niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
In contrast to these laws which have been found to have a tenuous connection with employee benefit plans, the Supreme Court has found that common law breach of contract and tort claims against an insurance company based on the improper processing of benefits is preempted. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit has further explained that section 514(a) has been interpreted to preempt certain state common law causes of action “whenever the alleged conduct at issue is intertwined with the refusal to pay-benefits.” Garren v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam); see also Variety Children’s Hosp., Inc. v. Century Medical Health Plan, Inc., 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Parisian, 807 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims (B) holding that erisa preempts the texas dtpa because plaintiff relied on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated (C) holding erisa preempts state contract and tort actions based on improper processing of claims for benefits (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that erisa preempts state law claims of fraud and misrepresentation that are based upon the failure of a covered plan to pay benefits
Output: (E)
in full satisfaction of the debt. This overstates the effect of § 506(a)(2). Surrender would satisfy the creditor’s secured claim, not the entire debt. If a creditor holds an undersecured claim, the creditor would still have an unsecured claim to the extent the debt exceeds the collateral’s judicially-determined replacement value. Santander also argues that applying § 506(a)(2) would be absurd because it eliminates creditors’ contract and state law rights to liquidate and pursue an unsecured claim for any deficiency. But state law does not govern if the Bankruptcy Code requires a different result. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 1955, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Bankruptcy Code is contrary to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code (B) holding that the purpose of the bankruptcy codes avoidance provisions is to prevent a debtor from making transfers that diminish the bankruptcy estate to the detriment of creditors (C) holding that administrative expense claims are accorded special treatment under the bankruptcy code and are not subject to section 502d (D) holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added (E) recognizing distinction between perfection which governs secured creditors rights against third parties and enforcement of liens which controls creditors rights against its debtor rejecting theory that such inchoate or unenforced security interests are voidable under bankruptcy code  544a
Output: (A)
determination under the reasonableness test as clearly erroneous, we perceive no error. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 1 . Appellees’ original complaint was filed before the bylaw amendment was passed. 2 . The lobby, which per Paragraph 7(c) of the Ridgely Declaration is explicitly characterized as a common element, was refurbished in 1990 out of common funds consisting of contributions from each unit owner. To deny the use of the lobby to clients of the commercial owners constitutes an ultra vires taking of a portion of their percentage interest in the common areas in derogation of the Ridgely Condominium declaration as well as certain provisions of the Maryland Condominium Act. Paragraph 8 of the Ridgely Declaration, in pertinent part, provid 495, 500 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants presence in a dark alleyway at six oclock in the morning behind a closed business in an exclusively commercial area supported the investigative stop and explaining that knowledge of recent burglaries in an area is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an officers suspicion because knowledge of the character of the area is part of an officers expertise (B) recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common (C) holding that the requirement of explicitly and prominently was intended by the legislature to ensure that the declaration give unequivocal notice to the project unit owners of the authorization for such use (D) holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area (E) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest
Output: (D)
through conscience-shocking behavior.” Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.2008)). The plaintiffs base their Fourteenth Amendment claim on the deprivation of Colon-Andino’s liberty and the seizure of his property resulting from a fabricated prosecution against him. Together, members of the Puerto Rico Police Department fabricated an entire case against Colon-Andino, conduct which plaintiffs believe shocks the conscience. These are the same factual allegations made in support of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, analyzed above. The Supreme Court has held that “because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of 249, 256 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). The civil actions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (C) holding the same for malicious prosecution (D) holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists (E) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person
Output: (A)
1 & 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142; College Sav. Bank, — U.S. —, — —, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2228-29, — L.Ed.2d — (rejecting Parden’s doctrine of constructive consent because it conflicts' with the longstanding requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be unequivocally expressed and “altogether voluntary” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Although this second method of waiver seems to allow looking beyond the text of a state statute or constitution to a state’s conduct in relation to a federal program in order to find a waiver, KSU contends that Edelman and this court’s decision in Johns restrict our analysis to examining only statutory and constitutional text to find a waiver. See Johns, 57 F.3d at 1553 (reading Edelman as requiring that a state may. waiv 407, 1408 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In spite of these holdings, however, this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court (B) holding that the new mexico school district and their governing boards are not arms of the state entitled to eleventh amendment immunity (C) holding that state did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by removing case to federal court (D) holding that the nyshrl does not waive the new yorks eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court (E) holding that new mexico did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by engaging in activities and entering contracts subject to federal regulation
