niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
competent, and the proceedings moved forward. Harvey argues that the district court committed plain error in failing to grant his motion to withdraw his. plea because of Harvey's "marginal competency" and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to withdraw his plea on the same ground. 117 "The same standard applies to both a determination of competency to plead guilty and a determination of competency to stand trial." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 50 n. 11, 63 P.3d 731. The district court's determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial was therefore also a determination that Harvey was competent to plead no contest. See id. Harvey argues that a finding of incompetency by one of the psychiatrists was sufficient reaso 1th Cir.2001) (per cu-riam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 899 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum (C) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be
Output: (E)
trial, arguing the court improperly excluded its sole expert witness, Bolt, from testifying at trial. The court denied the motion, stating that it did not completely exclude Bolt from testifying at trial, “but rather determ limine serve as the basis for the rule that “error claimed in a court’s ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial.” State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 1975). This is because the error only occurs, if at all, when the evidence is offered at trial and is either admitted or refused. State v. Langley, 265 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>). There is, however, an exception to this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 (D) recognizing further normally the ruling is not a final one it is a red flag to counsel that the evidence is not to be brought before the jury unless and until it is separately taken up with the court  at trial (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
Output: (D)
that RM Kids’s claim was excluded because it suffered “no loss or damage.” Furthermore, as discussed at length in Division 1, supra, Old Republic contends that even if RM Kids has a valid title defect claim, a bona fide dispute exists as to whether the date of any loss, for the purpose of measuring damages, was the date that Peachtree Bank closed on the subject loan rather than the date RM Kids foreclosed on the subject property. And indeed, as we held in Division 1, supra, Old Republic’s contention in this regard was perfectly reasonable. In fact, it proved to be correct. Given these particular circumstances, Old Republic had a reasonable basis to refuse RM Kids’s demand. And as a result, the trial court did not err in granting Old Republic’s motion for summary judgment on this (4) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that payment under settlement agreement between insurer and insureds concerning disputed premium claims was a compromise that did not violate antirebate statute (B) holding that an agreement between insurer and insureds whereby insurer reimbursed insureds for costs of providing insurers administrative services did not violate antirebate statutes where agreements were not offered as an inducement to purchase insurance and reimbursements were reasonable in comparison to services rendered (C) holding that in a dispute between insurer and insured in which the insurer admitted liability hut disputed the amount of damages it was only after entry of a judgment upon that verdict that the claim became liquidated (D) holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith (E) holding that insureds demand to insurer was liquidated when insurer did not point to any evidence at trial in support of its contention that damages were disputed
Output: (E)
of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 478-79 (Colo.App.1989)(interpreting C.R.J.P. 4’s requirement that a dependency and neglect petition be filed with the district court within ten days from the day the child is taken into custody as a rule not affecting the court’s jurisdiction such that a failure to object in time to the child’s extended custody will waive the requirement). Instead, the time requirement of 19-1-108(5) is a procedural rule that creates a condition precedent to the party’s right to appeal the magistrate’s order. Because such procedures can be waived and because the Department failed to raise the requirements of 19 — 1—108(5) before the district court reviewed C.S.’s petition, the Department has waived any argument under 19-1-108(5). Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 617-618 (Colo.2002)(<HOLDING>); see also Ex Parte H.F., 843 So.2d 190, 191-92 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date (B) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (C) holding that crim p 35s requirement that criminal defendants file a motion for relief with the state court before proceeding to habeas corpus implicates the doctrine of exhaustion of legal remedies and not the concept of subject matter jurisdiction and any argument based on crim p 35 is therefore waivable (D) holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus (E) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus
Output: (C)
challenges they can present to litigants, and that he understood that another lawyer’s perspective would be helpful in his defense. Thus, although defendant may not have been well-qualified to handle the task of criminal defense that he chose to undertake, he was eminently qualified by his back ground, training, and experience to make that choice with full knowledge of its consequences. ¶ 16. On appeal, defendant points to numerous errors and gaffes in his self-representation to suggest that his waiver was not truly knowing. But defendant’s own acknowledgment that he was not experienced enough to provide adequate self-representation, either before or after trial, does not invalidate his deliberate choice to proceed pro se. See Wiesner v. Abrams, 726 F. Supp. 912, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Lewis, 155 Vt. at 655, 586 A.2d at 552 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires (B) recognizing that any witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if he so desires and is not under or subject to legal process (C) recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice (D) holding that even in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires if he makes the choice with eyes open (E) holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live
