niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
larger than, the size of the "Done” button that users clicked in order to register. In the instant case, by contrast, the phrase "Terms of Service & Privacy Policy” is much smaller and more obscure, both in absolute terms and relative to the "Register” button. Id. (citation omitted). 8 . Bekele does not contest that the FAA applies to this case. His agreement with Lyft, a California company, implicates interstate commerce. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17-18, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ("The general rule prescribed by § 2 of the [FAA] is that arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate transactions are enforceable as a matter of federal law.”); Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Mgmt. & Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 867 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). 9 .The First .Circuit has stated on one 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the term commerce in the faa is to be broadly construed (B) holding that the district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration  because the faa is inapplicable to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce (C) holding that the fcra must be construed broadly in favor of remediation (D) recognizing that the faa is applicable to only those transactions involving interstate commerce (E) holding that as title vi is a remedial statute the zone of interests to be protected  must be construed broadly
Output: (A)
favor.” Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 635 (quotation marks omitted). After considering the text, structure, history and purpose of the statute, we are left with “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Barber, 130 S.Ct. at 2508-09(inter-nal quotation marks omitted). The ambiguity in the statute is particularly highlighted when contrasting the two separate interpretations offered by the government and the dissent. The dissent claims that supervised released never commenced so there is nothing to stay while the government claims the stay kicks in upon certification but is somehow lifted once commitment is ordered. Both of these approaches cannot be correct nor can they be squared with our interpretation which endeavors to reconcile all three of the relevant statutes. See id. (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule of lenity applies only if the provision being construed is still ambiguous after the application of normal rules of construction (B) recognizing that the rule of lenity only applies if after considering text structure history and purpose there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the court must simply guess as to what congress intended (C) holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines (D) recognizing that the rule of lenity applies only after courts exhaust all other evidence of congressional meaning (E) holding that the rule of lenity ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered
Output: (B)
basis of the request for declaratory judgment.” LSRC asserts that Texas Insurance Code section 4102.207 makes contracts with unlicensed public insurance adjusters merely voidable, not void, thereby purportedly defeating any claim for a declaratory judgment that the contracts are void. Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, a person interested under a written contract may have determined a question of construction or validity arising under the contract and obtain a declaration of rights. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.004 (West 2015). The law is well-settled that a contract to fulfill an obligation that cannot be performed without violating the law contravenes public policy and is void. See Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468 . Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The rationale behind this rule—that courts 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law (B) holding motorist entitled to hearing before taking his license under statute that required loss of license if uninsured driver involved in an accident (C) holding contract for driving services void and illegal because driver did not have chauffeurs license and consequently performance of contract would violate law re quiring chauffeurs license which was enacted for purpose of public safety (D) holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer (E) recognizing validity of retroactive license that memorialized grant of oral license
Output: (C)
do not find that MBI has waived this argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 49(B). 3 . We also note that MBI did not present any expert testimony, or any other evidence, that would suggest that Orlando's permanent injury to his knee was not caused by the accident. 4 . The prospective juror was struck from the jury pool prior to trial. 5 . MBI also argues that Orlando was only asking for $75,000 in damages. However, Orlando clearly argued that $75,000 was where he thought the jury should begin its discussion for damages, but he did not limit his damages to this amount. Tr. p. 223. 6 . MBI also argues that "[i]f there is no evidence to establish the loss of earning capacity, there can be no recovery on that issue.” Scott v. Nabours, 156 Ind.App. 317, 321, 296 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1973) (<HOLDING>). However, the final jury instructions gave a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not err by withdrawing the issue of loss of earning capacity from the jury when there was no evidence in that regard (B) holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact (C) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent (E) holding that trial court did not err
Output: (A)
