niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
The order was entitled "Amended” because a previous order granting summary judgment omitted dismissal of the counterclaim. These dismissals are not at issue on appeal. 3 . In the motions for summary judgment, appellees did not specifically address Methodist’s request for declaratory judgment. However, Methodist requested merely a declaratory judgment "that the ... claims fertile pre-existing injuries of [Riegert and Fulton-Perez] are entirely Zurich’s responsibility.” Thus, this relief depended on Methodist’s prevailing on its other theories. Further, on appeal, Methodist does not contend the trial court granted more relief than requested in the motions for summary judgment. See Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d 426, 436 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we will review summary judgment on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an appellant fails to raise arguments regarding an issue on appeal that issue is deemed abandoned (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that evidence filed less than 21 days before original summaryjudgment hearing was timely even though trial court never granted leave to file late evidence because the summaryjudgment hearing was reset to a date more than 21 days after the evidence was filed (D) holding that a party must obtain a distinct ruling on an issue in order to raise it on appeal (E) recognizing appellant must raise issue on appeal that more relief than requested in motion was improperly granted in summaryjudgment order
Output: (E)
was admissible, “subject to anything that might cause the court to reconsider based on the evidence.” When the Government introduced this evidence during the trial, Komolafe did not object. This court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir.1996). However, where a party fails to object to the admission of evidence, our review is for plain error. United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the evidence provided context and background for the conspiracy and was intrinsic to the charged conspiracy. See Chin, 83 F.3d at 88; United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Further, the evidence was not unfairly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment is sufficient as long as it fully and clearly sets out the crime and the elements of the offense even if the evidence consists of proof of other means of committing the same crime (B) holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged (C) holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime (D) holding that admission of prior crime similar to the one charged increases likelihood that jury will convict based on past pattern of behavior rather than on facts of charged offense (E) holding that fedrevid 404b does not restrict evidence of crimes that arose out of the same series of transactions as the charged offense or that are necessary to complete the story of the charged crime
Output: (E)
contractor’s work is accepted and end day it is accepted and that, while one “who assumes control over a dangerous condition left by a contractor may be liable,” it “does not necessarily mean that he who creates the danger should escape liability”). Third, the defect in Preston— the design and construction of the pool— was “a patent one as a matter of law.” 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 720 P.2d at 485. Moreover, other jurisdictions have faced more factually analogous circumstances and have rejected arguments similar to Occidental’s. These cases have imposed liability on former plant owners whose negligent design work resulted in an injury to a third-party after the sale of the plant to a new owner. See Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W.Va. 347, 475 S.E.2d 439, 443-44 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Dorman v. Swift & Co., 162 Ariz. 228, 782 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor (B) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (C) holding that section 150002 was satisfied with respect to hotel owners claims against former owners architect for negligent design of foundation and drainage (D) holding former plant owner liable for its negligent design of conveyor belt (E) holding that in the context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals a tort action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional
Output: (D)
103-322, § 250002, 108 Stat. 2082, 2083 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2327(b)(3)). Contrary to Vicky’s assertion, the variation among these restitution statutes does not mean that Congress eliminated the proximate cause requirement for the specifically enumerated losses in subsections 2259(b)(3)(A) through (E). Rather, variances among these restitution statutes “demonstrate that Congress viewed particular offenses as causing foreseeable risks of certain losses [meriting enumeration] in the[se] [restitution] statutes.” Id. at 97 n. 13. The First Circuit concluded that, although Congress determined that restitution offenses foreseeably cause the losses in subsections (A) through (E), the defendant — to be liable — still must proximately cause the victim’s losses. See id. at 95-97, 99-100 (<HOLDING>). This court agrees. Congress determined that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proximate cause requirement was satisfied  because the defendants actions resulted in identifiable losses as outlined in the expert reports and vickys victim impact statements footnote and citation omitted (B) holding that the government may be an identifiable victim (C) holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate (D) holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized (E) holding that such reports fell within the core class of testimonial statements described in this courts leading confrontation clause decisions internal quotation marks and citation omitted
Output: (A)
include the element that elevates the crime to a higher level.” As we noted in State v. Bean, 153 N.H. 380 (2006), “[i]n Glanville, the State, although not required to do so under Johnson, attempted to charge the defendant with a specific variant of the crime allegedly attempted, but failed to accurately set forth that variant in the indictment.” Bean, 153 N.H. at 384; see Johnson, 144 N.H. at 178. Indeed, Glanville recognized that all that was required “[t]o charge the defendant with attempted armed robbery, class A felony, [was for] the indictment ... to allege that the defendant (1) with a purpose to commit armed robbery, (2) committed acts constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” Glanville, 145 N.H. at 634 (emphasis added); cf. Casanova, 164 N.H. at 566 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the indictment in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants (B) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (C) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (D) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (E) holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible
