niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
This was improper since the issue of the voluntariness of a confession — i.e. whether it was obtained in a manner which did not violate the due process rights of the defendant under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions — is entirely separate from the issue of whether a defendant’s admissions in the confession conclusively establish, factually, that he or she committed the acts which form the basis for his or her conviction. As these are two separate and distinct questions, the resolution of each involves fundamentally different considerations. When a court is called upon to determine whether a confession is voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to ascertain whether it i .2d 775, 779 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Rather, a court is constrained to examine 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession (B) holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession (C) holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature (D) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (E) holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given
Output: (B)
v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.2001) (discussing § 1983 liability for a municipality based on “governmental ‘custom’ ”). Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Count VII is also due to be affirmed. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . Hawk filed a motion to dismiss Klaetsch with prejudice after Klaetsch filed a petition in bankruptcy court. 2 . Only two of the incidents cited by Hawk involve tasers, and none of them recount the actual tasing of an arrestee. And although all three incidents recount aggressive arrests by Klaetsch, this circuit requires something more to transform aggressive force into excessive force. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an officer grabbed plaintiffs arm twisted it around plaintiffs back jerking it up high to the shoulder and then handcuffing the plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees screaming did not constitute excessive force (B) holding that fact that plaintiffs arm was broken during tackle did not constitute excessive force (C) holding that there was evidence of grossly excessive force where the defendant shot the victim once in the arm and then in the base of the skull (D) holding that officer was liable as an integral participant for his help in handcuffing plaintiff because it was instrumental in the officers gaining control of him which culminated in excessive force (E) holding that officers knocking the plaintiff to the ground rolling him over and pinning him with their knees on his neck back and legs so he could be handcuffed did not constitute excessive force and noting that the plaintiffs offer to return to custody after his escape attempt did not eliminate the need for force
Output: (A)
choice of forum should be given “paramount consideration.” (D.I. 19 at 15-16) (citing Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25) ACI responds that GPH’s choice should be accorded “little or no weight” because Delaware is not GPH’s “home turf.” (See D.I. 12 at 16) (citing In re Link-A-Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (Fed.Cir.2011)) According to ACI, GPH’s home turf is New York, because that is GPH’s principal place of business. While there are cases supporting ACI’s view that Delaware is not GPH’s “home turf,” there are likewise cases from this District in which a plaintiffs “home turf’ has been construed to include its state of incorporation, which here is Delaware. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 744, 754 (D.Del.2012); Praxair, 2004 WL 883395, at *1-2 (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees with those cases that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes (B) holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center (C) holding delaware is home turf as long as company is incorporated in delaware regardless of location of principal place of business (D) holding  1332c does not apply to a domestically incorporated corporation with its principal place of business abroad (E) holding that lehman bank had its principal office in delaware rather than new york based in part on lehman banks establishment of its home office in delaware
Output: (C)
subjected to discrimination” by a federally funded entity, 29 U.S.C. § 794.) In the education context, it has been interpreted to guarantee the same “free appropriate public education” required by the IDEA. Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 125 (1st Cir.2003) (both '“statutes may be available to redress particular denials of a free appropriate public education,” and “apply similar standards for substantive relief’); Ms. S. ex rel. L.S. v. Scarborough Sch. Comm., 366 F.Supp.2d 98, 99 n. 2 (D.Me.2005). Despite this similarity, however, the First Circuit has stated that “it may be that § 504 claims require some showing of deliberate indifference not required by IDEA.” Nieves-Marquez, 353 F.3d at 125 n. 17 (citing Sellers by Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)). In this case, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (B) holding that the term in fact within the context of the exclusion here should be read to require either a final adjudication including a judicial adjudication or at a minimum at least some evidentiary proof (C) holding that either bad faith or gross misjudgment should be shown before a  504 violation can be made out at least in the context of education of handicapped children (D) holding that bad faith andor prejudice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence (E) holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith
Output: (C)
