niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause”). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
Output: (B)
case in Mitchell. < See id. As in Mitchell,: considering the deed as a whole, the parties clearly intended that the mineral rights in the land be reserved to the grantors. Id. at 274, 243 P.2d at 415; see also Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532, 537-88 (1974) (giving effect to a mineral reservation within a deed's habendum clause even though the deed failed to mention the reservation in its granting clause); Jones v. Am. Ass'n, 120 Ky. 413, 86 S.W. 1111, 1112 (1905) ("[Rleservations or exceptions are enforced, although contained in the habendum clause of the deed, as fully as if set out in the granting clause, when on the whole instrument the intention of the parties is sufficient ly expressed to be enforced."); Price v. Johnson, 78 N.M. 123, 428 P.2d 978, 980-81 (1967) (<HOLDING>). T23 Based on Mitchell and other authorities 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury (B) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (C) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (D) holding that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (E) recognizing that where a deed is susceptible to alternative construction the construction most favorable to the grantee will be adopted but still finding that in light of the modern rule the reservation in the habendum at issue was not void for repugnancy
Output: (E)
the state could have elected to charge Reynolds with both burglary and theft and, upon conviction, would have been entitled to a separate sentence on both charges. Reynolds cannot complain that it was improper to deny an instruction on theft that would have permitted the jury to consider the offense only as a lesser alternative to burglary. Reynolds’ conviction is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for a retrial in conformity with the views expressed herein. 1 . See Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306-314 (Alaska 1970). 2 . See abo Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 (Alaska 1978) (citing Mead with approval in holding that offenses of grand larceny and theft from an airplane do not merge and are subject to separate punishment). 3 . Cf. State v. Occhipinti, 562 P.2d 348 (Alaska 1977) (<HOLDING>). 4 .Here, as in Mead, "we are presented with 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state (B) holding that when the state prosecutes and obtains a conviction on separate charges as to which the rule of merger does not apply the state is entitled as a matter of law to a conviction and a separate sentence on each charge (C) holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case (D) holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him (E) holding defendant who voluntarily dismissed his appeal of one conviction based on plea agreement for separate charges was not entitled to outoftime appeal
Output: (B)
have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers”); United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36, 36 (2d Cir.2000)(speaking of a district court’s power to discipline attorneys as part of its “inherent power to manage its own affairs”). The Supreme Court has explained that this power “derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which granted admission.” In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 643, 105 S.Ct. 2874. Consistent with this derivation, the cases in which courts have found inherent power to discipline attorneys appear to be limited to those in which the attorney being disciplined violated a court order, disrupted a court proceeding, or otherwise abused the judicial process, and those involving suspension or censure. See, e.g., Seltzer, 221 F.3d at 42 (<HOLDING>). Such cases should not be read to mean that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders (D) holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   (E) recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants
Output: (D)
at the fringes, section 22-1115 applies clearly and directly to the activities in which the parties who brought this action wish to engage. The complaint they filed made precisely that admission: “[Pjlaintiffs wish peacefully to carry banners, placards, signs and devices which depict messages critical of foreign governments, and their acts and policies. They wish to do so on the public streets and sidewalks in the District of Columbia, within 500 feet of the official buildings of the foreign governments whose acts and policies they intend to criticize.” Complaint at 3-4, R.E. at 6-7. There is no ambiguity, therefore, in the statute’s application to the conduct primarily at issue. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 58-59, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2446-47, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Nor in any event is section 22-1115 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a formal summons and complaint were unnecessary because the motion before the court is not an independent action (B) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (C) holding that the challenge to the constitutionality of a 1996 fort lauderdale ordinance was moot where the ordinance had been amended in 1998 (D) holding it unnecessary to consider vagueness challenge to an ordinance unquestionably applicable to the parties before the court (E) holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance
Output: (D)
