niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County’s comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
Output: (A)
would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority’s opinion that the term “expenses” as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority’s determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
Output: (E)
law also can serve as a basis for revoking an arbitration contract, so long as it does not single out arbitration agreements for special treatment. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-88, 116 S.Ct. 1652. Here, the only possible state statutory ground that Aspen cites for revoking the forum selection clause is N.C. Gen.Stat. § 22B-3, which provides in relevant part: “[A]ny provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.” Aspen correctly concedes that the FAA preempts section 22B-3. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (<HOLDING>); Newman ex rel. Wallace v. First Atl. Res. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that montana law cannot require special notice provisions in arbitration contracts (B) holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract (C) holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration (D) holding that montana law requiring all arbitration provisions to be typed in underlined capital letters was preempted because congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status (E) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable
Output: (D)
1148, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 443, 253 P.3d 535, 544 (2011) (reaffirming Armenta, 42 Cal.2d 448, 267 P.2d 303, after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“[T]he objective of comparative fault is to achieve an equitable allocation of loss. That objective is not served by subjecting the employer to a second share of fault in addition to that assigned to the employee and for which the employer has accepted liability.”); Loom Craft Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Gorrell, 823 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (retaining the McHaffie rule after the adoption of comparative negligence) (“We believe the better rule is to apportion fault only among those directly involved in the accident, and to hold the entrustor liable for the percentage of fault apportioned to the driver.”); McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (<HOLDING>); Gant, 331 Ill.App.3d 924, 264 Ill.Dec. 459, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee (B) holding that the donovan rule applies regardless of whether the injunction is issued before or after the federal court filing (C) holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor (D) holding that with respect to noneconomic damages section 768813 requires that an employers comparative fault must be considered by the jury in a negligence suit by an employee against a manufacturer even though the employer is immune from liability under the workers compensation law (E) holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct
Output: (A)
a threat to life or freedom.’” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993)). The incidents of which Petitioner complains simply do not rise to this level. As a child Tjandra witnessed the burning of a church and the destruction of his father’s business. As an adult he lived with the fear that soccer hooligans would hurt his family. Tjandra, however, was never harmed. While we are troubled by the actions of Muslim extremists in Indonesia, this Court does not recognize “isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury” as persecution. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir.2005). Accordingly, we determine that Tjandra has not been the victim of persecution. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We also determine that Tjandra failed to show 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution (B) holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants against ethnic chinese indonesians which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution (C) holding that petitioner an ethnic chinese christian from indonesia did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution in indonesia because she failed to demonstrate that she would be individually targeted for persecution and country reports indicate that religious discrimination and harassment of ethnic chinese have declined in previous years (D) holding that isolated physical violence and unfulfilled threats perpetrated by serbian citizens against an ethnic albanian in kosovo constituted harassment not persecution (E) holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution
Output: (B)
time to the end of the videotape. III. Defendant moved, and the State cross-moved, for leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s judgment. We granted both motions, 205 N.J. 11, 11 A.3d 371 (2010), and we thereafter granted leave to the Attorney General to participate as an amicus curiae. Before this Court, defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting the findings ajnd conclusions of the trial court that his initial request to speak with his mother was an invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. First, he asserts that the panel was obligated to defer to the factual findings of the trial court and that its failure to do so yiolated the clear directives from this Court, requiring reversal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 17, 974 A.2d 1057 (2009) (<HOLDING>); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244, 927 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (B) holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation (C) holding that a trial courts findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction (D) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous (E) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed
Output: (C)
