niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
977. Thus, in order to establish causation and redressability, plaintiffs in this case need demonstrate only that consideration of Medi-Cal providers' costs in relation to equal access to quality services could influence the reimbursement rates the State ultimately sets. 7 .The Supreme Court has in the past recognized a lack of incentive in the form of "practical barriers to suit" because of "the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation” as an obstacle sufficient for third-party standing purposes. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-415, 111 S.Ct. 1364. Defendant points out that the Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] simple lack of motivation does not constitute a 'genuine obstacle' to asserting an interest.” Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 489 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). There seems to be some tension between Powers 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (B) holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden (C) holding that an employer does not have thirdparty standing to challenge a labor statute on its employees behalf simply because the employees probably would not be motivated to assert their own interests because they lack a sufficient individual economic stake in the outcome (D) holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change (E) holding that probation department employees are not county employees
Output: (C)
however, argues that the District failed to properly convene a meeting of his IEP team when DCPS forcibly excluded his attorney, who had represented Mr. Douglas for eight months, from the May meeting. Id. at 8. The Court agrees. Because Douglas designated Mr. Nabors to attend the meeting as an “individual who ha[s] knowledge or special expertise regarding the child,” Mr. Nabors is a member of the IEP team. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(B)(vi). The “IEP team” therefore did not meet as required by the HOD when DCPS barred Mr. Nabors from attending. The Court therefore disagrees with the Special Master’s conclusion that “an IEP meeting was convened on May 27th.” Rep. at 9. The May 27, 2014 meeting was a nullity. See, e.g., M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). A meeting of the IEP team did occur, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an iep team that excludes the individuals identified by congress as necessary participants is illegally constituted (B) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim (C) holding that wjhatever the procedure authorized by congress is it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned (D) holding that even if construction commences but it is based on an illegally issued permit no vested right is created (E) holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution
Output: (A)
in VALIC establishes that variable annuities are not the “business of insurance.” In VALIC, the Supreme Court found that variable annuities are securities because they lack the traditional earmarks of insurance. The Court stated that “we conclude that the concept of ‘insurance’ involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company. The risk of mortality, assumed here, gives these variable annuities an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, not real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no element of a fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.” VALIC, 359 U.S. at 71, 79 S.Ct. 618. See also NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 264, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable (B) holding that a federal statute 12 usc  92 which expressly permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns is a statute which specifically relates to the business of insurance and preempts a state statute which prohibits banks from selling insurance (C) holding a federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in towns with less than 5000 residents preempted a state statute prohibiting banks from selling most types of insurance (D) holding that comptroller of currencys holding that annuities both fixed and variable are not insurance within the meaning of 12 usc  92 2000 a provision allowing banks to sell insurance products in towns with less than 5000 inhabitants was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and stating that fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable annuities  (E) holding a variable annuity issued by an insurance company to be a covered security
Output: (D)
lease. See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 24.002(a) (Vernon 2000). Here, the trial court awarded lost rents pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 752, which provides in pertinent part: On the trial of the cause in the county court the appellant or appellee shall be permitted to plead, prove and recover his damages, if any, suffered for withholding or defending possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal. Damages may include but are not limited to loss of rentals during the pendency of the appeal ... Tex.R. Civ. P. 752. To support an award of lost rents under rule 752, the plaintiff must prove the defendant occupied the leased premises during the pendency of the appeal. See Powell v. Mel Powers Inv. Builder, 590 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex.App.Houston [14th DistJ 1979, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues there is no evidence in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence insufficient to support conviction when none of the defendants had any proprietary interest nor previous association with the premises and there was no evidence of how long the defendants had been on the premises prior to the arrival of the police (B) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award (C) holding that the trial courts damages award was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was based upon inadmissible evidence (D) holding the trial courts findings were insufficient to support a lumpsum award (E) holding evidence was insufficient to support trial courts award of lost rents under rule 752 because no evidence showed tenant occupied premises during pendency of appeal
Output: (E)
