niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
would violate the restrictive covenant, which can be enforced by both the IVGID and private property owners within the 1968 property. The restrictive covenant specifies that the beaches are to be “held, maintained and used by [IVGID] ... only for the purposes of recreation by, and for the benefit of,[the 1968 property] owners and their tenants .... ” Although there have been some de minimis exceptions, the beaches have been used almost exclusively by owners and tenants of the 1968 property. That only a limited set of property owners may access the beaches for limited, non-expressive purposes also weighs against finding the beaches to be a traditional public forum. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682-83, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992) (<HOLDING>). With de minimis exceptions, the “actual use 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an airport terminal is not a public forum partly because port authority management considered the principal purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of passenger air travel not the promotion of expression (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding since the sidewalk is a nonpublic forum the regulation must be reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speakers view (D) holding a violation of the travel act (E) holding no violation of the travel act
Output: (A)
This changed with the adoption of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”). In FACTA, Congress amended the FCRA by, inter alia, defining credit for purposes of the statute as amounting to a particular kind of debt: “the right granted by a creditor to a debt- or to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor.” See Pub.L. No. 108-159, § 111, 1955 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d)). By defining credit as a “right ... to defer payment,” FACTA indicates that a § 1681b(a)(3)(A) “credit transaction” is a transaction in which the consumer directly participates and voluntarily seeks credit. Accord Stergiopoulos v. First Midwest Bancorp, Inc., 427 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Not all “debt” involves a “credit 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step (B) holding that a credit transaction is not a consumer debt when it is incurred with a profit motive (C) recognizing statutory credit (D) holding that the government agency was engaged in the collection of an account under 15 usc  1681ba3a and therefore had a permissible purpose for obtaining the credit report (E) holding that  1681ba3a applies only if the con sumer initiates a credit transaction
Output: (E)
his resignation to the DOE. (Id. ¶ 67, 74.) These contentions may carry weight at a later stage of this case. The allegations summarized earlier, which must be assumed as true on a motion to dismiss, however, are sufficient to show that school officials had actual notice of, but failed to investigate or stop Van Amburgh’s sexual harassment of students long before Plaintiffs mother approached Fournier and Salzman. Although the actions Defendants took after the mother’s complaint may eventually defeat Plaintiffs § 1983 claim, it can be sufficiently inferred from the pleadings that school officials exhibited a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of their students by their earlier failure to investigate and supervise. Cf. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 907 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The court will deny Defendants’ motion to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where plaintiff actually told her supervisors that she was being sexually harassed and the supervisors did not take any steps whatsoever to investigate those allegations (B) holding that plaintiffs allegations that coworker attempted to grab her breast and later touched and rubbed her thigh that customers made sexually threatening remarks and that supervisors did not respond to her complaints about these incidents did not support a hostile work environment claim (C) holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient (D) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (E) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment
Output: (A)
of the Property exceeds principal, interest and actual, reasonable attorney’s fees, the Trustee will be entitled to recover the difference from SB & T. On the other hand, if the actual value of the Property does not exceed principal, interest and actual, reasonable attorney’s fees, judgment will be for SB & T. The parties are directed to contact chambers to set the date for an evidentiary hearing. IT IS ORDERED. 1 . It is not clear that sending the notice under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 is required for an overse-cured creditor to recover actual, reasonable attorney’s fees only. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. ELL 11, LLC, 414 B.R. 881, 884 (M.D.Ga.2008) (awarding attorney’s fees to creditor who failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11); In re Amron Techs., 376 B.R. 49, 51 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2 . In Welzel, the Eleventh Circuit allowed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding for oversecured creditor despite failure to comply with ocga  13111 (B) holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits (C) holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice (D) holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions (E) holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order
Output: (A)
omitted.) State v. Cole, 50 Conn. App. 312, 330-31, 718 A.2d 457 (1998), aff'd, 254 Conn. 88, 755 A.2d 202 (2000). In a civil case, the appellant has the burden of establishing the specific harmfulness of the error by demonstrating the likelihood that the evidentiary ruling had affected the result. Constantine v. Schneider, 49 Conn. App. 378, 393, 715 A.2d 772 (1998). We conclude that the introduction of hearsay during Lenes’ testimony was harmless. The court, in its memorandum of decision, did not rely on any evidence introduced during Lenes’ testimony that had not been introduced by either the plaintiff or Reddick, and the defendant does not explain how Lenes’ testimony affected the court’s decision. See Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 276, 282, 587 A.2d 1056 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant failed to preserve error because it did not present appellate complaint to trial court (B) holding absence of record harmless when hearing was not evidentiary and appellant failed to argue harm (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (E) holding that error harmless because appellant failed to identify any specific harm from improper introduction of evidence
