the Morning Glory/KEB swap agreement. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Diamond Timber, Inc., 559 F.Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Morgan’s position 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (B) holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard (C) holding that  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (D) holding that a  1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that notice occurs when party charged with having notice has actual knowledge or when from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists
Output: (E)
between her ankle injury and her employment, neither the hearing officer nor the full Board ever reached the question of whether Milledge's infection and subsequent amputation were causally connected to her ankle injury. Therefore this cause is remanded to the Board for consideration of this issue. Conclusion We conclude that an injury resulting from an unexplained accident falls under the category of a neutral risk, one neither distinctly personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. We conclude also that in the case of a neutral risk, the positional risk doctrine applies. As applied in this case, Milledge would not have been at the place where she injured her ankle injury but for the duties of her employment. Consequently, a presumpt 83, 786 (1970) (<HOLDING>); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Maw, 510 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where an employee is fatally injured in an unexplained assault there is a rebuttable presumption that the employees death arose out of the employment (E) holding that in determining whether an accident arose out of employment the issue is whether the employees employment brought him in contact with the risk that in fact caused his injuries
Output: (B)
force to effectuate that arrest. Appellant’s claim, however, is not that the officers used excessive force after he stopped resisting or to stop his resistance; his claim is based solely on his assertions that he did not resist arrest, did nothing wrong, and was attacked by the Appellee officers for no reason. Thus, Appellant’s suit “squarely challenges the factual determination that underlies his conviction for resisting an officer,” and if he prevails, “he will have established that his criminal conviction lacks any basis.” Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed. Appx. 321, 324-25 (5th Cir.2004). This type of excessive force claim is, therefore, the type of claim that is barred by Heck in our circuit. Id.-, see also DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656-57 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Third, Appellant argues that Heck does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims (B) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (C) holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim (D) holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed (E) holding that heck barred appellants excessive force claim where his complaint maintained that he did not resist arrest and did nothing wrong and provided no alternative pleading or theory of recovery
Output: (E)
blood from 116 unrelated Korean individuals); Jeanne M. Hayes et al. & Maya Freund, “Arab Population Data on the PCR-Based loci: HLADQA1, LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D758, Gc and D1S80,” 40 J. Forensic Sci. 888 (1995) (collecting ninety-four blood samples from unrelated Arabs); see also Pope, supra, 220 Ill.Dec. at 312, 672 N.E.2d at 1324 (finding that “[b]ecause the PCR polymarker systems are two allele or three allele, the FBI may rely on a smaller database. Thus, the PCR Caucasian database contains only 145 individuals”). Second, the trial court found that the underlying databases were reliable. In light of that finding, questions regarding the size of a database go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See People v. Adams, 195 Mich.App. 267, 489 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1992) (<HOLDING>), modified in part on other grounds, 441 Mich. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility (B) holding that allegations of tampering went to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility (C) holding statistical conclusions admissible and questions regarding the size of a tests database goes to the weight not admissibility of the evidence (D) holding that in face of expert testimony that database was valid questions concerning size of database and statistical conclusions drawn from it went to weight not admissibility of evidence (E) holding that questions regarding size of fbis population databases was matter of weight once principle that frequency calculations could be made from an adequate database was determined to be generally accepted
Output: (D)
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8 — 1(a)(1) (West 1996)), a defendant convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term no less than 20 years and no more than 60 years. In this case, defendant received a sentence 10 years above the minimum. Clearly, such a term is within the statutory guidelines and thus, it cannot be said such a term was excessive or unjust. Nor can it be said such a sentence was unfairly disparate when it is considered that the codefendant in this case' pled guilty from the outset of this proceeding. Dispositional concessions are properly granted to defendants who plead guilty since the public interest in the effective administration of criminal justice is served. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 218; see People v. Milton, 182 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1094-95, 538 N.E.2d 1227 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find defendant’s sentence is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility (B) holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state (C) holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges (D) holding it is proper for a trial court to grant leniency in sentencing a defendant who by his plea ensured prompt and certain application of correctional measures to him acknowledged his guilt and showed a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct (E) holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari
Output: (D)
789, 794 (Tex.2002) (personal jurisdiction). A relator who demonstrates that the order or judgment challenged is void need not demonstrate that remedy by appeal is inadequate. In re S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000) (citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1998)). A void judgment results when the trial court had (1) no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, (2) no jurisdiction to render the judgment, or (3) no capacity to “act as a court.” State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.1995). Errors that render a judgment merely voidable, as opposed to void, may be corrected through the customary appellate process or other proceedings. See id; see also Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). It is well-settled that an order signed after 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that void order must exceed courts authority to act and not be merely erroneous (B) recognizing that acts made in violation of statutory authority are void (C) holding void judgment must be vacated (D) recognizing collateral attack on void order (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous
Output: (A)
incentive for Liberty to terminate coverage or deny the claim. Under such facts, “the potential for self-interested decision-making is evident.” Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 846 n. 4 (6th Cir.2000). “The ‘possible conflict of interest’ inherent in this situation ‘should be taken into account as a factor in determining whether [Liberty’s] decision was arbitrary and capricious.’.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Kentucky Finance Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 1924, 109 L.Ed.2d 288 (1990)); see also Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Darland, 317 F.3d at 527-528; Whitaker v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 121 Fed. Appx. 86, 87 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While several courts have altered the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious (C) holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment (D) holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable (E) holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard performs its usual role of assuring factual support in a case involving a nhtsa decision to rescind a motor vehicle safety standard
Output: (B)
federal maritime law to the effect that the show-tag of profits and losses and the right to joint control are merely important indicators of a joint venture relationship rather than essential elements of such a relationship. Fulcher’s Point deals with maritime liens, not with employment status or tort liability under The Jones Act. 935 F.2d at 209. The emphasis of Fulcher was on nondilution of the credit of the vessel and the maintenance of this security for suppliers who are strangers to ownership of the vessel. See id. at 211, 213. Davidson involved the application of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901. 848 F.2d at 575. 11 .But cf. Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 257-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S.Ct. 261, 98 L.Ed.2d 218 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 12 . As Taiyo points out, a substantial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac  remcode  38001 to maritime contract disputes (B) holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law (C) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (D) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (E) holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters
Output: (C)
of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court” is contemptible, regardless of whether the actions disrupt the proceedings. Id. § 78-32-1(5). ¶4 Utah Code section 78-32-3 does not require that the contemptible actions interrupt or block the proceedings in order to be punished summarily. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3. Rather, it only requires that the “contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers.” Id. Even though the juvenile court waited until the end of the certification hearing to issue the contempt order, Weis-kopfs contemptible actions took place in the court's presence; therefore, it properly exercised its summary contempt powers. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 5 Weiskopf also asserts that his due 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (B) holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection (C) holding that if a judge believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without extinguishing his summary contempt power (D) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (E) holding that the commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a patent if he believes that doing so would be contrary to law
Output: (C)
authority to assess credibility. 24 Magistrates may make ered-ibility determinations in preliminary hearings, but the extent of those determinations is limited. In Talbot, we recognized that assessing "'the credibility of the witnesses [in a preliminary hearing] is an important element in the determination of probable cause'" and that preventing magistrates from making credibility determinations "would undermine the fundamental purpose served by the preliminary examination." 972 P.2d at 438 (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84, 786). Indeed, that the probable cause standard demands "reasonable belief" rather than merely "belief" strongly suggests that magistrates must, to a certain extent, assess the credibility of the evidence presented. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 300 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we have also noted that "the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added (B) holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt  emphasis added (C) holding that plaintiff must present such evidence (D) holding that the investigators belief that a crime had been committed does not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence (E) holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable
Output: (A)
constitutional responsibility for their actions.” S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987). Any increase or decrease in taxing or spending necessarily affects private behavior. To hold that such an effect necessarily creates a “close nexus” would be to hold that nearly any action in an industry that receives government funding constitutes state action, in contravention of Supreme Court authority. As the Court stated in Blum, “[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the state responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2777; see also S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 546, 107 S.Ct. 2971 (<HOLDING>). That is precisely what happened here: 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for  1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor (B) holding that foster parents are not state actors (C) holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors
Output: (C)
of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Iowa 2006); Imagnu v. Wodajo, 85 Md. App. 208, 582 A.2d 590 (1990); Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. 788, 716 N.W.2d 47, 52 (2006); Stiel v. Stiel, 348 S.W.3d 879, 885-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104 (Wyo. 1996). 22 Hartley v. Hartley, 205 P.3d 342, 352 (Alaska 2009) (“We have consistently recognized that the superior court is in the best position to assess each party’s circumstances and to determine what division of property is most equitable.”); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, 567 (1976); In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 538 (Colo. 1995) (“The method adopted may vary with the facts in each case.” (citations omitted)); Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 785 A.2d 197, 216 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Forrester v. Forrester, 953 A.2d 175, 186 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the method used to distribute retirement benefits was properly a matter within the trial courts discretion (B) recognizing offset method (C) holding it is within the trial courts discretion to choose on a casebycase basis the method although expressly rejecting the reserved jurisdiction method (D) recognizing this method of submission (E) recognizing this method
Output: (C)
the alleged negligence of an independent contractor. More specifically, GET argues that tour operators are not liable for the negligence of providers of transportation services. Corby, 1990 WL 488464 at 3. GET also cites numerous out-of-state cases which hold that tour operators are not liable for the negligence of third party suppliers of Grand European Inbound’s safety because GET made an inquiry into the reliability of GEI, and used it without incident for more that 10 years before Ramage’s alleged accident. B. Plaintiffs Opposition First, Ramage claims that waiver of defendant GET’s liability is contrary to public policy, and thus unenforceable and void. See Cal.Civ.Code § 1790.1. Ramage contends that he was not put on sufficient n Cal.App.3d 237, 240, 142 Cal.Rptr. 570 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Ramage contends GET expressly and impliedly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a summary judgment motion must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion (B) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (C) holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied (D) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (E) holding the denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue which is later submitted to the jury is not reviewable
Output: (C)
motion. 9 . Plaintiffs also argue that because this statement was incorporated by reference into the registration statements filed with the SEC for the Hotels.com, LendingTree, and Expedia mergers, those registration statements were rendered materially false and misleading as well. See infra at I.D. 10 . See supra Background at II.A.2. 11 . The Derivative Complaint describes Dil-ler’s relationship with defendants Khosrowsh-ahi, Bennett, and Malone (DC ¶ 123(f)), but none of these individuals was serving on the Board at the time plaintiffs filed their Complaint, and thus Diller’s relationships to them are not relevant to the issue of demand futility. (See id. ¶ 114); See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, 2002 WL 31888343, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Haseotes v. Bentas, C.A. No. 19155 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board (B) recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board (C) holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself (D) holding that the board as constituted on the date that the original complaint was filed is the board for purposes of evaluating whether demand is required or excused (E) holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings
Output: (D)
to a child. Similarly, the jury’s acquittal on the manslaughter charge has no bearing on the second prosecution for injury to a child. Manslaughter is not the same as injury to a child for the same reasons that criminally negligent homicide is not the same as injury to a child. Application of the Blockburger principles to the charge of capital murder leads us to a slightly different result. Capital murder does include an element not required to prove injury to a child, namely the death of the victim. Therefore, capital murder is not subsumed within the offense of injury to a child. Cf. Wright v. State, 866 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, pet. refd) (citing United States v. Webb, 796 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987)) (<HOLDING>). The opposite is true also: injury to a child 
