niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
or justify its action. If the aggrieved party is not then satisfied, the matter shall be submitted to the American Arbitration Association for final and mutually binding resolution by it including the award of damages or other relief. Peoples Security, 867 F.2d at 810 n. 1. The court held that this language was broad enough to encompass a claim of fraud in the inducement of the agreement. Id. at 813-14. In so holding, the court reversed the determination by the district court that the arbitration clause in question was not broad enough to cover the fraudulent inducement claim. The Peoples Security court cited with approval several cases from other jurisdictions construing language similar to that contained in the Alamria/Telcor Contract. See e.g., S.A. Mineracao, 745 F.2d at 192 (<HOLDING>) (second alteration in original); Life of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract (B) holding that a clause requiring arbitration wjhenever any question or dispute shall arise or occur under this agreementcontract was sufficiently broad to cover a claim of fraudulent inducement (C) holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause (D) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad (E) holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation
Output: (B)
other forms of damages as well, including “the ‘lost’ value of services such as companionship and care ... and the loss of advice, guidance and counsel.” Id. at 607, 902 A.2d 238 (citing Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 4, 424 A.2d 210 (1980)). The proper measure of damages in a wrongful death action is the deprivation of a reasonable expectation of a pecuniary advantage that would have resulted by a continuance of the life of the deceased. Curtis, supra, 83 N.J. at 569, 417 A.2d 15 (internal quotation and citations omitted). A wrongful death action can only be brought for the benefit of a decedent’s heirs. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-4. The action is commenced by either an administrator ad prosequendum of the decedent or an executor, if the decedent die , 537 N.Y.S.2d 26, 533 N.E.2d 1055 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The only other consideration of the issue by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal estate tax credits that the decedent would have received had he lived longer could not be recovered in a wrongful death action absent express legislative authority (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (C) holding that the loss of prospective federal estate tax credits as a consequence of an insureds premature death is not an element of damages under the florida wrongful death act (D) holding that premature payment of estate taxes was not a recoverable loss in a wrongful death action because the test is a measurement of benefits of pecuniary value that the decedent might have been expected to contribute to the surviving spouse and children had the decedent lived (E) holding that a cause of action for wrongful death is an asset of an estate
Output: (A)
jurisdiction before the November 7, 2007 hearing. The Agreed Order indicated that each party agreed to the terms of the order “to the extent permitted by law” and that the trial court "finds that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties.” 4 . The Agreed Order dismissed S.L.'s petition with prejudice. 5 .Subsequent temporary orders entered by the trial court stated that J.W.L. "filed an answer and although duly and properly notified, did not physically appear at the hearing and wholly made default.” Nothing in the record before this court suggests that at the time of the hearing J.W.L. had filed any "answer” to Grandparents’ pleadings other than . See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. at 2063-64. 13 . See Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 168 n. 8 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). 14 . M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549 (emphasis 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim (B) recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights (C) holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother (D) recognizing that while proceeding is not technically termination of parental rights action it may have such effect where mother without adequate transportation lives some distance from son and existence of visitation rights likely will be insufficient to allow her to have a substantial role in her childs upbringing (E) holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father
Output: (D)
that the allegations of sexual abuse or molestation and also being photographed by Bracigliano in a sexual manner are sufficient aggravating circumstances which, if accompanied by a permanent posttraumatic stress disorder, which is substantial, constitutes a “permanent loss of a bodily function” even without residual physical injury. Id. at 413, 696 A.2d 625; see also C.P. by J.P. v. Township of Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 293 N.J.Super. 421, 430-31, 681 A.2d 105 (App.Div.1996) (suggesting that a minor who had been subjected to an act of sexual contact by a swim instructor could cross the verbal threshold, provided plaintiff demonstrates a permanent psychological disability resulting from the molestation); A.C.R. by L.R. v. Vara, 264 N.J.Super. 565, 571-72, 625 A.2d 41 (Law Div.1992) (<HOLDING>). However, we agree with the Board that if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury (B) holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages (C) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (D) holding that sexual assault of a minor resulting in psychological harm may be compensable under the tca even in the absence of personal injury (E) holding that sexual assault coercion and harassment certainly may violate contemporary standards of decency and cause physical and psychological harm
Output: (D)
of benefits in 1989 established a "pattern” of benefit increases such that the Plan's later rescission of the 1999 Benefits Increase, which was adopted ten years after the 1989 increase, violated the anti-cutback rule. We find this argument to be without merit as a matter of law. 18 . Thornton also alleges that the Board breached its fiduciary duty by favoring one class of Plan participants over another class, specifically by eliminating the 1999 Benefits Increase for pre-February 1, 1999 retirees while maintaining it for Plan participants retiring on or after that date. Thornton waived this argument on appeal, however, by waiting until his reply brief to address the issue, rather than raising it first in his opening brief. United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 19 . 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) states in relevant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited (B) holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived (C) holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived (D) holding issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court (E) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court
