niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
“most damaging” to Vos’ case — Vos’ alleged use of Florida’s banking system to facilitate its sales to A & V. Our review of the evidence on this issue reveals that in the transactions involving A & V, CommerzBank Nederland sent shipping documents to SunBank, Sun-Bank notified A & V of the documents’ arrival, A & V signed the trade acceptance forms and submitted payment to SunBank. SunBank then transferred the funds and paperwork to CommerzBank. Vos’ involvement in the process was virtually non-existent, and SunBank merely operated to facilitate the international transfer of money under a letter of credit. Such contacts are clearly insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Vos. See Banco Continental, S.A. v. Transcom Bank (Barbados) Ltd., 922 So.2d 395, 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); La. Reunion Franqaise, S.A. v. La Costeña, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank (B) holding that a bank owed no duty of care to a noncustomer who was defrauded by a bank depositer since the bank had no direct relationship with the noncustomer (C) holding that the mere maintenance of a correspondent account in new york is insufficient to establish minimum contacts with the united states (D) holding that defendants bank account and open line of credit in florida utilized to transfer money in international commerce was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under section 481932 florida statutes where defendant operated its business in honduras had no employees or agents in florida and did not advertise or solicit business in florida (E) holding that a correspondent relationship with a florida bank where the bank merely facilitates the international transfer of monies under a letter of credit is insufficient to meet the minimum  contacts requirement
Output: (E)
that only Oxford moved for removal of the default in the December 4, 2007 motion, so the default is still in effect as to B&M. 9 This language falls within the recording requirements for “(ljiens under sections two and four ...” G.L.c. 254, §8. A lien under section one, however, incorporates the above-quoted language by requiring “a like statement. . .” Id. 10 See The American Heritage Dictionary College Edition at 307 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “conditioned” as “[p]repared for a specific action or process”). 11 bn Count II of the Lead case the Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of contract under 29 U.S.C. §185 against B&M. Count II is not dependent on the existence of the Lien and therefore survives Oxford’s motion. See Driscoll v. Boston Edison Co., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 954, 955 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In May of 2007, however, the clerk entered a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state law controls whether issues decided in a prior state court action are entitled to preclusive effect and setting forth the elements of collateral estoppel under washington law (B) holding that an action under 29 usc  185 may be brought in a state court    but federal law controls over inconsistent state law internal citations omitted (C) holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law (D) holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
Output: (B)
requirements under UFTA, Gulf and Security nevertheless contend that as a matter of law and of public policy the statute of limitations should not have commenced in this action until they obtained the default judgment against Clark in August of 1997 in California. ¶24 As far as the law is concerned, Gulf and Security vigorously argue under the mistaken assumption that a creditor may not assert an UFTA claim until after the underlying judgment is entered. This persistent assumption represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law under UFTA. ¶25 Gulf and Security base their theory on our decision in Murphy v. Atkinson (1993), 262 Mont. 164, 864 P.2d 273, as well as a recent appellate court decision from California, Cortez v. Vogt (Cal.Ct.App. 1997), 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853-54 (<HOLDING>). In Murphy, we determined that a cause of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final (B) holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment (C) holding that in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the ufta as a cumulative and additional remedy limitation period did not commence until debtorcreditor relationship existed after judgment was made final (D) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (E) holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement
Output: (C)
as Aladdin argues, to only section 29, it could just as reasonably be read to refer, as Bayerische argues, to the PMA as a whole. Indeed, the latter interpretation seems more likely. The clause at issue comes at the end of a sentence that states “no other person shall have any right ... under ... this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.” (emphasis supplied). The following sentence, which identifies the Swap Counterparty as “an intended third party beneficiary” (emphasis supplied) has no language of limitation and could reasonably be read as clarification that, whomever else might be a third-party beneficiary, the Swap Counterparty is for certain. See also Sony Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Nippon Express U.S.A. (Ill), Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 333, 336-38 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in one of the cases the district 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a rule requiring an excess carrier to drop down upon the insolvency of the primary carrier would impermissibly shift the risk of the primary carrier to the excess carrier and would require insurance companies to scrutinize one anothers financial stability before issuing secondary policies (B) holding that bill of lading not charterparty governed contract dispute between carrier and shipper (C) holding specifically provided otherwise herein broad enough to refer to full contract between sony and common carrier but not to provision in separate contract between a subcontracted carrier and railway company (D) holding the only lawful interstate common arrangement or through ticketing  is an arrangement between a motor carrier and the air carrier (E) recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer
Output: (C)
around Miller’s conduct, which could not be determined without his testimony. See, e.g., Med. Protective Co. v. Bubenik, No. 4:06-CV-01639, 2008 WL 5070042, at *27 (E.D.Mo.2008) (“[I]t is clear from the facts of this case that [the defendant’s] testimony was, in fact, highly important to the defense of the medical malpractice claim filed against him.”), aff'd 594 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir.2010). Second, Miller’s failure to appear for his court-ordered deposition led to the entry of default judgment against Medical Assurance, thereby foreclosing trial on the issues of liability and proximate cause and eliminating Medical Assurance’s ability to defend the ease in any way, including by presenting defenses. See, e.g., Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Vt. 355, 830 A.2d 108, 114 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to constitute prejudice an insureds noncooperation must have significantly hindered or precluded the insurer from presenting a credible defense to the underlying claim (B) holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for negligently failing to claim contribution (C) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (D) holding that the insureds ordinary burden to allocate a verdict between covered and noncovered claims does not shift to the insurer unless the insurer had an affirmative duty to defend the underlying claims (E) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss
Output: (A)
will neither gain nor lose by the court’s determining who the children’s biological father is. The court’s paternity determination will not impact the need for Husband to raise a third-party custody claim if he wishes to seek custody of Wife’s children, and it will not impair or impede his ability to do so. Husband argues, however, that the paternity case is the only action in which he can assert his third-party custody claim, because he cannot assert it in the dissolution of marriage case. We agree with Husband that the court does not have the authority in a dissolution proceeding to determine the custody of children not born of the marriage or adopted by the parties. Warlop v. Warlop, 254 S.W.3d 262, 263 (Mo.App.2008). See also In re Marriage of Said, 26 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Mo.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Merely because Husband cannot assert his 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that although husband and wife were both fit and proper persons to have custody of the child custody in a dissolution action should have been awarded to wife the biological parent in light of blood test showing that husband was not the childs biological father (B) holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (C) holding that the issue of custody was foreign to the dissolution action because the husband was not the natural father but that the husband could seek to intervene to assert a thirdparty custody claim in a pending custody modification proceeding between the childs natural parents (D) holding that a modification of custody should not be based on one parents default because it is the childs best interests that are at stake (E) holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child
Output: (C)
the maximum fine on Count Two, an Arms Export Control Act violation, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, was“$l million or twice the gain. or twice the loss.” DA 77. The government then argues that because the defendant corporation was advised the maximum total fine which could be imposed was $1,010,000 and defendant was fined one millions dollars, the error was harmless. In support of its position, Defendant relies primarily on. United States v. Herrold, 635 F.2d 213 (3d Cir.1980), for the proposition that “failure to instruct defendant of the actual maximum sentence before the submission of a guilty plea violates Rule 11(e)(1),” id. at 215, and affords grounds for .withdrawal of a plea under Rule 32(e) (formerly Rule 32(b)). See id. at 216. See also Kelsey v. United States, 484 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). The Herrold court reviewed the proceeding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing (B) holding that a counsels oral statements at a plea hearing  that the plea being entered was conditional  did not satisfy the rule 11 writing requirement (C) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (D) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (E) holding that defense counsels informing a defendant the maximum penalty was more than the statute allowed resulted in the plea not being knowing or voluntarily and necessitated withdrawal of the plea
Output: (E)
are minimal is not arbitrary and capricious. 2. Reliance on NMFS’s BiOp NEDC contends that the Corps’ reliance on NMF S’s BiOp caused its cumulative impacts analysis to be arbitrary and capricious and that the Corps’ EA falls short of the “quantified or detailed information” that is necessary for a cumulative impact analysis. Bark v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 643 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1224 (D.Or.2009) (citations omitted). First, NEDC argues that the BiOp itself is flawed. As I have already determined that the BiOp was proper under Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, this argument needs no further analysis. Second, NEDC contends that the BiOp is not a NEPA document, therefore the Corps may not tier to it as a substitute for the Corps’ own analysis. See League of Wilderness Defenders, 549 F.3d at 1219 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). It was proper for the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nsf must comply with procedural requirements of nepa when considering incineration of food waste in antarctica because 1 the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because nepa is designed to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the united states 2 the united states exercises legislative control over antarctica 3 any concerns about nepa interference with foreign policy were overstated because when foreign policy interests outweighed benefits of nepa compliance nepas requirements must yield and 4 broad language of the statute supports broad application of nepa requirements (B) holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist (C) recognizing that nepa merely prohibits uninformed  rather than unwise agency action (D) holding that an agency carries its burden of proof by providing affidavits to explain why documents are subject to an exemption (E) holding that an agency may only tier to documents subject to nepa review and citing cases