Output: (D)
a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715. It appears, however, that AEDPA overruled the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, and that at this time, district courts cannot order evi-dentiary hearings unless the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) are met. See Shumate v. Newland, 75 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1084, 1098-99 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“AEDPA, however, has ‘reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s discretion’ by imposing threshold requirements that must be met before a request for an evidentiary hearing may be entertained.”) (quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.1999)); Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1054-55 (D.Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (B) holding that evidentiary hearing not necessary where proposed administrative action is based on undisputed material facts (C) holding that aedpa did not codify keeney but instead significantly curtails the availability of evidentiary hearings to develop material facts (D) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint
Output: (C)
were realized — without any substantive reasoning or even a reference to the reports. Id. at 185-86, 95 S.Ct. 1491. Moreover, the Board was in no way bound by the reports’ recommendations, nor the reasoning contained therein; the reports were simply prepared for t . 22 (D.C.Cir.1983) (noting that “[i]f the agency merely carried out the recommended decision without explaining its decision in writing, we could not be sure that the memoranda accurately reflected the decisionmaker’s thinking”). Courts have similarly honored the deliberative process privilege where an agency has only casually referred to a document, because a casual reference to a privileged document does not necessarily imply that an agency agrees with the reasoning contained in those documents. See Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81 (<HOLDING>); Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege (B) recognizing application of federal deliberative process privilege to internal state communications (C) holding that two minor references to a document protected by the deliberative process privilege were insufficient to establish adoption or incorporation (D) holding that there is no statutory deliberative process privilege in arizona and declining to create such a privilege under the common law (E) holding that emails among prosecutors relating to decision not to prosecute were covered by the deliberative process privilege
Output: (C)
on behalf of’ MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullís as “Contractor.” The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullís, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis’s personal account, not into MBC’s account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullís was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullís wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullís, without any citation to authority, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents
Output: (D)
not offer evidence that the defendant possessed commonly available materials—such as tape—if the defendant otherwise possesses all of the key components necessary to assemble a destructive device. See United States v. Simmons, 83 F.3d 686, 687 (4th Cir. 1996) (observing that possession of a'method of ignition, such as a match, is not typically required to find that the defendant possessed the components necessary to assemble a Molotov cocktail); United States v. Crocker, 260 Fed.Appx. 794, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Although the government did not introduce evidence that the defendant possessed tape, this Court does not require showing possession of all commonly available materials when'determining whether- a destructive device could have been readily assembled.”); Langan, 263 F.3d at 626 (<HOLDING>). As Sheehan could be convicted of possessing a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury (B) holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice (C) holding that the defendant could not be convicted for possessing a combination of parts that could be readily assembled into a bomb where the defendant did not possess any explosive material a key element required for the creation of a bomb (D) holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff (E) holding that a reasonable jury could find the device to be readily convertible into an explosive bomb where wires could be quickly stripped and recrimped to a pager that was part of the detonating mechanism
Output: (E)
with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. Although I agree with nearly all of what Justice Ginsburg has written in her concurrence — a concurrence that raises serious concerns that the Court totally ignores — I dissent for the following reasons. The mere fact that a false denial fits within the unqualified language of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 is not, in my opinion, a suffic 1932) (“We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting [a Prohibition Act] statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them”); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.) (<HOLDING>). Although the text of § 1001, read literally, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although words any person or persons in maritime robbery statute are broad enough to comprehend every human being    general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them (B) recognizing that the court must give meaning to all the words in the claims (C) holding that a jury could find an intent to discriminate from evidence of use of code words such as all of you and one of them the words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal  the intent of the speaker (D) recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims (E) holding that if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous a court must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended
Output: (A)
assault and battery committed by Eugene,” and as such are barred by the intentional tort exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). (ECF No. 10-1, at 17 n. 6 (citing Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 916-917 (4th Cir.1995))). The intentional tort exception provides that the United States retains immunity as to “[a]ny claim arising out of [an] assault [or] battery.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Indisputably, Eugene’s murderous acts constituted assault and battery. That assault could not form the basis for a direct claim against the United States. See, e.g., Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir.1953) (concluding Section 2680(h) barred respondeat superior claim where servicemember used excessive force in shooting civilian); Wise v. United States, 8 F.Supp.2d 535, 542 (E.D.Va.1998) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the intentional tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses (B) holding section 2680h barred direct liability claim premised on servicemembers sexual assault and murder of civilian (C) holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault (D) holding that conduct charged under article 120k ucmj was not plainly private when the sexual activity occurred while in the presence of two additional servicemembers in the unlocked barracks room of two other servicemembers who were reasonably likely to unintentionally observe the sexual activity and therefore the failure of the military judge to raise a lawrence issue sua sponte was not plain error (E) holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct
Output: (B)
Amendment in his effort to confer with counsel. Although the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), found in that clause a right to counsel, calling the presence of counsel “the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege,” id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and “[a]lthough conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may significantly impair that right [to avoid self-incrimination], a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). That is of no help to Padilla, who does not face the prospect of a trial. But see Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted sub nom. Chavez v. Martinez, — 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used threats and physical violence against the plaintiff in march 1992 to coerce a confession that was later used to convict him of murder (B) holding that application of statutory mandatory minimum in  841b1a does not violate defendants fifth and fourteenth amendment rights (C) holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession (D) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (E) holding that a plaintiff may bring a  1983 action alleging a violation of fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from police coercion in pursuit of a confession even though statements were not used against him at trial
Output: (E)
Muhammad stated that he understood his rights, that he wanted to talk to the agents, but that he did not want to sign the waiver of rights form. At that point, the agent told Muhammad that he would not talk with him unless he signed the form. Agent Gandolfo then gave the form to Muhammad and left the room. When the agent returned, he noticed that Muhammad had signed the form and he then began the interview. A defendant must unambiguously request the assistance of counsel in order to invoke his right to an attorney under Miranda and thus prevent the interrogator from asking any further questions. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-60, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In Davis, the defendant claimed that he had 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once miranda warnings have been given if the individual indicates in any manner  that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion subtle or otherwise (B) holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that once the right to counsel is invoked custodial interrogation must cease until the suspects attorney is present (E) holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel
Output: (B)
purpose. Id. That is, we must evaluate whether Gardetto spoke out based on the same motivation that would move the public to speak out. Applying these standards to each of the six incidents of speech at issue in this case, we hold that all but two (Gardetto’s criticism of McBroom’s termination and Gar-detto’s conversation with Gonzales) involve matters of public concern. The speech incident that most obviously involves a matt y electrical inspector’s comments complaining of work performed for city officials and their friends on city time, illegal payoffs, and incidents of released substandard electrical work constituted expression on matters of public concern); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1316-18 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (<HOLDING>). By the same token, Gardetto’s efforts to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding school district hable for teachers sexual harassment of student only upon knowing failure to act (B) holding that statement challenging sexual harassment determined to be employee grievance driven by selfinterest was not matter of public concern (C) holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern (D) holding that a teachers accusations of sexual harassment and poor job performance by a principal involved matters of public concern (E) recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern
Output: (D)
