niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
Morgan had no reasonable expectation of privacy when he voluntarily displayed his cell-phone screen in the presence of the detectives. Morgan had his phone because he asked for it. He did not object when the detective observed his activities. And—according to the detective’s uncontested testimony—Morgan spontaneously shared information about his contacts with the detective. This is unlike officers looking on their own through the contents of a cell phone. See Riley v. California, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2480-82, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). Instead, it is “an officer’s mere observation of an item left in plain view,” which “generally involves no Fourth Amendment search.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (<HOLDING>). Morgan believes that the plain-view doctrine 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant (B) holding a visual strip and visual cavity search unreasonable when done beside a police car (C) recognizing the courts continued holding that visual observation is no search at all (D) holding that there is no illegal search within the fourth amendment where a police officer makes a visual observation of contraband from a vantage point he rightfully occupies (E) holding a month delay in search of a computer constitutional because probable cause continued to exist at the time of the search and no prejudice occurred
Output: (C)
or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party
Output: (D)
of a discrimination charge and chooses to respond to the merits of the claim before the EEOC without asserting lack of verification as a defense it waives its right to secure dismissal of the federal court proceedings on that basis”). Moreover, verification provides notice and an opportunity for the employer to investigate, promoting the prompt administration of discrimination complaints and possible settlement. But we also recognize that a rigid rule can result in a Title VII complainant inadvertently forfeiting his or her rights. That suggests a rule where noncomplianee might be excused, at least in extreme circumstances where negligent EEOC conduct would mislead a reasonable layperson into thinking he need not verify. Price apparently allows such a result. See Price, 687 F.2d at 79 (<HOLDING>); see also B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the eeoc is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling (B) holding that certificate of merit is a mandatory but nonjurisdictional filing requirement (C) holding requirement nonjurisdictional and remanding for a possible eeoc waiver of that requirement (D) recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver (E) holding copyright statutes registration requirement a nonjurisdictional condition although previously held to be jurisdictional
Output: (C)
198, ¶ 15, 761 A.2d 291 (adopting the view that we should not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it” (quotation marks omitted)). 12 . In fact, the court already could have terminated the guardianship. The mother represented in her first four affidavits that the child's father was unknown. There is now no dispute that she believed R.M. to be the father, and informed him and the court of that fact just weeks after filing her affidavit. When, in January of 2010, the court realized that the father had been identified, it could have terminated the guardianship because it was based on the fraud or misrepresentation of the mother. See 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204; M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); Presnell v. Peoples Heritage Bank, 619 A.2d 1205, 1206 (Me.1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the guardianship may no longer exist 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the courts inherent sua sponte powers in certain circumstances to allow it to manage its own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases in the furtherance of justice quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing inherent power in the courts to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being impaired or destroyed (C) recognizing a district judge may dismiss a case sua sponte under either rule 41b or its inherent authority to manage its docket (D) recognizing every federal appellate court has a special obligation to consider its own jurisdiction even if it must do so sua sponte (E) holding that the right to choose counsel cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice
Output: (A)
any federal law____” (Compl. 2.) 2 . The Court's later findings regarding AstraZeneca's material misrepresentation constitute an independent basis for remand. I do not address the situation where a defendant has knowledge of a fraudulent joinder prior to removal, intends to use fraudulent joinder to explain why the rule of unanimity is inapplicable, but fails to plead fraudulent joinder in the removal notice. 3 . AstraZeneca asserts that Local 68 did not meet the requirements of N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(C), such as evidencing diligent effort and inquiry into personal service. AstraZeneca, however, conflates the requirements of two separate service provisions of New Jersey state law. See Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J.Super. 346, 351-52, 759 A.2d 865, 868 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2000) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Four of the fifty-eight named defendants 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that more stringent requirements of  1823e do not apply retroactively (B) holding that requirements of nj ct r 444c do not apply to service authorized by nj ct r 444b1c (C) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (D) holding the contract was not authorized by law (E) holding civil factual sufficiency preservation requirements do not apply in criminal context
