niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
subpoena, but that it was necessary to do so on a document-by-document basis. Order on Mot. for Summ. J. at 2-4. Now the Committee contends that the documents that survived that review are not covered by the deliberative process privilege because the privilege only applies to deliberations concerning the development of policy. See PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26-27 (asserting that the privilege allows “agency decisionmakers to engage in that frank exchange of opinions and recommendations necessary to the formulation of pol . U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 478 F.Supp.2d 77, 83 (D.D.C.2007) (finding that deliberative process privilege covered email messages discussing the agency’s response to news article); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Reno, No. 00-0723, 2001 WL 1902811 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001), at *3 (<HOLDING>). Following the same reasoning, the Court holds 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege (B) holding that deliberations about how to handle press inquiries and other public relations issues are covered by exemption 5 under foia (C) holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall (D) holding that documents concerning how to respond to ongoing inquiries from the press and congress about the entry of a government witness and mexican national into the united states fell under the deliberative process privilege (E) holding that the government cannot waive foia exemption 6 on behalf of the individual whose privacy interests the exemption protects
Output: (B)
not include those UAs that did not produce a sample. Either , way, the record demonstrates that Casey's participation in the random UA testing program was minimal. 17 . See G.C., 67 P.3d at 651. 18 . AS 47.10.088(a)(2); Sherman B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 290 P.3d 421, 431 (Alaska 2012). 19 . AS 47.10.088(b). 20 . Sherry R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 74 P.3d 896, 903 (Alaska 2003). 21 . We also note that the treatment assessor's initial assessment of Casey was based exclusively on information which Casey provided. Thus, to the extent the provider erroneously concluded that Casey did not need treatment, this error was presumably caused Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 765 (Alaska 2009) (<HOLDING>). 32 . Casey notes that OCS "only obtained one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the juvenile court could have concluded that dhr had made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with the child (B) holding that dhr properly ended reunification efforts after eight months when previous reunification efforts had failed and the record indicated that further efforts would be unavailing (C) holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection n when after release from prison the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents (D) holding that even under the higher active efforts burden required in indian child welfare act icwa cases the fact that ocs failed to make efforts during three of the 26 months it was involved in the case was not determinative (E) holding that ocs made active efforts as required by icwa even where ocss efforts temporarily declined when father was incarcerated
Output: (E)
and should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.” 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). We adopt the Third Circuit’s Smith test, which retains Reves’ operation or management test in its definition of the underlying substantive § 1962(c) violation, but removes any requirement that the defendant have actually conspired to operate or manage the enterprise herself. Under this test, a defendant is guilty of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) if the evidence showed that she “knowingly agreefd] to facilitate a scheme which includes the operation or management of a RICO enterprise.” Smith, 247 F.3d at 538. Schoenberg’s role in the activities of the Erne enterprise is enough to justify her § 1962(d) conspiracy conviction. See Howard, 208 F.3d at 751 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges (B) holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy (C) holding that in addition to the general conspiracy principles mentioned in salinas a defendant must also have been aware of the essential nature and scope of the enterprise and intended to participate in it  (D) holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication (E) holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy
Output: (C)
entitle it to tax any portion of the business’ income, then it is proper to attribute the production of income from those sales entirely to the state or stales which have provided “protection opportunities and benefits” to the business throughout the manufacturing process up to the point of shipment to the purchaser. Allocation of such sales to New Hampshire, the state of shipment, under the “throwback rule” therefore does not constitute taxation of extraterritorial values. Rather, it is an allocation of those sales to the state most entitled to levy a tax in return for the opportunities, protections and benefits which it has afforded the taxpayer. [Id. at 1308-1309 (citation omitted).] See also, Covington Fabrics Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 264 S.C. 59, 212 S.E.2d 574 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Based on the constitutionality of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a threefactor apportionment formula which included a throwback rule in calculating the sales factor satisfied federal constitutional requirements (B) holding that actual apportionment of damages is a question of fact (C) holding that definition of date of injury in section 306c8ix is intended to be utilized for calculating benefits not for determining whether section 311 notice requirements were satisfied (D) holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied (E) holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law
Output: (A)
it clearly and unambiguously states that there are likely increased costs associated with the influx of felons registering to vote, but that the exact amount of cost increase cannot be determined. Moreover, the financial impact statement clearly and unambiguously explains that the Financial Impact Estimating Conference could not determine the impact on state and local government revenue. Therefore, we conclude that the financial impact statement complies with section 100.371(5). See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Growth Mgmt. Initiative Giving Citizens Right to Decide Local Growth Mgmt. Plan Changes, 2 So.3d 118, 124 (Fla. 2008) (“Overall, the financial impact statement is necessarily indefinite but not unclear or unambiguous.”); see also Medical Marijuana II, 181 So.3d at 479 (<HOLDING>); Water & Land Conservation, 123 So.3d at 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca (B) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (C) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (D) holding that the financial impact statements indeterminate conclusion with regard to the increase or decrease in costs or revenues to state and local government nonetheless complied with section 100371 (E) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law
