niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
This substance abuse, the report continued, “seems to have had an exacerbating effect on the grandiose and persecutory beliefs that Doug began to develop during the mid-1970s.” Thus, Mickey is simply incorrect that there was undiscovered evidence of pre-drug abuse psychiatric disturbance for counsel to investigate. The same is true of the new social history with respect to the purported abuse. It is black-letter law that counsel cannot be found deficient for believing what his client plausibly tells him: “when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Cox, 588 F.3d at 1048-49 (<HOLDING>); Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 803 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel (B) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (C) holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel (D) holding that trial counsel will not be convicted of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to engage in futile acts (E) holding counsel not responsible for defendants failure to mention abuse
Output: (E)
Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 771 N.E.2d 770, 775-76 (2002); see also Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 704 N.E.2d 1147, 1155 (1999) (“[T]he principal purpose of § 10(j) is to preclude liability for failure to prevent' or diminish harm, including harm brought about by the wrongful act of a third party.”). Here, Plaintiff has not presented evidence of an affirmative act (as opposed to a failure to act) by the Individual Defendants that originally caused Plaintiff to suffer harassment. See, e.g., Doe v. Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 56 F.Supp.2d 114, 121 (D.Mass.1999) (“Even if the School District ignored the Does’ complaints about harassment by other students, "there are no allegations that it ‘originally caused’ the students to harass Jane Doe.”); Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1155-56 (<HOLDING>). Thus, even if Plaintiff had made presentment, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student (B) holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a suit claiming that he destroyed and falsified evidence (C) holding that school officials were immune from suit claiming they failed to protect student from an inschool stabbing (D) holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment (E) holding state immune from suit involving a federal question
Output: (C)
but it is "as provided in Section 30 of the Automated External Defibrillator Act.” The current version of the Good Samaritan Act was not in force at the time of Mr. Tobin's death, and therefore it cannot govern the issue retroactively. 45 . Plaintiffs seem to concede that the off-duty flight attendants are entitled to immunity under the Samaritan Act, but claim that on-duty flight attendants are not, because they worked "for compensation.” 46 . 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 49/10 (1998). 47 . In re Heanue, 355 Ill.App.3d 645, 291 Ill. Dec. 537, 823 N.E.2d 1123 (2005); see Johnson v. Matviuw, 176 Ill.App.3d 907, 126 Ill. Dec. 343, 531 N.E.2d 970 (1989). 48 . In re Heanue, 291 Ill.Dec. 537, 823 N.E.2d at 1129. See Rodas v. SwedishAmerican Health System Corp., 594 F.Supp.2d 1033 (N.D.Ill.2009) (<HOLDING>). But see Henslee v. Provena Hospitals, 373 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law doctors were immune from civil damages under the samaritan act because they did not derive economic benefit directly from the service performed (B) holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that payments from a tortfeasors insurer are not from a collateral source because they stem directly from the tortfeasor (D) holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that port authority is immune from punitive damages
Output: (A)
the court erroneously exercises its discretion, or exercises it “upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable in light of the evidence”). ¶ 27. In affirming the family court decision, we stress what is not covered by this opinion. Wife, recipient spouse, appealed only the decision to find changed circumstances and not the modification decision reached by the family court once it found changed circumstances. Thus, we have not reviewed the amount of the reduction with respect to the improvement of wife’s financial situation. Nor have we determined whether part of the original maintenance award in this case was compensatory. If it was, we would question the family court’s authority to terminate that part of the maintenance award. See id. at 39-40, 819 A.2d at 690 (<HOLDING>); Stickney v. Stickney, 170 Vt. 547, 549, 742 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years (B) holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award (C) holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance (D) recognizing that recipient spouses improved financial security will support modification of maintenance award (E) recognizing that family court cannot eliminate compensatory part of maintenance award
Output: (E)
however, provides a narrow exception to this rule: [U]pon the submission of documentation to the commission that a contractor or subcontractor has represented himself to a higher tier subcontractor, contractor, or project owner as having workers’ compensation insurance at the time the contractor or subcontractor was engaged to perform work, the higher tier subcontractor, contractor, or project owner must be relieved of any and all liability under this title except as specifically provided in this section. Liability may only be transferred from the higher tier contractor to the Fund after the higher tier contractor has properly documented the lower tier contractor’s claim that it retains workers’ compensation insurance. See Barton v. Higgs, 381 S.C. 367, 371, 674 S.E.2d 145, 147 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We find substantial evidence in the record to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled (B) holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage (C) holding liability could not be transferred to the fund where the certificate of insurance was not signed (D) holding that where a bankrupt wife transferred a certain lot to her husband the husband being already the equitable owner of the transferred property it cannot be said that the lot was transferred to him without consideration (E) holding that an insurance policy cannot be transferred to a third person without the insurers consent
Output: (C)