Output: (D)
a " 'white rock substance,' " distinguished the substance from powder cocaine, and agreed that crack was " 'vernacular slang for cocaine base’ ”); United States v. Lawrence, 471 F.3d 135, 139 (D.C.Cir.2006) (affirming a conviction where police witnesses testified that the substance was a "large white rock substance” and that the sale “followed conventional practices for the sale of crack cocaine," and where an undercover officer testified that the defendant gave him the substance in response to his request to buy crack). 6 . , The Johnson court cited the opinion in United States v. Eli, which noted a DEA chemist’s testimony that the concentration of cocaine base in crack cocaine is typically at least 50-60%. 437 F.3d at 75 (citing Eli, 379 F.3d at 1021); see also Eli, 379 F.3d at 1021 (<HOLDING>). 7 . Powell noted that a characteristic of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under  856 where premises contained two white envelopes containing thirtytwo packs of crack cocaine equipment required for the manufacture and packaging of crack cocaine fortyone white envelopes containing particles of crack cocaine and crack cocaine stored in a laundry bag in the bathroom (B) holding two prior convictions for distribution of crack relevant to show intent to distribute the crack found in defendants possession (C) holding admissible police officers expert testimony that seized cocaine of eightythree percent purity would be cut with lactose to achieve lesser purity prior to streetlevel distribution (D) holding that purity of 3644 did not disqualify a drug as crack in light of the chemists testimony that he had previously tested crack of lowerthantypical purity (E) holding that the defendants prior distribution of crack was admissible to prove that he had intent and knowledge regarding crack found in a gym bag
Output: (D)
we next ask whether the City offered a nondiscriminatory reason for his termination and, if so, whether Adair has showed that the City’s non-retaliatory reason is pretext. As previously discussed, the City has offered ample evidence that Adair was physically unable to perform his duties as a firefighter given his lifting restrictions. Indeed, his own doctors concluded that he could not perform the duties of a firefighter. Adair’s inability to perform a firefighter’s duties constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his termination. See Buckner, 760 P.2d at 806-07 (offering “the employee’s inability to perform the assigned duties” as an example of a non-retaliatory reason for discharge); Keddington v. City of Bartlesville, 42 P.3d 293, 298 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the City satisfied its burden. At this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once the employees temporarytotaldisability period has ended and the employee is determined to suffer some permanent physical disability which prevents the discharge of assigned duties for the employer the employer bears no  341 liability for then terminating the employee under  341c (B) holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate (C) holding that an employer who has determined that the employee had not been under a disability can discipline that employee for subsequent unexcused absences and not violate section 510 (D) holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury (E) holding that after the employer determined the employee was not disabled the employer had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the employee for unexcused absences under section 510
Output: (A)
the harassment,” Murray, 57 F.3d at 250. As the Second Circuit has recognized, “not every response to a complaint should take the form of discharge;” even a mere written warning can be an appropriate response if it conveys the message that further harassment will not be tolerated. Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63; see also Torres, 116 F.3d at 639 (“[R]esolution will vary from case to case.”). By far the best evidence that Metro-North’s response was effective is that plaintiff has not been sexually harassed by Chapman or any other Metro-North employee since meeting with Ms. Gormley-O’Connor, see Wahlstrom Dep. at 30, 248, nor has Chapman been accused of accosting any other employees since returning from his suspension, see Chapman Dep. at 64, 279; Sinigiani Dep. at 49; cf. Murray, 57 F.3d at 251 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, while factual issues exist as to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination (B) holding that where the plaintiffs allegations concerning a hostile work environment consist of facts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint such a claim is timebarred (C) holding that allegations of failure to remedy a hostile work environment provided no basis for relief where the evidence demonstrated that the harassment had ended by the time plaintiffs complaint was filed (D) holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment (E) holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment
Output: (C)
Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 444-45 (3d Cir. 1987)). 20 . Doc, No, 97 (Petition) at 15. Although Petitioner states that his Certificates of Completion for these courses are attached to his Petition as "Exhibit A,” no such exhibits appear on the docket, Nonetheless, the Court takes as true' Petitioner's allegation that he has completed a number of educational courses while incarcerated. 21 . 562 U.S. 476, 481, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011). 22 . Although the Third Circuit affirmed Petitioner's convictions on Counts 1-11, Petitioner’s sentence on those counts was reduced from 360 to 235 months on resentencing. See Doc. Nos. 68, 95 (Judgment and Amended Judgment). 23 . See United States v. Renfro, Criminal No. 08-93-ART-CJS-2, 2017 WL 1416869, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2017) (<HOLDING>); McCullough v. United States, No. 12-1214, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice (C) holding that federal court cannot review claim procedurally defaulted in state court absent showing of either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (D) holding that request for resentencing based on pepper was not cognizable in a  2255 proceeding absent a showing of a complete miscarriage of justice (E) holding that pepper did not allow petitioner to seek a resentencing under  2255
