niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
did not suffer any physical injury and that she did not recall being hit by Taylor. We do not sustain the ALJ’s legal conclusion that Taylor engaged in physical abuse of a patient as defined by Administrative Order 4:08-C.3. On this record, we are satisfied that Taylor’s conduct constituted “inappropriate physical contact” within the meaning of Administrative Order 4:08-C.5 and that removal would be an excessive sanction. Accord Harcum v. New Lisbon Dev. Ctr., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 324, 1996 WL 433210 (1996) (reducing physical abuse charge to charge of inappropriate physical contact because employee did not act with malice and patient was not injured); Lyew v. Morris View Nursing Home, 93 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 673, 1993 WL 470770, aff'd, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 718, 1994 WL 757555 (App.Div.1994) (<HOLDING>). IV We acknowledge the responsibility of DHS 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sanction of removal for nursing home attendant who was found to have hit patient suffering from dementia should be reduced to penalty of sixmonth suspension because act of hitting patient was isolated instance in which patient was aggressor (B) holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave (C) holding that no rehabilitation act violation occurred when nursing home discharged patient with behavioral problems because no reasonable accommodation existed (D) holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied (E) holding issue of vicarious liability was for jury where patient did not have opportunity to choose physician who was provided by hospital
Output: (A)
is fixed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042, independent of an inconsistent state law.” 374 U.S. at 164-65, 83 S.Ct. 1850. Section 4042 requires that the BOP “provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence” of persons in its custody. § 4042(a)(2). Pappas argues that, under Muniz, the duty of care in § 4042 trumps any inconsistent Oklahoma duty of care. We need not address that question because the duty of care established by § 4042 does not appear inconsistent with Oklahoma law, which has noted the general rule that custodial personnel “must exercise reasonable care and diligence to protect those in [their] custody from known or reasonably perceivable dangers.” Seiler v. City of Bethany, 746 P.2d 699, 700 (Okla.Ct.App.1987) (c Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Pappas asserts that the district court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence (B) holding that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the protection of the work product doctrine (C) holding the law presumes that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction (D) holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions (E) holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies
Output: (C)
relates to Melissa’s financial condition and ability to support her children. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gehl, 486 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 1992) (“[T]he new spouse’s income can be considered as it relates to the divorced custodial parent’s overall financial condition and ability to support the child.”); Page v. Page, 219 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Iowa 1974) (considering income of noncustodial parent’s spouse in deciding the appropriate amount of child support). Melissa and Jeff also have a child of their own, whom they must support on the couple’s income. This new dependent is a consideration in deciding whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. See Iowa Code § 598.21C(l)(d). There was significant disagreement at the modification trial about Scott’s income. Scott p wa 1991) (<HOLDING>). In the 2008 temporary child support order, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiff entitled to depreciation after repairs in determining the vehicles value at the time of the theft allowance must be made for depreciation then accrued (B) holding that depreciation could not be deducted from cost to repair building to its condition prior to fire under actual cash value policy (C) holding that depreciation in land value caused by a material change in a highway grade which made access to the property difficult is compensable (D) holding that the exspouse should be allowed a deduction for depreciation determined under the straight line method of depreciation rather than under the accelerated method (E) recognizing that determination of appropriate sentence to be imposed should ordinarily be determined by the trial court on remand rather than at the appellate level
Output: (D)
that it had not discriminated against Brummett, including the fact that Innovex had fired a substantially younger employee at the same time for violations of the same company policy. Finally, the district court dismissed as “stray remarks” several age-related comments Innovex employees allegedly made to Brummett, concluding that they were either too ambiguous to be probative or had been made by individuals without authority or influence over Innovex’s decision to terminate Brummett’s employment. See, e.g, Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir.2000) (“In order for an age-based comment to be probative of an employer’s discriminatory intent, it must be direct and unambiguous____”); Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Concluding that Brummett was thus unable to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that stray remarks are insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination and concluding that a comment by the decisionmaker that he selected a candidate for a promotion because the candidate was a bright intelligent knowledgeable young man was a stray remark that did not raise an inference of age discrimination (B) holding that stray remarks made almost two years prior to employment action was outdated and lacking in apparent probative value (C) holding that a comment made by a person who played no role in the employment decision was a stray remark that lacked any probative value as a matter of law (D) holding managers discriminatory remark indicative of age bias where buttressed by other evidence of discrimination and thus remark was not an isolated comment (E) holding hispanic supervisor will understand you better to be stray remark
Output: (C)
