niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
we embark upon our analysis of the Keystone’s Commerce Clause claim as contained in Count I of the amended complaint. The Board Defendants assert that Count I does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, inter alia, Commerce Clause claims cannot be based upon a finding of fact or an analysis of an agency or court. However, as stated above, a reasonable person could read Count I as basing the Commerce Clause claim on the PGCB’s application of the Gaming Act to Keystone. Such “as applied” claims have routinely been deemed cognizable. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (rejecting the “as applied” claim on the merits); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545, 69 S.Ct. 657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Consequently, we decline the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that  16913a violates the commerce clause (C) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause (D) holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause (E) holding rational basis as standard for commerce clause inquiries
Output: (C)
paternity of the children has been determined legally, poten tially disrupting any stability in their family life, and destroying any confidence they may have in our legal system. In my view, even though permitted to modify a paternity order on a more liberal basis than before, “the discretion to modify or set aside otherwise final orders merely because they are entered in a paternity case is a remedy which must be exercised with the utmost caution.” Jessica G. v. Hector M., 337 Md. 388, 401, 653 A.2d 922, 929 (1995). This caution must include considering the welfare of the child. Maryland has consistently required that the best interest of the child standard be applied in matters affecting the welfare of children. See, e.g., Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, 170, 106 A. 337, 338 (1919) (<HOLDING>); Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 117, 607 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child (B) holding in a paternity action that the selection and change of the childs surname from the name chosen by the mother must be based on the trial courts determination that renaming is in the childs best interests and the record must affirmatively show such a name change is required for the welfare of the minor child (C) holding that trial court improperly awarded custody of child to the childs stepmother and grandparents where no pleading in the case was directed at such relief and the childs mother had no notice that the issue would be considered (D) recognizing that irrespective of the outcome of the title 9 hearing the court had the authority under njsa 304012 to retain custody of the child because the childs health and welfare would be at risk if returned to the home (E) holding that the primary concern in deciding child custody cases is promoting the childs highest welfare
Output: (E)
diligent effort' requires such pointed measures as an examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar ree-ord keepers."). {47 Here, the motion for publication Brown filed in 1978 states that "search has been made of the public records of the County of Weld and County of Morgan, State of Colorado." Such a search, if undertaken with reasonable diligence, should have resulted in the discovery of the 1950 Deeds, as they were readily available matters of public record and part of the relevant chain of title. Each document identified Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the city of the Gadbois' residence. Brown could-and should-have discovered this information. See In re Colon, 563 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) 4 48 Sunﬂarly, Brown could-and should-have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that implied easement arose because each deed in chain of title referenced community plan (B) holding that a typographical error in a security deed does not necessarily invalidate the legal description when the deed also referred to the propertys physical address (C) holding that trustees have a duty to exercise the same judgment and prudence that a careful owner would exercise in the sale of his own property (D) recognizing that a per son exercising reasonable prudence and diligence in examining propertys chain of title would have located a deed containing a misstatement in its descmptlon of the property (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title
Output: (D)
(2d Cir.1993). However, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993), the Supreme Court “held that a federal court may not apply a ‘heightened pleading standard’ in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under section 1983.” Rheingold v. Harrison Town Police Dept., 568 F.Supp.2d 384, 394 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160). Following Iqbal and Twombly, Monell claims must satisfy the plausibility standard: It is questionable whether the boilerplate Monell claim often included in many § 1983 cases, including this one, was ever sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Smith v. City of New York, 290 F.Supp.2d 317, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). In light of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss (C) holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss (D) holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra (E) holding that a conclusory boilerplate assertion of a municipal policy or custom was insufficient to survive motion to dismiss
Output: (E)
theory); Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 635 (Iowa 1990) (noting that in a professional negligence action, “[o]rdinarily, evidence of the applicable standard of care—and its breach—must be furnished by an expert”); Brandt v. Richter, 159 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 1968) (allowing testimony of farm safety expert and discussing precedent rejecting argument such testimony improperly altered the standard of care). But expert testimony as to-a legal conclusion is inadmissible in an ordinary negligence action. See, e.g., Bell v. Cmty. Ambulance Serv. Agency, 579 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Iowa 1998) (affirming exclusion of opinion testimony of law enforcement trainer that ambulance driver’s “actions were highly dangerous and likely to cause injury”); Terrell v. Reinecker, 482 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1992) (<HOLDING>). We have not previously decided where the line 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding that a district courts refusal to allow cross examination as to certain prior conduct was not reversible error where the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness (C) holding it was reversible error to allow investigating police officer to testify to the legal conclusion that plaintiff failed to yield the rightofway (D) holding the denial of a bill of particulars was not reversible error because it failed to cause the defendant any prejudice (E) holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court  was reversible error
