niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
a partial wage loss benefit. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-12a and b (seventy percent of weekly wages, subject to a statutory cap). Each benefit is payable for weeks the injured worker is unable to work because of the injury. This similarity further sways us towards the conclusion that the weekly benefit in either case is intended as a partial wage loss replacement for disability resulting from the work related injury or illness. Even if it can be said that total permanent disability compensation benefits contain some unspecified and unquantified component of indemnity for physical impairment, the overriding form, amount and purpose of the benefit is partial replacement of wages during the period of disability. See also Young v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 96 N.J. 220, 232, 475 A.2d 544 (1984) (<HOLDING>). “The workers’ compensation system is remedial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (B) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (C) holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits (D) holding that the workers compensation offset includes total social security disability benefits received by claimant and his dependents (E) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability
Output: (B)
990 So.2d 578, 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Analyte Diagnostics, Inc. v. D’Angelo, 792 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). Stated differently, the scope of the law of the case is “limited to rulings on questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal.” U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 487 So.2d 1061, 1068 (Fla. 1983); see also Gabor v. Gabor & Co., 599 So.2d 737, 738-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Gibson v. Maloney, 263 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). The applicability of rule 3.212(d)’s conditions was neither raised nor addressed in Petition I. Thus, our disposition in McCray did not foreclose the State from raising the argument anew upon release of the opinion. See, e.g., Arch Se. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abraham Commc’ns, Inc., 702 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Harbour Club Condo. No. Three, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that faa does not require appellate review of order interlocutory under state law denying motion to compel arbitration and overruling prior decision finding such a requirement (E) holding that prior per curiam affirmance of the trial courts decision denying motion to compel arbitration was not law of the case concerning whether buyer and seller entered into valid oral agreement settling disposition of escrowed money
Output: (E)
likely causes of the engine failure are related to components of the oil delivery system, components of the cylinder assembly, cracked crankcase or an oil leak in general, etc.” As such, the Court finds that Mr. Klepacki’s opinion regarding the more likely causes of engine failure should be excluded. Plaintiffs Expert Donald Sommer Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Sommer is qualified to testify as an expert on piloting and accident reconstruction, including engine failure analysis, the Court must still find that the process he used in forming his expert opinion is suffi ciently reliable under Daubert and its progeny. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony”); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (<HOLDING>). The Court must also find that the testimony 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial (B) holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility (C) holding that experts causation opinion based on statements made by plaintiff was not inherently unreliable (D) holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  (E) holding that rjulings on admissibility under daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered experts methodology
Output: (E)
this suit ... was a necessary incident to the attorney’s effort to establish [the defendants’ claim].” Id. Unlike Bosurgi, however, the plaintiffs allegations provide no “basis for an inference” that CARCO conferred authority on Steele to receive service. Cf. Santos v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 1092,1094 (2d Cir.1990) (noting that service on defendant State Farm’s attorneys was improper where the plaintiff offered “no basis for an inference that State Farm had authorized its attorneys to accept service of process”). Accordingly, the court determines that the plaintiff has not shown that Steel was an agent of CARCO for service and that the plaintiffs service on CARCO was therefore deficient. United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., Ill F.3d 878, 881 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); J. and L. Parking Corp. Inc. v. United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where an attorney exercises broad powers to represent a client in litigation these powers of representation alone do not create a specific authority to receive service (B) recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 (C) recognizing separation of powers doctrine (D) holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
Output: (A)
before the verdict, the appellate court overruled the complaint, stating: We believe that it would be wantonly unfair to allow a litigant to take his chances with the jury and later complain of misconduct when he is unhappy with the result. A party may not speculate on the result of a verdict and then for the first time complain of jury misconduct. Id. at 943. The Losiers respond that, unlike the situation in Alamo Carriage, the jury misconduct was witnessed by a non-lawyer employee of the Losiers’ law firm the day the jury returned its verdict, and there is no evidence the misconduct was actually brought to counsel’s attention before the jury returned its verdict. The Losiers cite as support Mercado v. Warner-Lambert Co., 106 S.W.3d 393 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the Losiers have not waived 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict (B) holding that appellant did not waive right to complain of jury misconduct not witnessed by appellants counsel (C) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (D) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (E) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel
Output: (B)
1219. 3 . Notably, qualified immunity and fair warning derive from two entirely separate sources. The fair warning requirement, which springs from the Due Process Clause, protects a defendant from criminal liability. See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617, 74 S.Ct. 808. Qualified immunity, on the other hand, is a common-law "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, which public officials typically invoke as a defense to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (applying qualified immunity to a police officer after noting that Congress never meant to abolish common-law immunities). 4 . Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-62, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 5 . To justify dismissing an action for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources (B) holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances (C) holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant (D) holding that the government must satisfy its burden of proving contract damages (E) holding that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proving the facts required for disqualification
Output: (A)
Section 1983 either when a defendant’s conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.” Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir.1991). An award that is “grossly excessive” violates the Due Process Clause because it denies individuals fair notice of the penalty to which his conduct could expose her. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1598, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, 825-826 (1996). To determine the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages, a court must refer to the three BMW guidepos that is given relatively low importance when compared to other BMW guideposts. See Arizona v. ASARCO LLC, 733 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir.2013) reh’g en banc granted, 755 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Defendants offer no further arguments to show 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages (B) holding that even if the trial court had erred in denying the defendants motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages the error was harmless because the jury found in favor of the defendant and never reached the punitive damages claims (C) holding a court may not award punitive damages (D) holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages (E) holding that perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendants conduct
Output: (E)
was an independent contractor. As an experienced reporter, Friedman controlled the manner in which the article was written— including the selection of a topic, research plan, and sources — without any guidance from the Voice. Voice editors reviewed the article only after Friedman completed a draft, and the editors subsequently made few substantive changes. Moreover, the terms and conditions of Friedman’s employment provide compelling evidence of his independent status: he did not receive a regular salary and was only paid for articles the Voice decided to publish; did not have a contract; did not receive fringe benefits; did not have taxes withheld; did not maintain an office at the Voice; and was not listed on the masthead of the Voice as a staff writer. See Nelson, 626 F.Supp. at 978 (<HOLDING>). By contrast, the Chaikens have provided no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding at summary judgment stage that terms and conditions of authors employment established he was independent contractor (B) holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage (C) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (D) holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff (E) holding that evidence of an employers 100healed policy was relevant to the issue of perceived disability at the summary judgment stage
Output: (A)
29-30 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(l)-(3)). The Commission says that Qwest failed to meet that burden here and the Phoenix Order so concluded. See id. at 32-33. We first address the issue of burden of proof. Although the statute says nothing about it, the Commission has determined through a notice-and-comment proceeding that the burden of proof — en compassing the burdens of both production and persuasion — is on the petitioner. See In the Matter of Petition to Establish Procedural Requirements to Govern Proceedings for Forbearance Under Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, As Amended, 24 FCC Rcd. 9543, 9554-55, ¶ 20 (2009) [hereinafter Forbearance Procedures Order], That construction of section 10(c) is entitled to our deference. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (<HOLDING>). And we believe the construction to be a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency (B) holding that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for chevron deference when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority (C) holding regulations entitled to chevron deference (D) holding that agency interpretations promulgated by noticeandcomment rulemaking warrant chevron deference (E) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority
Output: (D)
discs to also take a license to Lagadec, an allegedly-nonessential Sony patent. Tying arrangements have a long history in both the patent misuse and antitrust contexts. Much of the Supreme Court’s early patent misuse doctrine was developed in cases involving a challenge to some form of tying arrangement. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-91, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942), for example, the Court held that a tying arrangement where the patent license was conditioned upon the purchase of a separate, staple product amounted to patent misuse, because in such a case “the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the patentee’s sale of an unpatented product.” Id. at 493, 62 S.Ct. 402; see also III. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 1281 (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the early antitrust cases found 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief (B) holding that a patent alone does not confer market power necessary to show unlawful tying (C) holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction (D) holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services (E) holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid even where such aid may be necessary to secure life