Output: (A)
criminality of the behavior. It remains unclear to this court whether the deciding officials at the FBI interpreted its policy to require a criminal finding, such that they could only investigate Doe if his surreptitious videotaping of his sexual liaisons was criminal. The record indicates that the deciding officials at OPR as well as Doe’s own supervisors were under the impression that Doe’s conduct violated state voyeurism laws, and was reasonably subject to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the AJ held that Doe’s conduct likely did not violate the Ohio state voyeurism law, because Doe had not shown the videotapes to any other person and the females who had been taped waived their right to privacy with respect to Doe. See State v. Frost, 92 Ohio App.3d 106, 634 N.E.2d 272, 272 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Yet, while the Board agreed with the AJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated (B) holding the government waived its standing argument when it was put on notice the defendant would claim a privacy interest (C) holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived (D) holding no violation of ohio state voyeurism statute when the privacy interest to be protected had been waived by the females who probably expected to be observed (E) holding statute of limitations is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time but noting other ohio appellate courts have held the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and may be waived if not asserted at the trial level
Output: (D)
” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Commotir-Law Claims Finally, Comley attempts to repackage her discrimination claims under various common-law labels, some sounding in law and others in equity. Chapter 151B is a comprehensive remedial statute, and thus precludes replication of discrimination claims in the form of common-law actions. See id. § 9 (exclusivity provision). The purpose of this provision is “to subject all discrimination claims to some administrative scrutiny.” Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 585, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994). Claims against the individually name defendants Chapter 151B, unlike its cognate federal statutes, provides for. individual personal liability. Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 491, 738 N.E.2d 753 (2000) (<HOLDING>). While Comley has adduced sufficient facts to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting (B) recognizing aiding and abetting conversion (C) recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion (D) recognizing aiding and abetting trespass (E) holding that individual harasser could be found liable for aiding and abetting his corporate entity which was the vehicle through which the plaintiff was dismissed for refusing his sexual advances
Output: (E)
recognition that on remand the plaintiff may very well be entitled to no relief at all. See, e.g., Maj.Op. at 86-87 & n. 24, 88 n. 26. In particular, I find this setting singularly inappropriate for an abstract discussion of novel constitutional rights of dubious applicability. 1 . The District Court may, however, have made the case more difficult than it need have been by refusing to rule on the Government’s request that the highly relevant materials contained in the sealed affidavit be disclosed. See Maj. Op. at 91. 2 . See Maj. Op. at 90 (recognizing well-established principle that a court should not consider constitutional arguments unless it has already determined that case cannot be decided on non-constitutional grounds); cf. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). But see Maj. Op. at 80 n. 14 (noting in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no private right of action exists (B) holding that a private right of action exists (C) holding that there is no private right of action against a state governmental entity for violations of the texas constitution (D) holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information (E) recognizing private right of action
Output: (D)
P. King ed., 15th ed. rev.1999). 14 . See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.1998) (synonym of "fraudulent” is "deceitful”); Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ("To act with 'intent to defraud' means to act willfully, and with the specific intent to deceive or cheat.”).. 15 . See also Lindholm, 24 F.3d at 1083-84 (criminal statute § 152 applies even if false statements do not affect the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 427, 432-33 (8th Cir.) (citing cases and holding that debtor’s sworn statement attesting to his lack of employment, aimed at securing in forma pauperis status before the tribunal, is material), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 833, 113 S.Ct. 103, 121 L.Ed.2d 62 (1992); In re Robinson, 506 F.2d 1184, 1188—89 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Grant, 971 F.2d 799, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (B) holding that 18 usc  1014 has no materiality requirement because the statute does not so much as mention materiality (C) holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement (D) holding that materiality is an element of false statement prosecutions which must be submitted to the jury (E) holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient
Output: (C)
million cash component. The spreadsheet was also subsequently revised over the weekend of July 24, although at all times the spreadsheet showed that HHI's bid was superior to RHJI's bid. 9 . Indeed, how could it be otherwise? RHJI sought Court approval of the amendments. If it believed they were enforceable without Court approval, there would be no need to file the motion. Indeed, Donohoe testified that the amendments were subject to Court approval for purposes of obtaining bidder protections. 10 . It does not appear that the Second Circuit has weighed in on this split. At least two bankruptcy judges in this jurisdiction have held that contracts subject to court approval are not binding before court approval. See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 326 B.R. 240, 256 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 168 B.R. 294, 303 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not pending because nothing was left for the court to decide (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable (D) holding that because  363 sale was subject to court approval debtor was not bound to perform until then and could withdraw the application to approve and abandon the contract (E) holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable
Output: (D)
Desert responds that the export policy does not contain an arbitration agreement and the export policy makes no references to the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement. When a trial court denies a motion to compel arbitration, its factual findings are reviewed under a competent, substantial evidence standard, and its legal conclusions regarding the construction and validity of an arbitration agreement are reviewed de novo. BKD Twenty-One Mgmt. Co. v. Delsordo, 127 So. o another document, the contract must expressly refer to the document or sufficiently describe the document so that the document could be interpreted as part of the contract. Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consol. Credit Counseling Services, Inc., 920 So.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the doctrine [of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an administrative rule referred to in the contract became part of the contract under the doctrine of incorporation (B) holding that the arbitration agreement in a written contract did not apply to a dispute arising from a subsequent oral agreement which did not incorporate the arbitration clause from the written contract (C) holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur (D) holding that when plaintiff sought arbitration and neither the award nor the arbitration agreement mentioned interest the plaintiff was not entitled to preaward interest (E) holding that a contract does not incorporate the arbitration clause of the companys user agreement when that user agreement was neither expressly referred to nor sufficiently described in the contract
Output: (E)
of the jury.’ Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proo, art. 36.14). “We have generally held that, if a jury-charge instruction ‘is not derived from the [penal] code, it is not ‘applicable law” under art. 36.14.” Id. (quoting Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)). “Texas Government Code § 311.011 provides that statutorily undefined words and phrases shall be ‘construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.’ ” Id. at 650 (quoting Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.011 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Normally, in looking at jury charge error, the instructions must be construed as a whole and not by isolated extracts, excerpts, or paragraphs. See Smith v. State, 959 S.W.2d 1, 27 (Tex.App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also Joseph v. State, No. 13-11-00461-CR, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole (B) holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury (C) holding that jury charge in juvenile case warranted fundamentalerror review and analyzing whether charge violated due process (D) holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error (E) holding that whether a jury charge comments on weight of evidence is determined by looking at the jury charge as a whole not isolated statements
Output: (E)
31, 33 (2d Cir.1978)). II, A. ’ In support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff first claims that the defendant has violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f by attempting to collect a debt barred by the state statute.of limitations, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-576. The plaintiffs argument, however, is devoid of merit. In Hubbard v. National Bond & Collection Associates, 126 B.R. 422 (D.Del.), aff'd without opinion, 947 F.2d 935 (3d Cir.1991), the bankruptcy court held that the plain language of Section 1692e “was intended to prohibit only knowing or intentional misrepresentations by debt collectors,” and that this interpretation was “consistent with the FDCPA’s purpose and structure.” Id. at 427; see also Smith v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1032 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (providing that “[a] 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action (B) holding that a violation of a state statute regarding the swearing of criminal complaints does not give rise to constitutional liability (C) holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims (D) holding that a state agencys violations of its own internal regulations did not establish a due process violation or otherwise give rise to a constitutional claim (E) holding that an unintentional bona fide error did npt give rise to a violation of the fdcpa
Output: (E)
her conduct suggests that she may pose a substantial threat of reoffending if set free.”). This also raises another important distinction between this case and White. The White court focused on the non-violent nature of White’s crime as a reason for a lessened governmental interest. See id. (“Not every serious crime is equally serious. The nature of White’s crimes lessens the government’s interest in prosecuting her because her alleged crimes were nonviolent offenses.”). While we recognize Nieklas’s crime involved sending threatening letters and faxes, which Nicklas may argue are non-violent acts, we note this court has previously held the crime of mailing threatening communications to be a crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that the White 
 Holding statements: (A) holding mailing a threatening letter was a crime of violence for the purposes of ussg  4b11 (B) holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing (C) holding that a guilty plea for which the defendant received a deferred adjudication counted as a conviction under federal law for purposes of ussg  4b11 (D) holding that  215 is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  2l12 (E) holding morevstat  569055 qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  4b12a
Output: (A)
