niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court’s conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that “[t]he phrase 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally  (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
Output: (D)
that any sentence that reasonably reflected the gravity of the petitioner’s offense would have serious consequences for the petitioner. The Court specifically recommended to the Bureau of Prisons that the petitioner be designated to the Federal Medical Center at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, although the petitioner appears to be incarcerated at another facility and has received treatment at a local hospital. The petitioner argues that this strengthens his claim that the incarceration at the MCC was unusually burdensome on him and that his attorney should have made that argument. For the reasons explained above, that is not a viable basis to grant the petition. The motion can also be read as a request to the Court to reduce his sentence because of his current medical condit h Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the Bureau of Prisons does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (B) holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority (C) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendants motion for reduction under section 3582c1a because the director of the bureau of prisons had not brought motion (D) holding court lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by defendants who were not public officials (E) holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal
Output: (C)
950 S.W.2d 121, 132 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.); Ulloa v. State, 901 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.); Castaneda v. State, 852 S.W.2d 291, 294-95 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no pet.). A waiver of a “right” is distinguished from a waiver of an “error.” Until there is a timely request for the instruction the constitutional right to the instruction does not arise. Only if there is a timely request for the instruction and the trial court refuses the request does error occur. Whether to request a “no adverse inferences” jury instruction is within the tactical discretion of the defense counsel. Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d at 502; Henson v. State, 734 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd). Cf. Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also 43A George E. Dix & Robert O. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defensive issues not applicable to the case within article 3614 of code of criminal procedure unless and until defense counsel raises issue by requesting jury instruction on issue (B) holding that criminal defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of restitution under the oregon vehicle code (C) holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel (D) holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue (E) holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested
Output: (A)
at *13 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194). In applying this doctrine, “the Second Circuit has determined that ’New York in fact affords an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of, inter alia, a Court of Claims- action.’” Id. (italics omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir.2001)); see also Malik v. City of N.Y., No. 11-CV-6062, 2012 WL 3345317, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (“New York provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of state law causes of action for negligence, replevin, and conversion.”), adopted by 2012 WL 4475156 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012). District courts thus routinely dismiss claims by inmates who assert that they were deprived of property by corrections officers. See, e.g., West, 2014 WL 4290813, at *6 (<HOLDING>); JCG v. Ercole, No. 11-CV-6844, 2014 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (C) holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted (D) recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted (E) holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available
Output: (C)
court failed to question any of the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the first Zehr principle, defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him. With regard to the second Zehr principle, the State’s burden of proof, the circuit court questioned the prospective jurors as to whether they would sign the appropriate verdict form if the State had or had not met its burden of proof. This was a “general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law” (177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix) which did not comply with the 2007 amended rule’s requirement that the court question the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the State’s burden. See also People v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (2009) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court questioned the prospective 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan did not comply (B) holding that such a general question regarding the prospective jurors willingness to follow the law did not comply with the 2007 amended version of rule 431b (C) recognizing general rule (D) holding that the february 28 2007 interim rule was invalid because it failed to comply with the administrative procedure act (E) recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
Output: (B)
from the hostile work environment complaint. ¶29. Thus, assuming that Hall voluntarily entered into the Agreement, nothing in the language of the Agreement, as discussed above, provides the trial court with a basis for finding that, as a matter of law, the Agreement unambiguously permitted Hall’s claims in this case. Rather, on remand, the trial court must consider whether the Agreement unambiguously precluded all or part of Hall’s remaining retaliation claim or whether the language of the Agreement is ambiguous as to its preclusive effect on all or part of that claim in light of the circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement, thereby requiring the court to instruct a new jury to that effect. See Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Tilley v. Green Mt. Power Corp., 156 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court may consider collateral evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement in determining whether the language of the agreement is unclear and if the evidence presented is so plain that no reasonable person could hold any way but one then the court may interpret the meaning as a matter of law (B) holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances (C) holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder (D) holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists (E) holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave
Output: (B)
