niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
that during the recess, Corenthia bawled and screamed for between three and five minutes “at the top of her voice, ‘He didn’t have to do it. She had so much to live for.’ ” Defense counsel stated that although the jury was not present in the courtroom during this outburst, the conduct occurred in the area of the courtroom adjacent to the jury room, and that, therefore, the jury was very likely to have heard what transpired. The trial judge promptly denied the motion for mistrial. The jury then returned to the courtroom, and Corenthia’s testimony continued. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the judge charged the jury on, inter alia, murder and involuntary manslaughter. At defense counsel’s request, he also gave a King charge. See State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1939) (<HOLDING>). After the jury had been deliberating for just 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court should instruct the jury that if they had any reasonable doubt as to whether unlawful killing was murder or manslaughter it was jurys duty to convict defendant of the lesser offense manslaughter (B) holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was if error harmless (C) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (D) holding that the defendant who was charged with felony murder was not entitled to a lesser included instruction on manslaughter because manslaughter is neither a lesser included offense nor an inferior degree crime with respect to felony murder (E) holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter
Output: (A)
in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 Rutgers L.Rev. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Simmons, Can Winston Save Us ] (describing these searches as qualitatively different than ordinary searches, and thus requiring higher constitutional standards). These searches are all so invasive of privacy or dignity that courts have held that the government must show more than the standard requirement of probable cause in order to obtain a warrant. Id. at 550, 560 (“[W]hen a search technique is extraordinarily intrusive, the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment could impose extra limitations ....”); see, e.g., Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (stating a higher-than-probable cause standard for no-knock warrants); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a compelled surgical intrusion into an individuals body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be unreasonable even if likely to produce evidence of a crime (B) holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted (C) holding that ijnadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence (D) holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence (E) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence
Output: (A)
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11(b)(1)(A), 300aa-11(c)(1)(A); see also Schafer, 20 F.3d at 7; Head v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 26 Cl.Ct. 546, 547 n. 1 (1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 318 (Fed.Cir.1993). In this case, neither Plaintiff alleges to have “suffered a relevant injury ... after he or she received a vaccine.” Nor have Plaintiffs asserted any claims in a representative capacity. Therefore, the Vaccine Act’s requirement that petitioners file a Program petition prior to a lawsuit does not bar Plaintiffs from filing the instant action against the Vaccine Manufacturers. See Schafer, 20 F.3d at 5 (explaining that the Vaccine Act’s tort suit ban does not apply to individuals who cannot file petition in the Vaccine Court except in a representative capacity); Head, 26 Cl.Ct. at 550 (<HOLDING>); McDonald v. Lederle Labs., 341 N.J. Super. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mother who neither owned vehicle in question nor had control over her daughter could not be liable as a matter of law for damages caused by daughters negligent driving (B) holding that an amendment by a plaintiff to allege a claim in her representative capacity as adminis trator of estate under federal law related back to claims brought in her individual capacity under state law such an amendment was not equivalent to the commencement of a new cause of action so as to subject the amendment to the statute of limitations (C) holding that an award to a mother in her individual capacity in an action arising from vaccinerelated injuries received by her daughter did not bar the daughters subsequent action under the vaccine act (D) holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother (E) holding that trial court properly terminated fathers obligation to support his seventeenyearold daughter who refused to live with father but instead chose to reside in her own apartment after her mother moved out of state where daughter offered no justifiable reason for not living with her father daughter only contended that her stepmother was too neat for her and that she wanted to live closer to her friends
Output: (C)
