niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
a parolee does not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only [] the conditional liberty properly dependant on observance of special parole restrictions.” Id. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quotation omitted); accord Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (“[R]evocation[ ] is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, [even if it] does result in a loss of liberty.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (recognizing that a parolee does not have the full panoply of constitutional rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled). Relying on these cases, we have reached the same- conclusion in the supervised-release context. See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The panel’s decision is thüs- contrary to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release (B) holding that  3605 authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a defendants supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of jurisdiction (C) holding that the fourth amendment does not require a warrant based on an oath or affirmation to revoke an individual on supervised release (D) holding that constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants through the sixth amendment apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions (E) holding that proceedings to revoke supervised release  need not comply with the procedural protections constitutionally guaranteed for criminal prosecutions
Output: (E)
we hold the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motions to dismiss those charges. Moreover, we note that neither counsel for defendant nor for the State objected to the omission of Black’s name in the jury instructions. Despite the trial court’s asking if there were “any corrections or additions from either party as to the jury charge as given,” neither counsel for defendant nor for the State requested any changes. In fact, we recognize that the trial court’s instruction in applying the concerted action theory to the evidence presented “was in fact favorable to defendant.” State v. Harris, 315 N.C. 556, 564, 340 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1986). Accordingly, even if the trial court’s jury instruction had been erroneous, we cannot find that defendant was prejudiced thereby. See id. (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 86-87, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that comments that implied that the drug trade would continue if the jury did not convict the defendant were improper (B) holding the trial courts subsequently corrected instruction that the jury must find the defendant personally committed the offenses in order to convict the defendant on those charges did not prejudice the defendant (C) holding that there was no error where one instruction did not inform the jury that in order to convict defendant of attempted murder the evidence must show that defendant had a specific intent to commit murder but where subsequent instruction did inform jury of this requirement and concluding that the instructions when read as a whole adequately informed the jury of the requirement of specific intent to kill (D) holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense (E) holding that the trial judges misconduct at trial did not prejudice the defendant in light of the courts curative instructions
Output: (B)
some form of systemic negligence by the hospital, and is not simply a vicarious theory of liability based on the negligence of its employees. See Edwards v. Brandywine Hosp., 438 Pa.Super. 673, 652 A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1995). 1. Robert Stroud Adequately Pled Corporate Negligence Hospital’s first challenge to Robert Stroud’s Second Amended Complaint is that it fails to state a claim for corporate negligence against Hospital. (Doc. 69 at 6.) Relying on Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent, Hospital argues that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead that it knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged failings in its patient care procedures upon which Plaintiffs corporate negligence claim is based. See Kennedy v. Butler Mem’l Hosp., 901 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa.Super.2006) (<HOLDING>). (Doc. 69 at 7.) Plaintiff counters that he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors (B) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (C) holding that a complaint against a hospital containing averments that appear to meld the two causes of action for vicarious liability and corporate negligence with no averment pertaining to the hospitals knowledge  fails to state a claim of corporate negligence (D) holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury (E) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action
Output: (C)
Gregory v. Novak, 121 Or.App. 651, 655, 855 P.2d 1142 (1993). When fraud is based on silence or nondisclosure, a party must “demonstrate that the defendant either (1) remained silent when they had a duty to speak, or (2) assumed the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth by making a representation in the nature of a ‘half-truth.’ ” Smith v. U.S. Bank, N.A, 2011 WL 7628515 at *6 (D.Or. Oct. 26, 2011) (footnote added), report and recommendation adopted 2012 WL 1029364 (D.Or. Mar. 26, 2012); see also McFadden v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 2004 WL 2278542 (D.Or. Oct. 8, 2004) (reasoning that “silence or concealment of facts can be the basis for a fraud action, especially when there are half-truths or misleading statements”); Gregory, 121 Or.App. at 655, 855 P.2d 1142 (<HOLDING>). To establish reliance in a fraud cause, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that one who makes a representation that is misleading because it is in the nature of a halftruth assumes the obligation to make a full and fair disclosure of the whole truth (B) holding that damages and injunctive relief may be awarded in fair representation cases when necessary to make employees whole (C) holding intentional conduct without rational basis is arbitrary breach of duty of fair representation (D) holding that it is not (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
