niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
expenses related to the children’s needs at the time of the hearing. The trial court made numerous, in-depth findings regarding the children’s accustomed standard of living, the needs of the children, and the variance between the expenses incurred by defendant on behalf of the children and expenses incurred by plaintiff on behalf of the children. These findings are sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that the Pataky presumption was rebutted. Although in most cases, the custodial parent obtains an increase in child support, a court has discretionary authority to enter an order establishing child support in an amount less than the amount established by a separation or child support agreement. See Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 234-35, 346 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We hold the trial court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (C) holding trial court had discretionary authority to enter order setting child support amount as less than that provided for in the parties separation agreement (D) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (E) holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order
Output: (C)
The transformers were not within the scope of any demolition work. Shipp specifically informed Leo Gomez, AAA’s owner and Murillo’s worksite supervisor, to consider the transformers to be energized. The signage on the transformer box doors declared “DANGER, KEEP AWAY.” It warned that energized electrical equipment was inside and of the dire consequences that contact could cause. Oncor did not contemporaneously energize the transformer while Murillo worked, or tell anyone at the worksite that it had been switched off when in fact it was not. Without evidence of such acts, Oncor, as an electricity provider, had no general duty to recognize and prevent electrical contact during a construction project. See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Brooks, 161 Tex. 32, 336 S.W.2d 603, 606 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Because Oncor’s failure to turn off an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the contractor where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding a duty to an injured construction worker (B) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (C) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (D) holding that electrical supplier owed no duty in general negligence to construction worker injured by contact with live highvoltage electrical transmission lines on construction site (E) holding that time workers spent traveling on an employers boat to a construction site was not compensable under the act
Output: (B)
See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir.2013). Section 301 of the LMRA supplies jurisdiction for “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). It is well-established that card check and neutrality agreements with arbitration provisions are contracts within the meaning of § 301. For example, in Hotel & Restaurant Emps. Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, this Court affirmed jurisdiction over a dispute arising from an agreement between an employer and a union with card check, neutrality, and arbitration provisions similar to those at issue here. 996 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir.1993); cf. Retail Clerks International Ass’n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 25-28, 82 S.Ct. 541, 7 L.Ed.2d 503 (1962) (<HOLDING>). Our sister circuits have similarly understood 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process (B) holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 (C) holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights (D) holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced (E) holding that where a collective bargaining agreements terms are clear but the management has engaged in contrary practice for a number of years the words of the agreement must be enforced
Output: (B)
time period, they were housed in separate units, experienced different medical problems, and received different medical treatment by varying medical providers. For the most part, their claims require entirely different proof. Undoubtedly, the Amended Complaint alleges that Vladimir’s and David’s injuries resulted from a jail, County, and/or CCS policy and/or practice of indifference to the medical needs of inmates. Nevertheless, such similarity does not convert the claims involving Vladimir and David into the same “series of transactions or occurrences” in Rule 20(a)’s terms. See, e.g., Abdelkarim v. Gonzales, No. 06-14436, 2007 WL 1284924, at *4-5 (E.D.Mich. April 30, 2007) (citing Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350); see also Lover v. District of Columbia, 248 F.R.D. 319, 324 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Cohen, No. 11-11780, 2011 WL 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the first prong of rule 20 is not satisfied even though the proposed plaintiffs claims levied against the district of columbia its police chief and individual officers alleged similar illegal searches (B) holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia (C) holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia (D) holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council (E) holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city
Output: (A)
409 P.2d 466 (1965). 46 Id. at 664. 47 SAK refers to section 20 of the subcontract, which requires that the subcontractor give notice of a claim or dispute within 14 days of the occurrence of a problem, dispute, claim or delay event, or the claim will not be reimbursed. 48 Ferguson asserts that the trial court’s ruling on this issue (raised in Ferguson’s first summary judgment motion) was error and offers this as another basis on which to affirm the trial court. But Ferguson neither cross appealed nor assigned error to this ruling, which rejected Ferguson’s argument that SAK’s failure to comply with the notice and claim requirements barred SAK’s lawsuit. Thus, this argument is not within the scope of our review. But see Realm v. City of Olympia, 168 Wn. App. 1, 8, 277 P.3d 679 (2012) (<HOLDING>). 49 Cook v. Brateng, 180 Wn. App. 368, 375, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (C) holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city (D) holding that contractor waived right to sue city by failing to comply with notice provisions in the contract that were preconditions to litigation against the city (E) holding that mailing a copy of a notice of appeal that was filed in the trial court to the city law director does not constitute filing the notice of appeal with the city board of zoning appeals
