niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
Output: (B)
whom, children live and spend their time is that courts can and often do award physical rights and responsibilities to the custodial parent, while awarding shared legal rights and responsibilities pursuant to the parties’ agreement, or even primary legal rights and responsibilities to the parent who is not assigned physical rights and responsibilities. See, e.g., Shea, 167 Vt. at 496, 712 A.2d at 888 (affirming order awarding physical rights and responsibilities to mother and legal decisionmaking relating to education and medical care to father). The kind of cooperation reflected and cultivated by an agreement to share legal rights and responsibilities is generally a good thing, and should be encouraged in appropriate cases. See Gazo v. Gazo, 166 Vt. 434, 443, 697 A.2d 342, 347 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 85. The kind of shared decisionmaking 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing trial courts flexibility to fashion an award that keeps both parents involved in decisionmaking when such an award is in the best interests of the child (B) holding that cooperation between parents is essential if the arrangement is to be in the best interests of the child (C) holding that it is within the courts discretion to award both reinstatement and punitive damages for violation of  2114 although finding that the district courts decision not to award such remedies did not constitute an abuse of discretion (D) holding that when a parent asserts that an agreement is not in the best interests of a child the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing (E) holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set
Output: (A)
acted outside their jurisdiction. In sum, none of Pasiewicz’s arguments show that Sandahl and Henning violated the Constitution when they arrested him. They and the other officers (Johnson in particular) certainly could have, and we think should have, proceeded with more caution. They get no commendation ribbons for the way they handled this case. Pasiewicz’s claim against the forest preserve district (even assuming it’s a suable entity) for failure to train or supervise its officers properly regarding the laws of search, seizure, and jurisdiction is a born loser. Because the officers did not violate Pasiewicz’s constitutional rights, he did not suffer constitutional injury. Accordingly, under City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed. 1412 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>), it is worth pointing out that Ross involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure (B) holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment (C) holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment (D) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding that the concept of reasonableness in the fourth amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful authority by a police officer
Output: (E)
of Appeals stated in Bluebonnet Savings, “The contract itself is notice of binding duties, and when it requires that amendments be in writing, that is additional notice not to rely on oral representations.” 907 S.W.2d at 908. In Bluebonnet, the court of appeals concluded, as a matter of law, that the borrowers failed to prove they justifiably relied to their detriment on statements by the lender’s agents that “everything looked fine” regarding a loan restructuring proposal and “everything would be okay.” Id. at 909. In Bluebonnet, the borrower, w jury’s verdict on Schleider’s alternative theory of negligent misrepresentation. Accordingly, we render judgment Schleider take nothing under his alternative theory of recovery. III. I d 366, 369 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because there is no evidence of a binding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding promise lacked definiteness of essential element ie the total sum to be underwritten during a period of six years (B) holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established (C) holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim (D) holding that damage to the property of another is an essential element of the offense of criminal mischief (E) holding dollar amount is not an essential element
Output: (A)
fees in the amount of $6821.25. Baratta appealed the order, disputing both the entitlement and the amount granted. We find that Valley Oak was entitled to attorney’s fees because it was the prevailing party and properly claimed attorney’s fees. Chapter 720, Florida Statutes, deals with homeowners’ associations. It provides legal redress against the .association, members, directors, and officers for failure to comply with statutes, association documents, or community rules. Prevailing parties in the litigation are entitled to recover attorney’s fees under section 720.305, Florida Statutes (2002). Valley Oak became the prevailing party when Ba-ratta’s claim was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Norland v. Villages at Country Creek Master Ass’n, 851 So.2d 770, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Valley Oak, as the prevailing party, properly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (B) holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action (C) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (D) holding that the defendant became the prevailing party and thus properly claimed attorneys fees when the plaintiffs claim was involuntarily dismissed for failure to prosecute (E) holding that a defendant homeowners association was the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees when a plaintiff homeowners action was dismissed for failure to prosecute
Output: (E)
into two distinct inquiries because each question is intertwined with and dependent upon the other. Clause 2 of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2002), states that “all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,” though not specifically criminalized by another UCMJ Article, “shall be taken cognizance of by a ... court-martial ... and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.” Thus, in contrast to most criminal statutes that speak in terms of prohibited acts, clause 2 of Article 134 speaks in general terms of acts which create a prohibited effect. Nonetheless, Article 134 is not void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the question in this case is whether 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (B) holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties (C) recognizing that the reasonableness of an agencys interpretation turns in part on the constructions fit with the statutory language (D) holding that consideration for a contract as a whole covers the arbitration clause (E) holding judicial constructions of article 134 have narrowed the reach of its broad language and supplied examples of the conduct it covers
