niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
listing testimony topics, Aristocrat's subpoenas seek documentary evidence. The Bondholders correctly argue that Aristocrat may not seek document production after the discovery cut-off. See McKay v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., No. 05 Civ. 8936, 2007 WL 3275918, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2007) ("parties may not issue subpoenas ‘as a means to engage in discovery after the discovery deadline has passed.' ") (citing Dodson v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 9270, 2005 WL 3177723 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.29, 2005)). Aristocrat's argument that these new documents would be used as trial exhibits is of no moment since Aristocrat's document requests are broad and, in many instances, call for "all documents” relating to several issues (Int. Defs.’ Mem. Ex. E.) See Dodson, 2005 WL 3177723, at *3 (<HOLDING>). 3 . The Bondholders move in limine to limit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where original documents were illegally seized those documents as well as all copies had to be returned (B) recognizing that rule 45 can be used to subpoena documents to be introduced at trial as trial exhibits but rejecting plaintiffs argument that documents sought after the discovery cutoff were for use as trial exhibits where the scope of the request is broad and clearly is designed for discovery not lastminute trial needs such as for originals of documents where copies were produced in discovery and there is a need for the original at trial (C) holding if a deposition is taken for discovery only  not for use at trial the deposition is not a stage of trial for which the defendant must be present (D) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable
Output: (B)
with the State, and the legislature determined that the plate will bear the message “Choose Life.” The State thus exercises complete editorial control over the content of the speech on the Choose Life plate. As a result, the second factor also weighs in favor of finding government speech. Finally, I consider the third and fourth factors of the SCV test: the “identity of the literal speaker” and “whether the gov- eminent or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility” for the speech. SCV, 288 F.3d at 621. As to the third factor, I note, as our court did in SCV, that the Supreme Court has held that even messages on standard license plates are associated at least partly with the vehicle owners. Id. at 621; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (<HOLDING>). This association is much stronger when the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge floridas choose life license plate under either the establishment clause or the free speech clause of the first amendment (B) holding that a new hampshire statute requiring vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto live free or die not obscured could not be constitutionally enforced because it violated the defendants first amendment right to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster in the way new hampshire commands an idea they find morally objectionable (C) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (D) holding that vehicle owner had first amendment right to cover the live free or die motto on new hampshire plate (E) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment
Output: (D)
will “potentially eliminat[e] a substantial expenditure of time, resources, and money of the parties, their counsel, and the Court that may later be determined to have been unnecessary.” Pis.’ Br. filed Nov. 19, 2007, at 9. Because the opinion and order meets all of the requirements for certification, the court, in its discretion, grants plaintiffs’ motion to certify an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, as follows: 1. The paragraph of the ordering language on page 25 in the court’s November 9, 2007 opinion and order is amended, as follows: Defendant’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment is granted, and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied. Because controlling questions of law are involved with respect to which there are substantial grounds for di 5) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that gross income can include interest or dividends accruing to fathers ira (B) holding that an overstatement of basis can constitute an omission from gross income within the meaning of irc  6501e1a (C) holding that trial judge has discretion to not include bonuses as part of gross income if he or she determines that the bonus income is not dependable or would place a hardship on a parent (D) holding gross receipts provision provides exception for trade or business to general meaning of gross income provided in section 61a so reporting of gross proceeds alone from sales of commodities would not prevent application of irc  6501e1a (E) holding gross receipts provision to supply exception to general definition of gross income in case of trade or business and applying irc  6501e1a to omission of income
Output: (E)
Second, if the State can err as asserted by appellant, we do not find that the “error” was preserved for review by an objection or otherwise. See Tex.RApp. P. 33.1. After the “order” was granted, appellant did not object to the State’s failure to act, request enforcement of the “order” by the trial court, or obtain an adverse ruling. No motion for continuance was filed. Appellant permitted the trial to conclude without requesting any further relief. Moreover, there is no showing that if the State had produced the requested items for an in camera inspection by the trial court, appellant would have been given access to items or be legally entitled to the same. In the Interest of Justice Nevertheless, appellant has cited Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>) and Thomas v. State, 837 S.W.2d 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant (B) holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense (C) holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence (D) holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant (E) holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment
Output: (B)
Practice and Procedure § 1261 (1969)). Accordingly, matters admitted in a defendant’s answer require “neither proof nor finding[.]” Fontes v. Porter, 156 F.2d 956, 957 (9th Cir.1946). Moreover, under rule 8(d), the effect of a failure to deny facts alleged in the complaint is to admit them. See Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1293 (10th Cir.1980)(observing that failure to deny even jurisdictional facts in answer is to admit them); Meschino v. N. Am. Drager, Inc., 841 F.2d 429, 435-36 (1st Cir.1988)(finding that corporation’s admission in its answer that it sold machine to hospital precluded plaintiff from having to prove that corporation sold machine); Hall v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 617 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir.1980)(<HOLDING>); In re BWL, Inc., 123 B.R. 675, 682 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage (B) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (C) holding that a california commonlaw requirement that insurers show prejudice before they may deny coverage because of late notice regulated insurance and was saved from preemption the insurance company that issued a group disability policy as an insured employee benefit plan could not rely on the notice provisions to deny coverage unless there was prejudice (D) holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed (E) holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination
Output: (D)
breaches of their duties to maintain safe prison conditions and provide medical care. The MVCC defendants and the federal defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to grant these motions. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Varma failed to state a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (“FTCA”), because he was not confined in a facility operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that Varma did not state a claim under Bivens because a Bivens cause of action does not lie against a private prison or its employees, and because v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252-55 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 295-97 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insufficiency of evidence not cognizable in postconviction claim (B) holding claim is not cognizable (C) holding that asserting a mere protected interest in a process itself is not a cognizable claim (D) holding that a claim seeking dna testing is cognizable under section 1983 (E) holding that a burrage claim is cognizable under  2255
Output: (B)
citizenship claim.”). It found “extreme circumstances,” id. at 1139, because “[a]n assertion of U.S. ‘citizenship is ... a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact’ in a deportation proceeding.” Id. at 1136 (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922)). It also relied on the principle that American citizenship must be intentionally relinquished. Id. at 1137 (citing Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260-61, 100 S.Ct. 540, 62 L.Ed.2d 461 (1980)). “Because he has a colorable citizenship claim, Rivera has a constitutional right to judicial review, and may obtain such review via habeas corpus even after accepting deportation and waiving his right to appeal the IJ’s decision.” Id.; see also Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Under Rivera, “the Constitution is violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding agency claim requirements under the federal torts claim act must be exhausted before district court has jurisdiction (B) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia (C) holding on direct review from the bia that bjecause minasyans claim to citizenship is not patently frivolous we have jurisdiction to review it irrespective of whether he has exhausted his claim before the agency (D) holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider a claim not raised before the bia even when the bia sua sponte considers the claim (E) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte
Output: (C)
months). Subtracting the hypothetical chapter 13 expenses of $2,910 from the projected disposable income results in projected income available for distribution of $23,946. Comparing this amount with the debtor’s present unsecured debt of $24,827, the debtor could repay approximately 96% of his debt within 36 months. 4 . It has been held, however, that the funds already in the qualified retirement account are not "disposable income” within the meaning of § 1325(b). See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir.1995); In re Stones, 157 B.R. 669 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1993). 5 . The cases upon which they rely, however, do not adopt a per se rule, but rather appear to address the necessity of the claimed expenses on a case per case basis. See, e.g., In re Festner, 54 B.R. 532, 533 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Fountain, 142 B.R. 135, 136-37 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that debtors additional retirement fund was not reasonably necessary (B) holding that former husbands highway patrol retirement fund could be taken into account in dispersing marital property even though the fund was a substitute for social security (C) holding liability could not be transferred to the fund where the certificate of insurance was not signed (D) holding that a debtors inherited ira could not be exempt under a wisconsin statute because the source of the fund was immediately payable regardless of debtors age or retirement status (E) holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement
Output: (A)