Output: (C)
or property on which it is found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.” Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1969) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, there must be additional proof of knowledge and control to sustain a conviction for possession. Although control of marijuana may be established by evidence that a person smoked marijuana, the smoke in the hotel room does not provide the additional proof necessary to sustain Petitioner’s conviction. As discussed above, the record in this case supports merely an inference that someone smoked marijuana in the room, not that Petitioner, one of five occupants of the room, smoked marijuana. In Garrison, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767, Judge O’Donnell, writing for t .2d 252, 254 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 9 Md.App. 48, 55, 262 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana (B) holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search (C) holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement (D) holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase (E) holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea
Output: (A)
was not true, and that she was, in fact, involved in an extramarital affair with Sehalk. 2 . Calvert High School has been dismissed as a party defendant. 3 . There is no Count VII in the complaint. 4 . It is unnecessaiy for the Court to address the issue of whether Plaintiff was an "otherwise qualified individual with a disability,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), since she cannot meet the third prong of the test, see infra. 5 . Whether a plaintiff can bring a cause of action for "false light” publicity in Ohio is a matter of some uncertainty. In M.J. DiCorpo, Inc. v. Sweeney, 69 Ohio St.3d 497, 634 N.E.2d 203 (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court expressly declined either to adopt or reject such a cause of action. Appellate Courts in Ohio are split on the issue. Compare Piro and Killilea (<HOLDING>) with Bertsch v. Communications Workers of Am. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (C) recognizing the cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium (E) holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action
Output: (C)
the evidence presented that a reasonable person would, if in Rhoads’s position, feel compelled to resign.” In the instant action, the facts are even more compelling for a finding that the resignation was voluntary than in Rhoads in that all four of the relevant inquiry elements of the voluntariness test are met here. Although Director Howard presented Plaintiff only with a choice between resignation and termination, Plaintiffs admitted assault conviction gave Howard good cause to believe that Plaintiff was subject to termination. That is, although Plaintiff was not ultimately terminated pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 3319.39, Howard reasonably believed that that statute was applicable to Plaintiff and that it would have required Plaintiff s termination based upon Plainti XIS 86385, at *20 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it is not disputed that Plaintiff 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the next morning reasonable (B) holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense (C) recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights (D) holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement (E) holding that the bia rule is reasonable
Output: (A)
that post-1978 refinancing of a debt did not constitute a novation, thus debtor could not avoid liens on equipment it owned prior to the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code where no new money was advanced, no additional security was encumbered, and varying the term of years and interest rates was done to benefit the debtor); In re Hemingson, 84 B.R. 604 (Bankr.D.Minn.1988) (<HOLDING>); Geist v. Converse County Bank (In re Geist), 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58 (B) holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife (C) holding that under minnesota law refinancing and consolidation of purchase money loans did not destroy their purchase money character for bankruptcy lien avoidance purposes (D) holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract (E) holding section 501 applies to both purchase money and refinancing mortgages
Output: (C)
fired him because City officials thought Kaplan was permanently disabled by rheumatoid arthritis. But rheumatoid arthritis did not prevent Kap-lan from fully recovering from his work-sustained injury. Eventually, he did recover. Because Kaplan was allegedly fired based on a misdiagnosis, Kaplan seeks relief under the ADA as an individual who was “regarded as” having a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(3), not as someone who is actually disabled. Whether “regarded as” plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation under the ADA is an issue of first impression for this circuit. Some circuits have considered the issue and concluded that “regarded as” plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an employers awareness of plaintiffs past medical problems does not establish that it regarded her as disabled (B) holding that an employers awareness of an employees impairment without more is insufficient to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as disabled (C) holding that regarded as disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation (D) holding that employees requests for accommodation were not protected activity because the evidence did not show that he had a reasonable good faith belief that he was disabled or perceived as disabled (E) holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada
Output: (C)