Output: (B)
or in community control shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve.” We interpreted that provision (since renumbered as section 948.06(3), see ch. 97-299, § 13, Laws of Fla.) as establishing a general rule that “credit cannot be given for time served on community control.” Young, 697 So.2d at 77. Fraser, we explained, merely “recognized a limited exception to this general rule” for those unusual circumstances “when the original term of community control is revoked as illegal.” Id. at 77 n. 6. After Young, three district courts have held that the plain meaning of section 948.06(3) forbids jail-time credit for time spent in community control, with the limited exception adopted in Fraser. See Robinson v. State, 850 So.2d 658, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. State, 838 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration (B) holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control (C) holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs (D) holding that florida law dictates that credit cannot be given for time served on community control (E) holding that time served on community control may not be applied to a postrevocation sentence of incarceration
Output: (E)
5 . We have also examined United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434, which afforded retroactivity to Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889, and Grosso v. United State, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed. 2d 906. We feel that the Coin & Currency case is different in that it involved a constitutional immunity barring any punishment. O’ Callahan, on the other hand, involved no such constitutional immunity from punishment, but a question of jurisdiction of State or military courts to hear the case. See Gosa v. Mayden, supra 450 F.2d at 758-759. 6 . Among the decisions denying retroactivity to cases recognizing new constitutional rules are: Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (<HOLDING>) ; DeStefano v. Woods, supra (holding the rule 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the guarantee against double jeopardy applicable to the states as announced in benton v maryland 395 us 784 89 sct 2056 23 led2d 707 to be retroactive (B) holding the rule that an accused has a right to counsel at any critical confrontation announced in united states v wade 388 us 218 87 sct 1926 18 led2d 1149 and gilbert v california 388 us 263 87 sct 1951 18 led2d 1178 not to be retroactive (C) holding the rule against adverse comments on a defendants failure to testify as violative of the privilege against selfincrimination announced in griffin v california 380 us 609 85 sct 1229 14 led2d 106 not to he retroactive (D) holding the rule on the scope of per missible searches incident to arrest announced in chimel v california 395 us 752 89 sct 2034 23 led2d 685 not to be retroactive (E) holding that counsel must be appointed to indigents for purposes of appeal as announced in douglas v california 372 us 353 83 sct 814 9 led2d 811 to be retroactive
Output: (D)
the State violated the defendant’s" Fifth Amendment right by commenting on his failure to testify, “[w]e view the State’s argument from the jury’s standpoint and resolve any ambiguities in the language in favor of it being permissible argument.” Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). Here, the State Was reminding the jury about Nickerson's confession, not emphasizing his silence at trial. Because the language was not “manifestly intended or was of such a character'that the jury would necessarily "and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify,” we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Nickerson’s objection to the State’s statement. See id.; see also Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Further, the charge instructed the jury that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense (B) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (C) holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence (D) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify (E) holding that prosecutor did not comment on defendants failure to testify by referencing defendants written statement and pointing out what defendant did not say
Output: (E)
of the statute. Of course their interpretations differ. That is why they are in court. See Bank of America NT & SA v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461, 119 S.Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed.2d 607 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A mere disagreement among litigants over the meaning of a statute does not prove ambiguity; it usually means that one of the litigants is simply wrong.”). Whether a statute is ambiguous is a pure question of law to be determined by the courts, however, not by the parties or by an administrative agency. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 369, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) (finding that interpretation of statutory terms is a question of law and is therefore the court’s duty); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (<HOLDING>). Second, it is not unheard of for a court to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact (B) holding that pure questions of law that are discernible from the record are subject to de novo review (C) holding that district courts retain jurisdiction after iirira to decide habeas corpus challenges involving pure questions of law (D) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (E) holding that courts must decide pure questions of statutory construction
Output: (E)