for highly compensated employees than for other employees. Exhibit “A” to Appellee’s Answer Brief (emphasis added). Clearly, the I.R.S. determination letter does not inquire into the operation of the Profit Sharing Plan and, in fact, limits its own applicability in that regard. Therefore, since the Bankruptcy Court below, did not consider evidence regarding operational aspects of the Profit Sharing Plan, and instead relied upon the favorable I.R.S. determination letter, the Bankruptcy Court committed reversible error. This issue shall be remanded back to the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether, in light of the Debtor’s operation of the Profit Sharing Plan, such Plan is qualified under Internal Revenue Code § 401(a). See e.g., In re McDonald, 100 B.R. 598 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). While this Court understands the lower 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language (B) recognizing that benefit plans must designate a fiduciary to serve as the plan administrator (C) holding that since favorable irs determination letter does not express an opinion as to the plans current operation plan is not exempt (D) holding that an erisa insurers declaratory suit seeking a favorable interpretation of a standard policy clause against a party having no obligations under the plan was not an action to enforce the plan terms (E) holding that attorneyclient privilege was not waived when a letter sent by an irs regional counsel to the doj requesting legal services was copied to other irs personnel involved in the investigation
Output: (C)
innocently touched the truck’s passenger-door handle during that limited time, in that limited geographical area, while the truck was in the possession of one of the assailants. The truck was a movable object, and it is reasonable to conclude that, rather than touching the truck as he entered the truck during the aggravated robbery, appellant instead later encountered the truck and touched it at that time. There is simply no way to determine when or where appellant touched the truck even during that discrete time and limited area. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, as the State’s evidence failed to exclude every other reasonable conclusion but that of appellant’s guilt. See Standridge v. State, 310 Ark. 408, 837 S.W.2d 447 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we reverse and dismiss. Reversed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a thumbprint on an easily movable cup found beside a tent that was located six to fifteen feet away from marijuana plants was insufficient to prove that the defendant was manufacturing marijuana as there was no evidence suggesting when or where the defendant touched the cup (B) holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana (C) holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea (D) holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement (E) holding that evidence that the defendant lived in a home where marijuana was being cultivated was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession
Output: (A)
discussed, Plaintiffs’ claims and alleged injuries are educational based, and the fact that Plaintiffs contend that the current educational plan is sufficient does not render exhaustion futile. At its heart, this dispute is about a failure to sufficiently provide a public education to Justin and the adverse educational consequences of that failure. Requiring Plaintiffs to proceed under the IDEA’S administrative process in such a case is not futile. See Charlie v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch., 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir.1996) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (“Both the genesis and the manifestations of the problem are educational; the IDEA offers comprehensive educational solutions; we conclude, therefore, that at least in principle relief is available under the IDEA.”); N.B., 84 F.3d at 1379 (<HOLDING>); Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (B) holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court (C) holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face (D) holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court (E) holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages
Output: (E)
in the New York state courts. There is little easelaw on. the burden a plaintiff must meet to show that they can not raise t he availability of an Article 78 proceeding is not relevant to the Court’s Anti-Injunction Act and Younger abstention analysis, and (2) under the current case law in New York, the Plaintiffs ability to litigate their federal disability claims in the state court eviction proceeding is “more theoretical than real”, and that they have met their burden of showing that the state court is unlikely to hear their federal disability claims for purposes of Younger abstention. 1. As to the Availability of an Article 78 Proceeding The Defendants contend that, because the FHA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims can be raised in an Article 78 upp.2d 686, 688 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(B)(2)); Sokoya v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court (B) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts  (C) holding there is no statutory requirement that a taxpayer exhaust administrative remedies before filing a complaint in the tax court (D) holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim (E) holding that because the fha explicitly provides that an aggrieved party does not need to exhaust parallel administrative remedies provided through hud before commencing a federal action it would seem logical that if an aggrieved party does not need to exhaust hud remedies before filing a federal action he or she should not have to exhaust local remedies
Output: (E)