 Holding statements: (A) holding noncapital murder and injury to a child not same offenses for doublejeopardy purposes noting murder requires proof of death while injury to a child does not (B) holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill (C) holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child (D) holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child (E) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute
Output: (A)
persons for damages that result because of an injury to the corporation unless a special injury exists in the form of either: (1) a special duty, such as a contractual duty, between the defendant and the shareholder; or (2) an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders. Healthsource, Inc., 2005-NMCA-097, ¶ 25, 138 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861; Marchman, 120 N.M. at 81-82, 898 P.2d at 716-17. {14} Defendants argue that Marchman and Healthsource, Inc. are controlling and that Plaintiff lacks standing because neither exception applies. Furthermore, Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff alleges mismanagement or negligence, these claims may also be asserted only derivatively. See Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99 N.M. 436, 441, 659 P.2d 888, 893 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The district court agreed, and dismissed 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege for corporate officers directors and shareholders to influence the actions of their corporation (B) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (C) holding that the trust fund and denuding theories of recovery were considered to belong to the debtor corporation because each action was created for the benefit of the corporation ie to vindicate injury to the corporation caused by improper actions by control persons (D) holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation (E) holding that claims against corporate officers for mismanagement belong to the corporation
Output: (E)
permission to be absent, she unilaterally proclaimed her intention to take a vacation the week of August 20, 1979. The claimant never received either the explicit or implicit permission of her employer to be absent. The floor lady said nothing a reasonable person could construe as permission to be absent. Id. 429 A.2d at 1219 (emphasis added). The Fritzo court relied on the fact that “the claimant never requested the employer’s permission to be absent from work” and therefore wilfully disregarded the employer’s interest in upholding the unemployment compensation board’s denial of unemployment insurance benefits due to wilful misconduct related to work. Id. at 1217; see also Grispino v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 51, 472 A.2d 288 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Dulgerian v. Commonwealth Unemployment 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an isolated incident in which an employee used profanity in a telephone conversation with her supervisor did not constitute misconduct sufficient to cut off unemployment benefits (B) holding that isolated incident in which claimant raised voice at his supervisor in private office but in front of two other employees and possibly used profanity did not constitute misconduct sufficient to deny unemployment compensation benefits (C) holding that leaving work early without permission after having been previously warned constitutes misconduct (D) holding that single incident of leaving work early without receiving permission from supervisor to address problem of impending termination of electrical service to his home by employee on probation due to poor attendance record constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits (E) holding that single incident of failing to return to work after doctors visit without permission due to employees professed anxiety after being informed she may have skin cancer constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits
Output: (D)
activities are sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient”). See also Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir.1973) (concluding that allegations stating the time, place, and nature of allegedly fraudulent activities meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement). Rule 9(b) “does not require nor make legitimate the pleading of detailed evidentiary matter,” however. All that is necessary is “identification of the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations.” Walling, 476 F.2d at 397 (alleging in conclusory fashion that defendant’s conduct was fraudulent was not sufficient under Rule 9(b)). See also Miscellaneous Serv. Workers Local #427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). 3. Whether Plaintiffs Lack Standing Under 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule does not apply where defendant made false representations (B) holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b (C) holding that pleading fraud with particularity in this circuit requires time place and contents of the false representations as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what that person obtained thereby  (D) holding that rule 9b requires a pleader to set forth the time place and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation (E) holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter
Output: (D)
938, 949-50 (10th Cir.2008). Even assuming without deciding we were free to revisit the governing standard of review, we question whether de novo review would be appropriate or make any difference in this case. Even when the constitutional fact doctrine applies, credibility determinations remain subject to clear error review, see Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989), and a sincerity finding is in the end "almost exclusively a credibility assessment,” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir.2007). In those few instances where the Supreme Court has mandated de novo review of facts involving a litigant’s state of mind, the inquiry has usually involved some purely legal question. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 511, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116-17, 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that on appeal an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight the courts duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding (B) holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question (C) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (D) holding appellate court must when evaluating actual malice in libel case independently determine whether the evidence in the record  is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of first amendment protection (E) recognizing that appellate court is in same position as trial court to assess evidence when all of the proof is contained in the record by deposition