on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); INA § 240(c) (7) (C) (ii). Regarding the “material” element of the exception, we have explained that an alien who attempts to show that evidence is material to his removal proceedings “bears a ‘heavy burden/ and must ‘present! ] evidence of such a nature that the [BIA] is satisfied that if proceedings before the [IJ] were reopened, with all attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.’ ” Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The instant motion is both time-and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia does not err by denying a motion to reopen without an opposition from the government (B) holding the bia did not err in denying aliens motion to stay voluntary departure period pending determination on the motion to reopen (C) holding that the bia did not err in putting the burden of proof to demonstrate grounds for granting a motion to reopen on the alien (D) holding that bia did not err in denying motion to reopen that was filed after expiration of aliens voluntary departure period because alien had failed to depart (E) holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment
Output: (C)
similar to his demeanor, could have impacted the weight the jury gave to his testimony. See Trial Tr. 725, ECF No. 355 (discussion at a bench conference where Morpho’s counsel complained that Dr. Denton was speaking for five to eight minutes in response to a single question to which the Court: (1) noted that it had previously commented on such problem; (2) opined that Smiths was getting the testimony it wanted but not “the way [Smiths] need[ed] it for [its] case”; and (3) warned Smiths that it was “going to lose the jury on the whole issue”). The Court does not suggest that Dr. Denton lacked credibility or that the jury was free to wholly disregard his largely unrebutted opinion on this issue. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983 (1931) (<HOLDING>). However, in this Court’s view, the fervid 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although the question of the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury alone such rule does not mean that the jury is at liberty under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt (B) recognizing the purpose of crossexamination is to enlighten the jury as to whether the witness actuallyas a matter of fact knows the general reputation of the defendant and to place the jury in a better position to pass upon the credibility of the witness testimony (C) recognizing that in any criminal trial the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is central (D) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
Output: (A)
as to their propriety. SECTIONS 8-11 AND 8-12 OF THE CITY’S ZONING CODE BEAR A SUBSTANTIAL RELATION TO A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE The City asserts that the ordinances in question are a valid exercise of the City’s police power because the ordinances seek to preserve the integrity of the residential areas and the unique aesthetic qualities of the City. Kuvin admits that a zoning ordinance may regulate or limit the use of property on behalf of the general welfare of its citizens and he recognizes that unless the City’s exercise of its police powers is clearly shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and without a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the ordinance must be upheld. See Fox v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 450 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>). Kuvin’s argument is that, while the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (C) holding that ordinance conferred unbridled discretion where issuance of permit was subject to broad findings that proposed use will not have a harmful effect upon the health or welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the aesthetic quality of the community or the surrounding land uses (D) holding that ordinance which generally promotes public welfare is unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to landowners property (E) holding that the burden of overcoming a zoning ordinances presumption of validity is satisfied when it is shown that the ordinance does not bear a substantial relation to the public health safety morals or general welfare
Output: (E)
recognizes that the rights of unborn children are protected from third-party actors, criminalizing murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and assault against an unborn child. Geiser, at ¶ 17; see also N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-17.1-02 to 12.1-17.1-06. Under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17.1, the legislature defined unborn child as, “ ‘the conceived but not yet born offspring of a human being, which, but for the action of the actor would beyond a reasonable doubt have subsequently been born alive.’ ” Geiser, at ¶ 17 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17.1-01(3)). Therefore, as stated in Geiser, “[t]his makes it clear that when the Legislature wants to cover unborn children, it does so expressly” and, if the legislature “intended N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2(l)(b) to include unborn (2005) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the definition of person in the hawaii manslaughter statute did not include a fetus and thus did not apply when a woman caused the death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine (B) holding that fetus was not a human being for purposes of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide and firstdegree reckless injury statutes (C) holding for purposes of establishing the offense of reckless manslaughter against a pregnant woman a fetus is not a person (D) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute (E) holding that a woman possessed immunity from criminal prosecution for causing injury or death to her fetus
Output: (C)
