niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
(“Allegations of date, time or place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity, but alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule.”). Under this Court’s nuanced, case-by-case approach, other means are available to present the required indicia of reliability that a false’ claim was actually submitted. Although there are no bright-line rules, our case law has indicated that a relator with direct, first-hand knowledge of the defendants’ submission of false claims gained through her employment with the defendants may have a sufficient basis for asserting that the defendants actually submitted false claims. See U.S. ex rel. Walker v. R & F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, a plaintiff-relator without 
 Holding statements: (A) holding relator satisfied rule 9b by alleging the basic framework procedures the nature of fraudulent scheme and the financial arrangements and inducements among the parties and physicians that give rise to relators belief that fraud has occurred (B) holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed (C) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (D) holding that rule 9b was satisfied where the relator was a nurse practitioner in the defendants employ whose conversations about the defendants billing practices  with the defendants office manager formed the basis for the relators belief that claims were actually submitted to the government (E) holding that rule 9b was not satisfied where the relator was a doctor who did not allege firsthand knowledge of the hospitals submission of false claims
Output: (D)
filed state petition for postconviction review. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). Here, beca evens, J., concurring) (“[I]n our post-AEDPA world there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies. Indeed, there is every reason to do so when AEDPA gives a district court the alternative of simply denying a petition containing unexhausted but nonmeritorious claims, and when the failure to retain jurisdiction would foreclose federal review of a meritorious claim because of the lapse of AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period.”); cf Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (citing Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374 (2d Cir.2001)) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has recently held, however, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted (B) holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should stay the unexhausted claims pending exhaustion rather than dismiss them without prejudice for the same purpose it is preferable to stay proceedings pending exhaustion (C) holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims raised in a petition for review unless the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies (D) holding that a district court faced with a mixed petition should dismiss only the unexhausted claims in the habeas petition and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted hisher remedies in state court (E) holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court
Output: (D)
claim”. Williams (Willie), 4 Vet.App. at 273-74. 3. Litigation Stage. Having concluded that the Secretary was not substantially justified in his position at the administrative stage, the Court need not address whether the government’s litigation position before this Court was substantially justified. See Looker and ZP, both supra. III. Conclusion Accordingly, having concluded that the Court’s remand to the Board was based in part on a determination that the Board had committed an error of adjudication that was not substantially justified and that would itself constitute sufficient grounds for a remand, the Court grants the October 8, 1998, EAJA application and the December 7, 1998, supplemental EAJA application subject to a recalculation pursuant to Mannino, 12 Vet.App. at 244 (<HOLDING>). The appellant may file and serve on the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted (B) holding that malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause (C) holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret (D) holding individual standing not available where inter alia there is no claim that plaintiff sustained a loss disproportionate to that sustained by the corporation (E) holding inter alia that appellant must use local cpiu where available
Output: (E)
all relevant issues at the termination stage."). 26 . See D.M., 995 P.2d at 209 ("[Alt the termination proceeding, a court could review the evidence offered at the adjudication hearing, and, applying the stricter proof standard, make supplemental findings satisfying the requirements for termination."). 27 . AS 47.17.290(9). 28 . The failure of the superior court to specify what subsection of the CINA statute it is proceeding under, let alone what paragraph of the subsection, does not constitute error so long as the court's factual findings support a determination that the child is in need of aid. See A.J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 62 P.3d 609, 613-14 (Alaska 2003). 29 . Cf. McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735, 743 (Alaska 2001) (<HOLDING>). 30 . See Martin N. v. State, Dep't of Health 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence (B) holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case (C) holding that plaintiff entitled to recover for changes not incorporated into contract under theory of breach (D) holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment (E) holding that so long as a complaint provides notice plaintiff can recover under any theory supported by the evidence
Output: (E)
created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference ... by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts'were occurring. Id. at 127 (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, which found that a supervisor can be held liable only "through the official’s own individual actions,” id. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, arguably casts doubt on the continued viability of some of the categories set forth in Hastings On Hudson and Colon. See Grullon, 720 F.3d at 139 (<HOLDING>). For the purposes of this case, however, it is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same with respect to an apartment (B) holding that no heightened showing is required (C) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (D) recognizing that opinion work product subject to discovery upon heightened showing of compelling need (E) recognizing chat iqbal may have heightened the requirements for showing a supervisors personal involvement with respect to certain constitutional violations
