niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
before section 362(b)(3) can come into play. An act that both creates and perfects a lien postpetition cannot so qualify. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Excel Eng’g, Inc. (In re Excel Eng’g, Inc.), 224 B.R. 582, 589-90 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (refusing to recognize validity of postpetition creation and perfection of mechanic’s hen because creditor had no lien at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy); Water-vliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274, 281-83 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990) (finding postpe-tition creation and perfection of property tax lien barred by automatic stay because no prepetition interest existed); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y v. Ballentine Bros. (In re Ballentine Bros.), 86 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. D.Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); North Side Lumber Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that creation of a postpetition tax levy based on a prepetition assessment was barred by the automatic stay
Output: (E)
for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or offense described in section 841, 952(a), 955, or 959 of title 21, and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. The Attorney General can delegate this authority to the United States Attorneys. See 28 U.S.C. § 510 (authorizing the delegation of the Attorney General’s functions to other officers, employees, or agencies of the Department of Justice); 28 C.F.R. § 0.59 (delegating authority under 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032 and 5036 to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, and authorizing further delegation to the United States Attorneys); United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). In a similar case, this Court held that this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a precondition to chevron deference is congressional delegation of administrative authority (B) recognizing the medicare statutes broad delegation of authority (C) holding that sovereign immunity bars an attorneys lien against the united states (D) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (E) recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys
Output: (E)
to overcome this presumption by persuading the finder of fact, by a prepon derance of the evidence, that the income tax assessments are erroneous. See Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.1980). Klimek has failed to offer any evidence that the tax assessments are incorrect in the amount the Government claims. He has never challenged in the Tax Court the Notices of Deficiency or the Certificates of Assessments and Payments for tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992. Nor has Klimek ever rebutted or even responded to the Government’s requests for admissions regarding tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992, except to return them with the words “Refused for Fraud” scrawled across them. See Lane v. United States, 328 F.2d 602, 603 (5th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). Given the fact that Klimek bears the burden 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances (B) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (C) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is  justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (D) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence (E) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
Output: (C)
106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989); Freedom, from, Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir.2000). Here, the program had a religious component only to the extent that individual students selected religious material to present. Rogers submitted no evidence to suggest that school personnel encouraged the students to choose religious as opposed to secular presentations or that they otherwise gave the impression of endorsing religion. Nor did he support his inference that the program’s theme was meant to solicit performances with religious content. The mere fact that some religious material was presented does not establish that the “principal or primary effect” of the program was to advance religion. See Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F.Supp. 1405, 1411-12 (C.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, No. 97-55369, 1998 WL 133602 (9th Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party held in prisons visiting room did not have the effect of advancing religion where it was dubbed a christmas party and some songs contained religious lyrics (B) holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise (C) holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion
Output: (A)
the report and recommendation did not notify the parties that they must file timely objections to preserve their right to appellate review. He argues that the firm waiver rule should not be enforced in the absence of such an explicit notification. While we have held that the firm waiver rule is inapplicable when pro se litigants are not given explicit notice of the rule, see id. at 659, we have never extended that practice to counseled cases. We decline to do so today, because we expect counsel to know the rules. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 5 (10th Cir.2007) (“[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the road without being given personal notice of them by the district court.”); United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (B) holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its own local rules even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by plaintiffs that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion (D) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery (E) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings
Output: (B)