Eleventh Amendment purposes. The problem with relying now on the decision we made in Mumford is that we nowhere addressed the issue of who would pay for a damage judgment against the court of common pleas. The Supreme Court has now explicitly told us that this is the most important factor bearing on the Eleventh Amendment question. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997) (stating “that the question whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued”); Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994) (<HOLDING>). This court has followed suit; we now 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the vulnerability of the states purse as the most salient factor in eleventh amendment determinations (B) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (C) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (D) recognizing that the most important factor in determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to eleventh amendment immunity is whether a judgment against it would be paid from the state treasury (E) recognizing the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from suing a state
Output: (A)
its concern with Plaintiffs’ lack of proof of causation and specific damages when the court entered summary judgment against them on their injurious falsehood/business disparagement and wrongful interference with business relations claims, and Plaintiffs’ testimony at trial failed to further illuminate their assertion that Petta’s statements caused them special damages. Plaintiffs’ testimony about special damages was unsupported by any documentary evidence, including any business operations analysis, tax returns or similar exhibits, or expert testimony, and Plaintiffs’ own con-clusory statements provided little quantifiable evidence of their claimed damages, leaving the jury to speculate regarding special damages. See Gilmore v. Cohen, 95 Ariz. 34, 36-37, 386 P.2d 81, 82-83 (1963) (<HOLDING>). ¶43 Furthermore, the evidence presented does 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not entitle a person to a federal remedy for every breach of contract by a state thus unless every breach of every public contract is to be actionable as a violation of constitutional rights it is necessary to distinguish between mere contract rights and constitutional property rights internal citations and quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) recognizing in a breach of contract ease that the plaintiff in every case should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as from the nature of his claim and the available evidence is possible citations omitted (E) holding that one method of computing damages for a breach of contract is the contract price less the reasonable cost of completion
Output: (D)
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
Output: (E)
that other items in the car, including the backpack, contained evidence of a methamphetamine lab. In fact, the evidence permits no other plausible inference. Therefore, the trial court properly determined that the search was supported by subjective probable cause. We turn to the issue of objective probable cause. Defendant argues: “From an objective standpoint, the backpack did not suggest that it contained crime evidence. Dahl testified that the backpack was closed and that he could not see inside the pack to determine its contents. Although defendant had previously been searched incident to his arrest, the only thing found on defendant’s person was a bindle that ‘didn’t appear to have much in it.’ * * * That evidence would not support probable cause to believ 68 P2d 1338 (1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cromwell, 109 Or App 654, 658, 820 
 Holding statements: (A) holding warrantless search of defendants automobile four days after impoundment was permissible under requirements of fourth amendment and state constitution where officers had probable cause to search vehicle when it was impounded and that probable cause continued between the time of the impoundment and the search (B) holding that officers had probable cause to search the defendants van for drugs where among other facts the defendant had voluntarily retrieved half a gram of methamphetamine from the vehicle and had acted surreptitiously in doing so (C) holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime (D) holding that where other evidence established probable cause to believe that the defendant possessed controlled substances investigating officers had probable cause to search the defendants purse for similar evidence (E) holding that the protective sweep of a van was lawful where officers stopped the van on reasonable suspicion that the driver had just committed an armed bank robbery and officers could not see inside the van to determine whether other occupants posed a danger to them
Output: (B)
v. al-Kidd, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, the Second Circuit has from time to time cited case law from other circuits to show that courts generally were divided over the lawfulness of a particular behavior, as extra support for a finding that the behavior was not clearly unlawful. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107 n. 10 (citing case law from the Eighth Circuit to support conclusion that challenged behavior was not clearly unlawful at time); see also Doninger, 642 F.3d at 350 ("Finally, our conclusion that whatever right Doninger may have had was not clearly established is buttressed by the similarities between this case and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.2007), 10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., 447 F.3d 569, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding with respect to a general motion for directed verdict that it raised the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence on venue an essential part of the governments case internal quotation marks and citation omitted (B) holding that a ruling from a prior decision of this court becomes the law of the case that cannot be challenged in a later proceeding quotation marks omitted (C) holding that in the asylum context the bia must provide an individualized analysis of how changed conditions will affect the specific petitioners situation citation and internal quotation marks omitted (D) holding that the challenged conduct or statement must be directed at the familial relationship with knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect that relationship internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted
Output: (D)