Output: (D)
when they find that magistrate judges have dealt with the issues fully and accurately and that they could add little of value to that analysis. We cannot interpret the district court’s statement as establishing that it failed to perform the required de novo review. In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 584. Notably, because “Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations,” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406 (emphasis omitted), a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d at 724-25 (<HOLDING>). Where no party objects to the Magistrate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the error caused by the magistrate judges unauthorized postjudgment order was cured by the district courts later de novo review of the magistrates findings and conclusions (B) holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing (C) holding that the district courts adoption of the magistrate judges particular reasonablehour estimates is consistent with the de novo determination that 28 usc  636b1 and united states v raddatz require (D) holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law (E) holding that a magistrate judges ruling on dispositive motions such as those for the suppression of evidence must be reviewed de novo by the district court
Output: (C)
doubt that Petitioner participated in both the Caldwell and Zales Robberies. Thus, the consolidation of the two robberies into one trial did not prejudice Petitioner with respect to either conviction. 37 . 12/6/95 N.T. at 56. 38 . Although the trial court's instruction removing the elements of the crime from the purview of the jury was incorrect, the error was harmless. The uncontested evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the robberies involved the theft of jewelry, and that the jewelry stores had received their inventories from out of state. As such, no reasonable juror could have found that the jewelry stolen was not personal property or that the robberies did not impact interstate commerce. See United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 553-55 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that harmless error review applied when the trial court instructed the jury that the materiality element of counts for perjury and failure to disclose a material fact had been satisfied as a matter of law (B) holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established (C) holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis (D) recognizing that trial courts failure to instruct jury on element of offense is harmless when existence of element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence (E) holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury
Output: (A)
relevant and useful information in the field of human toxicology. Likewise, in vitro tests provide useful information about metabolic processes at a cellular level, and may supplement existing animal and human data.”); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1050 (S.D.Ill.2001) ("[A]n overwhelming amount of case reports of a temporal proximity between a very specific drug and a very specific adverse event might ... be enough to make a general causation conclusion sufficiently reliable.”); see also, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 475 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. Ed., 2d ed. 2002) ("[case reports] may be carefully considered in light of other information available, including toxicological data.”). 6 . See Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 261-67 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiffs experts opinion on causation because while expert plainly had greater knowledge of medicine generally than lay person he did not have specialized knowledge on precise subject of causation (C) holding that lower court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiffs expert where experts opinion was based on a differential diagnosis rather than epidemiologic evidence (D) holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (E) holding that differential diagnosis rendered expert opinion on causation sufficiently reliable for admission
Output: (C)
came from co-conspirators who had either entered into cooperation agreements providing for reduced sentences or who anticipated that their truthful testimony would bring about leniency in sentencing. Since the testimony of such witnesses here and in Calderon was subject to heavy attack as to believability, obviously in each case it is difficult to prove the negative that the government had no need to introduce evidence of the accused’s prior drug activity to establish his intent. Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1332. Defendant suggests that the two 1998 convictions are too remote to be admissible as 404(b) evidence. At the time of the trial in 2003, the 1998 convictions were five years old. Our holdings do not support this argument. U.S. v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044, 1047, 1048 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1332 (a six-year span 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (B) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy (C) holding that in certain circumstances where a defendant is convicted of a charge alleging a conspiracy to distribute one drug or another he must be sentenced as if the conviction were only for a conspiracy involving the drug that triggers the lowest statutory sentencing range (D) holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness (E) holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case
Output: (E)
Law: The Infringement-Preemption Test, 21 Ariz.L.Rev. 85 (1979). However, this infringement test cannot have the same scope in states, like Idaho, with Public Law 280 jurisdiction as it does in states without it; otherwise the legislation was a meaningless act, something we will not presume Congress intended. Cf. Duluth Lumber, supra (distinguishing cases arising in nonPublic Law 280 jurisdictions). Until the Supreme Court clarifies the confusion it has created, we and all other courts are left to grope our way in the darkness. Hence we must examine the law of both Public Law 280 jurisdictions and that of non-Public Law 280 jurisdictions for whatev with Public Law 280 jurisdiction may not tax personal property located on trust lands); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra (<HOLDING>); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of   net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all   fishing sources (B) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge (C) holding a state cannot impose an income tax on indians whose income is solely from reservation sources (D) holding state may not impose tax on nonindian trader operating on the reservation (E) holding that arizona could not impose an income tax on reservation indians