Output: (E)
discretion when it makes an error of law.” In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d at 334 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Accordingly, the abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to substitute the trustee for the debtor as the party plaintiff. Wieburg v. GTE Sw. Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 308 (5th Cir.2001) (addressing a motion to substitute as the proper party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) (citing Collateral Control Corp. v. Deal (In re Covington Grain Co.), 638 F.2d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>)). Questions of law, including interpretation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion (B) holding that denial of joinder motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion (C) holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion (E) holding that a rule 25 motion to substitute the real party in interest following a transfer of interest while the litigation is pending is reviewed for abuse of discretion
Output: (E)
He waited over a year after learning he was being denied enhanced credits due to his conviction in 84-51 to file his first “Request to Staff.” Therefore, he did not begin to exhaust his administrative remedies until after the limitations period had already expired. Consequently, his exhaustion of administrative remedies, however diligent, did not toll the limitations period. See cf. Fisher, 262 F.3d at 1142-43. He is not entitled to administrative tolling. D. Equitable Tolling Assuming equitable tolling even applies in this case, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he demonstrates (1) he diligently pursued his rights and (2) some extraordinary circumstance prevented his timely filing. See Holland v. Florida, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 2562, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Titsworth has failed to satisfy either prong. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases (B) holding new time period of 28 usc  2244d inapplicable to pending habeas petition where period ended before amendments effective date (C) holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc  2244d is subject to equitable tolling (D) holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling (E) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations set out in 28 usc  2244d applies to  2241 petitions
Output: (C)
or constructively) of the protected activity; (3)she suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action. Pearl v. DST Sys., Inc., No. 06-918, 2008 WL 8602367, *13 (W.D.Mo.2008). If she makes such prima facie showing, the defendant can still “avoid liability if it can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of the protected activity.” Id. (i) Plaintiffs Claims PreDating August 8, 2008 are Time Barred. A federal district court “can only conduct a ‘de novo review’ of those [SOX whistleblower] claims that have been administratively exhausted.” Willis v. Vie Fin. Grp., No. 04-435, 2004 WL 1774575, *6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmts., 348 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding fact that a constitutional claim is so novel that it is not reasonable for counsel to raise it until after the supreme court articulates that such claim is a basis for federal habeas relief constitutes cause for failure to raise that claim in accordance with applicable state procedures (B) holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim (C) holding plaintiffs could have filed administrative claim and then de novo claim in district court seeking a determination regarding their obligations to the fdic (D) holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with osha precluded pursuing that claim in district court (E) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court
Output: (D)
While R.E. concerned the use of retrospective testimony by DOE to support a finding that it provided a child a FAPE, the court’s rejection of E.Z.-L.’s substantive challenge introduced doubt about whether parents could prospectively challenge their child’s educational placement without first enrolling the child in the recommended placement school. DOE argued that R.E. foreclosed all such prospective challenges on the basis that they are inherently speculative. The argument found some acceptance. See, e.g., E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 6709, 2014 WL 4332092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (rejecting prospective challenge as “impermissibly speculative and premature”); P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (<HOLDING>). But most courts did not adopt this hardline 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (C) holding that the sro correctly concluded that a challenge tothe does choice of school is improper where the student never attended the school (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver
Output: (C)
of his disclosures.” Id. The Board explained that Mr. Mizrach, the DVA official who removed Mr. Jones, was not implicated in any of the petitioner’s disclosures. Id. Moreover, the Board credited Mr. Mizrach’s testimony that he did not consider the disclosures in removing Mr. Jones. Id. The Board found that even though the petitioner was not removed until six months after the last incident of misconduct, the delay was attributable to failed mediation efforts initiated by the OSC. Id. The petitioner also raises numerous arguments generally challenging the credibility of the witness testimony relied upon by the Board. There has been no showing here that we should reject the Board’s assessment of witness credibility. See Hambsch v. Dep’t of Treasury, 796 F.2d 430, 436 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In light of the above, we hold that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the credibility determinations of hearing officers are afforded special deference (B) holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence (C) holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable (D) holding that credibility determinations are for the jury (E) holding the boards credibility determinations are virtually unreviewable at this level quoting hambsch v dept of treasury 796 f2d 430 436 fed cir 1986
Output: (C)
we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. § 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
Output: (B)