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir.1995). That means that the Court must “resolve all evidentia-ry conflicts and credibility questions in the prosecution’s favor; and, moreover, as among competing inferences, two or more of which are plausible, the judge must choose the inference that best fits the prosecution’s theory of guilt.” Id. When, as here, the Court reserves decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court “must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.” ■ Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(b). Thus, that decision will not affected by intervening verdicts of acquittal on other counts. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593, 597 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the applicable standard of review in addressing the sufficiency of the evidence is manifest error (B) holding that in resolving sufficiency of evidence appeals court does not weigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses (C) holding that sufficiency of the evidence review should be independent of the jurys determination that evidence on another count was insufficient (D) holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction (E) holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial
Output: (C)
Quinn would have standing under Washington law, we need not decide this issue. The continuous ownership requirement imposed by Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is procedural and therefore applies in diversity actions such as this one. Kona, 179 F.3d at 769. 6 . Quinn attempts to distinguish Lewis, arguing that, unlike in Lewis, 719 F.2d at 1048, here there was inadequate disclosure concerning the Board members' purported conflicts and Quinn's allegations. Even assuming that Anvil’s disclosure to shareholders was less extensive than that in Lewis, that alone is not enough for us to conclude that equity warrants a different result here. 7 .The state cases cited by Quinn likewise involved challenges to mergers. See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 n. 10 (Del. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 124, 249 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing first two exceptions (B) recognizing the efficiencies defense in merger cases (C) recognizing that the federal litigant has a personal right subject to exceptions in certain classes of cases to demand article iii adjudication of a civil suit (D) recognizing exceptions to immunity (E) recognizing exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement in certain merger cases
Output: (E)
time for filing objections to discharge, see In re Gaines, 932 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.1991)—are not final. See, e.g., In re Rebear, 89 B.R. 314 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988)(incidental procedural matters not immediately appealable). Those orders pose much less risk of leaving the bankruptcy estate with unwarranted assets or liabilities, or of denying creditors their lawful rights. C. The Finality of the Order in this Case Given the understanding of finality developed above, it is clear that the bankruptcy court’s denial of the motion to convert this ease from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is not a final order for purposes of § 158(a)(1). See Stewart v. Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A1981); In re Hebb, 53 B.R. 1003, 1005 (D.Md.1985); In re Klein/Ray Broadcasting, 100 B.R. 509 (9th Cir. BAP 1987)(<HOLDING>). An order denying a motion to convert does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion (B) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (C) holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute
Output: (B)
district court’s decision of whéther to give a jury instruction and the content of the instruction. See United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir.1996). A court’s refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error if the instruction “(1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir.1995). We conclude the district court provided an adequate specific intent instruction to the jury, and thus was not required to give an additional instruction on good faith. See United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 317 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, this claim is without merit. II. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel (B) holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case (C) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (D) holding that a specific pretext instruction is not necessary (E) holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction
Output: (E)
2005 version of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46, the version relied on in the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss.” [¶ 10] Too much significance has been placed on the dates in Larson. Whether the commencement date of the case or the injury date is used was of no consequence in Larson because N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 (1981) was in effect during both time periods. Larson stands only for the principle that between the commencement date and the date the defendant moves to dismiss, the commencement date controls. More germane authority to the present case is found in Fortier v. Traynor, 330 N.W.2d 513, 515-16 (N.D.1983). In Fortier, this Court held the applicable law in malpractice actions is the law in effect when the cause of action arises. Id. See also Hoffner, 2003 ND 79, ¶ 11, 660 N.W.2d 909 (<HOLDING>); State v. Dimmler, 456 N.W.2d 297, 298 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach (B) holding cause of action accrues when some compensable damage occurs (C) holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself (D) recognizing that a cause of action accrues when a reasonably diligent plaintiff ascertains the nature and cause of his injury (E) holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach
Output: (C)