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against the Carmel Defendants are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Bankruptcy Court’s November 23,1999 intended action order concluded that even if the Carmel Defendants did take advantage of inside information, their purchase of the bondholders’ claims did not injure Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s order and the proposed distribution to the bondholders went. forward. Plaintiffs are barred from relitigating the issue. Littlejohn v. United States, 321 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 486, 157 L.Ed.2d 377 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 2. Plaintiffs’ claims against the trustee are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims (B) holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel (C) holding that third exception to antiinjunction act permits federal courts to enjoin state court relitigation of matters finally adjudicated in federal court including matters that were not raised but could have been raised in federal proceeding (D) holding that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously adjudicated matters (E) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant
Output: (D)
new value. 12 . Hanover asserts that the bankruptcy court also ruled in its favor on separate equitable grounds. Because we affirm the bankruptcy court’s application of the new value defense, we address Hanover’s equitable defense only to note that neither this court nor any other has recognized that such an equitable defense to a preference action exists. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) ("[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”) Even the single case that Hanover cites to support its equitable grounds defense provides it no support. See Kmart Corp. v. Uniden Am. Corp. (In re Kmart Corp.), 318 B.R. 409, 415 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2004) (<HOLDING>). TRAXLER, Chief Judge, dissenting: Because I 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the existence of antagonistic defenses does not require severance unless defenses are actually irreconcilable (B) recognizing that cases have generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses (C) holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court (D) holding that exceptions  such as the act or omission of a third party  to strict liability under section 13385 of californias water code are affirmative defenses (E) holding that apart from threshold defenses such as lack of in personam jurisdiction service of process standing and the like the enumerated 547c preference exceptions are the ex elusive defenses to liability for an otherwise avoidable preferential transfer
Output: (E)
amended Exemption 7 in 1986 to make clear that 7(E) “was not limited to records or information addressing only individual violations - of the law.” Id. at 79. More recently, in Blackwell v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court of Appeals held that the FBI had properly withheld methods of data collection, organization, and presentation contained in certain reports under Exemption 7(E). 646 F.3d at 42. The methods were developed for the FBI to meet the agency’s “investigative needs,” rather than linked to a specific investigation. Id. Moreover, as Defendant correctly points out, Def.’s Mot. at 11, 13-14, courts in this District repeatedly have held that information connected to law enforcement databases qualifies for exemption under 7(E). See, e.g., Long, 149 F.Supp.3d at 44 (<HOLDING>); Strunk v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 906 F.Supp.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that computer transaction and function codes that reveal how to navigate and retrieve information from a law enforcement database were properly withheld under exemption 7e (B) holding that user access codes that facilitated access to a law enforcement database were properly redacted under exemption 7e (C) holding that records concerning polygraph examination procedures and other law enforcement techniques are protected from disclosure under  exemption 7e (D) holding that numerical codes used to identify information and individuals as well as codes related to procedures concerning the use of law enforcement resources and databases  and case program and access codes were properly withheld under exemption 7e (E) holding that requests for metadata and database schema of law enforcement information databases qualify for exemption under 7e
Output: (E)
adopted in United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.2005), for sentences within the guidelines range cannot be reconciled with the advisory character of the guidelines established in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). This court rejected the same contention in Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 607 (“[WJhile a per se or conclusively presumed reasonableness test would undo the Supreme Court’s merits analysis in Booker, a clean slate that ignores the proper Guidelines range would be inconsistent with the remedial opinion.”); see Hankton, 463 F.3d at 630 n. 5 (dismissing as “ridiculous” the argument that applying Mykytiuk’s rebuttable presumption renders guidelines mandatory); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 767, 769 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Black alone argues that it was error to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that mykytiuk avoids conflict with booker (B) recognizing conflict between circuits (C) recognizing the conflict (D) recognizing an exception to the conflict rule where the conflict arose after the award of the contract (E) recognizing conflict
Output: (A)
during the amended period to above $6 per share, before crashing to $2. 19 as a result of FCPA-related disclosures. Doc. 63 at 3. As for Cuneo’s own losses, his original loss chart only shows purchases prior to the corrective disclosures about FCPA subpoenas, raising doubts about whether he even has standing to represent FCPA-related claims. Doc. 70-2. Cuneo responds that HDY represents an aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs with lesser financial interest in the litigation. Doc. 69 at 15. An amended loss chart filed with Cuneo’s amended complaint, however, shows he purchased additional stock after the first FCPA disclosure but sold it all prior to the second FCPA disclosure. Doc. 70-6 at 8. See Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005) (<HOLDING>); In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the permit process where it could not show that it would ever be genuinely threatened by an unconstitutional prior restraint in this case (B) holding that a plaintiff would have to show that he was not promoted because of his race not that he was a member of a protected group and was not promoted (C) holding that where one plaintiff has standing we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit (D) holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying (E) holding a plaintiff did not have standing to show loss causation where he completely sold out of a security by the time the operative corrective disclosure was made
