niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
damage to other persons and their property, but not insuring the risk of the insured causing damage to the insured’s own work. Weedo, 405 A2d at 791-92. The exclusion at issue in this ease, an exclusion for property damage to “[tjhat particular part of real property on which [the insured] is performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations,” is a business risk exclusion. Glens Falls Ins. v. Donmac Golf Shaping, 203 Ga.App. 508, 417 S.E.2d 197, 200 (1992). The instant exclusion denies coverage for more than just damage to the insured’s work, however, by excluding from coverage damage to the particular part of property on which the insured is performing operations. See Vinsant Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 530 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Tenn.1975) (<HOLDING>). An explanation of why this damage to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (B) holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled (C) holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage insured caused to well as it was lowering gun to depth at which insured was to use gun to perforate well (D) holding that particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to entire apartment insured was renovating even though insured was working only on one part of apartment at time of damage (E) holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to a switchboard upon which insured was adding circuit breakers
Output: (E)
creditor, whether or not' the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 1327(a). Thus, courts have ruled that “[t]he Order of Confirmation is res judicata as to all justiciable issues decided or which could have been decided at the hearing on confirmation.” In re Guilbeau, 74 B.R. 13, 14 (Bkrtcy.W.D.La.1987); In re Russell, 29 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983); In re Lewis, 8 B.R. 132, 137 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1981); Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1327.01 (15th ed. 1991). It is clear that the IRS had ample opportunities to raise the eligibility issue, including before, during, and after confirmation. Therefore, the IRS is now barred from raising the issue unless i io 1983) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the IRS cannot rely upon section 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a request made within 180 days of a modified confirmation order  entered three months after the original confirmation order  but more than 180 days after the original confirmation order was timebarred (B) holding  1330a motion untimely when filed over 180 days from confirmation (C) holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days (D) holding  1330a motion not now justiciable because not raised within 180 days of confirmation (E) holding that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed
Output: (D)
stated that he conveyed all plea-bargain offers to appellant. Following the hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant’s issue in this appeal states generally that he complains of ineffective assistance of counsel during the “plea bargain process.” Appellant specifically complains of ineffective assistance concerning his counsel’s alleged failure on October 3 to convey the 15-year plea-bargain offer made by the State; appellant argues that he lacked sufficient time to consider the offer that he admittedly rejected on October 4. At the hearing on his motion for new trial, however, appellant complained of ineffective a rwise — between the error and the judgment of guilt. Sanchez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); but see Brink v. State, 78 S.W.3d 478, 484 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because judgment of youngs guilt was not rendered independently of trial courts ruling on motion to suppress evidence of offense and judgment would not be supported without that evidence error not waived by plea of guilty (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (C) holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea (D) holding that courts mention of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility to defense counsel was not reversible error (E) holding that appellants plea of guilty was not rendered independently of trial courts ruling on motion to reveal identity of confidential informant and that error was thus not waived by plea of guilty because informants testimony was relevant to and needed for defense to prosecution
Output: (E)
on May 27, 2010, almost a full year after the limitations period expired. Absent any tolling of the one-year limitations period, Galindo’s habeas petition is clearly barred. Galindo argues the district court should have granted his request for an evidentiary hearing to address whether the doctrine of equitable tolling would apply to permit the late filing of his habeas petition. Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations is tolled when the plaintiffs “failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000). Equitable tolling is only appropriate, however, when a plaintiff “diligently pursues his claims.” Id.; see also Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quotation and citation omitted), Galindo 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances (B) holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling (C) holding petitioners alleged ignorance of aedpas statute of limitations is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling (D) holding that aedpas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control (E) holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence
Output: (D)