exculpatory DNA evidence would prove his innocence under Article 64.03(a)(2)(A).”). 55 . In Whitaker v. State, 160 S.W.3d 5 (Tex.Crim.App.2004), we held that testing blood found on the gun used as the murder weapon and finding that it did not belong to the defendant in a case involving three conspirators would not be exculpatory since the blood could have belonged to the victim or one of the other co-conspirators, or it could have been left on the rifle prior to the murder. Id. at 9. 56 . See, e.g., Prible v. State, 245 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("without more, the presence of another person's DNA at the crime scene would not constitute affirmative evidence of the appellant’s innocence” requiring relief under Chapter 64); Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). 57 . Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 60. 58 . Tex.Code 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of another persons dna if found on hair cigarette butt and bloodstained bath mat collected from crime scene does not constitute affirmative exculpatory evidence (B) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (C) holding that the state has no affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence (D) holding that a new trial was necessary due to the petitioners counsels failure to seek dna testing on hairs gathered from the crime scene (E) holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence
Output: (A)
not be expected to endure it. Finally, this Court has also held that mere termination of employment will not support an emotional distress claim, but if “the manner of termination evinces circumstances of oppressive conduct and abuse of a position of authority vis-a-vis plaintiff, it may provide grounds for the tort action.” Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 296, 576 A.2d 441, 448 (1990); see also Goosens v. AT&T Corp., No. EP-00-CA-002-DB, 2000 WL 33348222, at *3 (W.D.Tex. April 3, 2000) (simply terminating an employee without more cannot amount to IIED). Dulude’s allegations, taken as true, fail to demonstrate that FAHC’s actions during the actual grievance procedure and termination process were extreme and outrageous. See Crump, 154 Vt. at 296-97, 576 A.2d at 449 (<HOLDING>). This Court has held that absent at least one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident (B) holding that there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury on an iied claim when an employee with eighteen years of service was summarily fired after being falsely accused of theft kept in a three hour meeting with no opportunity to leave or eat lunch and badgered to sign a confession (C) holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable (D) holding that a confession was voluntary despite the fact that an officer falsely told the defendant that physical evidence connected him to the crime (E) holding that the jury should determine whether an employee eating lunch in a hospital cafeteria was within the course and scope of employment where factual disputes arose as to whether he was eating lunch in a place required or encouraged by his employer whether other employees regularly ate there and whether the employee had a choice in where to eat lunch
Output: (B)
of certain extraordinary circumstances, (2) the presence of willfulness, bad faith, or fault by the offending party, (3) the efficacy of lesser sanctions, [and] (4) the relationship or nexus between the misconduct drawing the [default] sanction and the matters in controversy in the case.” Halaco Eng’g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 380 (9th Cir.1988). In addition, the court may consider the prejudice to the moving party as an “optional” consideration where appropriate. Id. This multi-factor test is not “a me , 591 (9th Cir.1983) (upholding dismissal where the district court determined that “the deliberate deception and irreparable loss of material evidence justified the sanction of dismissal”); William T. Thompson Co. v. Gen’l Nutrition Corp., 593 F.Supp. 1443, 1456 (C.D.Cal.1984) (<HOLDING>). Given this requirement of extraordinary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding reversal required where party lacked an opportunity to present evidence on the issue before sanctions imposed (B) recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents (C) holding that the constitutional right to present a defense is not violated by the exclusion of a defendants proffered evidence where he is otherwise given the opportunity to present his defense and crossexamine the key prosecution witnesses (D) holding that default and dismissal were proper sanctions in view of partys willful destruction of documents and records that deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to present critical evidence on its key claims to the jury (E) holding that the failure to investigate and present the confession of a third party deprived defendant of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense
Output: (D)
§ 240(c). Thus, unlike section 166i, when a person dies, the distribution of that person’s property must, at a minimum, invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 15 V.I.C. § 167 (administration of an estate in a summary manner). The Legislature has outlined in detail the duties of a executor or administrator in administering an estate and the process by which a creditor should seek to satisfy his claim, all under the guidance and review of the Superior Court. See 15 V.I.C. § 394; 15 V.I.C. § 240(c). Theref early identical statute — section 115.325 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, which requires a creditor to present his claim to the executor or administrator before filing an action with the court — to be non-jurisdictional. Balthrop v. Berryman, 96 Ore. App. 354, 772 P.2d 955, 956-57 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Stevens v. Scanlon, 248 Ore. 229, 430 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12b6 because as a matter of law complaint faded to present an issue for trial (B) holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act (C) holding that a failure to accommodate claim is separate and distinct from a claim of discriminatory treatment under the ada and pointing out that a failure to accommodate claim and a claim of discriminatory treatment under the ada are not like or reasonably related to one another and one cannot expect a failure to accommodate claim to develop from an investigation into a claim that an employee was terminated because of a disability (D) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (E) holding that although section 115325 is nonjurisdictional failure to present a claim to the estates executor or administrator constituted an insufficiently pleaded complaint for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim citing meissner v murphy 58 ore app 174 647 p2d 972 973 1982