Output: (E)
insurers. Plaintiffs contend that coverage is available under the Guaranty Act because the insurance policy at issue is not “ocean marine” insurance under the 1989 amendments to the Guaranty Act. Plaintiffs argue, alternatively, that even if the policy is “ocean marine” insurance, the amendments are substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. Plaintiffs additionally contend that the cut-through endorsement by EAIC is an “insurance policy” under the Guaranty Act because the 1989 amendment excluding cut-through endorsements from the coverage of the Guaranty Act is also substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. Defendant LIGA disputes both contentions and claims that coverage is unavailable under the Guaranty Act for the insurance policy at issue. III. CONCLUSI W.D.La.1987) (<HOLDING>). In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy (B) holding that a standard employers liability policy is not an ocean marine policy (C) holding that a professional liability policy provided primary coverage over a general liability policy for acts committed by a pastor during counseling sessions (D) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (E) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils
Output: (B)
advertising regarding the digestive benefits of “Align,” a daily food supplement. Plaintiff alleged that although Procter & Gamble promoted the “clinically proven” digestive benefits of “Align,” in fact, there was no clinical data showing that Align improved digestion. The Rikos court held that the plaintiff had alleged “injury in fact” in the form of economic injury: “Plaintiff purchased Align in reliance on P & G’s claims that the product provides defined health benefits, when these advertisements were allegedly false and deceptive.... Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that [his] purchase of the product is the economic harm, because it was not provided as advertised.” Id. at 530, at *5. See also In re Celexa and Lexapro Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 751 F.Supp.2d 277 (D.Mass.2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendants’ reliance on “no-injury” products 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged injuryinfact where he alleged that the product an antidepression drug was unsatisfactory because it was inappropriate and not efficacious for his son (B) holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injuryinfact based on impact to sites that the plaintiff had visited in the past and planned to revisit each year in the future (C) holding that police chiefs son who alleged that he was denied an interview for a position because his father had criticized the local officials did not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of his father (D) holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident (E) holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities
Output: (A)
bar, of rule 32:1.3 for dilatory handling of estates despite notices and inquiries from beneficiaries). Johnson’s failure to respond to Neefs phone calls and requests for information, failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case, and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rules 32:1.4 (duty to keep client informed) and 32:1.16(d) (duty to protect client’s interests upon termination of representation). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 2010) (finding attorney’s neglect of client’s legal matters and failure to keep clients informed about their cases violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:1.16(d)); Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also violated rule 32:8.4(c) (duty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests (B) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (C) holding attorney violated rules 3214 and 32116d when he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their cases failed to communicate with his clients after their repeated requests for information and failed to  account for or return client money from retainer fees (D) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (E) holding that equitable tolling applied when the attorney informed his client there was no such thing as a oneyear filing deadline and consistently lied to his client and the clients wife
Output: (C)
the issue on direct appeal” of his conviction. (Resp.’s Ex. 2, County Court Order Dated Sept. 1, 2009, Aug. 26, 2010, ECF No. 8-4.) Noting that “[t]he purpose of a 440.10 [motion] is to advise the Court of facts that were unknown at the time of the judgment,” the County Court rejected Petitioner’s legal insufficiency claim as unpreserved since it relied entirely on matters of record being improperly raised for the first time. Id. Failure to preserve an issue for state appellate review by not raising it on direct appeal is clearly an adequate and independent procedural ground recognized in New York and one on which the County Court relied in denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment. See, e.g., People v. Cooks, 67 N.Y.2d 100, 103-04, 500 N.Y.S.2d 503, 491 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Jossiah, 2 A.D.3d 877, 769 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal (B) recognizing that the rule disallowing matters of record to be raised on a 44010 motion is designed to prevent cpl 44010 from being employed as a substitute for direct appeal when defendant was in a position to raise an issue on appeal or could readily have raised it on appeal but failed to do so (C) holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived (E) holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived
Output: (B)
and thus held that the entire agreement was unenforceable. In reaching this conclusion, the district court determined that the cost-splitting provision was severable from the rest of the agreement; had it reached the contrary conclusion, it would not have proceeded to consider the enforceability of the remainder of the agreement. We agree with the district court’s determination that the cost-splitting provision at issue in the present case was sever-able from the rest of the arbitration agreement. That provision was not interwoven with the rest of the agreement and may be deleted without affecting the rest of the agreement’s provisions regarding arbitration. This conclusion is consistent with both Tennessee contract law and our own precedents. See also Giordano, 2001 WL 484360, at *6 (<HOLDING>); Fuller v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack of Del., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement (B) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (C) holding that when agreement includes severability provision intent of the parties and policy in favor of arbitration dictate that rest of agreement should be held enforceable (D) holding that costsplitting provision in pep boys arbitration agreement is severable from the rest of the agreement (E) holding that arbitration agreement was not unconscionable where agree ment did not limit punitive damages and limitation of liability provision was severable if unenforceable
Output: (D)
that City Sign could renew the lease “at the end of 10-years.” The parties properly recognize that no Tennessee case has clarified the requisite time frame within which an , 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement the lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease (B) holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term (C) holding that the lease pro vision granting the lessee the option of constructing improvements did not make the construction the pith of the lease (D) recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election (E) holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease the lessee was required to exercise the option on or before the last day of the lease
Output: (D)
is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
Output: (E)
F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir.1988). Our understanding of what Rule 60(b)(1) requires in the default judgment context is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent clarification of the concept of “excusable neglect” generally. That concept, the Supreme Court has made clear, is a general equitable one, not necessarily reserved for extraordinary circumstances, and takes account of factors such as “prejudice, the length of the delay and impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunsunck Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); cf. Bateman v. United States Postal Service, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made (B) holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys fees because plaintiffs rule 54d2 motion was untimely and they had failed to show excusable neglect that would justify extending the time they had to file such a motion (D) holding that the pioneer investment excusable neglect standard applies to rule 60b1 (E) holding that it is an abuse of the courts discretion to consider an untimely filing in the absence of a motion to enlarge demonstrating excusable neglect
Output: (D)
the raising of roosters, (3) there are no disputed material facts, and (4) Plaintiffs have failed to overcome the presumption that the County’s anti-cockfighting ordinances are valid. In requesting a declaratory judgment as to whether cockfighting is a protected native Hawaiian right, Plaintiffs urge this court to “determine their rights prior to having to suffer actual criminal prosecution, which is threatened and imminent.” Because we believe Plaintiffs’ request is not appropriate for a declaratory judgment action, we affirm summary judgment on behalf of the State and County, but on different grounds. See Waianae Model Neighborhood Area Ass’n v. City & County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 40, 43, 514 P.2d 861, 864 (1973); McCarthy v. Yempuku, 5 Haw.App. 45, 52, 678 P.2d 11, 16 (1984) (<HOLDING>). III. It is evident, as mentioned above in 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion (B) recognizing that this court may affirm on any ground supported by the record even if it differs from the reasoning of the district court (C) holding that appellate court can uphold a trial courts ruling on any ground appearing in the record whether urged in the trial court or not (D) recognizing that the court of appeals can affirm a grant on summary judgment on any basis made apparent by the record (E) holding that an appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record even if the circuit court did not rely on it
Output: (E)
to allege damages through June 30, 2006 is the focus of their motion.”). Because the Government does not oppose Plaintiff supplementing the September 4, 2009 Complaint to seek damages through the end of 2009, the issue before the court is whether Plaintiff may supplement to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009, or through December 31, 2010. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 (“Supplementation may be limited or curtailed to avoid prejudice.” (citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff may have given the Government an estimate of 2010 damages as early as July 2010, Plaintiff did not identify the specific 2010 damages claimed or provide the Government with supporting documentation of those damages until April 20, 2011 — t 4 Fed.Cl. 727 (2006) (“SMUD III") (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 Fed.Appx. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (B) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages (C) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (D) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them (E) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003