visiting a sister whose general area of residence he did not even know). Bernal exhibited an inappropriate level of concern regarding the reason for the stop and remained nervous even after he was allowed to inspect the defective headlight. These factors, when taken together, demonstrate that the officers’ detention of Bernal for only two minutes after writing the citation and warning was supported by reasonable suspicion. This court has found reasonable suspicion under similar circumstances. See Pack, 612 F.3d at 361 (finding reasonable suspicion where the of ficer testified as to the defendant’s nervousness, the driver’s and passenger’s conflicting stories, and the fact that the pair was traveling on a known drug corridor); United States v. Fishel, 467 F.3d 855, 856 (5th Cir.2006). (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding nervousness is of limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists (B) holding that reasonable suspicion existed based on defendants nervousness expired drivers license and suspicious story regarding travel plans (C) holding that officers may question motorists about their license registration and travel plans (D) holding that extreme nervousness potentially inconsistent stories and other suspicious answers did not amount to a reasonable or articulable suspicion (E) holding defendants nervousness in part presented officer with reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity
Output: (B)
"fraud” to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied by law. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.08[5], at 523-58 (footnotes omitted). [17] 17. Some courts require the creditor to have reasonably relied on the representations, but the Fifth Circuit does not. See In re Allison, 960 F.2d at 484-85 & n. 3 (citing cases). 18 . Other circuits have applied a uniform standard resembling our "actual fraud” standard to all debts falling under § 523(a)(2)(A). See, e.g., Britton v. Price (In re Britton), 950 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir.1991) ("The Ninth Circuit has employed a five-part test for determining when a debt in nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A).”); Caspers v. Van Home (In re Van Home), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir.1987) ("To succeed in a F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Lacy, 947 F.2d at 1277 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statecourt breach of fiduciary duty judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding (B) recognizing that even though standards of proof and findings in care and protection proceeding are identical to those in subsequent consent to adoption proceeding collateral estoppel inapplicable because incentive to litigate custody or appeal findings from earlier proceeding which are limited and do not carry same degree of finality may be substantially less than incentive to litigate or appeal findings in adoption proceeding which permanently terminates legal parentchild relationship (C) holding that resolution of issue underlying statecourt fraud judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in nondischargeability proceeding (D) holding that statecourt consent judgment containing findings of fraud precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding (E) holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant
Output: (D)
4 . The parties do not contest the question of whether Plaintiffs’ contract in this action satisfies the nexus to interstate commerce requirement of the FAA. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 6, n. 2; Defs.’ Consolidated Mot. at 2-3.) Accordingly, the court finds that for the purposes of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff's contract satisfies this jurisdictional prerequisite of the FAA. See generally, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995); Staples v. Money Tree, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 856 (M.D.Ala.1996). 5 . Plaintiff contends that: (1) "Green Tree is a creditor within the g that claims arising under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Actof 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(2), maybe subject to arbitration); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42 (<HOLDING>); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims arising under the racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations act 18 usca  19611968 may be subject to arbitration (B) holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration (C) holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration (D) holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration (E) holding civil rico and robinsonpatman act claims subject to arbitration based on an arbitration provision in salesconfirmation forms
Output: (A)
(second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured”). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity” for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans,” whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within” the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means “a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance”); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc  853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
Output: (A)
at the time of the loss, but ours appears to be the majority approach. See, e.g., Century Indem. Co. v. Carlson, 133 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir.1998) (agreeing with “the determination that the grain in question in this case at the time of the accident traveled in interstate commerce” (emphasis added)); Canal Ins. Co. v. J. Perchak Trucking, Inc., 3:CV-07-2272, 2009 WL 959596, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 6, 2009) (denying summary judgment because “[consideration of the important issues presented in this case should be made only in the context of a concrete determination as to whether the insured’s vehicle was involved in interstate or intrastate commerce at the time of the accident ” (emphasis added)); Canal Ins. Co. v. Paul Cox Trucking, 1:05-CV-2194, 2006 WL 2828755, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 2, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Kolencik v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce (B) holding that the district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration  because the faa is inapplicable to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce (C) holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added (D) holding that the interstate commerce nexus was too attenuated where extortion was directed at a victim who worked for an entity engaged in interstate commerce but was aimed at him in his personal capacity not in his official capacity (E) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce
Output: (C)
from the common pleas court. Although Ap-pellees challenged the common pleas court’s order in this regard, as well as its order precluding Ms. Fleck from intervening in the termination proceedings, these issues are not currently being pursued before the Court. 7 . However, Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 specifically allows an appeal as of right, without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c), from an order granting peremptory judgment in mandamus. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(5). 8 . Apparently, the majority recognized that an appeal as of right from the interim suspension would not lie by virtue of the interlocutory character of the decision. See generally Pa. R.A.P. 341(a) (interposing finality as a prerequisite to appealability, as a general rule). 9 . Accord Kaplan, 388 Pa. at 220, 130 A.2d at 676 (<HOLDING>). Although the Commonwealth Court dissent was 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a school acted impermissibly when a public school teacher was not rehired because allegedly he had relayed to a radio station the substance of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance (B) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (C) recognizing a school districts implied authority to suspend a tenured teacher in circumstances where he could become an influence inimical to the best welfare of the children (D) holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the state asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional (E) recognizing the districts duty of care for the protection of school children in its schools
Output: (C)
of this[,] verbalizing her understanding and agreement”); id. at 133 (setting forth the testimony of the attending anesthesiologist, Dr. William Shepard, who stated that there was “a period of deliberati 3 A. 341, 342 (1932)). Similarly well-established is the proposition that claims alleging a lack of consent for a surgical procedure constitute a battery committed upon a patient by a physician. Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (providing that “a claim involving a surgical procedure performed without any consent at all by the patient ... sounds in battery”); Morgan v. MacPhail, 550 Pa. 202, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (1997) (acknowledging that the performance of a surgical procedure upon a patient without his consent constitutes a battery); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663, 669 (1966) (<HOLDING>). The tort of battery has been described as an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a jury question existed as to whether a patient consented to an operation and whether the operation received was substantially similar to the operation to which the patient consented so as to be within the scope of the consent (B) holding that a patient who endures an operation without his consent may base his action on a tortious battery (C) holding that in pennsylvania lack of informed consent claims utilize a battery standard that is a physician commits battery where the patient does not consent to the procedure on his person thus constituting a harmful or offensive contact (D) holding that an operation without the patients consent sounds in battery (E) holding medical practices patient base is not protectable interest
Output: (B)
or otherwise, with respect to this Agreement ... or for the appointment of a receiver or trustee of the Trust, or for any other remedy with respect to an event of default hereunder ...” (PSA § 6.07 (emphasis added).) This language makes “any other remedy with respect to an event of default” simply one category to which the no-action clause applies, in addition to “any proceeding ... with respect to this Agreement.” Consistent with other courts interpreting similar clauses, the Court concludes that the breadth of this provision— applying to “any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, with respect to this Agreement” — requires that the prerequisites for filing suit apply to Plaintiffs’ contract and tort claims. See Peak Partners, LP v. Republic Bank, 191 Fed.Appx. 118, 126-27 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Feldbaum, 1992 WL 119095, at *6 (interpreting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration (B) holding under new york law that a noaction provision containing similar with respect to this indenture language barred negligence claims against a servicer (C) holding that new york law applies to this matter (D) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (E) recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations
Output: (B)
§ 50 provides in part that "any person,” convicted of bribery of a public official "shall, as part of the punishment thereof, be forever disfranchised and disqualified from holding any office of trust, or profit, in this State.” According to Judge Friedman's treatise, such punishment "may not be subject to pardon[,]” although "[tjhere are no appellate opinions to suggest whether [that] interpretation is correct.” Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution 119 (2011). 14 . When Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 532, 233 A.2d 791 (1967), was decided, capital punishment was still a legal sentence upon a conviction for rape. Although that is obviously no longer true, as a matter of federal constitutional law, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (<HOLDING>), the Court of Appeals' statements, in Jones, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of death for a defendant convicting of raping a child (B) holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape (C) holding that an offenders death sentence for the rape of a child who did not die is unconstitutionally disproportionate (D) holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment (E) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child