1152 ("The doctrine of alter ego does not rest upon a particular creditor's dealings with or reliance on the control entity, nor does the doctrine require a showing of fraud on a particular creditor.”). 32 . 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994). 33 . In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 348. 34 . See H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 2nd Sess., at 324-25 (1977). 35 . In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 624 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982). 36 . 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1)-(6) (1994). 37 . S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1148; In re Davis, 191 B.R. 577, 586 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (compiling citations). 38 . S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1147-48; Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.Ct.App.1990). 39 . Courts have noted, with curiosity, the different statutory language used in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2). See, e.g., In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 349 (<HOLDING>). 40 . 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1988). 41 . 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover (B) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (C) recognizing that congress per mits injunctions to be issued under subsection b1 regarding property involved in the foreign proceeding but subsection b2 only authorizes turnover of property of the estate leading to the conclusion that the two sections must perform different functions (D) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (E) holding that  determining the nature and extent of property of the estate is also a fundamental function of a bankruptcy court and therefore the turnover action is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 usc  157b2a
Output: (C)
and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA’s legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers “help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees.” Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM “has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA.” The court determined that even though the plan “allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation,” that “does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute” because “the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer  (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
Output: (B)
is not enough to confer standing.” Id. Finally, the plaintiffs can meet their burden to show standing in a threat-of-prosecution situation by showing past prosecutions under the act in question. Id. at 1128. Because the gun rights plaintiffs could not establish the foregoing requirements, they did not meet their burden of showing they had Article III standing for their claim. Id. at 1129. With regard to ripeness, the court noted that the issue must be “fit for judicial decision” and that “the parties will suffer hardship if we decline to consider the issues.” Id. at 1132. Because the issues were not “purely legal” and because the plaintiffs had not been threatened with prosecution, the court found that the claims were not ripe for adjudication. Id.; see also Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138-39 (<HOLDING>). In this case plaintiffs allege three 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioners did not possess a private right of action for injunctive and declaratory relief sought because only the citys housing official could enforce the citys housing maintenance code (B) holding that landlords who vowed not to follow an antidiscrimination housing statute did not have a justiciable claim for injunctive relief when they had not yet violated the statute and had certainly not been prosecuted for any violation (C) holding that college violated stay by not delivering transcript to chapter 7 debtor when debt had not yet been determined dischargeable (D) holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute (E) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded
Output: (B)
is a portion of the retirement benefits represented by the number of years of the marriage divided by the husband's [or wife's] employment. The wife [or h e Woodward formula, stating that "the decision to give equal credit for each year of [Husband's] service in the plans is consistent with the approach set forth in [Woodward ]." The court also reasoned that it was not able to apply "strict] Woodward formulas because the benefits were converted to lump sums before the end of the marriage." Finally, the court acknowledged that a significant portion of Husband's benefits accrued during the years the parties were married, and announced its intention to "make some equitable adjustments to recognize that." In so doing, the trial court was clearly acting within its discretion. See id. (<HOLDING>). 128 Contrary to Wife's argument, we determine 
 Holding statements: (A) holding it is within the trial courts discretion to choose on a casebycase basis the method although expressly rejecting the reserved jurisdiction method (B) holding that the method used to distribute retirement benefits was properly a matter within the trial courts discretion (C) holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion (D) holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion (E) recognizing this method
Output: (B)
that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing the complaint on a motion to dismiss, “no more [is required] from plaintifff’s] allegations of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8’s notice pleading minimum and Rule 9(b)’s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally.” Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir.1993). Alvarado’s complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that because of the prison officials’ deliberate indifference, he was being exposed to levels of ETS which aggravated his chronic asthma, thereby endangering his existing health, a claim recognized as an Eighth Amendment violation twenty-five years ago in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Id. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (<HOLDING>). He also stated a valid claim as to his future 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (B) holding that an inmate stated a cause of action under the eighth amendment by alleging that prison officials had with deliberate indifference exposed him to levels of ets that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health (C) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation (D) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (E) holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
Output: (A)