448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). In order to have a viable cause of action under § 1983 based on the violation of a federal statute, however, a plaintiff must establish that the statute allegedly violated gives the plaintiff enforceable rights. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2275, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (rejecting the notion that case law permits “anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action ' brought under § 1983”). We emphasize, as did the Court in Gonzaga, that in cases brought to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, such as the Adoption Act, Congress must “speak with a clear voice” and manifest an “unambiguous” intent to co 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has set forth three 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race (B) holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury (C) holding that the brooke amendment to the housing act provided a cause of action under  1983 (D) holding that administrative scheme in brooke amendment to housing act does not provide exclusive remedy precluding claim under 42 usc  1983 because court was unconvinced  that defendant has overcome its burden of showing that the remedial devices provided in the housing act are sufficiently comprehensive  to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under  1983  quoting middlesex county sewerage auth v national sea clammers assn 453 us 1 20 101 sct 2615 2626 69 led2d 435 1981 (E) recognizing the cause of action
Output: (C)
be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant’s case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it
Output: (C)
the two-year statute of limitations to bar the state law claims of Plaintiffs Karen Angus, Diane Ciprian, Jason Hoane, Christopher Peira-no, and Barbara Shafer, as well as the state law claims of Eric Heberle based on paychecks he received prior to February 1, 2000. E. Liquidated Damages NHC asserts that, even if it is liable to the Plaintiffs for overtime compensation under the FLSA, it is not hable for liquidated damages. The FLSA provides for liquidated damages in an amount equal to the plaintiffs actual damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The liquidated damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for the loss he suffered by not being paid the wages he was owed in a timely manner; they are not intended to punish the employer. McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 322-23 (6th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa (B) recognizing that liquidated damages under the flsa  are compensation not a penalty or punishment  (C) holding under flsa (D) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (E) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award
Output: (B)
exists, “it may provide one of the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive showing that wrongful discrimination has occurred.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373-74, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). Logically, in cases where the challenging party is a member of a cognizable racial group or where race is an issue in the case, a discriminatory purpose in the exercise of strikes against veniremembers of that same race is more readily apparent. See id. Therefore, although racial identity between the challenger and the excused veniremember is not required to raise a Batson challenge, the absence of such an identity can certainly impact the strength of the challenger’s prima facie case of racial discrimination. See id.; see also Bean, 816 S.W.2d at 119 (<HOLDING>). This impact is especially significant in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (B) holding that the employers discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge (C) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (D) holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination (E) holding that where defendant was not african american and established only that the state exercised four out of ten peremptories to strike african american veniremembers a prima facie case of racial discrimination had not been made
Output: (E)
counterclaim. See, e.g., Wassail v. DeCaro, 91 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the plaintiff agreed to drop claims where the defendant agreed to drop counterclaim); Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting that the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss claims where the defendants agreed to dismiss counterclaims). The economies argument ultimately devolves into an argument about the manageability of the counterclaims in the context of the class action, a concern addressed both by Rule 13 and by Rule 23. Rule 13 (i), through its reference to Rule 42(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that, to further convenience and to avoid prejudice, a court may order separate trials of the counterclaims. See FDIC v. Selaiden Builders, Inc., 973 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 1944, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver (D) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served
Output: (E)
it does not follow that the presentment of a defective complaint invests the trial court with jurisdiction. Under Huynh, defendants charged by complaint in municipal court may raise alleged defects in the complaint for the first time on appeal, even though, after the 1985 amendments to article five, section 12, of the Texas Constitution and to article 1.14(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, defendants charged by indictment or information could no longer raise such complaints for the first time on appeal. We therefore conclude, again based on Huynh, that if a complaint does not allege all the elements of an offense, the complaint is not a valid charging instrument, it does not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court, and is therefore void. See, e.g., McElroy, 720 S.W.2d at 492 (<HOLDING>). We sustain appellant’s third point of error. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (B) holding that all five elements of  547b must be met (C) holding that a found in indictment need not allege all of the elements of entry (D) holding in a case predating the amendment to article five section 12 that to be a valid charging instrument and to invoke the trial courts jurisdiction an indictment must allege all essential and constituent elements of the offenses sought to be charged (E) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense
Output: (D)
