niryuu/sni-each-converted huggingface dataset:
v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.2007); Slaney v. The Int’l. Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir.2001). The question before the Court, however, is whether responses to affirmative defenses which allege fraudulent concealment must also be pleaded with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). The Seventh Circuit has yet to hold that such specificity in this context is required. What the Seventh Circuit has clearly held is that “a plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, in his complaint.” Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir.2003) (vacating and remanding lower court’s dismissal of a complaint); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in this case, Plaintiffs need not plead 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion (B) holding that a complaints failure to overcome affirmative defenses does not warrant dismissal (C) recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional (D) recognizing the existence of antagonistic defenses does not require severance unless defenses are actually irreconcilable (E) holding that affirmative defenses are waived if not pled
Output: (B)
that the IEPA's approval and involvement satisfied the NCP”). 232 . In other cases approving the concept that the involvement of a state environmental agency can fulfill the NCP’s public participation requirement, it appears there was substantial public input irrespective of the state agency's participation. See Sherwin-Williams, supra, 125 F.Supp.2d at 753 ("[A]s to the remedial actions taken ... it appears that [plaintiff], with the continuous involvement of [the state agency], assessed and investigated these areas, proposed alternative remedies, and provided opportunities for public comment through notices published in the Baltimore Sun (a local general circulation newspaper) prior to the initiation of the remedial actions”); American Color & Chemical, supra, 918 F.Supp. at 953-54 (<HOLDING>). 233 . The Eighth Circuit recently addressed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (B) holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy (C) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is  to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (D) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary (E) holding that there was a reasonable opportunity for meaningful public comment where the state agency involved issued a press release the remediation effort was reported in several articles plaintiff spoke informally to at least fifty residents concerning the initial investigation and report the remedial alternatives under consideration and the proposed remediation and residents removal preferences were taken into consideration in selecting the remediation method
Output: (E)
court was entirely foreseeable, bringing BPC before the bar of a Puerto Rico-based court in respect to litigation arising out of the financing agreement is neither unreasonable nor fundamentally unfair. It follows, therefore, as night follows day, that Puerto Rico’s long-arm statute reaches this dispute, and the lower court’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over BPC is both legally and constitutionally supportable. Having III. THE FINANCING AGREEMENTS We turn now to the main event — a series of questions involving the enforceability and interpretation of the financing agreements. In answering these questions, we look to th Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (<HOLDING>). A. Article 1425. We begin our expedition by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo (B) holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law (C) holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo (D) holding that courts of appeals must review the statelaw determinations of district courts de novo  (E) holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo
Output: (D)
to an in-state transaction, even if the claim did not “arise from” that transaction. See e.g., George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding there was jurisdiction over a Massachusetts resident for breach of an employment contract entered into in New York); Singer v. Walker, 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965) (sustaining jurisdiction because plaintiffs personal injury claim resulting from the use of a defective hammer arose from “the purposeful activities engaged in by [defendant]” in New York “in connection with the sale of its products in the New York market”). On the other hand, New York courts have also held that jurisdiction is not justified where the relationship between the claim and the transaction is too attenuated. See e.g., Talbot, 522 N.E.2d at 1027 (<HOLDING>); Ward, 829 N.E.2d at 1203 (concluding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that the nexus between a coachs defamation action and a former students pursuit of a college degree in new york was insufficient to support jurisdiction (C) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york
Output: (B)
1605(a)(7) coupled with the Executive Branch’s inherent constitutional authority in the area of foreign affairs provide more than enough guidance to the Secretary of State to make a finding of fact upon which the operation of § 1605(a)(7) partially depends. We hold that § 1605(a)(7) does not include an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the Executive Branch. B. Sufficiency of the Pleadings Sudan argues that appellees failed to plead the jurisdictional causation requirement; specifically, it argues appellees failed to plead sufficient facts to “reasonably support a finding” that Sudan’s mate rial support of al Qaeda in the early 1990s caused the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 94 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because “causation is indeed a jurisdictional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs allegations of abuse did not amount to the allegations of torture required by  1605a7 to survive a motion to dismiss (B) holding plaintiffs must provide particularized allegations as to why demand would be futile to survive a motion to dismiss conclusory allegations are not enough (C) recognizing inferential factual allegations to defeat a motion to dismiss (D) holding it appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss a discrimination claim where claim is not supported by factual allegations (E) holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant
Output: (A)
784 P.2d 717 (Ariz. App. 1989); Glencoe State Bank v. Cole, 265 Ill. App. 158 (1932); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. L & T Developers, Inc., 434 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1983); Home Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Depass, 340 S.E.2d 545 (S.C. 1986). We first note that each of the cases cited by plaintiffs involve construction lending rather than commercial lending which, while certainly not dispositive, may more easily permit monitoring through on-site inspections. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. L & T Developers, Inc., 434 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1983). Moreover, the existence of an implied duty on the part of a lender to a guarantor to monitor the borrower’s use of loan proceeds is far from universally recognized. See, e.g., Light v. Equitable Mortgage Resources, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. App. 1989) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Glencoe State Bank v. Cole, 265 Ill. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit (B) holding that federal express fee required by lender was a transaction imposed by the lender as incident to the extension of credit and needed to be disclosed within the finance charge (C) holding lender loses right to a premium when it elects to accelerate the debt and declining to allow lender to avoid the consequences of its choice of acceleration (D) holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full (E) holding that where lender undertook no duties for the benefit of guarantors lender owed guarantors no duty with regard to disbursement of construction loan proceeds to developer
Output: (E)
Count Twelve.) 6 . The Court notes that Gilbert's argument that he would be prejudiced by his inability to examine Troutman at a joint trial is without merit. The mere possibility of a co-defendant’s exculpatory testimony is an insufficient reason for severance. United States v. Studley, 892 F.2d 518, 525 (7th Cir.1989). A "mere possibility” of Troutman's testimony, however, is all Gilbert has presented as Trout-man may exercise her Fifth Amendment right not to testify even if Gilbert were tried separately. In addition, contrary to Gilbert’s argument (R. 109, Gilbert Reply at 25), he would not be allowed to ask the jury to draw inferences from Troutman's refusal to answer questions even if he were tried separately. See United States v. Mabrook, 301 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.2002) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that we have never found that it is permissible for a jury to make an inference from the invocation of a witnesss assertion of the fifth amendment (B) holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition (C) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights (E) holding adverse inference permissible in the face of defendants repeated invocation of fifth amendment privilege in discovery responses
Output: (A)
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”). And to the extent that some of the decisions were not final because proceedings were still pending, the district court would have had to exercise equitable restraint from hearing his claims under the Younger doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Improper Forum The Committee on Admissions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied Rodriguez’s application for bar admission before he filed his federal complaint. The proper forum for review of that decision was the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, not the federal district court. See D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 46(g) (providing for review of Committee decisions); see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (<HOLDING>). Preclusion We take judicial notice of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it (B) holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case (C) holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings (D) holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review  of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions (E) holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar
Output: (E)
the Department, subject to its developed guidelines, “to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation — ” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5). This Court held that [t]he Legislature has hot provided an exception for gifts placed in an inmate’s personal account, and it does not require the Department to account for the source of all funds in an inmate’s personal account before making deductions. The personal account of an inmate may be derived from various sources, including wages, gifts and government benefits. The source of funds is of no moment. Danysh v. Dep’t of Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (emphasis added), aff'd, 584 Pa. 122, 881 A.2d 1263 (2005). Moreover, althoug 552 A.2d 750 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because “Act 84 allows the Department 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff cannot assert a statutory claim for wages under the labor law if he has no enforceable contractual right to those wages (B) holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation (C) holding that a workfare participant is not an employee of a municipality for the purposes of workers compensation because participant neither received nor could have expected to receive remuneration or wages for the services that he performs (D) holding that inmate remuneration for prison labor does not constitute wages under section 8127 of the judicial code (E) holding that inmates have no constitutionally protected interest in the wages earned while in prison
Output: (D)
Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The evidence clearly demonstrated that McIntyre’s cognitive skills were not so impaired that he was prevented from premeditating or forming an intent to kill, and that his motor skills were not so impaired that the shooting was an accident. Accordingly, McIntyre has not demonstrated Strickland prejudice and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . The certificate of appealability ("COA'') granted by the district court stated the issue as follows: "Whether habeas relief is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) with respect to petitioner's claim that he received ineffective 999) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that coas should be construed liberally (B) holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed (C) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed (D) recognizing that umuim statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed (E) holding that under edenfield the act should be liberally construed
Output: (A)
no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added). The exclusive rights in the copyrighted work granted by the Act are reproduction; preparation of derivative works; distribution by sale, rental, lease or lending; public performance, in the case of motion pictures or audiovisual works; and public display of individual images from motion pictures or audiovisual works. 17 U.S.C. § 106. State laws, whether statutory or common law, are subject to express preemption under Copyright Act § 301 only if they create rights that are “equivalent” to the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see also Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); 1 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works (B) holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement (C) holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply (D) holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted (E) holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession
Output: (D)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship be waived her right to complain about Proctor’s involvement because she did not file her motion to disqualify in a timely manner. More specifically, Hendricks argues that the motion was untimely because Barker knew that Proctor represented him “some three years” before suit was filed. See Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 690 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“A party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely manner waives the complaint.”). Hehdricks did not preserve this point because he did not raise it in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. that she did not waive her complaint. See In re Hoar Constr., L.L.C., 256 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Hendricks’s second issue. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a tenmonth delay in filing a dismissal motion was reasonable (C) holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay (D) holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly rejecting a waiver argument where the motion to disqualify was filed after a threemonth delay
Output: (E)
no real purpose,” unnecessarily expends the “energy and time of courts and litigants,” and risks the introduction of potentially inflammatory, irrelevant evidence into the record. Id. The court also explained that once an employer concedes it is vicariously liable for any negligence of its employee, the employer becomes strictly liable to the plaintiff for damages attributable to the employee’s conduct, regardless of the percentage of fault as between the employer and the employee. Id. ¶25 Several state supreme courts have adopted the rule articulated in McHaffie, and numerous intermediate appellate courts and federal district courts in other jurisdic tions have applied the McHaffie rule as well. But see, e.g., James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 377 S.C. 628, 661 S.E.2d 329, 332 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Although this case presents an issue of first 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability for the conduct of its employee direct negligence claims become duplicative (B) holding that employees violation of his employers policy against drinking on the job does not preclude liability under respondeat superior (C) holding that a plaintiffs direct negligence claims against an employer are not precluded by the employers admission of respondeat superior liability (D) holding that employees defamatory statements made at work about matters relating to work were within the scope of their employment for purposes of respondeat superior and recognizing that californias respondeat superior doctrine imposes a broad rule of liability on employers (E) recognizing respondeat superior liability
Output: (C)
arbitration before AAA was barred because the plaintiffs had executed an arbitration agreement stating that all controversies would be determined by arbitration before the NASD, the NYSE, the AMEX, or any recognized arbitration facility provided by any exchange. Id. at 1119. Thus, the defendants argued that AAA was not a proper forum since AAA was not named as a forum in the arbitration agreement. Id. This Court held that the AMEX Window operates as a default provision in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties. Id. at 1120. Thus, this Court concluded that the AMEX Window was superseded by the arbitration agreement and that under the arbitration agreement, AAA was not an available arbitration forum. Id. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109 (2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action (B) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement (C) holding that an arbitration in accordance with aaa rules is a binding arbitration (D) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (E) holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision
Output: (D)