Output: (B)
as saying, “[m]y feeling is, if I’m going to sentence someone to state prison or county jail it should always be followed by probation.” Martin v. State, 804 So.2d 360, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). When the court indicated that such a motion must be in writing, defense counsel asked for time to file a written motion. The court denied the request and sentenced him to a five year prison term. Subsequently, Tyler filed the motion to recuse in -writing. The court denied the motion, finding that it was legally insufficient. The court also denied a motion to correct sentence, which was based on the motion to disqualify. Denial of a motion for continuance for the purpose of filing a written motion to recuse is an abuse of discretion. See Reynolds v. State, 568 So.2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)(<HOLDING>). Clearly, an oral motion is insufficient. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing (B) holding that appellant did not preserve error because he failed to obtain ruling on motion for continuance (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (D) holding it was error for trial court not to grant a continuance when appellant moved in open court to disqualify judge or in the alternative for a continuance to file a proper motion (E) holding the record open for additional testimony amounts to a continuance
Output: (D)
after the FBI told Whitacre to get rid of the tapes. That friend, David Hoech, denied destroying any tapes. It follows that because no evidence was destroyed, its exculpatory nature could not have been apparent before its destruction. Furthermore, because Whitacre recanted his allegation that the FBI ordered him to destroy tapes — an allegation that was far from credible even when made — no evidence indicates bad faith by the government. b. Federal Wiretap Laws The defendants further contend that the tape recordings violated federal wiretap laws, and therefore must be excluded from trial based on 18 U.S.C. § 2515, which prohibits the evidentiary use of any illegally obtained tape recording. Two exceptions to § 2515 potentially apply. First, § 2511(2)(c) allows the use of tap Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 476 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that various data tapes were owned or obtained by the agency even though they were neither created by agency employees nor  currently located on agency property because the firm that created the tapes acted on behalf of the agency in creating the tapes (B) holding that defendants statements made to an informant were admissible even though the informant lied about his identity (C) holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording (D) holding that tapes made by fbi informant were admissible under  25112ed (E) holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca
Output: (D)
search at the police station, a small amount of marihuana was recovered from the defendant’s back pocket. In support of his decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun and marihuana, the judge found that Clinton reasonably concluded, after he saw the pipe with a bore, that the object was a gun. This finding was supported by the evidence. Clinton was entitled to apply his experience of twenty years as a Boston police officer to draw conclusions from his observations, and the judge, in turn, was entitled to consider such experience in making his factual findings. Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 407 (1974). It was proper for Clinton to assume that Ferguson was carrying the gun without a license. See Commonwealth v. Ferrioli, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 492 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation (B) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (C) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (D) holding that an arresting officer who had made a warrantless search of the defendants person on the basis of information from a reliable source that the defendant was armed could properly assume that the defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm (E) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown
Output: (D)
15:529.1. It is evident that the two twenty-four year sentences imposed on the defendant are legal and within the statutory range, thus, defendant’s assertion that his sentences exceed the maximum sentence allowed by law is meritless. However, we recognize that even a sentence which falls | Bwithin statutory limits may violate a defendant’s right against excessive punishment. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). Defendant also contends, in essence, his sentences were excessive because they were not individualized with respect to him. Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, a trial court in sentencing a defendant must state for the record those circumstances taken into account as well as the factual basis for the sentence imposed. State v. MacDonald, 390 So.2d 1276 (La.1980 89) (<HOLDING>). The jurisprudence does, however, indicate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary (B) holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary (C) holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent (D) holding that fifteen years for a second offender convicted of simple burglary was clearly not excessive (E) holding that the police have an automatic right to conduct a protective search of a burglary suspect because burglary is a crime for which an offender would likely be armed
Output: (D)