Output: (E)
payments not later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the plan or the order for relief, whichever is earlier....” 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). Although the bankruptcy court did not identify § 1326(a)(1)(A) or § 1307(c)(4) as the statutory basis for dismissal during the April 16, 2014 hearing or in the Dismissal Order, we can discern that the court was referring to those provisions when it stated: “This statute says once you file a plan, thirty days later you have to commence your payments.” Bankruptcy courts within this circuit have long held that a debtor’s failure to make payments to the chapter 13 trustee as required by § 1326, “by itself, is grounds for dismissal.” In re Jones, 174 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr.D.N.H.1994); see also In re Kaspar, 60 B.R. 658, 659-60 (Bankr.D.R.I.1986) (<HOLDING>). Courts beyond this circuit agree. See, e.g., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment (B) holding that debtors breach of his obligation to make payments to the trustee under his proposed plan without good cause independently   constitutes grounds for dismissal (C) holding that where plaintiffs alleged that the plan suffered significant losses and requested that fiduciaries make good to the plan the losses to the plan they need not seek to recover for all plan participants allegedly injured by the fiduciary breach (D) holding that debtors failure to pay postconfirmation taxes pursuant to terms of court order constituted cause for dismissal as a lack of good faith (E) holding on an objection to confirmation of plan that the debtors failure to file tax returns before filing the chapter 13 plan and debtors failure for six months to comply with federal law constituted a lack of good faith sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case
Output: (B)
in the litigation whenever state policies or procedures are at stake. This commonsense observation of the State’s real interest when its officers are named as individuals has not escaped notice or comment from this Court, either before or after Young. See, e. g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 846-847 (1824) (stating that the State’s interest in the suit was so “direct” that “perhaps no decree ought to have been pronounced in the cause, until the State was before the court”) (Marshall, C. J.); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 114, n. 25 (1984) (noting that Young rests on a fictional distinction between the official and the State); see also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the suit in Young, which sought to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (C) holding california school district a state agency for purposes of the eleventh amendment (D) recognizing the irony that a state officials conduct may be considered  state action for fourteenth amendment purposes yet not for purposes of the eleventh amendment (E) holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment
Output: (D)
the theory that it tended to prove the criminal ‘system’ of [the defendant].” Id. at 914. The court required the extraneous offense to be “so nearly identical in method to the charged offense as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused.” Id. at 914-15 (internal quotations omitted). The similarity required to prove a “defendant’s system” naturally is high because the extraneous offense evidence is being used to show the defendant’s distinctive and idiosyncratic manner of committing the criminal acts. Id. We hold that it does not follow that an extraneous offense admitted to rebut the defensive theory of frame-up requires this same degree of exacting similarity between the extraneous and charged offenses. Cf. Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 492-93 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (En banc) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the facts in Wheeler do not support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense (B) holding extraneous conduct subsequent to the charged offense admissible (C) holding proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose required to show equal protection violation (D) holding that high degree of similarity between extraneous and charged offense used in cases proving modus operandi not required when purpose of proof is to show intent (E) holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense
Output: (D)
improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
Output: (A)
the probable cause finding, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674. Here, there was an ex parte prewarrant hearing during which Officer McGrew testified that Flake was convicted of child molestation in 1991. That was an untrue statement. McGrew misrepresented the age of the victim by stating that she was a minor when she was actually over the age of majority. McGrew misrepresented the circumstances of the offense by stating that Flake had forced the victim into his vehicle when, in reality, she had been hitchhiking and entered the vehicle voluntarily. McGrew ultimately misrepre sented the type of conviction by stating that it was child molestation whe d States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1360-62 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). We also hold that McGrew’s misrepresentations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits (B) holding that an agents omission of evidence that was readily available to him constituted a substantial preliminary showing of recklessness (C) holding that recklessness not merely the violation of a city ordinance must be shown for assault with a firearm conviction (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available (E) holding that misdemeanor violation of carrying an unlicensed firearm was sufficient without a showing of recklessness or negligence for an involuntary manslaughter conviction