in abatement based on disqualification propter affectum to challenge grand juror bias is not possible because grand jurors may in fact be biased; there is no right to an unbiased grand jury and therefore no proper means for challenging such. See Garnett v. State, 10 Ga. App. 109 (1) (72 SE 951) (1911) (explaining that the grand jury is merely a court of inquiry and the disqualification of a grand juror cannot be achieved by plea bias is proper. Furthermore, to the extent that pre-indictment motions do not qualify as “pretrial motions” under OCGA § 17-7-110, they wouldstill be proper because they were filed before the indictment was issued. We have recognized that if any propter affectum challenge exists at all, it must be made before the indictment is issued. Bitting, 165 Ga. at 63, 64 (<HOLDING>); Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347 (3) (16 SE 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it may be appropriate in a particular case to challenge grand juror bias (B) holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose (C) holding that a challenge propter affectum was not a good ground for a plea to abate the accusation but noting that it is proper for the court to hear challenges to grand jurors based on bias and partiality in advance of the grand jurys action (D) holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court (E) holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury
Output: (C)
102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975)). 29 . 539 U.S. at 120, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (emphasis in original). 30 . id. 31 . See Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010). 32 . 768 P.2d at 455-56 ("[T]he federal rules on standing ... are not binding on state courts, and the article III constitutional restrictions and federalistic prudential considerations that have guided the evolution of federal court standing law are not necessarily relevant to the development of the standing rules that apply to Utah’s state courts.”) 33 . See id. at 456-57 (remarking on the "rather narrow standing doctrines developed by the federal courts” and quoting the Suprem 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 43 .See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the application of overbreadth doctrine to state laws and explaining that because first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity (B) holding that a claim under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine will not succeed unless  the challenged statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the court (C) holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the challenged statute against him is actual or imminent and quoting prime media v city of brentwood 485 f3d 343 350 6th cir 2007 because overbreadth creates an exception only to the prudential standing inquiry the supreme court has made clear that the injury in fact requirement still applies to overbreadth claims under the first amendment (D) recognizing in criminal case exception to standing rules where statute involving first amendment freedoms is challenged on vagueness grounds (E) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case
Output: (A)
of the crime” -without being “present at the commission of the offense.” Tolley v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 341, 348, 218 S.E.2d 550, 555 (1975). Plainly, it is possible to incite, advise, or abet in the commission of a crime without at the same time having agreed to commit such crime. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[a]iding, abetting, and counseling are not terms which presuppose the existence of an agreement. Those terms have a broader application, making the defendant a principal when he consciously shares in a criminal act, regardless of the existence of a conspiracy.” Pereira, 347 U.S. at 11, 74 S.Ct. at 364. Thus, murder, even when committed as an accessory before the fact, does not require proof of an agreement. See also Ramsey, 2 Va.App. at 272, 343 S.E.2d at 470 (<HOLDING>). Because the charged murder and conspiracy 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense (B) holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense (C) holding that for facilitation of a felony the state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing the specified felony (D) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (E) holding that proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not a necessary element in a conviction for the commission of the felony
Output: (E)
back their severance benefits before filing their ADEA claims, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ previously executed waiver of all claims against Allied. D. Summary Judgment on Counterclaims Defendants have appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their counterclaims arguing that the court denied Defendants both adequate notice and an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, as required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Circuit Rule 50. Specifically, Defendants complain that the court failed to afford Defendants the full ten days notice on Plaintiffs’ motion, as required by Rules 56(c) and 50. In response, we observe that such objections must be raised before the trial court or they are forever waived. See Tripp v. May, 189 F.2d 198, 199-200 (7th Cir.1951) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Alied waived its chance to appeal these 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a litigant waives any violations of rule 56cs ten day requirement if he fails first to object before the trial court (B) holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error (C) holding that defendant forfeits right to have issue considered on appeal when he fails to object to misconduct at trial (D) holding that litigant must object at trial to preserve error for review (E) holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day
Output: (A)
had concealed valuable jewelry. See In re Alvarez, No. 10-45709, 2011 WL 5593176 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. Oct. 25, 2011). In response, the debtor moved to convert the case to a case under Chapter 13. The court in Alvarez denied the debtor’s motion to convert, finding that the debtor had made misleading statements in an effort to defraud creditors. Mercado and Alvarez provide useful examples of the kind of conduct that will result in the denial of a motion to convert. The Court is looking for proof of a materially false statement made with the purpose of defrauding creditors. 2. The Burden of Proof It is well established that when a debtor seeks to confirm her Chapter 13 Plan, the burden is on her to prove her good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3); In re Smith, 328 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Kearney, 439 B.R. 694, 697-98 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint (B) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (C) holding claimant has burden of demonstrating a good faith work search (D) holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith (E) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law