Output: (B)
if anything, this may affect the scope of the remedy available to the plaintiff, but it does not indicate that relief is unavailable. 7 . As is evident in the cases cited by Sunflower itself, completion is a potentially relevant factor in the mootness analysis when it relates, not merely to the agency’s action, but rather to the actual project at issue. For example, in Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 460 F.3d 13 (D.C.Cir.2006), plaintiff's case challenging the federal agency's plan relating to gathers of wild horses and burros was held to be moot because the gathers had already occurred and could not be undone; therefore, "it was impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever.” Id. at 22; see also Feldman v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 643 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) The instant case, however, differs 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a disability must be evaluated at the time of the challenged employment action (B) holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute (C) holding that a challenged action relating to the killing of feral pigs was moot because by the time the court heard the case the pigs had already been killed and plaintiffs had already suffered whatever harm could conceivably result from the challenged agency action (D) holding a claim seeking the humane removal of feral pigs from an island became moot once monitoring indicated that all pigs had been killed (E) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action
Output: (C)
in the district court to his own or Plaskett’s statements, our review of challenges to those statements is limited to plain error. See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010). Here, we identify no error, much less plain error, in any of the district court’s rulings. In evaluating Barnes’s challenge to the admission of his own statement about killing a rival drug dealer who had intruded on his crack-dealing territory, we note at the outset that the statement was not admitted as “other crime” evidence, see Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), but as direct proof of the charged crack conspiracy and of Barnes’s firearms possession related to that conspiracy. As such, it was highly probative. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 643 (2d 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence (B) recognizing high probative value of act done in furtherance of conspiracy because it is part of the very act charged (C) recognizing high probative value of evidence providing conduct that was part of the very act charged (D) recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal (E) recognizing substantial probative value of tape recording that provided direct evidence of knowledge element of crime charged
Output: (C)
never been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 15 n. 15. 5 . Afghanistan might not be individually liable under Doe's wrongful death claims in the absence of a conspiracy theory. The complaint does not allege tortious actions committed by Afghanistan in the United States. See Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1524 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting that the conduct at issue "lacks the required nexus with the United States”). Section 1605(a)(5) "requires that both the tor-tious act as well as the injury occur in the United States.” Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 169 (D.C.Cir.1994) (finding that noncommercial tort exception did not apply to kidnappings that occurred in Lebanon); State of Israel, 400 F.Supp.2d at 108 (<HOLDING>). Doe claims that "at least four of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (B) holding that prosecution of defendant in the united states for hostage taking based on acts committed outside the united states did not violate due process (C) holding that ajlthough the  action is nominally one against individual defendants the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the united states and that under such circumstances the action is in fact one against the united states (D) holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy (E) holding that despite plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy they did not suggest that any of the acts committed by individual defendants occurred in the united states
Output: (E)
proceedings and in courts of law would appear to constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of due process, since the holder of the right to payment would never have an opportunity to be heard concerning property already allegedly owed her. Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 390-91 (emphasis original). Other courts have allowed for the possibility of declaratory claims under § 1821 as well. See, e.g., Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n. 12 (discussing Third Circuit decision, stating “the administrative claims procedures and the jurisdictional bar have concurrent scope, which suggests that declaratory judgment actions could be raised in the administrative forum”) (citing Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Conn., N.A., 43 F.3d 843, 849-50 (3d Cir.1994)); see also Freeman, 56 F.3d at 1403-05 (<HOLDING>); Henderson v. Bank of New England, 986 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs could have filed administrative claim and then de novo claim in district court seeking a determination regarding their obligations to the fdic (B) holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law (C) holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo (D) holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal (E) holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing
Output: (A)