Output: (D)
in which this Court's authority to review criminal convictions was greatly circumscribed.” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. 1781. It could examine constitutional errors in a criminal trial only on a writ of habeas corpus, and only then if it deemed the error "jurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court’s desire to correct obvious constitutional violations led to a 'somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction.Id. (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 . A charging instrument may be so deficient that a court does not have jurisdiction over the case; for instance, if the charging document was never filed. See State v. Kaulia, 128 Hawai'i 479, 491, 291 P.3d 377, 389 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Without deciding the matter, a charge that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (B) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (D) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney (E) holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial
Output: (E)
to grant good time credit to prisoners “serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner’s life ” (emphasis added)); see also McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir.1997) (“A habeas corpus proceeding ‘attacks the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate release or a shortened period of confinement.’ ”). After concluding there was a factual dispute on the point, the court proceeded to analyze the due process claims under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The court concluded Alexander received the minimum safeguards guaranteed by Wolff and, accordingly, it denied his § 2241 application. Id. at 563-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (<HOLDING>). Upon review of Alexander’s appellate brief, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in disciplinary proceedings a student must be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and if he denies them an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story (B) recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process (C) holding that procedural due process requires that a student suspended for disciplinary reasons be given oral or written notice of the charges against her and if she denies them an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present her side of the story (D) holding an inmate has a due process right to 1 advance written notice of the disciplinary charges 2an opportunity to call witness and present evidence and 3 a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action (E) holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause
Output: (D)
Defendants’ conduct does not approach the “extremely high” standard required for behavior that shocks the conscience. The undisputed evidence shows that Defendants undertook some measures to address Plaintiffs harassment. Defendants’ response to the bullying and threats may well have been unreasonable and ineffective in some respects. For instance, Defendants could have made more efforts to communicate with faculty, take Plaintiffs complaints and emotional distress seriously, and preserve documentation of them investigation. Defendants’ response, however, cannot be characterized as “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be. said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Rivera, 402 F.3d at 36. Compare Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076-77 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), and Rogers v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 152 
 Holding statements: (A) holding school officials investigation of high school coachs sexual misconduct with students while on the border of deliberate indifference or intentional discrimination was insufficiently extreme and outrageous (B) holding school board liable for studentonstudent harassment if school officials knew of harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action (C) holding that school coachs conduct shocked the conscience where coach intentionally hit football player in the head with a metal lock and knocked out his eye (D) holding that plaintiff was required to comply with notice of claim provisions where complaints assertions that school principals actions in engaging in willful course of malicious conduct designed to defame and inflict emotional distress upon plaintiff constituted conduct intimately related to the discharge of his duties as a principal and the legitimate goals of the school district (E) holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials
Output: (C)
F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir.1981) (en banc) (per curiam). As Judge Friendly has observed, It is in the last degree undesirable to read into a procedural statute or rule, fixing the time within which action may be taken, a hidden exception or qualification that will result in the rights of clients being sacrificed when capable counsel have reasonably relied on the language. United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 331 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997, 84 S.Ct. 1917, 12 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1964). Accordingly, most courts have tended to construe the Rule broadly and to apply the 60-day provision when the government has a substantial interest in the case. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 578 F.2d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, HHS was named in the original 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (B) holding that when the united states is a named party participates in the general action and is or may be interested in the outcome of an appeal even though it is not a party to the appeal it is a party for purposes of frap 4a (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal
Output: (B)