Output: (C)
plan itself and not the employer or the plan’s administrator. Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan is an entity that may sue or be sued in its own right! 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). However, the circuits disagree on what other parties are subject to suits for benefits. Many jurisdictions hold that the proper defendant in such a suit is either the plan itself or the plan’s administrator or trustee ' exercising management over and control of the plan. Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 34-35 (1st Cir.1998) (the proper party defendant in a § 1132(a)(1)(B) action for benefits under an ERISA plan is the party that controls administration of the plan, ie., by reserving the power to decide disputes, and not a third party service provider); Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that making intentional representations about the future of plan benefits may be an act of plan administration (B) holding that in a recovery of benefits claim only the plan and the administrators and trustees of the plan in their capacity as such may be held liable (C) recognizing that pension plan administrators have the ability to fashion their own plan formulas (D) recognizing that plan participants should be able to access information about the plan administrators fiduciary duties from the plan administrators counsel (E) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself
Output: (B)
Because this Court has long held that a prosecutor’s closing remarks constitute reversible error where they are designed to appeal to “bias, passion, or prejudice,” Snow contends that this Court should find reversible error in the instant case. ¶42. The applicable standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. McGilberry v. State, 741 So.2d at 907. This Court has held that a mistrial is reserved for occasions where the trial court can take no action to cure the improper occurrences. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581 (Miss.1995). In Walker, this Court stated: Elementary to all trial proceedings is the proposition that the occurrence of any prejudicially incompetent matter or misconduct before a jury, the damaging effect of which cannot be removed by adm 6)(<HOLDING>). b. ¶ 44. Snow also alleges that a note 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is barred from contending on appeal that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial motion when he acquiesced in the courts decision to give curative instructions and did not then renew his own motion for mistrial or join in his codefendants renewal of the motion (B) holding that when an objection is overruled failing to request curative instructions or a mistrial does not result in waiver (C) holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions (D) holding defendant not entitled to mistrial after emotional outburst during states closing argument where the court gave curative instructions to disregard incident as irrelevant to case (E) holding trial courts curative instructions adequately prevented error from arising due to spectators emotional outburst during states closing argument in guiltinnocence phase of capital murder prosecution
Output: (D)
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. An Eighth Amendment violation may be found only “ ‘in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (noting that the “gross disproportionality principle ... [is] applicable only in ... ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case[s].” (citation omitted)). This is not such a case. Because Whitehead had been convicted of five prior felony drug offenses, see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276, 284-85, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (<HOLDING>), and because cocaine distribution represents a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty (B) holding that restitution is a criminal penalty that negates the imposition of prejudgment interest (C) holding that the penalty is applicable (D) holding that recidivism may support the imposition of a severe penalty (E) recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty
Output: (D)
which would have no effect on the claims of the other class members. While it is true that the individual claims have in common many questions of fact and law, and the royalty owners have a shared interest in the manner in which the gas is collected and the royalty is calculated, the royalty owners do not possess a “common and undivided interest” in either the royalty payments or the natural gas supply. See Kary v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. A1-03-009, 2002 WL 32067456, at *4 (D.N.D. Mar.19, 2002); see also Coulter v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., No. 98-1413-WEB, 1999 WL 1253031, at *3 (D.Kan. Oct.8, 1999) (acknowledging the court’s consistent rejection of attempts at aggregating the claims of oil and gas royalty owners). Cf. Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 421 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). But see Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing as impermissible the aggregation of claims seeking to recover royalties allegedly due under oil and gas leases (B) recognizing oil gas and coal are minerals and holding if oil gas and minerals are reserved from the grant of the surface of several tracts of unseated land  they can be taxed as an estate in land (C) recognizing that a metes and bounds partition when land contains oil and gas results in a serious loss to a coowner who receives a lot without oil or gas under the surface with the loss due solely to the division of the land (D) holding assignment of oil and gas lease is subject to business and commerce code section 2601 (E) holding provision in oil and gas lease authorizing lessor to use gas for agricultural purposes contained no geographical limitations
Output: (A)