to his defense, an in camera review of those records must be conducted to ascertain whether they contain evidence that is reasonably necessary, and therefore essential, to the defense. Only when the trial court finds such evidence, should it be provided to the defendant. Id. at 562. This court agrees with the reasoning of Stanaway. To hold the statutory privilege superior to Mr. White’s right to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence would be unconstitutional. Id. at 573-75. Because a court has already determined that the adoption records sought by Mr. White may contain evidence relevant to Mr. White’s defense, denying Mr. White access to such evidence would violate his right to due process. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). “An in camera review by the trial court will 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (B) holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt (C) holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution (D) holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
Output: (E)
is clear.” Investment Company Institute, 891 F.Supp.2d at 205. The appellants also assert that the agency improperly counted hypothetical benefits, but this assertion is incorrect. It was appropriate for CFTC to count the benefits flowing from its registration and disclosure requirements in § 4.5 and § 4.27, as the specifics of those requirements are finalized and not subject to the harmonization rule. The appellants further complain that CFTC failed to put a precise number on the benefit of data collection in preventing future financial crises. But the law does not require agencies to measure the immeasurable. CFTC’s discussion of unquantifiable benefits fulfills its statutory obligation to consider and evaluate potential costs and benefits. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 519, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (<HOLDING>). Where Congress has required “rigorous, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies (B) holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued (C) holding that agencies are not required to adduce empirical data that cannot be obtained (D) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence
Output: (C)
so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination” for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
Output: (C)
March 28, 2017). In this case, the State’s explanation for the strike cited a race-neutral observable fact and did not express a belief or assumption about members of the juror’s race or even a subgroup of that race. See generally State v. Weaver, 912 SW2d 499, 509 (I) (Mo. 1995) (no Batson violation where prosecutor’s decision to strike was not based upon assumptions about members of the juror’s minority group). Compare State v. Jensen, 76 P3d 188, 193 (II) (Utah App. 2003) (explanation for strike not gender-neutral where prosecutor assumed that men involved in a protective order “would be on the defendant’s side, since more likely than not men are the respondents to protective orders, rather than women”) (punctuation omitted); State v. Lucas, 18 P3d 160, 162-163 (Ariz.App. 2001) (<HOLDING>) (citation and punctuation omitted). I 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (B) holding that while the plaintiffs job responsibilities included assisting patients who received epidurals her regular work routine did not require lifting the legs of women weighing 263 pounds who had received epidurals (C) holding explanation that southern men take a negative view of pregnant women who work wrongfully excludes a subgroup of one gender from participation in the judicial process and reinforces prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women (D) holding that the existence of prior convictions are typically matters of public record of which the trial court can take judicial notice without violating the defendants right to due process (E) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket
Output: (C)
acknowledge that Garcetti addresses mostly free speech claims, as opposed to political affiliation or freedom of association claims: But Garcetti’s concerns about the "delicate balancing" of public-employee rights and government flexibility, as well as its anxiety about “judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations,” are not applicable only in the free speech context. 547 U.S. at 423, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Those concerns, for example, also underlie the so-called policymaker exception: the principle that political affiliation, for certain public employees, is an "appropriate requirement for continued tenure.” O’Connell, 724 F.3d at 126 (quoting Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir, 2003)); see also Maymí v. P.R, Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Speaker Eves cites several other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment (B) recognizing that both an officials political affiliation and her substantive views on agency matters are permissible justifications for firing or demotion when she occupies a policymaking role citing flynn v city of boston 140 f3d 42 47 1st cir 1998 (C) holding that first amendment prohibits government officials from discharging or threatening to discharge lowerlevel public employees based on their political affiliation (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment (E) recognizing a life tenants power to lease not only her present interest in the land she occupies but also a future interest she owns in the same land
Output: (B)
acted to remove the children from the Mann home. Defs. Mot. 10. “[Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Thus, on summary judgment, a court “appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727; see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (<HOLDING>). “If, the law was clearly ' established, the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law (B) recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights (C) holding that a plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant officials qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conductat issue (D) holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right (E) recognizing that qualified immunity shields officials unless the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established
Output: (C)