1983). But the FTCA provides only damage actions. Thus there is a broad world to which the military-specific language of the Privacy Act can apply, while Feres leaves the FTCA’s similar language with little or no role. More generally, we have understood Feres to create the equivalent of a “clear statement” rule. In finding it applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), we said: ... Feres itself represents a refusal to read statutes with their ordinary sweep. The unique setting of the military led the Feres Court to resist bringing the armed services within the coverage of a remedial statute in the absence of an express Congressional command. Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 469 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1986) (emphasis added); see also Coffman v. State of Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ada and rehabilitation act do not apply to the military absent a clear direction from congress emphasis added (B) holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable (C) holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment (D) holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act (E) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act
Output: (A)
sa-blefish fisheries, but upon the work he performed during his marriage to Betty Jo. As the trial court noted, in order to fish during the qualifying years for the IFQs, Greg expended marital assets and effort, and Betty Jo is entitled to share in the benefits received from these efforts. Greg also contends that Ferguson should not control because the court in Ferguson did not consider the “economic impact [on the fisher] of a marital division” of IFQs. Greg contends that the IFQ program acts as a legal disability to fishers, and that quota shares are analogous to workers’ compensation benefits or early retirement benefits in that their transferability compensates a fisher for lost future earnings which are not marital property. See Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165-66 (Alaska 1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Frahm, 45 Cal.App.4th 536, 53 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that health benefits earned during marriage are marital asset of insured spouse (B) holding that workers compensation disability benefits received by disabled spouse are marital property only to the extent that they compensate for loss of earnings during the marriage (C) holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage (D) holding that retirement benefits are marital property because they would be a form of deferred compensation funded by money earned during the parties marriage (E) holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property
Output: (B)
of the property. See C.R.E. 602; C.R.E. 701. However, there is no evidence in the record which establishes that Pomeranz ever paid a bill relating to the maintenance of the property or that he was personally responsible for any aspect of the maintenance because McDonald’s had been responsible for the payments for the past fifteen years. Because no adequate evidentiary foundation was laid for Pomeranz’s estimation of maintenance expenses on the property, it is impossible, absent pure speculation, to ascertain from the record how Pomeranz obtained the $4,800 estimation. The trial court's factual findings relating to future maintenance expenses are not sustained by either competent or adequate evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 170 Colo. at 13, 458 P.2d at 758 (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented by the petitioners on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (B) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence (E) holding that where the original drug quantity determination is not specific enough for the district court to determine whether it has the authority to reduce a defendants sentence under  3582c2 that court may make new findings of fact that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing proceedings
Output: (D)
goods in storage bay as instructed with person falsely identifying himself as representative of consignee despite observation of representative loading U-Haul truck discharged contractual obligation and was not negligent). Because Transus did this, and PolyGram has not shown that the goods were in diminished condition at the time of said delivery, the allocation of risk of loss shifted to PolyGram. Moreover, liability extinguished under both the Carmack Act and the Federal Bills of Lading Act. Even were summary judgment inappropriate on the issue of liability under these Acts, however, the court also finds that attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 are not recoverable under the Carmack Amendment. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding no liability under false claims act unless certification prerequisite to payment (B) holding the state law claims were not preempted (C) holding that carmark act preempted state law claims including those for liability for payment of claims (D) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law (E) holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted
Output: (C)
asserted or argued that he did not know the marshal was a federal employee attempting to arrest him or that he acted out of a reasonable belief that he was being attacked by a private citizen. Thus, the district court did not plainly err in failing to issue such an instruction. See Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that the district court used the pattern jury instruction in the instant case. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 2.09. By giving an instruction that tracked the pattern instruction and that was a correct statement of the law, the district court did not plainly err. See United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 354 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Leach finally contends that the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that convictions under  111 require at least some form of assault (B) holding that under  111 the defendants knowledge of the official status of the victim is generally irrelevant (C) holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty (D) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant (E) holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind
Output: (B)