or fact common to the class.” This standard is not strictly construed: Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively. All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factu or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” “Typicality and commonality requirements are similar and tend to merge.” Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. at 346 (N.D.Cal.2008); see also Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551, n. 5. “Under the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; see also L.H v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 662463, at *12-13 (<HOLDING>). Although the claims of the purported class 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that minor differences among the class are inconsequential and rejecting the defendants assertion that plaintiffs had not shown sufficient evidence that each plaintiff was disabled since the deprivations complained of by plaintiffs affected the entire class (B) holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity (C) holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint (D) holding that where material misrepresentations are made to class members an inference of reliance arises to the entire class (E) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members
Output: (A)
claiming the defense counsel is arguing “something ridiculous” is directed at defense counsel’s argument, not at defense counsel. Id. at 713. Telling the jury that they shouldn’t feel bad about taking a long time for a verdict is more akin to calling Appellant’s argument ridiculous than calling his counsel a liar. See id. Because the State’s comments attacked Appellant’s arguments, rather than his counsel personally, the argument did not strike over his shoulders. See Acosta, 411 S.W.3d at 93 (stating that State’s comments suggesting jury not be “fooled” by defense’s “good lawyering” and that argument was “just words from the defense attorney’s mouth,” attacked defense counsel’s arguments, not defense counsel personally); Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the argument did not strike over the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state did not comment upon defendants failure to testify when it questioned during closing arguments why defendant never gave police the murder weapon because the comment was a valid attack on the credibility of the defendants claim that the homicide was justified (B) holding a prosecutors comments indicating his personal belief in the states witnesses was a fair reply to defense counsels attack on the veracity of the states witnesses (C) holding that states comment that defense was arguing that hogwash that youve heard was states opinion of defenses arguments not an attack on counsels personal integrity (D) holding comment that was heard out of context and not necessarily related to employment of plaintiff was not evidence of discrimination (E) holding the states comment that nobody testified he wasnt the guy was an impermissible comment on appellants right to remain silent in a case in which the only individual who could have contradicted the states evidence was the appellant
Output: (C)
Common sense tells us that lead paint that never leaves a wall or ceili 79, 615 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dep’t 1994); St. Leger v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 870 F.Supp. 641 (E.D.Pa.1994) (same), aff'd without opinion, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Kaytes v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co., No. Civ. A. 93-1573, 1994 WL 780901 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 6, 1994) (same). On that interpretation, it might be permissible for Chubb to refuse to A.2d 617, 622-23 (1995) (same); Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 413 Mass. 90, 595 N.E.2d 762, 764 (1992) (same). Because the poisoning occurred inside an apartment, the lead paint might not be regarded as an environmental pollutant and therefore coverage would not be excluded. See United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Bourbeau, 49 F.3d 786, 789 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The clause at issue here bars coverage for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a discharge into the environment is necessary for the total pollution clause to be applicable (B) holding that removal of insulation that released asbestos  a thermal irritant  into an apartment was covered by the pollution exclusion (C) holding that the discharge of paint chips into soil was covered by the pollution exclusion because it polluted the environment but that the presence of lead paint in a household would not be so covered (D) holding lead paint poisoning covered by the pollution exclusion (E) holding that pollution exclusion did not apply to claim arising from ingestion of lead paint because exclusion reasonably may be limited to environmental claims
Output: (C)
language, including such words as “just cause.” They have “bargained for” the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement. And the courts will set aside the arbitrator’s interpretation of what their agreement means only in rare instances. Of course, an arbitrator’s award must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice. But as long as [an honest] arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision. 531 U.S. 57, 121 S.Ct. at 467, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, just like in Eastern Associat 11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Maxxam, Inc., 1991 WL 280659 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interests of plaintiffs former employees of defendant company in combating discriminatory policies were coextensive with the interest of all former and present employees subjected to the discriminatory policy (B) holding that former employees subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination without more is not enough to survive former employers summary judgment motion (C) holding that former employees were not entitled to a rule of 65 steelworker pension because the employees were not laid off as a result of a permanent shutdown where thepurchaser offered employment on the same terms (D) holding that probation department employees are not county employees (E) holding that where an spa does not mention former employees but only current employees and a complaint only alleges that former employees were solicited there is no breach of a nonsolicitation clause
Output: (C)
