niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ’s improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA’s ruling in March 2002, the application for § 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman’s argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for § 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of § 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of  212c relief
Output: (C)
Scobbie v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Greenville Steel Car Co.), 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 424, 427, 545 A.2d 465, 466 (1988). However, the fact that the claimant’s residual disability no longer renders him incapable of performing his pre-injury job does not justify a suspension of benefits if the pre-injury job is no longer available to the claimant through no fault of his own. The burden is on the employer to demonstrate job availability. Id. at 428-29, 545 A.2d at 467. 6 . Once an employee is fully recovered, the employer is not required to show work availability. See Celio v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Canonsburg General Hospital), 109 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 442, 531 A.2d 55 peal Board (Federici), 96 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 208, 214-15, 506 A.2d 1357, 1360 (1986) (<HOLDING>) 9 . As the Board correctly noted, Employer may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a presumptive partial disability exists by virtue of the order to suspend compensation the employer can eliminate liability only by offering suitable work (B) holding that claims actionable only by virtue of the nlra are preempted (C) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (D) holding that a district court only has jurisdiction to order compliance with compensation orders entered by an administrative law judge alj and reviewed by the benefits review board and to screen for procedural defects but may not otherwise affirm modify suspend or set aside a compensation order based on the substantive merits of the aljs decision (E) holding that where the employer discontinues a specially created job the employer must offer another suitable job to the claimant or continue total disability payments
Output: (A)
Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 18 . In an effort to meet this burden, during the April 25, 2012 Hearing, U.S. Steel’s counsel argued that its Motion for Expedited Relief (Docket No. 53) and Motion to Seal (Docket No. 64) were akin to a motion for an injunction. (Docket No. 209 at p. 14, Ins. 11-12). Although obtaining an injunction can render prevailing party status, such status is only awarded in cases where the underlying lawsuit seeks permanent injunctive relief. See e.g. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees awards are available under  1988 for frivolous actions (B) holding that interim awards of attorneys fees are inappropriate where the only relief obtained is a preliminary injunction which may be subsequently overturned on the merits (C) holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction (D) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal (E) holding that a preliminary injunction reversed on appeal does not support an award of attorneys fees
Output: (B)
is made in one state and accepted in another, we now recognize that elements of the transaction have occurred in each state.” Id. at 786-87. Following this approach, the court held that all of A.S. Goldmen’s offers to purchase stock had occurred in New Jersey, but the acceptance of such offers by non-New Jersey residents had occurred in the purchaser’s state of residence. See id. at 787 (“A contract between Goldmen in New Jersey and a buyer in New York does not occur ‘wholly outside’ New Jersey, just as it does not occur ‘wholly outside’ New York. Rather, elements of the transaction occur in each state....”). Accordingly, New Jersey appropriately could regulate “the aspect of the transaction that occurs within its boundaries,” id., but not that part which occurred out of state. See id. (<HOLDING>) (internal footnote omitted). In Carolina 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer (B) holding that the new jersey blue sky law simply allows the bureau to regulate its half of the transaction  the offer that occurs entirely within the state of new jersey (C) recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller (D) recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey (E) holding purposeful and deliberate omission on enactment of new jersey sales and use tax of exemption found in new york counterpart act which served as the model for new jersey act
Output: (B)
The court, however, need not reach this issue because even if Defendants were properly served, this action is barred by the statute of limitations. 4 . All parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is three years. Because a federal court in a diversity action based on state negligence law must apply state law to determine when an action is commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations, Wolfberg v. Greenwood Development Corp., 868 F.Supp. 132 (D.S.C. 1994), the present action was commenced, if at all, more than three years after Plaintiff's accident. See S.C.R.C.P. 4(d)(8) ("Service [by certified mail] is effective upon the date of delivery as shown on the return receipt.”); Dandy v. American Laundry Machinery Inc., 301 S.C. 24, 27, 389 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The court notes that the Supreme Court of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service (B) recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act (C) holding that if service done by certified mail action commenced upon receipt of summons and complaint (D) holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail (E) holding that service of a subpoena via certified mail is sufficient under rule 45 particularly when defendant does not deny actual receipt
Output: (C)
