niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Appellee argues that although he acknowledges receiving the notice of claim more than 60 days before the suit was brought, because appellant failed to notify him by certified mail, return receipt requested, the notice was somehow deficient. Appellee does not claim that he was harmed in any way by the failure to receive notice via certified, return receipt requested first class mail. We believe that appellant has fulfilled the primary purpose of the statute. See Netherland v. Wittner, 662 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.). Several other courts have held that when dealing with notice requirements, the technicalities of the method of service are not crucial when the purposes of the notice statute have been satisfied. See Netherlands 662 S.W.2d at 787 (<HOLDING>); Hill v. W.E. Brittain, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 803, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where appellant acknowledged timely receiving notice by regular mail appellant appeared and fully participated at the trial and appellant made no claim that he was harmed in any way appellee had fulfilled the primary purposes of texrcivp 21a (B) holding that if an appellee raises an argument not addressed by the appellant in its opening brief the appellant may reply  citation omitted (C) holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension (D) holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant (E) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement
Output: (A)
(Br. in Support of Defs.’ Mt. for Summ. J., 10.) Even if a home is being rented, governmental interference with a landlord's property right through padlocking can be a deprivation of. property without due process of law if there is no notice and no "extraordinary situation where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 at 53, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993), quoting Fuentes, id. Thus, the state court’s ruling that Ms. Habich was a landlord at the time of the padlocking does not affect analysis of the due process claim. 2 . See also City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 WL 35806 (2004) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose (B) holding that combating blight is a permissible public purpose and upholding the taking of property for that purpose even when the specific property taken is not in a blighted condition (C) recognizing that eontract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid (D) holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation (E) holding that where the sole purpose of the ordinance was to freeze property values so that the property could be subsequently acquired for a public purpose the walls of jericho must fall
Output: (B)
policy which required all patrons to order a drink if they wished to remain in the club); Taylor v. Bar MT LLC, Civ. A. No. H-09-481, 2009 WL 5195982 (S.D.Tex. Dec.22, 2009) (discussing only a 42 U.S.C. § 2000a claim, not the Plaintiff’s other 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, arising from allegations that the dress code at Bar MT was a pretext for racial discrimination); Mazloum v. District of Columbia Police Dep’t, 522 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C.2007); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (discussing the "full and equal benefit” clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (rather the "make and enforce contracts” clause), which does not necessarily implicate contractual rights). 6 . Excepting the Sixth Circuit decision in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, supra. 7 . See also Perry v. Burger King 924 F.Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. City of Boston, 738 F.Supp. 604 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc  1981 (B) holding in a title vii case but relying on  1981 cases that the issue is not the plaintiffs physical characteristics but whether he was discriminated against by other africanamericans because he was born black (C) holding that plaintiff stated a valid liberty interest claim where he contended that based on industry custom he was foreclosed from working at any savings and loan in the state where he had been denied a de facto license (D) holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation (E) holding that the plaintiff had stated a claim under 42 usc  1981 when he alleged that he was prohibited from using the restroom at a burger king after ordering and eating a meal because he was black
Output: (E)
616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
Output: (C)
right ... exists.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). Therefore, a plaintiff must identify and plead an independent contractual relationship, constitutional provision, federal statute, or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc) (“The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in order to come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.”). The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls upon the plaintiff. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also RCFC 12(b)(1). The May 12, 2009 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction resides with plaintiff (B) holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that plaintiff bears the burden to timely allege facts supporting equitable tolling (E) holding that the burden is on the party seeking to exercise jurisdiction by clearly alleging facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction
Output: (A)
Department Country Reports and other exhibits regarding country conditions in Senegal contained in the record; (3) the letter from a family friend introduced by Sene at his immigration hearing; and (4) a credibility determination regarding Sene’s testimony. The motion panel provisionally denied INS’ motion and ordered briefing to proceed on the merits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review final orders of removal. Factual determinations made by the BIA are reviewed to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir.1998). However, we must uphold the BIA’s findings of fact unless the evidence compels otherwise. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 3, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We summarily deny Sene’s request for relief 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice (B) recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law (C) holding that to reverse the bia we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion but compels it (D) holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion (E) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte
Output: (C)