Output: (E)
judicial review of an arbitration award. See UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998 (“ “We may not set an award aside simply because ... the arbitrators erred in interpreting the law or in determining the facts.’ ”) (quoting Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751). This third challenge is nonetheless partially cognizable, but only to the extent it can be read as an assertion that there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, a statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), as a claim of misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence or to provide a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, another statutory ground under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), or as an extra-statutory challenge to the “fundamental fairness” of the proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s fourth challenge is to the denial 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (B) holding right to be fundamental (C) holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground (D) recognizing plain or fundamental error (E) recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground
Output: (E)
engaged in by an employee before the commencement of his ‘principal’ activity ... and ‘postliminary activity1 means an activity engaged in by an employee after the completion of his ‘principal’ activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7; see also, § 785.5. A rounding claim is something quite different; it arises, if at all, from rounding the clocked times at which employees start and stop their “principal” activities. See Lacy v. Reddy Elec. Co., No. 11-CV-52, 2013 WL 3580309, at *13-14, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97718, at *37 (S.D.Ohio, July 11, 2013) (to recover damages under rounding theory, employees must show they clocked in and engaged in principal activities before their scheduled start time, but were not compensated); see also, Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 590 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In short, a rounding claim cannot reasonably 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the substantial body of case law discussing distinction between preliminary and postliminary activities on the one hand and principle activities of employment on the other (B) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) recognizing the liens on the one hand and representing that the tax claim had been released on the other (D) recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other (E) holding that presale activities were preliminary and did not transfer title
Output: (A)
Basin] operations.”. Ex. 21 to Pis.’ Schneider Decl. at 1 (April 8, 2003 letter to J.K. Towner of FWS from S. Adams of the Missouri River Natural Resources Committee (“MRNRC”), a collection of relevant wildlife agencies from both Upper and Lower Basin states on the Missouri River ); see also Ex. 20, 23-27 (letters from each of the individual agencies of the MRNRC, restating that committee’s position). Consequently, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to prove that the 2003 Supplemental BiOp is arbitrary and capricious given FWS’ failure to “satisfactorily explain” why it has abandoned the 2000 BiOp’s extensively peer-reviewed and approved requirement for implementing summer low flow no later than 2003. See National Audubon Society v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). d. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Establish that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action (B) holding that the mere allegation of arbitrary and capricious action on defendants part absent a direct and pointed attack on the evidentiary basis of the agencys action is insufficient to warrant a judicial determination of wrongful agency action (C) holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change course when one of its basic assumptions in earlier rulemaking was contradicted by new data (D) holding that any alteration to agency action can be held arbitrary and capricious if the agency does not satisfactorily explain its reason for the alteration (E) holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power
Output: (D)
at the right time. Wet weather can arrive at any time and frustrate all attempts to plant those final acres or harvest the last few fields. Consequently, even one day lost to jury duty may mean a setback of several days or even weeks in accomplishing these tasks. Under these unique circumstances, we find ample basis for finding a special hardship to farmers in serving on a jury during planting or harvesting season. Accordingly, their exclusion from jury service during these periods is justified and does not violate the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. TV. Statutory Claim. Chidester claims the venire was illegally drawn because the procedure used in Webster County was contrary to Iowa Code section 607A.6, which provides, in part, that “[t]he court may 328 (1997) (<HOLDING>); State v. Coble, 100 Wis.2d 179, 301 N.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors (B) holding statute allowing court to excuse jurors from jury duty and defining court as a judge was violated when clerk excused jurors without obtaining court approval of the excuses granted (C) holding that double jeopardy barred the second prosecution when one of the jurors in the first trial became disabled and the trial court declared a mistrial instead of proceeding with eleven jurors (D) holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias (E) holding statute empowering judge to excuse potential jurors was violated by board of supervisors action in exempting persons residing in a certain geographical area of district from serving on jury trial held in another part of district
Output: (B)
view, the Fifth Amendment is “self-executing.” Requiring further governmental action when it is the government that has effected the taking is contrary to the very reason for the Fifth Amendment: a check against abusive governmental power. If we were to accept the State’s argument, New Mexico would be the first and only jurisdiction in the nation to apply this Tucker Act analysis to state court proceedings. We decline to do so. {44} The State agencies do not rest with the previous argument. They further contend that the Takings Clause is not self-executing as applied to the states because it is applied through Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and only Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (<HOLDING>). Section 1 says, “nor shall any State deprive 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (B) holding section 1 of the fourteenth amendment includes prohibitions on traditional state power (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action (D) holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action
