niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
plans may effectively limit them to services offered at Grant does not alter this conclusion. If plaintiffs’ practice of pain medicine is, as Dr. Leak avers, truly more cost effective than traditional pain management used by anesthesiologists, then both the hospitals at which plaintiffs have privileges and plaintiffs have a competitive advantage over the defendant anesthesiologists. See Dr. Leak affidavit para. 24 & exhibit D. If pain medicine is more cost-effective than traditional pain management, then in an open and competitive marketplace managed care insurance plans should eventually be more inclined to designate those hospitals at which pain medicine is practiced. See Capital Imaging Assoc., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assoc., Inc., 725 F.Supp. 669, 673 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (<HOLDING>). In these circumstances, the Court concludes 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility (B) holding whistleblower protections available under the washington health care act rcw 4370075 adequately promoted workplace safety ensured compliance with the accepted standard of care and prevented fraudulent billing in the health care industry (C) recognizing that the selective nature of managed care insurance plans is procompetitive and reduces health care costs (D) holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided (E) holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider
Output: (C)
thereby preventing his constitutional injury. Second, he alleges that the department failed to adequately train and supervise the officers who arrested him and that, had it done so, his injury would not have occurred. The court will address these issues seriatim. 1. Failure to Investigate Citizen Complaints A custom of failing to investigate citizen complaints may provide a basis for municipal liability if the “a policy-maker (1) had notice that a constitutional violation was likely to occur, and (2) acted with deliberate indifference to the risk.” Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 Fed-Appx. 909, 912 (3d Cir. 2003); Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3rd Cir.1996); Maiale v. Youse, No. Civ. A. 03-5450, 2004 WL 1925004, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Aug.27, 2004) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff must also prove that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a citys failure to discipline a police officer for an isolated incident involving the alleged use of excessive force to effect an arrest did not give rise to an inference that the city had an official policy authorizing or encouraging police misconduct (B) holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect (C) holding that failure to furnish proper training instruction training manuals and documents to officer who injured plaintiff failure to provide adequate tests for that officer and failure to discipline that officer fell outside ttcas property waiver (D) holding police officer is a public official (E) holding that police departments failure to discipline an officer can create municipal liability particularly when plaintiffs injuries result from conduct similar to that alleged in prior complaints against the officer
Output: (E)
was simply unable “to imagine a more direct and palpable case of cruelty to a wife by a husband.” McMahen v. McMahen, 186 Pa. 485, 40 A. 795, 797 (1898). There are many similar decisions from other states. See, e.g., Holden v, Holden, 63 Idaho 70, 116 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1941) (“If [the husband) knowingly communicated [gonorrhea] to [his wife], that would constitute cruelty.”); Carbajal v. Fernandez, 130 La. 812, 58 So. 581, 581 (1912) (stating that “all the courts agree” that knowing transmission of an STD to a spouse “constitutes cruel treatment”); Holthoefer v. Holthoefer, 11 N.W. 150, 150 (Mich.1882) (stating that knowing transmission of an STD by a spouse constitutes “extreme cruelty” and grounds for divorce); Darling v. Darling, 181 Mo.App. 211, 167 S.W. 1166, 1166 (1914) (<HOLDING>); Cook v. Cook, 32 N.J. Eq. 475 (NJ.Ct.Ch.1880) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce (B) holding that counsel fees awarded to debtors wife in a divorce action were nondisehargeable under  523a5 (C) holding that knowing communication of gonorrhea to a wife was grounds for divorce (D) holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment (E) holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver
Output: (C)
Cir.2001). Parkhill’s notice of appeal indicates only that he appeals from the district court’s August 25, 2000, order granting summary judgment in Parkhill (III). (Notice of Appeal, Appellant’s App. at 2305.) No mention is made of the district court’s order of a year earlier (Park-hill II) denying class certification. Our court previously has held that an appeal from one order does not “inherently imply” an intent to appeal other orders entered in the action. See Berdella v. Delo, 972 F.2d 204, 208 (8th Cir.1992). Our court also has held on numerous occasions that a notice which manifests an appeal from a specific district court order or decision precludes an appellant from challenging an order or decision that he or she failed to identify in the notice. See Moore, 249 F.3d at 788 (<HOLDING>); C & S Acquisitions Corp. v. Northwest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment (B) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (C) holding that appellant could challenge interlocutory partial summary judgment even though notice of appeal stated that appeal was from order sustaining subsequent plea to the jurisdiction (D) holding that notice indicating the appeal was from summary judgment order was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction to reach appellants challenge to earlier order compelling arbitration (E) holding that notice indicating appeal was from judgment on date of jury verdict was insufficient to preserve appeal from earlier order granting summary judgment
Output: (E)
includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC’s involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a “strict” to “substantial compliance” standard for private parties, it did so “to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination.” 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6) is only a “universe of requirements which are potentially relevant,” and should “not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int’l Corp., 177 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary
Output: (B)
of Resident Owners Inc. did not file a notice of appeal with our court. Therefore, this issue is moot because we cannot exercise jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, the decisions of the trial court are AFFIRMED. SHORT and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. 1 . However, we note the current version prohibits "actions to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property” that arise more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvement. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (Supp.2009). 2 . Any res judicata argument in relation to Judge Few's order is not preserved. Hopkins v. Harrell, 352 S.C. 517, 522 n. 1, 574 S.E.2d 747, 750 n. 1 (Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Several copies of the record on appeal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review (B) holding issues not raised to and ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review (C) holding that issues not raised to or ruled upon by the lower court are not preserved for appellate review (D) holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court (E) holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review
Output: (E)
restriction at issue. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed, we AFFIRM the district court. * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . The cases relied on by the Government do not persuade us otherwise. In both United States v. Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d 179 (1st Cir.2013), and United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138 (1st Cir.2012), the issue the defendant later raised on appeal — closing the proceedings to the public — had been squarely presented to defense counsel in the district court, but defense counsel failed to raise an objection. See Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d at 187 (<HOLDING>); Christi, 682 F.3d at 142 (1st Cir.2012) (same 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defense counsel waived objection where he remained silent despite the district courts specific inquiry during a side bar conference whether there were any concerns about closing the courtroom to the public (B) holding that when defense counsel withdrew an objection to admission of evidence the defendant waived his right to a review of the courts ruling on appeal (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that defendant acquiesced to counsels waiver of right to be present at bench conference where trial judge advised everyone in courtroom including defendant about the topic of the bench conference and defendant raised no objection to his absence (E) holding that defendant acquiesced in inchambers conference occurring in his absence when trial court discussed the subject of the conference and its ruling and neither defense counsel nor defendant raised an objection
Output: (A)
ed. 2000)). In the legal malpractice context, injury is the invasion of another’s legal interest, while damages are the monetary value of those injuries. Id. The Huffs were injured by Mr. Roach when he missed the statute of limitations, effectively invading their legal interes 992) (finding statute of limitations did not begin to run until final judgment was entered, although plaintiff was aware of attorney’s failure to present crucial evidence prior to that date); Inc. v. Drakulich, 107 Nev. 367, 369-70, 811 P.2d 1305 (1991) (finding statute of limitations for legal malpractice does not begin to run until the conclusion of the underlying litigation; until then, the element of injury or damage remains speculative and remote); Johnson v. Cornett, 474 N.E.2d 518, 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (<HOLDING>). f 16 Adopting the Huffs’ proposed exception 
 Holding statements: (A) holding attorney negligence did not result in damage until dissolution order in divorce proceeding became final (B) holding that order awarding attorney fees in amount to be determined at later date was not final appealable order (C) holding that a courts custody order was not a final order and not appealable with a rule 304a finding because a petition for dissolution advances a single claim (D) holding that an order pending divorce is not a final judgment that creates a right of appeal (E) holding that section 4523755 provides that a third party may intervene in a case in which custody is at issue only in a dissolution of marriage action or a modification of a dissolution proceeding and reversing the circuit courts order permitting a grandmother to intervene in an adoption proceeding for the purposes of obtaining visitation
Output: (A)
of conviction constitutes proof of conviction for purposes of removal proceedings. Section 1003.41(b) specifies that the certification requirement is satisfied if a copy of a record is “attested in writing by an immigration officer to be a true and correct copy of the original.” The photocopy of a document entitled “Judgment in a Criminal Case” offered at petitioner’s removal hearing was certified by one “Robert Kennedy SA 123,” but the certification did not specify that Kennedy was an “immigration officer.” For that purpose, the INS offered a form 1-213, identifying a Robert Kennedy, SA as an INS officer. There was no effort made to authenticate the 1-213, so it may have been inadmissible had a proper objection been raised. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, Rosas Robles did not object to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that uncut blank green card forms constituted counterfeit instruments (B) holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved (C) holding that immigration forms must be authenticated (D) holding in a battle of the forms inquiry that a term reserving all rights and remedies for one party did not conflict with an arbitration provision (E) recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible
Output: (C)
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) (stating that the risk of corruption in cases involving candidate elections is not present in a popular vote on a public issue). The mere fact that advocacy “may influence the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.” City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 298, 102 S.Ct. 434 (citation omitted). Because “ballot initiatives do not involve the risk of ‘quid pro quo’ corruption present when money is paid to, or for, candidates,” Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 648, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999), this Court does not find the anti-corruption interest to being sufficiently important to justify § 11.30’s chilling effect upon free speech. See also, Swaffer, 610 F.Supp.2d at 970 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the asserted interest in providing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied (B) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (C) holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant (D) holding pennsylvania state ethics act unconstitutional as applied to former judges (E) holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff
Output: (E)
for a damages claim. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29. Nor can Russell change the facts that render her remaining grounds not justiciable. As long as there is no dispute that the release between Metro and American Century is not binding on Russell, and Metro and its representatives have not been awarded and do not seek attorney fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, there is no way in which Russell could re-plead her claims to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing Russell an opportunity to further amend her pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1 . S rters, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex.1963) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 366, 190 
 Holding statements: (A) holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states (B) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by  14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained (C) holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity (D) holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute (E) recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials
Output: (A)
application insures a defendant receives that to which he is reasonably entitled.” State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher, 195 W.Va. 185, 192, 465 S.E.2d 185, 192 (1995). Such agreements require "ordinary contract principles to be supplemented with a concern that the bargaining and execution process does not violate the defendant's right to fundamental faimess[.]” State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449, 458, 513 S.E.2d 676, 685 (1998). 18 . Similarly, federal courts construe ambiguous plea agreements in favor of defendants and against the government. See, e.g., U.S. v. Isom, 580 F.3d 43; 51 (1st Cir.2009) ("Under the basic contract principles which we apply to the construction of plea agreements, we construe such ambiguities against the government.”); U.S. v. Difeaux, 163 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an ambiguous contract will be construed against the party drafting the same (B) holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello (C) recognizing ambiguous terms of plea agreement are construed against government (D) holding that parol evidence can be presented when the terms of the agreement are ambiguous (E) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor
Output: (C)
pages 7-34 to 7-66 and page F- 1 (the Table of Contents). Most of these enhancements are too trivial to be afforded copyright protection. Enhancements such as the coloration of the text (adding red print) are not copyrightable. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a); U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium II: Compendium of Copyright Office Practices § 503.02(a) (1984) (“[M]ere coloration cannot support a copyright even though it may enhance the aesthetic appeal or commercial value of a work.”). While the term “line art” is unclear, “mere variations of typographic ornamentation” are not subject to copyright protection. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a). The table of contents does not have sufficient creativity to be protected either. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674, 683-89 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Spilman also claims copyright protection for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while broadcasts of basketball games are copyrightable the scores of basketball games represent purely factual information which any patron of an nba game could acquire from the arena as such the underlying games are not copyrightable (B) holding that enhancements such shortening the form of titles capitalizing letters providing subsequent case history and other gardenvariety additions are not copyrightable because they miss the creative spark (C) holding that broadcasts of national basketball association games are copyrightable but that the games themselves are not copyrightable as such copyright preemption did not apply (D) holding that evidence of subsequent criminal conduct may be used at sentencing hearing on prior criminal charge and stating that misdeeds occurring up to the time of sentencing whether before the finding of guilty or subsequent are relevant as they go to the defendants history and character  (E) holding that agency demand letters are not suits
Output: (B)
