niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
to them predicate acts that the jury verdicts did not. Similarly, Barragan argues that the court erred in attributing to him predicate acts of which he was acquitted or which were not formally charged in the indictment. These arguments fail. District courts are generally “free to make factual determinations not made by the jury and may base their ultimate decisions regarding the length of a convicted criminal’s sentence on these determinations.” United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir. 2006). Like our sister circuits, we have held that district courts may consider criminal conduct that the jury did not find—indeed, even conduct for which the jury acquitted—in setting the offense level for RICO sentences. See United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Carrozza, 4 F.3d at 77 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentencing courts may consider evidence of conduct or charges of which a defendant was acquitted (B) holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct (C) holding that the district court could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct in rico sentencing (D) holding that district court may treat acquitted conduct as relevant conduct at sentencing (E) holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant
Output: (C)
The end result was that Carol and I felt forced into selling our inventory and licenses for $17,500.00. At that time we did not have anywhere to store or take our inventory to. We believed there was no other choice. At no time did either Carol or I agree to the termination of rights and obligations under the Business Lease dated October 1,1995. [¶ 15] As in Lamb, the facts relied on by the district court to determine the Pierces had fully performed their obligations and accepted the benefits under the unsigned written termination agreement and thereby voluntarily surrendered the lease are equally consistent with the Pierces mitigating their damages for the Elks’ alleged breach of the lease agreement. Compare Felco v. Doug’s N. Hill Bottle Shop, 1998 ND 111, ¶ 16, 579 N.W.2d 576 (<HOLDING>). The Pierces’ vacation of the premises, sale 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds (B) holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it (C) holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds (D) holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract (E) holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract
Output: (D)
right of a party....”). 68 . United. States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.2008). 69 . Id. 70 . United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1993)). 71 . Skelton, 514 F.3d at 442 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)). 72 . Id. at 439 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674(1986)). 73 . Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431. 74 . United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1389 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir.1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 75 . United States v. Farias-Farias, 925 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir.1991). 76 . See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (<HOLDING>). 77 .Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (the factors 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction (B) holding that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach a witness for bias like other confrontation clause errors is subject to chapman harmlesserror analysis (C) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that the improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach for bias is subject to harmlesserror review in which the reviewing court must determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Output: (D)
could remain “available at all times to attend to the needs of the parish”). Where the proximity of the residence to the house of worship was not essential, but rather merely beneficial, to the advancement of religious purposes, the residence was held taxable. See German Apost. Christ. Church, 279 Or at 644-45 (parson not required to have “continuous presence near the house of worship” to fulfill his duties); Found, of Human Understanding, 301 Or at 263 (caretaker not required to live next to church to prevent vandalism and take phone calls). In the present matter, the county concedes that the office located within the residence is exempt under ORS 307.140 because it was reasonably necessary and primarily used to advance church purposes. See German Apost. Christ. Church, 279 Or at 644 (<HOLDING>); Washington County, 11 OTR at 252 (same). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding office exempt where the rest of the residence was not (D) holding residence means legal residence for will probate (E) holding that a realestate appraisal was not a guarantee of the condition of the residence but a valuation of the residence and thus not a misrepresentation
Output: (C)
the delay outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. A district court is “required to set out its reasons for granting an ‘ends of justice’ continuance” to provide a record for appellate review, otherwise “the time is not excludible.” United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir.1982). Additionally, once a district court grants a continuance we have “strongly urged” district courts “not to wait and rely on counsel to inform them when defendants are ready to go to trial.” United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 883 (3d Cir.1992). Here, the district court ruled that this was a complex case because of the number of defendants, and the fact that the indictment contained fifty separate charges. See United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 444 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although Gutierrez attempts to refute that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time (B) holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act (C) holding that where the case is technically not closed and the ends of justice may best be served by the admission of crucial evidence it is an abuse of the trial courts discretion to deny the introduction of such evidence (D) holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex (E) holding that an ends of justice continuance is proper when a case is complex and involves multiple codefendants and multiple overt acts occurring in multiple states and in which the complexity outweighs the interests of individual defendants