Amended Complaint. 4 . The District Court previously dismissed the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim by stipulation of the parties. 5 . In support of its contention that O’Connell intended to remain in Virginia, the NJTA notes that: (1) O’Connell's program was initially scheduled to end on June 11, 2011, but he remained in Virginia well into 2012; and (2) O’Connell updated his Linkedln profile in May 2011 to reflect a new job title for a position that was located in Virginia. We find this proffer falls well short of "clear and unequivocal” evidence that O’Connell intended to remain in Virginia. First, the reason O’Connell remained in Virginia past his originally scheduled end date was because he underwent treatment for thyroid cancer that required two s 5 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the references to O’Connell's 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 (B) holding that agency must examine  the relevant data and articulate  a satisfactory explanation for its action quoting state farm 463 us at 43 103 sct 2856alterations omitted (C) holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states (D) holding that in order to present a federal question a right or immunity created by the constitution or laws of the united states must be an element and an essential one of the plaintiffs cause of action quoting franchise tax bd v constr laborers vacation trust 463 us 1 1011 103 sct 2841 77 led2d 420 1983 (E) holding that in order to prevail under  1983 a plaintiff must show 1 that defendants deprived him or her of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the united states and 2 that in doing so defendants acted under color of state law internal quotation marks omitted
Output: (D)
withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1288 n. 4 (noting that a failure to establish eligibility for asylum on the merits necessarily entails ineligibility for withholding of removal and CAT relief). We deny Salazar-Hinca-pie’s petition for review. PETITION DENIED. 1 . In addition to Marta Dora Salazar-Hinca-pie, her husband, Oscar Antonio Yusty, and her children, Sara Yusty and Jose Ignacio Yusty, are also involved in this appeal. 2 . As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to consider several issues raised by Salazar-Hin-capie. As the BIA limited its ruling to the adverse credibility determination, her argument regarding internal relocation within Colombia is not properly before us. See Shkambi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 584 F.3d 1041, 1049 n. 5 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we must decide the petition on 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (B) holding appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review bia order affirming ijs denial of asylum because alien did not file petition for review within 30 days of bia order as required by 8 usc  1252b1 (C) holding that we will not review portions of an ijs ruling that are not adopted by the bia (D) holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted (E) holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte
Output: (C)
which resulted in severe bruising to her kidneys. Page also stole Chastain’s purse, which contained credit cards, identification, a cell phone, and twenty-five dollars. Page and Broadnax attempted to use the stolen credit cards at a shoe store in the mall and resisted officers when they arrived. Our review of the character of the offender reveals that Page was nineteen years old at the time of the offenses and had a pending charge of battery. Page pleaded guilty as charged, and the State promised not to file any additional or enhanced charges. After due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we cannot say that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 846 N.E.2d 723, 731 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Page’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants fortyfiveyear sentence for molesting his stepdaughter was not inappropriate (B) holding that the defendants sentence for robbery was not inappropriate (C) holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment (D) holding that circumstantial evidence that defendant drove the car and fled the scene after his brother committed robbery was insufficient to sustain defendants conviction absent other evidence of defendants intent to aid in the robbery (E) holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery
Output: (B)
collection agency’s argument that since it was not patty to original loan transaction, it could not be held liable for usury statutory penalties because '‘[otherwise, one who was not a party to the original loan transaction ... could attempt to collect usurious interest without fear of the penalties for usuty”); Davis v. Boling, 340 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that burden is on debtor to plead and prove that creditor has “notice or knowledge of the usury in the transaction” when "there is nothing to show upon the face of the note that it is a usurious contract” and there is nothing in record to show creditor "had any notice of any usury”); Hamor v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 74 S.W.2d 1035, 1038 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism’d) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Additionally, we note that the penalty 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that to recover statutory penalty for usury against assignee plaintiff must prove assignees knowledge or notice of usurious interest (B) holding that the penalty is applicable (C) holding that the right to pursue a statutory penalty for charging usurious interest was unassignable (D) holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent (E) holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute
Output: (A)
