niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
was no allegation that the losses put the plan in "at-risk status” under the statute, which is contested here, the court concluded that it was more important that the complaint did not allege that the plan sponsor "is financially compromised and thus unable to adequately fund the Plan so that it may meet its future obligations to pay all vested benefits.” Id. 14 . The Non-Transferee Class does cite cases regarding the per se ERISA violations listed in § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106. But these cases do not stand for the proposition that participants can sue for § 409 relief without showing particularized injury to themselves. Courts addressing § 406 claims still assess whether plaintiffs have constitutional standing. See, e.g., Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir.2011) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plan beneficiaries had consl rational standing to bring  406 claim for injunctive relief although not for disgorgement or restitution which require particularized injury where beneficiaries could not show individual harm because they received entire amount of promised benefits (B) holding that an individual plaintiff could not proceed under  1132a2 because it affords no remedies to individual beneficiaries (C) holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury (D) holding that the proceeds of a pension plan could be garnished after they had been paid out to the beneficiaries (E) holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services
Output: (A)
or both liability theories, and because we find there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of gender discrimination, infra, we need make no determination as to whether or not the court erred in granting judgment to Plaintiff as a matter of law on her constitutional claim of a violation of procedural due process. Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2199, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“[P]rior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”). Our analysis has the effect of mooting the district court’s holding as to the due process claim, leaving that ruling without legal effect. Cf. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 93-95, 113 S.Ct. 1967, 1973-74, 124 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked (B) holding that the invalidity of a provision for a de novo trial in superior court in the appeal section of an act did not affect the validity of the remainder of the appeal section (C) recognizing that in patent infringement eases a finding of noninfringement prevents a court from reaching an affirmative defense asserting the patents invalidity because the validity issue becomes immaterial to the disposition of the case and that any determination of the patents validity by the district court in such a case should be vacated (D) holding that the rationale of the consent decree cases was fully applicable where a stipulated dismissal and settlement resolved pending patent litigation and there were other licensees and alleged infringers who had an incentive to challenge the patents validity (E) holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case
Output: (C)
did attempt to make an offer of proof or other motion to enable the trial court to decide the appropriate scope of his testimony. See Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 443. Defendant also argued trial counsel’s claimed failure to object to improper comments by the prosecution. According to defendant, trial counsel did not object when the prosecution impermissibly highlighted his failure to testify, made an issue of trial counsel’s sincerity, misled the jury by suggesting that defendant’s theories of intoxication and reasonable doubt were sufficient in law only if the jury believed both defenses, and referred to him as a “pervert.” These alleged errors were raised on direct appeal as instances of prosecutorial misconduct which denied defendant a fair trial. See Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 445-47 (<HOLDING>). We cannot say, however, even assuming defense 
 Holding statements: (A) holding errors based on the constitutional rights to confrontation and due process may be waived by failure to object at trial (B) holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report (C) holding failure to object in timely fashion at trial results in waiver of issue for appeal (D) holding claimed errors waived for failure to timely object (E) holding that claimed errors of law are subject to plenary review
Output: (D)
if it: (1) “legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment,” (2) “upon an identifiable individual,” and (3) “without provision of the protections of a judicial trial”). The enabling act establishing the Board and its duties does not meet these criteria. 2. The district court properly dismissed Read’s claims against Administrative Law Judge Gutman on the basis of judicial immunity. Read failed to a the Oregon Medical Board was not error. The district court properly applied Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), and Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 1999), in determining that the Board members’ functions were sufficiently analogous to those of a judge or prosecutor. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922-29 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Mishler, 191 F.3d at 1009 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board (B) holding that members of idaho state board of medicine their staff and their counsel were entitled to absolute immunity under butz and mishler (C) holding that the nevada state board of medical examiners and its members are functionally comparable to judges and prosecutors  and are entitled to absolute immunity for their quasijudicial acts (D) holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony (E) recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing
Output: (B)
it is not excessive and does not work as an affirmative disability or restraint for ex post facto purposes. Williams, 574 Pa. at 507, 832 A.2d at 973-74 (“Such liberty is, of course, tempered by the reality that registrants deemed sexually violent predators [with respect to the statute commonly known as Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9] may, as a consequence of public notification, be foreclosed from certain employment positions, particularly working with children. But any such restriction is in direct furtherance of the government’s compelling interest in keeping sexually violent predators away from children to the extent possible.”). Regarding the second factor, such an employment ban has not been historically regarded as punishment. See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146 (<HOLDING>); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196, 18 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction (B) holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that forbidding felons from working as union officials is not punishment (D) holding that one who is precluded from working a narrow range of jobs is not disabled (E) holding that prohibiting felons from practicing medicine is not punishment
Output: (C)
by an objective standard. Lieb, 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir.1986). One view of an “improper purpose” is any purpose other than one to vindicate substantive or procedural rights or to put claims of a right to a proper test. GREGORY P. Joseph, Sanctions, 13(B)(2) at p. 216. But simplifying and isolating the “purpose” of certain litigation tactics is not always helpful. See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.1995) (reversing sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 and the court’s inherent power for the filing of a complaint “with a view to exerting pressure on defendant through the generation of adverse and economically disadvantageous publicity” where complaint did not lack foundation in law or fact); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 154 F.R.D. 675, 682 (D.Ariz.1993) (<HOLDING>). As indicated earlier, an objective basis for 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation (B) holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose (C) holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose (D) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (E) holding that sanctions under rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twentyone day safe harbor period before it is filed with or presented to the court
Output: (C)
Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents 217 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Source Book ]. 25 . Throughout the legislative history of the Act, Congress recognized the need to protect civil rights claimants whose financial circumstances would foreclose litigation aimed at vindicating deprivations of important nonpecuniary rights. S.Rep. No. 1011, at 2, reprinted in- 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910 (“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights ... then [they] must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court."); H.R.Rep. No. 1558, at 1, reprinted in Source Book 209 (<HOLDING>); Rivera, 477 U.S. at 577, 106 S.Ct. at 576 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title viis broad venue provision was necessary to support the desire of congress to afford citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances (B) recognizing that it is important that the judicial remedy be full and complete and stating because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel they are unable to present their cases to the courts (C) holding that the illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax or imposition is not of itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the united states in such a case the aggrieved party is left to his remedy at law when that remedy is as complete practicable and efficient as the remedy in equity (D) recognizing a criminal defendants right to present a complete defense (E) holding that the trial court violated the defendants allocution rights when the court in the defendants absence did not afford  defense counsel an opportunity to present information in mitigation of punishment
Output: (B)
Temex Energy, Inc. v. Haste & Kirschner (In re Amarex, Inc.), 96 B.R. 330, 332 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1989) (citing In re Stratford of Tex., Inc.). To be sure, “(a) Chapter 11 Plan, whether it is one contemplating reorganization or the liquidation of assets, is nothing more nor less than a contract between a debtor and the creditors of the bankruptcy estate.” Retail Marketing Co. v. Northwest Nat’l Bank (In re Mako, Inc.), 120 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr.E.D.Okla.1990), on subsequent remand on other grounds, 127 B.R. 474, 476 (1991). That the Plan was later confirmed by court or der changes not the validity of the contract. See In re Stratford of Tex., Inc., 635 F.2d at 368; see also United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37, 95 S.Ct. 926, 934, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, for purposes of this ruling, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coas should be construed liberally (B) holding that consent decrees and orders should be construed as contracts (C) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding that ambiguities in insurance contracts should be favorably construed to the insured
Output: (B)
