niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The defendants- argue that because “the statute does not make any specific reference to the possession of a firearm outside of the United States, ... there is no ‘clear, affirmative indication’ that Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 8. “Section 924(c) crimes are not ordinary substantive offenses, however.” United States v. Abu Khatallah, 151 F.Supp.3d 116, 136 (D.D.C. 2015). “They depend on the commission of a concurrent—and predicate—crime of violence’” or drug trafficking crime. Id. see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). th Cir. 2010) (upholding extraterritorial.application of § 924(c) where torture was the predicate offense); United States v. Ahmed, 94 F.Supp.3d 394, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  924c applies extraterritorially because the predicate crime of violence  violation of the torture act is one that may be prosecuted in a court of the united states  (B) holding that  924c applies extraterritorially where the predicate crimes of violence relate to international terrorism and  congress clearly and explicitly gave those statutes extraterritorial effect (C) holding that  924c applies extraterritorially where the underlying substantive criminal statutes apply extraterritorially (D) holding that  924c applies extraterritorially in a bombing plot where the charges were predicated on 18 usc  844i which the court held to apply extraterritorially (E) holding that  924c applies extraterritorially where the predicate acts include crimes on the high seas
Output: (B)
did so after Mr. Wilson’s appeal, his complaint that they failed to do so immediately, however justified, is now moot. 2. Scope of the Request Mr. Wilson further argues that the FHWA made an “unreasonable and unilateral assumption that the Plaintiff requested only ‘formal’ complaints.” Opp’n at 8. The FOIA Appeals Official determined that the FHWA’s interpretation that Mr. Wilson was seeking formal complaints, instead of informal records such as counseling logs, was “more than reasonable.” Nov. 20, 2009 Final Agency Decision at 2. An agency may decide to limit the scope of an ambiguous request as long as the narrowed scope is a reasonable interpretation of what the request seeks. See, e.g., Mogenhan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-2045, 2007 WL 2007502, at *3 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Adamowicz v. IRS, 552 F.Supp.2d 355, 362 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to file appeal was not deficient performance under strickland where the petitioner in  2255 action did not direct counsel to file an appeal and acquiesced in counsels decision to pursue as an alternative a reduction in sentence (B) holding that extraordinary circumstances did not include the mere neglect of the professional who was in a position to file a timely application (C) holding that it is proper to dismiss an appellants appeal for failure to file a brief or request an extension within the time allotted by the bankruptcy rules (D) holding reasonable an agency determination that a request for an investigative file did not include the employment file (E) holding defendant did not waive issues by failing to file posttrial motions where defendant did file petition for reconsideration which was intended to function as posttrial motion
Output: (D)
that the recipients of the devices used the devices for their intended purpose — to receive unauthorized cable service offered on the plaintiffs system. Id. at 460. Similarly, the district court in DIRECTV Inc. v. McCool, 339 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1033 (M.D.Tenn.2004), found that a factual dispute existed for trial where defendant denied that he purchased and used an un-looper device, and plaintiffs evidence of unlawful interception of DIRECTV’s satellite signal, “albeit circumstantial,” showed “that an order was placed for the unlooper by someone using Defendant’s credit card and e-mail address, and that the unlooper was shipped to Defendant’s residential address.” Id. at 1034; see also DirectTV, Inc. v. Griepsma, No. 03-CV-6243-CJS-JWF, 2005 WL 608250 at *7 (W.D.N.Y. March 11, 2005)(<HOLDING>). A genuine issue of material fact clearly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that although there was no direct evidence of use of an unlooper by the defendant use could be inferred from the purchase and delivery of the unlooper to the defendant (C) holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public (D) holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs (E) holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances
Output: (B)
gave rise to a simple tort claim between strangers, not a dispute arising out of the commercial relationship. The accident did not involve the Red Lake Band itself, and although the individual injured was a member of the Red Lake Band, he was not a party to the commercial relationship. The Tribal Court asserts that additional discovery is necessary to determine the facts regarding whether Nord was driving in connection with a contract with the Red Lake Band or on a personal errand. We conclude that such facts would not be material in this situation because the dispute merely involves the tortious conduct of “a run-of-the-mill highway accident” between strangers, and no amount of discovery can alter the nature of that claim. See id. at 457, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (internal marks omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Plains Commerce Bank, 491 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the first exception did not apply to a highway traffic accident dispute that was distinctly nontribal in nature internal marks omitted (B) holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted (C) holding that the agency did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a continuance where the petitioner was only at the first step in a long and discretionary process and relief was speculative at best alterations and internal quotation marks omitted (D) recognizing that party is not permitted to use the accident of a remand to raise an issue that it could just as well have raised in the first appeal internal quotation marks and alterations omitted (E) holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted
Output: (A)
S.C. 177, 184, 554 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ct.App.2001). When awarding alimony, the family court considers the following factors: (1) duration of the marriage; (2) physical and emotional health of the parties; (3) educational background of the parties; (4) employment history and earning potential of the parties; (5) standard of living established during the marriage; (6) current and reasonably anticipated earnings of the parties; (7) current and reasonably anticipated expenses of the parties; (8) marital and nonmarital properties of the parties; (9) custody of children; (10) marital misconduct or fault; (11) tax consequences; (12) prior support obligations; and (13) other factors the court considers relevant. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130(0 (Supp.2009); Patel, 347 S.C. at 290, 555 S.E.2d at 391 (<HOLDING>). The family court awarded Wife $1,000 per 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it is error for an alj to fail to consider factors relevant to the pain analysis which are supported by the record (B) holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony (C) holding that only relevant factors must be considered (D) holding that the argument that the immigration judge did not consider all of the relevant factors in determining that his children would not suffer the requisite hardship was not a question of law under  1252a2d (E) holding that the domesticrelations exception prevented the plaintiff from challenging in federal court the constitutionality of the statecourt judges decision to consider certain assets and property when calculating the plaintiffs husbands income for the purposes of determining alimony payments because the plaintiff ultimately wanted this court to enjoin the state court from using property  to determine the amount of alimony owed
Output: (B)
of old elements. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52, 86 S.Ct. 708, 714-715, 15 L.Ed.2d 572, 148 USPQ 479, 483 (1966) ("Despite the fact that each of the elements of the Adams battery was well known in the prior art, to combine them as did Adams required that a person reasonably skilled in the prior art must ignore” long-accepted factors.) There is neither a statutory distinction between "combination patents" and some other, never defined type of patent, nor a reason to treat the conditions for patentability differently with respect to "combination patents”. It but obfuscates the law to posit a non-statutory, judge-created classification labeled "combination patents”. Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 219 USPQ 8, 12 (Fed.Cir.1983). Medtronic, 721 F.2d at 1566 (<HOLDING>). Cedarapids’s citation of Medtronic indicates 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt (B) holding exclusion was harmless error (C) holding that the district courts error in calculating the amount of drugs at issue was harmless because the error had no impact on the defendants sentence (D) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (E) holding that the district courts error was however harmless in light of other considerations
Output: (E)
whether a broker is entitled to a commission for condemnation of property should be analyzed according to ordinary contract principles, including those applicable to oral contracts and contract modification. The focus should be on the agreed scope of the broker’s employment, not on extraneous factors such as when the state should take possession. We now discuss those principles and apply them to this case. B. Applying Contract Principles An oral contract, such as the one in this case, is subject to the basic requirements of contract law such as offer, acceptance, consideration and sufficient spe t a contract of employment between a broker and a principal may be oral or written); 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers § 51 (1997) (same); cf. Futch v. Head, 511 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles to brokerage 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sufficient evidence existed of an enforceable oral commission agreement between a broker and a cobroker and sustaining the verdict (B) holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract (C) holding that oral listing agreement did not preclude recovery of a commission (D) holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified (E) holding that broker whose contract called for commission on sale of property was not entitled to commission on transfer of property to partnership in which owner had an interest and that because broker was not entitled to commission under terms of his contract he also could not recover against a third person on theory of tortious interference with that contract
Output: (A)