Output: (D)
cite Nance in his Rule 104 brief. Our conclusion is buttressed by the original trial court’s use of its discretion in handling the Cyco evidence, the Iowa Supreme Court’s independent review of the issue on appeal, the PCR court’s thorough and well-reasoned discussion of the issue, the district court’s analysis denying habeas relief, and the overwhelming evidence against Pfau. We are confident the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the limited evidence abou *4 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov.16, 2001) (unpublished) (concluding “evidence of a victim’s gang membership is not inherently prejudicial” in a “case where no evidence was introduced regarding the defendant’s membership in a gang”); State v. Allen, No. 98-2012, 2000 WL 767686, at *2 (Iowa Ct.App. June 14, 2000) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Instead, Nance announced that “evidence of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting police reports in civil case under publicrecords exception (B) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in its admitting extraneous evidence to rebut a defensive theory (C) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence (D) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes (E) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony
Output: (C)
during custodial interrogation, the accused “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Thus, the police “ ‘may not reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted [this] right to counsel.’ ” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485,101 S.Ct. at 1885). However, nothing e of counsel during custodial interrogation on a limited basis that still permits some police questioning. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 525-26, 107 S.Ct. 828, 830, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Further, a suspect may also validly choose to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a suspect may invoke his miranda right to counsel only with respect to written statements while still permitting verbal statements without qualification (B) holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel (C) holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt (D) holding that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel police may still legitimately inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (E) holding that statements given after miranda warnings are admissible even when the arrest that preceded the statements was constitutionally deficient
Output: (A)
the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP § 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) (“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 (“[R]egistrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... ”). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is “specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise.” TMEP § 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
Output: (D)
years. At the time that this statute was amended and New Jersey’s death penalty legislation was enacted, both effective August 6, 1982, the Legislature and the Governor expressly stated that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b provided for mandatory minimum sentences for all convicted murderers not sentenced to death. New Jersey courts have consistently held that N.J.S.A 2C:11-3b imposes a thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence on non-capital murderers. In State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the statute required the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of thirty years in the absence of a death sentence. Id. at 154-55, 524 A.2d 188. That position has been reaffirmed in numerous cases. See State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 511, 651 A.2d 19 (1994) (<HOLDING>); accord State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 320, 590 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced (B) holding that a defendant found guilty of murder not by his own conduct is subject to imprisonment of at least a thirtyyear mandatory term (C) holding that when the defendant was misadvised when entering his guilty plea that he would not have to serve a mandatory parole term following his release from prison fundamental fairness required limiting the term of his sentence to that which comported with the plea bargain (D) holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  (E) holding that the statute is mandatory
Output: (B)
791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant consideration is whether the justifications underlying the issuance of the injunction refer to the content of the restricted ex pression. See id. (examining content neutrality of local ordinance and concluding that “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others”). Contrary to Scott’s contentions, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an injunction is content-based simply because it restricts only the speech of anti-abortion protestors. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the purpose of the modified 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that injunction at issue did not restrict the expression of those demonstrating in favor of abortion rights was justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion rights and noting that the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the courts original order (B) holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination (C) recognizing that a court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would interfere with the rights of those who are not parties to the action (D) holding as moot appeal from circuit court injunction prohibiting abortion where abortion performed during appellate stay (E) recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality
Output: (A)