However, Medical Expert # 1, Dr. Abramson, found Hampton was capable of performing only light to medium work. (R. 70). Dr. Blackman testified that due to Hampton’s anger and depression interfering with his concentration, Hampton could not perform “even in the simplest of jobs now.” (R. 84). Once the psychiatrist established Hampton’s limitations performing the simplest of jobs due to his lack of mental concentration based on depression, the ALJ was required to call the VE to testify because the grid rules were no longer appropriate in determining whether Hampton could perform light to medium work where Hampton’s nonexertional impairments were so severe as to limit the range of work he could perform. Herron, 19 F.3d at 336; Allen v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 385, 389-90 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Intertwined with claimant’s argument that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the record viewed in its entirety does not support the aljs finding that allen had no nonexertional impairments (B) holding that when court applies the clearly erroneous standard court may not reverse boards finding of fact if after court reviews the record in its entirety the finding is supported by a plausible basis (C) holding that ambiguity will be found where writing viewed in its entirety fairly admits of more than one meaning (D) recognizing the aljs broad discretion to correct mistakes in the record (E) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record
Output: (A)
(reversing and remanding for determination of whether permissive intervention should have been allowed, where district court did not previously rule on question and where appellate court concluded that to permit it would not constitute an abuse of discretion). On appeal, however, we have a duty to determine if such an error was harmless. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir.1979) (applying harmless-error analysis to denial of motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing). Since we have considered all of the Task Force’s claims in this appeal, we conclude that the denial of its motion to intervene permissively constituted harmless error. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the order is only reviewable if actually considered by the district court (B) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (C) holding that failure to permit intervention was harmless where the appellate court considered the defendants claim  as if the district court had al lowed them to intervene (D) holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial (E) holding that appellate court may infer that district court considered sentencing guidelines policy statements despite district courts failure to make explicit reference to them
Output: (C)
a right to enjoy over the land of another for the benefit of the easement holder’s land, but it does not create an interest in the land itself." (footnote omitted; emphasis added)). 2 . 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 100 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see Cameron v. Barton, Ky., 272 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1954) ("Appellant finally contends that the easement in controversy was extinguished by merger when a former owner of the dominant estate bought an adjoining lot which offered a means of ingress and egress to and from the Highway Department’s property. The answer to this contention is that the doctrine of merger could not apply because the former owner of the dominant estate did not acquire the ser-vient estate." (emphasis added)); Sievers v. Flynn, 305 Ky. 325, 204 S.W.2d 364 (1947) (<HOLDING>); City of Franklin v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that owners of a dominant estate had a duty to keep the easement in a proper state of repair to avoid damaging the servient estate through erosion (B) holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another (C) holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership (D) holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate (E) recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement
Output: (C)
based on the above analysis, to succeed on a defense of vindictive prosecution, defendant must prove (1) that the prosecutor “harbored genuine animus toward the defendant”; and (2) that the defendant would not have been prosecuted except for that unlawful animus. Aviv, 923 F.Supp. at 36 (citing Futernick, 78 F.3d at 1056-57 (6th Cir.1996)); see also Koh, 199 F.3d at 640. First, it is clear from the record that it had been well over a year between the time defendant was erroneously released and the time that a decision was made to prosecute this case. During that year no one had shown any interest in prosecuting this case. It is well established that to prosecute a defendant based on the success of an appeal is unconstitutional. See United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Second, based on evidence presented at the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (B) holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction (C) holding violation of due process to penalize a criminal defendant for pursuing statutory right of appeal (D) holding that a criminal defendant has a due process right to present evidence and that exclusion of evidence for a defense discovery violation should be imposed only if no other remedy suffices (E) holding a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process
Output: (C)
seeks damages — that is, those entered into with Safeco, Provident and Manulife. (See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n at 34, 92 Doc. 484-1 at 51, 109.) In the opinion of the Court, all of the Safeco, Provident and Manulife annuities, except the QPA-2, are variable annuities not entitled to the exemption provided for by section 3(a)(8). (1) The Safeco Annuities The QPA-2 was a traditional fixed annuity with a guaranteed interest rate. (PL’s Ex. 358 at Safeco 00127, Doc. 456-3 at 1.) All deposits were held in Safeco’s general fund, not a separate account. (PL’s Ex. 360 at Safeco 00115, Doc. 456-4 at 2.) Safeco bore all of the risk as it had to meet minimum interest payments. As such, it falls within the exemption provided by section 3(a) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8). See Otto I, 814 F.2d at 1131-32 (<HOLDING>). The Resource Variable Account A was an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation (B) holding that the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty when its actions were consistent with the trust instrument (C) holding that insurance instrument was fixed annuity exempt from securities regulation because the instrument provided a guaranteed return of four percent 4 (D) holding that the gravamen of the offense is the physical adaptation of the instrument (E) holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument
Output: (C)