40 . See Landry v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 123 F.R.D. 474, 476 (S.D.N.Y.1989). 41 . Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir.1999) (alterations in original) (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)). 42 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). See also Banyai v. Ma-zur, 205 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y.2002). 43 . See Baffa, 222 F.3d at 60. An antagonistic interest arises when there is a "fundamental conflict or inconsistency between the claims of the proposed class members" that is "so palpable as to outweigh the substantial interest of every class member in proceeding with the litigation.” In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y.1996). See also Robinson, 267 F.3d at 170 (<HOLDING>). 44 . In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 108 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16 (B) holding that current text of  1396aa10b requires comparability between groups of the categorically needy as well as between individuals within the same group (C) holding that the equal rights amendment requires that wife as well as husband be permitted to recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that rule 23a4 requires absence of conflict between named representatives and class as well as vigorous prosecution (E) holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled
Output: (D)
litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society ... The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud. Id. at 246, 64 S.Ct. at 1001. The Law Firm Defendants’ motions to dismiss rest entirely on the argument that the Trustee cannot bring an independent action for damages for fraud on the court. The Court acknowledges that there is limited authority for awarding damages in an action brought for fraud on the court. See Chmil, Jr. v. Rulisa Operating Company (In the Matter of Tudor Associates, Ltd. II), 1990 WL 546146, *1 (E.D.N.C.) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court also notes that most 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the record supported the district courts award of damages (B) holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages (C) holding that it was within the bankruptcy courts equitable powers to award damages in an action for fraud on the court (D) holding that pursuant to federal statute and the courts inherent equitable powers a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue a separate money judgment after determining the amount and dischargeability of a claim (E) holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court
Output: (C)
fees for tax years 1995 through 1999, the parties stipulated that judgment was sought against Connie Ogg in rem only. 3 . Although it has been amended several times since its enactment in 1985, section 33.011 has always provided a process for a taxpayer to request a waiver of penalties and interest if the act or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the appraisal district or taxing unit caused or resulted in the taxpayer’s failure to pay the tax before delinquency. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.011 (Vernon 2001). Here, the trial court stated in a finding of fact that the Oggs did not request a waiver of penalties or interest pursuant to section 33.011. The parties do not challenge that particular finding of fact. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Act of May 24, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding unless contrary is established as matter of law or there is no evidence to support finding (B) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that judgment on the pleadings will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (E) holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law
Output: (A)
the entirety ... to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). a. Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law for Entirety Property Exemption To determine whether the Condominium is exempt from process, the court will look to the law of the situs of the real property. In this case that is Florida. “Under Florida law, entireties property is exempt from process to satisfy debts owed to individual creditors of either spouse. Entireties property is not exempt from process to satisfy the joint debts of both spouses.” See In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 40-41 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1997) (citing Neu v. Andrews, 528 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) and Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843, 846 (1936) (<HOLDING>)). “Courts have generally recognized that § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (C) holding that a judgment debt against both spouses can be satisfied by selling the entireties property (D) holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt (E) holding that where one spouses arson destroyed the house which both spouses owned as tenants by the entireties the innocent spouse was entitled to recover under their fire insurance policy for her share of the loss
Output: (C)
an alcohol concentration of .22. The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Gergen’s driving privileges, and the district court affirmed. ISSUES 1. Where a district court determines that a person arrested for driving while intoxicated did not make a good faith effort to contact an attorney, is the driver’s right to counsel vindicated even though the telephone provided by the arresting officer is blocked from dialing 800-numbers? 2. Did the police officer violate Minn.Stat. § 481.10? ANALYSIS I. A person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, provided the consultation does not unreasonably delay the testing. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>); see Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (“In all 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law (B) holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga  405671 (C) holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (E) holding that right to counsel under implied consent statute is limited because of the evanescent nature of alcohol
Output: (E)
