niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
there was no explicit delineation of which subjects were permitted. Therefore, the Policy did not regulate viewpoints on a list of permitted subjects; it simply eliminated one subject, religion, from the subjects that could be discussed in this nonpublic forum. Therefore, the Building Authority claims that it properly exerted its right to exercise its control over the nonpublic forum lobby in a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral manner: Its Policy prohibits all religious displays and symbols. It further suggests that there is no evidence that it would allow, under private sponsorship, secular seasonal holiday displays. We cannot accept these attempts to distinguish the clear teaching of Lamb’s Chapel. As the court’s colloquy with counsel at oral argument made quite clear, the Poli (<HOLDING>); cf. AIDS Action Comm, of Mass., Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the military judge has considerable discretion to exclude relevant evidence under military rule of evidence 403 (B) holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay (C) holding that the exclusion of peace activists from career days when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpointbased administration (D) holding exclusion was harmless error (E) holding exclusion was not ambiguous
Output: (C)
becoming final, and the filing of his first state habeas petition. Ramos offered no justification for this 240-day delay, which is substantially longer than the 90-day period in which the courts presume timeliness under California law. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317 (1998) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal.”). Without the required justification for his delay, Ramos’s state petitions were not “properly filed,” making the time they were pending before the California courts ineligible for statutory tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Without statutory tolling of the time his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an unexplained gap of 101  days between filing of state habeas petitions made petition untimely under california law and not subject to statutory tolling (B) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (C) holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time (D) holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing (E) holding that the filing of a first federal habeas petition is not an application for other collateral review under the tolling provision of  2244d
Output: (A)
that, although the trial court was initially prepared to suppress based solely on the deputies’ conduct in providing Gomez’s name, the court ultimately applied the Neil factors and, finding that the identification was unreliable, ruled the state failed to establish that the witness’ recollection was independent of the suggestive identification. On these facts, the trial court could properly conclude that it was unnecessarily suggestive for the victims to be provided the defendant’s name and resulting access to his photo on the website before having any opportunity to identify him, thus giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See generally Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005)(quoting Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding showing of a single photo is unduly suggestive (D) holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight (E) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive
Output: (C)
judgment for $20,000 as emotional distress damages sustained on this claim. Levi first argues the district court committed error in determining which state’s law should apply. We disagree. The district court properly applied the relevant choice-of-law principles and determined California law applied. Levi next argues this cause of action arises exclusively in tort and, consequently, the one-year statute of limitations for torts applies to Tolan’s claim. See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 340(3) (West Supp.1984). Because Tolan filed this action approximately thirteen months after his discharge, Levi argues Tolan’s claim is time-barred. See id. Again, we disagree. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 700 & n. 42, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 239 & n. 42, 765 P.2d 373, 401 & n. 42 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Under the California statute of limitations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding that in the employment context cause of action seeking tort remedies for breach of implied covenant is not permitted recovery for breach of this covenant is limited to contract remedies (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach
Output: (C)
plan description. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on this claim. James then filed a motion to reconsider, arguing for the first time that the defendants also breached their fiduciary duty by not informing him of the out-of-network status of the Rush providers during his April 7, telephone conversations with Concert. The district court denied James’s motion to reconsider, holding that it was too late to raise an argument premised on the April 7 telephone conversations. By not presenting a timely argument to the district court premised on the April 7 telephone calls, James waived any argument that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty based on those telephone calls. Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 567, 561 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The en banc court, though, holds that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court (D) holding that a litigant who fails to raise an argument in opposition to a properly raised motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to raise that same argument later either in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal (E) holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below
Output: (D)
502 F.3d at 269. The Circuit explained that this ruling was based on the officer’s “limited training in law,” and the fact that an on-the-scene analysis of the “ramifications of the statute of limitations defense” would be “too heavy a burden.” Id. In contrast, in Radich, the Circuit held that where a potential arrestee argues, prior to arrest, affirmative defenses that are specifically included in the statute setting forth the elements of the crime, then an officer must act “reasonably ... under the facts and circumstances” k d that “as a matter of law, self-defense is not the type of affirmative defense that officers must consider or disclose in affidavits of probable cause.” Gorman, 947 F.Supp.2d at 523; see also Lue v. Borough of Collingdale, 2015 WL 70931, at *5 (E.D.Pa.2015) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Cuneo, 2012 WL 4926471, at *6 