matter. When it is clear, however, from the relevant parts of the contract taken together and considered with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties or was necessary to effect their intention, then such obligation may be implied and enforced. But when the contract between the parties speaks to the obligation sought to be implied, the courts will not write that implied obligation into the contract. Stated conversely, there may be an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the absence of any expressed on the subject as in the lease).[ ] Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation omitted). See also Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560, 569 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in accordance with New Mexico law, any 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions (B) holding that courts cannot imply covenants which are inconsistent with express provisions (C) holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants (D) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (E) holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter
Output: (B)
that the criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster and a bane to human society, the law sets a note of infamy upon him, puts him out of it’s [sic] protection, and takes no farther care of him than barely to see him executed. He is then called attaint, attincbus, stained, or blackened. He is no longer of any credit or reputation. ...” SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 235 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *380). While the prohibition against bills of attainder has evolved far beyond the original context of capital sentences, it continues to focus on legislative enactments that “set[ ] a note of infamy” on the persons to whom the statute applies. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-54, 85 S.Ct. at 1717-18 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Viewed in this light, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void (C) holding that a statute is not a bill of attainder where it incorporates no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of men (D) holding that demand upon a bill already paid or unauthorized demand upon unpaid bill constitutes a false claim even though bill itself contains no false statement (E) holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered
Output: (C)
official capacity as members of the Louisiana Air National Guard, which was in turn acting under color of state law. 10 . The Court also notes that, in their opposition to the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs concede that Thomas is a “state police officer.” Rec. Doc. 51, p. 29. 11 . Although this issue was not raised by the parties, the Court also notes that according to "long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent ... neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons’ under § 1983,” and thus neither a State nor its officials are amenable to suit under §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986. Fairley v. Stalder, 294 Fed.Appx. 805, 808-809 (5th Cir.2008); Bryant v. Military Dept. of State of Miss., 381 F.Supp.2d 586, 592 (S.D.Miss.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiffs’ official ca pacity claims 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims under  1983 1985 and 1986 are barred for the further reason that these statutes create rights solely against persons and a state is not considered a person under these statutes (B) holding that these statutes are not intended to create a duty where none exists but to preserve any that do exist (C) holding housing statutes create no rights in tenants for purposes of section 1983 (D) holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing (E) holding state is not a proper defendant under  1985
Output: (A)
judgment of the Court, made clear that court decisions cannot be applied retroactively to civil causes already barred by statutes of limitation or res judicata. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the notion that a statute of limitation may bar a tax refund action, notwithstanding the Court’s ruling that the state’s taxing statute is unconstitutional, and irrespective of the Court’s retroactive application of that ruling. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 27, 45, 110 L. Ed. 2d 17, 29, 41, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2245, 2254-55 (1990) (acknowledging that statutes of limitation may be dispositive in such cases); Ward v. Board of County Commissioners, 253 U.S. 17, 25, 64 L. Ed. 751, 759, 40 S. Ct. 419, 422 (1920) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that refund suit for tax imposed in violation of export clause filed beyond applicable period of limitations was barred where claimant had failed to first present timely administrative claim to internal revenue service even though there was little  if any  reason to believe that claim would have been granted (B) holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run (C) holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim (D) holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations (E) recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was any valid local limitations law in force when the claim was filed
Output: (E)
motions). The Second Circuit has not yet announced a specific standard for exercising the district court’s discretion in ruling on such a motion. The Second Circuit has, however, stated that: “[o]nly ‘reasonably genuine surprise’ on the part of the appellant, Moylan v. Siciliano, 292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1961), combined with an assertion of the nature of the additional evidence, Berns v. Pan Am. World Airways, 667 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.1982), would give us sufficient reason to remand for the taking of additional evidence.” Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985); see also Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 679 (upholding district court’s decision to permit party to re-open a hearing where (1) additional evidence was material, (2) opposing part (S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>). I shall consider the issue of Plaintiff’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them (B) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (C) holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court (D) holding that when appraising a partys motion to reopen the record posttrial the court must consider 1 whether or not the moving partys failure to submit evidence was the result of its own lack of diligence 2 the extent to which reopening the record might prejudice the nonmovant and 3 where the interests of justice lie (E) holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case
Output: (D)