Output: (D)
consent to remove board, reduce size of board, and elect new directors); Kalageorgi v. Victor Kamkin, Inc., 750 A.2d 531, 536 (Del.Ch.1999) (describing effort by written consent to remove directors and then reduce size of board); AGR Halifax Fund, Inc. v. Fiscina, 743 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Del.Ch.1999) (describing effort by writte , 630 (Del.Ch.1970) ("I am of the opinion that plaintiff, having no vested right in her office, has been properly removed as a director. ..."). 4 . For more recent Delaware decisions articulating this principle, see Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 252 n. 70 (Del.Ch.2005) ("Delaware law does not permit directors to remove other directors.”), aff'd, 884 A.2d 512 (Del.2005); Solstice Capital II, Ltd. Partnership v. Ritz, 2004 WL 765939, at *1 (Del.Ch. Apr. 6, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Stroud, 585 A.2d at 1309 ("Generally, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing (B) holding that the attempt to remove  a director by written consent of the board is invalid (C) holding that a search exceeded the scope of the initial oral consent and was not validated by a subsequent written consent an allegedly consensual seizure must stand or fall on the basis of the consent preexisting the seizure (D) holding that allegation that company paid a director 50000 in consulting fees was not enough to demonstrate that the director lacked independence as plaintiffs had failed to allege that 50000 was material to the director (E) holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile
Output: (B)
acted in conscious disregard of that risk. See Marshall v. Sam Dell’s Dodge Corp., 451 F.Supp. 294, 301 (N.D.N.Y.1978) (“The defendants’ practice of knowingly maintaining inaccurate time records which greatly understated the number of hours worked by their sales personnel permits only one conclusion; i.e. the violations of the Act were willful.”). We conclude, however, that any error in the court’s ruling was harmless. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that “[n]o error in the admission or exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling ... is ground for ... disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; see also Gandy v. Sullivan County, 24 F.3d 861, 866 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). “Plainly Rule 61 teaches that the proceedings 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exclusion was harmless error (B) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error (C) holding that judges comments to jury during equal pay act trial were harmless error (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal
Output: (C)
was not unlawful). We will assume without deciding, therefore, that Guevara’s detention was an arrest. Guevara argues that the discovery of a hidden compartment containing cardboard and plastic was insufficient to give the troopers probable cause to arrest. Gue vara maintains that because the troopers did not know with any degree of certainty that there were drugs hidden in the compartment, they .lacked probable cause to arrest her. We disagree. Whether officers make a formal arrest or a detention ripens into an arrest, “[a] warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause.” Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.2013) (quoting Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522-23 (8th Cir.2011)); see also Martinez, 462 F.3d at 907, 910 (<HOLDING>). “Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment (B) holding that the language if the merits were reached the result would be the same is a contrarytofact holding not an alternative holding emphasis in original (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting alternative perpetrator evidence where the record demonstrated the supposed alternative perpetrator was near the victim no more than ten minutes before the crime (D) holding that we may affirm on an alternative basis supported by the record (E) holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause
Output: (E)
to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Id. Having reviewed the record, we find that the testimony of six-year-old C.S. was not so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. While there are inconsistencies between some of C.S.’s statements, the inconsistencies “are appropriate to the circumstances presented, the age of the witness, and the passage of time between the incident and the time of her statements and testimony.” Id. at 1209. Based upon the facts detailed above, we conclude that the State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could have found Surber guilty of child molesting as a class A felony. See, e.g., id. (<HOLDING>). V. The final issue is whether Sur-ber’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that violence is synonymous with force in affirming armed robbery conviction (B) holding that the incredible dubiosity rule was inapplicable and affirming the defendants conviction for child molesting (C) holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child (D) holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter (E) holding that heck was inapplicable where court vacated defendants conviction and government filed nolle prosequi indicating that it would not prosecute defendants case further
Output: (B)