tail wagging the dog. Certainly contracting parties such as the parties in this case, who entered an agreement to refer “all claims, disputes, and matters arising out of or relating to this Agreement” to an arbitrator, intended this definition to include issues of contractual validity. However, if the court were to accept the Plaintiffs proposed application of the law, then any party who disputed the validity of the contract and was opposed to arbitration could file 22 (11th Cir.2007) (“Thus, even a party’s claim that a usurious finance charge renders the contract as a whole void ab initio is for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide, and is no defense to a motion to compel arbitration.”); Lucey v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2007 WL 3052997 at *4 n. 6 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2007) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Plaintiff has not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants (B) holding that because respondents challenged a contract broadly without challenging the arbitration clause specifically challenge must be considered by an arbitrator (C) holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause (D) recognizing exception to general rule that disputes arising under contract with valid arbitration clause are referred to arbitrator (E) holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator
Output: (E)
key distinctions between Mueller and the instant case: (1) unlike a common law claim for loss of consortium, a cause of action for wrongful death is statutory in nature and may not be judicially expanded; and (2) at the time of the operative event—i.e., Mr. Sapp’s death—California law did not preclude Messrs. Ferry and Sapp from marrying. First, as to the nature of the right being asserted, the Connecticut Supreme Court specifically noted that Mueller concerned the expansion of “the judicially created right to maintain a loss of consortium claim....” 312 Conn. at 660, 95 A.3d 1011 (emphasis in original). Thus, the court was “not constrained”- by the limitations that attend the expansion of “a statutory benefit.” Id. (citing Charron v. Amaral, 451 Mass. 767, 773, 889 N.E.2d 946 (2008) (<HOLDING>)). Here, on the other hand, “[i]t is well 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a samesex partner could not recover loss of consortium damages under a massachusetts statute for injuries  suffered by her partner even though samesex marriage was unlawful at the time the underlying tort occurred (B) recognizing that laws prohibiting samesex marriage humiliate tens of thousands of children now being raised by samesex couples (C) holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother    because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children
Output: (A)
will initiate criminal prosecution against them and their corporate officers, employees, and agents” should they do so. Complaint at 4. Although Appellants h ppellees have taken an oath to enforce Minnesota law. Moreover, § 211B.15, subd. 2, is not a dormant law; it recently was enforced by a county attorney in another county. See State v. Eiben-steiner, 690 N.W.2d 140 (Minn.Ct.App. 2004) (discussing Mower County Attorney’s prosecution of insurance company and insurance company officers who made corporate contributions to a state political party for the purpose of defeating a candidate for Minnesota governor). Appellants “are thus not without some reason in fearing prosecution” should they make the political expenditures that they propose. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302, 99 S.Ct. 2301 (<HOLDING>); see also Butler, 146 F.3d at 560 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute (B) holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative even though the challenged criminal penalty provision had never been applied to plaintiffs proposed conduct where statute on its face proscribed the proposed conduct and where the state has not disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty provision (C) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (D) holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable (E) holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired
Output: (B)
The USSC concluded “[t]he unpardonable vice of the Roberts test.. [was] not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.” Id. at 63, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Upon reconsideration of Roberts, the USSC held the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay statements of a witness absent from trial unless: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, and (2) the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 541 U.S. at 53-54, 58, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, even if a statement is admissible hearsay, the Confrontation Clause may operate to render the otherwise admissible hearsay evidence inadmissible if it is testimonial in nature. See id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (<HOLDING>). Included within the “core class of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (B) holding of crawford applies only to testimonial hearsay (C) holding testimonial evidence implicates the sixth amendment which demands unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination but the admission of nontestimonial hearsay evidence remains the province of each states development of hearsay law (D) holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay (E) holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion
Output: (C)