Output: (E)
pending causes of action to avoid surprise or prejudice to the Association. They also acknowledged during oral argument before this Court that the same legal reasoning applies to their declaratory judgment and to the questions submitted to the jury. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. If a trial amendment to add a request for declaratory relief is not prejudicial or a surprise because it involves the same legal reasoning and evidence and does not change the nature of the case, then it cannot at the same time serve as a non-duplicative basis for the recovery of attorney’s fees. For these reasons, this ease falls squarely within the rule that a party cannot use the Declaratory Judgments Act as a vehicle to obtain otherwise impermissible attorneys’ fees. MBM Fin. Corp., 292 S.W.3d at 669 (<HOLDING>). Because the declaratory relief awarded by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding property owner not entitled to award of attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because his declaratory judgment counterclaim did not present any issues beyond the homeowners associations cause of action (B) recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act (C) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (D) holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action (E) holding attorneys fees waived in lawsuit brought under declaratory judgments act to interpret statute
Output: (B)
him his constitutional right to counsel by permitting counsel to withdraw and by adjudicating the claims presented in his pro se PCRA petition. He cites testimony from a previous hearing conducted on August 30, 2012, during which Appellant expressed his desire for counsel and the PCRA court categorized some of his pro se arguments as “unintelligible.” N.T., Aug. 30, 2012, at 11. According to Appellant, if his pro se petition was unintelligible, the court had a constitutional duty in this capital case to appoint qualified counsel so that the issues could be identified more clearly, rather than proceed to address and reject them as presented, resulting in a complete denial of counsel. See Brief for Appellant at 17-18 (citing Commonwealth v. Padilla, 622 Pa. 449, 80 A.3d 1238, 1253 (2013) (<HOLDING>); and Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel (B) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (C) holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial (D) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (E) holding that a conviction will generally be vacated for a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel only where the reliability of the trial has been undermined but prejudice is presumed where the defendant suffers a complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of trial
Output: (E)
constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic’s lien determines only that mechanic’s lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic’s lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (“We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.”); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable 
Output: (B)
L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). 50 . See In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 246 F.R.D. 428, 432 (S.D.N.Y.2007). 51 . See DCL §§ 270-281. See also Drenis, 452 F.Supp.2d at 428. 52 . 452 F.Supp.2d at 428 (quoting Shelly v. Doe, 249 A.D.2d 756, 671 N.Y.S.2d 803, 805 (3rd Dep’t 1998)). 53 . See Club Protector, Inc. v. Peta, No. 01 Civ. 0337, 2002 WL 1020782, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2002). 54 . See BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 10 Civ. 8630, 2011 WL 3847376, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). 55 . See Countered. § 38 ("Coleman is the inventor and true owner of United States Patent Number D616-635 as well as trademark rights related to the subject matter of the '635 patent”). 56 . See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 283, 292, 832 N.Y.S.2d 873, 864 N.E.2d 1272 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 57 . In re Chateaugay Corp., 156 B.R. 391, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that electronic records may be subject to a claim for conversion (B) holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information (C) recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records (D) holding that where defendant retained possession of and deprived plaintiff access to business records a claim for conversion was properly stated (E) holding complaint was not based on a conversion claim but was a declaratory judgment action thus not governed by conversion statute of limitations
Output: (A)