Duke neither reported nor evaluated this diagnosis. Further, one month prior to the filing of this suit, Dr. Chen, a Duke cardiopulmonary radiolo error. II. Next, Duke argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for JNOV because there was no competent evidence that “any of the treating physicians alleged to have been negligent was an agent of Duke.” A motion for JNOV is treated as a renewal of the motion for directed verdict. See Maintenance Equip. Co. v. Godley Builders, 107 N.C. App. 343, 353, 420 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1) (1990). Thus, a movant cannot assert grounds on a motion for JNOV that were not previously raised in the directed verdict motion. See Lassiter v. English, 126 N.C. App. 489, 492-93, 485 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Because Duke never asserted this agency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that some evidence was presented to support the jurys verdict that defendant breached contract and therefore trial court did not err in denying defendants motion for directed verdict or jnov (B) holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely (C) holding party that filed motions for summary judgment directed verdict and jnov preserved complaint drat issue should not have been submitted to jury even though party submitted jury questions on same issue (D) holding that a party must have made a directed verdict motion at trial on the specific issue which is the basis of the jnov (E) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict
Output: (D)
of lien from the lien and any action brought to recover the amount claimed. Unless otherwise prohibited by law, if no action is commenced to recover on a lien within the time specified in RCW 60.04.141, the surety shall be discharged from liability under the bond. RCW 60.04.161. The purpose of this provision “is to allow a party to file a bond to support transferring to the bond a lien against the property to allow the party supplying the bond to free up the property for conveyance.” Olson Eng’g, Inc. v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 171 Wn. App. 57, 66, 286 P.3d 390 (2012). Thus, filing the bond does not destroy the lien entirely but instead transfers the lien from the real property to the bond. DBM Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Wn. App. 35, 42, 170 P.3d 592 (2007) (<HOLDING>). A. CalPortland’s Failure To Serve Process on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a lien is a claim against property  here a surety bond and breach of contract is a claim against a person thus the lien proceeding did not dispose of the breach of contract action (B) holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond (C) holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien (D) holding that a lien cannot be estopped into existence where the borrowers promised to execute a lien in the manner mandated by the constitution and then failed to do so (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor had standing to avoid a judgment lien to the extent of her exemption amount but not the entire judgment lien
Output: (B)
statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are “clearly expressed”). See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94-95, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001). As the Supreme Court has cautioned, canons serve as “guides,” not “mandatory rules.” Id. at 94, 122 S.Ct. 528. Moreover,’ “[sjpecific canons are often countered ... by some maxim pointing in a different direction.” Id. (quotation omitted) (“[T]he canon that assumes Congress' intends its statutes to benefit [Native American] tribes is offset by the canon that'warns'us against interpreting federal statutes -as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed.”); see N. Arapaho Tribe v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-247-SWS, 118 F.Supp.3d 1264, 1284, 2015 WL 4639324, at *15 (D.Wyo. July 2, 2015) (<HOLDING>). See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding indian tribes subject to gamblingrelated taxes from which states are exempt (B) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (C) holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes (D) holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act (E) holding that large employer mandate and related tax from the affordable care act apply to tribal nations despite congresss failure to specify tribes as large employers if congress wished to exempt indian tribes from this mandate that otherwise might be reasonably construed as applying to them it needed to do so explicitly
Output: (E)
hold that a court of appeals may not award a new trial on the basis of an erroneous eviden-tiary decision” in the absence of a post-verdict motion. Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir.2006). Likewise, in Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed.Appx. 635, 637 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit stated that Unitheim "deals with the specific situation of a party’s failure to renew, post-verdict, a Rule 50 motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial” and reasoned that "Unitherm is inapposite” to Metcalf's case because the appellants did not "challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” 3 . Our circuit has repeatedly accepted such claims of retaliation for taking FMLA leave. See, e.g., Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 403 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference (B) holding that  825220c is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibition on interference with and restraint of employees rights under the fmla  2615a1  and that the labor departments conclusion that employer use of the taking of fmla leave as a negative factor in employment actions  violates  the act is  a reasonable one (C) holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave (D) holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys conclusion that west retaliated against arban for taking leave under the fmla (E) holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla
Output: (D)
