niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
of an agency’s action, inquiring whether the agency has “(1) impose[d] any rights and obligations, or (2) genuinely [left] the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion.” CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 883 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The language used by an agency is an important consideration in such determinations. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.Cir.1987 F.2d 33, 38, 48 (D.C.Cir.1974) (noting that a policy statement that “does not establish a binding norm,” and “is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed,” is not subject to review) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), with Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 47-49 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the distinction between 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that certain dual purpose documents created in response to the epa information request and consent order were protected from discovery by the work product doctrine as they were created because of potential litigation with the epa (B) holding that epa regions policy statement does not constitute final agency action because it does not compel action (C) holding inter alia that an epa guidance which created new reporting requirements for regulated entities as a directive with legal consequences amounted to final agency action (D) holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action (E) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted
Output: (C)
to the jury that Shepherd smoked marijuana, he was not unduly prejudiced by Fleischer’s remark. Fleischer also stated that when he first walked up to the apartment complex, he recognized Shepherd from other contact he had had with him. Although no evidence was introduced to mitigate the prejudicial nature of this statement, the Commonwealth’s proposed admonition explained that the jury should not hold this comment against Shepherd because Fleischer patrolled Shepherd’s neighborhood often and was trained to be familiar with the people living there. Even though Shepherd declined the proposed admonition, if it had been offered, it would have cured any potential prejudice. When an admonitory cure is possible, a mistrial is not required. Graves v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 865 (Ky.2000) (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Fleischer testified that he and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding if the admonition would have cured the prejudice there is no necessity for a mistrial even if the appellant declined to request an admonition (B) holding that there is no prejudice if an error had little likelihood of affecting the verdict (C) holding regarding sixth amendment prejudice if there is no reasonable possibility that the appellate court would have ruled in his favor there can be no strickland prejudice (D) holding that a request for an instruction on entrapment should be refused even if there is evidence to support the defense if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constituting the crime that is charged (E) holding that a judges constitutional challenges to commissions admonition would have been considered by the arkansas supreme court had such matters been on the record
Output: (A)
Rule 1.16(d) provides that an attorney must refund unearned fees upon termination of representation. Respondent failed to refund Ms. Nelson the unearned $1,500.00 fee after she terminated his representation which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.16(d). See Shakir, 427 Md. at 206, 46 A.3d at 1167 (attorney violated 1.16(d) by not refunding unearned fees after representation was terminated). Rule 8.4 generally prohibits attorney misconduct. Subsection (c) of Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. “The retention of unearned fees paid by a client, alone, may constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c).” Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients money in trust (B) holding that because attorney violated several rules of professional conduct the attorney also violated rule 84a (C) holding that an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients (D) holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal (E) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case
Output: (C)
23, 1990). But part of our basis for concluding that the limitation did not violate public policy was that it left intact NSP’s liability for all other kinds of injury. Id. The Minnesota legislature has not plainly altered a person’s right to bring a common-law-tort claim against a utility, and it is not appropriate for the judiciary to undertake an alteration of this magnitude under the guise of interpretation. Courts in Minnesota have long heard cases alleging injuries by a utility, and we find no basis for curtailing that division of authority. See, e.g., Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Minn.1984) (reversing for failure to give res ipsa instruction in negligence case involving gas leak); Steinbrecher v. McLeod Coop. Power Ass’n, 392 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we conclude that the filed-rate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in wrongfuldeath action against electricity provider negligence issues were for jury (B) holding that an action for the negligence of an architect in the performance of professional services is an action for breach of contract (C) holding petition alleging negligence was a personal action (D) holding that an action against a tribal enterprise is an action against the tribe itself (E) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action
Output: (A)
mortgage and note are valid only as to Mr. Sagi, Brae is effectively and permanently restrained from enforcing any defi ciency judgment against him. That is, by the terms of the permanent restraint, any funds collected by Brae from Mr. Sagi or paid on his behalf would have to be funneled to Mrs. Sagi, who in turn by the court’s order would not be obliged to use the monies to pay the mortgage debt or the real estate taxes while remaining in the residence. Furthermore, the imposition of the restraints against Brae’s collection of its mortgage obligation is contrary to laws of this State governing lien priority. The basic rule of lien priority in New Jersey is “first in time, first in right.” Fidelity Union Title & Mtg. Guar. Co. v. Magnifico, 106 N.J. Eq. 559, 562, 151 A. 499 (Ch.1930) (<HOLDING>); United Jersey Bank/South v. Camera, 271 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law (B) holding that determination of whether prior conviction was punishable by term of imprisonment exceeding one year is governed by law in effect on date of conviction (C) recognizing that it is an open question whether drpa is a federal agency governed by the apa or a state agency governed by state administrative law (D) holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily (E) holding that priority of liens whether by mortgage or judgment is governed by the date of acquisition
