niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
reached, two were struck for cause, and two were seated on the jury. The prosecutor then argued that defense counsel had not shown a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court overruled appellant’s motion. After the jury was sworn and dismissed for the day, the prosecutor asked that she be allowed to explain on the record why she struck the contested jurors. Following the prosecutor’s presentation, defense counsel stated why she thought the State’s reasons were merely pretextual. Appellant claims the State waived its right to maintain that no prima facie showing of discrimination was made when it chose to give its reasons for striking jurors Delaney and Jones. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The record shows that the State 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (B) recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons (C) holding that once prosecutor makes raceneutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules on question of intentional discrimination issue of prima facie case becomes moot (D) holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case (E) holding that when the prosecutor articulates reasons for strikes and the trial court makes a ruling on discriminatory intent the question of whether a prima facie case was made is moot
Output: (E)
Chavis’s first state habeas petitions, filed in 1993 and 1994, did not toll the one-year statute, since AEDPA was not enacted until 1996. The district court erred. A “state habeas petition filed before the AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run tolls the limitation period.” Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494 (9th Cir.2001)). A habeas petition is considered pending during one full round of state review, which in California includes petitions filed in Superior Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1005-06. As long as the petitions are properly filed, a habeas petitioner is also entitled to tolling during subsequent rounds of state review. See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 985-86 (9th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (B) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review (C) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (D) holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution (E) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review
Output: (A)
between 1983 and 1986. Stanley’s engineer, Hreha, was present throughout Powers’ deposition. The Court revisits its ruling upon further contemplation of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative and the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C.1996) (noting that in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “[t]he corporation appears vicariously through its designee”). “The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corpo ration’s ‘position’ on the topic.” Id. (citing cases). The designee testifies on behalf of the corporation and holds it accountable accordingly. See Starlight Int’l, Inc., v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 688 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Audiotext Communications Network, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed (B) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (C) holding that an officer or director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the corporation over which he exercises management authority and any breach of fiduciary duty claims arising out of injuries to the corporation in most cases may only be brought by the corporation itself or derivatively on its behalf (D) holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation
Output: (B)
Smith Barmy, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.2005). The doctrine, however, is not a complete bar to liability. As the District Court for the District of Columbia recently explained, “[N]o degree of cautionary language will inoculate statements that the defendants knew were simply not true when made.” See Freeland v. Iridium World Comm’ns, Ltd., 545 F.Supp.2d 59, 71-72 (D.D.C.2008) (citing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991)). In other words, the bespeaks caution doctrine does not immunize forward-looking statements, even if accompanied by cautionary language, when a defendant asserts forward-looking statements with knowledge or awareness of their falsity. See, e.g., Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493-94 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); FSP Stallion 1 v. Luce, 2009 WL 1219683 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes (C) holding that the bespeaks caution doctrine did not immunize a corporate executive from liability when the executive made financial projections while aware of information that rendered those projections unreasonable (D) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (E) holding that foia exemption 4 did not apply because agency did not meet burden of showing that desired information consisted of trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person that are privileged or confidential
Output: (C)
255 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (finding waiver when the defendant made a subsequent request under oath for the appointment of counsel); Douglas v. State, No. 14-00-01226-CR, 2002 WL 1988163, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 29, 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (finding waiver when the defendant "steadfastly refused to waive his right to counsel, saying over and over that he wanted ‘a lawyer to consult with’ ”); Garrett v. State, 998 S.W.2d 307, 316-17 (Tex. App.- Cir. 1976) ("A criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly procedures, to choose between waiver and another course of action as long as the choice presented to him is not constitutionally offensive.”); see Smith v. Grams, 565 F.3d 1037, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); Pazden v. Maurer, 424 F.3d 303, 319 (3d Cir. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary (B) holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se (C) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary (D) holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act (E) holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right
Output: (E)