employee.” Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir.1994) citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In this case, the Defendants state that Turner was fired because management honestly believed that Turner had directed threats towards other employees. The testimony of Gibbons, Woodward and Overstreet supports that story. The Court finds that the Defendants’ explanation has a reasonable basis in fact. The Court also finds that Turner’s alleged conduct, if true, would be sufficient to warrant discharge. There is no question that if the Defendants honestly believed that Turner actually made threats of violence, that Turner could be rightfully discharged. See Lenoir v. Roll Coater, 13 F.3d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 3. Pretext. Because the Defendants’ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made (B) holding that if management honestly believed that the plaintiff employee possessed a weapon wielded at coworkers and made menacing comments then management had a reasonable explanation for discharging the plaintiff employee (C) holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct (D) holding that a partner in and accounting firm who brought an action under the age discrimination in employment act adea and the employee retirement income security act erisa was considered an employee because he was subject to the control of a management committee which acted in secrecy and had no bona fide ownership interest fiduciary relationship voting right or management control (E) holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice
Output: (B)
77, 566 N.W.2d 229 (1997), and Hoffman v. Spartan Stores, Inc., 197 Mich.App. 289, 494 N.W.2d 811 (1992)).) Petitioner contends that the denial of a new trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. The claim is without merit. The Supreme Court long has recognized the common-law rule prohibiting the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117-18, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) (citing history beginning in 1785). The Court has acknowledged, however, that certain kinds of external influences on the jury may implicate the guarantee of a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117-18, 126-27, 107 S.Ct. 2739; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jury trial waiver valid despite defendants argument that district court failed to clearly distinguish between jury trial bench trial and the use of stipulated facts (B) holding that the sixth amendments guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury to base its verdict only on the evidence presented at trial (C) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (D) holding that a trial judge cannot usurp the function of the jury as triers of fact if the amount awarded by their verdict is supported by sufficient evidence and is reached by a fair and impartial jury (E) holding that the regular association during trial between the jury and two deputy sheriffs who testified at trial undermined the defendants right to a fair trial by an impartial jury
Output: (E)
that competency bears upon the knowing waiver of constitutional rights. See Dist. Ct. R. vol. VII, doc. 40 at 14, 20. The court concluded the record supports the state court determinations that petitioner was competent. On appeal, respondent notes that the district court correctly recognized the state jurisdictional rule requiring petitioner to withdraw his guilty pleas. Respondent, however, does not actually assert procedural bar. Instead, he cites to recent Tenth Circuit authority, Walker v. Attorney General, 167 F.3d 1339, 1344 (10th Cir.1999), and proceeds to discuss the merits of this claim. See Appellee’s Br. at 8-9. Because respondent does not specifically argue procedural bar, we turn to the merits of petitioner’s claim. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1216-17 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The state trial court held two competency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding state is required to raise procedural bar as affirmative defense or it is waived (C) holding that the state may waive the affirmative defense of procedural default by failing to assert it (D) holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived (E) holding that fair use is an affirmative defense
Output: (B)
a small purchase, rather than smaller genuine bills in defendant’s possession as a circumstance from which guilty knowledge could be inferred). These cases, however, reflect a concern with convicting an innocent bystander “passed” counterfeit bills without knowledge of their lack of authenticity. A rational jury could, on this evidence, have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to defraud. The requisite fraudulent intent required by the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 472, may be inferred from surrounding circumstances or circumstantial evidence and thus need not be proven directly. See United States v. Tucker, 820 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1987) (“The requisite fraudulent intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.”); United States v. Sink, 586 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carlson, 359 F.2d 592 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that surrounding circumstances often supply inferences of knowledge which adequately prove intent (B) holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances (C) holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession (D) recognizing that the intent element is to be gleaned from all the surrounding facts and testimony and not solely from the subjective intent of the original shipper (E) holding that parties intent to create or extend agency relationship may be inferred from their conduct viewed in light of all circumstances surrounding transaction
Output: (A)