ambiguous. See, e.g., Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield, 859 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Okla.1993). A contract provision is ambiguous only if it can be interpreted as having two different meanings. E.g., Little-field v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 857 P.2d 65, 69 (Okla.1993). If it is not ambiguous, it is construed in its plain and ordinary sense. E.g., Phillips, 859 P.2d at 1104. If it is ambiguous, it is construed in favor of the insured. E.g., Littlefield, 857 P.2d at 69. The bodily injury provision of the policy and its accompanying amendatory endorsement excluding coverage for indemnification or contribution claims based on bodily injuries are not ambiguous because they are capable of only one interpretation. Cf. Pearson Servs., Inc. v. INA Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 401, 402, 403 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Easier Corp., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person (B) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (C) holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled (D) holding that the policys exclusion of coverage for any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of such bodily injury operates where the genesis of the action is an employees workrelated bodily injury quoting national union fire ins co 906 f2d at 200 (E) holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party
Output: (B)
652, (Tex.App.Waco 1993, writ denied); see also Ex parte Threet, 160 Tex. 482, 333 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1960) (evidence that couple was introduced as husband and wife to a few friends was no evidence that they held themselves out as married). Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that a couple held themselves out as husband and wife turns on whether the couple had a reputation in the community for being married. Eris, 39 S.W.3d at 715; see also Danna v. Danna, No. 05-05-00472-CV, 2006 WL 785621, at ⅜1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar. 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (a “couple’s reputation in the community as being married is a significant factor in determining the holding[-]out element”), quoted in Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex.App.Dallas 2009, no pet.); Giessel, 734 S.W.2d at 31 (<HOLDING>). Proving a reputation for being married 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police did not enjoy qualified immunity for a period where they acknowledged that plaintiff had to be released but nevertheless kept him handcuffed (B) holding that couple held themselves out as married when they had reputation in community for being married even though they had kept marriage secret from a few family members (C) holding that the defendants statement in an application for citizenship that he had only been married once was false even if the second marriage had been a nullity because it was bigamous (D) holding victims statements to coworkers admissible to rebut defendants claim that they had a good marriage (E) holding that samesex partners who would  have chosen to marry before a childs birth had they been permitted to are entitled to a statutory presumption of parentage that otherwise conferred benefits only upon a married spouse
Output: (B)
differs. This is contrary to the TAA’s plain language as well as its mandate — that we construe it “to effect its purpose and make uniform the construction of other states’ law applicable to an arbitration.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 171.003 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.028 (“A uniform act included in a code shall be construed to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.”). Texas, not federal, law governs this case, and that law is clear: a party may not appeal an order that grants rehearing. V. Section 171.098(a)(5) is uniformly interpreted to prohibit appeals when a rehearing is granted. The concurrence also argues that “subsection (5) allows an appeal when a re ., P.A., 34 Kan.App.2d 340, 118 P.3d 704, 706-08 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Crack Team, 128 S.W.3d at 583 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (D) holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action (E) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable
Output: (C)
of public concern, for any reasonable official would know that unlawfully retaliating against a public employee for his protected speech activities constitutes “significant government misconduct.” Furthermore, we have held that it was clearly established since at least 2007 that testifying pursuant to a subpoena in a judicial or administrative proceeding of public concern constitutes protected speech. See Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1109. Although none of our earlier cases specifically addressed subpoenaed deposition testimony as opposed to testimony in open court, our holdings have not been so narrowly cabined that Caw could reasonably have believed subpoenaed deposition testimony was excluded from the First Amendment’s ambit of protection. See, e.g., Alpha Energy Savers, 381 F.3d at 925 (<HOLDING>). Second, a reasonable official would also have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant who filed a  2255 motion but produced no affidavit from the witness in question or any other independent support for his claim failed to show prejudice because he offered only speculation that he was prejudiced by his counsels failure to interview the witness which was not enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial as required by strickland (B) holding that closure was limited not only because it lasted only for the testimony of one witness  but also because there was no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officers testimony (C) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (D) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (E) holding that not only the employees testimony at the grievance hearing but also the affidavit that he filed and his agreement to be listed as a potential witness were entitled to protection
Output: (E)
the charges brought against a defendant. The Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2046-47, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), however, recognized that judicial discretion plays a role in sentencing and that sentences resulting from guideline departures are appropriate in certain circumstances. Koon sends a signal to appellate courts to extend a greater measure of deference to district courts’ discretion in sentencing. In this case, Judge Melloy, an experienced jurist, made a fair and reasonable decision supported by adequate grounds for departing. We should affirm. II. DISCUSSION In Koon, the Supreme Court instructed appellate courts to accord sentencing courts greater discretion in their decisions to depart from the guidelines. Koon, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2043 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. McNeil, 90 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo (B) holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard (C) recognizing abuse of discretion rather than de novo standard of review (D) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (E) holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo
Output: (C)
occurred during that ongoing clergy-counselee relationship are factual matters for the jury to decide and do not present vagueness concerns. The term “religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort” has acquired a reasonably definite meaning from the use of the same term in the evidentiary clergy privilege statute. Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(c) (2006) (stating that a member of the clergy shall not “be examined as to any communication made to the member of the clergy or other minister by any person seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort * * * without the consent of the person”). We have said that the term applies to requests for religious or spiritual aid that are made to clergy in their professional capacity. E.g., State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Minn.1980) (<HOLDING>). We have also noted that the “wording of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that request for historical csli information was not a search (B) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense (C) holding that request from inmate to county jail chaplain to pass information to coeonspir ator was not privileged because the aid requested was not religious and because the request was not intended to be confidential (D) holding that plaintiffs request that inquiry be made of the jury about its intent behind the verdict was not a request to poll the jury (E) holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential
Output: (C)
rights.” Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 616, 731 A.2d 14 (1999). A second test is described as the “relative nature of the work test.” Id. at 616, 731 A.2d 14. That test is generally applied “in situations involving work performed by professional employees.” Id. at 617, 731 A.2d 14. The test “requires a court to examine ‘the extent of the economic dependence of the worker upon the business he serves and the relationship of the nature of his work to the operation of that business.’ ” Id. at 616, 731 A.2d 14 (quoting Marcus v. E. Agrie. Ass’n, 58 N.J.Super. 584, 603, 157 A.2d 3 (App.Div.1959) (Conford, J., dissenting), rev’g on dissent, 32 N.J. 460, 161 A.2d 247 (1960)); see also Delbridge v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 238 N.J.Super. 288, 319-23, 569 A.2d 854 (Law Div.1989) (<HOLDING>). While neither Lowe nor Delbridge involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the new jersey statute of limitations applicable to  1983 actions is njsa 2a142 (B) holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy (C) holding that public defender did not face conflict requiring withdrawal when bringing collateral attack of a defendants conviction public defender was required to attack competence of previous public defender and stating that automatic disqualification  would hamper the ability of public defenders offices to represent indigents in criminal cases (D) holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and  1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act (E) holding designated counsel acting on behalf of the office of public defender in law guardian program to be public employees for purpose of the new jersey tort claims act njsa 5911 to 123 and therefore entitled to indemnification by the state
Output: (E)
Third Claim of Relief. These motions raise four distinct issues. First, are Defendants properly subject to Title IX’s requirements if they do not receive federal financial assistance? Second, are Defendants “state actors?” Third, do Plaintiffs have standing to sue? Fourth, even if Defendant MHSAA is subject to Title IX, may the Individual Defendants be sued in their official capacities? Discussion Summary judgment requires that the Court determine whether the Plaintiffs have presented enough evidence so that a jury could reasonably find for them. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc inquiry and justify a decision to grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, both Plaintiffs and the United States as amicus curiae argue that even tho etic Assoc., 1999 WL 1012948 (E.D.J.Pa. Nov.8, 1999) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated below, the Court does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title ix subjects state athletic association to suit under the theory that association controls athletic programs receiving federal aid (B) holding that the ncaa did not exercise controlling authority over school athletic programs (C) holding that federal wage controls applied to state employees too (D) holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state (E) holding in part that the ncaa was subject to title vi because it exercised controlling authority over athletic programs receiving federal financial assistance
Output: (A)
the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that ‘an order denying a double jeopardy claim is not immediately appealable’ ” (quoting Miller, 289 S.C. at 427, 346 S.E.2d at 706)); Gilliam v. Foster, 63 F.3d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying State’s motion to stay federal district court’s grant of habeas corpus for pending decision on merits of defendant’s double jeopardy claim in state court proceedings; stating, “[i]t is also regrettable that, because South Carolina law does not permit an interlocutory appeal of the double jeopardy ruling, the appellate courts of that state were not the ones to rule on the matter in the first instance”); cf. Paul v. People, 105 P.3d 628, 633 (Colo. 2005) (en banc) (concluding that denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss on d 2, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (<HOLDING>). 5 . S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (Supp. 2015) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense (B) holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation (C) holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw (D) holding that in drunkdriving investigations the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant (E) holding existence of arrest warrant compelling case for finding dissipation