Output: (B)
First, the trial court’s evidentiary ruling to exclude a police report summarizing Roscoe Buffington’s statement did not violate Shandola’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to compulsory process and due process. The statement had little, if any, probative value and was not material to Shandola’s defense at trial. See Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.1985) (“In weighing the importance of evidence offered by a defendant against the state’s interest in exclusion, the court should consider [among other factors] the probative value of the evidence on the central issue ... and whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.”); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial court’s exclusion of a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material (B) holding that section 1983 action requires a showing of defendants personal participation in alleged constitutional violation (C) holding that partys failure to specify how his presence would have been of assistance at the hearing precluded the requisite showing of harm (D) holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense (E) holding that a violation of a defendants constitutional right to compulsory process requires at a minimum some plausible showing of how the excluded testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense
Output: (E)
and amount of a claim and (2) a request for a final decision.” M. Maropakis Carpentry, 609 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2010). When a claim seeks more than $100,000, it must be certified in accordance with 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1), but a defective certification may be corrected during the pendency of a suit in this court, id. § 7103(b)(3). “Claim” should be broadly construed. Todd Constr., 656 F.3d at 1311. There is “no requirement in the [CDA] that a ‘claim’ must be submitted in any particular form or use any particular wording.” Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed.Cir.1987); see Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the contracting officer effectively made a final decision on the government claim for set off by declining to pay the contractor the balance due on the contract (B) holding that a contractor must provide the contracting officer with adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim (C) holding that the tucker act gives the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction over cda claims only when a decision of the contracting officer has been issued under section 6 of the cda  (D) holding that submissions qualified as cda claims when the contractor asserted in writing and with sufficient specificity a right to additional compensation and the contractor communicated his desire for a contracting officer decision (E) recognizing that because subcontractor was not a contractor as defined in the cda there was no cda jurisdiction to consider its direct appeal
Output: (D)
did not lack good moral character, present false testimony, or misrepresent or conceal his criminal act. We disagree. The evidence is clear that Al-Aqaili failed to possess good moral character during the relevant statutory period. In his federal criminal case, Al-Aqaili entered a plea agreement in which he admitted to knowingly committing the crime of mail fraud, a crime Al-Aqaili admits began approximately one month prior to his application for naturalization and continued while his application was pending. Accordingly, Al-Aqaili committed the crime during the period in which he was required to possess good moral character, and it is of no consequence that his conviction occurred after he was already naturalized. See United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1191 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Al-Aqaili’s admission that he 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (B) holding that a naturalized citizen who committed certain unlawful acts during the statutory period prior to taking the oath of allegiance but for which he was indicted arrested and convicted after naturalization stands to lose his precious acquisition for lack of good moral character (C) holding sorna inapplicable to a defendant who traveled during the gap period between enactment and issuance of the interim rule and was indicted on march 15 2007 (D) holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury (E) holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury
Output: (B)
issues are whether under the UCCJA the New Jersey courts should enforce the California judgment and whether under the UCCJA the New Jersey courts may properly modify the custody judgment of the California court. Because the principal issue involved custody of a minor and the attendant urgency due to the need of the child to begin school, we issued an order without opinion 93 N.J. 15. Our order reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstated the judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division. This opinion now follows. The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, on custody adjudications. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (<HOLDING>); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice (B) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree (C) holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding north carolina had authority to modify new york custody decree if the north carolina court found changed circumstances because new york decree was modifiable under new york law on showing of changed circumstances
Output: (B)
contractual, measures of recovery. Id. 14 . In the Roberdeau case, the insurer paid for $575 of repairs to the insured's station wagon after it was damaged in a collision. See 231 S.W.2d at 949. The insurer then offered to pay $475 (the amount of repairs minus the $100 deductible). See id. The policy stated that the insurer’s limit of liability would not exceed the vehicle’s actual cash value nor the cost to repair or replace the vehicle with another of like kind and quality. As here, the policy also gave the insurer the option of paying for the loss in money or paying for repair or replacement. See id. at 950. The insured refused the offer and sued the insurer for the difference between the vehicle’s actual cash value before and afte d Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762, 767 (Okla.1956) (<HOLDING>); Barton v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 255 S.W.2d 451, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality (B) holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss (C) holding that unless the collision resulted in a total loss the measure of recovery is the difference between the fair market value of the vehicle in the condition in which it was immediately prior to the collision and its value thereafter (D) holding there cannot be a complete restoration of the property unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of value after repair of the car and adding that the appropriate and fair measure of damages could be achieved by awarding either the difference between the fair cash value of the car before and after the collision or similarly the cost of repairs plus any diminution in value (E) holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance
Output: (C)
it could have provided a similar definition of unborn children, as in the previously existing N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17.1.” Geiser, at ¶ 17. [¶ 18] Chapter 12.1-17.1, N.D.C.C., also expressly excludes criminalizing acts committed on the unborn child by the pregnant woman: Charging a pregnant woman for a crime allegedly committed against her unborn child violates the express legislative policy of N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17.1. Our holding that a pregnant woman cannot be charged for a crime allegedly committed against her unborn child under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.l-22.2(l)(b) coincides with ... N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17.1. Geiser, at ¶ 19 (emphasis added). [¶ 19] The State argues Geiser is not applicable because Geiser’s unborn child died in útero. Our conclusion and analysis in Geiser did not hin 991) (<HOLDING>); State v. Aiwohi, 109 Hawai'i 115, 123 P.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy (B) holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse (C) holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was factually sufficient to support termination (D) holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was legally sufficient to support termination (E) holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy
Output: (E)
the plaintiff suffered actual injury, such as a loss of sales, profits, or of present value. Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island, 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2nd Cir.1991); Web Printing Controls Co., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (7th Cir.1990); PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc., supra at 271-72. When a plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief, however, it need only prove a likelihood of confu sion among consumers that has resulted from the defendant’s violation. Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island, supra; Web Printing Controls Co., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Corp.; PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc., supra at 271; cf., Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Further, where a defendant has engaged in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law (B) holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages (C) holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers (D) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation (E) holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act
Output: (C)
of a statement or evidence on the jury,” and a defendant “must show that his substantial rights are prejudicially affected. This occurs when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The mere utterance of the word jail, prison, or arrest does not, without regard to context or circumstances, constitute reversible error per se.” Id. With respect to Jasmin’s statement that Miller “had just got out of jail the day before,” the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller’s motion for a mistrial. The record reveals that the statement, when made, was volunteered by Jasmin and not expected by the prosecutor. See United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 139-40 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). It does appear that the prosecutor attempted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a mistrial was not warranted because the statement that the defendant had been in prison before was volunteered unexpected and added nothing to the governments case (B) holding that because the record in the case had not been developed sufficiently to determine whether a childs statement was admissible under the tender years exception a new trial was warranted (C) holding that the objection had been sufficiently timely when the defense waited until the governments rebuttal to object to a statement made during the governments closing statement (D) holding that a mistrial was not required after a police officer testified that he had once chased the defendant after the defendant had fired a gun where the testimony was a logical response to the prosecutors questions the statement was not made maliciously the evidence against the defendant was great and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony (E) holding that the court correctly denied a mistrial when the statement that the witness saw the defendant when the defendant was signing in as a condition of bail was brief and added nothing to the governments case
Output: (A)
forbids preventative detention for public safety, “that is, imprisoning accused but unconvicted defendants because they may endanger the public.” Id. at 570-71, 621 A.2d at 1299. Although the constitutional bail provision had been amended in 1982, the Court noted that the amendment had been criticized because it did nothing to allow consideration of an accused’s danger to the community as a basis for pretrial detention. Noting that Proposal 7 was under consideration by the Legislature at that time, the Court stated, “Unless this new concept is enacted, we must continue to evaluate bail statutes as mandated by chapter II, § 40, and as discussed in our prior cases.” Id. at 573, 621 A.2d at 1300; see also State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 390, 396, 659 A.2d 124, 127-28 (1995) (Morse, J.) (<HOLDING>). My review of the drafts of Proposal 7, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  3583e2 allows a district court to modify the conditions of supervised release without extending the term of that release (B) holding that evidence of a threat to a witness by the defendant is relevant as showing an attempt to prevent a witness from testifying and avoid punishment for the crime (C) holding that even though the victim has settled a civil claim and signed a release the state is not barred from seeking or the court from imposing reasonable restitution (D) holding state demonstrated conditions of release would not prevent defendant from posing a significant threat not only to the victim but to other young women (E) holding prohibition lies to prevent a lower tribunal from acting in excess of its jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction
Output: (D)
not use the benefit of hindsight to second-guess tactical decisions made by an attorney unless they are unreasonable.... Moreover, the mere fact that a tactic has been unsuccessful does not necessarily indicate that it was unreasonable.”). 28 . Petitioner's conviction became final on March 24, 2003, when the Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari. 29 . United. States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir.1999) (affirming district court's denial of motion to amend petition outside of one-year statute of limitations to add new claims, stating that "[a] prisoner should not be able to assert a claim otherwise barred by the statute of limitations merely because he asserted a separate claim within the limitations period.”). 30 . United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) 31 . Duffus, 174 F.3d at 337. 32 . United 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint (B) holding that federal rule of civil procedure 15c2 giving court discretion to permit amendment of complaint applies to  2255 petitions insofar as a district court may in its discretion permit an amendment to a petition to provide factual clarification or amplification after the expiration of the oneyear period of limitations as long as the petition itself was timely filed and the petitioner does not seek to add an entirely new claim or new theory of relief (C) recognizing that a court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party as long as the court states its reasons for refusing to permit the award (D) holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aedpas oneyear limitations period (E) holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aed pas oneyear limitations period
Output: (B)
a maid, and that she had heard about the facts of the case. According to Dunaway, if [M.B.] had divulged this information, his trial counsel would have removed her by a for-cause challenge or by exercising a peremptory strike. “Dunaway’s collateral counsel did not ask [trial counsel] if they would have removed [M.B.] if she had disclosed this information. Moreover, the trial record indicates that [M.B.] served as an alternate juror and was excused before the jury’s guilt phase deliberations began. Dunaway presented no evidence [M.B.] discussed her past associations with Mr. Whigham with members of his jury. If, for some reason, [M.B.] failed to answer questions during voir dire it would not have caused Dunaway to be prejudiced. See Reeves v. State, 807 So.2d 18, 32 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). “The Court finds that this, allegation of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when an ill juror after deliberations began left the other jurors accompanied by the trial judge to see a physician (B) holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors (C) holding no extrinsic evidence was brought into jury deliberations when in drug case two jurors discussed their personal life experiences with crack cocaine (D) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (E) holding there was simply no possibility reeves was harmed by jurors failure to recall their remote connections with reeves and the victim because both were excused before jury deliberations began andthere was no evidence they informed other jurors about their connections with the case
Output: (E)
not only is the mens rea lacking, but the actual ability to cause death or bodily harm has not been demonstrated. It is well established that there can be no conviction for reckless endangerment without a present ability to inflict harm. See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 287 Pa. Super. 120, 429 A.2d 1129 (1981). “In construing the Crimes Code section on recklessly endangering, this court has recently determined that the common-law assault requirement of actual present ability to inflict harm must be shown in order to support a conviction under the statute.” Gouse at 124, 429 A.2d at 1131. Further, “the mere apparent ability to inflict harm is not sufficient. Danger, and not merely the apprehension of danger, must be created.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 728 (Pa. Super. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Without evidence that the defendant was, in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault where appellant was seen pointing and firing a gun at two women (B) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept (C) holding that although pointing an unloaded gun would generally not be sufficient to support a conviction for recklessly endangering another person where the commonwealth presented evidence that there was at least one bullet in the gun a conviction could stand (D) holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the gun where although defendant denied ownership of the gun it was found near a knife of which defendant claimed ownership and where defendant was aware of the presence of the gun (E) holding that an unloaded gun used in the commission of an aggravated assault is a deadly weapon
Output: (C)
that a shareholder who has made a prior demand on the board may not assert thereafter as a grounds for the boards wrongful refusal of the demand that the board lacks independence or is motivated by self interest. Relying on this courts decision in Flocco, supra, appellees contend that it is improper for a shareholder to “bifurcate” his claim in this manner. In Flocco, this court held that a shareholder, who had grounded his derivative action on demand futility, had by making a demand on the corporate defendants after the trial court entered its order dismissing the complaint, waived his claim of demand futility and conceded the independence of a majority of the boards directors. 752 A.2d at 153. In Flocco, under choice of law principles, this court applied Illinois law. 752 A.2d at 151 (<HOLDING>). Again, applying Illinois law, this court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (B) holding that the law of the state of incorporation applies (C) holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made (D) holding that the viability of the derivative action is determined by law of illinois the state of incorporation (E) holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court
Output: (D)