misrepresentations as to loss of clothing, frozen beef, and washcloths and towels voided any claim under insurance policy); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Cox, 110 Wash.2d 643, 757 P.2d 499, 502 (1988) (material fraud as to personal property losses resulting from fire voided entire policy so that insured was not entitled to any recovery). But see Johnson v. South State Ins. Co., 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793, 794-95 (1986) (fraud as to contents of house does not void recovery for loss of dwelling and additional living expenses, even though “[a]n overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold that any fraud or misrepresentation as to any portion of property under an insurance policy voids the whole policy”); Northern Security Ins. Co. v. Hatch, 165 Vt. 383, 683 A.2d 392, 396 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we also conclude the district 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the majority rule (B) recognizing that majority of decisions give effect to concealment and fraud conditions to void entire policy but declining to apply where policy language is ambiguous (C) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect
Output: (B)
rely on a warrant to search a house where the warrant affidavit stated that there was marijuana growing near the house and that there was a road from the house to the marijuana). Of course, the information in the affidavit does not eliminate the possibility that the marijuana came from somewhere else. The affidavit states that the trash was found at the end of a lane that dumped out into a rural highway. Admittedly, the trash could have been flung out the window of a passing car, or it could have fallen off the back of a garbage truck. However, when it comes to probable cause, the name says it all; certainty is never required, only a fair probability. When the issue is one of good-faith reliance, even less is necessary. See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The affidavit must simply bear some indicia 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that magistrate must have substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists (B) holding that plaintiff was required to plead and prove the absence of probable cause to support his bivens claim (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question (E) holding that leon requires a less demanding showing than the substantial basis threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place
Output: (E)
“One who asserts an uncompensated taking claim must first establish that a vested property right is affected.” Id. at 787-788. “Without a property right, a plaintiff has no basis for challenging a statute on the ground that it constitutes a confiscatory taking without due process of law.” Id. at 788. A vested property right is an interest that is more than a mere expectation. Id. Rather, it requires a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” Berkowitz v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 127 Mich App 556, 563; 339 NW2d 484 (1983). In this case, although plaintiff might have had an expectation that his education, examination results, and experience would enable him to obtain a residency and ultimately a full license to practice medicine, that is not a vested property right. See id. at 562-563 (<HOLDING>); Nolan, 151 Mich at 655 (“We conclude that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution (B) holding that the inmate had no cognizable due process claim because he had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation (C) holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest (D) holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest (E) holding that the appellant had no property interest protected by due process in obtaining a psychology license because he did not have a legitimate claim to being licensed pursuant to the rules promulgated under the former psychologist registration act
Output: (E)
file were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The trial court should consider the nature of the requested documents, the reason the documents were prepared, the relationship between the preparer of the document and the party seeking its protection from discovery, the relationship between the litigating parties, and any other facts relevant to the issue. See Haynes, 597 So.2d at 619. The discoverability of such documents may differ depending on the circumstances of the case. Documents obtained by an insurer where its own insured is the claimant against it (first-party claim) may well be treated differently from documents obtained by an insurer from its insured where the potential claimant is a third party. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 n. 2, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>); accord Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship (B) holding that a thirdparty providers claim against insurer for promissory estoppel was not preempted by erisa because the thirdparty provider was not bound by the terms of the erisa plan (C) recognizing fundamental distinction between firstparty and thirdparty situations and imposing fiduciary duty upon insurer to protect its insureds interest in thirdparty situations (D) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (E) holding that a plaintiff who had asserted no claim against a thirdparty defendant lacked standing to complain of the courts action with regard to the thirdparty defendant
Output: (C)
Therefore, the magistrate could not have relied on such information when making the probable cause determination. [¶ 23] When Utvick’s room was searched on June 1, 2002, the officer observed persons in the room attempting to dispose of drugs by flushing in the bathroom, after executing a search warrant without a no-knock provision. While Ut-vick is not alleged to have engaged in this activity, Utvick was the registered guest of the hotel room and was in the company of persons suspected of disposing of evidence. Prior history of destruction of evidence, when detailed in an affidavit for a no-knock search warrant, is not a threshold requirement but may strengthen probable cause to believe evidence will be destroyed. Cf. Mazepink v. Arkansas, 336 Ark. 171, 987 S.W.2d 648, 655 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Henderson, 629 N.W.2d at 624 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant (B) holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant (C) holding noknock search warrant unreasonable because no exigent circumstances existed and noting moreover there was no evidence  the occupants may have attempted to destroy the evidence  by flushing it down the toilet (D) holding that officers may detain the occupants of a vehicle while executing a search warrant (E) holding no liability existed under the circumstances