of the state action is sought. First, federal courts handling in personam cases have generally limited their decisions to enjoin state court proceedings to MDLs or complex national class actions. “Under an appropriate set of facts, a federal court entertaining complex litigation, especially when it involves a substantial class of persons from multiple states, or represents a consolidation of cases from multiple districts, may appropriately enjoin state court proceedings in order to protect its jurisdiction.” Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 235. In fact, several courts have declined to enjoin state court proceedings specifically because the federal action did not involve an MDL or a certified class action. See Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Gooch, 589 F.3d at 330-31 (declining to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no record of a hearing about settlement objections (B) holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable (C) holding that the commissions approval of a nonunanimous settlement agreement did not violate intervenors due process rights because the record shows that the appellant presented arguments in opposition to the settlement during the agenda conference in which the appellant was allowed thirty minutes to present its views in opposition to the settlement agreement (D) holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations (E) holding that an injunction was inappropriate because this was not an mdl case discovery was not complete no class settlement was imminent in fact as far as the record shows no serious settlement progress had been made
Output: (E)
a favorable decision, by which we mean that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys’ fees is an “egregious and illegal use of tax dollars.” NMCGA’s Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim
Output: (E)
that the creditor is entitled to stay relief to collect any additional interest or costs for which the debtor is liable and not paying from a co-debtor); International Harvester Employee Credit Union v. Grigsby, 13 B.R. 409 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) (citing legislative history and stating that the court is to grant relief to the extent that the debtor does not pay the creditor in full, including interest but holding that stay would neither be modified or lifted, giving debtor time to modify the plan to include full pay ment of the claim); Mid Maine Mutual Savings Bank v. Johnson, 12 B.R. 894 (Bankr.D.Me.1981) (interest that has yet to be earned on a loan is recoverable by stay relief as against the co-debtor); West Beneficial Finance, Inc. v. Henson, 12 B.R. 82 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) (<HOLDING>); Timex Federal Credit Union v. DiDomizio, 11 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that junior creditor entitled to adequate protection from interest accruing on senior claim (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding that codebtor relief should be granted to collect accruing unpaid interest (D) holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date (E) holding that gross income can include interest or dividends accruing to fathers ira
Output: (C)
124 S.Ct. 2488, 2495, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated: The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § [1132(a)] of the statute as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies.... Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As such, a claim that “duplicates, supplements, or supplants” the remedies provided by ERISA runs afoul of Congressional intent and is preempted. Id.; see also Kidneigh, 345 F.3d at 1185 (<HOLDING>). However, a claim only falls within ERISA’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding flsa enforcement scheme preempted contract negligence and fraud claims (B) holding that even a state law  regulating insurance will be preempted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of or in addition to erisas remedial scheme (C) holding claims under the kentucky act were preempted because they conflicted with erisas civil enforcement scheme (D) holding that a proper waiver of interest by a nonpartieipant in a plan is not preempted by erisas antialienation provisions (E) holding claim providing additional remedies conflicts with erisas remedial scheme and is preempted
Output: (E)
named as defendants and because Nieto did not file a certificate of review. These assertions misinterpret the concept of immunity. A person or entity is not “immune” from suit merely because that person or entity asserts a successful • affirmative defense. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (noting that while a defense entitles an individual to some protection from liability, he is not entitled to immunity from suit). Rather, immunity from suit means that a plaintiff cannot legally file a lawsuit naming that person or entity as a defendant. See § 24-10-108, 7 C.R.S. (1999) (providing that sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Immunity means that the person or entity is 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (B) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (C) recognizing that an entitlement not to stand trial or face other burdens of litigation is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability (D) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional
Output: (C)
a level of presumed prejudice and does not require a showing of prejudice as required under Strickland; it imposes the lesser burden of having to prove some adverse impact. 4 . In Dixson v. Quarles, 627 F.Supp. 50 (E.D.Mich.1985), the district court utilized this standard. On appeal, this court approved the district court’s holding and analysis under that standard. Dixson v. Quarles, 781 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 411, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). 5 . Assistant Prosecutor Schigur testified at the magistrate’s evidentiary hearing that he would have considered accepting a plea from a single defendant under those conditions. 6 . But see Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 396-97 (Former 5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1982) (<HOLDING>). This holding of Baty has since been 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing conflict (B) recognizing the conflict (C) holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed (D) holding that to demonstrate that a conflict of interest violated his sixth amendment rights a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance (E) holding that habeas petitioner need not demonstrate adverse effect on representation but need only prove an actual conflict to justify habeas relief on account of a conflict of interest