agency which administers the scheme.’ ” Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987)). Courts consider the following non-exhaustive factors in deciding whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies: “(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.” Id. The doctrine “is to be used only if a claim ‘requires resolution of an issue of first impr -4387, 2011 WL 2111796, at *15 (N.D.Cal. May 26, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Chacanaca, 752 F.Supp.2d at 1124 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo (B) holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply where the court had to determine whether defendants all natural claims were misleading (C) holding that primary jurisdiction did not apply to claims of violation of fda regulations and guidance concerning all natural fresh antioxidant and other nutrient claims (D) holding that the natural gas act did not completely preempt state law claims within its scope and thus the federal court did not have removal jurisdiction over the contract price dispute filed in state court (E) holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act
Output: (B)
of the third party, Marquette. 2. “Special Circumstances” Exception The second exception to the general rule that a person has no duty to. protect another from the criminal acts of a third party is the “special circumstances” exception. It arises only in the rare case when the person “know[s] or [has] reason to know that acts are occurring or [are] about to occur on the premises that pose imminent probability of harm to an invitee.” Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Ass’n, Inc., 542 So.2d 1208, 1211 (Ala.1988) (quoting Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 197-98 (Tenn.1975)). In the overwhelming majority of cases presenting the question, we have not found special circumstances that give rise to a duty to protect. See, e.g., Ortell v. Spencer Companies, 477 So.2d 299 (Ala.1985) (<HOLDING>); Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So.2d 272 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that 8 incidents of assault theft robbery or burglary on the premises and 80 similar incidents within a 2bloek area within the prior 3 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect (B) holding foreseeability is based on the totality of the circumstances not on a mechanical prior similar incidents rule (C) holding that 1 battery 6 breakings and enterings of cars 2 robberies and 7 thefts in a parking deck within the prior 10 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect (D) holding that walmart was not under a duty to protect a patron from a criminal assault absent prior similar incidents at their facility or in the general area (E) holding that evidence of similar incidents is probative as to notice element in premises liability case
Output: (A)
from the Fijian military,” was “robbed repeatedly,” had his temple burned by Fijian soldiers, and Fijian soldiers attacked his home and destroyed his property while his wife was home alone. See id. Significantly, the attacks were linked by the fact that they were all carried out by a common entity, as opposed to random acts of violence that this court has characterized as the “common byproduct of civil unrest and economic turmoil.” See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.2004). The acts described by Kumar are closer to those in Gormley. Therefore, the evidence does not compel a finding of persecution. Nor did Kumar present evidence that would compel “any reasonable adjudicator” to find that he demonstrated a likelihood of future persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1061 (<HOLDING>). Because Kumar’s evidence did not compel a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals (B) holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution (C) holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground (D) holding that while widespread violence against a protected group by private individuals and public officials may constitute persecution widespread discrimination that may include persecution of some individuals does not compel such a finding (E) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution
Output: (D)
to have been rejected solely on the ground that this amount had not been tendered within the time period prescribed by appellant’s counsel. (emphasis added). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Marcum, Ky., 420 S.W.2d 113 (1967), (overruled on other grounds, 531 S.W.2d 493, 500 (1976)) the Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of bad faith in the context of a failure to settle a claim for policy limits. The court, in affirming a judgment against an insurer for bad faith, noted that (a) clear liability, (b) the seriousness of the injuries sustained and (c) the failure to seize the opportunity to settle the case for the policy limits of $20,000 resulted in sufficient evidence of bad faith. Compare Harvin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Ky., 428 S.W.2d 213 (1968) (<HOLDING>). For several years the law of Kentucky on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered (B) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (C) holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule (D) holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability (E) holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing
Output: (D)
that— (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In determining whether the defendant’s convictions for possessing weapons while a prisoner are violent felonies under the ACCA, the court must conduct a “formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Although neither the presentence report nor 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 (B) holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca (C) holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for acca purposes raises no sixth amendment issue (D) holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca (E) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense
Output: (B)
86 S.Ct. 1717, 1724, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966) , that is, whether one may regard the statute as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, the court concluded that there was “no sufficiently strong logical connection between the aim of the [FLSA] — to increase the wages and shorten the hours of certain employees — and central, obvious Fourteenth Amendment concerns.” Id. at 210. The court stated that “in the absence of explicit comment by Congress, only efforts to remedy discrimination against a class of persons that Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has already identified as deserving special protection ” is properly viewed as legislation passed pursuant to § 5. Id. The Tenth Circuit cited Wilson-Jones with approval in Aaron v. State of Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 817 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, although Congress in passing the 4-R 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the flsa does not prohibit changes in wage rates it prohibits the payment of overtime at less than one and onehalf times the regular wage rate (B) holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that aims of wage and overtime provisions of flsa were not sufficiently connected to fourteenth amendment concerns so as to fall under congress  5 powers (D) holding under flsa (E) holding that flsa which provides an exemption from the acts wage and overtime provisions for fishermen preempts claims under alaskas minimumwage and overtime statute