26-7A, 26-8A, and 26-8C or of Title 27A shall control, and the provisions of this chapter are in all respects to be supplementary thereto. (emphasis added). Thus, where allegations of abuse and neglect serve as the grounds for the guardianship petition, as was the case here, the statutory provisions specifically relating to abuse and neglect proceedings, as well as the provisions relating to juvenile court, must control. See Martinmaas, 2000 SD 85 at ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d at 611. [¶ 10.] Adjudication of abuse or neglect is done in juvenile court pursuant to SDCL chapters 26-7A and 26-8A. SDCL 26-7A-2 provides for exclusive juri ’s interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the welfare of the child. SDCL 26-8A-1. See also Matter of N.J.W., N.G.B., and K.F.B., 273 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D.1978) (<HOLDING>). The State is the only party that may seek to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right (B) holding state as parens patriae takes strong interest in care and treatment of children within its borders (C) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (D) holding that missouri has interest in providing a forum for victims injured as a result of activities conducted within its borders (E) recognizing that with respect to regulating or affecting conduct within its borders the place of the wrong has the predominant interest
Output: (B)
of an absolute bar to the availability of laches as a legal defense against the state has never been held by the Ohio Supreme Court. Adams Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Osborne (May 3, 1996), 4th Dist. No. 95CA592, 1996 WL 230038 (stating that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find that the doctrine of laches bars CSEA from seeking child support under certain facts). Instead, it has been held that laches is not applicable under the specific facts of a case. Id., citing Athens Cty. Prop. Owners Assn. v. Athens (Aug. 26, 1992), 4th Dist. No. 1482, 1992 WL 209497. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that laches may be applicable in parentage actions but only if material prejudice is shown. Wright v. Oliver (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 10, 12, 517 N.E.2d 883 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Fourth Appellate District 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state police is a state agency (B) holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that material prejudice was not present under the facts however an agency of the state was not a party to the action (E) holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case
Output: (D)
a sergeant entered the house with her. 2 . Harris testified that he opened the door for the police: "I saw them coming, so I just opened the door.” However, Officer Shepard testified that she knocked on the door and that after no one answered she entered the house through the door, which was unlocked. 3 . We decline to reach the question whether the warrantless entry and the search by the police officers were justified by exigent circumstances. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)(rejecting a "murder scene exception” created by the Supreme Court of Arizona to the requirement of obtaining a warrant). See also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984)(applying Mincey); Ex parte Usrey, 527 So.2d 732 (Ala.1987) (<HOLDING>); A.A.G. v. State, 668 So.2d 122, 128 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no liability existed under the circumstances (B) holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant (C) holding that exigent circumstances were created by dissipation of bloodalcohol content in time needed to obtain a warrant (D) holding that exigent circumstances were present because evidence of bloodalcohol content could disappear during the time necessary to obtain a warrant (E) recognizing that  exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant
Output: (B)
Ga. App. at 323 (1) (“[Rjights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature, and cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 49 See Division 1 (a), supra. 50 See McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383 (3) (a) (477 SE2d 814) (1996) (while reiterating that the issue of the defendant’s future dangerousness may be relevant to sentencing but not to the question of his guilt, the Court concluded that, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, it was highly unlikely that the improper portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument contributed to the jury’s verdict); cf. Collier v. State, 266 Ga. App. 345, 351-355 (2) (596 SE2d 795) (2004) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 511, 517-518 
 Holding statements: (A) holding counsels failure to investigate alibi witness and eyewitnesses to the crime amounted to constitutionally deficient performance (B) holding that there was no material prejudice arising from trial counsels repeated references to an accuseds invoking his right to counsel (C) holding that trial counsels failure to object to the prosecutors repeated pervasive and clearly improper references during closing arguments to similar transactions committed by the defendant constituted deficient performance and amounted to prejudice that required a new trial (D) holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue (E) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel
Output: (C)