case. See PI. Resp. at 4. The court, however, views the holding of California Federal Bank that a “causal connection between the breach and the loss of profits must be definitely established” is neither inconsistent nor incompatible and the court’s determination in this case that a causal connection between the breach and loss of reliance 347, 349-50 (5th Cir.1987) (recognizing an exception, under Mis sissippi law, to the rule that "a shareholder may maintain a nonderivative action for the violation of a duty owed directly to the shareholder as an individualf,]" but holding shareholder’s breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation claims were too speculative to qualify as individual injury to a shareholder); Gaff v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 814 F.2d 311, 317-18 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); with Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder (B) holding that corporation can file an answer when the plaintiffs cause of action is such as to endanger rather than advance corporate interests but not where the cause of action is fraud against the corporate directors (C) holding that damages resulting from directors misconduct destroying the value of the corporate stock does not qualify as a direct or personal injuiy to a shareholder and will not support a tort action (D) holding that defendants stock options are concrete and personal because they represent a species of compensation different from the one ordinarily accumulated by corporate officers and directors (E) holding that subclinical asbestosrelated injuiy is not sufficient to support cause of action
Output: (C)
106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). 5 . See also Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2289 (noting that the circuits uniformly have applied a negligence standard to title VII cases involving harassment by co-workers). 6 . Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir.1989); see also Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir.1993) (discussing failure of plaintiff to complain to "company hierarchy"). 7 . In Williamson, the supervisor whose knowledge was deemed sufficient to impute actual knowledge to the employer was an HPD sergeant. See Williamson, 148 F.3d at 463. 8 . This standard comports with that of other circuits. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation and citation omitted); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one who exercises daytoday control over the employee will be considered as the employer (B) holding that the proper inquiry is whether the individual defendant served in a supervisory position in which he exercised significant control over the plaintiffs hiring firing or conditions of employment and if not whether employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a hostile work environment and took no prompt and adequate remedial steps (C) holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff (D) holding board had jurisdiction when employer had final authority over the essential terms and conditions of employment including wages benefits hiring firing promotion discipline and grievances although employer was subject to various governmentimposed restrictions (E) holding that agent part of title viis definition of employer includes someone who serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over  hiring firing or conditions of employment
Output: (E)
obligation under the 1868 treaty to provide education for the Navajos lasted no more than ten years does not relieve the United States of its treaty obligation. The 1868 treaty is not the only source of the United States’ obligation to educate Navajos. Federal statutes and regulations also recognize the federal government’s responsibility in the area of Indian education. For example, Congress has expressly declared that a major national goal of the United States is to provide the quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities which will permit Indian children to compete and excel in the life areas of their choice, and to achieve the measure of self-determination essential to their social and. economic well-being. 25 U.S.C.A. § 450a(c) (1983). See also id. § 450a(a) (<HOLDING>); id. § 2502(c) (Supp.1994) (declaring it a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that delivery of subpoena via federal express was sufficient because effective service under rule 45 is not limited to personal service (B) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (C) recognizing education as a federal service to indian communities (D) holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service (E) holding public service corporation obligated to furnish service to each patron at same price charged to other patrons for substantially similar service
Output: (C)
the policy language at issue as a “choice of law” provision). Our Supreme Court has held “[a] difference of judicial opinion regarding proper construction of policy language is some evidence” that the policy language is ambiguous. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 326 N.C. 387, 392, 390 S.E.2d 150, 153 (1990) (citations omitted). I believe the language in General Casualty’s policy is ambiguous on the issue; and, accordingly, I would hold that the General Casualty policy does provide coverage for the claims sought in North Carolina by Plaintiffs to the extent that the benefits would be required under Virginia workers’ compensation law. See W&J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Group, 92 N.C. App. 313, 316, 374 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809 (1989) (<HOLDING>). I believe that the word “require” in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (B) holding that an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract that lends itself to different interpretations is ambiguous and must be construed in a manner most favorably to the insured (C) holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties (D) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (E) holding that only if provisions in an insurance contract are open to more than one interpretation should it be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured
Output: (A)
