niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that the victim was “physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, th[e] sexual act.” We agree with the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit that “[a] reasonable jury may conclude that a person who is asleep when a sexual act begins is physically unable to decline participation in that act.” United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1169 (8th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 1347-48 (8th Cir.1991)). If the victim testifies that she woke up while the sexual act was ongoing, this “provide[s] sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that penetration occurred while she was asleep.” Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was sufficient where inter alia the victim woke up to find the defendant on top of her and engaged in sex (B) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative (D) holding that a victim impact aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague because it directed the jury to consider inter alia the effect of the crime on the victims family (E) holding that the witnesss prior statement that the victim was lying flat on his back when he was shot impermissibly contradicted the witnesss trial testimony that the victim was on top of another individual at that time
Output: (A)
458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), or a regulation that completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074. The third category of takings is gov- . erned by the standard set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), and the fourth category is governed by the standard set forth in Nollan and Dolan. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39, 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074. Because Highlands relies solely on the Nollan and Dolan standard in its initial brief, we do not address the other theories of taking. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (<HOLDING>). 2 . In arguing that the exactions in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief (B) holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory (C) holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property (D) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
Output: (A)
consumer protection statutes based on allegations that the braking systems in their subject vehicles, contrary to GM’s representations as to -their safety, were in fact unsafe and hence defective. The plaintiffs in Briehl, who admittedly had not sustained any actual personal injury or property damage due to having purchased vehicles with the allegedly defectively designed braking system, nevertheless claimed damages for lost resale value and overpayment for the vehicles at the time of purchase. Id. at 626. The court, though, held that because the plaintiffs had “failed to allege that any defect had actually manifested itself in their vehicles, [their] allegations of damages failed to meet the pleading requirements for defective products.” Id. The mere .Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (<HOLDING>); Pfizer v. Farsian, 682 So.2d 405, 407 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages (C) recognizing cause of action (D) holding no cause of action for defect which never manifests itself (E) holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action
Output: (D)
claim that his assignment of an examination grade or a final grade is communication protected by the First Amendment. As does any communicative act, assigning a letter grade sends a message to the recipient. The message communicated by the letter grade “A” is virtually indistinguishable from the message communicated by a formal written evaluation indicating “excellent work.” Both communicative acts represent symbols that transmit a unique message. Because the assignment of a letter grade is symbolic communication intended to send a specific message to the student, the individual professor’s communicative act is entitled to some measure of First Amendment protection. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06, 89 S.Ct. 733, 735-36, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42, 86 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that raising chickens is not an expressive act for the purposes of the first amendment (B) holding that a public school may not without evidence  of substantial disruption punish students for wearing armbands protesting the vietnam war (C) holding that students action wearing black armbands was expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protection (D) holding that wearing black armband to school to protest vietnam war was expressive conduct (E) holding that participating in community service is not expressive conduct
Output: (C)
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980), cited in Butler, 335 Md. at 254, 643 A.2d at 397. Thus, in the instant case, Woodson has the burden of establishing that the jury actually decided an issue in his favor on the possession count which would prevent relitigation of that issue in a trial on Count 2, possession with intent to distribute. It is clear from the record of the proceedings in the instant case that Woodson has not met his burden. No verdict was actually delivered on the possession count in the instant case. Because the jury did not render a verdict on the possession count, there is no judgment from which findings of fact in favor of Woodson can be inferred. See Schiro v. Farley, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 783, 792, 127 L.Ed.2d 47, 60-61 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Collateral estoppel requires a finding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding procedural error is harmless where the court would have reached the same result had the guidelines issue been decided the other way and the sentence imposed would be reasonable even if contested issue decided in defendants favor (B) holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial (C) holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment (D) holding that the failure to return a verdict does not have collateral estoppel effect  unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendants favor (E) holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court
Output: (D)
(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (B) holding trial court erred when it sanctioned client where the evidence showed that the attorney filed frivolous pleadings on behalf of the client but the client did nothing more than rely on her attorneys advice (C) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (D) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case (E) holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability
Output: (A)
are free to employ counsel of their own choice and the courts are afforded little leeway in interfering with that choice.” United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir.1978) (citation omitted). However, we have recognized: [t]here are times when an accused’s right to counsel of choice must yield to a greater interest in maintaining high standards of professional responsibility in the courtroom. The trial court may therefore disqualify counsel if necessary to preserve the integrity, fairness, and professionalism of trial court proceedings. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d at 626 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (affirming the district court’s disqualification of the defendant’s attorney whom the State intended to call as a witness); see also State v. Powell, 684 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Iowa 2004) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, when a defendant’s counsel of choice 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the conflict (B) holding that prejudice is only presumed if there is proof of an actual conflict of interest (C) holding that the lower court had inappropriately granted relief based on the existence of a possible conflict and explaining an actual conflict is required (D) recognizing conflict (E) holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed
Output: (E)
promise to sell [him] Unit 7S,” which he considers “a unique property.” In addition, he contends that what “had been a refundable deposit on another unit in Boston is now non-refundable.” This is reportedly because he “has stopped looking at other properties in Boston and the opportunity to purchase many of these potential properties likely no longer exists.” The Rule 56 materials submitted to this court do not support these contentions. As mentioned in the background supra, Trinity Place has confirmed, in response to a subpoena, that Albrecht has already entered into a P&S agreement with them. It cannot be said, therefore, that Albrecht has suffered the harms he complains of. These facts are simply not sufficient to support an estoppel. Compare Levin v. Rose, 302 Mass. 378, 382 (1939) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Facts Alleged by Albrecht 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even wisconsin which has one of the broadest coverages of the economic loss doctrine would not apply it to bar an action for the rescission of a contract (B) holding that the statute of frauds is not a bar where the denial of relief to one who has been misled to his harm would cause an unjust and unconscientious injury and loss (C) holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages (D) holding that the plain language of this section requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his sentence (E) holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public
Output: (B)
with Rule 11 (c) (1) as to each individual charge for which a plea of guilty is offered.” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, a review of other states with rules of practice similar to § 39-19 reveals that they also require the court, when accepting pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, to ensure that the defendant understands the nature of each charge and the maximum penalty associated therewith, in addition to the maximum possible consecutive sentence when there are multiple charges. These states also consider this information to be mandatory, and, when the failure to inform on each of these direct consequences is raised via a motion to withdraw a plea before the trial court imposes sentencing, the withdrawal must be permitted. See, e.g., Wells v. State, 396 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1978) (<HOLDING>); People v. Flannigan, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1059, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself internal quotation marks omitted (B) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines (C) holding that to determine whether a north carolina conviction for a crime is punishable by a prison term exceeding one year a court is to consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted (D) recognizing district courts broad discretion to impose prison term up to the statutory maximum for violations of supervised release internal quotation marks omitted (E) holding that the maximum possible sentence provided by law for conviction of the offense charged is the most important consequence of the plea internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (E)
ask Mr; Brunson a single; question about his representation of Marcus Rus-saw or Michael-Russaw. Dunaway’s collateral counsel also failed to offer this Courp any 'information Brunson could ■have used to impeach the trial testimony of Marcus Russaw, Mary Russaw, Lois Russaw, Felicia Russaw, or Teresa Rus-saw. Further, Dunaway’s collateral counsel did not call any of the Russaws to testify at the evidentiary hearing. “The Court finds that this allegation of ineffective assistance is without merit. Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P. In the alternative,- the Court finds that Duna-way failed to meet his burden of proving this allegation of ineffective assistance by a prepondérance of evidence as required by Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. See M.S. v. State, 822 So.2d 449, 452 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>).” (C.R. 743-46.) We agree with the circuit 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the burden of proving that a conflict of interest rises to the level of ineffective assistance rests on the one asserting the conflict (B) holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal (C) recognizing the conflict (D) recognizing conflict (E) holding that a conflict of interest independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel  constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioners right to pursue his  1 claim
Output: (A)