 Holding statements: (A) holding corrections officers are not law enforcement officers under  41412 (B) holding that arkansas would not adopt the approach of reliance to resolve this case (C) holding that the elements of a criminal necessity defense under  951 are the same as the civil privilege defense (D) holding that counsels dual roles as prosecutor and defense counsel in the same county were inherently antagonistic and thus created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification (E) holding that officers are not required to resolve this inherently factbound defense of selfdefense on the scene
Output: (E)
each witness to $40 per day). Because no contract or other statute authorizes fees in excess of $40 in this case, we find no error. III. Conclusion For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of Defendant in the amount of $21,070.10. AFFIRMED. 1 . Defendant argues that the specific rule at issue here, Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B), is procedural and therefore does not apply in federal court for purposes of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Because we conclude that Defendant would win even if the rule were substantive and applied, we do not decide this issue. In any case, we observe that Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B) is likely substantive. Cf. Horowitch v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc., 645 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The full text of Rule 1.442(c)(2) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (B) holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned (C) holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added (D) holding that while rule 68 does not explicitly require that an offer of settlement under that rule be made in writing its requirement that the offer be served upon the adverse party implies as much (E) holding that rule 1442c2fs requirement that the proposal state whether attorneys fees are included is substantive because it prescribes specific substantive terms that an offer of judgment must include and which are material to an offerees ability to evaluate an offer
Output: (E)
Plaintiffs did not provide translated documents. The United States and Italy are both signatories to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”). The Supreme Court set out the test for the applicability of the Hague Service Convention in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988). The Convention itself states that it shall apply “in all cases ... where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699, 108 S.Ct. 2104 (citing 20 U.S.T. 362, 362), and the Supreme Court held that whether an “occasion ... for service abroad” existed depended on the internal la (N.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). Generally, the Hague Convention requires each 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that service was not perfected on the defendant german corporation because the plaintiff had failed tostrictly comply with the servieeofprocess requirements of the hague convention (B) holding that service of process by international registered mail from germany to the united states satisfied the hague convention and constitutional due process (C) holding because fla stat  48161 required sending of notice and process directly to the defendant under schlunk hague convention applies (D) holding hague convention applies to service of foreign defendant pursuant to fla stat  48181 and 48161 (E) holding that the hague service convention is selfexecuting
Output: (C)
have implied, though not stated directly, that the Remmer presumption is clearly established federal law under AEDPA, meaning state courts must apply the Remmer presumption to avoid running afoul of the federal Constitution. See Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 942-43 (7th Cir.2004) (stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, “The post-conviction court’s finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party”); see also Wisehart, 408 F.3d at 326-28 (noting in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the State must carry the burden of showing harmlessness in a Remmer hearing); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In Wisehart v. Davis, for instance, we 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a postaedpa habeas case that the remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury implying that the remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context (B) holding that the remmer presumption did not apply where the communication was innocuous and the defendant had failed to present evidence that the communication was prejudicial (C) recognizing presumption (D) recognizing a remmer presumption but noting that sometimes the circumstances are such that the remmer presumption does not even apply (E) holding in  2254d context that the state court did not unreasonably apply remmer in concluding wolfe failed to show that a jurors numerous telephone conversations during the course of jury deliberations constituted an impermissible external jury influence
Output: (A)
F.3d 967, 974 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008)). If the court is not allowed to rely on factual statements included in an unobjected-to PSR because those statements were based on police reports, it follows the court should not be allowed to rely on other unadopted statements similarly based on police reports. See United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219, 221-22, 226 (4th Cir.2010) (vacating sentence because district court erred in relying on facts included in the transcript for an Alford plea when such facts were the prosecution’s proffer for the plea and had not been accepted or admitted by the defendant); United States v. Weicks, 362 Fed.Appx. 844, 848 (9th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); cf. McCall, 439 F.3d at 973-74 (rejecting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (B) holding that police were justified in arresting person on basis of information provided directly to police by named citizen informer reliance on the information was justified in part because the informant by giving her name presumably knew that the police could arrest her for making a false report (C) holding that an ij could not consider a police report as part of the record of conviction to determine whether an alien had committed a firearms offense because the police report could encompass many offenses with which the alien was never charged or convicted (D) holding that the plaintiff may not rely on expenses for identity theft protection as a basis for standing (E) holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction
Output: (E)
computed from its own shares (200), Ella’s holdings (25), and the shares owned by Ella’s children (John — 40, Hank — 40, Ellen Hicks — 40). Following the redemption, the Trust’s constructive holdings were reduced to 145 shares (25 owned by Ella, 120 held by her children). Only 11 other shares remained actually outstanding (Hicks — 5, Winkler — 6); therefore, the Trust held 345/356 shares, or 97%, before and 145/156b shares, or 93%, immediately after the redemption. When the district court made this comparison it included the seventy-five option shares held by Hicks. Accordingly, the district court determined that the Trust held 80% of the company before redemption (345/431), and 62.8% after redemption (145/231). Because the Trust no longer controlled the company after the redemption (<HOLDING>), the district court concluded that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fee substantially less than the lodestar amount is permissible (B) holding less than twothirds of the stock (C) holding that apprendi does not apply where the defendant was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum (D) holding that demands for benefits not less than 10 million dollars contributions greater than 50 million dollars and less than 100 million dollars and attorneys fees not less than 150000000 were ambiguous and did not satisfy the sum certain requirement (E) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law
Output: (B)
1995 WL 779275, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29,1995) (recognizing that Second Circuit takes the view that section 524(e) does not limit a bankruptcy court’s section 105 injunctive power). III. Adamson’s Threats Give Rise to a Justiciable Controversy 35. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, a bankruptcy court may enter declaratory relief, whenever a party poses a real threat of litigation. Actual threats of litigation, such as the Adamson Letter, constitute a real and immediate controversy sufficient to convey jurisdiction on the Court. See, e.g., Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2829, 115 L.Ed.2d 998 (1991); YWCA v. HMC Entertainment, Inc., 1992 WL 279361, at *2, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1992) (<HOLDING>). 36. Letters indicating a party’s intent to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the case or controversy requirement applies with equal force to actions for declaratory judgment (B) recognizing that it is not essential for there to be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the declaratory judgment act (C) holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment (D) holding that letter stating that the defendant was fully prepared to take all necessary legal action in order to protect defendants work was sufficient to show an actual threat of litigation and created a case or controversy for the purposes of the declaratory judgment act (E) holding that to establish jurisdiction in action for declaratory judgment controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to defendant
Output: (D)
the forum State.”). TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace Eur. Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d at 1287-88. Thus, to establish specific personal jurisdiction that satisfies due process, a plaintiff must present evidence of “three salient factors that together indicate ‘purposeful direction’: (a) an intentional action ... that was (b) expressly aimed at the forum state ... with (c) knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state.” Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at 1239-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has held, however, that the mere foreseeability of harm occurring in a particular forum will not support a finding of minimum contacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)(<HOLDING>). In Roberts v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 100 N.M. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose thus indicating that it is foreseeable that a particular automobile may cause injury in a forum state  foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the due process clause (B) holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction (C) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that choiceoflaw provisions are alone insufficient to establish jurisdiction although they can reinforce a deliberate affiliation with the forum state and the reasonable foreseeability of possible litigation there (E) holding ejven though it is foreseeable that injury may arise by the negligent issuance of a credit card foreseeability alone does not give rise to duty
Output: (A)
Supreme Court created Bankruptcy Rule 3001 for a reason — so that debtors and other parties in interest can see and read the documents upon which claims are based in order to make an initial assessment of their validity. This Court does not believe that the Supreme Court contemplated that creditors could ignore Bankruptcy Rule 3001’s requirements unless and until a debtor complains and then cry “no harm, no foul” by producing documents that should have been produced initially. This latter scenario subverts the fundamental process by which the American legal system is based — that a claimant must come forward with at least some evidence that its claims are valid before collecting on their claims. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Though efficiency and the speedy resolution 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing burden (B) recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial (E) holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense
Output: (B)
that the State of Colorado is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the District Court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim against Colorado for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We next turn to the court’s decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim against the University of Colorado Board of Regents for lack of standing. We need not address this issue, however, because the Colorado Board of Regents is, like the state itself, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 494 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e have no doubt that UNMSM, its Regents, and the Committee on Admissions are ‘arms of the state,’ entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 69 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hensel v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (B) holding that the university of californias board of regents is shielded from suit under the eleventh amendment (C) holding that a debtors adversary proceeding against the university of virginia to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a suit for eleventh amendment purposes (D) holding that governors duty to nominate and appoint members of the board of regents of the university of hawaii is subject to a reasonable time standard judged by the totality of the circumstances (E) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981
