niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
consumer. An explosion occurred and the distributors/manu facturers were sued. That court held that the distributors of bulk propane to a retailer had no independent duty to warn the ultimate consumer. Rather, the distributor had only a duty to insure that the retailer was knowledgeable regarding the dangers and was able to warn the ultimate buyers. Thus, a seller of bulk propane can delegate to the retailer its duty to warn the ultimate consumer. Furthermore, the bulk seller has no duty to warn the retailer of the dangers of a product if that retailer is already aware "through common knowledge or learning" of a specific hazard. Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1980); Parkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1958) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, respondent could rely on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution (B) holding a manufacturer had no postsale duty to warn of dangers associated with an auger because numerous hodder factors were not present (C) recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known (D) holding manufacture had no duty to warn of the dangers of smoking because the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community (E) holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers
Output: (E)
Petitioner Jaswinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we grant the petition for review. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s order without discussion, thus we review the substance of the immigration judge’s order. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir.2003). The IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony inconsistent and implausible, and therefore the record compels finding Singh’s testimony, credible. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). First, the IJ erred when she found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails (B) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination (C) holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency (D) holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum (E) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true
Output: (A)
plea agreement between myself and the prosecutor.” The State argues this provision controls over the following handwritten notation on the plea form: “Defendant reserves his right to appeal the adverse ruling on defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence.” The State contends the handwritten notation, just above the preprinted waiver, was a pre-plea attempt to reserve his appeal rights, which did not survive the trial court’s acceptance of the plea bargain. There is no reporter’s record of the plea hearing, and the State does not explain why the following notation on the judgment was lined out: “Appeal waived, No permission for appeal granted.” On this record, we conclude appellant did not waive his right to appeal. See Alzarka v. State, 90 S.W.3d 321, 324 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Freeman v. State, 913 S.W.2d 714, 716-17 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exception to requirement of timely filing of notice of appeal exists in cases where defendant either was not told of right to appeal or was not furnished attorney to exercise those rights or was furnished attorney for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete appeal (B) holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal (C) holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information (D) holding defendant did not waive appeal and that record  in which trial judge district attorney and defendants attorney repeatedly made statements agreeing defendant would be permitted to appeal  directly contradicted and rebutted any presumption raised by terms of boiler plate plea form defendant signed (E) holding that trial counsel owes a criminal defendant a duty to file a notice of appeal regardless of whether the attorney was retained for the appeal or not
Output: (D)
offense; the maximum sentence is 10 years for each offense, which must run concurrently under Hale. By enhancing only one count and running it consecutively to the second count, appellant was sentenced to 12 years. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum if both sentences had been enhanced under section 775.084 and run concurrently, or if neither had been enhanced and run consecutively. As such the appellant’s sentence violates Hale. Although appellant was not sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years for the second offense, as explained in State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1995), the requirement that sentences run consecutively is not limited to only the minimum mandatory portion of. a total sentence: The State argues that Hale and its predecessors, Palmer v. State A 1997) (<HOLDING>). Here appellant was sentenced as an habitual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (C) holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence (D) holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions (E) holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment
Output: (C)
by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury “same protections as other constitutional rights”); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly “in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial”); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding  without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary  that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government
Output: (D)
have consistently held that “[a] reasonable investigation following a justifiable traffic stop may include asking for the driver’s license and registration^]” Allegree, 175 F.3d at 650 (citing United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir.1999) (“Asking for a vehicle’s registration papers is clearly a legitimate way to verify a vehicle’s registration status.”). Detective Hall’s request for Clay-born’s registration papers and identification was reasonably related to confirming the vehicle’s registration status and explaining the lack of license plates. The subsequent searches were also justified because of the odor of marijuana, the arrest of Clayborn, and the impounding of the vehicle. Peltier, 217 F.3d at 610 (<HOLDING>); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63, 101 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper (B) holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle (C) holding that because marijuana has a distinct smell the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage (D) holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs (E) holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle
Output: (E)