ego). We believe, however, that Carr is the better reasoned case and the path that the California Supreme Court would follow. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). FERGUSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: When an appellate court has alternative bases for its holding, it cannot be claimed that all but one of the bases is unnecessary dicta. Part III of the Court’s opinion here is not irrelevant to our disposition of the matter, as the special concurrence claims; rather, it is an alternative holding providing one of two independent bases for supporting our disposition. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038, 100 S.Ct. 710, 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (<HOLDING>). O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, specially 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that references to reading stipulations in muse are dicta (B) recognizing in dicta power to substantively consolidate entities but noting that power to be used sparingly (C) recognizing such limitations in dicta (D) holding that everything after denial of jurisdiction is dicta pure and simple (E) recognizing that alternative holdings are not dicta
Output: (E)
qualified counsel. UAW v. GMC, 497 F.3d at 626. To a large extent, the adequacy requirement tends to merge with the commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3). Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n. 20, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). As set forth above, Lead Plaintiffs’ interests and claims are common to and typical of the classes they represent. They do not have any interests that are antagonistic to those of the Class and the record reflects that they have pursued this litigation and the settlement negotiations vigorously, sharing the common goal of maximizing recovery. Thus, there is no conflict, intra-class or otherwise, that would defeat class certification. See Ford Motor Co., 2006 WL 1984363 at *19-20, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 70741 at *56 (<HOLDING>) For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing conflict (B) recognizing that only a conflict going to the very subject matter of the claims will defeat adequacy and there is no conflict with class members simply because the settlement may impact individuals differently (C) recognizing an exception to the conflict rule where the conflict arose after the award of the contract (D) holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion (E) recognizing the conflict
Output: (B)
cause determination is not at issue, discovery into its adequacy is not relevant in most cases. In light of Plummer and Heyne, however, and the fact that in this case Plaintiffs reserve the right to place before the jury the conclusions contained in the reasonable cause determination, the adequacy of ACRD’s reasonable cause determination is a relevant question on which discovery is appropriate. II. Deliberative Process Privilege The ACRD bases its motion for a protective order preventing Thompson’s deposition on the deliberative process privilege, and to a lesser extent on the attorney-client privilege. Significantly, Arizona Courts have declined to recognize a deliberative process privilege in the state common law. Rigel Corp. v. Arizona, 225 Ariz. 65, 234 P.3d 633 (Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in the absence of a statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege (B) holding that no scholars privilege exists under the first amendment or common law (C) holding that the joint defense privilege preserved the attorneyclient privilege against waiver in the context of a group with common interests seeking common representation (D) recognizing application of federal deliberative process privilege to internal state communications (E) holding that there is no statutory deliberative process privilege in arizona and declining to create such a privilege under the common law
Output: (E)
of [fee] agreements [for representation before the Court] is exclusively within the province of the Court.” R. at 3, 6. On December 2, 1998, the attorney appealed that BVA decision through other counsel. On June 29, 1999, the Secretary filed a motion in that appeal, seeking Court review of the fee agreement for the attorney’s representation before the Court in connection with the October 1991 Court remand in McCreary, supra. As a basis for his motion, the Secretary asserts that the Court’s review of the reasonableness of the fee agreement “may result in a prompt, favorable determination for the appellant which would moot this appeal and conserve judicial resources”; the Secretary cites In the Matter of the Fee Agreement of Mason, 13 Vet.App. 79, 86 (1999) (Mason Fee Agreement) (<HOLDING>). Motion at 2-3. On July 12, 1999, the attorney 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where attorney successfully represents a va claimant before this court  the secretary is obligated under certain circumstances to pay directly to the attorney 20 of the pastdue benefits awarded on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court (B) holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant (C) holding that the plain language of the regulations requires a claimant to have an intent to file a claim for va benefits (D) holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits (E) holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability
Output: (A)