Output: (E)
him to use an expert to evaluate the documents voluntarily produced. To a large extent, the court reads this third objection to be an invitation to the court to re-try the contentions of the parties before the arbitration panel and to make anew all factual and legal determinations. This the court is not permitted to do, under any standard applicable t his appeal of the arbitration award. Hoffman contends that the requirement in the NGFA rules that he pay the entire award by certified check to be held by the NGFA secretary prior to appealing only allows the wealthy and financially liquid to use the NGFA’s arbitration appeals system. This challenge can only be construed as a challenge to the “fundamental fairness” of the NGFA arbitration process. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). As his fifth challenge, Hoffman asserts that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) recognizing plain or fundamental error (E) recognizing review for fundamental unfairness as an independent extrastatutory ground
Output: (E)
with the evidence but whether the absence of the evidence undermines confidence in the verdict”). ¶20 Woods is particularly instructive because it confirms our application of the same prejudice standard under Strickland and in the Brady context in which the Strickland standard “finds its roots.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. So does In re Personal Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992), upon which the State heavily relies. Contrary to the State’s description of Rice, it is simply one of many cases in which this court employed the “reasonable probability” prejudice standard in resolving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a personal restraint petition. See Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 890; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 100 P.3d 279 (2004) (<HOLDING>), In re Pers. Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petitioner demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice by proving a claim under strickland (B) holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim (C) holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland (D) holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test (E) holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis
Output: (A)
residents according the 1990 U.S. census. Accordingly, Sharper contends the “one-person, one-vote” principal “has been codified into state law.” (Doc. 199, p. 5.) Thus, his claims should not be dismissed on this basis. It is well established that the “one-person, one-vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the judiciary. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453 (M.D.La.1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.2d 679 (1973). However, vote dilution and “one-person, one-vote” claims are distinct. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 402-03, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 954 (4th Cir.1992); see also Voter Info. Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 210-12 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Wells does not require this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing distinction between claims grounded in oneperson onevote and vote dilution in a rule 12b6 challenge to an atlarge method of electing state and city judges (B) recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) recognizing this distinction (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel
Output: (A)
to return monies paid by or on behalf of the class members. The amount of these monies may be reasonably obtained from [LSRC’s] records.” Thus, the Keys proved that through the time-sequential job numbers assigned to each of LSRC’s contracts with putative class members from a point certain in time (i.e., from whatever point in time suit is timely based on the application, if any, of LSRC’s statute-of-limitations affirmative defense to the certified class claims for declaratory-judgment and DTPA section 17.50(a)(4) (Violation of Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code) claims, the damages of each class member may be established solely by reference to the amount of LSRC’s contract with that class member. See Swv . Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 923-24 (Tex. 2010) (<HOLDING>). LSRC asserts that even if this is true— so 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining predominance was not defeated by differing amount of damages each class member would be entitled to when calculations could be computed from defendants records (B) holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages (C) holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages
Output: (A)
1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court’s injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) (“[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc.”). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
Output: (C)
the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1145, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 311 P.3d 184 (2013) (quotations and citations omitted). As the party opposing arbitration, Gillette “bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal.4th 223, 236, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 282 P.3d 1217 (2012). Unconscionability requires a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, “balanced on a sliding scale.” Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at *13 (citation omitted); see also Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443, 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, 165 P.3d 556 (2007) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on different grounds by Iskanian v. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that california supreme court is currently considering the appropriate standard for determining whether a contract or contract term is substantively unconscionable (B) holding that the more substantively oppressive the contract term the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable and vice versa (C) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (D) holding that a contract without a minimum quantity term is unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality (E) holding that procedural unconscionability is properly evaluated at the time a contract is negotiated