(1994). Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, in turn, implements this guarantee, by making it an unfair labor practice for a union to “restrain or coerce” employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A). However, § 8(b)(1)(A) also contains an important proviso, i.e., that nothing in the section shall be construed to “impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” Id. These provisions are generally understood to protect the right of employees to participate in or refrain from organized union activities, while preserving the authority of unions to govern, their internal affairs without running afoul of the Act. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 3 721 F.2.d 1402, 1406 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The coercive effect of such discrimination 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that union could contractually undertake in collective bargaining agreement other duties towards member employees in addition to statutorilyimposed duty of fair representation (B) holding that union members had standing to bring rico claims for reduced compensation under collective bargaining agreement (C) holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union (D) holding that a union may breach its duty of fair representation by rejecting an employees interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement if the unions interpretation is itself arbitrary or unreasonable (E) holding that union policy of furnishing only its members with legal counsel in connection with grievances under collective bargaining agreement violated unions duty of fair representation under federal service labormanagement relations statute
Output: (E)
Thus, CERC-LA specifically provides for a private right of action to institute civil actions to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their creation. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S.Ct. 2014, 114 L.Ed.2d 101 (1991). Moreover, an entity that is responsible for the remediation of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA may assert a claim for contribution against other responsible parties under § 9613(f). New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir.1997). See also SC Holdings, Inc. v. AAA Realty Co., 935 F.Supp. 1354, 1362 (D.N.J.1996)(<HOLDING>). In its reply papers, the Novak Group does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site (B) recognizing a right to contribution (C) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla (D) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (E) holding that site control alone is an improper basis for imposition on lessees of owner liability under cercla
Output: (D)
or instructions.” Rule 27.4, Ala. R.Crim. P. The circuit court filed its “Amendment to Probation Order” before the five-year maximum probationary period had expired. However, the amendment did not include an order to show cause or allege that the appellant had violated any conditions, regulations, or instructions of her probation. Rather, it simply indicated that the circuit court had spoken to the appellant’s probation officer. Because it was not an overt or affirmative action that officially began the revocation proceedings, the circuit court’s “Amendment to Probation Order” was not sufficient to initiate revocation proceedings and toll the running of the appellant’s probationary period. See Rule 27.4(a), Ala. R.Crim. P.; Watkins v. State, 455 So.2d 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the appellant’s probation officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rules of preservation apply in probation revocation proceedings (B) recognizing right of allocution in probation revocation proceedings (C) holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings (D) holding that a notation in the probation officers file that watkins was delinquent was not sufficient to initiate revocation proceedings and to toll the running of watkins probationary period (E) holding that the failure to satisfactorily meet the conditions of probation is not the legal equivalent of absconding and does not toll the probationary period
Output: (D)
97, 292 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1956). The enabling legislation empowering the district court merely repeats the language of Article V, Section 8. Tex.Gov’t Code ANN. § 24.020 (Vernon 2004) (“The district court has appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the commissioners court, with the exceptions and regulations prescribed by law.”); Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479. However, the scope of the district court’s jurisdiction has been defined by case law. Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479. A party can invoke the district court’s constitutional supervisory control over a commissioners court judgment only when the commissioners court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discre ct No. 18 of Limestone County, 172 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1948, writ refd) (<HOLDING>); Harris County v. Bassett, 139 S.W.2d 180, 182 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement (B) recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts (C) holding that the supervisory control of the district court may be exercised through its equitable jurisdiction (D) holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial (E) holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district courts supervisory control over the commissioners court
Output: (C)
do not apply in ... [piroceedings relating to probation." - Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(@2). A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Cox v. State 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E2d 144, 149 (Ind.1992)). Rather, a revocation hearing is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are more flexible than those of a criminal proceeding. Id. In revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, including expert testimony and scientific evidence. Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999) (noting that it is beyond doubt that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence); see also Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>); of - Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559 
 Holding statements: (A) holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings (B) holding that certified charging informations and police reports are deemed admissible in revocation hearings (C) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (D) holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings (E) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution
Output: (A)