for these terms in the specifications or prosecution histories of the ’403-S or ’838 patents. Furthermore, the fact that the inventors removed the term “comprising” from Claim 1 of the ’403-S patent does not change the plain meaning of the term “composition,” which remains in the final version of the claim. Moreover, if the court were to adopt the construction of the ’403-S claims put forth by Glaxo, Claim 1 would contradict Claim 1 of the ’838 patent, which retains the term “comprising” and claims the process for producing the compositions described in ’403-S patent. Such a construction would be inconsistent. In light of these findings, the court concludes that the terms “comprising” and “composition” must be construed according to their plain meanings. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the phrases “immunoglobulin 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that words in claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the patentee clearly sets forth a different in the specification or file history (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning (D) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (E) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning
Output: (A)
S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, no pet.); Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.). The order approving the revisions to the Texas Rules of Evidence stated that the amended rules take effect clusion by arguing that the retroactive application of current Rule 606(b) disturbs his substantive right to appellate review of his complaint. Although the defendant has a vested, substantive right to legislatively-granted appellate review, he has no vested right in the procedural mechanisms for reviewing his conviction or punishment. See Fowler v. State, 991 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (procedural mechanisms for reviewing conviction not a vested and substantive right); Montez v. State, 975 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court’s application of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature (B) holding that procedural rules are presumptively nonretroactive (C) recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules (D) holding rules of procedure interpreted in same manner as statutes (E) holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive
Output: (A)
interim orders issued by arbitration panel were resolution of separate and independent claim and subject to confirmation even though the orders did not dispose of all claims submitted to arbitration); The Home Insurance Company v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (an interim award which adjudicated a portion of a damages claim and ordered the payment of that sum is final even though liability and potential damages issues remained to be resolved with respect to the remainder of the same claim; court held that an arbitration award that fully disposes of a separate and independent claim is final for purposes of confirmation under the FAA even if other claims remain pending); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Publicis Communication v. True North 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate independent claim may be confirmed although it does not dispose of all the claims that were submitted to arbitration (D) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 (E) holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction
Output: (C)
limitations enumerated by state agency consultant Frank Lahman, including that Bain was moderately limited in her ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors and moderately limited in her ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. Accordingly, on remand the ALJ must also address these limitations. c. Nurse Stout The ALJ did not err in discrediting the opinion of treating nurse practitioner Deborah Stout. Although Stout consults with a psychiatrist every two weeks and participates in a peer supervision group with a psychologist, this is not the type of physician supervision that our case law requires in order to consider a nurse practitioner an acceptable medical source. See Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Because Stout is not an acceptable medical 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a nurse practitioners opinion constituted an acceptable medical source where the nurse worked closely under the supervision of the doctor such that the nurse was acting as an agent of the doctor (B) holding that nurse who is familiar with the standard of care at another similar hospital can qualify by experience to testify as a medical expert in a medical malpractice action (C) holding jury was warranted in finding hospital negligent in its selection and retention of a nurse after the nurse violated hospital rules and had been repeatedly reprimanded but not fired (D) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (E) holding that a question of fact existed regarding whether the hospital held the doctor out as its agent if the hospital provided the doctor without explicitly informing the patient that the doctor was not its employee
Output: (A)
L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). 3 . Because the search was without a warrant, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the search was lawful. See United States v. Johnson, 936 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). Thus, if the government were relying on some notion of plain sight, it would be required to produce evidence that the gym bag was open. It did not do so. Nor could it satisfy its burden premised on Smith’s consent, since, as we explain below, that consent could not extend to the bag. Moreover, even if the bag had been open, the fact that it was stored under the bed, thus requiring the police to move it, would have required probable cause, since such movement would constitute a search. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the condition of the bag was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers movement of stereo components to examine their serial numbers was a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment (B) holding canine sniff of an unattended vehicle parked outside the curtilage of defendants home was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment (C) holding a canine sniff on a legitimately detained automobile is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment (D) holding an officers movement of stereo equipment to view a serial number constituted a search under the fourth amendment (E) holding that the warrantless search of knights supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment
Output: (A)