Output: (A)
containing the enforcement provisions — do not apply to a Texas tribunal that is: exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding under this chapter or under other law of this state relating to a support order or recognizing a support order of a foreign country or political subdivision on the basis of comity. The tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this state in a proceeding described by this subsection. Id. In the case before us, Gregory submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. When Gregory filed a pro se motion to dismiss Karen’s enforcement motion without first filing his special appearance, he made a general appearance in the case. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 120a(l); Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex.1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus, under Family Code section 159.201, the 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing rule (B) recognizing general rule (C) recognizing this texas rule (D) recognizing that rule 120a is a limited exception to general texas rule that appearance for any purpose subjects defendant to courts jurisdiction (E) recognizing the same rule in texas courts
Output: (D)
him at the time of their release. See id. at 1226. Cf. Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F.Supp. 425, 433-34 (N.D.Ill.1995) (primary liability permissible where an accounting firm “played a central role in the drafting and formation” of misstatements that a partnership incorporated into a fraudulent Prospectus, even if Prospectus did not disclose the accountant’s role as “mastermind”). So far, the courts in this district have uniformly rejected efforts to impose liability on accountants for merely reviewing and approving financial statements where there was no evidence the accountant played a significant role in drafting the statement, and there are no attributions in the statement to the accountant. See In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F.Supp. 26, 28 (D.Mass.1994) (<HOLDING>) (citing Software Toolworks, 38 F.3d at 1078, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an auditor intricately involved in the creation of misstatements and omissions may be liable under  10b even if the statements could not be reasonably attributable to him (B) holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements (C) holding an auditors review and approval of quarterly financial statements nonactionable under  10b and stating that because defendant did not actually engage in the reporting of the financial statements  but merely reviewed and approved them the statements are not attributable to defendant and thus defendant cannot be found liable for making a material misstatement (D) holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief (E) holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant
Output: (C)
Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. at 3148, 111 L.Ed.2d at 655). Such guarantees of trustworthiness are gleaned from the totality of circumstances “that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” Id. Corroborating evidence, however, may not be used to demonstrate trustworthiness: “the statement must be trustworthy on its own.” Id. (emphasis in original). [¶ 38.] The trial court concluded that the victim’s statements in this case were both relevant and probative. See State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 854 (S.D.1993). Accordingly, it admitted the statements under SDCL 19-16-6, the excited utterance exception, SDCL 19-16-7, the state of mind exception, and SDCL 19-16-35, the residual exception. [¶ 39.] Only one statement was admitt 96) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 137 N.C.App. 221, 527 S.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statements admissible to rebut defendants claims of selfdefense suicide or accidental death (B) holding that evidence of customer inquiries is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule (C) holding victims statements to coworkers admissible to rebut defendants claim that they had a good marriage (D) holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted (E) holding victims statements admissible under state of mind exception to rebut defendants claim of accident andor suicide
Output: (E)
omitted); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (observing that the fact a state sets regulations “tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose . . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny”). Thus, with the exception of classifications based on wealth or minor-party status, Clements held that ballot-access restrictions are subject to a general balancing test “involv[ing] a consideration of the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests the State seeks to protect by placing restrictions on candidacy, and the nature of the interests of those who may be burdened by the restrictions.” 457 U.S. at 963. ¶ 14. Clements applied the balancing test to a resign-to-run restriction contained in the Texas constitution and applicable wh (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 542 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that resigntorun provision of maine judicial code of conduct does not violate the guarantees of equal protection freedom of speech or freedom of association in either the maine or united states constitutions (B) holding that a twoyear suspension of visitation privileges did not violate either the first amendments right to freedom of association (C) holding that federal lobbying act does not violate lobbyists constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and petitioning the government (D) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (E) holding that a nocontact order did not violate the right to freedom of association