Output: (C)
and held that a failure to do so amounted to ineffectiveness of counsel warranting the grant of a new trial. A review of our case law prior to the Brooks decision, however, indicates that this Court had declined to evaluate ineffectiveness claims alleging the failure to prepare based solely on the existence or duration of counsel’s pretrial face-to-face consultation with the defendant. See Harvey, 812 A.2d at 1196-97 (rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for consulting with defendant for only one hour prior to trial where defendant failed to allege any issues that counsel should have raised or any beneficial information that his counsel would have discovered had further pretrial consultations been held); Commonwealth v. Mason, 559 Pa. 500, 741 A.2d 708, 715-16 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Porter, 556 Pa. 301, 728 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels limited pretrial consultation with defendant did not render him ineffective because defendant did not identify issues that should have been raised and the defendants ability to convey pertinent information to counsel was impaired due to his severe intoxication at the time of the offense (B) holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different (C) holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings (D) holding that the defendant did not show prejudice to support ineffective assistance of counsel because any evidentiary error was harmless (E) holding counsels strategic decision not to present a voluntary intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel determined the murder was not committed while floyd was under the influence of cocaine
Output: (A)
Hughes refers us to, is KRE 403, which permits the exclusion of relevant evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.” Here, to be sure, as the majority observes, the hospital picture does not depict Ashley dressed as she was when Hughes met her in November 2008 or with make up as she may have been wearing at the time but the fact that the picture does not depict those details did not prejudice Hughes. He was free to argue, as his counsel did argue, that the hospital photo did not represent Ashley’s appearance on the night of their encounter. That argument goes, not to the admissibility of the photo evidence, but to its weight, a matter properly addressed to the jury. See, United States v. White Calf, 634 F.3d 453, 460 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 451 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that the defendant had stalked threatened and assaulted the victim his exgirlfriend was evidence as to the nature of the defendants relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive (B) holding in a very similar underagesex case that a school photo of the victim taken three months after the alleged crime plainly was relevant to the defendants mistakenage defense and did not prejudice the defendant because he was free to challenge the weight of the photo evidence by arguing that it did not show the victim as she had appeared on the night in question (C) holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction (D) holding that the photo lineup was not unduly suggestive where the defendants photo was the only one that included his name (E) holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind
Output: (B)
Chief Judge. John Ross appeals a summary final judgment dismissing his suit against his former employer, Jim Adams Ford, Inc., in which he alleged a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. See § 760.10(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (prohibiting employers from discharging employees based upon handicap). We affirm because the statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1993), bars this action. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). Although Mr. Ross was required to file an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute creating the maryland human relations commission did not grant the commission power to make monetary awards for compensatory or other damages particularly in the absence of any statutory guidelines or limitations (B) holding fouryear statute of limitations in section 95113f applies to claims under florida civil rights act when commission on human relations fails to make reasonable cause determination within 180 days (C) holding fouryear period for statutory actions applies to section 440205 claims (D) holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days (E) recognizing a fouryear statute of limitation for fraud claims
Output: (B)
needed to object when appellant asked this court to look at and consider the DVD; appellant first requested this in her appellate brief, not in the motion to supplement. 7 . In fact, neither party contends, and we are aware of no authority so holding, that an in-court demonstration is reviewable on appeal only if captured on video. 8 . Rule 602 provides in relevant part: "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness.” TEX. R. EVID. 602. 9 . Rule 701 provides as follows: "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences 82) (<HOLDING>); McGuire v. Nelson, 162 Mont. 37, 508 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not plain error for the district court to admit an experts testimony that it was his opinion that approximately 200000 worth of cocaine was possessed with intent to distribute and not for personal use (B) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available (C) holding it was error to admit similar type knife allegedly found on plaintiff when it was not made clear admission was solely for illustrative purposes and therefore was prejudicial (D) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (E) holding that statement was stray remark where it was consistent with the context in which it was allegedly made
Output: (C)