members rather than the board as whole. 87 Ill.App.2d at 32-33, 42, 230 N.E.2d at 467-68, 472. The relevant statute required that all expenditures by a school board be approved at a meeting. Id. at 34, 230 N.E.2d at 468. Noting that the school district had the “general power to contract as it did,” including for “extras” added to a construction project, the court concluded that the contract was not ultra vires simply because the district had not followed the statute requiring full board approval. Id. at 42, 230 N.E.2d at 472. Instead, the district was estopped from refusing to pay, because it had permitted the contractor to perform the extra work and had accepted the benefits of that work. Id.; see also Mahoney Grease Serv., 85 Ill.App.3d at 582, 40 Ill.Dec. 708, 406 N.E.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). No Illinois case has directly considered the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning (B) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (C) holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city (D) holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se (E) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law
Output: (B)
facts submitted on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court determines that Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief may be resolved as a matter of law. “[District courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.” Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 678 (5th Cir.2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Because Defendant North Bay moved for summary judgment as to its counterclaim and dismissal of Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief, the parties were on notice to present arguments relating to both claims. See Apache Corp. v. W & T Offshore, Inc., 626 F.3d 789, 798 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In Luig’s complaint, “Plaintiff requests a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure (B) holding that defendant waived any objection to the accuracy of the presentence report by failing to object after having been given ample opportunity to do so (C) holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice (D) holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal (E) holding plaintiff had ample notice and opportunity to object to the scope of relief prayed for because defendant affirmatively requested dismissal of the complaint as a whole
Output: (E)
the back of the invoice that CDW sent BYS form “part of the contract unless ... they materially, alter it.” Iowa Code § 554.2207(2). Whether the Terms and Conditions materially alter the contract depends on whether the terms would result in “surprise” to BVS. Iowa Code § 554.2207, cmt. 4. Prior to this dispute, BVS and CDW entered into hundreds of transactions. Furthermore, prior to this dispute, BVS received the Terms and Conditions from CDW hundreds of times. See Harb Affidavit, CDW App’x at 245 (stating that every order confirmation',' ing that additional terms did not materially alter the parties’ contract because the parties had exchanged the . term's numerous times prior to the transaction at issue and, therefore, there was no surprise); Sudenga Indus., Inc., 894 F.Supp. at 1238 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court finds that the January 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fine print terms at the bottom of an invoice imposing attorney fees were not terms upon which the parties agreed and therefore did not become part of the contract (B) holding that agreement had been reached where the plaintiff had proposed terms for providing his services to the defendant and the parties then entered into a business relationship  despite defendants claim it never agreed to the plaintiffs proposed salary terms for that relationship (C) holding that possession was obtained when goods were received at the debtors facility and was not dependent on the contractual terms between the parties (D) holding that the plaintiff could not show surprise when the plaintiff had received the additional terms from the defendant prior to the agreement (E) holding that the terms on the back of an invoice sent after the parties entered into a contract were enforceable because the invoices were issued relatively contemporaneously with the shipment of goods  the parties dealings involved identical invoice provisions throughout the parties relationship  additional terms were found in the invoices that were not in the purchase orders and the plaintiff never exercised any opportunity to delete these additional terms
Output: (E)
535 Pa. 77, 82, 634 A.2d 192, 195 (1993). When defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Ms. Robinson regarding her being “on the run” with her fugitive husband, the trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible as Ms. Robinson was never convicted of a crime. Commonwealth v. Fuller, 336 Pa.Super. 507, 509, 485 A.2d 1197, 1198 (1984) (a witness’s credibility may not be impeached by prior acts of misconduct which have not led to convictions). Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting appellants’ cross examination. Nolen, supra. Appellants next argue that the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875, 75 S.Ct. 112, 99 L.Ed. 688 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Here, as part of its charge, the trial judge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the opportunity for positive identification is good and not weakened by prior failure to identify and the witness is positive in his identification even after crossexamination identification need not be received with caution (B) holding that witness had an independent basis to support incourt identification where the description made prior to any pretrial identification was substantially an accurate description of the defendant (C) holding that prior identification is not hearsay when the declarant is available at trial for crossexamination and that it makes no difference whether the witness admits or denies or fails to recall making the prior identification (D) holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial (E) holding that admission of a witness prior identification statement where the witness could not remember the basis for the identification did not violate the confrontation clause or fedrevid 802
Output: (A)
But the comparator must still be similar enough “to eliminate confounding variables, such as differing roles, performance histories, or decision-making personnel, [so as to] isolate the critical independent variable: complaints about discrimination.” Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi, 526 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir.2008) (second insertion in original) (quoting Humphries, 474 F.3d at 405). As Assistant Superintendent, Malito was directly under Simpson and he had many of the same responsibilities as Simpson. He even seemed to have “fraternized” with the same juvenile detainee that Simpson did. And we have tended to look more broadly for appropriate comparators when an employee holds an arguably unique job description. See McNabola v. Chi. Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 514 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But the Audit Report makes Malito far from 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney (B) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (C) holding that the maximum statutory damages available to plaintiffs under the fdcpa is limited to 100000 per plaintiff per proceeding (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that a per diem physician could be adequately compared to per diem attorneys in an organization with a limited number of per diem physicians