Output: (E)
floor bathroom prior to the date Phillips fell. Riley understood the reason for the water was due to “some type of plumbing problem.” Riley stated there was a problem with the plumbing in the first floor bathroom “at least every other month.” Riley further stated that every time he was in the bathroom, it was “sloppy, with water on the floor and water on the counter. I have never seen it in a clean condition.” Phillips argued a genuine dispute existed as to the element of knowledge because this evidence established that “the maintenance crew knew that the bathroom' in question had had plumbing issues in the past, and had on more than one prior occasion, cleaned up and fixed said plumbing issues.” See Zacher v. Missouri Real Estate & Ins. Agency, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Mo. 1965) (<HOLDING>); Braun, 907 S.W.2d at 374 (holding the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of a puddle of water that had accumulated on a bank floor on a rainy day 20 minutes after the bank opened (B) recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge (C) holding the defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition a wet floor in the second floor hallway because snow and sleet regularly accumulated there in periods of inclement weather (D) holding that in the absence of undisputed evidence the issues of whether a store in a slipandfall case had actual or constructive knowledge of an item on the floor is a question reserved for the jury (E) holding that absent any actual evidence of injury the plaintiffs allegations were too vague to establish the jurisdictional floor for damages
Output: (C)
the I.C. court — perhaps Plaintiffs’ strongest case — determined that “the juvenile court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction.” I.C., 742 So.2d at 404. The I.C. court looked to § 39.453(8)(g), which holds: The court may issue a protective order in assistance, or as a condition, of any other order made under this part. In addition to the requirements included in the case plan, the protective order may set forth requirements relating to reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified period of time by a person or agency who is before the court; and such order may require any such person or agency to make periodic reports to the court containing such information as the court in its discretion may prescribe. See also Henry & Rilla, 720 So.2d at 573 (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiffs and their counsel, if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts (B) holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law (C) holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding (D) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial  and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages (E) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles
Output: (C)
See, e.g., Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 224 A.2d at 623. Nor does Section 2719 of the UCC apply. Instead, Pennsylvania common law controls the enforceability of the “Limitation of Liability” provision here and makes clear that said limitation is valid and enforceable. Lobianco, 437 A.2d at 420-21 (although case involved a sale of goods under Article 2 of UCC, court found § 2719(c) not applicable and therefore applied Pennsylvania common law in holding that a limitation of liability provision in contract for installation of security alarm system limiting liability to cost of repairs was enforceable, and noting clauses limiting liability in security alarm cases have uniformly been upheld in non-UCC cases); Wedner v. Fidelity Sec. Sys., Inc., 228 Pa.Super. 67, 307 A.2d 429, 432 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Magar v. Lifetime, Inc., 187 Pa.Super. 143, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nolostprofits clause in parties agreement was not unconscionable as a matter of law in part because similar clause had been in the agreement between the parties for years (B) holding that a limitation on liability for stolen property in a contract between a jeweler and a burglar alarm company was valid and did not invoke the public service exception where the contractual provision in question was set out in the contract in bold print and neither party contended that the contract in question was not signed by it nor does the plaintiff deny its contents (C) holding in contract for burglar alarm system limitation of liability provision as to damages resulting from vendors own negligence was enforceable and not against public policy or unconscionable where agreement was between two private businesses and plaintiff had 20 years experience with similar provisions in similar service contracts with a competitor of the defendant (D) holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds (E) holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract
Output: (C)
Objections of [the Department] are overruled and [the Department] is ordered to file answers to the Petitions.”). Faced with the Petitions and the demurrers thereto, the Safe Harbor I court had to determine whether or not the facts pleaded in the Petitions were legally sufficient to permit those actions to continue. See Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833, 835 (1976)(stating the role of the court in ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer). Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the Safe Harbor I courts overruling of the Departments demurrer had no greater effect than to permit Appellants Petitions to go forward. The courts ruling in Safe Harbor I, therefore, was interlocutory and not final. See Rosenwald v. Barbieri, 501 Pa. 563, 462 A.2d 644, 646 (1983)(<HOLDING>). In this regard, Safe Harbor I is in direct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired (B) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that an order dismissing preliminary objections is interlocutory but an order sustaining them is not