find that there occurred sexual conduct” constituting the single crime of engaging in a sexual act with a child. See Hartness, 326 N.C. at 565, 391 S.E.2d at 179. We note that our Supreme Court’s determination that first-degree sexual offense is a single wrong for unanimity purposes requires us to conclude that charging a defendant with a separate count of first-degree sexual offense for each alternative sexual act performed in a single transaction would result in a multiplicious indictment. If the defendant engages in alternative sexual acts in separate transactions, however, each separate transaction may properly form the basis for charging the defendant with a separate count of first-degree sexual offense. Compare State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 444, 373 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1988) (<HOLDING>) and State v. Dilldine, 22 N.C. App. 229, 231, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state may charge a defendant with only one count of disseminating obscenity for each separate transaction even though several obscene magazines were disseminated during each transaction (B) recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step (C) holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed (D) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (E) holding that sale of two obscene magazines to one detective in one transaction and sale of two obscene films to another detective in another transaction could result in only one conviction for each separate transaction
Output: (A)
to fair warning, Rogers v. Tennessee, 582 U.S. 451, 457-59, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001), such concerns are not present in the civil context. In the civil context, the “law applicable to a particular case does not turn on “whethe or Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that “when a question of retroactivity is involved” the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational). As discussed earlier, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in great detail in Collins why it adopted the risk contribution doctrine and in Thomas why it applied it in the lead paint context. Nothing about the court’s reasoning is arbitrary and irrational. See generally United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Nor does application of the risk contribution 
 Holding statements: (A) holding change of law from apportionment of liability to sole liability of current insurer affected substantive rights of parties and could not be given retroactive effect (B) holding that the act is not retroactive (C) holding that the act is retroactive (D) holding that retroactive liability under comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 which allocates to the defendant the burden of disproving causation comports with due process (E) holding no liability existed under the circumstances
Output: (D)
Mr. Muniz contends that, because Colorado defendants typically assert ineffective assistance claims upon collateral review, a collateral proceeding is effectively the first tier of review and counsel must be provided. Although, as Mr. Muniz notes, Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), extended the right to counsel to a class of discretionary direct appeals, Halbert did not overrule clearly established Supreme Court precedent that individuals have no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 2591-92. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“[T]here is no right to counsel in state collateral proceedings.”); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings (C) holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases (D) recognizing the common practice of substituting specialized capital counsel for habeas petitions filed by capital defendants (E) holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel
Output: (B)
program was rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of protecting Davis’s health and the public at large and attempt to rebut Davis’s allegations of anti-gay animus by asserting “as the Step I grievance [response] indicates, Davis’[s] situation presented a safety risk.” The question of whether Davis was removed from the public-works program because of safety reasons or because of anti-gay animus, however, is the issue in dispute in this case, and the defendants’ arguments are better suited for a motion for summary judgment. At this stage of the proceedings, the district court was required to treat Davis’s allegations — not the contested statements contained in the grievance response — as true. See Delay, 585 F.3d at 1005; Hill, 630 F.3d at 471. Because Davis al ir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Davis’s complaint likewise contains 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation (B) holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus (C) holding that a gay prisoner alleging discriminatory treatment because of his sexual orientation was not required to identify any nonhomosexual prisoners who were similarlysituated but treated better because the complaint contained allegations that if true constituted direct evidence of discriminatory motive and animus (D) holding that sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable (E) holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition
Output: (C)
v Bewersdorf, 181 Mich App 430, 433; 450 NW2d 271 (1989), aff'd in part and rev’d in part 438 Mich 55 (1991). 48 Bewersdorf, 438 Mich at 68. 49 Id. at 69-70 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 50 Id. at 68. The OUIL provisions at issue in Bewersdorf differ from the SORA. provisions in that the underlying offenses in Bewersdorf were misdemeanors and SORA-1, SORA-2, and SORA-3 are all felonies. Defendant complains that his sentence is inappropriate because his SORA-1 conviction was used to support his SORA-2 conviction and as th 491 (1990) (reaffirming Eilola and extending it by holding that the sentence could be enhanced using the same conviction used to elevate the offense (answering a question left open in Eilola)); People v James, 191 Mich App 480, 481-482; 479 NW2d 16 (1991) (<HOLDING>); People v Lynch, 199 Mich App 422, 423-424; 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the habitualoffender statutes and the statute imposing a mandatory minimum 5year sentence for a second offense of criminal sexual conduct may be concur rently applied (B) holding the mandatory minimum sentence to be constitutionally applicable to respondent (C) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (D) holding that the statute is mandatory (E) holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired
Output: (A)
ordered by the commissioner.” Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 413.014(d); see also Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 413.014(c); 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 134.600 (requiring preauthorization for spinal surgeries). 4 . On the record before us, it appears that Caldera has suffered no out-.of-pocket loss for the costs at issue. And as far as we can tell, Medicare has taken np,steps to recover these funds from ICSP or Caldera. 5 . The parties agreed to sever Caldera's extent-of-injury appeal and his MSP claim. The MSP claim is pending before the 105th Judi- . cial District Court of Nueces County, Texas, but is abated pending the outcome of this declaratory judgment. 6 . Courts across the country have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Varacalli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 763 F.Supp. 205, 207 (E.D.Mich.1990) (<HOLDING>); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F.Supp. 1155, 1165 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident (B) holding that under msp any payment that medicare does make is secondary and is subject to reimbursement from sources of primary coverage under the statute regardless of whether those sources can be expected to pay promptly (C) holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that the msp preempted a state law that required insurers to offer coordination of benefits at reduced premiums when the insured had other health and accident coverage making medicare the primary payer in direct conflict with the msp