Output: (B)
two separate legal insufficiency claims. When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge is one of “no evidence to support the finding.” See Creative Manufacturing, Inc. v. Unik, 726 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.). Where the party having the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding (failure to find), the proper complaint is that the fact was established as “a matter of law.” See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Company, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). Here, Tech filed a verified special denial that it received timely notice. Consequently, Lucero had the burden to plead and secure a finding on notice. See Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied)(<HOLDING>); see also Harrison v. Texas Department of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (B) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (C) holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice (D) holding that where the governmental unit filed a verified special denial that it received timely actual notice the plaintiff had the burden to prove and secure a finding on actual notice at trial (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice
Output: (D)
court order was in violation of the stay because, as the courts below concluded, it ordered Johnston to pay arrears or go to jail without focusing on Johnston’s non-estate property. See Johnston II, 321 B.R. at 275-80; Johnston I, 308 B.R. at 478, 480; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362. Sternberg recognized this but did not say anything to the appellate court because he did not think it was his duty “to practice law on [Johnston’s] behalf.” That did not, however, authorize him to act in violation of the automatic stay. To comply with his “affirmative duty” under the automatic stay, Sternberg needed to do what he could to relieve the violation. He could not simply rely on the normal adversarial process. See Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 615-16 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). At a minimum, he had an obligation to alert 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 11 sanction proceeding was exempt from automatic stay (B) holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor (C) holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay (D) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (E) holding that parties who attempted to exempt a debtor from their unlawful detainer action with a unilateral stipulation still violated the automatic stay because the stipulation might not have accompished its intended purpose and thus the parties could have and should have pursued the orthodox remedy relief from the automatic stay
Output: (E)
College to now come forward within the next ten (10) days with full payment of the unpaid principal, $862,-396.39, and unpaid and accrued interest of $38,793.70 as of this day, 05/14/91. Interest is accruing at a rate of $283,528 per day. FBIT’s Ex. #K. FBIT argues that this letter had the effect of accelerating the debt evidenced by the Note and triggering the Post Maturity Rate of sixteen percent provided for by the Note. A debtor’s failure to pay an obligation on the due date does not automatically mature the entire debt, despite the presence of an acceleration clause in the agreement. Capital City Motors, Inc. v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 363 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo.1962) (citations omitted). See also Josephson v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Group, Inc., 810 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). An acceleration clause does no more than give 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (B) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (C) holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death (D) holding that an automatic forfeitureupondefault clause does not mean a notice of forfeiture is not required in order to terminate a lease (E) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court
Output: (D)
its judgment after conducting an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed unless the record shows that it is contrary to the great weight of evidence. Ex parte McConathy, 911 So.2d 677 (Ala.2005). “The ore tenus rule does not, however, extend to cloak a trial judge’s conclusions of law or incorrect application of law to the facts with a presumption of correctness.” $3,011 in United States Currency v. State, 845 So.2d 810, 814 (Ala.Civ.App.2002). Section 20-2-93, Ala.Code 1975, provides for the forfeiture o g that 10-week delay between the seizure of property and the institution of forfeiture proceedings did not meet the promptness requirement of § 20 — 2—90(c)); Eleven Automobiles v. State, 384 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); Winstead v. State, 375 So.2d 1207 (Ala.Civ. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forfeiture proceeding instituted four weeks after seizure met the promptness requirement of the statute (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) holding that forfeiture proceeding instituted more than seven months after property was seized did not meet the promptness requirement of  202  93c (D) holding that forfeiture proceedings instituted eight months after the seizure of property failed to meet the promptness requirement (E) holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture
Output: (A)