would have it, transmission of such notice would be all that is required to exercise the right of rescission. The problem with this argument is that, in a significant number of instances, the remedial economy of the remedy would be jeopardized. See Kull, supra, at 577. Specifically, it is self-evident that when a borrower who has provided notice to a creditor decides later — at some unknown, and perhaps distant, point in the future— to effectuate the rescission right through judicial process, the underlying circumstances in no small number of cases are likely to have changed significantly. Just to provide one example: new actors may have come onto the field post-transaction and obtained some interest in the loan or the underlying property. Cf. Beach, 523 U.S. at 418-19, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (<HOLDING>). And, as a consequence of this reality, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title (B) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (C) holding that statute of repose acts as an outer limit or ceiling within which all suits must be brought (D) holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose (E) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose
Output: (A)
voluntariness ruling at that time has obvious benefits. The evidence that was developed on the issue is fresh in the minds of counsel and the court, the issue is fully ripe for decision, and a ruling at that time makes clear to both parties before trial the extent to which, if at all, the State may use the defendant’s statement at trial. 5 . See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 552 (1990). Note also the exceptions to Miranda that the Supreme Court announced in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243, 251 (1990) (conversations between suspects and undercover agents admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2631, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, 557 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Detective Barba’s legally incorrect 
 Holding statements: (A) holding public safety exception to miranda warning requirement did not apply where there was no evidence gun had been left in public place (B) holding that miranda warnings were not required for suspect testifying at inquest when suspects lawyer had previously advised him of his privilege against selfincrimination (C) holding that miranda warnings do not have to be given in the exact form stated in the miranda opinion as long as an effective equivalent is given (D) holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible (E) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial
Output: (E)
Standish, 2008 ME 23, ¶ 7, 940 A.2d 1097. Under its umbrella are two applications: issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, and claim preclusion. Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 39, 2 A.3d 301. Here, Pearson contends that Wendell should have been collaterally estopped from presenting evidence about fac December 2014, none of the prior orders constituted a final judgment. Although the March 2013 order was originally issued as a final judgment on the grant of the divorce itself , and on parental rights and responsibilities, the nature and effect of that order changed in March 2014 when, with the parties’agreement, the court vacated the judgment and correctly recharacterized it, and all subsequent orders, as interim orders. See Gulesian v. Gulesian, 377 A.2d 119, 120 (Me.1977) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (B) holding property settlement to be contractual obligation from date of final judgment of divorce (C) holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal (D) holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment (E) holding that an order pending divorce is not a final judgment that creates a right of appeal
Output: (E)
argues that even had she exercised reasonable diligence to discover the factual bases of her claims during the applicable limitations periods, she would not have discovered any information concerning Zoloft’s alleged ineffectiveness because no information criticizing Zoloft’s efficacy existed to which a reasonably diligent consumer would have been exposed. However, the district court took judicial notice of an extensive record of documents—all publicly available during the relevant limitations periods—which discussed Pfizer’s unpublished clinical trials and the allegation that Zoloft was no more effective than a placebo. The district court did not-err in taking judicial notice of these documents. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t Ltd. v. Content 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court may take judicial notice of publications to establish what was in the public realm at the time (B) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (E) recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court  to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings
Output: (A)
completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court’s sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under  841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release
Output: (D)
exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand.” Ishimaru v. Fung, 2005 WL 2899680, at *12 (Del.Ch. Oct. 26, 2005); see also 6 Del. C. § 18-1001 (providing LLC members and assignees the right "to bring an action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited liability company to recover a judgment in its favor” when managers or members with authority to do so have refused, or an effort to cause them to do so “is not likely to succeed”); id. § 18-1003 ("In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the effort, if any, of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a manager or member or the reasons for not making the effort.”); Eureka VIII LLC v. Niagara Falls Hldgs. LLC, 899 A.2d 95, 96 (Del.Ch.20Q6) (<HOLDING>). D. Parties’ Contentions Zimmerman brings this 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing claim for wrongful dissociation based on members ceasing participation in the llcs management and ceasing honoring its duties and obligations under the llc agreement (B) holding that a fiduciary corporation was a purchaser within the meaning of  12a2 and was entitled to bring suit on its own behalf or on behalf of its clients (C) holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing the right of an llc member or assignee to bring a derivative action on behalf of the llc when another member breaches a contractual or fiduciary duty owed to the llc
Output: (E)
