niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (<HOLDING>). External forces that have been found to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency (B) holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead (C) recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove (D) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (E) holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508
Output: (B)
separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser
Output: (D)
S.Ct. 586. The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A within Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal, and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district court properly calculated Holder’s Guidelines range based on his relevant conduct and criminal history and explained the sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors in great detail, we conclude that Holder’s sentence is proee-durally reasonable. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Further, the sentence, which is within the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the district court must place on the record an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it and that the individualized assessment  must provide a rationale tailored to the particular ease at hand and be adequate to permit meaningful appellate review (B) holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case (C) holding that suspicion must be individualized (D) holding that the individualized assessment  must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and be adequate to permit meaningful appellate review (E) recognizing that the district court must place on the record an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it and that the individualized assessment  must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and be adequate to permit meaningful appellate review
Output: (B)
on the holding in Provident Bank. First, the argument against a finding of fiduciary status was submitted in that case by a plaintiff who was seeking to overturn a finding that his state law claim could be removed to federal court. In other words, the posture of the party submitting the argument was not that of a bank or some other funds’ custodian, and it is plausible to think that the argument was not fully briefed to the appellate court from the perspective of a party in a position similar to that of National City herein. Second, other circuit courts which have considered the argument from the perspective of the funds custodian have ruled that a mere custodian of ERISA plan funds is not a fiduciary thereto. See Beddall v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund 
 Holding statements: (A) holding greatwest bars a plan fiduciary seeking enforcement of a subrogation clause from settlement funds already received but does not bar a lien on specific funds yet to be received (B) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (C) holding that a bank which does no more than hold plan funds and generate reports is not a fiduciary (D) holding a bank is a fiduciary under the disposition clause where it wrongfully disbursed the plans funds (E) holding no fiduciary breach where plaintiffs argued plan should only offer institutional funds
Output: (C)
S.W.2d at 45-46 (emphasis in original); Jefco, 520 S.W.2d at 922; Martin, 437 S.W.2d at 592. Satterfield has not made it clearly apparent that chapter 149 is unnecessary, unreasonable, and unjustified by the facts. See Bellaire, 317 S.W.2d at 45-46. To invalidate chapter 149, Satterfield, would have this Court reject the statement of legislative intent accompanying the statute’s enactment. However, because there is room for a fair difference of opinion as to the necessity and reasonableness of chapter 149 on subjects that lie within the police power (i.e., promotion of the public interest in jobs and pensions, increasing state industries, developing its resources, and adding to its wealth and prosperity), this Court will not hold it void. See id.; see also Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 634 (<HOLDING>). Chapter 149 handles competing economic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that edwards aquifer acts cap on landowners water withdrawal was necessary to safeguard public welfare and that consideration of preexisting users water consumption before effective date of act did not render act unconstitutional (B) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective (C) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (D) recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters (E) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act
Output: (A)
as applied to him. The district court rejected both of these arguments. Thereafter, Defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to the § 922(g)(5) violation and the district court sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment (time served) followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Defendant now appeals, renewing his facial challenge to § 922(g)(5). The government argues in response that Defendant waived this argument by his unconditional guilty plea and, in any event, that § 922(g)(5) is constitutional. “We have not yet squarely addressed whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute survives a guilty plea.” United States v. Rickett, 585 Fed.Appx. 668, 671 (10th Cir.2018) (unpublished). But cf. United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1154 (10th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, our sister circuits have split on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the alc may not rule upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute but may rule upon an asapplied challenge (B) recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal (C) holding in the context of an asapplied challenge that when a defendant admits guilt of a substantive crime he cannot reverse course on appeal and claim the criminal statute is unconstitutional (D) holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied (E) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins
Output: (C)