Output: (E)
VI. Conclusion Trinity’s liability for direct and accidental loss to Carlton’s vehicle is capped at the “[ajmount necessary to repair or replace the property with other of like kind and quality.” Therefore, Trinity is not liable, as a matter of law, for the “inherent diminished value” to Carlton’s automobile. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Trinity or in denying Carlton’s motion for partial summary judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Carlton’s second and fifth issues. Having determined that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Trinity on the ground of that Trinity is not hable for “inherent diminished value,” we do not reach the remainder of Carlton’s appellate issues. See Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious (B) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (C) holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal (D) recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice (E) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
Output: (A)
does not require a litigant to present an issue that the state court has already decided. Even if the exhaustion doctrine did require such an odd result, I would excuse Pursell’s failure to exhaust this claim because exhaustion would be futile. The Third Circuit has explained that “ ‘[f]utility’ exists where ... ‘a state’s highest court has ruled unfavorably on a claim involving facts and issues materially identical to those undergirding a federal habeas petition and there is no plausible reason to believe that a replay will persuade the court to reverse its field.’ ” Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 162 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Allen v. Attorney General of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st Cir.1996)); see also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 436 n. 4, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Just such a situation is present in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree (B) holding procedural error is harmless where the court would have reached the same result had the guidelines issue been decided the other way and the sentence imposed would be reasonable even if contested issue decided in defendants favor (C) holding that exhaustion would have been futile because the florida supreme court previously rejected the same claim in other cases and counsel for the state had not suggested any reason why the florida courts would have decided petitioners case differently (D) holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state (E) holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise
Output: (C)
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In order for the county to be liable under § 1983, Frank must show, among other things, either the unconstitutional action of policymakers or an unconstitutional policy or custom. See Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1992). The district court correctly determined that Frank failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any official policy or custom governed the alleged conduct and whether Chambers was the final policy maker. See Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Drain v. Galveston County, 979 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county (B) holding elected constable not the final policymaker and therefore unconstitutional acts of elected county official not chargeable against the county (C) holding county clerk sued in official capacity was entitled to the immunity the county enjoyed (D) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (E) holding that an order redistricting a county was merely prospective as to qualifications of county commissioners and did not affect the right to office of those previously elected
Output: (B)
recall who told him. When he was arrested he said, “I guess Evelyn told you.” Finally, he told Tony Bone about beating someone with an ax handle. These are only the highlights of the evidence, and although they are circumstantial, when viewed as a whole, a reasonable conclusion is that Schreiber murdered Terry. For this reason, Schreiber has not established prejudice, and his ineffective assistance claims in his § 2254 petition must be denied. IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL Schreiber asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert each of the claims noted and evaluated above. Because none of the claims had merit, Schreiber’s appellate attorney was not ineffective for failing to bring them. See Clark v. Groose, 16 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the reasons detailed above, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue (B) holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection (C) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim
Output: (B)
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. Pa.R.E. 609(a)(b) (emphasis supplied). ¶ 7 The language of the rule is clear — there is no distinction drawn between a witness who is not a defendant and a witness who is a defendant. In fact, our Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant can be impeached with his or her own prior convictions. See Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 528 A.2d 1326 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, neither Pa.R.E. 609 nor case law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility (B) holding that a conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement may be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who chooses to testify (C) holding that a witnesss prior inconsistent statement to an officer could be used to impeach her (D) holding that summary convictions of crimes involving dishonesty could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness (E) holding that a defendant who chooses to testify in his or her own defense may not conceal contradictory statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment from the jury
Output: (B)