is likewise unavailing. Voidness for purposes of a 60(b)(4) motion contemplates lack of jurisdiction or defects in due process that deprive a party of notice or an opportunity to be heard. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271, 130 S.Ct. at 1377. It is not sufficient to cite a regulation that makes use of the word “void,” see 31 C.F.R. § 598.205(a) and (e), and Herrera does not provide additional argument for why execution of OFAC-blocked assets without a license constitutes a “fundamental infirmity.” See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270, 130 S.Ct. at 1377. Motions filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and 60(b)(3) are not subject to the very generous timing considerations that 60(b)(4) motions are because they do not carry the same jurisdictional and due process concerns. See, e.g., Hertz, 16 F.3d at 1130 (<HOLDING>). Thus, they “must be made within a reasonable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding argument based on economic loss rule waived when raised for first time in posttrial motions (B) holding only that rule 60b4 motions are not subject to the reasonable time requirement (C) holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement (D) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (E) holding pcr motions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to the timebar
Output: (B)
in advance). We have considered time an important factor in distinguishing between a legitimate investigative stop and a de facto arrest, United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc), but we recognize that there is “no rigid time limitation on [investigative] stops.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); see also Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[W]e question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the ... important need to allow authorities to graduate then-responses to the demands of any particular situation.”). Accordingly, under the proper circumstances, we have considered delays for dog-sniffs far in excess of 90 minutes reasonable. See Maltais, 403 F.3d at 557-58 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the record suggests that Fitzer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a threehour delayallowing a drug dog to reach the remote location of the investigation was acceptable because the officers acted with diligence and pursued the quickest and least intrusive means of investigation reasonably available to confirm or dispel their  suspicions that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking (B) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (C) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking (D) holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert (E) holding defendant made motive issue in drug conspiracy prosecution by advancing theory he was conducting investigation of drug dealing
Output: (A)
481-82 & 489, 112 S.Ct. 812. He failed to do so. This case is distinguishable from Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799 (9th Cir.2004), where there was evidence that the petitioner suffered persecution separate from efforts by guerrillas to recruit him, which led to a conclusion that the assaults were “punishment for his pro-establishment political opinions.” Id. at 804. Zarate testified that he was not a member of any political group and did not establish that the attacks on him were caused by anything other than his resistance to forced recruitment. Zarate also failed to provide compelling evidence that he would more likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government if he returned to Guatemala. See Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). PETITION DENIED. ** This disposition is not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cat applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country (B) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners argument that the evidence in the record clearly establishes that he is more likely than not to face torture if removed citation quotation marks and brackets omitted (C) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed (D) holding that to qualify for protection under the convention against torture an alien must show that he will more likely than not be tortured in his home country if removed (E) holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return
Output: (D)
Vaughn Index and In Camera Review Plaintiff has requested that the Court review a representative sample of documents in camera and order Defendant to provide a “Vaughn index” for the Redacted and Withheld Documents. The Court will not require either of these measures. In camera review is not required where the Court is satisfied that the agency has adequately supported their exemption claims. See Rugiero, 257 F.3d at 544. In addition, under Eighth Circuit law, no Vaughn index may be required where Exemption 7, the law enforcement exemption, forms a basis for withholding documents. In re DOJ, 999 F.2d at 1311 (error to require agency to provide Vaughn index detailing documents withheld when the basis for exemption was law enforcement purposes); see also Barney, 618 F.2d at 1273-74 (<HOLDING>). Attorney’s Fees The Court turns to Plaintiffs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that no vaughn index would be required since the record clearly demonstrated that the foia requestor was subject to an ongoing law enforcement investigation (B) holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation (C) holding that the fdas voluntary release of documents that may have been caused by the courts order to submit a revised vaughn index cannot constitute court ordered relief (D) holding that the cia complied with the requirements of eo 12958 where a declaration regarding a foia request stated that the declarant had rereviewed each of the documents described in the cias vaughn index during the current litigation process and determined that the relevant documents each contain information  warranting their continued classification despite their age (E) holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia
Output: (A)