stay. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5963, 6299 [hereinafter House Report]; S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 5838 [hereinafter Senate Report]. Nowhere is it mentioned that section 362(b)(4) permits government agencies to enforce contractual rights against debtors without first seeking relief from the automatic stay. Nor has appellant cited any cases holding that actions by a governmental agency to enforce contractual rights, even if related to the agency’s general regulatory power, are exempt from the automatic stay. See In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 989, 1000 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1980), vacated as moot by stipulation, 687 F.2d 344 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The alleged breach of contract by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession (B) holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions (C) holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive (D) holding that a government corporation with respect to actually implementing its contractual remedies after the debtor has filed for relief under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code  is in the same position as any other party in interest (E) holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11
Output: (D)
to suffer irreparable harm in the ab sence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); see also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1126—27 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374). A plaintiff also may obtain a preliminary injunction upon a showing of “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply towards the plaintiff ..., so long as the plaintiff also shows a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance For the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (<HOLDING>). “In all cases, the burden of persuasion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the slidingscale standard for granting preliminary injunctions survives winter v natural resources defense council inc 555 us 7 129 sct 365 172 led2d 249 2008 (B) holding that the serious questions approach survives winter when applied as part of the fourelement winter test (C) holding that the slidingscale approach also survives winter in the context of stays (D) holding that parole survives deportation (E) holding that a serious questions version of the sliding scale approach to preliminary injunctions survives winter
Output: (B)
the proceedings.” Id. The district court reversed the trial court’s judgment for petitioner and ordered that a directed verdict be entered for respondent. The conflict issue is whether the Whistle Blower’s Act should be strictly or liberally construed. We agree with petitioner that the Act is remedial and should be given a liberal construction. See Martin County v. Edenfield, 609 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla.1992) (“[W]e believe it clear that the [public employee] Whistle-Blower’s Act is a remedial statute designed to encourage the elimination of public corruption by protecting public employees who ‘blow the whistle.’ As a remedial act, the statute should be construed liberally in favor of granting access to the remedy.”); Hutchison v. Prudential Ins. Co., 645 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Respondent’s argument that the Act should be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed (B) holding that under edenfield the act should be liberally construed (C) holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed (D) holding that the social security act is remedial and needs to be construed liberally (E) holding that coas should be construed liberally
Output: (B)
noted that Plaintiffs’ claims “shall be litigated in federal district court,” and that “[i]f upheld by the court, they shall be paid along with, those claims found in Class 6 above.” In re Club Zippers, Inc., No. 04-11644, Docket No. 31. Thus, it appears as though the bankruptcy court accepted Plaintiffs’ Adversary Proceeding as an informal proof of claim and in evaluating the documents filed in the bankruptcy proceeding the elements of an informal proof of claim are clearly met in this case. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint constitutes a written demand on the debtor’s estate as Plaintiffs state a cause of action against Club Zippers and seek damages for (1) medical expenses, (2) pain and mental anguish, (3) funeral and burial expenses, and (4) loss of future earni 1986) (<HOLDING>). Limiting an informal claim to a complaint to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13 (B) holding that complaints against a chapter 7 discharge coupled with objections to a chapter 13 plan of reorganization are sufficient to establish an informal proof of claim (C) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (D) holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 (E) holding congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit of chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for chapter 7 relief
Output: (B)
Bonilla did not have the present ability to comply with the court’s discovery orders. A trial court should only impose discovery sanctions, especially the severe sanction, of dismissal, “when the non-complying party has the present ability to comply with the discovery orders.” Arviv v. Perlow, 528 So.2d 139, 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to impose the sanction of dismissal upon a party who does not have the present ability to comply with the court’s discovery orders. See Arviv, 528 So.2d at 140 (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs case where the plaintiff had no present means with which to comply with the discovery order); Garcia Fleet Corp. v. Martinez, 483 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 417 So.2d 778, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying the habeas petitioners motion to conduct dna testing which was unavailable at trial (B) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by entering a dismissal where the plaintiffs were at sea when the trial court granted its discovery order and were therefore unavailable to be renoticed for their depositions (C) holding trial court abused its discretion when case had been on file for only three months the discovery sought was material to the plaintiffs claims and the plaintiff exercised due diligence in obtaining discovery (D) holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion (E) holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial
Output: (B)