of the same performance when each of them, individually, has the duty of fully performing the obligation[.]” Id. at 837. HRS § 483-1 (1993) states that “[sjeveral obligors means obligors severally bound for the same performance.” Similarly, the Introductory Note of Chapter 13 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[tjhis Chapter deals with the rights and duties created by multiple promises of the same performance^]” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter 13, introductory note. In contrast, a guarantor does not promise the “same performance” as the prin cipal debtor. While a principal debtor promises to pay a specified amount, a guarantor promises to pay that amount only if it cannot be collected from the principal debtor. See Schweitzer v. Fishel, 13 Haw. 690, 693 (1901) (<HOLDING>). A “contract of guaranty is an enforceable 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) recognizing that where liability is joint and several among multiple parties complete relief may be granted with respect to any one of them (C) holding that a suit against one insurance company was not compulsory as related to a suit against another insurance company because even though they were the result of the same event  a hurricane strike  they were two different parties with two different policies (D) holding that provisions concerning joint custody and healthcare of the parties child were consistent with the signed notes (E) holding a guarantor and principal debtor were not joint and several obligors they were severally parties to different contracts with the plaintiffs
Output: (E)
the trial court’s conclusion that Charles should be credited for these debts and Karen’s argument to the contrary is an invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses — an invitation we decline. Next, Karen argues that the trial court erroneously valued the marital residence at $72,000 because, although the home was originally appraised at $72,000, the condition of the residence had deteriorated markedly since the appraisal. Karen, however, testified only that she believed that the home was worth “less than that” but neglected to state what she believed the value of the residence to be. Id. at 37. Consequently, Karen may not now complain that the evidence of the home’s value is inaccurate. See Church v. Church, 424 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). Inasmuch as the trial court’s valuation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party who fails to provide sufficient evidence at trial cannot object to the resulting determination on the basis of inadequate evidence (B) holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date (C) holding that the objective of maintaining the marital residence for the best interest of the minor children is properly accomplished not by granting exclusive ownership of the home to the wife but by granting the wife exclusive use and possession of the marital residence during the minority of the children (D) holding that a party who fails to introduce evidence of the specific value of the marital residence is estopped from appealing the distribution based on that absence of evidence (E) holding invited error doctrine bars appellant from appealing the admission of evidence where appellant invited the error by being the first to introduce the evidence thus injecting the issue into tjie case
Output: (D)
Thus, Petitioner asserts that “there is a reasonable possibility that these errors might have contributed to the conviction,” citing State v. Maluia, 107 Hawaii 20, 24,108 P.3d 974, 978 (2005), because “[Respondent] had the burden of disproving the EMED defense beyond a reasonable doubt..: VII. It is established that “[a]rguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by the court.” State v. Mahoe, 89 Hawai'i 284, 290, 972 P.2d 287, 293 (1998) (citing Royde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)) (emphasis omitted). Improper statements by Respondent may serve as grounds for vacating a judgment of conviction and remanding the case for a new trial. See State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai'i 504, 516, 78 P.3d 317, 329 (2003) (<HOLDING>); State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 415, 984 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense (B) holding that prosecutors comment on defendants failure to testify constituted plain error affecting the defendants substantial rights (C) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (D) holding that failure to object to prosecutors comment on defendants failure to testify preserved nothing for appellate review (E) holding that the prosecutors reference to the nonexistence of mitigating evidence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify
Output: (B)
plan. Allowing the Debtors to now modify their chapter 13 plan in such a way as to reduce the value received by GMAC is inequitable and such a result is unacceptable under the Bankruptcy Code and relevant case law. The Debtors’ proposed modification is not permitted by § 1329(a). The Bankruptcy Code does not allow the Debtors’ to modify the amount of an allowed secured claim post-confirmation. To allow the Debtors’ to surrender their vehicle and reclassify GMAC’s deficiency as an unsecured claim would shift the loss resulting from the vehicle’s depreciation to GMAC. Such a result seems illogical when any appreciation post-confirmation would benefit the debtor and not the secured creditor. See e.g. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Stevens (In re Stevens), 130 F.3d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). A debtor who decides to retain collateral at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan (B) holding that  506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence (C) holding that where a security agreement contained collateral other than collateral for which creditor advanced funds to debtor since it secured antecedent debts as well as new debt and the agreement provided that the security interest secured payment and performance of the debtors present and future debts to the creditor the creditor did not have a pmsi and the debtors could avoid the creditors lien on collateral claimed as exempt (D) holding that the secured creditor was only entitled to the amount of its claim as provided in the debtors chapter 13 plan when the destruction of the vehicle yielded insurance proceeds greater than the secured creditors claim (E) holding that chapter 13 debtors were unable to avoid a creditors unperfected secured claim because they lacked standing
Output: (D)
Second, these materials fall within the “narrowly defined category of materials a court can consider without converting a[n FRCP] 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. This category includes exhibits attached to the complaint, undisputed documents relied upon by the plaintiff, other items appearing in the record of the case, and matters of public record.” Stuler v. United States, No. 07-642, 2008 WL 957009, at *2 (W.D.Pa. Apr. 8, 2008) (citation omitted). Senate reports, court filings, and resolutions passed by municipalities are public records. See Biomed. Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal., Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“[C]ourt filings ... are matters of public record....”); Jones v. Butler, No. 09-03128, 2009 WL 2461885, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 11, 2009) (<HOLDING>); L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F.Supp.2d 1072, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice because it was docketed should be considered a matter of public record (B) holding that bond and miller did not apply because the plaintiff was appointed to the city council by the mayor rather than elected by the public (C) holding that neighbors aesthetic concerns could constitute compelling evidence for a city council (D) recognizing that a city council resolution is unquestionably a matter of public record (E) holding that an employment contract between an outgoing city council and the city manager was void on public policy grounds because it attempted to take away the governmental or legislative power of the incoming council to appoint and remove public officers