an indemnitee’s own negligence. The phrase must be read in the context of the entire contract. If the contract warrants it, though, the use of the phrase “any and all” may indicate, as COSCO contends, that the parties intended an indemnitee be indemnified, even for the indemnitee’s own negligence. See, e.g., Economy Mechanical Industries, Inc. v. T.J. Higgins Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 150, 155 (1997) (interpreting contract language which provided that “[indemnitor] will at all times protect, indemnify and save and keep harmless the [indemnitee] against and from any and all loss, cost, damage or expense, arising out of or from any accident or other occurrence” to provide indemnification for an indemnitee’s own negligence (emphasis omitted)); Rios v. Field, 132 Ill. App. 2d 519, 522 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Haynes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 47 Ill. App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad (B) holding that the modifying phrase in any manner is sufficiently broad to include attempts to evade taxes by concealing assets to protect them from execution or attachment (C) holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   (D) holding that the judicial admission exception did not apply to prove the existence of an oral agreement for the sale of stock where the defendant offered his deposition testimony acknowledging that the parties agreed to have a document transferring the stocks drafted by an attorney because the defendants references to the agreement were in terms of a tentative or incomplete agreement and because any admission of such a contract would necessarily have to include a statement of the price and quantity terms (E) holding that the use of the phrase any and all even if it is the sole descriptive reference to the cause of the injury claim or loss indemnified can render an agreement sufficiently broad to include indemnification for claims or injuries caused by indemnitees own negligence subject to any limitations in the agreement
Output: (E)
in plan, interior arrangement or building features not subject to public view.” St. 1955, c. 601, § 8 (c). The quoted provision made it clear that the Nantucket historic districts commission was to review only features visible to the public in its h reted the term “structure” as defined in local by-laws. In Galligon we found that a billboard was not a “structure” pursuant to language which expressly defined both “structure” and “sign.” The zoning by-law at issue in Williams provided no definition of “structure,” and we 05, 208 (1967) (finding that combination of platform that extended at ground level out over a steep slope, a retaining wall, and door to a storage space under the platform was a “structure” under a zoning by-law); Nash v. Commonwealth, 174 Mass. 335, 336 (1899) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Wilbur v. Newton, 307 Mass. 191, 193-194 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aqueduct entirely underground in places was a structure for purposes of the mechanics lien statute (B) holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah (C) holding that the corresponding structure is a controller (D) holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes (E) holding that a leakage of an underground petroleum tank was excluded from coverage by a similar definition of pollutants
Output: (A)
did not arise out of her employment, given that she was no longer employed at Riverside when she was injured. Respondents counter that, for purposes of the NIIA, the employment relationship continues for a reasonable amount of time after an employee quits or is fired, so that Fanders was still considered an employee when she was injured, and thus, the NILA applied and was Fanders’ sole remedy. The NIIA only covers injuries that arise out of and in the course of the injured claimant’s employment. NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace. Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding employees under age discrimination in employment acts adea parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law
Output: (A)
United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.1988). We held that a district court may empanel an anonymous jury if it “conclud[es] that there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection [ ... and] tak[es] reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that his fundamental rights are protected.” Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1090 (quoting United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir.1991)). The Group I appellants assumed that a trial court’s decision to empanel and sequester an anonymous jury was reviewable only for abuse of discretion, an assumption implicitly followed by the Edmond court. See Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1091 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (B) holding that voir dire of jury may be delegated to magistrate judge where defendant consents to the delegation because the district court retains the ultimate decision on empaneling the jury (C) recognizing the district courts broad discretion to utilize civil procedures in a manner that is useful and equitable to the parties (D) holding that the empaneling of an anonymous jury is left to the district courts discretion subject to the broad constraints noted above (E) holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
Output: (D)
that already presented, the Court would have to hold, out of fairness to both sides, counsel to the time allotted. And that means it’s been expended. These portions of the transcript not only demonstrate that the mother has failed to advise us of any prejudice resulting from the complained-of action by the trial court, but that she also failed to advise the trial court of any claimed prejudice. In that regard, the quoted portion of the record makes it clear that she did not make the required offer of proof at trial as to the evidence that she would have presented at trial if given more time, such that even if the mother’s point relied on were not wholly defective, she failed to preserve her claim for appellate review in any event. See Brady v. Brady, 39 S.W.3d 557, 560-61 (Mo.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). As a result of the substantial deficiencies 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to preserve an issue for review a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial (B) holding that to properly preserve an objection to the trial courts imposing a time limit for the presentation of evidence the objecting party must make a specific and definite offer of proof informing the trial court of the evidence that is being excluded by the limitation (C) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (D) holding party must make timely and specific objection at trial to preserve issue for appellate review (E) holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence
Output: (B)