discretion. It is an abuse of discretion, however, to fail to award support from the date of the petition for modification where the need for the support and the ability of the former spouse to pay existed at the time that the modification petition was filed. Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So.2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citation omitted). In Beal v. Beal, 666 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award retroactive child support to the date that the petition for dissolution was filed. The Beal court explained that “the child’s needs and the [fa-therms ability to pay existed at the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution.” Beal, 666 So.2d at 1054. See also Campbell v. Campbell, 635 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(<HOLDING>); Brock v. Brock, 695 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification because the childs increased need for support and the former husbands ability to pay the increased child support existed at the time the former wifes petition for modification was filed (B) holding that the court could award child support without a showing of changed circumstances where the original divorce decree awarded child support to be set after a specified time upon petition to the court (C) holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees (D) holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 (E) holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to order child support retroactive to date of filing where there was no evidence that husband was unable to pay the ordered amount during that period of time
Output: (A)
of minority voters instead of a larger number of “influence districts” that would increase the likelihood of electing more of the group’s candidates of choice. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1155, 122 L.Ed.2d 500, 511 (1993). But the Cingles test—which is the current standard for Section 2 claims—suggests that a claim based on dilution of minority influence could not survive, because the first prong requires that a minority group be large enough to constitute a majority in a district. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Voinovich, supra, noting that if it were to assume that influence claims are actionable, “the first Cingles precondition ... would have to be modified or eliminated.” 507 U.S. at 158, 113 S.Ct. at 1157, 122 L.Ed.2d at 514 (<HOLDING>). The Court has left that question for another 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts need not reach both prongs of an ineffectiveassistance claim if the claim fails on one of them (B) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (C) holding that court need not reach question of influencedilution claim because complainant failed to prove gingless third requirement white bloc voting (D) holding that this court does not decide whether a petitioner must demonstrate that a trial court would have accepted the plea offer to prove prejudice because assuming such a requirement exists petitioner met the requirement (E) holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law
Output: (C)
that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) wrongfully found him statutorily ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Reviewing the record de novo and giving deference to the BIA’s permissible interpretations, see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999), we affirm for the following reasons: 1. Former § 212(c) limits eligibility for discretionary relief to “aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Where permanent residency status is obtained by false pretenses the “legally admitted for permanent resident” requirement of former § 212(c) is not met. See, e.g., Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, 58 Fed.Appx. 596, 2003 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that admission is not lawful if it is regular only in form the term lawfully denotes compliance with substantive legal requirements not mere procedural regularity (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that statement within expert report is not a judicial admission but is instead an admission by party (D) holding that it is not (E) holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law
Output: (A)
at 3801 Chestnut. Also found at the residence at the time of Jones’s arrest were three firearms: a semi-automatic .22 pistol loaded with a clip (seized from the dining-room floor), a loaded .357 revolver (seized from a bedroom), and a loaded .38 revolver (seized from the top of a china cabinet in the dining room). All these weapons were found near parts of the residence where drug distributions had occurred. Jones and his cohorts had ready access to these weapons, and even as the police were conducting their search of the residence various individuals seeking to purchase crack cocaine came to the front door with money in their hands. We find that the evidence is not insufficient to support Jones’s § 924(c) conviction. See United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 368 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Jones also challenges the sufficiency of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence is sufficient for  924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (B) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of  924c (C) holding sufficient to support conviction under  924c evidence of loaded firearm recovered from defendants room during execution of search warrant for drugs (D) holding that a large amount of drugs increases the likelihood of weapons (E) holding that where the record shows defendant was represented by counsel and the conviction is valid on its face the defendant is precluded from attempting to undermine the validity of that conviction by collateral attack
Output: (A)