course of action with respect to its short positions,” Aristocrat Leisure, 618 F.Supp.2d at 307, evidence relating to the Non-Consequential Damages Parties’ hedging strategies is particularly probative of the reasonableness of the Consequential Damages Parties’ actions. Therefore, because evidence of Non-Consequential Damages Parties’ hedging strategies has some “tendency” to make the reasonableness of Consequential Damages Parties’ hedging actions “more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” such evidence is relevant. Fed.R.Evid. 401. To the extent that the Non-Consequential Damages Parties seek to proffer evidence not relating to their hedging strategies, that testimony is not relevant and will be cut-off by the Cou L 490740, at *3 (D.Conn. Mar.2, 2000) (<HOLDING>). The Bondholders also argue that allowing some 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting  90403 fla stat (B) holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice (C) holding that prior conviction shall be admissible evidence for impeachment purposes unless danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs probative value (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction
Output: (D)
not enough of the Debtors’ income is subject to the inherent risks of farming to say they engage in a “farming operation.” Therefore, VBHS concludes, absent such risks in a petitioner’s income, the special provisions of Chapter 12 should not apply. Regarding the good faith proposal of the Debtors’ Plan, VBHS claims its treatment as an alleged, but not judicially determined tort feasor unfairly discriminates against VBHS, and therefore not only violates 11 U..S.C. § 1222(b)(1), but also § 1225(a)(8) as being proposed in bad faith to thwart the claims of the Debtors’ chief creditor. Furthermore, the Court has an independent duty to inquire into the issue of the Debtors’ bad faith. See Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87, 90 (9th Cir. BAP 1988) (<HOLDING>). I. At the outset, the Court finds that in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court need not inquire into the veracity of a classified affidavit unless the information it provides is insufficient or contradicted by the record or there is evidence of bad faith on behalf of the agency (B) holding that bad faith in a  706a conversion permits the court to consider sua sponte whether the petitioner engaged in abuse of process under 11 usc  105a (C) holding title company liable for bad faith (D) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (E) holding court has independent duty to inquire into bad faith under 11 usc 1325a3
Output: (E)
See Mitchell, 376 S.W.3d at 838 (quoting MacFarlane v. Burke, No. 01-10-00409-CV, 2011 WL 2503937, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rabatin v. Kidd, 281 S.W.3d 558 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet;), which Johnson relies on to support her contention that the omissions did not render her authorization ineffective, is unavailing. See id. at 562. Since the El Paso court decided that case, the Texas Supreme Court has made clear that the plaintiff must provide both the statutory notice of claim and medical authorization to toll the statute of limitations in a health care liability claim. See Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 74; see also Nicholson v. Shinn, No. 01-07-00973-CV, 2009 WL 3152111, at *5-6 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We hold that the authorization 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice and authorization were ineffective to toll statute because release failed to include information on plaintiffs physicians for previous five years and portion requiring her to identify her treating physicians was also incomplete (B) holding the plaintiffs failure to identify an independently created right upon which her  1983 claim rested was fatal to her claim (C) holding that a defendants argument that her psr overstated the seriousness of her past conduct was not a sufficiently specific objection to the fact of her previous conviction (D) holding victim waived physicianpatient privilege by authorizing her doctor to release her medical records to the department of criminal investigation because the information contained in her medical records was no longer confidential between herself and her physician (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
Output: (A)
his former counsel failed to adequately prepare him for the merits hearing in October 2004 before the Immigration Judge. Hossain also contends that, prior to the hearing, his former counsel failed to discuss with him the legal requirements for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Hossain admits that later, within a short time after the BIA denied his appeal, his former counsel read to him the BIA’s decision. Despite numerous signs that would have alerted a reasonable person — much less one with the legal education and training like Hossain — to his counsel’s possible deficient performance, Hossain nevertheless failed to take any action to investigate until he met with current counsel on October 12, 2007. See Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 680 (<HOLDING>). Under these circumstances, the BIA did not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing (B) holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners (C) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim (D) holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte (E) holding that the mechanical failure of the petitioners car on the way to the hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the court
Output: (A)
to final disposition of the appeal.”). DISCUSSION In his first appellate issue, Gardner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment without stating the grounds on which it based its ruling. We hold that two well-established summary-judgment principles are fatal to Gardner’s argument. First, our summary-judgment jurisp of fact and conclusions of law have no place in a summary judgment proceeding. If summary judgment is proper, there are no facts to find, and the legal conclusions have already been stated in the motion and response.” Willms v. Americas Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796, 810 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted); see IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 441 (same); Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). As these cases suggest, the trial court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law (B) holding that appellate deadlines are not extended by request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following summary judgment because they have no place in a summary judgment proceeding (C) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed (D) holding that findings of fact and legal conclusions are neither necessary nor proper in summary judgment proceeding (E) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment
Output: (B)
in employment discrimination cases,” citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate in employment discrimination cases only in “those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion.” Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244; see also Webb v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 51 F.3d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). To put it another way, “[b]e-cause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-movant.” Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (<HOLDING>); accord Snow, 128 F.3d at 1205 (“Because 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact (B) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (C) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (D) holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment (E) holding that an eeoc reasonable cause determination letter did not constitute evidence precluding summary judgment when the other evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
Output: (B)
Miller, 622 F.3d at 538., While expressing its view that HCEA should inform principals and assistant principals of their altered status under PECCA, the Board did not dictate whether HCEA could accept principals and assistant principals as members. In fact,, the letter explicitly recognized that “if an administrator wants to continue to pay dues to [an employee] organization, including HCEA, they certainly may.” Similarly, the letter’s request that HCEA refrain from making comments the Board rightly or wrongly believed to be improper did not constitute a “a general prohibition against certain forms of advocacy,” nor did it “imposte] sanctions for the expression of particular views.” Ark. State Highway Emps., 441 U.S. at 464, 99 S.Ct. 1826. Rather ., 623 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). HCEA suggests that the Board’s letter 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school (B) holding that a students right to bodily integrity under the fourteenth amendment encompasses a students right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers (C) holding that a reprimand letter sent in response to a teachers union representation of a fellow employees grievance infringed on the teachers right of free association (D) holding board did not fail to disclose exculpatory information in violation of teachers due process rights (E) holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment
Output: (C)
of having used the drug charged. Gipson, 24 M.J. at 253; McMorris, 643 F.2d at 461-2. Is it admissible on an accused’s behalf — we think so in spite of the absolute prohibition in Military Rule of Evidence 707. See United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555 (A.C.M.R. 1994). We agree the President may promulgate rules of evidence for trials by court-martial. However, the President may not promulgate a rule which infringes on an accused’s constitutional right to present relevant, material, and favorable evidence. See, e.g., Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90 (C.M.A.1988) (striking down President’s rule in R.C.M. 916(k)(2) precluding accused from presenting evidence of partial mental responsibility to negate state of mind element of an offense); United States v. Hollimon, 16 M.J. 164 (C.M.A.1983) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we recognize a constitutional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same (B) holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim (C) holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii (D) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse (E) recognizing constitutional limit on presidents bar in milrevid 412a on admission of reputation or opinion evidence of noneonsensual sexual offense victims past sexual behavior
Output: (E)
sentencing him to life imprisonment was not erroneous. C. The district court’s failure to consider making Sanchez’s life sentence concurrent with his state term of imprisonment Sanchez argues that the district court erred in finding that it lacked discretion to make his federal life sentence concurrent with his current state term of imprisonment. The government concedes that the district court erred in finding it had no discretion, 2003 WL 22706781 at *275; see also United States v. Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir.2002), but argues that any error is harmless because Sanchez will spend the rest of his life in prison whether the federal sentence runs concurrent with or consecutive to his state sentence. See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In light of the government’s concession that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudice is shown where a sentencing error may affect the determination of sentence (B) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (C) holding that an incorrect guidelines calculation generally requires a remand for resentencing unless we conclude on the record as a whole  that the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed citation omitted (D) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed (E) holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case
Output: (B)
judgment, and the hearing on the motion was set for October 18. The hearing was continued for three additional days to allow Perrotta the opportunity to review materials Farmers had produced in discovery and to question a Farmers representative about what each document was. When the hearing resumed, the court denied the motion for continuance and rendered summary judgment in favor of Farmers. A plaintiff is expected that additional time for discovery was needed to compel the production of documents Farmers had withheld based upon attorney-client privilege. Perrotta, however, did not show why the documents were material nor file a motion to compel production after being served with Farmers’s responses. See Blake v. Lewis, 886 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, Perrotta claimed he needed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a court has found good cause to protect material from public disclosure there is no longer any commonlaw right of access to this material and the party seeking disclosure must present sufficiently compelling reasons why the sealed discovery document should be released (B) holding that general allegations of a need for additional discovery will not suffice the person presenting such a claim must show what discovery has been obtained why it is inadequate and the what additional information he expects to obtain from additional discovery (C) holding that such information is not material under securities law (D) holding proponent of a motion for continuance should state what specific discovery is material and show why it is material (E) holding that disclosure during discovery of certain kinds of information including privileged material trade secrets attorney work product or material involving a confidential informant could constitute a material injury of an irreparable nature