to the merits of the ease” and the defendant must not be prejudiced in “his defense on the merits.” Id. The State may not seek amendments altering the material set of facts in the indictment or “materially alter(ing) a defense to the indictment ... to prejudice the defendant’s case.” Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss.1991) (Griffin II). The test for determining whether an amendment will prejudice the defendant’s case is “whether a defense as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made.” Griffin v. State, 540 So.2d 17, 21 (Miss.1989) (Griffin I). Holmes argues that amending the indictment to a different charge is prejudicial and reversible error. Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.1991); Shive v. State, 507 So.2d 898, 900 (Miss.1987) (<HOLDING>). Holmes’ defense, that the taking of property 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering  only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment (B) holding that the indictment was permissibly amended to change the description of a stolen watch (C) holding indictment may not be amended to change charge except by action of the grand jury because amendments can only go to form and not substance (D) holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury (E) holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury
Output: (C)
of the writ, the CCA examines the substance of the claim to see if it establishes a prima facie case of retardation, and only upon deciding that question can the state court decide whether remand is appropriate.”). 10 . Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir.2005). 11 . 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 12 . Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). 13 . In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.2005). 14 . Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 & nn. 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992)). 15 . See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361-63 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bri-seno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (“[T]he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and related limitations in adaptive functioning (C) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct
Output: (B)
validity of any debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to an entity that extended such credit in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and the ■incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, were stayed pending appeal. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, they contend, Weinstein has no remedies because it failed to obtain a stay of the bankruptcy court’s order pending the appeal and because the bankruptcy court expressly found that Comerica extended credit in good faith. Weinstein’s claim is- therefore mooted, they urge, because any relief the Weinstein firm seeks would “affect the validity of [the] debt.” See Bennett v. Gemmill (In re Combined Metals Reduction Co.), 557 F.2d 179, 187 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). A Specifically, the Weinstein firm seeks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding (B) holding that because appellate jurisdiction was lacking the court can express no position on  whether the sierra clubs case was moot when filed (C) holding that an appeal is properly dismissed as moot when an appellate court lacks power to provide an effective remedy for the appellant should it find in his favor (D) holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief (E) holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original
Output: (D)
the government has not pled that Toyobo caused any factually false claims to be submitted to the government. Nor has the government pled an express false certification claim, since the complaint does not allege that any of the relevant contracts contained express provisions requiring five-year warranties against defects. Additionally, the government has not pled an implied certification claim. The complaint does not allege facts that support an inference that either the government or Toyobo understood to be a condition of payment the requirement that the vests satisfy a five-year warranty by remaining fit for use as body armor for five years. Cf. United States v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 798 F.Supp.2d 12, 20-21, Civil Action No. 08-961(RWR), 2011 WL 2672624, at *4-5 (D.D.C. July 8, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Nor does the complaint allege that “the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries (B) holding that the allegation that had the united states known of the defective nature of the z shield vests it would not have purchased them for use in the ballistic protection of law enforcement officers sufficient to support the inference that the implied requirement that the vests satisfy their fiveyear warranty was material (C) holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states (D) holding that confirmation vests in the debtor property of the estate not dedicated to the plan (E) holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate
Output: (B)
sophisticated consumer” might well reach the same conclusion. In sum, particularly at this early stage, defendants cannot establish as a matter of law that Santander is a creditor exempt from the FDCPA. Thus, the motion to dismiss should be denied. TCPA Claims Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the TCPA based on an exception contained in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2), which excepts calls to a residential line when made pursuant to an “established business relationship.” It is difficult to imagine how that exemption would apply to Letricia Hamlett, who was not a signatory to the loan, but in fairness there is at least one case that supports this odd interpretation of the law. See Santino v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 09-CV-982, 2011 WL 754874, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011) (<HOLDING>); but see Watson v. NCO Group, Inc., 462 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (C) holding exemption applies to nondebtor (D) holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (E) holding that  1447c applies to counsel
Output: (C)
resources would not outweigh the entity’s interest in knowing the charges and evidence against it. In fact, OFAC has provided just such a summary in a different case. See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts I), 647 F.Supp.2d 857, 868 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (noting that OFAC had provided “an unclassified three-page summary of the classified evidence” to the entity under investigation). We understand from the parties that many (and likely most) of the designated persons are not United States citizens or entities. That conclusion is unsurprising given that EO 13,224 primarily targets “foreign persons.” Many of those persons likely cannot assert the due process protections that are available to AHIFOregon, a United States entity. See NCO-RI, 251 F.3d at 201 (<HOLDING>); see afeo Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause or otherwise internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the petitioner may not turn a clerical error into a windfall of rights it would not otherwise enjoy internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (D) holding that bankruptcy is no exception to the due process principle that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party to or to which he has not been made a party by service of process internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (A)