it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). B. Whether the FDIC Properly Determined the Amount of Deposit Insurance to Which Plaintiffs Were Entitled under the Regulations Applicable on August 8, 2008 18. The FDIC’s deposit insurance determinations are governed the regulations set forth in 12 C.F.R. Part 330. Regulations governing recognition of deposit ownership and fiduciary relationships note that, except in circumstances not relevant here, when “determining the amount of insurance available to each depositor, the FDIC shall presume that deposited funds are actually owned in the manner indicated on the deposit account records of the insured depository institution.” 12 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(1). See also Villafane-Neriz v. F.D.I.C., 75 F.3d 727, 731 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). “Deposit account records” include “account 
 Holding statements: (A) holding affidavit statements by custodian of records based upon review of companys business records contained sufficient evidence of ownership of account (B) holding that the fdic is entitled to rely exclusively on the account records of the failed institution and that while ownership under state law is one prerequisite for insurance coverage the deposit account records are controlling (C) holding that when state law prohibited discovery of records of a medical review committee the district court should have determined whether the records came within the statutes coverage and if so whether the right of access nevertheless outweighed the public policy expressed by state law (D) holding that seventeen missing records does not constitute improper record keeping because the fact that the records are not at the station does not mean that the records are incorrect or inaccurate (E) holding that records relating to a student court were not education records
Output: (B)
prosecutor made the following statement, which Begay insists is a justification for a new trial: He knew exactly what he was doing. He intended to kill the occupants of the vehicle. That’s premeditation. He intended it. He was conscious of it. That’s first degree murder. The prosecutor did make a mistake in saying “that’s premeditation” right after she said “he intended to kill the occupants of the vehicle.” Intent is not the same thing as premeditation. But we consider the misstatement in context. The court properly instructed the jury on the correct definition, and an instruction carries more weight than an argument. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384-85, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); see also Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Plus, the prosecutor correctly stated the law 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions (B) holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions (C) holding that jurors were presumed to follow instructions similar to those in the instant case (D) recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions (E) holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial courts instructions
Output: (B)
substantial connections with this country.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270-71, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (emphasis added). See also American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, 18 F.Supp.2d at 59-60 (noting line of cases that grant constitutional protections applies to permanent residents or those with “substantial connections” to United States). Petitioner, who undisputedly crossed approximately nine miles over the border and was apprehended within 30 minutes of crossing, does not have any substantial ties to this country to place the nature of her rights near those of a permanent resident. Thus, for purposes of the constitutional right to due process, Petitioner’s status is assimilated to that of an arriving alien. Cf. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214, 73 S.Ct. 625 (<HOLDING>); Sierra v. Immigration & Naturalization 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable (B) holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states (C) holding that departure based on deportable alien status was prohibited (D) holding that respondent an alien whose prior residency was interrupted by 19month absence was assimilated to entrant alien status for constitutional purposes (E) holding that notice to an alien at the most recent address provided by the alien is legally sufficient
Output: (D)
is arbitrary and capricious. 2. Does Civil Rule 90.3 violate due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption? Jerald argues that blind application of the Civil Rule 90.3 formula denies noncustodial parents the right to a fair hearing. He believes that this is illustrated in this case by the superior court’s denying him the opportunity to question Darla concerning her expenses. As the state points out, however, Civil Rule 90.3(c)(1) specifically allows for exceptions to the formula. Other courts have found that child support guidelines do not offend due process so long as they provide for discretion in their application. Schenek v. Schenek, 161 Ariz. 580, 780 P.2d 413 (App.1989); see also In re Guidelines for Child Support Enforcement, 301 Ark. 627, 784 S.W.2d 589, 590-91 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Dalton v. Clanton, 559 A.2d 1197, 1212 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any sentence that is properly calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (B) holding that child support formula creates a rebuttable presumption and an inequitable result rebuts the presumption (C) holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption (D) recognizing a rebuttable presumption of reliance in rule 10b5 (E) holding however that a first party insured is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of harm
Output: (C)