a permissive appeal, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. On October 27, 2014, this Court granted the petition for a permissive appeal to address whether Goldthwaite’s nuisance claims are preempted by the ICCTA. Standard of Review “This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s conclusions of law. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 882 So.2d 849, 852 (Ala.2003). “‘The appropriate standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is whether “when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [the pleader] to relief.” Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993); Raley v. Citibanc of Alaba Santa Fe Ry., 280 F.Supp.2d 919, 934-35 (D.S.D.2003)(<HOLDING>). Here, Goldthwaite seeks damages for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with respect to operation of side track (B) holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with regard to railway traffic (C) holding that the iccta preempted statelaw claims alleging tortious interference and seeking punitive damages (D) holding that the iccta preempted statelaw tortiousinterference claim (E) holding that the iccta preempted statelaw negligence and nuisance claims intended to interfere with railroads operation of switchyard
Output: (C)
the victims’ trailer with the intent to steal from them but without any intent to kill them. Thus, Walls description of what he thought the trial strategy would be is exactly the trial strategy presented by his counsel. Moreover, even if Walls’ testimony had been in direct conflict with the testimony of his attorneys, we would still recognize the trial court’s superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses. See Chandler v. State, 848 So.2d 1031, 1041 n. 11 (Fla.2003) (affirming denial of postcon-viction relief on a similar claim of conceding guilt where court found trial counsel’s testimony to be more credible than that of the defendant, who “waffled” on whether he agreed to the strategy in his testimony); see also Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1034 (Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the trial court sitting as the trier of fact conducts an evidencebalancing test from the vantage point of being best able to judge credibility of witnesses and the weight to be assigned thereto we will defer to its opinion (B) holding that superior court was in best position to make factual determination because it required assessing credibility and each partys testimony (C) recognizing that in any criminal trial the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is central (D) holding trial court free to evaluate credibility of witnesses (E) recognizing trial courts superior vantage point in assessing credibility of witnesses
Output: (E)
the service of process here under consideration if it were held retroactive, and the Court considers that question separately, infra. First we address our attention to the effect to be given our construction of § 24-113.1(b) by reason of the intervening amendment. It is obvious that the legislature had in its contemplation situations just like the one posed by the cases for decision today when it enacted § 24-113.1 (c). The question raised by the amendment is this: Did the Georgia legislature feel that § 24-113.1 (b) did not cover out-of-state negligence causing an in-state injury, and because of that feeling enact § 24-113.1 (c) to fill the “gap”, or was it simply confirming in more explicit terms the correctness of this Court’s rea 7 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493, 14 L.R.A. 721 (1891) (<HOLDING>). We accepted the test in Pritchard as stating 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is retroactive (B) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary (C) holding that retroactive application of amended guidelines provision is not plain error (D) holding that the act is not retroactive (E) holding retroactive application
Output: (E)
be overcome. The Director Defendants counter that Delaware state courts frequently dismiss duty of care claims based on a DGCL § 102(b)(7) exculpatory defense at the motion to dismiss stage of a suit. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del.2001). Yet, those Delaware courts were interpreting Delaware state procedural rules. The Director Defendants incorrectly assume that Delaware’s procedural rules concerning a motion to dismiss are equivalent to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Third Circuit stated, “Delaware cases are legion requiring specific allegations of fact to support a plaintiffs demand for relief under Chancery Rule 8.” Tower Air, 416 F.3d at 236; see also Notinger v. Costa. (In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc.), 374 B.R. 36, 44 (Bankr.D.N.H.2007) (<HOLDING>). Relying on Delaware state court decisions, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (B) recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard (C) holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter (D) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 (E) holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases
Output: (B)
significant understatements of liability totaling over $1 million. Accordingly, the court concludes that defendant is subject to penalty under I.R.C. § 6694. IV. CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER I.R.C. § 7402 In addition to the injunctions sought under I.R.C. §§ 7407 and 7408, the Government also seeks an injunction pursuant to I.R.C. § 7402. This statute grants the district courts of the United States the authority “to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” As set out above, the conduct of defendant has resulted, inter alia, in significant understatements of tax liability and, consequently, is subject to an injunction under I.R.C. § 7402. See United States v. Cohen, 222 F.R.D. 652, 657 (W.D.Wash.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Franchi, 756 F.Supp. 889, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax (B) holding that us was entitled to injunction under  7402 for defendants provisions of false and fraudulent tax advice through his website and his sales of forms and documents that result in substantial understatements tax liabilities (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding that  1983 is not an exception to the state tax injunction act (E) holding that plaintiffs who received fraudulent tax advice and acted in reliance on the advice though only alleging a future risk of being assessed penalties for acting on the advice had alleged an injuiyinfact