the district court lacked authority to transfer the case elsewhere; when venue is proper in multiple counties, the plaintiff may choose where to file and the district court lacks the discretion to transfer the case pursuant to rule 1.808. See id.. If venue was not proper in Johnson County, we must decide whether it was proper in Grundy County. Id. To answer the foregoing questions, we must apply the various provisions of Iowa Code chapter 616. Id. We first analyze Iowa Code section 616.17, our general venue statute. We then consider two specific venue provisions, which the parties variously claim have applicability in this case. A. Iowa Code § 616.17 In Iowa, there is a long-standing preference for trying cases in the county of a defendant’s residence. Tull v. Honda Res 90 (1885) (<HOLDING>). Here venue was proper in both Story and Polk 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim (B) holding that it could not disregard the express pleadings alleging negligence by specific parties (C) holding a negligence action arising out of an allterrain vehicle accident was a personal action (D) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (E) holding petition alleging negligence was a personal action
Output: (E)
to serve a particular area, a telephone company must obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity from the KCC. K.S.A. 66-131. The KCC is vested with discretion in this area to regulate telephone companies in order to maintain a statewide telecommunications system and to provide for efficient and effective service to communities in Kansas. Therefore, any municipal franchisee must still obtain KCC approval to serve its franchised area. The power of a city to grant franchises does not confer upon that city any power to decide whether a telephone company should be granted a certificate of convenience and necessity. See K.S.A. 12-2002 (stating that the Franchise Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the KCC); City of New Strawn v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 5 Kan. App. 2d at 635 (<HOLDING>). That power was specifically vested in the KCC 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are enforceable to protect the basic product which the franchisor has to sell namely the franchise itself   (B) holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created (C) holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit  and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity  (D) holding that the kcc has the power to deny a certificate of convenience and necessity regardless of whether the city has granted a franchise (E) recognizing that the legislature has the sole power of enacting law
Output: (D)
Howard’s due process claims lack merit. In the first instance, Howard admitted the prohibited conduct. Secondly, an “inmate does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, although prison officials have the discretion to grant that right in appropriate cases.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). We note that any defenses Appellant may have had to his conviction, including a sustainable Johnson claim, could have been raised and reviewed pursuant to the internal prison grievance process. Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s contention that he was convicted without due process of law. See Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 373, 527 S.E.2d at 752 (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion Because the plain language of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reciprocal discipline cases disciplinary procedures in the other state must meet minnesotas due process requirements (B) holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process (C) holding that the conditions delineated in canon 3c1a alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the due process clause (D) holding that scdcs disciplinary and grievance procedures are consistent with constitutional standards delineated in wolff v mcdonnell 418 us 539 94 sct 2963 41 led2d 935 1974 which established the minimum constitutional requirements for procedural due process when an inmate is disciplined for serious misconduct (E) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate
Output: (D)
CURIAM. The Court has determined that this appeal is premature as it was taken from a non-final order. T.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 736 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a judgment that reserved the issue of child support pending the mothers taking an examination  to obtain her nursing license to be nonfinal (B) holding order was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and child support issues (C) holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter (D) holding that without personal jurisdiction over one parent a court could still decide custody of a child living in the state but could not determine support and visitation (E) holding order improperly denied relators right to visitation with his child
Output: (B)
or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 480, 103 S.Ct. 3164. It goes without saying that the district court’s inherent authority does not include the power to contravene or circumvent an “express grant of or limitation on the ... court’s power contained in a rule or statute.” Dietz v. Bouldin, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of [the court’s] ‘inherent power,’ ,,. it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) is an express limitation on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice (B) holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure (C) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised (E) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
Output: (B)
that a contract which specifies the period of its duration terminates on the expiration of such period. See Shepard v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 210 Kan. 652, 653, 504 P.2d 228, 229 (1972); Bartlett & Co., Grain v. Curry, 1 Kan.App.2d 242, 247, 563 P.2d 1096, 1101 (1977) (citing 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 486, p. 955). The general rule that an insurance policy lapses if the insured fails to pay the renewal premium before the policy expiration date may be modified by a statutory requirement of notice. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Tab Transp., Inc., 12 Cal.4th 389, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 159, 906 P.2d 1341, 1347 (1995) (finding that carrier statute prohibited lapse in particular case); Lopez v. New Jersey Auto., Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 239 N.J.Super. 13, 570 A.2d 994, 995 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Contractual requirements of notice may also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding negligent failure to notify regulatory body of lapse of insurance policy did not arise out of underwriting of insurance (B) holding that late notice of the bond did not excuse supplier from its obligation to comply with statutory notice requirements (C) holding that title automatically vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period if all the requirements are met (D) holding that even if statutory requirements are met courts must inquire into totality of the circumstances to determine if waiver was knowing and voluntary (E) recognizing that insurance policy may lapse if the statutory renewal notice requirements are met