the detectives’ tactics were intended, and did in fact implant fear of prosecution for a more serious offense of murder and also induce hope of leniency. Defendant was promised that if he confessed, he may be able to continue his plans to attend community college. Additionally, unlike in Barnes, Defendant was in custody at the time of his interrogation. Barnes, 154 N.C. App. at 117, 572 S.E.2d at 170. Because the interrogation tactics utilized by detectives rendered Defendant’s statement involuntary, the trial court appropriately determined that Defendant’s statement was inadmissible. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. Judge ELMORE concurs. Judge BRYANT concurs with separate opinion. 1 . The Stale also cites State v. Shelly, 181 N.C. App. 196, 204, 638 S.E.2d 516, 522 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 84, 558 S.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process is violated if evidence of prior bad acts goes only to character and there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from it internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that bankruptcy is no exception to the due process principle that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party to or to which he has not been made a party by service of process internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that waiver of counsel may be valid absent an inquiry by the court where the surrounding facts and circumstances including the defendants background and conduct demonstrate that he actually understood his right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation and knowingly and intelligently waived his right internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that trial court appropriately found that no promises or offers of reward were made where a defendant was told that if he wanted to help himself that he could help himself by cooperating internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that no improper promises were made where an interrogating officer told a defendant that i can tell you that a person who cooperates and shows remorse and is honest and has no criminal background when it goes to court has the best chance of getting the most leniency because he cooperated internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (E)
authority to consent even if he did not. Because we hold that Reed had actual authority to consent to the search, there is no need for us to determine whether the officer’s conduct was justified by Reed’s apparent authority. We leave the apparent-authority doctrine to be further developed in a case in which its application is, unlike here, determinative of the outcome. Conclusion Because he possessed actual authority over the appellant’s bedroom, Reed had the power to consent to a search of the appellant’s bedroom. The search of the appellant’s bedroom was, therefore, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and, as there are no other points of error requiring remand, we affirm the judgment of the 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (B) holding that it is unreasonable to search individuals who are in the same general area as someone being searched under a valid warrant without something more to establish probable cause (C) holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid (D) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (E) holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes
Output: (B)
district court correctly concluded, Fisher has not shown that the state court findings are unreasonable, unsupported, or otherwise erroneous. Indeed, they are supported by competent evidence. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any indication that the state court treated the MAR in a haphazard or careless fashion and, on the contrary, it appears that Fisher was afforded much latitude in developing his claims and the evidentiary bases behind them. Finally, to the extent the state court’s order, whether from the bench or in writing, could be considered summary in nature, we have consistently rejected such attempts to circumvent § 2254’s requirement that we accord deference to the state court’s application of clearly established law to the facts found. See e.g., Weeks, 176 F.3d at 259 (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 157 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the brecht standard applies on federal collateral review even after passage of the aedpa (B) holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court (C) holding that the aedpa standard of review applies even where the state court has given no indication of how it reached its decision (D) holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion (E) holding that aedpa only applies where the state court adjudicated the constitutional issue on the merits
Output: (C)
81 did not have a traffic control device posted indicating any restrictions or prohibitions for travel. (Notes of testimony, 10/6/05 at 11-12; trial court opinion, 12/14/05 at 3 n. 4.) Without such a posting, appellant claims the trial court erred in finding her guilty of the violation when she was not properly afforded notice of the restriction. ¶ 5 The parties have not cited and we have been unable to discover any legislative history regarding the statute in question. We are thus presented with a preliminary issue of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is an issue of law over which we exercise plenary review. Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 584 Pa. 244, 247, 883 A.2d 479, 481 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Dellisanti, 583 Pa. 106, 112 n. 8, 876 A.2d 366, 369 n. 8 (2005) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 6 In interpreting a statute, we are guided 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (B) holding that this court may address an issue not ruled on by the trial court if it presents a question of law and all the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented (C) holding that statutory construction is a question of law which this court reviews de novo (D) recognizing that what this court had treated as an issue of sufficiency actually presented a question of statutory construction (E) holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury
Output: (D)
during the commission of a first degree assault. 5 Augustine’s fails to cite any relevant case law supporting the contention that a deadly weapon under 14 V.I.C. § 297(2) cannot include a firearm. 6 Augustine argues that the trial court erred in not defining “public place” to the jury. Augustine, however, failed to raise this issue at trial, and the trial court’s failure to define the term “public place” did not constitute plain error. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (<HOLDING>); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court did not err by failing to consider amended petition filed after hearing without leave of court (B) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (C) holding trial court did not err in failing to define manufacture (D) holding that trial court did not err (E) holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing
Output: (C)