story.” Id. The Court then admonished greater pre-termination procedural rights “would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id.; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (noting a federal court “is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies”). Here, Schwartz’s due process rights were fully accorded. Schwartz was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard: he was afforded a full evidentiary hearing, represented by counsel, cross-examined hostile witnesses, and presented evidence on his own behalf. Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545, 79 S.Ct. 968, 975, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Schwartz contends Commissioner Koshetz’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding us department of interior violated its own termination proceeding regulations when it denied employee the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses and failed to provide a specific statement of charges at disciplinary hearing (B) holding that a student has a right to counsel in a university disciplinary hearing where there is a pending criminal charge for the same incident but noting that the attorneys role at the disciplinary hearing is limited to safeguarding the students rights at the criminal proceeding and not to affecting the outcome of the disciplinary hearing (C) holding an inmate has a due process right to 1 advance written notice of the disciplinary charges 2an opportunity to call witness and present evidence and 3 a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action (D) holding that the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings (E) holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy
Output: (A)
(Rule 60(b) motion); Mehdipour v. Snowden, 162 F.3d 1173, 1998 WL 777397 (10th Cir. Nov.4, 1998) (unpublished op.) (motion to enjoin); Mehdipour v. City of Oklahoma City, 161 F.3d 18, 1998 WL 694527 (10th Cir. Oct.6, 1998) (unpublished op.) (Rule 60(b) motion); Mehdipour v. Oklahoma County Sheriff, 161 F.3d 18, 1998 WL 614448 (10th Cir. Sept. 4, 1998) (unpublished op.) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition); Mehdipour v. City of Oklahoma City, 145 F.3d 1346, 1998 WL 199648 (10th Cir. April 24, 1998) (unpublished op.) (Rules 59(e) and 60(b) motions); Mehdipour v. City of Oklahoma City, 131 F.3d 152, 1997 WL 748651 (10th Cir. Dec.3, 1997) (unpublished op.) (civil rights action). 2 . See, e.g., District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts (B) holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court (C) holding federal district courts do not have jurisdiction  over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state courts action was unconstitutional review of those decisions may be had only in this united states supreme court (D) holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts (E) holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case
Output: (C)
suggests, that at this point, the defense can say with assurance that third-party guilt cannot be advanced. That simply does not validate Mann’s prior conduct. At the very least, this case involves an appearance of impropriety. See RPC 1.7(c) (setting forth appearance of impropriety rule). Although debate is raging over the continued vitality of that concept in other contexts, it is a critical factor in a capital case, where public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings leading to the verdict is a paramount consideration. State v. Loyal, 164 N.J. 418, 430, 753 A.2d 1073 (2000) (observing that when appearance of impropriety is found in criminal matter, disqualification of attorney is regularly required); State v. Rivera, 232 N.J.Super. 165, 177-78, 556 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 169, 564 A.2d 885 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice (B) recognizing the conflict (C) recognizing conflict (D) holding that a conflict of interest independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel  constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioners right to pursue his  1 claim (E) recognizing that attorneys may be disqualified under conflict of interest rules where defendants right to counsel of choice is outweighed by need to preserve public confidence in judicial system
Output: (E)
violate the rule of Doyle by asking ... improper question^] in the presence of the jury” constitute prosecuto-rial misconduct, and that misconduct warrants reversal where it “may [have] so infec[ted] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102 (citation omitted). Because the district court sustained the Doyle objections, struck the one answer, admonished the jury to disregard that answer, and instructed the jury that “questions ... by lawyers are not evidence” and that “testimony that has been excluded or stricken or that you have been instructed to disregard is not evidence and must not be considered[,]” the prosecutor’s improper questions did not violate Lopez’s due process rights. See id. at 766, 107 S.Ct. 3102 (<HOLDING>). B. Jury Instruction — Burden of Proof Lopez 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (D) holding that there was no due process violation occasioned by the prosecutors attempt to violate doyle on closely analogous facts (E) holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred
Output: (D)
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation op erates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” The court elaborated on this principle in Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1975) as follows: “Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he (the suspect) can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requireme (1989) (<HOLDING>). In Commonwealth v. Peterson, C.C.P. Lehigh, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights (B) holding that defendants invocation of miranda rights is inadmissible to prove defendants sanity (C) holding that defendants request to call his mother to get an attorney was an invocation of miranda rights requiring that further questioning must end (D) holding that smith who was 15 years old could waive his miranda rights and his right to have an attorney or parent present during questioning by police (E) holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning
Output: (C)
to the federal district court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, and moved for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants argued, among other things, that Preston lacked a property interest in his volunteer position with the VFD. Preston rejoined he was a “fire code official” under the Code and IFC and could not be fired except after a hearing and upon a showing of just cause. In December 2009, the district court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed Preston’s case with prejudice. Preston filed a motion to reconsider, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 59, which the district court denied. Preston appeals. II. DISCUSSION Before considering the merits of Preston’s appeal, we briefly examine the latent issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting McAdams v. McCord, 533 F.3d 924, 927 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking (B) holding that even where subjectmatter jurisdiction may go unchallenged on appeal we have an obligation to inquire sua sponte into our jurisdiction over the matter (C) recognizing that even if neither party disputes this courts subject matter jurisdiction under 38 usc  7292 we are obligated to consider the issue sua sponte if there is reason to doubt that jurisdiction exists (D) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (E) recognizing every federal appellate court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction even if it must do so sua sponte