Output: (D)
§ 1521(a), (e). C. Board Application of 38 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 1521 Without considering section 1513, the Board applied section 1521(e) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.351(d)(2), concluding that, without a disability rated as total or permanent, “the provisions for special monthly pension at the housebound rate are not for consideration.” R. at 9. Mr. Hartness argues that the Board erred because it failed to apply section 1513 when considering whether he is entitled to a special monthly pension under section 1521(e). We agree. The Board’s analysis and finding that Mr. Hartness was not entitled to a special monthly pension based on permanent housebound status, without consideration of section 1513, is clearly erroneous. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (d)(1); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the Board will apply the following 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed (B) holding that the court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence and may only set aside the finding if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust (C) holding that error is harmless if there is substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction
Output: (A)
by appellant is best evaluated by the legislative branch and the determination of the appropriate format for such proposed legislative change, if any, is best weighed by the legislature. Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966). The sagacity of making changes in workmen’s compensation statutes, or rights created thereunder, has been generally held to be outside the province of the courts. Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming 544 P.2d 1153 (1976), (abolishing, the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1972) (abolishing defense of assumption of risk); Claymore v. City of Alb., 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (20 N.M. Bar Bulletin 75 (1981) (abolishing defense of contributory negligence); Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, in light of New Mexico’s long 
 Holding statements: (A) holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort (B) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge (C) holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim (D) recognizing tort of negligence by words (E) holding tort of negligence must be based upon duty other that one imposed by contract
Output: (D)
and the lawsuit they had commenced. While Gotbetter represented to the Court that he did not initiate any of the publicity attending this lawsuit, at a minimum, as a result of Gotbetter’s and Katzman’s actions, Defendants have been made to respond to a patently meritless complaint and to suffer unwarranted adverse publicity. Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have emphasized that the purpose of the sanctioning mechanism of Rule 11 “is not reimbursement but ‘sanction,’ ” “and that, accordingly, Rule 11 sanctions ‘shall be limited’ to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126, 110 S.Ct. 456, 459-460, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989); see also Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 (<HOLDING>). Consistent with these holdings, Rule 11 was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because counsels lumping of fees was not considered in  calculating the revised lodestar amount it could serve as a basis for adjusting the fee award (B) holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed (C) holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation (D) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied (E) holding that a fee substantially less than the lodestar amount is permissible
Output: (E)
accomplices bound, gagged, and blindfolded the Sum-ners with duct tape. The accomplices then drove the Sumners, who were forced into the trunk of their own car, to a previously excavated gravesite, secured the duct tape that was binding them, retrieved their ATM-pin number, forced them into the grave, and then filled the grave with dirt with the Sumners alive inside. The Sum-ners were “buried alive, and suffered a slow and torturous death from the weight of the soil being built up around them and inhaled into their lungs until they lost consciousness and expired.” Accordingly, Jackson has failed to demonstrate prejudice because the appellate process was not compromised. Therefore, there was no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and Jackson is not entitled to habeas r (<HOLDING>). 3 . Jackson also refers to extensive portions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellate counsel was not ineffective for forgoing a claim disputing the admission of victim impact evidence because it had no merit (B) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (C) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim (D) holding that appellate counsel could not be found to have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise issues that are without merit (E) holding that letters from the victims family constituted improper victim impact statements but appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim because the jury never saw the letters and thus the claim was without merit
Output: (E)
Street. As Ferguson turned onto Hulme, he observed Throneberry’s car “fishtail” out of the alley without stopping. Both Officer Ferguson and his passenger, who was a city councilman on a “ride-along,” testified that Throneberry’s headlights were not turned on when he exited the alley. Ferguson’s police report, however, indicated that Throneberry turned the lights off about 100 yards down the street after he exited the alley. Ferguson further testified that, when he observed Throneberry’s car fishtail out of the alley, he activated his emergency lights and siren in an attempt to stop Throneberry’s vehicle. According to these facts, the jury could reasonably have found that Throneberry violated section 545.256 of the transportation code, which prov Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). This same line of cases also holds that such 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car (B) holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle (C) holding that accelerating a car so that it screeched and fishtailed a bit was sufficient for offense (D) holding that accelerating a car so that its tires spun when a light turned from red to green was sufficient (E) holding that accelerating a car so that it threw gravel on police car was enough to satisfy exhibition of speed violation