by a state officer and the subsequent participation in joint activity by the two to violate the civil rights of an individual will suffice. But these particular instances of state-individual joint undertakings are hardly exhaustive of the circumstances that will necessitate the application of the state actor doctrine. As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, what is necessary — in pure and simple terms — is that the private actor be “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); see also Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429-30 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). This principle, formulated in United States 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights (B) holding police officer is a public official (C) holding that texas democratic party was subject to the fourteenth amendment as a state actor and rejecting as a slight  change in form defendants argument that because the democratic party was a private entity it was not a state actor (D) recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer (E) holding that bail bondsman was state actor where he searched a home for a felon with a police officer the court wrote that in cases where a private party and a public official act jointly to produce the constitutional violation both parts of the lugar test are simultaneously satisfied
Output: (E)
have adopted a presumption that the disclosure of a trade secret constitutes an irreparable harm that justifies an injunction. The presumption of irreparable harm is based upon the fact that the disclosure of a trade secret has the potential to. destroy the legal protections afforded to a trade secret if it becomes generally known. See 4 Rosmrt M. Mincrim & Eric E. Bensen, Minazrim on Traps § 15.02[1][c] (20183) (noting that "unprotected disclosure of a trade secret destroys the secret"). Because "of the difficulties involved in valuing the consequences of the destruction of a trade secret," id., some courts have adopted a presumption that the harm associated with an unauthorized disclosure is irreparable, see FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages (B) recognizing that customer lists may be protectable trade secrets (C) holding that the logs of trade secrets is usually considered an irreparable harm that cannot be measured in money damages alterations in original internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana (E) holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages
Output: (E)
we proceed to the first step under Edwards-, whether SA KS’s communication with the appellee post-invocation of counsel — but prior - to the appellee’s subsequent waiver — constituted an interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Mil. R. Evid. 305(e)(1). Did SA KS’s Communication Constitute an Interrogation? For purposes of this Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, we review de novo the question of whether SA KS’s communication with the appellee post-invocation of counsel constituted an interrogation. Kosek, 41 M.J. at 63. The military judge ruled that SA KS’s request for consent to search did not constitute an interrogation. AE CXX at 14. We agree. A request to consent to search does not constitute an interrogation. See United States v. Burns, 33 M.J. 316, 320 (C.M.A.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  (B) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent (C) holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime (D) holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent (E) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion
Output: (C)
matter should be reopened because his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Kirlew also sought reconsideration of the BIA’s previous decision because he claimed that it “failed to articulate any legal standard, statutory, case law or regulation in support of its legal conclusion” (A.R. 7) (emphasis in original) and improperly discounted his claims of bias regarding the IJ. Because the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of recusal, we will affirm the BIA’s decision not to reopen the matter on that ground. Furthermore, while the record validates Kirlew’s claim that his Marijuana Conviction was subsequently vacated, he would still be unable to obtain Section 212(c) relief because of the Firearms Conviction. See Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (citing Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 212c relief is unavailable to a lawful permanent resident convicted of a firearms offense qualifying under 8 usc  1227a2c (B) holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief (D) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina  212c (E) holding that an alien is only lawfully admitted for permanent residence for purposes of the ina if his or her adjustment to lawful permanent resident complied with substantive legal requirements and that because the alien failed to show that she had complied with the relevant substantive legal requirements the ij correctly determined that she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and was not entitled to  212c relief
Output: (A)
of a debt collector carved out by Section 1692a(6)(F)(ii) of the statute. As a result, the Court will not reach the additional bases for the Defendants’ argument pertaining to dismissal of the FDCPA claim. Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exempts from the definition of “debt collector” any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). Thus, the FDCPA is inapplicable to “collection efforts by those who obtained the right to payment on the debt before the debt was in default.” Franceschi, 22 F.Supp.2d at 253; See also Healy v. Jzanus Ltd., No. 02 CV 1061, 2006 VJL 898067, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Plaintiffs do not allege the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities (B) holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt (C) holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa (D) holding that the fdcpa did not apply to a collection agency retained by a hospital seeking medicaid reimbursement because the underlying debt was not in default even though the agency identified itself as a debtcollector (E) holding that reporting a consumers debt to a creditreporting agency constitutes collection of the debt under  1692gb
Output: (D)
PER CURIAM. Donald Jackman, Jr. appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion filed pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(g) for the return of firearms and other property seized during a search of his residence. In February 2002, Jackman was convicted of possession of an unregistered destructive device and pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. He was subsequently sentenced to 262 months in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In a separate proceeding, the government filed for forfeiture of several of Jackman’s firearms, a Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>). Although Jackman focuses primarily on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a convicted felon is not entitled to return of firearms or to have firearms held in trust by third party (B) holding that a convicted felon is not entitled to have firearms returned held in trust or sold for his profit (C) holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence (D) holding that a convicted felon may sue a municipal government to recover the value of seized firearms that he owned (E) holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy
Output: (A)
the piling of wires next to the staircases “arguably did not create an unreasonable risk of harm.” The trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment as to the elements of duty and breach. ¶ 12. We disagree. Given plaintiff’s deposition testimony that she did not see the wire in the stairs before she tripped, and defendant’s admissions that the area was poorly lit, covered in debris, and unsecured, a reasonable jury could conclude that either the danger was not open and obvious or that defendant should have foreseen the harm even if the danger was obvious. Thus, a jury could find that defendant had a duty to make the condition safe or warn plaintiff of the danger, and that he breached this duty. Cf. Menard, 174 Vt. at 479-80, 806 A.2d at 1005-07 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also testified as to the elements 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support an inference of constructive notice where plaintiff who slipped on an unknown substance could not say that the substance was placed there by employees of defendant that its presence was known to them or that it was there for an appreciable time before accident (B) holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law (C) holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger (D) holding defendants not liable for negligence under either an invitee or licensee standard where danger of spiral staircase was obvious to plaintiff defendants had installed a guardrail area was welllit and there was no foreign substance on the stairs (E) holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger
Output: (D)
closely by a retaliatory action. Gordon v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir.2000); Cifra v. GE, 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim ‘can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.’ ”) (quoting Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir.1996) (internal citation omitted)). Although the Second Circuit “has not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship between the e . Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446-47 (2d Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff alleges that soon after his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior north carolina conviction was for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year (B) holding something more than denial of receipt is required (C) holding that a one month delay is acceptable (D) holding abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more than one year earlier (E) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim
Output: (D)
We conclude as well that any alleged defect in Dr. Schmidtgoessling’s assistance cannot be attributed to counsel. Fautenberry argues that Dr. Schmidt-goessling misdiagnosed his mental condition when she concluded that he did not suffer from organic brain damage. Even if we assume that Dr. Schmidtgoessling did misdiagnose Fautenberry, “[a] licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary.” Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 772 (6th Cir.2006). Fautenberry has not shown that counsel had “good reason” to believe that Dr. Schmidtgoessling was incompetent, and we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely upon the doctor’s opinions and conclusions. See Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 555 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Under these circumstances, any inadequacies 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (B) holding the experts opinion testimony lacked a proper foundation when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the experts admitted that their conclusions were based solely on the childrens statements that they had been abused (C) holding that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the appointment of the defendants requested expert as there was no undue prejudice to the defendant because the defendants claim on the predicted effect of the experts testimony was purely speculative (D) holding there was no doubt that the trial judge erred in failing to appoint at least two experts (E) holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent
Output: (A)
petition was defective and the case required remand). Cf. Maori v. M & M Contractors, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 381, 384 (N.D.Ind.1995) (“The plaintiff has a right to remand if the defe 151, 1157-58 (N.D.Cal.2003) (the defendant railroad was required to file a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the complaint in a wrongful death action arising after a student was hit by a train while riding his bicycle to school, rather than within thirty d 65, 169-70 (S.D.Tex.1995) (remanding a case where the removing defendants had all of the information needed to remove the case based on fraudulent joinder on the date they were served with the plaintiffs complaint, but filed the notice of removal more than thirty days later); Delatte v. Zurich Ins. Co., 683 F.Supp. 1062, 1064 (M.D.La.1988) (<HOLDING>); Skidmore v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 672 F.Supp. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that removal based on fraudulent joinder was not timely where it occurred more than thirty days after the removing defendants learned of facts showing that a nondiverse codefendant was fraudulently joined (B) holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined (C) holding that a notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder was procedurally defective because it was filed more than thirty days after defendants could have intelligently ascertained that the action was removable (D) holding that removal was untimely where the removing defendant could have ascertained from the face of a complaint that certain nondiverse codefendants were fraudulently joined but did not seek removal based on fraudulent joinder until after the state court granted a motion to strike the plaintiffs allegations against the diversitydefeating codefendants (E) holding that failure to remove within thirty days after receiving a statecourt complaint from which the removing defendant could have discerned fraudulent joinder of a nondiverse party rendered removal untimely
Output: (A)