is not in bankruptcy) are among several ‘improper means’ that defendants used to interfere” but states that "[tjhese means would be improper whether or not they arose in the context of an automatic stay” — in other words, the claims are not premised on that violation. Pl. Rep. at 7. 58 . MSR Exploration, Ltd., 74 F.3d at 913 (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99, 107 S.Ct. 2425). Accord, In re Extended Stay, 435 B.R. 139, 149 (S.D.N.Y.2010) ("Unlike the plaintiff in [MSR ], which 'self-consciously and entirely ... [sought] damages for a claim filed and pursued in bankruptcy court,’ [plaintiff here] seeks the enforcement of contractual obligations.”). 59 . Indeed, according to the Second Circuit, this Court would be obligated to do the same. See Eastern Equipment, 236 F.3d at 121 (<HOLDING>). 60 . Cf. Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect (B) holding district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a removal order because such challenges must be raised in a petition for review (C) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the purported state law claim for violation of the automatic stay and that any such claim could be brought only in bankruptcy court only (D) holding that claims under 11 usc  362h must be brought in the bankruptcy court rather than in the district court which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases (E) recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy
Output: (C)
under the state constitution are typically subject to rational basis review). 19 . As far as I can tell, no other court has held that such laws exceed a state’s police power. When restrictions on the sale of alcohol have been struck down, it has generally been on some other discrete constitutional or statutory ground. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (declaring a state law taxing certain alcoholic beverages produced in-state differently from beverages produced out-of-state to be violative of the Commerce Clause and noting that the state justified the law solely on the basis of promoting the local beverage industry); Rice v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal.3d 431, 146 Cal.Rptr. 585, 579 P.2d 476, 494-95 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 20 . "The privileges and immunities of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that official proponents of californias proposition 8 lacked article iii standing in federal court (B) holding cercla does not preempt californias corporate capacity statute (C) holding that californias liquor pricefixing statute violated federal antitrust law (D) holding that californias antislapp statute is applicable in federal court (E) holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding
Output: (C)
is no dispute that the facts of this case establish a valid disclaimer by Ms. Gillette. We need not look beyond the plain language of Section 6205 to determine the effect of this disclaimer and the proper result in this case. The clear meaning of Section 6205(a) is that the status of the parties and the effect of the disclaimer are fixed to the time of the decedent’s death, regardless of when the disclaimer is actually made. See In re Bute’s Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 339, 341 (1946) (“When a devise is renounced the renunciation will relate back to the moment when the gift was made and prevent it from ever taking effect, leaving the devisee without an interest in the property and without liability in connection therewith.”); In re Estate of McCutcheon, 699 A.2d 746 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>). In addition to relating a disclaimer back to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made (B) holding in case where plaintiff sought damages resulting from the defendants failure to pay the accidental death benefit claims she filed following death of her husband transfer to south carolina was warranted because with the exception of plaintiffs relocation to the state of west virginia following the death of the decedent the cause of action bears virtually no relation to the forum chosen by the plaintiff (C) holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury (D) holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution (E) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute
Output: (A)
the jury to determine the size of the punitive damage award, both parties provided extensive briefing on the applicability of the Seventh Amendment. “We may uphold the district court's decision ... under any ground that the record supports.” United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 536 n. 9 (10th Cir.1994). See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25, 108 S.Ct. 2239 (affirming Eleventh Circuit's choice-of-law decision “under somewhat different reasoning”). 8 . We need not permit Jones to choose between a new jury trial or acceptance of the remittitur because, unlike the reduction in O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1440, 1447, this reduction is required by the constitution, not a court’s determination as to whether substantial evidence at trial supported the amount awarded. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d at 642-42 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the nonmovant failed to raise a fact issue on mitigation by not raising a fact issue as to the amount of damages that could have been avoided had the movantproperly mitigated his damages (B) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable (C) holding that a reduction in punitive damages to comply with the due process clause is a federal constitutional issue not a fact issue requiring jury consideration (D) holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury (E) holding a court may not award punitive damages
Output: (C)
Nor did the district court err in failing to adopt as establishing a timely filing" the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter. This form letter contains no statement that the EEOC found the plaintiffs’ charge timely nor any guarantee that a court action based on the charge would be found timely. Even if it had contained such a statement, the district court is not bound by EEOC determinations. See Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir.1997) (finding “no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude [an] EEOC letter” from evidence where there was “little if any basis for the district court to conclude that the report had any probative value”); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 1996 WL 557800, at *12 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1996) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). The district court was not required to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court does not err as a matter of law by categorically refusing to admit eeoc cause determinations in either bench and sic jury trials (B) holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession (C) holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue (D) holding that trial court did not err (E) holding that trial court did not err by refusing to enforce mediated settlement agreement that contained an illegal provision