S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, which is a named defendant in this action. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to Mr. Sprouse in this opinion. 4 .Ms. Bagwell, who is not a lawyer, also testified that she thought that the original five-year lease was on "a year[-]to[-]year basis.” 5 . Mr. Sprouse did not take issue with the $534 award for the damage to Mr. Ellis's corn crop. 6 . See also 2 Friedman on Leases § 14.301, at 915 (noting that payment of increased rent under an option constitutes an acceptance of the option). 7 . Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla.1955) (finding such a presumption contrary to statute); Branagen v. Winders & Alm, 194 Iowa 461, 187 N.W. 440, 440-41 (Iowa 1922); Schiltz v. Teledirect Int'l, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Elec. Sales Eng’rs, Inc. v. Urban Renewal & 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there was no renewal but finding estoppel on the part of the landlord (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) recognizing the abuse of discretion standard and the requirement of evidentiary support for a finding of estoppel (E) holding that estoppel was a question of fact
Output: (A)
district court held, following a bench trial, that Aceco was liable to Shaoxing for approximately $3.4 million for unpaid invoices, and that Aceco had failed to prove its counterclaims. We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Beck Chevrolet Co. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 787 F.3d 663, 672 (2d Cir. 2015). Because this case involves a contract for the sale of goods, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by the State of New York (“NYUCC”) governs. See Integrated Circuits Unlimited v. E.F. Johnson Co., 875 F.2d 1040, 1041 (2d Cir. 1989). Under the NYUCC, “[t]he buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted.” N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-607(1); see also Sobiech v. Int’l Staple & Mach. Co., 867 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>). “Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 (B) holding that seller was entitled to recover contract price of goods where buyer failed to make effective rejection under the ucc (C) holding contract for sale of water which did not specify price was unenforceable because price of water was essence of contract (D) holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach (E) holding buyer liable for balance of contract price of accepted goods
Output: (E)
motion for partial summary judgment is granted. SO ORDERED. 1 . The Malley plaintiffs have fully settled and compromised their claims against the defendants and their joint motion to dismiss their action with prejudice was granted by an Order dated September 16, 2003. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide no mechanism by which a ruling that issues exist for trial can be obtained. The plaintiffs’ motion seeking that ruling will be regarded as in furtherance of their opposition to the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. 2 . On May 6, 2002, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Kocoras’s grant of the wholesaler's motion for summary judgment, which dismissed the individual plaintiffs’ claims against them. In re BNPD Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1032-35 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 3 . However, the individual plaintiffs raise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs  19853 claim alleging a conspiracy among a corporation and its directors to discriminate against her on the basis of sex was barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine (B) holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction (C) holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges (D) holding evidence insufficient to show that wholesalers knew of manufacturers alleged conspiracy to price discriminate between retailers and hospitals and hmos via chargeback system (E) holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold
Output: (D)
court by any party ... (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment ... the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. Carr concedes that Osteopathic’s motion for reconsideration was really a Rule 59(e) motion to amend judgment. Consequently, the date from which the clock started ticking under Rule 4(a)(4) was April 1, 1993. Osteopathic filed its notice of appeal on April 22, 1993, well within 30 days of the district court's April 1 denial of Osteopathic's motion for reconsideration. 6 . The only cases Carr cites in support of his position—-Funkhouser v. City of Newark, 312 F.2d 383, 384 (3d Cir.1962) and District 65, Distributive, Processing & Off Calif., 779 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In analyzing Amoco's petition for writ 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver (B) holding remand on the basis of partys waiver of right to remove not within  1447c (C) holding that partys failure to develop issue in argument section constitutes waiver of issue (D) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (E) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver
Output: (B)
even a single act of NWP by which it held Mr. Brink out as an agent authorized to modify the CBA, Plaintiff has failed to establish the lack of a genuine issue regarding the existence of apparent authority. Despite Plaintiffs failure to show as a matter of law that Brink acted with apparent authority, NWP may still be bound to the Standard Clause under the agency principle of ratification. Accordingly, Mr. Brink’s actions, even his unauthorized acts, will have binding effect if NWP knew of, and accepted, the benefits of Mr. Brink’s actions without taking steps to disavow them. See Restatement, (Second) Agency, § 98 (A receipt of benefits may constitute an affirmance by which a ratification is established); see also Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192, 193 (1952) (<HOLDING>); Presbyterian Board of Relief for Disabled 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under illinois law silence can constitute acceptance under the terms of the restatement of contracts (B) holding that under  98 of restatement principal elected to ratify unauthorized act by accepting benefits of agreement with full knowledge of its terms and was therefore bound to terms of agreement (C) holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities (D) holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms (E) holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello
Output: (B)