rule of evidence” that, if the defendant is entitled to introduce into evidence part of a writing, the state is entitled to introduce the remainder of that writing. 295 Or at 490-91 & n 4. The reasoning of Middleton II disposes of the state’s argument in that regard. In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred when it permitted the state to introduce the above-emphasized parts of Smith’s plea agreement. In Snider, this court held that the improper bolstering that occurred in that case was prejudicial error: “In this case, the testimony of [the witness] provided critical evidence about the alleged conspiracy to kidnap and kill the victim. The error in allowing improper bolstering of this witness’s credibility was prejudicial.” 296 Or at 173. See also Keller, 315 Or at 286 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Smith was the only witness who 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error (B) holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added (C) holding that fact that one witnesss testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury (D) holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness (E) holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility
Output: (A)
potentially to have lost contact with family, friends, or each other. But that consequence is not “serious harm” — and warning of such a consequence is not a “threat” — under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In applying the Act, we must distinguish between “Dimproper threats or coercion and permissible warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences.” United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir.2004), judgment vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 2543, 162 L.Ed.2d 271 (2005); cf. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1170 (Act aims at serious trafficking and threats of dire consequences). This case involves the latter. A church is entitled to stop associating with someone who abandons it. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). A church may also warn that it will stop 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (B) holding that the free exercise clause protects the practice of shunning explaining that when the members of a cjhurch no longer want to associate with someone who has abandoned them those members are free under the first amendment to make that choice (C) holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court
Output: (B)
amend. XIV, § 1. “The threshold question for federal equal protection analysis concerns the level of scrutiny.” Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Management v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind.1994). Absent a burden upon the exercise of a constitutionally protected right (none is at stake here — see part IV-C-2 infra) or creation of a suspect class (none is alleged here), the general standard of review of state action challenged under the equal protection clause is the rational basis test. Id. This test merely requires “that the law be ‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.’ Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L.Ed.2d 465, 471 (1988).” Id. See, e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The Transfer Rule is designed “[t]o preserve 
 Holding statements: (A) holding illinois high school associations version of the transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection
Output: (A)
of said contracts. It was quite apparent that Hurst knew the payment affidavits were false and misrepresented. Appellants objected to the second statement — the statement that Young allegedly made to Doolan — on the basis of hearsay. See Tex.R. Evid. 801(d). Appellants objected to the other statements arguing that they were “unsupported conclusory statements” and, thus, not proper summary judgment evidence. Appellants’ hearsay objection should have been sustained. Appellees do not identify any evidence in the record showing that Young’s alleged statement falls within a hearsay exception. Therefore, we will not consider this statement in our review. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Einhorn v. LaChance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. Hink, 757 S.W.2d 449, 451 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (B) holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment (C) holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence (D) holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment (E) holding that a district court may not consider either hearsay evidence in affidavits or unsworn documents in a summary judgment proceeding
Output: (C)
125 S.Ct. 1561, 161 L.Ed.2d 563 (2005). The homestead exemption is not, however, the exclusive remedy for a debtor facing the loss of his or her residence. An alternative remedy is for the debtor to seek abandonment by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) if the property is “of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.” If Jahn could extinguish the abandonment remedy by simply tendering the homestead exemption, then he could effectively nullify 11 U.S.C. § 554(b). Such an argument overlooks relevant caselaw and the text of the abandonment statute. Jahn’s second argument is that the Burkes lacked Article III standing to proceed on their motion to compel abandonment. To ha uest for the abandonment of another’s property. See In re Miller, 302 B.R. 705, 711 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In such a case, the debtor has suffered no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtor had no standing to compel the trustee to abandon production equipment and other property that concededly belonged to third parties (B) holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee (C) holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor (D) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession (E) holding that for purpose of the means test debtor can deduct mortgage payment even though debtor will abandon property
Output: (A)
being threatened or impaired, a finding of irreparable injury is mandated. In other words, the first factor of the four-factor preliminary injunction inquiry — whether the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits — should be addressed first insofar as a successful showing on the first factor mandates a successful showing on the second factor— whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm. See id.; see also Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir.1998) (finding that “[wjhen a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential violation of the First Amendment, the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor”); Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The district court erred in this regard 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records (B) holding that if the constitutional right of privacy is either threatened or in fact being impaired this mandates a finding of irreparable injury (C) holding that where the uncontradicted evidence shows that a former employee is working for a direct competitor no finding of irreparable injury is necessary to support a permanent injunction to protect trade secrets because irreparable injury is established as a matter of law (D) recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records (E) holding that evidence of threatened loss of prospective customers or goodwill supports a finding of irreparable harm