Rodriguez-Vera argues that, because Revised Code of Washington § 9.41.170 includes antique firearms in its definition of firearms, his conviction under that statute does not categorically qualify as a firearm offense for purposes of being statuto rily ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(C) (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)). But Rodriguez-Vera failed to raise this argument before the BIA. Accordingly, Rodriguez-Vera failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, see Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>), and we lack jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a petitioner must specify which issues form the basis of the appeal (B) holding that the direction the governments appeal must take or whether it may appeal at all is to be governed by the substantial basis of the orders sought to be reviewed rather than their designation and form (C) holding that a petitioner must show  that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had counsel raised the issue (D) holding petitioner may not introduce on appeal issues that were not presented to or considered at the administrative level (E) holding that issues must be briefed to be preserved on appeal
Output: (A)
(Colo.2005). Third, the trial court confused the jury by providing the entire statutory definition of "prostitution by a child." None of these arguments was preserved below. 174 We decline to address defendant's unpreserved constitutional arguments for the same reasons given in Part III, supra. Because providing the statutory definition of "prostitution by a child" was appropriate and Madden does not require a different result, we discern no error in the trial court's instruction. 1. Standard of Review 175 When a defendant does not make a specific objection to tendered jury instructions, review is for plain error. People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 345 (Colo.2001). Plain error occurs only where an error is so "obvious and substantial" that it "undermined the fundament 69 P.2d 54, 62 (1962) (<HOLDING>), with Crawford, 191 Colo. at 507-08, 558 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge (B) holding that defendant must establish the application of the limitationexclusion to the plaintiffs claim where defendant did not contest the plaintiffs assertion that defendant bore the burden of proof in this case because the limitation on benefits for mental and nervous conditions is a coverage exclusion and the plan documents contained no express provision regarding burden of proof (C) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (D) holding that additional instructions were necessary when the statutory definition of the charged offense by itself suggested that the defendant bore the burden of proof (E) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence
Output: (D)
713.31. See Wells v. Halmac Dev., Inc., 189 So.3d 1015, 1016-22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the homeowner was not the prevailing party on the significant issues in this case, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the homeowner’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. We also affirm the award of costs to the contractor in the consolidated case (4D15-2588), because the contractor was adjudicated to be the prevailing party in the litigation. The Contractor’s Cross-Appeal On cross-appeal, the contractor challenges the trial court’s determination that its lien was fraudulent. We affirm, because competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of a fraudulent lien. See Delta Painting, 710 So.2d at 664 (<HOLDING>). “It is within the trial court’s discretion to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants assertions of workproduct were not supported by competent evidence (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process (D) holding that a trial courts finding of a fraudulent lien must be supported by competent evidence (E) holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence
Output: (D)
expressly authorized her daughter to sign the agreement. Under these circumstances, while the prior conduct of Doris Alexander may have authorized Carol Alexander to sign certain medical forms for her, “there is no evidence that [Doris Alexander], prior to or at her admission to the nursing home, gave [her daughter] express authority to enter into the [arbitration] agreement on her behalf.” McKean, supra at 509 (1) (a). See also Ashburn Health Care Center v. Poole, 286 Ga. App. 24, 26-27 (648 SE2d 430) (2007) (where no power of attorney, nursing home failed to establish that husband had actual authority to sign arbitration agreement on behalf of his wife upon her admission to nursing home); Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & Rehab. Center, 997 FSupp.2d 1318, 1324 (I) (B) (2) (N.D. Ga. 2014) (<HOLDING>). (b) Implied authority. We note that “Georgia 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a person signing an arbitration agreement using power of attorney is not a party to that agreement merely by virtue of having signed it (B) holding that the plain language of a healthcare power of attorney did not give daughter the right to sign away her mothers right to a jury trial (C) holding mother qualified as thirdparty beneficiary to daughter and soninlaws agreement incident to divorce because it provided for repayment to mother of a specific amount of money from the proceeds of the sale of the couples home (D) holding that trial court properly terminated fathers obligation to support his seventeenyearold daughter who refused to live with father but instead chose to reside in her own apartment after her mother moved out of state where daughter offered no justifiable reason for not living with her father daughter only contended that her stepmother was too neat for her and that she wanted to live closer to her friends (E) holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother
Output: (E)