Output: (D)
of the rescue doctrine— there is no enforceable duty to rescue another individual. The only difference is that where the potential rescuer is the government, the argument for imposing such a duty to an individual is stronger because it is the government’s job to provide protection to the community at large. Our public duty cases stand for the proposition that notwithstanding this difference, the existence of an obligation to protect "everyone" will not be treated as a duty to any particular individual. That is as far as our precedents have gone. See note 6, infra. For the reasons stated below in the text of this opinion, I do not think that we should now go further. 6 . Compare Warner, supra, note 4, 580 A.2d at 130-31, and Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 136-37 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>), with Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court must find a total failure to respond to the discovery requested (B) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (C) holding that the public duty doctrine applied to bar claim against city for negligence in housing inspections (D) holding that public duty doctrine barred suit against district for failure of ambulance service to respond promptly to calls for help (E) holding in case where claim was that the decedent would have survived his stroke if an ambulance had been sent when first summoned that the public duty doctrine barred a suit alleging negligent and inept failure to dispatch an ambulance
Output: (D)
spite of § 14. Again, in that decision this Court held that an award of attorney fees was inappropriate. Therefore, we were not required to address the issue whether § 14 barred such an award, and our opinion is not precedent on that issue. Additionally, the fact that an action seeks a declaratory judgment and thus purportedly falls within an exception to § 14 does not necessarily open the doors of the State treasury to legal attack. The exception afforded declaratory-judgment actions under § 14 generally applies only when the action seeks “construction of a statute and how it should be applied in a given situation,” Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 280, 250 So.2d 677, 679 (1971), and not when an action seeks other relief. Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 242 Ala. 379, 6 So.2d 479 (1942) (<HOLDING>). Section 14 bars an action characterized as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  14 prevents an action against the state when a result favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or property right of the state (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that  14 prohibits the awarding of costs against the state as a defendant (D) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action that seeks only a declaration to construe the law and direct the parties and no other relief does not violate  14 (E) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action against the state that would affect property in which the state had an interest was barred by  14
Output: (D)
included offense. Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his “previous objections,” a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (<HOLDING>); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under former circuit court rule 76 the denial of the defendants directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence (B) holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified (C) holding in an appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in not ruling on his motion to subpoena a transcript of his guilty plea proceedings was not preserved for review because the circuit court never ruled on the motion and the appellant never objected to the circuit courts failure to rule on the motion (D) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (E) holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision
Output: (A)
titled and because he subsequently made his intent explicitly clear, we find that the district court erred in construing his filing as a § 1983 complaint. Accordingly, we modify the district court’s dismissal to show that the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the dismissal as modified. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED. * See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (explaining that a federal district court has no authority to review state court judgments); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction over a general district courts review of an administrative license suspension in the absence of any statutory authority vesting them with such jurisdiction (B) holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims (C) holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a tax lien (D) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts (E) holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss
Output: (D)
attempt to resolve it). While the record does not reveal the bankruptcy court’s reasons for denying relief from the injunction, the district court’s opinion affords some guidance. In upholding the bankruptcy court’s refusal to relax the injunction, that court cited the substantial delay in the liquidation of BRMC that this litigation already had caused and concluded that, in all events, any proceeding brought by the churches in the probate court likely would be a waste of time. BRMC III, 2004 WL 1778881, at *5-*6 & n. 12. Although the matter is far from clear, we assume, for argument’s sake, that the probate court retains the authority, even at this late date, to modify its decree confirming Ms. Krauss’s estate plan. Cf. O’Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 256, 294 N.E.2d 363, 380-81 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Even so, the mere fact that relief which is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probate courts have the continuing power to revoke or modify their decrees but suggesting that such action would only be appropriate in limited circumstances (B) holding that the power to terminate a contract atwill subsumes the power to modify its terms (C) recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose (D) holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted (E) holding that consent decrees and orders should be construed as contracts