denial of his motions in Leo, Mr. Leo filed his second suit in the Kansas federal district court (No. 10-2495-JTM), in which he used the aforementioned 70,000 word opening brief/“Supporting Analysis” as his complaint. In a memorandum and order dated March 22, 2011, 2011 WL 1097759, the district court concluded that Mr. Leo’s second suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on the earlier suit and granted Garmin’s motion to dismiss. In the same order, the court denied Mr. Leo’s motion for the entry of a default judgment against Garmin and granted Garmin’s request for sanctions. In a subsequent memorandum and order dated April 15, 2011, 2011 WL 1457937, the district court awarded Garmin $ Practice and Procedure § 4433, at 78-85 (2d ed.2 , 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We nonetheless have examined each of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them (B) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed (C) holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules (D) holding that although a pro se litigants pleadings are construed liberally a pro se litigant must still follow the same rules that govern other litigants including the requirement of constructing and supporting arguments with legal authority (E) holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure
Output: (D)
apply to statutory appeals in general, or to assessment appeals specifically. Instead, the Supreme Court stated: [O]ur trial courts have had the right to enact rules and publish these to cover practice in this area of the law. Where they have not created and published such local rules, then each trial court has been vested with the full authority of the court to make rules of practice for the proper disposition of cases before them and that we have enforced those rules unless they violated the Constitution or laws of the Commonwealth or United States, or our state-wide rules. Id. at 554. Where no local rule exists, the trial court may, but is not required to, apply the Pa. R.C.P. by analogy. See, e.g., Codispot v. Butler County Tax Claim Bureau, 938 A.2d 499, 503-04 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, no local rule governs how an appellant 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule does not apply where defendant made false representations (B) holding that the requirements of rule 3700 apply to resentencing (C) holding a local government sued under  1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal (D) holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims (E) holding that while pa rcp no 2271 does not apply to tax assessment appeals the trial court has discretion to apply its requirements where no local rule exists
Output: (E)
of the proposed amendment or attach a copy of the proposed amendment.” See Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.1999). This district's local rules require that a "motion for leave to file an amended pleading shall be accompanied by an original of the proposed amended pleading as amended.” LCvR 7(i). The defendants have met this requirement by lodging a pr uments that stem from the plaintiff’s assertion that the DOT is not the proper defendant to this action. 6 . Furthermore, the fact that res judicata “belongs to courts as well as to litigants” renders moot the plaintiffs argument that the defendants are barred from asserting res judicata here because they failed to do so in the Court of Federal Claims action. Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C.Cir.1997) 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that in the interest of judicial economy res judicata may properly be raised by a district court sua sponte particularly where both actions are brought in the courts of the same district (B) holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal (C) holding lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is fundamental error that this court may properly raise and recognize sua sponte (D) holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment (E) holding that a district court has the discretion to raise a  2254 timeliness consideration sua sponte
Output: (B)
682, 685 (8th Cir.2001). In order to receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Baker must prove four factors ... :(1) the evidence must have been unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant must have been duly diligent in attempting to uncover it; (3) the newly discovered evidence must be material; and (4) the newly discovered evidence must be such that its emergence probably will result in an acquittal upon retrial. United States v. Haskell, 468 F.3d 1064, 1076 (8th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366, 372 (8th Cir.2006) (same). Furthermore, in order to meet the materiality requirement, newly discovered evidence must be “more than merely ... impeaching.” Dogskin, 265 F.3d at 685; see Johnson, 450 F.3d at 372-73 (<HOLDING>). With these requirements in mind, we review 
 Holding statements: (A) holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed (B) holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence (C) holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial because nonmovant presented sufficient evidence at trial for the district court to conclude that the outcome was not against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute a miscarriage of justice (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials
Output: (D)
Moreover, the lawful exercise of the Government’s tax collection powers does not amount to a taking. See U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2002) (the ruling that imposition of the federal income tax does not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment); see also Branch ex rel. Me. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“enforcement action [of the constitutional tax assessment], including seizure of the property, could not be challenged as a taking”); see also First Atlas Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 137, 141 (1991), aff'd per curiam, 954 F.2d 733 (Fed.Cir.1992) (concluding that the filing of a notice of a hen, standing alone, does not constitute a taking); Castillo Morales v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 342, 345 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this ease, the Complaint alleges that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim (B) holding that irs may not levy against bank account of delinquent taxpayer held in tenancy by the entirety where taxpayer did not have unilateral right to withdraw funds (C) holding that the court of claims did have jurisdiction over plaintiffs statutory claim for back pay including arguments based on the first amendment (D) holding that the court does not have jurisdiction over takings claims because where  a taxpayer disputes an irs levy on its property the appropriate course of action is a direct challenge of the levy not the prosecution of a fifth amendment claim (E) holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal
Output: (D)