Court would apply its own jurisprudence because Braun prescribes an objective just cause standard-the standard Jurgens requests. 65 . Cassel, 14 P.3d at 284 (quoting Univ. of Alaska v. Tovsen, 835 P.2d 445, 447 (Alaska 1992)). 66 . Id. at 284 (quoting Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 304). 67 . See NPMC 2.36.010(A) (stating that purpose of chapter is to "establish and operate a system of personnel administration based upon equitable merit principles and professional methods governing ... removal, [and] discipline ... of employees"), .310(A) (requiring system of "uniform and equitable administration of discipline"), .310(B) (requiring that "discipline [] be administered in increasingly progressive severity"), .321(F) (allowing board to impose "lesser disciplinary action"); Tovsenm, 835 P.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). 68 . See Braun, 816 P.2d at 142. 69 . See 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law (B) holding that words found evaluated and unsatisfactory in personnel regulation required an objective just cause termination (C) holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases (D) holding that termination is an adverse employment action (E) holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable
Output: (B)
or motion has been made in the trial division.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(1) (2005). The State also argues that, because defendant’s counsel encouraged the trial court to submit the offense of sexual battery to the jury as a lesser included offense of first degree rape, it would be unfair to allow defendant to now take advantage of the error which he encouraged the trial court to make. Our Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine of invited error, holding that an appellant may not assign error “to the granting of [his] own requests” at trial. State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 213, 474 S.E.2d 375, 383 (1996). North Carolina courts have “consistently denied appellate review” to defendants who do so. Id.; see also State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409, 415, 420 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Further, our Supreme Court has held that “a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an appellant is not permitted to rely on invited error on appeal (B) holding that defendant may not complain of error he invited and further holding that reversal cannot be based on such error (C) holding a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal (D) holding that a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal (E) holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal
Output: (E)
27 . State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78, 82 n. 8 (Alaska 1973), quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 28 . Williams v. State, 737 P.2d 360, 362 (Alaska App.1987). 29 . Davenport, 510 P.2d at 80. 30 . Id. at 82 & n. 8. 31 . - See Landon v. State, 941 P.2d 186, 190 (Alaska App.1997); Stam v. State, 925 P.2d 668, 670 (Alaska App.1996) (when assessing the trustworthiness of hearsay information contained in a search warrant application, courts presume that police officers and citizen informants are credible sources of information}. 32 . Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322-25 (Alaska 1985) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (C) holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis (D) holding as a matter of law that adaptations of subject matter or expressions in the public domain cannot support a finding of copyright infringement (E) holding that as a matter of state law the aguilarspinelli test continues to govern the evaluation of hearsay information offered to support a search or seizure
Output: (E)
of the INS were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 471(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)). 3 . Petitioner argues that it was inappropriate to look to the treatment of his family members in determining the likelihood of petitioner being persecuted if he returns to Algeria, because his situation is not identical to theirs. This is mistaken; relatives' situations in the home country, while not conclusive, are certainly relevant. See Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 573 ("Without some explanation, the fact that close relatives continue to live peacefully in the alien’s homeland undercuts the alien’s claim that persecution awaits his return”); In re A-E—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (BIA 1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Petitioner also argues that the BIA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness of an aliens fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure (B) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (C) holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities (D) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (E) holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion
Output: (A)
as to whether she was wrongfully discharged by BCBS. Therefore, jurors — not judges — must be allowed to make that ultimate determination. We affirm the court of appeals and remand with directions to order a new trial on Maria-m’s wrongful discharge claim. 1 . See infra part III. A, p. 19. 2 . Mariani’s direct supervisor for both her positions and throughout most of her employment with BCBS was Samuel Weidman. 3 . For a brief period applicable to this assertion, Mariani’s supervisor was Joe Donahue. 4 . Ultimately, the documents were not submitted to the Division of Insurance and were used 2d 730, 733 (Ky.1983)(indicating that public policy must be limited to a constitutionally protected right or statute); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (B) holding that public policy must be evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that the courts may not declare public policy without a basis in either the constitution or statutory provisions (D) holding that public policy may be found in letter or purpose of constitutional statutory or regulatory provisions in judicial decisions of state and in certain instances in professional codes of ethics (E) holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary
Output: (B)