Output: (E)
two years experience as patrol officers. An officer’s experience is taken into consideration in determining if there was reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. See United States v. Carter, 1999 WL 1007044, at *3-4. 13 . The Government argues that under the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), McCray was not seized until he was actually subdued by the officers. Hodari D., held that seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires either 1) physical force applied by the police on the suspect; or 2) submission by the suspect to the officer’s authority. See id. at 626-627 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 1547. The court agrees and determines that McCray was not seized until he was tackled by the officers. 14 . 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (<HOLDING>). 15 . McCray's statements will be suppressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest (B) holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop (C) holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop (D) holding that an areas reputation for criminal activity alone cannot justify an investigatory stop (E) holding there was no reasonable suspicion which would justify an investigatory stop despite report of a domestic disturbance
Output: (D)
amounted to harmless error. II Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the second degree murder charges for insufficient evidence of malice. “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “ ‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’ ” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (199 0 S.E.2d 859, 864-65 (2000) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Norman, 213 N.C. App. 114, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court properly denied motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence of malice in second degree murder case resulting from impaired driving based in part on evidence that defendant drove his pickup truck erratically swerved off the road and struck the victims bicycle while he was traveling at a speed of approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour (B) holding that defendant who admitted that he knew when he deliberately drove off in his truck that he was disobeying an officers lawful order to park his truck at the side of the road had engaged in conduct that was both knowing and willful (C) holding that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone before the collision and a minimum of 50 miles per hour at the time of impact (D) holding evidence of malice sufficient for trial court to properly deny motion to dismiss in second degree murder case stemming from crash caused by impaired driving where evidence showed defendant had a 13 bac ran over a sign and continued driving and at that point should have known that he was a danger to the safety of others continued driving and weaving side to side eventually ran off road and without braking or otherwise attempting to avoid collision hit another truck (E) holding state presented substantial evidence of malice in second degree murder case resulting from impaired driving based in part on evidence that defendant was driving without looking at the road in order to pick up a fit cigarette he had dropped when defendants truck literally flew across the intersection
Output: (A)
to allege that any defense existed), Marine Midland Trust Co. of So. N.Y. v. State Nat’l Bank of Bethesda, 268 Md. 503, 511-12, 302 A.2d 609 (1973) (affirming trial court’s refusal to vacate default judgment under former Maryland default judgment rule because party could not show fraud, mistake, or irregularity). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit had adopted a liberal view of discretionary relief from default judgments, particularly when the attorney, and not the party, is responsible for the error. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings v. Fodor Contracting, 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir.1988) (“When the party is blameless and the attorney is at fault, the former interests control and a default judgment should ordinarily be set aside.”), United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). While Fourth Circuit law is not controlling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief (B) holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor (C) holding that any doubt as to the propriety of granting relief must be resolved in favor of the party when the party is not responsible for the error that caused the default judgment (D) holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee (E) holding that reversible error was committed when the court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant
Output: (C)
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244, 252 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th. Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Int'l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. Int’l Energy Dev. Corp., 981 S.W.2d 38, 48 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1137, 120 S.Ct. 982, 145 L.Ed.2d 932 (2000); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 331 (1st Cir.2000). 12 . Tex. Commerce Bank v. Universal Technical Inst. of Tex., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). 13 . Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.1997); Tex. Commerce Bank, 985 S.W.2d at 680. 14 . See, e.g., TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 633. 15 . Id. at 637. 16 . See Houston Vill. Builders, Inc. v. Falbaum, 105 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Tex. Commerce Bank, 985 S.W.2d at 681 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator (B) holding that each individual member of an unincorporated association is a client of the associations lawyer (C) holding that undisclosed representation of an association that the arbitrator disclosed he was a member of and the association will be affected by the outcome of the case is evident partiality (D) holding that while the determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement is for the court the enforcement of pleading requirements before the arbitrator is a procedural matter for the arbitrator (E) holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator
Output: (C)