Output: (A)
Co., 633 F.2d 214 (table) 1980 LEXIS 13583 (6th Cir.1980) (quoting C.J.S. Contracts 100(1) at pp. 790-91); Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 43 S.Ct. 592, 67 L.Ed. 1086 (1923); General Motors Corp. v. Keener Motors, Inc., 194 F.2d 669 (6th Cir.1952); Tennessee Enamel Mfg. Co. v. Stoves, Inc., 192 F.2d 863 (6th Cir.1951). “A promise that does not put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promissor but leaves his future action subject only to his own will is illusory. It is not enforceable against the one making it nor operative as consideration for a return promise.” Pippin Way v. Four Star Music Co. (In re Four Star Music Co.), 2 B.R. 454, 460 (Bankr.M.B.Tenn.1979); Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298, 302 (6th Cir.1903) (<HOLDING>). A distribution agreement that does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract (B) holding that mutuality of obligation is essential for contracts based on mutual promises and that a contract is unenforceable where a party is free to perform or not perform the contract (C) holding mutuality of obligation is essential to the formation of a bilateral contract (D) holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration (E) holding that a contract without a minimum quantity term is unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality
Output: (B)
B’s definition of “applicant” excluded guarantors. Douglas County Nat’l Bank v. Pfeiff, 809 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Colo.Ct.App.1991); Kevin A. Palmer & Michael H. Malin, Jr., ECOA, Regulation B, and the Spousal Guaranty: Recent Developments, 115 Banking L.J. 357, 359 (1998). The primary purpose of the 1986 amendment was “ ‘to give guarantors and similar parties standing to seek legal remedies when a violation occurs under § 202.7(d).’ ” Pfeiff, 809 P.2d at 1103 (quoting Final Rule Revising Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,018, 48,020 (Nov. 20, 1985) (Official Staff Commentary)); see also Joel D. Stafford, Consumer Protection: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: Guarantors as Applicants' — :Did the Cost of a Violation Go Up?, 40 Okla. L.Rev. 431, 442-43 (1987) [hereinafter “Stafford Article ”] (<HOLDING>). Consequently, for purposes of § 202.7(d), a 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the amendment provides regulatory standing to a guarantor to sue for violations of regulation bs cosignature rules (B) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (C) holding that employers have standing to sue (D) recognizing right of guarantor to contribution against coguarantors (E) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment
Output: (A)
University Dictionary 141 (1994 ed.); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 135 (6th ed.1990) (defining “available” as “suitable; useable; accessible; obtainable; present or ready for immediate use. Having sufficient force or efficacy; effectual; valid.”). Brown’s argument is essentially that officials in the security department of the prison thwarted his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. Assuming security officials told Brown to wait for the termination of the investigation before commencing a formal claim, and assuming the defendants never informed Brown that the investigation was completed, the formal grievance proceeding required by DC-ADM 804 was never “available” to Brown within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Cf. Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). III. The District Court’s order dismissing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy under  1997e (B) holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs (C) holding that a thwarted remedy is not available (D) holding remedy not available to prisoner where officials purportedly prevented plaintiff from employing the prisons administrative remedies (E) holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy
Output: (A)
there is presently a justiciable controversy before the Court. C. Governing Law Under the New York rules that govern choice-of-law questions in diversity actions in this Court, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), a contractual choice-of-law provision is generally binding on a party claiming rights under a contract. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines (UK) Ltd., 230 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir.2000). Both the Merger Agreement and the Escrow Agreement choose New York law. (See Merger Agreement § 14.08; Escrow Agreement § 7.1.) The Court will rely on New York contract law to resolve the issues raised in this case. D. Notice as a Condition Preceden ., 84 A.D.3d 464, 927 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep’t 2011) (<HOLDING>). “In determining whether a particular 
 Holding statements: (A) holding under california law that a set of general terms and conditions that included an arbitration agreement and that were not provided to plaintiff but were available upon request were properly incorporated by reference into a purchase agreement (B) holding that because the indemnification clause contained no clear statement that would give the contractors notice of the harsh burden that complete indemnification imposes indemnification was inappropriate (C) holding that the court should review de novo the administrators decision that a property settlement agreement constituted a qdro because it involves interpretation of a settlement agreement and statutory construction not interpretation of the plan (D) holding language in a stock purchase agreement making demand for indemnification contingent upon compliance with notice and consent to settlement provisions were express conditions susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation (E) holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances
Output: (D)
property owners and others to open their lands to recreational users. The Ward court found, under the agreement, the landowner did not delegate to the defendant the power to control entry to the land. Holding that “[a] grant of immunity to the [defendant] would not serve the underlying purpose of the recreational use statute,” the court concluded the defendant was not an occupant under the act. Id., 890 P.2d at 1147. While discussing other jurisdictions’ decisions, the Ward court emphasized that “[t]he relationship of an entity to the premises, not the length and stability of its presence, should primarily determine whether the entity ‘occupies’ the premises” under the statute. Id., 890 P.2d at 1148. See also Tennyson v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 73 Wash.App. 550, 872 P.2d 524 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 191 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that where a coworker commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer  the policies behind the act would not be served by immunizing the coemployee (C) holding prior act testimony admissible to establish the identity behind an alias (D) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective
Output: (D)
394 Ill. 362, 68 N.E.2d 750; People ex rel. School District No. 88 v. Holland (1943), 384 Ill. 277, 51 N.E.2d 266; Almon v. American Carloading Corp. (1942), 380 Ill. 524, 44 N.E.2d 592.) Although the contrary conclusion was recently reached in Leckrone v. City of Salem (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 126, 503 N.E.2d 1093, we adopt the analysis of the court in National Wrecking Co. v. Midwest Terminal Corp. (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 621, 518 N.E.2d 193, which adheres to the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in Almon. See also Leib v. Toulin, Inc. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 707, 447 N.E.2d 900; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 362, 375 N.E.2d 522; cf. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller (1985), 472 U.S. 424, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (<HOLDING>). Since no Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders (B) holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine (C) holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action (D) holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable (E) holding that disqualification orders do not fall in the collateral order exception
Output: (E)
court erred when it dismissed his petition without ruling on his motions for Rule 32 discovery or on his ex parte applications for funds. (Issue III in Boyd’s appellate brief.) As Boyd maintains, the circuit court never ruled on his discovery motions or on his ex parte applications for funds. However, Boyd never objected to the circuit court’s failure to rule on those matters and never attempted to invoke a ruling of the circuit court as to those matters. Because Boyd suffered no adverse ruling from the circuit court, this issue is not properly before us for review. See Allen, supra, 825 So.2d at 270-71. See also Conners v. State, 837 So.2d 319, 322 (Ala.Crim.App.2001); cert. denied, 837 So.2d 326 (Ala.2002), overruled on different grounds, Ex parte Deramus, 882 So.2d 878 (Ala.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ruggs, supra, 601 So.2d at 512 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant did not preserve error because he failed to obtain ruling on motion for continuance (B) holding that a habeas petitioner failed to preserve for review a claim regarding the circuit courts failure to rule on his discov ery motion because the petitioner never objected to the courts failure to rule and suffered no adverse ruling (C) holding that a prisoners failure to pursue an appeal in state court is a procedural bar to federal habeas relief unless the petitioner shows both cause for failing to bring the state claim  and actual prejudice from the failure to consider his federal claims (D) holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure (E) recognizing that district courts should resolve issues related to jurisdiction or venue prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
Output: (B)
must satisfy each fac by VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 924 n. 36 (Alaska 1999) (disapproving of possible broad interpretation and requiring employee's act to have at least some motivation to serve corporation}. 16 . Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 948 (Alaska 1986). 17 . Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158, 175 (Alaska 1999). 18 . 720 P.2d at 948-49. 19 . Goddard v. Grand Trunk Rwy., 57 Me. 202, 222-23 (1869), as quoted in Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966, 970 (1982) (quoting this language as justification for following the course of employment approach); see also Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293, 297 (1948) ("Having, by the constitution of their being, to act solely by ston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 907 P.2d 506, 521 (App. 1995) (<HOLDING>). 22 . See Alaska Evidence Rule 103(a)(1); see 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages award against vicariously liable law firm was not excessive in part because the award is proportionate to the law firms financial position (B) holding a court may not award punitive damages (C) holding that it was appropriate for trial court to award separate punitive damages awards against an employee and his vicariously liable employer because this would enable each award to be based on the two defendants differing financial status (D) holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages (E) recognizing the financial position of the defendant as a factor in assessing a punitive damages award