object, if the claimed error is fundamental in nature.” Charlton v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind.1998). Our supreme court has recently observed, however, that claims of fundamental error should not be raised during a post-conviction proceeding. Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002). “The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies to direct appeals. In post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal.” Id. Accordingly, freestanding fundamental error claims in a post-conviction petition may not be raised. See Martin v. State, 760 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, our supreme court has recognized 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that postconviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a superappeal or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct appeal (B) holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court (C) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (D) holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act (E) holding that freestanding claim that the trial court committed fundamental error in giving a jury instruction after deliberations had begun was unavailable in postconviction proceedings
Output: (E)
project). Finally, Morgan Keegan’s allegations fail to show that the municipality would have obtained any profit or benefit from the construction of this facility, except for job creation and other economic stimulation. In fact, any payments Defendants received as a result of this project were to be used to repay bondholders. [Doc. # 25-2 at 326-27]. Consequently, this case is distinguishable from those cases cited by Morgan Keegan in which the municipality actually operated a business for profit. Cf. Junior Coll. Dist. of St. Louis, 149 S.W.3d at 448 (“[W]hen a municipality is in the business of selling water to customers for profit or revenue, it is engaged in a proprietary function.”); Pierson v. Cumberland Cnty. Civic Ctr. Comm’n, 141 N.C.App. 628, 540 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 247 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the percentage of minority faculty need not approximate the percentage of minority students (B) holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation (C) holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  (D) holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied (E) holding that the leasing of an event center was proprietary where the public entity charged each promoter a fee for leasing the facility and received a percentage of the total ticket sales
Output: (E)
of such partnership arrangements have in the past far outweighed the temporary benefits. Id. at 276, 161 P.2d at 881-82 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court of New Mexico distinguished the agreement of the company to pay Clovis $130,000.00 in annual installments, because the agreement did not “place any burden or charge against any of the revenues of the City, current or otherwise, and did not bring about any liability of the citizens of the City for the levy of any taxes, or bring about any burden of any kind whatsoever upon the City of Clovis or its citizens, and, therefore, does not come within the purpose of the constitutional inhibition.” Id. at 276-77, 161 P.2d at 881. See Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 100 N.M. 342, 347-48, 670 P.2d 953, 958-59 (1983)(<HOLDING>). Likewise, the Attorney General of New Mexico 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though labeled a tax on conducting retail liquor business challenged statute was nevertheless a penalty designed to punish the violation of state liquor laws (B) holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry (C) holding that legislative diminishment of tax obligation constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to the liquor industry in violation of the antidonation clause (D) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (E) holding husbands early retirement subsidy was not marital property as a vested right but an option contingent upon his continued employment and eventual qualification for the subsidy in nine years based upon value of the pension frozen at the time of dissolution
Output: (C)
’ II. A. Smith first complains that the district court erroneously refused to admit a 1996 Consumer Reports article regarding the stability of 1995 and 1996 Isuzu Troopers. The article gave 1995 and 1996 Isuzu Troopers a “not acceptable” rating because Consumer Reports’ testing showed that those vehicles had a propensity to roll over. The article, however, specifically disclaimed its applicability to earlier year-model Troopers: “The Not Acceptable rating does not apply to 1994 and earlier Troopers, has been applied to allow the admission of the preliminary or interim evaluative opinions of agency staff members. Indeed, to apply Rule 803(8)(A) in the fashion Smith suggests would swallow whole Rule 803(8)(C) and its limitations. Rule 803(8)(C) provides a hearsay exception r.1988) (<HOLDING>); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal irs referral report because it did not contain agency factual findings (B) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea (C) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (D) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (E) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it
Output: (A)
induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?” See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 491. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492. The Eleventh circuit had already previously rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine. Because the in-tracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court’s silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); Sacramento Valley Chapter of National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (B) holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products (C) holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff (D) recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation (E) recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed
Output: (B)
than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” FedEx argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the overtime claims of 24 of the 25 Plaintiffs asserting such claims. First, FedEx argues that the ten Plaintiffs with overtime claims who stopped working for FedEx before January 1, 2007 are exempt from the MMWL. Before January 1, 2007, the MMWL excluded from its definition of “employee” any “individuals employed by an employer” subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 290.500, Historical and Statutory Notes, 2006 Amendment (West 2012) (providing that “individuals employed by an employer covered by 29 U.S.C. § 203” were not subject to the state statute); Doyel v. McDonald’s Corp., 2009 WL 350627, at *2 (E.D.Mo. Feb. 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). FedEx contends it is an “employer” within the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that employees may not contract away their flsa rights (B) holding that claims arising from a june 2007 loan were governed by the preamendment statute (C) holding that the statute plainly exempted  all employees who were covered by the flsa before january 1 2007 (D) holding under flsa (E) holding that maintenance workers in a building that did produce goods for interstate commerce were covered under the flsa