Output: (B)
298 (1989) (“NOPSI ”), we hold that it is generally appropriate for a district court to abstain on Burford grounds only when asked to provide equitable relief. Alternatively, we hold that even if Burford abstention would be available when a district court is not asked to grant equitable relief, the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it declined to abstain on Burford grounds. We therefore affirm. I. Background Because we are reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, we must accept as true the allegations of the complaint. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir.1993) (reviewing grant of motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>). We accordingly relate the plaintiffs’ version 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se complaint  should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (B) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief  (E) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
Output: (C)
of the debt itself that is the key factor in determining dischargeability.” 21 B.R. at 912. Therefore, in determining whether a debt to a former spouse is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, the court must look behind the designation assigned by a state court, or by the parties themselves, as to whether or not a particular obligation was in the nature of support or a property settlement, and to determine the true nature of the obligation. Parisi v. White, 26 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr.R.I.1983). With this test in mind, we turn to the relevant factors in determining wheth er payments are m the nature of support. Whether the payments are made contingent upon conditions reflecting a need for support is one relevant factor. Cf. Warren v. Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 104 (Bankr.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present case the child support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony (C) holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock (D) holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home (E) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer
Output: (B)
The husband specifically argues that the trial court’s judgment awarding the wife 20% of KRIP, LLC (“KRIP”), was in error because, he says, that corporation is governed by an operating agreement that prevents the transfer of any membership interest without the consent of the other members. The operating agreement of KRIP specifically provides: “No Membership Interest shall be Disposed of ...[,] whether voluntarily or involuntarily, by operation of law or otherwise, without the consent of all the remaining Members .... ” The husband testified that KRIP is owned by him and Ryan Smith, who is the managing member. Smith was not added pp.1999) (noting that “the Partnership Agreement governed Husband’s assignment to Wife”); Nilsen v. Hanson, 709 A.2d 1190, 1191 (Me.1998) (<HOLDING>); Castonguay v. Castonguay, 306 N.W.2d 143, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that in a divorce action one partys limited partnership interest could not be assigned to the other party without the consent of the general partner (B) holding that a partnership agreement that contained prohibitions against the sale or assignment of a partners interest in the partnership without the others consent would be enforced (C) holding a mechanic working in a garage owned by a partnership is an employee of the partnership not the individual partner (D) holding one partner can not sic maintain an action at law against another partner to recover an amount claimed by him by reason of partnership transactions until there has been a final settlement of the affairs of the partnership (E) holding that a partner who is without actual authority has no power to bind the partnership in a transaction that is not within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business any person dealing with a partner can only rely on the partners acts if they are within the ordinary and apparent scope of the partnership business
Output: (A)
or outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, in light of the evidence discussed above that Sergeant McNicholas had conspired to manufacture the evidence on which such a conviction would be based— viz., the Mejias’ possession of the cocaine, his actions do begin to take on an extreme and outrageous character. Second, Sergeant McNicholas’s alleged repeated use of ethnic slurs against them during the course of the Mejias’ arrest and subsequent interrogation would probably be sufficient on its own to state a claim for IIED. Several courts have held that a police officer’s use of ethnic slurs, when coupled with use of excessive force, is sufficient to state an IIED claim. See, e.g., Holder v. Ivanjack, 39 F.Supp.2d at 970 (applying Illinois law) (<HOLDING>); Oliver v. Cuttler, 968 F.Supp. 83, 93 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff stated iied claim where officer allegedly hurled racial epithets at him and struck him without provocation (B) holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed (C) holding that plaintiff stated iied claim where officers yelled racial slurs at attacked and filed false charges against him (D) holding that the use of racial slurs and menacing remarks constitute severe conduct (E) holding that motorists allegation that racial epithet was used against him coupled with officers justifiable use of force did not state iied claim
Output: (C)