Output: (D)
Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The appellant asserts that the Court should find that the Secretary’s interpretation of section 1117 that veterans who served in Afghanistan are not eligible for the service-connection presumptions afforded in it is arbitrary and capricious because the agency did not consider all relevant factors, including the purposes for which section 1117 was originally promulgated and the fact that VA and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) have both recognized that veterans who served in Afghanistan face “many if not all” of the same exposures faced by veterans who served in the other countries included in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. App. Br. at 13-17 (citing Marlow v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 146, 151 (1993) (<HOLDING>)(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable (B) holding that a court reviewing an informal adjudication must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment (C) holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment (D) holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable (E) holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious
Output: (C)
maritime law [D.E. 21 at 5-8]. The Court has already determined that Plaintiffs claims against Norwegian fall within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, as Plaintiff has conceded [D.E. 23 at 7-9]. Torts committed within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction are governed by maritime law. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generole Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against Norwegian must be based on maritime law; and to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a negligence claim against Norwegian based on premises liability or any other theory of negligence under Florida law, this claim must be dismissed. See, e.g., Stewart-Patterson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 12-20902-CIV, 2012 WL 2979032, at *2 (S.D.Fla. July 20, 2012) (<HOLDING>). To state a negligence claim under maritime 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonpecuniary damages created under florida law were available in an admiralty action (B) holding claim is not cognizable (C) holding claim is cognizable (D) recognizing that the seventh amendment applies to admiralty claim that is cognizable at law (E) holding that a claim based on a cruise lines negligent mode of operation under florida law is not cognizable under federal admiralty law
Output: (E)
or otherwise resolved and are not at issue in this appeal. 2 . We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and throughout this opinion, unless otherwise noted. 3 . In light of this holding, we need not address the parties’ arguments concerning the district court’s additional grounds for granting DirecTV’s motion, that the phone calls were not "in or affecting commerce.” 4 . In its reply brief, Exclaim argues DirecTV did not satisfy this burden because it demonstrated total profits, while the statute should be inteipreted to require a plaintiff to show profits relating to the infringing activity. Because that argument is raised for the first time in the reply brief, we do not consider it. See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue first argued in a reply brief is not properly before a court of appeals (B) holding issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court (C) holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived (D) holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief (E) holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief
Output: (A)
on § 101 ineligibility). Joining the fray, I turn to the first step in the inquiry: is the ’731 patent directed to an abstract idea? Claim 1 of the ’731, which is representative of the asserted claims, is directed to the receipt, storage, and processing of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in a broadly defined computing environment, and to specific types of processing performed in that environment. See ’731 patent at col. 20:25-60. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the receipt, storage, and processing of ESI are abstract concepts. Indeed, the Federal Circuit held in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014), that claims drawn to similarly generic computing functions were directed to abstract ideas. Id. at 1348 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues, however, that the asserted 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court should not have prevented expert from testifying as to his opinion that had echocardiogram been performed it would have shown cardiac tamponade to require testimony based only on tests actually performed would eviscerate the evidence necessary in failuretodiagnose cases (B) holding that data collection recognition and storage were wellknown concepts that humans have always performed (C) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed (D) holding that statement were the low cost commercial collection experts was puffery because any implication that services were superior to that of the competition was merely general in nature (E) holding that claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct which were based on facts in the record could have and should have been raised on direct appeal and were thus not cognizable in postconviction proceedings
Output: (B)
as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland’s decision. Vickers’ retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland’s decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers’ refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers’ Title VII claims draw 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment
Output: (C)