both prolonging this litigation and unnecessarily increasing the confusion and complexity already inherent to such actions. While the Court is not of the opinion that intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) is appropriate, permissive intervention shall be allowed under Rule 24(b). First to be considered will be the SEC’s position that, setting aside any inquiry into the demands of Rule 24, Section 21(g) absolutely bars intervention in any SEC enforcement action without the SEC’s prior consent. Section 21(g) states as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1407(a) of Title 28, or any other provision of law, no action for equitable relief instituted by the Commission pursuant to the securities laws shall be co iv.A. 95-1746-LFO, 1998 WL 29496, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (<HOLDING>). As was noted in SEC v. Prudential Securities, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing intervention is generally impermissible after entry of final judgment and exception allowing postjudg ment intervention in the interests of justice is limited to permitting intervention by affected persons so that an appeal can be taken (B) holding that pursuit of a parallel state court lawsuit involving claims and parties common to the federal action does not justify the district courts intervention in state court proceedings (C) holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention (D) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (E) holding that as applied to case in which applicants for intervention are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound  is squarely before the other court section 21g bars intervention noting that allowing intervention would effectively allow coordination of enforcement action with lawsuit already pending in another jurisdiction
Output: (E)
by the state. Appellant moves to quash the circuit court’s orders stating that he has complied with all pleading requirements to obtain a transcript. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b) allows for this appeal from the revocation of probation and imposition of sentence. Appellant states that the fact that he entered a plea does not preclude him from pursuing his direct appeal with a record on appeal. See State v. Trowell, 739 So.2d 77 (Fla.1999); Ford v. State, 575 So.2d 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The state takes no position on appellant’s motion. In a direct criminal appeal, an indigent is entitled to have all proceedings transcribed at public expense that are necessary to support the appellant’s claims. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (<HOLDING>). A trial court cannot withhold transcripts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (B) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (C) holding that state and federal equal protection guarantees provide similar protections (D) holding on equal protection grounds that meaningful first appeal requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants (E) holding that as a matter of equal protection the state must provide indigent defendants with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools are available for a price to other defendants
Output: (E)
a housing development. Streckfus, 504 N.E.2d at 274. She was an at-will employee but had an employment agreement with the development's management company. Id. at 274-275. Her employment agreement referenced a management contract between the development and the management company, and the management contract provided procedures by which the management company could terminate a Resident Manager. Id. Our supreme court held that "as a matter of law, the Employment Agreement did not contain any job security provision which altered the employment at will relationship. ... Id. at 276. The Trails fail to demonstrate that Eddie states a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the Club's Articles of Incorporation or the Club's standard practices. See also Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 719-720 (<HOLDING>). Even viewing the Trails' breach of contract 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook (B) holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will (C) holding employee handbook or employers printed statement of policy are promises in implied offer of unilateral contract which an employee can accept by beginning or continuing to work for employer (D) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (E) holding that an employee handbook did not constitute a valid unilateral contract between the employee and employer in the absence of adequate independent consideration
Output: (E)
Out, Inc. v. Karras, 469 N.W.2d 380, 385 (S.D.1991). In Time Out, we found the discussion between the alleged conspirators “evidenced little more than common business sense.” Here, discussion during the election about changing management at WEB was similar — a discussion about business, not a conspiracy. Once the WEB Board was constituted, the actions of the individuals became the action of the whole, of the corporate entity. “[T]here is no conspiracy if the conspiratorial conduct challenged is essentially a single act by a single corporation acting exclusively through its own directors, officers and employees, each acting within the scope of his [or her] employment.” Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2nd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003, 99 S.Ct. 613, 58 L.Ed.2d 679 (1978) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the reasoning of the Second 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the vote of faculty and trustees discharging professor was essentially a single act by corporation (B) holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act (C) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation (E) holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity
Output: (A)
cases have held to the contrary. In Sikirica v. Cohen (In re Cohen), Case No. 05-38135-JAD, Adv. No. 07-02517-JAD, 2012 WL 5360956 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. Oct. 31, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 487 B.R. 615 (W.D.Pa.2013), the court rebuffed a chapter 7 trustee’s effort to recover payments made by the debtors for tuition for their children’s undergraduate educations, holding that “[wjhile the Pennsylvania legislature has not yet enacted a statute that requires parents to pay for their children’s post-secondary education, this Court holds that such expenses are reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the Debtor’s family for purposes of the fraudulent transfer statute only.” Cohen, 2012 WL 5360956, at *10. Accord, Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687, 712 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2013) (<HOLDING>). See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413 (in child support 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that funds paid for undergraduate college tuition for debtors children constituted expenditures for necessities that were therefore not avoidable under the pennsylvania uniform fraudulent transfer act (B) holding that debtors daughter was not liable under fraudulent transfer law for the amount her parents paid for her wedding prepetition (C) holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds (D) holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college (E) holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary
Output: (A)
satisfied the definition of “distribution” contained in § 2G2.2(b)(2). It is this finding that Hill challenges. In United States v. Canada, this court held that the term distribution was not limited to pecuniary gain and that it also included distribution based on non-monetary gains. See 110 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir.1997) (“[T]he intended definition of ‘distribution’ for the sake of the guideline is meant to be inclusive of pecuniary gain purposes, but not exclusive of all other purposes.”). Therefore, we held that because Canada’s distribution “was accompanied by an additional element,” namely the potential gain of enticing a minor to have sexual relations with him, the five-level enhancement was warranted. See id.; see also United States v. Fowler, 216 F.3d 459, 460 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, Canada and subsequent cases have 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mailing child pornography to another in the expectation of receiving similar materials in return constituted distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 (B) holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor (C) holding that trading of child pornography is distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 (D) holding that distribution of child pornography to encourage a meeting to engage in sex was sufficient to warrant enhancement (E) holding that trading tapes of child pornography in order to augment a defendants personal collection constitutes distribution 
Output: (D)
body of responsive documents. Rugiero also contends that bad faith in the section 2255 proceeding and his criminal trial obligated the district court to conduct an in camera review of the responsive documents. With respect to the section 2255 action, the parties argue whether the government has played a “shell game” by telling Rugiero there that he can obtain documents for the collateral challenge to his conviction in this FOIA action while saying here that he can receive material through discovery in the section 2255 proceeding. Regarding the criminal trial, the parties debate whether the failure to disclose LaRene’s then-impending indictment constituted bad faith. Relying on the line of cases originating in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (<HOLDING>), see also Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding in context of sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel based on asserted failure of counsel to file appeal established prejudice per se for purpose of establishing habeas review jurisdiction as if proven such failure constitutes denial of a fundamental constitutional right (B) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (C) holding that a conflict of interest independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel  constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioners right to pursue his  1 claim (D) holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal (E) holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se
Output: (E)
is in accord with the vast majority of other decisions which address the issue. See, e.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union SOkA of United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO, 913 F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1683, 114 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991) (co-defendant could not waive appellee’s attorney-client privilege); Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist: v. Continental Casualty Co., 142 F.R.D. 471, 478 (D.Colo.1992) (applying Colorado law in an environmental coverage dispute, the court ruled that for documents subject to a joint defense privilege, “a waiver of the privilege requires the consent of all parties participating in the joint defense.”); Construction Unlimited Corp. v. Woodfield, 1992 WL 157511, at *2, 1992 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1827, at *4 (June 15, 1992) (<HOLDING>); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (D) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case
Output: (A)
lawsuit [need] not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth in [McDonnell Douglas].’ " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (emphasis added) (first alteration in original) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)). In both contexts, demonstrating that relief is "plausible” is part of the requisite "prima facie showing.” Put differently, there is nothing inconsistent about saying that the defendant must make a "prima facie showing” in one case and saying that the defendant must show that relief is "plausible” in another case. 1 . Sea, e.g., Export Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1470-71 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that party was an agent under the plain terms of his contracts (B) holding that a party waived the right to allege contrary facts on appeal eg that defendant was not an agent or instrumentality of the mexican government for sovereign immunity purposes where the party alleged that the defendant was an agent or instrumentality in its complaint (C) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party (D) holding that an entity majorityowned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is itself an agency or instrumentality of that foreign state under the fsia (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
Output: (B)
important state interests); see also 17A Moore’s Federal Practice § 122.05[2][d] (3d ed.2012) (describing the extension of Younger). We have come to view O’Shea as standing for the more general proposition that “[w]e should be very reluctant to grant relief that would entail heavy federal interference in such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial system.” L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir.1992). O’Shea compels abstention where the plaintiff seeks an “ongoing federal audit” of the state judiciary, whether in criminal proceedings or in other respects. E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 476, 184 L.Ed.2d 297 (2012); see also Kaufman v. Kaye, 466 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that abstention was required where the relief sought would be overly intrusive in the administration of the new york court system (C) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process
Output: (B)