Output: (E)
to apply a drug trafficking multiplier not employed at the prior sentencing to impose a sentence of seventy-two months. Trotter, 825 So.2d at 367-68. Similarly, in Roberts v. State, 547 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla.1989), the original trial judge imposed the maximum guidelines sentence of concurrent terms of twenty-seven years using an improperly calculated scoresheet. At resentencing, the new trial court imposed the same sentence by departing upward from the guidelines maximum of twenty-two years under the new score-sheet. We approved, holding “that it is proper for the judge to reconsider whether a departure from the guidelines is appropriate when the corrected guidelines score-sheet is before him on remand.” Roberts, 547 So.2d at 131; see Roberts v. State, 644 So.2d 81, 81-82 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>). We have already referred to the attendant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant (B) holding that state may not revoke probation for nonpayment of fine where probationer is unable to pay through no fault of his own (C) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (D) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (E) holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation
Output: (A)
(Fla.1998), the supreme court held that section 784.07 of the Florida Statutes, which enhances the punishment for committing assault, aggravated assault, battery and aggravated battery committed against law enforcement and other specified public officers, does not create new substantive offenses and, by its plain language, does not apply to “attempts” to commit the enumerated crimes. The court explained: The enhancement statute contains no enhancement or reclassification of penalties for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses; therefore, attempted assault and attempted battery as well as attempted aggravated assault and battery of a law enforcement officer are nonexistent offenses. Id. at 385. The State argues that the supreme court has since determined that 05)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, J.S.’s adjudication of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding where school principal was struck while trying to stop student fight transferred intent operates to transfer students intent to commit simple battery on classmate thus negating conviction for attempted battery on school official which requires heightened level of intent (B) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two (C) holding sentence enhancement statute did not create offense of attempted battery on school employee and thus minors adjudication of delinquency should have been based on finding that minor committed attempted battery (D) holding that battery is clearly a factual determination readily resolved by the application of a legal standard defining battery to the facts in question (E) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery
Output: (C)
within the criminal code, the legislature has classified “violations” as offenses “which characteristically involve conduct inappropriate to an orderly society but which do not denote criminality in their commission,” AS 11.81.250(a)(6), and defined a “violation” as a “noncriminal offense [such that] conviction of a violation does not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime,” AS 11.81.900(b)(58). With respect to the size of the fine, it is our view that a maximum fine of $8,000 for a first offender, or $6,000 for a repeat offender, does not in itself connote criminality in the context of the highly regulated multi-million dollar fishing industry. See State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 538 (Alaska 1980) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>). To be considered along with the fine is the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a promissory statement of future intent which does not come to fruition is not an unfair or deceptive practice (B) recognizing purpose of ccpa as protection of consumers from unfair illegal or deceptive acts (C) holding that 5000 civil fine assessable for unfair or deceptive bill collection practice does not render proceedings criminal prosecutions as those found guilty will not suffer severe collateral consequences such as curtailment of future economic opportunities or substantial social opprobrium (D) holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm (E) holding that billings by the cruise line for port charges that were misrepresented as passthrough expenses but kept as additional profits is a deceptive practice under the florida deceptive and unfair trade practices act
Output: (C)
TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 18.06(a) (Vernon 1977); see Swanson v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 104, 18 S.W.2d 1082 (1929). The State asserts that the warrant could not have been signed and issued on March 20, 1987, because (1) according to the complaint, the affiant did not receive the informant’s report until March 25, 1987; (2) the complaint for the search warrant was filed on March 25, 1987; (3) the warrant did not “come to hand” until March 25, 1987; and (4) the warrant was executed on March 25, 1987. The State concludes that the March 20 dates are clerical errors which do not affect the validity of the search warrant. The State argues that courts must interpret affidavits and warrants in a common sense and realistic fashion. Faulkner v. State, 537 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). We agree. However, there is no reason, other 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that court must use common sense in interpreting warrant containing grammatical error (B) holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court (C) holding that in interpreting a contract the actual purpose and intent of the parties must be derived (D) recognizing fraud in the inducement as defense under federal common law interpreting erisa (E) holding that common knowledge and common sense of one skilled in the art must be considered in determining obviousness