to be paid or given for anything bought or taken in barter or for service rendered: CHARGE, PRICE”); Black’s Law Dictionary 312 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “cost” as “Expense; price. The sum or equivalent expended, paid or charged for something.”); Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 591 (1934) (defining “cost” as “[t]hat which has to be given for a thing in order to procure it; especially, the price paid; outlay of any kind; expense”). In these circumstances, a credible argument can be made that, as between two plausible meanings, a reader should give the word “cost” its ordinary meaning as opposed to the more specialized meaning preferred by accountants or economists. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 159 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  unless otherwise defined words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning  at the time congress enacted a statute and reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statutes enactment to assist in determining its meaning citation omitted (B) holding that an undefined statutory term should be given its natural ordinary meaning (C) holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import (D) recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning
Output: (D)
judgment order on appeal. 2 . Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Grp., Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.1998)). 3 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 4 . Compare Fleming v. Yuma Reg'l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006, 130 S.Ct. 3468, 177 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2010) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act covers discrimination claims by an independent contractor.”) with Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir.2006) (“With respect to Dr. Wojewski’s claims under ... the Rehabilitation Act, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants because Dr. Wojewski was not an employee of the hospital.”). See also Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 969-75 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action (B) holding that the rehabilitation act does not incorporate the adas requirement that the employer have fifteen or more employees (C) holding employer was entitled to rely and act upon the written advice from the employees physician (D) holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees (E) holding that the national parks act does not incorporate state procedural housekeeping rules such as rules of evidence or civil procedure but the act does incorporate outcome determinative state law
Output: (B)
unlawful harm under that public policy may include actions that violate recognized and accepted standards of conduct, such as applicable codes of ethics. The critical question in this case is whether under all of the surrounding circumstances MacDougall’s termination by Weiehert violated that clear mandate of public policy and was in retaliation for either his vote on the municipal parking ban ordinance or his refusal to change the ordinance. At the outset, we recognize that conduct that is directed against constitutionally-protected activity may violate a clear mandate of public policy, even though it may not offend any other statutory or legal standard. Supra at 390, 393, 677 A.2d at 167, 168. Compare Shovelin v. Central New Mexico Elec. Coop., Inc., 115 N.M. 293, 850 P.2d 996 (1993) (<HOLDING>) with Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy (B) recognizing public policy limits on employer discretion in discharging employees (C) holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern (D) recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim (E) holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy
Output: (A)
that the cause of Ford’s injuries was not the Defendants’ various alleged negligent acts and omissions, but rather the subsequent false arrest and false imprisonment that flowed from those actions. Indeed, had the Defendants miscalculated the duration of Ford’s supervised release and requested arrest warrants be issued, but not arrested and detained Ford, Ford’s Amended Complaint suggests that he would not have suffered any damage. For these reasons, Ford’s damages arise out of his false arrest and/or false imprisonment, not the alleged negligent actions of the USPC and CSOSA Defendants. See Kugel, 947 F.2d at 1507 (concluding that plaintiffs claims, though couched in terms of negligence, sounded in defamation and were therefore barred under FTCA); see also Snow-Erlin, 470 F.3d at 809 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court finds that Ford’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative (B) holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest (C) holding that state jurisdiction over claims by union members against employer for false arrest false imprisonment and malicious prosecution were not preempted under garmon (D) holding that false arrest is one means of committing false imprisonment (E) holding that plaintiff could not sidestep the ftcas exclusion of false imprisonment claims by suing for the damage of false imprisonment under the label of negligence
Output: (E)
is logical to conclude that in a situation covered by subsection (d), a formal determination that indemnification is proper would be unnecessary; because the director has been exonerated, or at least not been held liable, no proof of her good faith would be required. On its face, subsection (d) appears to apply to Safeway’s situation. Presumably, a “successful defense" in a settlement (a "proceeding referred to in subsection (b)”) occurs where no liability is conceded. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the Safeway directors denied any liability whatsoever, see E.R. at 230, exh. 26, p. A-7 (section R); therefore, they were successful "on the merits or otherwise,” and Safeway is required to indemnify them under subsection (d). 25 . hipping Co., 47 F.3d 316, 324 (9th Cir.1995) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest (B) holding that like other affirmative defenses to liability immunity from liability must be pleaded or else it is waived (C) holding that reversal for a new trial on liability is appropriate only where the error complained of affects only the issues of liability (D) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional (E) holding that prejudgment interest is inappropriate trader  3287a where defendant disputes not only liability but its liability in proportion to other defendants