Output: (A)
"laches embraces not only the element of time, but the added ingredient of prejudicial harm.” 34 Tex. JuR.3d Equity § 46 at 363-64 (1984). This much is evident from the majority’s statement in the same paragraph, that "the State was prejudiced by applicant's fourteen year delay....” Majority opinion at 488, n. 3. 2 . The Legislature has increasingly exercised regulation of procedural rules governing the filing of a writs of habeas corpus: [T]he Legislature since about 1967 has "reworked and expanded procedural Tequi-sites” ... So, it has not been uncommon for the Legislature to "enact laws to render the remedy speedy and effectual.” Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 225 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(McCormick, P.J., concurring); see also Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 611 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.l998)(<HOLDING>). 3 .Article 11.071 was the provision at issue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conclusory opinion may be rejected (B) holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others (C) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (D) recognizing ajlthough presiding judge mccormicks opinion in davis  is labeled a concurring opinion it was joined by a majority of the court and may be regarded as an opinion for the court (E) holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence
Output: (D)
on the part of the jurors to impose the death sentence are similarly problematic. Unquestionably, “appeals to the pecuniary interests of jurors are patently improper.” United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1016, 71 L.Ed.2d 304 (1982). Nonetheless, after further review of the DA’s closing argument, it becomes apparent that these isolated statements did not constitute an overarching theme or even serve as a significant part of the DA’s case. In addition, the jury instructions explained in detail how the jury should base their decision. In the context of the whole closing argument and the entirety of the trial, these remarks did not amount to a constitutional violation. See United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 842, 109 S.Ct. 113, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding any improper delegation did not rise to level of plain error (B) holding that inadmissible testimony did not rise to level of plain error because the overwhelming evidence against defendant leads us to conclude that the error committed did not cause the jury to reach a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached (C) holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error (D) holding that an infringement on the defendants fundamental due process right in the form of a comment on the defendants silence by the prosecution did not rise to level of plain error (E) holding that improper argument about purging jurors community of drug conspiracies did not rise to level of plain error
Output: (E)
the conversations as they occurred. Further, this officer testified that after speaking with Diana Buchanan during her arrest, he was “convinced” that the voice on the tape was Diana Buchanan’s. Although the district court did not elicit testimony as to all the Biggins elements, the officer sponsoring the recording gave adequate testimony to support the recording’s reliability. All the voices were identified, and there was no intimation that the tape had been altered. Further, the testifying officer explained how the recording was made, and testified as to its accuracy. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the tape as an accurate reproduction of relevant conversations. See United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). C Diana Buchanan next argues that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations (B) holding recordings properly authenticated where law enforcement agents who participated in the taped conversations testified that according to their memories the audio and video tapes contained accurate recordings of the conversations that occurred (C) holding that foreign bank documents found inside a persons home were properly authenticated (D) holding that the plaintiffs fourteenth amendment substantive due process claim was foreclosed because the fourth amendment provided protection for their claim that law enforcement officers participated in an unlawful seizure of their mobile home (E) holding that government met its burden with evidence that agents found a firearm and other drugrelated items in the defendants house where defendant engaged in conspiratorial conversations
Output: (B)