Output: (B)
of the defendant following a bench trial. We affirm. The plaintiff sued the defendant for civil theft. See § 772.104, Fla. Stat (1995). The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs civil theft claim failed, as he failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with criminal intent. At the end of the proceedings, the plaintiff made an ore tenus motion to amend the pleadings to add a claim for fraudulent inducement in conformity with the evidence. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion to amend to conform with the evidence. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Nunez, 646 So.2d 831 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>), review denied 658 So.2d 992; see also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (C) holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion (D) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (E) holding that a trial courts decision to permit or to refuse amendments to pleading to conform to the evidence during trial will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal in absence of abuse of discretion
Output: (E)
of the case.” See First Community Bank v. In re E.M. Williams & Sons, Inc. (In re E.M. Williams & Sons, Inc.), 2009 WL 1321034 at *3 (Bankr.E.D.Va. May 8, 2009) (“Both the Plaintiff and the Trustee admit that the Partnership had agreed pre-petition to deed the Real Property to the Debtor.... The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to conclude, as the Plaintiff and the Trustee both stipulate, that the Debtor had an equitable interest in the Real Property, which interest became property of the Debtor’s estate on the Petition Date pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(1).”), aff'd, 2010 WL 1279094 (E.D.Va. Mar.30, 2010). Depending on the circumstances, this could be true even if the agreement was oral. See Skiba v. Sipple (In re Sipple), 400 B.R. 475, 479 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2009) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, if the Debtor did not have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds (B) holding that to establish an exception to the statute of frauds it must first be shown that an agreement to convey was actually reached that an oral contract must be established by clear and convincing evidence and that the chapter 7 trustee failed to establish that there was any parol contract for conveyance of property from debtors parents to the debtor (C) holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds (D) holding that where an oral contract was removed from the statute of frauds by clear and convincing evidence under arkansas law the defendant could not terminate the contract at its will only a contract of indefinite duration may be so terminated  (E) holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous
Output: (B)
in the state court. The Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Court of Claims Act, 705 Ill.Comp.Stat. 50% et seq., which provides for sovereign immunity for the actions brought against the state or its officials unless such a suit is filed in the Illinois Court of Claims. Wells v. Vincennes Univ., 982 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.1992). Any state law remedy which may be available to plaintiffs must come in a state court action. See Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that, because of the Eleventh Amendment, the plaintiffs claims against the state could not be brought in federal court, and entering judgment against plaintiff without prejudice so that he might file suit in Illinois Court of Claims); see also Magdziak v. Byrd, 96 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The court’s determination that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that tort actions brought against a state actor must be brought in the illinois court of claims and the district courts dismissal of such claims was proper (B) holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act (C) holding that this language applies to tort claims brought under the federal tort claims act  against a contractor who has a selfdetermination contract (D) holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court (E) holding that ethical violations may be relevant to tort claims brought against attorneys
Output: (A)
at 805. Law and Analysis Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral examination or written questions either: (a) to perpetuate or obtain the person’s own testimony or that of any other person for use in an anticipated suit; or (b) to investigate a potential claim or suit. Tex.R. Civ. P. 202.1. The City contends that the trial court erred by ordering its employees deposed because “U.S. Filter failed to state any valid potential state law cause of action which could serve as the future basis for bringing suit in state court against the City.” Specifically, the City contends that it is immune from any state law claims and that the on ouston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). There is no requirement in Rule 202 that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that private individuals who conspired with judge could be sued even though judge could not (B) holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant (C) holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal (D) holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him (E) recognizing that judge who continued to function after end of term was a de facto judge whose actions could not be collaterally attacked
Output: (A)