Output: (E)
understanding that the “EAJA is a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, and it must be strictly construed in the government’s favor.” Tex. Food Indus. Ass’n v. USDA, 81 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). B. Analysis 1. Murkeldove and the Vinning Plaintiffs “incurred” attorney’s fees as contemplated by the EAJA. In order to receive an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA: (1) the claimant must be a “prevailing party,” (2) the claimant must “incur” attorney’s fees, (3) the government’s position must not have been “substantially justified,” and (4) “special circumstances” cannot render an award of fees unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The district court acknowledged that Murkeldove and each of the Vinning Plaintiffs is a “prevailing party” fo 1583 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>)). Against this framework, we examined cases 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that incurred within the meaning of the eaja requires an express or implied arrangement that the fee will be paid over to a legal representative (B) holding that attorney fees are incurred only when there is an express or implied agreement that the fee award will be paid over to the legal representative (C) holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and  the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made (D) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied (E) holding that the prosecution of an equitable adjustment claim before a contracting officer was not a civil action within the meaning of the eaja
Output: (A)
allows an award of costs and attorney’s fees from the petitioners to the debtor. Here, Focus also asks us to order the disgorgement of attorney’s fees previously paid out of Focus’ estate to the petitioning creditors’ attorneys. To clear the way for the relief Focus seeks, we would have to return control of the business to Focus, discharge the trustee and dismiss the involuntary petition. See Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1984) (“An award of attorney’s fees under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) depends upon dismissal of the petition.”). Because we could fashion these equitable remedies, effective relief is available to Focus, and this case is therefore not moot under the first type of mootness. See Spirtos v. Moreno (In re Spirtos), 992 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Neither are we persuaded that we should 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (B) holding that distributions from an inter vivos trust do not qualify as bequests and  541a5a does not operate to bring such distributions into the bankruptcy estate (C) holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become part of the bankruptcy estate (D) holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor (E) holding appeal not moot when court could order debtor to return to the estate postconfirmation distributions of pension plan assets
Output: (E)
his personal belief that the officer was not lying. The prosecutor stated: “He came in here and told you the truth about what happened” and later reiterated, “This officer didn’t commit perjury. He came in here and told you the truth about what happened.” This was improper vouching by “placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity ...” United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Contrary to the government’s assertion, the prosecutor need not invoke the name of the federal government in offering his personal belief — it is sufficient that the personal statement of belief came from the government’s attorney. See, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Second, the prosecutor vouched for Officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (B) holding that it was improper for prosecutor to state he did not lie to you he is a lot of things but he is not a liar (C) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (D) holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it (E) holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail
Output: (B)
redress, there is little difference between retaliating against a person for filing a grievance, and retaliating for threatening to file one. The right to file a grievance stems from the First Amendment right to free speech and to petition the state for redress of grievances. See Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1996). Once a prisoner makes clear his intention to resort to official channels to seek a remedy for ill treatment by a prison employee, retaliation against the prisoner by that employee implicates all the policies intended to protect the exercise of a constitutional right. It appears that the Sixth Circuit treats filing and threatening to file as categorically identical outside the prison context. See Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 756-57 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech (B) holding that an employee engages in protected activity under the first amendment when he threatens to file a lawsuit on a matter of public concern (C) recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern (D) holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation (E) holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern
Output: (B)
enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests.” Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (citing Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293-94 (Fla. 1997)). Whether an emergency actually existed is immaterial “so long as the officer reasonably believes it to exist because of objectively reasonable facts. The officer’s conclusion then may be based on a combination of the ‘objective’ nature of the circumstances and the officer’s ‘subjective’ perception of those circumstances.” State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (<HOLDING>). The record supports that law enforcement 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable (B) holding that in determining prejudice a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury (C) holding that the court must consider the totality of the circumstance when determining whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant (D) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith (E) holding a search permissible where the officer reasonably believed he faced an emergency situation that would result in the destruction of evidence
Output: (C)