manslaughter. Wilson v. State, 871 So.2d 298, 301 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App. 2004). Although Harris contends that his counsel should have correctly instructed him as to the voluntary-intoxication defense, these allegations are not enough to overcome the heavy burden of proof required to show ineffective assistance. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314. Harris offers no explanation as to why his trial counsel should have pursued the voluntary-intoxication defense. The evidence presented at trial and at the suppression hearing demonstrated that Harris was not intoxicated or under the influence at the time he committed the offense. Therefore, any argument that counsel would have made regarding voluntary intoxication would have been inconsistent with the evidence. See, e.g., White, 972 F.2d at 1221 (<HOLDING>). Because Harris has not produced any evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings (B) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense (C) holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense (D) holding that an attorney was ineffective for failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense because he did not understand the elements (E) holding counsels strategic decision not to present a voluntary intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel determined the murder was not committed while floyd was under the influence of cocaine
Output: (A)
above, Hotel Eden’s motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction or for forum non conveniens are denied. The parties should appear for a scheduling conference on May 7, 2002, at 4:30 p.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Travel Bound's facsimile cover sheet refers to itself as "A Gulliver’s Company.” Cert, of Andrew Jacobs, Ex. N. 2 . There is no jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a), because there is an insufficiently strong connection between the reservations made inside the State of New York and the tort itself (requiring that causes of action brought under § 302(a) arise out of the non-domiciliary’s contacts with New York). See Noble v. Singapore Resort Motel of Miami Beach, 21 N.Y.2d 1006, 1008, 290 N.Y.S.2d 926, 927, 238 N.E.2d 328 (1968) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (C) holding that two meet ings in new york and numerous telephone calls and correspondence to new york were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction (D) holding that reservations made inside the state of new york were not closely related enough to alleged tort within florida hotel to warrant jurisdiction under cplr  302 (E) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree
Output: (D)
agree. Because Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies, we do not have jurisdiction where “the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (quotation omitted); see also McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc). As Buntin is no longer employed by the Board, the injunction enjoining the Board from assigning her duties not prescribed by Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 159.140 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) no longer affects her legal interests. We therefore conclude that Buntin’s request for injunctive relief is moot. Cf. Ahmed v. University of Toledo, 822 F.2d 26, 27 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION Because we conclude that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed (B) holding that the defendant school officials did not create the students danger or increase their risk of harm where female students were physically verbally and sexually molested by male students in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom (C) holding moot the plaintiffs challenge to a universitys requirement that foreign students carry health insurance where named plaintiffs were no longer students at the university (D) holding that female students claim was moot because the university they were suing had already established a womens lacrosse team which was the relief the students originally sought (E) holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations
Output: (C)
sufficient that the named representatives’ claims are representative of other class members. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (“presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs’ interests and vice versa”); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (“[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.”); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev’d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 85. In this case, the named plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation (B) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (C) holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim (D) holding that the state has interest apart from affected individuals in antitrust suit against railroads for price fixing that discriminated against georgia shippers (E) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
Output: (A)
representative the right of action which accrued to the deceased at common law. See Harvey v. Hassinger, 315 Pa.Super. 97, 461 A.2d 814, 817 (1983). A survival action is brought by the personal representative of the decedent, and is an action which the decedent himself could bring had he survived and, in effect, is brought on behalf of the decedent. See In re Pozzuolo’s Estate, 433 Pa. 185, 249 A.2d 540, 544 (1969). In order to succeed on his claims of wrongful death and survival action on behalf of Keith Ketchmore and Markeith Ketchmore, respectively, Donlan must establish that the defendants were negligent with respect to the care of Markeith Ketchmore. See Estate of Zimmerman v. S.E.P.T.A., 168 F.3d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 1999); Carroll v. Colon, 608 F.Supp. 1277, 1279 (E.D.Pa.1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in consideration of the facts pleaded, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding act 111 valid under pennsylvania constitution (B) holding that pennsylvania law applied as the parties did not argue choice of law issue and implied that pennsylvania law applied by focusing their arguments on same (C) holding that when majority of class lived in new jersey maryland pennsylvania and virginia the eastern district of pennsylvania was a desirable forum (D) holding that an amended complaint alleging injuries to the driver caused by an auto accident which were allegedly the result of defendants negligence and that pennsylvania survival act was the basis for the cause of action stated a valid survival claim under pennsylvania law (E) holding that we are required to predict the position which the pennsylvania supreme court would take in resolving this dispute  and in the absence of a clear statement by the pennsylvania supreme court to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in pennsylvania law we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of this court
Output: (D)