to be uncontested that Officer Watson's pepper spray was still snapped and secured on his belt after the incident. 27 .See Spring, 479 U.S. at 576-77, 107 S.Ct. at 858-59 (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. at 1141) (for a Miranda waiver to be valid, police are not required to supply information that would merely affect the wisdom of the waiver); State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. 473, 747 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1987) (the Miranda rights waiver is calibrated "to ensure the voluntary and knowing nature of the waiver, not its ultimate wisdom”); State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 381 N.W.2d 120, 127 (1986) ("In reference to a waiver of the rights designated in the Miranda warning, intelligent is not synonymous with prudent, and intelligence is not equated with wisdom.”) (citation omitted); 3 (1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Domagalski, 127 Wis.2d 563, 378 
 Holding statements: (A) holding request to lie down and think about what happened  not a clear invocation of the right to silence (B) holding a suspects request for some time to think alone was not an invocation of the right to silence (C) holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights (D) holding defendants request to lay down and think about what happened did not constitute invocation of right to silence as not every break in questioning compels renewed administration of the miranda warnings (E) holding a juveniles request to speak to a probation officer is not a per se invocation of fifth amendment rights
Output: (A)
indicating that the decision to demote and reassign Harmon to one of their Fairfax, Virginia locations was based not on his polygraph test results but instead on the company’s belief that Harmon’s refusal to provide additional information demonstrated a need for increased supervision for a period of 30 to 60 days. See Day Dep. at 71-73; Brar Dep. at 54-61. Defendant’s evidence further indicates that CB Squared executives offered Harmon the option of working at a closer location in Garrisonville, Virginia after he complained that the commute to Fairfax in the mornings was prohibitively long. Brar Dep. at 61-63. Such attempts to accommodate Plaintiffs needs could be construed by the trier of fact as inconsistent with an intent to force Plaintiff to resign. See Holsey, 743 F.2d at 209 (<HOLDING>). In his account of the October 16th meeting, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (B) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances (C) holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence (D) holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent (E) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence
Output: (C)
paying $1,000 each month (Cf. Doc 43, p. 7, line 19). 9 . A true comparison of the Schedule J expenses and the Form B22C expenses cannot be made because they are described, calculated, and grouped differently from each other. 10 .The court notes that, although raised by the parties, the narrow exception for "special circumstances” found in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) is a confirmation issue and not a post-confirmation modification issue. Kolb never discusses post-confirmation modification, except to raise the question this decision addresses. In re Kolb, 366 B.R. 802, 817, n. 21 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2007). 11 . The text in italics represents language added and the strikeout text is language removed by the enactment of BAPCPA. 12 . See, e.g., In re Solis, 172 B.R. 530 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>) and Sunahara v. Burchard (In re Sunahara), 326 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff entitled to recover for changes not incorporated into contract under theory of breach (B) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (C) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (D) holding  1325b is incorporated into  1329 (E) holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement
Output: (D)
actions was justified, is surprising to this court, because the responsibility of the Department of Justice, in its representation of the United States in criminal proceedings, is to do justice and to see to it that the law is e district court noted the vulnerability of the elderly widow gave notice of the use of any "victim-related” departure factors, and the fact that the case was compared to another fraud case in which an upward departure was upheld gave notice of the potential use of any "offense-related” factors. 8 . See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 9 . See United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1129 (5th Cir.1993) (applying rule to misapplication of guidelines); see also United States v. Hinder, 355 F.3d 735, 743 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See, e.g., Himler, 355 F.3d at 743. 11 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis (C) holding burden is on the government to show participation under  2d18al (D) holding that burden is on government to show that error in failure to provide notice is harmless (E) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (D)
v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
Output: (D)
Bac-A v. West, 13 Vet.App. 308, 311 (2000) (providing that even prior to the Court’s clarification of the caselaw governing compliance with Board remands, “there was ample regulatory language and case law requiring the Board to assure that its adjudication was undertaken only after the compilation of an adequate record”). Additionally, the Secretary has not demonstrated how the manner in which the Court reviews the Board’s findings of fact is in any way relevant to the Board’s responsibility to ensure that the Secretary carries out his obligation to assist the veteran in processing his claim, to return a medical opinion where it is inadequate, and provide an adequate statement supported by a reasonable basis in both fact and in law. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541 (<HOLDING>); Douglas v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 19, 26 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the governments position must be justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person and have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (B) holding that congress did not want the substantially justified standard to be read to raise a presumption that the government position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case citations omitted (C) holding that given creditors pro se status the complaint was substantially justified as it had a reasonable basis in fact and law and it would be unjust to penalize her for having only a lay persons knowledge of the law (D) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (E) holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact
Output: (E)