Output: (A)
is a “fact-intensive issue,” and requires more than a “defendant’s mere presence during a police search of a residence.” United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1043 (8th Cir.2011). Shores’s participation in this transaction outside of 3714 Melba Place the day before drugs were seized at the residence supports the inference that one of the purposes for which Shores maintained those premises during the relevant time period was the distribution of drugs. See United States v. Holliman, 291 F.3d 498, 502 (8th Cir.2002). Similarly, testimony describing Shores’s participation in a hand-to-hand transaction on September 15, 2009 also falls within the conduct charged in the two possession-with-intent-to-distribute charges. Cf. United States v. Williams, 165 F.3d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the evidence is part of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient (C) holding that a witnesss description of the defendant giving him methamphetamine in exchange for a car was admissible because it relates to events occurring around the time period alleged in the superseding indictment and tended to prove an element of the offense of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (D) holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy (E) holding an indictment legally insufficient when it failed to inform the defendant of the gravamen of the alleged offense
Output: (C)
looked right at her, that’s how I got a good look at her.” Shirk stated that the female wore a full face helmet, but he did not say that it covered her face. Further, the officers disclosed that the female wore a “full face helmet” in the affidavit. Thus, this information does not undermine Shirk’s identification or the judge’s issuance of the warrant. The Ewings next note that after viewing various DMV photos, including those of Mark and Heather, Contreras and Rajala initially made no identifications. However, the officers included Rajala’s statement in the affidavit. They did not include Contreras’s non-identification, but given the strength of Shirk’s identification, this omission does not cast doubt on probable cause. See United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 302 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Ewings also complain that pri- or to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that omission of nonidentification from photo spread was not material and that the fourth amendment does not require an affiant to include all potentially exculpatory evidence in the affidavit (B) holding allegation that false affidavit was basis for arrest warrant is sufficient to state  1983 fourth amendment claim against affiant officer (C) holding that the state has no affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence (D) holding defendant was improperly denied potentially exculpatory evidence (E) holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant
Output: (A)
See Am. Compl. Ex., at 80a. It is equally clear, therefore, that Plaintiff had no property interest in his role as HOCALJ. “Once a determination has been reached ... that an employee ‘held [his] position at the will and pleasure’: of his employer, “that finding ‘necessarily establishes that [the employee] had no property interest.’ ” Thomas, 351 F.3d at 113 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 346 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2074)). While Plaintiff would be entitled to certain procedural guarantees if he was removed from his position as ALJ, his loss of the title and duties of HOCALJ and restoration to the role of ALJ “was not an action against an employee for which cause was required” and does not entitle Plaintiff to the protections of the Due Process Clause. See Pinar, 747 F.2d at 913-14 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff had no property interest in his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a disclaimer setting forth policies for general guidance only which stated that it did not create a binding contract and that the employee could be terminated without notice and at will at any time for any reason unambiguously provided that employment was atwill (B) holding that a public employee who may only be terminated for cause has a property interest in his position that is protected by the 14th amendment (C) holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution (D) holding that the elevation of a federal employee who could not be removed without cause to a temporary promotion that could be terminated at any time at the discretion of the agency did not confer a property interest protected by the due process clause in the elevated position (E) holding that a public employee who can be discharged only for cause is entitled to at least some informal due process before he can be terminated
Output: (D)
fees, which the government opposed. The government contended that Wagner was not a prevailing party, and even if she were, the government was substantially justified in its position throughout the litigation; in either case, Wagner would not be awarded the fees she sought. We denied Wagner’s motion. In our Order, filed on August 26, 2008, we stated that in order to be a “prevailing party” under the EAJA, a party must establish that a federal court’s actions resulted in a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” and that the alteration was “judicially sanctioned.” See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We determined that the Court’s actions 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja (B) holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea (C) holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses (D) holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted (E) holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel
Output: (A)
apparently found that all of the statements were admissible under Roberts. On appeal, Defendant argues that admission of four of the statements (the grand jury testimony, the stationhouse statement, the statement to the SANE practitioner, and the statement to Lewandowski at the scene) violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, as that Clause was interpreted in Crawford. The parties agree that Crawford applies in this case. We begin by addressing several preliminary matters, and we then analyze each statement under Crawford. STANDARD OF REVIEW {12} Defendant’s claim that the victim’s statements were admitted in violation of his Confrontation Clause rights presents a constitutional question that we review de novo. State v. Lasner, 2000-NMSC-038, ¶ 24, 129 N.M. 806, 14 P.3d 1282 (<HOLDING>). We review the trial court’s decision to admit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo (B) holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo (C) holding questions of law related to class certification are reviewed de novo (D) holding that issues concerning the sufficiency of an indictment are reviewed de novo (E) holding that rule 12b6 disposition is reviewed de novo
Output: (B)
obvious scriveners' errors. With Count VII, we see that the file name was changed from "LFSOO07-0103.jpg" to "Ifs-0070103.jpg." Id. at 445, 532 respectively. Other charges were amended in a similar manner. Brown did not object to the amendment in this regard. 12 . Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar analysis. See State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135 (Minn.App.2004); State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 732 A.2d 425 (1999); State v. Martin, 674 N.W.2d 291 (S.D.2003). But see, United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358 (5th Cir.2002); Girard v. State, 883 So.2d 717 (Ala.2003). 13 . Brown cites four cases in support of his argument that multiple punishments for child exploitation and possession of child pornography violate principles of double jeopardy. See Scuro v. State, 849 N.E.2d at 687 (<HOLDING>); Adams v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1169, 1176 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim (B) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (C) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm (D) holding abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more than one year earlier (E) holding that more than notice to a defendant is required
Output: (A)
at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, January 19, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citation omitted). In this case, perhaps there were such facts, possibly in the testimony that was struck from the record or in the testimony that might have been elicited from Pugh, had he been called to testify, but these circumstances are not in the record before us. We concur in the sentiments of our sister court expressed in In re J.J.K., that "we are reluctant to deny court-ordered treatment for anyone who is ill. However, within Lthe record] before us, we do not find the State proved its case by clear and convincing evidence as it is required to do.” Nos. 14-03-00379-CV, 14-03-00380-CV, 2003 WL 22996950, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). CORRECTED DISSENTING OPINION EVELYN V. KEYES, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (B) holding that an opinion of a potential danger to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard (C) holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of potential danger to others insufficient to support commitment (D) holding that evidence that patient who had a history of not taking medication and who murdered husband during a period when she was off of her medication and delusional tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to patient or others (E) holding that evidence that appellant suffered severe delusions became so agitated at the hospital that she had to be physically restrained knocked door off hinges in hospital and engaged in verbal altercations with others was insufficient to support commitment determining that there was no evidence of overt acts that would tend to confirm that appellant would cause serious harm to self or others
Output: (E)
added). Plaintiffs point out, correctly, that beneficial use is an evolving and dynamic requirement of federal and state law. See Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967) (While “what is a reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.”). Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires that all water provided pursuant to the Act be put to “beneficial use,” as defined by state law. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665-67, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1242, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 5 P.3d 853 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder (C) holding that the montana constitution protects water rights against unreasonable state action  (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest
Output: (A)
Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a). But neither the Seventh Amendment, nor any other provision of the Constitution, preserves any right to a bench trial. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). Plaintiff initially sought compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by the court, which triggered Principal Summa’s Seventh Amendment rights. See U.S. Const, amend. VII. But the right to a jury trial does not depend only on the initial pleadings. See Hildebrand, 607 F.2d at 709-10. When subsequent events leave only equitable issues to be resolved, the right to a jury trial does not exist and is not preserved by the Seventh Amendment or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. See id.; see also Wall v. Trust Co. of Ga., 946 F.2d 805, 809 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). So, the dismissal of Principal Summa’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well (B) holding that no right to a jury trial existed after one of the plaintiffs claims was dismissed leaving only an equitable claim (C) holding one example of a claim is a right to an equitable remedy that can be satisfied by an alternative right to payment (D) recognizing that the determination is an equitable one (E) holding that back pay was an integral part of title vips equitable remedies and that therefore no right to jury trial existed