insured.”). If so, the court asks whether the suppositions that underlay the insured’s expectation were reasonable, from the perspective of the insured, allowing the insured a great deal of latitude and taking into account the insured’s personal characteristics and experiences. See id. If the subjective expectation of the insured cannot be ascertained, the court asks whether a reasonable person, with background and characteristics similar to the insured, would have viewed the resulting injury or death as substantially certain to result from the insured’s conduct. See id.; Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456. Courts applying the federal common law of ERISA have used a number of slightly different verbal formulations to describe the objective portion of the inquiry. See, e.g., Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456 (<HOLDING>); Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088-89 (stating a court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that substantive issue of liability may be litigated in the same action for wrongful death and survival actions (B) holding that manifest intent exists when a particular result is substantially certain to follow from the employees conduct (C) holding that a subjective expectation of survival is objec tively reasonable if death is not substantially certain to result from the insureds conduct (D) holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment (E) holding that plaintiff in survival action bears burden of proving that death was not instantaneous although a few seconds survival constitutes sufficient amount of time to vest accrual of cause of action
Output: (C)
or the Commission’s considered decision to impose a sentence at or near the maximum authorized only on those offenders who have engaged in three or more felonies. Instead, it allows the draconian effect of § 4B1.1 to reach even two-time offenders, in effect, redefining career offender status. Third, treating these sentences as separate also has implications for the reality and the appearance of fundamental fairness in sentencing. While an offender “has no substantive right to a particular sentence,” the Supreme Court has recognized that the “procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence” does implicate due process concerns. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977); see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948) (<HOLDING>). And those concerns are triggered where the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that concerns for officer safety warrant criminal history check during traffic stop (B) recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on false criminal history (C) holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (D) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category (E) holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category
Output: (B)
salary of $275 per week for 55 hours, he is entitled to receive the $275 for a 55-hour workweek plus a statutory overtime premium for each of the 15 hours he worked in excess of 40. 2 . It also appears that the majority may place the burden on Appellants to prove the nonexistence of such agreements. See ante, at 461 ("There is simply no evidence to support the firefighters’ contention that they did not agree for their annual pay to include an overtime premium.”). But, in fact, the City bears the burden of proving the existence of the agreements because the City is attempting to use the agreements to justify its exclusion of a portion of Appellants’ wages in determining Appellants’ regular rates. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(e)(5); cf. Clark v. J.M. Benson Co., 789 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The City correctly conceded as much at oral 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employer bears the burden of proving applicability of flsa exemptions (B) holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider ftca claim (C) holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances (D) holding defendant bears the burden of proving an accord and satisfaction defense (E) holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury
Output: (A)
DEPRIVED JET URBAN OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT JET URBAN DID NOT SUBSTANTIATE ITS CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE ABATEMENT AGREEMENT. We have carefully reviewed the record and we conclude that these contentions are clearly without merit, R. 2:11— 3(e)(1)(E), and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Small in his oral opinion. The City had the right to tax the addition. Plaintiff contends that the City taxed the abated property through the device of an excessive assessment of the addition. Thus, the core of plaintiffs position is the contention that the addition, which the City had the right to tax, was overassessed. The remedy for that contention is a tax appeal. See Tru Urban Renewal Corp. v. City of Newark, supra, 11 N.J.Tax at 70 (<HOLDING>); see also N.J.S.A. 40:55C-65 providing that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that challenge to tax exemption could not be pursued solely on taxpayer basis because it did not involve expenditure of tax funds (B) holding that the granting or denial of an urban renewal tax exemption is reviewable by tax appeal (C) holding that in some rcases there is an adequate remedy at law for an attack on an illegal or unconstitutional tax through the tax appeal board (D) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (E) holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption
Output: (B)
(petition for clemency-under Washington state law is not an application for “state post-conviction or other collateral review” and therefore does not toll the statute); see also Moore v. Cain, 298 F.3d 361, 366-67 (5th Cir.2002) (state court mandamus application requesting trial court be directed to rule on state habeas application is not application for collateral review with respect to prisoner’s conviction, and does not toll one-year limitation period), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1236, 123 S.Ct. 1360, 155 L.Ed.2d 202 (2003); Hodge v. Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir.2001) (finding no basis for equitable tolling where petitioner sought discovery through state mandamus proceeding, rather than timely filing habeas petition); Johnson v. Lewis, 310 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125-26 (C.D.Cal.2004) (<HOLDING>). Thus, this Court finds no basis to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim (B) holding that such a dismissal may provide grounds to equitably toll the statute of limitations for a second habeas petition (C) holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations (D) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations (E) holding petition for writ of mandate seeking return of property does not toll the statute of limitations