this represents a “very narrow exception,” AIU Ins. Co. v. Block Marina Inv., Inc., 544 So.2d 998, 1000 n. 1 (Fla.1989), to the general rule that “equitable estoppel may be used to prevent a forfeiture of insurance coverage but not to create coverage where none exists.” Cummins v. Allstate Indem. Co., 732 So.2d 380, 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Regarding the representation element, courts have required that the promise be definite, and when the promise is “ ‘entirely indefinite as to terms and time,”’ this is insufficient to support an estoppel claim. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So.2d 919, 924 (Fla.1989) (quoting Hygema v. Markley, 137 Fla. 1, 187 So. 373, 380 (1939)). See also Prof'l Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Freytes & Sons Corp., 565 So.2d 900, 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, Tome’s only basis for the assertion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a representation was that the insured had what coverage it needed  such a statement does not rise to the level of specificity required to be a representation of liquor liability coverage (B) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that a representation which is merely a statement of intent to perform under the contract cannot constitute fraud (E) holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer
Output: (A)
that the “claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” §2244(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); §2244(b)(4). Relying on Circuit precedent, see Brown v. Leming, 171 F. 3d 1031 (CA5 1999); In re Smith, 142 F. 3d 832 (CA5 1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he “could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” App. 15. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question whether Cage was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,” as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Compare Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F. 3d 270 (CA1 1998) (<HOLDING>); Brown, supra (same); In re Hill, 113 F. 3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that child support should have been made retroactive (B) holding the supreme court has not held in a case or a combination of cases that the rule in johnson is retroactive to cases on collateral review and therefore it has not made johnson retroactive (C) holding that cage has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review (D) holding that the act is not retroactive (E) holding that cage has not been made retroactive by the supreme court
Output: (E)
vehicles, such as trucks, could also be driven off-road, trucks are occasionally needed for off-road driving for such legitimate purposes as the maintenance of the park grounds and the transportation of large and/or cumbersome machinery. Clearly, off-road motorcycling would serve no such purposes. Thus, like in Wroblewski Shanks has not alleged facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality coupled with a readily apparent justification for the ban. Therefore, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Shanks’ equal protection claim. C. Substantive Due Process In determining whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, courts have also looked to the substantive branch of the Due Process clause. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Jonathan Hangartner, Comment, The 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false statements are constitutionally protected (B) holding right to travel emanates from concept of substantive due process (C) recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest (D) recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected (E) holding that while there is not a constitutionally protected right of intrastate travel under equal protection there is a constitutionally protected right to intrastate travel arising from the due process clause
Output: (E)
for which permission was granted” and concluding that “unauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright” (emphasis added)); WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.1982) (same); Glovaroma, Inc. v. Maljack Prod., Inc., 71 F.Supp.2d 846, 855-56 (N.D.Ill.1999) (hold ing that summary judgment dismissing infringement claim was inappropriate where scope of license was unclear). Also, it has been held by several courts and noted by commentators that a nonexclusive license cannot be transferred without permission of the copyright owner. See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider suit for judicial review filed by entity that was neither owner of property nor owners properly designated agent (B) holding that there can be no plain error where neither we nor the supreme court has addressed an issue (C) holding neither booker nor blakely can be applied retroactively (D) holding that neither exclusive nor nonexclusive licenses can be transferred absent copyright owners authorization (E) holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment
Output: (D)
at 267. More importantly, even if an offer of judgment to a plaintiff is comprehensive and undisputed, courts will not dismiss the case as moot if there is a pending motion for conditional certification and additional individuals have opted in the litigation. See, e.g., Velasquez, 842 F.Supp.2d at 488 (“In view of the facts that an opt-in plaintiff has been identified and a motion for conditional collective action certification has been made, the court holds that this matter is not moot.”) Rubery, 494 F.Supp.2d at 181 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss as premature in light of plaintiffs pending motion for collective action certification and the joinder of putative class members); Bah v. Shoe Mania, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 9380(LTS)(AJP), 2009 WL 1357223, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2009) (<HOLDING>). In general, “courts are wary of attempts by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members (B) holding that even if the offer of judgment was undisputed the case could not be dismissed in light of plaintiffs pending motion for conditional certification including authorization to issue optin notice to putative class members  and the fact that one additional plaintiff had already joined the action (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing that in appropriate circumstances the court may limit the parties communications with putative class members prior to decision on conditional certification question in a  216b action (E) holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification
Output: (B)
for Dr. Crabtree’s ultimate post-award refusal to continue the counseling relationship by threatening to sue Dr. Crabtree and press charges against him before the licensing board. The District Court’s statement that the arbitrator could not address the reasons for the breakdown in the counseling relationship upon remand could be understood as a direction to the arbitrator not to consider the Hospital’s contention. We see no legal reason why the arbitrator, who will be advised of the contingency that has rendered the award ambiguous, should not also be able to hear the Hospital’s explanation for the breakdown in the counseling relationship, if he so chooses. The District Court’s statement may be interpreted as a judicial determination of the appropriate procedures to be u 48-49 (<HOLDING>). We conclude, therefore, that nothing in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court erred in ruling that a particular item of evidence must be admitted in the arbitral proceeding (B) holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants (C) holding that district court erred in issuing injunction against future work stoppages based on arbitral award prohibiting one such stoppage (D) holding the district court erred by reviewing the evidence and making an evidentiary ruling on secondtier review (E) holding that the district court erred in not making an inequitable conduct determination prior to ruling on the exceptional case issue
Output: (A)
be proved in support of the claim. See id. It is well-settled that North Carolina law precludes a plaintiff from recovering more than one-satisfaction for the same injury, caused by different parties. “Both reason and justice decree that there should be collected no double compensation, or even overcompensation, for any injury, however many sources of compensation there may be.... Any amount paid by anybody, whether they be joint tort-feasors or otherwise, for and on account of any injury or damage, should be held for a credit on the total recovery in any action for the same injury or damage.” Holland v. Southern Public Utilities Co., Inc., 208 N.C. 289, 292, 180 S.E. 592, 593-94 (1935). See also Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. Schrimsher, 140 N.C.App. 135, 138, 535 S.E.2d 594 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Chisholm v. UHP Projects, Inc., 205 F.3d 731, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that duplication of damages or double recovery is impermissible (B) holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate (C) holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages (D) holding that it is wellsettled that although a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery for its damages it is not entitled to a double recovery for the same loss or injury (E) holding that it is not
Output: (D)
District of Texas which are typical of, and essential to, both parties’ ordinary business operations. In addition, Plaintiff offers evidence that much of the alleged anticompetitive conduct at issue in this case was, and is, directed to and impacts consumers in the Eastern District of Texas. II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING 1404(a) MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE Section 1404(a) provides, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” Under section 1404, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating to the Court that it should, in its sound discretion, decide to transfer the case. See Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion (B) recognizing that the privilege of being a heard amicus rests solely within the discretion of the court (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion (E) holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court
Output: (C)
it clearly views meal expenses incurred while temporarily working away from home as distinct from those incurred while working at a permanent location and acknowledges'that expenses incurred while temporarily away from home are for the benefit of the employer. Plaintiffs’ argument that meal expenses are always incurred for the benefit of the employee fails to consider this critical distinction. See Dkt. #'87, at 17. Based on the foregoing case law and DOL guidance, the Court concludes that defendant properly excluded the “hot shot” payments from the regular rate calculation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2). Plaintiffs were traveling away from home and performing, work for defendant. Their meal expenses were thus incurred on behalf of the defendant and in furtherance (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Carpenters 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing limits on the erisa preemption clause (B) holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists (C) holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption (D) recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof (E) holding that  502a may serve as an independent basis for preemption where  514a the blanket erisa preemption provision is inapplicable
Output: (C)
(Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080.) Although Calero-Toledo did not involve the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, the Court in that case emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding is brought against the instrumentality of a crime, rather than against the offender himself. The Calero-Toledo Court noted that the object of the forfeiture is “ ‘primarily considered as the offender ***. [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand^] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.’ ” (Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 94 S. Ct. at 2092, quoting The Palmyra (1827), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-16, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535-36 (<HOLDING>).) The Calero-Toledo Court also noted, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding (B) holding that a judgment set forth in a separate document is not a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction where the parties assumed that there was a final judgment (C) holding that a conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding jeopardy had not attached because the district court was without power to enter a judgment of conviction in a pretrial proceeding
Output: (C)
later, Bain filed the rule 3.853 motions that are the subject of this appeal. In summarily denying both motions, the postconviction court found that they were untimely, in part because Bain’s delay in refiling was an abuse of process. However, due to an amendment to section 925.11, Florida Statutes, enacted on June 23, 2006, no time limit applies to rule 3.853 motions for postconviction DNA testing filed on or after October 1, 2005. See Ch. 2006-292, §§ 1, 4, at 2204-7, Laws of Fla. (codified in § 925.11, Fla. Stat. (2006)). Moreover, in dismissing Bain’s 2003 rule 3.853 motion without prejudice, the postconviction court set no filing deadline. Consequently, the postconviction court erroneously denied the 2006 motions as untimely. See Jumper v. State, 903 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>) Because Bain timely filed his pro se motion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion (B) holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues (C) holding that the remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for postconviction relief under rule 3850 (D) holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion (E) holding that postconviction court could not deny a refilled rule 3850 motion as untimely when postconviction court did not set a filing deadline in dismissing defendants first rule 3850 motion without prejudice to refiling
Output: (E)
reasoned explanation for its decision. Complaint at ¶ 14. The Mullinses allege that CSD’s objection had nothing to do with their fitness as adoptive parents. They claim that CSD objected because it erroneously thought that it had to obtain the blessing of Washington authorities before it could send the chil dren to live with the Mullinses in Seattle. See Complaint at ¶ 16. Whatever the reason for the objection, once CSD withheld its consent to the adoption, that was the end of the road for the Mullinses. The juvenile court had no choice but to dismiss their adoption petition for want of jurisdiction. See Oreg.Rev.Stat. § 109.316 (providing that CSD must consent to adoption of children in its custody); see also In re Adoption of Greybull, 29 Or.App. 889, 565 P.2d 773, 774-75 (1977) (<HOLDING>). The juvenile court dutifully dismissed the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that csds consent is jurisdictional fact that must be pleaded in adoption petition (B) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (C) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded (E) holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional
Output: (A)
statute, including § 18.1-215, the statute under which Silver was charged. Although not directly raised by Silver, the Court further notes that application of the recent complaint hearsay exception to § 18.1-215 does not raise an ex post facto concern. On brief, Silver indirectly presents an ex post facto argument, claiming that § 18.1-215 of the Code of Virginia is not one of the exceptions delineated in § 19.2-268.2. (Memo. Opp. Mot. in Limine 2-4.) The applicability of the relevant hearsay exception is a mere procedural change that “does ‘not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt’.” Pilcher v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 158, 163, 583 S.E.2d 70, 72 (2003) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)) (<HOLDING>); see also Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (B) holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them (C) holding that the rape shield statute affects the use of character evidence to impeach witnesses  and is therefore procedural in nature (D) holding that the retroactive application of a statute authorizing the assessment of a cost to a defendant who committed the felony pri or to the statutes enactment did not violate ex post facto laws (E) holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute
Output: (A)
convictions are impermissible when they rest on the same “unit of prosecution,” i.e., when they “punish a defendant twice for continuous possession of a firearm in furtherance of co-terminous predicate offenses involving essentially the same conduct.” United States v. Wallace, 447 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, predicate offenses are distinct in time and conduct, however, involvement of the same weapon will not bar consecutive sentences. See United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 277-79 (2d Cir.2001) (upholding consecutive sentences for § 924(c)(1) violations involving same bomb, where predicate offenses were not co-terminous and punished defendant separately for carriage and use); see also United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d at 205-06 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, overwhelming trial evidence showed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy (B) holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) recognizing that deprivation of a right was a necessary predicate to  1983 conspiracy liability (E) holding that single conspiracy connecting multiple assaults does not preclude treating assaults as separate predicate offense nor does fact that assaults are clustered in time and space merge them into one predicate crime
Output: (E)