to initiate an adversary proceeding. As dictated by these Rules, Lawler should have filed a Complaint, paid the appropriate filing fee and secured the issuance of a Summons; he took none of these steps. See, Fuerst v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 5 B.R. 47 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1980) (objection to Discharge dismissed because although the pleading was denominated a complaint, no filing fee was paid and no summons sent); In re Ennis, 50 B.R. 119 (Bankr.Nev.1985) (request for an injunction is an adversary proceeding). As pled by Lawler, the allegations of professional malpractice were solely a defense to the claim filed by Guild. Agger v. Seaboard Allied Milling Cory. (In re Cushman Bakery), 526 F.2d 23, 35 (1st Cir.1975) cert. denied 425 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 1670, 48 L.Ed.2d 178 (1976) (<HOLDING>) When Guild withdrew its claim, Lawler received 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trustees objection to the allowance of a claim is manifestly not the institution of a proceeding that will entitle the trustee to recover on behalf of the estate (B) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee (C) holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court (D) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate (E) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself
Output: (A)
by the legislature. See Goldman, 151 N.H. at 773-74. II. Confidentiality Citing Goodrow v. Perrin, 119 N.H. 483, 485 (1979), and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the respondent asserts that he “has a vested [constitutional] right to maintain the confidences he shared with his treatment team, which cannot be taken away by legislative fiat.” Although any such assertion is belied by his limited waivers of confidentiality discussed below with respect to his asserted contractual rights, we address this argument for guidance in other circumstances where such limited waivers may not exist. We have never recognized a constitutional right to the privacy of medical information on behalf of incarcerated persons and we decline to do so now. But cf. In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 230 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records (B) recognizing stu dents right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to the students bodily integrity (C) recognizing that the right to be free of stateoccasioned damage to a persons bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process (D) recognizing state constitutional right of individual privacy that    may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily integrity (E) recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records
Output: (D)
U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A (1993). Thus, any error by the district court in denying Oliver eligibility for relief under Amendment 505 was harmless. Nor would Amendment 706 affect his sentence. In Oliver’s § 3582 motion, he conceded that he was held accountable for 11.23 kilograms of cocaine base. Therefore, Oliver’s base offense level would remain unchanged even after Amendment 706 revised § 2Dl.l(c)(l) because he was held responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. In short, Oliver’s sentence was not based on a range subsequently lowered by Amendment 706 and the district court lacked authority to grant him a sentencing reduc tion under § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 706. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(2)(B); see also United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), cert denied, McFadden v. United States, — 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that amendment 706 would not affect the guideline ranges for career offenders sentenced under  4b11 (B) holding that the recent amendment to the crack cocaine guidelines does not qualify defendant for a sentencing reduction under  3582c2 because defendant was originally sentenced pursuant to the guideline range for career offenders (C) holding that a district court lacks authority under  3582c2 to reduce a defendants sentence when the defendant was sentenced under  4b11 as a career offender (D) holding that the district court lacked authority under  3582c2 to grant a sentencing reduction to defendants who were career offenders sentenced under ussg  4b11 because amendment 706 would not ultimately affect their guideline ranges (E) holding a reduction in defendants sentence as a career offender was not authorized under  3582c2 because amendment 706 did not lower his applicable guideline range under the careeroffender guidelines
Output: (D)
the protection of [a lesser standard of review] but are subject to de novo review.” In re Kretzinger, 103 F.3d 943, 946 (10th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted); see also Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.2006) (discussing vs., 470 F.3d 509, 513-14 (2d Cir.2006) (finding legal error when “[a]lthough the BIA cited the proper legal standard at the outset of its decision, it failed to apply this deferential standard of review when evaluating the IJ’s credibility finding”). B Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)©, the BIA cannot “engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an [IJ].” Instead, the BIA reviews those facts found by the IJ — including credibility determinations — only to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Id.; see also RamirezPeyro, 477 F.3d at 641 (<HOLDING>). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion (B) holding that the lower court is the factfinding body and that its findings of fact will not be set aside on appellate review unless they are clearly erroneous (C) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record (D) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (E) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous
Output: (D)
to the City’s administrative expenses in exercising its police power, including the costs associated with any incidental consequences of the franchised services. If after trial the district court determines that none of the franchise fees are reasonably related to the City’s administrative expenses, the court shall issue the appropriate order disallowing the franchise fees as contained in the ordinances. However, if the district court determines that all or part of the franchise fees are reasonably related to the City’s administrative expenses, the court shall enforce the ordinances up to an amount equal to the fees reasonably related to the City’s administrative expenses in exercising its police power. Cf. State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550, 565 (Iowa 1973) (<HOLDING>); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506a does not determine the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506d (B) holding a department store was not allowed to collect finance charges on its retail installment contracts and revolving charge accounts that were in excess of the interest rate allowed by statute however the store was allowed to assess finance charges in the amount allowed by statute (C) holding that ridethrough is allowed (D) holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa (E) holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502