than .08 a the time of the accident, then the jury must also find that the defendant was guilty of the DUI offense. In this case, one expert fixed the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of the crash as .185 or .19. A second expert testified that the defendant had the equivalent of eleven drinks of alcohol in his body at the time of the crash. According to the testimony, the maximum blood alcohol level he could have had at the time of the accident was .20, and the minimum was .12. The defendant had also ingested Valium, which further impaired him. The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove with an unlawful blood alcohol level. As in Dodge, any presumption of impairment issues was a moot concern. See also Searles v. State, 816 So.2d 793, 795 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). The trial court believed that the granting of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the giving of the presumption of impairment instruction was harmless error when there is sufficient evidence of actual impairment such that there is no doubt that the jury would have found impairment even without the erroneous instruction (B) holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error (C) holding that the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error (D) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (E) holding that a trial judge is obliged to give a correct jury instruction notwithstanding that request for instruction was technically erroneous if the evidence generates the subject matter of the jury instruction
Output: (A)
that it could not have asserted that the Convention governed its breach of contract claims in the original action. Nor has it asserted that a contract claim arose under the Convention after it went to judgment in the first suit. Accordingly, the two cases Por-timex relied on at the hearing to support its res judicata position do not alter the Court’s analysis. First, both cases applied federal law of preclusion, which, as the Court has noted, no longer governs the preclusive effect of the Court’s judgments in a diversity case. Second, the holdings in both cases were based on the unremarkable proposition that conduct that occurs after the judgment in the original action may gave rise to new causes of action. See Kilgoar v. Colbert County Bd. of Educ., 578 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new claims for damages could arise from actions that occurred subsequent to the judgment in the original action (B) holding that to the extent plaintiffs present action is based on conduct subsequent to the original action it is not barred by the prior litigation (C) holding that subsequent action barred by res judicata where party had full and fair opportunity to present case before zoning board (D) holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim (E) holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action
Output: (B)
was sued. Consequently, they properly alleged standing to sue for all asserted claims. B. Mootness Even when a plaintiff has standing at the outset, “[t]here must be a case or controversy through all stages of a case[.]” K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 438 (5th Cir.2013). “A case becomes moot — and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III— ‘when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’ ” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 721, 726-27, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (per curiam)). See also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1068, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages (B) holding that courts will dismiss an appeal as moot unless an actual case or controversy exists at all stages of the judicial or administrative process (C) holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling (D) holding that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review not merely at the time the complaint is filed (E) holding that rule 43aentitles a defendant to be present at all stages of his trial and that cjommunication between the judge and the jury or a single juror is one of those stages
Output: (D)
area of successor liability — especially since state law will in many other instances determine whom the EPA may or may not look to for compensation. See, e.g., Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.1987)(California law determines capacity of a dissolved corporation to be sued); Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458-60 (state law determines validity of' contractual releases of CERCLA liability). If state law varied widely on the issue of successor liability, perhaps the need for a uniform federal rule would be more apparent. This is not the case, however, as “the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.” Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir.1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). The argued “need” for uniformity thus stems 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law determines successor liability under cercla (B) holding that  successor liability is not a tort it is an equitable tool used to transfer liability from a predecessor to a successor  quotation omitted (C) holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law (D) holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla (E) holding that state law governs application of successor liability to cercla defendants
Output: (A)
as she has failed to show that a majority of the arbitrators deliberately disregarded the law. (See id.) Although the award in this case is general, it does not appear that the panel deliberately disregarded the law. Both parties made viable legal arguments to the arbitration panel regarding equitable remedies and defenses including the voluntary payment doctrine, which the panel says it considered. Although the voluntary payment doctrine could preclude Olde’s recovery, it is not applicable in all situations and there are exceptions to the doctrine. For example, courts have found that if a mistake of fact is alleged, then the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply. See Kane-Miller Corp. v. Lakeview Trust & Sav. Bank, No. 88 C 7561, 1989 WL 13295, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.13, 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Best Buy Co. v. Harlem-Irving Cos., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff (B) recognizing that a mistake of fact may constitute a valid defense (C) holding that applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine and the mistake of fact exception raises questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss (D) holding that money paid under mistake of fact may be recovered regardless of the negligence of the payor (E) holding the general rule is that money paid to another under a mistake of fact may be recovered because the money belongs in equity and good conscience to the person who paid it
Output: (D)