Output: (A)
appellant could only be guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he intended that crime to be accomplished. Logic dictates, however, and this Court has recognized that it is impossible for one to intend to commit an unintentional act.” 833 A.2d at 796 (citing Commonwealth v. Spells, 417 Pa.Super. 233, 612 A.2d 458, 461 n. 5 (1992) (“[a]n attempt to commit murder can only constitute an attempt to commit murder of the first degree, because both second and third degree murder are unintended results of a specific intent to commit a felony or serious bodily harm, not to kill”)). See also Commonwealth v. Barnyak, 432 Pa.Super. 483, 639 A.2d 40, 45 n. 5 (1994) (noting that there is no crime of attempted third-degree murder); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa.Super. 39, 456 A.2d 171, 177 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Although this Court has not yet spoken to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants (B) holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible (C) holding that a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree depravedmind murder could not stand under current case law because conspiracy requires both intent to agree and intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy and depravedmind murder is an unintentional killing resulting from highly reckless behavior (D) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (E) holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder
Output: (B)
trustee of a trust. 7 . While Bainbridge focused on whether an express trust had been pled, its holding also implicitly precluded the possibility that a statutory trust had been pled. Bainbridge affirmed the lower court’s order sustaining Stoner's demurrer based on the conclusion that plaintiffs complaint had alleged a cause of action for constructive trust, and that the limitations period for bringing an action based on a constructive trust had run before the filing of the complaint. Id. at 429, 106 P.2d 423. If a statutory trust had been sufficiently pled, the Bainbridge court presumably could not have affirmed the order on the demurrer based on the running of the constructive trust limitations period. 8 . Fanners' & Merchants' Bank of Los Angeles v. Downey, 53 Cal. 466, 468 (1879) (<HOLDING>); Interactive Multimedia Artists, Inc. v. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a real estate partnership involved commerce within the meaning of the act where the real estate at issue was located in texas and the partners lived in illinois maintained a bank account in illinois and borrowed money from an illinois bank (B) holding that bank was equitably estopped from recovering against stock broker for conversion of stock certificates that were assigned in blank and that broker had sold for a bank employee who misappropriated the stock certificates from the bank (C) holding that a bank officer who obtained for his own benefit a profit participation in a real estate venture in exchange for loaning bank money misappropriated a corporate asset (D) holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation (E) holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes
Output: (C)
abstract, underlies the determination of items such as the amount, timing, and characterization of items of income, credit, gain, loss, deduction. Appellant's Br. 43-45. The government, however, fails to explain why partner identity would be necessary to determine those items on the facts of this particular case. As explained above, whether a particular item qualifies as a partnership item turns on the specific facts of the case. The government's abstract argument, therefore, is insufficient. 8 . The IRS did cite I.R.C. § 465 in the FPAAs and assert that the transactions did not increase the partners’ amounts at risk. While the Court of Federal Claims placed substantive significance on the citation to I.R. 195716, at *---, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 695, at *47-49 (Tax Ct. Dec. 10, 1990) (<HOLDING>); and Weiner v. United States, 389 F.3d 152, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (C) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (D) holding that overvaluation penalty did not apply where the taxpayers conceded other grounds of adjustment in the notice of deficiency including that they lacked a profit objective that the property at issue was not qualifying property and that the property was not placed in service (E) holding that the penalty was inapplicable when the deficiency was not due to overstated basis but to a failure to place property into service
Output: (D)
that CPI had sustained actual damages. See DeJong, supra, 162 Ga. App. at 530 (1). There was no evidence that these were liabilities owed by CPI. Consequently, CPI lacks standing to pursue any damages belonging to H&I or NCO. See Augusta Tennis Club, supra, 219 Ga. App. at 94 (1). (b) Oami’s Damages “It is axiomatic that each corporation is a separate entity, distinct and apart from its stockholders.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Accurate Printers, Inc. v. Stark, 295 Ga. App. 172, 175 (1) (a) (671 SE2d 228) (2008). Canton Plaza was owned in the name CPI. Although Oami was the owner of CPI, he did not enter into the contracts underlying this lawsuit — the promissory note and security deed — in his individual capacity. As a result, Oami was not a party to those contracts. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Oami was not entitled to pursue 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity (B) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (C) holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation (D) holding that the individual defendants were acting as principals andor officers of the corporation and therefore there was no third party present to interfere in the relationship to which their corporation was a party (E) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed
Output: (A)