business.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The statements alleged by Rivera to be defamatory include statements made by the individual defendants regarding Rivera’s alleged falsification of time cards and his alleged threats against Amtrak employees. As a result of these statements, the police came to Rivera’s home, and Rivera was arrested and faced criminal charges that were ultimately dismissed. These statements were allegedly made by the individual defendants while on the job and concerned matters of interest to Amtrak and its employees. The statements are therefore appropriately characterized as being made within the scope of the individual defendants’ employment for purposes of respondeat superior. See McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the district court erred by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees defamatory statements made at work about matters relating to work were within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior and recognizing that californias respondeat superior doctrine imposes a broad rule of liability on employers (B) holding that the liability reform act preempted in part the common law doctrine of respondeat superior (C) recognizing respondeat superior liability (D) holding that employees violation of his employers policy against drinking on the job does not preclude liability under respondeat superior (E) holding that a plaintiffs direct negligence claims against an employer are not precluded by the employers admission of respondeat superior liability
Output: (A)
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.’” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2390 n. 13, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion)). But the Court’s 1983 decision in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), which upheld against constitutional challenge a state statute requiring courts to instruct sentencing juries that the governor could commute a life sentence without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence, could have been read to indicate that the “factors which may call for a less severe penalty” that count for Eighth Amendment purposes do not include possible post-conviction contingencies. See id. at 1014, 103 S.Ct. at 3460 (<HOLDING>). Because of the potential tension between 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notwithstanding the eighth amendment the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of possible commutation is best left to the states (B) holding that the eighth amendment to the united states constitution prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals (C) holding that execution of the mentally retarded is prohibited under the eighth amendment to the united states constitution (D) holding that under the eighth amendment to the united states constitution the government may not execute a mentally retarded person (E) holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child
Output: (A)
the effort does not involve filing or threatening a lawsuit. Compare McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020 (dunning letters offering to “settle” time-barred debts could violate Act by leading debtors to believe the debts were legally enforceable); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 2016) (effort to collect is not automatically unlawful, but letter violates FDCPA if it could lead unsophisticated consumer to believe her time-barred debt is legally enforceable); and Buchanan v. Northland Group, Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing dismissal on pleadings; offer to settle time-barred debt could violate Act by failing to disclose that suit would be time-barred or that partial payment would remove statute of limitations bar), with Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33 (<HOLDING>), and Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 771 (same). Even 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attempt to collect a timebarred debt was permissible if litigation not threatened (B) holding that because secured creditor did not attempt to collect its entire debt through the bankruptcy proceeding the liens in question were not property dealt with by the plan for  1141c purposes (C) holding assignee could collect debt on stated account (D) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (E) holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa
Output: (A)
activity other than making the allegedly infringing sales. Additionally, the claims against MCSC are peripheral to the central issues of the action. See L.G. Elecs., 131 F.Supp.2d at 812. Specifically, the Kohs seek a declaratory judgment that the ImageDeck infringes the ’830 patent and an injunction prohibiting the manufacture, use, sale, offers to sell, and importation in derogation of the Kohs’s rights under the ’830 patent. “Ultimately the infringement claim[s] against the manufacturer” and the sole importer are “more likely to restore contested property rights nationwide than securing an injunction enjoining a merchant from selling infringing products from existing inventory.” Id. As a result, MCSC is only peripherally involved in this action. See LG Elecs., 131 F.Supp.2d at 811 (<HOLDING>); Corry, 16 F.Supp.2d at 665 (holding that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts (B) holding on policy grounds that a strict liability claim should not lie against drug manufacturer (C) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (D) holding that a patent infringement claim against a reseller of infringing products is only peripherally related to a claim against the manufacturer (E) holding that the adjudication of claims against an infringing products manufacturer would resolve claims against a mere reseller
Output: (D)
107 In addition, several other courts have recognized the authority of a trial court to recall an undischarged jury for the purpose of allowing it to correct its verdict, but have concluded that the jury already had been discharged at the time the jury had been recalled. See Montanez v. People, 966 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Colo. 1998) (explaining that “a jury may change or modify its verdict up to the point the verdict is accepted by the court and the jury is formally discharged” but that jury already had been discharged because one juror was about to exit courthouse and another already had been outside and that both had opportunity to mingle and to discuss case with outsiders when trial court recalled jury to correct its verdict); Burchett v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591, 613 (Tenn. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding denial of jury trial was harmless because evidence was insufficient to create issue of fact for submission to jury and insurer would have been entitled to directed verdict (B) recognizing that a trial court has the authority before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury to send the jury back to correct a mistake in its verdict but concluding that jury had been discharged because jury was allowed to return to court on following day and was allowed to deliberate same issue it previously had decided (C) holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial (D) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (E) holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury
Output: (B)