involvement with five or more kilograms of cocaine, arguing that he had withdrawn before El Don organized the delivery of the intercepted 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011. Ortega argues that the sole evidence of a conspiracy existing at the time of the seizure of 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011 was the April 17, 2011 phone calls between Ortega and El Don. In that call Ortega had arranged for El Don to buy five kilograms of cocaine. Ortega’s argument is unavailing. A conspiracy between Ortega and El Don having been established by the government, the burden rested with Ortega to prove that he affirmatively withdrew from it, not with the government to prove the nonexistence of withdrawal. See Smith v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 714, 720, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Ortega has not met his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in passing 21 usc  846 congress left the common law burden of proving the affirmative defense of withdrawal on the defendant rather than requiring the government to prove nonexistence of withdrawal (B) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (C) holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea (D) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (E) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence
Output: (A)
4. Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they only used “directed force.” Defendants argue that those defendants who only used force as directed by their supervisors — Deputies Sanford, Vazquez, and Delgado — are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was a legitimate penological purpose for their actions. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs resisted cell extractions, and this necessitated use of the Tasers by the Defendants. At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that denial of outofcell exercise for an extended period violates the eighth amendment (B) holding that the core judicial inquiry in resolving an eighth amendment excessive force claim is whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm (C) holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the eighth amendment (D) holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment (E) holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under  2l12bla
Output: (C)
of the American people and the English common law to define the parameters of “fundamental” rights). Among those interests lying at the core of parents’ rights to raise and care for their own children is the right to control their children’s companions and associations. In concurring with the plurality’s decision in Troxel, Justice Souter explained the importance of a parent’s control over a child’s personal associations: “The strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associates is as obvious as the influence of personal associations on the development of the child’s social and moral character. Whether for good or for ill, adults not only influence but may indoctrinate children, and a choice about a child’s social companions is not essentially differen 5, 45 S.Ct. 571 (<HOLDING>); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233, 92 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (B) recognizing that pjarents have a fundamental liberty interest protected by both the florida and federal constitutions in determining the care and upbringing of their children (C) holding that a parents right to control a childs upbringing is a fundamental liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment (D) recognizing liberty of parents  to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control as against law compelling publicschool attendance (E) holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own
Output: (D)
of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (8th Cir.1991); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.1987)). Against this background, this Court must determine whether these findings must necessarily lead to the conclusion that qualified immunity is unavailable to Defendant Rogers. The Court concludes that they do not. Applying the Third Circuit’s observation that police officers generally have a duty to know the elements of the laws they enforce as a starting point, the Court acknowledges that there exist exceptions to this general rule. Indeed, in establishing the general rule that police officers are required to know clearly established law the United States Supreme Court noted that the rule is not absolute. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (<HOLDING>). In Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim (B) holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable (C) holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances (D) holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available (E) holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong
Output: (D)
compliance with such a complex set of requirements is practically impossible, and we will not infer congressional intent that a state achieve the impossible”), rev’d on other grounds, Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 436, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). Rather, we consider whether it is absolutely clear that a systemic computer problem of the type that caused Unan’s and Quintino’s injuries could not reasonably be expected to recur. Defendant failed to put forward sufficient evidence to meet this standard. Although there is evidence that DHHS took significant steps to correct the systemic problem, evidence of substantial compliance does not moot a case unless it is “absolutely clear” that the violations could not reasonably recur. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 193, 120 S.Ct. 693 (<HOLDING>). Here, defendant argues that by the end of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah (B) holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case (C) holding that motion for reconsideration may only be granted if the movant demonstrates controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying motion that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the courts decision (D) holding that defendants substantial compliance with its permit requirements  might moot the case  but  only if  these events made it absolutely clear that defendants violations could not reasonably be expected to recur (E) holding that if the defendants breach does not permit the plaintiff to reduce its overhead then defendant is not entitled to a reduction in the damages awarded against it
Output: (D)
it was not prejudicial. The same analysis applies to Reyes. D. The Alleged Defects Before the Grand Jury Do Not Warrant Dismissal of the Indictment Ortiz argues that the Indictment should be dismissed because it is “the product of testimony and evidence that was incorrect and wholly insufficient to produce a valid bill of charges.” (Ortiz Mem. at 17). Specifically, Ortiz takes issue with Special Agent Kolvek’s grand jury testimony in which she testified that Ortiz had been that the jury could not have cured the defect, because the defect was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy in 2004, 2005, and 2006. The Court cannot, however, dismiss a facially valid indictment based on insufficient evidence. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that grand jury witnesses may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on illegally seized evidence because any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best (B) holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (C) holding that an in dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence (D) holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence (E) recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to fbi agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents
Output: (C)
other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, * This doctrine has never been reexamined by the Supreme Court and is still followed today. The cases of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1669 (1960) (rejecting the “silver platter” doctrine and holding that evidence obtained by state police from a search and seizure which would be unconstitutional if similarly conducted by federal officers could not be used in federal courts even though the federal authorities did not participate in the search and seizure), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961) (<HOLDING>), do not overrule the holding of Burdeau, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (B) holding all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the constitution is by that same authority inadmissible in a state court (C) holding that forfeiture statute is subject to the fourth amendments prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (E) holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
Output: (A)
discovery practice in civil litigation. However, here, plaintiff had no discovery rights which were inconsistent with the applicable provisions of the Open Records Act. Plaintiff argues that the denial of access to the confidential examination material violated his due process rights in the administrative appeal. We disagree. Although plaintiff’s interests in prospective governmental employment, without more, may not have been entitled to the protection of procedural due process, when the state, as here, establishes a statutory and regulatory scheme imposing more stringent standards on itself than are otherwise required by the constitution, due process requires the government to adhere strictly to those standards. Carpenter v. Civil Service Commission, 813 P.2d 773 (Colo.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); see Department of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal (B) holding that unsuccessful job applicant for governmental employment had due process right to meaningful administrative appeal of rejection when regulations established right to such appeal (C) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal (D) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (E) holding violation of due process to penalize a criminal defendant for pursuing statutory right of appeal
Output: (B)
Carolina address and received notification that the petition was “not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward.” As to the second method, service through CT Corporation, the Thompsons received notice from CT that it was not Deutsche's agent. Finally, the district court also rejected the Thompsons' third argument, that service on ASC was service on Deutsche. A citation must be "directed to the defendant.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 99(b)(8). The citation to ASC was directed only to it with no mention of Deutsche. Thus, we agree with the district court that Deutsche was never properly served. 6 . The Court need not consider ACS's citizenship, which is unclear from the record, because ACS was not a party at the time of removal. See Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 390-91 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The United States apparently argued in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a colorable claim was asserted against the nondiverse agent of the insurer blocking removal of the suit to federal court (B) holding that the limitation of  1367b applies only to plaintiffs efforts to join nondiverse parties (C) holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined (D) holding that district court appropriately dismissed suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the case was moot (E) recognizing that a case becomes removable when nondiverse parties are dismissed subject to the oneyear limitation on removal
Output: (E)
Order, he also refused to withdraw them after being notified by defendant that they were protected. PG & E Violation Opinion, 79 Fed.Cl. at 746. It therefore appears that counsel for PG & E intentionally and voluntarily performed an act which he should have known to be contrary to the court’s Order Amending Protective Order. As in Aloe Vera, Eagle Comtronics, and Lion Raisins, regardless of plaintiffs counsel’s subjective intentions or beliefs, he violated a clear and unambiguous court order. See Aloe Vera, 376 F.3d at 966; Eagle Comtron-ics, 305 F.3d at 1313-14; Lion Raisins, 64 Fed.Cl. at 544. Because plaintiffs counsel undisputably acted in violation of a clear and unambiguous court order when he used thirty-five doc man v. American Red Cross, 979 F.2d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). See Def.’s Br. 3. However, as plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing relevance of information and that need for this information outweighs the burden to appellants (B) holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy (C) holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause (D) holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information (E) holding that coleman could use certain information to bring a new and separate suit even though that information was discovered subsequent to a violation of the courts protective order
Output: (E)
speculation about the future,’ a court should determine projected disposable income by calculating a debtor’s ‘present monthly income and expenditures’ and extending those amounts over the life of the plan.’ ” In re Campbell, 198 B.R. at 473 (quoting In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir.1995)). There is a split of decisions as to whether, pursuant to § 523(a)(15) a debt may be partially discharged. Some jurisdictions have held that “under § 523(a)(15) a debt may be partially discharged according to the facts of the particular case, just as with determinations of dischargeability of student loan debts under § 523(a)(8).” Melton v. Melton (In re Melton), 228 B.R. 641, 646 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1998); see also Brasslett v. Brasslett (In re Brasslett), 233 B.R. 177, 186 (Bankr.D.Me.1999) (<HOLDING>); Gagne v. Gagne, 244 B.R. 544, 548 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived (D) holding that  523a15 is not an allornothing proposition (E) holding that the title of an act is not an index but is merely a label
Output: (D)