Output: (E)
Maria de Jesus Romo Orozco, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 782 (9th Cir.2003). The BIA acted within its broad discretion in denying Romo Orozco’s motion to reopen because she failed to present evidence that she was eligible for relief, given that she has no qualifying relative. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Ordonez, 345 F.3d at 785 (<HOLDING>). Although the BIA construed her motion as both 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied (B) holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing (C) holding that motion to reopen must establish prima facie case demon strating reasonable likelihood that requirements for relief have been satisfied (D) recognizing that bia may deny motion to reopen where movant has not established prima facie eligibility for relief sought (E) holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen based on its finding that the movant has not established his prima facie eligibility for relief
Output: (A)
attention deficit disorder. I see these patients for their regular medical problems and provide their primary medical care. [Emphasis added.] Dr. Rushing’s report and curriculum vitae show that he was (a) actively and currently practicing medicine at the time it was written, (b) has actually treated and was currently treating patients being prescribed Adderall specifically for ADD, and (c) is board certified in internal medicine. Thus, he meets the requirements set forth in section 74.401(a) and (c) for being qualified to render an opinion as to the standard of care applicable to the treatment of a person diagnosed with ADD and being prescribed Adderall. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.401(a), (c); Terry A. Leonard, P.A., 293 S.W.3d at 677; cf. Barber, 303 S.W.3d at 795-96 (<HOLDING>). Appellants contend that because Dr. Rushing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a written report drafted by a person who is not properly qualified as an expert may not be considered as summary judgment evidence (B) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (C) holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider (D) holding that anesthesiologist who had participated in numerous similar surgeries and had observed proper padding and positioning technique as part of surgical team was qualified to provide expert report as to standard of care applicable to general surgeon (E) holding anesthesiologist qualified to opine on conduct of surgeon in health care liability claim because anesthesiologists report tied his education training and experience to the specific alleged breach  the positioning and padding of a patient during surgery not the conduct of the actual operating techniques
Output: (D)
standing against the need for confidentiality before proceeding to an automatic in camera review of the materials”). Indeed, the court might decide that releasing the records in a redacted form while editing out any privileged or confidential subject matter is appropriate. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 488-89, 591 A.2d 921. However, a “mere summary of the record is inadequate * * * where a more complete record reflecting the underlying facts is available and the plaintiffs need therefore outweighs any threat disclosure may pose to the public or private interest.” Id. at 489, 591 A.2d 921. III We first observe that plaintiff has a sufficient interest under the common law to request access to public records. See South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 496, 591 A.2d 921 (<HOLDING>); Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 258 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that newspaper had a sufficient interest under the common law to request access to minutes and related documents of governmental meeting held in executive session (B) holding that council discussion in executive session of whether to appeal did not violate the open meeting law given that ultimate decision to adopt ordinance to meet the objections of trial court was made in public (C) recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents (D) holding that the first amendment right of public access does not extend to nonjudicial documents compiled during an executive branch investigation (E) holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision
Output: (A)
article” and the government does not adequately address the application of GRI 2(a) in the context of this matter. The Explanatory Notes (which are not binding) to GRI 2(a) state that GRI 2(a) does not “normally” apply to products of Section VI of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which includes Chapter 32. 1 Explanatory Notes 2. Ms. Walsh, the Customs officer responsible for classification under heading 3215, conceded that this does not mean “not ever.” Walsh Dep. Tr. 140:3-141:13. Her recollection was of a “shampoo before it[ ] had a color and the fragrance from the manufacturer” added, which was considered “an unfinished shampoo, but it had all the characteristics of a shampoo.” Id. at 140:13-18. Cf. Aceto Chemical Co., Inc. v. United States, 59 C.C.P.A. 212, 465 F.2d 908 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Other courts have also apparently determined 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (B) holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment (C) holding that an imported unfinished shampoo mixture contained the essential elements that impart the function of shampoo even though water perfume and coloring agents were added after importation (D) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (E) holding that coming to work regularly is an essential function