cause,” but it did not contain a provision permitting Colameta to terminate his employmentforgoodreason or a provision guaranteeing Colameta’s salary. The absence of these provisions, Protégé argues, means that Protégé had the authority to make unilateral changes to the 2007 Employment Agreement without being in breach. In interpreting a contract, the court “must first examine the language of the contract by itself, independent of extrinsic evidence concerning the drafting history or the intention of the parties.” Indus Partners, LLC v. Intelligroup, Inc., 77 Mass.App.Ct. 793, 795 (2010), quoting Bank v. Thermo Elemental, Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 648 (2008). The court only considers extrinsic evidence “in the construction of ambiguous contract language.” Id. (citation omitted); see id. (<HOLDING>). Where the contract language is unambiguous, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute (B) holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment (C) holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured (D) holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation (E) holding that ambiguity is not created simply because a controversy exists between parties each favoring an interpretation contrary to the others citation omitted
Output: (E)
lease, for the first time in his reply brief, thus, he has waived it. In most circumstances a litigant who fails to raise an argument until his reply brief wül be deemed to have waived that argument. Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990). This case is before us, however, on a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The inquiry we are faced with is whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support his allegation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This court has held that when reviewing Rule 12(b)6) motions, we wül consider new factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint. See Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-64 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint (B) holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings (C) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (D) holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion (E) holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss
Output: (C)
at 1459-60 (references to subsidiary as “division” of Kodak not equivalent to evidence that two companies operated as “single economic entity”); Akzona, 607 F.Supp. at 238 (language of annual report and employee testimony describing subsidiaries as divisions of parent not sufficient, even in conjunction with other evidence, to establish alter ego relationship). ... In a case presenting similar questions, the Ninth Circuit found no alter ego relationship was created where the parent company guaranteed loans for the subsidiary, reviewed and approved major decisions, placed several of its directors on the subsidiary’s board, and was closely involved in the subsidiary’s pricing decisions. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir.1980).... Id. at 927-928 (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs proffer evidence that CNOFG 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities (C) holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another (D) holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary (E) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham
Output: (C)
(4th Cir.1993). That section provides: A carrier or freight forwarder may not provide by rule, contract, or otherwise, a period of less than 9 months for filing a claim against it under this section and a period of less than 2 years for bringing a civil action against it under this section. The period for bringing a civil action is computed from the date the carrier or freight forwarder gives a person written notice that the carrier or freight forwarder has disallowed any part of the claim specified in the notice. 49 U.S.C. § 11707(3). Section 11707(e) “is not a statute of limitations, but a statutory determination of what is a reasonable period of time for a carrier to impose for filing a claim.” See Louisiana & W.R.R. v. Gardiner, 273 U.S. 280, 284, 47 S.Ct. 386, 71 L.Ed. 644 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Yamazen U.S.A., Inc. v. Chicago and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an earlier version of  11707 was not intended to operate as a statute of limitation but rather was meant to restrict  the freedom of carriers to fix the period within which suit could be brought (B) holding that the time within which suit may be brought after disallowance of a claim by irs is not controlled by a statute of limitation as generally understood but on conditions under which the united states has consented to be sued (C) holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur (D) holding that the discovery rule within mcl 6005838a2 is an alternative to the other periods of limitation and it is itself a period of limitation (E) recognizing that under illinois law parties are free to contract for a time period within which a suit may be brought  which is less than the general statute of limitation period applicable to written contracts
Output: (A)
has admitted in this and prior proceedings that he committed intentional torts against Ms. Lewis, and, therefore, cannot deny an intent to injure. Such an admission, regardless of its characterization, is not sufficient to show the intent required by section 523(a)(6) because such intent may be present in some, but not all intentional torts. For example, under Virginia law, conduct that is intentional or reckless is all that is required to establish the intent requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress (an intentional tort). Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 639 S.E.2d 182, 189 (2007). Yet, intentional or reckless conduct is not sufficient to establish the intent required under section 523(a)(6). See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Court were to consider the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury (B) holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury (C) holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 (D) holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6 (E) holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury
Output: (D)