lifting more than twenty pounds, any kneeling or crawling, and standing for periods of time greater than fifteen minutes. Dr. Jochims opined that Burress’ disability “virtually eliminated any type of standing job or walking job.” Burress testified that he did not believe he could return to work at any of his prior jobs because of his physical restrictions. He also testified that it was painful for him to sit for any extended period of time. Burress explained that he might try to open a small engine repair business with the help of Iowa Vocational Rehabilitation Services, but also testified to the difficulties of successfully opening such a shop. We have previously held similar evidence provides substantial evidence of a permanent total disability. See Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d at 635 (<HOLDING>); see also Dailey v. Pooley Lumber Co., 233 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when the claimant has established that his impairment prevents him from returning to his previous employment the burden shifts to the commissioner who must produce evidence to show the existence of alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy and which the claimant could perform considering not only his physical and mental capability but also his age education experience and training (B) holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits (C) holding substantial evidence supported permanent total disability where commissioner relied on prior work experience as welder and physical laborer and inability to perform such work in the future ninthgrade level of functioning and doctor testimony that claimant was virtually unemployable (D) holding claimant suffered permanent total disability where functional disability was only twentyfive or thirty percent claimant was fiftynine years of age claimant had little or no education and the injury kept the claimant from performing physical work (E) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability
Output: (C)
U.S. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-85. Since Gamory was not entitled to a Franks hearing, there was no violation of his rights to due process, confrontation, or right to counsel. B. THE RAP VIDEO Gamory challenges the District Court’s admission, over his objection, of the rap video that was described above. He contends the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the video because it was irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay, contrary to the Confrontation Clause, and unfairly prejudicial. In the District Court, Gamory only objected based on Fed. R.Evid. 403 “with regards to prejudicial information that’s contained on this video.” Because he did not preserve his relevancy, hearsay, and Confrontation Clause claims, they are subject to plain error review. See Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1291 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause (B) holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue (C) holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay (D) holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised (E) holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge
Output: (E)
evaluate all of the qualifications of the nominees of the political parties and independent candidates for state offices prior to certifying such nominees and candidates to the probate judges pursuant to [§ 17-9-3, Ala.Code 1975]. If the Secretary of State has knowledge gained from an official source arising from the performance of duties prescribed by law, that a candidate has not met a certifying qualification, the Secretary of State should not certify the candidate.” (Emphasis added.) Rather, the Secretary of State contends that the task of ensuring a candidate’s qualifications is left to the leadership of that candidate’s respective political party, a less than ideal procedure for all challengers because of its partisan nature. See generally Knight v. Gray, 420 So.2d 247 (Ala.1982) (<HOLDING>). Courts in other states have tended to agree 
 Holding statements: (A) holding party must support argument with legal authority (B) holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporters qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict (C) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (D) holding that third party seeking to be reimbursed for costs incurred in responding to discovery request had standing to appeal because its interests were directly represented by its own counsel in the trial court it was effectively bound by the trial courts final order of dismissal the other party would have had the right to appeal the trial courts ruling if it had granted the request for reimbursement and the third party had no other legal remedy to contest the trial courts denial of its request (E) holding that the democratic party had the authority to hear preprimary challenges to the political or legal qualifications of its candidates
Output: (E)
4331. The Rule 12(b)(6) defendants respond that: (1) the ATA does not provide for secondary liability as the statute is silent on that issue, see Al Rajhi Bank Br. 41 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182, 184, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (noting that “there is no general presumption that [a] plaintiff may ... sue aiders and abettors” and that statutory silence regarding aiding and abetting liability “indicates a deliberate congressional choice with which the courts should not interfere”)); and (2) plaintiffs do not allege the actions of the Rule 12(b)(6) defendants proximately caused their injuries, see id. at 29 (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.E , 114 S.Ct. 1439 (<HOLDING>). Second, we held in Rothstein that Congress 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the lower courts erred in finding that the question of the extraterritorial reach of  10b of the securities and exchange act of 1934 was jurisdictional even though nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on this mistake (B) holding that a private plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an aiding and abetting action under  10b or rule 10b  5 (C) holding of wilko equally applicable to cases arising under the securities exchange act of 1934 (D) holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement (E) holding that an implicit congressional intent to impose  aiding and abetting liability could not plausibly be inferred from the statutory silence in  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934
Output: (E)