premises in a locked storage locker. Salzer had claimed the trailer as exempt, and he charges that Stinson’s actions violated the automatic stay. Salzer’s claim is meritless. Under the Bankruptcy Code, an entity in possession, custody, or control of property that the trustee is entitled to possess, including property that the debtor may exempt, must turn that property over to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). Salzer asserts that he had a key to the leasehold premises and complete access to it through April 1, 1993. From this, Salzer deduces, without citation to any authority, that Stinson was not in possession of the trailer at the time he put it in the locker. (App.Br. at 10-11). This argument is waived. See Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1566 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding the waiver, when Salzer’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority (B) holding that the defendants contention was waived because it was supported neither by cogent argument nor citation to authority (C) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (D) holding that a claim that sovereign immunity has been waived is itself waived if not argued on appeal (E) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived
Output: (C)
but for counsel’s decision not to call her, the outcome of the trial would have been different; so Watkins has also failed to show prejudice. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that Watkins’s counsel was not ineffective by failing to call Odessa Watkins to testify at her son’s trial. Watkins also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Betty Taylor, Donjeola Barker and Marvin Lumpkins as witnesses at trial. Counsel’s uncontroverted testimony was that he had never heard of these witnesses, and Watkins does not argue that counsel should have independently discovered them. Counsel’s failure to call these witnesses was therefore not deficient. See Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1555 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because counsel’s failure to call these 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (B) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (C) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity (D) holding that to demonstrate deficient performance a petitioner must show counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed a defendant by the sixth amendment (E) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument
Output: (C)
and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.8 at 342-44 (1986)). We noted with approval the seven factors LaFave and Scott have suggested be balanced in deciding this question. One of these factors, the severity of the punishment, suggests that the legislature might have intended to require proof of mental state for the enhancement of dealing in cocaine. .Other factors, particularly the great danger of the prohibited conduct and the great number of expected prosecutions, suggest that the General Assembly likely did intend to create a strict Hability enhancement. Our assessment of these factors makes it difficult to conclude that the General Assembly intended to require separate proof the defendant knew that the dealing occurred near a school but failed 623 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). 2 . These factors are: 1) the legislative 
 Holding statements: (A) holding obscenity statute required proof of scienter (B) holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required (C) holding that proof of scienter is required to succeed on a claim under  1991a1 but not under  1991a2 or  1991a3 (D) holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter (E) holding that the incredible dubiosity rule was inapplicable and affirming the defendants conviction for child molesting
Output: (D)
requirement for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents was satisfied because defendant’s failure to pay child support came within the long-arm statute’s provision providing that a court may exercise limited jurisdiction over an individual when the individual causes "an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.” MCL 600.705(2); MSA 27A.705(2). Plaintiffs position is supported by Black v Rasile, 113 Mich App 601; 318 NW2d 475 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 987 (1981) (a paternity action), which adopted the position of other state courts interpreting the "tortious act” language of their state long-arm statutes. In particular, the Black Court adopted the rationale of an Illinois appeals court, Poindexter v Willis, 87 Ill App 2d 213; 231 NE2d 1 (1967) (<HOLDING>), as well as an Ohio court decision enforcing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child (B) holding that the word tort is not technically construed and hence a fathers breach of the statutory duty to pay child support for his illegitimate child constitutes a tortious act within the meaning of the statute (C) holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child (D) holding that an illegitimate child is guaranteed a right of support from his father (E) holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5
Output: (B)
While Smith was under general anesthesia, Geld-zahler found a completely normal range of motion and positioning and did not depart from accepted standards of medical treatment. (Id.) There was no medical indication, no objective medical evidence, to support performing the surgical procedure, an eminectomy, based upon the Smith’s presentation at that time. (Id.) The consent form, dated September 27, 2004, and signed by Smith, attested to his knowledge of the manipulation procedure. This evidence directly refutes Smith’s contention that he believed he was going to undergo an eminectomy on that date. Furthermore, even had Smith preferred to undergo an eminectomy, that does not establish that there was a departure on behalf of WCMC. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). “In a medical malpractice action, expert 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that disagreement with a doctors judgment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference (B) holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court (C) holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict (D) holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm (E) holding that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim
Output: (E)