Output: (E)
case, such as we have here, makes intent a material issue and opens the door to admission of prior drug-related offenses as highly probative, and not overly prejudicial, evidence ola defendant’s intent.”) In applying the second prong of the Chavez test, the evidence of defendant’s prior 1998 convictions must be sufficient to support a finding that he actually committed the acts in question. As to the Cannabis conviction, the evidence consisted of a transcript of the plea, conviction and sentence. Certainly, the conviction itself is sufficient proof that he committed the pri- or act. “The fact that the conviction was based on a guilty plea is inconsequential. See United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1884, 76 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (<HOLDING>)” Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1332. The evidence as 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (B) holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial (C) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that appellants own statement admitting act even if mere puffery is sufficient to justify a jury finding that he committed the act for purposes of rule 404b
Output: (E)
OF ERROR LAGOA, Judge. Based on the State’s confession of error, we find that the record lacks competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s order requiring appellant to pay child support. The State concedes that the child support guidelines worksheet is not contained in the record and, accordingly, reversal is warranted. See Long v. Long, 916 So.2d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). We reverse and remand for an evidentiary 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing impact of child support guidelines (B) holding prior to adoption of child support guidelines that a credit was discretionary (C) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (D) holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 (E) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation
Output: (C)
1133 (2002); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 105 Wn. App. 41, 45, 17 P.3d 1266 (2001); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wn. App. 885, 893, 28 P.3d 823 (2001), review denied, 145 Wn.2d 1027, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 954 (2002). The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of showing that the agreement is not enforceable. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92, 121 S. Ct. 513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000). WLAD Requirements f 13 Relying on cases holding that an exclusive remedies provision in a collective bargaining agreement does not prevent employees from initiating civil suits in court for violations of the WLAD, Adler argues that the WLAD requires a judicial forum for discrimination claims of employees. See Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 577, 731 P.2d 497 (1987) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union (B) holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union (C) holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement (D) holding that a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate is binding upon individual employees even when dispute involves federal cause of action (E) holding that chapter 4960 rcw permits individual employees to pursue their rights under the wlad in court without first exhausting remedies in a collective bargaining agreement
Output: (E)
and honor, and integrity, and I resent this very much.!! You are In Contempt of EVERYTHING that I represent, and standby, and believe. OFFICIALLY: you were NEVER the “president” of anything.!! In an non-jury trial in November 1990, the district court found the defendant guilty of violating section 871 under an objective reasonable person standard for having made the above and other similar comments. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. After adopting the objective reasonable person standard already used by this Circuit, the Third Circuit analyzed a number of factors to reach its conclusion that the defendant’s comments were not protected political hyperbole like the comments made in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (<HOLDING>). These factors are helpful to this Court in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding utterance that if they ever make me carry a rifle upon being drafted into the us military the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was merely a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the president and was thus protected by the first amendment (B) holding that 18year old vietnam protestor who stated if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj did not violate  871 because the comment constituted political hyperbole protected by the first amendment (C) holding that with the commands of the first amendment clearly in mind a comment that the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj was political hyperbole which did not constitute a willful threat against the president (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment (E) holding that the following statement conditional in nature and made at a political rally was not a true threat if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man i want to get in my sights is lbj
Output: (B)