Output: (E)
can foster a public confidence in our judicial system. Explaining to the public that possession of pornography is not a victimless crime, for example, is a completely appropriate role for the trial judge and for this court. Likewise, we do not intend to suggest that trial judges cannot learn from experience or consider prior cases when seeking to impose a proper sentence. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, J.Q.C. No. 77-16, 357 So.2d 172, 178 (Fla.1978) (“Every judicial officer is the sum of his past. When he dons his robe and ascends to the bench, he is not divested of the effects of his previous training, education and real life experiences. He takes his official office as a human being, not as a judicial robot.”); Nateman v. Greenbaum, 582 So.2d 643, 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, we recognize that all good 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial (B) recognizing a judges duty to address the jurys questions (C) holding that a judges conduct seriously undermined the publics faith that judges are as subject to the law as those who appear before them and justified removal from office (D) recognizing that judges are expected to be influenced by real life experiences (E) holding that bankruptcy judges are not bound by appellate ruhngs of single district judges even those from their own district
Output: (D)
court on the merits absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude Fair-cloth has not made the requisite showing. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039-40, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED. * To the extent Faircloth seeks to raise issues not properly presented to the district court, we find they are waived. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (C) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances (D) holding claims raised for first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances (E) holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice
Output: (D)
CURIAM. After a jury trial, William Bubb was convicted of sexual battery on a person less than twelve years of age and lewd or lascivious molestation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by permitting the victim’s Child Protection Team (“CPT”) interview video to be admitted into evidence after the child took the witness stand but refused to testify. We affirm. This alleged error was not preserved below. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So.3d 1105, 1109 (Fla. 2010) (“While no magic words are required to make a proper objection, ... the concern articulated in the objection must be sufficiently specific to inform the court of the perceived error.” (citations omitted)); Mungin v. State, 932 So.2d 986, 1003 (Fla. 2006) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that any error in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding appellants confrontation issue unpreserved for appeal (B) holding that scattered statements in the appellants briefs are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal (C) holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal (D) holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal (E) holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it  
Output: (A)
court of appeals overlooked Cain's holding that only errors labeled as structural by the Supreme Court are immune from a harm analysis.”); Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("The erroneous submission of an unwanted defensive issue has not been labeled by the United States Supreme Court as structural.”). 13 . Gonzales, 994 S.W.2d at 171. 14 . Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 15 . Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264. See also Gonzales, 994 S.W.2d at 171-72. 16 . 422 U.S. at 865, 95 S.Ct. 2550. 17 . Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (citing Herring and Ex parte Flores, 537 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)). See Ex parte Shivers, 501 S.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (<HOLDING>); Flores, 537 S.W.2d at 459 (holding it to be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led2d 336 1967 controlled with respect to texas revocation proceedings that suspended the imposition of sentence and accorded a constitutional right to counsel and further holding that gagnon v scarpelli was inapplicable (B) holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings (C) holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation (D) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (E) holding the rule requiring that counsel be furnished in proceedings for probation or imposition of deferred sentence as announced in mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led 2d 336 to be retroactive
Output: (A)
sentence for a crime, the Supreme Court noted that a defendant may consider gain time or parole eligibility in deciding whether to enter a plea bargain. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. at 966 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36). An alien defendant, in addition to considering factors such as parole eligibility, would likely consider his or her eligibility to apply for a deportation waiver as well in deciding whether to plead or contest the charges. Just as the Supreme Court has found that “only an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that he was not suffering a penally when he was denied eligibility for parole,” Warden, 417 U.S. at 662, 94 S.Ct. at 2538, only an unus 952) (<HOLDING>); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39, 44 S.Ct. 283, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (B) holding that the ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation orders because deportation however severe its consequences has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure (C) holding that because of its civil nature section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause (D) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (E) holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation
Output: (B)
526 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that “retire” is not synonymous with “age,” and holding that without more, employer’s statement that' plaintiff should “retire and make everybody happy” was not direct evidence of age discrimination); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 y attitude during the 2010 discussion, Dunn has failed to show a specific link between the Board’s attitude and its decision to nonrenew his contract. After all, not only was there an almost two-year gap between the Board’s 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal, but the Board rehired Dunn twice during this period despite him being at least sixty years old. Given these circumstances, any link between the 2010 discussion and the 2012 nonrenewal is too attenuated to constitute direct evidence. See Bone, 686 F.3d at 954 (<HOLDING>); Haigh v. Gelita USA, Inc., 632 F.3d 464, 470 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial (B) holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases (C) holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age (D) holding that comments made at least four months before the adverse employment action were not connected to the decisionmaking process and thus were not direct evidence of age discrimination (E) holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision
Output: (E)
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a district court or a case filed in the district court is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court, the circuit clerk or a judge of the court where the case was filed shall transfer the case to the docket of the appropriate court, and the clerk shall make such cost and docket fee adjustments as may be required and transfer all case records.” § 12-11-9, Ala.Code 1975. The requirement that a district court transfer an action within the jurisdiction of the circuit court is jurisdictional. § 12-11-9. However, for a district-court order transferring an action to the circuit court to be effective, the circuit court must have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Alexander v. Hawk, 189 So.3d 824, 827 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (<HOLDING>); Darby v. Schley, 8 So.3d 1011, 1014 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment (B) holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court (C) holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court (D) holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action (E) holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment
Output: (E)
addressed in Devlin and City of San Benito applies to shareholders who object to the settlement of a derivative suit in the trial court, deeming them to be parties who may appeal. In City of San Benito, the supreme court explained that an appellant is a deemed party under the doctrine when it meets three requirements: (1) it is bound by the judgment; (2) its privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the record; and (3) there is an identity of interest between the appellant and a party to the judgment. 109 S.W.3d at 755. The supreme court went on to recognize that the most important consideration is whether the appellant is bound by the judgment. Id,.; cf. BASF FINA Petrochem. Ltd. v. H.B. Zachry Co., 168 S.W.3d 867, 870-71 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, Lapiner meets all three requirements of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant complied with rule 3as requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was clear from the face of the notice of appeal which judgment appellant sought to appeal (B) holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point (C) holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial (D) holding the nonparty had standing to appeal because it was bound or adversely affected by an injunction (E) holding that appellant had standing to appeal because it was bound by the judgment even though it did not meet the second requirement
Output: (E)
that “discriminating among religions” in the workplace is “subject to strict scrutiny”)(citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982)). Because the right here is to be free from an alleged discriminatory conspiracy to demote employees based on their religion, the particular adverse employment action does not appear important to the analysis whether the right to be free from workplace discrimination based on religion is clearly established. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit in August, 2010, found a reassignment, with significantly less monetary loss, and less of a demotion in job title and responsibilities, qualified as an adverse employment action for disparate-treatment discrimination purposes. See Jones v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d at 1279-80 (<HOLDING>). Thus,, notwithstanding that the right to be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a materially adverse action is of the magnitude of a termination of employment or a decrease in salary or a material loss in benefits (B) holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion (C) holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions (D) recognizing possible adverse action where reassignment left plaintiff with significantly different  and diminished  supervisory and programmatic responsibilities (E) holding that a teachers reassignment with a 17000 decrease in salary to take place one year following a teachers reassignment constituted an adverse employment action notwithstanding that the teacher was not demoted
Output: (E)