Output: (E)
in a. trust created by his mother should have been included in the marital estate. In holding that it should not have been included, the supreme court noted that the central question was whether the husband’s future interest was so remote that it should not have been included in the marital pot. Id. at 353. Noting that the husband’s interest was subject to a complete defeasance because if he predeceased his mother, he would take nothing under the trust, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the husband was “not presently possessed of any pecuniary value which could have been before the court for disposition.” Id. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the husband’s remote interest in the trust from the marital pot. Id. See also Fiste, 627 N.E.2d at 1371-72 (<HOLDING>). Here, as in Loeb and Fiste, Wife’s- interests 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate (B) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (C) holding that husbands obligation to pay premiums on a life insurance policy for five years with wife as the beneficiary was periodic alimony (D) holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation (E) holding that where husbands grandfather had devised real estatefirst to his wife for life then to their daughter husbands mother for life and then to her child or children in fee husbands remainder interest in the realestate was tooremote to be considered marital property as it was subject to a complete defeasance if he predeceased his mother
Output: (E)
the ADEA prohibit employers from discriminating with respect to “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). “[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment” is considered an adverse employment action. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotes omitted); see also, de la Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1996). An action “injurious to current employment or the ability to secure future employment” is an adverse employment action. Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir.1997). The Second Circuit has held that a downgrade in evaluation is an adverse employment action. See Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Dominic v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law (B) holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action (C) recognizing retaliation involving promotion as adverse employment actions under the first amendment (D) holding in the context of a first amendment retaliation claim that adverse employment actions may include negative evaluation letters (E) holding that lesser actions than discharge refusal to hire refusal to promote demotion reduction in pay and reprimand may also be considered adverse employment actions in the first amendment retaliation context
Output: (D)
from disciplining him for absenteeism prior to May of 2007. Sánchez contends that AT & T’s offer of other positions was not reasonable because those positions offered lower compensation. He also contends that the offer of shift-swapping was not reasonable because AT & T did not provide the sched ules of other employees, as it had promised. However, we need not decide whether either of these accommodations was reasonable in isolation, because they were not offered in isolation — rather, they were offered as part of a series of attempts by AT & T to accommodate Sánchez. Many courts have found similar accommodations or combinations of accommodations to be reasonable under Title VII. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77-78, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding that employer reasonably accommodated seventh day adventist employee by inter alia agreeing to permit any shift exchanges that employee could arrange on his own (C) holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job (D) holding that a seniority and absenteeism system itself provided reasonable accommodation to a seventh day adventist employees religious needs (E) holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury
Output: (B)
1998) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. BOOTH, POLSTON and HAWKES, JJ., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute prohibiting conduct that obstruets or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings was not impermissibly vague (B) holding in the context of the invocation of the right to counsel that interpretation is only required where the defendants words understood as ordinary people would understand them are ambiguous (C) holding that statute prohibiting affray was not impermissibly vague because ordinary people could understand the meaning of affray (D) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (E) holding that term unreasonably loud is not impermissibly vague
Output: (C)
The point is that, once jurisdiction is lost, the court of appeals lacks the power to invoke any rule to thereafter obtain jurisdiction. Even a claimed deprivation of constitutional rights cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court where none exists, anymore than parties can by agreement confer jurisdiction upon a court. So any amendments made pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) cannot be jurisdictional amendments. Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). According to Riewe, the only amendments permitted under Rule 25.2(d) are wcm-jurisdictional amendments. Id. The amendments appellant must make to his notice of appeal to invoke our jurisdiction over his complaint about punishment evidence are “jurisdictional amendments.” Craddock v. State, 32 S.W.3d 886, 887 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43, 46-47 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice requirements of 4206a are jurisdictional (B) holding that notice requirements under rule 252b3 are jurisdictional (C) holding that notice requirements under former rule 40b1 are jurisdictional (D) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature (E) holding that notwithstanding rule 252b3 requirements appellate court could address jurisdictional defects
Output: (B)