Output: (C)
this test the trial court ascribed insufficient weight to the government’s interest in the children’s well-being, in the context of this narrowly-tailored statute addressing grandparent involvement in non-intact families. In this regard, the classification under Section 5312 is not based on antagonism against non-intact families, but, like Section 5311, reflects circumstances where the child’s family environment has been disturbed. Accord Seagrave v. Price, 349 Ark. 433, 79 S.W.3d 339, 344 (2002) (“Because the differences in the circumstances between married and divorced parents established the necessity to discriminate between the classes, the [grandparent visitation] statute at issue would not be found unconstitutional.”); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1064 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Curtis, 542 Pa. at 261-68, 666 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under strict scrutiny a grandparent visitation statute did not violate equal protection principles given legislative recognition that children of unmarried or separated parents may be at heightened risk for certain kinds of harm when compared with children of intact families (B) holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (E) holding that biological grandparents were statutory strangers to children following their adoption by stepfather statute authorizing grandparent visitation violated parents constitutional right to privacy
Output: (A)
original tax sale. See Anderson, 44 F.3d at 797. However, there had not been a successful sale of the property in that case; the Andersens filed suit against the IRS prior to the second attempted sale. See id. Therefore, it was unnecessary for that court to determine whether any sale was void or voidable. Consequently, these cases do not support the Johnstons’ position. The Johnstons also urge this Court to hold that, for the purposes of characterizing an action in violation of section 6335, the terms voidable and void are both intended to mean only void. Appellants cite no law to support their argument. On the contrary, it is clear that courts have considered the difference between void sales and voidable sales when ruling on section 6335 violations. See Koby, 47 Fed. Cl. at 104-05 (<HOLDING>); DRWSEA, 132 S.W.3d at 469 (asserting that “a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (B) holding that although irs failed to comply with procedures of section 6335 tax sale was valid due to ratification by taxpayer (C) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (D) holding that failure of irs to provide statutory notice of sale caused sale to be voidable ab initio (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable
Output: (A)
731, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-199, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). This inquiry involves evaluating whether a reasonably competent public official would have known that his actions were prohibited by the law at the time he engaged in the conduct in question. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The standard is one of objective reasonableness. We find that the plain language of the statute and the case law gave clear notice to Defendants that releasing the informa tion in question violated federal law. The words of the DPPA alone are “specific enough to establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to overcome qualified immunity.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the case law defining the reach of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory language alone even in the total absence of case law can be sufficient to provide fair notice (B) holding statutory violation sufficient cause (C) recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt (D) holding that an error can be plain even in the absence of binding case law where it violates an absolutely clear legal norm (E) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages
Output: (A)
case from the Southern District of New York that holds that the fact tha ay or may not have out-of-state origins does not demonstrate that Plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. Supreme Court precedent has distinguished employees who handle goods for a wholesaler and move these goods interstate from those who handle goods after an employer acquires the goods for local disposition. See McLeod, 319 U.S. at 493, 63 S.Ct. 1248. While the FLSA provides protections for the former group, it may not for the latter. Id.; accord Thorne, at 1267, 2006 WL 1228863, at *3 (“When goods reach the customer for whom they were intended, the interstate journey ends and employees engaged in any further intra state movement of the goods are not covered under the Act”); Xelo, 2005 WL 2385724, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Even Plaintiff concedes that any goods she 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that individual coverage is established if a substantial part of an employees activities related to goods whose movement in the channels of interstate commerce was established by the test we have described he is covered by the flsa (B) holding that maintenance workers in a building that did produce goods for interstate commerce were covered under the flsa (C) recognizing that interpreting the flsa to apply to a handler of any good which has moved interstate would negate the significance of the clause and ignore the intent of congress to create a distinction between certain workers whose activities were covered by the flsa and others whose activities were not (D) recognizing the substantial body of case law discussing distinction between preliminary and postliminary activities on the one hand and principle activities of employment on the other (E) holding under flsa
Output: (C)