Output: (C)
so or how you do so will be up to you. You will have also some exhibits which will go back as well. If you think it’s helpful in your deliberations to review and peruse the exhibits, they will be available to you throughout the course of deliberations. Whether you use them or how you use them again will be up to you. I will arrange with the deputy to have some food and drinks served to you. Whether you partake of that or not and how you work with your deliberations will be up to you. It’s perfectly [sic] to eat and deliberate at the same time.” Mindful of the forfeiture considerations discussed herein, our earlier observations must be modified given the practical considerations of objecting to a judge’s comments to the jury. See People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295 (1963) (<HOLDING>); People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 736 N.E.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waived its objections on appeal to an affidavit presented in support of a motion for summary judgment by failing to raise its objections to the trial court (B) recognizing the practical difficulties of contemporaneous objections to a trial judges conduct (C) holding that contemporaneous objections were required to preserve for appeal improper comments on defendants right to remain silent (D) recognizing states duty to preserve relevant evidence where practical (E) holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them
Output: (B)
trekker from Nepal who agreed to transport a suitcase from Thailand to the United States. Id. at 658, 663. Customs agents found the suitcase to contain three kilograms of 87% pure heroin, and the defendant was ultimately convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and importation of heroin. Id. at 658. In affirming the reduction of the defendant’s offense level under the safety valve, the Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant "provided the authorities with substantial information concerning the offense, including the names of those involved abroad," while maintaining that he was innocent of knowing the contents of the suitcase. Id. at 663. Vazquez has not so cooperated with the Government. Cf. United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 189 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.1999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not eligible for the safety valve provision because he never even met with the government to offer information and suggesting that given his undisputed association with members of the conspiracy he would have some perhaps useless relevant information to provide the gov ernment even if he were innocent of drug dealing himself (B) holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy (C) holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to find that the defendant participated in the conspiracy even though he did not have a relationship with all of his fellow coconspirators (D) holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel
Output: (A)
opens the door by suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of an abused child. As noted below, many other courts have allowed testimony that a child victim’s behavior or symptoms are “consistent with” child abuse trauma as rebuttal evidence. That is not what happened in this case. Just two years ago, in State v. Favoccia, the Supreme Court of Connecticut thor oughly reviewed the conflicting precedent and policy considerations in reaching the same conclusion we reach today. 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002, 1012-22 (2012). The Favoccia court overturned its own precedent to hold that “the trial court abused its discretion in permitting [the expert] to testify about the complainant’s behaviors being consistent -with those generally characteristic 6, 671 N.E.2d 984, 985 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chamberlain, 137 N.H. 414, 628 A.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding admission of expert testimony not erroneous where expert described typical traits and characteristics of sexually abused children (D) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case (E) holding that the testimony of an expert witness is admissible when the witness outlines the general characteristics of sexually abused children and then states that the victims symptoms are consistent with those characteristics
Output: (D)
refer to the road by its correct designation, despite, its description as "state highway 27” throughout the record below. 2 . We note that, in response to INDOT’s motion to dismiss, Union County designated an affidavit of its sanitarian, which is evidence outside of the pleadings and thus would ordinarily convert this matter into a motion for summary judgment, since it was not expressly excluded by the trial court. See Ind. Trial Rule 12(B). However, it is apparent from the trial court's disposition of this motion that the designated affidavit played no part in its decision. Thus while it was error for the trial court to not formally exclude the affidavit in its order, that error was harmless. Cf. Reich v. Lincoln Hills Christian Church, Inc., 888 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). We therefore shall examine this case from a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  (B) holding the trial courts failure to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment after an affidavit was filed in response to the motion was harmless error where the affidavit had no impact on thedecisive statute of frauds issue (C) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (D) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (E) holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment
Output: (B)