Output: (B)
years after the allegations regarding Enron’s manipulation of the energy markets in California became widely known and almost two years after he articulated virtually identical causes of action and legal theories in the California Claims. In order to meet the section 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay, when a law has multiple purposes, the Court must find that the action is brought primarily to enforce the law’s protection of the public safety or health of the citizens of California and not primarily to protect the State’s pecuniary interest. Here the Attorney General advances the California Litigation primarily for restitution, which is only an ancillary purpose of the California consumer protection laws. Pacific Land Research, 20 Cal.3d at 17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20, 569 P.2d 125 (<HOLDING>). According to press reports, the Attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not (B) holding that the request for restitution in a consumer protection action is only ancillary to the primary remedies sought for the benefit of the public (C) holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction (D) holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing (E) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction
Output: (B)
to and including a present violation, so that it is the cumulative effect of the discriminatory practice, rather than any discrete occurrence, that gives rise to the cause of action. Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); see also Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir.1998). In Davis, the Austin Court of Appeals held that in some instances “equitable considerations may require that the filing period not begin until acts supportive of a civil rights action are, or should be, apparent to a reasonably prudent person in the same or a similar position.” Id. The “focus is on what event should, in fairness and logic, have alerted the average layperson to act to protect his or her rights.” Id.; see also Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 239 (<HOLDING>). Appellees respond that all of Davis’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining whether a discovery violation warrants the sanction of exclusion of evidence a court must look to whether the violation was substantial the timing of the violation the reason for the violation the degree of prejudice to the parties whether such prejudice may be cured by a postponement and the desirability of a continuance (B) holding the touchstone of determining existence of erisa plan is whether an administrative scheme is required (C) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (D) holding that touchstone in determining whether one act is part of continuing violation is whether employee was put on notice that his rights had been violated (E) holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated
Output: (D)
might have arisen from his father’s actions in response to the MIP ticket and did not seek to influence the resolution of any public questions arising from any such controversy; the only actions Wade took after the MIP ticket that related in any way to such “controversy” were actions to defend himself in court at the trial on the ticket and to petition for, and receive, an expunction. However, Wade’s use of judicial processes did not “thrust” him to the “forefront” or “inject” him into the “vortex” of “a public controversy” or “public issue” in order to “influence the resolution” of “public questions,” nor did it constitute a “voluntary engagement” in activities that involved the risk of increased exposure and injury to reputation. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55, 96 S.Ct. 965-66 (<HOLDING>). Appellants invite us to create a new category 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that use of judicial process to litigate divorce did not make plaintiff a public figure and noting that such action was no more voluntary than that of defendant called upon to defend his interest in court (B) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required (C) holding that former state transportation department employee who brought allegations of departmental corruption to public attention was public figure (D) recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier (E) holding that the petitioner who was denied further appellate review by the supreme judicial court had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state trial court and appeals court and thus stone precluded federal habeas relief
Output: (A)
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id. We agree with the trial court that the State derives no unfair advantage nor imposes any unfair detriment on the petitioners by challenging Willey’s status as a professional gambler, and thus his standing to contest the constitutionality of the Gambling Winnings Tax as applied to professional gamblers. Given that the interlocutory transfer request was denied by this court, the petitioners cannot show any particular unfair advantage to the State or unfair detriment to themselves in the case before the trial court that resulted from the State challenging Willey’s status as a professional gambler, whether or not such a position was inconsistent with the ITS. See In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 502-03 (2007) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that father failed to establish that any unfairness resulted from mothers allegedly inconsistent positions in seeking to modify child support pursuant to statutory right (B) holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity (C) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding that an illegitimate child is guaranteed a right of support from his father
Output: (A)