Output: (B)
a judge’s future actions with respect to matters that may come before him, falls within the statute’s prohibitions”). Hence, the matter of whether to “enforce the law against social vices is always before” a police officer like Arneson. Gaio, 81 Cal.App.4th at 930, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 392. So too is the matter of whether to use his position as an LAPD officer-to investigate someone in the Los Angeles area. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (describing law enforcement as the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). Arneson’s use of his office to investigate someone, via confidential databases or otherwise, necessarily involved a classic type of police “matter”— investigation. See Gaio, 81 Cal.App.4th at 931, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 (<HOLDING>). Arneson’s theory that an act brought before 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award (B) holdingthat evidence was sufficient to support defendants convictions on rape and aggravated assault charges (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to support bribery convictions because evidence established that payment was given to influence any one or more instances types or courses of official action (D) holding that because evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962c convictions and jury could infer from evidence that defendants each manifested an agreement to participate in enterprises affairs evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962d convictions for rico conspiracy (E) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees
Output: (C)
the idea — the lock can be used again. This loss or alteration of the combination may be a useful metaphor for damage to software and data in a computer. With damage to software, whether it be by reconfiguration or loss of instructions, the computer may become inoperable. But the hardware is not damaged. The switches continue to function to receive instructions and the data and information developed on the computer can still be preserved on the hard drive. While the loss of the idea represented by the configuration of the computer switches or the combination for the lock might amount to damage, such damage is damage to intangible property. It is not damage to the physical components of the computer or the lock, i.e., to those puters & More, 147 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1116 (W.D.Okla.2001) (<HOLDING>). The claims in the underlying actions assert 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in an insurance context that ajlone computer data cannot be touched held or sensed by the human mind it has no physical substance it is not tangible property (B) holding in 1894 that it is against the public policy of this state to allow any one who has no insurable interest to be the owner of a policy of insurance upon the life of a human being (C) holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights (D) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (E) holding that it is not
Output: (A)
or (2) establish an interest obligation pursuant to the court’s authority under 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2009) (establishing the court’s authority to equitably “divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just”), in lieu of awarding post-judgment interest pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1602-C(2), see Wormelle v. Howard, 526 A.2d 1390, 1391 (Me.1987), we conclude that Brown became a judgment debtor and became obligated to pay Habrle when the post-judgment grace period expired on or about November 2, 2007. The obligation to pay post-judgment interest began running upon the expiration of the court-ordered g discussing post-judgment interest due on child support arrearage, vacating only as to computation of such interest); Raymond v. Raymond, 480 A.2d 718, 723-26 (Me. 1984) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Because the September 2005 divorce 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because divorce proceedings are civil actions resulting in an order for judgment postjudgment interest was due under the statute on withheld alimony payments (B) holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment (C) holding that the trial court erred in denying as untimely a postjudgment motion to intervene filed promptly after judgment and noting that this holding was consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appeal (D) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (E) holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment
Output: (B)
fact exist regarding the reason for Plaintiffs failure to meet the NCAA’s eligibility requirements and thus whether the NCAA discriminated against him based on his learning disability. Furthermore, and most important to the outcome of the case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot in light of the fact that he will complete his fourth and final year of eligibility with the conclusion of the current football season. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim "public accommodation” also applies to services, privileges, and other intangibles independent of a physical place. See, e.g., Tompkins v. United Healthcare of N.E., Inc., 203 F.3d 90, 95 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., v. Auto. Wholesaler's Assn, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 18-20 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See, e.g., Chabner v. United of Omaha 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii (B) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada (C) holding that insurance company administering employerprovided disability plan was not place of public accommodation under ada because employees received their benefits through employment not through a public accommodation (D) holding that public accommodation within meaning of title iii of ada includes more than actual physical structures (E) holding that ada claim under title iii did not survive plaintiffs death