our state Supreme Court to determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant”); cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377, 381-82, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996) (in determining whether it is proper for a jury to “ ‘shoulder [the] responsibility [of construction of a written instrument] ... to preserve the substance of the [Seventh Amendment] common-law right of trial by jury,’ ” noting that judges not juries, ordinarily construe written documents (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1987)); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964) (<HOLDING>). Some have argued that Blakely prohibits the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment (B) holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts (C) holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process (D) holding that continued incarceration after the lawful basis for custody expires violates due process under the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that an attempt by a prosecuting attorney to serve two masters violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
Output: (C)
present case is controlled by Jordan. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for the court of appeals to conduct a harm analysis. 1 . Before voir dire, appellant filed his election for the jury to assess punishment in the event of conviction and his sworn application for community supervision from the jury in which appellant swore that he had never before been convicted of a felony in the State of Texas or any other state. 2 . There is no evidence in the record regarding whether appellant appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. 3 . See Milburn v. State, No. 07-04-0100-CR, 2005 WL 1412055, at *1, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 4679, *2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo June 16, 2005) (not designated for publication). 4 . 77 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). 5 . TexCode Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 4(e). 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed (B) holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction (C) holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court (D) holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court (E) holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court
Output: (A)
a suspected crime.”); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 970 P.2d 722, 728 (1999) (“An officer must therefore be able to articulate an objective rationale predicated specifically on safety concerns, for officers, vehicle occupants, or other citizens, for ordering a passenger to stay in the vehicle or to exit the vehicle to satisfy article I, section 7.”); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 711 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1999) (“[W]e conclude that art. 14 requires that a police officer, in a routine traffic stop tection under the state’s constitutional provision because they conclude that the officer’s order to exit and/or remain in a vehicle is not a minimal intrusion upon an individual or that it constitutes a separate and distinct seizure. See, e.g., Sprague, 824 A.2d at 544-45 (<HOLDING>); Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d at 112 (stating that an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant stopped in middle lane of traffic to exit his vehicle (B) recognizing that an order to exit ones vehicle is a further seizure within the meaning of article eleven (C) holding that for general safety purposes an officer may routinely order the driver of a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit the vehicle because when the vehicle is already stopped the slight additional intrusion associated with being directed to exit the car can only be described as de minimis (D) holding that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle (E) holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983
Output: (B)
147, 158 (2d Cir.2003); Stamelman v. Fleishman-Hillard, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8318, 2003 WL 21782645, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003). 14 . Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). 15 . Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir.2005) (citations omitted). 16 . In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F.Supp.2d 281, 323 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (citations omitted). 17 . Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.2002). 18 . Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995)). 19 . Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S.Ct. 992. Accord Conley, 355 U.S. at 48, 78 S.Ct. 99 ("The Fed 632-37 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 25 . Baur, 352 F.3d at 632, 637 (finding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party who had demonstrated an injury sufficient to confer standing to appeal from an agency decision could raise  any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the agency (B) holding that in the context of food and drug safety suits enhanced risk qualifies as sufficient injury to confer standing (C) holding that allegation of cipa violation is sufficient to confer standing (D) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (E) holding that if an injury is unexpected from the workers point of view it qualifies as an injury by accident
Output: (B)
has been described as “collateral, subordinate and incidental in character.” Bassell v. W.Va. Cent. Gas Co., 86 W.Va. 198, 103 S.E. 116, 118 (1920). Thus, a lessor’s right to free gas generally only accrues upon production of gas in paying quantities. See Caylor v. Mendenhall, 127 Kan. 290, 273 P. 172, 173 (1929). Several issues have arisen regarding free gas clauses in oil and gas leases, however, this appears to be the first case to address whether such “free” gas must be in a useable condition. Often the dispute concerns the interpretation of “a principal dwelling” in the lease language, the source free gas, the quantity of free gas, or the geographic scope of the use of free gas. See, e.g., D.R. Lauck Oil Co. v. Breitenbach, 20 Kan.App.2d 877, 879-80, 893 P.2d 286, 289 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 241 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs were properly enjoined from using excessive amounts of gas not contemplated by the free gas clause in the lease (B) holding provision in oil and gas lease authorizing lessor to use gas for agricultural purposes contained no geographical limitations (C) holding a gas storage and oil lease providing for free gas for domestic use at the principal dwelling house on said lands and for low cost gas for domestic use on said lands in the event of storage limited the lessor to low cost gas at one principal dwelling (D) holding the lessee in providing free gas to the lessor owed the lessor the same duty of care as a regulated public utility would owe its customers despite express lease language placing the risk of using the gas on the lessor (E) holding assignment of oil and gas lease is subject to business and commerce code section 2601