3105, *2 (N.D.Ill.1985) (recognizing an exception to the general rule precluding shareholder suits for injuries to the corporation where there is a special duty, such as a contractual duty, between the wrongdoer and the shareholder, but holding that, under Illinois law, where plaintiff’s complaint alleges dissipation of stock due to mismanagement of the corporation, the real harm is to the corporation, not the plaintiff); Cunningham v. Kartridg Pak Co., 332 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa 1983) ("In order to bring an individual cause of action for direct injuries a shareholder must show that the third-party owed him a special duty or that he suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by the other shareholders.”). 2 . See Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Holland v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that standing to sue under a contract requires plaintiff to be in privity or be an intended thirdparty beneficiary (B) holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply (C) holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them (D) holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship (E) holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status
Output: (C)
746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 20, 979 P.2d 799. Although we have cautioned against saddling defendants with a choice between ineffective counsel and no counsel at all, that is not the case presented here. As we have noted above, supra ¶¶ 15-17, Waterfield has not demonstrated that good cause — such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict — existed for substitution of counsel. Moreover, prior to the denial of substitute counsel, Waterfield had made two requests to proceed pro se and had informed the court that he was prepared to do so. On this record, we conclude that the district court could find that Waterfield’s waiver was voluntary. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 20, 979 P.2d 799 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 28 The colloquy conducted by the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se (B) holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se (C) holding that a defendants decision to proceed pro se was voluntary despite having to choose between that course and proceeding with counsel with whom he had expressed dissatisfaction because the defendant had not shown good cause for substitution of counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial (E) holding that a defendants waiver was invalid where he was required to choose between proceeding with unprepared counsel or no counsel
Output: (C)
¶1 In light of this Court’s decision in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, 293 Mont. 224, 975 P.2d 312, Cory Rosales moved the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, to amend his sentence for the conviction of felony assault and the use of a weapon pursuant to § 46-18-221, MCA. The District Court dismissed his motion due to the running of the five-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief. Rosales appeals. We affirm the District Court. ¶2 On appeal, Rosales asks us to reconsider two procedural bars effective in a case similar to his, State v. Nichols, 1999 MT 212, 295 Mont. 489, 986 P.2d 1093. Specifically, he asks us to reverse our decision on the application of the statute of limitations and the bar against retroactive application of the law. Cf. Nichols (<HOLDING>). Rosales asserts that it would be inequitable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both procedural bars precluded the defendant from moving the court to amend his sentence on the basis of guillaume (B) holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal (C) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (D) holding bars failure to present evidence on an issue to which the parties had stipulated precluded the attorney from challenging the accuracy of the finding (E) holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal
Output: (A)
seasonal in nature. Likewise, Labounty is distinguishable as that case dealt only with the “exclusive” requirement of adverse possession, not the “actual,” “open,” or “notorious” requirements that are at issue here. The parties disagree when the statute of limitations for adverse possession was tolled and hence, the court has found several benchmarks. It is undisputed, and the court finds, that in the summer of 2002 the discussion over the fence between the Plaintiff and the Defendants is an act that tolled the statute of limitations. Additionally, the court finds that in late fall 2001, when Sipas cleared brush and put stakes and string around the boundaries of Lot 23C, the statute of limitations was tolled. See Mendonca v. Cities Serv. Oil Co. of Pennsylvania, 354 Mass. 323 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Lastly, any dispute as to the tolling of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a new york state law requiring the owner of an apartment building to allow the installation of cable equipment on the building which amounted to a few wires and a small box on the roof constituted a taking (B) holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution (C) holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed (D) holding that the statute of limitations was tolled when owner removed fences on the parcel and used it for three or four weeks for the storage of building materials and equipment during renovation work to the buildings on his lot (E) holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations
Output: (D)
investigation exception in the case before it, but was not presented with and did not specifically comment upon cases in which the disclosing party had entered into a confidentiality agreement. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C.Cir.1981). Only one court of appeals has rejected the government investigation exception when the disclosing party had entered into some kind of confidentiality agreement with the government. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427-27 (3d Cir.1991). All of the other circuit decisions that the court cites either concern whether disclosures to one federal government agency waive privilege as to another federal government agency, United States v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), or address privileges other than the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation (B) holding that the statute establishing the confidentiality of department of children youth and famines records did not create a testimonial privilege (C) recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege (D) holding that disclosure to department of defense audit committee without a confidentiality agreement waived privilege in irs investigation (E) holding that attorneyclient privilege was not waived when a letter sent by an irs regional counsel to the doj requesting legal services was copied to other irs personnel involved in the investigation
Output: (D)