Output: (D)
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the ease under this title; 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (emphasis added). As the statute clearly indicates, § 362(a) only stays those “proeeeding[s] against the debtor,” see Freeman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 799 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (5th Cir.1986), thereby “protect[ing] the debtor’s assets, providing] temporary relief from creditors, and furthering] equity of distribution among the creditors by forestalling a race to the courthouse.” GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir.1985). In determining whether a continuing proceeding, such as the removal of this action, is against the debtor, we normally examine the posture of the case at the initial proceeding. See Freeman, 799 F.2d at 1092-93 (<HOLDING>). Our situation is complicated somewhat by the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that while an original bankruptcy proceeding where the state is not named as a defendant is not a suit an adversary proceeding directly against the state would be (B) holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding (C) holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that a garnishment proceeding is an action against the consumer
Output: (C)
and becomes liable to the mortgagor the same as anyone else who converts property to his own use.’ ” (quoting Marchand v. Ronaghan, 9 Idaho 96, 98, 72 P. 731, 732 (1903))). Conversion, in turn, requires a distinct act of wrongfully asserted dominion over another’s personal property, see Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984), and a cause of action for conversion “accrues in favor of the owner of property as soon as the property is wrongfully taken from his possession or wrongfully converted.” Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605, 616 (1999). Title to property in a nonjudicial foreclosure action is not “taken” until the conclusion, of the sale. See Roos v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 482, 321 P.2d 210, 215 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Thus, while we recognize that a few 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a wouldbe bona fide purchaser could not simply ignore the recorded notices of an impending nonjudicial foreclosure sale and fail to make inquiry as to whether the announced sale had occurred (B) holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale (C) holding that a trustee may conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale only after satisfying the conditions in former ors 86735 (D) holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser (E) holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default
Output: (D)
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”). The inquiry “must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Claimants argue that their claims do not arise from the purchase or sale of Tele-group’s common stock because a claim “aris[es] from the purchase or sale of ... a security” only if the claim alleges that the purchase or sale of the security was itself unlawful. According to claimants, a claim does not arise from the purchase or sale of a security if it is predicated on conduct that occurred after the purchase or sale. See In re Amarex, Inc., 78 B.R. 605, 610 (W.D.Okla.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Angeles Corp., 177 B.R. 920, 926 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument (B) holding that a partnership agreement that contained prohibitions against the sale or assignment of a partners interest in the partnership without the others consent would be enforced (C) holding that a claim for breach of a partnership agreement because it is based on conduct that occurred after the issuance and sale of the partnership units does not arise from the purchase or sale of those units (D) holding that under  510b a claim does not arise from the purchase or sale of a security if it is predicated on conduct that occurred after the securitys issuance (E) holding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not arise from the purchase or sale of limited partnership interests where the wrongful conduct occurred after the sale of those interests
Output: (C)
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), the Supreme Court held that “the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.” The Second Circuit, however, has since made clear that the “extra protection that Bremen accords to mandatory forum selection clauses,” is not applicable to a permissive forum-selection clause which “contemplates more than one forum.” Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir.1993). Further, “[a]n agreement conferring jurisdiction in one forum will not be interpreted as excluding jurisdiction elsewhere unless it contains specific language of exclusion.” John Boutari and Son, Wines and Spirits, S.A v. Attiki Importers and Distribs., Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that, despite the Franchise 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a forumselection clause which stated that any dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the jurisdiction of the competent greek courts was permissive rather than mandatory (B) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington (C) holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory because it provided for exclusive jurisdiction and venue in a particular court (D) holding clause reading the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue shall be in california to be mandatory (E) holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad
Output: (A)