a sufficient supporting brief for purposes of the Local Rules. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Whiting’s motion to sever Cable-La’s third-party complaint against Whiting and GAI from the Cable-La-Williams matter. This results in two separate act nge Corp., 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir.1988), continues to govern the distinction between mandatory and permissive forum-selection clauses in this circuit, because the Supreme Court’s subsequent overruling of the case was limited to a holding on an unrelated issue. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989). The language contained in the forum-selection clause in the contract between Cable-La and Williams is unquestionably mandatory under Sterling Forest. 840 F.2d at 251-52 (<HOLDING>). 4 . The court notés that, while the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forumselection clause which stated that any dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the competent greek courts was permissive rather than mandatory (B) holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory (C) holding clause reading the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue shall be in california to be mandatory (D) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory because it provided for exclusive jurisdiction and venue in a particular court (E) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad
Output: (C)
plaintiffs accepted by executing the Agreements and returning them to Chase, along with the supporting documentation. The subsequent breach of the TPP contract by Chase cost plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue other options in the effort to salvage their homes (such as restructuring their debts under the bankruptcy code), or remedying the default by renting or selling the home or looking elsewhere for cash. To add insult to injury, Chase compounded plaintiffs’ predicament by tacking improper fees and servicing costs on loans that already were in default. CAC ¶ 246. Chase concedes (as it must) that in Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2010 WL 4825632 (D.Mass. Nov. 24, 2010), this court rejected Chase’s arguments against a similar theory of lost opportunity damages. See id., at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). This court also held that the TPP Agreements 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a partial failure of consideration can support a claim for breach of contract (B) holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract (C) holding that plaintiffs had set forth a viable claim for breach of contract where as consideration plaintiffs had agreed to assume duties beyond their preexisting legal obligations such as agreeing to undergo credit counseling (D) holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
Output: (C)
if erroneous at all. See generally United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1337-38 (D.C.Cir.1991). The district court recognized Suschanke was the one who “sought [the child pornography] out,” and Suschanke brought the offensive images into the home computer. Even if the abrogation of United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629-30 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming a district court’s decision to consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a lengthier sentence) is forthcoming, “nothing ... prohibits sentencing courts from considering rehabilitative needs for other reasons, such as in selecting a shorter term of imprisonment.” In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C.Cir. 2009). See generally Pepper v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 1241, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The district court merely stated, “I also 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that resentencing is required (B) holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation (C) holding that a district court is not to consider evidence of postconviction rehabilitation in deciding whether to resentence under crosby (D) holding district courts may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a more lenient sentence at a defendants resentencing (E) holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation
Output: (D)
§ 371, and armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)(d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Collins contends that the district court grossly abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35(a) motion. We disagree. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the stipulation entered into by the parties and read to the jury provided sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could infer that the deposits of the banks were federally insured at the time of the offenses alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Chapel, 41 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that a bank official’s testimony is not required to prove the federally-insured status of a bank); United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161,164 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that parties may stipulate to facts from which jurisdiction may be inferred (C) holding that a prosecutors motive may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts (D) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (E) holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances
Output: (B)
in trying all of the offenses together. The remedy for joinder which is permitted under Rule 8, but is prejudicial, is found in Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 14 provides in relevant part: "If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. The district court is in the best position to make, this determination. See Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516, 80 S.Ct. 945, 948, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960). 10 . See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 570 & n. 20 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 340, 116 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that other courts have applied rule 8b to cases involving multiple defendants but stating that it seems to us that contrary to the jurisprudence in other circuits when a joinder of offenses charged against the same defendant is challenged the literal meaning of the rule 8 requires application of rule 8a irrespective of whether multiple defendants are involved in the case (B) holding that when there are multiple defendants rule 9b requires that a plaintiff allege facts specifying each defendants contribution to the fraud (C) recognizing rule (D) recognizing district court application of the same rule (E) recognizing the same rule in texas courts
Output: (A)