does not mean that Garcia is without remedy for the breach of his plea agreement. “It is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.” In the instant case, the prosecution promised Garcia an 81-month executed sentence, which did not include a conditional release term, in exchange for his plea of guilty to the charge of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct. This unqualified promise is unauthorized by law and therefore, Garcia must be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement if he so chooses. If he does not so choose, Garcia should be permitted to continue to be bound by the original plea agreement, as amended to include the 10-year conditional release term required by law. We affi ) (<HOLDING>). 9 . 577 N.W.2d 481, 493 (Minn.1998). 10 . Id. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants may agree to departure from sentencing guidelines in plea bargain (B) holding that only factors specifically prohibited by the sentencing guidelines cannot form the basis for a downward departure (C) holding that trial court acted within its authority in rejecting a plea bargain in a capital case (D) holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress (E) holding that the government likely could not agree to a plea bargain which would directly circumvent a mandatory minimum
Output: (A)
due process required that a petitioner be given the opportunity to file a motion for a hearing by an article V judge and challenge the traffic commissioner’s findings as part of the trial de novo process before the article V judge entered judgment against him. Id. at 698. According to Dabin and Stiens, due process allows a party to file with an article V judge a motion for a hearing on the traffic commissioner’s findings and recommendations prior to entry of judgment. Upon considering the motion, the circuit judge may elect to grant a hearing and may consider admissible evidence not previously offered to the traffic commissioner because no final judgment has been entered in the case. See Slay v. Slay, 965 S.W.2d 845, 845 (Mo. banc 1998); Keck v. Keck, 969 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Mo.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). By granting a hearing after the traffic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy (B) holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted (C) holding that appellate courts lack the authority to review a decision issued by a commissioner unless such decision is adopted by an article v judge because a commissioner is not authorized to exercise judicial power pursuant to article v of the missouri constitution (D) holding that definition of the term final decision has been left to the commissioner to flesh out by regulation (E) holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute
Output: (C)
People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 319 Ill.Dec. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (2008) (upholding an agreement where the parolee consents in advance to warrantless searches); Sullivan v. Bunting, 133 Ohio St.3d 81, 975 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (2012) (per curiam) (upholding the search of a parolee’s email based on his prior consent to warrantless searches); see also Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Alaska 1977) (“Depending on the nature of the crime involved, a 93, 899 (2003) (finding that a search pursuant to a parole agreement is permissible when “(1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer”); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1356-58 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arrest of a parolee for parole violation does not trigger the speedy trial period for the underlying offense (B) holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement (C) holding that notwithstanding an agreement the state still must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of parole or committed a crime (D) holding parolee waives constitutional searchandseizure rights by voluntarily signing parole agreement (E) holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee
Output: (C)
proponent’s case to the adopter's case.” United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 737 (1st Cir.1991). The case against Mercado-Cruz was markedly stronger than the case against Rivera-Rodríguez. 22 . We express no opinion on whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a habeas corpus petition could have its basis in a counsel's actions as to waiver of the procedural requirements of § 851(a). No such claim is part of this appeal. 23 . Mercado-Cruz did not argue that he did not own any street clothes or that he lacked the resources to obtain them. Thus, we need not decide, as some circuits have, whether a defendant in such a situation would be constitutionally entitled to have the court provide street clothing for him. See, e.g., Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Through his counsel and his pro-se 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison (C) holding unconstitutional a requirement that defendant appear in prison garb at trial (D) holding that a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy under  1997e (E) holding that an accused who is forced to stand trial in prison garb because of financial inability to obtain other attire is under a compulsion equal to that of the prisoner who is not allowed to don readily available civilian attire
Output: (E)
a pure propensity theory: the principal’s evidence showed that Klink-hammer was an aggressive person in general, and that made it more likely that Klinkhammer acted aggressively during the June 29 traffic stop. Like federal courts, Wisconsin largely excludes propensity evidence. Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1); Fed. R.Evid. 404(a)(1). But, also like federal courts, Wisconsin makes an exception if the character evidence is offered by the accused in a criminal case in order to prove “a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime.” Wis. Stat. § 904.04(l)(b); accord Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(2)(B). Hanson accordingly argued that, within the meaning of the Wisconsin rule, Klink-hammer was a “victim” of Hanson’s conduct. Cf State v. Haase, 293 Wis.2d 322, 330, 716 N.W.2d 526 (Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). The trial court rejected Hanson’s theory. It 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation (B) recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer (C) holding police officer is a public official (D) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown (E) holding that where the defendant eluded a police officer and caused damage to a squad car the officer was a victim for purposes of restitution
Output: (E)