Output: (B)
and counterclaims under ch. 93A were tried to the court along with the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The jury found against PH on all of its claims except for s., 900 F.2d 397, 399 (1st Cir.1990) (requiring either “bottom-line litigatory success” or “catalytic effect in bringing about a desired result” for social security plaintiff to be entitled to attorneys’ fees). Moreover, outside of the civil rights context, an award of zero damages, supported by a rational basis in the record, is generally considered a judgment for defendant. See, e.g., Ruiz-Rodriguez v. Colberg-Comas, 882 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that award of zero damages is “commonly viewed as, in effect, a judgment for defendant”); Poulin Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 861 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Farrar, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 573-74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial (B) holding that upon award of zero damages plaintiff has failed to establish an essential part of its proof and judgment should have been entered for defendant (C) holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification (D) holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal (E) holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith
Output: (B)
2005 WL 1522232, *3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32266, *9 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, these courts conclude that a debtor’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtors could cure the default until the delivery of a sheriffs deed to the successful purchaser rendering the sale complete under new jersey state law (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding that the debtors were entitled to cure the mortgage arrearage through their chapter 13 plan because the creditors failure to record the sale deed prior to the bankruptcy filing rendered the sale incomplete under state law (D) recognizing the language of  1322c1 as a minimum floor in cutting off the debtors right to cure and permitting the debtor to cure until the deed was delivered to the successful bidder which would complete the sale under new jersey law (E) holding that  1322c1 is not ambiguous that the debtors cure right terminates on the date of the foreclosure sale regardless of the intricacies of the state foreclosure sale process and refusing to attach significance to the legislative record indicating that more extensive cure rights under state law persevere
Output: (D)
While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103) — which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b) (“An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal.”). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant’s release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc  1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
Output: (D)
339 (2005)). As to appellant’s assertion of error by the court in permitting the cautionary instruction to include the additional language, appellant’s claim is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Generally, a petition under Rule 37.1 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). To fall within the very limited exception to that rule, the ground must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, such as a lack of jurisdiction, a violation of double jeopardy, or the right to a twelve-member jury. Id. at 26-27, 238 S.W.3d at 32. Appellant did not raise an issue in this claim that falls within the exception. See Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168, 282 S.W.3d 795 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In appellant’s fifth point on appeal, he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper
Output: (C)
questions, Pennsylvania counsel also raised objections about the identity of documents Bayer’s counsel reviewed with the witnesses in deposition preparation. Defendants of course have no objection to the Court coordinating with Judge New on this matter and involving him in its resolution as appropriate. Nonetheless, it is appropriate for this Court to resolve the issue to preserve efficiency and consistency in Xarelto actions, particularly in light of PTO 23 (¶ H.M.38), which contemplates that this Court will resolve any "disputes during or relating to depositions” taken in tire MDL, See, e.g,, 28 U.S.C, § 1407 (MDL procedure exists to “promote the just and efficient conduct of [related] actions” and serve “the convenience of parties”); Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 20.313 (<HOLDING>). * V 4 Defendants respectfully request that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (B) recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia (C) recognizing need for coordinating rulings on discovery disputes (D) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (E) recognizing applicability of discovery rule
Output: (C)
this instruction. However, the court later stated that it had allowed the aforementioned questionin ounsel argued in his closing argument the very point which he contends he was denied the opportunity to make — that Elliott’s willingness to take a lie detector test demonstrated a lack of consciousness of guilt. The Commonwealth argues that the PCRA court’s denial of relief on this ineffectiveness claim is correct because the underlying claim of trial court error is meritless. First, it argues that this Court has already ruled that testimony regarding a defendant’s purported willingness to undergo a polygraph examination is inadmissible for the same reasons that a defendant’s refusal to take such test is inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Saun ders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442, 445-46 (1956) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth further submits that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when counsel denied the petitioner the right to appeal neither the strickland prejudice prong nor the harmlesserror test is appropriate (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance (D) holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious (E) holding that because a polygraph test is not judicially acceptable it is obvious that neither a professed willingness nor a refusal to submit to such a test should be admitted because a defendants willingness is merely a selfserving act or declaration which obviously could be made without any possible risk