Instead, the cause of action pleaded on behalf of SEAI depends on “representational” standing, i.e., standing that relies solely on the status of SEAI as a representative of its members. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 1. An association invoking such representational standing “must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)); see also Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 18 CIT 754, 758, 861 F.Supp. 121, 126-27 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The complaint alleges that “SEAI is an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding mistake of fact exists where broker unintentionally and nonnegligently was unaware of the physical nature of the imported merchandise and customs relied on agent to enter good properly (B) holding that an association of licensed customs brokers has standing to challenge an interim customs regulation allowing consignees to make informal entry of certain low value merchandise (C) holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended (D) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over customs allegedly erroneous duty assessments because the importer failed to timely protest liquidation which thereby made the customs decision final and conclusive upon the parties (E) holding courts should interpret the contract using the references of the particular customs and usages of the trade of the parties to the contract
Output: (B)
interest exists here; the surety has a $75,000 financial obligation composed of two separate bail bonds. And there is also little question that there is a significant governmental interest here: the efficient operation of judicial and bail-bond systems and the need to ensure the attendance of defendants at court proceedings. We conclude that there was a complete failure to provide procedural safeguards to protect appellants’ interests in this case because of the failure of the administrator to provide any notice to appellants that the bond was initially forfeited. This failure to follow rule 702(e) meant that appellants never knew that defendant had absconded and issued a second bond without notice of the first forfeiture. Cf. McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Minn.App.1989) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1989). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim (B) holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice (C) holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay (D) recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance (E) recognizing in summaryjudgment context that party must show he was prejudiced by lack of notice or other procedural irregularities to prove he is entitled to relief from district courts ruling
Output: (E)
penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime”). Defendant argues that § 95.-ll(4)(c) should be held to apply to this action, and that it should be held time-barred thereunder. Upon consideration, it appears that the two-year limitations period is indeed, as argued by defendant, applicable to the instant case. McWilliams v. Escambia County School Board, 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981). McWilliams held that § 95.11(4)(c) provides the appropriate time frame for commencement of § 1983 employment discrimination actions, since an employment discrimination case filed in Florida is considered to be a suit for the recovery of wages, even though the plaintiff requests more than just back pay. Id. at 658 F.2d at 330; Cf. Williams v. Western Electric Company, 618 F.2d 1110, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>); Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (B) holding  95114c generally applicable to employment discrimination cases (C) holding that the contention that all employment discrimination cases should be analyzed as mixedmotive cases is meritless (D) holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination (E) holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii
Output: (B)
person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete. 1 . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(d), (f). 2 . See In re Revised Interim Policy on Elec. Release of Court Records, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC07-49 (Fla. Sept. 7, 2007) (providing revised interim policy for the electronic release of court records); In re Implementation of Report and Recommendations of the Comm, on Privacy and Court Records, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC06-20 (June 30, 2006) ("Admin. Order No. AOSC06-20”) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Statewide Standards for Elec. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that certain conditions including rule amendments must be met before goal of providing the public electronic access to court records can be achieved (B) recognizing derivative standing if the bankruptcy court determines that certain conditions exist and certain prerequisites are met (C) recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records (D) recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies (E) holding that electronic records may be subject to a claim for conversion
Output: (A)
that may be imputed to a governmental entity as the act of the entity's servant comes within § 893.80). ¶ 38. The principles of immunity for particular types of agents under Wis. Stat. § 893.80, as discussed in Kettner, should be read in harmony with the Lyons test and with the principles of governmental immunity enunciated in § 893.80(4). For example, the allegation in Lyons that the bridge was improperly designed by the governmental contractor, who undertook the design at the direction of the governmental entity, was the act of a § 893.80(4)-type agent because the governmental entity controlled the design choice and design choices are legislative or quasi-legislative functions. See Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 452-58; see also Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 39. However, if the allegation in Lyons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit (B) recognizing legislative or quasilegislative nature of design decision (C) recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision (D) recognizing that the decision to undertake a project or how to design the project may be immunized as the exercise of a legislative or quasilegislative function (E) holding that design professionals marking on pipe to indicate how it should be cut was a construction project within the meaning of a kansas statute similar to rcw 51240351
Output: (D)