Output: (A)
and, therefore, uninformed. We cannot agree. There is no statement of personal knowledge by the executrix stating whether Burnett consulted with legal counsel prior to executing the CSA or Guaranty. Plaintiff certified JTB, Inc. defaulted under the CSA and provided the documents supporting entry of judgment against it. JTB, Inc. never challenged the action or the relief sought. Proof of the Guaranty and its execution by Burnett was also provided to support judgment under the cognovit provision. Moreover, the Guaranty is clearly written and its waiver provisions are boldly identified, as is the confession of judgment clause. Importantly, plaintiffs action was based on the Guaranty, not the terms of its CSA with JTB, Inc. See Tam Enters., supra, 369 N.J.Super. at 59, 848 A.2d 27 (<HOLDING>). Further, the provision contains a succinct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment (B) holding a guarantee of a note that contains a cognovit provision alone is insufficient to permit confession of judgment against the guarantors (C) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (D) holding that a confessed judgment was not enforceable against a corporate president who individually guaranteed payment of corporate note signed by him in his capacity as president and which authorized confession of judgment (E) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment
Output: (B)
free exercise claim pursuant to the “hybrid rights” doctrine. Kane, 2006 WL 997217 *26. The Kane court agreed that “Smith may be read to impose strict scrutiny in ‘hybrid situation[s]’ in which a law ‘involve[s] not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.’ ” Kane, 2006 WL 997217 *26 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595). To assert a “hybrid rights” claim in the Ninth Circuit, however, “a free exercise plaintiff must make out a colorable claim that a companion right has been violated — that is, a fair probability or a likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits.’ ” Kane, 2006 WL 997217 *26 (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also, Truth, 542 F.3d at 651 (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiffs’ free speech claim fails 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that free exercise claims implicating other constitutional protections such as free speech could qualify for strict scrutiny review to the extent the plaintiff could make out a colorable claim that it was denied an exemption from the school districts nondiscrimination claim based on religion or content of speech (B) holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech (C) holding that campaign money laundering was in furtherance of political speech but an invalid exercise of free speech rights because it was illegal (D) holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause (E) holding that claim under connecticut law for employer discrimination based upon the employees exercise of privacy and free speech rights not preempted
Output: (A)
under the considerations provided in § 6.” Cosme, 632 N.E.2d at 835. First and most importantly, Massachusetts’ interests in this case substantially exceed those of Rhode Island. Robidoux is a Massachusetts resident who, after obtaining the approval of a Massachusetts administrative judge, received benefits from a Massachusetts workers’ compensation policy for an injury he suffered while employed by a Massachusetts company. Even where the injury occurs out of state, Massachusetts retains a significant interest in the extent to which a resident is compensated for a workplace injury. See, e.g., id. at 836; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 26 (expressly authorizing paying benefits for injuries sustained outside the state); cf. Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In addition to its interest in the amount of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (B) holding the new york state wiretap statute controlling on this issue (C) holding in a wifes suit against her husband stemming from a new york car accident that massachusetts law governed spousal immunity issue in part because the economic and social impact of this litigation will fall on massachusetts domiciliaries and a massachusetts insurer (D) holding that application of georgia law to dispute arising under life insurance policy issued by massachusetts insurer to new york resident violated due process clause where only georgia contact was that beneficiary moved there (E) holding that new york law applies to this matter
Output: (C)
the final order. The principal contention of the employer/carrier is that there was no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the. opin--ion of the expert medical advisor. The judge of compensation claims relied on the testimony of Dr. Hooshmand to determine the statutory presumption of correctness with regard to the expert medical advisor’s opinion was overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The record before us contains substantial competent evidence to support that finding. The employer/carrier did not contest the competence of Dr. Hooshmand to render an expert opinion on the effects of lightning strikes and electrical injuries. The judge of compensation claims was swayed by Dr. Hooshmand’s thirty plus years experience and specialization in this area of -82 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Patty Schmitt’s treating physician’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to establish particular claims as invalid must overcome the presumption of validity in 35 usc  282 by clear and convincing evidence (B) holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence (C) recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome (D) holding presumption overcome based on competent substantial record evidence which the judge could reasonably find to be clear and convincing (E) holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness
Output: (D)