Output: (D)
before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status
Output: (D)
425 F.3d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir.2005) (mandatory conditions); United States v. Tulloch, 380 F.3d 8, 13-14 & n. 8 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (standard conditions). We also note that at least two other circuits have held that defendants have constructive notice for “special” conditions that become “recommended” when certain criteria are met. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 937 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Asunción-Pimental, 290 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir.2002) (stating that, where specific factors necessary to make “special” conditions “recommended” are present, “these ‘special’ conditions are no different in practical terms from ‘standard’ conditions, that is, they are generally recommended”). But see United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The financial disclosure condition imposed by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) holding that for purposes of revoking supervised release the applicable guidelines are those in effect at the time of the supervised release violations rather than those in effect at the time of initial offense (C) holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions (D) recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release (E) holding that conditions announced for the first time in a written judgment that govern more than the basic administration of supervised release violate a defendants right to be present at sentencing
Output: (E)
Id., 177 W.Va. at 322, 352 S.E.2d at 72. In Daily Gazette, we noted that “it seems evident that the legislature enacted these provisions with the ultimate purpose of improving the quality of medical care provided in the hospitals of this State.” Id., 177 W.Va. at 322, 352 S.E.2d at 71. See Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 185 W.Va. 59, 65, 404 S.E.2d 750, 756 (1991), cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 185, 116 L.Ed.2d 146 (1991), (noting that this Code section “evinces a public policy encouraging health care professionals to monitor the competency and professional conduct of their peers in order to safeguard and improve the quality of patient care”). In Daily Gazette, we also quoted from Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill.2d 468, 82 Ill.Dec. 382, 388, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (1984) (<HOLDING>) that “[T]he purpose of this legislation is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that failing to comply with hospital bylaws in connection with peer review proceeding did not vitiate peer review immunity (D) holding a similar peer review confidentiality statute did not deny the plaintiffs equal protection (E) holding that state and federal equal protection guarantees provide similar protections
Output: (D)
the attack is facial, the court determines whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Where the attack is factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See id.; McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction (B) recognizing that generally disputes between purchasers of a debtors assets and third parties are not within the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction but recognizing that disputes concerning the sale order itself may be sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that a court may review any evidence such as affidavits and testimony to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction (D) holding that in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a court may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings including affidavits (E) holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard
Output: (C)
told about the shooting by someone else; in such case, the third party’s out-of-court statement would constitute hearsay, and therefore, must independently satisfy a hearsay exception. See Tex.R. Evid. 805. We find that this contention is without merit. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex.R. Evid. 801(d). Although Anderson may have learned of the shooting from a third party, the State did not offer the third party’s statement into evidence. The only out-of-court statement offered into evidence was Anderson’s own statement. Therefore, the State was only required to show that Anderson’s statement falls within a hearsay exception. Passage of Time Appellant also contends that Anderson’s statement ston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that the record supports a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no excited utterance because declarant most likely deliberated about the offense during 10day lapse (B) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (C) holding no excited utterance because declarant had time to fabricate during oneyear lapse (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper
Output: (A)
The State, by contrast, argues that because the court’s summary denial of Pinholster’s claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Pinholster’s petition for writ of habeas corpus “on the substantive ground that it is without merit,” Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that “the California Supreme Court’s denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims” (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court
Output: (D)