and so require an interpretive step to determine the expressive elements of these processes. However, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Although writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation. Thus, we have not drawn a hard line between the essays John Peter Zenger published and the act of setting the type. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The process of expression through a medium 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that dating is a type of association protected by the first amendment (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) holding that a tax on ink and paper burdens rights protected by the first amendment
Output: (E)
procedure[s] ... [are] inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society ... [and] the treatment needs of this population are very long-term and the treatment modalities ... are very different from the traditional treatment modalities available in a prison setting or for persons appropriate for commitment under chapter 229” (emphasis added)). The legislature’s intent to enact a civil statute is also implied from the placement of the law among code chapters dealing with the mentally ill; chapter 229 provides for the voluntary and involuntary hospitalization of persons with mental illness and chapter 230 concerns support of persons with mental illness. See Iowa Code chs. 229, 230; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. at 2082, 138 L.Ed.2d at 514-15 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, a person determined to be a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim of quantum meruit was appropriate in a probate case because under section 103 principles of law and equity supplement the provisions of the utah uniform probate code unless displaced by particular provisions of the code (B) holding that the possibility that a sex offender could face civil commitment under a state statute was a collateral consequence because civil commitment does not flow automatically from the plea (C) recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue (D) holding placement of commitment statute within probate code rather than within criminal code was evidence of intent to enact civil remedy (E) recognizing that code is speech
Output: (D)
Relief and Retirement Fund v. Sears, 803 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990). In Irving, the court also held that spendthrift provisions “are limited to protection of the benefits from the annuitant’s creditors and assignees.” The wife was held to be neither a creditor nor an assignee, but the owner of a community interest in the fund. Id. Not only was Coppola’s interest in his ORPA assignable, but it was in fact validly pledged to secure Beeson’s alimony by the terms of the divorce decree, and the security interest was perfected, in lieu of U.C.C. compliance, by the divorce judgment. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 9.104(8) (excepting interest created by court judgment from the perfection requirements of Article 9); Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1978) (<HOLDING>). Coppola next asserts that the ORPA is exempt 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time (B) holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc  1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity (C) holding that a debtors right in collateral may be transferred by court order (D) holding that a district court order denying anonymity to the parties is a collateral order (E) recognizing collateral attack on void order
Output: (C)
evidence suggesting that each of the hotel stays involved the same individual, (e.g., the perpetrator gave the same fictitious address and/or fictitious telephone number; tips on credit card vouchers were in such amounts that the totals rounded off to even dollar amounts, the perpetrator departed prior to the scheduled end of his stay without checking out). “Evidence of this kind may be sufficient alone to establish a perpetrator’s identity. See United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 524-25 (3d Cir.1979) (finding similar modus operandi evidence probative of identity); 2 Jack B. Wein-stein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[16] (1992) (discussing "signature” evidence in context of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)).” See also Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence of individual modus operandi may be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of testimony which denominated appellants modus operandi in previously uncharged and charged crimes was not clearly erroneous (B) holding that rule 404b evidence is probative of intent only when the prior acts were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense (C) holding that prior con victions are not related simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi were part of a crime spree or shared the same motive (D) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (E) holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago
Output: (A)
S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658), the ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990, see 104 Stat. 327, 327. We therefore borrow the state statute of limitations that applies to the most analogous state-law claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), partially superseded by statute as stated in Jones, 541 U.S. at 377-80,124 S.Ct. 1836. The district court concluded that Virginia’s one-year limitations period for claims under the Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (hereafter, the Virginia Disabilities Act), Va.Code Ann. § 51.5-40 et seq., should apply to the ADA claims here, and the parties do not dispute this conclusion on appeal. See Childress v. Clement, 5 F.Supp.2d -384, 388 (E.D.Va. 1998) (<HOLDING>). This court has not previously determined what 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada (B) holding that  1522 is the most analogous limitations period for  1983 actions (C) holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah (D) holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada (E) holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims
Output: (A)
is outside the ambit of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 891. Specifically, we held: Recall that in the majority of those cases, the court specifically considered whether the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and concluded that the defendant's statement or action was an invocation of the right. See Combs [v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 286 (6th Cir.2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)]; [United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992)]; Coppola [v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989)]; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (<HOLDING>)[, reh'g denied ]. Based on these cases and the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (B) holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer (C) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent
Output: (A)