when a psychiatric expert was appointed before his plea, and he was not entitled to appointment of another expert to aid in the presentation of a PCRA petition. Id. at 5-6. The court then concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the PCRA petition. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of the petition in a memorandum opinion filed on February 13, 2002. The panel rejected appellant’s claim that his brain injury, and its alleged effect upon his ability to discern the facts upon which his petition was premised, qualified under the “after-discovered” evidence exception to the PCRA time-bar. The panel deemed this.question to be controlled by Superior Court’s previous decision in Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700, 703 (Pa.Super.2001) (<HOLDING>). This Court granted further review, in part to 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing exception (B) recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception (C) holding that the time limits in the equal access to justice act are jurisdictional (D) holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations (E) holding that claim of mental illness does not fit any exception to the statutes time limits
Output: (E)
responsibility for managing LES during the ARS freeze was transferred to the LFG Board of Directors, there are insufficient facts currently in the record to support this contention. Whether any such abdication occurred is a factual matter that cannot be resolved by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The LFG Trustee has properly stated a claim for the breach of fiduciary duty against the LES Directors under Maryland law. Claims Against the LES Officers In Maryland, officers as well as directors are fiduciaries of a corporation and owe fiduciary duties accordingly. Shenker v. Laureate Educ., 411 Md. 317, 983 A.2d 408, 419 (2009) (stating that the duties owed by officers of a corporation are set forth in § 2-405.1(a)). See also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). Officers are also subject to general agency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate (B) holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions (C) holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract (D) holding that under delaware law the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors (E) holding that directors and officers are fiduciaries
Output: (D)
697 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn.1985) (same). In finding specific jurisdiction, the district court relied on the following facts: (1) Lloyds sent three wire transfers from Hercules Holdings to the account of Space Age Industries in Erwin, Tennessee (Hogsed’s account); (2) Tennessee residents wired funds to The Bond Partnership at Lloyds; (3) Lloyds and its attorney responded to letters from Harris and other individuals in Tennessee about this litigation; and (4) Lloyds faxed a two-page bank statement to Hogsed detailing numerous transactions involving the transfer of substantial funds from Tennessee customers to the accounts of Hercules Holdings at Lloyds. The d response to communications initiated by Harris and others in Tennessee. Cf. Rice v. Karsch, 154 Fed.Appx. 454, 460 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 91 F.3d at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that easements using terms telephone telegraph and communications could properly be utilized for both internal communications and for thirdparty voice and data communications (B) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (C) holding that internet purchase of one compact disc by plaintiffs counsel did not constitute purposeful availment (D) holding ban preempted by federal communications commission regulations (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service
Output: (B)
City would inspect it. N.T., 2/14/14, at 59. In light of this concession, Tube City could not now prevail on its argument that the attorney-client privilege was waived because Dr. Ozol took the stand with these documents in his file. 9 . Under this subsection, Tube City also argues that the trial court should have struck these claims because they were barred by the statute of limitations. Tube City’s Brief at 43. This argument does not relate to whether Roller adequately established the elements of fraud or negligent misrepresentation, but is a completely separate issue. Tube City did not include an issue raising the statute of limitations in its statement of questions involved, see Tube City’s Brief at 4, and so it has been waived. Cobbs v. SEPTA, 985 A.2d 249, 256 (Pa.Super.2009) (<HOLDING>); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) ("No question will be 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal (B) holding that issue not explicitly raised in appellants statement of the questions involved is waived (C) holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal (D) holding that matters not raised in an appellants briefing in the court of appeals are waived (E) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived
Output: (B)
Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.1990) (overruled on other grounds) (citing AT & T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415). A court may not deny arbitration “unless it can state with ‘positive assurance’ that [the] dispute was not meant to be arbitrated.” Autoradio U.S.A Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir.1978) (quoting Hussey Metal Div. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., 471 F.2d 556, 558 (3d Cir.1972)); see First Liberty Inv. Grp. v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647, 653 (3d Cir.1998). When an agreement contains both a choice-of-law clause and an arbitration clause, the reviewing court will apply the substantive law of the state named in the choice of law clause. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63-64, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) (<HOLDING>). IV. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no conflict between a contracts arbitration clause and its venue clause (B) holding that the party did not waive its right to enforce the arbitration clause (C) holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause (D) holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable (E) holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause
Output: (C)