Output: (C)
general assets of his estate for distribution to the beneficiaries.” Id. at 22-23, 145 S.E. 2d at 357. The Court reiterated this view in the case of In re Edmundson, 273 N.C. 92, 159 S.E. 2d 509 (1968), where it held that such a policy was “unquestionably” an asset of decedent during her lifetime and an asset of her estate upon death, and that the potential right of the administrator of decedent’s estate against the insurance company was a chose in action, an intangible asset. Id. at 95, 159 S.E. 2d at 511-12. In accordance with the rationale of the foregoing cases, the Court has also held that a hospital-expense policy with an insurance company is an asset. Graham v. Insurance Co., 274 N.C. 115, 161 S.E. 2d 485 (1968). See also In Re Scarborough, 261 N.C. 565, 135 S.E. 2d 529 (1964) (<HOLDING>). This decisional authority compels us to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (C) holding that a cause of action for wrongful death is an asset of an estate (D) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child (E) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge
Output: (C)
to use the latter route to circumvent Congress’s apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1998). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the new restrictions on successive petitions do not prevent a petitioner from bringing a § 2241 claim after he has already brought a § 2255 claim. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). Furthermore, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that a § 2255 petition that followed a § 2241 petition was not barred. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1998), citing Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1 the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition”); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Corrao, 152 F.3d at 191 (“a motion under § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (B) holding that a petition under  2241 attacks the execution of a sen tence while a  2255 petition attacks the validity of a judgment and sentence (C) holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a  2241 petition (D) holding that  2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence (E) holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that  2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement
Output: (C)
(D.P.R.2006) ("The motion as to preliminary injunction is DENIED as the Court considers that the preliminary in-junctive relief in this case, being one to determine likelihood of success and there being no 'smoking gun’ evidence, precludes the Court, at this stage, from deciding issues of credibility, weighing of evidence, and issues of motive and intent in order to determine the required injunctive criterion of ‘likelihood of success.' The Court is of the opinion that the described issues are outcome determinative to be made by the jury.”); Franklin v. Ciroli, 865 F.Supp. 940, 947 (D.Mass. 1994) (Tauro, J.) (citing Spencer Co., 489 F.2d at 707); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 1988 WL 159936, *4, No. 88-0033-S, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16427, at *11 (D.Mass. Dec. 29, 1988) (<HOLDING>). See also Waldmann Lighting Co. v. Halogen 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the district court is not bound by its prior factual findings determined in a preliminary injunction hearing (B) holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases (E) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated
Output: (E)
a “particularized need and likely relevance” as justification for the conduct of discovery beyond the local units which made the decision to terminate. Id. at 1085. See also, Brown v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., 939 F.2d 946, 954 (11th Cir.1991) (“Unless it is clear that nationwide practices are relevant, discovery should be confined to the local units of a corporation.”) The Sixth Circuit has recently applied Earley’s approach to corporate-wide discovery in a Title VII case: It is well-settled that information concerning an employer’s general employment practices is relevant even to a Title VII individual disparate treatment claim. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); EEOC v. Roadway Express Inc., 750 F.2d 40 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>) A plaintiff who must shoulder the burden of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim (B) holding that plaintiff states a cause of action under  1981 by alleging that defendant harassed and retaliated against him for filing eeoc claim and otherwise attempting to receive redress for disparate treatment (C) holding that statistical evidence that was too broad to support a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment was nevertheless admissible in plaintiffs individual disparate treatment case but noting that a valid statistical analysis must encompass the rel evant labor market (D) holding that a patternorpractice claim is not available to individual plaintiffs although patternorpractice evidence may be relevant to proving an otherwiseviable individual claim for disparate treatment under the mcdonnell douglas framework (E) holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions
Output: (A)