examination, in response to a question from the prosecutor asking her whether the two men in her garage “could” have been Billings and Ross, Quick answered, “Yes.” Billings and Ross both objected, and the trial court sustained the objection on the ground that the testimony was mere speculation. The court instructed the jury to disregard Quick’s answer. Billings then moved for a mistrial, but Ross did not make his own mistrial motion or join in Billings’s motion. The court denied Billings’s motion. Ross asserts that Billings’s motion for a mistrial was sufficient to preserve the issue so that Ross can challenge the trial court’s denial of the motion on appeal. That is incorrect; Ross forfeited his right to appeal that ruling. See Mathis v. State, 291 Ga. 268, 271 (728 SE2d 661) (2012) (<HOLDING>); Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 875, 877 (644 SE2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to raise issue at district court forecloses party from raising same issue on appeal (B) holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal (C) holding that failure to object does not preclude raising the issue on appeal where erroneous evidence is offered in violation of an order in limine (D) holding that a defendants failure to object or join in a codefendants objection to an issue bars the defendant from raising the issue on appeal (E) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal
Output: (D)
sweep of the house. During this sweep, the police noticed two weapons and a marihuana growth set-up. Once police saw this, they withdrew from the premises to obtain either a warrant or consent for a more thorough search. But for appellant’s warrantless seizure, police would not have conducted the protective sweep, which led to the discovery of the items for which the police ultimately sought consent to search. The second factor favors appellant. The third factor is more problematic. Courts usually do not deem police misconduct as “flagrant” unless the illegal conduct was engaged in for the purpose of obtaining consent, or the police misconduct was calculated to cause surprise or fear. Id., (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Garcia v. State, 3 S.W.3d 227, 243 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct (B) holding that police misconduct had a quality of purposefulness and was calculated to cause surprise fright and confusion (C) holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry (D) holding that the core inquiry is whether the police would have discovered the evidence if the misconduct had not occurred (E) holding that the prosecution must establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police prior to the misconduct and that the police were actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation prior to the misconduct
Output: (B)
work-related limitation of function” .... 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00A; see Markle, 324 F.3d at 188 (discussing the revised regulations); see also Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50772 (Aug. 21, 2000). The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe physical and mental impairments consisting of diabetes mellitus with retinopathy and an affective mood disorder. [AR 21-22], Therefore, under both Ninth Circuit law and the Commissioner’s newer, more demanding regulatory standard, plaintiff has “a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function” within the meaning of section 12.05. See Fanning, 827 F.2d at 633 n. 3; see also Markle, 324 F.3d at 188 (<HOLDING>); Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a city which was sued by an electrical contractor for breach of contract following a dispute regarding additional costs necessary to complete electrical work could maintain a common law indemnity claim against a design professional to the extent the city is found to be without fault for the conduct which forms the basis of the indemnity claim (B) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (C) holding that because defendants made the statements in the press release and signed the sec disclosure forms in light of a preliminary finding of a primary violation it could not dismiss the  20a action (D) holding that even absent the commissioners clarifying regulation the severity of the claimants other impairments obstructive pulmonary disease hypertension obesity and gout which limit him to some forms of light work constitute impairments imposing additional and significant workrelated limitations of function  (E) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct 
Output: (D)
from, relates to, and concerns (1) the [NAC’s] investigation of complaints against [Reverend Greer] about his performance of duties as a minister, (2) Alford’s involvement in that investigation, (3) information gathered in that investigation, (4) the findings of that investigation, (5) information allegedly known to Alford, the District, and the [NAC] as a result of that investigation, and (6) its attempts to impose discipline upon [Reverend Greer] as a result of its investigative findings and the governing ecclesiastical law.” The circuit court denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss, and the petitioners filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus, which requests that this Court direct t 999) (unpublished decision); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>).” Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 359 n. 10 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that first amendment barred adults breach of fiduciary duty claim against pastor for actions that occurred when parishioner was a minor (B) holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions (C) holding that first amendment barred parishioners negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty claims against pastor and church for sexual contact that occurred between pastor and parishioner during the course of a counseling relationship (D) holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty against pastor for sexual relationship with parishioner during the course of pastoral counseling was tantamount to impermissible clergy malpractice claim (E) holding that first amendment barred adult parishioner who engaged in sexual relationship with priest during the course of pastoral counseling from bringing intentional infliction of emotional distress negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims
Output: (A)
‘despite repeated efforts by Dr. Phelps to schedule a meeting with him on it’ and because it appeared that [Nurriddin] had deliberately avoided asking Dr. Phelps, his first line supervisor, for approval to travel.” Def.’s MSJ at 27 (quoting EEO Report of McGee Interview). Nurriddin does not produce evidence showing that he properly requested travel or that he had completed the work necessary to engage in the travel requested. He responds only by citing the alleged statements made to him by Owens and Phelps. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. Nurriddin does not explain how these alleged statements are evidence that McGee’s denial of his travel request in November 1998 was retaliatory. And because Nurriddin does not provide information about who allegedly, denied his travel request in December .2005) (<HOLDING>). NASA instead provides a legitimate 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that assignment of unfavorable class schedules did not constitute an adverse employment action absent evidence of materially adverse consequences (B) holding that a transfer to a worksite 180 miles away from plaintiffs home did not necessarily constitute an adverse employment action while noting that such a transfer could under some circumstances constitute an adverse employment action (C) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action (D) holding that designation as awol did not constitute an adverse action (E) holding that being socially isolated in the office did not constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law
Output: (D)
the District Court of Appeal for Florida in Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes, etc., 408 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. App. 1982), cited to State ex rel. Perez v. Wall, 41 Fla. 463, 26 So. 1020 (1899), for the following proposition: “ ‘We do not think it can be maintained that a husband is related to his wife by affinity. They are embraced in the definition of neither affinity nor consanguinity, but are regarded in law ... as one person.’ ” See, also, Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941) (estates by entirety are predicated on unity of husband and wife making them one person in law); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967) (historically, by marriage husband and wife are one person in law). See, also, State v. Hooper, 140 Kan. 481, 37 P.2d 52 (1934) (<HOLDING>). While there is authority that husband and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that doctrine of affinity grew out of canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one (B) holding that the trial court committed manifest error by substituting its judgment for that of a valid and enforceable contractual agreement between the parties when it awarded wife nearly half the value of specific assets acquired during the marriage in disregard of antenuptial agreement calling for husband to take 23 and wife to take 13 of property acquired during the marriage (C) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (D) holding claims waived because they all grew out of their unsatisfactory business relationship (E) holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted
Output: (A)
or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in section 3553(a). The plain language of this statute does not grant a district court authority to order that its sentence run consecutively to a future sentence. Rather, the statute gives a court power to determine whether a sentence will “run concurrently or consecutively” only when a defendant is (1) sentenced to “multiple terms of imprisonment ... at the same time,” or (2) “already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (emphasis added). Because the district court in this case sentenced Smith to multiple terms of imprisonment for bank robbery at the same time, it had authority under § 3584(a) to run the f (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Clayton, 927 F.2d 491, 492 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probation does not constitute a sentence (B) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed (C) holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless (D) holding that   3584a does not authorize district courts to order a sentence to be served consecutively to a notyetimposed state sentence (E) recognizing that the section does not  authorize suits for cancellation in the district courts
Output: (D)
these decisions appear to be inconsistent with this court’s opinion in Vimy Ridge Municipal Water Improvement District No. 139 of Little Rock v. Ryles, 373 Ark. 366, 284 S.W.3d 70 (2008). By certifying this case to us, the court of appeals is seeking clarification of the rule and is asking us to resolve the conflict in the decisions of our appellate courts. In Jasper v. Johnny’s Pizza, 305 Ark. 318, 807 S.W.2d 664 (1991), the notice of appeal failed to designate the judgment or order being appealed as required by Rule 3(e). We held that this was not a fatal defect that required the dismissal of the appeal. Instead, this court held that it is the timing of a notice of appeal that is of jurisdictional significance. See also Davis v. Ralston Purina Co., 248 Ark. 14, 449 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (<HOLDING>). In subsequent decisions, we have held that an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional (B) holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal (C) holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue (D) holding that the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional but irregularities in the other procedural steps found in rule 3e are merely grounds for such action as this court deems appropriate (E) holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal
Output: (D)
GARY W. LYNCH, P.J., and NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, J., concur. 1 .It is the duty of this Court to determine the propriety of the appeal. Krause v. Tullo, 835 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Mo.App. S.D.1992). J.L.G. was included in the caption in E.W.G.’s appeal and a separate “Notice of Appeal” was filed for her. However, E.W.G. is not J.L.G.’s biological father. The parental rights of J.L.G.’s biological father were terminated on April 17, 2000. The only action the trial court took regarding J.L.G. was termination of the parental rights of J.L.G.’s biological mother (“Mother”). Mother is not a party to this appeal; therefore, we dismiss the separate Notice of Appeal for J.L.G. in that E.W.G. has no standing to assert parental rights for her. See In re Q.M.B., 85 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (<HOLDING>). We refer to evidence about Mother and/or 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that as a matter of contract no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so (B) holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child (C) holding that an evicted plaintiff has no legal interest in property and therefore has no standing to bring a cercla claim (D) holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal (E) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal
Output: (D)
Id. at 1321. The D.C. Circuit held that these bare and conclusory assertions did not satisfy the plaintiffs burden to show that the lowered performance evaluations were “attached to financial harms.” Id.; see also Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199 (noting that evaluations and written warnings are adverse actions only when they have “tangible job consequences”). Similarly, plaintiff in this case has not alleged that she suffered losses in pay, promotion, or reassignment of duties, or that she faced any other tangible job consequences as a result of the two personnel performance notes, except for the bare, conclusory assertion that “[t]he effect of the retaliatory employment practices ... was to deprive [her] of pay, overtime pay, benefits and privileges and otherwise adversely affect D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff asserts in her opposition to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the ada plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of job when the plaintiffs psychotherapist had told the employer that the plaintiff was unable to work in any position when the plaintiff did not disagree with that point and when the plaintiff in response to a request for admission conceded that she was no longer able to work (B) holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination (C) holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void (D) holding sevenday suspension was not materially adverse because although it was disciplinary in nature plaintiff was able to remain on the job and in pay status (E) recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority
Output: (D)
litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
Output: (E)
erred by submitting a charge that allowed the jury to convict him on less than a unanimous verdict in violation of the Texas Constitution and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (recognizing a defendant is entitled to a unanimous verdict in felony cases). Hiatt alleges the court’s charge was erroneous because it is conceivable jurors improperly “applied testimony regarding counts 1 and 2 to convict [him] on counts 3 and 4 and on 7 and 8 to convict [him] on counts 9 and 10.” Although Hiatt asserts he was deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict, there is no jury unanimity problem in this case. The jury charge contained ten different counts, each relating to a separate and distinct offense. See Bottenfield, 77 S.W.3d at 359 (<HOLDING>). In addition, the jury was not charged in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the former rules congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms (C) holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case (D) holding that two distinct acts of assault with a deadly weapon taking place within a fifteen minute period were a part of the same incident and they could not reasonably be held to constitute two separate offenses each complete in itself and each of which would require a separate charge (E) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders
Output: (C)
favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Johnson was not just associated with coconspirators or merely present in an area where a drug transaction occurred, but instead was a knowing and voluntary participant in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See Reeves, 742 F.3d at 497; Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1236. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the sufficiency of the evidence for her conspiracy conviction. B. Blanchard and Johnson argue that their mere presence in the back seat of a car that contained contraband was insufficient to support a conviction for the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute. See United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The government, they assert, did not present 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that something more than mere presence in the car in which drugs are found is required to sustain a conviction for the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute (B) holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute (C) holding that the presence of firearms may go toward proving that a defendant possessed drugs with the intent to distribute (D) holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (E) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger
Output: (A)