1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1978). Moreover, it is well established that the identity in language between 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and 15 U.S.C. § 15 is not a mere happenstance; Congress consciously patterned the RICO section after the antitrust prototype. See, e.g., 115 Cong.Rec. 6992, 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska). Legislators must have known that courts have construed virtually identical language as giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims. It would be anomalous for this court to hold that the jurisdictional grant in the RICO statute did anything other than create exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil claims by persons injured by violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. But see Luebke v. Marine National Bank of Neenah, 567 F.Supp. 1460 (E.D.Wis. 1983) (<HOLDING>) The court concludes, therefore, that res 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing presumption (B) holding rico claim could have been raised in state court because of presumption of concurrent jurisdiction but not addressing whether statutes language and legislative history rebuts the presumption (C) holding that child support formula creates a rebuttable presumption and an inequitable result rebuts the presumption (D) holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action (E) holding that the absence of plausible grounds for relief rebuts the presumption of prejudice
Output: (B)
by the Eleventh Amendment But He Has Not Established Qualified Immunity or Immunity Under Noerr-Pen-nington in His Individual Capacity. 1. Hoffman concedes that Markwell cannot be sued for civil damages in his official capacity. Hoffman concedes that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes Markwell from Hoffman’s claim of damages against Markwell in his official capacity as State’s Attorney. See Pl. Resp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 18) at 11-12. However, because Hoffman is also seeking an injunction against Markwell as to his involvement in advising the Board to exclude Hoffman from participation in Board activities, Markwell remains in this lawsuit in his official capacity for the purposes of the claimed injunctive relief. See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted). 2. Markwell is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity (B) holding that a party can sue a state officer in his or her official capacity to enjoin prospective action that would violate federal law (C) holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 (D) holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation (E) holding that a prisoner can under rluipa pursue nominal damages against a state officer in her official capacity
Output: (B)
Johnson, 351 So.2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), or a writ of prohibition. This court has no authority through a writ of prohibition to review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the defendant’s affirmative defense of statute of limitations. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is extremely narrow in scope and operation. It exists to prevent “an inferior tribunal from acting in excess of jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.” English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 297 (Fla.1977). When a trial court makes an erroneous ruling on a statute of limitations defense, that error, like any other error concerning an affirmative defense, can be corrected on appeal from a final order. Cf. Mandico v. Taos Constr., 605 So.2d 850 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). Although this court in Swartzman v. Harlan, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state is required to raise procedural bar as affirmative defense or it is waived (B) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (C) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (D) holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived (E) holding that the coemployee immunity provision in workers compensation law was constitutional
Output: (C)
the circuit court on remand concludes that the attorney-client privilege applies to these documents, the materials would not be subject to the work-product doctrine because they would not be “otherwise discoverable.” Assuming the subject documents are “otherwise discoverable,” the crux of the work-produet dispute between the parties is whether the materials were “prepared in anticipation of litigation.” HRCP Rule 26(b)(4); see Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Waikoloa Beach Villas ex rel. Bd. of Directors v. Sunstone Waikoloa, LLC, 130 Hawai'i 152, 161, 307 P.3d 132, 141 (2013) (noting that the work-produet doctrine applied because an opinion letter was a prerequisite for litigation and thus “prepared in anticipation of litigation”); Save Sunset Beach, 102 Hawai'i at 484, 78 P.3d at 20 (<HOLDING>). We note that “[t]he burden of establishing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court erred in admitting letter as business record where testimony was not adequate to establish that the letter was compiled as a matter of regular practice as opposed to one prepared in anticipation of litigation (B) holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable (C) holding that the workproduct doctrine was inapplicable where there was no indication a memorandum was prepared in anticipation of litigation (D) holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5 (E) holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation
Output: (C)
26 Ariz.App. 265, 270-71, 547 P.2d 1065, 1070-71 (1976), which held that a party is precluded from raising for the first time on appeal the trial court’s failure to make findings when specifically required to do so by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 179 Ariz. at 301, 878 P.2d at 657. Accordingly, I perceive that Trantor’s waiver rule applies with as much vigor to statutes or rules that specifically require findings as it does when the requirement is imposed by case law. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (“Once published, our interpretation [of a statute] becomes part of the statute.”); Local 266, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A.F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 43, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 One further point. Because my colleagues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute (B) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (C) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (D) recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written (E) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous
Output: (D)