the BIA’s decision as the final failed to take his medical condition into account in denying his request for a continuance. To the contrary, the IJ expressly considered Maldonado-Reyes’s request for an extension based on his medical condition and denied that request because the medical condition did not provide a basis for remaining in the United States. (A.R. 61-62). Maldonado-Reyes further contends that the denial of a continuance amounted to a deprivation of his right to counsel, violating his due process rights. The denial of a continuance is discretionary and therefore cannot form the basis for a due process claim. Abu-Khaliel, 436 F.3d at 635. Regardless, Maldonado-Reyes cannot demonstrate prejudice, as discussed below. See Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Maldonado-Reyes also asserts that the IJ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding petitioner must show prejudice to prevail on due process claim (B) holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim (C) holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim (D) holding that an alien raising a due process challenge to removal proceedings must show error and substantial prejudice (E) holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim
Output: (D)
applies to receivers appointed by state courts, and the Court determines that it does not. Section 959(a) does not permit maintenance of this action against Lighthouse because Lighthouse was appointed by a state court, (emphasis added). Following Republic Bank, other courts have similarly held that section 959(a) applies only to receivers appointed by federal courts, not state courts. See Freeman v. Cty. of Orange, 2014 WL 12668679 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) “has no application to a receiver appointed by a state court,” and therefore, the Bartondoctrine was applicable to the plaintiffs claims); In re Jefferson County, Alabama, 484 B.R. 427, 456-458 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012); Republic Bank of Chi. v. Lighthouse Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 829 F.Supp.2d 766 (D. Minn. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Based bn the above cited cases, we conclude 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 959a only applies to receivers appointed by federal courts not state courts (B) holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law (C) recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts (D) holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts (E) holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts
Output: (A)
probation differ only in that the former follows a prison term and the latter is in lieu of a prison term.”). 10 See United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing similarities between probation and supervised release); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“Revoking or Modifying Probation or Supervised Release.”). 11 For instance, federal law generally directs that filings attacking the validity or length of a conviction or sentence be made in the sentencing court. See, e.g., In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily a petitioner should present [an attack on a conviction] to the sentencing court rather than the court in the district in which he is confined.”). 12 See 18 U.S.C. § 3605; cf. United States v. Adams, 723 F.3d 687, 689 (6th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). 13 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(4), (5). 14 We 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  3583a itself authorizes a term of supervised release in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute of conviction (B) holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release (C) holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses (D) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (E) holding that  3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a defendants supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of jurisdiction
Output: (E)
for a patent holder to continue to mark with an expired but previously applicable patent.” Document No. 31 at 18. In support of this proposition, Pro Patch cites two cases, neither of which holds that marking a product with an expired patent can never constitute a violation of § 292. See Arcadia Mach. & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed.Cir.1986) (upholding district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of patent holder who had marked his products with an expired patent, stating that "[p]aramount is the [district] court's finding and conclusion that Arcadia had totally failed, after at least nine months of discovery, to produce any evidence of intent to deceive the public.”); FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F.Supp.2d 539, 584 (E.D.Pa.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is self evident that once a patent has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that copyright infringement defendant failed to prove the affirmative defense of unclean hands which was based on the patent holders marking of its product with an expired patent because there was no evidence that the patent holder had acted with the requisite intent to deceive (B) holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement (C) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (D) holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent (E) holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent
Output: (A)
absence of any effort to serve Bustos with a summons or a complaint, the Receiver cannot claim substantial compliance with Rule 4. The Receiver’s failure even to attempt to comply with Rule 4 is no “minor defect,” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir.1984), that can be remedied by actual notice. More importantly, the difficulty here runs deeper than mere insufficient service of process. The Receiver never filed a complaint and never named Bustos as a party. In other words, the Receiver never commenced an action against Bustos, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; it simply named Bustos in a motion for the disgorgement of allegedly ill-gotten gains earned through the sale of unregistered securities. See In re Alpha Telcom, 2004 WL 3142555, at *1 (<HOLDING>). Prior to Bustos’s intervention in the action, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons (B) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons (C) holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint (D) holding that a formal summons and complaint were unnecessary because the motion before the court is not an independent action (E) holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service