in a proper case, it is within the trial judge’s discretion to grant such relief. We are not convinced, however, that the two lines of authority may not be reconciled on the basis of differences in local procedure or the types of interests threatened.... Grimm, supra, 252 Md. at 639, 250 A.2d 866. We, then, are tasked with addressing the “local procedures or the types of interests” that make a circumstance unusual and compelling so as to warrant issuing a declaratory judgment when an action involving similar issues is pending before another court. Id. When a litigant initiates a declaratory judgment under such circumstance, the trial court generally does not abuse its discretion by refusing to issue a declaration. Sprenger v. Pub. Serv. Comm’s of Md., 400 Md. 1, 33, 926 A.2d 238 (2007) (<HOLDING>); accord Popham, supra, 333 Md. at 140 n. 2, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial judge is legally correct in dismissing declaratory action when two actions are substantially the same issues were identical and the identical action was still pending (B) holding that an identical or nearly identical limitation of liability clause was valid and enforceable under georgia law (C) holding same under virtually identical circumstances (D) recognizing that the two statutes are nearly identical (E) holding that the standard was met when two actions were related to the same assets and were based upon almost identical breaches of fiduciary duty
Output: (A)
375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther’s theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts “a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman.” White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther’s termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
Output: (C)
habeas petition to add new claim or theory after one-year federal statute of limitations governing habeas petitions had expired; permitting such amendment would be contrary to very policy of limitations period). See also Pursell II, 749 A.2d at 915-16 (“[W]hile layered claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness may avoid the waiver restrictions in the PCRA, we have repeatedly held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not automatically qualify pursuant to the exceptions to the one-year time limitation provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(f)-(iii).”) (collecting cases). In the past, of course, this Court has had to consider the continuing viability of judicial rules that find themselves in separation of powers tension with the governing terms of the PCRA. Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 700 (<HOLDING>). Having noted the tension, however, we will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra (B) holding that claim alleging counsels ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining process is cognizable under the pcra (C) holding that claim challenging counsels effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is cognizable under pcra (D) holding that relaxed waiver is no longer viable on pcra appeals because inter alia application of the doctrine of relaxed waiver in a pcra proceeding runs afoul of the very terms of the pcra which excludes waived claims from the class of cognizable pcra claims (E) holding that substantive due process challenge to continued validity of defendants judgment of sentence after a nineyear delay is not cognizable under the pcra
Output: (D)
providing warnings about dangerous conditions (e.g., weather, construction areas) that may cause risk to visitors.” Director’s Order # 50C specifies that superintendents should exercise that discretion in light of “NPS policies relating to public safety, health, and the environment.” Against the backdrop of those and other related agency policies, our cases have identified important distinctions between protected and unprotected agency actions. The NPS’s decisions with respect to the design and construction of roadways and trails, for example, are discretionary decisions that are “clearfiy] link[ed]” to social and political policies relating to access and resource preservation. ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir.1987); see also Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1137 (<HOLDING>); Childers, 40 F.3d at 975 (concluding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality (B) recognizing the hazards of ex parte communication with a deliberating jury (C) holding that denial of access to carbon paper and reproduction equipment and denial of facetoface access to other inmates did not deprive an inmate of his right of access to the courts (D) holding that the npss decision not to warn of a rockfall hazard involved a process of identifying and responding to hazards in the wild and implicated the npss broader policy mandates to balance access with conservation and safety (E) holding that an owners policy must comply with the statutory mandates in  3031902
Output: (D)
justification was pretextual.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005)). The court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. The strength of the plaintiffs prima fa-cie case, especially the existence of a causal connection, can be a significant factor in his attempt to rebut the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n. 4 (stating that “a prima facie case that strongly suggests intentional discrimination may be enough by itself to survive summary judgment”); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Meadows v. Mukasey, 555 F.Supp.2d 205, 211-13 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (B) holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection
Output: (E)