Output: (E)
taken together can be reasonably construed to be based on personal belief.” Id. at 1176-77 (citing Bess). We not only found that this constituted misconduct calling for the trial court to take corrective measures, but we also characterized the prosecutor’s conduct as “inexcusable.” Id. at 1177. Similarly, in United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1353 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Bess), we held: “It was improper for the prosecutor to state [in his closing argument] that [a witness] is honest. Such a statement conveys a conviction of personal belief regarding the witness’s veracity.” The error might have been reversible had the trial court not immediately instructed the jury that all assertions are to be made from the evidence. See also United States v. Hart, 640 F.2d 856, 858-59 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992, 101 S.Ct. 2334, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony (B) holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made (C) holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument (D) holding that it was harmless error when the prosecutor focused on a single incident in closing argument (E) holding that various expressions of personal belief by the prosecutor in closing argument were improper warrant ing admonishment by the trial court
Output: (E)
in the locality in which he or she practices or in a similar locality; (2) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care provider failed to act in accordance with that standard; and (3) By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified medical expert that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suffered injuries that would not otherwise have occurred. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(a) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). Our case law has relied on § 16-114-206(a) and specifically on the need for expert testimony regarding specialty and similar locality in deciding whether summary judgment or a directed verdict should be awarded. See, e.g., Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249, 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Reagan v. City of Piggott, 305 Ark. 77, 805 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where appellant failed to meet proof with proof in the form of expert testimony to demonstrate that appelleedoctor violated appropriate standard of care trial court did not err in granting appelleedoctors summaryjudgment motion (B) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (C) holding that the bia did not err in putting the burden of proof to demonstrate grounds for granting a motion to reopen on the alien (D) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof (E) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper
Output: (A)
Elliott v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293, 297 (D.Idaho 1983). Without making their reasoning completely clear, these courts seem to assume that there is a greater risk that officers doing this work would not express their views honestly if they knew their words might be used against individual officers or the police department by a civil rights plaintiff. But see, e.g., Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (rejecting the view that candor will be chilled by limited disclosure). This premise, coupled with the notion that it is important to preserve the vigor of disciplinary procedures within police departments, has led some courts to conclude either that a plaintiff never should be able to discover such material, see, e.g., Kott v. Perini, 283 F.Supp. 1 (N.D.Ohio 1968) (<HOLDING>); but see Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute making child welfare agency records confidential but disclosable pursuant to a court order did not create an absolute privilege for such records (B) recognizing an absolute privilege for police records in a habeas corpus action (C) recognizing privilege under federal rules (D) recognizing privilege (E) recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant
Output: (B)
Second, Defendants raise the possibility that Venezuela law, rather than Ohio law, applies to the equitable estoppel theory. “[I]n FSIA cases, [the Court] use[s] the forum state’s choice of law rules to resolve all issues, except jurisdictional ones.” O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 381 (6th Cir.2009) (internal quotations omitted). Under Ohio law, “if two jurisdictions apply the same law, or would reach the same result applying their respective laws, a choice of law determination is unnecessary because there is no conflict, and the laws of the forum state apply.” Wendy’s Intern., Inc. v. Illinois Union Insur. Co., No. 2:05-cv-803, 2007 WL 710242, at *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 6, 2007); see also Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 112 Ohio St.3d 470, 474-75, 861 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the party seeking application of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state (B) holding that an actual conflict between ohio law and the law of another jurisdiction must exist for a choiceoflaw analysis to be undertaken (C) recognizing conflict between prior precedents on whether jurisdiction is question of law or fact (D) holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed (E) holding that atca establishes cause of action for violations of international law but requiring the district court to perform a traditional choiceoflaw analysis to determine whether international law law of forum state or law of state where events occurred should provide substantive law in such an action
Output: (B)
remedy unobjected-to errors.” The court’s insistence that the forfeiture rule and the plain-error rule “have different purposes and are guided by different principles” is both confused and confusing. The court’s position is confused because the plain-error rule does not actually have a different purpose than the common-law forfeiture doctrine. We have repeatedly recognized that the purpose and effect of the plain-error rule, like the common-law forfeiture doctrine, is to encourage contemporaneous objections. See, e.g., Pearson, 775 N.W.2d at 161 (“The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.”); Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298-99; see also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 184-36, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (<HOLDING>). The court’s position is confusing because the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the plainerror rule is tied directly to the contemporaneousobjection requirement as it sets forth the consequences for failing to object and promotes judicial efficiency (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (C) holding that a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule (D) holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review (E) holding that plainerror review applies where the defendant fails to object to a constructive amendment
Output: (A)