Output: (D)
judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the fac appealability on ineffective assistance of counsel, the “cause” Hernandez assigns for his procedural default, suggests that it intended to allow review of the procedural bar. However, even assuming that the district court wished this court to review its procedural bar finding or that we would grant a certificate of appealability on this issue, the correctness of the district court’s central holding — that there was no error, constitutional or otherwise — in the state trial court’s charge on intent is dispositive. The test for finding charge-based constitutional error is a strict one. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis for finding a Fourteenth 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error (B) holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless
Output: (D)
to require proof of such culpability. See Id.; State v. Jones, 865 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Mo. banc 1993). Here, nothing in section 167.031 suggests that the legislature did not intend to require proof of a culpable mental state in causing non-attendance, specifically, proof that the parent acted knowingly or purposely. To the contrary, the necessity of proof of some level of scienter is implicit in the requirement that the parent “cause” their child to regularly attend school. To “cause” a child to do something implies an affirmative act on the part of the parent and requires that criminal responsibility for failure to comply with the statute be based on a failure to cause the child to attend, not merely on a lack of attendance per se. Cf. In Re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Mo.App. W.D.1982) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The burden was on the State 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (B) holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution (C) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (D) holding burden of proof must be on prosecution to prove that particular home school curriculum was not adequate to avoid exposing parents to the risk of criminal prosecution should their suppositions of the adequacy of the home curriculum be mistaken however in good faith thus indicating mental state is relevant to guilt (E) holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution
Output: (D)
Int’l, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 471, 477 (S.D.Ohio 2004) (“Before delving into the ‘rigorous analysis’ required by Rule 23, a court first should consider whether a precisely defined class exists and whether the named plaintiffs are members of the proposed class”). At a minimum, the description must be “sufficiently definite that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.” 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1760, at 120-21 (2d ed.1986). As this Court discussed in Brockman, courts have rejected proposed classes where plaintiffs failed to “identify any logical reason ... for drawing the boundaries where they did.” Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 133 F.R.D. 600, 602-03 (D.Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). Usually, scientific or objective evidence 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23 (B) holding that when defendant failed to appear at scheduled suppression hearing the court could have decided the motion in defendants absence but it did not have the authority to refuse to consider it (C) holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute (D) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (E) holding that plaintiffs had failed to identify a class where the proposed boundaries did not appear to relatte to the defendants activities but were instead arbitrarily  drawn lines on a map
Output: (E)
was a “substantial factor” or “motivating factor” in Walker’s allegedly retaliatory actions. Abrams argues that a reasonable jury could infer, as a result of this chronology, that he was “falsely arrested” and that he was arrested “because of what [he] said.” Abrams then opines that “the arrest was for an illegal purpose” and finally that “[a]nger often leads to unthinking retaliation.” After reviewing the record and the standards presented in our line of cases, we agree with the district court’s finding that this chronology is unconvincing, as it fails to present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion,” Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2001), contains mere speculation, and demands the making of unreasonable inferences in suppo -84 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that such a step would not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest (B) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest (E) recognizing first amendment retaliation right
Output: (C)
or deny relief. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the absence of power to make any ruling at all.”); Knowles v. Knowles, 811 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1991, no writ) (in dicta, stating, "... if the 1975 divorce decree is construed, albeit erroneously, to award her separate property interest in the military benefits to the appel-lee, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed under the doctrine of res judica-ta. ..."). 10 . Accord Wilson v. Uzzel, 953 S.W.2d 384, 390-91 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no writ); Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no writ); see also Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.1980) (dicta). Cf. Berry v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>); Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612 
 Holding statements: (A) holding res judicata applied to unappealed division of military retirement benefits when that division was not preempted at time of divorce but would have been preempted by later federal act had that act applied retroactively which it did not (B) holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce (C) holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems (D) holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division (E) holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement
Output: (A)