different circumstances, constitute deficient representation. Under other circumstances, it might be reasonable trial strategy for counsel to indicate sympathy for a prosecution witness, elicit forensic evidence the state had not sought to present, or adopt a tough stance with one’s client. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel ... ”). In cases in which we have found such actions or omissions were not deficient, however, the circumstances revealed that those actions or omissions were part of identifiably reasonable trial strategies calculated to benefit the defendant in some way. See, e.g., Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d at 1323 (<HOLDING>); Fowler v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1302, 1310-11 (10th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision (B) holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt (C) holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful (D) holding that performance of counsel whose first involvement with the case came on the morning of trial constituted ineffective assistance (E) holding counsel made reasonable strategic decision to concede some involvement by defendant given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial and focused on the extent of his involvement and whether others could have been involved
Output: (E)
granted the motion to suppress and signed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only finding made by the trial court was that “[a]ll witnesses were credible and testified truthfully.” The court concluded that “based on the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement lacked sufficient probable cause to enter the motel room” and “an exigency that required an immediate entry into said motel room without a warrant did not exist.” Applicable Law Because the trial court found the only witnesses who testified — Investigator Geske and Corporal Engstrom — to be “credible and truthful,” we review the application of the law to the facts de novo. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Both probable cause and exigent circumstances must have existed for the s p.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to conduct an investigatory detention where a juvenile in a high drug area started walking away upon the approach of a law enforcement officer while keeping his head turned away from the officer and while moving his mouth as if he had something in it (B) holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime (C) holding that the hgn test may be considered as a factor in determining probable cause (D) holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (E) holding fact that appellant immediately turned and started walking in opposite direction when confronted by police officer was factor to be considered in determining existence of probable cause to believe he was attempting to flee after committing offense
Output: (E)
period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner’s substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities”); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor”); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
Output: (D)
to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Within 10 days after the return of a verdict, a party who has timely moved for a directed verdict may serve a motion to set aside the verdict and any judgment entered thereon and to enter judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict. (Emphasis added). Because the rule treats the denial of a motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence as a reservation of ruling, in order to preserve the point for appellate review it is necessary to make an appropriate post-trial motion. See Indus. Affiliates, Ltd. v. Testa, 770 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); see also Williams v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County, 770 So.2d 706, 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Brown moved for a directed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely (B) holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (C) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (D) holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision (E) holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict
Output: (C)
on its face define who can sue under the statute, it does clearly define who can be sued. A plaintiff may bring a Title VII action against any “employer,” defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is undisputed that Palmetto does not employ fifteen employees. Llampallas, however, argued at trial that Mini-Circuits and Palmetto should be considered as a “single employer” under Title VII such that the employees of both companies count toward the fifteen-employee jurisdictional requirement. The district court agreed, applying the four-part test developed in Radio and Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965) (<HOLDING>), to hold that Mini-Circuits and Palmetto were 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act (B) holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act (C) holding that although a union may waive a members substantive statutory right under the national labor relations act to be free from having a private employer discourage membership in any labor organization such waiver did not occur because such waiver must be established clearly and unmistakably (D) holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board (E) holding that two entities were a single employer and therefore that their gross receipts could be totaled together to establish jurisdiction under the national labor relations act
Output: (E)
to award attorney’s fees to appellees. By affirming the trial court’s judgment, our judgment essentially adopted the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case for lack of juris diction. Because the trial court did not award attorney’s fees to the appellees in its judgment — and the appellees did not raise this failure to award fees as an issue in Medina I — our opinion and judgment in Medina I closed the door on the possibility of the appellees recovering their attorney’s fees in this case. See, e.g., Martin, 824 S.W.2d at 257 (trial court erred by granting relief not specified in appellate court’s mandate after court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment); see also Tex. R.App. PROC. 38.1(i); San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209-10 (Tex.1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Citing to Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (B) holding the issue of standing is waived if not asserted at the district court level (C) holding under former rule 52a appellant must object to alleged error in the trial court or such error is waived (D) holding that appellant who merely listed  points of error without further argument or explanation had waived those issues for failure to brief (E) holding it is a wellestablished rule that grounds of error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of appeals are waived