Output: (D)
the parole search was not based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the jury was properly instructed to examine the motives and intent of [the] Officers .. .to insure that, at the very least, the suspicionless search was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.”). As such, this is yet another basis for which the Court cannot grant Defendants summary judgment. As to qualified immunity, Plaintiffs argue “[a] search performed to harass is unconstitutional and no reasonable officer could have believed otherwise in November 2014.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 12. In doing so, they cite both the Supreme Court’s opinion in Samson v. California, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. King, both of which condemn harassing searches. Id.; see Samson 547 U.S. at 856, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (<HOLDING>); King, 736 F.3d at 810 (probation may not be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (B) holding that fourth amendment applicable in administrative searches for safety inspections (C) holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells (D) recognizing tedder as a significant procedural safeguard (E) recognizing californias prohibition on harassing searches as a procedural safeguard under the fourth amendment
Output: (E)
violates [a] mandatory regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to policy.” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). For example, we have observed that the limitation of an officer’s judgment during a high speed chase — such as the limitation of “the speed of a vehicle in hot pursuit — indicates that the [police department] already had made the decision to limit the officer’s exercise of discretion.” Biscoe v. Arlington Cty., 738 F.2d 1352, 1363 (D.C.Cir.1984). Consequently, “effective law enforcement would not be hindered by enforced adherence to such regulations” through civil liability. Id.; see also Keller v. United States, 771 F.3d 1021, 1024 (7th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). We see no difference between a prescription 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the discretionary function does not apply where the decisionmaker lacks authority (B) holding federal tort claims act discretionary function exception does not apply if prison personnel violate a mandatory regulation (C) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (D) holding that the government cannot waive or forfeit an argument that the discretionary function exception to the federal tort claims act ftca should apply (E) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision 
Output: (B)
were reasonable under the circumstances, triable issues of fact would exist regarding whether the scope and degree of the state interference was justified by the alleged exigency. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447; Barlow, 943 F.2d at 1138 (“Police officers can proceed without a warrant if they reasonably believe they are confronted with an emergency that threatens life or limb, but the [intrusion] must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”); Franz, 997 F.2d at 791 (intrusion must be “reasonably necessary to alleviate the threat”); Good, 891 F.2d at 1093 (under “very limited exception” to warrant rule, intrusion must be reasonably necessary to alleviate the threat of immediate harm); Hebein, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1043 (<HOLDING>). Merely because some intrusion on a child’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that before a duty can be imposed there must be a relationship between the parties and the harm must have been foreseeable (B) holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions (C) holding that aggravating factors may justify increasing the degree of discipline imposed (D) holding that danger must justify the degree of interference imposed (E) recognizing that the question of the degree of intent that must be shown to support a judgment of civil contempt is unsettled
Output: (D)
we find that there is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes involved that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes. Plaintiffs cause of action is based on the Act. As such, the only limitations period applicable to her claim is the two-year statute of limitations period found in section 2 of the Act. Thus, plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband’s death to file a wrongful death action provided that plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was not time-barred at the time of his death. For purposes of determining whether plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was time-barred at the time of his death, we use the limitations period found in section 13 — 214(a), which applies to construction d 621, 628 (1989), aff’d on other grounds, 146 Ill. 2d 477 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also finds support for her position 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212 (B) holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code (C) holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific (D) holding that the then twoyear statute of limitations for constructionrelated actions found in section 13  214a of the code applies over the fiveyear statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13  205 of the code (E) holding merck applies to section 13 of the securities act
Output: (A)