Group L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 158 L.Ed.2d 866 (2004) (dismissing an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where jurisdictional defect, which had been cured prior to a jury verdict, was raised for first time on appeal). Allowing this strategy could result in a waste of judicial resources and allow defendants to “test the waters” of the plaintiffs chosen forum, before invoking their rights under the forum-selection clause. The use of such a strategy undermines the efficiency and convenience that we believe is gained from enforcement of forum-selection agreements. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14, 92 S.Ct. 1907. Analyzing forum-selection clauses under Rule 12(b)(6) does not present the problems that analysis under 12(b)(1) would present. See Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, Supreme Court precedent 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing significant differences in text of state and federal equal protection clauses (B) holding that a forumselection clause may be enforced under rule 12b3 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue (C) holding that forumselection clauses are generally enforceable and a party attempting to show that such a clause should not be enforced bears a heavy burden (D) holding that consideration of forumselection clauses under rule 12b6 does not present significant doctrinal error (E) holding that motions to dismiss based on forumselection clause should be analyzed under rule 12b3
Output: (D)
its inability to agree, the law must afford defendant the benefit of the final non-unanimous verdict that might have been returned absent the coercion. Having erroneously been deprived of a substantial opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment rather than death, the defendant may not be subject to another capital sentencing proceeding. We recognize that any reversible error in a capital case may be said in some sense to have deprived a defendant of the opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment, and that nevertheless the usual and proper remedy for such errors is reversal of the death sentence and a retrial of the sentencing proceeding in which the defendant may again face the death penalty. See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 67 (<HOLDING>). But a Czachor error is critically different 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (B) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (C) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (D) holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error (E) holding that resentencing is required
Output: (C)
the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court “lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.” Id. at 2620. In other words, “the question is whether the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Id. at 2618. In Stern, the “action at issue” was an independent state law tort claim that the bankruptcy court need not have addressed. Id. In this case, the situation could hardly be more different. Unquestionably, a bankruptcy court’s decision whether to grant relief from an automatic stay “stems from the bankruptcy process itself.” Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2618. Indeed, a bankruptcy court is gr 12) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority (B) holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent (C) holding that a lawsuit alleging malpractice by an accountant in a bankruptcy case was a core matter within a bankruptcy courts jurisdiction (D) holding that stem does not change bankruptcy courts authority to decide fundamental core procedures of bankruptcy court (E) holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
Output: (D)
of the due date.” Consent Motion at 1. As was made clear in Pioneer, however, “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.” 507 U.S. at 392, 113 S.Ct. 1489. See also Fox v. Am. Airlines, 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2004) (parties are “obligated to monitor the court’s docket”); Halmon v. Jones Lang Wootton USA, 355 F.Supp.2d 239, 244 (D.D.C.2005) (“Parties have an obligation to monitor the court’s docket and keep apprised of relevant deadlines.”). It is easy to see why this is so. If a simple mistake made by counsel were to excuse an untimely filing, “it [would be] hard to fathom the kind of neglect that we would not deem excusable.” Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). See also Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff bears the burden of showing that delay was due to oversight inadvertence or excusable neglect (B) holding that the states failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the states right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals (C) holding that failure to accurately calculate the thirtyday appeal period is not excusable neglect (D) holding that the circuit judge did not have the authority to extend the thirtyday time limit for filing a notice of appeal (E) holding that the concept of excusable neglect could not be invoked to gloss over a failure to take minimum safeguards for determining that action is being taken
Output: (C)
Plaintiff asserts that his right to the foreshore did not derive from a grant from the State, but instead from a colonial grant from Thomas Dongan, the Governor of Staten Island. Even if the court were to consider Plaintiffs post-trial submissions, including the Dongan grant and the Caleb Ward deeds, the court would find that Plaintiff did not own the foreshore. The Dongan Grant transferred to Christopher Billopp approximately 1600 acres of property on Staten Island and designated that the foreshore was included in the boundary of the property. Pl.Ex. Bl. New York courts have found, under the public trust doctrine, that large grants of land to private individuals are ultra vires and void. See Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 296, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936) (<HOLDING>); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 406, 39 N.E. 400 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) holding that a state has subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce if one of the spouses is domiciled in the state (C) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion (D) holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the  grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report (E) holding in reference to an eleven mile grant of the foreshore that neither the king nor the state could grant away for private purposes so much of the publics rights in the lands under water
Output: (E)