in nature, but contains guidelines to ensure that the substantive right to counsel is protected.” State v. T.G., 800 So.2d 204, 211 (Fla.2001). The detailed inquiry and waiver verified by counsel are required by rule 8.165 to determine whether k waiver of counsel was made “knowingly and intelligently in consideration of [the juvenile’s] age, education,- experience, mental condition, and the nature and complexity of the case.” Id. at 212 (quoting P.L.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). The supreme court explained that if it appears from the face of the record that the trial court did not comply with the specific procedures of rule 8.165, including conducting a ‘thorough inquiry into the child’s comprehension of that offer [of the assistance of counsel] and th 2007) (<HOLDING>). The trial court’s failure to comply with rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fundamental error occurred because merely informing a juvenile of the role of counsel and asking the juvenile if he understands that he is giving up his right to counsel does not constitutethe thorough inquiry concerning the juveniles comprehension of the offer of counsel that is mandated by rule 8165b2 (B) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel (C) holding that juvenile and his parents must be advised of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings and the mothers knowledge that she could employ counsel was not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right (D) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (E) holding that the court without violating due process of the law may conduct a hearing to determine whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction even if the juvenile fails to appear if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juveniles behalf
Output: (A)
court found that "lilt is elementary that there can be no deputy without there first being a principal; the principal being the duly elected, qualified and acting official of the county." Id. at 290. The general and well-affirmed rule is that, in the absence of some statutory provision to the contrary, the commission or appointment of a deputy officer runs or continues only during the term of the officer making the appointment. Of course, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the principal has the right, at his pleasure, to remove his deputy. Id. (quoting Hord v. State, 167 Ind. 622, 79 N.E. 916, 922 (1907)). "If the principal officer is re-elected or reappointed for another term, his deputies must also be reappointed in order to continue them in office." Hord, 79 N.E. at 922 (<HOLDING>). Our court concluded in Roberts that, because 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where state attorney general files suit on behalf of a specified group of individuals that suit qualifies as a de facto class action and the statute of limitations is tolled during the period in which the individuals are participants in the attorney generals suit (B) holding that delegation of attorney regulation to judiciary did not prevent attorney generals prosecution of law for engaging in fraudulent business practices (C) holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term (D) holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney much less an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings (E) holding under section 1420 district attorney lacks authority to appoint deputy attorney general as an assistant prosecutor in a drug possession case
Output: (C)
to have prevailed in 1997, when this Court suspended numerous provisions of prior medical malpractice reform legislation as intruding on the Court’s exclusive powers under Section 10(c). See, e.g., 40 P.S. § 1301.813-A (Dilatory or frivolous motions, claims and defenses) (suspended). However, the Court’s efforts to define the limits of exclusivity of its procedural rulemaking powers solely in terms of the nebulous line between substance and procedure have yielded a number of facially implausible holdings. See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67, 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30, 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In the face of such decisions, one jurist has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment (B) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (C) holding that execution of a defendant who commits a capital crime while under the age of eighteen is prohibited by the eighth amendment (D) holding that substantive review is adequate (E) holding that a stay of a capital prisoners execution is substantive
Output: (E)
acts have “sufficient indicia of distinctness.” Id. These indicia “include the separation between the illegal acts by either time or physical distance, the quality and nature of the individual acts, and the objectives and results of each act.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Distinctness may also be established by the existence of an intervening event, the defendant’s intent as evinced by his or her conduct and utterances, the number of victims, and the behavior of the defendant between acts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, we will not find that a defendant’s conduct is unitary where the defendant completes one of the charged crimes before committing the other. See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 11, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the' question of whether a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants sentence for robbery was not inappropriate (B) holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery (C) holding that defendants conduct was not unitary where his attempted robbery of the victim began after he completed the murder of the victims boyfriend (D) holding in attempted murder case that testimony regarding victims medical prognosis properly admitted (E) holding defendants phone call to his exwife announcing his intent to kill the victim was not an unrelated act of misconduct and permissible to rebut defendants testimony that he did not threaten the murder victim
Output: (C)
without including a message of their own. “[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). Common sense dictates that the use of images of Plaintiff Bosley to sell video tapes, website memberships, or defendants’ other wares, at most, constitute commercial speech. The Supreme Court has noted that “advertising which ‘links a product to a cur rent public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (<HOLDING>) “Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine (B) holding that information pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech (C) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (D) recognizing that noncommercial speech is accorded greater protection under the first amendment than is commercial speech and striking down ordinance that imposed a greater restriction on political than on commercial billboards (E) recognizing that code is speech