17 n. 7; see also Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 469, 522 S.E.2d 170, 177 (1999); Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 651, 472 S.E.2d 649, 652, aff'd on reh’g en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); Penn v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 399, 406-07, 412 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1991), aff'd per curiam, 244 Va. 218, 420 S.E.2d 713 (1992); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 117, 122, 390 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1990). The DUI statutes nowhere provide for a suppression remedy for procedural violations. Instead, Code § 18.2-268.11 states that a violation of the procedural steps of Code §§ 18.2-268.2 through 18.2-268.9 “shall go to the weight of the evidence and shall be considered with all the evidence in the case.” See Shumate v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 877, 883, 153 S.E.2d 243, 247 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Snider v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 729, 734, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court (B) holding that procedural violations merely affect the weight of the evidence (C) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses (D) holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative (E) holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation
Output: (B)
appeal a negative decision by the BOP Regional Director to the BOP’s Office of General Counsel within thirty days of the date of the Regional Counsel’s decision. Id. The inmate may file an action in federal court only after these four steps have been completed. Indelicato does not allege that he completed the ARP’s four steps before filing his complaint in this Court. Rather, In-delicato contends that he exhausted all of his available remedies after he completed step one, because the grievance form required in step two was not available to him. (Compl.¶¶ 2, V(e); Pl.’s Mem. at 4-5.) An inmate may defeat a motion to dismiss even if he has not technically exhausted his administrative remedies when he has made a “reasonable attempt” to do so, “espec 738424, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Denial of forms, however, does not itself 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief (B) holding that plaintiff who was denied requests for forms by unhelpful prison officials but went on to write letters file and appeal a foia request and make several other inquiries had made a reasonable attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies (C) holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim (D) holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms (E) holding that a pro se plaintiff who was unfamiliar with the process and failed to file a grievance form but wrote numerous letters and memoranda to various prison officials had made a reasonable attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies
Output: (E)
circumvent the subrogation rights of the insurer, then those rights may reach any portion used to defeat the subrogation rights. See id. Though not at issue here, we are cognizant of the fact that claimants could try to circumvent the subrogation rights of the insurer in cases that are litigated without reaching a settlement. A claimant could fail to pursue the economic claims ardently, or not pursue these claims at all. Although courts cannot control a plaintiffs strategy in pursuing personal injury claims, they do have jurisdiction over trial verdicts. See Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Colo.1983) (court may scrutinize verdict and grant new trial if verdict is result of bias, prejudice or passion); Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 20, 233 P.2d 382, 384 (1951) (<HOLDING>). Upon request, a personal injury court may 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court must compare and weigh the opposing evidence and it must set aside the verdict if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence (B) holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment (C) recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict (D) holding that the court may set aside agency action only in extremely limited circumstances (E) holding that the trial courts denial of a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence is reviewable only for abuse of discretion
Output: (C)
See id. We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that Sosa failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.2003). Sosa’s contention that the agency deprived him of due process by misapplying the law to the facts of his case and by disregarding their evidence of hardship is not supported by the record and does not amount to a colorable constitutional claim. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”); see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that misapplication of career offender enhancement in light of intervening case law not a miscarriage of justice because guideline range still within statutory maximum authorized (B) holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo (C) holding that a factual sufficiency complaint in a parental termination case may be reviewed even though it was not preserved in the trial court (D) holding that the misapplication of case law may not be reviewed (E) holding that a sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in a parental termination case to be reviewed on appeal
Output: (D)
to institute the litigation in bad faith, intending only to harass the third parties and not to bring his claim to definitive adjudication.” Id. b. Plaintiffs and/or the Estate’s Lawsuit a Basis for Tortious Interference In their Counterclaims against Plaintiff and their Third Party Complaints against Liza and/or Andrew Kramer, Berck and Life Product failed to allege plausibly that any of the Kramers lacked belief in the merits of this litigation or that they intended this litigation only to harass. Although, arguably, the intent of the Parties is an issue to be determined as a matter of fact, dismissal is appropriate where, as here, such a factual allegation, if asserted, would lack plausibility. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (<HOLDING>). Without drawing any conclusions as to the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may present unsubstantiated factual allegations on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint to show that the complaint should not have been dismissed (B) holding that twombly and iqbals plausibility standard applies (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that rule 12b6 dismissal is proper where it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations (E) holding that where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendants liability it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief 