expression is not limited to speech that could be construed as discrimination on the basis of union membership. Rather, it broadly protects “any views or opinions on the subject of employer-employee relations.” TenmCode Ann. § 49-5-606(a)(5). This language, particularly “any views” and “the subject of employer-employee relations,” comprehends a range of expression much broader than opinions on the desirability of unionism or union membership. And even though most cases dealing with employer expression, including those cited by the district court, involve comments on the merits of impending unionization in the employer’s company, case law upholding the employer’s right to expression is not limited to this circumstance. See Fla. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 751-53 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding judges letter to the editor advocating against gay rights constituted speech fully protected by the first amendment (B) holding that letter that was copied to the schools board of directors was written pursuant to her duties and was not protected speech (C) holding that  8e protected an employers speech undertaken to correct any misunderstandings informing employees that their signed union cards were not confidential and that the employer retained the right to discharge or discipline employees for cause (D) holding that company letter to employees advising them of their right to ask for an opportunity to obtain legal counsel before speaking with a nlrb agent following a failed union election was protected speech under the first amendment and  8c (E) holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline
Output: (D)
131 (1992); Pugh v. State, 103 Md.App. 624, 650-51, 654 A.2d 888, cert. denied, 339 Md. 355, 663 A.2d 73 (1995); Maryland Rule 4-324(a). In the present case, appellant argued at trial that the State was required to produce the cocaine she distributed to Trooper Elzey in order to establish that she had committed the offenses charged. This was not a correct statement of law. The nature of the substance distributed to the trooper could have been proved by other, sufficient evidence. One 1979 Cadillac Seville v. State, 68 Md.App. 467, 471-2, 513 A.2d 927 (1986) (admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle). See also Best v. State, 79 Md.App. 241, 255, 556 A.2d 701 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In her brief, appellant broadens her 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine (B) recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence (C) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (D) holding intent to intimidate or threaten may be proved by circumstantial evidence such as ones conduct or statements (E) holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction
Output: (B)
Amended Complaint, however, the Seeligs were compelled, for personal reasons, to withdraw as class representatives and from the litigation, in general. 2 . In their Reply Memorandum, Plaintiffs make clear that the area of contamination is a single, commingled groundwater plume that allegedly was caused by Defendants' combined volatile organic compound ("VOC”) spills. Therefore, throughout the remainder of this Opinion & Order, the Court will refer to the area of contamination underlying the proposed subclass (a) members' properties as the "commingled groundwater plume” or "commingled plume." 3 . The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs's Amended Complaint and are assumed true for purposes of deciding this Motion. Mayo v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 148 F.R.D. 576, 579-80 (S.D.Ohio 1993) (<HOLDING>). 4 . According to the Ohio EPA, "Urbana is 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the courts obligation to assume all factual allegations to be true and to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (B) holding that courts must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving partys favor and accept the nonmoving partys evidence as true (C) holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom (D) holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences (E) holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
Output: (C)
or irrelevant differences. Richardson, 107 N.M. at 694, 763 P.2d at 1159 (quoting Espanola Hous. Auth. v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787, 789, 568 P.2d 1233, 1235 (1977)). As Amicus points out, “[ejpidemiologic studies of workers exposed to radiation, including [u]ranium miners, have established a [five to fifteen] year latency period for development of lung cancer from exposure to radiation.” As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court in a similar case, because available medical knowledge shows that workers exposed to radiation can develop lung cancer “beyond the magical [ten-year], post-exposure period,” the ten-year limitation for bringing such claims is arbitrary and not based on substantial or real distinctions. See Caruso v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 15 Ohio St.3d 306, 473 N.E.2d 818, 821 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Stevenson v. Industrial Comm’n, 190 Colo. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an eightyear limitation period applying to silicosisrelated deaths unconstitutional under a variation of the rational basis test (B) holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach (C) holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification (D) holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction (E) recognizing heightened rational basis scrutiny
Output: (A)
claims, specifically, those tort claims that are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations or proceedings involving the employment or discipline of clergy. As demonstrated above, the plaintiffs’ tort claims are intertwined with ecclesiastical investigations and proceedings involving the employment and discipline of Reverend Greer. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ tort claims would trigger the same type of impermissible investigation prohibited by Ex parte Bole, regardless of the plaintiffs’ third-party status. Because the petitioners have demonstrated that the First Amendment protections set out in Ex parte Bole are applicable to this case, I would grant the relief requested in the petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1 . inn.Ct.App. Sept. 22, 1997) (<HOLDING>); Missouri: Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship (B) holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing negligent hiring and supervision claims but that first amendment would not be violated by adjudication of claim of intentional failure to supervise priest (C) holding that first amendment barred negligent hiring and supervision claim against archdiocese for alleged sexual abuse of minor by priest (D) recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention (E) holding that negligent retention and supervision claims based upon a pastors sexual contact with parishioners was barred by the first amendment