Output: (D)
begun a proceeding to amend the comprehensive plan, which would have given them a “point of entry” to oppose the project. In Rinker Materials Corp. v. Town of Lake Park, 494 So.2d 1123 (Fla.1986), however, the supreme court held that sewer and roadway improvements within the rights-of-way are not subject to the requirements of part two of chapter 163. See also Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County v. Department of Community Affairs, 560 So.2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). The appellants, therefore, have failed to show that the project violates the requirements of chapter 168, or that the comprehensive plan must be amended before the project can proceed. Accordingly, they have failed to show that they have standing. See City of Sarasota v. Windom, 736 So.2d 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. PLEUS J, and ORFINGER, M., Senior 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave (C) holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen (D) holding that citizen did not have standing where there was no showing of a procedural irregularity (E) holding that appellant was not harmed where defendant never asserted that he was not a us citizen and no evidence in the record suggested he was not a us citizen
Output: (D)
Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.1978); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n. 3 (2d Cir.1977). 7 .The rationale for this rule, as Judge Aldrich stated, is that "to permit copyrighting [in that case] would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms [of expression], could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance ... [and thus] the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.” Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967). 8 . As an example of where dissection was improperly used, see Apple Barrel Productions Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 .For example, the court may find that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consideration supports the agreement as a whole (B) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (C) holding district court erroneously failed to consider copyrighted show as a whole (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole
Output: (C)
the form defendant signed, entitled “Declarations to Paramedical Examiner,” with the exception of (i) the title of the forms; (ii) the signature line differences depending upon whether an agent, paramedical examiner or medial examiner asked and recorded the data and (iii) the questions relating to height and weight, which were not included on the form that defendant signed . (Youngquist Aff. ¶ 3). In the instant matter, the paramedical examiner conducted a physical examination, including measuring defendant’s height and weight, and reported the results of the physical examination on a separate form. (Youngquist Aff. ¶ 6). Thus, every medical question on the form defendant signed, entitled “Declarations to Paramedic oup, Inc., 556 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553, 157 A.D.2d 293, 298 (1st Dep’t 1990) (<HOLDING>); Benefit Trust Life Insur. Co. v. Rowland, 486 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause (B) holding failure of insurer to file under sections of insurance law requiring readable and understandable policies would not by itself void the policy clause but rather carries its own penalties for nonfiling further such clause is void only if the substantive provisions of the clause are inconsistent with other statutes or regulations (C) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (D) holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness (E) holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause
Output: (B)
Circuit’s decision. See Juan Fermin v. United States, 513 U.S. 1170, 115 S.Ct. 1145, 130 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1995). 6 . On May 16, 2011, Fermin sought to amend his § 2255 petition to add a claim alleging that the petit jury’s failure to identify the controlled substance he was found to have been trafficking violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. However, the Court denied Fermin's request to amend his petition because, at the time of the request, nearly a full year had passed since Fermin submitted his initial petition, and because the motion to amend came near the end of a 60-day extension that the Court had already granted to him in order to reply to the Government's opposition. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); Monahan v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court may refuse leave to amend because of undue delay (B) holding leave to amend should be freely granted absent a showing of undue delay bad faith undue prejudice or futility (C) holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months (D) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (E) holding that delay of eleven months did not justify denial of leave to amend
Output: (A)
child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. § 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that “Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that “[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional
Output: (B)