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and state statutes or regulations. Id. With respect to interests arising directly under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has narrowly circumscribed its scope to protect no more than the “the most basic liberty interests in prisoners.” Hewitt v. Helms,’459 U.S. 460, 467, 108 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (“Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen.”). The Due Process Clause does not protect against “every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact” on inmates, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478, 115 S.Ct. at 2297, if S.Ct. 1028, 1036-37, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Aside from the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest (B) recognizing right to refuse psychotropic medication in the absence of emergency as aspect of liberty guaranteed by due process clause (C) holding that inmate has a liberty interest under the due process clause to refuse the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs (D) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate (E) holding that prisoners possess a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and identifying procedures which comported with due process
Output: (C)
retroactive deadline by requiring hospitals to have appealed the exclusion of expansion waiver days before October 15, 1999 — two months prior to the PM’s issuance on December 15, 1999. Pl.’s SJM at 32-33. This argument assumes, however, that hospitals were entitled to include expansion waiver days in the DSH calculation prior to the PM’s issuance. Indeed, they were not. The Secretary’s policy prior to January 2000 was to exclude expansion waiver days from the DSH calculation. Cookeville, 531 F.3d 844, 848 (2008). Furthermore, hospitals— including those in Tennessee — were “on notice that the expansion population might not be included.” Id. PM A-99-62 merely clarified the Secretary’s existing policy. See United Hosp. v. Thompson, No. 02-3479, 2003 WL 21356086, *5 (D.Minn. June 9, 2003) (<HOLDING>). PM A-99-62 served a limited purpose— to hold 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an endorsement to an existing insurance policy which added a new vehicle did not create a new contract of insurance but was merged with and became a part of the original policy (B) holding that pm a9962 was not a policy change requiring notice to hospitals but a clarification of existing policy (C) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy
Output: (B)
California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review
Output: (D)
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The final interest advanced by Defendants to justify Section 470 is the availability of the remedy of attachment against nonresident attorneys. See Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at 7 (citing Matter of Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.Div.1972); Matter of Fordan, 5 Misc.2d 372, 158 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surrogates Ct.N.Y.Co.1956)). The remedy of attachment is a disciplinary measure involving a seizure on a defendant’s property in order to secure the enforcement of a money judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6201 (McKinney 2011). Under Section 470’s current construction, however, an attorney need only maintain an “of counsel” relationship with an in-state office to satisfy the office requirement. Austria v. Shaw, 143 Misc.2d 970, 542 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>). Based on this standard, the remedy of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case (D) holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid (E) holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement
Output: (E)
or "inherently” require the claim element that is believed to have been rendered obvious and makes much of the fact that (in its opinion) APT’s prior art references do not meet this rigorous standard. Yet in attempting to describe this standard for finding a patent invalid because obvious, IXYS has erroneously cited this court to several cases discussing the standard for invalidity by anticipation, not by obviousness. Compare Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir.2002) ("Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is 'necessarily present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.”) (citations omitted); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2002) (same), with Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1323 (<HOLDING>). A plaintiff who seeks to prove invalidity for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding of obviousness affirmed on the basis of the teachings of the prior art references in combination not on the basis of the contemporaneous invention (B) holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (C) recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention (D) holding the district court erred by considering the references in less than their entireties ie in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand (E) holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art
Output: (B)
owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.” United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798, 822-823, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, citing Robbins v. California (1981), 453 U.S. 420, 427, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744. The court went on to state that the degree of that protection varies depending on the circumstances, noting that a suitcase may be randomly searched by customs agents or that containers, including those found inside automobiles, may be searched incident to the arrest of the owner. Id. at. 823, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572. Other cases have recognized that one may not have Fourth Amendment protections from searches of “rare single purpose containers which by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectatio pp. No. 99CR203, 2001 WL 62288 (<HOLDING>). In Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 103 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him (B) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station (C) holding that plaintiff conceded argument raised in dispositive motion by failing to address it (D) holding that a folded index card is not a singlepurpose container since officer conceded that contents were not immediately apparent to him (E) holding that appellant did not unequivocally consent to a search when deputy asked him if he would mind if the contents of his pockets were removed and appellant did not respond
Output: (D)
stating that “a Bivens remedy is available for Plaintiffs’ ... Fourth Amendment unreasonable and punitive [ ] search[ ] claims.” 789 F.3d at 237. The court reasoned that “the Fourth Amendment is at the core of the Bivens jurisprudence, as Bivens itself concerned a Fourth Amendment claim ... for the defendants’ use of unreasonable force without probable cause, resulting in the plaintiffs unlawful arrest.” Id. The p rcuit law— that the Bivens issue was not directly raised before this Court in Martinez-Aguero — is unpersuasive. As this Court has stated, “[wjhen confronting decisions of prior panels ... we are bound by 'not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result....’” Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 n. 11 (5th Cir 28-29 (D.Conn.2010) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs (B) holding that the csra precludes even those bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy because it found no inadvertence by congress in omitting the remedy (C) recognizing the civil service reform act as a special factor precluding a bivens remedy (D) holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy (E) recognizing a bivens remedy for undocumented immigrants who were subjects of a raid by federal immigration officials reasoning that if a bivens remedy were precluded the present plaintiffs would have no forum in which to seek a remedy for the defendants alleged constitutional violations