establish expectations of privacy and that an individual’s expectations in respect of privacy must be objectively reasonable. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 200, 576 A.2d 793 (1990). It follows that an individual’s privacy interest in the home is accorded the most deference in state and federal constitutional law. State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 625, 775 A.2d 1273 (2001) (citing Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir.1997)). Other settings also enjoy recognized expectations of privacy, although they do not receive the same deference as that accorded to one’s home. United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir.1984) (stating that citizen’s expectation of privacy is less in office than in residence); United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542-45 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). One such setting is an inpatient hospital 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room even though search warrant affidavit failed to mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity (B) holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room even though search warrant affidavit failed tp mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity (C) recognizing that defendant had diminished expectationof privacy in motel room (D) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will (E) holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room for evidence of drug activity even though search warrant affidavit failed to mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity
Output: (C)
In re Glenn Electric Sales, 99 B.R. 596, 599 (D.N.J.1988); Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (In re Diamond Lumber, Inc.), 88 Bankr. 773, 776 (N.D.Tex.1988). The duty of disclosure is so important that the failure of an attorney to disclose all of his or her relevant connections is an independent basis for the disallowance of fees. In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. at 533, citing Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir.1981); In re Arlan’s, 615 F.2d at 933; Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d at 59; In re Granite Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 159 B.R. 840, 847 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1993); In re Envirodyne Industries Inc., 150 B.R. 1008, 1021 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993); see also In re Fretter, Inc., 219 B.R. 769 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1998) (<HOLDING>). It is clear that BG & S did not comply with 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing power of bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on parties and counsel who willfully abuse the judicial process but not finding sanctions appropriate against debtor and his attorney for their repeated bankruptcy filings (B) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (C) holding that while appropriate sanctions may vary in the courts discretion denial of all fees is required when an attorney willfully disregards the fiduciary obligations under the disclosure rules (D) holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees (E) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion
Output: (C)
Nov. 25, 1992 at 6. Instead, it articulated the following standard: In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, appellant, must show that his underlying contention possesses arguable merit, that the course chosen by counsel had no reasonable bases designed to serve his interest, and that counsel’s conduct prejudiced him. If the claim lacks merit, the inquiry ceases, as counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless issue. Id. (internal citations omitted). Applying this standard, the court then concluded that it “had no alternative but to deny defendant’s motion.” Id. It is settled in this circuit that the test used by the Pennsylvania court in determining ineffective assistance of counsel claims is not contrary to Strickland. See Werts, 228 F.3d at 204 (<HOLDING>) See also Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 106 n. 9 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding strickland two prong test applies to ineffective assistance claims throughout trial including punishment (C) recognizing that strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims (D) holding that pennsylvanias test for ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to strickland (E) holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal
Output: (D)
not required to proffer that evidence at trial. See Reed v. State, 353 Md. 628, 637-38, 728 A.2d 195, 200-01 (1999) (“ '[W]hen the effect of the ruling [on a motion in limine] is to exclude the evidence, and the trial judge intends that ruling to 'be the final word on the matter, a contemporaneous objection made at the time of the ruling ordinarily preserves the issue for appellate review.'... When motions in limine to exclude evidence are granted, normally no further objection is required to preserve the issue for appellate review.,! ”) (first alteration in original) (quoting Hickman v. State, 76 Md.App. 111, 117, 543 A.2d 870, 873 (1988)) (citing Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 37-38, 542 A.2d 1258, 1259-60 (1988)). See also Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 356, 535 A.2d 445, 449 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Hence, contrary to Respondent's argument, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the value of brady evidence must be evaluated in light of the other evidence admitted at trial (B) holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions (C) holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions (D) holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial (E) holding that when a trial judge determines that questionable evidence will not be admitted the proponent of the evidence is left with nothing to do at trial but follow the courts instructions
Output: (E)
relationship to the parties or transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice of law, or (b) application of Virginia law "would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of [Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971). Plaintiffs do not claim Virginia has no substantial relation to the transaction; after all, Virginia is where AOL has its principal place of business. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 134 Cal.App.4th 886, 36 Cal. Rptr.3d 456, 458-59 (2005) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether California "has a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under certain conditions a bank assumes a duty to disclose facts material to a transaction (B) holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor (C) holding judge in bank robbery prosecution did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse juror whose wife was bank employee or juror whose daughter had been victim of bank robbery (D) holding delaware had a substantial relation to transaction where defendant discover bank was domiciled in that state (E) holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank
Output: (D)
prohibition,” but rather "viewed the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on billboards because it believed that the ordinance would have the practical effect of eliminating the billboard industry in San Diego and thereby would eliminate billboards as an effective medium of communication.” Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1058. Because of these sharp differences, neither opinion has any controlling precedential force. 11 . We note that the Dimmitt/Metromedia-plu-rality approach is consistent with the prevailing approach among other Circuits. See, e.g., Nat’l Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.1991) (observing that the Second Circuit "has adopted the plurality decision in Metromedia concerning billboard regulation”); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 986 F.2d 1180 (8th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech (B) holding that prohibiting external illumination of political signs while allowing it for other signs was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction since the message on the sign determines whether or not it may be externally illuminated (C) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (D) holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague (E) holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum
Output: (A)
“Such actions do not reflect the kind of considered judgment ‘grounded in social, economic, and political policy’” that the discretionary function exception shields “from ‘judicial “second guessing.”’” Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755). The same must be said with respect to SSgt. Raventos’ alleged negligence. It simply goes too far to hold that his decisions to hoist the obstacle’s plank ont tionary function exception applies “is not whether there is any discretion at all, but whether the discretion is grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime,” the proper analysis looks to “whether the decision is fraught with economic, political, or social judgments.” Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 449-50 (D.C.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception (B) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  (C) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (D) holding that asserted failure to post adequate warning signs along commuter road not shielded by discretionary function exception (E) holding asserted negligence in failure to provide adequate lighting or warning in federally controlled parking lot not shielded by discretionary function exception
Output: (D)
of appeal. A trial court has the discretion to order dismissal or default against a party for that party’s failure to comply with discovery requirements. See Fla. R. Civ. P, 1.380(b)(2)(C); Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Tubero, 569 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1990). However, “the striking of pleadings or entering a default for-noncompliance with an order compelling discovery is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed only in extreme circumstances.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944, 946 (Fla.1983). Before striking a party’s pleadings and entering a default, the trial court must make a finding that the party’s nonappearance was willful or done in bad faith. In re Forfeiture of Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($20,900) U.S. Currency, 539 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>); Trupei v. City of Lighthouse Point, 506 So.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial (B) holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits (C) holding that defendants general objection to states specific questions regarding defendants failure to appear before grand jury was sufficient to put trial court on notice of objection based on defendants constitutional right to remain silent (D) holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute (E) holding that the trial court was required to make a finding or recital that defendants failure to appear for deposition was willful or contumacious prior to striking the defendants pleadings
Output: (E)
writ). 32 . See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(P). 33 . See id. § 161.001(1)(0). Apparently, the service plan is the only court order with which Kevin was required to comply. Wolfe could not recall whether Kevin had been ordered to pay child support, nor did she know whether a parent is ordinarily required to pay child support while incarcerated. 34 . See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265-66. 35 . Tex Fam.Code Ann. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a); G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847. 36 . See M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549. 37 . See id. at 545. 38 . Id. at 549. 39 . Id. at 549-50 (quoting Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.Crim.App.2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1195, 123 S.Ct. 1351, 154 L.Ed.2d 1030 (2003)). 40 . See id. at 550. 41 . Id.; see also Horrocks v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 852 S.W.2d 498, 498-99 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>). 42 . M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 550. 43 . In light 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court (B) holding where record fails to establish whether and how appellant presented motion for new trial to the trial court it was not timely presented (C) holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial (D) holding that appellant failed to preserve error because it did not present appellate complaint to trial court (E) holding that motion for a new trial whether for guilt or punishment requires a valid legal claim a court cannot grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that he is entitled to one under the law
Output: (A)
before May 9 that he wanted nothing to do with union representation and neither did Emerson. Id. at 188. The evidence accepted in Transpersonnel, and indeed in Levitz, are the same types of evidence presented by Mullican Lumber — statements received from its employees, who were members of the bargaining unit, who presumably voted, and who presented this information in an effort to accelerate the decertification process. The General Counsel also argues that in cases applying the Levitz standard, the probative value of hearsay evidence should be slight. We need not, however, decide the relevant weight of the evidence presented by Mullican Lumber — except to conclude that it was sufficiently substantial to be probative — inasmuch as the General Counsel offered 8, 731 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Hall, 333 N.L.R.B. 458, 458 n. 4 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that educational records are not privileged under ferpa (B) holding that communications to the police are conditionally privileged (C) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (D) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (E) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known