its commission.” O’Grady v. Libertyville, 304 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.2002). The changes in Indiana’s parole procedures did not alter the statutory punishment for the crime (life in prison) or the standards for determining the initial date for parole consideration (after 20 years of serving time) or change the standards for determining a prisoner’s suitability, set out in Ind.Code § 11-13-3-3 and 220 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1-2-3. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000) (upholding Georgia administrative regulation changing frequency of parole hearings for prisoners serving life sentences from every three years to every eight years against ex post facto challenge); Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we have explicitly held that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant who received a suspended sentence of 157 days in jail was convicted of an offense punishable by more than oneyear of incarceration because california law provided for a sentence of up to three years imprisonment (B) holding that a statute imposing a one dollar court cost for law enforcement on every person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because it is reasonable that one convicted of a crime should be made to share in the improvement of agencies that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for which he has been convicted (C) holding that there was no ex post facto violation when california changed frequency of reconsideration for parole from every year to up to every three years for prisoners convicted of more than one homicide (D) holding that the plaintiff could not assert a continuing violation when there was a three year gap in time from one allegation to the next (E) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim
Output: (C)
commercial, including ... [any maritime contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce], falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 202; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2. A seaman’s contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate generally falls under the convention. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>) (citing Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts (C) holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage (D) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (E) holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same
Output: (E)
therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance to submit a written brief regarding the departure issue. We disagree. Beatty received sufficient notice about the departure issue. The presentence investigation report (PSR) included a section entitled “Factors That May Warrant Departure,” which listed the specific factors that could justify an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 and specifically informed Beatty that “upward departure might be warranted.” (See PSR at 16-17.) We conclude that the PSR provided sufficient information to Beatty about the possibility that the district court might depart upward. See United States v. Andrews, 948 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir.1991) (citing Burns v. United States, — U.S.—,—, 111 1017-18 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court, however, did not actually 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing potential upward adjustment beyond that provided by guidelines for aggravating role in the offense (B) holding government did not breach plea agreement where government provided information to probation department that would support higher base offense level and aggravated role but encouraged court not to consider such information and to calculate base offense level consistent with plea agreement (C) holding that a reduction for minor role in an offense cannot be awarded when the larger offense was not taken into account in setting the base level (D) holding that defendants concealment of crime does not warrant adjustment for obstruction of justice because commission provided for concealment in base offense level (E) holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level
Output: (D)
record, if you find a hypothetical case that somebody is mentally ill, would that prevent you from considering the minimum range of punishment in a murder case where the person has no prior convictions and is probation eligible. ADA: Objection, Your Honor. Court: Sustained. The appellant’s voir dire question improperly sought an answer committing the juror to a specific set of facts that obviously applied to the appellant in this case: Could they consider probation if faced with a mentally ill defendant, who had been convicted of murder and had no other pri- or convictions. This question was not an attempt to explain the law to the venire. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the question. See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 739-40 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); White, 629 S.W.2d at 706 (holding whether a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill (B) holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder (C) holding whether a juror could assess life imprisonment in a specific fact scenario constituting capital murder was an improper commitment to facts (D) holding that sentence was erroneous but not void where sentence of life imprisonment without parole was imposed for first degree murder under unconstitutional penalty statute (E) holding that whether amendment to capital felonymurder information to add the charge of premeditated and deliberate murder was improper turned on whether there was prejudice or surprise
Output: (C)
reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 288 (1978). A defendant’s illiteracy or low intelligence is not dispositive of his capacity to waive Miranda rights and render a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 346, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86-87 (2000) (concluding that the defendant, who had a learning disability and an IQ in the eighties, validly waived his rights in light of his “considerable prior experience with the police and in receiving Miranda warnings,” as well as his “cunning” attempts to exculpate himself “after being confronted with the [ ] evidence against him”); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 380-81 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 274, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney (B) recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury (C) holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner (D) holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights (E) holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights
Output: (E)