Output: (E)
Loans, L.P. v. Estate of Bracher, 93 S.W.3d 469, 480-81 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). In FCLT, the court noted that no formal recognition of a fiduciary relationship between the executor and estate creditors exists, like the one between the executor and estate beneficiaries. Id. The executor holds the estate property in trust for the beneficiaries because they have a vested right in that property, but she does not hold it in trust for the creditors, whose claims against the estate are contingent. Id. at 480-81. The court observed that no provision in the Probate Code establishes that an independent executor holds the estate property in trust for those with claims against the estate. Id. But see Ertel v. O’Brien, 852 S.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Buller, 834 S.W.2d 622, 626 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bank trustee of a relevant plan was not a fiduciary in regard to real estate interests because it performed only administrative and ministerial functions (B) holding that bank as coexecutor of estate breached its fiduciary and statutory duties to creditor when it failed to pay creditors claim against estate and instead paid claims of bank and other creditors (C) holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate (D) recognizing that the party can instead file a claim against the estate (E) holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court
Output: (B)
Joseph F. Nascimento and his minor daughter Kendall E. Nascimento appeal pro se the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), of their civil rights action seeking reversal of a Montana state court decision regarding the custody of Kendall Nascimento. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal and affirm. See H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should abstain when an exercise of jurisdiction might lead to a parallel federal regulatory review mechanism complicating state administration (B) holding that federal district courts should abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings (C) holding that courts should only abstain under younger if the state proceedings are coercive and not remedial and citing a number of district court opinions (D) recognizing that the longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings generally requires federal courts to abstain from involvement in state criminal proceedings (E) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law
Output: (B)
prong of Paragraph 1491(b)(1). See RAMCOR Servs. Group, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“§ 1491(b) ... does not require an objection to the actual contract procurement.... As long as a statute has a connection to a procurement proposal, an alleged violation suffices to supply jurisdiction.”); Angelica Textile Servs., 95 Fed.Cl. at 215 (“The phrase ‘in connection with’ is very sweeping in scope.” “[A] procurement ‘includes all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with the contract completion and closeout.’” (quoting RAMCOR, 185 F.3d at 1289 (first quote); 41 U.S.C. § 403(2) (second quote))); OTI America, Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 108, 117 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court finds that it has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the broad language of subsection 1491b demonstrated congresss expressed intent that the subsection encompass the entire procurement process (B) holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract (C) recognizing that subpart iia of the dol regulation overlaps with subsection i of the statutory definition (D) holding that when the specification clearly disavows a feature that feature is outside the reach of the claim language even if the language might otherwise be broad enough to encompass the feature in question (E) holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary 
Output: (A)
claims that respondent was aware World Bowling was purchasing the bowling alley from appellants but was never informed of the details of the purchase. We reject respondent’s contention that it could not have actual knowledge of appellants’ misfiled U.C.C.-l because any details it knew about the purchase of the bowling alley and its contents took place before the U.C.C.-l was filed. First, respondent had notice that the bowling alley contents were encumbered because it was involved with the sale until the time of closing. Second, the plain language of section 386.9-401(2) does not require that knowledge of the contents be gained only after the U.C.C.-l is misfiled and we may not add this requirement to the statute. Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Finally, both the district court and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks (B) holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature (C) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (D) holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted (E) holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature
Output: (A)
arbitrators, Eventys argues, the circuit court could have assured that both parties would have an opportunity to make their arguments to that forum. Alternatively, Eventys maintains, the circuit court should have considered and expressly ruled upon Eventys’s arguments that the provision purporting to waive class action claims was unconscionable and unenforceable. Eventys further argues that, because the “terms and conditions” did not include a severability provision, the circuit court’s necessary determination that FDUTPA’s remedial purposes are frustrated by the class action waiver provision would then invalidate the entire arbitration provision. For this argument, Eventys relies principally on the analysis in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So.2d 600, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>), and a group of federal cases holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contractual provisions in an arbitration agreement purporting to prohibit consumers from prosecuting class actions for small sums of money per consumer but for a substantial number of consumers are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of fdutpa contrary to the public policy of this state and unenforceable for that reason (B) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (C) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable (D) holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth (E) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy
Output: (A)