Output: (D)
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses. We have held that “[a] jury’s award of damages will not be set aside unless the award is ‘entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained.’ ” Flanagan v. Aaron E. Henry Cmty. Health Servs. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1236 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.1983)). In Flanagan, we explained that “[a] certain amount of emotional distress may be assumed from the racially motivated treatment [the plaintiff] received from the defendants.” Id. There was sufficient evidence of the racially motivated mistreatment here and the jury heard testimony that this adversely affected Rhines. See Williams v. Trader Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Salinas Construction’s challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that damages in a fela action are limited strictly to the financial loss thus sustained overturning a jury award for the loss of society and companionship (B) holding that plaintiffs own testimony that he was embarrassed and humiliated by defendants conduct was sufficient to support compensatory damages award (C) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss (D) holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand (E) holding that a title vii plaintiffs testimony that her employment discharge resulted in sleep loss smoking and weight loss was sufficient to support an award of 100000 in compensatory damages
Output: (E)
of Liability Provisions SBVS argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to lost rent or diminution in value damages because both of the Agreements contain provisions barring the award of consequential damages. The Court concludes that the enforceability of these provisions turns on disputed facts and, therefore, that summary judgment on this issue is improper. Generally, provisions limiting liability in construction contracts are enforceable under California law so long as the parties negotiated and expressly agreed to the limitations. See Cal. Civ.Code § 2782.5. However, such a provision is unenforceable if it is unconscionable or otherwise contrary to public policy. Markborough California, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 227 Cal.App.3d 705, 715, 277 Cal.Rptr. 919 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Under § 1668 of the California Civil Code, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity (B) holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant (C) holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract (D) holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract (E) holding that limitation of liability clause in construction contract that is not unconscionable or in violation of public policy is valid so long as parties had a fair opportunity to accept reject or modify limitation and affirming summary judgment on basis that plaintiff had presented no evidence that it had had no such opportunity
Output: (E)
has fewer than twelve creditors and this Court finds that the evidence produced at Trial was sufficient to establish that the Proposed Debtor was generally not paying his debts as they became due. Therefore, the only issue for this Court to address is whether the Petitioning Creditor has standing to file the Involuntary Petition. To have standing, the Petitioning Creditor must be the holder of a bona fide claim against the Proposed Debtor. London v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir.1992) (“The Bankruptcy Code clearly states that an involuntary proceeding can only be filed by creditors who hold claims that are not contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide dispute”) (emphasis in original); B.D.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 865 F.2d 65, 66 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Tama Manufacturing Co., Inc., 436 B.R. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bona fide purchaser may be considered in privity with its predecessor (B) holding bona fide error defense barred claim for fdpca violation which arose from mistake of law (C) recognizing that if a creditors claim is subject to a bona fide dispute that creditor lacks standing to file an involuntary petition (D) holding that bona fide dispute over whether bank actually  possessed property belonging to taxpayer is reasonable cause (E) holding that unsatisfied execution creditor had rights in property superior to all but prior secured creditors and bona fide purchasers for value
Output: (C)
on an indefinite schedule is not acceptable. Alternatively, the plaintiffs assertion that she could work with her requested accommodations conflicts with her representation to the OPM that she could not work even with reasonable accommodations. Compare Pl.’s Opp’n at 22 with Def.’s Mot., Exs. 45-46. “[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position.” Galt v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 120 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C.Cir.1941). Prior agency determinations, such as the one made by the OPM in this case, are analogous to the “legal proceeding” described in Galt. See, e.g., Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding (B) holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding (C) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that misleading testimony regarding the purpose of a proceeding did not warrant inquiry into the result of the proceeding
Output: (D)