acts of fraud, she must satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) twice. See Emery II, 134 F.3d at 1323. Ms. Goren’s amended complaint fails to allege a “pattern of racketeering activity” with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). In fact, Ms. Goren’s attempt to allege a “pattern of racketeering activity” fails on several fronts. The first and most glaring deficiency in the amended complaint is its failure to allege two predicate acts. The amended complaint alleges only one fraudulent transaction — the sale of two bottles of “Essential Minerals” to Ms. Goren. This is simply not enough to state a claim under § 1962(c). Indeed, we have repeatedly held that a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that “defendants” also defrauded unidentifi 918, 923 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Because the single sale to Ms. Goren is the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unspecified allegations that other companies were defrauded by use of the mails in the same manner as plaintiff did not satisfy particularity requirement of rule 9b (B) holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail (C) holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity (D) holding allegations that fraudulent statements were made during fourmonth period insufficient to satisfy rule 9b (E) holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement
Output: (A)
not reached a final decision on the merits, entitling a litigant to relitigate the issue. International Nutronics, 28 F.3d at 970-71 (antitrust claim against joint venture bidders could have been brought in pri- or bankruptcy proceeding, thus, claim was precluded in subsequent suit to avoid the sale); International Union of Operating Eng’r.-Employers Constr. Indus. Pension, Welfare & Training Trust v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir.1993) (in employee action to recover benefits from employer, employee’s audit claim barred by res judicata because it could have been brought in prior proceeding). If litigants could bring a new suit whenever an issue was not previously litigated, no judgment would ever be final. See Ellingson v. Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The proper method to challenge the decision 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the application of an extended statute of limitations to offenses occurring prior to the legislative extension where the prior and shorter statute of limitations has not run as of the date of such extension does not violate the ex post facto clause citing united states v powers 307 us 214 21718 59 sct 805 807 83 led 1245 rehg denied 308 us 631 60 sct 66 84 led 526 1939 (B) holding that an indemnitees settlement must be in an amount reasonable in view of the size of possible recovery and degree of probability of claimants success against the indemnitee quoting damanti v as inger 314 f2d 395 397 2d cir1963 cert denied 375 us 834 84 sct 46 11 led2d 64 1963 (C) holding that a change in law does not affect the res judicata effect of judgments citing chicot county drainage dist v baxter state bank 308 us 371 375 60 sct 317 319 84 led 329 rehg denied 309 us 695 60 sct 581 84 led 1035 1940 (D) recognizing nardone v united states 308 us 338 60 sct 266 84 led 307 1939 taint test as controlling authority (E) holding that due process forbids the use of a coerced confession irrespective of its truth as announced in jackson v denno 378 us 368 84 sct 1774 12 led2d 908 to be retroactive
Output: (C)
22, 122 S.Ct. 1012 (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commission’s activity falls within one of these specific jurisdictional grants, the “prefatory language of section 201(a)” does “not undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 22, 122 S.Ct. 1012. And the authority that Section 201(b) affords to the Commission has expanded over time because transmissions on the interconnected grids that have now developed “constitute transmissions in interstate commerce.” Id. at 7, 16, 122 S.Ct. 1012. Taken together, these points support the Commission’s assertion of authority over transmission planning matters in the challenged orders, notwithstanding petitioners’ contention that the orders intrude on the States’ authority. First, beca 5 U.S. 295, 299, 73 S.Ct. 706, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Given that fit, New York v. FERC teaches that 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (B) holding that transmission of photographs by means of the internet  constitutes transportation in interstate commerce (C) recognizing that federal authority under the fpa extends to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and that fpa section 206 is among those provisions that grant authority in connection with such interstate transmission opera tions (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that transmission of photographs by means of the internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce
Output: (C)
must disagree with the District Court on this point because, as noted above, the presence or absence of property rights under state law is not dispositive of the question whether a person has a property interest protected by substantive due process. We reach the same conclusion concerning the question whether the defendants’ alleged campaign of harassment against the plaintiffs would “shock the contemporary conscience.” Again, the state court found only that Desi’s was a common nuisance under state law and that the defendants were justified in believing Desi’s to be such. It does not follow from the state court’s findings that the defendants’ alleged act of singling out Desi’s for harsher treatment with the goal of driving African-Americans and Latinos out of W 0, 312 (6th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Rooker-Feldman does not apply to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that question of whether former employer was entitled to preliminary injunction ordering former employees to comply with noncompetition provisions of employment agreements was moot since the noncompetition restriction expired by time of appeal (B) holding that where a noncompetition clause in a contract had expired by its own terms the plaintiffs appeal from the district courts denial of the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction enforcing the clause was moot (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot (E) holding plaintiffs appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction moot where defendants directive no longer in effect
Output: (B)
not contest Alaimalo’s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo’s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must “effect a material change in the applicable law” to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessability of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm (B) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used (C) holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review (D) holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
Output: (A)