664, 669 (Colo.1988), the exercise of such power must be guided so that any action taken by a city "in response to a land use proposal will be rational and consistent." Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928, 936 (Colo.1985). The Colorado Springs Zoning Code specifically allows the City to take into account the effect on the neighborhood. See § 4-6-602(C)(1) ("Will the project design be harmonious with surrounding land uses and neighborhood?") In my view, this standard is insufficient to provide "all users and potential users of land with notice of the particular standards and requirements" imposed by the City for plan approval. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 790 P.2d 827, 832 (Colo.1990); see also Bauer, 182 Colo. at 327, 513 P.2d at 204 (<HOLDING>); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 418 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans (B) holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process (C) holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed (D) holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law (E) holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress
Output: (C)
the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial
Output: (E)
would be dangerous, futile, or allow the destruction of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). In this case, the trial court granted Broussard's motion in limine prohibiting any mention of what Officer Kwiatkowski learned to support the search warrant. Given this limited record, we cannot know whether one of the exceptions applies. Further, even if there was a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether or to what extent the exclusionary rule should be used as a remedy. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 1919 n. 4; United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 992, 997 n. 3, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998). 3 . See, e.g., Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814-15 (<HOLDING>). 4 . In 1991, Broussard pleaded guilty to a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant waived ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsels failure to emphasize certain evidence where amended motion for new trial did not assert claim of ineffectiveness on that ground and no argument related to the asserted ground was made at the motion for new trial hearing (B) holding that the combined effect of trial counsels errors should be considered (C) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (D) holding ineffectiveness should be considered at hearing dedicated to considering all facts circumstances and rationale behind counsels actions including opportunity to explain why no objection was made in trial court (E) holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully
Output: (D)
court. ORDER AND NOW, this 5th day of November, 2010, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, dated December 31, 2009, in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED. 1 . A Quality Assurance Officer takes vehicles to inspection centers and observes whether emission inspection regulations are followed. Reproduced Record at 40a (R.R_). 2 . Section 177.602(a) establishes a schedule of penalties that can be imposed upon inspection stations. The penalty established for the first violation of "Fraudulent recordkeeping” is "1 year [suspension] and [a] $2,500 fine.” 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a)(iii). 3 .Generally, participation in a de novo hearing cures any procedural defects regarding notice. See Department of Transportation v. Sutton, 541 Pa. 35, 40, 660 A.2d 46, 48 (1995) (<HOLDING>). However, at the trial court, McCarthy argued 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo (B) holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal (C) holding a de novo statutory appeal hearing in the court of common pleas cures any defects in the departments notice of suspension (D) holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review (E) recognizing de novo standard of review
Output: (C)
or entity. See Grantham v. Blount, Inc., 683 So.2d 538, 541 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (stating ssenKrupp or any other defendant. B. A “John Doe” Petition Does Not Toll Limitations As To An Unknown Defendant. Because “John Doe” was not a misnomer for ThyssenKrupp or any other defendant, Riston named an unknown defendant. ThyssenKrupp asserts that a petition which fails to identify the defendant does not toll limitations. We agree for several reasons. 1. No Texas Statute Generally Authorizes A “John Doe” Petition To Toll Limitations As To An Unknown Defendant. The Texas Legislature has not generally authorized a plaintiff to initiate suit and toll limitations by suing an unknown defendant as “John Doe” or any other fictitious name. See Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, 812 (Tex.Com.App.1922) (<HOLDING>); see also Grantham, 683 So.2d at 540-41 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing there is no authority to proceed against unknown persons in the absence of statute (B) holding that there is no spousal exception to the statute (C) recognizing the legitimacy of a passon defense in the absence of any statute (D) holding that there is no right of recovery against individual defendants under the ada (E) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify
Output: (A)
536 U.S. 822, 122 S.Ct. 2559, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), and Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir.1999) can be interpreted as standing for the proposition that students, regardless of age and level of education, have a diminished expectation of privacy given the tutelary nature of being a student. I strongly disagree. Drug testing was found to be constitutional in Earls, Vemonia, and Miller because the individuals affected were children that happen to be high school students. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 824, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (“The need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use provides the necessary immediacy for a school [drug] testing policy.” (emphasis added)); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (<HOLDING>); Miller, 172 F.3d at 582 (holding random drug 
 Holding statements: (A) holding high school which allowed student secular noncurricular activities to meet on school property was required to provide equal access to a christian student group (B) holding that student has no fundamental right to participate in high school athletics (C) holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights (D) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver (E) holding drug testing high school student athletes was constitutional
Output: (E)
has made good faith efforts to repay the loan; (3) whether the Debtor filed for bankruptcy for the sole reason of discharging student loan debt; (4) whether additional facts and circumstances such as a medical condition, employability and the like weigh in favor of a hardship discharge. Anelli, 262 B.R. at 8. This Court added: In considering these and other factors, the Court acknowledges that the First Circuit has suggested, though in dictum, that the “hardship alleged ... must be undue and attributable to truly exceptional circumstances, such as illness or the existence of an unusually large number of dependents.” TI Federal Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 927 (1st Cir.1995); see also Lohman v. Connecticut Student Loan Found. (In re Lohman), 79 B.R. 576, 581 (Bankr.D.Vt.1987) (<HOLDING>). At the same time, the Court must balance the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court (B) holding that where the board of immigration is permitted to reopen proceedings in exceptional circumstances its decision not to reopen a case is unreviewable because there are no statutory regulatory or caselaw definitions of exceptional circumstances  and  thus no manageable standard to apply on review (C) recognizing that this special circumstances exception is very narrowly limited  and that only on rare occasions does a case present such circumstances (D) holding that such a threat would not supply exceptional circumstances (E) holding hardship is discovered in the rare case based on exceptional circumstances