administrative or judicial action.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1) (2011). The Commissioner may elect to reopen a prior decision, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987, 988 (2011), but this decision is not reviewable. See Culbertson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 319, 322 (4th Cir.1988) (“When deciding whether to reopen or to reconsider his own administrative determinations, the Secretary enjoys broad discretion, which is generally not subject to judicial review.”). Here, the Appeals Council determined that res judicata barred a finding of disability during the period at issue in Fiske’s prior disability application. The Council’s inquiry into the ALJ’s decision and evidence concerning this period does not constructively reopen the claim. See Hall v. Chater, 52 F.3d 518, 521 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because the Commissioner’s decision not to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that additional records submitted to the appeals council are part of the administrative record for judicial review (B) holding rule 38 applies to frivolous criminal appeals as well as civil appeals (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that appeals council must consider evidence submitted with a request for review if it is a new b material and c related to the period on or before the date of the aljs decision (E) holding that appeals council did not explicitly or implicitly reopen case and stating that appeals council must be afforded opportunity to look far enough into record to determine whether res judicata applies
Output: (E)
at 573 (I960)). Thus, where a movant’s sole claim is for monies paid based on a change in decisional law, the courts are hard pressed to find extraordinary circumstances or undue hardship under Rule 60(b)(6). For example, in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1988), the court faced the question of “whether a final money judgment may be reopened [pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(6) motion] several years after the time for appeal has expired because of a favorable legal ruling in some other party’s appeal.” Finding that money judgments are inherently final and devoid of prospective application, the court denied relief. See id. at 194-95; but cf. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala (In re Blue Diamond Coal Co.), No. 3:93-CV-473, slip op. at 6-9 (E.D.Tenn. Nov. 4, 1998) (<HOLDING>). Under the Rule 60(b)(6) doctrine, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eastern enterprises decision was sufficiently extraordinary to warrant vacation of a final judgment (B) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (C) holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review (D) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
Output: (A)
1116 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003)). ¶17 The Indiana Court of Appeals employed similar reasoning in upholding its state’s analogous juvenile waiver statute. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 702-04. The court recognized that, [a]s a practical matter, a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act and is not retained in the juvenile justice system but is waived into adult court will (if found guilty) face harsher consequences for his or her conduct. Nonetheless, Ice makes clear that not all judicial fact-finding ultimately resulting in an increased term of incarceration invades the province of the jury. . . . Villalon provides no argument as to how our juvenile waiver statute might be unders , 765 N.E.2d 1071, 262 Ill. Dec. 463 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 778, 47 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (D) holding that the apprendi rule was not implicated because a juvenile transfer proceeding does not involve sentencing or a determination of guilt or innocence (E) holding that the states transfer statute did not violate the apprendi rule because the transfer hearing determines not the minors guilt but the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated
Output: (E)
he was deprived of a legitimate liberty or property interest and that he was not afforded adequate procedural protections in connection with the deprivation. Barreras v. New Mexico Corrections Dep’t, 114 N.M. 366, 370, 838 P.2d 983, 987 (1992). The definition of property centers on the concept of entitlement; therefore, interests in government benefits will be recog L.Ed.2d 184 (1986). Therefore, his claim of entitlement to employment was satisfied so long as he continued to receive the full compensation due under his contract. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “suspension with pay [does] not invade any recognized property interest.” Pitts v. Board of Educ., 869 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir.1989); see also Black v. Board of Educ., 87 N.M. 45, 46, 529 P.2d 271, 272 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Because the Board did not deprive Harrell of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours (B) holding that suspended school superintendent was not entitled to due process guarantees afforded discharged certified school personnel (C) holding that intraconspiracy doctrine applied to plaintiffs claims against school board teacher school principal and district superintendent (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials
Output: (B)
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . [citations omitted] The existence of prejudice, in large measure, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case . . . [citations omitted] and it is axiomatic that the granting of a severance is within the discretion of the trial judge . [citations omitted] The burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the ruling of the trial judge will rarely be disturbed on review [citations omitted] The defendant must show something more than the fact that ‘a separate trial might offer him a better chance of acquittal’. . . . [citations omitted) “Appellants alleged that they were prejudieed'and their trial rendered unfair because the jury was unable to collate the evidence and connect the names and faces of each d d 409 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an accused cannot sustain a speedytrial claim when delay results from his    making dilatory pleadings or motions failing to object when a continuance is granted the government    (B) holding that delay is waived when the defendant fails to object when a continu ance is granted (C) holding that delay is waived when the defendant makes dilatory pleadings and motions (D) holding defendant waived complaint (E) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions
Output: (C)