Output: (B)
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if . the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may ... as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that ' interest.... Alaska R. Civ. P. 19(a). 28 . See Brandon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 28 P.3d 269, 274 (Alaska 2001) (citing Parson v. Marathon Oil Co., 960 P.2d 615, 618 (Alaska 1998); LeDoux v. Kodiak Island Borough, 827 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Alaska 1992)) (stating that "a rule on one motion is an implicit denial of another contradictory pending motion"). 29 . Mundt v. Nw. Explorations, Inc., 947 P.2d 827, 830 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>). 30 . See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted (B) holding applicants motion to intervene was timely even though it was filed after superior court entered final judgment because record was unclear whether applicant knew before court issued its order invalidating her interest in land her parcels of land would be affected by the litigation (C) holding that court had jurisdiction where no separate judgment had been entered even though notice of appeal was not timely filed as measured from the final decision (D) holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court (E) holding that even though the complaint sought money damages and land was actually recovered the attorneys lien attached to the land
Output: (B)
The agency reasonably found that unfulfilled threats, which were the only individualized harm Yang alleged he had suffered, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ci Pan v. United States Atty. General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). This is so, even when considered in conjunction with his father’s alleged beating, because, as the IJ noted, Yang did not allege that this incident resulted in any injuries to his father or caused Yang any continuing harm. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (“the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer”); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the agency did not err in finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic (B) recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 (C) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (D) recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident (E) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person
Output: (D)
relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, ¶ 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL’s account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) (“[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion.”); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action
Output: (B)
plain error review because he did not object to the admissibility of the reports or to the testimony by Detective Duft about the report. See State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 427, 516 S.E.2d 106, 118 (1999) (plain error is error “so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached.”). Indeed, Defendant never disputed that the material was cocaine. He chose not to defend on that basis, but rather focused on portraying himself as a homeless person making a delivery in exchange for beer and cigarettes. Since the identity of the substance was not challenged, the admission of the laboratory reports was harmless error. See State v. Edwards, - N.C. App. -,-, 621 S.E.2d 333, 337 (2005), (<HOLDING>); State v. Thompson, 110 N.C. App. 217, 225, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence (B) holding that failure to require production of dna testing protocols was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant did not dispute that he committed the crimes at issue but rather argued that he was mentally impaired (C) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (D) holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases (E) holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal
Output: (B)
at the Bus Stop. If the City was required to install additional amenities under such circumstances, it would be required to install those amenities at virtually every City bus stop in an attempt to prevent all crime at those locations. This is not what the law requires. Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 210-11, 941 P.2d at 222-23 (stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety). Under the circumstances of this case, where there was no evidence that prior crimes had occurred at the Bus Stop, a reasonable jury could not find that the City breached the duty of care it owed Tiana because it did not install a $10,000 shelter and lighting at the Bus Stop. Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1; cf. Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 212, 941 P.2d at 224 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16 Tiana also contends that the City 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that active participation in a criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is more than nominal passive inactive or purely technical and that defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang (B) holding that an expert in the field of gangs and gang codes of behavior including the requirements of members obedience silence and staunch defense of other gang members and the punishment meted out to a gang member who violates these requirements could testify because these were factual matters outside the experience of the average juror (C) holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm (D) holding appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal district courts decision to admit evidence that defendant was a member of a gang because gang membership was relevant to show motive and intent (E) holding that expert testimony from a detective about the reluctance of witnesses residents of gang neighborhoods to testify in cases involving gang activity is relevant to the credibility of a witness
Output: (C)