540 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004) (citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986)). 20 . See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., Criminal No. 03-48-A (E.D.Va. December 9, 2003) (Ex Parte Order). 21 . Only one of the six charged defendants — • Cuong Gia Le — had been charged prior to the return of the Superseding Indictment. 22 . See Schwartz, 372 F.2d at 682 (citing Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356). 23 . The statute also provides a limited "safe harbor" for a voluntary confession made after arrest, but before arraignment, "if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 534 n. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas law governs the procedural matter of preservationoferror requirements even if another jurisdictions law governs substantive issues (B) holding that  3501 not mcnabbmallory governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court (C) holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix (D) holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law (E) holding that federal common law governs equitable remedies available under erisa
Output: (B)
theory’s failure in part to the fact that the plan service provider had never exercised the power to substitute the funds on the menu. However, the Court still acknowledged the analytical significance of whether the Plan had the ultimate authority over investment option substitutions: “[The Plan Servicer] reserves the right to make substitutions to the funds that [the Plan Trustee] chooses to offer Plan participants, and thus there is at least some basis for questioning whether [the Plan Servi-cer] has ‘the final say on which investment options will be included.’ But Leimkueh-ler concedes that [the Plan Servicer] has never exercised this contractual right in a way that could give rise to a claim.” Id. at 911 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 583); see also Santomenno, 2013 WL 3864395, at *7 (<HOLDING>); Zang et al. v. Paychex, Inc., 728 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu (B) holding that service provider which offered a big menu of investment options from which 401k the plan trustee selected a smaller plan menu was not a fiduciary because provider did not have ultimate authority over which investments were included in the plans (C) holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where he alleged that the plan offered funds that charged higher fees than available alternatives that underperformed during the relevant time period and that were included in the plan because of improper influence by the plans trustee (D) holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary (E) holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so
Output: (B)
918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court’s decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement
Output: (E)
it was in violation of the bankruptcy stay and, therefore, the justice court was without jurisdiction to enter it. Judgments — even final ones — that are void for jurisdictional defects are subject to collateral attack. Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex.1985); Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 294-95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Zarate v. Sun Operating, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 617, 620-21 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). But the ability to collaterally attack a judgment is limited by the long-standing and well-settled rule that we must presume the validity of the judgment under attack and, thus, extrinsic evidence may not be used to establish a lack of jurisdiction. See In re A.G.G., 267 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 914 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider custody dispute before a divorce or separation action had commenced (B) holding that extrinsic evidence of applicability of automatic stay could not be considered because divorce decree on its face recited that trial court had jurisdiction of matter and no evidence in record of divorce proceeding affirmatively showed that automatic stay deprived trial court of jurisdiction (C) holding that district court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims that his constitutional rights were violated in state divorce proceeding (D) holding that the jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to support and maintenance is statutorily determined unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated into the divorce decree (E) holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce
Output: (B)
or had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. Finally, the IJ denied Plesea’s applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Plesea did not establish that he had suffered past persecution and, therefore, was not entitled to a presumption of future persecution. The BIA expressly declined to reach the IJ’s findings that Plesea’s application was not timely and that he was not credible. However, even though the BIA’s decision did not mention the IJ’s finding that Plesea had firmly resettled in Italy, the BIA affirmed that finding when it cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994). See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s denial of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted (B) holding no due process violation where the bia affirms the ijs decision without issuing a separate opinion (C) holding that we will not review portions of an ijs ruling that are not adopted by the bia (D) holding the bias decision upholding the ijs finding of removability  was the final order (E) holding that the bia adopts the ijs entire decision when it cites burbano and expresses no disagreement with the ijs decision
Output: (E)
of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.” Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (“established rule” is that “recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) (recognition is retroactive in effect); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-330, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition is retroactive). Further, the FSIA itself is retroactive in application and applies to actions of foreign sovereigns prior to the passage of the FSIA. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1, (2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the FSIA would apply to all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fsia applied retroactively to actions of the austrian government in 1948 (B) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (C) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively
Output: (A)