of valid military service by [ARPERCEN].” R. at 30 (emphasis added). Second, the RO repeated this misstatement of the law (again assuming that § 3.203 applies here) in the August 2000 SOC cited by the Board. Although the SOC accurately quoted § 3.203 in the section entitled “Pertinent Laws and Regulations” (R. at 38), the “Reasons and Bases” section on the very next page contained the same inaccurate (again assuming that § 3.203 applies) statement of law (noting that “basic eligibility to VA benefits may be established only upon verification of valid military service by [AR-PERS-COM]”). R. at 38-39 (emphasis added). In addition, the SOC postdated the May 2000 initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision in the instant case. See Pelegrini, 18 Vet.App. at 120 (<HOLDING>). Having found a notice error, the Court must 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits (B) holding that appellant must identify with considerable specificity how 38 usc  5103a notice was defective (C) holding that section 5103a notice must precede initial aoj adjudication on serviceconnection claim (D) holding because an initial order contemplated the subsequent entry of a judgment the initial order was not considered a final adjudication (E) holding that any board reasonsorbases deficiency in discussing how section 5103a  3159b1 notice has been satisfied would of necessity be nonprejudicial to claimant where claimant re  ceived compliant notice
Output: (C)
their employer, Toledo Hospital, was a “partner” with CSB. This conclusory contention has no merit in view of Ohio’s definition of a partnership: “ ‘Partnership’ means an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for-profit formed under section 1776.22 of the Revised Code, a predecessor law, or a comparable law of another jurisdiction.” O.R.C. § 1776.0(M). I conclude that the allegations in the complaint fail adequately to plead that defendant doctors Tiffany A. Lisk, Susan P. Tourner, Jamie L. Dargart, and John Gregory Rosenthal were state actors. They are entitled to dismissal on that basis alone. B. Nothing Any Toledo Hospital Doctor Did “Shocks the Conscience” i. Plaintiffs’ Claim Plaintiffs’ complaint claims that the 016 WL 4491837, *4 (E.D. Ky.) (<HOLDING>). Where a complaint describes a defendant’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a conclusory affidavit without supporting evidence is inadequate to establish net worth (B) holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim (C) holding conclusory assertions of intent to cause insufficient without supporting facts (D) holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient (E) holding that conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based citations omitted
Output: (C)
to the registrations of any party to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby. 15 U.S.C. § 1119. 27. The legal issue in a cancellation proceeding is the right to register a mark and when a mark is not incontestable, a court may cancel the mark on any ground which would have prevented registration initially. International Order of Job's Daughters, 727 F.2d at 1091. 28. As noted, a mark "which does not fulfill the functions of a trademark, but, rather, serves essentially a utilitarian or functional purpose cannot be registered as a trademark." Id.; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir.1928) (<HOLDING>). 29. Because Shakespeare's mark is a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that automobile racing is not an ultrahazardous activity (B) holding that diamondshaped tread on tire which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire cannot be registered (C) holding when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile (D) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (E) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered  stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment
Output: (B)
v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir.1993) (stating “[b]e-cause the qui tam relator: (1) funds the prosecution of the FCA suit, (2) will receive a private share in the government’s recovery only upon prevailing, and (3) may be liable for costs if the suit is frivolous, the relator’s personal stake in the case is sufficiently ensured.”); United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 775 F.Supp. 172, 180 (E.D.Pa.1991) (acknowledging that a relator’s personal interest in the outcome in the litigation, the relator is considered to have “a sufficient stake to ensure the genuine adverseness of the litigation.”) (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 99); United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F.Supp. 1084, 1097-99 (C.D.Cal.1989) (<HOLDING>). The second rationale courts apply is that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable probability is one that in the judgment of the reviewing court is  sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding citation omitted (B) recognizing that the mere plausibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to justify reversal (C) holding statutory violation sufficient cause (D) recognizing that the statutory bounty is sufficient to give the relator a personal stake in the outcome (E) holding that an employer does not have thirdparty standing to challenge a labor statute on its employees behalf simply because the employees probably would not be motivated to assert their own interests because they lack a sufficient individual economic stake in the outcome
Output: (D)
.1; so, I'm using that value here. So, you have 7.5 divided by .1. The square root of that is 8.66, multiplied by a speed of, say, 45 constant. And now you have to convert that to feet per second, which is 1.467 to change it to feet per second. Now multiply it by the empirical number there, .458 equals 262 feet. So if you were to do it normally at 45, you’d have traveled down the road about 262 feet. 5 . See, e.g., Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) ("Exposing a witness’ motivation to testify for or against the accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination.”); Koehler v. State, 679 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) ("Thus, 323760, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 7, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>), with Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge (B) holding appellate court erred in reversing conviction on confrontation clause grounds because appellant did not clearly articulate to trial court that confrontation clause demanded admission of evidence in question (C) holding that a proffer of evidence to established a witnesss bias and motive to lie did not preserve a confrontation clause argument because a defendant must specifically articulate that the confrontation clause demands admission of proffered evidence to preserve error on this ground (D) holding that a defendant forfeited his confrontation clause claim by failing to properly preserve it at trial (E) holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue
Output: (C)
of South Dakota and Gant, in his official capacity, are also properly before the court because they have answered the amended complaint. A review of the record reveals that Chris Nelson, in his personal capacity, Jeff Gromer, in his personal and official capacity, and Mike Milstead, in his personal capacity, have not been served, and they have not answered the complaint or amended complaint. 2 . During the evidentiary hearing, Smith appeared to drop the facial challenge to SDCL 23-7-7.1(8). The court will nonetheless briefly address the issue. 3 . In United States v. Stevens, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a possible alternative standard with regard to a facial attack that might apply in "a typical case.” Id. at 1587 (<HOLDING>). During the evidentiary hearing, Smith 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a statute is certainly not so plainly unconstitutional that the failure of the trial court  to hold it so can be regarded as a plain error or a culpable neglect of judicial duty internal citation omitted (B) recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep  citation omitted (C) holding that defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively reasonable citation omitted (D) holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted (E) holding that a statute may be facially challenged only  by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep 
Output: (B)
of that order pursuant to Rule 62(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides: In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 62(b); see also for example Joy Technologies, Inc., A/S Niro Atomizer v. Flakt, Inc., 1992 WL 188814 (D.Del.1992) (<HOLDING>), reversed on other grounds, 6 F.3d 770 (Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once a plaintiff has met its burden in showing that an injunction is necessary no delay in the issuance of that injunction is appropriate absent extraordinary considerations here there are no extraordinary circumstances or considerations only the relatively standard posttrial motions (B) holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice (C) holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances (D) holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy (E) holding that an accounting is an extraordinary remedy
Output: (A)
Copeland and Stokes. Additionally, Minor argues the family court erred in allowing the State to call Eric as a witness at trial. Minor contends the State sought solely t failing to grant its directed verdict motion as to grand larceny when the State failed to present evidence the items stolen from Izzard were worth more than one thousand dollars. This issue is not preserved for our review because it was not raised at trial. See Guider v. Churpeyes, Inc., 370 S.C. 424, 430 n. 2, 635 S.E.2d 562, 566 n. 2 (Ct.App.2006) (finding defendant did not preserve argument regarding malice and damages in malicious prosecution claim when failure to meet those elements was not argued in directed verdict motion); see also Scoggins v. McClellion, 321 S.C. 264, 267, 468 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Hendrix v. E. Distribution, Inc., 316 S.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict (B) holding defendant did not preserve argument regarding element of negligence in tort claim when only causation and punitive damages were raised in directed verdict motion (C) holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely (D) holding that even if the trial court had erred in denying the defendants motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages the error was harmless because the jury found in favor of the defendant and never reached the punitive damages claims (E) holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim
Output: (B)
for example, is a claim and time barred by the nonclaim statute. Nelson, 288 Kan. at 596. We also agree the time to file a will passed on July 27, 2014, no timely petition to admit a will was filed, and Beverly’s allegation of a will has no merit. K.S.A. 59-617 establishes tire general rule. The statute provides in its entirety: “No will of a testator who died while a resident of this state shall be effectual to pass property unless a petition is filed for the probate of such will within six months after the death of the testator, except as hereinafter provided.” Simply put, K.S.A. 59-617 functions as a statute of limitations prohibiting the admission of a will to probate more than 6 months after a testator s death. In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602, 607-08, 142 P.2d 824 (1943) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Tracy, 36 Kan. App. 2d 401, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach (B) holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant (C) holding the then 1year time limitation in gs 1941 supp 59617 to be a statute of general limitation (D) recognizing a fouryear statute of limitation for fraud claims (E) recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation
Output: (C)
and actions shall be taken openly as provided in this act.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-401. Section 403(a) effectuates that purpose: All meetings of the governing body of an agency are public meetings, open to the public at all times, except as otherwise provided. No action of a governing body of an agency shall be taken except during a public- meeting following notice of the meeting in accordance with this act. Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with this act is null and void and not merely voidable. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403. [¶13] The rationale behind the Act’s open-government objective is the same as the purpose of the Wyoming Public Records Act—to maintain an “open and accountable government.” Aland v. Mead, 2014 WY 83, ¶¶ 10-13, 327 P.3d 752, 758-59 (Wyo. 2014) (<HOLDING>). We will likewise afford the Act a liberal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an ambiguous contract will be construed against the party drafting the same (B) holding that to implement the  goal of the wpra disclosure generally prevails over secrecy the wpra will be afforded a liberal interpretation and exceptions will be construed narrowly (C) holding that general categorical release clauses are narrowly construed (D) holding that the definition of customer under sipa should be construed narrowly (E) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law