Output: (E)
the court held that the discretion of the trial court to impose such sanctions has constitutional limitations. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. When a trial court dismisses a ease based on a claimant’s conduct during discovery, it adjudicates the claimant’s cause of action without regard to the merits of the case. Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate a party’s claims unless that party’s conduct justifies a presumption that his claim lacks merit. Id. at 918. The court further explained that “[s]anctions which are so seve d 167, 171 (Tex.1993) (death-penalty sanctions held inappropriate where nothing in the evidence suggested Remington’s argument lacked merit, a finding necessary to a justify death-penalty sanction); Koepp v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). Denton failed to appear for his deposition 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable (B) holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions (C) holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where plaintiff refused to name coworkers who used drugs and was late in answering interrogatories because of attorneys illness because there was no indication of bad faith (D) holding that without a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the attorney in question sanctions pursuant to this statute are inappropriate (E) holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a new affidavit and report complying with section 2622 where there was no indication that the plaintiffs failure to file the report earlier in the litigation was in bad faith
Output: (C)
an unconstitutional prior restraint on First Amendment expression for two reasons. First, Vermont’s vanity plates are a nonpublic forum and access is, by definition, selective. Second, as discussed in subsections II.A.2(a) and (b), ante, Vermont’s restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Vermont’s vanity-plate regime is governed by Vt. Ann. Stat. tit. 23, § 304(d) and by the state regulation implementing that provision — that is, vanity plates are issued subject to the granting of permission by an authorized state official. While § 304(d) grants the state the power to revoke “offensive” or “confusing” vanity plates, the regulation limits this discretion by specifying content and includes the right to a prerevocation hearing. Cf. Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because we have concluded that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy (B) holding that a vanity plate is a designated public forum where a state allows groups to place various slogans and designs on license plates (C) holding that a state statute authorizing the rejection of vanity plates deemed contrary to public policy violated the first amendment because it granted unfettered discretion to state officials (D) holding that a vanity plate is not a public forum (E) holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy
Output: (C)
the authority for which the section provides is being abused.” The government has provided no basis upon which to distinguish the reasoning of In re Letter of Request. In addition, that reasoning finds support in decisions of at least one other circuit and the Supreme Court. See In re Letter Rogatory from Justice Court, 523 F.2d 562, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Although it is well-established that records of account belong to the bank and that a depositor may not prevent their disclosure on [F]ourth or [F]ifth Amendment grounds, it does not follow that appellant lacks standing to challenge the district court’s power to issue á subpoena under the terms of an authorizing statute.” (citations omitted)); see also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court concludes that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena (B) holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena (C) holding that because a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable  the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the subpoena recipient who seeks to avoid compliance but recognizing that a court may be justified under some circumstances in requiring the government to reveal the general subject of the grand jurys investigation before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of persuasion (D) holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the fourth amendment when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable (E) holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena
Output: (A)
States v. Verdunn, 89 F.3d at 802). Although the Debtor disputes whether he is liable on his unsecured debts stemming from the Michigan and Ohio law suits, the issue of whether a debtor is hable for a particular debt is separate from whether that debt is liquidated as of the filing date for purposes of § 109(e). See Slack v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (In re Slack), 187 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir.1999) (“Even if a debtor disputes the existence of liability, if the amount of the debt is calculable with certainty, then it is liquidated for the purposes of § 109(e).”); In re Sylvester, 19 B.R. at 673 (“the fact the claim was disputed was not relevant for purposes of section 109(e), and the fact it was subject to defenses and counterclaims was likewise not relevant”); In re Jordan, 166 B.R. at 202 (<HOLDING>). As the Court in In re Jordan determined, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an attempted setoff in response to a debtors postpetition lawsuit was enjoined by  524a2 notwithstanding that acts giving rise to action occurred prepetition (B) holding that legal malpractice claim against chapter 7 debtor arose prepetition when the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred and therefore was subject to the debtors discharge (C) holding disputed claim for misappropriation of funds is noncontingent and liquidated because all events giving rise to liability occurred prepetition and the amount of the debt can be calculated (D) holding that in a dispute between insurer and insured in which the insurer admitted liability hut disputed the amount of damages it was only after entry of a judgment upon that verdict that the claim became liquidated (E) holding that every prepetition debt is discharged subject to the provisions of  523
Output: (C)