Output: (E)
error. In Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the determination whether two crimes are functionally “ ‘consolidated for sentencing,’ and hence ‘related,’ ” id. at 61, 121 S.Ct. 1276, should be reviewed deferentially because the determination is “bounded by[ ] case-specific detailed factual circumstances,” id. at 65, 121 S.Ct. 1276. We have similarly held that “[w]e review a district court’s finding as to whether prior convictions are factually related for clear error.” United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 338 & n. 15 (2d Cir.1999); see United States v. Patasnik, 89 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1143 (2d Cir.1995). But see United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d 884, 894 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lopez, 961 F.2d 384, 386 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that whether a statute has been properly construed is a question of law subject to de novo review (B) holding prior to having been superseded by mapp that the determination of factual relatedness is subject to de novo review (C) holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review (D) recognizing de novo standard of review (E) recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review
Output: (B)
States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), is similarly misplaced. Descamps concluded that a defendant’s prior California burglary conviction did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2285-86. Given that Descamps and Donawa address other federal statutes and do not address whether an offense under Florida Statutes § 893.13(l)(a) is a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), their holdings cannot establish plain error in this case. Hartsfield’s prior convictions for the sale of, or the intent to sell, a controlled substance are not convictions for simple possession of a controlled substance. See Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188, 188, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 364 (2006) (<HOLDING>). As a consequence, under the terms of the plea 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that simple possession is not a lesserincluded offense of distribution of a controlled substance (B) holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance (C) holding that because some form of intent to manufacture import export distribute or dispense is not involved simple possession of a controlled substance does not constitute  a controlled substance offense for purposes of united states sentencing commission guidelines manual  4blla (D) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute (E) holding that possession of listed chemical with intent to manufacture controlled substance is controlled substance offense
Output: (C)
distribution crimes applies when “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” by the defendant. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The adjustment is appropriate “if the weapon is present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id., comment. (n.3). Thus, the guideline clearly requires that before the enhancement is imposed, the government must establish that a weapon is at least present. This circuit has consistently held that in order for § 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a dangerous weapon was present when the crimes ioere committed, and that it was not clearly improbable that the weapon had some nexus with the criminal activity. See United States v. Shields, 44 F.3d 673, 674 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Bost, 968 F.2d 729, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding enhancement not appropriate because firearms were seized from defendants home thirtyseven days after last known drug sale occurred (B) holding that a city which brought an action for forfeiture of firearms recovered from a drug suspects residence was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of drug possession thus it could not prove the firearms were used in drug transactions and could not forfeit them (C) holding that unloaded firearms qualify for this enhancement (D) recognizing firearms as common tools of the drug trade (E) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home
Output: (A)
factors,” the resulting sentence is procedurally reasonable. Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1114. As long as the court takes into account all of the relevant considerations, the order in which it does so is unimportant. We do not suggest that a heartland comparison is sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the district court’s responsibility to weigh all the relevant factors. When the Guidelines were mandatory, a court could not depart from the recommended range unless the case was exceptional. If the court determined that the case was within the heartland, then its analysis was effectively over. Now that the Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory, there are no mandatory requirements as to when a district court may sentence a defendant to an above- or below-Guidelines sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 595 (<HOLDING>) Even in routine, heartland cases, the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness (B) holding sentencing courts decision to impose a sentence six years longer than advisory guidelines range was reasonable because district court employed  3553based reasoning to justify the variance (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that requiring extraordinary circumstances to justify a variance comes too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the guidelines range (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
Output: (D)