Output: (B)
n.3. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Bruton. Here, unlike Bruton, the statements at issue do not involve a custodial confession by Permanian, and the statements were admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Permanian’s statements were also generally made under circumstances that indicate their reliability including that Permanian had personal knowledge of the incident, it was unlikely that Permanian’s statements were founded upon a faulty recollection, the statements were against Permanian’s penal interest given their context, and the statements did not contain any express factual assertion of defendant’s guilt but only an inference of guilt. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 226-27, 91 S. Ct. 210, 219-20 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d at 284-85 (finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause (C) holding that the defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admission of the child victims statements to her mother grandmother a detective and a forensic investigator (D) holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made (E) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements
Output: (E)
issue in question.” Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson’s pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court’s relevant finding was “essential to the judgment.” Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson’s impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 (“[R]es judicata does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance
Output: (C)
results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence. (b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible. Under the plain language of this rule, the military judge’s ruling was correct. By adding this Rule, the 1991 amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial restored the armed forces to the approach followed in the 1969 Manual. Cf. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253 (C.M.A.1987)(2-1 decision holding that the trial judge has the discretion to admit the results of polygraph examinations); United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R.1994)(<HOLDING>). The concerns behind this rule include: that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ban violated the sherman act (B) holding that the governments use of classified evidence in detentionpendingdeportation proceedings violated detainees due process rights and inter alia justified his release (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative (D) holding that the absolute ban on polygraph evidence violated due process and the right to present evidence citing inter alia chambers v mississippi 410 us 284 93 sct 1038 35 led2d 297 1973 (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
Output: (D)
as: “bodily injury which ... involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the second or third degree”. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-l-901(3)(p). Thus, Gonzalez contends the Colorado statute includes a different class of injuries (e.g., fractures) than the MPC. Although Gonzalez cites similar cases supporting his assertions, other case-law cuts against his position. Compare United States v. Calzada-Ortega, 551 Fed.Appx. 790, 792-93 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding a similar Wisconsin statute was broader than the enumerated aggravated-assault offense), with United States v. Aluya, 590 Fed.Appx. 433, 434 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, pursuant to our limited 
 Holding statements: (A) holding on plainerror review an oklahoma statute for assault and battery was equivalent to the enumerated offense (B) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two (C) holding that virginia domestic assault and battery statute did not qualify (D) holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury (E) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery
Output: (A)
no suggestion that the region to be considered is or should be confined by our State’s borders, id. at 329, 3 A.3d 1268 (Skillman, P.J.A.D., dissenting) (citing Saddle Brook, supra, 156 N.J. at 597, 722 A.2d 530), he criticized the majority for relying on Justice Blackmun’s concurrence when the United States Supreme Court’s majority had not suggested such a limitation on the relevant market area, id. at 330-32, 3 A.3d 1268. II. This matter comes to us as an appeal as of right, arising only through the dissent in the Appellate Division. R. 2:2-l(a)(2). As such, our review is confined to the issue which was the subject of the dissent, ibid., no other matter having been brought to us through a petition for certification, see State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 371 n. 9, 939 A.2d 754 (2008) (<HOLDING>); accord, Aversano v. Palisades Interstate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of appeal based on a dissent in the appellate division preserves for review only those issues on which the dissent was filed and certification must be sought separately as to all other issues (B) holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues (C) holding that issues must be briefed to be preserved on appeal (D) holding that appellant did not limit his issues on appeal by gratuitously listing only some of those issues in his notice of appeal (E) holding that issues must be raised and ruled upon in the trial court to be preserved for appellate review
Output: (A)