met where kayakers fell overboard and a rescue mission was attempted, because the “efficacy of search-and-rescue operations has a direct effect on the health and lives of seamen”). The second prong, which we have interpreted broadly, likewise is easily met. In Gruver, 489 F.3d at 984-86, for instance, a seaman was assaulted by a former maritime employer while the seaman slept in his ship, docked at a pier. The origin of the dispute lay in allegedly unpaid wages by the former employer. Id. We held that the lens through which to examine the relevant activity was the underlying wage dispute; because that dispute concerned maritime wages, the second prong was met. Id.; see also Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC v. Colombo (In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC), 570 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The activity here, whether characterized as a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the locality requirement for admiralty jurisdiction was met only to the extent that the claims arose from exposures that occurred on navigable waters (B) holding that a jetski injury met the second prong because the activity in question  operating a vessel in navigable waters  has a maritime connection (C) holding that federal maritime law and not state law applies to all actions for wrongful death in navigable state waters (D) holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters (E) holding that platform workers death caused by an explosion on a platform bore no significant relation to maritime law even though the death occurred while the worker was located on a vessel in navigable waters
Output: (B)
is progressing in functional math, and is interacting socially with staff and peers in ways she never demonstrated at Sharpe.” Id. at 27. Ms. Mattson’s testimony assesses Sharpe only in comparison to Kennedy. The EHA, however, requires the District to provide Ann Marie with an appropriate education, not the best education possible. See Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3047, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (“[T]o require ... the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential is, we think, further than Congress intended to go.”). As we have noted, however, “the [EHA] simply does not place the comparative question before the court.” Knight by Knight v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1025, 1030 (D.C.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In granting the temporary restraining order 
 Holding statements: (A) holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds (B) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (C) holding that the district court erred in not making an inequitable conduct determination prior to ruling on the exceptional case issue (D) holding the trial court erred in not charging the jury that a defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense of comparative negligence (E) holding that the district court erred in overturning on comparative grounds the hearing officers noncomparative determination that the public school was an appropriate placement
Output: (E)
a limited right in the secured creditor to the sale proceeds of the licenses. Id. at 380. Her decision not to recognize even such a circumscribed right, therefore, was based upon an implicit assumption — and in the bankruptcy court’s view, an erroneous one — that broadcasting licenses do not qualify as property of the estate. Id. We decline to adopt the rationale of Ridgely for two reasons. First, contrary to Ridgely’s interpretation, Judge Crabb did not reject the notion that a broadcasting license may fall within the broad range of assets that qualify as property of the estate. Indeed, she expressly assumed that it did constitute property of the estate. See 138 B.R. at 576 (citing In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 114 B.R. 865 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 124 B.R. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest (B) holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property (C) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (D) holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate (E) holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest
Output: (D)
participate in the sex-offender treatment program violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-inerimi-nation. Id. at 792. .The supreme court disagreed and held that delaying Morrow’s supervised release date was not a sufficient “compulsion” to implicate the Fifth Amendment. Id. Fo-cussing on the “nature of the compulsion,” the supreme court concluded: Morrow had a choice between treatment and confinement for a larger portion of his sentence, and that choice does not rise to the level of compulsion necessary in order to constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. Id. (quotation omitted). The court went on to explain an “important distinction” exists between being released from prison earlier than the time ordered in one’s sentence and losing one’s freedom when one is (1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude the trial court violated 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (B) recognizing that  ejquity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution solely to prevent such a prosecution  (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal (E) holding a probationer cannot be forced to incriminate himself without first receiving immunity from criminal prosecution as a result thereof
Output: (E)
of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor---However, if a person commits an interference with official acts, as defined in this subsection, and in so doing inflicts bodily injury other than serious injury, that person commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 719.1(1). Because an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law carries the possibility of a two-year prison sentence, see Iowa Code § 903.1(2), it qualifies as a “prior felony conviction” for purposes of § 4B1.1, see USSG § 4B1.2, comment, (n.1). See United States v. Postley, 449 F.3d 831, 832 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To convict Malloy under section 719.1(1), a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg  4a12c (B) holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony (C) holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law (D) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
Output: (A)