personally waive the rights to testify at trial, to have the prosecution witnesses testify in defend other settings. One such case arose when a defendant charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct stipulated to the element that he was more than 36 months older than the victim without waiving his right to a jury trial on that element. State v. Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). In Wright, we applied a harmless-error analysis to the district court’s failure to obtain appellant’s personal waiver. Id. at 191. In part, we reasoned that proving the age element to the jury would have had “a more prejudicial effect than- the stipulation” because appellant was significantly older than the victim. Id.; see also Hinton, 702 N.W.2d at 281-82 (<HOLDING>). Also, both Wright and Hinton involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate (B) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (E) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
Output: (A)
grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18] (1988). A second type includes killings less violent but “conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to the victim,” State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 65, 337 S.E.2d 808, 826-27 (1985)[, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988)], including those which leave the victim in her “last moments aware of but helpless to prevent impending death,” State v (1994). Additionally, the evidence shows that the victim was conscious and in great pain for at least fifteen minutes after the shooting, thereby permitting the inference that he was also aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death after the shooting. See Brown, 315 N.C. at 67, 337 S.E.2d at 828 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the killing demonstrates an unusual 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that the victim was conscious for fifteen minutes after being shot six times supports a finding that the victim suffered great physical pain prior to death (B) holding that evidence the defendant knew the victim supported a finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest (C) holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim (D) holding that where the dying victim remained conscious for fifteen minutes the evidence was sufficient to show that the victim knew that he was dying but was helpless to prevent it (E) holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon
Output: (D)
good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury * * Black’s Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 903 (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 463 (3rd ed. 1961) (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to make good or compensate for an injury sus tained — distinguished from punitive damages ”). When civil rights plaintiffs seek “damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (<HOLDING>). “Punitive damages aside, damages in tort 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages (B) holding that punitive damages which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischargeability of compensatory damages are likewise nondischargeable (C) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (D) holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 (E) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases
Output: (D)
alleges that she, Rutledge, and Knapp generally performed similar jobs, and that the fact that her supervisors provided various explanations to her of why she could not be promoted demonstrates that those explanations are pretext. See EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir.2001) (“Indeed, the fact that Sears has offered different justifications at different times for its failure to hire Santana is, in and of itself, probative of pretext.”). Neither of these allegations creates a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext. It is undisputed that Rutledge and Knapp had different job titles than Baldwin, and Baldwin offers no evidence other than her unsupported allegation to permit a conclusion that their duties were nonetheless similar. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>). Absent proof that their duties were the same, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employers nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee was in fact pretextual (B) holding that a plaintiffemployees unsubstantiated allegations and bald assertions are insufficient to rebut the employers nondiscriminatory justification for an employment decision (C) recognizing that even a personal grudge can constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision (D) holding that unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence (E) recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee
Output: (B)
offense committed as to violate the Constitution” (emphasis added)). In this case, however, Howerin presented no evidence that a fine was imposed as part of his Florida sentence. Relatedly, the fact that a forfeiture within the congressionally mandated range of fines is presumptively constitutional does not mean that a forfeiture outside of that range is presumptively unconstitutional. Congress has authorized both a fine and forfeiture as part of the punishment for many offenses, thus suggesting that it does not consider a punishment somewhat above the statutory fine range to be excessive. A forfeiture far in excess of the statutory fine range, however, is likely to violate the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498-99 & n. 6 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) 10 . Howerin, in his deposition in this case, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 150000 was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 20000 (C) holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine (D) holding that forfeiture of 357144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 250000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 5000 (E) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 65000 was not excessive where the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 40000
Output: (B)
462 F.Sd 237 (3d Cir.2006), for support. We review the District Court’s interpretation of its legal authority at sentencing de novo. United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243, 246 (3d Cir.2005). We note, at the outset, that the District Court imposed a sentence below the Advisory Guidelines, albeit for reasons other than the crack/powder cbcaine differential. The recerd demonstrates the District Court clearly understood the mandate of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and recognized its discretion with respect to the guidelines. The District Court properly considered' and then declined Edge’s request to vary from the guidelines based on the differential. See Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 558, 563-65, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Gunter, 462 F.3d at 249 (“[T]he District 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the cocaine guidelines  are advisory only (B) holding that even though the guidelines are advisory a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendants guidelines range (C) recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory (D) holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature (E) recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts
Output: (A)
period. See Dkt. No. 76 at 2-3, ¶¶ 3-6 (Smith Decl. of April 2008), and id. Ex. 1 at 7, ¶¶ 1-7 (Smith Report of April 2005); see also Dkt. No. 79, Ex. 3 at 70-71 (Firestone Dep.) (similar). A strikingly similar expert opinion on the cumulative effect of a manufacturer’s asbestos product resulted in a prima facie case of proximate causation against the manufacturer in Lockwood. See Lockwood, 109 Wash.2d at 247-248, 744 P.2d at 613. Such evidence, when coupled with the conclusions by plaintiffs’ additional experts, also establishes a genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Headley’s exposure to Ferro’s crystalline silica-containing product constituted a “substantial factor” in causing his silicosis. See Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Coming Corp., 86 Wash.App. 22, 30, 935 P.2d 684, 688 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, Ferro 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when multiple asbestos products exists as potential causes of asbestosis a plaintiff can prevail by showing that the defendants product was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury (B) holding that when a plaintiff can establish that she was in the vicinity in which asbestos dust from defendants products was inhaled a jury can reasonably infer that plaintiff was injured by defendants products (C) holding plaintiff could not prevail on productsliability action where there was no proof he used defendants product (D) holding that no products liability claim lies in admiralty when commercial party alleges injury only to product itself resulting in purely economic loss insofar as the tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself (E) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control
Output: (A)
commerce claim nor the request for declaratory and injunctive relief requires individualized proof and both are thus properly resolved in a group context. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343-44, 97 S.Ct. 2434 (emphasis added). Thus, the varying extent of the burdens incurred by individual members of the Commission to comply with the North Carolina statute at issue did not preclude the granting of associational standing. Id. Authorities cited by Defendants do not suggest a different result, because takings claims, medical injuries, and damages to real property are prototypical examples of claims requiring individualized proof that do not speak to the vagueness claims or compelled speech claims of the Associations. Cf. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. at 52 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in cases involving a facial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (B) recognizing fiduciary exception in the erisa context (C) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in either a thirdparty beneficiary individual or associational capacity because there was nothing in the contract between a conservation district and a city concerning rates charged to the city that conferred donee  or creditorbeneficiary standing upon the plaintiffs to challenge the contracts terms (D) recognizing that ij should look at an individuals claim in the context of country condition reports (E) recognizing associational standing in the context of a compelled speech claim
Output: (E)
the box which was in the defendant’s pocket prior to the time they searched the defendant and removed the box from the defendant’s pocket, ... the fruits of that search are not to be considered by you in arriving at your verdict, and in that case you should return a verdict of not guilty. Record on Appeal vol. 2, at 145-46, 178-79, 210-11 (emphasis added). Because the record indicates that the district court, at most, made only an initial determination of whether officer Young saw the cocaine in plain view and left the ultimate determination of that question to the jury, we reject the government’s' argument. III For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE Lang’s conviction and REMAND for a new trial. 1 . See Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (<HOLDING>). We do not address the validity of the Terry 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a police officer may order an individual out of his car and frisk him for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and dangerous (B) holding that an officer making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect  and he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose (C) holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous (D) holding that an officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous (E) holding that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous  he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him
Output: (E)
Milliken & Co. v. FTC, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 362, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); United States v. W.H. Hodges & Co., Inc., 533 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam), and submission to investigation preliminary to regulatory action, see Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C.Cir.1980), each of which has been held not to require notice and comment. Indeed, the impact of the inspection plan before us falls well short of the regulation in Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp., 589 F.2d 658 (D.C.Cir.1978), where the court held that agency provisions for selecting, among other things, auditors and auditing criteria did not have substantial impact. Id. at 664—68; see also Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804 (4th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). East would have the APA’s procedures 
 Holding statements: (A) holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 (B) holding that an agencys informal interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference to the extent it has the power to persuade (C) holding that names of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are categorically exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity (D) holding that disclosure rule regulating access to agencys investigative files was within procedural rules exemption from informal rulemaking (E) holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure
Output: (D)