Output: (B)
exception and recover economic damages in negligence, (1) the economic damages must result from “a sudden, dangerous, or calamitous event,” and (2) the event must also cause “personal injury or property damage.” In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 200-01; see also Trans State Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 177 Ill. 2d 21, 26-27 (1997). The trial court held that the September 2008 storms were not a sudden or dangerous occurrence and that the exception consequently does not apply, barring plaintiffs negligence claim under the Moor-man doctrine. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court should have accepted the precedent of Mars for the proposition that the September 2008 storms were a sudden and dangerous occurrence. See Mars, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 353 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues that the second 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after  it was informed of the occurrence (B) holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy (C) holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme (D) holding that the phrase sudden and accidental is not a synonym for unexpected and unintended and that the discharge of coal dust over an eight year period was not sudden (E) holding that a single thunderstorm was a sudden and dangerous occurrence
Output: (E)
or terminating an arrest must be within the discretion and judgment of enforcing officers.” Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir.1998). Hart’s characterization of nationally recognized protocols for making arrests as mandatory does not make them so. Second, because the Handbook granted S/A Robertson discretion to afford Block some freedom of movement before transporting him to jail, we presume S/A Robertson’s actions were grounded in the sort of policy choice that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield from liability in tort. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (“When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government h Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Such decisions are quintessential examples of 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (B) holding a park rangers decision to terminate an arrest falls within the discretionary function exception to the ftca because such decision was the classic example of conduct grounded in policy (C) holding the manner in which federal law enforcement agents investigated a suspect and execut ed an arrest warrant fell within the discretionary function exception to the ftca (D) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  (E) holding that the government cannot waive or forfeit an argument that the discretionary function exception to the federal tort claims act ftca should apply
Output: (C)
cocaine and that she would “hook them up” with Hunter. Ebert also indicated that she had seen Hunter in possession of a small gun on several occasions, and her descriptions of that gun matched the gun found in her apartment. Additionally, Hunter’s instant offense occurred about three years after he was arrested and convicted in Texas for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, an offense involving Hydrocodone, MDMA, powder and crack cocaine, and a handgun. A defendant’s active involvement in drug distribution reasonably supports the inference that his possession of a loaded firearm was for protection of even a small amount of drugs. United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1198 — 1200 (5th Cir. 1994); cf. United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 693 — 94 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>)- The district court’s finding that Hunter’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding harmless any error in district courts drug quantity determination where undisputed quantity of drugs was enough to place defendant at the base offense level calculated by the district court (B) holding that apprendi is not implicated where the defendant has stipulated to the amount of drugs for which he was held responsible and the district court did not rely on any fact outside of the plea agreement to determine drug quantity at sentencing (C) holding that simultaneous possession of a small quantity of drugs and a gun standing alone was insufficient to apply the enhancement where there was a lack of any evidence of current or recent drug distribution or sales of any kind by the defendant (D) holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute (E) holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c
Output: (C)
appealed the judgment of the Court of Veterans Appeals to this court. On appeal the Secretary contends that the Court of Veterans Appeals erred by not deferring to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits. The Secretary also disputes Mrs. Jones’s assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals is conferred upon this court by 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994). Under the express terms of that statute, however, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order
Output: (A)
§ 418.301(11). Unlike a'claim for benefits or medical services, however, the Act fails to specify a remedy for retaliation or even a means to enforce the right to be protected from retaliation. Cf. id. § 418.1065 (specifying prohibition against retaliation for filing a claim under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act and also providing a detailed administrative scheme for remedying retaliation claims). But employees who suffer retaliation for exercising their rights under the workmen’s compensation statute are not without a remedy. The Michigan courts have recognized a common law exception to Michigan’s employment at will doctrine for discharges that violate public policy. See Suchodolski v. Mich. Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (citing Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law (B) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law (C) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge (D) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (E) holding that an atwill employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reason for a discharge was the employees exercise of a right conferred by a wellestablished legislative enactment
Output: (E)