remuneration — whether monetary or otherwise — from defendant for their children’s Social Security information. Generally, as part of those transactions, defendant paid $100 per child in exchange for that information and the mothers’ agreement to allow other individuals to claim their children as dependents for purposes of the 1996 federal tax year. Also in 1997, defendant informed Irabahima Bane, Alioune Camara, Baba Deme, Seydina Ba, Amandou Anne, and Mammadou Seek, African immigrants living in defendant’s neighborhood, that they could receive tax refunds by listing children as “foster children” on their federal income tax returns. Defendant also informed Jade Woodall, an American-born citizen, of this tax advantage. At a rate of approximately $200 per child, defendan (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Odom, 199 F.3d 321, 323 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination concerning the amount of loss for which the defendant is to be held accountable as relevant conduct under   1b13a1 (B) holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings (C) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination of a defendants role in an offense for purposes of applying ussg  3b11a (D) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination of the conduct in which defendant engaged but that we review de novo the district courts determination of whether that conduct constitutes relevant conduct for purposes of ussg  1b13a2 (E) holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination as to whether prior cases were consolidated for sentencing under ussg  4a12a2 and that we give the court due deference in its application of the guidelines to that determination
Output: (A)
of litigation. Both Curry and Moscow deny giving or authorizing disclosure of the diary to Mr. Alexander, and Denis Daly, general counsel to Dayco, avers that only senior employees and officers of Dayco, and Dayco’s counsel and accountants have been permitted access to the diary. Exhibit attached to doc. # 79; doc. # 88. Plaintiffs have not offered any challenge to these statements, by way of affidavits or otherwise. Under these facts, and based on the Court’s in camera review of the document in question, it seems clear that the Curry diary should be considered to fall under both the attorney-corporate client privilege, and work-product immunity (for the latter, at least since December of 1981). See Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. LeMay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413-14 (S.D.Ohio1981) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed mem., 708 F.2d 721 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances (B) holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances (C) holding so under circumstances similar to the present ones (D) recognizing privilege (E) holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred
Output: (A)
1999-NMSC-016, ¶ 25, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A reviewing court’s determination of what process is due in an administrative proceeding results from a balancing of (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. ¶ 26 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S nced against ABCWUA’s and NMIEC’s private interest in just and reasonable utility rates. See § 62-3-1 (B) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we turn to the second prong of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a private invasion whether accidental or deliberate reasonable or unreasonable does not violate the fourth amendment because of its private character (B) recognizing the public interest exception (C) recognizing the private interest in reasonable and proper service at fair just and reasonable rates (D) recognizing that the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private (E) recognizing private right of action
Output: (C)
motion to suppress de novo. See id. {8} The State argues that when the district court erroneously found that, because Investigator Hubbard lacked reasonable suspicion about anything pertaining to the car he had no right to run a license plate check, it equated the license plate check “with an officer stopping a car without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.” The State asserts that this was inappropriate in that the license plate check “was neither a search nor a seizure because Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the license plate number.” We agree with the State. Although New Mexico has not explicitly addressed this issue, our case law has relied on this assumption in related eases. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 386, 890 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1995) (<HOLDING>). {9} In a similar ease involving a license 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (C) holding under smith that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata (D) holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records (E) holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business
Output: (D)
states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) (“[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew’s evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding.”). But see Klein v. Comm’r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) (“A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”); Calcutt v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action
Output: (B)
initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) (“An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden’s admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion
Output: (E)
only indigent inmates with three previous frivolous dismissals from filing new civil actions. Those inmates who also have filed three or more frivolous actions in the past, but have enough money to pay filing fees, can file as many new lawsuits as they can afford. Under § 1915(b), even indigent inmates have to pay the full fee eventually anyway, which serves as a financial incentive for inmates to file only actions they believe are meritorious. Stopping all further lawsuits under § 1915(g), frivolous or not, by indigent inmates with three dismissals unless imminent serious physical injury is involved would bar many other important and arguably meritorious constitutional claims by only those inmates. Cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966) (<HOLDING>). For all of these reasons, the court concludes 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (B) holding that state statute which re quired reimbursement of cost of criminal appeal transcript only by incarcerated persons violated the equal protection clause the statute would burden many appeals that were not frivolous and allow many that were so it did not serve the purpose of deterring frivolous appeals (C) holding that once the court of appeals recognized that the claims of the absent parties were not frivolous as part of the rule 19b inquiry it was error for the court of appeals to address them on their merits when the required entities had been granted sovereign immunity and explaining that the courts consideration of the merits was itself an infringement on foreign sovereign immunity (D) holding rule 38 applies to frivolous criminal appeals as well as civil appeals (E) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles
Output: (B)
issue, we need not consider the second argument raised. 7 . In a dissent to Smith, Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Pellegrini and Kelley, objected to following the Miller/Lewis/Selan line of cases which automatically equated the refusal to sign a hospital consent form with a refusal to submit to chemical testing. The dissenting judges expressed preference for the other line of caselaw, particularly Conrad, and noted that because Smith orally agreed to the blood test and only refused to sign the hospital consent form, which was a pre-test procedure linked to the test, although not required by section 1547, Smith did not make a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. 8 . Wheatley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 Although Renwick does not expressly 
 Holding statements: (A) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation (D) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (E) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form
Output: (D)
Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups, including groups which use meeting rooms for sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional exercises. Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2523. 14 . Capitol Square involved a "full-fledged public forum” rather than a limited forum case. However, as the Court pointed out in Capitol Square by its reference to Lamb’s Chapel, the same principle applies in nonpublic forum cases. 15 . See, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc) (reversing to permit Chabad-Lubavitch to erect a menorah in Rotunda, a public forum); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). But see Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no violation of federal establishment clause (B) holding that display of solitary semipermanent menorah in city hall park closely associated with seat of city government violates the establishment clause (C) holding there was no establishment clause violation in displaying a privately funded menorah during chanukah in the public plaza on which city hall and county building are located (D) holding that display of unattended menorah in city hall park quite close to seat of government violated establishment clause because its combination alongside a secular holiday display did not cause a viewer to see the exhibit as a whole or as a unitary symbol (E) holding that a city owned creche and christmas tree erected in a public park adjacent to another park with a christmas tree lights and a privately owned menorah did not offend the establishment clause
Output: (C)
achieved dismissal of 59% of the Plaintiffs’ causes of action, the Court finds that McKool Smith is only entitled to that same percentage of the fees requested in the Fee Statements. See Roussell v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., No. H-05-3733, 2010 WL 1881898, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Jan.13, 2010) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933) (noting that the most important of the Johnson factors to be considered in adjustments to the lodestar fee is “overall degree of success achieved”); Arnold, 2000 WL 354395, at *7-8 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991, 114 S.Ct. 548, 126 L.Ed.2d 450 (1993)) (considering the results obtained in making a downward adjustment to the lodestar fee); Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court reduces the lodestar 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that deficiencies in a fee application justified a fortyfive percent reduction in the allowable fees (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint (C) holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation (D) holding that even after a ten percent reduction to the lodestar fee the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the result obtained relative to the attorneys fees requested (E) holding that under  1988 consideration of the results obtained relative to the relief requested is required
Output: (D)
Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert’s testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
Output: (B)
and directed the lessor to acquire the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods from that person; (B) that the lessee is entitled under this division to the promises and warranties, including those of any third party, provided to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods; and (C) that the lessee may communicate with the person supplying the goods to the lessor and receive an accurate and complete statement of those promises and warranties, including any disclaimers and limitations of them or of remedies. 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2A103(a). See also De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. v. M.B. Management Co., Inc., 888 A.2d 895 (Pa.Super.2005) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 The Comment to Section 2A103 elaborates 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the question of whether a bankruptcy trustee or a putative lessor was entitled to the proceeds of an equipment sale depended on whether a true lease was involved when the lease is intended as a security interest article 9 applies however a bona fide lease is not affected by article 9 (B) recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election (C) holding lease agreement that explicitly stated it was finance lease as defined in article 2a of ucc was finance lease even though lessee did not direct lessor to acquire goods or right to possession and use of goods from supplier (D) holding lessee of copy machine breached finance lease which obligated lessee to make payments to lessor regardless of whether copy machine satisfied lessees use requirements where lessee accepted delivery of copy machine and made two payments under lease prior to willful default (E) holding evidence that suppliers employees were trained to complete the finance lease documents and were authorized by the finance lessor to negotiate a finance lease was sufficient to defeat a motion for directed verdict
Output: (C)