but rather whether there is at least one common question that will generate a common answer “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 1225 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang, 737 F.3d at 544 (“[s]o long as there is even a single common question, a would-be class can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).”). Here, the question of whether using the name-only matching logic assures maximum accuracy is such a question. See Acosta v. Trans Union LLC, 243 F.R.D. 377, 384 (C.D.Cal.2007) (common question of whether defendants maintained reasonable procedures to assure maximum accuracy satisfied commonality prerequisite); Clark v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2001 WL 1946329, at *2 (D.S.C. March 19, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied for the FCRA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant conceded the accuracy of his prior convictions in his psi report by failing to object to the report (B) holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information (C) holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy (D) holding that question of what reasonable procedures if any have been set up by the defendants to assure maximum accuracy of the information contained in the consumer report including information regarding or related to bankruptcy among other questions satisfied the commonality requirement of rule 23a2 (E) holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments
Output: (D)
Aug. 23, 2010). 3 The Superior Court Rules make the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 applicable for the purposes of discovery in all civil cases. See SUPER. Ct. R. 39. 4 We note that the Superior Court held the Molloys to the wrong standard, requiring them to prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing. Instead, as we stated above, the Superior Court should only have required the Molloys to make a prima facie showing supported by competent evidence. Additionally, the trial court, after reciting the undisputed facts presented by both parties’ submissions, focused on what contacts the defendants lacked, instead of analyzing and considering what contacts BCBSAhad with the Virgin Islands. See Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 332 (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding these errors, because our 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proper focus is reasonableness of inquiry not frivolousness (B) holding that the courts analysis should focus on the nature of the abuse injuries inflicted and the effect of both (C) holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy (D) holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue (E) holding that the proper focus should be on whether the outofstate defendant engaged in any act that might provide the court with jurisdiction
Output: (E)
of undisputed facts as admitted, however, the court implicitly chose to base its decision on all of the evidentiary materials in the record on summary judgment. See Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir.1992) (“In opposing summary judgment, the nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole.”); Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir.1986) (“The District Court shall consider all evidence in the record when reviewing a motion for summary judgment— pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. — and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record ... demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Holtz, 258 F.3d at 73 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while a court is not required to consider what the parties fail to point out in their local rule 561 statements it may in its discretion opt to conduct an assiduous review of the record even where one of the parties has failed to file such a statement (B) holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record (C) holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear (D) holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties (E) holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract
Output: (A)
L.Ed.2d at 1035-86). Unfortunately, the adjective "readily" is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of "readily mobile." Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 765 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver (B) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers (C) holding that ocga  40520 as safeharbor provision requires a defendant to produce a drivers license that was valid at the time the vehicle was being driven (D) holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key (E) holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another
Output: (B)
provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff’s harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. § 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor’s liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician’s liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution
Output: (E)
all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the settlement proposed and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity present their objections.”); Mars s case clearly satisfies all of the necessary requirements. The Class Notice indicates the nature of the pending litigation. Stipulation of Settlement, Ex. F-2, at 4-7. The Class Notice indicates that any 00, 503 (10th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). 117. Though the Court will address all of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (B) holding that notice apprised class members sufficiently of information that notice was intended under the rule to convey (C) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (D) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (E) holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members
Output: (B)