Output: (D)
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” Id. at 681, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Schools are not prevented by the First Amendment from encouraging the “fundamental values of ‘habits and manners of civility,’ ” id., by “insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.” Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159. And “[t]he determination of what manner of speech ... is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.” Id. Accordingly, Fraser establishes an exception to Tinker’s disruption requirement. Under Fraser, the banned school speech need not meet Tinker ’s disruption requirement; rather, speech in school can be banned if it is lewd, vulgar, indecent, or plainly offensive. Id. at 685, 106 S.Ct. 3159; see also Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (<HOLDING>); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Ed., 220 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred school from punishing student for vulgar myspace post concerning principal be cause it was offcampus speech (B) recognizing obscene and indecent have different meanings and indecent speech may be regulated under some circumstances without transgressing the first amendment (C) holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech (D) holding that under fraser there is no first amendment protection for lewd vulgar indecent and plainly offensive speech in school (E) recognizing school officials ability to act for the protection of minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language
Output: (D)
show that the proffered reason for his termination is unworthy of credence. See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. Finally, even if the Plaintiffs had shown that the Defendants’ proffered reason for the termination had been false, they failed to establish that racial discrimination was the real reason for his firing. See Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. B. Clark’s Racial Discrimination Claim Here, the Plaintiffs have not challenged the district court’s conclusion that Clark failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the racial discrimination claim brought under Title VII. Hence, any challenges to the grant of summary judgment on Clark’s discrimination claims are limited to the count brought under § 1981. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). As to the § 1981 discrimination claim, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant abandoned argument by failing to argue it in body of brief (B) holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal (C) holding that an appellant abandons an issue for purposes of appeal where he fails to argue it in his briefs (D) holding that a party abandons claims that he does not argue in his brief (E) holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief
Output: (D)
¶18 Did the District Court err in ordering Eaton to pay restitution from his “net income,” which is defined as including his social security benefits? ¶19 Eaton argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it ordered him to make restitution payments equal to the amount of 20 percent of his net income, including income from his social security benefits. He contends that this condition violates 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). While the State argues that the inclusion of Eaton’s social security benefits in his net income for the purpose of calculating the amount of monthly restitution payments is not an “execution,” “levy,” “attachment,” “garnishment” or “formal legal process” in violation of § 407(a), we agree with Eaton th 9 U.S. 413, 417, 93 S.Ct. 590, 592, 34 L.Ed.2d 608, 611-12 (<HOLDING>). In Washington State Dept. of Social and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation (B) holding that the express language of  407a and the clear intent of congress that social security benefits not be attachable (C) holding that under 42 usc  407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income on a firstin firstout basis (D) holding that  407a imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits (E) holding that under 42 usc  407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income
Output: (D)
the question. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding all decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. 3 . The Tucker Act, in place at the time the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases were decided, provided in pertinent part: The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or fore liquidated or un-liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (amended). 4 . The exact mechanism used to ensure time for proper consi 103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409, 127 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule announced in padilla v kentucky 559 us 356 130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review (B) holding inter alia that the decision in padilla v kentucky  us  130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 should not be applied retroactively while certifying the question as one of great public importance (C) holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review (D) holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review (E) holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review
Output: (A)
J. Mark Orben Ellis appeals the denial of his rule 3.850 motion. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the motion solely on the basis that it was not notarized, we reverse. In order for a rule 3.850 motion to be legally sufficient it does not have to be notarized, it only has to contain a signed declaration. See State v. Shearer, 628 So.2d 1102 (Fla.1993)(<HOLDING>). Since Ellis’ motion contained a signed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants postconviction motion must contain either a notarized oath or a signed declaration (B) holding that there was no error where the motion court denied the defendants motion for postconviction relief without an express finding that the defendants escape impacted the criminal justice system (C) holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion (D) holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief (E) holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived
Output: (A)