Output: (B)
have not before explicitly considered — is whether we have jurisdiction to determine whether these jurisdictional facts are present. Drakes argues, and the government concedes, that we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(C). We agree, thus joining all of our sister circuits which have considered the issue. See, e.g., Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir.2001); Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir.2000): Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.2000); Lewis v. INS, 194 F.3d 539, 542 (4th Cir.1999); Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591, 597 n. 11 (5th Cir.2000); Diakite v. INS, 179 F.3d 553, 554 (7th Cir.1999) (per curiam); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.2000); see also Lettman v. Reno, 168 F.3d 463, 465 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), rev’d on other grounds, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases (B) holding that district courts retain jurisdiction after iirira to decide habeas corpus challenges involving pure questions of law (C) holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira (D) holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction (E) holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction
Output: (C)
liability under this rule is the “superior knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm of which the invitee, in the exercise of ordinary care, does not or should not know.” Jenkins v. Hestand’s Grocery, Inc., 320 Ark. 485, 898 S.W.2d 30, 31 (1995). An exception to this general rule of duty of care is found in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965) which states that a “possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Based on section 343A(1), a landowner has no liability to his invitees when the allegedly dangerous condition is open and obvious. See Jenkins, 898 S.W.2d at 31 (<HOLDING>). In this ease, Smith testified that she had 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception (B) recognizing such an exception (C) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (D) recognizing the restatements exception to the duty a landowner owes an invitee as articulated in section 343 (E) recognizing the public interest exception
Output: (D)
130 S.Ct. 1855; Smith, 130 S.Ct. 1382; Spisak, 130 S.Ct. 676; McDaniel, 130 S.Ct. 665; Knowles, 556 U.S. Ill, 129 S.Ct. 1411; Waddington, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S.Ct. 823; Wright, 552 U.S. 120, 128 S.Ct. 743; Uttecht, 551 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2218; Schriro, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S.Ct. 1933; Carey, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649; Rice, 546 U.S. 333, 126 S.Ct. 969; Kane, 546 U.S. 9, 126 S.Ct. 407; Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 125 S.Ct. 1432; Holland, 542 U.S. 649, 124 S.Ct. 2736; Yarborough, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140; Middleton, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S.Ct. 1830; Mitchell, 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7; Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1; Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166; Woodford, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 357; Early, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362; Bell, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843. 3 . See Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (<HOLDING>); Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 2062 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal circuit would henceforth apply its own law rather than regional circuit law to questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal and state law rights (B) holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law (C) holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied (D) holding that the sixth circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that of the supreme court in determining what is clearly established federal law (E) holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts
Output: (D)
the LOC will not be invalidated. Morgan’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted, and KLI’s illegality claim is dismissed. D. Plaintiffs’ Gambling Claim Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action alleges that the transactions at issue were “bets” in violation of the New York Anti-Gambling Statute. See N.Y. G.O.L. § 5-401. Although I have characterized KLI’s swap agreements as “bets” and “speculations” on currency fluctuations, the transactions were in the form of forward contracts, swaps and derivatives. Derivatives transactions, forward contracts and swap agreements in currencies and commodities are not considered illegal gambles, and do not violate New York’s gambling statute. See General Elec. Co. v. Metals Res. Group, 293 A.D.2d 417, 741 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1st Dep’t 2002) (<HOLDING>). As such, summary judgment is granted to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a commodities swap agreement is not an illegal contract to gamble  and is exempt from the strictures of   5401 (B) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (C) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (D) holding that an addition to an abated property is not exempt (E) holding that no action may be maintained on an illegal agreement
Output: (A)
the integrity and order of its territory and the welfare of its members ...” Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law ("Federal Indian Law ”), Ch. 4, § C5 at 252 (1982). 2 . The Bill of Rights is not applicable to Indian tribes. "Indian tribes are not states of the union within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional limitations on states do not apply to tribes.” Federal Indian Law, Ch. 12, § E2 at 664-65; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56, 98 S.Ct. at 1675-76 ("As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384, 16 S.Ct. 986, 989, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The ICRA has been held to apply for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws (C) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (D) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (E) holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury
Output: (A)