was the product of an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court lineup that followed (by several months) Bashonga’s review of a photo array. We have examined both the photo array and a videotape of the lineup, and find nothing impermissibly suggestive about either one. See Washington, 12 F.3d at 1134. In particular, we reject Pindell’s contention that the lineup was suggestive because he was assigned the same “number” ]s soon as the agents saw the check stubs, they were justified in believing that they were useful as evidence of a money structuring offense,” even "without removing the rubber bands and inspecting the stubs individually”). 8 . Pindell does not contend that this action constituted an unlawful search. See United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 9 . We also conclude that the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person (B) holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment (C) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (D) holding that under a warrant for seizure of cocaine police were authorized to search through notebooks or any other items in which drugs might be concealed (E) holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes
Output: (D)
Fieldstone, may exist such that Countrywide could be indirectly liable for Hilltop and Fieldstone’s violation of the CTA and fraudulent misrepresentations. Although the plaintiffs do not allege an agency relationship between Countrywide and the other defendants in their complaint, it is not necessary for a pleading to allege an agency relationship in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. “[A]s a matter of law, allegations of agency, vicarious liability, and/or respondeat superior are not required. A person legally responsible for an act may be alleged to have committed it without going into the theories which support that ultimate fact.” Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 886 (9th.Cir.1987); see also Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-Am., 658 F.Supp. 1331, 1343 (D.P.R.1987) (<HOLDING>). IV. Ameriquest’s motion to dismiss 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party can be held liable for securities fraud on an agency or a respondeat superior theory (B) holding inter alia that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory (C) holding that a municipality cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory (D) holding that liability may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior because a supervisor can be liable only for his own acts or omissions (E) holding that municipality may not be held liable under  1983 upon theory of respondeat superior
Output: (A)
court’s January 29, 1991, decision from the bench. On January 29, 1991, the bankruptcy court explained that the IRS was not enjoined from proceeding lawfully to enforce debtor’s outstanding tax liabilities not paid under her plan. See Tr. at 8 (Jan. 29, 1991). By enjoining the IRS from proceeding against debt- or, the bankruptcy court intended only to prevent future violations of the automatic stay in this bankruptcy proceeding. Id. (stating that a “clean lifetime letter” was not intended but that “[t]he sort of thing that has transpired again and again shall not continue”). 13 . Accord Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165, 169-70 (8th Cir.1989); Inslaw, 113 B.R. at 810; In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 835 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1989); see also In re Gustafson, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Pearson, 917 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a (B) recognizing fdcpa claim for violation of bankruptcy codes automatic stay provision 11 usc  362 which explicitly provides private cause of action (C) holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a (D) holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim (E) holding rule 11 sanction proceeding was exempt from automatic stay
Output: (C)
42 U.S.C. § 4822. The statute’s language does not unambiguously create new rights enforceable by Section 8 tenants under § 1983. Rather than expressly creating such rights, the LBPPPA grants administrative authority to the executive branch and mandates that the Secretary of HUD include certain requirements relating to the provision of information to purchasers and tenants, periodic risk assessments, inspections, reductions, and abatement of lead-based paint hazards. Id. at § 4822(1)(A)-(G). The Act requires HUD to implement certain “procedures” for public housing agencies to follow. This language falls well short of unambiguously conferring individual rights on tenants who would benefit from the Secretary’s procedures. See Roseberry v. United States, 736 F.Supp. 408, 410 (D.N.H.1990) (<HOLDING>). Further, the administrative regulations in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lbpppa did not create an implied private cause of action and recognizing that the act is in essence a legislative directive to the secretary of housing and urban development hud to establish and implement procedures addressing such hazards and that the lbpppa is purely an administrative authoritygranting statute (B) recognizing the cause of action (C) holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of education acting in his role as an administrator (D) recognizing implied private action under the collection agency act (E) holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy
Output: (A)
provision, its application to plaintiff, or the governmental interests it serves. Without such evidence, there is no showing at this juncture that plaintiff, or anyone else, is likely to be harmed by its continued enforcement. The City ordinances that prohibit “sales or exchanges,” § 62 — 5(b)(9), and establishment or acceptance of “a price or fee ... for observing or participating in a display or performance, other than ... a tip the amount of which is not solicited,” § 62-5(b)(10), along with the categorical ban on commercial activity, § 62-4, present thornier questions. I now turn to those provisions. B. Restrictions on Commercial Expression and Activity Section 62 — 5(b)(10), quoted above, plainly regulates speech. See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting regulation; emphasis in original). 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech (B) holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal (C) holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague (D) recognizing that code is speech (E) holding that a regulation forbidding street performers to  solicit donations  except by  passively  informing the public that such donations are sought  with written signs constituted a restriction on speech because it allows the conduct exchange of money but regulates only the speech by specifying the manner of requesting money  only  passively
Output: (E)