Output: (E)
quotation from Rash, 31 F.3d at 329, omitted). Thus, the Eighth Circuit agrees with our conclusion that retail value is the proper measure. A few days after Trimble was decided, the First Circuit followed suit, in Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries v. New Bedford Inst. for Sav. (In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries), 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.1995). Like the Eighth Circuit, the Winthrop court gave meaning to the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a): ... A number of courts ..., including four Circuit Courts, have adhered to this clear expression of congressional .intent and declined to value collateral that a debt- or proposes to retain based on a hypothetical foreclosure sale. These courts reason that because the reorganizing debtor proposes to retain and use the collateral, 4-86 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), ... vacated on other grounds, - U.S. -, 113 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (B) holding that second sentence of  506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debtors real property to be retained by debt or (C) holding that  506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence (D) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor (E) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or
Output: (B)
110, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Supreme Court contrasted discrete acts of discrimination with hostile work environment claims, for which the continuing violation doctrine remained available, because hostile work environment claims by “[t]heir very nature involve[] repeated conduct,” and further explained that “a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Although Morgan discussed the continuing violation doctrine in the context of Title VII, many courts have held that an alleged failure to provide a requested accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA is also a “discrete act” under Morgan and thus cannot rest on a continuing violation theory to make it timely. See, e.g., Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1246-47 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Szedlock v. Tenet, 61 Fed.Appx. 88, 93 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act (B) holding that denials of hearingimpaired employees multiple requests for accommodations under the rehabilitation act were each discrete acts of discrimination under morgan (C) holding rehabilitation act applicable (D) holding that denial of request for accommodation of religion is a discrete act under morgan (E) holding that denial of employees request for respirators under the rehabilitation act was a discrete act of discrimination under morgan
Output: (E)
work site. Similarly, in Loyland v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 9 Wn. App. 682, 514 P.2d 184 (1973), overruled on other grounds by Bayne v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 88 Wn.2d 917, 922,568 P.2d 771 (1977), injured workers brought suit against Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, which had contracted with a public utility district to design, supervise, and exe cute an extension to a hydroelectric power plant. Id. at 683. In assessing the design professional’s liability, the Court of Appeals held that liability hinged on “[t]he extent of supervision required of Stone & Webster in its contract with the district and the amount and character of inspection which it was to conduct.” Id. at 687; see also Porter v. Stevens, Thompson & Runyan, Inc., 24 Wn. App. 624, 602 P.2d 1192 (1979) (<HOLDING>). ¶48 In sum, at common law, third party design 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consulting engineer was not liable for workplace injury where it was not contractually responsible for safety precautions and did not exercise actual control of the work site (B) holding that the department of transportation was liable under the mtca but that it was not responsible for any of the cleanup costs (C) holding that the state was not liable as an operator for responding to a site to conduct cleanup activities (D) holding that determination that work was performed as a consulting engineer did not affect underlying determination of negligence and so could be established through extrinsic evidence (E) holding the defendant responsible for the greater of the actual or intended loss
Output: (A)
reasonable inference could be drawn that Thompson interfered with Lucas’s opportunity to get contract work with OADC based on evidence that Thompson and the OADC director were friends, communicated with each other on the day Lucas was terminated, and had a history of discussing whether Defender Office employees should receive OADC contracts. The undisputed evidence in the record, however, is that the OADC director never communicated with Thompson or Wilson about Lucas. Lucas’s argument requires a factfinder to speculate that perhaps the undisputed evidence is inaccurate, but such speculation and conjecture is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Pioneer Centres Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>). We affirm the magistrate judge’s grant of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict (B) holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding (C) holding that burden of clear and convincing proof cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture or speculation (D) holding that an inference is unreasonable if it is a mere possibility or involves a degree of speculation and conjecture that requires the factfinder to make a guess (E) holding that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard
Output: (D)