Output: (E)
ORDER Petitioner Ming Zhang Xu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 4, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming the April 16, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Paul A. DeFonzo, denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ming Zhang Xu, No. A094 048 617 (B.I.A. Mar. 4, 2010), aff'g No. A094 048 617 (Immig.Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 16, 2008). We assume 6) (<HOLDING>); see also Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that withholding of removal and cat claims necessarily fail if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same (B) recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate (C) holding that where a petitioner fails to establish a claim for asylum on the merits his claims for withholding of removal under the ina and cat also necessarily fail (D) holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each (E) holding that defeat of asylum claim on credibility grounds does not necessarily preclude relief on a cat claim
Output: (D)
duty of loyalty. Only the second subparagraph of that Rule specifically deals with confidentiality. The Second Circuit made clear in In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1986), that “an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his client” and that “[tjhese obligations do not necessarily end when the attorney-client relationship ends.” Id. at 17. See also Arifi v. de Transport du Cocher, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (“The duty of loyalty that runs from an attorney to a client does not necessarily end when the formal attorney-client relationship ends because the attorney owes a ‘duty of continuing loyalty’ to his former client.” (internal citations omitted)); Schwed v. General Electric Co., 990 F.Sup t’l Inc.), 222 B.R. 401, 408 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998) (<HOLDING>); Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. and Annuity Assoc., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (C) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (D) holding that the substantial relationship test embodies a broader concept than the rule of confidentiality  that of continuing fidelity to a former client  a duty of loyalty (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
Output: (D)
(S.D.N.Y.1986) (quoting Lewis & Eugenia Van Wezel Foundation, Inc. v. Guerdon Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1264, 1267 (2d Cir.1971)). It is the borrowing of the money, not simply the execution of notes, that is the transaction of the business. See Lewis & Eugenia Van Wezel Foundation, 450 F.2d at 1267; Catalyst Energy, 630 F.Supp. at 1316. Here, the money was borrowed from a New York bank in New York, $50,000 of which was then deposited into Chemical Bank in New York. The totality of Ziifle’s alleged acts, whereby she availed herself of the benefits and protection of New York law, constitute sufficient purposeful contacts with New York to bring her within the réaeh of § 302(a)(1) of New York’s long arm statute. See Bank of New York v. Strumor, 179 A.D.2d 736, 579 N.Y.S.2d 124 (2d Dep’t 1992) (<HOLDING>). Ziifle’s alleged contacts with New York also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york law applies to this matter (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that a financial guaranty payable in new york is a contract to perform services in new york subjecting foreign guarantor to jurisdiction under  302a1 (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
Output: (B)
act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If “a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.” Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive.” Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
Output: (B)
reside because they have no standing to pursue those claims. As explained herein, the Court finds that none of defendants’ arguments warrant dismissal of any state-law claims at this stage. A. Legal Standard To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The D.C. Circuit has not considered the application of the plausibility standard to class allegations, but several other circuits have held that Rule 12(b)(6) motions can be used to strike class allegations when it is apparent on the face of the, complaint that they cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. See McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus, & Co., 687 F.3d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under present rule settlement class must meet all rule 23 requirements and expressing concern about dangers of overrewarding attorneys and undereompensating class members (B) holding that a case may be dismissed sua sponte under rule 12b6 prior to service without motion by defendants or briefing by the parties (C) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (D) holding that even if a defendant in a proposed class action does not seriously contest whether the rule 23 requirements have been met a court nevertheless has the responsibility of conducting its own inquiry as to whether the requirements of rule 23 have been satisfied in a particular case (E) holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion
Output: (E)
Co., Inc., 384 Pa.Super. 537, 559 A.2d 566 (dismantling of allegedly illegal surveillance equipment), appeal denied, 524 Pa. 628, 574 A.2d 70 (1989); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 383 Pa.Super. 223, 556 A.2d 878 (refusal to mail insurance mailings that were allegedly in violation of state law), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 584, 575 A.2d 115 (1989). In each of these cases, however, the issue of whether the act alleged was indeed illegal was unclear; in light of this uncertainty, the courts felt that the judgement as to whether the act was illegal was in the hands of the employer and not the employee. Callahan, 541 F.Supp. at 563 ("employee complaints on matters generally entrusted to management” do not rise to the level of a clear mandate of public policy); Hineline, 559 A.2d at 569-70 (<HOLDING>); McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 885 ("when the act to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that takings cases are based on the proper exercise of statutory and regulatory authority (B) holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding that denial of remand was proper where plaintiff failed to raise the proper objection
Output: (D)