found concealed in Holloway’s undergarments should not be suppressed, we REVERSE the district court’s order suppressing that evidence and REMAND this case for trial. 1 . Record on Appeal, vol. 3, at 4-6, United States v. Michael Anthony Holloway, No. 91-8044 (5th Cir. filed Apr. 11, 1991) ["Record on Appeal”]. 2 .A seizure may constitute an arrest or merely an investigatory detention, and there is no bright-line rule to distinguish one from the other. We have held that such a determination depends upon the "reasonableness” of the intrusion in light of all the facts. See United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 1962, 95 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987), describing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  where officer drew his gun ordered driver out of truck patted him down for weapons and detained him for fifteen minutes until dea agent arrived and suspects vehicle was then searched by dea agent  detention was an investigatory stop that required only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (B) holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention (C) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area (D) holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop (E) holding that officer may order driver out of vehicle once lawfully detained for traffic violation
Output: (A)
act or mandatory duty; and the requirements that the plaintiff establish a clear legal right, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and an absence of another adequate and appropriate remedy. See id. at 666 (citing Shaler Area Sch. Dist. v. Salakas, 494 Pa. 630, 636, 432 A.2d 165, 168 (1981)). The majority, however, found that Appellant failed to meet the last of these requirements (lack of a alternative remedy), because he had the ability to appeal an ultimate, adverse removal decision pursuant to the Local Agency Law. See id. at 666, 432 A.2d 165 (citing 2 Pa.C.S. § 752). In so holding, the court distinguished the present situation from others in which it had concluded that mandamus was proper, see, e.g., Burns v. Uniontown Area Sch. Dist., 748 A.2d 1263, 1270 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (<HOLDING>), on the basis that the suspension in this case 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that mandamus was proper where the school board was seeking removal for grounds not enumerated in section 1080 of the school code (B) holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials (C) holding that a county ordinance imposing an impact fee on new residential construction to be used for new school facilities did not constitute an unauthorized delegation of power from the county to the school board because the fundamental policy decisions were made by the county and the discretion of the school board was sufficiently limited (D) holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours (E) holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal
Output: (A)
the denial of a gift or gratuity if the states refused to waive their sovereign immunity. See id. Instead, in both Parden and College Savings Bank, Congress threatened a sanction: “exclusion of the State from otherwise permissible activity.” Id. Specifically, the federal statute in Parden required Alabama to waive its immunity or give up its ability to own and operate .a railroad in interstate commerce. In College Savings Bank, the TRCA required Florida to waive its immunity or give up its ability to engage in the business of advertising and selling a for-profit educational investment vehicle. The voluntariness of a waiver is destroyed “when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity.” Id.; see also Innes, 184 F.3d at 1284 (<HOLDING>). 3. Application of College Savings Bank 47 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court (B) holding that state waived its eleventh amendment immunity by filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings (C) holding that a plaintiff waived an argument that the defendant voluntarily waived its eleventh amendment immunity by removing the case from state to federal court by failing to raise it before the district court even though an intervening supreme court decision clarified the law in the plaintiffs favor (D) holding that a state university knowingly and voluntarily waived the states immunity by agreeing as a prerequisite to its participation in the perkins loan program to undertake certain enumerated actions in federal bankruptcy court in the event of a claim for discharge filed by the studentborrower (E) holding that when state voluntarily submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding the state waives its sovereign immunity
Output: (D)
County v. Skipper, supra, 329 Md. at 487 n. 4, 620 A.2d 880. See also Holiday Point Marina Partners v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 190, 210, 707 A.2d 829 (1998); Boulden v. Mayor & Comm’rs, 311 Md. 411, 415-17, 535 A.2d 477 (1988); Broadcast Equities, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 123 Md.App. 363, 393, 718 A.2d 648 (1998), vacated on unrelated grounds, 360 Md. 438, 758 A.2d 995 (2000). Yet, “[n]ot all conflicts between state public general and local law neatly fall within this ‘prohibit-permit’ principle. A local law may conflict with a state public general law in other respects and will, therefore, be preempted.” Coalition for Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, 333 Md. 359, 380 n. 39, 635 A.2d 412 (1994) (citing Montgomery County v. Bd. of Elections, 311 Md. 512, 536 A.2d 641 (1988) (<HOLDING>)); East v. Gilchrist, 296 Md. 368, 463 A.2d 285 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state (B) holding that conflict preemption existed when state law and local law provided two different and irreconcilable methods for appointing the same public officials (C) holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern (D) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (E) holding the existence of a possible conflict required remand for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and holding a new trial would be required if an actual conflict existed
Output: (B)