Output: (E)
and misunderstanding of the local rules involving summar he district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment. See Hesling v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.2005). The Sangis did not provide the district court with clear and convincing evidence that FCC engaged in fraud or other misconduct or that any misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case. See Gov’t Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1995). Rather the Sangis offered only allegations of fraud and misconduct. Nor have the Sangis shown exceptional circumstances to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants (B) holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances (C) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (D) holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances (E) holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay
Output: (E)
serve an important countervailing interest. See 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236. “Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Id. Abstention is appropriate where an action presents difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import which transcend the result in the case before the court. See Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (“Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.”); La. Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-30, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1959)(<HOLDING>); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 316-35, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (B) holding that pursuit of a parallel state court lawsuit involving claims and parties common to the federal action does not justify the district courts intervention in state court proceedings (C) holding that the district court had discretion to stay declaratory judgment action where parallel proceedings presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues were underway in state court (D) holding that a federal action was properly stayed pending the outcome of parallel state proceedings where the action involved a matter of state policythe scope of eminent domain powers of municipalities under state law (E) holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law
Output: (D)
514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995); Williams, 110 So.2d at 658; Jackson v. State, 403 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So.2d 466 (Fla.1982). See also, Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674 (Fla.1995) (similarity is not always a prerequisite to admissibility), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1096, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996); Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413 (Fla.1993) (explaining that other crimes, whether factually similar or dissimilar to the charged crime, are admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a matter of consequence other than bad character or propensity). The victim testified that the defendant was upset, that he grabbed her hair, dragged her into the apartment and beat her until she lost consciousness. The defendant, how 3d DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we find that the probative 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prior battery was admissible to prove defendants intent to injure (B) holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute (C) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery (D) holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime (E) holding that  2a22b2b requires intent to injure
Output: (A)
978 S.W.2d 612, 618 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) (considering apartment complex and neighborhood surrounding complex). Finally, Barton’s contention that Whataburger’s earlier employment of a security guard on the weekends proves the foreseeability of the robbery is unavailing. “The mere act of taking preventative measures to protect against the possibility of future crime is not the same as foreseeing that criminal activity.” Allen, 158 S.W.3d at 67. If we equated preventative measures to foreseeability, we would “virtually eliminate the foreseeability requirement for a negligence claim against a person who installs a security system or takes other preventative measures to guard against crime.” Id.; accord Stewart, 214 S.W.3d at 665; Garcia, 203 S.W.3d at 437-38 (<HOLDING>). Applying the Timberwalk factors of proximity, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable (D) holding that targeted murder committed on premises of sonic restaurant was not foreseeable result of sonics failure to employ security guard (E) holding that murder committed by minor gang members was not foreseeable result of sale of alcohol to gang members
Output: (D)
about all eight incidents and several relevant dates. He also advised Toledo that he was “working on additional information * * * to add [to] and clarify [his] complaint.” J.A. 61. Toledo claims that he never received any further information from Crawford. The Department dismissed Crawford’s complaint on August 7,2012, for a purported failure to contact an EEO Counselor within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory events. Crawford took the optional step of appealing that decision to the EEOC. The EEOC affirmed the dismissal on December 13, 2013. C Three months later, Crawford filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work envi . 389, 405-406, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) (<HOLDING>). That approach is consistent with how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in accordance with other circuits that an intake questionnaire may serve as a charge of discrimination if the circumstances of the case demonstrate that the charging party manifested the intent to activate the administrative process (B) holding that based on plain language in box 2 plaintiffs intake questionnaire could not be construed as timely eeoc charge (C) holding that plaintiffs filing with the eeoc constituted a formal charge because the plaintiff attached a statement to the filed intake questionnaire that included a request for the agency to act (D) holding an intake questionnaire to constitute a charge under the adea upon application of the manifestation of intent test although the eeoc did not consider the questionnaire to be a charge and the aggrieved person subsequently filed a formal charge (E) holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date
Output: (C)