of Concern related to time and attendance. Def.’s Statement Fact ¶ 122. Ms. Britt’s effort to portray Ms. Wilson as possessing an anti-Muslim animus fails. Ms. Britt does not allege that Ms. Wilson expressed her anti-Muslim animus in any other way beyond allegedly denying her Ramadan accommodation. Contrary to Ms. Britt’s assertions, the record evidence shows that Ms. Wilson exercised her discretion, against the advice of HR, to accommodate Ms. Britt’s request for modified hours during Ramadan. As such, Ms. Britt has failed to identify facts sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Ms. Wilson’s desire to retaliate against Ms. Britt was the “but for” cause of Ms. Britt’s termination. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (<HOLDING>). b. Mis. Trask’s July 19, 2012 email summary 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is nothing to indicate that the principle of employer responsibility does not extend equally to other title vii claims such as a claim of unlawful retaliation (B) holding that title vii retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of butfor causation which requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer (C) holding that discrimination and retaliation claims are considered distinct types of claims that must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing of the administrative charge (D) holding that the court finds more persuasive the decisions of the circuit courts which reject reading a thirdparty retaliation cause of action into title vii but ultimately finding that the participation prong of title vii is potentially broad enough to encompass retaliation against third parties in the circumstances alleged in the instant case (E) holding that title vii retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the butfor cause of the challenged employment action
Output: (B)
who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the facility, and to transporters of hazardous wastes to the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4). 8 . The RAP for the site prepared by Neville also supplies indisputable evidence of the presence of hazardous substances at the Ne-ville facility. See Jeche Deck, Ex. A at 35-49. 9 . Neville also attempts to raise DTSC’s alleged arbitrary and capricious conduct as a defense to liability. However, this is a misapplication of the' arbitrary and capricious conduct standard, which is employed to measure the consistency of particular cleanup actions with the NCP, and therefore goes to the question of what costs the government is entitled to recover as damages rather than to the question of liability. See WSDOT, 59 F.3d at 798 (<HOLDING>). 10 . The evidence presented by the parties in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wsdot was not entitled to recover response costs under cercla where its actions in connection with an environmental cleanup were inconsistent with the ncp to such a high degree as to be arbitrary and capricious but also stating that failure to comply with the ncp is not a defense to liability but rather a factual issue affecting damages (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to substantially comply with public participation requirement rendered cleanup inconsistent with ncp (C) holding the director of the united states environmental protection agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order (D) holding that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment but also for expenses of his defense (E) holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurers failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party
Output: (A)
of the [Hotel]”). It is also apparent from the Agreement that Lerfer and Calumet delegated the day-today management of Taber to Taber’s officers, Eugene and Linda Romano. Appel-lees have introduced no evidence to suggest that either Lerfer or Calumet ever usurped that role. In sum, the record reveals that Ler-fer and Calumet serve as holding companies which manage their assets in Taber, a separate, and legally distinct, partnership entity, and that all their “activities” as holding companies occur exclusively in New York. We need go no further. Under either the “nerve center” test or the “center of corporate activity” test, the principal place of business of both Lerfer and Calumet is New York. Cf. Vareka Invs., N.V. v. American Inv. Properties, Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 910 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 107, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham (B) holding that ecuador corporation which served as passive investment vehicle for florida real estate venture had principal place of business in ecuador where it maintained its corporate books and records made all corporate decisions held all corporate meetings hired its employees and obtained loans for the initial purchase of the venture (C) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (D) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant (E) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter
Output: (B)
1, 1953, until August 2, 1974, a period of 21 years and 2 months. At the time of his retirement, Falardo was eligible for both a “for service” retirement (“Service Retirement”), which requires 20 years of service, and an ordinary disability retirement (“Disability Retirement”). Only retirees who satisfy the Service Retirement prerequisites are eligible to receive benefits from the VSF. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code (“Code”) § 13-271(a)(8). Falardo alleges that the Police Pension Board and his Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”) representative failed to inform him 707 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131, 119 S.Ct. 1804, 143 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1999); Bergamine v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of the City of New York, Inc., 202 A.D.2d 201, 608 N.Y.S.2d 431 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 758, 615 N.Y.S.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation (B) holding that unions interpretation of a contractual provision necessarily favorfing some workers over others did not violate the duty of fair representation (C) holding that sixmonth duty of fair representation statute of limitations applicable to claim alleging breach of union contract (D) holding that the pba did not violate its duty of fair representation by not taking steps to insure plaintiffs would receive vsf benefits (E) holding intentional conduct without rational basis is arbitrary breach of duty of fair representation
Output: (D)